Ius Gentium

Important

Please read this disclaimer. This is not an official version of the trial judgment.

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

TRIAL CHAMBER II
Before: Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding Judge
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde

Registrar: Binta Mansaray

Date 18 May 2012

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T
PROSECUTOR v. Charles Ghankay TAYLOR

JUDGEMENT


Office of the Prosecutor:
Brenda J. Hollis
Nicholas Koumjian
Mohamed Bangura
Kathryn Howarth
Leigh Lawrie
Ruth Mary Hackler
Ula Nathai-Lutchman
Nathan Quick
Maja Dimitrova
James Pace

Defence Counsel for Charles G. Taylor:
Courtenay Griffiths, QC.
Terry Munyard
Morris Anyah
Silas Chekera
James Supuwood
Logan Hambrick


CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION (page 1)
A. THE ACCUSED (page 2)
B. SUMMARY OF THE CHARGES (page 5)
C. SUMMARY OF THE DEFENCE CASE (page 7)
II. CONTEXT (page 10)
A. ORIGINS OF THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR ................................................................... 11
1. SIERRA LEONE AND THE RISE OF PAN-AFRICANISM ...................................................... 1 1
2. TRAINING OF DISSIDENT REVOLUTIONARIES IN LIBYA .................................................. 12
3. FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT AND TRAINING IN LIBERIA
(1989-1990) ............................................................................................................... 13
4. INSURGENCY INTO SIERRA LEONE (1991-1992) ............................................................ 14
B. CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA LEONE (1991-1996) .................................................................... 15
1.1991-1992 ..................................................................................................................... 15
2.1993-1995 ..................................................................................................................... 18
3. ELECTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE AND "OPERATION STOP ELECTION" (1996-1997) ........... 20
C. AFRC/RUF JUNTA PERIOD (1997-1998) ....................................................................... 22
1. AFRC COUP .................................................................................................................. 22
2. ECOMOG INTERVENTION (1998-1999) ....................................................................... 25
D. CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA LEONE (1998-1999) .................................................................... 27
E. CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA LEONE (1999-2002) .................................................................... 30
1. FREETOWN ATTACK ...................................................................................................... 30
2. LOME PEACE ACCORD AND DISARMAMENT (1999) ....................................................... 31
3. RUF CAPTURE OF UNAMSIL PEACEKEEPERS AND APPOINTMENT OF ISSA SESAY AS
INTERIM LEADER (2000) ............................................................................................. 33
4. ABUIA PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE END OF THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR (2000-
2002) ............................................. I ............................................................................. 35
III. PRELIMINARY ISSUES (page 36)
A. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION ............................................................................................... 36
B. EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE INDICTMENT AND/OR JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT ............................................................................................................................ 40
C. ISSUES RELATING TO THE PLEADING IN THE INDICTMENT .............................................. 49
D. PREIUDICIAL DELAY IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER'S RULING ON THE DEFENCE’S
CHALLENGE TO THE PLEADING OF THE JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AS A MODE OF
LIABILITY ....................................................................................................................... 57
FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................... 59
E. DISCRETIONARY PAYMENTS AND OTHER INDUCEMENTS TO WITNESSES BY THE
PROSECUTION ................................................................................................................. 60
P. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE ............................................................................................ 60
IV.
B. EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE (page 63)
A. LAW APPLICABLE TO THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE ................................................... 63
1. BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF .............................................................................. 63
2. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE .............................................................................................. 64
B. FORMS OF EVIDENCE UNDER REVIEW ............................................................................ 64
1. WITNESS TESTIMONY .................................................................................................... 64
2. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ............................................................................................ 75
3. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND REPORTS ............................................................................... 79
4. FACTS OF WHICH JUDICIAL NOTICE WAS TAKEN ........................................................... 80
5. AGREED FACTS ............................................................................................................. 80
C. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT OF SPECIFIC WITNESSES ....................................................... 80
D. AUTHENTICITY ASSESSMENT OF SPECIFIC DDCUMENTS ............................................... 137
V.
V. APPLICABLE LAW (page 144) ....................................................................................................... 144
A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 144
B. SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES ............................................................................. 145
1. COUNT 1: ACTS OF TERRORISM (ARTICLE 3(D) OF THE STATUTE) ............................... 145
2. COUNTS 2 AND 3: UNLAWFUL KILLINGS (ARTICLES 2(A) AND 3(A) OF THE STATUTE) 148
3. COUNTS 4, 5 AND 6; SEXUAL VIOLENCE (ARTICLES 2(G) AND 3(E) OF THE STATUTE). 149
4. COUNTS 7 AND 8: CRIMES RELATING TO PHYSICAL VIOLENCE (ARTICLES 3(A) AND
2(I) OF THE STATUTE) ............................................................................................... 157
5. COUNT 9: CRIMES RELATING TO CHILD SOLDIERS (ARTICLE 4(C) OF THE STATUTE) .. 159
6. COUNT 10: ABDUCTIDNS AND FORCED LABOUR (ARTICLE 2 (C) OF THE STATUTE) .... 162
7. COUNT 11: PILLAGE (ARTICLE 3(E) OF THE STATUTE) ................................................ 163
C. LAW ON INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ......................................................... 164
1. RESPONSIBILITY PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 6(1) OF THE STATUTE .................................. 164
2. RESPONSIBILITY PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 6(3) OF THE STATUTE .................................. 175

VI. LAW AND FINDINGS ON THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS(page 181)
A. ARTICLE 2: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY .................................................................... 181
B. ARTICLE 3: WAR CRIMES ............................................................................................. 198
C. ARTICLE 4: OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF [NTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW .. 203

VII. FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS ON ALLEGED CRIMES (page 204)
A. COUNTS 2 AND 3 (MURDER OR "UNLAWFUL KILLINGS") ............................................. 205
1. ALLEGED UNLAWFUL KILLINGS IN KENEMA DISTRICT (25 MAY 1997 TO ABOUT 31
MARCH 1998) ........................................................................................................... 207
2. ALLEGED UNLAWFUL KILLINGS IN KONO DISTRICT (BETWEEN ABOUT 1 FEBRUARY
1998 AND 31 DECEMBER 1998) ................................................................................ 236
3. ALLEGED UNLAWFUL KILLINGS IN KAILAHUN DISTRICT (BETWEEN ABOUT 1
FEBRUARY 1998 AND ABOUT 30 JUNE 1998) ............................................................ 282
4. ALLEGED UNLAWFUL KILLINGS IN FREETOWN AND THE WESTERN AREA (BETWEEN
ABOUT 21 DECEMBER 1998 AND ABOUT 28 FEBRUARY 1999) .................................. 291
B. COUNTS 4, 5 AND 6 (SEXUAL VIOLENCE) ..................................................................... 338
1. COUNT 4 (RAPE) .......................................................................................................... 339
2. COUNT 5 (SEXUAL SLAvERY) ...................................................................................... 384
3. COUNT 6 (OUTRAGES UPON PERSONAL DIGNITY) ....................................................... 438
C. COUNTS 7 AND 8 (PHYSICAL VIOLENCE) ...................................................................... 444
1. KONO DISTRICT (1 FEBRUARY 1998 TO 31 DECEMBER 1998) ..................................... 445
2. KAILAHUN DISTRICT (30 NOVEMBER 1996 TO 18 JANUARY 2002) ............................. 451
3. FREETOWN AND THE WESTERN AREA (21 DECEMBER 1998 TO 28 FEBRUARY 1999).. 457
D. COUNT 9 (CHILD SOLDIERS) ......................................................................................... 486
1. FINDING ON THE AFRC AND RUF AS ARMED GROUPS ............................................... 488
2. CONSCRIPTION AND ENLISTMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS ............................................... 488
3. USING CHILDREN TO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN HOSTILITIES .................................... 517
E. COUNT 10 (ENSLAVEMENT) .......................................................................................... 572
1. KENEMA DISTRICT ...................................................................................................... 573
2. KONO DISTRICT ........................................................................................................... 587
3. KAILAHUN DISTRICT ................................................................................................... 618
4. OTHER LOCATIONS ...................................................................................................... 640
5. FREETOWN AND THE WESTERN AREA ......................................................................... 643
F. COUNT 11 (PILLAGE) .................................................................................................... 652
1. KONO DISTRICT ........................................................................................................... 653
2. BOMBALI DISTRICT ..................................................................................................... 659
3. PORT LOKO DISTRICT .................................................................................................. 661
4. FREETOWN AND THE WESTERN AREA ......................................................................... 663
G. COUNT 1 (ACTS OF TERRORISM) ................................................................................... 677
1. PRIMARY PURPOSE OF CERTAIN ACTS OF VIOLENCE ..................................................... 677
2. KENEMA DISTRICT ...................................................................................................... 681
3. KONO DISTRICT ........................................................................................................... 681
4. KAILAHUN DISTRICT ................................................................................................... 700
5. FREETOWN AND THE WESTERN AREA ......................................................................... 702

VIII. FACTUAL FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF THE ACCUSED (page 741)
A. PRE-INDTCTMENT PERIOD (1988 TO 1996) .................................................................... 741
1. ALLEGED MEETING IN LIBYA AROUND 1989 ................................................................ 741
2. ALLEGED MEETING BETWEEN THE ACCUSED, SANKOH AND DR MANNEH IN BURKINA
FASO ......................................................................................................................... 752
3. CAMP NAAMA ............................................................................................................. 759
4. THE INVASION OF SIERRA LEONE ................................................................................ 786
5. ATTACK ON KONO (NOVEMBER 1992 TO JANUARY 1993) .......................................... 809
6. ALLEGED RUF ASSISTANCE TO FIGHT ULIMO IN LIBERIA ........................................ 831
7. ALLEGED SUPPLY OF MATERIEL TO THE RUF FROM GUINEA DURING ULIMO
OCCUPATION ............................................................................................................ 837
8. SIERRA RUTILE ............................................................................................................ 840
9. OPERATION STOP ELECTION (1996) ............................................................................ 851
B. THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES ..................................................................................... 872
1. BENJAMIN YEATEN ..................................................................................................... 872
2. DANIEL TAMBA (A.K.A. JUNGLE) ................................................................................. 892
3. IBRAHIM BAH .............................................................................................................. 925
C. MILITARY OPERATIONS ...................... ) .......................................................................... 941
1. ALLEGED MESSAGE FROM BASE 1 TO TROOPS RETREATING FROM KONO ................... 941
2. OPERATIONS IN KONO (EARLY 1998) .......................................................................... 946
3. OPERATION FITTI-FATTA ............................................................................................ 983
4. THE FREETOWN INVASION ......................................................................................... 1016
D. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ............................................................................................. 1263
1. COMMUNICATIONS .................................................................................................... 1263
2. SUPPORT AND TRAINING ........................................................................................... 1350
3. ALLEGED PROVISION OF SAFE HAVEN ...................................................................... 1426
4. PROVISION OF RUF GUESTHOUSE IN MONROVIA ...................................................... 1440
E. PROVISION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ......................................................................... 1467
1. ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO THE RED LION BATTALION ............................................ 1467
2. SCORPION UNIT ......................................................................................................... 1512
3. REPATRIATION OF SIERRA LEONEANS ....................................................................... 1542
4. ALLEGED COOPERATION IN THE RETURN OF DESERTERS TO SIERRA LEONE ............. 1569
F. ARMS AND AMMUNITION ............................................................................................ 1583
1. PRELIMINARY ISSUES ................................................................................................ 1585
2. ALLEGATIONS OF DIRECT SUPPLY BY THE ACCUSED ................................................ 1648
3. ALLEGATIONS THAT THE ACCUSED FACILITATED SUPPLIES ...................................... 1794
4. USE OF MATERIEL SUPPLIED OR FACILITATED BY THE ACCUSED .............................. 1902
5. OTHER SOURCES OF MATERIEL ................................................................................. 1978
G. DIAMONDS .................................................................................................................. 2015
1. ALLEGED DELIVERY OF DIAMONDS TO THE ACCUSED .............................................. 2015
2. ALLEGED FACILITATION OF DIAMOND TRADING BY THE ACCUSED .......................... 2106
3. PROVISION OF MINING EQUIPMENT AND MINING EXPERTS ....................................... 2124
H. PEACE PROCESS .......................................................................................................... 2142
1. EXTERNAL DELEGATION IN COTE D’IVOIRE .............................................................. 2142
2. ABIDJAN .................................................................................................................... 2158
3. LOME ......................................................................................................................... 2171
4. RELEASE OF UN PEACEKEEPERS (1999) .................................................................... 2187
5. RELEASE OF UNAMSIL PEACEKEEPERS (2000) ....................................................... 2208
6. COMMUNICATIONS WITH ISSA SESAY ON DISARMAMENT ......................................... 2235
I. LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND STRUCTURE .................................................................. 2252
1. ACCUSED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RUF/AFRC ...................................................... 2252
2. ANALYSIS OF THE RUF/AFRC ALLIANCE ................................................................. 2351
J. THE WAR STRATEGY OF THE RUF/AFRC .................................................................. 2371
K. KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCUSED .................................................................................. 2374

IX. LEGAL FINDINGS ON RESPONSIBLITY (page 2405)
A. ARTICLE 6.1 OF THE STATUTE .................................................................................... 2405
1. JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE .................................................................................... 2405
2. AIDING AND ABETTING ............................................................................................. 2410
3. PLANNING ................................................................................................................. 2424
4. INSTIGATING .............................................................................................................. 2429
5. ORDERING ................................................................................................................. 2429
B. ARTICLE 6.3 OF THE STATUTE .................................................................................... 2429
1. SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY ........................................................................................ 2429
X. CUMULATIVE AND CONCURRENT CONVICTIONS (page 2433)
A. CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS ....................................................................................... 2433
1. CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES... 2433
B. CONCURRENT CONVICTIONS ...................................................................................... 2435
XI. DISPOSITION (page 2437)
XII. ANNEX A: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (page 2441)
XIII. PROCEDURAL HISTORY (page 2446)
A. INDICTMENT, AKREST, AND INITIAL APPEARANCE ..................................................... 2446
1. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION ................................... 2447
2. PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................................... 2448
3. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................................. 2452
4. PROSECUTION CASE .................................................................................................. 2455
5. DEFENCE CASE .......................................................................................................... 2462
6. FINAL JUDGEMENT .................................................................................................... 2472
XIV. ANNEX C: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (page 247)
1. JUDGEMENTS AND DECISIONS ................................................................................... 2473
2. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS ....................................................................... 2489
3. SECONDARY SOURCES ............................................................................................... 2491
XV. ANNEX D - MAPS OF SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA ................................... 2492

I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Special Court for Sierra Leone ("Special Court" or "Court") was established to
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since
30 November 1996.l It is an international courtz established under an Agreement between
the United Nations3 and the Government of Sierra Leone ("Agreement"),4 and independent
from the domestic legal system of Sierra Leone. The Statute of the Special Court
("Statute")5 empowers the Court to prosecute persons who committed crimes against
humanity, serious violations of Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims and of Additional Protocol 11, other serious violations of
international humanitarian law and speciiied crimes under Sierra Leonean law.° The Special
Court is governed by the Agreement, the Statute and by its Rules of Procedure and Evidence
("Rules").7
2. This Judgement is rendered by Trial Chamber 11 of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone,8 pursuant to the mandate granted to the Special Court by the United Nations and the
Republic of Sierra Leone and in accordance with Article 18 of the Statute and Rule 88 of the
Rules.
1 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 1(1) ("Statute").
2 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-059, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004. para.
57.
X Authorised pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000, UN
Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
4 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002.
5 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the Agreement.
6 Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute.
7 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("Rules").
8 Composed of Justice Teresa Doherty (Northern Ireland), appointed by the Secretary General of the United
Nations; Justice Richard Lussick (Samoa), appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone; Justice Julia Sebutinde
(Uganda), appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations; Justice El Hadji Malick Sow (Senegal)
appointed as Alternate Judge by the Secretary General of the United Nations and by the Government of Sierra
Leone.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X (3469 18 May 2012

3%,014 1+
A. THE ACCUSED
3. The Accused, Charles Ghankay Taylor,9 was born on 28 January 1948 in Arthington
in the Republic of Liberia. Taylor was the third eldest of eleven children and by his own
testimony came from a ‘humble’ background.IO
4. Taylor completed his high school studies to become a teacher in 1967, and went on
to become an accountant.II ln 1972, he went to the United States and graduated with an
associate degree in accounting in May 1974 from Chamberlayne Junior College in Boston,
Massachusetts. ln 1976, he graduated with a BSc degree in economics with specialisation in
development from Bentley College in Waltham, Massachusetts.I2
5. When Taylor arrived in the United States in 1972, he, along with others, rounded the
Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas ("ULAA") with the aimto bring about
peace, as well as political and democratic changes, in Liberia. ln 1979, Taylor became
chairman of ULAA. I3
6. ln that capacity Taylor visited Liberia in January 1980.I4 During that visit, in April
1980, Samuel Doe successfully staged a coup d’etat to become the President of Liberia.
Taylor joined Doe's government as a Director General of the General Services
Administration and Deputy Minister of Commerce until he fled to the United States in late
1983 following embezzlement allegations by the Doe Government.I5 Taylor was arrested in
9 The Accused is also known as "Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor" and "Dankpannah Charles
Ghankay Macarthur Taylor" and has operated under the alias "Jean-Michel Some" (see Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 9 November 2009, p. 31427; Transcript 1 December 2009, p. 32697). "Dankpannah" is a traditional
title given to the most senior chief in Liberia who serves as the chairman of the chiefs and elders and as the
"father of the land", see Defence Exhibit D-421, Affidavit of Chief Jalloh Loon. This title has been spelled in a
variety of ways, such as "Dah Kpannah" (Exhibit D-421), "DahlSCSL-03-01-T-292,) or "Dankpannah".
I0 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24354-24356, 24361.
II Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24368, 24372-24374.
I2 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24374-24379; Exhibit P-031, "Report for the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006",
p. 2. Mr Taylor received honorary doctorate degrees from the University of China and University of Liberia see
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24355.
I3 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24385-24387; Exhibit P-031, "Report for the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006",
p. 2.
I4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24423-24424.
I5 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, pp. 24467-24468, 24489-24491. 24501-24502; Exhibit
P-031, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone, Stephen
Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 2.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 2

32; was
June 1984 in the United States pursuant to an extradition request on the Liberian
embezzlement charges by Liberia.l° He was detained on remand pending extradition in
Plymouth County House of Correction in Massachusetts, and was able to escape in
November 1985.17
7. Following his escape from prison in the United States Taylor travelled back to West
Afiica and in 1986 foiined an arined opposition group in Cote d’Ivoire, the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia ("NPFL").l8 The NPFL received military training in Libya in
1987.19 Following the training in Libya, Taylor retumed to West Afiica in order to plan his
insurgency and incursion into Liberia. 1n December 1989, Taylor led the NPFL insurgency
into Liberia from Cote d’1voire and a civil war ensued. Taylor established the National
Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government ("NPRAG") in the NPFL held territories,
which he headed.2O He remained the leader of the NPFL throughout the Liberian civil war
until its official end in 1996, following the peace agreement amending and supplementing
the Cotonou Accord, the Akosombo Agreement and its Accra Clarification, commonly
referred to as the Abuja Peace Accord.2l
8. As part of the peace process, Taylor, along with all the waning factional leaders,
formed and became a member of the interim govemment known as the Council of State.22
Taylor resigned from the Council of State in January 1997 in order to be eligible to stand as
a candidate for the 1997 general election.23 He won the election,24 which was declared "free
and fair" by governmental organisations and intemational observers,25 to become the 21st
16 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, p. 24508; Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 3.
17 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, p. 24509; Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 3.
lg Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, pp. 24534-2453 5.
19 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, pp. 24539, 24553-24554.
20 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 July 2009, p. 24690-24691; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 18 January
2008, p. 1550.
Zi Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra
Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 3; Exhibit P-478, "Excerpts From: US Deptarrnent of State Liberia
Country Report on Human Rights for 1998, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 26,
1999;" Edward Zaymay, Transcript 6 May 2010, pp. 40606-40607.
22 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 July 2009, pp. 25015-25016.
23 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 December 2009, p. 32764.
24 Exhibit D-385, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
Volume 22, Special Edition", pp. 185-190.
25 Exhibit D-338, "Letter Dated 24 July 1997 from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc. S/1997/581, 24 July 1997", p. 3 (stating that "[o]n behalf of the United Nations and

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

gg oaf;.
President of` Liberia on 2 August 1997 for a six-year term.26 In that capacity he was involved
and held positions in regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West
African States ("ECOWAS").27
9. In 1999, Taylor's Government came under military pressure by an armed rebellion
which reached the outskirts of Monrovia by January 2002. Given this military pressure,
combined with the political pressure following the unsealing of his Indictment and Warrant
of Arrest on 4 June 2003, Taylor stepped down from the Presidency on 11 August 2003.28
Taylor went into exile in Nigeria and remained there until his arrest by Nigerian authorities
on 29 March 2006, following a request by Liberian President J ohnson-Sirleaf to the
Nigerian authorities that he be surrendered to the Special Court pursuant to the Warrant of
Arrest issued by the Special Court.29
10. On the same day, Taylor was transferred into the custody of the Special Court in
Freetown. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all counts in the Indictment on 3 April
2006.30 Followin ¤ securit concerns about holdin the trial in West Africa, UN Securit
L Y S Y
Council Resolution 1688 (2006) and agreements with the Government of The Netherlands
and the Intemational Criminal Court, the President of the Special Court ordered his transfer
to The Netherlands in June 2006 in order to stand trial in The Hague.3]
ll. Taylor is currently held in the detention centre of the International Criminal Court
("ICC") located in The Hague under the authority of the Special Court.
ECOWAS, the elections were certified as having been free and fair".); Exhibit D-385, "Official Journal of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Volume 22, Special Edition", pp. 185, 186 (where
Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi states before the release of the election results that he did not observe and
did not receive any reports of "intimidation, harassment and hostility" and the Independent Election Commission
states that ECOWAS, the UN, the OAU, European Union and the Carter Centre have been unanimous that the
elections were "peaceful, free, fair and trnsparent"); Exhibit D-126, "The Carter Center Report, ‘Observing the
1997 Special Elections Process in Liberia"’, p. 9.
26 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers 2 August 1997- 31 December l998", p. I4; Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 31 August 2009, p. 28056.
27 Exhibit D-171, "New African, No. 358, ‘Taylor's Triumph Liberia's 100 Days,’ December l997", pp. 8-
9.
28 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript I4 July 2009, pp. 24344-24347.
29 Exhibit D-410, "Security Council Approves Trial Transfer of Former Liberian President Charles Taylor
to Netherlands, UN Doc. SC/8755", 16 June 2006. I
30 Transcript 3 April 2006, p. I4.
3 1 Exhibit D-410, "Security Council Approves Trial Transfer of Former Liberian President Charles Taylor
to Netherlands, UN Doc. SC/8755, 16 June 2006".

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Case No; SCSL-O3-O]-T Z @ 18 May 20] 2

EQQ Civ"? B. Summary of the charges
12. The Accused faces an 11 count indictment.32 Five of these counts charge the
Accused with crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 2 of the Statute, in
particular: murder (Count 2); rape (Count 4); sexual slavery (Count 5); other inhumane acts
(Count 8); and enslavement (Count 10). Five additional counts charge the Accused with
violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions ("Common Article 3") and of
Additional Protocol 11, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute, in particular: acts of
terrorism (Count 1); violence to life, health and physical or mental well—being of persons, in
particular murder (Count 3); outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6); violence to life,
health and physical or mental well—being of persons, in particular cruel treatment (Count 7);
and pillage (Count 11). The remaining count charges the Accused with conscripting or
enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them to
participate actively in hostilities (Count 9), a serious violation of international humanitarian
law punishable under Article 4 of the Statute.
13. The Indictment charges that "[m]embers of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or
alliance and/or Liberian fighters, including members and ex—members of the NPFL (Liberian
fighters), assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or
control of, and/or subordinate to the Accused"33 committed the crimes underlying the 11
charged counts spanning over a period of 61 months and 19 days, i.e. from 30 November
1996 to 18 January 2002, in named locations within six districts of Sierra Leone, as follows:
(i) From 30 November 1996 to 24 May 1997: rape, sexual slavery, outrages upon
personal dignity, physical violence and enslavement in Kailahun District.
(ii) From 25 May 1997 to 31 January 1998: unlawful killings and enslavement in
Kenema District; unlawful killings, rape, sexual slavery, outrages upon personal dignity,
physical violence and enslavement in Kono District; unlawful killings, rape, sexual slavery,
outrages upon personal dignity, physical violence and enslavement in Kailahun District.
(iii) From 1 February 1998 to 31 December 1998: unlawful killings and enslavement in
Kenema District; pillage in Port Loko and Bombali Districts; burnings as acts of terrorism,
32 Prosecutor v, Taylor, SCSL—03—01—PT—263, Prosecutions Second Amended lndictment, 29 May 2007
("1ndictment").

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / Gb; 18 May 2012 \@

uq
unlawful killings, rape, sexual slavery, outrages upon personal dignity, physical violence,
enslavement and pillage in Kono District; unlawful killings, rape, sexual slavery, outrages
upon personal dignity, physical violence and enslavement in Kailahun District; burnings of
civilian property as acts of terrorism in Freetown and Western Arca.
(iv) From I January 1999 to 28 February 1999: unlawful killings and enslavement in
Kono District; rape, sexual slavery, outrages upon personal dignity, physical violence and
enslavement in Kailahun District; bumings of civilian property as acts of terrorism, unlawful
killings, rape, sexual slavery, outrages upon personal dignity, physical violence,
enslavement and pillage in Freetown and Western Arca.
(v) From I March 1999 to 18 January 2002: unlawful killings and enslavement in Kono
District; rape, sexual slavery, outrages upon personal dignity, physical violence and
enslavement in Kailahun District.
14. Thc indictmcnt chargcs as follows:
(vi) that "[m]cmbcrs of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance and/or Liberian
fighters, including members and cx-members of the NPFL (Liberian fighters), assistcd and
cncouragcd by, acting in concert with, under the dircction and/or control of and/or
subordinatc to the Accused" routincly conscriptcd, cnlistcd and/or uscd boys and girls under
thc agc of 15 to participatc in activc hostilitics, throughout the pcriod of the indictmcnt -
from 30 Novcmbcr 1998 to 18 January 2002 -and throughout the territory of Sierra Lconc;34
(vii) that "[m]cmbcrs of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance and/or Liberian
fighters, including members and cx-members of the NPFL (Liberian fighters), assistcd and
cncouragcd by, acting in concert with, under the dircction and/or control oi, and/or
subordinatc to the Accused" burncd civilian property, and committcd cach of the forgoing
crimes, as part of a campaign to terrorise the civilian population of the Republic of Sierra
Lconc.35
(viii) that the Accused, by his acts or omissions, is individually criminally responsible
pursuant to Articlc 6(1) of the Statutc for the crimes as alleged in the Indictmcnt, which
13 lndictmcnt, paras 5, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 28.
34 lndictmcnt, para. 22.
35 lndictmcnt, para. 5.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T uf GK 18 May 2012 %
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3 CT CI
crimes the Accused planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or in whose planning,
preparation or execution the Accused otherwise aided and abetted, or which crimes
amounted to or were involved within a common plan, design or purpose in which the
Accused participated, or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such common plan,
design or purpose.36
(ix) that in addition or alternatively, pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute, the
Prosecution alleges that the Accused, while holding positions of superior responsibility and
exercising command and control over subordinate members of the RUF, AF RC, AFRC/RUF
Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, is individually criminally responsible for the
crimes as alleged in the Indictment. It charges that the Accused is responsible for the
criminal acts of his subordinates in that he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the Accused failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof37
C. Summary of the Defence Case
15. The Accused pleaded not guilty to all counts in the Indictment.38
l6. The Defence accepts that crimes against humanity and war crimes were committed in
the armed conflict in Sierra Leone during the Indictment period, but denies that the Accused
is responsible for them.39 The Defence submits that the burden of proof is upon the
Prosecution to prove each and every count of the Indictment.4O Specifically, the Defence
submits that the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (i) that the crimes were
actually committed; (ii) that the crimes fulfil all the legal — contextual and specific —
elements of Article 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute; and (iii) that there is a nexus between the
alleged crimes and the Accused.4l
36 Indictment, para. 33.
37 Indictment, para. 34.
38 Transcript 3 April 2006, p. l4.
39 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-1229, Defence Final Trial Brief, 9 March 20ll ("Defence Final
Trial Brief’), para. 1557; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-PT-229, Defence Pre-Trial Brief] 26 April 2007,
("Defence Pre-Trial Brief ’), para. 43.
40 Defence Final Trial Brief] para. 27.
ll Defence Pre-Trial Brief, para. 42.

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17. In addition to denying responsibility for crimes committed, the Defence also
maintains that:
(i) the Accused did not have the means to support the war in Sierra Leone
because he was President of a country that was "effectively bankrupt" and subject to an arms
embargo;42
(ii) the Accused had no reason to have gone into Sierra Leone to take its natural
resources as alleged when "he had vast amounts of untapped natural resources in Liberia";44
(iii) the Accused did not support the war in Sierra Leone because he had a justifiable
apprehension that a major war in Sierra Leone would lead to regional instability and so it is
"incredulous" that the Accused "would have been in cahoots with the Junta";44
(iv) contrary to the Prosecution's submissions, the Accused, through his diplomatic
efforts, played a substantial role in fostering peace and security in Sierra Leone and that his
contribution to the peace process was significant;45
(v) the Prosecution adduced a considerable amount of evidence outside the temporal and
geographical scope of the Indictment and that this evidence is so prejudicial to the Accused
that it contravenes the Accused's right to a fair trial and its admission would bring the
administration of justice into serious disrepute,4°
(vi) much of the Prosecution's case has in large measure been "shrouded in secrecy" as
some insider witnesses have testified with protective measures,47
(vii) the Prosecution provided financial inducements to potential witnesses and sources in
exchange for cooperation and testimony, that these were made independent of and distinct
from those made by the Witnesses and Victims Section and are a case of prosecutorial abuse
of process depriving the Accused of a fair trial,48
42 Defence Final Trial BriefQ paras 461-471, 707.
43 Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 468.
44 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 859
45 Defence Final Trial Briefl paras 87-102.
46 Defence Final Trial Brief; paras 28-37, 42-46, 1558- 1567.
44 Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 9 March 201 1, pp. 49408-49409.
444 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 23-26.

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(viii) some of the Prosecution's witnesses, particularly the linkage witnesses, were so
lacking in credibility that the Trial Chamber should completely put aside several Prosecution
witnesses altogether;49
(ix) the Prosecution failed to call key individuals as witnesses, resulting in the
Prosecution's case being largely focused on hearsay, circumstantial evidence and broad
assumptions;50
(x) much of the Prosecution's evidence was uncertain, contradictory and implausible;5l
(xi) the Prosecution's cross-examination of the Accused was unfocused, disjointed and
generally ineffective in discrediting his evidence—in—chief;52
(xii) procedural irregularities surrounding the pleading and adjudication of issues relating
to the joint criminal enterprise ("ICE") and the delay in rendering a decision on a Defence
motion53 had a prejudicial and irremediable impact on the Accused's fair trial rights;54
(xiii) under international criminal law, the Accused cannot be individually criminal
responsible under the third form of ICE for participating in a ICE that had as its primary
purpose the commission of a specific intent crime, such as terrorism;55 and, moreover, there
is a lack of Prosecution evidence to sustain a ICE as a mode of liability;56 and I
(xiv) the prosecution of the Accused is "selective and vindictive in nature" and that the
Accused was "singled out and prosecuted on the basis of [the United States Government's]
political motives and interests".57
49 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1377-1556, Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript l0 March 2011, pp.
49473, 49518.
50 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 72-81; Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 9 March 201 1, p. 49401.
51 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 385, 418, 490, 548, 589-596.
52 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 82-86.
53 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-378, Public Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal Defect in the
Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment relating to the Pleading of ICE, 14 December 2007.
54 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 47-71.
55 Defence Rebuttal to Prosecution's Closing Arguments, Transcript 1 1 March 2011, pp. 49615-49617.
56 Defence Rebuttal to Prosecution's Closing Arguments, Transcript l 1 March 20l 1, p. 49580.
57 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras l-22.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
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II. CONTEXT
18. The Sierra Leone Civil War commenced on 23 March 1991 when armed fighters
known as the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") launched an insurgency from Liberia's
Lofa County into Sierra Leone's Kailahun District.58 The conflict continued until President
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone announced the cessation of hostilities on 18 January
2002.59 The Prosecution alleges that the Accused is responsible for crimes committed
throughout the Indictment period — that is, from the signing of the Abidjan Accord on 30
November 1996 until the formal declaration of the end of the war on 18 January 2002.60 The
Accused is indicted for crimes alleged to have been committed in six of Sierra Leone's
thirteen districts.6l
19. The ll-year civil war was complex, featuring a number of armed groups. Some of
these groups formed alliances and some also experienced intemal divisions and fracturing.
In order to explain these complex events and relationships, an overview of the conflict in
Sierra Leone is necessary. Further, as the Accused is alleged to have participated in the civil
war without being physically present on theterritory of Sierra Leone, it is necessary to
rovide a brief outline of the broader eo olitical context in which the civil war took lace.
P S P P
In this section, the Trial Chamber provides an introduction to the politics, personalities and
events necessary to understand the allegations against the Accused. The Trial Chamber also
highlights the major areas of dispute between the parties and briefly summarises the parties’
submissions on these issues, reserving its findings for later in the judgement.62
58 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December
2007 [Decision on Judicial Notice], Annex A, Facts C and N; DCT-190, Transcript 7 June 2010, pp. 42182-
42183; DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37252-37255; Exhibit P—431, "Excerpts from: News Article,
IPS — Inter Press Service/Global Information Network, Politics — Sierra Leone: No Lawyer Willing to Defend
Rebel Leader (Lexis Nexis), 7 September 1998", p. 1; Exhibit P-497, "Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, Vol. 2", p. 41; Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp.
3.8839- 38840; Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48369-48370, 48377; John Vincent, Transcript 25
March 2010, pp. 38008-38011.
59 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-227, Joint Filing by the Prosecution and Defence Admitted Facts &
Law, 26 April 2007 [Admitted Facts and Law], Agreed Fact 35; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact C.
60 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 1.
Ol The Accused is charged with crimes alleged to have been committed in Kailahun, Kenema, Kono,
Bombali, Port Loko and Freetown and the Western Area.
62 The issues and submissions highlighted in this Chapter are not exhaustive of all the issues raised by the
parties.

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A. Origins of the Sierra Leone Civil War
1, Siena Leone and the Rise of Pan-Afiicanism
20, A former British colony, Siena Leone achieved independence on 27 April 1961, ln
the decades following independence, Siena Leone experienced several military coups until
21 April 1971 when Siaka Stevens assumed the Presidency under the All Peop1e's Congress
("APC"), ln 1978 he established a one-pany state, Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh
succeeded Stevens as President in 1985,63 Despite its rich natural resources, including
alluvial diamonds, Siena Leone experienced economic decline during the 1980s as a result
of corruption and nepotism under the APC regime,64 Disenchanted by the political and
economic decadence, a dissident group known as the RUF was formed in the late
1980s/early 1990s with the aim of forcibly removing the APC Government and restoring
democracy and good governance to Siena Leone,65
21, During the 1980s, Pan-Africanism became increasingly popular in West Africa and
within Siena Leone this movement was promoted by Fourah Bay College student Ali
Kabbah.66 Siena Leonean students with connections to the Pan—Afiican movement,
including Abu Kanu, Rashid Mansaray, Mohammed Dabo and Cleo Hanciles, travelled to
Libya to train with other supponers of the Pan-African ideology and to prepare for a
revolution in Siena Leone.67 While in Libya, Ali Kabbah formed the Siena Leone Pan
African Revolutionary Movement ("SLPARM"), a dissident group which he led from 1987
until his departure from Libya in 1989,68
63 Stephen Ellis, Transcript 18 January 2008, p. 1555; DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37013;
Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Puelled the Conflict, Chronology of Siena Leone, Siena Leone Diamonds,
Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 1.
64 D-006 (Confidential) ERN 16493-16494; Ngulu Kpakai, Transcript 1 1 March 2010, pp. 37014-37016.
65 Exhibit D-336, "Footpaths to Democracy, Toward a New Siena Leone, Volume One, 1995", pp. 19-21;
TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2545-2549 (CS).
66 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 July 2009, p, 24645; DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, pp.
37111, 37157; Transcript 12 February 2008, p, 3675.
67 Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), ERN 18108-18109; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, p.
24568; Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24748-24749; Transcript 10 September 2009, p. 28568; TF1-168, Transcript
2009, pp. 23393-23394 (CS).
68 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, p. 24748; Transcript 10 September 2010, p. 28568;
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 November 2009, p. 32076; Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010,
p. 35609; DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, p, 36849; Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46427,

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 @

3% 1 Cr 1-1-
2. Training of Dissident Revolutionaries in Libya
22. During the late 1980s, the training of members of SLPARM in Libya was organised
by an institution known as the Mathaba Alimia ("the Mathaba"), a military and ideological
or anisation that romoted Pan-Aiiicanism.69 The Mathaba or anised milita trainin in
3 P g YY g
Libyan camps such as "Tinning March" and "Tajura".7O A number of other West African
revolutionaries were trained in Libya, including Charles Taylor from Liberia, Foday Sankoh
from Sierra Leone and Kukoi Samba Sanyang (a.k.a. Dr Manneh) from the Gambia.71 The
Accused was the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia ("NPFL"), a group that had
been formed in order to remove President Samuel Kanyon Doe's regime from power, citing
concerns about corruption.72 Members of the RUF who trained in Libya were called Special
Forces and held the highest status within the RUF .73
23. The Prosecution submits that the origins of the Sierra Leone Civil War can be traced
back to "a common cause" formed between the Accused, Sankoh and Manneh in which they
agreed to assist each other in waging war in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Gambia.74 The
Defence denies the existence of an alleged common plan between the Accused and Foday
Sankoh to wage war in Sierra Leone.75 It maintains that the Accused was based in Burkina
Faso during this period and occasionally visited the Mathaba, interacting only with the
Liberian group and other leaders such as Ali Kabbah and Dr Manneh.76 The Defence further
maintains that the Accused did not even know Sankoh while in Libya and that the two men
did not have any contact until 1991 in Liberia when they agreed to cooperate strategically
a ainst the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democrac ULIMO .77
3 Y
69 DCT-125, Transcript 4 March 2010, pp. 36665-36668, p. 36681 (CS); DCT-068, Transcript ll March
2010, p. 37111.
70 Exhibit D-115A, "Untitled Map ot`Libya"; Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9802-9803; DCT-
125, Transcript 4 March 2010, pp. 36672-36673; Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35571-35577.
71 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, p. 24568; Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24748-24749;
Transcript 10 September 2009, p. 28568; TFl-168, Transcript 2009, pp. 23393-23394 (CS).
72 Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra
Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 3, ERN 26606; Exhibit D-383, "Statement by Charles Ghankay
Taylor, Leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 1 January l990".
73 TFl-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2211-2212 (CS); Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p.
3042; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21317; TF1—579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p.
19787; Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43606, 43609.
74 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 51-52. ,
75 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 306, 736-770.
Y6 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 745.
77 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 815.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % gk 18 May 2012 M

$4:1 cr;.
3. Formation of the Revolutionary United Front and Training in Liberia ( 1989-1990)
24. By August 1990, the RUF had been formed and were training in Liberia.78 The
NPFL, following its incursion into Liberia on 24 December 1989, seized control of Gbarnga
and the Camp Naama training base.79 From August 1990, Camp Naama was used as a
trainin base for both NPFL and RUF fi ters.8O A roximatel 300 RUF fi hters
8 PP Y 8
comprising Sierra Leoneans and Liberians were trained at Camp Naama, including persons
who later became senior members of the RUF, such as Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Morris
Kallon, Philip Palmer, Augustine Gbao and Mike Lamin.8l Members of the RUF who
trained in Liberia were called Vanguards and held the second highest status within the
RUF.82
25. The Prosecution submits that, in furtherance of the common cause alleged to have
been formed between Taylor and Sankoh in the late 1980s, the NPFL and RUF trained
alongside each other at Camp Naama and were "carbon copies" modelled by Taylor.88 lt
iirrther submits that the Accused was the "father" or "godfather" of the RUF88 in the sense
that he created the RUF as a viable organised armed force,88 nurtured and sustained it by
providing a secure training environment,88 supplies,87 instructors88 and new recruits;89
ensured its continued survival; taught it how to terrorise civilians;9O directed it in its first
78 DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37226-37228.
78 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41838-41839.
80 Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra
Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", pp. 3-4; Exhibit D-006 (Confidential); DCT-125, Transcript 4 March
2010, pp. 36696-36697; Exhibit P-414, "Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project —
Appendix D, Key events in Liberian History from 1979-2003"; Decision on Judicial Notice, para. 66; Defence
Final Trial Brief, para. 395; DCT-025, Transcript 12 Marc}1 2010, pp. 37226-37228.
81 lsaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5666-5667; Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008,
p. 4374; TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2204, 2206-2208 (CS); DCT-025, Transcript 17 Marc}1 2010,
p. 3741 1; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23203-23204 (CS); TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008,
p. 4805 (CS); TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14096.
82 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21301-21302; TF1-371, Transcript 25 January
2008, pp. 2230-2231 (CS); Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13234-13235; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4
February 2008, pp. 3042-3043; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23157-23160 (CS); Issa Sesay,
Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43606, 43609; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 1 April 2010, p. 38609.
83 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 61.
84 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 58.
85 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 60, 65.
88 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 66-67.
87 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 75. 8
88 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 71-73.
88 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 68-70.
80 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 74.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M! Sh 18 May 2012 W

3% ( ck
endeavours, protected it from outside threats to its existence, and strengthened the basic
unity of the group".91
26. The Defence denies that the Accused played any role in creating or supporting the
RUF and submits that the RUF forged its own identity separate from the NPFL and was a
"self-reliant struggle".92 While it accepts that the NPFL and RUF fighters were trained at
Camp Naama at the same time, the Defence maintains that the two forces were segregated in
that they trained separately, had separate command structures93 and that the RUF fighters
were strictly confined to their area, known as "Crab Hole" or "Sokoto".94
4. insurgency into Sierra Leone (1991-1992)
27. In late February 1991, Foday Sankoh issued an ultimatum to President Momoh to
resi from the Presidenc within 90 da s or else face a revolt.95 On 23 March 1991, rior to
an Y Y P
the expiration of the 90-day deadline, about 150 RUF and NPFL96 fighters from Camp
Naama launched an insurgency into eastern Sierra Leone, signifying the commencement of
the civil war.97 The armed forces of Sierra Leone, commonly known as the Sierra Leone
Ariny (‘"SLA") fought to repel the RUF's offensives. As the RUF spread throughout the
country, they set up bases and captured civilians who were trained in fighting techniques,
war tactics and ideology of the RUF.98 Those trained in Sierra Leone were called Junior
Commandos and were considered junior in rank to the Vanguards.99
91 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 60.
92 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 391.
93 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 398.
94 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 392-393.
95 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39642, 39645-39646.
Q6 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 78-79, 256; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 423.
97 DCT-190, Transcript 7 June 2010, pp. 42182, 42183; DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010 pp. 37252-
37255; Exhibit P-431, "Excerpts from: News Article, IPS - Inter Press Service/Global Information Network,
Politics 4 Sierra Leone: No Lawyer Willing to Defend Rebel Leader (Lexis Nexis), 7 September 1998", p. 1;
Exhibit P-497, "Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report,
Vol, 2", p. 41; Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38839- 38840; Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November
2010, pp. 4836948370, 48377; John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 38008-3801 1; Decision on Judicial
Notice, Annex A, Facts C and N.
98 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2228-2232, 2248-2255 (CS); DCT-025, Transcript 17 March
2010, pp. 37428-37433; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13222—13224.
QQ TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2253-2255 (CS); Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008,
pp. 3042-3043; DCT-025, Transcript 17 March 2010, pp. 37434-37435; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 8 July 2008.
pp. 13234-13235.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (QM l8 May 2012

Ba Seite;
28. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused, Sankoh and NPFL commanders planned
the March 1991 invasion of Sierra Leone at a meeting chaired by the Accused in Voinjama
in Liberia's Lofa County in March 1991,lOO The Prosecution further claims that the NPFL
commanders and fighters under the command of the Accused were the primary participants
of the initial invasion into Sierra Leone and during the early stages of the conflict until they
were withdrawn in about June 1992.lOl Further, it claims that about 300 novice RUF fighters
trained at Camp Naama were integrated into the NPFL battalions which led the invasion into
Sierra Leone "in order to gain experience as the invasion continued";lO2 and that during the
period 1991-1992 the Accused regularly sent NPFL fighters to Sierra Leone to reinforce the
RUF 103
29, The Defence maintains that the Accused was not present at the Voinjama meetingm
and neither planned nor had knowledge of the alleged plan to attack Sierra Leone, IOS \Vhilst
the Defence does not deny that the invasion force did include members of the NPFL, or the
fact that the majority of RUF recruits were Liberian, it maintains that these men were not
sent to invade Sierra Leone by the Accused. W6
B. Civil War in Sierra Leone {1991-19961
1, 1991-1992
30. In fighting against the RUF, the SLA cooperated with ULIMO, an armed group that
was initially formed to fight against the NPFL in Liberia,l07 ln addition, in early 1991 the
Sierra Leone Government created the Special Task Force ("STF"), an armed group
consisting of mainly Liberian recruits who were former ULIMO members, in order to assist
the SLA in repelling the rebels, mg
mo Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 77.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 78-80.
mz Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 78-81.
'O3 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 82-84.
IO4 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 415-417.
IOS Defence Final Trial Brief, para, 417,
W6 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 423,
W Exhibit P-031, "Repor"t for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Ghankay Taylor and the War in
Sierra Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 7; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp, 796-799;
Exhibit D-026, "Submissions to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Appendix 2, Statement
by His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 4 August 2003".
M8 Exhibit D-469, "Letter from Brigadier General David L M Bropleh to Acting CDs, DHQ, Request for

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / W. 18 May 2012

3% 1 oi
31. From at least August 1991 until at least May 1992, the RUF cooperated with the
NPFL in fighting against ULIMO and the SLA.lO9 In early 1992, however, at a time when
the RUF was seeking peace talks with President Momoh's APC Government, a group of
young military ofHcers led by 26-year-old Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew the APC
Government in a coup and established a ruling military council known as the National
Provisional Ruling Council ("NPRC").HO While many in the RUF saw this as the
culmination of their struggle to rid Sierra Leone of the APC's one-party state,] H the Strasser
regime refused to pursue negotiations with the RUF and instead mounted a crushing
offensive that drove the RUF towards and over the border into Liberia by the end of
1992/early 1993.**2
32. In early 1992, tensions emerged between the RUF and the NPFL over the way in
which the latter were treating Sierra Leonean civilians.l 13 Fighting erupted between the two
groups resulting in the execution of at least 30 Vanguards and escalating into a series of
three military operations code-named "Top 20", "Top 40" and "Top Final"H4 respectively,
in which the NPFL withdrew from Sierra Leone and returned to Liberia after June 1992.115
Some NPFL members remained in Sierra Leone and assumed senior roles within the RUF,
Redress on the Twenty-Six (26) Liberians Rejected at BTC BSTTT 4 Training Program on Constitutional
Grounds, November 30 2000"; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2387-2388 (CS); Exhibit D-462
(Confidential); Exhibit D·026, "Submissions to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Appendix 2, Statement by His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 4 August 2003".
mq Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24328-24329; Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24796-
24797; Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28535-28536, 28563-28564; Transcript 22 September 2009, pp.
29296, 29298-29299; Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28939-28940; Transcript 25 November 2009, pp.
32367-32369.
H0 Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Ghankay Taylor and the War in
Sierra Leone, Stephen Ellis;" Stephen Ellis, Transcript 22 September 2008, p. 16906; Charles Ngebeh,
Transcript 22 March 2010, p. 37781.
HI Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38928-38929.
H2 Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone
Diamonds, Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 2; Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38929.
H3 TF1-561, Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9862; TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2235-2237 (CS);
TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23167 (CS); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp.
24812, 24839.
H4 TF1-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23437-23438 (CS); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp.
38897, 38900; Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4371-4373.
H5 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38908-38909, 38913-38914; Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), pp.
00018120-00018121; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, p. 13670; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009,
pp. 23212-23213 (CS); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6615-6617.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

ia tccl
including Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman),l 16 Isaac Mongorl 17 and Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO
33. The Prosecution claims that after the initial attack in March 1991, the Accused sent
NPFL troops including radio operators and commandos from Liberia to reinforce the RUF
forces fighting on the front lines in Sierra Leone, and created and equipped a special unit
known as "Black Gadaffa" tasked with regaining the border areas of Sierra Leone and
preventing ULIMO from cutting off the Liberia-Sierra Leone supply channelsllg The
Prosecution further claims that Taylor's forces remained in Sierra Leone, directing and
artici atin in the fi htin and the crimes committed a ainst civi1ians;l2O and that even
P P g g g g
after the NPFL's withdrawal from Sierra Leone in June 1992, the Accused continued his
involvement, participation and concerted action within the RUFIZI and was in contact with
Sankoh through radio communication, checking on the situation within the RUF.l22 The
Prosecution further alleges that the Accused ordered the RUF to capture Sierra Leone's
diamondiferous areas and thereafter provided the RUF with arms and ammunition in
exchange for diamonds. 123
34. The Defence argues that Charles Taylor's involvement in the initial stages of the
Sierra Leone conflict was not intended to aid Sankoh's revolution but rather was "a strategic
expansion that would create a frontier buffer zone behind which the revolution in Liberia
could be adequately protected" against ULIMO.l24 It submits further that while the RUF
obtained "some ammunition" from Taylor in this early part of the war, his contribution was
negligible and not sufficient to support an RUF military victory.l25 It submits further that by
May/June 1992, about a year after the launch of the invasion into Sierra Leone, Taylor cut
back his support to Foday Sankoh and ultimately withdrew all the NPFL forces from Sierra
lm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2258-2259 (CS); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12873.
H7 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5712, 5722-5723; TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008,
pp. 2258-2259 (CS);
HS TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12830-12831; Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p.
21351.
H9 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 82-83
120 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 84.
m Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 84-94.
H2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 85, 93-101.
I2} Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 86-87, 206, 349.
D4 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 428, 814-820.
Us Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 428.

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3% 1 1G
Leone in mid—l992 during Operation Top Final.126 The Defence also maintains that
Operation Top Final and the NPFL's withdrawal caused a rift between the Accused and
Foday Sankoh, with the two men ceasing all contact from mid—1992 until 1999.127 The
Defence denies that the Accused maintained radio communications with Foday Sankoh or
the RUF from mid—l992 to the time of the Junta in 1997,128 or that he provided the RUF
with arms and ammunition after May 1992,129 or that the RUF provided the Accused with
diamonds.1311 The Defence submits that it would not have been possible for the Accused to
su l the RUF with arms and ammunition because ULIMO controlled the Liberian—Sierra
PP Y
Leonean border sem rere 1992 umu 1996.131
2. 1993-1995
35. Throughout the early period of the civil war, the RUF were scattered throughout the
jungles of Sierra Leone, from where fighters launched guerrilla attacks on towns in order to
capture arms, ammunition and other supplies. ln late 1993, after the capture of Kono, the
RUF retreated from Kono District and crossed into Kailahun District, where they maintained
control over many of the major towns until early 1994.132 The RUF then moved to Kenema
District, capturing the Tongo mining area and establishing their main base at "Camp
Zogoda", in the Kambui Hills.133 ln late 1994 or early 1995, the RUF attacked the
international mining company Sierra Rutile in Bonthe District, holding the site until a
counter—attack by SLA forces in January 1995.134
**6 Defence rieer r1~1e1B1~1e1; paras 429-430.
127 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 431; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28669-
28670; Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30245-30254, 30255-30256; Transcript 7 September 2009, p. 28192;
Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38915.
128 Defence Final Trial Briefj para. 820.
129 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 430-431.
*1*1 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 73-81.
131 Defence Final Trial Brief] paras 434-436.
132 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39702-39704; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp.
23228-23230(CS); Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), p. 31.
133 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39704-39706; TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12874-
12875; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23233-23236; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, pp.
37790-37791; Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39708-39712. For the fact that Camp Zogoda was
located in the Kambui Hils, see TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2251; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April
2008, p. 6839; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21762; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January
2009, p. 23488.
134 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12876; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054;
Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38653; Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39712-
39716; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43747.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J Cb 18 May 2012

3%; 1 1 1
36. ln March 1995, some RUF fighters launched several ambushes near Freetown,
prompting Strasser's NPRC government to invite a South African private security firm
known as Executive Outcomes to assist in repelling the RUF. 135 Executive Outcomes trained
the SLA and local militia groups, including Donsos, Gbethis, Tamboros and Kamajors.
These combined forces repelled the RUF fighters that were located near the Freetown
Peninsula, forcing them to withdraw to Fogbo and then Makoot.136 This defeat prompted the
RUF to initiate peace talks with the NPRC. In early 1995, preliminary talks were held
between the two groups in Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire. 137
37. The Prosecution submits that RUF persomrel remained in Liberia until late 1992 or
early 1993 and that Gbamga, Taylor's Headquarters, continued to be the transit point
through which Sankoh and the RUF fighters would transit to and from Sierra Leone;l38 and
that until access to the Sierra Leone/Liberian border was significantly reduced, Taylor
regularly provided the RUF with arms, ammunition, food and medicines from various areas
in Liberia within his control, 139 as well as communication equipment,l40 training suppor"t,14l
and a safe haven,142 in order to sustain the RUF war in Sierra Leone. The Prosecution further
alleges that in late 1992, Sankoh and Taylor planned the capture of diamond-rich Kono
District, Taylor provided the arms and ammunition for that attack and that after Kono was
captured, Sankoh took diamonds to the Accused in exchange for more ammunitionm lt
further alleges that during this period and throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone, the i
Accused continued to provide the leaders of the RUF and AFRC/RUF with strategic
instruction, direction and guidance in relation to a range of political, military and other
135 Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone
Diamonds, Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 4; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37825-37827.
136 Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone
Diamonds, Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 4; Stephen Smith, Transcript 22 September 2008, pp. 16911-
16914; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37825-37827; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March
2010, pp. 37834-37835.
137 Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), p. 43; TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23270; Issa Sesay,
Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43738-43739.yExhibit P-567, "Sierra Leone Web, Sierra Leone News, March 1996";
Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Diamonds,
Africa Confidential, April 1998", pp. 4-5; Stephen Smith, Transcript 22 September 2008, pp. 16913-16916.
138 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 86.
139 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 88-94.
140 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 93-101.
M1 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 102-110.
142 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 111-1 13.
143 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 86 - 88.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T A Z 18 May 2012
=\

@$,111
mattersm including advising the RUF to set up "jung1es" from which to launch attacks,l45
advising the RUF to attack "a maj0r p1ace" in order to capture the attention of the
interi1ationa1 community and to force the Strasser Government into agreeing to a peace
dea1l46 and advising the RUF to set up an "exteri1a1 de1egation" that would handle dip10matic
re1ations. 147
38. The Defence argues that ii0m late 1992 or early 1993 until 1996, the border between
Sierra Leone and Liberia was effectively c10sed by the activities of ULIMO and that it
remained c10sed during the 1996 Sierra Leone e1ections.l48 The Defence maintains that alter
the RUF were pushed to the border by the NPRC regime forces, the former changed their
tactics by waging a "se1f-reliant strugg1e" in which they set up bases in vari0us jungles in
Sierra Leone and 0btained arms and ammunition principally ii0m ambushes and battles, but
not from Liberia.l49 The Defence specifically denies that the Accused was in radi0 contact
with Sankoh or the RUF alter 1992 or that he ordered the Sierra Rutile attack.l5O
3. E1ections in Sierra Leone and "Operation St0p E1ection" g 1996-1997)
39. Strasser announced that elections were to be held in Sierra Leone but, before these
cou1d take place, he was overthrown as leader of the NPRC government by his deputy,
Brigadier General Julius Maada Bi0.l5l Peace talks between the NPRC Government and the
RUF were scheduled to take place in C0te d’1v0ire but despite calls ii0m the latter for peace
before dem0cratic e1ections,l52 presidential elections were held in Sierra Leone on 26 and 27
February 1996 before any peace agreement was signed. However, as no candidate w0n the
necessary percentage of the v0te, it was necessary to h01d a second round of v0ting.l53
Before the second round of v0ting cou1d cornmence, Sankoh called an RUF forum in
M4 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1 19-120.
M5 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 121.
M6 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 122-124.
M7 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 125.
M8 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 434-436.
M9 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 435-436.
wo Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 820-835.
15 I Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conf1ict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone
Diamonds, Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 4; Exhibit P-329, "Hurnan Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone:
Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape, New Testirn0ny fr0rn Sierra Leone, V01. 11, No.3, Part [II,
July l999", p. 1.
152 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23265-23267 (CS).
153 Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conf1ict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone
Diamonds, Africa Contidential, April 1998", p. 4.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J Sm 18 May 2012 %

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Zogoda and ordered "Operation Stop Election"154 during which the disgruntled RUF
attacked several towns, including Bo, Magburaka and Kenema155 and committed numerous
atrocities against civilians, including carving "RUF" on the chests of civilians and the
amputation of the fingers and/or hands of those who attempted to vote. 156
40. On 15 March 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected President of Sierra Leone and
was inaugurated two weeks later, on 29 March 1996.151 Kabbah continued peace
negotiations with the RUF and on 30 November 1996, the Abidjan Peace Accord was
si ed1511 wherein Foda Sankoh a eed to a ceasefire, the RUF was anted the status of a
an Y gf gf
"political movement" and its members an amnesty against prosecution for their past
crimes. 159 The temporary cessation of active hostilities brought about by the Abidjan Accord
was short—lived and the civil war in Sierra Leone continued. 1611 In November 1996, the SLA
and the Kamajors attacked the RUF base in Zogoda, forcing the RUF from their stronghold
and into Kailahun and Pujehun Districts.161 In March 1997 while returning to Sierra Leone
from Cote d’1voire, Sankoh was detained by Nigerian authorities for possession of arms and
ammunition11"2 and kept under house arrest. He was however, permitted to remain in contact
with the RUF by radio.1113 Members of the RUF's External Delegation, who did not support
Sankoh's lack of respect for the peace negotiations at Abidjan, took advantage of Sankoh's
1511 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20104-20106.
155 Exhibit P-277 (confidential), p. 42; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43746; Transcript 17 August
2010, p. 46494; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20107-20108; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript
21 May 2008, pp. 10422-10423; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5697-5698.
1511 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43746; Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46494; Isaac Mongor,
Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5697-5698; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10422-10423;
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20107-20108; TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2010, p.
12483.
157 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008 , p. 8677; Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, p.
12347; Exhibit P-567, "Sie1ra Leone Web, Sierra Leone News, March l996".
1511 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39014; Exhibit P-277 (confidential), p. 43; Exhibit D-087,
"Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front"; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact O; Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successful
Peace Talks in Lomé, l999", pp. 35-36; Exhibit D-087, "Peace Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL)", Articles 13 and 14.
159 Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successful Peace Talks in Lomé, l999", pp. 35-36; Exhibit
D-087, "Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF/SL)", Articles 13 and 14.
160 Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact T; Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 28.
161 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20108-20112; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23
March 2010, pp. 37842-37846; Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39748-39750.
1112 Exhibit P-078, "Sie1ra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 2; Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39098; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43737.
163 Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39100.

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Case No.: scsr-03-01-r / 18 May 2012
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Ea a 1 at
absence to advocate for change of leadership of the RUFI64 Bockarie, however, remained
loyal to Sankoh and on 29 March 1997 ordered the arrest of the External Delegation,
accusing them of attempting to take over control of the RUF. 165
41. The Prosecution claims that Taylor convinced Sankoh to take part in the peace talks
in Cote d’1voire in 1996, to negotiate a peace deal which would allow the RUF to end its
isolation in Sierra Leone. The Prosecution further alleges that Taylor convinced the RUF to
participate in the peace talks in order to ensure that the RUF would survive to continue its
fight to control the Sierra Leonean people and territory and to pillage the resources of Sierra
Leone.l66 It submits that although the plan to disrupt the elections by teirorising civilians
was not devised by the Accused, the RUF leadership sought his approval and guidance
before implementing Operation Stop Election, and that the Accused approved of it, telling
Sankoh that the plan "was not a bad one".l°7 The Defence denies this allegation and
maintains that the Accused was not in contact with Sankoh at this time.l°8 It submits that
Foday Sankoh bears full responsibility for the failure of the Abidjan Peace Accord and for
the continuation of the war thereafter. 169
C. AF RC/RUF Junta Period g1997-l998[
1. AFRC Coup
42. Disillusionment grew within SLA ranks as a result of Kabbah's support for the local
militias rather than the professional army and, on 25 May 1997, a group of SLA soldiers
overthrew the Kabbah Government in a coup d’état.l7O On 28 May 1997, the group
IM Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43707-4371 1; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008,
pp. 16268-16269; Exhibit P-277 (confidential), pp. 18144-18148; Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, pp.
39056-39058, 39081, 39101; TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23296-29302 (CS).; Exhibit P-531,
"Article, Sierraleone.org, Sierra Leone Web, Sierra Leone News, March l997"; Exhibit D-083, "Expo Times
Gazette, Vol. 1, No. 44, Kabbah Hails New RUF, 17 March l997".
M5 Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39110-39112; TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp.
23313-23316 (CS); Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43881-43892; Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army,
Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander", pp. 9672-9681; Exhibit P-277 S
(confidential), pp. 18160-18161; Exhibit P-531, "Article, Sierraleone.org, Sierra Leone Web, Sierra Leone
News, March l997".
I66 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 136.
M Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 130-133.
mg Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 820, 836-841.
mg Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 447. .
no Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 17; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact D; Prosecutor v
Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-765, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts from the
AFRC Trial Judgement pursuant to Rule 94(B), 23 March 2009 [Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T J gg 18 May 2012 %

1 ?>%| 1S`
announced that they had formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ("AFRC") and
that they had assumed the governance of Sierra Leone.{7{ Koroma assumed the leadership of
the AFRC, while President Kabbah went into exile in neighbouring Guinea.{72 W"hile in
exile, Kabbah united the local militias into a single armed force, known as the Civil Defence
Forces ("CDF"). *73
43. Shortly after the AFRC seized power, the RUF joined the AFRC in governing Sierra
Leone.{74 As the founders of the AFRC belonged to the Sierra Leonean Army and had
therefore been fighting the RUF since 1991, the coalition between the two factions was not
based on longstanding common interests; both factions officially declared that they were
'oinin forces to brin eace and olitical stabilit to Sierra Leone. On 18 June 1997 the
J S S P P Y 7
RUF issued an ofhcial apology for its crimes, and praised Koroma's government.{75
44. The coup was widely condemned by the international community.{7° On 26 August
1997, members of the Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") agreed
to an almost total embargo against Sierra Leone and raised the possibility of using armed
force.{77 A Ministerial Committee of Four, comprising the foreign ministers of Nigeria,
Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, was charged with the responsibility of implementing the
ECOWAS initiatives.{78 On 29 August 1997, the Economic Community of West African
States Cease-fire Monitoring Group ("ECOMOG"), a Nigerian-led West African
Adjudicated Facts], Annex A, Fact 1.
{7{ Exhibit P-100, "Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette No. 34, 28 May 1997, Public Notice No. 3 of
l997", Proclamation Administration of Sierra Leone; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact D. .
{72 Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 18; Exhibit P-329, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone:
Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape, New Testimony from Sierra Leone, Vol. ll, No.3, Part III,
July l999", p. 2.
{73 Exhibit D-169, "UN Security Council, Second Progress Report of the Secretary·General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/960, 16 October l998", p. 00012371; Exhibit D-443, "Report
To the United Nations Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, New York, From Interim Leader-RUF/ SL, General
Issah H. Sesay, Detail Information About The RUF and Her Position on the Ongoing Peace Process, April 6
200l", p. 00025662; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, p. 25559.
{74 Joint Filing by the Prosecution and Defence: Admitted Facts and Law, No. 30.
{75 Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts from the AFRC Trial
Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B), Fact 1.
{76 Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, Abuja,
Ni eria, 26 Au ust l997", pp. 1-2; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities A ainst Civilians,
8 S 8
Amnesty International Report", p. 2.
{77 Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact AC; Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of
Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, Abuja, Nigeria, 26 August l997", p. 3; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998,
A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report", p. 2; Exhibit P-034, "Profile: Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)".
~ {78 Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, Abuja,

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / JM 18 May 2012

Bai i lc
intervention force that had previously fought in Liberia, had its mandate extended to cover
the civil war in Sierra Leonem ln October 1997, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 1132 which imposed mandatory sanctions on Sierra Leone.l80 The
United Nations Security Council also expressed its full support for the efforts and role of the
ECOWAS Committee to resolve the political crisis and restore lasting peace and stability to
Sierra Leonem
45. By this time, peace had been realised in Liberia after seven years of conflict and, on
19 July 1997, the Accused was elected as President.l82 ECOWAS invited the Liberian
Govemment to join the Committee of Four for Sierra Leone, thereby transforming it into a
Committee of Five.l83 On 23 October 1997, the Committee of Five met in Conakry and
agreed to a peace plan for Sierra Leone.l84 The Conakry Accord called for the cessation of
hostilities, humanitarian assistance for refugees and the reinstatement of President Kabbah
Nigeria, 26 August 1997", p. 3.
179 Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact Z; Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone ~ Charles Taylor and the War and Sierra Leone, Report and Corrigenda, Stephen Ellis, p. 4.
180 Exhibit P-329, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and
Rape, New Testimony from Sierra Leone, Vol. 11, No.3, Part 111, July 1999", p. 2; Exhibit P-069, "United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, S/RES/1132 (1997), 8 October 1997"; Exhibit P-305, "United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1181, S/RES/1181 (1998), 13 July l998"; Exhibit P-311, "United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1231, S/RES/1231 (1999), 11 March 1999", paras 1-4, 7-12; Exhibit D-135,
"ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Siena Leone, Abuja, Nigeria, 26 August
1997", p. 3.
181 Exhibit P-069, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, S/RES/1132 (1997), 8 October 1997";
Exhibit P-305, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181, S/RES/1181 (1998), 13 July 1998"; Exhibit
P-311, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1231, S/RES/1231 (1999), 11 March 1999", paras 1-4, 7-
12.
182 Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact L; Exhibit D-127, "New African, No. 358, "Taylor's
Triumph, Liberia's 100 Days, December l997".
183 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24331—24332; Transcript 27 July 2009, pp. 25299-
25300; Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja,
Nigeria, 26-27 August 1997", pp. 3, 10.
184 Exhibit D-339, "ECOWAS, Communiqué, Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the
Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, Conakry, 22—23 October 1997"; Exhibit P-036, "ECOWAS Six-Month
Peace Plan for Sierra Leone 23 October 1997 ~ 22 April 1998"; Exhibit D-342, "ECOWAS, Second Report of
the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to Resolution
S/RES/1132 (1997) of8 October 1997", p. 2.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X pj ; 18 May 2012

3 an ra-
by 22 April 1998.lgS Hostilities continued, however, notwithstanding the signing of the
A Conakry Accord.l86
46. The Prosecution maintains that during the Junta and throughout its existence, Taylor
provided invaluable instruction, direction and guidance to the leaders of the AFRC/RUF
I alliance and that this was often crucial to the continued survival of the alliance as a viable
} entity with the ability to continue carrying out the campaign of terror against the civilian
population of Sierra Leone, encompassing all the crimes alleged in the Indictment.l87 The
Prosecution further claims that in violation of a UN arms embargo against the AF RC/RUF
Junta, Taylor provided vital arms and ammunition to the Junta in exchange for diamonds. 188
47. The Defence refutes the Prosecution allegations, arguing that the Accused had no
conrrnunication with any members of the Junta Government nor did he provide the Junta
with arms and ammunition.l89 The Defence argues that the Accused was not in a position to
· provide support for the Junta, because at the time he had neither the time nor the means to
provide support as he had just assumed the Presidency and Liberia was bankrupt and subject
to an arms embargo.l90 The Defence further argues that the Accused supported the
I restoration of the Kabbah Government and sought to use his position on the Committee of
Five to secure peace in Sierra Leonem The Defence denies that the Accused organised the
Magburaka arms shipment and instead submits that the arms were purchased by Sankoh
from Burkina Faso, prior to his arrest in Nigeria}92
2. ECOMOG Intervention g 1998-1999)
J 48. On 5 February 1998, ECOMOG commenced a major offensive against the
AFRC/RUF forces and, by 14 February 2008, had succeeded in expelling the Junta from
{S5 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 2; Exhibit D-339, "ECOWAS, Communique, Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the
Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, Conakry, 22—23 October 1997"; Exhibit D-342, "ECOWAS, Second Report
of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to
Resolution S/RES/1132 (1997) of8 October 1997", p. 2.
{S6 Decision on Judicial Notice of AF RC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 5.
{S7 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 139.
{gg Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 223-237.
{S9 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 842-868, 1042-1062.
'°° oaraaaa Final Trial Briar, paras 461-471, 707.
*9* Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 87.
m Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 862.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ QQ 18 May 2012

B2: r %
Freetownm On 10 March 1998, the Kabbah Government was restored to power in Sierra
Leone.l94 By mid-March 1998, ECOMOG, acting in concert with the CDF, extended its
control to Bo, Kenema and Zimmi in the south of the country; Lunsar, Makeni and Kabala
in the north; and Daru in the east.l95
49. Bockarie's group retreated from Kenema to Kailahun Town, while the AFRC/RUF
fighters who had been based in Freetown retreated to Masiaka under the leadership of
Koroma.l% Unable to pay his fighters, Koroma ordered an operation known as "Operation
Pay Yourself ’ in which his fighters engaged in extensive looting.l97
50. The Prosecution submits that during this period the AF RC/RUF depended
overwhelmingly on Taylor's direct provision of arms and ammunition to start repelling the
ECOMOG advancement or to contain the situation,l98 and that in exchange for vast amounts
of diamonds paid to Taylor, Sam Bockarie, as commander of the troops on the ground in
Sierra Leone, received substantial amounts of arms, ammunition and other assistance from
Taylor and Taylor's subordinates during Bockarie's numerous trips to Liberialqq The
Prosecution claims that the arms and ammunition obtained from Taylor and his subordinates
were used inter alia, to reinforce the RUF at their training base at Bunumbu,200 to capture
W3 Exhibit D-155, "United Nations Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the
Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/249, 18 March 1998", para. 6; Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 29 July
2009, pp. 25571-25572; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact AD; Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-
765, Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 5.
W4 Exhibit D-343, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1156, S/RES/1156 (1998), 16 March 1998;
Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report", pp.
1-2; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 7 September 2009, pp. 28261-28262; Decision on Judicial Notice,
Annex A, Fact E.
W5 Exhibit D-155, "United Nations Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the
Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/249, 18 March 1998"; Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth
Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998"; Exhibit D-191,
"United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999", para. 13; Exhibit P-132, "IRJN West Africa, Update 146,
University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center,16 February l998".
W6 Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 5; Exhibit P-132, "IR1N West
Africa, Update 146, University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center,16 February 1998"; Exhibit D-076, "Map
of Sierra Leone (marked by Dauda Aruna Forrrie)"; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10482-10486;
Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43959-43960; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5733; TF1-
371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2349-2350 (CS).
W7 The fighters looted food, clothing and vehicles from the civilian population and broke into a bank to loot
money. Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43963-43968; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp;
5734-5735; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2352-2355 (CS); TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp.
12501-12502; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7934-7937.
wg Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 238.
W) Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 239-248.
200 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 250.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Est ta
and hold on to Kono,2m and during the "Fitti—Fatta" mission, in the course of which
operations the RUF/AF RC forces committed crimes against the civilian population of Sierra
Leone.2O2
51. The Defence refutes the Prosecution allegations and submits that after President
Kabbah was reinstated, President Charles Taylor (as he then was) as a "point person" on the
Committee of Five, played a conciliatory role between the waning factions in Sierra
Leone.203
D. Civil War in Sierra Leone (1998-1999)
52. Following the ECOMOG Intervention, the RUF and AF RC forces retreated from
Freetown204 to Masiaka205 and onto Makeni.2O6 In late February—early March 1998,
combined AFRC/RUF forces attacked and ultimately captured Koidu Town (a.k.a. Kono),
the primary town in Kono District. 207
53. Koroma then went to Buedu to meet Bockarie and was later arrested by him on
suspicion of attempting to leave Sierra Leone with a large quantity of diamonds.208
Following this incident, Bockarie assumed control of the AFRC/RUF forces.2O9
201 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 251.
202 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 252-254.
203 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 502-517.
204 Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 5; Decision on the Prosecution Motion for
Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Fact , AD.
205 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December
2007, Annex A, Fact AD; Prosecutor v Tay/or, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009,
Annex A, Fact 5; Exhibit D-155, "UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
in Sierra Leone, S/1998/249, 18 March 2008", p. 2, para 6
206 TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2353-2354 (CS); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp.
10495-10496; Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, p. 5735; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p.
3095; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4498; TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12501; TFl-
539, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14136; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43991-43995.
207 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7943, 7946-7947; TFl-371, Transcript 28 January
2008, pp. 2355, 2358-2359 (CS); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10496-10497; Perry Kamara,
Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3098-3099; TFl-539, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14139-14140; Isaac
Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5737-5738; TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12503-12504.
203 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10526-10542; Exhibit D-084, "Revolutionary United Front,
Sierra Leone Defence Headquarters, Salute Report from Brigadier Issa Sesay, Battlefield Commander, RUF/SL,
to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September l999", p. 6; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44018-44027.
209 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3109-3110; Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, p.
5741; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF/SL, from
Major General Sam Bockarie", p. 5, ERN 9662; Exhibit D-084, "Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute
Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, 27

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ 77 18 May 2012

38 u 2.0
54. A few weeks later, ECOMOG and the CDF regained control of Koidu Town and the
AFRC/RUF forces retreated to other locations in Kono District, including an area referred to
as "Su erman Ground".2111 Followin defeat of the AFRC/RUF forces at Koidu Town, Alex
P 8
Tamba Brima a.k.a. Gullit , a former SLA member of the Su reme Council, led another
P
ou of redominantl AFRC soldiers north to Koinadu to `oin SAJ Musa.211 B that
SY P P Y gu J Y
time, SAJ Musa had based in Koinadugu District in the north of Sierra Leone, leading a
breakaway group of predominantly AFRC troops, refusing to accept that AFRC soldiers be
subordinate to RUF soldiers.212 ln mid 1998, Brima's group commenced a march through
the north of Sierra Leone to Cam Rosos, where the established a base, while SAJ Musa's
P Y
group remained in Koinadugu.213
55. ln mid—1998, Bockarie instructed the RUF's battlefield commander for Kono
District, Denis Min o a.k.a. Su erman , to make another attem t to ca ture Koidu Town.214
8 P P P
The attack on Koidu Town code—named Operation Fitti—Fatta was a failure and Bockarie's
group suffered heavy casualties.215 Following this attack, Superman assumed the leadership
of a group of predominantly RUF fighters travelling to Koinadugu to join SAJ Musa's
ou .216 ln October 1998, however, there was a violent dis ute between Su erman's ou
SY P P P SY P
and SAJ Musa's group which resulted in Musa's group relocating to Camp Rosos, while
Superman's forces retreated to a place referred to as "Pumpkin Ground".217 Following this
September 1999", p. 6, ERN 7761. See also TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6967; TF1-045, Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20202-20203; Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20413; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010,
p. 44028-44030, stating that Bockarie was the overall commander of the RUF at this point..
P
B10 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3112. 3182-3183; Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010,
p. 45973.
211 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8044; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December
2008, p. 21684; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44053.
212 Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 6; Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July
2010, pp. 43982-43983.
213 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3173-3183.
214 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3160; Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12209-
12213; Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12233-12241.
215 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp.
12236-12240; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3170-3171; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21
February 2008, pp. 4517-4519; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44054-44055; Transcript 11 Au ust 2010,
8
p. 45972.
216 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44054—44055; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3155-
3156, 3167-31769; TF1-375. Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February
2008, pp. 4524-4525.
217 Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 10; Komba Sumana, Transcript 6
October 2008, pp. 17966-17968; TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12578-12579; Perry Kamara, Transcript
6 February 2008, pp. 3209-3211; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4524-4528.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ·· 1 J 18 May 2012

?>%¤ at
incident, SAJ Musa severed ties with the RUF command and created an unaffiliated SLA
ou of a roximatel 1,000 fi ters at Cam Rosos, with Brima as his de ut .218
EY P PP Y P P Y
56. In late November 1998 or early December 1998, a meeting was held at Waterworks
in which Bockarie ordered his group to commence an attack.2l9 In mid-December 1998, an
attack on Kono commenced under the command of Issa Sesay, with ECOMOG forces
sustaining heavy casualties during their retreat.22O On 23 December 1998, Sesay's forces
ca tured Ma buraka and, on the followin da , took control of Makeni.22l
P S S Y
57. In mid-December 1998, SAJ Musa's group commenced its advance on Freetown and
by the end of December 1998 had reached Benguema on the outskirts of the capital.222
Following the capture of Benguema, SAJ Musa was killed and Brima took over as
commander of this group.223
58. The Prosecution submits that after the ECOMOG Intewention in mid-February 1998,
the Accused took immediate steps to secure the diamond-mining areas by planning or being
involved in a plan to take control and maintain control over Kono District. The plan was for
the AFRC/RUF to ho1d Kono and thereafter move to the capital to restore AFRC/RUF
control over Freetown. This plan resulted in the attacks on Kono in 1998. According to the
Prosecution a multi-axis offensive was implemented in late 1998 which culminated in the
attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999.224 _
218 Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 10; Komba Sumana, Transcript 6
October 2008, pp. 17966-17968; TF1-375, 24 June 2008, pp. 12578-12579; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February
2008, pp. 3209-3211; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4524-4528.
219 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5789-5794; Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp.
9418-9427; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2410-2411 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2640-
2642 (CS); Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44127-44129, 44138, 44160-44161.
220 Exhibit D-178, "United Nations Security Council, Second Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/20, 7 January 1999", p. 1.
22] Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa
Sesay on the Take Over of Koidu, 26 January 1999"; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44082—44083;
Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37918—37919; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12269-
12272.
222 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3211-3213; Exhibit D-178, "United Nations Security
Council, Second Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone,
S/1999/20, 7 January 1999", p. 2.
323 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8243-8246; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February
2008, pp. 3214-3216; Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 13.
224 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 147-175.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ,,.. 4/ 18 May 2012

3 Er 2 1-
59. The Prosecution claims that during the Freetown Invasion Bockarie went to
Monrovia to take instructions from the Accused225 and that during the second half of 1998
the Accused held clandestine meetings with Bockarie aimed at refining and implementing
the plan after the failed Fitti—Fatta mission.226 Furthermore, according to the Prosecution, the
Accused was instrumental in procuring and organising a major shipment of arms and
ammunition Burkina Faso that was supplied to the AFRC/RUF forces as part of this plan.227
60. The Defence denies that the Accused ever planned or ordered such offensives and
instead submits that the plan to capture Kono District was made by Bockarie and Superman
in Ma 1998.228 The Defence contests the alle ation that the Accused rovided Bockarie
Y S P
with arms and ammunition and argues that there is credible evidence that suggests that this
materiel was obtained from a variety of altemative sources.229 The Defence claims that the
Accused had never met Bockarie before his visit to Monrovia in September 1998230 but
acce ts that the Accused met with Bockarie on three occasions in late 1998 and maintains
P
that all meetings were open, transparent and arranged for the purpose of discussing
arrangements for facilitating peace in Sierra Leone.23 I
E. Civil War in Sierra Leone {1999-2002)
1. Freetown Attack
61. It is an adjudicated fact from the AF RC Trial Judgement that: "following the death
of SAJ Musa, the troops reorganised. On 5 January 1999, the Accused Brima gathered the
troops in Allen Town and told them the time had come to attack Freetown. On 6 January
1999, they invaded Freetown".232 During the operation, between 3,000 and 5,000 persons
were killed, including at least 2,000 civilians.233 Brima's forces held central Freetown for
four days, until a counter-attack by ECOMOG forces weakened their position.234 While the
225 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 173.
226 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 158-175, 1201.
227 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 257-264.
228 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 606.
229 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 926.
230 Defence rmi rmi Brief] para, 530.
23} Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 516-531, 920.
232 Decision on Judicial Notice of AF RC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 14.
233 Exhibit D-191, "United Nations Security Council. Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999", para. 21,
P4 Exhibit D-191, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United

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Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T 4/ 6'LQ 18 May 2012

38 12.2
AF RC managed a controlled retreat, RUF reinforcements arrived in Waterloo. On 24
February 1999, ECOMOG forces succeeded in expelling the rebels from Waterloo.235
62. The Prosecution submits that the Freetown invasion was a joint RUF and AF RC
operation.236 Brima commanded the AFRC troo s inside the cit while the RUF rovided
P P Y P
critical support by: (i) leading the nationwide offensive that altered the military balance in
Sierra Leone and made it possible for Brima's troops to enter Freetown;237 (ii) providing
communications, manpower and jet wamings;238 (iii) attacking ECOMOG forces at strategic
locations outside the city, which affected the battle inside;239 and (iv) giving orders from
Bockarie to be implemented during the attack.24O
63. The Defence submits that it was the AF RC, not the RUF, which planned and
executed the invasion and that the evidence that the Accused planned the attack with
Bockarie is contradictory and vague and does not show that the Accused "planned the
commission of crimes or was aware of the substantial likelihood of crimes as charged in the
Indictment as part of the January 6 invasion".241 Furthermore, the Defence maintains that the
arms and ammunition used by the AFRC to attack Freetown were not supplied by the
Accused, but rather captured by the AF RC during their approach to the capital.242
2. Lomé Peace Accord and Disarmament g 1999) J
64. On 7 January 1999, with the attack on Freetown ongoing, President Kabbah and
Foday Sankoh agreed to a ceasefire which was announced over the radio, but was
disregarded by the AFRC and RUF fighters. Further peace talks were facilitated by the
Accused and the other members of the Committee of Five and, on 18 May 1999, another
ceasefire agreement was signed in Lomé.243 This ceasefire agreement, however, failed to
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March l999", para. 2; Decision on Judicial Notice of
AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 15.
235 Exhibit D—l9l, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March l999", para. 3.
236 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 513.
D7 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 514.
P8 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 515.
239 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 516.
M Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 517.
241 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1345.
242 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1 1 12-1 1 13.
243 Exhibit D—l99, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successful Peace Talks in Lomé, l999", pp. 3, 9, 1 1.

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Case No.; SCSL—O3—O1—'1" / 6* 18 May 2012 M

2% aw-}
bring about the end of hostilities.244 On 7 July 1999, the Lomé Peace Accord was signed by
President Kabbah and Poday Sankoh.245 The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF
agreed to the immediate release of Sankoh, the transformation of the RUP into a political
party that would become part of the Government of Sierra Leone and amnesty for all
waning factions, including RUP members.246 Sankoh received a formal position within the
Sierra Leonean Government as Chairman of the Commission for the Management of
Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, a position with the status of
Vice-President of Sierra Leone.247
65. Despite the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord, hostilities continued.244 A splinter
group of AF RC fighters loyal to Koroma and known as the ‘"West Side Boys" continued to
attack ECOMOG forces and the civilian population in Port Loko District.249 In September
1999, Koroma and 13 of his subordinates issued a document claiming that the APRC had
been unrepresented, unrecognised and marginalised in the Lomé Peace Agreement.250 On 28
September 1999, Sankoh travelled to Monrovia to participate in two days of peace talks with
Koroma that were mediated by the Accused.254 Subsequently, the AF RC was included
244 Exhibit P-264, "Radio Log-Book 0008636-0008726", pp. 8653, 8656, 8658, 8660, 8662, 8665, 8668A,
8672; Exhibit D-022, "Sie1ra Leone News Archives, September 1999, Sierra Leone Web, 30 September l999";
Exhibit D-206, "Outgoing Code Cable, Urgent Issues, President Taylor's Request for Teleconference with the
Secretary General, to Riza for Secretary General, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas, RSG,
UNOL, Monrovia, 6 August l999;" Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26668-26669; Issa
Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44201-44203; Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1930; Isaac
Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6178-6180.
245 Exhibit D-224, "Letter to the President of Sierra Leone, Dr Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, from Foday
Saybana Sankoh, 29 October l999", para. 3; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 17 January 2008, pp. 1482-1483.
446 Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successful Peace Talks in Lomé, l999", pp. 35-36.
244 Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successful Peace Talks in Lomé, l999", pp. 35-36.
248 Exhibit P-264, "Radio Log-Book 0008636-0008726", pp. 8680-8681, 8687, 8701; Exhibit D-022, "Sierra
Leone News Archives, September 1999, Sierra Leone Web, 30 September l999"; Exhibit D-206, "Outgoing
Code Cable, Urgent Issues, President Taylor's Request for Teleconference with the Secretary General, to Riza
for Secretary General, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, 6 August
l999"; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp 26668-26669; Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July
2010, pp. 44201-44203; Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1930; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31
March 2008, pp. 6178-6180.
249 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44201-44203; Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p.
1930; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6178-6180; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April
2008, pp. 8416-8419; Transcript 24 April, pp. 8447-8760.
250 Exhibit D-022, "Sierra Leone News Archives, September 1999, Sierra Leone Web, 30 September l999".
254 Exhibit D-217, "Itinerary for the Visit of Hon. Foday Sankoh and Delegation Visit to Liberia, 8-30
September l999"; Exhibit P-530, "Ariicle, Sierra Leone News Archives, Sierra Leone Web, October l999"; Issa
Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44430-44431; Exhibit D-022, "Sierra Leone News Archives, September
1999, Sierra Leone Web, 30 September l999"; Exhibit D-217, "Itinerary for the Visit of Hon. Foday Sankoh and
Delegation Visit to Liberia, 8-30 September l999".

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4 18 May 2012 %

3*3 my
within the power—sharing government, with Koroma appointed as the Chairman of the
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace ("CCP").252
66. The Prosecution submits that the Accused's involvement in the Lome negotiations
were calculated to allow the Accused to give the appearance of a peacemaker, while
continuing his clandestine support for the RUF and AFRC.255 The Defence, however, denies
this allegation, and submits that the Accused's efforts towards achieving peace in Sierra
Leone were genuine.254 The disarmament process in Sierra Leone took time to eventuate.255
Bockarie strongly opposed RUF disarmament.256 On 14 December 1999 Bockarie resigned
from the RUF257 and in the same month left Sierra Leone with a group of men and relocated
to Monrovia.258 Some of the men who moved with Bockarie to Liberia were incorporated in
the Accused's ATU.259 The parties agree that Bockarie left Sierra Leone to Monrovia upon
the Accused's invitation, but while the Prosecution alleges that the Accused ordered
Bockarie to do so and that Bockarie's ariival in Liberia was kept secret,26U the Defence
submits that the Accused's actions were carried out under the auspices of ECOWAS as part
of the peace process.26l
3. RUF Capture of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers and Appointment of 1ssa Sesay as Interim
Leader (2000;
67. ln May 2000, the RUF captured between 400 and 500 UN peacekeepers in the area
between Lunsar and Makeni in Sierra Leone.262 Shortly after this, on 8 May 2000, Sankoh
was arrested by the Government of Sierra Leone and incarcerated in Freetown.265 Thereafter,
552 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8501-8503; Transcript 25 April 2008, p. 8644;
Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47190-4719].
555 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1, 38.
255 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 965, 101 1.
255 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32562-32566.
556 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2448-2450 (CS); Stephen Ellis, Transcript 18 January 2008 pp.
1595-1596; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28556-28557.
257 Exhibit D-003, "Radio Leg-Beers: BRN 8764.
555 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2449-2451 (CS); Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008,
pp. 882-883; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4571. 4573-4574; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April
2008, pp. 7037-7038; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, p. 26859
255 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30202-30203.
560 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 204, 334, 388.
26* Defence rmi rmi Brief, paras 663, 933, 1297.
562 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44505-44513; Abu Keita. Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-
2032; Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 36.
5°5 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44504-44505; Perry Kamara. Transcript 6 February 2008, p.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /6/ Og 18 May 2012 w

$@126
the UN peacekeepers were taken to Liberia and released after having been held hostage for
approximately three weeks.264 Subsequently, and due to the arrest of Foday Sankoh, Issa
Sesay was appointed as interim leader of the RUF.265 From mid-2000 fighting between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF ceased almost entirely266 and the RUF began to
take their commitment to disarm more seriously.267
68. The Prosecution submits that the Accused, as leader of the RUF, appointed Sesay as
the interim leader during an ECOWAS Heads of State meeting held in Monrovia on 26 July
2000.268 According to the Prosecution, the Accused ordered Sesay to release the hostages so
that the Accused could improve his standing in the international community and protect his
financial interests in Sierra Leone's diamond resources.269 The Defence, however, denies
that the Accused appointed Sesay as interim leader, and instead maintains that this
appointment was made by the ECOWAS Heads of State.270 The Defence submits that the
Accused earnestly negotiated for the unconditional release of the UN peacekeepers in
fulfilment of his responsibilities to ECOWAS and the international community.27l
_ 3269; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31656 (the Accused agreed that an incident
occurred at Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown); TF 1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15120-15121.
264 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44515, 44538-44539; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008,
pp. 3269-3270; Exhibit D-245, "Press Release, Secretary General Acknowledges Liberian President's Role in
Peacekeepers Release, SG/SM7396, Secretary General, Department of Public [nformation, New York, 15 May
2000"; Exhibit D-246, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs,
Liberia, 16 May 2000"; Exhibit D-244, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for
Presidential Affairs, Liberia, 13 May 2000"; Exhibit D-247, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry
of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia, 22 May 2000"; Exhibit D-250, "Fax—Letter, from the President of
Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General,
Oluyemi Adeniji, Government Statement, 23 May 2000"; Exhibit D-253, "Letter from President of Liberia,
Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor to President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 5 June
2000"; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 17 January 2008, p. 1482; Exhibit D-243, "Letter from General Issa Sesay, RUF
Field Commander, to the President of Liberia, Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 1 1 May 2000".
265 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 180; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 686-689.
266 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44570-44571.
267 Exhibit D-441A, "Witness Statement of Alpha Konaré, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, 13 March 2007";
Exhibit D-441B, "Witness Statement of Oluyemi Adeniji (Issa Sesay), Freetown/Nairobi (Telephone), 2 March
2008"; Exhibit D-441C, "Witness Statement of Daniel Opande, 7 March 2008"; Exhibit D-441D, "Witness
Statement of Ali Hassan, 10 March 2008; Exhibit D-441E, "Witness Statement of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (Issa
Sesay), Juba Hill,l2 May 2008".
268 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15145-15146, 15155-15156; Prosecution Final Trial Brief
paras 180-181.
i 269 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 178-179.
270 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44548-44552; Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 34.
271 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 93, 672-674.

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3% t 2.}
4. Abuja Peace Agreements and the end of the Sierra Leone Civil War (2000-2002)
69. On 10 November 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF sigr1ed a peace
a eement known as the "Abu`a 1 Peace A eement".m The two arties affirmed their
sr J sr P
commitment to the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999, agreed to an immediate ceasefire
and agreed to continue with the disarmament process.273 With the exception of skirmishes
between the CDF and the RUF in Kono District, the ceasefire generally held.274 A ceasefire
review conference was held in Abuja in May 2001, in what became known as the "Abuja 11
Peace Agreement". On this occasion, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
("UNAMS1L") joined the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone in tripa1tite
discussions.275
70. From mid-2001, the RUF began to make significant progress in the disarmament
rocess.276 B the end of 2001, the RUF had disarmed com letel and hostilities had ceased
P Y P Y
in all areas of Sierra Leone, with the exception of Kono District.277 On or about 18 January
2002, President Kabbah announced the end of hostilities in Sierra Leone, signalling the end
of the warm
272 Decision on Judicial Notice, Amiex A, Fact H; Exhibit P-587, "Agreement on cease—fire and cessation of
hostilities between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone, represented by Solomon Ekuma Berewa,
and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) represented by Jonathan Jim Kposowa, S/2000/ 191, 10 November
2000".
273 Exhibit P-587, "Agreement on cease—fire and cessation of hostilities between the Government of the
Republic of Sierra Leone, represented by Solomon Ekuma Berewa, and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
represented by Jonathan Jim Kposowa, S/2000/ 191, 10 November 2000".
274 Exhibit P—590, "United Nations Security Council, Eleventh Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/857, 7 September 2001j’.
275 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44572-44574.
276 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45337-45341.
277 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38696—38697.
278 Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 35; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact C.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / dm 18 May 2012

. $$12.3
III. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
71. The Defence raises several preliminary objections to aspects of the Prosecution case.
The Defence submits that; (i) the charges against the Accused should be dropped as he has
been selectively prosecuted;279 (ii) certain evidence falling outside of the scope of the
Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the court should be excluded or the purposes for which it is
used should be limited28O and (iii) the Defence has been prejudiced by the delay in the Trial
Chamber's ruling on its challenge to the pleading of the joint criminal enterprise, and that
, the Trial Chamber should therefore decline to consider joint criminal enterprise as a mode of
criminal responsibility against the Accused.28l The Defence also raises the issue of
discretionary payments and other inducements to witnesses made by the Prosecution,
submitting that a case of prosecutorial abuse of process has been made out with the
consequence of depriving the Accused of a fair trial.282
72. In this section, the Trial Chamber has also considered related Prosecution
submissions, in which it requests the Trial Chamber to consider evidence of (i) locations not
specifically pleaded in the Indictment;283 (ii) evidence of crimes not specifically pleaded in
the 1ndictment,2g4 (iii) evidence of crimes which fall within the "approximate" timeframes of
the Indictment.285
A. Selective Prosecution
73. The Defence submits that the prosecution of Taylor has from the outset been
selective and vindictive in nature. The Defence argues that Taylor was singled out for
prosecution on the basis of improper political motives, and that other individuals who are
similarly situated to Taylor were not prosecuted.22;6 According to the Defence, whereas the
record is replete with evidence of alleged assistance given before and during the Indictment
period (30 November 1996 through 18 January 2002) to members of the RUF by other
279 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 9-22.
280 Defence Final Trial Brief] paras 28-46.
281 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 47-71.
282 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 23-26.
283 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 662,
284 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 663.
285 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 662.
2% Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 9-22. See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 9 March
2011, pp. 49389-49390.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T Og 18 May 2012 M

African leaders, notably Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina
Faso, only Charles Taylor stands charged for assisting the RUF.287 The Defence argues that
it was improper for Taylor to have been prosecuted despite the fact that others, namely
Ghaddafi and Compaoré, who bear the same level of responsibility were not prosecuted.288
74. The Defence submits that it has satisfied the two-pronged test established in the
Celibiéi Appeals Judgement that a party alleging selective prosecution must establish (i) an
unlawful or improper (including discriminatory) motive for the prosecution and (ii) that
other similarly-situated persons were not prosecuted.289 The Defence argues that it has
satisfied the first prong of this test by establishing improper and discriminatory motives
behind Taylor's prosecution. It argues that Taylor was singled out and prosecuted on the
basis of political motives and interests of the United States,290 and that evidence for this
assertion can be found in Prosecutor David Crane's comments to the U.S. Congress29l and
leaked U.S. Embassy cables.292 It also submits that it has satisfied the second prong of the
test, as other individuals who were similarly situated to the Accused, such as Gaddafi and
Compaoré, were not prosecuted, despite statements made by Crane that they had participated
in the same joint criminal enterprise as Taylor.293 The Defence therefore requests that the
Trial Chamber make a finding of selective prosecution and dismiss all charges against
Taylor as a consequence thereof.294
75. The Prosecution submits that disclosing the sealed Indictment against Charles Taylor
to governments was completely proper and within the Prosecutor's powers and that there is
no basis for the Defence submission that this indicates some kind of political misconduct by
the Prosecutor or interference by a Government. The Prosecution denies that the prosecution
287 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 9- 10.
288 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 13; Exhibit D—404, Hearing — Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human
Rights and International Operations of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 109th
Congress, Second Session, Impact ofLiberia's Election on West Africa, 8 February 2006, p. 79, fn 1 1.
289 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 16, referring to Celibiéi Appeals Judgement, para. 61 1.
M Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 3, 5, 18, 22.
2% Exhibit D—404, "Hearing - Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations
of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 109th Congress, Second Session, Impact
of Liberia's Election on West Africa, 8 February 2006", p, 79, fn. 10.
292 Exhibit D-481, "United States Government (USG) Embassy Cable: Rising Concern about the Taylor
Prosecution Case (10 March 2009), Guardian.co.uk, 17 December 2010"; Exhibit D—482, "United States
Government (USG) Embassy Cables: the Protracted Case against Charles Taylor (April 15 2009),
Guardian.co.uk., 17 December 2010".
M Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1 1, 17.
204 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 22.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gm 18 May 2012 `E

3%l 30
of the Accused was politically motivated and submits that rather than demonstrating that the
prosecution of the Accused is in the interests of the United States Government, the evidence
demonstrates that the Accused and the Government of the United States had a close
relationship.295
76. Furthermore, the Prosecution submits that the second prong of the Cclibiéi test has
not been met, as no one is similarly situated to the Accused with respect to the armed
conflict in Sierra Leone. The Prosecution contends that the Accused had control over the
leaders of the groups that were perpetrating horrific crimes and there is far more evidence
linking the Accused to the crimes committed in Sierra Leone rather than Ghaddafr and
Compaoré, and that the majority of the assistance provided by other individuals went
through the Accused.296 The Prosecution also argues that while there is evidence that
Ghadaffi and Compaoré and the governments they headed aided the RUF, that evidence is
less than a tenth of the evidence involving Charles Taylor's assistance to the RUF and that
there is further evidence showing that a great majority of that aid went through Charles
Taylor.297
77. ln considering the question of selective prosecution, the Trial Chamber is mindful of
Article 15 of the Statute, which vests the Prosecutor with responsibility "for the
investigation and prosecution of persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of intemational humanitarian law...". ln doing so, the Prosecutor shall "act
independently as a separate organ of the Special Court. He or she shall not seek or receive
any instructions from any Government or from any other source".
78. _Article 15 of the Statute gives discretion to the Prosecutor to determine which
individuals are to be prosecuted for crimes under the Statute, based on investigations and
evidence gathered. ln the present case, the Defence alleges that others who bear
responsibility for these crimes equal to the responsibility of the Accused have not been
charged, and that the decision not to charge them has been improperly motivated by the
interests of the U.S. Government, constituting an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
295 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp. 49368-49370; Transcript 11 March
2011, pp. 49573-49574.
2% Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp. 49366-49368; Transcript 11 March
2011, pp. 49574-49575.
297 Prosecutor v. Zlzylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp. 49366-49367.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V//l [(19.. 18 May 2012

3% i gs
79. The Trial Chamber adopts the test set forth in the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the
Celibiéi case that in order to establish that there has been selective prosecution, the Defence
must establish: (i) an unlawful or improper (including discriminatory) motive for the
prosecution and (ii) that other similarly situated persons were not prosecuted.298 This test
puts a heavy burden on a claimant. To satisfy this test, the claimant must demonstrate "clear
evidence of the intent of the Prosecutor to discriminate on improper motives, and that other
similarly situated persons were not prosecuted".299 The threshold is a very high one. As the
ICTY Appeals Chamber noted, "it cannot be accepted that ‘unless all potential indictees who
are similarly situated are brought to justice, there should be no justice done in relation to a
person who had been indicted and brought to trial."’300
80. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has indicated that the rationale behind this test is
that:
the breadth of the discretion of the Prosecutor, and the fact of her statutory independence, A
imply a presumption that the prosecutorial functions under the Statute are exercised
regularly. This presumption may be rebutted by an appellant who can bring evidence to
establish that the discretion has in fact not been exercised in accordance with the Statute;
here, for example, in contravention of the principle of equality before the law [...]. This
would require evidence from which a clear inference can be drawn that the Prosecutor was
motivated in that case by a factor inconsistent with that principle. Because the principle is
one of equality ofpersons before the law, it involves a comparison with the legal treatment of
other persons who must be similarly situated for such a comparison to be a meaningful
one.3O
81. In the present case, the Defence adduced evidence to support its contention that the
Prosecutor's decision to prosecute Charles Taylor was improperly based on political motives
and interests of the U.S. Government. This evidence consists of comments made by
Prosecutor David Crane to the U.S. Congress, and his disclosure of the sealed Indictment to
the U.S. Government. However inappropriate Crane's actions may have been, in the view of
the Trial Chamber such actions do not constitute clear evidence of the intent of the
Prosecutor to discriminate on improper motives.
82. Given the failure of the Defence to establish that the Prosecution had a
discriminatory or improper motive to prosecute the Accused, it is not strictly necessary to
consider the additional question of whether there were similarly situated persons who were
M Celibiéi Appeals Judgement, para. 611.
299 Celibiéi Appeals Judgement, para. 610.
300 Celibiéi Appeals Judgement, para. 618; Akayesu Appeals Judgement, paras 93-97.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / "! 18 May 2012

3% l32.
not prosecuted. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber observes that in his statement to the U.S.
Congress, cited by the Defence, the Prosecutor referred to Charles Taylor as "a catalyst"
while characterizing Gaddafi and Compaoré as "compatriots" who backed Taylor. He
explained his decision not to indict Gaddafi and Compaoré in part on the basis of
"evidentiary issues".3O2 The Trial Chamber finds that the evidence in the record, and the
allegations made by the Prosecution against Charles Taylor, as well as the statements cited
by the Defence in support of its submission, do not establish that the Accused, Gaddafi and
Compaoré were similarly situated. The allegations against the Accused go well beyond the
scope of the allegations against the others, uniquely asserting that in addition to providing
support, the Accused exercised control over the leadership of those perpetrating the crimes
set forth in the Indictment.
83. For these reasons the Trial Chamber finds that neither of the two prongs of the test
for selective prosecution, set forth by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Celibiéi case and
adopted by the Trial Chamber, has been met. The Trial Chamber notes that the remedy
requested by the Defence, the dismissal of all charges against the Accused, would be in the
words of the ICTY Appeals Chamber an "entirely disproportionate response".3O3 In any
event, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused has not been singled out for selective
prosecution.
Finding
84. The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused has not been singled out for selective
prosecution.
B. Evidence Outside of the Scope of the Indictment and/or Jurisdiction of the
SPE
85. On 24 September 2010, the Defence submitted a motion requesting that the Trial
Chamber exclude and/or limit the use to be made of Prosecution evidence falling outside of
the temporal or geographical scope of the Indictment and/or the jurisdiction of the court.3O4
30* Celibiéi Appeals Judgement, para. 618; Akayesu Appeals Judgement, paras 93-97.
302 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 12.
303 Celibiéi Appeals Judgement, para. 618.
304 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03-01-T-1086, Defence Motion to Exclude Evidence Falling Outside of the

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T { $1 18 May 2012
/

3% I 3 3
The Trial Chamber held that the motion was premature at that time and that the said issues
would be more appropriately addressed by the parties in their final trial briefs and/or closing
arguments.3O3 The Defence raised this issue again in its Final Trial Brief, incorporating by
reference all arguments it had previously advanced in the motion.306
Timing of the Objections
86. The Prosecution submits that the Defence objections in relation to evidence outside
the scope of the Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the Court are not timely, as the Defence
did not object at the time that such evidence was adduced. It therefore submits that the
Defence has waived its right to make such obj ections.3O7
87. The Defence submits that it has objected previously to such evidence, including in its
Pre-Trial Brief which included a specific section urging "the Trial Chamber to be vigilant in
ensuring that there is no expansion of the territorial or temporal jurisdiction of the court via
the back door".3O8 However, it argues that the use of ex-temporal and ex-territorial evidence
was so widespread that it was impractical for the Defence to raise the objection every time it
arose.309 The Defence also argues that while it may itself have led such evidence during the
Defence case, the necessity for doing so was directly related to rebutting Prosecution
evidence. It therefore submits that, bearing in mind that the Defence has no burden of proof
and never has an obligation to put forth a case, whether or not the Defence has led such
evidence is immaterial and of no consequence to the relief it seeks vis-ei-vis Prosecution
evidence.330 I
88. Further, in its oral response, the Defence argues that the Prosecution's submission
that its objections are untimely is misplaced, as it raised these issues in its prior motion. The
Trial Chamber held that the motion was premature and that these issues should more
Scope of the Indictment and/or the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 24 September 2010.
3 03 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T—1101, Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude Evidence Falling
Outside the Scope of the Indictment and/or the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 6 October
2010 [Decision on the Evidence Falling Outside of the Indictment], p. 3.
306 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 29.
307 Prosecution Closing Arguments, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp. 49371—49372.
3 08 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 33, referring to Defence Pre-Trial Brief, paras 9-23.
309 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 33.
310 Defence Final Trial Brief. para. 45.

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Case No.; SCSL-03»01—T / Tr E 18 May 2012 `E

3% t 31+.
appropriately be raised in the Defence's final trial brief} 11 The Defence therefore submits
that it did not waive its right to object, but was only following the court's directive.312
89. In its Pre-Trial Brief the Defence objected to the Prosecution's use of "alleged facts
re-datin the indictment eriod and alle ed conduct said to have been committed outside of
P E P E
the territory of Sierra Leone".313 In particular, the Defence objected to evidence of crimes
committed in Liberia and evidence which pre-dated the Indictment period,314 and argued that
the Trial Chamber could rely on such evidence only in relation to an offence which
continues into the mandate year, to provide background or context, or as "similar fact
evidence" pursuant to Rule 93.315 The Defence also objected to such evidence in its opening
statement.3 1 °
90. Moreover, at several times during the presentation of the evidence,317 during its
submissions on applications by the Prosecution for the admission of evidence pursuant to
Rule 92bis,318 and in its Rule 98 submission,31q the Defence did raise objections about the
311 Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 11 March 201 1, p. 49614, referring to Decision on the Evidence
Falling Outside of the Indictment, p. 3.
312 Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 1 1 March 201 1, p. 49614.
313 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT, Corrigendum to Rule 73bis Taylor Defence Pre-Trial Brief, 18
May 2007, paras 9-23 ("Defence Pre-Trial Brief"). ..
314 Defence Pre-Trial Brief, paras 10, 11-12.
315 Defence Pre-Trial Brief, paras 14-16.
316 Defence Opening Statement, Transcript 13 July 2009, p. 24306.
317 Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1829, 1843-1844, where the Defence objected to evidence about attacks
in Guinea and Liberia on the basis that this evidence was outside of the geographical and temporal scope of the
Indictment; Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8054, and Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8077, where the Defence
objected to the admission of evidence from districts in Sierra Leone that were not pleaded in the Indictment and
indicated that this was a continuing objection; Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9148, where the Defence objected to
the admission of evidence from districts in Sierra Leone that were not pleaded in the Indictment and indicated
that this was a continuing objection; Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19798-19799, where the Defence objected
to the admission of evidence of fighting in Liberia on the basis that this evidence was outside of the geographical
and temporal scope of the Indictment.
318 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-579, Public with Confidential Annex A, Defence Objection to
‘Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence relating to inter alia Kono District — TF 1-
218 & TF1-304", 9 September 2008, paras 4(a), 19; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-589, Public with
Confidential Annex A, Defence Objection to ‘Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of
Evidence related to inter alia Kono District’ and Other Ancillary Relief, 12 September 2008, paras 5(a), 20;
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-597, Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Objection to ‘Prosecution
Notice Under 92bis for the Admission of Evidence related to inter alia Freetown and Western Area — TF 1 -023 &
TF1-029’ and Other Ancillary Relief, 17 September 2008, paras 5(a), 22; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-
598, Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Objection to ‘Prosecutor Notice under Rule 92bis for the
Admission of Evidence related to inter alia Kono District — TF1-195, TF1-197, TF1-198, TF1-206’ and Other
Ancillary Relief, 17 September 2008, paras 5(a), 21; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-626, Public with
Confidential Annex A, Defence Objection to ‘Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of
Evidence related to inter alia Freetown & Western Area — TF1-098, TF 1-104, TF1-227’ and Other Ancillary
Relief, 8 October 2008, paras 5(b), 20-21.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T j/ i 18 May 2012

A 3 8D g§
introduction of such evidence. The Defence also filed a motion prior to the close of the case
which raised the same objections that it has now addressed in its final submissions.32O
91. Therefore, while the Defence did not object every time evidence falling outside the
temporal or geographical scope of the Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the court was
introduced, it indicated at several points that its previous objections were continuing
obj ections.3 33 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Defence objected to this evidence
in a timely fashion, and dismisses the Prosecution's submissions to the contrary.
Submissions of the Parties
92. The Defence submits that the Prosecution has adduced a considerable amount of
evidence falling outside of the temporal and geographical scope of the Indictment. The
Defence objects that much of the ex-temporal and ex-teriitorial evidence adduced in the case
is irrelevant to the Indictment or falls outside the jurisdiction of the Special Court and should
be excluded from the Trial Chamber's consideration of the evidence in the case.322 The
Defence position is that there is so much evidence outside the scope of the Indictment that it
amounts to prejudice of such a nature that it far outweighs any probative value of such
evidence, and that therefore the admission of this evidence would contravene Rule 95 and
Amie 17.333
93. In particular, the Defence objects to certain specific categories of evidence: (i) any
evidence of a joint criminal enterprise falling outside of the temporal scope of the
Indictment;324 (ii) any evidence of atrocities in Liberia and elsewhere beyond Sierra Leone
falling outside the geographic and temporal scope of the Indictment.325
3 19 Transcript 6 April 2009, p. 24092, where the Defence objected to the receipt of radios from Charles
Taylor in 1991 to prove aiding and abetting as this occurred prior to the Indictment period; Transcript 6 April
2009, p. 24102, where the Defence objected to evidence about atrocities committed in Liberia.
320 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—0l—T—1086, Defence Motion to Exclude Evidence Falling Outside of the
Scope of the Indictment and/or the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 24 September 2010.
321 See, for example, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8077, and Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—0l—T, Transcript
7 May 2008, p, 9148, where the Defence noted it was making a continuing objection to the admission of
evidence from districts in Sierra Leone that were not pleaded in the Indictment.
322 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 34, 36.
323 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 34, 37.
324 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 38-39.
325 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 40—41.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T M (114. 18 May 2012 y)
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3 % a gra
94. As to category (i), the Defence argues that evidence that pre-dates the Indictment,
such as evidence relating to a common plan between the Accused and Foday Sankoh which
ori inated in the late 1980s, cannot be used to determine ilt.32°
g gu
95. As to category (ii), the Defence submits that such evidence has little relevance or
probative force other than to "blacken the Accused's character with the Trial Chamber",
which the Defence claims is not permitted pursuant to Rule 93, and violates Rule 95 and
Article 17.327 The Defence submits that the same holds true for the Accused's alleged role in
conflicts, arms-dealing and diamond-dealing throughout the African continent.328
96. The Defence specifically objects to the Prosecution's attempt to "push the frontiers
of Rule 93 evidence by suggesting that such evidence can found mens rea".329 The Defence
submits that evidence of a prior act of the Accused is not admissible for the purpose of
demonstrating a general propensity or disposition to commit the crimes charged, and is not
admissible to show that the accused is capable of committing the offence, or that on some
other occasion he had the intent to commit the offence.330 It submits that evidence of similar
conduct is only admissible where it is probative of some peculiar feature of the case or
where it is highly distinctive or unique such that it amounts to a signature or identifiable
pattern.33l
97. In its Final Trial Brief] the Prosecution submits that evidence falling outside the
tem oral and/or eo aphical sco e of the Court's 'urisdiction and/or the Indictment ma be
P g ST P J Y
admitted and relied upon by a Trial Chamber for multiple purposes, including:
(i) proving by inference the elements (in particular, criminal intent) of the criminal conduct
(i.e. elements of crimes and individual criminal responsibility) occurring during the temporal
jurisdiction of the court
(ii) establishing the contextual elements of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute
326 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 38.
m Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 40.
P8 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 40.
329 Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 96.
B0 Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 97.
3 31 Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 97.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / T l 18 May 2012 Q

B21?-]»
(iii) demonstrating a deliberate or consistent pattern of conduct, which can be relied upon to
establish intent, specific offences, including a campaign of terror and the use of child
soldiers and modes of liability charged in an indictment including command responsibility
and/or
(iv) providing the context in which the crimes are said to have been committed.332
Findings e
98. In many instances during the trial proceedings, the Trial Chamber held that evidence
falling outside of the temporal and/or geographical scope of the Indictment and/or the
jurisdiction of the court, was admissible pursuant to Rule 89(C), as it was relevant to the
context and/or chczpeczu requirements of the alleged crimes, or as evidence of a consistent
pattern of conduct under Rule 93.333 The Trial Chamber reiterates its previous decisions
concerning the admissibility of this evidence. However, insofar as the Defence submissions
constitute a request for clarification of the permissible and impermissible uses that may be
made of such evidence, the Trial Chamber will consider these submissions in determining
the limits to be placed on the use of this evidence.
(a) Temporal Scope
99. The Trial Chamber may convict an accused only where all of the elements required
to establish his guilt are present during the temporal jurisdiction of the court.334 The ICTR
Appeals Chamber has held that in order for the accused to be held liable, it must be shown
that:
a) The crime with which the accused was charged was committed in [the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal];
b) The acts and omissions of the accused establishing his responsibility under any of the modes of
responsibility referred to in Article 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute occurred in [the temporal jurisdiction of the
tribunal], and at the time of such acts and omissions the accused had the requisite intent (mens rea) in order to
be convicted pursuant to the mode of liability in question.3 3 3
3 3 2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 46-47.
333 See for example, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1830; Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8055; Transcript 21
April 2008, p. 8077; Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9149; Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19800.
334 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, ICTR—99—52—A, Judgement, 28 November 2007 [Nahimana et al. Appeal
Judgement], para. 313.
3 3 3 Nahimamz Appeal Judgement, para. 313. The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber was wrong
insofar as it had convicted the accused on the basis of criminal conduct which took place before 1994, and was
. therefore outside the temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See para. 314.

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3 2 was
100. In the Prlié case, an ICTY Trial Chamber dealt specifically with this issue in relation
to evidence led with respect to a joint criminal enterprise and held that "only criminal
conduct, in the form of a joint criminal enterprise or any other form of responsibility alleged
in the Indictment, taking place during the alleged material period [of the Indictment] may
form the basis for the conviction of the accused".336
101. A Trial Chamber may, however, rely on evidence that falls outside of the temporal
scope of the Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the following three
circumstances:
i. to clarify a given context;
ii. to establish by inference the elements, in particular the mens rea, of criminal
conduct occurring during the material period; or I
iii. to demonstrate a deliberate pattern of conduct.337
102. The Trial Chamber has dealt with evidence outside of the temporal scope of the
Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the court in accordance with such principles. The principles
applicable to establishing the elements of criminal conduct by inference, and evidence of a
consistent pattern of conduct are considered more specifically below.
(i) Establishing elements by inference
103. The ICTR Appeals Chamber has held that "evidence of a required element could
come from a time anterior to the mandate year, but what that evidence would prove was that,
at the point of time within the mandate year when the crime was allegedly committed, the
required element was present".338
336 Prosecutor v. Pr/ic, IT—04—74—T, Decision on Slobodan Praljak's Motion for Clarification of the Time
Frame of the Alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise, 15 January 2009 [Pr/ic Decision on Time Frame of Joint
Criminal Enterprise], p. 9.
337 Nahimana Appeal Judgement, para. 315; Pr/ic Decision on Time Frame of Joint Criminal Enterprise, p.
9.
338 Ngeze and Nahimana v. Prosecutor, ICTR—96—11—AR72 and ICTR—96—11—AR72, Decision on the
Interlocutory Appeals, 5 September 2000, p. 6, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 5. See also Simba v.
Prosecutor, ICTR—01—76—AR72.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction, 29 July
2004 [Simba Appeal Decision on Temporal Jurisdiction], footnote 5.

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3% B9
104. Even where conduct commences before the material period of the indictment and
continues during the indictment period, a conviction may be based only on that part of such
conduct which occurs during the material period.339 The Prosecution must therefore prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that such conduct continued into the Indictment period.
105. The Trial Chamber therefore emphasizes that it has not used evidence outside of the
temporal scope of the Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the court except insofar as inferences
can be drawn from such evidence about elements of the joint criminal enterprise and other
forms of liability which continue to exist during the Indictment period. The Prosecution
must therefore prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these elements continued into the
Indictment period.
(ii) Evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct — Rule 93
106. Rule 93 provides that:
Evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct relevant to serious violations of international humanitarian law
under the Statute may be admissible in the interests of justice.
107. The ICTR Appeals Chamber has established that evidence of a prior criminal act of
the accused is not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a general propensity or
disposition to commit the crimes charged.34O Prior criminal offences by the accused — even
of precisely the same offence with which the accused is charged, are not admissible if the
only purpose for their introduction is to establish that the accused was capable of
committing the offence, is inclined to commit the offence, or on some prior occasion did
have the intention to commit the criminal offence.341 Evidence of similar conduct is only
admissible if "it is probative of some peculiar feature of the case" or where it is "highly
distinctive and unique such that it amounts to a signature or an identifiable pattern".342
339 Na/zimana Appeal Judgement, para. 317.
340 Prosecutor v. Bagosora et. al, ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Admissibility of Proposed Testimony of
Witness DBY, 18 September 2003, para. 12 [Bagosora Decision on Witness DBY]; confirmed on appeal -
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-AR93 & ICTR-98-41-AR93.2, Decision on Prosecutor's Interlocutory
Appeals Regarding Exclusion of Evidence, 19 December 2003 [Bagosora Appeal Decision on Exclusion of
Evidence], para. 14.
34* mz.
342 Bagosora Decision on Witness DBY, para. 14; Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion
to Admit Evidence of a Consistent Pattern of Conduct, ICTR-07-9 1 -T, 20 February 2009, para. 4.

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108. The ICTR Appeals Chamber has also held that "even where pattern evidence is
relevant and deemed probative, the Trial Chamber may still decide to exclude the evidence
in the interests of justice when its admission could lead to unfairness in the trial proceedings,
such as when the prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence outweighs its probative
value".343
109. The Trial Chamber concurs with these principles and will follow this approach in
assessing evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 93.
(b) Geographic Scope
110. The Trial Chamber finds that the principles above are equally applicable to evidence
falling outside of the geographic scope of the Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the court. The
Trial Chamber will therefore consider evidence falling outside of the geographical
jurisdiction of the court only as it relates to the context or where it falls within the
parameters of Rule 93.
(i) Prejudice to the Accused as a Result of the Sheer Volume of Evidence Admitted
that Falls Outside of the Scope of the Indictment and/or Jurisdiction of the Court
111. The Trial Chamber considers that the sheer volume of evidence falling outside of the
scope of the Indictment and/or jurisdiction of the Special Court does not, of itself, amount to
prejudice which outweighs the probative value of such evidence. The Trial Chamber is
composed of professional judges who are capable of considering evidence for certain
permissible purposes, while excluding it from their consideration for impermissible purposes
that would prejudice the Accused. Further, the Defence has not clearly defined what
prejudice it has suffered. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the admission of this
evidence and its use for the purposes identified above does not contravene Rule 95 and
Article 17.
343 Bagasora Appeal Decision, para. 13.

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3%*114
C. Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment
(a) Evidence relating to locations in Sierra Leone not pleaded in the Indictment
Submissions of the Parties
112. The Prosecution submits that as locations within a District are pleaded using the
inclusive language "various 1ocations" and "throughout", the Trial Chamber should consider
all relevant evidence adduced where the evidence falls within the district pleaded in the
Indictment,344 even if the specific location has not been pleaded. The Prosecution alleges, in
relation to locations not specifically pleaded in the Indictment, that "considering the superior
position of the Accused, the fact that personal commission is not charged, and the
widespread nature of the alleged crimes, the Accused was provided adequate notice",
referring to the Appeals Chamber Judgement in the case of Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallorz and
Gbao.345
1 13. The Defence objects to Prosecution evidence relating to crimes committed in
locations in Sierra Leone that were not pleaded in the Indictment,346 and requests the Trial
Chamber to exclude such evidence or to impose strict limits on the degree to which such
evidence may be taken into consideration.347 The Defence cites as authority for this position
the AFRC Trial Judgement, where the Trial Chamber held that while such evidence could be
used for other purposes, such evidence could not be used for a finding of guilt for those
crimes perpetrated in locations not charged in the Indictment.348
Findings
1 14. In Prosecutor v. Brima, Kumara and Kanu, the Trial Chamber held that:
The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution has led a considerable amount of evidence
with respect to killings, sexual violence, physical violence, enslavement and pillage which
occurred in locations not charged in the indictment. While such evidence may support proof
of the existence of an armed conflict or a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population, no finding of guilt for those crimes may be made in respect of such locations
not mentioned in the indictment.
344 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 662.
345 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, footnote 1798.
346 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 31, 42-46.
347 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 46.
348 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 46, referring to Prosecutor v. Brima, Kumara and Kcmu, SCSL-04-16-T,
Judgement (TC), 20 June 2007 [AFRC Trial Judgement], para. 37.

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3% M2.
[...]
Moreover, the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals makes it clear that an
accused is entitled to know the case against him and is entitled to assume that any list of
alleged acts contained in an indictment is exhaustive, regardless of the inclusion of words
such as "including", which may imply that other unidentified crimes in other locations are
being charged as well.
In light of the above, the Trial Chamber will not make any finding on crimes perpetrated in
locations not specifically pleaded in the Indictment. Such evidence will only be considered
for proof of the chapeau requirements of Articles 2, 3 and 4 where appropriate, that is the
widespread or systematic nature of the crimes and an armed conflict.34°
This approach was upheld by the Appeals Chamber.35O
115. In the RUF Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber held that locations must be
pleaded with specificity if the Accused is charged with having "personally committed" such
crimes.35l The Trial Chamber is of the view that whether or not the Accused is charged with s
having personally committed the alleged crimes, or is charged under another mode of
liability, he is nevertheless entitled to know the case against him and is entitled to assume
that any list of alleged acts contained in an indictment is exhaustive, regardless of the use of
words such as "including", which may imply that other unidentified crimes in other
locations are being charged as well.352
116. However, consistent with the AFRC Trial Judgement, evidence of crimes committed
at locations not specifically pleaded in the Indictment will be considered in relation to proof
of the chapeau requirements of Articles 2, 3 and 4 where appropriate, i.e. to prove the
widespread or systematic nature of the crimes or the existence of an armed conflict.353 Such
evidence may also be used pursuant to Rule 93 as proofof a consistent pattern of conduct.354
349 AFRC Trial Judgement, paras 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
350 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kumara and Kanu, SCSL-04-16-A, Judgement (AC), 22 February 2008 [AFRC
Appeal Judgement], para, 64
W Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallort and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-A-1321, Judgement (AC), 26 October 2009 [RUF
Appeal Judgement], para. 832.
352 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 37, referring to Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1
September 2004 [Brdjanin Trial Judgement], para. 397; Prosecutor v. Brdanirt, IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion
for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis, 28 November 2003 [Brdjanin Decision on Motion for Acquittal], para. 88,
referring to Prosecutor v. Stakié, IT-97-24-T, Judgement (TC), 31 July 2003 [Sta/tic Trial Judgement], para. 772.
Trial Chamber I in the AFRC case came to a similar finding, see Prosecutor v. Brima, Kumara and Kanu, SCSL-
04-16-PT-046, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion on Defects in the Form of the Indictment
(TC), l April 2004 [Kamara Decision on Form of Indictment], para. 42.
D3 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 38. 4
354 See Preliminary Issues: Evidence Outside the Scope of the Indictment.

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Bam-3
117. The Trial Chamber notes that whereas the Prosecution has pleaded specific locations
in Freetown and the Western Area for the crimes of Terrorizing the Civilian Population,
Unlawful Killings, and Physical Violence, it did not do so with respect to the crimes of
Sexual Violence, Abductions and Forced Labour, and Pillage. With respect to districts, the
r Trial Chamber has not considered crimes that took place in locations not specifically cited in
the lndictment, with the exception of continuing crimes. However, and although the
Prosecution has inconsistently pleaded in this respect for crimes in Freetown and the
Western Area, because Freetown and the Western Area is not a district, the Trial Chamber
finds that the pleading of the location of Freetown and the Western area without specific
locations is sufficient to provide adequate notice to the Accused for the crimes of Sexual
Violence, Abductions and Forced Labour, and Pillage.
118. Further, the Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution has not been consistent with
respect to its pleading of offences of a continuous nature. For example, with respect to the
crimes of sexual slavery and the enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers, the
Prosecution has not pleaded any locations. However, with respect to enslavement, which is
also an offence of a continuous nature, the Prosecution has specified locations in Kenema
and Kono Districts but not in the districts of Kailahun or Freetown and the Western Area.
119. However, notwithstanding this inconsistency, the Trial Chamber, in accordance with
the AFRC Trial Judgement, considers that the prolonged nature of these crimes, especially
in the context of the Sierra Leone conflict where the perpetrators were often on the move
between villages and districts over a significant period of time, may make pleading
particular locations sometimes impracticable. Therefore, while it is the Prosecution's duty to
provide any material facts on the alleged crimes within its possession so as to enable the
Accused to prepare a defence,355 nevertheless in the present case a significant amount of
evidence has been adduced in respect of each of these crimes over the course of a lengthy
trial. Moreover, the Defence has not specifically objected to the lack of specificity of
locations relating to the crimes of sexual slavery, the enlistment, conscription and use of
child soldiers or enslavement in Counts 5, 9 and 10. Accordingly, in the interests of justice,
the Trial Chamber will treat the pleading of these counts in the Indictment as permissib1e.356
355 See AFRC Trial Judgement, paras 39-40.
356 See AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 41.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T [ gu 18 May 2012

?>%¤ w+
(b) Evidence relating to crimes not specifically pleaded in the Indictment
Submissions of the Parties j
120. In relation to evidence of criminal acts not specifically pleaded in the Indictment, the
Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber "should also consider for guilt of the Accused
all relevant evidence adduced where the evidence falls within the District and the
approximate time frames specified by the Indictment".357
121. In support of this proposition the Prosecution submits that the Indictment uses
inclusive language in Count 6, namely "sexual violence [...] including" indicating that all
forms of sexual violence constituting ‘outrages against personal dignity’ including evidence
of sexual violence against male victims358 should be considered for guilt under Count 6 not
just evidence of rape and sexual slavery.359 Similarly, as Counts 7 and 8 refer to "physical
violence [...] including", it submits that the Trial Chamber should consider all forms of
physical violence constituting "cruel treatment" under Count 7 or "inhumane treatment"
under Count 8 for guilt of the Accused under these counts, and not just evidence of
mutilations and/or beatings.3°O
122. The Prosecution argues that "an additional ground in support of the above approach
to the evidence which can be taken into consideration for guilt of the Accused under Counts
6 to 8 is that the Accused has been provided with timely, clear and consistent notice of the
material facts underpinning the charges by the Original Indictment, First Amended
Indictment, Indictment, Case Summary, Pre-Trial Brief] opening statement and/or witness
statements".3°l
123. The Defence has not made any specific submissions on this issue.
Deliberations
124. The particulars pleaded in relation to Count 6 of the Indictment ("Outrages upon
Personal Dignity") refer to "widespread acts of sexual violence against civilian women and
357 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 662.
358 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 665.
359 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 663.
360 rm.
M Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 664-665.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T f Gia 18 May 2012

Eva:
girls, including" rape, abductions and sexual slavery, but do not allege any other forms of
sexual violence nor sexual violence against male victims.362 The particulars of Counts 7 and
8 ("Physical Violence") allege only beatings and mutilations, but do not refer to any other
forms of physical violence.363
125. Hence the Indictment does not provide the Accused with any notice that he is
charged with any form of sexual violence other than rape, abduction or sexual slavery of
girls and women under Count 6, or that he is charged with physical violence constituting
cruel treatment other than beatings and mutilation under Counts 7 and 8.
126. The Prosecution is, in effect, submitting that the Trial Chamber should consider
evidence of criminal acts not specihcally pleaded in the Indictment. Such submission comes
late in the proceedings without prior notice to the Defence. Charges against an accused and
the material facts supporting those charges must be pleaded with sufficient precision in an
indictment so as to provide notice to the accused.3°4 Moreover, an accused is entitled to
know the case against him and to assume that any list of alleged acts contained in an
indictment is exhaustive, regardless of the use of words such as "including".365 Therefore an
indictment which fails to satisfy these requirements is, to that extent, clearly defective.
127. However, a defective indictment may be said to be cured if the accused has
nevertheless been given sufHcient notice of the case he has to answer. The Trial Chamber
has previously held that:
If the indictment is found defective because it fails to plead material facts or does not plead
them with sufficient specificity, a Trial Chamber must consider whether the accused was
nonetheless accorded a fair trial. Where an accused has received timely, clear, and
consistent information iiom the Prosecution detailing the factual basis underpinning the
charge, the defects in the indictment are considered to be cured and a conviction may be
362 Second Amended Indictment, paras 14-17.
363 Second Amended Indictment, paras 19-21.
364 Seromba v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgement (AC), 12 March 2008 [Seromba Appeal
Judgement], paras 27, 100; Simba v. Prosecutor, ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement (AC), 27 November 2007 [Simba
Appeal Judgement], para. 63; Nluhimana v. Prosecutor. ICTR-95-1B-A, Judgement (AC), 21 May 2007
[Muhimana Appeal Judgement], paras 76, 167. 195; Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-01-64-A, Judgement (AC),
7 July 2006 [Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement], para. 49; Ndindabahizi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-01-71-A, Judgement
(AC), 16 January 2007 [Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement], para. 16.
365 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 37, referring to Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1
September 2004 [Brdanin Trial Judgement], para. 397; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Decision on Motion for Acquittal,
para. 88, referring to Sta/cié Trial Judgement, para. 772. Trial Chamber I in the AFRC case came to a similar
finding, see Kanu Decision on Form of Indictment, para. 17; Kamara Decision on Form of Indictment, para. 42.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // GIA 18 May 2012

Bwuk
entered. If insufficient notice has violated the accused's right to a fair trial, no conviction
may result.366
128. In the present case, the only document cited by the Prosecution that provides notice
that sexual violence was alleged to have been committed against men is the Original
Indictment667 which alleged that attacks against civilians included sexual violence against
men.666 This allegation was subsequently deleted from the general charges section of the
First and Second Amended Indictments. It was therefore reasonable for the Accused to
conclude that the Prosecution no longer intended to proceed with this particular charge.
129. The Prosecution has failed to point to any references in the charging documents669
capable of providing timely, clear and consistent notice to the Accused of allegations of any
forms of sexual violence other than rape and sexual slavery, or to physical violence
constituting cruel treatment other than beatings and mutilation.676
130. In relation to the Prosecution's submission that such notice was provided by the
disclosure of witness statements, the Trial Chamber notes that while witness statements
may, in some cases, be found to put an accused on notice of a charge and therefore cure a
defective indictment,} 71 mere service of witness statements by the Prosecution in discharge
of its disclosure obligations does not always suffice to inform an accused of material facts
that the Prosecution intends to prove at trial.672 Witness statements/sumrnaries will only put
an accused on notice if the allegations provide specific references to the relevant counts or
366 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 47, citing Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Kos, Radic, Zigic and Prcac, IT-98-30/ 1-
A, Judgement (AC), 28 February 2005 [Kvoéka et al. Appeal Judgement], para. 33, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,
Kupreskic, Kupreskic, Josipovic and Santic, [T-95-16-A, Judgement (AC), 23 October 2001 [Kupreskic Appeal
Judgement], para. 1 14, Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 217 quoting Gacumbtsi Appeal Judgement, para. 49;
Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement (AC), 13
December 2004 [Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement], para. 27; Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki and
Imanishimwe, ICTR-99-46-A, Judgement (AC), 7 July 2006 [Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement], paras 28, 65.
See also Prosecutor v. F ofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-A-829, Judgement (AC), 28 May 2008, [CDF Appeal
Judgement], para. 443.
367 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I, Indictment, 7 March 2003 [Original Indictment], para. 30.
366 Original lndictment, para. 30, which alleges "[t]he attacks included unlawful killings, physical and sexual
violence against civilian men, women and children". However, the particulars in relation to Counts 4-6 do not
include any reference to sexual violence committed against men.
666 Original Indictment; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-075, Amended Indictment and Case Summary
accompanying the Amended Indictment, 17 March 2006 [First Amended Indictment], Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-T-327, Prosecution Notification of Filing of Amended Case Summary, 3 August 2007 [Case
Summary]; Pre-Trial Brief; Opening Statement, Transcript 6 June 2007; and/or witness statements.
376 See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, footnote 1807.
671 RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 126.
372 Prosecutor v. Naletilié and Martinovic, IT-98-34-A, Judgement (AC), 3 May 2006 [Naletilic Appeal
Judgement], para. 27.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T if (h. 18 May 2012

38 1%:1*
paragraphs of the indictment to which they relate,373 and will generally Only be found to cure
a defect in the indictment when considered in conjunction with other materials (e. g. a pre-
trial brief) which provide clear and consistent notice to the accused.374
131. In this case, the claim by the Prosecution that, notwithstanding, its failure to specify
these additional criminal acts in the Indictment, the Accused has been given timely clear and
consistent notice by "witness statements" has not been supported by reference to any
portions of these witness statements capable of providing such notice. Moreover, as witness
statements were Only disclosed to the Defence, not to the Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber
is not in a position to consider whether they provide the Defence with timely, clear and
consistent notice.
Findings
132. In asmuch as the Prosecution seeks to prove the guilt of the Accused for criminal
acts not specifically pleaded in the Indictment, the Trial Chamber finds that the Indictment is
defective in that it fails to plead the material facts of those criminal acts. Moreover, such
defect cannot be said to be cured, since the Accused has not been provided with timely, clear
and consistent notice that he is charged with any such criminal acts.
133. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber holds that granting the Prosecution's submission to
consider evidence of all f0nns of sexual vi0lence, including sexual vi0lence against men
under C0unt 6, and all f0nns of physical vi0lence constituting "cruel treatment" under
C0unts 7 or 8, would be unfair and prejudicial to the Accused and would be tantamount to
allowing the Prosecution to amend the Indictment without specifically seeking leave to do s0
under Rule 50.375
134. The Trial Chamber therefore will not consider evidence of sexual vi0lence other than
rape and sexual slavery as charged in the Indictment under C0unt 6. Furthennore, the Trial
Chamber will not consider evidence of physical vi0lence constituting cruel treatment other
373 Naletilié Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-00-55A-A, Judgement (AC), 29
August 2008 [Muvunyi Appeal Judgement], para. 98.
374 Ntakirutimamz Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
375 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 418. See a1s0 Mtzvunyi Appeal Judgement, para. 28, and AFRC Trial
Judgement, where the Trial Chamber held at paragraph 80 that "the Prosecution cannot be permitted to mould
the case against the Accused as the trial progresses".

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / (DA 18 May 2012 %
x

3% I 4%
than evidence of mutilations and/or beatings as charged in the Indictment under Counts 7
and 8. ·
(c) Timeframes not pleaded precisely in the Indictment
Submissions of the Parties
135. The Prosecution submits that since timeframes in the Indictment are pleaded using
the inclusive language "between about [...] and about", the Trial Chamber should consider
all relevant evidence adduced where the evidence falls within the approximate timeframes
specified by the Indictment.376 The Prosecution does not specify how proximate to the
timeframes pleaded the evidence must be in order for the Trial Chamber to consider it.
136. The Defence has not specifically responded to this submission, beyond reiterating
that there must be limits to the use that the Trial Chamber may make of evidence falling
outside of the scope of the Indictment.377
Findings
137. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR has held that "a broad date range does not, in and
of itself invalidate a pleading"378 and Trial Chambers at the ICTR and ICTY have held that
while specificity is preferable, if a precise date cannot be specified, a "reasonable range of
dates" may be provided.379 Trial Chamber I has also held that timeframes pleaded in the
RUF Indictment, which are similar to those pleaded in the Indictment in the instant case,
provided the Accused with sufficient information for him to understand the nature of the
charges and to prepare his defence.380 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that given the
376 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 662.
377 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 3l.
378 Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, paras 58-59. See also RUF Trial Judgement, para. 426.
379 Prosecutor v. Ntawukulilyayo, ICTR-05-82-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion Alleging
Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 28 April 2009 [Ntawukulilyayo Decision on the Form of the Indictment],
para. 15; Prosecutor v. Niseyimana and Hategekimana, ICTR-00-55-I, 25 September 2007, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for Severance and Leave to Amend the Indictment Against Idelphonse Hategekimana
[Niseyimuna Decision on Leave to Amend the Indictment], para. 33; Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, ICTR-200l-63-
I, Decision on Defence Motion on Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 27 September 2006 [Nc/uzmihigo
Decision on the Form of the Indictment], para. l7; Prosecutor v. Brayanin, IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Objections
By Momir Talié to the Form of Amended Indictment (TC), 20 February 2001 [Brojanin Decision on the Form of
the Indictment], para. 22.
330 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 426.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-0l-T / FP 18 May 2012
L.

2>~z¤ Lee;
nature of the case, the timeframes in the Indictment provide the Accused with sufhcient
information for him to understand the nature of the charges and to prepare his defence.
D. Prejudicial Delay in the Trial Chamber's Ruling on the Defence's
Challenge to the Pleading of the Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Mode of Liability
Background
138. In a motion Hled on 14 December 2007, the Defence challenged the sufhciency of
the pleading of joint criminal enterprise ("JCE") in the Indictment on several grounds, the
most signihcant of which was the legal and factual ambiguities surrounding the common
purpose of the alleged J CE.3 81 The Trial Chamber ruled orally on this matter on 19 February
2009,382 and issued a written decision on 27 February 2009.383 The Trial Chamber by
majority, Justice Lussick dissenting, held that paragraphs 5, 9, 14, 22, 23, 28, 33 and 34 of
the Indictment, when taken together "fulHl the requirements for pleading J CE and serve to
put the Defence on notice that the Prosecution intended to charge the Accused with having
participated in a [JCE]".3g4
139. The Trial Chamber further found that "a campaign to terrorize the civilian population
of the Republic of Sierra Leone" as alleged in paragraph 5 (when read in conjunction with
paragraph 33) was the "common purpose" of the alleged JCE and the crimes charged in
counts 2 through 11 were part of the "campaign of terror" or were a reasonably foreseeable
consequence thereof.385 Justice Lussick dissented, holding that "the Accused should not be
381 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-378, Public Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal Defect in the
Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment relating to the Pleading of JCE, 14 December 2007 [Taylor Defence
Motion on JCE]. See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-388, Public Defence Reply to ‘Prosecution
Response to Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment
relating to the Pleading of JCE,’ 14 January 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-446, Consequential
Submission in Support of Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second
Amended Indictment relating to the Pleading of JCE, 31 March 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-754,
Defence Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal Defect in the
Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment relating to the Pleading of JCE, 2 March 2009; Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-T-767, Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions regarding the Majority Decision concerning the
Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended Indictment, 26 March 2009; and Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-
769, Corrigendum to Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions regarding the Majority Decision concerning the
Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended Indictment, 30 March 2009.
3*2 Transcript 19 rppmary 2009, pp. 24052-24053.
383 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-752. Decision on Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal Defect
in the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment relating to the Pleading of JCE, 27 February 2009 [Taylor
Trial Chamber Decision on JCE].
334 Taylor Trial Chamber Decision on JCE, para. 70.
385 Taylor Trial Chamber Decision on JCE, para. 71.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ON 18 May 2012

3@S¤
required to undergo the brain-twisting exercise of reading together paragraphs 5, 9, 14, 22,
23, 28, 33 and 34 of the Indictment in order to fathom what facts are most likely to form the
basis of his alleged joint criminal enterprise liability".386
140. On 1 May 2009, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber Decision on
JCE 387
Submissions of the Parties
141. The Defence alleges that the amount of time taken by the Trial Chamber to render a
decision on the Defence Motion on JCE was inordinate and unreasonable and resulted in
irremediable prejudice to the Accused's fair trial rights.388
142. The Defence notes that the Trial Chamber Decision on JCE in this case was only
rendered on the day that the Prosecution closed its case, and submits that the jurisprudence
indicates a clear preference for the resolution of any ambiguity in an Indictment as soon as it
emerges, and in any event, pre-tria1.389 It submits that there are several forms of prejudice
that resulted from this unreasonable delay, namely: (i) the Accused could not conduct
meaningful pre-trial investigation into the alleged common purpose and the nature of the
Accused's participation in it, (ii) effective cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses
regarding the common purpose of the J CE and the Accused's participation in it was severely
undermined and hindered by the unresolved legal ambiguities surrounding the Indictment
and (iii) preparation for the Defence case during the currency of the Prosecution's case was
fractured and impossible to progress due to uncertainty regarding which J CE allegations to
defend and (iv) the very fact of a Majority opinion on the J CE Motion serves to confirm that
reasonable minds, including those of the judges, differed in their understanding of what the
common purpose of the alleged J CE was.39O I
386 Trial Chamber Decision on JCE — Dissenting Opinion of Justice Richard Lussick, 27 February 2009,
para. 15; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-761, Corrigendum to Decision on Public Defence Motion
Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of JCE —
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Richard Lussick.
387 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-775, Decision on Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions
regarding the Majority Decision concerning the Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended Indictment, 1 May
2009 [Taylor Appeal Chamber Decision on JCE], paras 21-23.
388 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 52; Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 11 March 2011, pp. 49578-
49580.
W Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 54.
390 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 55. j

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ya os t
143. The Defence therefore requests that the Trial Chamber remedy this prejudice by
exercising its discretion, in the interests of justice, in declining to consider JCE as a mode of
criminal responsibility against the Accused.39l
144. The Prosecution submits that the Defence is simply revisiting issues already decided
in the J CE Trial and Appeal Decisions. It alleges that the Defence submissions in relation to
the I CE "do not make sense when the decision of both the Trial Chamber and the Appeal
Chamber was that the indictment, the long—existing indictment, correctly pled a joint
criminal enterprise in which the means used to obtain the objectives was a crime within the
statute and jurisdiction of the Court and that is the crime of terrorism".392 The Prosecution
therefore takes the position that as the Indictment put the Accused on notice of the common
purpose of the ICE, the Defence carmot complain that it was prejudiced by the late ICE
Decision.393
Findings
145. In relation to the time it took to render the ICE Trial Chamber Decision, the Trial
Chamber notes that the JCE Motion was filed by the Defence on 14 December 2007,
pending the resolution of the Appeal in the AFRC Case. AHer the delivery of the AFRC
Appeal Judgement on 22 February 2008, the Trial Chamber invited both parties to file
consequential pleadings, taking into consideration the Appeals Chamber's findings.394 These
consequential submissions were Hled by the parties on the 31 March 2008,395 10 April
20083% and 15 April 2008,397 respectively. The Trial Chamber ruled orally on this matter on
19 February 2009,398 and issued the I CE Trial Chamber Decision on 27 February 2009.
W Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 59, 71.
392 Prosecution Oral Response, Transcript 9 March 2011, p. 49377.
303 Prosecution Oral Response, Transcript 9 March 201 1, pp. 49377—49378.
394 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-434, Scheduling Order in Relation to the Urgent Defence Motion
A Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of the J CE,
6 March 2008.
305 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T—446, Consequential Submission in Support of Urgent Defence
Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of
JCE, 31 March 2008.
3% Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-463, Prosecution Response to the Defence's Consequential
Submissions Regarding the Pleading of JCE, 10 April 2008.
W Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T—473, Defence Reply to the Prosecution Response to the Defence's
Consequential Submission Regarding the Pleading of JCE, 15 April 2008.
398 Transcript 19 February 2009, pp. 24052-24053.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1-T GQ 18 May 2012

3% I 5 1
146. The Trial Chamber found in the ICE Trial Decision that the Indictment provided the
Accused with sufficient notice of the common purpose of the ICE. The Trial Chamber
therefore did not need to consider whether subsequent disclosure by the Prosecution
provided "timely, clear and consistent" information regarding the common purpose of the
ICE.
147. Consequently, the Accused was on notice from 29 May 2007, when the Second
Amended Indictment was filed, of the common purpose of the ICE. As the Trial Chamber
found that the pleading was not defective (a finding that was upheld by the Appeals
Chamber), the Defence therefore did not suffer any prejudice resulting from the fact that the
ICE Decision was rendered only at the close of the Prosecution case. The Trial Chamber
therefore finds that the Defence has not established that it was irremediably prejudiced by
the delay in rendering the ICE Trial Decision, nor that the Accused was denied a fair trial as
a consequence of this delay.
E. Discretionary Payments and Other Inducements to Witnesses by the
Prosecution
148. The Defence also raises the issue of discretionary payments and other inducements to
witness by the Prosecution, submitting that this constitutes a prosecutorial abuse of process
and has deprived the Accused of a fair trial.399 The Trial Chamber has dealt with these
objections in Section IV(b), "Forms of Evidence under Review".
F. Suppression of Evidence
149. The Prosecution submits that by virtue of the resolution initiating the SCSL on 14
August 2000, the report of the Panel of Experts four months later, finding "clear and
convincing evidence" of Taylor's support for the RUF, the signing of the Agreement
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN creating the SCSL on 16 I anuary 2001
and the first seven indictments issued on March 2003 of former AFRC and RUF leaders
refening to Taylor's involvement in a "common purpose", the Accused became aware that
399 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 23-26.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T @26 18 May 2012

3 % I5 3
he would probably face trial for crimes in Sierra Leone.4OO Accordingly, he ordered the
arrest, torture or execution of anyone who might "betray" him.
150. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused arrested joumalist Sorious Samura and
others in August 2000 and threatened them with death, which led to their promise to
discontinue their investigative work on accusations that the Accused was involved in
diamond-smuggling, gun-running and support to the RUF.40l The Prosecution also alleges
that the Accused arrested joumalist Hassan Bility seven times between 1997 and 2002,
tortured him and threatened him with death, following his disclosures of information
pertaining to Liberian support for the RUF.4O2 The Defence submits that these arrests had
nothing to do with information disclosures.403
151. The Prosecution further alleges that the Accused ordered the killing of Denis Mingo
(a.k.a. Superman), Sam Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koroma, and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle).404 I
152. Although these allegations fall outside the scope of the Indictment, the Prosecution
argued that they were efforts by the Accused to suppress evidence of his role and that they
are relevant to his consciousness of guilt.4O5
153. The Defence does not make submissions with respect to the alleged killing of Denis
Mingo, Sam Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koroma and Daniel Tamba. However, the Defence
generally submits that the Prosecution has adduced a considerable amount of evidence that
falls outside the temporal and geographical scope of the Indictment. The Defence had
objected previously to such evidence, maintaining that the use of ex-temporal and ex-
territorial evidence by the Prosecution was so widespread that it proved impractical for the
Defence to raise the same objection at every tum.4O6 Furthermore, the Defence submits that
much of that evidence is irrelevant to the Indictment, contrary to the interests of justice and,
in any event, adversely prejudicial to the Accused such that it contravenes both Rule 95 and
400 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1175-1176.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 1186.
102 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para 1187,
403 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1428.
MH Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1176.
105 Prosecution Closing Arguments, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp. 49372-49373.
406 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 33

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T GMU 18 May 2012 E

3 sa i $*4
Article 17. Accordingly, such evidence should be excluded from the Trial Chamber's
deliberations. The Defence submits that there is so much evidence outside the scope of the
Indictment, it amounts to prejudice of such a nature which far outweighs any probative value
to such evidence. ln that sense, it contravenes both Rule 95 and Article 17 and should
consequently be excluded.4O7
154. The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution led substantial evidence from a number
of witnesses to support its allegation that Denis Mingo, Sam Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koroma
and Daniel Tamba were killed on the orders of Taylor. TF1-516, TF1-371, TFl-276, Joseph
Marzah, Sam Kolleh, John Vincent and Issa Sesay all gave testimony relevant to the killing
of Denis Mingo in 2001 in a roadside ambush allegedly orchestrated by Benjamin Yeaten on
the order of the Accused. TF1-585, TF1-388, TF1-367, TF1-561, TF1-375, TF1-579, Sam
Kolleh and DCT-292 all gave testimony relevant to the killing of Sam Bockarie in May
2003, allegedly by Benjamin Yeaten on the order of the Accused. TF1-375, TF1-399, and
TF1-516 gave testimony relevant to the killing of Johnny Paul Koroma, allegedly on order
of the Accused. TF1-399, TF1-388, TF1-375, Joseph Marzah, DCT-215, and DCT-008 gave
testimony relevant to the killing of Daniel Tamba, allegedly on order of the Accused. The
Accused denied having a role in these killings.
155. To consider this evidence would, in the view of the Trial Chamber, be extremely
prejudicial to the Accused. The Prosecution argues that the crimes are relevant to his
"consciousness of guilt".4O8 However, the Accused has not been charged or tried for these
crimes. And notwithstanding all the evidence that has been introduced, the Accused is not on J
trial for these crimes in this Court. For this reason it would be inappropriate for the Trial
Chamber to draw conclusions from the evidence on the "consciousness of guilt" of the
Accused, as suggested by the Prosecution.
407 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 34-36.
408 Prosecution Closing Arguments, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp. 49372—49373.

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2 1,1 SS
IV. IV. EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
A. Law Applicable to the Assessment of Evidence
156. The Trial Chamber has assessed the probative value and weight of the evidence in
this case in accordance with the Statute and the Rules.
157. Rule 89 provides that:
(A) The rules of evidence set forth in this Section shall govern the proceedings before the Chambers. The
Chambers shall not be bound by national rules of evidence.
(B) In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules of evidence which
will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and
the general principles of law;
(C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence.
1. Burden and Standard of Proof
158. Article 17(3) of the Statute enshrines the presumption of imiocence, i.e. that an
accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty.4O9 This presumption places on the
Prosecution the burden of establishing the guilt of the Accused, a burden which remains on
the Prosecution throughout the trial.
159. In respect of each count, the standard to be met for a conviction to be entered is that
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 87(A) of the Rules provides, in its relevant part: "A
finding of guilt may be reached only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt". Accordingly, in respect of each count, the
Trial Chamber has determined whether it is satisfied, on the basis of the whole of the ·
evidence, that every element of that crime and the criminal responsibility of the Accused for
it have been established beyond reasonable doubt. In making that determination, the Trial
Chamber has been careful to consider whether more than one inference was reasonably open
from the facts and, if so, whether there was an inference inconsistent with the guilt of the
409 This provision is in accordance with all major human rights instruments, see International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(2); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article
7(1)(b). 1

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Case No.: SCSL»O3—O1—T / 18 May 2012 : E

2glS b
Accused. lf so, the onus and the standard of proof require that an acquittal be entered in
respect of that count.4l0
2. Admission of Evidence
160. Rule 89(C) of the Rules states the general principle of admissibility that a Trial
Chamber "may admit any relevant evidence".4H The Appeals Chamber has made it clear
that this provision favours the admission of all relevant evidence, the probative value and
weight of which are only to be assessed at the end of the trial and in the context of the entire
record.4l2
B. Forms of Evidence Under Review
161. For the purposes of the Judgement, ‘evidence’ has been taken to mean the
information which has been put before the Trial Chamber in order to prove the facts at issue.
162. Evidence was admitted in the following forms: (i) oral evidence, (ii) documentary
evidence, including such evidence provided in lieu of oral testimony pursuant to Rule 92bis,
and evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92quater, (iii) testimony of expert witnesses, (iv)
facts of which judicial notice was taken and (v) facts agreed upon by the Parties.
l. Witness Testimony
163. The Trial Chamber heard the viva voce testimony of a total of 115 witnesses: 94
called by the Prosecution and 21 called by the Defence (including the Accused).
164. ln accordance with Rule 90(B), witnesses gave evidence under a solemn declaration
or oath, and were cross-examined and re-examined in accordance with Rule 85(B).
165. When evaluating the credibility of witnesses who gave evidence viva voce, the Trial
Chamber has taken into account a variety of factors, including their demeanour, conduct and
410 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 98. See Prosecutor v. Delalié, Mucié, Delié and Landfo, IT-96-21-A,
Judgement (AC), 20 February 200 l [Celebiéi Appeal Judgement], para. 458.
in Rule 89(C) is thus different from its counterpart in the ICTY Rules, which provides that "[a] Chamber
may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value" (emphasis added).
412 Prosecutor v. Fofana, SCSL-04-14-AR65, Fofana — Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail, ll March
2005 [Fofana Appeal Decision Refusing Bail], para. 26; AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 99; RUF Trial Judgement,
para. 474.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / &N` l8 May 2012

32 isa-
character (where possible),M3 their knowledge of the facts to which they testihed, their
proximity to the events described, the plausibility and clarity of their testimony, their
impartiality, the lapse of time between the events and the testimony, their possible
involvement in the events and the risk of self-incrimination, inconsistencies in their
testimony and their ability to explain such inconsistencies, any motivations to lie, and their
relationship with the Accused.M4
166. ln some instances, only one witness gave evidence on a material fact. As a matter of
law, the testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not require corroboration,M5
and the Trial Chamber ma rel on "a limited number of witnesses or even a sin le witness
Y Y S
provided it took into consideration all of the evidence on the record".M6 Nevertheless, the
Trial Chamber has examined the evidence of a single witness with particular care before
attaching any weight to it.M7
167. The Trial Chamber may accept or reject the evidence of a witness in whole or in part,
and may find a witness to be credible and reliable about certain aspects of his or her
testimony and not credible or reliable with respect to others.M8
(a) Hearsay Evidence
168. ln addition to evidence of facts within the testifying witness's own knowledge, the
Trial Chamber has also admitted hearsay evidence. Under Rule 89(C) of the Rules, the Trial
Chamber has a broad discretion to admit relevant hearsay evidence.M9 However, before
determining whether to rely on hearsay evidence, the Trial Chamber has examined such
M3 Prosecutor v. Blugojevié and Jokié, 1T-02-60-T, Judgement (TC), 17 January 2005 [Blugojevié Trial
Judgement], para. 23.
M4 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 108; Nahimanu et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 194; Prosecutor v. Halilovié,
IT-01-48-T, Judgement (TC), 16 November 2005 [Halilovié Trial Judgement], para. 17.
M5 Prosecutor v. Tudié, 1T-94-1-A. Judgement (AC), 15 July 1999 [Tadié Appeal Judgement], para. 65;
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, 1T-95-14/1-A, Judgement (AC), 24 March 2000 [Aleksovski Appeal Judgement],
para. 62; Kupreskié et ul. Appeal Judgement, para. 33.
M6 AFRC Appeal Judgement. para. 147; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T-1234,
Judgement (TC), 2 March 2009 [RUF Trial Judgement], para. 501.
M7 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, IT-03-66-T, Judgement (TC), 30 November 2005 [Limaj Trial
Judgement], para. 21; Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 27.
M8 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 488, citing Kupreskié et al. Appeal Judgement. para. 333.
M9 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kumara, Kanu, SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Joint Defence Motion to Exclude
all Evidence from Witness TF1-277 Pursuant to Rule 89(C) and/or Rule 95, 24 May 2005 [Kumara Decision on
Motion to Exclude Evidence], para. 24. See also Blugojevié and Jo/tic Trial Judgement, para. 21; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 February 1999
[Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence], para. 14.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 %

38 s S 8
evidence with caution, as the weight and probative value to be afforded to such evidence
will usually be less than that accorded to the evidence of a witness who has given the
evidence under oath or solemn declaration and who has been tested in cross-examination.424)
ln so doing, the Trial Chamber has taken into account whether the hearsay evidence is
voluntary, truthful, and trustworthy, and has considered both its context and the
circumstances under which it arose.424
169. Factors that the Trial Chamber has taken into account in assessing the probative
value of hearsay evidence include whether the hearsay is first-hand or removed,422 whether
the hearsay emanates from identified or unidentified/anonymous sources,424 the opportunity
to cross-examine the person who made the statement,424 whether the hearsay statement is
. corroborated,425 the potential for errors of perception and the circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness surrounding the statement.426
(b) Circumstantial Evidence
170. ln some instances, the Trial Chamber relied upon circumstantial evidence, i.e.,
evidence surrounding an event from which a fact at issue may be reasonably inferred,427 in
order to detemiine whether or not a certain conclusion could be drawn. While individual
pieces of evidence standing alone may well be insufficient to establish a fact, their
420 Prosecutor v. Fofczncz, SCSL-04-14-AR73, Fofana A Decision on Appeal Against "Decision on
Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence" [Fofana Appeal Decision on
Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence], Separate Opinion of Justice Robertson,
16 May 2005, para. 6. See also RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 518; RUF Trial Judgement, paras 495-496;
[Krnojelac Trial Judgement], para. 70; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15.
424 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 495, citing Krnojeluc Trial Judgement, para. 70; Aleksovsld Appeal Decision
on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15. See also Prosecutor v. Delic, IT-04-83-T, Judgement (TC), 15
September 2008 [Delic Trial Judgement], para. 27; Prosecutor v. Tczdic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on
Defence Motion on Hearsay, 5 August 1996 [Tadic Decision on Hearsay], para. 16.
422 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 496; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15;
Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement (AC), 20 October 2010 [Kulimanzira Appeal
Judgement], para. 78.
424 Prosecutor v. Rulcundo, ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgement (TC), 27 February 2009 [Rukundo Trial
Judgement], para. 89; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on Confirmation of Charges,
30 September 2008, para. 140; Prosecutor v. Rukundo, ICTR-2001-70-A, Judgement (AC), 20 October 2010
[Rukundo Appeal Judgement], paras 194, 196.
424 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 496; Aleltzsovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15.
425 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 199.
426 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 496; De/ic Trial Judgement, para. 27.
427 Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 35; Blugojevic Trial Judgement, para. 21,

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/

3%: Sq
cumulative effect may be revealing and decisive.428 Therefore, it is "no derogation of
evidence to say that it is circumstantial".429
l7l. When considering whether to rely on circumstantial evidence in proof of a fact in
issue, the Trial Chamber has considered whether the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from such evidence leads to proof of the guilt of the Accused.430 When such evidence is
capable of any other reasonable inference it is not reliable for the purposes of convicting an
accusedfm
(c) Discrepancies Between the Evidence of Various Witnesses, or Between the Evidence of
a Particular Witness and a Previous Statement
172. lt is the responsibility of the Trial Chamber to resolve any inconsistencies that may
arise within and/or amongst witnesses’ testimonies. In doing so, the Trial Chamber has
1 discretion to evaluate any inconsistencies, to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole
is reliable and credible and to accept or reject the ‘fundamental features’ of the evidence.432
ln this context, the Trial Chamber endorses the statement of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Kapreskié that:
[tlhe presence of inconsistencies in the evidence does not, perse, require a reasonable Trial
Chamber to reject it as being unreliable. Similarly, factors such as the passage of time
between the events and the testimony of the witness, the possible influence of third persons,
discrepancies, orthe existence of stressful conditions at the time the events took place do
not automatically exclude the Trial Chamber from relying on the evidence.433
173. A number of witnesses gave evidence of horrific events in which they personally
suffered the amputation of one or both arms, or were raped, or witnessed atrocities inflicted
upon members of their families. Recounting this evidence in court evoked strong emotional
reactions in some of these witnesses. As a result, the Trial Chamber took the view that there
may have been memories which prevented the witnesses from giving a full account of their
428 Celibici Appeal Judgement, para. 458.
429 Prosecutor v. Oric, IT-03-68-T, Order Concerning Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of Parties
During Trial Proceedings, 21 October 2004 [Oric Order on Evidence}, p. 7, referring to Taylor, Weaver and
Donovan (1928) 21 Cr. App. R. 20, 21, per Lord Hewart C.J.
430 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 200; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 499. See also Ntagerura et al. Appeal
Judgement, para. 306; Karera v. Prosecutor, ICTR-01-74-A, Judgement, 2 February 2009 [Karera Appeal
J udgement}, para. 34.
43 1 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 200. See also RUF Trial Judgement, para. 499; Karera Appeal Judgement,
para. 34.
432 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 1 10. See also Kapreskic Appeal Judgement, para. 31.
433 Kupreskic Appeal Judgement, para. 31. See also AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 1 10.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3% tbo
experiences to the Court, or which prevented them from articulating in detail what they had
endured.434 The Trial Chamber also took into consideration the possibility that any
observations made by the witnesses at the relevant time may have been affected by terror or
stress.435 While these circumstances do not necessarily mean that such evidence is not
reliable, the Trial Chamber has weighed it with particular scmtiny.436
174. During the trial, both the Prosecution and the Defence made use of pre—trial
statements from witnesses — and sometimes of interview notes — for the purpose of cross-
examination. ln many instances both parties alleged inconsistencies and contradictions
between the pre—trial statements of witnesses and their evidence at trial. The Trial Chamber
accepts that the information given in such a statement will not always be identical to the
witness's oral evidence. This may be because the witness was asked questions at trial not
previously asked, or may in his or her testimony remember details previously forgotten.437
The Trial Chamber has also taken into account that the lapse of time since the events in the
Indictment occurred may have affected the accuracy and reliability of the memories of
witnesses. Another factor considered by the Trial Chamber was that interviews with
witnesses were usually conducted in one of the local languages of Sierra Leone or Liberia,
whereas the resulting witness statements used in court were a summarised English
translation of the original statement or interview notes.
175. Thus, in general, the Trial Chamber has not treated minor discrepancies between the
evidence of various witnesses, or between the evidence of a particular witness and a
statement previously made by that witness, as discrediting their evidence where the essence
of the incident had nevertheless been recounted in acceptable detail.438 However, it has
considered the impact of such inconsistencies on the credibility of each witness on a case-
by—case basis.
176. Where there are material inconsistencies in the evidence of a witness, the Trial
Chamber has assessed any explanations provided by the witness for such discrepancies and
considered the extent to which such inconsistencies have a bearing on the witness’ evidence
434 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 111. See also Celebiéi Appeal Judgement, para. 496.
435 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 111.. See also Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 15.
446 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 111.
437 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 112. See also Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 26.
438 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 113. See also Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 69.

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as a whole. The Trial Chamber has the discretion to determine whether, in light of
significant inconsistencies, it will reject the witness's evidence in its entirety, or accept
certain parts of the witness’ evidence.439 However, where there are material inconsistencies
within the witness's testimony, the Trial Chamber has generally only accepted those parts of
the witness's testimony which are corroborated.44O
177. When there are discrepancies between the accounts of two witnesses, it is for the
Trial Chamber to determine whether these discrepancies discredit a witness's testimony.44l
When faced with competing versions of events, it is the prerogative of the Trial Chamber to
determine which one is more credible.442
(d) Names of Locations
178. The Trial Chamber reiterates that names of locations mentioned by witnesses which
are similar, but not identical, may refer to the same location. lt would not be appropriate to
strike out the names of such locations given that a variety of languages and dialects are
spoken in Sierra Leone and that some witnesses are illiterate. Thus names of locations
mentioned by witnesses which are similar but not identical to names of locations that appear
in the lndictment may refer to the same location.443
(e) Time Frames
179. Various witnesses testified about events occurring during broad time periods, such as
"the rainy season", "the dry season", or "the mango season". Where reliable evidence has
been adduced about the dates of a particular season such as the rainy season or the mango
season in a particular district, the Trial Chamber has considered this evidence in determining
the timing of certain events that occurred during that season.
439 See e. g. AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 362; AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 121.
440 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 490.
Ml AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 121.
442 AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 121. See also Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, lCTR-96-3-A, Judgement (AC),
26 May 2003 [Rutaganda Appeal Judgement], para. 29.
443 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SC SL-03-01-T, Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24202.

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3% 1 eo.
(f) Testimony of the Accused in his own Defence
180. There is no burden on an accused to prove his innocence. Article 17(4)(g) of the
Statute provides that no accused shall be compelled to testify against himself or confess
guilt.
181. The Accused elected to testify in his own defence. In accordance with Rule 85(C) of
the Rules, he gave his evidence under oath and thereafter called other witnesses in his
defence. By electing to testify and to call witnesses in his Defence, the Accused did not
thereby assume the burden of proving his innocence. Rather, the Trial Chamber has to
determine whether the Prosecution evidence should be accepted as establishing beyond
reasonable doubt the facts alleged, notwithstanding the evidence of the Accused and that of
the other Defence witnesses.444
(g) Accomplice Evidence
182. The Trial Chamber has heard considerable testimony from "insider witnesses" — that
is, persons who were former members of the RUF, NPFL, Liberian government or close
associates of the Accused. The Appeals Chamber has held that there is no requirement that
in order to qualify as an accomplice, a witness must have been charged with a specific
offence.445
183. In assessing the reliability of accomplice evidence, the main consideration for the
Trial Chamber is whether or not the accomplice has an ulterior motive to testify as he did.
The Trial Chamber has generally looked for corroboration in such circumstances, but it
notes that it may convict on the basis of the evidence of a single witness, even an
accomplice, provided such evidence has been viewed with caution.446
444 Prosecutor v. Vasihevié, IT-98-32-T, Judgement, 29 November 2002 ["Vasi[jevié Trial Judgement"],
para. 13; Limaj Trial Jugement, para. 22. See also AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 117.
445 AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 127; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 497.
M6 AFRC Appeal Judgement, paras 128-129; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 498. See also Prosecutor v.
Nchamihigo, ICTR-2001-63-A, Judgement (AC), 18 March 2010 [Nchamilzigo Appeal Judgement], para. 48;
Muvurzyi Appeal Judgement, para. 128.

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3*3163
(h) Alleged ‘lncentives’ for Witnesses
184. The Defence alleges that the evidence of some of the Prosecution witnesses is
suspect because they allegedly received incentives to testify against the Accused, such as
financial incentives or the promise of relocation to another country.447
185. The Defence submits that the Prosecution's Witness Management Unit ("WMU")
made large payments on a systematic basis to Prosecution witnesses, and that this taints the
overall credibility of Prosecution evidence and amounts to an abuse of the Prosecution's
discretion pursuant to Rule 39(ii).448
186. ln particular, the Defence argues that such payments are contrary to the letter and/or
spirit of Rule 39(ii), in that some were impermissible under this Rule, while those that were
permissible were demonstrably exorbitant and irregular, that such payments were
duplicative and supplemental to payments made by the Witness and Victims Unit (WVS),
that these payments occurred both pre-trial and during the life of 'the trial, and were
deliberate and designed to influence the cooperation and evidence of potential witnesses,
witnesses, suspects or sources and to otherwise interfere with the administration of
justice.449 The Defence also submits that the amounts of money provided to witnesses by the
Prosecution must be viewed "in the light of the realities of life in Sierra Leone", where such
sums could have a significant effect on the lives of witnesses.450
187. The Defence submits that at a minimum, an adverse inference (if not presumption)
should be drawn vis-d—vis the reliability and credibility of Prosecution evidence in those
instances where the payments/inducements to particular witnesses are objectively
im Defence Final Trial Briefi paras 23-26, 1396.
448 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 23-26. The Defence also notes at paragraph 25 that it incorporates by
reference the submissions it made in Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1089, Public with Confidential
Annexes A-J and Public Annexes K-O Defence Motion Requesting an Investigation into Contempt of the Court
by the Office of the Prosecution and its Investigators, 24 September 2010 [Contempt Motion]; Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T1 142, Public with Annexes A-H and Confidential Annexes I-J Defence Motion to Recall
Four Prosecution Witnesses and to Hear Evidence from the Chief of WVS Regarding Relocation of Prosecution
Witnesses, 17 December 2010 [Motion to Recall].
449 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 24. See also Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1396; Defence Closing
Arguments, Transcript 11 March 2011, p. 49620, where the Defence listed witnesses whom it submits were
provided with overlapping payments by the WVS and WMU.
450 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 10 March 2011, p. 49478; Defence Final
Trial Brief, para. 1396. »

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3%.1bL+
unreasonable and/or excessive.454 ln appropriate instances of egregious and unmitigated
abuse of discretionary payments/inducements by the Prosecution, the Court should exclude
the evidence of the applicable witnesses in their entirety.452 The Defence submits that as a
clear and regrettable case of prosecutorial abuse of process has been made out, the Accused
has been deprived of a fair trial.453
188. The Defence also submits that relocation or the promise or offer of relocation may
have had an impact on the credibility of certain witnesses’ testimony.454
189. The Prosecution does not specifically address these allegations in its submissions. lt
does, however, indicate that the Defence had ample opportunity to test insider/accomplice
evidence via full cross-examination, assisted by the disclosure of WVS and OTP
disbursements.455
(i) Financial Incentives
190. With regard to alleged ‘financial incentives’, the costs of allowances necessarily and
reasonably incurred by witnesses as a result of testifying before a Chamber are met by the
Special Court in accordance with the ‘"Practice Direction on Allowances for Witnesses and
Expert Witnesses", issued by the Registrar on 16 July 2004. The Practice Direction provides
for a wide range of allowances to be paid to witnesses testifying before the Special Court.
These include an attendance allowance as compensation for eamings and time lost as a result
of testifying, accommodation, meals, transport, medical treatment, childcare and other
allowances. No distinction is made between witnesses for the Prosecution and Defence.
191. The Practice Direction requires the Special Court's Witnesses and Victims Section
("WVS") to provide records of payments to the Special Court's Finance Section, and vice
vcrsa.456 ln the present case, records of disbursements to Prosecution witnesses were
disclosed to the Defence pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules, and disbursement forms
454 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 25.
452 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 25. See also Prosecutor v. T oylor, Transcript 10 March 201 1, p. 49476.
453 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 26.
454 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 24, Motion to Recall, paras 1, 18.
455 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 42.
456 Practice Direction on Allowances for Witnesses and Expert Witnesses, Article 2(D).

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3 s 1 ep S
concerning witnesses for both parties have been admitted into evidence,457 and used to cross-
examine witnesses.458
192. In addition, in some cases, the Prosecution also made payments to and/or conferred
benefits upon witnesses outside of the WVS framework via its Witness Management Unit
("WMU"). Information about these payments has also been disclosed to the Defence,
admitted into evidence,459 and used to cross-examine Prosecution witnesses,46O
193, Rule 39(ii) provides that the Prosecutor may:
Take all measures deemed necessary for the purpose of the investigation, including the
taking of any special measures to provide for the safety, the support and the assistance of
potential witnesses and sources.
194, The Trial Chamber has previously held that the issue of whether there has been any
abuse of the Prosecution's discretion under Rule 39(ii) "in that the payments might not have
been necessary for the safety, support or assistance" of witnesses would be "considered at
the stage of final deliberations, taking into account the evidence adduced and the cross-
examination of the witness in question",46l
457 See, eng., Exhibit P-048, "A11 Disbursements for Witness TFl-276"; Exhibit P-120, "A1l Disbursements
for Witness TFl-561"; Exhibit P-200, "A11 Disbursements for Witness TF1-304"; Exhibit D-064, "Al1
Disbursements for Witness TF 1 -197"; Exhibit D-069, "A11 Disbursements for Witness TF1-034"; Exhibit D-071,
"Al1 Disbursements for Witness TFl-023"; Exhibit P-501, "Report from WVS"; Exhibit P-517, "Inter-office
Memo WVS dated 22 March 2010, Expenses Incurred on DCT-146, Dated 22 March 2010"; Exhibit P-554,
"Record of Expenses incurred on DCT-190 Dated 04 June-20l0".
454 See, c.g., Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 780-782; Vannuyan Sherif, Transcript 14
January 2008, pp. 1162-1169; Dennis Koker, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1389-1398; Karmoh Kanneh,
Transcript 4 May 2008, pp. 9763-9771; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38726-38733; DCT-190,
Transcript 28 June 2010, pp. 43437-43443.
454 See Exhibit P-048, "A11 Disbursements for Witness TF1-276"; Exhibit P-120, "A11 Disbursements for
Witness TFl-561"; Exhibit P-200, "A11 Disbursements for Witness TF1-304"; Exhibit D-075, "Schedu1e of
Interviews and Payments for TFl-579"; Exhibit D-064, "A11 Disbursements for Witness TFl-l97"; Exhibit D-
069, "A11 Disbursements for Witness TF1-034"; Exhibit D-071, "Al1 Disbursements for Witness TFl-023";
Exhibit D-073, "A11 Disbursements for Witness SCSL P0298"; Exhibit D-479, "Index of Disbursements for
Witness DCT-032".
464 See, ag., Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2154-2155; Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February
2008, pp. 3396-3402; Suwandi Camara, Transcript 13 February 2008, pp. 3766-3808; Foday Lansana, Transcript
26 February 2008, pp. 4754-61; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6702-6711; Dauda Aruna Fornie,
Transcript 1 1 December 2008, p. 22251.
46l Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1 1 18, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A-J and Public
Annexes K-O Defence Motion Requesting an Investigation into Contempt of Court by the Office of the
Prosecutor and its Investigators, 12 November 2010, para. 40. See also Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-
44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera's Motion to Dismiss for Abuse of Process: Payments to Prosecution
Witnesses and "Requete de Mathieu Ngirumpatse en Retrait de L’Acte D’Accusation", 27 October 2008
[Karemera Decision on Abuse of Process].

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T JM 18 May 2012

33 z be
195. In assessing witness credibility, the Trial Chamber has therefore taken into account
information about witness payments made both by the WVS and by the Prosecution, and has
considered any cross-examination of the witness in relation to these payments. In particular,
the Trial Chamber has considered, on a case by case basis whether the benehts conferred
upon and/or payments made to witnesses went beyond that "which is reasonably required for
the management of a witness".462 In assessing whether such a payment is "reasonab1y
required", the Trial Chamber has also taken into account the cost of living in West Africa
and the station in life of the witness receiving the payment.
(j) Relocation
196. Article 16(4) of the Statute and Rule 34 of the Rules mandate WVS to provide short
and long-term protection and support to witnesses and victims who appear before the
Special Court. Accordingly, WVS may relocate witnesses to another country pursuant to its
responsibility to provide appropriate protection for witnesses and victims who are at risk on
account of their testimony. The Registrar has indicated that "re1ocation is a last resort" and is
"on1y provided to those witnesses who are considered most at risk on account of their
testimonies"./163 Further, the Registrar has indicated that whenever relocation is warranted it
is "resorted to only after the witness has testihed and on the basis of threat assessments".464
197. In the present case, the Defence cross-examined several Prosecution witnesses about
relocation or promises/offers of relocation.465 In its assessment of the credibility of such
witnesses, the Trial Chamber has taken in consideration evidence that witnesses have been
promised relocation or have in fact been relocated, the effect that such promises may have
462 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1084, Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure of Statement and
Prosecution Payments made to DCT—097, 23 September 2010 [Taylor Decision on Payments to DCT-097], para.
21; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-1104, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A»—D Defence
Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Information Relating to DCT-032, 20 October 2010 [Taylor Decision on
Exculpatory Information], para. 30, citing Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, ICTR-98-44-PT,
Decision on Defence Motion for Full Disclosure of Payments to Witnesses and to Exclude Testimony from Paid
Witnesses, 23 August 2005 [Karemera Decision on Disclosure of Payments], para. 6.
463 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1153, Submissions of the Registrar Pursuant to Rule 33(B)
Regarding the Defence Motion to Recall Four Prosecution Witnesses and to Hear Evidence from the Chief of
WVS Regarding Relocation of Prosecution Witnesses, 11 January 2011 [Registrar's Submission on Motion to
Recall], para. 11.
464 Ibid., para. 12.
465 See, e.g., TF1-375, Transcript 27 August 2008, p. 14706; TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp.
21244-21246; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 11 December 2008, pp. 22242, 22249; Alex Tamba Teh,
Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 782; TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, p. 5079 (CS); TF1-590, Transcript 16
June 2008, p. 11906.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J mw 18 May 2012 %

3% 1151-
had on their testimony, the opportunity that the Defence had to cross-examine the witnesses
about such offers, and any cross—examination in relation to these issues, on a case by case
basis.
(k) Other incentives
198. In assessing witness credibility, the Trial Chamber has also taken into account other
incentives that may have been offered to witnesses, including indemnity letters provided to
witnesses by the Prosecution,466 and offers to release witnesses from prison.467
2. Documentary Evidence
(a) Intr0duction
199. In the course of the trial, the Trial Chamber admitted a total of 1522 exhibits: 782
were tendered by the Prosecution, and 740 by the Defence.
200. D0cuments were admitted through witnesses who testified during the trial, pursuant
to Rule 89(C) provided the d0cument was relevant and sufficient foundation was laid for the
document to be used and/or admitted through the witness.468 Documents were also admitted
into evidence in lieu of 0ral testimony pursuant to Rules 92bis and 92quater.
201. In this case, the Trial Chamber admitted the prior trial transcripts and related exhibits
0f twenty—two witnesses, and the statements of six witnesses, into evidence pursuant to Rule
92bis provided the Prosecution make the said witnesses available for cross-examination by
the Defence.469 The Trial Chamber also admitted a statement of one Defence witness into
466 See e.g. Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 10 March 2011, p. 49481; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31
March 2007, p. 6240; Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6718-6719, 6739, 6743; Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May
2008, pp. 10114-10115, Exhibit P-119, "Memo from James Johnson, Acting Prosecutor, SCSL to Moses Blah,
30 October 2006".
467 See eg. Foday Lansana, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 4612-4614; TF1-375, Transcript 22 August
2008,p. 14340.
468 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14253; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-
03-01-AR73, Decision on "Prosecution Notice of Appeal and Submissions Concerning the Decision Regarding
the Tender of Document.s", 6 February 2009 [Taylor Decision on the Tender of Documents], paras 40-42.
469 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-556, Decision on Prosecution Notice under Rule 92bis for the
Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Kenema District and on Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for
the Admission of the Prior Testimony of TF1-036 into Evidence, 15 July 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-
01-T-623, Decision on Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for Admission of Evidence related to Inter Alia
Kono District, 8 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0 1-T -633, Decision on Prosecution Notice Under
Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Kono District- TF 1-218 and TF1-304, 14
October 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-634, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A to G

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

3%: as
evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis.°’7O ln addition, the Trial Chamber admitted several other
categories of documents pursuant to Rule 92bis, tendered by both the Prosecution,°’7l and the
Defence.472 The Trial Chamber admitted the prior trial transcripts and related exhibits of two
deceased witnesses pursuant to Rule 92 quater.473
202. It is important to emphasise that the admission of a document into evidence in the
course of the trial has no bearing on the weight, if any, subsequently attached to it by the
Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber has assessed the weight and reliability of documentary
evidence in the light of all the evidence in the case.
Prosecution Notice under Rule 92bis For the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Kono District-TF1-
195, TF1-197, TF1-198 and TF1-206, 15 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-635, Decision on
Public with Confidential Annexes A to C Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence
Related to Inter Alia Freetown and the Westem Area- TF1-023 and TF1-029, 16 October 2008; Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-642, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes B to G Prosecution Notice Under
Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Freetown and Westem Area- TF1-024, TF1-081
and TF1-084, 20 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-644, Decision on Public with Confidential
Annexes A to D and F to G Prosecution Notice under Rule 92bis For the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter
Alia Freetown and Westem Area- TF1-098, TF1-104 and TF1-227, 21 October 2008.
470 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-981, Defence Filing of Chief Jalloh Loon Pursuant to Rule 92bis
and the Trial Chamber's Order of 11 June 2010, 15 June 2010.
47] These included: (i) Liberia Search documents (Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-736, Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Admission of Liberia Search Documents, 18 February 2009); (ii) extracts of the Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone (Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-737,
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Extracts of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Sierra Leone, 19 February 2009); (iii) documents of United Nations and United Nations Bodies
(Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-739, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents of the
United Nations and United Nations Bodies, 20 February 2009); (iv) documents of certain non governmental
organizations and Associated Press releases (Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-742, Decision on Prosecution
Motion for Admission of Certain Non-Govemmental Organizations and Associated Press Releases, 23 February
2009); (v) BBC Radio Broadcasts (Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-745, Decision on Prosecution Motion
for Admission of BBC Radio Broadcasts, 25 February 2009); (vi) documents seized from Foday Sankoh's house
(Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-747, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents Seized
from Foday Sankoh's House, 26 February 2009); (vii) documents seized from RUF Kono Office, Kono district
(Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-749, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents Seized
from RUF Kono Office, Kono District, 27 February 2009); (viii) newspaper articles obtained from the Catholic
Justice and Peace Commission Archive in Monrovia, Liberia (Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-750,
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Newspaper Articles Obtained from the Catholic Justice and
Peace Commission Archive in Monrovia, Liberia, 27 February 2009); (ix) Security Council Resolution 1315
(2000) pursuant to Rule 92bis (Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-744, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Admission of Document Pursuant to Rule 89 (C) and 92bis, 25 February 2009).
472 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1064, Decision on Public with Annexes A and B Defence Motion
for Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 27 August 2010; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-
1079, Decision on Public with Annexes A-J and Confidential Annexes K-L Defence Motion for Admission of
Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis — Special Task Force, 17 September 2010 [Taylor 92bis Decision on Special
Task Force]; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1082, Decision on Public with Annexes A-D Defence Motion
for Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis — Contemporaneous Documentation, 22 September 2010;
Transcript 12 November 2010, pp, 49112-49115.
473 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-720, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes C to E
Prosecution Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial Transcripts of Witnesses TF1—021 and TF1—083 Pursuant to
Rule 92quater, 5 February 2009.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T »/ dm 18 May 2012

381 60]
(b) Documents Used in Cross—Examination by the Prosecution.
203. During the Defence case, the Prosecution tendered several documents that it had put
to the Accused and other Defence witnesses during cross—examination. The Trial Chamber
held that fresh evidence impeaching the credibility of the Accused or other Defence
witnesses may in the Trial Cha;mber's discretion be admitted on a case by case basis but that
documents containing fresh evidence that is probative of guilt would not be admitted into
evidence unless the Prosecution can establish "exceptional circumstances".474 The Trial
Chamber admitted several documents, or parts of documents, used by the Prosecution during
cross—exa;mination.475 As the Prosecution sought to tender these documents solely for the
purpose of impeaching the credibility of the Accused or other witnesses, the Trial Chamber
has relied on these documents, or parts thereof, only for that purpose.476
(c) Objections to specihc categories of documents
204. Many documents tendered by the Prosecution have been contested by the Defence
and vice versa. The Trial Chamber admitted the documents into evidence on the basis of
relevance, leaving their reliability and probative value to be assessed at the end of the trial.
The individual objections raised by the parties are discussed below.
(i) Chain of Custody
474 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T—865, Decision on Prosecution Motion in Relation to the Applicable
Legal Standards Governing the Use and Admission of Documents by the Prosecution During Cross-
Examination, 30 November 2009, para. 27 and p. 13 (Disposition); Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T,
Decision on Public with Annexes A and B Defence Motion for Admission into Evidence of 301 Documents and
Photographs Marked for Identification During the Cross—Examination of the Accused and on Prosecution List of
Documents Marked for Identification During the Testimony of Charles Taylor Sought to be Admitted into
Evidence, 18 March 2010 [Admission of Documents Decision]. See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T,
Trial Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46255—46266, where this test was applied in relation to a custodial
statement that the Prosecution attempted to tender during the cross—examination of Issa Sesay,
475 Admission of Documents Decision, p. 14 (Disposition) and Annex, pp. 33-53.
446 See Prosecutor v. Prlié, IT—04—74—AR73.14, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial
Chamber's Decision on Presentation of Documents by the Prosecution in Cross—Examination of Defence
Witnesses, 26 February 2009, para. 29, where the Appeals Chamber held that a Trial Chamber "has the
discretion to limit the purpose for which an admitted piece of evidence is used". See also Prosecutor v.
Karemera, ICTR—98—44—T, Decision on Admission of Documents Used in Cross—Examination of Edouard
Karemera and Witness 6, 11 November 2009 [Karemera Decision on Admission of Documents During Cross-
Examination], para. 5 (where the Trial Chamber held "when seeking to assess the potential prejudice suffered by
the Accused as a result of the admission of fresh evidence, the Trial Chamber must have particular regard for the
purpose for which the admission of this evidence is sought [...]" and that the Trial Chamber must consider
various measures to address any prejudice to the Accused, "including limiting the purpose for which the
evidence is admitted"). See also Prosecutor v. Delic, IT—O4—83—AR73.l, Decision on Rasim Delié's lnterlocutory
Appeal against Trial Chamber's Oral Decisions on Admission of Exhibits 1316 and 1317, 15 April 2008, paras
22-23.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T / <]\_[g 18 May 2012

3 % 4 it o
205. Both parties have raised issues with respect to the chain of custody of several
documents. In many cases, the chain of custody is unknown or incomplete.477 The Trial
Chamber, however, notes that due to the difHculties in investigations during conflict and
post—conflict situations, "a perfect chain of custody is not a sine qua non requirement for
admissibility" and that "gaps in the chain of custody are not fatal, provided that the evidence
as a whole demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the piece of evidence concemed is
what is says it is".478 Thus, while the Trial Chamber has admitted these documents as
relevant, the lack of or an incomplete chain of custody is a factor that has been taken into
account in assessing the weight to be given to such documents on a case by case basis.
(ii) Authenticity
206. The Trial Chamber recalls that where objections were made regarding the
authenticity of certain documents, the Trial Chamber admitted the documents on the basis
that that any considerations relating to the authenticity of documents went to weight, rather
than admissibility.479 In many cases, the Prosecution and/or Defence were either not able to
prove authorship, or the authorship of the document is in dispute. In a few cases, it was
alleged that the documents had been forged.480 No experts testified regarding handwriting or
signatures, although these were disputed in the case of several documents.48l
*77 See, e. g., Exhibit P-028, "Operation Order 20 January 2001"; Exhibit P-065, "RUF Letter from Foday
Sankoh to Charles Taylor, 5 May 1992"; Exhibit D-008, "Unof`ficial Translation - Verbatim Report on a
Recorded Discussion between CPL. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention"; Exhibit D-
084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield
Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999"; Exhibit D-085, "RUF - Sierra
Leone (People's Army of Sierra Leone) Ops. Segbwema, Brief Comprehensive Report From Major Francis M.
Musa District I.D.U. Commander Kailahun, TO CPL Foday Sankoh RUF/ SL, 31 August 1999". See also Tariq
Malik, Transcript 20 January 2009, p. 23101.
478 Orié Trial Judgement, para. 27.
479 See, eg., Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 677; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 933-934;
Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1206-1207; Tay/or 92bis Decision on Special Task Force, p. 6.
480 See, eg., Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44136; Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44256, 44294;
Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46714; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46931; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-
T, Transcript 11 March 2011, pp. 49534-49536.
481 See, eg., Exhibit P-028, "Operation Order 20 January 2001"; Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/SL
Comprehensive Report from Major Sam Bockarie to Brigadier Issa Sesay on the take over of Koidu, 26 January
1999"; Exhibit P-136, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, 19 November
1998"; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie"; Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from
Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999".
See also Exhibit P-582, "End of Page indicating fifteen different signatures with marks indicating those signatures that
do not belong to Issa Sesay - as indicated by DCT—172"; Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47061-
47063.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QN. 18 May 2012

és wt
3. Expert Testimony and Reports
207. The Trial Chamber heard the testimony of three expert witnesses who testified for
the Prosecution pursuant to Rule 94bis, and admitted their respective reports.482 One of those
three experts, Expert Witness TF]-150, testified entirely in closed session.483 Two other
expert reports were admitted without calling the experts to testify in person, as the Defence
accepted their reports pursuant to Rule 94bis(C).484 Although Witness Corinne Dufka was
originally tendered as an expert witness, the Trial Chamber, pursuant to a motion from the
Defence, reclassified her as a witness of fact and excluded the opinion portion of her
evidence.485
208. The Trial Chamber has evaluated the probative value of the expert evidence taking
into account the professional competence of the expert, the methodology used and the
credibility of the findings made in the light of all the other evidence in the trial.486 ln
addition, in assessing the weight to be given to expert evidence, the Trial Chamber has taken
into consideration the sources upon which the expert based his or her opinion and the extent
to which the expert has been able to provide details regarding the basis of the opinion.487
209. Where expert testimony or reports went beyond their parameters by drawing
conclusions touching upon the ‘ultimate issue’ in this case, i. e., the individual criminal
responsibility of the Accused, the Trial Chamber disregarded such conclusions.488
482 Expert Witness lan Smillie, Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Cor1nection"; Expert
Witness Stephen Ellis, Exhibit P—03 1, "Char1es Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone"; Expert Witness TF1-150,
Exhibit P-077 (confidential).
483 The provision that TF 1—150's testimony be heard entirely in closed session was ordered by Trial Chamber
I in Prosecutor v. Norman, F ofana and Kondewa, SCSL—04—14—T—432, Decision on Prosecution Application for
Closed Session for Witness TF2—218, 15 June 2005. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03-01—T—432, Transcript 18
February 2008, p. 4002, where the Trial Chamber found that it continued to be bound by this order.
444 Expert Witness Beth Vann, Exhibit P—073, "Conflict—Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone"; Jessica
Alexander, Exhibit P—43, "Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the Conflict in Sierra Leone".
485 Prosecutor v. T ctylor, SCSL-03-01-T—543, Decision on Defence Application to Exclude the Evidence of
Proposed Prosecution Expert Witness Corinne Dufka or, in the Alternative, to Limit its Scope and on Urgent
Prosecution Request for Decision, 19 June 2008.
486 Vasiycvié Trial Judgement, para. 20; Orié Trial Judgement, paras 59-71; Prosecutor v. Galié, [T-98-29-T,
Decision on the Expert Witness Statement Submitted by the Defence, 27 January 2003, p. 3.
437 Prosecutor v. Bizimurtgu et al., ICTR—99—50—T, Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Portions of
Testimony of Expert Witness Alison Des Forges, 2 September 2005, para. 21.
444 See Transcript 16 January 2008, p. 1451. AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 151; RUF Trial Judgement, para.
538.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GQ 18 May 2012

3% 1 *1-1
4. Facts of which Judicial Notice was Taken
210. On 7 December 2007, the Trial Chamber issued a decision taking judicial notice of
36 facts pursuant to Rule 94(A) of the Rules.489 These facts have been relied upon in this
Judgement as indicated. The Trial Chamber also took judicial notice of 15 adjudicated facts
from the AFRC Trial.490 The Trial Chamber recalls that these judicially noticed adjudicated
facts are subject to a rebuttable presumption of truth, and could be challenged by the parties
during the course of the trial.49l
5. Agreed Facts
211. A number of facts in this case were admitted in whole or in part by the Defence.492
There is no provision in the Rules pertaining to agreed facts. Nonetheless, it follows from
the very nature of adversarial proceedings that the parties may stipulate to any fact on which
they reach consensus.493 Before relying on these agreed facts as indicated in this Judgement,
the Trial Chamber has subjected them, as all other evidence, "to the tests of relevance,
probative value and reliability".494
C. Credibilig Assessment of Specific Witnesses
212. The Trial Chamber has made both general assessments of the credibility of particular
witnesses, as well as assessments of their credibility in relation to particular events. In this
section, the Trial Chamber provides a general credibility evaluation of several significant
Prosecution and Defence witnesses whose credibility has been challenged by the Parties.
VVhere possible, the assessments of credibility in relation to specific events have been
discussed in the sections dealing with those events. However, in instances where the
489 Taylor Decision on Judicial Notice.
400 Taylor Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts. However, the Trial Chamber dismissed
Motions from both the Prosecution and Defence for judicial notice of adjudicated facts from the RUF Trial. See
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-04-01-T-987, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated
Facts from the RUF Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B) gid Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of
Adjudicated Facts from the RUF Judgement, 17 June 2010 [Taylor Decision on Judicial Notice of RUF
Adjudicated Facts]. T
W Taylor Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, para. 27; Prosecutor v. Popovié et. al.,
IT-05-88-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts with Annex, 26 September "
2006 [Popovic Decision on Adjudicated Facts], para. 21.
492 Admitted Facts and Law.
493 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 154; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 521. See also Rule 92 of the Rules
("Confessions") which has however a different scope of applicability.
494 Simié Trial Judgement, para.21; B/agojevié and Jokic Trial Judgement, para. 28; Ha/ilovic Trial

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / du 18 May 2012

3% W3
credibility of witnesses with relation to specific events was challenged by one or both of the
Parties, and did not arise in context elsewhere in the draft, the evidence related to such
events has been addressed in this section.
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
213. Abu Keita testified that he joined the AFL in 1990.495 Following his service in the
AFL, Keita became a member of LUDF during the time LUDF was fighting the RUF.496
Keita served in ULIMO—K from 1995 to 1997, where he attained the rank of Deputy Chief
of Staffim In 1998, according to his testimony, Keita was sent to the RUF by the Accused to
serve as head of the Scorpion Unit in Sierra Leone, where he was until 2002.498
214. The Defence submits that Abu Keita has political motivation to incriminate the
Accused. It points out that Keita was a member of LUDF and ULIMO at the time they
fought against the Accused and the NPFL, and that he was imprisoned for not fighting
against Roosevelt Johnson's forces, although he denied interacting with Johnson as part of a
coup attempt against the Accused.499 The Trial Chamber notes that while Keita was once an
enemy of the Accused, he acknowledged in his testimony that the Accused was involved in
his release from prison.5OO The Defence further challenged Keita's credibility in relation to
his role within the ‘Scorpion Unit’ and a meeting he allegedly attended with Sam Bockarie,
lbrahim Bah and the Accused. This evidence has been considered in context in the section
on Military Persom1el.5Ol
215. Abu Keita repeatedly testified that he shared information with investigators that did
not appear in his earlier statements, and that he had not told investigators what the
statements say he said. For example, the Defence highlighted a number of inconsistencies
between Keita's testimony and his prior statements to the Prosecution. Some of these
Judgement, para. 20.
""5 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008,p. 2077.
4% Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1947-1949.
497 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1950-1954.
‘*"’·‘ Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2117.
4°° Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1400-1401.
500 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2106-2108. See also TF1-406, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp.
856-857; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29325—29327.
501 Provision of Military Personnel: Scorpion Unit.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gibb 18 May 2012

Es e CM
inconsistencies, such as the identity of the person who released him from prison,502 and the
number of bodyguards assigned to him by Yeaten,5O3 are minor in nature. With regard to
Keita's prior statement that he left with Bockarie to travel to Buedu, the Trial Chamber finds
his testimony in court to be more detailed, indicating that he left for Buedu in a convoy that
included Bockarie but that they parted in Voinjama, after which Keita joined 1ssa Sesay in
Foya and they continued together to Buedu.5O4 As the prior statement is so limited in detail,
the Trial Chamber finds it is not necessarily inconsistent with Keita's testimony.
216. The Trial Chamber notes that some details which could incriminate the Accused and
were mentioned in Keita's prior statements were not mentioned during his testimony. For
example, Keita testified that he did not leave Sierra Leone between 1998 and 2002. He
denied telling investigators what was recorded in his prior statements, that he had been
present with Bockarie (a.l<.a. Mosquito) on three occasions in 1999 in which he brought
diamonds to Charles Taylor in Liberia,5O5 and that he had been present when Charles Taylor
and Issa Sesay discussed finances at a house in Kongo Town in 2000.506
217. The Defence alleges that several Prosecution witnesses testified about Abu Keita's
relations with the RUF prior to 1998, while Keita himself omitted these facts from his
testimony. These omissions relate to RUF purchasing arms from ULIMO while Keita was a
ULIMO General, the relations of his girlfiiend's father with Sankoh, or times he spent in
Sierra Leone prior to the Accused's inauguration.5O7 Keita testified prior to these witnesses
and was not cross—examined on these issues. The Trial Chamber finds that these omissions
are relatively minor in nature and do not undermine Keita's credibility.
218. The Defence asserts that Keita received payments in excess of what was necessary to
cover his expenses, and that his testimony was influenced by the indebtedness he felt to the
Prosecution.5O8 The Trial Chamber notes that most of the $USD 2,502 and 6,000 leones
(approximately $USD 2)5O9 received by Keita can be accounted for as reimbursement for
502 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008. pp. 2107-2108.
503 Abu Keita. Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 213 l.
504 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2126.
505 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 21 17-21 18.
506 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2120-2121.
507 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1404.
508 Defence Final Trial Brief. para. 1397.
509 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 leones/US dollar.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / W 18 May 2012

3% l`-`+S`
plane tickets, hotel expenses, meals, and other transport—related expenses.5m The Trial
Chamber does not find that these payments undermine the witness's credibility. The
Defence also submits that Abu Keita "denied all suggestions that he had been promised
incentives, including relocation, only to appear in the newspaper in Sierra Leone later
threatening to sue the Prosecution for failing to meet its end of the bargain after he had
testified for them".5H The Trial Chamber notes that Abu Keita was not questioned on
whether he was promised relocation, or that he denied that he was. Keita did deny that he
told others that if they would cooperate with the Prosecution they would subsequently be
able to get asylum.5l2 In a newspaper article published after Keita had testified, Keita is
recorded as saying that he had been "misused and abandoned by the Special Court" since he
believed that after he testified and "performed his own side of the bargain" officials of the
Special Court have breached the verbal agreement he had with them to protect and relocate
him and his family to a country where he would feel safe, thereby putting his life in
danger.5l3 The Trial Chamber notes that Keita is also recorded as saying that "he carmot
travel to Liberia nor can he continue to live in Sierra Leone because he knows that Charles
Taylor has spies all over the country".5l4 Given this explanation, and since this information
stems from an unverified news article, the Trial Chamber does not find that this undermines
Keita's credibility.
219. ln light of the above, the Trial Chamber finds the witness to be generally credible
and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may arise.
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
220. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,5l5 testified entirely in closed session. Although
he denied personally committing crimes, other witnesses have alleged that he did so. He is
an accomplice witness, and the Defence argues that TF1~371 received immunity from
prosecution in exchange for his testimony. The witness testified that there was no such
exchange, that he was simply informed in a letter handed to him during his first meeting
510 Exhibit P-048, "Special Court all disbursements for Witness Form SCSLP0023 (Redacted)".
5 H Defence Pinal Trial Brief, para. 1270.
512 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2152-2154.
SB Exhibit D-468, "Standard Times Article, Prosecution Witness May Take Legal Suit Against Special Courts.
Breach of Agreement, Vol. 30 No. 46, 29 September 2009".
SM Exhibit D-468, "Standard Times Article, Prosecution Witness May Take Legal Suit Against Special Courts.
Breach of Agreement, Vol. 30 No. 46, 29 September 2009".
515 TE1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dw l8 May 2012

3% t *H¤
with the Prosecution that he was not under investigation. The Prosecution also stated that
there were no negotiations or communications relating to the letter given to the witness.
22l. The Trial Chamber observes that TF]-371 was very consistent between his evidence
in chief and cross-examination. He was confronted by some prior inconsistent statements in
cross-examination. ln most of these cases, the witness reafhrmed his examination in chief
and indicated that the prior inconsistent statements were asked in different contexts or were
improperly recorded.
222. The statement that TF]-371 prepared for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
("TRC"), for example, stated that he escaped Kakata and went into hiding at Bong Mines
before he was arrested on suspicion of spying for ECOMOG, while in Court he testified that
he was forcibly recruited by the NPFL in Kakata before being marched to Bong Mines. ln
cross-examination, the witness affirmed his testimony and explained that his TRC statement
was in draft form with mistakes that had not been corrected. The TRC statement entered into
evidence is in draft form.5l6 The Trial Chamber notes that it is handwritten with several
deletions, and clearly is not a final document. It is not clear from the evidence whether this
statement reached the TRC. The Defence notes a prior statement to the Prosecution
indicating that TF]-371 "opted" into the NPFL because he had no other way to feed his
family.5l7 The witness denied using this word. The Trial Chamber accepts that it was the
OTP's word. In light of the explanations of the witness, the Trial Chamber finds that the
inconsistencies highlighted with regard to his entry into the NPFL are relatively minor and
do not undermine the fundamental credibility of his testimony.
223. The Defence also highlights an interview TF]-371 gave as an illustrative example of
his duplicity.5l8 The interview is a tirade against the former government, British, Nigerians T
and UN. ln cross-examination, the witness said he had reneged on some of his earlier stands
in support of the RUF. The Trial Chamber found him to be sincere and candid in his
testimony on this matter. He came across as a man who realised and accepted that what had
been done was wrong. The Trial Chamber notes that his contrition is not inconsistent with
the views he espoused previously in the interview, but rather a subsequent expression of
regret resulting from reflection on previous behaviour.
5 M Exhibit D-006 (confidential).

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Case No.; SCSL-O3-Ol-T J 18 May 20l2

231 41
( 224. In his evidence, TF1-371 testified that ‘Operation No Living Thing’ was a plan
involving the Accused, to capture Freetown at all costs, in which the fighters should broker
no nonsense from anyone, civilian or military.5l9 The Defence submits that this is
"diarnetrically opposite" to the testimony he gave about the same operation in the RUF trial,
where he said that the term ‘Operation No Living Thing’ was a morale booster for the
fighters to urge them to keep on fighting without fear of death.52O The Trial Chamber
disagrees with the submission that TF1-371's evidence in this trial is "diametrically
opposite" to the testimony he gave in the RUF trial since both descriptions he gave could be
applicable to ‘Operation No Living Thing.’ Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that in his
cross-examination on this issue, TF1-371 did not disavow his earlier testimony, in which he
stated that Freetown was to be captured "by all means".52l TF1-371 stated that no explicit
orders were given to burn, rape, loot and kill indiscriminately.522 While the specifics of the
interpretation of the term offered by the witness vary somewhat, in the Trial Chamber's
view his testimony is not inconsistent. The primary message conveyed, as described
consistently by the witness, was that Freetown was to be captured.
225. Factual issues raised by the Defence in challenging the testimony of TF1-371 in
relation to particular events are dealt with in the context of the Trial Chamber's
consideration of these events.
226. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Trial Chamber finds TF1-371 to be
generally credible and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as
. they may arise.
Prosecution Witness Pegry Kamara
227. Witness Perry Kamara was an RUF memberm and radio operator524 with the
codename "System".525 He testified that he was abducted into the RUF in April 1991.526
517 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2514-2535 (CS).
518 Exhibit D¥005A (confidential).
519 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2413—2414 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2640, 2650—
2660 (CS).
520 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1552.
521 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2413—2414 (CS).
522 TF1—371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2652—2653 (CS).
523 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3024.
524 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3033, 3037, 3059; Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3073,

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T [ W 18 May 2012

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Before the AFRC coup, Kamara worked for a number of RUF commanders including Foday
Sankoh, Issa Sesay and Isaac Mongor.527 During the Junta Period, Kamara served in Makeni
as the overall signal commander,528 moving briefly to Koidu Town and then Superman
Ground after the ECOMOG lntervention.529 Around September 1998 he testified that he was
sent by Morris Kallon to join Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) in Rosos53O and participated
in the Freetown invasion in January 1999.53l From 1999 until disarmament, Kamara was
based in Kono.532
228. The Trial Chamber observes that Kamara's testimony was coherent, detailed and
generally consistent between his evidence—in—chief and cross—examination. He maintained a
calm demeanour, despite persistent questioning by Defence Counsel and accusations that he
was lying.533
229. The Defence submits that Kamara's determination to implicate the Accused was "so
palpable it resulted in him making some of the most outrageous allegations".534 In particular,
the Defence makes lengthy submissions regarding Kamara's testimony concerning the
Accused's involvement in a plan for a multi—axis operation to capture Kono and Freetown
conceived before Operation Fitti—Fatta.535 The Trial Chamber notes that while it did not
ultimately rely on Kamara's testimony in this regard, certain aspects of his testimony were
corroborated by other witnesses and that an offensive similar to the one described by
Kamara ultimately took place in the latter half of 1998. The Trial Chamber is therefore of
the view that Kamara's evidence was influenced by his subsequent knowledge of the events
that unfolded and that he added detail to events he recalled with the benefit of hindsight. It
does not consider that Kamara's general credibility is adversely affected thereby.
3089.
525 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3073.
526 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3024-3025.
527 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3038-3040, 3051-3053; Transcript 5 February 2008, pp,
3085-3086.
528 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3087-3089.
529 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3100-3102, 3112-3115.
530 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3174-3176; Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3184-3189.
53] Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3224-3225, 3250.
532 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3254-3255.
533 See for example Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3308, 3313-3314, 3340, 3344, 3348.
534 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 898.
535 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 891-898; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 31.

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2% ¤ ’r‘1
230. The Defence also submits that Kamara's credibility is damaged by his denial of
certain exculpatory facts, despite being "someone who claimed to be in the know". It cites
by way of` example Kamara's denial that weapons used in the Fitti—Fatta attack on Kono
were obtained from ULIMO.536 In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes Kamara's testimony
that he knew that any arms or ammunition that came from Liberia had been sent by
Taylor.537 The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that the Accused was one of` several
sources for the materiel for Fitti—Fatta538 and that ammunition was supplied by the Accused
on many occasions throughout 1998.539 However, it considers that, although Kamara may
have been overzealous in makin such an assum tion, in his testimon he made his views
S P Y
clear and the basis for them is explicit. For this reason, the Trial Chamber does not find that
Karama's overly broad statement to be detrimental to his general credibility.
231. In its Final Trial Brief`, the Defence also highlights Kamara's agreement with
Defence Counsel's proposition that he tailored his evidence according to the trial in which
he testifying.540 To the extent that evidence provided in a previous trial is not inconsistent
with the sworn testimony before this Court, the Trial Chamber is not of` the view that
rovidin testimon s ecificall relevant to the case at hand is a matter from which adverse
P S Y P Y
inferences can be drawn.
232. On cross—examination, Kamara testified that radio messages541 between Sankoh and
Taylor were recorded in special logbooks at each of the 20 RUF stations in the Sankoh era,
most of which were destro ed when the RUF "lost ower" or when it dissolved.542 He also
Y P
described how the special logbooks "got missing" when the Kamajors attacked Zogoda in
1996543 or when the RUF were attacked by government troops.544 W"hen challenged about
the discrepancy between saying the books went missing or were destroyed545, Kamara
536 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 898.
537 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3349.
538 Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or F acilitated by the Accused.
539 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February l998·December 1999).
540 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 898 highlighting the testimony given at Perry Kamara, Transcript 7
February 2008, p. 3389 (PS).
541 As opposed to radio conversations between the two men which Kamara explained were never recorded.
See Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3310-3311.
542 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3309, 3311, 3314-3315.
543 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3309, 3315.
SM Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3315.
545 The Defence also raises Perry Kamara's "conflicting answers" on this topic in the Defence Final Trial

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Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T On 18 May 2012

121 z 0
explained that he was talking about different occasions: sometimes they went missing during
operations or were destroyed, and mostly when they were about to disarm, the books were
destroyed. They were burnt.546 He remained firm in his testimony that the Taylor-Sankoh
logbooks in all 20 RUF stations ultimately disappeared.547 The Trial Chamber accepts the
witness's explanation.
233. ln his prepping session shortly before his testimony to the Court, Kamara stated that
Foday Sankoh was present in Senge on the first occasion the witness saw the Accused.
Neither in his first statement to the Prosecution548 nor at Court549 did he mention Sankoh in
relation to that meeting. When confronted with the inconsistency, the witness stated that he
did not recall that Foday Sankoh and the Accused were in Senge, stating that Prosecution
Counsel had erred when taking the prepping notes.550 Noting that the witness did not
mention Sankoh's presence in his first statement to the Prosecution or in his testimony, the
Trial Chamber accepts this explanation.
234. On cross-examination, Defence counsel questioned Perry Kamara about various
payments, including some for accommodation, meals, repairs to a motor vehicle, repair of a
generator in Freetown, ‘assistance’ and a top-up card made on days when no interviews
were conducted by the Prosecution.55l Although Kamara could not recall what he was doing
on each of the days in question or the dates of his interviews with the Prosecution, he
explained that he lived far from Freetown and travelled there frequently whenever required
to do so by the Prosecution.552 Further, in addition to his own interviews, Kamara testified
that the Prosecution invited him to assist them in locating a particular individual.553 He also
highlighted that some of the payments for example were of the nature of disbursements, not
direct payments to him554 and denied that any money had been given without consideration
on his part.555 ln total, Kamara received 2,615,025 Leones (approximately SSUSD 870)55°
Brief, para. 829.
546 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3312.
547 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3315.
548 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3283.
544 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3032-3033.
550 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3283-3286.
55I Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3397, 3399-3401.
552 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3397-3398, 3400.
554 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3398-3399.
554 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3396, 3401.
555 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3402.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T Z @*8 18 May 2012

3% r sn
from the Prosecution in 41 payments.667 The Trial Chamber does not find that these
payments undermine his credibility.
235. Throughout its Final Trial Brief the Defence makes other submissions regarding
specific portions of Kamara's testimony. The Trial Chamber has considered these instances
in the context of the Judgement as they arise, and has accepted or rejected Kamara's
testimony about those particular events accordingly.
236. ln light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds Perry.Kamara to be a generally
credible witness and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they
may arise.
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
237. Foday Lansana, an RUF radio operator,668 was born in Liberia and joined the NPFL ·
in February or March 1990.669 Lansana was trained as a radio operator in 1990, and he
remained an operator until at least 1997.666
238. The Defence highlights the fact that Lansana's testimony in court differed from his
prior statements with regard to the order by Charles Taylor to evacuate NPFL fighting forces
from Sierra Leone in 1992.661 The witness testified that he was present in Baidu in May
1992 when Taylor spoke to Mekunagbe on the radio and ordered the evacuation of NPFL
fighting forces from Sierra Leone.662 ln one prior statement he said that he heard Oliver
Varney announce this message at a parade in Kailahun, while in another prior statement he
said that the order came from Liberia to Dopoe Menkarzon, and he learned of it through
NPFL fighters in Vahun.666 ln cross-examination, the witness maintained that his prior
statements were not inconsistent with his testimony. He explained, "different questions were
asked and I responded to them in different manners". He said that he heard the general
communication from Taylor over the radio in Baidu and that Oliver Varney was the more
556 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 Leones/US dollar.
667 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3402.
566 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
556 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4315-4320. Lansana confirmed that he also goes by the
name CO Nya. Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4703-4706.
666 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4406-4407.
Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1488.
562 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4368-4369, 4377.

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Bin sa.
operational person carrying out the instruction.664 On re-examination, the witness clarified
the sequence of events, that a message for the evacuation of the NPFL fighting forces was
first transmitted from Charles Taylor's operator to the radio station in Baidu and when the
generals arrived, Taylor spoke to them in the radio room in Baidu and gave Oliver Varney
the task of ensuring that all the NPFL fighters assembled, and the message was read to them
on the parade ground.666
23 9. The Defence also notes that Lansana denied that he was arrested on account of being
involved in an incident at Spur Road on 8 May 2000.666 Lansana testified that he was
arrested on 7 May 2000 as he was suspected of being a mercenary working as an
intermediary between Taylor and Sankoh. His co-defendants were charged with crimes
relating to the Spur Road incident. The witness maintained on cross-examination that he had
been arrested the day before and was not involved in the incident. He was convicted for
crimes relating to the incident and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.667 The Defence
argues that Lansana's account is "if not totally ridiculous, then at least illogical and highly
suspect".666 The Trial Chamber notes Lansana's testimony that in May 2000 he gave a
statement to the police regarding the Spur Road incident under torture.666 The Trial Chamber
has not seen a transcript of the trial and does not know the details of the case, but notes that
the witness referred to his date of incarceration as one of the grounds of his appeal.676 lt does
not find that his testimony with regard to his arrest, torture and subsequent conviction is
illogical, in light of his explanation, or that his version of events with regard to the criminal
case against him undermines his general credibility.
240. The Defence argues that the witness had a clear motive to help the Prosecution's
case, as his early release from prison was due to his testimony and he had been promised
support for himself and his family.67l ln cross-examination, Lansana testified that he was
given money by the Prosecution while in prison so that he could buy a suit for his interviews
666 Foday Lansana, Transcript, 25 February 2009, p. 4678.
664 Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4675-4679.
666 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4771-4773.
566 Defence Final Trial BriefQ para. 1485.
567 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4574-4581, 4584-4590.
666 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1485.
669 Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4610-4612.
570 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4581.
57] Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1491.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / qi; 18 May 2012

3%%;
with the Court investigators but he denied that prisoners were offered money by the
Prosecution in exchange for testimony against Taylor.572 He testified that the Prosecution
promised to work for his release from prison because he feared for his safety in prison
should he testify. He testified that the Prosecution paid for his children's school fees and
school uniforms, and promised to take care of his family in case of illness.575 Having served
six and a half years of his sentence, with just under two years left to serve, on 27 April 2007
Lansana was released.574 The witness affirmed that he had received from the OTP a total of
a roximatel 932,000 leones (a roximatel SSUSD 300 575 for ex enses includin
PP Y PP Y P 8
medication, meals, communication, his children's education and uniforms.576 He also
received in disbursements from WVS a total of 5,952,800 leones, or "approximately SSUSD
6,000" to cover rent, utility bills, subsistence, medical care, child care, transportation and
other miscellaneous expenses.577 The Trial Chamber notes that almost all of the funds
received by the witness came through WVS, not OTP, and finds that the promise of early
release from prison for protective reasons and the support he received for his and his
family's expenses did not influence his testimony.
241. A number of other prior statements were presented to the witness as inconsistent
with his testimony, which he clarified. For example, he testihed that he heard Charles Taylor
speak on BBC radio from the Coca—Cola factory in Monrovia in 1990 saying the people of
Sierra Leone "would taste the bitterness of war", while his prior statement to investigators
said that he was physically present with Taylor during this interview. ln cross—examination,
Lansana affirmed his testimony, explaining that he was physically present with Taylor when
he addressed the Special Forces and that the prior statement was incorrect, that he heard the
BBC broadcast but had not been physically present with Taylor during that broadcast.578 In
re—examination, the Prosecution cited notes from a preparatory session with Lansana in
February 2008, where the point had been clarified and the witness had stated that he was
575 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008. pp. 4597~99; Transcript 25 Feb 2008, pp. 4603-4609.
575 Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 Febraury 2008, pp. 4612~4617.
574 Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, p. 4617.
5 15 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 leones/US dollar.
5 76 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4754-4761.
577 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4761-4763.
575 Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, p. 4631.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03—01~T ""' 18 May 2012
,/

3s 1%%
present with Taylor when he met the Special Forces but that he had heard the BBC interview
on the radio,579
242, The Trial Chamber found Lansana to be a very steady witness, who remained calm
and repeatedly afhrmed his testimony under intensive cross—examination by the Defence,
His explanations and clarifications of prior statements put to him by the Defence in cross-
examination were clear and coherent responses that effectively addressed the issues raised,
243, For these reasons the Trial Chamber finds Foday Lansana to be generally credible
and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may arise,
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -362
244, Witness TF1-362, an RUF member580 and a Liberian, joined the RUF in 1990,58] The
witness gave testimony regarding military training at Matru Jong, Bunumbu and Yengema
training bases,582
245, The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-362 is an accomplice witness but found her to be
very candid about her own role, including her own mistreatment of recruits, which caused
injury and even many deaths, by her own account,583 The witness admitted to lying in her
first statements to the Prosecution due to fear of being prosecuted and fear of betrayal by
those who had introduced her to the Prosecution,584
246, The Trial Chamber notes TF1-362's concession that she did not like the NPFL and
its commander, the Accused, because the NPFL abducted, brutalised or killed some of her
siblings, looted her family house and killed her stepfather,585
247, TFl—362 conceded she is not too familiar with Sierra Leone's geographical
locations,586 Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that there were discrepancies in TF1-362's
579 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February, p. 4770.
580 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4826-4827 (CS).
jg! TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4802-4803 (CS),
582 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4866-4868, 4916-1917 (CS).
583 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp, 4830-4832. 4836-4853, 4869-4873, 4899-4901, 4906, 4917-
4919, 4927-4928 (CS).
584 TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 4984, 4986, 5076-5078 (CS).
585 TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 4963-4968. 4970 (CS); Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5191-
5192 (CS).
586 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4983-4984 (CS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

.?>·~z¤%S'
testimony regarding dates and that she was unable to specify months. For example, the
witness testified that she left Sierra Leone in 1994 when Sankoh left for Abidjan, stayed in
Liberia for two years and thereafter returned to Sierra Leone in 1998. As Sankoh left for
Abidjan in 1996, which coincides with the witness's account of returning to Sierra Leone
after two years in 1998, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the witness left Sierra Leone in
1996 and simply made a mistake in her recollection of the year.587
248. The Trial Chamber found TF1-362 to be very consistent and detailed when
describing the command structure, procedures and methods of training at the training bases
where she was stationed, which were methods to which she was subjected.588
249. The Trial Chamber finds the witness's inconsistencies with prior statements
regarding why she joined the RUF to be minor, and accepts her version at trial, which was
corroborated by other witnesses,589 of how she joined the RUF.590
250. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-362 received 14,311,150 leones (approximately
$USD 4,770591) in total from W VS. Additionally, payments were made to the witness by the
Prosecution. ln total, the witness received $USD 3,836 and 624,000 leones (approximately
$USD 208592) from the Prosecution for various items such as lost wages, accommodation
and transportation. For a period of a few months it appears that the witness lived on
Prosecution funds at a "Safe House" along with her three children and her sister. During that
period, she received a mobile phone, expenses for child care and school fees for her
children. There are records of only four interviews with her from that period. The witness
ex lained that she asked for this mone since durin that eriod since she was "under their
P Y S P
[referring to personnel from the Special Court of Sierra Leone] control".593
587 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4851, 4856-4858, 4866-4868 (CS).
5*8 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4830-4832, 4836-4853, 4869-4873, 4899-4901, 4906, 4917-
4919, 4927-4928 (CS).
589 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23145-23148 (CS); Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p.
44909.
590 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4861-4863,4943 (CS); Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 4944-
4946 (CS); Transcript 4 March 2008, p. 5193 (CS).
Sm Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 leones/US dollar.
592 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 leones/US dollar.
tm TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5142-5153 (CS); Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5155-5186 (CS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Em 18 May 2012

3*51 Sb
251. The Accused testified that TF1—362 had been boasting to her friends in Liberia that
she was given $USD 10,000 to build a house.594 Defence witness Sam Kolleh testified that
TF1—362 told him she received $USD 10,000 from the Prosecution after she testified, and
was now using it to build her house.595 However, when challenged on this statement in
cross—examination, Kolleh said he "had no personal knowledge of it".5% Defence witness
John Vincent testified that he, Martin George and another Vanguard met TF1—362 in 2009,
after she gave her testimony. According to Vincent, the witness told them she was asked to
go and tell lies in exchange for "a little thing" which she was using to build her house.
Vincent understood it to mean money from the Prosecution, although she did not specify
who "they" were or the exact amount of the payments.597 Defence witness Martin George
described the meeting but stated that TF1—362 only said that she was tired of paying rent and
wanted to build a house. He said she did not tell them that she was getting support from
anyone.5Q8 The Trial Chamber notes that although she was cross—examined on the benefit
issues of relocation, healthcare, childcare, and other expenses, TF1—362 was not cross-
examined on the question of this $USD 10,000.599 ln light of Defence witness George's
contradiction of Defence witness Vincent's testimony, and the vague hearsay testimony_of
the Accused, the Trial Chamber does not find that these allegations undermine the credibility
of TF1—3 62.
252. The Trial Chamber found TF1—362 to be very steady in her testimony. She was
honest and forthright about her own actions, despite the fact that they reflected negatively on
her character. In the Trial Chamber's view, the Defence has not established any impropriety
with regard to the support given to the witness by WVS and the Prosecution.
253. For these reasons the Trial Chamber finds TFl—362 to be generally credible and will
consider further issues relating to her credibility in context as they may arise.
594 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29074-29077 (PS). A
595 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 3 November 2010, pp. 4861 1-48612.
5% Sam Kolleh, Transcript 9 November 2010, p. 49016.
W John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38252-38254; Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38459-38461;
Transcript 1 April 2010, pp. 38464-38466, 38488-38491.
598 DCT-062, Transcript 26 April 2010, pp. 39900-39904 (PS); Transcript 28 April 2010. pp. 40255—40257
gis). TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, p. 5147 (CS),

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / mx 18 May 2012

3% 1%}-
Prosecution Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray
254. Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray, an lntemal Defence Unit Commander in the
RUF,666 testified that he was captured by RUF/SL and NPFL fighters in 1991, and that he
remained a member of the RUF until disarmament in 2001.66] From 1991 to 1994, Mansaray
was assigned as a fighter, serving in various districts of Sierra Leone and Liberia.662
Mansaray also held several leadership positions within the IDU from 1994 to 2000, and
served as the secretary to the RUF/SL Operational Commander and as transportation
secretary in 2000.666 Mansaray testified that he was appointed to the post of mining
commander in Nyaiga, Kono District in 2001.664
255. The Defence submits that the Prosecution covered a generous amount of medical
expenses for Mansaray and his family, and that Mansaray relied heavily upon the
Prosecution as a source of financial support for medical and other expenses during 2006 and
2007.666 The Defence argues that these financial benefits have undermined Mansaray's
credibility as a witness and induced him to give evidence in favour of the Prosecution.666
256. The Defence notes that although the Prosecution questioned Mansaray about the
Accused in his fourth interview, Mansaray did not tell the Prosecution that he saw the
Accused and Foday Sankoh speak to a group of RUF soldiers at Bomi Hills until his seventh
interview in October 2007.667 The Defence contends that Mansaray mentioned seeing the
Accused at Bomi Hills in his seventh interview because by that time the Prosecution had
covered expensive medical bills on Mansaray's behalf.666 On cross-examination, Mansaray
explained that his failure to mention seeing the Accused at Bomi Hills in the earlier
interview was a mistake on his part.666 The Trial Chamber notes that in a November 2003
666 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5229-5230.
661 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5212, 5223-5229.
662 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5223-5229.
666 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5229-5235.
666 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5234-5235.
666 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1476.
666 Defence Final Trial Brief`, paras 1476-1480.
667 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1479 citing Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, p.
5447.
666 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1479.
666 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 10 March 2008. p. 5610.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012

Ear is %
interview with the Prosecution, Mansaray mentioned having knowledge that the Accused
was in Bomi Hills in 1991, but not that he had seen the Accused there.°l0
257. The Defence also highlights Mansaray's inconsistencies concerning the execution of
miners, arguing that his evidence on this point became more favourable to the Prosecution as
he continued to receive payments.6H On cross-examination Mansaray testified that, on up to
ten occasions, he witnessed the execution of miners in Kaisambo and Number 11 mining
area.6l2 The Defence then confronted Mansaray with his prior inconsistent statements on the
issue, including statements from two interviews with the Prosecution in 2004 and 2006 in
which Mansaray stated that he knew that miners were being executed but that he had not
personally witnessed the executions.6l3 Further, in a 2008 interview with the Prosecution,
while discussing the issue of miners being executed, Mansaray stated that he was merely
told about the killings.6l4 Although he was asked specifically on cross-examination about
whether he witnessed the killings, not whether the killings had occurred, Mansaray was
adamant that he had mentioned the killings to the Prosecution early in the interview process
and seemed not to appreciate the apparent contradiction between his prior statements and his
a testimony.6l5 Mansaray eventually attempted to clarify these inconsistencies on cross-
examination by stating that he had witnessed the execution of miners at the time that he was
a mining commander, but that during the time that he was not a mining commander he had
only heard about the killings.°l6 The witness further explained that he had mistakenly
forgotten to mention to the Prosecution early in the interview process that he had witnessed
the kiiiingsfm
258. The Trial Chamber notes that there was a fair amount of confusion in the cross-
examination on this inconsistency and that when the question became clear to the witness, at
one point Mansaray indicated that the question had not been put to him so clearly in his prior
interviews with the Prosecution.6l8 Particularly in light of his repeated insistence that the
MO Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5638-5640.
GH Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1480.
M2 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5449-5451, 5460-5461.
M3 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5463-5465, 5469-5470.
M4 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5463-5465, 5468-5470.
M5 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5449-5451, 5469-5471.
M6 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5460-5461.
M7 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5460-5462.
M8 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, p. 5462.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ @.0, 18 May 2012

3% ¤%¢‘
killings took place, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the witness may not have fully
appreciated the significance of the distinction between witnessing the killings and knowing
that they occurred.
259. Mansaray testified that he was appointed as mining commander on 14 January
2001.619 However, during two interviews with the Prosecution in 2007 and 2008, Mansaray
had stated that he was appointed mining commander in June 2000.620 When confronted with
this inconsistency on cross-examination, Mansaray confidently confirmed that 2001 was the
correct date that he was appointed as mining commander and stated that he could not recall
whether the incorrect date appeared in the interview through his own mistake or the
Prosecution's.62l The Trial Chamber is of the view that this is a minor inconsistency.
260. The Trial Chamber notes that, in addition to reimbursing Mansaray for meal and
travel expenses and lost wages, the Prosecution paid approximately 1,190,000 leones V
(approximately SUSD 396)622 in medical expenses for Mansaray and other members of his
family during 2006 and 2007.623 Mansaray also testified that the Prosecution paid 250,000
leones (approximately SUSD 83) for his chi1dren's school fees and related expenses in
2006.624 The Trial Chamber notes that although the witness received some financial benefits
from the Prosecution, the nature of the information that he provided to the Prosecution
throughout the interview process was consistent and does not appear to have been tailored in
favour of the Prosecution as a result of those benefits. The Trial Chamber also notes that
Mansaray was detailed and forthright when recounting the payments he received from the
Prosecution.
261. The Trial Chamber finds that the inconsistencies highlighted by the Defence are
relatively minor in nature and that the witness provided plausible explanations for those
inconsistencies, readily admitting to occasional lapses in memory or previous misstatements.
619 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5234-5235.
620 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5467-5469.
621 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5467-5469.
622 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 1eones/ US dollar.
623 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 7 March 2008, pp. 5567-5569, 5597-5598, 5600, 5602. Mansaray
testified that the Prosecution paid an additional 195,000 leones (approximately $USD 65) in medical expenses in
November or December 2007. However, the record is not clear as to whether this was an additional payment, or
one that had already been accounted for in connection with a previous medical procedure. Mustapha M.
Mansaray, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5602-5603.
M4 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 7 March 2008, p. 5570.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T j Obi 18 May 2012

3% ta 0
With regard to his prior statements and the question of` whether he personally witnessed the
killing of miners, the Trial Chamber does not consider this to be a minor issue, but accepts
the explanations of` the witness in light of the considerations set forth above. ln the Trial
Chamber's view, the Defence has not established any impropriety regarding the support
provided to the witness and his family by the Prosecution.625
262. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds Mansaray to be generally credible and
will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may arise.
Prosecution Witness Joseph "Zigzag" Marzah
263. Joseph ("Zigzag") Marzah, an SSS member,626 testified that he was a member of the
NPF L fiom 1989 and later the SSS until late 2003. He stated that in 1991 the Accused sent
him to Sierra Leone as part of a joint operation with Foday Sankoh to overthrow the
government in Freetown. Marzah testified that he later returned to Liberia, where he was
tasked with transporting weapons, materiel, and diamonds between Liberia and Sierra
Leone. Marzah stated that by 1997, he was SSS Chief of` Operations at the Accused's
Executive Mansion.622 In his testimony, Marzah admitted to acts of cannibalism and other
atrocities.°22
264. ln light of his role in the NPF L and the SSS, and his admitted involvement in
E numerous serious atrocities, the Trial Chamber notes that Marzah is an accomplice witness,
and he repeatedly asserted that he was acting according to orders received fiom the Accused.
Marzah approached the Prosecution a1&er being told by another former fighter that he should
do so in order to avoid being prosecuted for the crimes he committed.229 The Trial Chamber
notes with concern the evidence that as soon as he completed his testimony, Marzah phoned
another Prosecution witness whom he had introduced to the Prosecution.620
265. The Trial Chamber notes that, generally, Marzah did not provide specific dates for
the incidents he describes and could not place events in context. Further, it finds that his
625 See Preliminary Issues: Discretionary Payments and Other inducements to Witnesses by the Prosecution.
626 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 6053-6055.
(222 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5860-5878, 5894.
622 See for example Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5899-5900, 5929-5930, 5943-5949.
622 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, p. 5970.
""’ See TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21212-21213 (PS), The witness testified that they were
laughing and talking about "nothing".

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J OQ 18 May 2012

3% la t
testimony was confusing and exaggerated. ln particular, he appears to have exaggerated his
own role in the conflict and his level of personal communication with the Accused, for
example in testifying that he informed the Accused of every amputation he performed.63l
The Trial Chamber also notes that while Marzah stated that he was the "Chief of
Operations" of the SSS, numerous other witnesses testified that he was merely Yeaten's
bodyguard or orderly.632 ln addition, the Trial Chamber notes that Mar2ah's testimony was
inconsistent and evasive as to whether or not he participated in the Freetown invasion of
January 1999, or was in Monrovia with serious injuries at the time.633
266. Marzah attempted to implicate the Accused in cannibalism, stating that he and the
Accused ate Sam Dokie's liver together in Liberia. The Trial Chamber notes that the
Accused was in South Africa at the time of Dokie's death, and that this event was
emphatically denied by the person who Marzah alleged had cooked the liver for him.634
267. Marzah's testimony was often inconsistent with his prior statements to the
Prosecution, particularly in regards to allegations against the Accused. With regard to his
first meeting with the Accused and Sankoh, for example, Marzah stated that it was in
Gborplay, after the Accused ordered that Marzah be released from a burning container and
taken to the Accused's house. Marzah had previously told the Prosecution that he first met
the Accused in the Cote d’Ivoire and Sankoh in Burkina Faso. When confronted with these
inconsistencies, Marzah insisted that he had told the Prosecution about the burning container
incident, although there is no record of this.°35 The Trial Chamber does not accept Marzah's
explanation of these inconsistencies.
268. ln light of the numerous inconsistencies and implausibilities in Marzah's testimony,
the Trial Chamber finds that his evidence, particularly as it relates to his personal interaction
and communication with the Accused, must be considered with caution and cannot be relied
upon without corroboration.
631 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5955-5956. See also Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March
2008, p. 5891 (testifying that he made more than 100 trips to Sierra Leone carrying materiel, but only accounting
for how he travelled/where the materiel came from for 30 to 40 trips).
M Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 818.
633 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 5990-5993.
634 See also Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6153-6156; Annie Yeney, Transcript, 3 June
2010, pp. 42096-42098; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 491; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September
2009, p. 29966; Naomi Campbell, Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45463-45465.
635 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 5990-6031.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Q N 18 May 2012

2% 14 *2.
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
269. Witness Isaac Mongor, a Liberian who trained RUF members in 1990, subsequently
rose through the ranks of the RUF to a brigadier.666 He was one of the most senior
commanders in the RUF, overseeing several operations. He participated in a number of
atrocities.667 I
270. The Trial Chamber notes that Isaac Mongor is an accomplice witness, who received
a letter of immunity from the Prosecution. He testified in cross-examination that he received
this letter after he had decided to testify and was adamant that he never had any fear of being
prosecuted.666 However, he also testified that with regard to the involvement of the Accused
in the Freetown invasion, he was fearful of being tricked and arrested, and fearful of what
would happen to him if he told the truth, including the possibility that "they" would kill
him.666 It is unclear to whom he was referring as "they" in this context. He claimed that he
was not fully forthcoming with the Prosecution in his earlier statements relating to the role
of the Accused in the Freetown invasion in the interest of his own protection and that he
eventually decided to tell the truth because he wanted peace for himself and if anything was
going to happen after that let it happen.646 The Trial Chamber finds under these
circumstances that the testimony of the witness with respect to his earlier statements does
not undermine his credibility.
271. The Trial Chamber notes that Isaac Mongor received sums for meals, transport and
lost wages when he was interviewed by the Prosecution. He testified that he was not told he
would benefit from his testimony or be remunerated for lost wages.64l In cross-examination,
the amounts of money given to the witness were put to him, and he was unable to explain
the exact amounts he was given for transportation, food, and lost wages.642 While these
M6 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6238.
667 See for example Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31
March 2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
666 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6253.
669 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6735-6742.
646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6735-6744.
641 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6259-6261.
646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l April 2008, pp. 6361-6366.

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3**619 2
amounts were significantly more than he had actually spent, the Trial Chamber accepts the
testimony of the witness in cross-examination that he did not testify for monetary gain.644
272. In cross-examination, a number of other inconsistencies were raised between Isaac
Mongor's testimony and his prior statements. The Trial Chamber finds these inconsistencies,
relating to details such as the date he joined the AFL, the length of time he was Battle Field
Commander, whether a particular radio conversation relating to ‘Operation Stop Election’
took place in 1995 or 1996, or whether materials delivered to Magburaka air strip included
AK-47 ammunition, to be relatively minor in nature. A number of other issues raised by the
Defence as inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness are prior omissions more than
inconsistencies, for example his failure to mention in early interviews a radio conversation
between the Accused and Sankoh where they discussed ‘Operation Stop Election,’ or the
fact that he specifically mentioned amputations in relation to this operation for the first time
only in his testimony.644 The Trial Chamber does not find that these minor inconsistencies
and omissions undermine the credibility of the witness.
273. The Trial Chamber observed that Isaac Mongor maintained a calm demeanour
throughout the entirety of cross-examination, despite being pressed heavily and repeatedly
accused of lying.
274. The Trial Chamber finds Mongor to be a generally credible witness and will consider
further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may arise.
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
275. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,645 testified that he was abducted into the
RUF in 1991 at the age of 17,646 and that he remained in the RUF until disarmament in
2001.647 During his time in the RUF, TF1-516 attained the rank of Sergeant and served as a
radio operator for the RUF in Sierra Leone and for Benjamin Yeaten in Liberia.648
443 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, p. 6366.
444 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1555.
645 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p, 6845.
646 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6802, 6811-6812, 6876.
W TF1-516, Transcript 10 Aprr1200s,p. 7106.
648 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 6858-6859, 7206.

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / GM 18 May 2012

2 3 1 ‘7 '-+
276. In the Trial Chamber's view, TF1-516 provided clear and detailed testimony and
testified in a calm and forthright marmer. He was careful to distinguish between those events
about which he had direct knowledge, and those events which he had not personally
witnessed and told the Trial Chamber candidly when he was unsure about when an event
occurred.°49
277. The Defence argues that Witness TF1-516 is not a credible witness because his
testimony was implausible and contradicted by the evidence of other Prosecution
witnesses.55O The Defence notes two particular instances in which, in its view, the witness
rovided im lausible testimon 1 the first occasion relates to a call TF1-516 testified that he
P P Y
received from Taylor's station in Gbam a in or around March 1996 and the second concerns
Y 8
a message that he stated he received from Base 1 during the retreat from Kono in February
1998. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has assessed the evidence relating to the call received
from Taylor's radio station in 1996 in the section of the Judgement on the Abidjan Peace
Accord and the message from Base 1 in 1998 in the section of the Judgement on Military
Operations. On both occasions it found the witness's evidence to be credible.65 I
278. The Defence asserts that portions of TF1-516's testimony in which he provided
details about radio stations, including their names and the dates that they were established,
were factually problematic because they contradicted the testimony of other Prosecution
witnesses.552 The Trial Chamber has considered this evidence in the section of the
Judgement on Operational Support.555 The Defence further challenges TF1-516's testimony
with reference to Dauda Amna Fomie's testimony that there was no direct link between
RUF and NPFL radio stations in March 1996.654 The Trial Chamber has considered this
evidence in the section of the Judgement on the Peace Process, where it found TF1-516's
testimony on this point to be reliable.65 5
545 See for example TFl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6945, 6962; Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7820-
7821 where the witness repeatedly and candidly explained that he did not know whether the ammunitions
shipment to which he testified took place during the Freetown attack of January 1999.
550 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1496-1502.
551 See Military Operations: Alleged Message from Base 1 to Troops Retreating from Kono and see Peace
Process: Abidjan.
552 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1500-1501.
555 See Operational Support: RUF and NPF L Radio Codes and Communications.
554 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1499.
555 See Peace Process: Abidjan. .

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T QTKQ, 18 May 2012 w

3 s n 75
279. The Defence argues that because TF 1-516 was reluctant to agree with prior
statements he made to the Prosecution that were exculpatory in nature, he was "not
interested in telling the truth, but in providing a [sic] inculpatory testimony".°56 The Trial
Chamber recognises that TF 1-516 was reluctant to agree with his prior statement.657 It is
clear that the witness wanted to distinguish communications which to0l< place over the radi0
as 0pposed to those conducted over the satellite phone, a distinction that was not made in his
prior statement.658 However, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the reluctance of the
witness was the result of his efforts to explain his answer rather than unwillingness to be
truthful.
280. S0me parts of TF 1-516's testimony were inconsistent with his prior statements to the
Prosecution. In his prior statement, the witness had stated that he had left Z0g0da and gone
to Buedu in December 1995 and stayed there until the AF RC coup when he moved to Kono,
whilst also maintaining that he remained there "over a year". The witness was consistent in
maintaining that he had corrected this version of his prior statement to record that he in fact
left Buedu in December 1996 which was substantiated by written corrections read to the
C0urt. The witness also explained that he had not moved to Kono until around August 1997.
Whilst the Trial Chamber notes that a slight inconsistency remains between these dates and
the assertion that the witness stayed in Buedu for a year, it considers the discrepancy a minor
one which does not affect the witness's overall credibility and which could in any event be
attributable to a miscalculation on the part of the investigator, rather than the witness.659
281. The witness had also previ0usly told investigators that he did not have the auth0rity
to call or receive messages from Liberia while he was wor1Only certain radi0 Operators had such auth0rity, yet he testihed to the Trial Chamber about
messages that he had received from Liberia. The witness explained that when he was in
Z0g0da and during some of his time in Buedu, he did not have auth0rity to communicate
with Liberia but that he had been given permission during his time in Buedu. In view of the
candid and consistent way in which the witness explained the apparent discrepancy and the
°5° Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1502.
057 TF1-516 was asked to agree or disagree with a statement he made to the Prosecution that he had not heard
any cornmunication from the Accused regarding the Freetown invasion of 1999. The witness was reluctant to
give a yes or no answer to the question and made several attempts to explain what he meant by his statement
versus what was written. TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7777-7779.
M8 TF1—516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7777-7779.
W) TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7498-7508.

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fact that the Trial Chamber was not shown the entirety of the prior statements to enable it to
assess the context in which the statements had been given, it does not draw any adverse
inferences from the discrepancy.666
282. The Trial Chamber has considered TF1-516's inconsistencies about whether he
witnessed Sam Bockarie handling diamonds in the Diamonds section of the Judgement,
where it found TF1-516's testimony to be 1‘eliable.66l
283. There were, however, some occasions when TF1-516 became agitated and tried to
avoid answering questions. For example, when presented with a prior statement to the effect
that he had never seen Yeaten or any other high-ranking Liberian dealing with diamonds, he
described an incident in which Eddie Kanneh had visited Yeaten's house but refused a
number of times to answer directly whether he agreed with his prior statement. Only after
being pressed several times by the Trial Chamber, did the witness then assert that the
investigators had made an error.662 The Trial Chamber noted that the witness also refused
several times to answer the question whether General Tengbeh was one of the Special
Forces. When pressed to do so, the witness replied that he did not know.663 The Trial
Chamber accepts this response.
284. For these reasons the Trial Chamber finds TF1-516 to be generally credible and will
A consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may arise.
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
285. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay (a.k.a. Bobby, Pastor Bobson and Pastor Yapo
Sesay)664 an AFRC member665 and officer666, testified that he was a member of the SLA
from 1991 until the AFRC coup in May 1997.667 Shortly after the coup, he was assigned to
666 TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7545-7548.
66l Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, February 1998-December 1999.
662 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 1998, pp. 7775-7777.
663 TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7444-7445.
664 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7849.
665 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7867, 7869; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp.
8684, 8689.
666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865-7866.
667 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7853. Bobson Sesay testified that he was working
in the Military Police at the Sierra Leone Military police Headquarters at Cockerill before 25 May 1997
(Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7855-7856). Samuel Kargbo corroborated that Bobson Sesay was an SLA
(Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10663).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012

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Hassan Papa Bangura, one of the 17 founding members of the AF RC, as a Military
Transport Officer and security guard.666 Aiier the ECOMOG Intervention, Bobson Sesay
moved to northern Sierra Leone as a combatant under the command of Alex Tamba Brima
(a.k.a. Gullit). While he was promoted a number of times, he never held a rank higher than
Captain.666 Notably, Bobson Sesay was one of two witnesses who participated in the
Freetown invasion led by Brima in January 1999.676 Aiier the Freetown invasion he served
as an aide-de-camp and personal bodyguard to Bangura,67] until he was arrested on 6 June
2000.672 At the time of his testimony before the Special Court, he practised as an
evangelist.673
286. The Trial Chamber notes that the witness provided coherent and detailed testimony.
Aside from isolated occasions on which he became agitated when Defence counsel
suggested that he testified before the Special Court for self-interested motives,674 and that he
killed his bush wife,675 he remained calm throughout his testimony. The Trial Chamber
observes that Bobson Sesay was generally consistent between his evidence in examination-
in-chief and cross-examination. Wihen confronted with prior statements which differed from
his in-court testimony, his explanation was that the investigators or OTP either did not ask
him a particular question,676 did not ask him to elaborate on a particular aspect677 or
666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7860, 7867.
666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7861-7863, 7865 (He was promoted to a
Regimental Sergeant Major after February 1998. At Colonel Eddie town, he was Second Lieutenant and he was
then demoted to a Lieutenant around 25 December 1998. He was promoted to Captain just before the Freetown
invasion). Note that Issa Sesay testified that Alimamy Bobson Sesay was one of the "honourab1es", one of the
founding members of the AFRC, see Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44912. However, given that neither
Bobson Sesay nor any other witness corroborates this, the Trial Chamber considers that Issa Sesay is mistaken as
to the witness's identity.
676 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8275-8279.
671 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7866-7867.
672 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7869-7871.
673 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8526-8527.
674 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8535-8536 (where Defence counsel suggested that
he had spoken to his family about seeking asylum in France after his testimony before the Special Court of Sierra
Leone, and that he had told someone that he knew the AFRC had no dealings with the Accused but that he
"needed to survive").
675 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8870-8873, 8881.
676 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8591-8592, 8606 (the witness did not mention the
Accused providing the delegation with $USD 15,000 before 6 April 2008 because the investigators did not ask
him about it prior to this date and maintains that he mentioned this sum of money to the investigators even
during the AFRC trial but they limited his answers since they were not relevant to the case at that time);
Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8602-8603 (the witness explained that he did not mention Taylor's logistical
support to the troops for the 6 January 1999 Freetown invasion until his 24th meeting with the OTP because this
was the first time the investigators questioned the witness on this matter and he only answered questions they put
to him); Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8721 (the witness explained that he limited his answer as to whether he saw

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
I

Es eas
otherwise noted his statement wrongly.676 While the Trial Chamber does not accept these
explanations as curing all of the witness's inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber has regard to
his explanations in considering his evidence about specific events.
287. On cross-examination, the Defence raised the issue of payments made by the OTP to
the witness without interviews being conducted. Defence counsel questioned Alimamy
Bobson Sesay about various payments, including payments for medical expenses, meals and
transportation costs, made when there were no interviews conducted by the OTP.679 The
witness did not dispute that payments were made and explained that the OTP invited him on
numerous occasions to assist them in obtaining information, in particular, on the location of
particular individuals. He would also be asked to physically locate persons or to obtain
information and was reimbursed for his travel costs.666 WVS provided him a weekly
allowance for meals and accommodation in addition to payments made by the OTP.66l The
Trial Chamber does not find these payments to be unreasonable, nor did they appear to
influence his testimony. The Trial Chamber also notes that Bobson Sesay was forthright and
candid when asked about the payments he received from the Prosecution.
288. The witness admitted to having personally participated in numerous and a wide
ranging array of crimes throughout the 1ndictment period, including raping two young girls
in Kono and in Freetown,662 training small boy units663 whom he instructed to amputate the
hands of civilians in Yomandu and Tombodu,664 burning civilians in a house at Karina,
any arms and ammunition to the time period when he was in Kono as the question was about when the RUF
withdrew from Freetown).
677 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8588-8589 (the witness did not mention Taylor's
logistical support to the SLA and the reorganisation of SLA soldiers from Guinea to Liberia because the
investigators did not ask him to elaborate on this).
676 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8702-8704, 8920-8922 (the witness blames an
inaccurate recording of his answers by the OTP when questioned by the Defence as to why he did not inform the
OTP until 8 May 2007 that the arms shipment at Magburaka was from Liberia and not Ukraine); Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8757, 8577 (when questioned about a statement of 7 November
2003 in which the witness did not mention the presence of RUF boys at Johnny Paul Koroma's house in
Monrovia, Bobson Sesay admits the reference is missing because the investigators edited it and that he had told
the investigators that Koroma had shown the witness the boys).
676 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8542-8545; Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8886-
8904.
666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8900-8904.
66l Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8900-8901.
662 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8865. K
663 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7976-7978.
664 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7978.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GB rg May 20];;

2% la Q
abducting about 30 women in Karina,685 looting valuable property from civilians at Lunsar
and Makeni in the implementation of ‘Operation Pay Yourself", and participating in
‘Operation Spare No Soul’ as ordered by the senior commanders.686
289. ln light of his admitted involvement in numerous and serious crimes, the Trial
Chamber notes that Bobson Sesay is an accomplice witness. However, given Bobson
Sesay's detailed and coherent account, the candour with which he testified about his own
complicity, and his lack of any motivation to lie, the Trial Chamber finds Bobson Sesay to
be generally credible and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as
they may arise.
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
290. Witness Samuel Kargbo, (a.l<.a. Sammy,°87 Honourable Sammy,688 Jungler)689 an .
AFRC Supreme Council member,69O was a soldier in the Sierra Leonean Army from 1990 to
2001691 and one of the 17 coup plotters who overthrew the Kabbah government in May
1997.692 He became a member of the Supreme Council693 and was one of Johnny Paul
Koroma's "securities".694 He testified that he was detained by the RUF in Buedu along with
Koroma as they tried to flee to Liberia in around March 1998695 and thereafter was sent by
the RUF to Manowa Ferry,696 Kailahun Town°97 and to Pendembu where he was appointed
Deputy Brigade Commander in April/May 1998, a position he maintained until the Lome
685 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8867-8877.
686 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8865-8870.
687 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10663.
688 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1233, 1238; Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43966.
689 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10663.
690 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10439, 10448, 10450; Exhibit P-58, "Excerpts from the
Sierra Leone Gazette No. 52, 4 September 1997 — 00007703-00007704", ERN 7703-7704.
lm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10414.
692 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10433-10437.
lm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10450, 10461; Exhibit P-131, "AFRC - Secret Minutes of
the First Meeting of the AFRC Held at the Conference Hall, Defence Headquarters on Saturday 19 July 1997,
00007081 — 00007086", ERN 7801. 1
694 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10441.
695 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10520, 10523-10540.
°% Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10813.
W Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10556.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T // QN 18 May 2012 j

3% Q`O O
Accord in July 1999.698 From October 1999 until 2001, Kargbo served in the Sierra Leonean
Army again.°99 From late 2001 until the witness testified, he had been unemployed.70O
291. The Trial Chamber notes that Kargbo's demeanour was of a witness who was eager
to testify. He remained calm throughout his testimony but spoke very quickly despite
repeated requests by Counsel and the Trial Chamber to slow down. He did not always
address events sequentially and often provided extraneous infomation. As a result, some of
the witness's answers were unclear and his testimony sometimes disorganised.
292. On cross—examination, Kargbo was confronted by several prior inconsistent
statements. ln most cases, the Trial Chamber considers these inconsistencies, such as
whether, following the Iranian Embassy incident, Johnny Paul Koroma called the Accused
on a landline or a satellite phoneml to be relatively minor in nature. The Trial Chamber notes
that the record of Kargbo's iiirst interview with the Prosecution omits to mention the
flogging he received at the hands of the RUF after he and Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in
Buedu in early 1998 and that, although Kargbo testiliied that he told the Prosecution about
the event in that interview, he failed to correct the mistake when the interview was read back
to him.702 However, in view of the fact that it is recorded that he mentioned the event as
early as his second interview only three days laterm and subsequently gave graphic
evidence to the Court about his ordeal,7O4 the Trial Chamber has no doubt as to the veracity
of his sworn testimony.
293. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has approached Kargbo's evidence regarding his
second trip to F oya to collect ammunition in early 1998 with caution primarily in view of his
failure to mention the event in his prior statement.705 However, the Trial Chamber notes that,
698 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10551-10552, 10556-10557.
699 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10840.
700 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10843.
70} Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10449; Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10726-10727, 10730-
10731, 10742-10745.
702 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10766-10769, 10771.
703 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10769.
704 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10523-10540.
705 See Arms and Arnmunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (February 1998-December 1999).

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T y 0*9 18 May 2012

25101
in general, Kargbo's testimony that trips were made by Bockarie to Liberia in 1998 to
collect ammunition sent by the Accused is substantially supported by other witnesses.711`1
294. Finally, the Trial Chamber also recalls that it did not find Kargbo's mistaken belief
that the Accused was President of Liberia shortly after the May 1997 coup7117 when Kargbo
asserted that the Accused privately supported the Junta government as indicative of any
intent on his part to mislead the Trial Chamber, but rather that he had simply confused the
Accused's status at the time the events he described occurred.1118 J
295. ln light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds Samuel Kargbo to be a generally A
credible witness and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they
may arise.
Prosecution Witness TF1-539
296. Witness TF1-539, a member of various fighting groups,7119 testified that he held
various positions including within the AFRC, RUF and SSS from 1990 until 2001.7111
297. The Defence submits that TF1-539's testimony was inconsistent, implausible,
manufactured and therefore not credible.711 1n addition to challenging specific areas of TF1-
539's that are highly inconsistent, the Defence alleges that a portion of TF 1-539's testimony
pertaining to Sam Bockarie's diamond dealings was manufactured to match the testimony of
witnesses who testified before him.712
298. The witness testified that in 1999 he was taken by two men to meet with Sam
Bockarie. On their way to Monrovia they stopped at a pub, where they encountered "Co1one1
Marzah" and "Captain Denis", who had just come from the "Mansion".713 Marzah took the
71111 See Amis and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (February 1998-December 1999).
707 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp, 10668-10671.
7011 See Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Junta Period.
7119. TF1-539, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11374; Transcript, 10 June 2008, pp. 11391, 11469-11471;
Transcript, 11 June 2008 pp. 11532, 11561—11562(CS).
710 TF1-539, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11374; Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11391, 11469-11471; Transcript
11 June 2008, pp. 11532, 11561-11563 (CS), As this witness is the subject ofprotective measures, he testified as
to potentially identifying information in closed session. The substance of that testimony is not included here.
711 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1449-1458.
712 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1449-1454, 1457-1458.
713 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11409-11412.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T " 18 May 2012

3% 2.cD-
witness to the back of the pub, questioned him about his companions, and told the witness
that the men the witness was with had alleged that the witness was a spy for Kabbah's
government.7l4 Marzah then showed the witness a photo of a mutilated female corpse who,
according to Marzah, had also been accused of being a spy,7l5 and told the witness that if it
was confirmed that he was a spy, he would die "in a more ugly manner" than the woman in
the photo.7l6 TF1—539's testimony about this incident was inconsistent on a number of
points. TF1—539 first told the Prosecution that Marzah showed him the photo of the
mutilated corpse in an effort to intimidate him, but TF1—539 later testified that Marzah had
simply dropped the photo on the floor while removing other things from his pocket, and the
witness picked up the photo and kept it without Marzah's knowledge.7l7 The witness also
gave inconsistent testimony between examination—in—chief and cross—examination about
whether he knew the identity of the woman in the photo.7l8 TF1—539 contradicted his own
cross—examination testimony when he first testified in detail about how he lost the original
copy of the photo from the pocket of his trousers,7l9 only to testify later on cross-
examination that he had given the photo to two police officers who scanned it, but he could
not recall if it had been returned to him. Additionally, the Trial Chamber notes the
implausibility of the witness's testimony that he managed to hold onto the photograph from
1999 to 2006, throughout his many travels, but then lost it while moving houses twice
between 2006 and 2008.720
299. The Trial Chamber also takes particular note of TF1—539's testimony regarding his
very first meeting with the Accused, which the Defence has characterised as implausiblem
According to the witness, days after being accused of espionage and being threatened by
Marzah, Marzah took the witness to the Executive Mansion to meet the Accused. During the
meeting, the Accused offered the witness encouraging words, and passed on a gift of SUSD
M TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11412-11413.
7*5 TF1-539, rraaaaapr 10 Jrma 2008, p. 11413.
M TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11412-11413.
W TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11413; Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11599-11605.
H8 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11421; Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11608-11610; Transcript 12
June 2008, pp. 11638-11639. The witness told the Prosecution in prior interviews that the woman was named
lsha, but on examination-in-chief stated that Marzah did not te11 him her name. On cross-examination he then
disavowed his examination-in-chief testimony, stating that Marzah had told him her name.
H9 TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11609; Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11617-11621, 11639.
720 TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11621-11623.
7** Defence mai Trial Brief, para. 1449.

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Case No.:aaar.-03-o1¤r / GM 18 May 21212 j

3% 2 ¤3
1,500 to him,722 The Accused then appointed the witness as a One Star General, stating that
if he proved his loyalty to the revolution he might "go beyond that",723
300, The Trial Chamber notes the Defence's challenge to TF1-539's inconsistencies
regarding whose signatures he saw on a set of consignment papers for ammunition received
after the Burkina Faso trip,724 and has considered that evidence in the section on Arms and
Ammunition,725 The Trial Chamber recalls that it accepted TF1-539's explanation regarding
those inconsistencies.
301, The Trial Chamber has considered other issues regarding the witness's testimony
raised by the Defence, including inconsistencies in his testimony regarding the dates and
length of some of his professional posts72(’ and his personal mining activities,727 ln the Trial
Chamber's view, these inconsistencies are relatively minor, Regarding the Defence's
contention that TF1-539 altered his testimony about Sam Bockarie and the mayonnaise jar
of diamonds, the Trial Chamber recalls that it has considered this evidence elsewhere in the
Judgement and found it to be unre1iable,728
302, The Trial Chamber notes that, in addition to the inconsistent and implausible aspects
of TF1-539's testimony, his overall testimony was scattered and difficult to follow, ln the
Trial Chamber's view, TF1-539 exaggerated aspects of his testimony, particularly with
regard to his own role in events, While TF1-539 at times testified in significant detail, the
Trial Chamber generally observes that many of his responses were rambling and evasive and
he failed to provide convincing explanations for a number of inconsistencies,729
722 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11468-11470,
723 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11471. The witness also told the Prosecution in a prior statement
that he had been stationed to work at the Mansion while with ECOMOG, but on cross-examination the witness
denied making the statement. TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11632-11633.
724 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1458.
725 See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (February 1998-December 1999).
726 Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 1456, citing TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11625-11629.
727 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1455, citing TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p, 11663.
728 See Diamonds; Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, Junta Period; Defence Final Trial Brief
para, 1454, citing TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11675, 11684-11685, 11688.
720 See for example TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11413; Transcript 11 June 2008, pp, 11599-11605,
11608-11610; Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11625-11629,

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3320%
303. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that TF1-539's evidence,
particularly as it relates to his personal interaction and communication with the Accused,
must be considered with caution and cannot be relied upon without corroboration.
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
304. Witness Alice Pyne, an RUF radio operator,73O testified that she was captured by the
NPFL in 1991, and was a member of the RUF from 1993 until disarmamentm Throughout
her time with the RUF, she testified, she was a radio operator working in a number of
locations and for various RUF members.732
305. The Defence contends that Pyne's reliability is questionable, because she provided
inaccurate details concerning well-known events. For example, the Defence claims, she
testified that Foday Sankoh was in Cote d’Ivoire when the 1996 elections were held.733 The
Defence notes that the elections were held before Sankoh left for Abidjan, which was on 24
March 1996.734 The Trial Chamber finds this inconsistency minor, as the rest of her
testimony concerning well-known events was consistent with the body of evidence at trial.
306. The Defence submitted that portions of Pyne's testimony, more specifically
concerning the allegation that the Accused provided herbalists to the RUF, that Bockarie
ordered the killing of Martin Moinama, and that Taylor sent Senegalese to Bockarie, render
her not credible.735 The Trial Chamber has considered these incidents in the context of the
Judgement as they arise, and has accepted or rejected Pyne's testimony about these events
accordingly.736 As to the Defence's concerns that her testimony was hearsay, the Trial
Chamber has also addressed those issues in context.
307. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds Alice Pyne to be generally credible
and will consider further issues relating to her credibility in context as they may arise.
"° Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008,p. 12074.
m Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12048-12049.
732 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12066-12083, 12091-12092; Transcript 18 June 2008, pp.
12105, 12129-12130, 12135-12136, 12155 -12160, 12166-12167; Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12248-12249,
12255-12257, 12272-12273.
733 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1494; Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12118-12119.
m Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1494.
735 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1492-1494.
736 See Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan; Provision of Military
Personnel: Former NPFL Fighters; Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged Provision ofHerbalists.

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Prosecution Witness TF 1 -375
308. Witness TF1-375, an RUF fighter,737 testified that he was captured by the RUF in
1991 at a young age and taken to Pendembu for training. He remained with the RUF for the
duration of the war.738
309. The Defence challenges TF}-375's credibility on the basis that he received
incentives, in the form of payments and other benefits from W VS and the Prosecution, to an
extent that the integrity of his testimony was compromised, and that he altered his evidence
to match that of witnesses appearing before him.739 Furthermore, the Defence submits that
the witness's demeanour demonstrates that he did not take the proceedings seriously.740
310. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-375 also gave internally inconsistent and
implausible testimony relating to several issues before the court.74l
311. The Trial Chamber also notes that the witness made self-aggrandising statements
throughout his testimony, which were not confirmed or corroborated by the remainder of the
body of evidence before the Trial Chamber.742 Although the witness provided highly
detailed testimony at times, that testimony was often inconsistent with his prior statements
in interviews.743 Additionally, as highlighted by the Defence, the Trial Chamber notes that
TF1-375 provided evidence at trial or at a very late stage in his interviews which he had not
737 TF} -375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. }2485.
738 TF} -375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. }2475-I2478.
739 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras }405-}4} 7.
740 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. }4 } 8.
Ml For example, the witness gave highly inconsistent testimony regarding the facts of his trip to identify
Johnny Paul Koroma, including whether he was actually present when Koroma was executed, whether he knew
how or why Koroma was executed, and whether Koroma and his men were naked or clothed at the time. TF}-
375, Transcript 25 August 2008, pp. }4512-14523 (PS); Transcript 26 August 2008, pp. 1453 } -}4536 (PS).
742 For example, the witness testified that he was personally sent by Yeaten to Foya to identify Johnny Paul
Koroma. The witness stated that in Foya he saw Koroma and his men, under the custody of Roland Duoh, Sweet
Candy, and Saddam. Koroma was taken away by Sweet Candy and Saddam who then returned and told the
witness that Koroma was dead. The witness testified that he questioned them four or five times to ensure that
Koroma was actually dead, as he did not want to take false information back to the Accused. He did not,
however, check the body. The witness stated he then went to Monrovia via helicopter to personally confirm his
identification of Koroma to the Accused. TF}-375, Transcript 25 August 2008, pp. }4489-}4527 (PS);
Transcript 26 August 2008, pp. }453 } -}4536 (PS).
743 See for example TF}-375, Transcript 25 August 2008, pp. }4458-}4464 (PS) (regarding the number of
people who went to Liberia with Bockarie [200 to 300 or 600 to 700] and how many Sierra Leoneans in the ATU
were killed at the same time as Bockarie, 50% or 90%); Transcript 28 August 2008, p. }48}7 (contradicting a
prior statement that an order from Benjamin Yeaten to kill Samuel Varney came directly from the Accused);
Transcript 27 August 2008, pp. }473}-}4734 (contradicting a prior statement that he did not engage in active
fighting from 199} to }997, stating that he started fighting at the front lines in 1995).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0} -T QM 18 May 2012

32,9-¤‘°
previously mentioned744 and which corroborated the testimony of other Prosecution
witnesses testifying before him without providing acceptable explanations.745 In the Trial
Chamber's view, TF1-375's testimony was convoluted and difficult to follow and he gave
dishonest testimony for which the Trial Chamber can find no motivation. Furthermore,
although the Trial Chamber acknowledges that the witness did not attempt to downplay his
part in violent activities that he testified about, the Trial Chamber considers that the
witness's demeanour, including laughing while testifying about serious events, indicate that
he did not take the proceedings seriously.
312. In light of these considerations, the Trial Chamber finds that the testimony of TF1-
375 must be treated with caution and cannot be relied upon without corroboration.
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
313. Witness TF1-567, an RUF member,446 was abducted by Liberian English-speaking
rebels in May 1991 and taken to undergo training in Pendembu.444 The witness held various
positions in the RUF until 2001.448
314. The Defence posits that TF1-567 testified about events that he did not have
knowledge of, and argues that he is a liar or exaggerator and that his testimony is therefore
not credible.444 In particular, the Defence highlights the inconsistencies between TF1-567's
evidence and the evidence of other witnesses, including TF1-371 and Issa Sesay, regarding
the taking of diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma.45O The Defence also alleges that evidence
744 See for example TF1-375, Transcript 25 August 2008, pp. 14474-14476 (PS) (despite recalling specific
details of his actions on the day in question, the witness did not tell the Prosecution that he went to a meeting
with Moses Blah and Sam Bockarie three days before Bockarie was killed); Transcript 26 August 2008, pp.
14584-14591 (PS) (adding evidence that a plane he took Eom Burkina Faso was loaded with boxes of
ammunition on the seats in the same area as the passengers).
7*5 TF1-375, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14808-14812. For example, during his 2444 interview, the
witness referred to diamonds being held in mayonnaise jars for the first time, shortly after Moses Blah had
testified to the same See also: TF1-375, Transcript 26 August 2008, pp. 14555-14557 (PS) (added statements
that Zigzag Marzah ate human fiesh and that Sweet Candy wore Johnny Paul Koroma's jacket after Koroma's
death following Marzah's testimony of the same incident).
744 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p, 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
747 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12819-12820.
744 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12832, 12909; Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
744 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1546-1547.
744 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1546.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T q`\j_ 18 May 2012 g ‘

33 26*1-
provided by the Accused contradicts TF1-567's testimony regarding a meeting between the
two of them.75l
315. Regarding the taking of diamonds from Koroma, the Trial Chamber notes that TF1-
567's testimony regarding this incident does diverge from the testimony of a number of
other witnesses. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that a number of other witnesses also
gave inconsistent and contradictory accounts surrounding the details of this event, including
those witnesses who gave direct evidence about the event. However, the Trial Chamber
recalls that it has assessed the inconsistencies and contradictions of all of the witnesses who
testified about that event elsewhere in the Judgement, and the Trial Chamber does not rely
upon the testimony of TF1-567 when making its findings regarding that event.
316. ln the Trial Chamber's view, TF1-567 was fortlnight in his testimony, openly
admitting when he did not know the answer to a question752 and when his testimony
concerned events that he did not personally witness.753 The Trial Chamber does not find that
this testimony undermines TF1-567's credibility.
317. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber iinds TF1-567 to be a generally credible
witness and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may
arise.
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
318. Witness TP1-338, an RUF member,754 testified that he was a member of the RUF
from late 1991 until 2002, during which time he held various positions that afforded him
proximity to senior RUF members, including Foday Sankoh and 1ssa Sesay.755 TF1-338
testified about interactions between the Accused and members of the RUF, as well as about
diamond and weapons dealings.
W Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1547.
752 TF1~567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12838; Transcript 4 July 2008. p. 12996 (PS).
753 TF1—567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13094~13095, 13097.
754 TF1—338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085—15086 (PS).
755 TF1~338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15083—l5086 (PS). As this witness is the subject of Protective
Measures, additional details of TF1—338's positions in the RUF are not included in this section.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f Obg 18 May 2012

3%2¤%
319. In its Final Trial Brief, the Defence submits that TFl-338's credibility was weak and
that his testimony was untrustworthy.756 Furthermore, in its final oral submissions the
Defence submits that TFl-338's testimony was so rife with inconsistencies that the Trial
Chamber should not consider it at all.757 Specifically, the Defence argued that TFl-338's
evidence was inconsistent regarding details of alleged diamond, ammunition, and money
exchanges involving the Accused.756 The Defence also asserted that portions of TFl-338's
testimony were implausible, including his testimony relaying his knowledge about meetings
between the Accused and Issa Sesay for which the witness was not actually present.756
320. Regarding TFl-338's inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber notes at the outset that the
witness is adamant that many of the inconsistencies pointed to by the Defence are statements
that were either incorrectly recorded by the Prosecution, or that he made corrections and
they were not applied to his statements.766 The Defence calls the Trial Chamber's attention
to the witness's failure to correct certain of his statements although he was given the
o ortunit to, and contends that this casts additional doubt on his credibilit .761 The Trial
PP Y Y
Chamber notes TFl-338's testimony that while correcting his prior statements, he was
instructed by the Prosecution to record the corrections in a separate notebook and that they
would be applied later.762 The witness then explained that many of his corrections were not
reflected.763 While the Trial Chamber does not accept that explanation as curing all of the
witness's inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber is mindful of this explanation while
considering TFl -338's evidence.
321. Further regarding TFl-338's inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber is of the view that a
number of them are immaterial, or were the result of confusion on behalf of the witness. For
example, the Trial Chamber considers TFl-338's inconsistency surrounding the amount of
diamonds, 3,500 pieces versus 350 carats or pieces, he took to Monrovia to be relatively
756 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1215.
757 Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 10 March 2011, p. 49518.
758 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1214-1225.
759 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 966. _
766 TFl-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15338-15343, 15346-15348 (PS); Transcript 4 September
2008, pp. 15354-15356 (PS).
76I Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1220-1221, 1225.
762 TFl-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15346-15348, 15350 (PS); Transcript 4 September 2008, pp.
15354-15356 (PS).
763 TFl-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15346-15348, 15350 (PS); Transcript 4 September 2008, pp.
15354-15356 (PS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T if GM 18 May 2012

ggzoq
minor.764 The Defence also points to TFl-338's inconsistency regarding his knowledge of
whether Eddie Kanneh in fact absconded with $USD 150,000765 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the witness's statements on this issue were not a true contradiction, and accepts
his argument that having knowledge of whether Eddie Kanneh took the money, and being
told that he took the money are two separate issues.766
322. The Defence challenged TFl-338's credibility on the basis of his testimony
re ardin the content of meetin s held between the Accused and Issa Sesa , which ersons
S S S Y P
the Accused instructed Sesay to deal diamonds with, and the amount and composition of the
diamonds in a certain delivery. The Trial Chamber has addressed these inconsistencies in
context of the events in the section of the Judgement concerning Diamonds.767 The Trial
Chamber recalls that it accepted the witness's testimony on these points.
323. The Defence further asserts that TF 1-338's inconsistencies regarding whether the
Accused advised Issa Sesay about returning weapons to the UN demonstrate that he is a liar
who fabricated evidence.768 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF 1-338's evidence in
relation to this specific event was reliable in the section of the Judgement on
Disannament.769 The Defence also challenged the witness's testimony regarding the number
of times Sesay allegedly visited the Accused and brought him diamonds. The Trial Chamber
has considered that evidence in the section of the Judgement on Diamonds, and recalls that it
found TF1-338's testimony to be reliable.77O
324. The Trial Chamber has also addressed TFl-338's inconsistencies about a delegation
sent to collect $USD 150,000 from the Accused in 2001 in the section of the Judgement on
Operational Support. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TFl-338's testimony about
that event is reliable.77l
764 TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15340, 15350 (PS).
765 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1220-1221; TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15381-15386
(PS); Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15411-15414 (PS).
M TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15381-15386 (PS).
767 See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, Alleged Facilitation of Diamond Trading
by the Accused.
M Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1225.
769 See Peace Process: Communications with Sesay on Disarmament.
770 See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, June 2000-2002.
771 See Operational Support: Support and Training, Financial Support.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / GNP 18 May 2012 _

2% 2. l 0
325. The Defence also points to TFl—338's contradiction in which he testified that he was
not present when the Accused and Issa Sesay spoke on a satellite phone in 2002 and that the
Accused was not in the habit of talking on a satellite phone at that time.772 The Defence
highlights that TF1—338 later contradicted that statement and asserted that he was earlier
speaking of a HF radio, not a satellite phone.773 The record clearly reflects that, when asked
whether Issa Sesay was "in the habit of speaking to Charles Taylor on the telephone to the
President of Liberia at this time", TF1—338 responded, "[a]t that time he was not in the habit
of speaking to the President of Liberia over telephone — on the satellite phone".774 In his later
testimony on cross—examination, when asked to recall his testimony that the Accused was
not in the habit of speaking on the satellite phone, the witness was adamant that he did not
mention a satellite phone, but was referring to an HF radio, because the HF radios were
constantly monitored, so the Accused preferred to speak over satellite phone.775
326. Additionally, the Defence highlights TFl—338's contradiction between his viva voce
testimony and prior statements to the Prosecution regarding the date of his first meeting with
the Accused. This evidence has been considered in the section of the Judgement on Amis
and Ammunition, where the Trial Chamber found that the inconsistency did not undermine
the witness's credibility.776
327. Contrary to the Defence's assertion, the Trial Chamber also does not consider that
these inconsistencies demonstrate that TFl—338 had an agenda to implicate the Accused.777
The Trial Chamber notes that TFl—338 was adamant to correct evidence where the Accused
was incorrectly implicated. For example, TFl—338 adamantly denied the Accused's
involvement in the RUF's diamond dealings with Minin, and denied delivering diamonds to
the Accused on more than two occasions.778
772 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1222 citing TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15248-15249
lis). Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1222 citing TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15430-15431
SES). TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15248-15249 (PS).
775 TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15430-15431 (PS).
776 See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Issa Sesay's
Leadership.
777 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 951-952 (arguing that TF 1-338 is determined to implicate the Accused
with his versions of specific events).
778 TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15352, 15356, 15359 (PS); Transcript 4 September 2008, p.
15430 (PS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M! 18 May 2012

2 Z 9- 1 1
328. Overall, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that TF1-338 gave measured testimony
that was rich in detail, although the record at times became very confusing. In the Trial
Chamber's view, TF1-338 offered plausible, logical explanations for a number of the
inconsistencies in his testimony.
329. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds TF1-338 to be generally credible and will
consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they arise.
Prosecution Witness TF1-585
330. Witness TF1-585, an RUF member,779 was captured by the RUF in 1991 at an early
_ age, and remained with the RUF, working alongside high-rarrking members until about the
year 2000. TF1-585 was also assigned in Liberia for a period, until leaving in 2002.780
331. The Defence submits that TF1—585's evidence is problematic and unreliable, and at
times improbable.78l The Defence further submits that TF1-585's testimony was littered
with errors regarding dates.782 The Trial Chamber notes that the witness's testimony with
regard to chronology was at times confused and inconsistent.783 However, in the Trial
Chamber's view, these inconsistencies are a result of confusion or lack of knowledge, and
not as a result of manufactured testimony or a desire to mislead the Trial Chamber. The Trial
Chamber notes that the level and nature of the knowledge reflected in TF1-585's testimony
is consistent with the witness's role and position throughout the indictment period and the
witness readily admitted to gaps in her knowledge. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber
finds that the submission that TF1-585's evidence could have been unduly influenced by the
Prosecution and others is unfounded.
332. The Defence made lengthy submissions regarding specific portions of TF1-585's
testimony that, in the Defence's view, render TF1-585 not credible. The Trial Chamber has
considered these instances in context as they arise, and has accepted or rejected TF1-585's
779 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15589-15592 (PS).
780 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15575-15592 (PS), Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15750-
15753.
781 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1524-1525.
1*2 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1526-1527.
183 For example TF 1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, p. 15877 (the witness stated that RUF radio code
books changed once or twice during the witness's time in Buedu, inconsistent with other evidence that they
changed every few months. This inconsistency is explained by the fact that the witness worked only
intermittently as a radio operator.)

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T `/ 18 May 2012
Q

3% 9.11
testimony about those particular events accordingly. Likewise, as to the Defence's concerns
that much of TF 1-585 's testimony was based on hearsay, the Trial Chamber has addressed
those issues in context throughout the Judgement.
333. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds TF 1-585 to be generally credible
and will consider further issues relating to her credibility in context as they may arise.
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
334. Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,784 was a teacher and a farmer prior to
being abducted by Liberian English—speaking soldiers and taken to a training base in
Pendembu in April 1991.785 During the conflict, Mohamed Kabbah worked at various
locations as a radio operator for the RUF .786
335. The Defence submits that much of Kabbah's testimony was unreliable and that he
poorly grasped "certain crucial details".787 Moreover, the Defence challenges Kabbah's
credibility on the basis that portions of his testimony were contradicted by other Prosecution
witnesses,788 and that other portions are unreliable because of Kabbah's own internal
contradictions regarding certain details, like dates and times.789 The Trial Chamber recalls
that it has addressed specific issues of Kabbah's credibility challenged by the Defence
within the Judgement as they arise.79O
336. The Trial Chamber notes one specific challenge raised by the Defence that does not
arise elsewhere in the Judgement. The Defence alleges that in Kabbah's testimony that
Sunlight infonned Charles Taylor when the RUF needed ammunition, Kabbah assumed that
Sunli t and the Accused were "close".79l Kabbah's actual testimon , that "Sam Bockarie
Y
would give us a message, or he would [...] communicate directly with Sunlight for him to
784 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
785 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16086-16090.
786 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16099—16l00, 16104-16105, 16126, 16180-1618l.
7*7 Defence Final Trial Brief; paras 1541, 1545.
788 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1542-1544.
780 Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 1545,
WO See Operational Support: Communications, RUF and NPF L Radio Codes and Communications.
W Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1544.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3-01-T GW / 18 May 2012

Bs zi 2
inform Charles Taylor that we needed ammunition",792 does not contain a statement that
Sunlight actually delivered the messages to the Accused himself
337. The Trial Chamber has further noted the Defence's arguments regarding Kabbah's
early statements to the Prosecution, including certain inconsistent details of those
conversations,793 and finds that they are either relatively minor in nature, or that Kabbah
offered acceptable explanations for them. The Trial Chamber also notes that the passage of
time may have affected Kabbah's memory regarding the details of certain events,794
however because Kabbah's testimony was generally consistent, the Trial Chamber does not
find that the inconsistencies highlighted by the Defence are detrimental to Kabbah's
credibility. Regarding false statements that he made to the Prosecution early in the interview
process, the Trial Chamber accepts Kabbah's explanation that he made those statements out
of fear for his life.795
338. In the Trial Chamber's view, Kabbah was a forthright witness overall, who openly
admitted when he did not know the answer to questions796 and pointed out inconsistencies in
his prior statements.797 For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds Kabbah to be generally
credible and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may
arise.
Prosecution Witness TF1-579
339. Witness TF1-579, an SSS member,798 testified that he voluntarily joined the NPFL in
1990.799 He stated that from 1992 until 1997 he was under Benjamin Yeaten's command.8O0
Later on, TF1-579 was under Bockarie's command until Bockarie's death.8O]
702 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript I2 September 2008, pp. I6132, 16138. In stating that Sam Bockarie
. "wouId teII us to tell Sunlight to teII Charles Taylor that he would talk with him" the witness was describing the
instructions that he was being given, rather than making an assumption as to whether Sunlight was close enough
to the Accused in order to directly convey a message to him.
793 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1545. if
794 The witness, by his own admission, stated that his memory for dates was at times confused. Mohamed
Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16435.
795 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16244-16247.
7% Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16139.
797 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16401-16402; Transcript I7 September 2008, pp. A
16405-16406.
798 TFI-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19822-19823.
799 TF1-579, Transcript 24 November 2008, pp. 21013-21014.
800 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19781-19783 (PS), I9792-19793, 19807-198 I 0.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I -T I8 May 2012

3 is 2.1 -(
340. There are a number of inconsistencies highlighted by the Defence between the
testimony of TF1-579 and his prior statements.8O2 For example, the witness testified that
after the death of Bockarie and his bodyguard, Kanu, in May 2003, he went into hiding
because of his association with Bockarie. According to his testimony, the witness stayed in
hiding for a week or two, after which he met Benjamin Yeaten and was sent on a mission.8O3
However, in a prior statement the witness said that he stayed in hiding until after Yeaten left
the country in 2004. On cross-examination, he could not explain the inconsistency despite
repeated requests from the Bench to respond to the questions put to him by Defence counsel.
He was evasive and stated that he did not correct the error in his statement when given the
opportunity to do so, despite making other changes, because he wanted to explain it to "this
Court".8O4
341. Similarly, the Trial Chamber notes the Defence's challenge to TF1-579's testimony
about several trips that were taken from Monrovia to Buedu in which materiel was delivered
to Bockarie. The Trial Chamber has considered this evidence in the section on Arms and
Ammunition, and recalls that it accepted this evidence on the basis that it was corroborated
by other witnesses.805
342. In his testimony, TF1-579 made serious accusations against members of the Defence
team, requiring an independent investigation into possible contempt of court. As the Trial
Chamber found that there was no basis for contempt proceedings, the Defence submits that
TF1-579 gave false testimony, which gravely undermines his credibility.806 The Trial
Chamber notes that the accusations made by the witness were not substantiated, detracting
from his credibility.
343. The Defence further argues that TF1-579's behaviour and his relationship with the
Prosecution are questionable.8O7 The witness testified that although he had committed to
being a Prosecution witness, and met with and was paid by the Prosecution, he continued to
visit the Defence office in Monrovia while Prosecution witnesses, including Joseph Marzah,
801 TF1—579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp, 19856—19858.
802 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1464-1468, 1475.
803 TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21184-21197 (PS).
804 TF1—579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21184-21197 (PS).
805 See Arms and Ammunition: Preliminary Issues: Closure of the Border/Arms Embargo.
806 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1460-1461.
807 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1469-1471.

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Case No; SCSL-03-01-T Wh X 18 May 2012

3% zi S"
were testifying.808 The witness had previously testified that he was not in Monrovia when
Marzah was testifying.8O9 The witness explained that he went to the Defence office only
when asked by the Defence investigator, fearing that if he did not, they and the Accused
would suspect he was a Prosecution witness.8l0 The Trial Chamber notes the concerns
expressed by the Defence and considers the conduct of the witness to have been
inappropriate.
344. The Defence characterises payments received by the witness from the Prosecution as
excessivegn TF1-579 was paid by the Prosecution $USD 2,345 and 126,000 leones
(approximately $USD 42)8l2 in total. For three meetings at the end of March to the
beginning of April 2008, the witness received $USD 150 in total for transportation and lost
wages. Although there is no record of interview by the Prosecution during those dates, the
meetings appear to have been associated with relocation and security concerns. The witness
had been given $USD 500 the previous year for that purpose, and another $USD 500 was
given to him for the same purpose in June 2008.8u On 4 August 2008, the witness received
$USD 250 for family assistance, which he explained was given to him to cover his lost
wages, in order to feed his family. However, transportation, lost wages and communication
are items which were already reimbursed on the same date. Moreover, a week later, the
witness was given another $USD 100 for medical, transportation costs and lost wages.8l4
A The Trial Chamber, while noting the questions about these payments, does not accept that
they improperly influenced the witness in his testimony.
345. However, in light of his evasiveness, and the incidents in which TF1-579 was clearly
untruthful, the Trial Chamber finds that the testimony of the witness must be considered
with caution and cannot be relied upon without corroboration.
808 TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21233-21237 (PS).
809 TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp, 21205-21206 (PS).
MO TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, p. 21283.
SH Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1472-1474.
W Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 leones/US dollar.
S13 TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21239-21252 (PS).
W TF1-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21258-21261 (PS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (DAQ 18 May 2012

3 ié 7.1 lo
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
346. Dauda Aruna Fomie, an RUF radio operator,8l5 testified that he was abducted by the
RUF in 1991, at the age of 16.8*6 At the end of 1991, Fomie was selected by Samuel
Bockarie to undertake radio signal training with the NPP L in Liberia, where he remained
until 1992.8n Fomie then returned to Sierra Leone, working as a radio operator in Kuiva,
Mendekeima, Kailahun Town, Koindu, and Zogoda.8l8 According to his testimony,
following Sankoh's order for all RUF members to join forces with the AFRC, Fomie began
working as a radio operator for Bockarie in Kenema town, Tongo, and then Kailahunm In
1998, he relocated to Buedu, where he travelled with Bockarie on a number of trips to
Liberiam In 1999, Fomie accompanied the RUF delegation to the Peace Talks in Lomé and
other cities.82l Fomie was imprisoned and tortured by Bockarie for his allegiance to Sankoh,
and by the end of the war, Fomie was in Pendembu.822
347. The Defence contends that Fomie's testimony is inconsistent with his prior
statements. In addition, the Defence submits, misattributions and vagueness in his testimony
undermine its credibility. 823
348. When Fornie was first questioned as to whether members of the Black Gadaffa unit
were rumoured to have connived against Taylor, he stated that he was "not aware" of this.
The Defence then presented Fomie with a prior statement in which he had said that "some of
the leaders in Black Gadaffa's group" were rumoured to have connived against Taylor.
Fomie responded that his prior statement was consistent with his testimony because
although "some" of those who were accused were members of Black Gadaffa, other non-
members were accused as well; he could not say, therefore, that it was "only" Black Gadaffa
leaders who had connived to kill Taylor.824 The Trial Chamber notes that Fomie was asked
815 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
Sm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21294.
W Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21335.
818 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21374, 21382-21383, 21395, 21400; Transcript 4
December 2008, p. 21731.
819 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21400, 21407; Transcript 2 December 2008, pp.
21418-21420,21457. L
820 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21457.
X2! Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21616, 21624.
822 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21627-21632.
823 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1503-1523.
824 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21989-21992.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL 18 May 2012

3% 2-t ’t~
about the Black Gadaffa unit conniving against Taylor. While he had mentioned some of
their leaders, he had also mentioned others who were not members, which indicates that the
witness did not think of Black Gadaffa as a group that was conniving against Taylor.
Rather, as explained, some of those conniving against Taylor were in this unit while others
were not, and not all of those in the unit were conniving against Taylor. The Trial Chamber
accepts this explanation and finds that Fornie's prior statement does not undermine the
credibility of his testimony.
349. Despite Fornie's claim to have been based in Bomi Hills at the same time as Oliver
Varney, he identified "One Man One" as his commander.825 Fomie was not cross-examined
on this point, but the Defence maintains that this response was "poorly infom1ed" as it was
well known that Oliver Varney commanded this battalion.826 The Trial Chamber notes,
however, that witness testimony and Exhibit P-054 indicate that during this time period
Oliver Varney was a superior to One Man One, who was a superior to members such as
Fornie, and thus both could have been considered "commanders" to Fornie.827
350. In his testimony with regard to an alleged visit by Taylor with Sankoh to Kakata
before Operation Octopus in 1992, Fornie gravitated between stating that the windows of the
vehicle in which Taylor allegedly sat were either open, or closed.828 While Fomie was
inconsistent on this point, he was consistent in stating that he was told that Taylor was
present by "Lion", and that he had never seen Taylor before this moment.829 The Trial
Chamber considers that whether the window was open or closed is a minor detail.
351. Fomie testified that he served as a radio operator for the RUF while based in
Tongo.g3O ln a prior statement, however, Fornie did not mention that he was a radio operator
in Tongo.83l When confronted with this inconsistency, Fornie noted that despite not
specifying that he was a radio operator in Tongo, in the same statement he clearly indicated
that he was trained as a radio operator prior to Tongo. Fomie also admits that during his first
825 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21310, 21317.
826 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1505.
327 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2009, pp. 2222-2225 (CS); Exhibit P-054, "NPFL Command Structure
Circa 1990-1991 as indicated by TF1-371, 00100162". See Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996), Alleged Meeting
between Taylor, Sankoh and Dr Manneh in Burkina Faso.
328 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21993-21995.
829 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21993-21995.
830 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21419-21420.
im Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 151 1.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T
$$21%
contact with Prosecutors he was pretending not to know certain things so as not to identify
himself too much.832 The Trial Chamber notes that Fornie did proffer in a prior statement
that he was a radio operator in Buedu, despite omitting that he was the same in Tongo.833
The Trial Chamber finds Fornie's explanation for the omission of this detail to be credible.
352. When confronted in cross-examination with other inconsistencies with his prior
statements, Fornie admitted again to a lack of candour in his first dealings with the
Prosecution in 2003.834 Fornie claimed that he was surprised by the Prosecution's
a earance at his home, and he mistrusted them. Fornie contends that until mid-2006, he
PP
still worried that he would be a possible defendant, but his concerns were lessened when he
received a letter promising immunity from prosecution.835 The Trial Chamber accepts this
explanation.
353. Fornie's account of being freed by the Kamajors is vague, and Fomie was not
articularl lucid in his account of his esca e from ca tivit . The Trial Chamber does not,
P Y P P Y
however, believe that the witness is inconsistent on the facts; he maintains that he "escaped"
throughout his testimony.836
354. The Trial Chamber notes the Defence's challenge to Fornie's testimony regarding a
radio recording about the Freetown invasion,837 and has considered that evidence in the
section on the Freetown 1nvasion.838 The Trial Chamber recalls that it accepted Fornie's
evidence on that point.
355. Similarly, upon cross-examination, Fomie mistakenly identified Gullit as a member
of the RUF.839 At another point in his testimony, however, Fomie referred to Gullit as a
senior member of the AFRC, and when he otherwise referred to Gullit in his testimony the
832 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21940-21941.
833 Dauda Aruna Fornie. Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 22026-22027.
834 Dauda Aruna Fornie. Transcript 8 December 2008. pp. 21940-21941.
835 Dauda Aruna Fornie. Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21 889-21894.
836 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008. pp. 21400-21401; Transcript 4 December 2008 pp.
21671-216722; Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21924-21929, 21935-21938.
837 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 899-901. "Q: Do you recall approximately when this recording occurred?
Fornie: lt was around [...] February to March 1999. That was after the Freetown Invasion on January 6 by the
RUF" (Dauda Aruna Fornie. Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21500).
838 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, Allegation that the Accused directed the Freetown Invasion.
839 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 901, citing Dauda Aruna Fornie. Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21666-
21667. 1

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T j GR 18 May 2012

3%¤i
context demonstrates that Fomie knew he was an AF RC member.8444 The Trial Chamber thus
regards Fomie's misidentification of Gullit as a minor error that does not undermine his
credibility.
356. ln direct examination, Fomie also testified that he monitored a conversation in which
Bockarie gave direct instructions to Gullit to cause mayhem in Freetown by destroying
government buildings and amputating civilian hands.844 Upon cross—examination, however,
Defence counsel contended that in his prior statements, Fomie did not mention the ordering
of amputations.842 Fomie insisted that he did tell Prosecutors that this occurred.844 Similarly,
Fomie testified to being put in a dungeon by Bockarie afrer a letter he wrote to Sankoh,
suggesting he use Taylor to convince Bockarie to disarm and depart from Buedu, was made
public.844 When confronted on cross—examination by a prior statement in which he did not
mention the letter or the link to the Accused, Fomie replied that he must have mentioned this
to investigators and that he could not recall every detail that took place a decade ago.845 The
Trial Chamber notes that Fomie's testimony is not inconsistent with his prior statements.
Rather it includes details and information not mentioned in the statements. The witness
testified that he thought he must have mentioned these details to investigators but also noted
that he does not recall everything. The Trial Chamber considers, in light of Fomie's
explanation, that the omission of information he provided at trial from his prior statements
does not undermine the credibility of his testimony.
357. Conceming alleged financial payments to Fomie, Fomie received in total
approximately 3.9 million leones (approximately $USD l,300)846 from the OTP and 6.5
million leones (approximately $USD 2,l70)847 from the W VS over two years.848 These
payments included transportation, medical expenses, rent payments and witness attendance
840 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21564. See for example Dauda Aruna Fornie,
Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21820-2182 (describing communication between the RUF and the APRC as
communication between Bockarie and Gullit).
444 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21590-21593.
442 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 22112-22114.
444 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 2211}-22115.
444 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21629-21632.
4445 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008. pp. 21987-21989.
*46 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 leones/US dollar.
447 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 leones/US dollar.
448 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 11 December 2008, pp. 22250-22251.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T . GN 18 May 2012

3 z 2.9-.04
allowances.549 The Trial Chamber finds that these payments do not appear to be
unreasonable, and did not influence his testimony.
358. ln light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber finds Fornie to be generally
credible and will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they may
arise.
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
359. Issa Sesay testified that around September or October 1990, while living in Abidjan,
Cote d’Ivoire, Foday Sankoh (a.k.a. Pa Morlai) abducted him into the RUF by deception.550
Sesay trained at Camp Naama from October 1990 until he took part in the RUF invasion of
Sierra Leone in March 1991.55l During the civil war, he rose through the RUF ranks. He
testified that between June 1994 and November 1995, he occupied the position of RUF Area
Commander for Kailahun.852 ln about March 1997 he was promoted to Battle Group
Commander, a position he held for a year until Bockarie appointed him Acting Battle Field
Commander in March 1998.555 During the Junta regime, he was also a member of the Junta
governing body.554 In July 1999, Sankoh re-instated his Battle Group Commander status
before appointing him Battle Field Commander after Bockarie left Sierra Leone in
December 1999.555 From May 2000, Sesay directed RUF activities in Sierra Leone.855 He
was appointed Interim Leader of the RUF in August 2000857 and, in that role, oversaw the
full disarmament of the RUF555 and the formal cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone on
about 18 January 2002.559
360. On 25 February 2009, Sesay was convicted by Trial Chamber l of the Special Court
of 16 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of
849 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 11 December 2008, p. 22251.
550 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43587-43588, 43597, 43604. See also Issa Sesay, Transcript 16
August 2010, pp. 46390-46391.
55l Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43590, 43597-43604; Transcript 16 August 2010, p. 46415.
552 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44596.
555 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44590.
554 Prosecution Exhibit P-058, "Excerpts from the Sierra Leone Gazette No. 52, 4 September 1997", p. 2.
855 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44591.
556 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
557 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44691.
555 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43589.
555 Prosecutor v Tay/or, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact 35.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Op 18 May 2012

3 =2» ¤-Ll
intemational humanitarian law,86O for which he was sentenced to 52 years’ imprisonment on
8 April 2009.861 With few exceptions, these convictions and the sentence were upheld on
appeal on 26 October 2009.862
361. The Trial Chamber observed that Issa Sesay maintained a calm demeanour
throughout the entirety of his oral testimony, including cross-examination, despite being
repeatedly accused of lying. He demonstrated a generally good recollection of dates and
offered extensive detail in his responses. The Trial Chamber observed the witness clearly
visualising some of the events as he described them.
362. The Trial Chamber does, however, have concems about the veracity and accuracy of
several aspects of Issa Sesay's testimony. Whilst he freely admitted that other senior
commanders like Foday Sankoh,g63 Mike Lamin864 and Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Supemian)865
and the RUF rebels committed crimes,866 he projected an implausible image of himself
throughout his testimony as the lone pacifist within the RUF movement concemed with the
well-being of civilians throughout the conflict. For example, he testified that Kono was
‘nice’ for civilians in 2000867 and that there was no evidence of crimes in Kailahun during
the time he was area commander there.868 He later admitted in cross—examination that this
latter statement was not correct.869 Considering that Sesay stated that his only hope of an
early release from prison lies in God and the people of Sierra Leone and that he came to
set the record straight on lies told about him by his former RUF colleagues,87l the Trial
Chamber considers that this witness apparently continues to harbour a misplaced belief that
his freedom can be secured if he continues to deny publicly his own involvement in
860 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46314-46315. See also Prosecutor v Sesay, Kullon and Gbao,
SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, 2 March 2009.
W Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47210. See also Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSI.-
04-15-T, Sentencing Judgement, 8 April 2009.
862 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47209. See also Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-
04-15-A, Appeal Judgement, 26 October 2009.
863 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46315-46316.
864 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, p. 46316.
365 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46316-46317.
866 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43590-43591.
W Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46275.
868 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43590-43591; Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44614.
wi Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, p. 46389.
870 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47210.
fm Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47351-47352.

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3% 2.2.2
atrocities committed by the RUF and AFRC/RUF alliance and was thus motivated to distort
some of the evidence he provided to this Court.
363. During his testimony, the witness contradicted himself several times when giving
evidence about the diamonds taken from Johnny Paul Koroma in early 1998 and how he
subsequently lost them outside his hotel in Monrovia. On separate occasions during his
examination-in-chief, he told this Chamber that when the diamonds were taken, they were in
a rubber cylinder like a ‘ludo’ cup872 and in a plastic case used to store tabletsm. Under
cross-examination, he testified, very soon afterwards, that they were in a cup or bottle with a
lid874 and then a plastic tablet bag.875 The following day, he reverted to the ‘ludo’ cup saying
he had made a ‘°slip of the tongue".876 The account of the subsequent journey to Monrovia
was equally contradictory. Sesay testified several times that he lost the diamonds on his fifth
or sixth day in Monroviafm. When challenged on cross-examination, he disavowed his
previous testimony saying "1'm talking about the days that 1 spent at the hotel, because when
1 lost the diamonds 1 was at the hotel for another two to three days before 1 went".878
lmmediately he changed his testimony again, telling the Trial Chamber that he went to stay
with Jungle (Daniel Tamba) after losing the diamonds879.
364. Issa Sesay's testimony about the confiscation of diamonds from Alex Tamba Brima
(a.k.a. Gullit) was similarly confused. He testified before this Trial Chamber that he had
seized diamonds from Brima at the Guinean border in 1998. He explained that Johnny Paul
Koroma had rejected the diamonds Brima had previously handed over to Sam Bockarie and
sent Lamin and Sesay for moreggo Three weeks previously he had testified that Brima had
not given up any diamonds until Sesay confronted him.88l Both versions of this encounter
contradicted the evidence he provided to Trial Chamber 1 where he testified that they had
found nothing on Brima because he had already handed his diamonds over to Sam
*72 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44025.
873 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45010.
W Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46585.
875 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46586—46588.
*76 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46676.
*77 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44094; Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44275; Transcript 18 August
2010, p. 46597.
878 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46598.
’"" Issa ssssy, Transcript is August 2010, p. 46598.
880 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45005.
88* Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44048-44049.

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3 s 22-2
Bockarie.888 When confronted, Sesay offered no explanation for the contradiction, saying
only that he did not recall what he had testified previously.
365. In cross—examination, a number of other inconsistencies were raised between Issa
Sesay's testimony and the evidence he gave to Trial Chamber 1 in his own trial ("the RUF
Tria1"). Examples include whether Sam Bockarie had brought a large shipment of arms in
late 1998 from Burkina Faso (as he testified in the RUF Trial)888 or from Foya, Liberia (as
he testified before this Trial Chamber)888, whether Bockarie had ordered Denis Mingo to
move to Koinadugu in mid-1998888 and how many trips he made to Monrovia in May 2000.
During the RUF Trial, he testified that he had travelled to Monrovia twice: once to discuss
the UN hostage crisis with Taylor and once to escort the hostages when they were
released.888 1n contrast, he told this Trial Chamber that he only went once to discuss the
release of the peacekeepers.887 \Vhen the Prosecution confronted him on each of the
inconsistencies, Sesay re—affirmed his examination-in-chief but claimed not to remember
what he had testified in his own trial.888 The Trial Chamber observed that his testimony that
‘he did not reca11’ what he had testified previously became somewhat of a standard response
while Sesay failed to engage with the factual situation at hand. When pressed on the 1998
arms shipment, he then testified that he had become aware of his error when he read the
transcripts his lawyer had given him after his trial had concluded.8888 In view of the detail in
which he had testified about the incident in the RUF Trial and his initial response that he did
not recall what he testified in the RUF Trial, the Trial Chamber finds this explanation
implausible. ln relation to the May 2000 Monrovia trip, he testified "{f1 said that, then it was
not the truth".89O Such responses did not satisfy the Trial Chamber that this witness was
telling the truth.
888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46740-46742.
888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46155.
888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44302; Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44627; Transcript 12 August
2010, p. 46158.
*85 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44054-44055; Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46629-46630.
886 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, pp, 46896-46897.
887 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44601-44602; Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45233.
888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46155-46160 regarding the 1998 arms shipment; Issa Sesay,
18 August 2010, p. 46631 regarding Superman's reassignment to Koinadugu and Issa Sesay, Transcript 23
August 2010, p. 46897 regarding the Monrovia trips.
888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46657.
*80 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46898.

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3%2=>.*+
366. The Trial Chamber notes that there were other major inconsistencies in Sesay's
evidence. For example, Sesay's testimony concerning the relationship between the group led
by Brigadier Mani and the RUF around the time of the January 1999 Freetown invasion was
inconsistent in several respectsgql as was his evidence regarding his knowledge of Idrissa
Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat).892 The Trial Chamber has considered these instances in
the context of the Judgement as they arise.
367. Sesay challenged the authenticity of a significant number of Prosecution and
Defence exhibits throughout the course of his testimony, in some instances on the basis that
the signature on the document, purportedly belonging to either Sesay or other RUF
members, was a forgery. Under cross-examination, Sesay was presented with Exhibit P-
582893 which shows 15 different signatures purporting to belong to him. He identified four
signatures as forgeries and adopted the remainder as his own.894 Of those four ‘forgeries’,
two corresponded with documents Exhibit D-084895 and D-2598% whose authenticity Sesay
had questionedgi)7 but he reluctantly admitted that the remaining two, Exhibits P-360898 and
P-584,899 were to be found on documents he testified that he had in fact signed himselfgoo
Furthermore, one of the signatures he accepted as his own belonged to Exhibit P-028, which
he had alleged to be a forgery.9Ol The Trial Chamber considers that Sesay's conflicting
evidence regarding his signature demonstrates that his allegations of forgery are not to be
gm See Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
892 See Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
893 Prosecution Exhibit P—582, "End of Page Indicating Fifteen Different Signatures with Marks Indicating those
Signatures that do not belong to Issa Se,say".
W Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47061—47064.
895 Defence Exhibit D—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, From Brigadier Issa
H Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999".
8% Defence Exhibit D—259, "Press Communiqué Issued by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Following
a Meeting with H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare, President of Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E. Olusegun
Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, and H.E. Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia, August
21 2000".
897 Regarding D—084, see Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44253-44254; regarding D—259, see Issa
Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44566-44567; Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47089—47092.
898 Prosecution Exhibit P—360, "The People's Amiy of Sierra Leone, to his Excellency Major J. P. Koroma,
Head of State and Chairman Amied Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) State House, Freetown, Proposal for
the Tentative Integration of the People's Amiy into the National Amiy and the Political Circle, from the Military
High Command and War Council, People's Amiy of Sierra Leone, 13 August 1997".
899 Prosecution Exhibit P—584, "Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone (RUFP/SL), Letter from
General Issa H Sesay, Interim Leader — RUFP/SL, to Lt. General Daniel I Opande, Force Commander,
UNAMSIL, Response, December 7 2000".
000 Regarding P—360, see Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47084; regarding P—584, see Issa Sesay,
Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47087—47088.
W Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45623—45624, 45627.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 7 QA 18 May 2012

3% '2."Z.,S"
believed. That Sesay identified Sam Boclwhen he was first shown it,003 only later alleging that it was a forgery000 supports this
conclusion.
368. Sesay alleged that documents D-009, D-084 and P-067000 had been fraudulently
drafted by Gibril Massaquoi.000 However, the Trial Chamber notes that not only did Sesay
initially fail to contest the authenticity of Exhibit D-009, but his allegation that Massaquoi
forged the documents was founded upon nothing more than speculation based on events that
had no relevance to the creation of the document, including Sesay's account of Massaquoi's
arrest007 and Massaquoi's movements throughout the conflict.008 Moreover, two of these
documents, D-009 and D-084, criticise and incriminate Massaquoi in various ways,
undermining Sesay's proposition that Massaquoi had forged the report.000
369. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay was inconsistent when contesting
the authenticity of` certain documents, reinforcing the Trial Chamber's view that such
challenges enjoyed little genuine foundation. For example, Sesay testified that P-067 could
not be genuine because if Swarray had written the report he would have necessarily signed it
and "then pen[ned] down his name under the signature".0l0 Yet this is contradicted by
Sesay's later challenge to Exhibit P-3 62 that Jackson Swarray was illiterate.0H
370. In light of Sesay's conflicting evidence and speculative assertions when challenging
the authenticity of documents exhibited to this Court, the Trial Chamber considers that his
perpetual allegations of forgery are not to be believed and thus accords no weight to any of
them.
002 Defence Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from
Major Sam Bocl‘"" rm Sesay, Transcript 12 Jury 2010, p. 44252.
000 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, pp. 46930-46931. 2
005 Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peop1e's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards".
000 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44296, 44316; Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44324-44327.
007 See for example Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44261-44263.
008 See for example Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44261-44263, 44304; Transcript 13 July 2010,
pp. 44324—44326.
000 See for example Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the
Revolution from Major General Sam Bockarie", ERN 9670; Exhibit P-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence
Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the
Revolution, 27 September 1999", ERN 7766.
010 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44294.

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371. Finally, the Trial Chamber notes that in cross—examination, Defence Witness DCT-
292 was asked whether Issa Sesay was a credible person, and the witness replied, "I have to
say that Issa Sesay is not a credible man" and affirmed that he had seen him lie when it was
in his interest to do so.9l2
372. In light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber finds that Sesay's evidence
must generally be considered with caution and cannot be relied upon without corroboration.
The Trial Chamber will consider further issues relating to his credibility in context as they
may arise.
Defence Witness DCT—008
373. Defence Witness DCT-008, a Liberian,9l3 joined the NPFL in the early 1990s and
joined the SSS a number of years later.9l4 DCT—008 was a radio operator. He testitied that,
while assigned in Monrovia, he had the opportunity to observe what Benjamin Yeaten's
radio operator, code named Sunlight, was doing.9l5
374. The Trial Chamber observes that in cross—examination, when asked by the
Prosecution whether he had "basically reinvented" his testimony, DCT—008 conceded,
stating that "I changed some parts of my testimony that I had given in Monrovia — when I
got here, I changed it".9l6 The witness testitied that he was not honest in the interviews
preceding his arrival in The Hague because he did not know the people who were
interviewing him well and was afraidfm DCT—008 further stated that he decided to change
his testimony because "I did not want to come before this Honourable Court and tell lies or
to explain made up stories".9l8
375. The Trial Chamber notes that with regard to several allegations made by the
Prosecution, the testimony of DCT—008 is wholly inconsistent with the testimony of other
Defence witnesses as well as Prosecution witnesses. For example, DCT—008 is the only
QH Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44339.
(H2 DCT-292 Transcript 3 June 2010, p. 42033.
W DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46948-46951 (PS).
914 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46972-46975, 46993, 46996-46999.
(H5 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47024-47025.
(H6 DCT-008, Transcript 6 September 2010, p. 48010.
W DCT-008, Transcript 7 September 2010, p. 48110.
918 DCT-008, Transcript 7 September 2010, p. 48109.

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witness who testified that Yeaten's arms trading with the RUF was being carried out
independently of and covertly from the Accused.Ql9 The Trial Chamber recalls that
Prosecution witness Dauda Aruna Fornie ("DAF"), an RUF radio operator,920 testified that
when Bockarie contacted Yeaten to request military supplies through his radio operators,92l
Yeaten's radio operator Sunlight would respond that Bockarie should wait while Yeaten
consulted with "Zero—Four—Seven", which Fornie testified to be the code name for the
Accused.922 The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused testified that "Zero—Four—Seven" or
"047" was indeed one of the code names used for him by radio operators.923 The Trial
Chamber also notes the testimony of Prosecution witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio
operator,924 who testified that Bockarie would send messages to his commanders "that he
had brought ammunitions from Charles Taylor".925 Prosecution witness TF1—516, an RUF
radio operator,926 testified that Yeaten himself would say when ammunition was given to the
RUF "that it is his dad Charles Taylor who provided them".927 The Trial Chamber finds no
corroboration of DCT—008's evidence that Yeaten was acting independently of the Accused,
while there is substantial evidence that Yeaten was representing, and was perceived to be
representing, the Accused.
376. The Trial Chamber notes that in cross—examination, DCT—008 sought to elide the
distinction between fact and opinion. When asked about contradictory evidence from other
witnesses regarding the transport of arms, DCT—008 said that their testimony is their own
view and that he could not judge the "opinions" of another person. According to the witness,
if he said that something happened and another person said it did not happen, "then that's
the person's opinion".928 The Trial Chamber found such an approach evasive, demonstrating
an unwillingness on the witness's part to engage with the inconsistency at hand. The Trial
Chamber also recalls that on successive answers the witness would first state that he had no
919 DCT—008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47046—47047.
O20 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
lm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21482.
022 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21483.
923 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 28992.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
925 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 18.
026 TF1—5 16, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
lm TF1—567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13040.
028 DCT—008, Transcript 3 September 2010, p. 47936.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T OA 18 May 2012

3%2.‘2.‘2
idea whether the Accused had any relationship with the RUF, and then testify that the
Accused had no involvement with the rebels in Sierra Leone.929
377. The Trial Chamber also notes that certain inconsistencies in the testimony of witness
DCT-008 can be observed. For instance, the witness testified that Sunlight does not speak or
understand Krio.93O The witness also gave evidence to the effect that Sunlight used to
monitor the RUF radio network and listen in to conversations between three Sierra
Leoneans, Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay.93l The witness testified that
Sunlight could follow these conversations because they were carried out in English and not
in Krio.932 In particular, the witness testified that Sunlight overheard Foday Sankoh giving
an order to Issa Sesay to take charge and become commander of the RUF.933 The Trial
Chamber recalls that Defence witness Issa Sesay testified that his English is not good.934 The
Trial Chamber notes that DCT-008 himself also testified to occasions when Sunlight
understood parts of conversations which, according to the witness, were conducted in Krio,
whereas he also said that Sunlight did not understand Krio. For example, he testified that
Sunlight overheard Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) telling Sellay to speak with "the brother",
Sam Bockarie,935 and he told the Court on several occasions that Sellay and Jungle spoke
Krio to each other.936
378. The Trial Chamber notes that DCT-008 provided contradictory and implausible
testimony regarding Liberian telephone communications, an area about which he should
have been best informed. For example, he repeatedly denied that "2-l" was the code for a
telephone in Liberiaim, rather that it was "l0-2-l" or "l0-2l", yet he himself shortly
thereafter described "this well-known code, 2-1 or 10-2-17938 Moreover, DCT-008 testified
that the operators at Base 1 avoided using the code because it was so well known.939 Both
929 See for example DCT-008, Transcript 7 September 2010, p. 48217.
930 DCT~008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47042-47043.
"" DCT-008, Transcript 7 September 2010, p. 48159.
932 DCT-008, Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48159-48161.
933 DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47488; Transcript 7 September 2010, p. 48160.
934 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43584; Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44163-44164.
"" ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010,p. 47048.
936 DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47485-47486; Transcript 3 September 2010, p. 47906;
Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48157-48158.
937 DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p. 47584; Transcript 6 September 2010, p. 47958.
"" nor-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p. 47586.
im DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, pp. 47585-47586.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ,4 QN 18 May 2012

3 $27-°q
DCT-008's assertions are belied by the testimonies of a significant number of credible RUF
radio operators who testified to Liberian operators, including those at Base 1, using the code
"2-1", meaning telephone, in communications with Sierra Leone.940
379. The Trial Chamber accepts that the witness might have felt insecure during his first
interviews and as a result lied in his statements. The Trial Chamber notes that after arriving
in The Hague the witness openly admitted doing so. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber also
observes that throughout his testimony, the witness presented a story which heavily
contradicted that of many other witnesses in the case, that there were inconsistencies in the
evidence provided and that on occasions, the witness appeared evasive.
380. ln light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber finds that Defence witness
DCT-008's evidence must generally be considered with caution and requires corroboration.
D. Authenticity Assessment of Specific Documents
381. During the course of the proceedings, several documents tendered for admission
were contested by the parties.94l The Trial Chamber recalls that where objections were made
regarding the authenticity of certain documents, the Trial Chamber admitted the documents
on the basis that any considerations relating to the authenticity of documents went to weight,
rather than admissibility.942 ln this section, the Trial Chamber will assess the authenticity of
two documents, Exhibit P-063 and Exhibit P-067, whose authenticity has been challenged
by the Defence during the course of the trial. Many of the other documents challenged were
challenged by Defence witness Issa Sesay. The Trial Chamber finds, for reasons detailed in
its discussion of his credibility, that these challenges are not to be accorded any weight.
Further issues relating to authenticity of specific documents are addressed as necessary in
the context of the Trial Chamber's discussion of the particular events to which they pertain.
940 See for example TF1-516, 8 April 2008, pp. 6911, 6977; TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.
15604-15605; Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12170.
941 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-747, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents
Seized from Foday Sankoh's House, 26 February 2009, para. 13; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-749,
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents Seized from RUF Kono Office, Kono District, 27
February 2009, para. 13.
942 See for example lan Smillie, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 675-677; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10
January 2008, pp. 933-934; Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1206-1207.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 M

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Prosecution Exhibit P-067
382. Exhibit P-067 was tendered into evidence through TF1-371. It consists of ten End of Pages
photocopied from a handwritten document entitled "Situation Report" addressed to "the
Leader", whom TF1-371 identified as Foday Sankoh.943 The exhibit is unsigned, although it
purports to have been authored by "the Black Revolutionary Guards". Although Exhibit P-
067 lacks any date, it describes events occuning as early as 1996 and as late as January
1999.944 The exhibit includes underlinings when references are made to the Accused, Johnny
Paul Koroma, Ibrahim Bah, Jungle, and Blaise Compaoré.945
383. The Prosecution adduced evidence on the chain of custody of Exhibit P-067 through
Tariq Malik, who in April 2003 became the chief of the Evidence Section within the Ofhce
of the Prosecutor, and was the chief of the Evidence, Archives and Post-Operational Access
Section within the Office of the Prosecutor at the time of his testimony.94° According to
Malik, on 9 May 2000, the Sierra Leonean police searched Foday Sankoh's residence at
Spur Road, Freetown, which had been "ransacked" the day before, and seized "a large
number of documents [that had been ...] strewn across the compound".947 The seized
documents were brought to the headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Division of the
Sierra Leone police force, or "CID",948 and placed in the custody of Officer Alfred Sesay.
Officer Sesay guarded the documents in "a cabinet in his office under lock and key",949 but
did not keep any written inventory of the documents.950 Later that year, certain documents
from this seizure were photocopied for the office of the Sierra Leonean Attorney General
and examined by UN personnel, as well as by Alfred Sesay himselfim From 2002 to 2004,
the Prosecution obtained a total of fourteen such documents from the CID through Alfred
Sesay on three separate occasions. After these documents had been reviewed by OTP
943 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2477 (CS).
(M4 Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peop1e's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN 9672, 9677, 9681.
(M5 Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peop1e's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN 9674-9678.
946 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22915.
(M7 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22940.
948 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22942.
049 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22942.
950 Tariq Malik, Transcript 20 January 2009, p. 23054.
051 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22941.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T dl" J 18 May 2012 M

3 is *2.3 I
lawyers and investigators, they were submitted to the Evidence Unit.552 By November 2004,
Malik's team had processed all 14 documents.955 Malik did not oversee the 14 Sankoh
documents until his unit received them. Consequently, Malik's knowledge of their
whereabouts prior to November 2004 derived from his reading of sworn affidavits and the
RUF trial testimony of Alfred Sesay.554 ln addition, the Trial Chamber notes that there are
also gaps in the chain of custody. Given the imperfect chain of custody, the Trial Chamber
weighed this hearsay evidence»·which on its own does not establish the chain of custody-
with caution. The Trial Chamber, however, recalls that "gaps in the chain of custody are not
fatal, provided that the evidence as a whole demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the
piece of evidence concerned is what is says it is".555 The Trial Chamber has therefore
considered additional evidence that may establish the authenticity of Exhibit P-067.
384. The Prosecution tendered Exhibit P-067 through witness TF1-371, who testified that
a representative of the Black Guards, Junior Vandi, presented the original report to Foday
Sankoh in April 1999. The witness further averred that, while in Lome as part of the RUF
delegation, he "went through" the report after Sankoh had conveyed it to his adjutant,
Rashid Dandy.956 This foundation was later corroborated by Prosecution Witness TF1-567,
who, as a Black Guard, claimed to have contributed to the report and watched Junior Vandi
write the original document in Lome.957
385. The Defence led evidence tending to impugn the authenticity of Exhibit P-067
during its cross-examination of TF1-371, asking the witness whether there was any
possibility that the document could be a forgery. TF1-371 replied that, although the exhibit
was a photocopy, he could still recognise the original document based on the content and
writing.558 The Defence also posited on cross-examination that "a journalist called Gberie"
5 5 2 Tariq Malik, Transcript 20 January 2009, p. 23 058.
555 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22944.
554 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, pp. 22936-22939.
555 See Section IV(A), citing Prosecutor v. Orié, [T-03-68-T, Judgement, 30 June 2006, para. 27.
556 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2477 (CS). On cross examination TF1-371 seemed to suggest
perused a photocopy of this same original report, although this testimony was unclear and not pursued further by
either party. TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2835-2836 (CS).
557 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12970.
555 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2835 (CS).

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T CM- 18 May 2012 `%

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claimed to possess the original report, although TFl—37l disavowed any knowledge of this,
and no other evidence has been adduced to substantiate this claim.959
386. During his examination in chief the Accused was questioned about this exhibit, line
by line.%O He denied the document's principal assertions of fact, and described it as "a
mischievous fabrication" and a mix of "facts and half truths, disinformation".%1
387. The Defence later questioned Issa Sesay about the exhibit.962 Sesay alleged that
Exhibit P-067 was forged by of Gibril Massaquoi,963 and provided several reasons for
doubting the authenticity of the document; he claimed that he knew of Sankoh's bodyguards
onl as "the Black Guards" and not "the Black Revolutiona Guards",%4 asserted that the
Y YY
Black Guard commander at the time, Jackson Swarray, would have been the one to prepare
such a report for Sankoh, and he certainly would have signed it.965 Sesay also characterised
most of the exhibit's factual content as "false",%6 "lies",%7 "big lies"%8 and "black lies",%9
further proof according to the witness, that Exhibit P—067 is a forgery.97O
388. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Issa Sesay's evidence should be treated
with caution,971 and places little weight on Sesay's challenges to this exhibit due to a
number of reasons. First, when initially asked "who are the Black Revolutionary Guards‘?"
by Defence Counsel, Sesay responded "Well, they are Mr Sankoh's bodyguards. They were
the ones who were called by that title".972 This initial adoption of the term "Black
Revolutionary Guards" belies Sesay's later denial that he had never heard this term used.
This denial was further undermined when the Prosecution confronted Sesay with evidence,
adduced at his own trial from a witness who "would know" that, initially, "Sankoh's
959 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2832 (CS).
960 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29660-29686.
961 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29686.
962 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44292-44318; Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44321-44325.
963 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44296; see also Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44316; Transcript
13 July 2010, pp. 44324-44327.
964 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44292-44293.
965 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44293.
966 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44306, 44314.
967 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44300, 44307, 44315. A
968 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44309, 44314.
069 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp 44308, 44314, 44315.
970 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44324-44327.
971 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
im Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44292-44293.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3-O1-T GN lg May 2012

3% 23 2
bodyguards [...] were called the Revolutionary Guard".973 This evidence is also consistent
with that of TF1—567, who testified that "Foday Sankoh trained us, the Black Guards, and he
told us that the revolution that he had launched was a black revolution. We, the Black
Guards, our duties were to guard the revolution".974 Furthermore, Exhibit P—067 refers to the
"Black Guards" at least three times and concludes with "Your Revolutionary Guards
RUF/SL", all of which underscore the interrelation of these terms.
389. Second, Sesay's propositions that Jackson Swarray would have been the only Black
Guard to submit reports to Sankoh, and that if Swarray had written the report he would have
necessarily signed it,975 are inherently speculative and unpersuasive in light of the direct,
consistent and mutually corroborative evidence of TF1—371 and TF1—567.
390. Finally, with regard to Sesay's assertion that the document was forged by Gibril
Massaquoi, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay made the same assertion in relation to other
documents, specifically Exhibits D—009 and D—084, but a perusal of these documents
demonstrates dissimilarities in language, style, and format. Moreover, two of these
documents, D—009 and D—084, incriminate Massaquoi, undermining Sesay's proposition that
Massaquoi had forged the report.976
391. The Trial Chamber has carefully considered the evidence relating to Exhibit P—067, C
and finds that Junior Vandi, as a representative of the Black Guards, did indeed present
Foday Sankoh with a report in April 1999 as part of the RUF's delegation to the peace talks.
TF1—371's testimony on this point is direct, detailed, and corroborated by the equally direct
and detailed testimony of TF1—567.977 The testimony of Dauda Aruna Fornie, who identified
Junior Vandi as a member of the Lome delegation,978 reinforces this finding.
973 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46199; Exhibit P—561A (confidential); Exhibit P—561B
(confidential).
‘"" TF1—567,Transcript2 July 2008,p. 12833.
975 At first blush, this proposition also runs against Sesay's later testimony that "Jackson Swarray does not
write, nor does he read". Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44339.
W6 See Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from
Major General Sam Bockarie", pp. 8, 13, ERN 9665, 9670; Exhibit P—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence
Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RIB?/SL, to the Leader of the
Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. l 1, ERN 7766.
977 TF1—371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2477 (CS); TFl—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12970.
978 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21640; Exhibit P—266B, "Copy of Photograph —
P0001163 Marked by TF1—274".

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T , GQ 18 May 2012

3r>2;*+
392. The Trial Chamber therefore considers Exhibit P—067 to be a faithful reproduction of
what it purports to be.
Prosecution Exhibit P—063
393. Exhibit P—063, entitled "Forum with the External Delegates Led by the Defence
Staff" and dated 2 December 1998, is a photocopy of a five—End of Page, typewritten document
purporting to be the minutes of a 2 December 1998 meeting held by Sam Bockarie at the
"Waterworks" facility in Buedu. The document bears the signature of an anonymous "Joint
Security Rep.", and has been dated by the signatory "4/12/98". The top of the first End of Page has
been marked "Battle Field Commander — RUF—SL" by hand, suggesting that this version of
the document was copied to Issa Sesay,979 who was the BFC at the time of the exhibit's
purported creation.98O The remaining four End of Pages also contain minor handwritten additions
which either correct spelling and punctuation errors, or insert material that is irrelevant to
the exhibit's authenticity or probative value.
394. Exhibit P—063 was admitted through witness TF1—371,98l who recognised it as the
minutes of "the forum that took place in Waterworks after the external delegate came back
from their trip led by Sam Bockarie".982 The witness expounded on the content of P—063 and
the meeting it describes, as well as the subsequent meeting of senior officers referenced at
the exhibit's final End of Page.983
395. Beyond the foundation developed through TF1-371, the Prosecution adduced
evidence on the chain of custody through Tariq Malik who testified that this document was
given to the Office of the Prosecutor by the Sierra Leone Police, "SLP", in 2005. The SLP
seized the document from an RUF office in 2001 in Kono District.984
396. Issa Sesay challenged the authenticity of Exhibit P—063, asserting that the minutes of
such meetings were typically taken by adjutants, and that Bockarie's adjutant, Rashid Sandy,
im Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence
Staff, handwritten title ‘Batt1efie1d Commander RUF-SL’, 2nd December, 1998", pp. 00015487, 00015491.
°g° Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2000, p. 44183.
Og] Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3826.
082 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2405 (CS).
983 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2405-2414 (CS).
p 084 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22980.

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Case No; SCSL-03-01-T GL" X 18 May 2012 w

3% ¤.:<.s"
would have presumably done so for this meeting.°85 However, the Trial Chamber observes
that the fact that P-063 was authored by a "Joint Security Rep". instead does not vitiate the
document's authenticity. Moreover, the Trial Chamber rejects Sesay's assertion that there
was no "Joint Security Rep". in the RUF, and that only a Joint Security Commander, who
was Augustine Gbao, existed,986 since the record contains at least one example of someone
other than Gbao acting on behalfof Joint Security. lndeed, there is direct evidence that Joint
Security personnel also took minutes of meetings held in or near Buedu at this time.987 The
Trial Chamber has also considered the fact that Exhibit P-063 was retrieved from an RUF
installation in Koakoyima,988 "where the Joint Security office was",989 as circumstantial
corroboration that the exhibit was indeed drafted and retained by a representative from Joint
Security. Sesay's challenges to the document are therefore outweighed by the evidence.
397. ln light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber accepts Exhibit P-063 as what it purports
to be.
985 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44180-4418l; Exhibit P—370, "Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone Defence Headquarter, Minutes of Forum Held with RUF/ SL Administrative Board at Water Works
Compound, 4 December 1998" (minutes of Waterworks meeting purportedly held two days later, prepared and
signed by "Lt. Col. Rashid Sandy, General Adjutant — RUF/SL"); See also Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript
4 March 2008, p. 5236 (testifying that Joint Security was an ad hoc entity charged with investigating misconduct
within the RUF).
986 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44181. . _
W Albert sarrirr, Transcript 5 Jrrrre 2008, p. 11088.
988 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22965.
989 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5311 ("1 passed a night at Koakoyima, that was where
the Joint Security office was"), 5351 (Q. Was there a Joint Security office located in Kono? A. Yes, it was
located at Koakoyima").

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T l8 May 2012

ggzgb
V. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Introduction
398. Article l(l) of the Statute empowers the Special Court to prosecute persons
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November
1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.
The crimes over which the Special Court has jurisdiction are specified in Articles 2, 3, 4,
and 5 of the Statute. In the instant case, only Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute, which deal
with crimes under international law, are relevant. Regarding such crimes, the Trial Chamber
is bound to apply customary international law in determining whether the crimes charged in
the Indictment have been established. 990 The Secretary—General of the United Nations
("Secretary—General") in his "Report on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone" noted that
In recognition of the principle of legality, in particular rzullum crimen sine lege, and the
prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation, the international crimes enumerated, are
crimes considered to have the character of customary international law at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime.99l
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that all the crimes and modes of responsibility charged in the
Indictment were part of customary international law at the time of the alleged commission of
the crimesm
399. Rule 72bis of the Rules provides that:
The applicable laws of the Special Court include:
(i) the Statute, the Agreement, and the Rules;
(ii) where appropriate, other applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international customary law;
OOO AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 639; Kamara Decision on Form of Indictment, para. 24. See also Prosecutor
v. Norman, SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child
Recruitment), 31 May 2004 [CDF Appeal Decision on Child Recruitment], paras 17 et seq.
W Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court, S/2000/915, 4 October 2000,
para. 12.
992 References supporting the customary nature of the crimes and modes of liability at the time of their
alleged commission will be provided in relation to each crime and mode of liability below.

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(iii) general principles of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of the Republic of Sierra Leone, provided
that those principles are not inconsistent with the Statute, the Agreement, and with
international customary law and internationally recognized norms and standards.
400. ln this section, the Trial Chamber has considered the law on the specific elements of
the crimes, and on individual criminal responsibility. The law on the chapeau elements of
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute has been considered in the section in the Section on "Law
and Findings on the General Requirements".993
40l. There is no significant dispute between the parties regarding the applicable law.994
Therefore, in this section the Trial Chamber has only referred to the submissions of the
parties where the parties have requested the Trial Chamber to depart from existing
jurisprudence, or where they have made submissions on issues which have not yet been
settled by the Special Court's jurisprudence or the jurisprudence of other international
tribunals.
B. Specific Elements of the Crimes
l. Count l: Acts of Terrorism (Article 3gdp of the Statute)
402. Count l charges the Accused with acts of terrorism, a violation of Additional
Protocol ll, punishable under Article 3(d) of the Statute.995 The Prosecution alleges that the
Accused committed the crimes set forth in paragraph 6 to 3l of the lndictment, and charged
, in Counts 2 to ll, "as part of a campaign to terrorise the civilian population of the Republic
of Sierra Leone".°%
403. In addition to the chapeau requirements of Violations of Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 11 pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, the
im See Law and Findings on the General Requirements.
im The Prosecution submits that it relies upon the law as articulated in the Appeal and Trial Judgements of
the Special Court, and incorporates by reference the jurisprudence referred to in these judgements. The
Prosecution indicates that it has only made specific submissions when "there has been a notable development in
the jurisprudence and/or whether [sic] there is some divergence of approach in the jurisprudence". Prosecution
Final Trial Brief, para. 44.
995 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was part of customary international law at the time of its
alleged commission. See AFRC Trial Judgement, paras 660-662, Prosecutor v. Galic, [T-98-29-A, Judgement
(AC), 30 November 2006 [Galic Appeal Judgement], para. 86.

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3%.13%
following elements of the crime of acts of terrorism must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt:
i. Acts or threats of violence directed against persons or their property;
ii. The perpetrator wilfully made persons or their property the object of those acts
and threats of violence; and
iii. The acts or threats of violence were committed with the primary purpose of
spreading terror among protected persons.997
404. Actual terrorization is not a required element of the crime of terror, although
evidence of such terrorization may be used to establish other elements of the crime.998
405. The Prosecution must prove that the spreading of terror was specifically intended.9q9
However, while spreading terror must be the primary purpose of the acts or threats of
violence, it need not be the only purpose.m0O Such intent can be inferred from, inter alia, the
"nature, manner, time and duration"lOOl of the acts or threats of violence, and may also be
inferred from the actual infliction of terror and the indiscriminate nature of the attacks. 1002
406. The Defence submits that the ICTY has held in the Milosevic Trial Judgement that an
act or threat can be considered as "terrorism" only where it results in "death or serious injury
to body or health within the civilian population or to individual civilians". 1003 It notes,
however, that Trial Chamber I of the Special Court explicitly rejected this requirement in the
9% Indictment, para. 5; see also Case Summary, para. 19, explaining that "[t]he words ‘civi1ian(s)’ or
‘civi1ian popu1ation’ refer to persons who took no active part in the hostilities, or who were no longer taking an
active part in the hostilities".
im CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 350; AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 667. See also Galic Appeal Judgement,
para. 100; Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement (AC), 12 November 2009 [D. Milosevic
Appeal Judgement], para. 31
098 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 669, referring to Galic Appeal Judgement, paras 102, 104, 107; D.
Milosevic Appeal Judgement, para. 35.
999 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 356, citing Galic Trial Judgement, para. 136; AFRC Trial Judgement, para.
699; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 1 19. See also Galic Appeal Judgement, para. 104.
1000 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 669, referring to Galic Appeal Judgement, para. 104; D. Milosevic Appeal
Judgement, para. 37. See also RUF Trial Judgement, para. 121.
mm Galic Appeal Judgement, para. 104. See also AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 669; RUF Trial Judgement,
para. 121.
1002 D. Milosevic Appeal Judgement, para. 37.
1003 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 173, referring to Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, 1T-98-29/1-T,
Judgement (TC), 12 December 2007 [D. Milosevic Trial Judgement], paras 876 and 880.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / Gl" 18 May 2012 E
4/

Bszzq
RUF Trial Judgement. 1004 The Defence submits that this represents a divergence between the
two courts which has not been resolved on appeal, and urges the Trial Chamber to resolve it
in the manner most favourable to the Accused.lOO5 The Prosecution does not address this
issue in its submissions.
407. However, contrary to the Defence submissions, there is appellate authority resolving
this issue, as in the Milosevic case, the Appeals Chamber of the 1CTY found that the Trial
Chamber had "misinterpreted the Galié jurisprudence by stating that ‘actual infliction of
death or serious harm to body or health is a required element of the crime of terror’, and had
thus committed an error of law". 1006 The Appeals Chamber of the 1CTY further found that
actual infliction of death or serious bodily harm was not a required element of the crime of
terror, but that it must be shown that the victims suffered grave consequences resulting from
the acts or threats of violence, which may include death or serious injury to body or
health. 1007 The Trial Chamber concurs with this approach.
408. The Defence submits that, in addition to these requirements, the Appeals Chamber of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ("STL") has recently held that a customary mle of
international law regarding the crime of terrorism has emerged which requires the following
three key elements: "(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping,
hostage—talamong the population (which would generally entail the creation of a public danger) or
directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or
refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational element". 1008 The Defence
submits that the second and third requirements, which differ from the definition of "acts of
1004 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 173, referring to RUF Trial Judgement, para. 117, footnote 240. At
paragraph 1 17, Trial Chamber I held that "the Prosecution is not required to prove that the act or threat caused
death or serious injury to body or health within the civilian population? In footnote 240, the Trial Chamber
noted that this requirement was included by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Dragomir Milosevic case. The Trial
Chamber stated that it had "considered the relevant portions of the CDF Appeal Judgement and the Galic Appeal
Judgement and [was] satisfied that this is not a required element of the offence".
1005 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 173.
1006 D. Milosevic Appeal Judgement, para. 33.
mm D. Milosevic Appeal Judgement, para. 33.
1008 Defence Response, para. 171, referring to STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, Interlocutory Decision on the
Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 16 February 201 1, [STL
Appeal Decision], para. 85.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T Ou 18 May 2012

3814®
terrorism" as defined above, should be included in the definition of the crime of "acts of
terrorism".lOO9 The Prosecution does not address this issue in its submissions.
409. The Trial Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber of the STL found that these three
key elements were applicable to "a customary rule of international law regarding the
international crime of terrorism" at least in times of peace. mm It distinguished this from the
war crime of "acts of terrorism".l0ll The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and the Trial
Chamber of this court have held that the war crime of "acts of terrorism" (which does not
contain these additional elements) is firmly established in customary international law.l0l2
410. The Trial Chamber is therefore of the view that the additional elements referred to in
the above paragraphs do not form part of the war crime of "acts of terrorism".
2. Counts 2 and 3: Unlawful Killings {Articles 2ga) and 3]a] of the Statute)
41 1. In Count 2, the Indictment charges the Accused with murder as a crime against
humanity, punishable under Article 2(a) of the Statute.lOl3 ln addition, or in the alternative,
Count 3 charges the Accused with violence to life, health and physical or mental well—being
of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
and of Additional Protocol II, punishable under Article 3(a) of the Statute.lOl4
mg Defence Response, paras 172-173.
mm STL Appeal Decision, paras 85, 102. Moreover, as the Appeals Chamber held that the STL must apply
the crime of terrorism as defined by Lebanese law, it did not find that the elements it listed at paragraph 85 were
applicable before the STL. STL Appeal Decision, para. 145.
mn The STL Appeals Chamber stated that "as the ICTY and the SCSL have found, acts of terrorism can
constitute war crimes". STL Appeal Decision, para. 107 and footnote 208.
lm AF RC Trial Judgement, paras 660-662; Galié Appeal Judgement, para. 86.
lm Indictment, paras 9-13. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was a part of customary
international law at the time of its commission. See RUF Trial Judgement, para. 137, CDF Trial Judgement,
para. 142.
mm Indictment, paras 9-13. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was a part of customary
international law at the time of its commission. See Prosecutor v. Fofana, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction Materiae: Nature of the Armed Contiict (AC), 25 May 2004 [CDF
Appeal Decision on Nature of Armed Contiict], para. 24; Prosecutor v. Tadié, IT-94-1-T, Decision on the
Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (TC), 10 August 1995 [Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction], paras 66-73; Prosecutor
v Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44-A4(a), Decision on Count Seven of the Amended Indictment - Violence to Life,
Health and Physical or Mental Well-Being of Persons (TC), 5 August 2005 [Karemera Decision on Count Seven
of the Amended Indictment], paras 5-10. See also Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para.195, where in analyzing the
offence of violence to life and person, the Trial Chamber recognized that it is a breach of customary international
law when the underlying act is murder, cruel treatment and torture. See also ICRC, Customary International
Humanitarian Law Online Database, Rule 89 (Violence to Life), and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-
Beck. ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, Cambridge, University Press (2005),
p. 31 1.

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412. The elements detining murder are identical regardless of the provision under which it
is charged.lOl5 Thus, in addition to the chapeau requirements of Crimes against Humanity
pursuant to Article 2 of the Statute (for Count 2) and the chapeau requirements ofViolations
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 11 pursuant to
Article 3 of the Statute (for Count 3), the following elements of the crime of murder must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt:
i. The perpetrator by his acts or omission caused the death of a person or persons;
and
ii. The perpetrator had the intention to kill or to cause serious bodily harm in the
reasonable knowled e that it would likel result in death. mm
S Y
413. For the physical elements of murder to be satisfied, the Prosecution is required to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator's conduct substantially contributed to
the death of the person.lOl7 The death of the victim may be demonstrated through
circumstantial evidence, provided it is the only inference that may reasonably be drawn from
the acts or omissions of the perpetrator. mg Therefore it is not necessary to require proof that
the dead body of that person has been recovered. low
3. Counts 4, 5 and 6: Sexual Violence (Articles 2] g] and 3]e) of the Statute)
414. ln Count 4, the Indictment charges the Accused with rape, a crime against humanity,
punishable under Article 2(g) of the Statute.l02O Count 5 charges the Accused with "sexual
W5 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 688, referring to Stakic Trial Judgement, para. 631; Brdanin Trial
Judgement, para. 380; Prosecutor v. Oric, 1T—03-68-T, Judgement (TC), 30 June 2006 [Oric Trial Judgement],
para. 345; Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, 1T-00-39-T, Judgement (TC), 27 September 2006 [Krajisnik Trial
Judgement], para. 848.
W6 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 688. See also Kvocka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 261; D. Milosevic
Appeal Judgement, para. 108;
mw AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 689; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic. Sainovic and Ojdanié, IT-05-87-T.
Judgement (TC), 26 February 2009 [Milutinovic et al. Trial Judgement], para. 137; Kvocka et al. Appeal
Judgement. para. 261; Oric Trial Judgement, para. 3V47. See also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucié, Delic and Landio,
IT-96-21-T, Judgement (TC), 16 November 1998 [Celebici Trial Judgement], footnote 435, providing the results
of its examination of various domestic legal systems, including that of England, Australia, Belgium and Norway.
Im AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 689. referring to Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, 1T—98—32-A, Judgement (AC), 25
February 2004 [Vasiljevic Appeal Judgement], para. 120; Kvocka et al. Appeal Judgement. para. 260; Celebici
Appeal Judgement, para. 458.
mm Krnolejac Trial Judgement, para. 326; Prosecutor v. Tadic. IT-94-1-T, Judgement (TC), 7 May 1997
[Tadic Trial Judgement], para. 240.
mo Indictment, paras 14-17. The Trial Chamber is satistied that this crime was a part of customary
intemational law at the time of its alleged commission. AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 692; RUF Trial Judgement.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 6],4 18 May 2012

3310.1
slavery", a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 2(g) of the Statue.lO2l ln
addition, or in the alternative, Count 6 charges the Accused with outrages upon personal
dignity, a violation of Common Article 3 and of Additional Protocol II, punishable under
Article 3(e) of the Statute.lO22
(a) Count 4: Rape gArticle 2g gt of the Statute;
415. ln addition to the chapeau requirements of Crimes against Humanity pursuant to
Article 2 of the Statute, the following elements of the crime of rape must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt:
i. The non-consensual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator or by any other object used by the
perpetrator, or of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; and
ii. The perpetrator must have the intent to effect this sexual penetration, and the
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.lO23
416. The consent of the victim must be given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free
will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.lO24 This is necessarily a
contextual assessment. However, in situations of armed conflict or detention, coercion is
almost universa1.lO25 Force or the threat of force provides clear evidence of non-consent, but
force is not an element per se of rape and there are factors other than force which may
render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the 1
victim.lO26 ‘Continuous resistance’ by the victim, physical force or even threat of force by
the perpetrator are not required to establish coercion.lO27 A person may be incapable of
para. 144; Kvocka Appeal Judgement, para. 395; Prosecutor v. Furundiija, 1T-95-17/1-T, Judgement (TC), 10
December 1998 [Furundzija Trial Judgement], paras 165-169; Celebiéi Trial Judgement, paras 476-477.
ml Indictment, paras 14-17. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was a part of customary
international law at the time of its alleged commission. See RUF Trial Judgement, para. 157.
mz Indictment, paras 14-17. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was a part of customary
international law at the time of its alleged commission. AF RC Trial Judgement, para. 715; RUF Trial Judgement,
para. 174, Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 21-22; F urundiija Trial Judgement, para. 168.
Im AFRC Trial Judgement, paras 692-693; see also Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 127.
my AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 694, referring to Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 127.
mj AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 694.
Im AF RC Trial Judgement, para. 694, referring to Kunarac Appeal Judgement, paras 129-130.
ION RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 736; AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 694, referring to Kunarac Appeal
Judgement, paras 128-130, 133; see also Gay J. McDougall, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery—like
Practices During Armed Conflict. Final Report submitted to the Commission on Human Rights Sub-commission

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T @5 18 May 2012

zz 14%
giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age related incapacity. Hm The Trial
Chamber acknowledges that the very specific circumstances of an armed conflict where
rapes on a large scale are alleged to have occurred, coupled with the social stigma which is
borne by victims of rape in certain societies, render the restrictive test set out in the elements
of the crime difficult to satisfy. Circumstantial evidence may therefore be used to
demonstrate the actus reus of rape. mg
417. In addition, the Trial Chamber is guided by the provisions of Rule 96 of the Rules,
which provides, in relevant part that:
In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropriate, apply the
following principles:
(i) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where
force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive enviromnent
undermined the victim's ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;
(ii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where
the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent;
(iii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a
victim to the alleged sexual violence.
(b) Count 5: Sexual Slaveg (Article 2g gl of the Statute)
418. ln addition to the chapeau requirements of Crimes against Humanity pursuant to
Article 2 of the Statute, the following elements of the crime of sexual slavery must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt:
i. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or
bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation
of liberty.
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 50th session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22
June 1998, para. 25, stating that "[t]he manifestly coercive circumstances that exist in all armed conflict
situations establish a presumption of non—consent and negates the need for the prosecution to establish the lack of
consent as an element of the crime". ·
lm RUF Trial Judgement, para. 148. See also ICC Elements of Crime, Article 8(2)(e)(vi)—1 , footnote 63.
Hm APRC Trial Judgement, para. 695, referring to Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Gacumbitsi
Appeal Judgement, para. 1 15.

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ii. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a
sexual nature; 8
iii. The perpetrator intended to engage in the act of sexual slavery or acted with the
reasonable knowledge that this was likely to occur. mw
419. The actus reus of the offence of sexual slavery comprises two elements, first, that the
Accused exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership of a person or
persons (the slavery element) and second, that the enslavement involved sexual acts (the
sexual element). ml The mens rea for the violation consists in the intentional exercise of any
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, over the victim. Hm
420. The primary characteristic of enslavement is the absence of the consent or free will
of the victim}033 In determining whether the perpetrator exercised a power attaching to the
right of ownership over the victim, the Chamber will take into account the existence of such
factors or indicia as "control of the victim's movement, control of their physical
environment, psychological control, measures taken to deter escape, use or threat of force or
coercion against the victim, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment
and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour", a list that is by no means exhaustive.lO34
There is no requirement that there be any payment or exchange in order to establish the
exercise of ownership.lO35 The deprivation of liberty may include exacting forced labour or
otherwise reducing a person to servile status.lO36 The Chamber also notes that the expression
mo AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 708; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 158
ml Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 540
W32 Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para 122
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 709, referring to Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovaé and Vukovié, IT-96-23-T
and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement (TC), 22 February 2001 [Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement], para. 542; Kunarac et al.
Appeal Judgement, paras 129-131; Update to Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special
Rapporteur, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during
armed conflict, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Cornmission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21, 6 June 2000 [Update to Final Report of
Special Rapporteur], para. 51.
lm Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 543 cited with approval by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kunarac
et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1 19
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 709, referring to Update to Final Report of Special Rapporteur pm 50
IO36 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 709, referring to the Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) - which lists sexual
slavery as a crime against humanity - delegates to the Working Group on the Elements of Crime took the view
that the word "similar" in the first element (i) of the crime should not be interpreted as referring only to
commercial character of the examples of selling, purchasing, or bartering. These delegates insisted that Footnote
18 be appended to the Article, which states "[i]t is understood that such a deprivation of liberty may, in some
circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to servile status as defined in the
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T _ 18 May 2012

3% 7-*1S
"similar deprivation of liberty" has been interpreted to cover situations in which the victims
may not have been physically confined, but were otherwise unable to leave the perpetrator's
custody as they would have nowhere else to go and feared for their lives. 1037
421. In addition to proving enslavement, the Prosecution must also prove that the Accused
caused the enslaved person to engage in an act or acts of a sexual nature. The acts of sexual
violence are the additional element that, when combined with evidence of slavery,
constitutes sexual slavery. 1038
422. The Trial Chamber notes that in this case, unlike the AFRC case and the RUF case,
"forced marriage" is not charged in the Indictment. Nevertheless, the evidence adduced by
the Prosecution under the charges related to Sexual Violence includes extensive testimony
by women and girls regarding forced conjugal association to which they were subjected. In
the absence of the charge of "forced marriage", the Trial Chamber has considered this
evidence with regard to the charges in the Indictment, as well as the past jurisprudence of
the SCSL with regard to this issue.
423. The Trial Chamber notes that the review of this issue by the Court has been
hampered by the erroneous pleadings of the Prosecution with regard to various forms of
sexual violence. The Trial Chamber recalls that in the AFRC case it was faced with a
procedural challenge raised by the failure of the Prosecution to distinguish between the
crime of sexual violence and the crime of sexual slavery. Count 7 of the Indictment in that
case, sexual slavery, was dismissed as duplicitous. Justice Doherty opined that the count
need not have been dismissed in its entirety. Justice Sebutinde expressed the view that the
defect in the indictment could be cured by an amendment dividing the offences into separate
to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in
persons, in particular women and children". Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Elements of
Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii), footnote 18.; Commentary documented by Eve La Haye, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) — 2 —
Sexual Slavery, in Roy S. Lee, Ed., The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (2001: Transnational Publishers, Ardsley) at p. 191.
103 7 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 161, AF RC Trial Judgement, para. 709 referring to a distinction also insisted
upon by some delegations to the Rome Statute Working Group on Elements of Crimes to ensure that the
provision did not exclude situations in which sexually abused women were not locked in a particular place but
were nevertheless "deprived of their libertf because they had nowhere else to go and feared for their lives,
Commentary documented by Eve La Haye, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) —— 2 — Sexual Slavery, in Roy S. Lee, Ed., The
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2001: Transnational
Publishers, Ardsley) pp. 191-192
1038 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 162

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2%:>.UJ<>
counts. ln its Judgement in the AFRC case, the Trial Chamber noted that the Prosecution
had not availed itself of Justice Sebutinde's suggested remedy. 1039
424. ln the Trial Chamber's view, the Prosecution erred in other lndictments by charging
"forced marriage" as a crime that falls within the scope of the crime against humanity of
other inhumane acts. Because it was charged in this manner, the Trial Chamber was
required to review the charge in this manner. ln her dissent in the AF RC Judgement, Justice
Doherty observed, "the abduction of girls and their coercion into marital unions, as
described by the Prosecution expert and by witnesses, is not the same nor comparable to
arranged or traditional marriages".lO4O She defined the crucial element of "forced marriage"
to be "the imposition, by threat or physical force arising from the perpetrator's words or
other conduct, of a forced conjugal association by the perpetrator over the victim".lO4l
Similarly Justice Sebutinde, in her concurrence in the AFRC Judgement, described this
phenomenon as "the forceful abduction and holding in captivity of women and girls (‘bush
wives’) against their will, for purposes of sexual gratification of their ‘bush husbands’ and
for gender-specific forms of labour including cooking cleaning, washing clothes (conjugal
duties)".lO42 The Trial Chamber considers, as expressed by both Justice Doherty and Justice
Sebutinde in the AFRC case, that the sexual and non-sexual acts involved in this forced
conjugal association carmot be considered separately as they are integrated in this form of
abuse.
425. The Trial Chamber considers that, in the absence of a charge of "forced marriage",
the evidence adduced by the witnesses of forced conjugal association can be considered
afresh with their testimony as a starting point. ln the Trial Chamber's view the term "forced
marriage" is a misnomer for the forced conjugal association that was imposed on women
and girls in the circumstances of armed conflict, and which involved both sexual slavery and
forced labour in the form of domestic work such as cooking and cleaning.
426. The Trial Chamber notes that in the absence of any specific charge relating to forced
conjugal association, which was extensively testified to in this case, the elements of sexual
slavery are satisfied, that is the deprivation of liberty and the imposition of non-consensual
Hm AFRC Trial Judgement, para 93.
1040 AFRC Trial Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty, para. 36.
WH Para. 53
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, Corrcurring Opinion of Justice Sebutinde, para 12.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T Ok}: / 18 May 2012

3sex. The Appeals Chamber decision in the AFRC case noted other elements that go beyond
sexual slavery as the basis for its decision, namely the "forced conjugal association with
another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of
the victim" and "a relationship of exclusivity between the ‘husband’ and ‘wife."’m43 The
Trial Chamber does not consider the nomenclature of "marriage" to be helpful in describing
what happened to the victims of this forced conjugal association and finds it inappropriate to
refer to their perpetrators as "husbands".
427. What happened to the girls and women abducted in Sierra Leone and forced into this
conjugal association was not marriage in the universally understood sense of a consensual
and sacrosanct union, and should rather, in the Trial Chamber's view, be considered a
conjugal form of enslavement. While noting that all forms of forced marriage violate human
rights under international law, the abuses perpetrated on women and girls in this context is
clearly criminal in nature, and of sufficient gravity as to constitute a crime against humanity.
lt constitutes a form of enslavement in that the perpetrator exercised the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over their "bush wives" and imposed on them a deprivation of liberty,
_ causing them to engage in sexual acts as well as other acts. The Trial Chamber notes that
conjugal relations involve both sexual and non-sexual acts. All of these forced acts, both
sexual and non-sexual acts, fall within the definition of enslavement in the view of the Trial
Chamber. As noted by the Appeals Chamber, "bush wives" were "coerced to perfomi a
variety of conjugal duties including regular sexual intercourse, forced domestic labour such
as cleaning and cooking for the ‘husband,’ endure forced pregnancy, and to care for and
bring up children of the ‘marriage."’lO44
428. With respect to the powers of ownership, the Trial Chamber notes that there is no
differentiation between the forced sexual and non-sexual acts described, and the Appeals
Chamber did not express the view that these acts did not constitute enslavement, but merely
that they were not limited to sexual forms of slavery. The Trial Chamber is of the view that
the conjugal slavery best describes these acts, and while they may constitute more than
sexual slavery, they nevertheless satisfy the elements of sexual slavery.
Hm AFRC Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 195.
IOM APRC Appeals Judgement, para. 190.

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Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T / UL 18 May 2012

as 24+%
429. The Trial Chamber considers that part of the confusion created by the Prosecution's
charge of "forced marriage" was its presentation as the conceptualization of a new crime. In
light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber considers that conjugal slavery is better
conceptualized as a distinctive form of the crime of sexual slavery, with the additional
component described by the Appeals Chamber. However, the Trial Chamber is of the view
that this additional component, which relates to forced conjugal labour, is simply a
descriptive component of a distinctive form of sexual slavery. lt is not a detinitional
element of a new crime, in the same way that gang rape is a distinctive form of rape, yet
nevertheless falls within the scope of the crime of rape.
430. The Trial Chamber considers that unlike the concept of "forced marriage", as it was
presented by the Prosecution in the AFRC and other cases before this Court, conjugal
slavery is not a new crime with additional elements. Rather it is a practice with certain
additional and distinctive features that relate to the conjugal aspects of the relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim, such as the claim by the perpetrator to a particular
victim as his "wife" and the exercise of exclusive sexual control over her, barring others
from sexual access to the victim, as well as the compulsion of the victim to perform
domestic work such as cooking and cleaning. ln the Trial Chamber's view, these are not new
elements that require the conceptualization of a new crime.
(c) Count 6: Outrages upon Personal Digpity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault {Article 3ge) of the
statutes;
43l. ln addition to the chapeau requirements of Violations of Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol ll pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, the
following speciiiic elements of the crime of outrages upon personal dignity must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt:
i. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the personal dignity
of the victim;
ii. The humiliation, degradation or other violation was so serious as to be generally
considered as an outrage upon personal dignity;

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T y A M 18 May 2012 M
(

2.a¤—‘+°1
iii. The perpetrator intentionally committed or participated in an act or omission
which would be generally considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation
or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity; and
iv. I The perpetrator knew that the act or omission could have such an effect. 1045
432. The Trial Chamber considers that sexual slavery, including the abduction of women
and girls as "bush wives", a conjugal form of sexual slavery, is humiliating and degrading to
its victims and constitutes a serious attack on human dignity, falling within the scope of
outrages upon personal dignity.
4. Counts 7 and 8: Crimes Relating to Physical Violence {Articles 3ga) and 2gi) of the
Statute)
433. In Count 7, the Accused is charged with violence to life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons, in particular, cruel treatment, a violation of Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II, punishable under Article 3(a) of the Statr1te.l04° In addition, or in
the alternative, Count 8 charges the Accused with other inhumane acts, a crime against
humanity, punishable under Article 2(i) of the Statute. 1047
(a) Count 7 — Violence to Life, Health and Physical or Mental Well-Being of Persons, in
particular Cruel Treatment (Article 3(a) of the Statutei
434. In addition to the chapeau requirements of Violations of Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, the
following specific elements of the offence of cruel treatment must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt:
1045 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 716; see also Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 161, 163; Rome
Statute, Elements of the Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xxi). ’
1046 Indictment, paras 18-21. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was a part of customary
intemational law at the time of its alleged commission. CDF Appeal Decision on Nature of Armed Conflict,
para. 24; CDF Trial Judgement, para. 154; Tadié Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 66-73; Karemera Decision on
Count Seven of the Amended Indictment, paras 5-10; See also Vasiljevié Trial Judgement, para.l95, where in
analyzing the offence of violence to life and person, the Trial Chamber recognized that it is a breach of
customary international law when the underlying act is murder, cruel treatment and torture.
1047 Indictment, paras 18-21. The Trial Chamber is satished that this crime was a part of customary
international law at the time of its alleged commission. See AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 198, referring to
Prosecutor v. Stakié, 1T-97-24-A, Judgement (AC), 22 March 2006 [Stakié Appeal Judgement], para. 315 and
Blagojevié and Jokié Trial Judgement, para. 624. See also AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 697 and RUF Trial
Judgement, para. 165.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2% mb 18 May 2012

320.51
i. The act or omission of the perpetrator caused serious physical or mental
suffering or injury or constituted a serious attack on human dignity;
ii. The perpetrator intended to cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury
or a serious attack on human dignity or acted in the reasonable knowledge that
this was likely to occur. 1048
435. The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution has provided a definition of mutilation
in its final trial brief which adopts and slightly modifies the definition provided in the
AFRC Trial Judgement.1449 However, Count 10 of the AFRC Indictment charged "violence
to life, health and physical or mental well—being of persons, in particular mutilation",1O5O
whereas Count 7 of the Indictment in this case charges only "cruel treatment". The Trial
Chamber therefore finds that a specific definition of mutilation is not required, but notes that
cruel treatment may encompass acts of mutilation, if such acts satisfy the requirements set
out above.
(b) Count 8 — Other Inhumane Acts (Article 2] i] of the Statute)
436. In addition to the chapeau requirements of Crimes against Humanity pursuant to
Article 2 of the Statute, the following specific elements of the crime of other inhumane acts
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
i. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health, by means of an inhumane act;
ii. The act was of a gravity similar to the acts referred to in Article 2(a) to (h) of the
Statute; and
1048 CDF Trial Judgement, para. 156; Celibiéi Appeal Judgement, para. 424; Celibiéi Trial Judgement, paras
551-552; Prosecutor v. Krstié, IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001 [Krstié Trial Judgement], para. 516;
Prosecutor v. Lukié and Lukié, IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement (TC), 20 July 2009 [Lukié and Lukié Trial Judgement],
para. 957; Prosecutor v. Blaskié, IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, [Blaskic Trial Judgement], para.
186; Prosecutor v. Jelisié, IT-95-10-T, Judgement (TC), 14 December 1999 [Jelisic Trial Judgement], para. 41.
1049 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 947, referring to AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 724. The Prosecution,
however, submits that a modification of the mental elements should be adopted, such that the Prosecution should
be required to prove "either that the perpetrator intended to subject the victim to mutilation, or that the
perpetrator acted in the reasonable knowledge that mutilation was likely to occur". See Prosecution Final Trial
Brief para. 948.
1050 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Consolidated Amended Indictment, 18
February 2005.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dk 18 May 2012

3%Q.S` 1
iii. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the
character of the avit of the act.1051
sr Y
437. With regard to particular acts of physical violence, the seriousness of a particular act
or omission and the sufficiency of its gravity must be examined on a case-by-case basis.1052
5. Count 9: Crimes Relating to Child Soldiers (Article 4(c) of the Statute]
438. In Count 9, the Indictment charges that "[b]etween about 30 November 1996 and
about 18 January 2002, throughout the Republic of Sierra Leone, members of RUF, AFRC,
AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in
concert with, under the direction and/or control of, and/or subordinate to the Accused,
routinely conscripted, enlisted and/or used boys and girls under the age of 15 to participate
in active hostilities". The Accused is thus charged with conscripting or enlisting children
under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively
in hostilities ("conscripting, enlisting or using child soldiers"), an ‘other serious violation of
international humanitarian law’, punishable under Article 4(c) of the Statute.1053
439. In addition to the chapeau requirements of other serious violations of international
humanitarian law pursuant to Article 4 of the Statute, the following elements of the crime of
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or
using children under the age of 15 years to actively participate in hostilities must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt:
11151 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 698. See also Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes, Article 7(l)(k);
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement (AC), 12 June 2002 [Kordic
and Cerkez Appeal Judgement], para. 117; Vasiljevic Appeal Judgement, para. 165; D. Milosevic Trial
Judgement, para. 934; Prosecutor v. Martic, IT-95-11-T, Judgement (TC), I2 June 2007 [Martic Trial
Judgement], para. 83; Blagojevic and Jokic Trial Judgement, para. 626; Galic Trial Judgement, para. 152;
Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 234.
11152 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 699. I
11153 Indictment, para. 22. The Appeals Chamber has held that the offence of recruitment of child soldiers by
way of conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into an armed force or group and/or using
them to participate activitely in hostilities constitutes a crime under customary international law which entailed
individual criminal responsibility prior to the timeframe of the Indictment. CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 139;
CDF Appeal Decision on Child Recruitment, para. 53. See also AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 731; RUF Trial
Judgement, para. 184.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / OIL 18 May 2012

3i. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into an armed force
or group or used one or more persons to actively participate in hostilities;1O54
ii. Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years; 11155
iii. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or persons were
under the age of 15 years. 1056
440. The actus reus of the crime can be satisfied by ‘conscripting’ or ‘enlisting’ children
under the age of 15, or by ‘using’ them to participate actively in the hostilities.
441. ‘Conscription’ encompasses any acts of coercion, such as abductions11157 and forced
recruitment of children by an armed group with the purpose of using them to participate
actively in hostilities.1O58
1054 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 729; RUF Trial Judgement, paras 190, 193.
11155 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 729; RUF Trial Judgement, paras 190, 193. See also Rome Statute,
Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and Article 8(2)(e)(vii).
11156 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 729; RUF Trial Judgement, paras 190, 193. In setting out the elements of
the offence, the Appeals Chamber in the CDF case also included as a mental element that the accused "knew or
should have known that such person or persons [...] may be trained for or used in combat". See CDF Appeal
Judgement, para. 141; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 190. However, the only source for this additional requirement
is paragraph 46 of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson to CDF Appeal Decision on Child Recruitment,
see Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-04-14-AR72(E)-131-7413/7430, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson to
Appeals Chamber Decision on Child Recruitment, 31 May 2004 [Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson to
CDF Appeal Chamber Decision on Child Recruitment], para. 46. As a dissenting opinion, this is in and of itself
not binding on the Trial Judgement. Moreover, in the CDF Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber included
this requirement in the absence of any submissions in that regard by the parties and did not explicitly discuss
why it had included this requirement, beyond citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Robertson. Therefore, the
Trial Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber's inclusion of this requirement in its discussion of conscription
and enlistment is obiter dicta. The Trial Chamber finds that element is not included in the ICC Statute or ICC
‘Elements of the Crimes’ in relation to these offences, and has no other support in international criminal law. See
ICC Elements of Crimes, 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii); ICC Statute, Article 2(b)(xxvi) and Article 2(e)(vii).
Moreover, it is evident from the Statutes of the SCSL and ICC, as well as from the relevant provisions of the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, that the prohibition against conscripting and enlisting children
in armed forces is absolute and not dependant on the purpose behind the conscription or enlistment. The
rationale behind these provisions, as contemplated by the ICC, is to keep children under the age of 15 years away
from armed conflicts to ensure their safety. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007 [Lubanga Confirmation of Charges Decision], para.
260, referring to ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, Geneva, Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman (eds), 1986, p. 925, para. 3187. The Trial
Chamber therefore concludes that this additional requirement should not be included in the elements of the
crimes of conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years.
11157 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court para. 18: "While the
defmition of the crime as ‘conscripting’ or ‘enlisting’ connotes an administrative act of putting one's name on a
list and formal entry into the armed forces, the elements of the crime under the proposed Statute of the Special
Court are: (a) abduction, which in the case of children of Sierra Leone was the original crime and is in itself a
crime under common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; [...]". This proposal was however rejected by the
Security Council.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J OA 18 May 2012
\

_§%:z.S3.
442. ‘Enlistment’ entails accepting and enrolling individuals when they volunteer to join
an armed force or group. [059 Enlistment need not be a formal process, and may include "any
conduct accepting the child as part of the [armed group]. Such conduct would include
making him participate in combat operations".m°O Conscription and enlistment are both
types of recruitment,m6l and while conscription involves an element of express
compulsionm`2 or coercion, this element is absent in enlistment.m°3
443. The crime of enlisting or conscripting "is an offence of a continuing character —
referred to by some courts as a continuous crime and by others as a permanent crime".m°4
The crime of conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 continues to be
committed as long as a child remains in the armed force or group and consequently ceases to
be committed when the child leaves the armed group or reaches the age of 15 years. [065
444. ‘Using’ children to participate actively in the hostilities encompasses putting their
lives directly at risk in combat,m6° but may also include participation in activities linked to
combat such carrying loads for the fighting faction, finding and/or acquiring food,
ammunition or equipment, acting as decoys, carrying messages, making trails or finding
routes, manning checkpoints or acting as human shields.lO67 Whether a child is actively
participating in hostilities in such situations will be assessed on a case-by—case basis.
1058 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 734.
1059 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 140, quoting AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 735. See also Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Robertson to CDF Appeal Chamber Decision on Child Recruitment, para. 5. See also
Lubanga Confirmation of Charges Decision. para. 247.
1060 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 144.
1061 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 184.
1062 Compulsion would include conscription through constitutional or legislative powers in the context of
otherwise lawful governments. See RUF Trial Judgement, para. 186.
1063 CDF Appeal Judgement. para. 140; AFRC Trial Judgement, paras 734-735. This distinction has also been
adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court. See Lubanga Decision on Confirmation
of Charges, paras’246—247.
·m°4 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, para. 248.
1065 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, para. 248. See also AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 39.
1066 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 736, referring to Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson to CDF Appeal
Chamber Decision on Child Recruitment, para. 5.
1067 AF RC Trial Judgement, para. 737. See also Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1, 14 April 1998, p. 21 at footnote 12.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T qik 18 May 2012 m

zziga
6. Count 10: Abductions and Forced Labour {Article 2 {C) of the Statute;
445. The Accused is charged under Count 10 with enslavement, a crime against humanity,
punishable under Article 2(c) of the Statute.[O68
446. In addition to the chapeau requirements of Crimes against Humanity pursuant to
Article 2 of the Statute, the following specific elements of the crime of enslavement must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt:
i. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or
bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation
of liberty;
ii. The perpetrator exercised these powers intentionally. [069
447. Indicia of enslavement include "control of someone's movement, control of physical
environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat
of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and
abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour". [070 "Lac1< of consent" is not an element of the
crime of enslavement, but may be relevant from an evidentiary perspective.[07[ There is no
requisite duration of the relationship between the Accused and the victim which must exist
in order to establish enslavement, but duration may be relevant in determining the quality of
the relationship. [072
[068 Indictment, paras 23-27. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was a part of customary
international law at the time of its alleged commission. See AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 743; RUF Trial
Judgement, para. 196; Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, paras 519-537, 539; Kunarac et al Appeal Judgement,
para. 129.
[069 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 749. See also Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 350; Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Einalised Draft Text for the Elements of the
Crimes, New-York, 13-31 March 2000/12-30 June 2000 [ICC Elements of the Crimes], p. 10, noting that "[i]t is
understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or
otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956".
[070 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 543, cited with approval by the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac et al.
Appeal Judgement, para. 119. See also AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 745.
[Om AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 746, referring to Kunarac er al. Appeal Judgement, para. 120.
[072 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 200, referring to Kunamc et. al. Appeal Judgement, para. 121.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // GA 18 May 2012

35159
448. In order to establish forced labour as enslavement, the relevant consideration is
whether "the relevant persons had no choice as to whether they would work",lO73 which is a
factual detennination that must be made in light of the indicia of enslavement identified.
However, the subjective belief of labourers that they were forced to work is not sufficient to
establish forced labour, but must be supported by objective evidence. Hm
449. The Prosecution submits that in relation to the mental elements for this offence, it
must be established that the perpetrator "either intended enslavement or acted in the
reasonable knowledge that it was likely to occur", as this approach would be consistent with
the mental elements of other crimes in the Statute, the approach of Trial Chamber I, and the
ICC Statute}075
450. However, the Trial Chamber notes that this requirement is not supported by the
AFRC Trial Judgement, which was not overturned on appeal on this point, nor by the
jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY.lO76 Such an expansion of the mental
elements requirement/mens rea is unwarranted, as it is difficult to envisage what the
requirement of "acting in the reasonable knowledge that enslavement was likely to occur"
would entail in the context of enslavement where the actus reus requires exercising the
powers of` ownership.
7. Count ll: Pillage (Article 3gf] of the Statute]
451. The Accused is charged under Count ll with pillage, a violation of Additional
Protocol II, punishable under Article 3(f) of the Statute. Nm
452. In addition to the chapeau requirements of Violations of Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, the
following specific elements of the crime of pillage must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
1073 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 202, citing Krnojclac Trial Judgement, para. 359. See also Prosecutor v.
Krrzojelac, IT-97-25-A, Judgement (AC), 17 September 2003 [Krnojelac Appeal Judgement], paras 194-195.
1074 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 202, referring to Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 195.
_ 1075 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1064.
1076 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 749; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 122.
W7 Indictment, paras 28-31. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this crime was a part of customary
international law at the time of its alleged commission. See AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 751: Prosecutor v.
Kordié and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement (TC), 26 February 2001 [Kordié and Cer/cez Trial Judgement],
paras 351-353 (see also Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 77).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % fm 18 May 2012

Zan; 2-
i. The perpetrator appropriated property;
ii. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner;
iii. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property. 1078
453. Article 3(f) of the Statute contains a general prohibition against pillage which covers
both organised or systematic appropriation and the isolated acts of individuals,11)79 and
extends to all types of property, including both public and private property. 1080
C. Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility
1. Responsibility Pursuant to Article 6g 1 [ of the Statute
454. Article 6(l) of the Statute provides:
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Aiticles 2 to 4 of the present
Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.
455. The lndictment cumulatively charges the Accused with the crimes in Counts 1
through ll under different modes of liability. lt further charges that "the Accused, by his
acts or omissions, is individually criminally responsible pursuant to Article 6(l) of the
Statute for the crimes referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute, as alleged in the
Second Amended lndictment, which crimes the Accused planned, instigated, ordered,
committed, or in whose planning, preparation or execution the Accused otherwise aided and
abetted, or which crimes amounted to or were involved within a common plan, design or
purpose in which the Accused participated, or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
such common plan, design or purpose".1O81
(a) Committing
456. The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution does not allege that the Accused
physically or directly committed any charged crime as a principal perpetrator. 1082
1078 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 755. See also Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 79 and 84.
1079 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 754; Celibiéi Trial Judgement, para. 590.
11180 Celibiéi Trial Judgement, para. 590.
1081 Indictment, para. 33.
11182 See Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 48.

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gglg}
(b) Committing through Participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise
457. The Indictment charges the Accused with the basic ("within") and extended
("foreseeable") forms of J CE}083 The following common elements have to be established:
i. A plurality of persons;
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or
involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute;
iii. Participation of the accused in the common plan, design or purpose. mm
458. The principle that an individual may be held responsible based on participation in a
joint criminal enterprise is established in customary international law. M5
459. The plurality of persons need not be "organised in a military, political or
administrative stmcture"l086 but it needs to be demonstrated that the plurality of persons
acted in concert with each other. While the plurality of persons must be identified, it is not
necessary to identify by name each of the persons involved, and depending on the
circumstances of the case, it can be sufficient to refer to categories or groups of persons. 1087
460. With respect to the requirement of the existence of a common purpose, the Appeals
Chamber has held that "the requirement that the common plan, design or purpose of a joint
criminal enterprise is inherently criminal means that it must either have as its objective a
crime within the Statute, or contemplate crimes within the Statute as the means of achieving
mg} Indictment, para. 33.
lm Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24198; Taylor Decision on Pleading of JCE in Indictment,
para. 67; Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 227.
{OSS RUF Trial Judgement, para. 253; Tadic Appeal Judgement, paras. 220, 226; Prosecutor v. Milutinovié,
Sainovié and Ojdanic, lT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanié's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003 [Ojdanié Appeal Decision on JCE], para. 29.
lm Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 227; Stakié Appeal Judgement, para. 64; Prosecutor v. Dordevié, IT-05-
87/1-T, Judgement (TC), 23 February 2011 [Dordevié Trial Judgement], para.l86l.
IW Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, IT-00-39-A, Judgement (AC), 17 March 2009 [Kmlmk Appeal Judgement], para.
156; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, IT-03-66-A, Judgement (AC), 27 September 2007 [Limaj Appeal
Judgement], para. 99; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgement (AC), 3 April 2007 [B"k""" Appeal
Judgement], para. 430.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T KT 18 May 2012
wm

Eszss
its objective".lO88 The plan need not have been previously arranged or formulated, but may 1
materialize contemporaneously and be inferred from the facts. [089
461. The Accused's participation in the common plan need not involve the commission of
a specific crime, but may take the form of assistance in or contribution to the common
pl3n‘lO9O
462. The Prosecution submits that the "law may or may not require that the Accused's
contribution be significant", referring to ICTY jurisprudence as authority for the position
that the contribution need not be significant.lO9l The Defence, on the other hand, submits
that the contribution must have "substantially assisted or significantly affected" the
enterprise's goals, and that the Accused's participation must be "indispensable for the
achievement of the final result". Hm
463. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that contrary to the parties’ submissions, it is
established law that it is not required that the Accused's participation in the common plan is
necessar or substantial, but he must have made at least a "si ificant" contribution to the
Y gn
common purpose. IOQ3
464. It is also possible for an Accused to withdraw from the joint criminal enterprise after
which point, he will not bear responsibility for the acts of the other members of the
lm AFRC Appeal Judgement, paras 76, 80. See also Taylor Appeal Decision on Pleading of JCE in
Indictment, para. 25; RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 296.
1089 Krajisnjk Appeal Judgement, para. 184; Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 227.
1090 Krajisnik Appeal Judgement, para. 215; Kvocka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 99.
[091 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 581, referring to Kvocka et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 97, 421, and
the Krajisnik Appeal Judgement, para. 680. However, the Prosecution submits that in any event, Taylor's
participation reaches the threshold of "significant".
1092 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 147; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01, Transcript 11 March 2011, pp.
49580, 49594-49595, where the Defence submits that the contribution must be "substantial".
[093 RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 401; Brdanin Appeal Judgement, para. 430; Krajisnik Appeal Judgement,
para. 215. See also RUF Trial Judgement, para. 261. The Trial Chamber notes that, contrary to the Prosecution's
submission, the Krajisnik Appeals Judgement does not provide support, at paragraph 680 for the proposition that
the contribution need not be significant, and specifically states, both in that paragraph and in paragraph 215 that
the contribution must be at least significant. Moreover, in Kvocka, the Appeals Chamber arguably takes the
position not that the threshold for the Accused's contribution is lower than "significar1t" but that in fact it is
higher, and must be "substantial". However, the Trial Chamber notes that this has been superseded by the more
recent Brdjanin and Krajisnik Appeals Judgements, in which the Appeals Chamber has held that the contribution
need not be substantial, but must be at least significant. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence does Hot
provide any authorities in support of its position that the contribution must be substantial, and has cited only a
textbook, but no jurisprudence, in support of its submission that the Accused's participation should be
"indispensable for the achievement of the final result". See Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 147, citing Antonio
Cassesse, International Criminal Law, p. 183 (Oxford University Press, 2003).

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.3%2Sq
ou .1094 The identit of the other erson or ersons makin u the luralit ma chan e
sr P Y P P g P P Y Y g
over the course of the existence of the joint criminal enterprise as participants enter or
withdraw from it.IO95 The principal perpetrator need not be a member of the joint criminal
enterprise, but may be used as a tool by one of the members of the joint criminal
enterprise. 'O96
465. The following mental elements are required for the first form of J CE in order for the
Accused to be held liable for crimes falling within the common purpose of the J CE:
i. The Accused intended to commit the crime or underlying offence, and this intent
must be shared with the other members of the joint criminal enterprise. I097
466. The following mental elements are required for the third fomi of JCE, in order for
the Accused to be held liable for a crime that falls outside of the common purpose of the
J CE, but is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the common purpose:
i. The Accused intended to take art in and contribute to the common langmqg
P P
ii. The Accused had sufficient knowledge that the additional crime might be
perpetrated by a member of the group, or a person used by a member of the
group, and willingly took the risk by continuing to participate in the common
plan 1099
467. With respect to the third fomi of J CE, the Defence submits that the Trial Chamber
should follow the approach of the Appeals Chamber of the STL and hold that there can be
IOQ4 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 262; Blagojevié and Jokié Trial Judgement, paras 700-701. See also United
States v. Greifelt et al., U.S. Military Tribunal, Judgement, 10 March 1948, in Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (1951), Vol. V, pp. 115, 140-141 [RuSHA
Case]; United States of America v. Josef Altstoetter, et al. (Case 3), U.S. Military Tribunal, October 1946 · April
1949, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10
(1951), vol. lll, [Justice Case], pp. 1083, 1086-1087
'°"5 ibid.
M6 RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 401; Krajisnik Appeal Judgement, para. 225; Brdanin Appeal Judgement,
paras 412, 430; Prosecutor v. Martié, IT-95-1 1-A, Judgement (AC), 8 October 2008 [Manic Appeal Judgement],
para. 168.
Hm Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24198; Brdanin Appeal Judgement, para. 365.
Im Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24198; see also Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 228;
Dordevié Trial Judgement, para. 1865.
IW) Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24198. See also Martié Appeal Judgement, para. 83; Kvocka
et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 83; Dordevié Trial Judgement, para. 1865.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / JQ 18 May 2012

g%').€c:O
no liability for specific intent crimes such as terrorism under the third form of JCE.IIII0 The
Prosecution did not address this issue in its submissions.
468. The Trial Chamber notes that the jurisprudence of the ICTY allows for convictions
under JCE lll for genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity even though those
crimes require specific intent.IIOI However, the Appeals Chamber of the STL has diverged
from this jurisprudence, on the basis that it results in the legal anomaly that "a person could
be convicted as a (co)perpetrator for a dolus specialis crime without possessing the requisite
dolus specialis I III2 lt held that "the better approach under international criminal law is not
to allow convictions under J CE lll for special intent crimes like terrorism", IIO3 and to
instead treat such an offender as an aider and abettor.I IO4 The Trial Chamber concurs with
the reasoning of the STL Appeals Chamber and accordingly finds that the Accused may not
be held liable under the third form of J CE for specific intent crimes such as terrorism.
(c) Planning
469. Planning consists of the following physical and mental elements: I IOS
i. The accused, alone or with others, intentionally designed an act or omission
constituting the crimes charged;I IO6
ii. With the intent that a crime or underlying offence be committed in the execution
of that design, or with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime or
underlying offence would be cormnitted in the execution of that design. I Im
IIOO Defence Response, para. 171, referring toASTL Appeal Decision, paras 248-249; Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 11 March 2011, pp. 49615-49617.
IIOI Prosecutor v. Brdanin, IT-99-36-A, Decision on lnterlocutory Appeal, 19 March 2004, paras 5-10; Stakic
J
Appeal Judgement, para. 38; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of
Acquittal, 16 June 2004 [Milosevic Decision on Motion for Acquittal], para. 291; Prosecutor v. Popovic et al.,
IT-05-88-T, Judgement(TC), 10 June 2010 [Popovic Trial Judgement], paras 1195, 1332, 1427, 1733-1735.
II02 STL Appeal Decision, para. 248.
II03 STL Appeal Decision, para. 249. 1
IIO4 STL Appeal Decision, para. 249. The Appeals Chamber clarified that the perpetrator should only be held
liable as an aider and abettor "provided of course that all other necessary conditions are met".
IIII5 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this mode of liability was a part of customary international law at the
time of the alleged commission of the crimes charged against the Accused. AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 761;
RUF Trial Judgement, para. 246; Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 669.
IIO6 Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24199. The accused need only design an "act or
omission"—and not necessarily a crime or underlying offence per se—if he has the intent that a crime or
underlying offence be committed in execution of the plan, or if he is aware of the substantial likelihood that a
crime or underlying offence will be committed. Kordic and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 31, 976.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / qw 18 May 2012

$#5:.6 (
470. While the Prosecution need not prove that the crime or underlying offence with
which the accused is charged would not have been perpetrated but for the Accused's plan,
the plan must have been a factor "substantially contributing to [...] criminal conduct
constituting one or more statutory crimes that are later perpetrated". 1 108
(d) lnstigating
471. lnstigating consists of the following physical and mental elements:1 109 V
i. The accused, through either an act or an omission, prompted another to act in a
particular way,] I 10
ii. With the intent that a crime or underlying offence be committed as a result of
such prompting, or with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime
or underlying offence would be committed as the result of such prompting.] 1 H
472. The Accused's prompting may be implicit, written or otherwise non-verbal,m2 and
does not require that the accused have "effective control" over the perpetrator or
lm Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24199. The standard of "awareness of the substantial
likelihood" was first articulated by the Appeals Chamber in Blaskié in respect of ordering under Article 7(l).
After undertaking a comparative analysis of the standards of recklessness and dolus eventualis in several national
legal systems, the Chamber held as follows:
[1]t appears that under the Trial Chamber's standard, any military commander who issues an order would be
criminally responsible, because there is always a possibility that violations could occur. The Appeals Chamber
considers that an awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element must be incorporated in the
legal standard.
Prosecutor v. Blaskié, 1T-95-14-A, Judgement (AC), 29 July 2004 [Blaskié Appeal Judgement], para. 41
(emphasis added); Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 26, 31; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para.
479; Prosecutor v. Semanza, [CTR-97-20-T, Judgement and Sentence (TC), 15 May 2003 [Semanza Trial
Judgement], para. 380 (planning "envisions one or more persons formulating a method of design or action,
procedure, or arrangement for the accomplishment of a particular crime"). See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript
4 May 2009, p. 24199.
NOS Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26.
Hog The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this mode of liability was a part of customary international law at the
time of the alleged commission of the crimes charged against the Accused. AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 761;
RUF Trial Judgement, para. 246; Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 669.
H10 The accused need only prompt another to "act in a particular way"——and not necessarily to commit a
crime or underlying offence per se—if he has the intent that a crime or underlying offence be committed in
response to such prompting, or if he is aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime or underlying offence will
be committed. Kvocka et al. Trial Judgement, para. 252.
HH AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 770, referring to Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 29, 32;
Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 269. See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24199.
lm Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 269; Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 280.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3-O1-T / 18 May 2012

3;~.<¤:>..
perpetrators.III3 The Accused's prompting may consist of a positive act, but may also be
accomplished by omission.I I I4
473. While the Accused's prompting must have been a factor "substantially contributing
to the conduct of another person committing the crime", the Prosecution need not prove that
the crime or underlying offence would not have been perpetrated but for the prompting of
the Accused. I I I5
(e) Ordering
474. Ordering consists of the following physical and mental elements: I I I6
i. The Accused intentionally instructed another to carry out an act or engage in an
omission,I I I7
ii. With the intent that a crime or underlying offence be committed in the execution
of those instructions, or with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a
crime or underlying offence would be committed in the execution of those
instructions. I I IB
475. While the Prosecution need not prove that there existed a formal superior-
subordinate relationship between the accused and perpetrator,III9 it must provide "proof of
III3 Semanza v. Prosecutor, ICTR-97-20-A, Judgement (AC), 20 May 2005 [Semanza Appeal Judgement],
para. 257. In order to have "effective control", the perpetrator must have the material ability to prevent and/or
punish the commission of the instigated crimes or underlying offences. Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 197.
III4 Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 269; Galié Trial Judgement, para. l68.
III5 Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 480; Kvocka et
al. Trial Judgement, para. 252 (holding that it must be shown that "the conduct of the accused was a clear
contributing factor to the conduct of the other person(s)"); Kordié and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 387
(holding that "the contribution of the accused [must have] in fact had an effect on the commission of the crime");
Tadié Trial Judgement, para. 674 (holding that "the prosecution must prove that there was participation in that
the conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of the illegal act").
III6 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this mode of liability was a part of customary international law at the
time of the alleged commission of the crimes charged against the Accused. AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 761;
RUF Trial Judgement, para. 246; Tadié Trial Judgement, para. 669.
III7 The accused need only instruct another to carry out an act or engage in an omission——and not necessarily
a crime or underlying offence per se——if he has the intent that a crime or underlying offence be committed in the
execution of the order, or if he is aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime or underlying offence will be
committed. Milutinovié et al. Trial Judgement, footnote 94.
III8 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 773, referring to Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 28, 30;
Martié Appeal Judgement, paras 22l-222. See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24200.
IIIQ AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 772, referring to Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 28; Semanza
Appeal Judgement, para. 361, See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24200.

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Case No.: SCSL-03—01~T / M 18 May 2012 a

2,<;,1é>'$
some osition of authorit on the art of the Accused that would com el another to commit
P Y P P
a crime in following the Accused's order".H2O Such authority may be informal and of a
temporary nature,l I2] and consequently, the order issued by the Accused need not be legally
binding upon the physical perpetrator or intermediary perpetrator.
476. The order need not take any particular form.l U2 However, ordering requires a
positive act and cannot be committed by omissionlm Because the ICTY Appeals Chamber
held that the Accused need merely "instmct another person to commit an offence",l U4 it is
clear that liabilit for orderin ma ensue where the Accused issues, asses down, or
Y 8 Y P
otherwise transmits the order, and that he need not use his position of authority to
"convince" the perpetrator to commit the crime or underlying offence.H25 Furthermore, the
Accused need not give the order directly to the physical perpetrator,l U6 and an intermediary
lower in the chain of command who passes the order on to the perpetrator may also be held
res onsible for orderin the underl in offence as lon as he has the re uisite state of
P 8 Y 8 8 fl
mma? 127
477. While the issuance of the order must have been a factor substantially contributing to
the physical perpetration of a crime or underlying offence,H28 the Prosecution need not
prove that the crime or underlying offence would not have been perpetrated but for the
Accused's order.H29
478. The Defence submits that while Trial Chambers in the AFRC, RUF and CDF cases
have held that the Accused's position of authority can be inferred or implied, these legal
findings are based on a misreading of the cited authorities, which instead provide only that
H20 Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 361. See also Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 28,
lm Semanza Appeal Judgement, paras 363, 364 (finding that the accused—a civilian mayor with no formal
position in the Rwandan military hierarchy—had the necessary authority over Interahamwe fighters to render
him liable for ordering them to kill Tutsis at Musha church, and that the Trial Chamber had erred in not
convicting him under this form of responsibility). See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24200.
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 772, referring to Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 281; Prosecutor v. Strngar,
lT—01—42—T, Judgement (TC), 31 January 2005 [Strugar Trial Judgement], para. 331.
lm Galié Appeal Judgement, para. 176.
lm Kordic and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 28.
M25 Milutinovié et al. Trial Judgement, para. 86.
M6 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 772, referring to Blaskié Trial Judgement, para. 282; Kordié and Cerkez
Trial Judgement, para. 388.
lm Prosecutor v. Kupreskié, Kupreskié, Kupreskié, Josipovié, Papié and Santié, lT—95—16—T, Judgement
(TC), 14 January 2000 [Kupreskié et al. Trial Judgement], paras 827, 862.
lm Strugar Trial Judgement, para, 332; Galié Trial Judgement, para. 169; Tadié Trial Judgement, para. 674.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 4 18 May 2012 w

3%’·b`+
the existence of an order may be proved through circumstantial evidence.ll3O Further, it
argues that the Appeals Chamber in the RUF case failed to make any distinction between an
inference of authority and an inference of an order in finding that "ordering can be
established by direct or circumstantial evidence". I 13 I
479. The Defence therefore submits that while the existence of an order may be proved
through circumstantial evidence, where this is the only reasonable inference, the Prosecution
must furnish direct evidence establishing that, at the material time, the Accused held the
required position of authoritylm lt submits that, even if the Trial Chamber finds that
circumstantial evidence can establish the Accused's position of authority, it should "in the
interests of justice demand independent evidence proving the separate elements of the actus
reus of ordering".lm lt submits that the Trial Chamber should not follow recent
jurisprudence which "compounds the elements to the extent that the existence of an
Accused's position of authority has been derived from evidence that the Accused issued
orders". 1 134
480. ln Section 1V(2), "Considerations Regarding the Evaluation of Evidence", the Trial
Chamber holds that it is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence in cases in which the
only reasonable inference to be drawn from such evidence leads to proof of the guilt of the
Accusedlm Moreover, the Trial Chamber finds that the Appeals Chamber's statement that
"ordering can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence" implies that each element
of the actus reus of ordering can be proved by means of either type of evidence.
481. The Trial Chamber finds accordingly that, as with all other elements of crimes or
modes of liability, the authority of the Accused may be proved by either direct or
circumstantial evidence. The Trial Chamber further finds that evidence that the Accused has
issued orders may be considered as circumstantial evidence that, inter alia, establishes that
the Accused was in a position of authority.
Im Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 332.
1130 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 127, referring to AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 772; CDF Trial
Judgement, para. 225; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 273.
IU I Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 128, referring to RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 164.
Im Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 127.
Im Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 129.
Im Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 130.
1135 Evaluation of Evidence: Law Applicable to the Assessment of Evidence.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / QW 18 May 2012 M

3%:>.é¤S'
(f) Aiding and abetting
482. Aiding and abetting consists of the following physical elements: I I36
i. The Accused rovided ractical assistance, encoura ement, or moral su ort to
P P S PP
the perpetration of a crime or underlying offenceI I37 and
ii. Such practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support had a substantial
effect upon the commission of a crime or underlying offence. I I38
483. An Accused may aid and abet not only by means of positive action, but also through
omission. I I39
484. The Accused may aid and abet at one or more of the "planning, preparation or
execution" stages of the crime or underlying offence. I MO The lending of practical assistance,
encoura ement, or moral su ort ma occur before, durin , or after the crime or underl in
S PP Y S Y S
offence occurs. I I4I The actus reus of aiding and abetting does not require "specific
direction".II42 No evidence of a plan or agreement between the aider and abettor and the
perpetrator is required,I I43 except in cases of ex post facto aiding and abetting where "at the
time of the planning, preparation or execution of the crime, a prior agreement exists between
II3° The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this mode of liability was a part of customary international law at the
time of the alleged commission of the crimes charged against the Accused. AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 761;
RUF Trial Judgement, para. 246; Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 669.
Im AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 775, citing Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Prosecutor v. Perisié, lT—
04-08-T, Judgement (TC), 6 September 201 1 [Perisié Trial Judgement], para. 126; Vasiljevic Appeal Judgement,
para. 102. See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24200. Aiding and abetting actually constitute
two discrete activities. "Aiding" consists of giving practical assistance to the physical perpetrator or intermediary
perpetrator, and "abetting" consists of "facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto"—in
other words, giving encouragement or moral support to the physical perpetrator or intermediary perpetrator.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR—96-4—T, Judgement (TC), September 1998 [Akayesu Trial Judgement], para. 484.
See also Kvoéka et al. Trial Judgement, para. 254; Blaskié Trial Judgement, para. 284 footnote 510.
II38 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 775, citing Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 46; Perisié Trial Judgement,
para.l26; Vasiljevié Appeal Judgement, para. 102. See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24200.
II39 Prosecutor v. Mrksié, IT—95—l3/1-A, Judgement (AC), 5 May 2009 [Mrksié Appeal Judgement], para.
135; Nahjmana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 482.
IMO AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 775, citing Blaskié Appeal Judgement, paras 45, 48.
IILII RUF Trial Judgement, para. 278. See also Prosecutor v. Blagojevié and Jokié, lT—02—60—A, Judgement-
(AC), 9 May 2007 [Blagojevié and Jokié Appeal Judgement], para. 127; Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
II42 Perisié Trial Judgement, para. 126, citing Mrksié Appeal Judgement, para. 159.
II43 Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 229; Brdanin Appeal Judgement, para. 263; Prosecutor v. Simié, IT—95—9—
T, Judgement (TC), 17 October 2003 [Simié et al. Trial Judgement], para. 162.

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Bgneb
the principal and the person who subsequently aids and abets the commission of the
Cum 8,,.1144
485. Although the practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support provided by the
Accused must have a substantial effect upon the commission of the crime or underlying
offence,l M5 the Prosecution need not prove that the crime or underlying offence would not
have been perpetrated but for the Accused's contribution. I 146
486. The mental elements of aiding and abetting require that:
i. The Accused performed an act with the knowledge that such act would assist the
commission of a crime or underlying offence, or that he was aware of the
substantial likelihood that his acts would assist the commission of underlying
offencegl M7 and
ii. The Accused is aware of` the essential elements of the crime committed by the
principal offender, including the state of mind of the principal offender. I M8
487. Although the lending of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support must
itself be intentional, the intent to commit the crime or underlying offence is not required.l M9
Instead, the Accused must have knowledge that his acts or omissions assist the perpetrator in
the commission of the crime or underlying offence.ll5O Such knowledge may be inferred
from the circumstanceslm The Accused must be aware, at a minimum, of the essential
elements of the substantive crime or underlying offence for which he is charged with
lm Blagojevié andJokié Trial Judgement, para. 731.
M45 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 52; Kvoéka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 90; Blaskié Appeal Judgement,
para. 46; Prosecutor v. Naletilié and Martinovic, lT—98—34—T, Judgement (TC), 31 March 2003 [Naletilié and
Martinovié Trial Judgement], paras 63, 507.
mb Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 48; Prosecutor v. Simié, IT—95—9—A, Judgement (AC), 28 November
2006 [Simié etal. Appeal Judgement], para. 85.
lm RUF Appeal Judgement, para. 546; Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Vasiljevié Appeal Judgement,
para. 102; Perisié Trial Judgement, para. 129. See also Rule 98 Decision, Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24200.
mg Blagojevié and Jokié Appeal Judgement, para. 221; Perisié Trial Judgement, para. 129.
M9 See Kunarac et al., Trial Judgement, para. 392. See also Prosecutor v. Krstié, 1T—98—33—A, Judgement
(AC), Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 19 April 2004 [Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen], para. 66: Intent must always be proved, but the intent of the perpetrator of genocide is not the
same as the intent of the aider and abettor. The perpetrator's intent is to commit genocide. The intent of the
aider and abettor is not to commit genocide; his intent is to provide the means by which the perpetrator, if he
wishes, can realise his own intent to commit genocide.
USO Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Vasiljevié Appeal Judgement, para. 102.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T g Cu 18 May 2012
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3 % ze?
responsibility as an aider and abettor.1152 The requirement that the aider and abettor need
merely know of the perpetrator's intent — and need not share it ~ applies equally to
specific—intent crimes or underlying offences such as persecution as a crime against
humanity. 1 153
2. Responsibility Pursuant to Article 6g 3) of the Statute
488. Article 6(3) of the Statute provides:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate
does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 1
489. ln addition, or alternatively, pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute, the lndictment
charges that "the Accused, while holding positions of superior responsibility and exercising
command and control over subordinate members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or
alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, is individually criminally responsible for the crimes
referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the [Second Amended lndictment]". It alleges that "the
Accused is responsible for the criminal acts of his subordinates in that he knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
Accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof ’.1 15 '1
(a) Elements of Superior Responsibility
490. ln order to establish criminal liability under Article 6(3) of the Statute, three
requirements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
i. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the Accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime;
1151 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 280; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 350; Martié Trial Judgement, para. 451.
See also Kvoéka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 237; Vasiljevié Appeal Judgement, paras 120, 128.
1152 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 280; Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 50; Simié et al. Appeal Judgement,
para. 86; Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
1153 Blagojevié and Jokié Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Simié Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Prosecutor v.
Krstié, IT-98-33-A, Judgement (AC), 19 April 2004 [Krstié Appeal Judgement], paras 140, 143; Vasiljevié
Appeal Judgement, paras 142-143; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 489.
1154 Indictment, para. 34.

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3 % 2..é>g
ii. The Accused knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and
iii. The Accused failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
crime or punish the perpetrators thereof I ISS
491. The principle that an individual may be held responsible as a superior in the course
0f an armed conflict is established in customary international law.ll56 The scope of Article
6(3) does not Only include military commanders, but also political leaders and other civilian
superiors in possession of authority. I W
492. The responsibility of a superior is not limited to crimes committed by subordinates in
erson, but encom asses an m0de of criminal liabilit roscribed in Article 6 1 of the
P P Y Y P
Statute. It follows that a superior can be held responsible for failure to prevent or punish a
crime which was planned, ordered, instigated or aided and abetted by subordinates.ll58
(b) Existence of a Superior-Subordinate Relationship
493. In order to establish the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship, it must be
demonstrated that the superior had "effective control"H59 over his subordinates — i.e. the
M55 APRC Trial Judgement, para. 781, referring to Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 346; See also Prosecutor
v. Oric, IT-03-68-A, Judgement (AC), 3 July 2008 [Oric Appeal Judgement], para. 18; Rule 98 Decision,
Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24201.
H56 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 782, referring to Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 333, stating "[t]hat
military commanders and other persons occupying positions of superior authority may be held criminally
responsible for the unlawful conduct of their subordinates is a well-established norm of customary international
law". See also Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura, IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on lnterlocutory
Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003 [Hadiihasanovic et al.
Appeal Decision on Command Responsibility], para. 31, holding that "[i]n the opinion of the Appeals Chamber,
the Trial Chamber was correct in holding, after a thorough examination of the matter, that command
responsibility was at all times material to this case a part of customary international law in its application to war
crimes committed in the course of an internal armed conflict".
H57 APRC Trial Judgement, para. 782, referring to Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76; Stakié Trial
Judgement, para. 459; Orié Trial Judgement, para. 308; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgement
(Reasons) (AC), 3 July 2002 [Bagilishema Appeal Judgement], para. 51; Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, ICTR-98-44A-
A, Judgement (AC), 23 May 2005 [Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement], para. 85. See also Rule 98 Decision,
Transcript 4 May 2009, p. 24201.
HSS AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 783, referring to Oric Trial Judgement, paras 301-302. See also Oric
Appeal Judgement, para. 21; Prosecutor v. Boskoski and Tarculovski, IT-04-82-PT, Decision on Prosecution's
Motion to Amend the Indictment and Submission of Proposed Second Amended Indictment and Submission of
Amended Pre-Trial Brief 26 May 2006 [Boskoski and Tarculovski Decision on Amending Indictment], paras 18
et seq. and Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (TC), 18 December 2008 [Bagosora Trial
Judgement], paras 2037, 2064, 2081.
USO Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 256; Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 276; Oric Trial Judgement, para.
311; Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 522.

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Zszba
material ability to prevent or punish the commission of the offence.H60 However, it is
immaterial whether the power of the superior over the subordinates is based on dejure or on
de facto authority.ll6l Possession of de jure authority is neither necessary nor sufficient to
rove effective control, althou it ma be evidentiall relevant to determinin whether
P Y Y E
there is effective control.ll62 Substantial influence over the conduct of others falls short of
effective control. I 163
494. A superior may be held responsible for crimes committed by individuals temporarily
subordinated to him, provided he exercises effective control over them.] 164 Further, superior
responsibility is not excluded by the concurrent responsibility of other superiors in a chain
of commandl 165
495. Identification of the principal perpetrator, particularly by name, is not required to
establish a superior—subordinate relationship. It is sufficient to identify the subordinates as
belonging to a unit or group controlled by the superior.] 166
(c) Actual or imputed Knowledge
496. For a superior to be held responsible pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute, it must
be established that he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
or had committed such crimes.] 167
HBO AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 784, referring to Halilovié Trial Judgement, para. 58; Orié Appeal
Judgement, para. l59; Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 256.
Hm Oric Trial Judgement, para. 309, stating that "the broadening of this liability as described above is
supported by the fact that the borderline between military and civil authority can be fluid. This is particularly the
case with regard to many contemporary conflicts where there may be only de facto self-proclaimed governments
and/or de facto armies and paramilitary groups subordinate thereto" (footnotes omitted). See also Kordic and
Cerkez Trial Judgement, paras 419, 422; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 87; Naletilié and Martinovié Trial
Judgement, para. 67.
Im Orié Appeal Judgement, paras 91-92.
M3 Celebiéi Appeal Judgement, para. 266; Blagojevié and Jokic Trial Judgement, para. 791; Prosecutor v.
Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe, ICTR-99-46-T, Judgement (TC), 25 February 2004 [Ntagerura et al.
Trial Judgement], para. 628.
N64 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 786, referring to Halilovic Trial Judgement, paras 61, 62; Kunarac Trial
Judgement, para. 399; Orié Trial Judgement, para. 313; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement
(TC), 25 June 1999 [Aleksovski Trial Judgement], para. 106.
M65 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 786, referring to Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 296, 302, 303; Krnojelac
Trial Judgement, para. 93; Naletilic Trial Judgement, para. 69; Halilovié Trial Judgement, para. 62.
HM AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 790, referring to Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 217; Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, IT-97-25-PT, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of the Indictment, 24
February 1999 [Krnojelac Decision on the Form of Indictment], para. 46; Oric Trial Judgement, para. 3 I l.
Hm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 791.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 20l2

2 g’>El·¤
(i) Actual Knowledge
497. Actual knowledge may be defined as the awareness that the relevant crimes were
committed or about to be committed.ll(°8 There is no presumption of such knowledge but, in
the absence of direct evidence, it may be established through circumstantial evidence.ll69
Factors indicative of actual knowledge include, first of all, an individual's superior position
and the superior's geographical and temporal proximity to the crimesgllm also, the type and
scope of crimes, the time during which they occurred, the number and type of troops and
logistics involved, the widespread occurrence of crimes, the tactical tempo of operations, the
modus operandi of similar illegal acts and the officers and staff involved. I m
(ii) Imputed Knowledge
498. In determining whether a superior "had reason to know", or imputed knowledge, that
his or her subordinates were committing or about to commit a crime, it must be shown that
specific information was available which would have put the superior on notice of crimes
committed or about to be committedlm The superior may not be held liable for failing to
acquire such information in the first placelm However, it suffices for the superior to be in
possession of sufficient information, even general in nature, written or oral, of the likelihood
of illegal acts by subordinates.ll74 The superior need only have notice of a risk that crimes
might be carried out and there is no requirement that this be a strong risk or a substantial
likelihoodlm
499. It is clear from the case law referred to above that negligence is insufficient to
attribute imputed knowledge, and that a superior cannot be held liable for having failed in
1168 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 792, referring to Kordié and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 427.
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 792, referring to Kordié and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 427; Celebiéi
Trial Judgement, para. 386. See also Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 278.
N70 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 792, referring to Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 80.
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 792, referring to Celebiéi Trial Judgement, para. 386; Galié Trial
Judgement, para. I74; Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 524; Bagilishema Trial Judgement, para. 968.
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 794, referring to Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 62; Celebiéi Appeal
Judgement, para. 24 l.
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 794, referring to Blaskié Appeal Judgement, paras 62-63, Celebiéi Appeal
Judgement, para. 226.
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 794, referring to (ielebiéi Appeal Judgement, para. 238; Celebiéi Trial
Judgement, para. 393; Kordié and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 437; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 370.
mj AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 794; Prosecutor v. Strugar, lT—0l—42—A, Judgement (AC), 17 July 2008
[Strugar Appeal Judgement], para. 304.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—0l—T QM 18 May 2012

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his duty to obtain infomation in the first place.II76 What is required is the superior's
awareness of` infomation which should have prompted him or her to acquire further
knowledge.II77 Responsibility pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute will attach when the
superior remains wilfully blind to the infomation that is available to him. I I78
(d) Failure to Prevent or Punish
500. lt must be established that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent or punish the crimes of his or her subordinates. These are two distinct
duties: it is the superior's primary duty to intervene as soon as he or she becomes aware of
crimes about to be committed, while taking measures to punish will only suffice if the
superior did not become aware of these crimes until after they were committed. I I79
50l. As regards the duty to prevent the crimes of subordinates, the type of necessary and
reasonable measures a superior must take is a matter of evidence rather than one of
substantive law.II80 Generally, it can be said that the measures required of the superior are
limited to those within his or her material ability under the circumstances,II8I including
those that may lie beyond his or her fonnal powers.I I82 The type and extent of measures to
be taken depend on the degree of effective control exercised by the superior at the relevant
time, and on the severity and imminence of the crimes that are about to be committed.I I83 I
502. The duty to punish only arises once a crime under the Statute has been
committed.II84 A superior is bound to conduct a meaningful investigation with a view to
establish the facts, order or execute appropriate sanctions, or report the perpetrators to the
II7° AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 796, referring to Celibiéi Appeal Judgement, para. 226.
Im AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 796, referring to Orié Trial Judgement, para. 324.
II78 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 796, referring to Halilovié Trial Judgement, para. 69, relying on Celebiéi
Trial Judgement, para. 387.
II79 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 797, referring to Orié Trial Judgement, para. 326; Limaj Trial Judgement,
para. 527; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 373.
IIBO AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 798, referring to Blaskié Appeal Judgement, paras 72, 77; Celebiéi Trial
Judgement, para. 394. See also Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovié and Kubura, IT-01-47-A, Judgement (AC), 22
April 2008 [Hadiihasanovié and Kubura Appeal Judgement].
ISI; Halilovié Appeal Judgement, para. 63.
IISI AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 798, referring to Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 528.
II82 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 798, referring to Celebiéi Trial Judgement, para. 395.
IIB} AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 798. referring to Orié Trial Judgement, para. 329.
II84 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 799, referring to Bias/cié Appeal Judgement, paras 83, 85.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T @$4 l8 May 2012

Z S Q..°l’9—
competent authorities in case the superior lacks sanctioning powers.H85 According to the
lCTY Appeals Chamber, there is no support in customary international law for the
proposition that a commander can be held responsible for crimes committed by a
subordinate prior to the commander's assumption of command over that subordinate. I H6
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 799, referring to Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 529; Orié Trial Judgement,
para. 336; Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 376. See also Hadiihasanovié and Kubura Appeal Judgement, para.
154; Halilovié Appeal Judgement, para. 182
H86 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 799, referring to Hadiihasanovié et al. Appeal Decision on Command
Responsibility, paras 45-46; but see Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 43; and see also
Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt — Command Responsibility Appeal, para. 8. See
also Orié Appeal Judgement, Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen, paras l6-l7; RUF Trial Judgement, paras
299-306.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T GN 18 May 2012

3 3 1‘a—3
VI. LAW AND FINDINGS ON THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity
503. The Accused is charged with Hve counts of crimes against humanity punishable
under Article 2 of the Statute. Specifically, the Accused is charged with murder (Count 2,
rape (Count 4), sexual slavery (Count 5), other inhumane acts (Count 8), and enslavement
(Count 10).
1. Applicable Law
504. Article 2 of the Statute is entitled ‘Crimes against humanity’ and provides as follows:
The Special Court shall have power to prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population:
a. Murder;
b. Extermination;
c. Enslavement;
d. Deportation;
e. Imprisonment; p
f Torture
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution; forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence;
h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds;
i. Other inhumane acts.
505. In order for liability to be established under Article 2 of the Statute, the acts of the
accused must have formed part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population. Five chapeau (or general) requirements for crimes against humanity must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(a) There must be an attack
506. An ‘attack’ may be deHned as a campaign, operation or course of conduct.1187 It is
not limited to the use of armed force but may encompass any mistreatment of any civilian
o u1ation.1188 ‘Attack’ is a conce t different from that of "armed conf1ict" and need not be
P P P
part ofit.1189
1187 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 214; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 77; CDF Trial Judgement, para. 11 1.
11811 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 214; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 77; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement,
para. 86.
11119 AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 214; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 77; Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 251;
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 86.

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Case No.: SCSI.—03—01—T OH 18 May 2012

3 rs 2.%%
(b) The attack must be directed against any civilian population
507. Therefore, it must be established that a civilian population was the primary object of
the attack.II9I) A population is considered a "civilian population" if it is predominantly
civilian in nature.II9I There is no requirement that the victims of the underlying crimes be
"civilians", as lon as the attack is directed a ainst the civilian o ulation.IIQ2 It is not
g g P P
required that the entire population be subjected to the attack. The Trial Chamber must,
however, be satisfied that the attack was in fact directed against a civilian "population",
rather than against a limited and randomly selected number of individuals. I I93
508. It is an agreed fact between the Defence and the Prosecution that the terms "civilian"
and "civilian population" throughout the Indictment refer to "persons who took no active
part in the hostilities, or who were no longer taking an active part in the hostilities, including
combatants rendered hors de combat by virtue of injury or wounds, capture or
surrender". I I94
509. With regards to alleged crimes against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute, the
Trial Chamber finds that this definition of "civilian" agreed to by the parties is overly broad
and inconsistent with customary international law. I I95 Referring to principles of international
humanitarian law, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has distinguished between a person hors dc
combat and a civilian:
Persons hors de combat are certainly protected in armed conflicts through Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions. This reflects a principle of customary international law. Even
horns dc combat, however, they would still be members of the armed forces of a party to the
conflict and therefore fall under the category of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1) of the
Third Geneva Convention; as such, they are not civilians in the context of Article 50,
paragraph 1, of Additional Protocol I. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
supports this conclusion in referring to "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities,
IIQII AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 216; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 80; CDF Trial Judgement, para. 114;
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 91; Blaskié Appeal Judgement, paras 1 10-115.
IIQI AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 216, referring to Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 644; RUF Trial
Judgement, para. 83; D. Milosevic Appeal Judgement, paras 50-51; Milutinovié et al. Trial Judgement, para.
146.
Im Mrksié Appeal Judgement, paras 25-33.
Im AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 217; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 85; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement,
para. 90.
IIQ4 Admitted Facts and Law, para. 37.
II95 AF RC Trial Judgement, para. 219.

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Case No.: SCSI.-O3-01-T K 18 May 2012

g%·;;,_:l*`S_`
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause".l N6
510. The Trial Chamber therefore holds that the term "civilian" must be more narrowly
defined in order to ensure a distinction in an armed conflict between civilians and
combatants no longer participating in hostilities. The fact that the persons are hors de
combat during the commission of a crime, does not render them "civilian" or part of the
"civilian population" for the purposes of Article 2 of the Statute. This distinction is
articularl im ortant in a case where the Prosecution alle es that crimes a ainst humanit
P Y P S S Y
were committed in a situation of armed conflict. I M7
(c) The attack must be widespread or systematic
511. This requirement that an attack must be either widespread or systematic is
disjunctive, so that once either condition is met, it is not necessary to consider whether the
alternative is also satisfiedllgg The term ‘widespread’ refers to the large—scale nature of the
attack and the number of targeted persons, while the term ‘systematic’ refers to the
organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random
occurrence. I [99 The existence of a plan need not be proved. [200
(d) The acts of the perpetrator must form part of the attack
512. In order for the offence to amount to a crime against humanity, there must be a
sufficient nexus between the unlawful acts of the perpetrator and the attack.l2Ol Although
this nexus depends on the factual circumstances of each case, reliable indicia of a nexus
include the similarities between the perpetrator's acts and the acts occurring within the
attack; the nature of the events and circumstances surrounding the perpetrator's acts; the
lm Galié Appeal Judgement, footnote 437; Blaskic Appeal Judgement, footnote 220 [emphasis added].
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 2 l9.
lm AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 2l5; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 78; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement,
para. 93.
lvm AF RC Trial Judgement, para. 215; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 78; CDF Trial Judgement, para. ll2; and
Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 94; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 95.
mo AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 215; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 79; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement,
para. 98; Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 120.
ml Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 579.

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381%%
temporal and geographic proximity of the perpetrator's acts with the attack; and the nature
and extent of the e etrator's knowled e of the attack when he commits the acts. 12112
P YP 8
513. lt does not suffice that an accused knowingly took the risk of participating in the
implementation of a policy, plan or ideo1ogy.12113 Nevertheless, the accused need not know
the details of the attack or approve of the context in which his or her acts occur;12114 the
accused merely needs to understand the overall context in which his or her acts took
place. 12115 The motives for the accused's participation in the attack are irrelevant; the accused
need only know that his or her acts are parts thereof.12116
514. Findings related to this requirement are addressed in the Findings on the Crimes
section of this Judgement.
(e) The perpetrator must have knowledge that his acts form part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population
515. The mens rea or mental requisite for crimes against humanity is that the perpetrator
of the offence must be aware that a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian
population is taking place and that his action is part of this attack.1201 Evidence of
knowledge depends on the facts of a particular case; thus the manner in which this legal
element may be proved may vary from case to case.121111 However, the perpetrator need not
have been aware of the details of the pre-conceived plan or policy when he committed the
offence and need not have intended to support the regime carrying out the attack on the
civilian population.12119 Findings related to this requirement are addressed in the Findings on
the Crimes section of this Judgement.
1202 Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 632.
1203 Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 190; Blaskié Appeal Judgement, paras 125-126.
12114 Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 190; Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 102.
1205 Limaj Judgement, para. 190; Kordié Trial Judgement, para. 185.
12116 Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 190; Tadié Appeal Judgement, paras 248, 252; Kunarac Appeal Judgement,
para. 103: "[a]t most, evidence that [acts were committed] for purely personal reasons could be indicative of a
rebuttable assumption that he was not aware that his acts were part of that attack".
1207 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 121; Tadié Appeal Judgement, para. 255.
1208 Blaskié Appeal Judgement, para. 126.
‘2"" Biaskie mei Judgement, paras 254-257.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % @~;§ 18 May 2012

5s 2.*%%-·
Submissions of the Parties
516. The Prosecution submits that the mistreatment of civilians in Sierra Leone was
constant during rebel operations prior to and for the duration of the indictment period.mO ln
order to demonstrate the existence of an attack, the Prosecution primarily relies (i) on
judicially noticed fact (AI), an RUF speech to the nation made on 18 June 1997 apologising
for rebel violence, Foday Sankoh's 1999 speech apologising for "the pain and g1ief" caused
by his "revolution" and deploring rebel actions in his absence and (ii) the Sierra Leone Truth
and Reconciliation Reportml The Prosecution further submits that the attacks in Sierra
Leone were both widespread and systematic, referring to the large number of victims and the
nationwide scope of the attacks, as well as to ofhcial operations, policies and pattems
relating to the mistreatment of civilians.l2l2 The Prosecution also submits that civilians were
the primary targets of mistreatment, as campaigns were directed at terrorising, punishing or
seeking revenge against civiliansmg
517. The Defence has not made any specihc submissions with respect to the chapeau
elements. However, it maintains that the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
each element of the crime - including the chapeau requirements. m4
Evidence
518. The crimes charged against the Accused allegedly occurred over the course of more
than Eve years, i.e. 30 November 1996 to 18 January 2002. Over that time period there were
many changes in the alliances between the warring factions, the membership and leadership
structure of such factions, and their position in the conflict. These factors affected the nature,
type and frequency of the attacks perpetrated. ln its submissions regarding the chapeau
requirements, the Prosecution asserts that the chapeau requirements are fulfilled throughout
the lndictment period without distinguishing between the time frames as pleaded in the
Indictment. Because the conflict evolved over time, the Trial Chamber has considered each
mo Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 670-671.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 671-672 (referring to Exhibit P-094, "Statement by Cpl. Foday
Sankoh, Leader of the Revolution United Front"; Exhibit P-057, "Transc1ipt of the RUF Speech to the Nation
Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997"; Exhibit P-296, "TRC Report: Appendix 1: Perpetrator Responsibility for
Violations over Time and Space and Correlations between Perpetrator Groups").
Im Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 674-685.
Im Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 686-688,
Im Defence Pre-Trial Brief para. 42.
N SLSL 01 T 185 T 8

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Case No.: " -03- - % GAD 1 May 2012 vg

3. Ya '2.:1~‘B
hase of the conflict in turn with res ect to the evidence of the cha eau elements for crimes
P P P
against humanity. HIS
(i) Pre—Junta Period (30 November 1996 to 24 May 1997[
519. The first distinct phase the Trial Chamber has examined is the period from the
signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996 to the eve of the coup d ’etat by
the SLA on 25 May 1997. 30 November 1996 marks the start of the Court's jurisdiction and
the beginning of the Indictment period.
520. From 1994 and continuing into the Indictment period, witnesses testified that the
RUF established a system of forced labour in Kailahun Districtmé Enslavement took the
form of sexual slavery,l2l7 forced marriagesmg and forced fanning,l2l9 often under the threat
of violence. 1220 From about 1994 to about 1998, men, women and children were abducted by
rebels at the war front and brought back to Buedu where they were trained to fight, forced to
farm and women and girls used as "wives".l22l For example, if civilians did not farm or fish
when ordered to do so, they would be beaten. m2
521. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from witnesses who testified that between 1996
and 2000, the RUF forced civilians to farm. mf; Witness Aruna Gbonda explained that
civilians farmed when they were ordered to because "when the war came", the civilians
were enslaved by the rebels.l224 Before the war, Gbonda said that he would farm at his own
pace and feed himself; but that during the war, the civilians were required to give the rebels
all the proceeds of farming. @5 For example, Gbonda explained that rice farming was a
1215 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, paras 91, 99, 100; Exhibit P-296, "TRC Report: Appendix 1: Perpetrator
Responsibility for Violations over Time and Space and Correlations between Perpetrator Groups", p. 21853
(referring to "the episodic nature of the conflict").
mm Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4239-4243, 4251-4253; Mustapha M. Mansaray,
Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5291-5293.
lm Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18684-18686.
mg Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18684-18686.
mg Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4251-4253, 4248-4249, 4251-4259.
1220 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4253-4255, 4267; Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5
March 2008, pp. 5291-5293.
ml Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18686-18688.
lm Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4253-4255, 4267.
lm Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4251-4253, 4255-4259. See also Edna Bangura,
Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18688-18689.
1224 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4252.
1225 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4252-4253.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / nk 18 May 2012

. §&'2j·°r
"physical job".l226 Gbonda testified that when rice was farmed, for example, civilians would
together clear and burn the farm, do the planting and farming, harvest the rice and hand it
over to the RUF. [227
522. F arming was organised. When labour was requested by RUF commanders, chiefdom
and de ut chiefdom commanders were enlisted to brin civilians to farms to work without
P Y 8
pay or benefit}228 Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray explained that when Sam Bockarie and
Issa Sesay required labour, they would order the G5 of the RUF who would communicate
the order to chiefdom commanders, section commanders and town commanders in each
town and village who would then order civilians to provide produce to the RUF}229 lf
civilians refused to comply, they faced beatings or detention or the RUF would appropriate
their produce. lm
523. Witness Amna Gbonda testified that civilians were monitored by the rebels and that
the would be beaten if the did not farrn.l23l Civilians were also forced to harvest and
Y Y
transport cacao,l232 to hunt and fishlfm and to weed grass}234 Forced labour occurred in a
number of towns and villages in Kailahun District and civilians, both men and women, were
forced to participate. IHS
524. Edna Bangura was captured in the pre-indictment period and brought to Buedu
where she sta ed until November or December l998.l236 She and other irls were forced to
Y 8
perform domestic labour for the rebels}237 Bangura testified that from l994 to l998,l238
civilian women would be captured and they would become the wives of rebels,l239 and that
{H6 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4251.
I227 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4252.
mg Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4253, 4248-4249, 4251-4253.
mg Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5291.
mo Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5291, 5923.
ml Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4239-4243, 4253-4255.
Im Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4259-4261.
Im Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4265-4268, 4270-4272.
Im Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4272-4274.
Im Arurra Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4251-4252, 4255-4259.
E36 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18665-18666, 18669-18670, 18677.
Im Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18700-18702, 18727-18730.
Im Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18687.
mq Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18685-18686.

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enerall **no women had ri ts".l24O She further ex lained that the rebels would ca ture
S Y P P
men, women and children when a particular town or village was attackedml
2 525. The testimony of these witnesses is corroborated by Exhibit P-296, an excerpt of the
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Report, which records instances of mistreatment in
1996 and 1997.*242
526. Also of relevance, is an RUF speech delivered on 18 June 1997 by the RUF
spokesman Eldred Collins apologizing to the citizens of Sierra Leone for violence
committed by the RUF. He stated:
For the past six years or so, we have been living in an environment of hatred and
divisiveness. We looked at our brothers and killed them in cold blood, we removed our
sisters from their hiding places to undo their femininity, we slaughtered our mothers and
butchered our fathers. It was really a gruesome experience which has left a terrible
landmark in our historydm
(ii) Junta Period (25 May 1997 to about 14 February 19983
527. The 25 May 1997 coup d’ ctat ousted the government of President Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah and placed Johnny Paul Koroma in power as Chairman of the AFRC}244 The
second distinct hase of the conflict runs from the cou d ’etat to shortl rior to the
P P Y P
ECOMOG 1nteryention.l245 This period is characterised by a shift in the dynamics of the
conflict as the RUF found itself in a new position of sharing power in Sierra Leone with its
former adversaries. The campaigns of the Junta govemment were aimed at the preservation
of governmental authority and involved hostilities against ECOMOG and CDF forces.
528. In July 1997, the United Nations Security Council expressed its deep concem
regarding the **continuing crisis in Sierra Leone", and in particular, the atrocities committed
against Sierra Leone's citizens}246 A month later, the President of the Security Council
stated that the Security Council **condemns the continuing violence and threats of violence
Im Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18685.
ml Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18686-18687.
’2"2 Exhibit P-296, "TRC Report: Appendix 1; Perpetrator Responsibility for Violations over Time and Space
and Correlations between Perpetrator Groups", pp. 21853-21860.
lm Exhibit P-057, "Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997"; TF1-
371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2837-2838 (CS).
Im Admitted Facts and Law, paras 17, 18, 30; Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Fact
1.
mj Decision on Judicial Notice, Fact AD. 1
E46 Exhibit P-299, "Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/36, 1 1 July 1997", p. 1.

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3% 2.% {
by the junta towards the civilian population, foreign nationals and personnel of the
ECOWAS monitoring group, and calls for an end to such acts of violence". I247
529. Witnesses, Amnesty International and a United Nations observer mission reported
that during junta mle, the AFRC and RUF were responsible for extra-judicial killings,
physical violence, rape, arbitrary detention, sexual slavery, the torture of children, forced
labour, looting and the destruction of property, and that the victims were civilians and were
specifically targeted.l248 For example, one witness testified that during a student
demonstration in August 1997, SLA fighters killed two students and detained others at the
Pademba Road Prison in Freetown}249 In Kenema District, several witnesses described the
killings of civilians.l250 During this time period, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
recorded an increase in the number of reported human rights abuses. 1251
530. The violence and mistreatment was directed at perceived political opponents,
journalists, students and human rights activists.l252 However, these attacks were not limited
to such selected civilians. Rather, any perceived collaborator was targeted by the junta.
Prosecution Exhibit P-078, a report by Amnesty International, describes attacks involving
lm Exhibit P-301, "Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/42, 6 August 1997", p.
2.
mg See, eng. TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2335-2340 (CS); Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September
2008, pp. 17516-17518; Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15009-15011; 15096-
15097; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15141; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15141-15412; Alex Sheku Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16656; Exhibit P-
078, "Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report", pp. 1-2, 8-9
(report generated from contemporaneous accounts); Exhibit P-077 (confidential) ("Information continues to be
received about human rights abuses perpetrated by forces loyal to the junta in the period before restoration of the
Government. From all parts of the country there are reports of extra-judicial killings, rape, arbitrary detention,
including for purposes of sexual abuse, torture of children (especially of child-combatants), forced labour, and
the looting and destruction of residential and commercial premises and property".)(report generated from
contemporaneous accounts).
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7919-7924.
mo See, eng., Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15007-15010, 15098; Exhibit P-
174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15140-15141 (testifying that a farmer was killed by Sam
Bockarie in Kenema Town in September 1997); Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9409-9411
(testifying that Mohamed Fityia was killed by Sam Bockarie in Kenema Town in September or November
1997); Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062 AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005". pp. 14919-14920 (testifying that three persons
were killed by unidentified AFRC or RUF fighters in a house in Tongo Fields in August 1997); Abdul Conteh,
Transcript 29 September 2001, pp. 17529-17531 (testifying that 15 civilians were intentionally killed by RUF
fighters in Bumpeh village in Tongo Fields).
lm Exhibit P-296, "TRC Report: Appendix 1: Perpetrator Responsibility for Violations over Time and Space
and Correlations between Perpetrator Groups", pp. 21853-2 1 860.
1252 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", pp. 8-9; TF1 -371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2346-2347 (CS); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript
17 April 2008, pp. 7919-7921.

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Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T AM 18 May 2012

Q $1% 2.
torture, physical violence and extrajudicial killings directed against joumalists and local
civilian leaders. 1255
531. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from a number of witnesses who testified
civilians were forced to work in diamond mines in Kenema District during this period.1254
The mining was organised by the AFRC and RUF.1255 Amnesty Intemational reported that
the rape of women and girls was systematic and that at least one hundred civilians were
"deliberately and arbitrarily killed".1256
(iii) Post-Junta to end of the Indictment Period gl February 1998 to 18 January
2002[
532. The third timeframe considered by the Trial Chamber runs from the ECOMOG
Intervention of February 1998 which led to the ouster of the AFRC/RUF government1257 to
the end of the Indictment period on 18 January 2002.
533. Following the retreat of the AFRC and RUF fighters from Freetown and their
re ou in at Masiaka, Port Loko District, Koroma announced ‘O eration Pa Yourself’
SY P g P Y
which resulted in a campaign of extensive looting.1258 This conduct continued throughout
the movement of the AFRC and RUF troops during this period.
534. AFRC and RUF fighters attacked the provincial headquarters Koidu Town and other
locations in Kono district in February/March 1998,1259 while a breakaway group under SAJ
Musa retreated north to Koinadugu District. AFRC and RUF fighters bumt civilian homes as
1255 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", pp. 8-9.
1254 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7913-7916; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12
November 2008, pp. 20153-20156; Dauda Aruna Fornie, 2 December 2008, pp. 21421-21425; Abdul Conteh,
Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17532-17543; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2335-2340 (CS).
1255 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7913-7916.
1256 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 9.
1257 Decision on Judicial Notice, Fact AD.
12515 The Junta had been removed from power, meaning that it did not have the money to pay its fighters. As a
result, the forces looted food, clothing and vehicles from the civilian population and broke into a bank to 1oot
money. Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43963-43968; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp.
5734-5735; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2352-2355(CS); TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp.
12501-12502; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7934-7937; Samuel Bull, Transcript 24
September 2008, p. 17062; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6851-6853.
1259 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10496-10498; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp.
43994-43995.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dk 18 May 2012

$$2533.
part of the operation in Koidu Town.121`11 Violence against civilians in AFRC/RUF held
territory was frequent and intensified in the north and east of Sierra Leone as the former
junta attacked those areas.1261 Several thousand civilians were killed or mutilated, and
hundreds more were abducted.1262 Witness testified that other violations, such as rape, the
burning of houses, killings and looting, continued.1263
535. In around May 1998, fighters burnt homes, looted and killed civilians as part of
‘Operation No Living Thing’ in Kenema.1264 One witness explained that the operation meant
that "if you go and attack that town, don’t leave any breathing thing in that village. Sort of
take away every life that you meet in that village".1265 I
536. In mid 1998 AFRC fighters moved from Kono District to an area on the border of
Bombali and Kambia District.1266 En route the fighters specifically targeted the civilian
o ulation. Civilians were ra ed, killed and/or mutilated and rebels burned houses and
P P P
looted property during that campaign.1261 Wounded civilians from Makeni, Bombali, Kono
and Kenema Districts were treated for burns and amputations in Connaught Hospital in
Freetown. 12118
537. In late 1998, RUF fighters instituted a campaign called ‘Operation Spare No Soul’ in
which fighters were encouraged to kill civilians.1269
1260 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1241-1246.
12111 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", pp. 1-2, 7, 11 ("In the days immediately after their removal from power by ECOMOG, AFRC and RUF
forces indiscriminately killed unarmed civilians, looted and burned houses, both in Freetown and other towns.
As the rebel forces were pursued eastwards by ECOMOG forces through towns such as Bo in Southern
Province, Kenema and Koidu in Eastern Province and Makeni in Northern Province during February, March and
April 1998, they were responsible for widespread killings, torture and i11-treatment including rape and other
forms of sexual assault, and abduction. Villages and towns were burnt to the ground, destroying thousands of
homes. Koidu, a major town in the diamond-rich Kono District, was almost totally destroyed by AFRC and RUF
forces and villages between Njaiama-Sewafe and Koidu were repeatedly attacked".).
1262 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 10.
1m See, e.g., Exhibit P-077 (confidential); TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2009, p . 2352-2361 CS ; TF1-
P
189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16497-16515; TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23674-23680.
1M Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17331-17334.
1265 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17332.
12611 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3173-3183.
'2‘" Exhibit P-077 qconadimuaii.
121*1 TF1—358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20616-20626.
1269 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20219-20224.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T QM / 18 May 2012
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538. Witnesses testified that AFRC and RUF forces used forced labour in a large—scale
manner in Kono Districtmo Civilian abductees were forcibly conscripted and trained or
forced to farm and carry suppliesml Civilians were also forced to mine for diamonds in
various locations throughout Kono District. mz
539. Witnessesmg and documentary evidencemil describe attacks by rebel forces on
civilian settlements, in which they burned and looted homes, and mutilated, abducted, raped,
tortured, and killed civilians. Mass internal displacement also occurred during this
period.m5
mo See, e.g., TF1-216, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19336-19337; Exhibit P-189, "TF1-072, AFRC Trial,
Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 8-15; Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, pp. 19695-19700.
ml See, e.g., Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17219-17225, 17231-17241, 17285-17286,
17316-17321; Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 696-704.
mz See, e.g., Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5341-5346; TF1-516, Transcript 10 April
2008, pp. 7150-7157; TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15041-15043; TF1-338, Transcript 3
September 2008, p. 15317.
Im Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23861-23866; Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January
2008, pp. 1231-1235; Exhibit P-201, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005", pp. 19465-19482; Sia
Kamara, Transcript 15 October 2008, 18434 -18437; Alex Temba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 683-705;
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20171-20176, 20203-20208; TF1-532, Transcript 31
March 2008, pp. 6215-6219; Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October, 2008, pp. 19338-19339; Alice Pyne,
Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12199-12201; Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17113-17121;
Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17461-17464; TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp.
23682-23685.
mil Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Exhibit P-079, "Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)
Press Release - Mutilation of Civilians on the Increase in Sierra Leone, 5 May 1998", p. 1; Exhibit P-078,
"Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report", p. 10-14. See also
Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council - First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", para. 35 (stating that, "[a] survey of 9 of Sierra Leone's 150
chiefdoms indicated that some 700 civilian war-related deaths have occurred since February, including 200 in
one village, Yifin, in late April. About 1,600 people have suffered war-related injuries in these chiefdoms since
February, of whom 30 per cent are children. In Koidu, a reliable source has stated that 663 bodies were buried
following the fighting in the area in mid-June. A significant percentage of the dead were women and children. At
the same time, the killing of some 44 of the 144 paramount chiefs during that period indicates a deliberate
attempt to target them",). The United Nations Observer Mission also reported that several thousand civilians
were being held by rebel forces, many of whom were women and children. It was also reported that in nine
chiefdoms, 1,619 homes had been destroyed, and another 600 were destroyed in three other chiefdoms. On a
single day in July, 40 homes were destroyed in a village near Masingbi. See Exhibit P-080, "UN Security
Council - First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12
August 1998", paras 35-37. See also Exhibit P-307, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/ 1 176, 15 December 1998",
p. 214161, paras 36-37.
`275 Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Exhibit P-079, "Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)
Press Release - Mutilation of Civilians on the Increase in Sierra Leone, 5 May 1998", p. 1; Exhibit P-078,
"Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report", p. 10-14. See also
Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council - First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", para. 35 (stating that, "[a] survey of 9 of Sierra Leone's 150
chiefdoms indicated that some 700 civilian war-related deaths have occurred since February, including 200 in
one village, Yifin, in late April. About 1,600 people have suffered war-related injuries in these chiefdoms since
February, of whom 30 per cent are children. In Koidu, a reliable source has stated that 663 bodies were buried

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // /LQ 18 May 2012
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éczssr
540. In the last days of 1998 and into January 1999, rebels went on the offensive in
several areas of Sierra Leone, including Makeni, Lunsar and Port Loko.m6 Refugees from
these areas fled to camps in Guinea where they reported that civilians had been killed,
property looted and homes destroyed during these attacks. [277
541. During the Freetown attack itself and the subsequent retreat, rebels killed thousands
of civilians.m8 Thousands more were abducted, burnt, beaten, mutilated, raped and/or
sexually abused.m9 Attacks against civilians occurred throughout Freetown and its
surrounds, including the State House area,l28O Kissy,l28l Fourah Bay Road,l282 Upgun,l283
Calaba Townl284 and Allen Town}285 Attacks against civilians also took place in the nearby
towns of Hastings,l286 Wel1ington,l287 Waterloolm and Benguema.l28°
following the fighting in the area in mid-June. A signiHcant percentage of the dead were women and children. At
the same time, the killing of some 44 of the 144 paramount chiefs during that period indicates a deliberate
attempt to target them".). The United Nations Observer Mission also reported that several thousand civilians
were being held by rebel forces, many of whom were women and children. lt was also reported that in nine
chiefdoms, 1,619 homes had been destroyed, and another 600 were destroyed in three other chiefdoms. On a
single day in July, 40 homes were destroyed in a village near Masingbi. See Exhibit P-080, "UN Security
Council - First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12
August l998", paras 35-37. See also Exhibit P-307, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/1176, 15 December l998",
p. 214161, paras 36-37.
mé Exhibit P-348A, "BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 - D0000528, 4 January l999".
Im Exhibit P-348A, "BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 - D0000528, 4 January l999".
'"8 Exhibit P-077 (confidential).
mg Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Exhibit P-123, "BBC News Article, Freetown Bears the Scars, 27 January
l999"; Exhibit D-191, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March l999", pp. 21594, 21598-21600; Perry Kamara,
Transcript 6 Febmary 2008, p. 3231.
lm Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Exhibit P—222, "TFl—024, AFRC Transcript 7 March 2005", pp. 43-50, 96-
106; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8290-8292.
ml Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Exhibit P-263, "BBC Audio File - Tab 17 Clip - D0000507 - Track Two";
Exhibit P-212B (confidential); TFl-097, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18588-18597.
Im Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8332-8334.
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8334-8339; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 Febmary
2008, pp. 3224, 3234, 3232.
*28* Exhibit P-077 (criiiiiiieiitiaii.
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8376; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008,
pp. 19178- 19183; Exhibit P-284 (confidential); Exhibit P-285 (Confidential).
H86 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8263-8265; Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8376.
Im See Exhibit P-285 (confidential); TFl-026, Transcript 14 Febmaiy 2008, pp. 3843-3848; Akiatu Tholley,
Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19173-19178.
Im See e.g. Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Afiica, Clip from Track 1 - D0000523, 22 December 1998";
Exhibit P-308, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/20, 7 January l999", para. 4; Patrick Sheriff] Transcript l October 2008, pp.
17765, 17774-17782.
mg See TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9022; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ···(w j 18 May 2012 M

32.$sQ>
542. Through July 1999, there was violence against civilians in Masiaka, Port Loko, the
Occra Hills and other locations in Port Loko such as Songo, Mangarama, Masumana,
Matteh, Melikeru and Tomaju which included killings, mutilations, abductions, sexual
abuse, large-scale property destruction and the contamination of fresh water sources by ex-
SLA fighters.l29O Attacks continued despite the Lomé Peace Agreement signed on 7 July
543. In August 1999, the villages of Landomah, Bonkoleke, Roists, Tenkabereh and
Wonfinfer in Port Loko were looted and civilians displaced.l292 From September until the
end of the year, attacks upon civilians increased, particularly along the Lungi-Port Loko axis
where summary executions, instances of physical violence, looting, mutilations, sexual
abuse, abductions and harassment were reported. 1293
544. In Exhibit P-320, a humanitarian situation report, internally displaced persons
interviewed by Medecins Sans F rontieres reported that they had fled Makeni and Magburaka
in order to escape "RUF forced recruitments and continuing attacks".l294 F orcible
recruitment, killings and rape continued in rebel controlled areas and massive displacement
of the civilian population continued to occur.l295 Exhibit P-335, a report by the Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, described reports from Kambia and Makeni Districts that
RUF forces went from village to village demanding a quota of men and boys, "most of
whom were forced to join under duress".l2% While instances of mutilation decreased during
this period,l297 in Kabala, approximately 40 civilians had the letters ‘RUF’ carved into their
.bodies in May 2000.1298
8242-8252; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8376-8377.
mo Exhibit P-077 (confidential).
ml Decision on Judicial Notice, Fact W.
‘2"2 Exhibit P-077 (cmrrdemiai).
Im Exhibit P-077 (confidential).
1294 Exhibit P-320, "ReliefV/ eb: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs" 25 Jul- 07 Aug 2000", p. 21732.
Im Exhibit P-320, "Relief Web: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report", UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 25 Jul — 07 Aug 2000", p. 21735 ("HRW said it has collected testimonies
of civilians who were tortured by the RUF or killed for attempting to flee (Makeni, Lunsar, Kambia). Given the
massive displacement of populations within RUF areas, the organization said it has reason to believe that the
RUF is trying to terrorize the remaining civilian population in their areas of control to prevent them from
leaving".). See also Exhibit P-335, "Child Soldiers Global Report 2001", p. 23400; Exhibit P-331, "Sierra
Leone: Rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women", pp. 23196-23197.
12% Exhibit P-335, "Child Soldiers Global Report 2001", pp. 23400-23401.
@7 Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1862 ("Also at that time, this is 2000, people were not

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T M GMQ 18 May 2012

gami-
545. Exhibit P-032, a report by an expert panel monitoring the implementation of the
ceasefire agreement, obseryed that military hostilities continued in Kambia District between
the RUF and Guinean forces from Se tember 2000 throu Ma /Jul 200l.m9 The anel
P Y Y P
also reported that hostilities took place between CDF and RUF forces in the east of Sierra
Leone in April 2001, but that a ceasefire was established and commitments to disarmament
reaffirmedmo The expert panel stated that Sierra Leone remained stable from early July
2001 onwardsml
546. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from witnesses who testified that in Kono
District, forced labour involving mining continued to occur until the end of the Indictment
period.l3O2 Mustapha M. Mansaray, commander of 200 mining pits in six towns and villages
in Ngaiya until June 2001, instructed his personnel to forcibly gather civilians for
mininglm Mansaray testified that mining using forced civilian labour was also taking place
in Tombodu, Kaisambu and Bumpe in Kono District}304 In Tombodu, witness Tamba
Yomba Ngekia was forced to mine with other civilians at gunpoint for six months in
2000.mS While working at the mine, Ngekia saw about 70 civilians, tied with ropes around
their waists, brought to the mine to work alongside those already there}306 Ngekia saw one
man shot to death at the mine for refusing to work. mm
being butchered and mutilated every day. The incidents of mutilation had come down drastically by 2000, even
though there were still occasional cases of it".); Exhibit P-296, "TRC Report: Appendix 1: Perpetrator
Responsibility for Violations over Time and Space and Correlations between Perpetrator Groups", pp. 21853-
21860.
lm Corinne Dufka, Transcript 21 January 2008, p. 1814.
W9 Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (200l)",
paras 95-98.
HOO Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (200l)",
paras 96-97. See also Exhibit P-590, "United Nations Security Council, Eleventh Report of the Secretary
General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone", paras 15-17, 21-22.
ml Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (200l)",
paras 97-98.
lm Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5234-5235; Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5340-
5353. See also Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16180-16184; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6
February 2008, pp. 3263-3267 (testifying that mining occurred in Kono District until end of disarmament). See
also TFl-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23773-23775.
lm Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5341-5346.
lm Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5344.
lm Exhibit P-196, "Tamba Yomba Ngekia, RUF Trial Transcript, 20 October 2004", pp. 18629, 18631-
18633 (the witness was captured on 16 December 1999 and taken to Tombodu to mine where he stayed until
disarmament); Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18257-18258.
lm Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18239.
lm Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18239-18240. ‘

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / OIL 18 May 2012

ggzzz
Findings
(i) An attack directed against any civilian population
547. The evidence shows that starting in the pre-indictment period, the RUF committed
crimes against civilians in Sierra Leone and that this pattem of crimes continued into the
indictment period. From November 1996 until May 1997, the mistreatment of civilians was
concentrated in Kailahun District, where the RUF subjected civilians to forced labour,
sexual slavery and forced marriage.
548. During the junta period, civilian leaders were targeted by the AF RC/RUF fighters, as
were civilians generally, particularly women and children. Civilians were the victims of
killings, physical violence, rape, sexual slavery, torture and arbitrary detention perpetrated
by RUF and AFRC lighters. During this time, the evidence demonstrated that there were
large numbers of civilian victims and that attacks were widespread and occurred in the areas
that were under control of the AFRC/RUF junta forces.l3O8 This mistreatment of civilians
during junta rule demonstrates that the RUF and AFRC specifically targeted the civilian
population in order to minimise any resistance or opposition to the regime. The pattem of
crimes by the RUF and AF RC which were directed against civilians persisted and intensified
during this period.
549. From February 1998 to December 1998, civilians were further victimised. During
operations such as ‘Operation No Living Thing’, ‘Operation Spare No Soul’ and ‘Operation
Pay Yourself`, AF RC and/or RUF fighters were explicitly ordered to kill civilians by
commanders, bum their settlements and take their property, demonstrating a clear intention
to direct attacks against civilians and to terrorise the population. The latter is demonstrated
by the pattem of conduct of the attacks that were conducted with the aim of spreading fear
amongst the population in order to control them and with the aim to call on the attention of
the intemational community. During the operations fighters carried out orders by killing,
mutilating, raping and abducting civilians throughout Sierra Leone.
550. From January 1999 until December 1999, the evidence shows that the RUF and
AFRC continued to commit crimes against civilians. While these crimes took place in the
lm The areas under control during the junta period were the Western Area, parts of Kenema, Bo, Port Loko,
Bombali, Koinadugu, Kono and Kailahun Districts.

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3<;:>.sq
context of an armed conflict, attacks were particularly directed against civilians. Women and
children were amongst the victims of the attacks and attacks continued to be directed against
civilian settlements. The brutality and the vengeful nature of` the attacks further indicate a
specific focus on the civilian population.
551. The mistreatment of civilians continued into the later stages of` the conflict. The RUF
in Kono District continued to forcibly use civilian labour for mining. While active hostilities
occurred in some areas of Sierra Leone, such as in Kambia and Makeni Districts, civilians
were forcibly abducted to participate in the RUF's war effort. Civilians continued to be
intentionally targeted as sources of labour and Hghters.
552. Based on the above, the Trial Chamber Hnds beyond reasonable doubt that at all
times relevant to the indictment an attack was directed against the civilian population of
Sierra Leone by the RUF and/or RUF/AFRC.
(ii) The attack was widespread or systematic
553. The RUF's use of forced civilian labour and physical violence in Kailahun District
from 1996 until 2000 was continuous, organized and structured. From 1994 to 1998, rebels
repeatedly abducted civilians from the war front and used them for labour or trained them to
Hght. They used abducted women as "wives". The pattern of mistreatment shows that crimes
were not isolated or random, but rather formed part of a continuous campaign directed
against civilians in communities that the RUF controlled. This pattern of civilian
mistreatment remained a feature of the RUF regime throughout the conflict, and resulted in
large numbers of civilian being mistreated, through abductions, forced labour and sexual
enslavement, in various towns and villages throughout Kailahun District.
554. During the junta phase, the number of civilian subjected to severe mistreatment
increased as the conflict spread throughout the territory of Sierra Leone.
555. From February 1998 to December 1998, human rights abuses intensihed, leaving
thousands of civilians killed or mutilated by RUF and AFRC Hghters. Hundreds of civilians
were abducted, raped and the burning of houses and looting continued to occur.
556. ln 1999, the evidence shows that thousands of civilians were killed during the attack
on Freetown and the subsequent retreat through Kissy, Upgun, Calaba Town, Allen Town,
Hastings, Wellington, Waterloo and Benguema and that thousands of others were abducted,

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 6* 18 May 2012

3burnt, beaten, mutilated and/or sexually abused. Further violence was directed towards
civilians in Masiaka, Port Loko, and the Occra Hills.
557. Attacks continued to occur against the civilian population at all times relevant to the
Indictment, affecting large numbers of civilians throughout the north and east of Sierra
Leone, e.g. Kailahun, Kambia and Kono Districts. Civilians continued to be abducted by
rebels in Makeni and Kambia Districts and a large number of civilians continued to be
captured and brought to mining sites in Kono District.
558. Based on the large number of victims and the geographic scope of the crimes
throughout the indictment period, the Trial Chamber tinds that at all times relevant to the
indictment the Prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the RUF, AFRC and/or
the RUF/AFRC directed a widespread attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.
Moreover, based on the pattern and organisation of the violence the evidence demonstrates
beyond reasonable doubt that the attack was also systematic.
Conclusion on the Chageau Reguirements for Crimes Against Humanity
559. The Trial Chamber accordingly tinds that at all times relevant to the Indictment the
Prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the RUF and/or AFRC directed a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population; resulting in the following
crimes against humanity having been committed: murder (Count 2), rape (Count 4), sexual
slavery (Count 5), other inhumane acts (Count 8) and enslavement (Count 10).
B. Article 3: War Crimes
560. The Accused is charged with four counts of violations of Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions ("Common Article 3") and of Additional Protocol 11,13 O9 pursuant to
Article 3 of the Statute: acts of terrorism (Count 1), violence to life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons, in particular murder (Count 3), outrages upon personal dignity
(Count 6), violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular
cruel treatment (Count 7), and pillage (Count ll). The Trial Chamber notes that the crimes
mg The Appeals Chamber noted that "Article 3, sub-paragraphs (a) to (t), and (h) of the Special Court Statute
are taken directly from Article 4(2) of Protocol II, while Article 3(g) mirrors Article 3(1)(d) of Common Article
3" and are almost verbatim with Article 4 of the ICTR Statute. See CDF Appeal Decision on Nature of the
Armed Contlict, para. 20.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GQ, 18 May 2012

$$7-Cl l
alleged in Counts 1 and 11 are crimes enumerated in Additional Protocol ll only, and not
Common Article 3.
Applicable Law
561. Article 3 of the Statute, entitled ‘Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
· Conventions and of Additional Protocol 11’, provides that:
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed or ordered the commission of
serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection
of War victims, and of Additional Protocol [1 thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include:
a. Violence to life, health and physical or mental we11—being of persons, in particular murder as well as
cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
b. Collective punishments;
c. Taking of hostages;
d. Acts of terrorism;
e. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
f. Pillage;
g. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by
a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable
by civilised peoples; and
h. Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
562. ln order for liability to be established under Article 3 of the Statute, the acts of the
Accused must have fonned part of an anned conflict. The jurisprudence has identified three
chapeau (or general) requirements for violations against international humanitarian law.
(a) There must have been an anned conflict at the time of the alleged violation
563. Although Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions is expressed to apply to
anned conflicts "not of an international character", the distinction between internal anned
conflicts and international conflicts is "no longer of great relevance in relation to the crimes
articulated in Article 3 of the Statute as these crimes are prohibited in all conflicts. Crimes
during internal armed conflicts fonn part of the broader category of crimes during
international anned conf1ict".mO The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has ruled that "an
armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to anned force between States or protracted
anned violence between governmental authorities and organised anned groups or between
such groups within a State". ml The anned conflict "need not have been causal to the
mo CDF Appeal Decision on Nature of the Armed Conflict, para. 25. See also Milosevic Decision on Motion
for Acquittal, para. 21; Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 90.
ml Tadié Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 70.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T @,0 18 May 2012 M

3% za 2
commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have
played a substantial part in the perpetrator's ability to commit it, his decision to commit it,
the marmer in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed". I3 I2
564. The criteria for establishing the existence of an armed conflict are the intensity of the
conflict and the degree of organisation of the waning factionslm These criteria are used
"solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry,
unorganised and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to
intemational humanitarian law". I3 M
565. Intemational humanitarian law applies irom the initiation of such armed conflicts
and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is
reached; or, in the case of intemal conflicts, until a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until
that moment, intemational humanitarian law continues to apply to the entire territory of the
waning States or, in the case of intemal conflicts, the entire territory under the control of a
party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. M5
(b) A nexus existed between the alleged violation and the armed conflict
566. For an offence to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber
must establish that a sufficient link between the alleged breach of Common Article 3 or
Additional Protocol Il and the underlying armed conflict existed.l3l6 The rationale of the
said requirement is to protect the victims of intemal armed conflicts, but not from crimes
unrelated to the conflict. The nexus is satisfied where the perpetrator acted in furtherance of
or under the guise of the armed conflict. I3 W
mz Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 58.
Im Tadié Trial Judgement, para. 562; Limaj Trial Judgement, paras 84, 89.
Im Tadié Trial Judgement, para. 562 [emphasis added]; Lima] Trial Judgement, paras 84, 89.
Im Tadic Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 70; Halilovié Trial Judgement, para. 26; Kunarac
Appeal Judgement, para. 64.
IM See Tadié Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 70; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR—95—1A—T,
Judgement (TC), 7 June 2001 [Bagilishema Trial Judgement], para. 105; Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR—96—13—T,
Judgement (TC), 27 January 2000 [Musema Trial Judgement], para. 259; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR—96—3—
T, Judgement and Sentence (TC), 6 December 1999 [Rutaganda Trial Judgement], para. 104; Prosecutor v.
Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR—95—1—T, Judgement (TC), 21 May 1999 [Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial
Judgement], para. 185; Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 643.
lm Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 58; Tadié Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 70; Rutaganda Appeal
Judgement, para. 570.

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?>%2.‘1 3
567. The following factors have been considered in the jurisprudence to determine if an
act was sufficiently related to the armed conflict: whether the perpetrator was a combatant;
whether the victim was a member of the opposing party; whether the act can be said to have ~
served the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and whether the crime was committed as
part of or in the context of the perpetrator's official dutiesmg The Appeals Chamber has
stated that "in respect of Article 3, therefore; the Court need only be satisfied that an armed
conflict existed and that the alleged violations were related to the armed conf1ict". I3 19
(c) The victims were not directly taking part in the hostilities at the time of the alleged
violation
568. Both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II protect only those persons who
take no active or direct part in the hostilities, and those who have ceased to take part therein
and are therefore placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other
cause.l320 The Prosecution must therefore establish the relevant facts of each victim with a
view to ascertain whether that person was directly involved in the hostilities at the relevant
time 1321
Submissions of the Parties
T 569. The Prosecution submits that an armed conflict existed in Sierra Leonemz The
Prosecution submits that "indictment perpetrators" used civilians as sources of "food,
materials, labour, transportation assistance, shielding during hostilities, and a means of
expression and publicity". It further argues that there was a nexus between the armed
conflict and the alleged violations, as "it was the conflict itself which prompted campaigns
of terror, murder, physical and sexual violence, and looting". 1323
mg Kunarac Appeal Judgement, paras 58~59. The nexus does not imply the requirement that the perpetrator
be related or linked to one of the parties to the conflict: Akayesu Appeal Judgement, paras 443·444. See also
Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 570.
1319 CDF Appeal Decision on Nature of Armed Conflict, para. 25.
1320 Common Article 3; Article 4(l) of Additional Protocol II.
ml AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 248; Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 616.
lm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 693~694.
1323 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 695-696.

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Case No.; SCSL—O3~Ol—T 6),9 18 May 2012

3% ufl Mt
570. The Defence has made no specific submissions in relation to alleged violations of
Article 3. However, it maintains that the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
each element of the crime — including the chapeau requirements. 132 4
Findings
(i) The existence of an armed conflict in Sierra Leone during the period relevant to
the Indictment
571. The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that there was an armed conflict in
Sierra Leone, lasting from March 1991 until January 2002.1325 The parties agree that
"[d]espite temporary lulls in the fighting occasioned by a 30 November 1996 peace
agreement and a 7 July 1999 peace agreement, active hostilities continued in the Republic of
Sierra Leone until about 18 January 200271326 Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that it is
established beyond reasonable doubt that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all
times relevant to the Indictment period.
572. The Trial Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that
Armed groups who participated in the armed conflict in Sierra Leone included:
a) The Revolutionary United Front (RUF); b) The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(Arno); e) The crvri Defence Forces (CDF)".m7
Conclusions on the Chageau Reguirements for Article 3 of the Statute
573. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubts that
there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment, involving
among others members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF.
Im Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1557; Defence Pre~Trial Brief, para. 42.
mj Decision on Judicial Notice, Fact C ("There was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone from about
March1991 until about 18 January 2002").
Im Admitted Facts and Law, Fact 28. The Trial Chamber does not consider that the ceasefire agreements
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the rebel forces during the Indictment period disrupted the nexus
between the crimes charged and the armed conflict. Despite temporary lulls in the fighting occasioned by the
November 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord, the October 1998 Conakry Accord, the May 1999 ceasefire agreement,
the July 1999 Lomé Peace Accord and the November 2000 Abuja ceasefire agreement, active hostilities
continued in Sierra Leone. International humanitarian law applies in the case of internal conflicts beyond the
cessation of hostilities until a peaceful settlement is achieved. Such a settlement was not brought about until
about 18 January 2002.
M7 Decision on Judicial Notice, Fact M.

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Case No.; SCSL~03~01~T QV? 18 May 2012

3% 29S
574. The questions of whether (i) nexus existed between the alleged violation and the
armed conflict, (ii) that the victim was not directly taking part in the hostilities at the time of
the alleged violation and (iii) that the perpetrator knew or had reason to know that the victim
was not taking a direct part in the hostilities at the time of the alleged act or omission are
considered on a case by case basis in the findings on the crimes section. mg
C. Article 4: Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
575. The Accused is charged with one count of other serious violations of international
humanitarian law pursuant to Article 4(c) of the Statute: conscripting or enlisting children
under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate
actively in hostilities (Count 9).
576. Article 4(c) of the Statute provides:
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following serious
violations of international humanitarian law:
[U,]
c. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups
or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
577. The crimes listed in Article 4 of the Statute possess the same chapeau requirements
as those in Article 3 of the Statute.
578. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubts that ‘
there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the lndictment, involving
among others members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF. A
579. The questions of whether (i) nexus existed between the alleged violation and the
armed conflict, (ii) that the victim was not directly taking part in the hostilities at the time of
the alleged violation and (iii) that the perpetrator knew or had reason to know that the victim
was not taking a direct part in the hostilities at the time of the alleged act or omission are
considered on a case by case basis in the findings on the crimes section. [329
13 28 See Findings on Alleged Crimes.
13 29 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes.

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Case No.: SCSL·03—01—T F /,,, A -·{l·*(3 18 May 2012

gquqw
VII. FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS ON ALLEGED CRIMES
General submissions and Hndings regarding Crime-base evidence
580. The Prosecution observes that the Indictment timeframes as well as locations within
a District are pleaded using "the inclusive language". The Prosecution accordingly submits
that the Trial Chamber should consider for guilt of the Accused all relevant evidence
adduced where the evidence falls within the District and the approximate timeframes V
specihed by the Indictment}330 Similarly, the Prosecution submits that given the "inclusive
language" used in Count 6 of the Indictment, the Trial Chamber should consider for guilt
evidence of all forms of sexual violence (including male sexual violence victims)l33 I and not
just evidence of rape or sexual slavery; and all forms of physical violence constituting "cruel
treatment" under Count 7 or "inhumane treatment" under Count 8.1332 In support, the
Prosecution argues that it has provided "timely, clear and consistent notice" to the Accused
of the material facts underpinning the charges, by the original Indictment, First Amended
Indictment, Second Amended Indictment, Case Summary, Amended Case Summary, Pre- i
Trial Brief Opening Statement and/or witness statements.l333 The Prosecution makes
specihc submissions in relation to the specific Counts as shown hereunder.
581. The Defence submits that it has not substantively addressed crime base evidence in
its submissions because its position from the outset is that it accepts that crimes were indeed
committed in Sierra Leone although it denies that the Accused is responsible for these
crimes}334 The Defence maintains however, that the onus of proving beyond reasonable
doubt the elements of the crimes charged in the Indictment, as well as the guilt of the
Accused, lies squarely upon the Prosecution.l335 In addition, the Defence requests the Trial
Chamber to exclude Prosecution evidence of crimes that fall outside the temporal or
geographical scope of the Indictment, or to impose strict limits on the degree to which such
evidence may be taken into consideration during deliberations.l336
133 0 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 662.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 665.
lm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 663.
lm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 664.
mil Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1557.
lm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 27.
lm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 42-46.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T mkq 18 May 2012 E

Zsufl il-
582. Tl1e Trial Chamber has, in the Chapter on Preliminary Issues, ruled on evidence
falling outside the temporal and/0r geographical scope of the Indictment,m7 locations and
criminal acts not specifically pleaded in the Indictmentgmg as well as timeframes
imprecisely pleaded in the Indictmentmg The submissions relating to specific C0unts in the
Indictment are appropriately handled under each C0unt. Tl1e Trial Chamber will now
examine the evidence relating to the various Counts in the Indictment. For ease of reference
C0unt 1 (Acts of terrorism) is examined after the other C0unts as it encompasses evidence
relating to all the other Counts. ta examining the crime-base evidence, the Trial Chamber
does not at this stage examine the role if any, played by the Accused or his alleged criminal
responsibility for the said crimes, as these are matters more appropriately examined under
the Chapter on the Role of the Accused and his alleged criminal responsibility.l34O
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber's findings in this Chapter are limited to the primary
perpetrators.
A. Counts 2 and 3 gMurder or "UnlawfulKi11i11gs"[
Allegations and Submissions
583. Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment allege the following particulars, namely, that
"Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of RUF, AFRC,
AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/0r Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in
concert with, under the direction and control of and/0r subordinate to the Accused,
throughout Sierra Leone, unlawfully killed an unknown number of civilians, including the
rp11pw1ng‘3"‘
i. In Kenema District between about 25 May 1997 and about 31 March 1998, in
various locations including Kenema town and the T0ng0 Fields area;l342
ii. In Kono District between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 January 2000, in
various locations including Koidu, T0mb0du or Tumb0du, Koidu Geiya 0r
Im Preliminary Issues: Evidence Outside of the Scope of the Indictment and./or Jurisdiction of the Court.
mg Preliminary Issues: Issues relating to the Pleadin in the Indictment.
mq Preliminary Issues: Issues relating to the Pleadin in the Indictment.
lm) See Chapter VIII.
'3"' Indictment, para. 9.
***2 inrirptment. para. 10.

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Case No.; SCSL—O3—01—T , 18 May 2012

Koidu Gieya, Koidu Buma, Yengema, Paema or Peyima, Bomboa fuidu,
Bumpe, Nimikoro or Njaima Nimikoro and Mortema,13313
iii. In Kailahun District between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 June 1998, in
various locations including Kailahun town,1344 and
iv. In Freetown and the Western Area between about 21 December 1998 and 28
February 1999, in locations throughout Freetown, including the State House,
Kissy, Fourah Bay, Upgun, Calaba Town, Allen Town and Tower Hill areas of
the city, and Hastings, Wellington, Tumbo, Waterloo and Benguema in the
Western Area".1345
584. The Prosecution submits that throughout the Sierra Leone conflict, massive numbers
of civilians were unlawfully killed at the hands of the Indictment perpetrators subordinate to
the Accused, as an integral part of the campaign of terror unleashed upon villages, towns
and cities,13316 and/or in order to capture the attention of the international community,1347
and/or as a punishment or example for failure to support the AFRC/RUF Junta Government
and forces.1348 The Prosecution further submits that the use of unlawful killin s as an
8
instrument of terror was ordered by senior RUF commanders like Foday Sankoh, Sam
Bockarie, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon as well as senior AFRC commanders like Johnny
Paul Koroma and Alex Tamba Brima, and was endorsed by the Accused.1349 Furthermore, I
the Prosecution submits that in addition to the evidence of unlawful killings in the locations
s eciiied in the Indictment, civilians were killed durin the pre—Indictment eriod and in
P 8 P
other villages, towns and districts not pleaded in the Indictment throughout Sierra Leone.133O
Evidence and Deliberations
1333 Indictment, para. 1 1
1344 Indictment, para. 12
1343 Indictment, para. 13.
1343 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 757-760.
1337 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 761 -762.
1348 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 761 -762. .
1349 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 759-760.
13 30 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 760.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T Og J 18 May 2012

1. Alleged unlawful killings in Kenema District Q25 May 1997 to about 31 March 1998;
585. The Trial Chamber heard evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt that after
the 25 May 1997 overthrow of the Tejan Kabbah Government by the Junta forces, a large
contingent of AFRC/ RUF forces were based in Kenema Townml until the ECOMOG
Intervention in mid-February 1998 when they were forced to flee the areamz The RUF
forces led by Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) were based at the NIC Compound on Dama
Road in Kenema Town, while the AFRC forces led by Eddie Kanneh, the Secretary of State
East, were based at 14 Hangha Road.l353 Notwithstanding that the AFRC and RUF forces
had separate command structures, the two groups worked in collaboration with each other in
Kenema Town during this period.l354 Other commanders in Kenema Town at this time
included Manawa, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Akimlm and Massaquoi.l356 Shortly after the
establishment of the Junta Government in Freetown, the AFRC/ RUF forces in Kenema
Town attempted to have a reconciliation meeting with one Kamoh Brima Bangura, who was
the leader of the Civil Defence Force (a.k.a. Kamajors). M7 When the Kamajor leader
refused to cooperate, Col. Eddie Kanneh and Col. Sam Bockarie ordered his arrest, sparking
off hostilities between the AFRC/RUF forces on the one hand, and the Kamajors and
ECOMOG forces on the other.l358 After 5 June 1997, the AFRC/RUF forces drove out the
ml Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 14989, 14991, 15101and 15108; Alex Bao,
Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16649-16652; Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", p.
15309. The AFRC was based at brigade headquarters near the reservation and the RUF was based on Dama
Road at the NIC compound. Both the AF RC and the RUF shared a secretariat administrative building on Hangha
Road. Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16652; Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May
2005", p. 15309.
B52 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 14991.
lm Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16653; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July
2005", pp. 15119, 15190. See also Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15309; Abdul
Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17509-17511; TF1-360, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3090; TF1-
371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2800-2803; Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp.
14992, 15110. See also Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9388.
B54 Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16653; Exh P178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005"
p. 15310.
USS These are described as RUF Commanders in Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp.
14991-14993; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15119-15120, 15130; TF1-590,
Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11916-11917; Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20148.
USO Massaquoi is described as an AF RC soldier who was a sergeant in charge of operations under Eddie Karmeh.
Confidential Exhibit 178B, pp. 15368-15369. See also Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June
2005", p. 14992.
W7 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15311.
B58 Adesanya Hyde, Transcript 23 September 2008, pp. 17005-17006; Exh. P178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript
12 May 2005" p. 15311.

---- End of Page 207 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
és jg

Kamajor and ECOMOG forces from Kenema Town.l339 The said hostilities continued until
the Junta forces were driven out of Kenema District in mid-February 1998. During the
eriod Ma 1997 to Februar 1998 man civilians in Kenema District sus ected of
P Y V Y Y P
supporting or cooperating with the Civil Defence Force were murdered, and/or had their
property looted or destroyed, by the AF RC/RUF forces. 1360
586. On 11 August 1997, under the command of Issa Sesay, Akim, and Sam Bockarie, the
AF RC/RUF forces travelled with heavy armaments from Kenema Town to Tongo Fieldsl36*
where they took control of the area from the Kamajors and subsequently looted civilian
property for three days.*363 Persons who fled the area reported that the RUF/AFRC forces
captured able-bodied men to forcibly mine diamonds for them and in the process, killed
many civilians who refused to cooperate.l363 During the AFRC/RUF occupation of Tongo
Fields, Sam Bockarie was in command and control of the Junta forces.*363 Other AFRC
commanders in Tongo Fields at this time included the PLO-2,*363 Captain Yamao Kati,
Captain J alloh, Sergeant Junior, Seth Marrah, and Victor,l366 while other RUF commanders
included Ca tain Ea le a.k.a. Karmoh Kanneh , Amu e eh, and Ban a.*367
P S Y P Y
587. In relation to unlawful killings alleged to have taken place in Kenema District the
Trial Chamber has considered the testimony of Prosecution Witnesses Alex Sheku Bao,
Adesanya Sanya Hyde, Kannoh Kanneh, Augustine Mallah, Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Issac
Tamba Mongor, Samuel Kargbo, protected Prosecution Witnesses TF 1-062, TF 1-375, TF 1-
567, TF 1-590, Defence Witnesses Issa Sesay, Sam Kolleh, protected Defence Witnesses
*339 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 14991; Exhibit P-174, "RUF Transcript of
TF1-122, 7 July 2005", p. 15282; Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16651; Exhibit P—178A "TF1-125,
RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15316; Adesanya Hyde, Transcript 23 September 2008. p. 17004.
*360 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005" pp. 15312-15316.
*36* Tongo Fields is a diamond mining area located in Kenema District about 27 miles from Kenema Town and is
made up of over ten villages spread out over an eight square kilometre area. See testimony of Abdul Conteh,
Transcript 29 September 2001, pp. 17495-17496 and 30 September 2008, p. 17560.
*363 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14912-14918; Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122,
AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15055-15056; TF1-062, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23632-23633;
Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17511; Exhibit D-063, "Lower Bambura Chiefdom Situation
Reports Prepared by Abdul Conteh", p. 1. See also TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12884
*363 Exhibit P-173, "TFl—l22, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 1505545056; Exhibit P—l74, "TF1—122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15159.
*363 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14953, 14960-14961.
*363 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20139, 20141, 20153.
*366 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14928—l4929, 14956—l4957.
*367 Exhibit P-174, "TF1—122, RUF riaiisciipt 7 Juiy 2005*; p. 15159.

---- End of Page 208 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T rrg_,,.. —’/I mg 18 May 2012
_//%

38 50 1
ocr-068, ocr-146 and Exhibits P-078,*368 P-173,l369 P-174,*370 P-175,*37* P-17sA,‘"2 P-
278,*373 P-366*374 and D-063.*375
(a) Kenema Town
(i) Killing of Mr Dowei
588. Witness Alex Baomb testified that for the period of nine months from about the end
of Ma 1997 to Febma 1998 when the AFRC/RUF forces were based in Kenema Town,
Y YY
he was working as a station sergeant based at Kenema Town Police Station.m7 He stated
that "right after the takeover"m8 in Kenema Town a civilian housewife called Mrs. Dowei
filed a comprehensive report with Kenema Police Station to the effect that AFRC/RUF
forces had attacked her home, looted all her property and shot her husband in the head and
stomach when he interyened to revent them from takin a dee freezer from his house. Mr
P S P
Dowei consequently died from the gunshot woundsmg In his prior testimony, Bao stated
that althou he was not resent when Mrs Dowei made her statement to the Kenema Police,
P
he subsequently went to Mrs Dowei's house to investigate the incident and saw the corpse of
lm Amnesty International Report entitled "Sierra Leone — 1998 — A year of Atrocities against Civilians"
(SCSL/ERN/88).
Bw The Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript 24 June 2005, testimony of Witness TFl-122, pp.
14985-15113.
mo The Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-04- 15-T, Transcript 7-8 July 2005, testimony of Witness TFl-122, pp.
15114-15303.
ml Copy ofa Diary dated 13/1/98 to 7/2/98 tendered by Witness TF1-122 (APRC Exhibit P24 and RUF Exhibit
28), pp. 15507-15705.
mz The Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript 12 May 2005, testimony of Witness TF1-125, pp.
15304-15342.
lm The Prosecutor v. Brirna et al., SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript 27 June 2005, testimony of Witness TF1-062, pp.
14908—14984 (SCSL/ERN/366).
W4 Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, US Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 26 February 1999; pp. 00025071-para 4, 00025072-para 6, 00025073-
aras 3-4, 00025074-para 9, 00025075- para 2, 00025077-para 5, 00025072-para 3 (CMS pp. 22798-22802,
P
22804).
ms Reports of the Lower Bambara Chiefdom prepared by Witness TF1-060 Abdul Otonjo Conteh in September,
October and November 1997.
W6 Alex Bao (TF1-122) gave evidence for the Prosecution in the AFRC and RUF trials which was admitted into
evidence in the Taylor Trial pursuant to Rule 92bis as Prosecution Exhibits P-173 and P-174, respectively ("prior
testimony"). Alex Bao was cross-examined by the Defence in this trial regarding his prior testimony. Alex Bao,
Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16758.
lm Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16758. See also Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, APRC Transcript 24
June 2005", pp 14991, 15101, 15108.
lm Exhibit P-173, "TFl-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15087.
mg Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, APRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15011; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15141-15412; See also Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16656.

---- End of Page 209 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T nd 18 May 2012 E
%

Mr Dowei with two bullet wounds. However, he could not conduct a proper investigation as
"the area was tense and there was shooting all over the place". BSO
Findings
589. The Trial Chamber finds Bao's account of this killing in the three trials, namely, the
RUF, AF RC and the current trial, to be consistent and credible. His testimony is based on an
official complaint filed by Mrs. Dowei, an eye witness to the killing. Although he could not
carry out a thorough investigation due to the shooting going on in the area, Bao visited the
Dowei residence and saw the body of the deceased bearing two bullet wounds as described
by Mrs. Dowei in her Police Statement. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the AF RC/ RUF forces, intentionally shot and killed Mr
Dowei, a civilian taking no active part in the hostilities, in order to steal his property. Given
that Mr Dowei was killed while trying to protect his property from being looted, the Trial
Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators carried out this killing with the
primary purpose of instilling terror in other civilians who would similarly attempt to resist
the looting.
(ii) Killing of three civilians near Mambu Street
590. ln his prior testimony, Alex Bao further stated that during the entire Junta period,l38l
both the RUF rebels and AF RC juntas looted excessively in Kenema Town. On one
occasion they went to Mambu Street to loot, and for the rest of the day were shooting in the
area}382 Later, Bao saw the RUF/AF RC fighters, including Commanders Akim and
Bockarie, with looted property, singing that "they had driven the Kamajors out of the
area".l383 That evening Bao went to a house on Mambu Street that belonged to one Pa
Mansaray. When he arrived, the house was on fire. M4 Bao testified that the house had
1380 Exhibit P-174, "TFl-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15141.
ml Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15047.
1382 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15047. Bao testified that "[t]hey take patrol,
every day they go with their pickup from village to village and when they are coming back we see them with
looted property. And most of the properties contained blood stains", and that he knew this because "The police
have more than 50 reports. Even above hundreds of looting and killing from village to village .... reports that they
attacked their village, killed their people, looted their properties. A hundred of cases reported of widespread
looting and killing of innocent people". Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15049-
15050.
lm Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15048-15049.
1384 Exhibit P-173, "TFl-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15048, 15050.

---- End of Page 210 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T gj 18 May 2012

38 Eoé
supposedly been occupied by Kamajors, but by the time he went there, there were no
Kamajors at the house.l385 On cross-examination in this trial, Bao clarified that the AFRC
and RUF fighters burned down Pa Mansaray's house because the Kamajors were using it as
a base.l386 Bao testified that he went down to the swamp behind Pa Mansaray's house where
he saw three dead bodies lying in the street.l387 He described the bodies as two elderly men
and one young man, all wearing "civilian plain cloth".l388 Bao testified that the attack on
Mambu Street was plarmed by AFRC and RUF fighters including Sam Bockarie and Akim,
and that he had seen Akim riding around Kenema Town that day on the bonnet of a
Mercedes with an AK-47 rifle in his hand}389
Findings
591. Bao's testimony regarding his discovery of three corpses behind the house of Pa
Mansaray is circumstantial and uncorroborated. Bao did not witness the actual killing of the
three persons and is therefore unaware of the specific circumstances of their death. He
merely assumed that the three victims were killed by the AFRC/RUF forces that were
engaged in the looting of civilian property. The Prosecution did not adduce any evidence
connecting those deaths in any way to the looting spree that had been taking place earlier
that day or to the burning of Pa Mansaray's house. Given Bao's testimony that fighting
between the AFRC/RUF fighters and the Kamajors was ongoing around the area and that Pa
Mansaray's house was being used as a base for the Kamajors, it is possible that the three
people could have been killed in the cross fire by either group. In the circumstances, the
Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
death of the three persons behind Pa Mansaray's house was unlawfully caused by the
AFRC/RUF as alleged.
(iii) Killing of Bonnie Wailer and other suspected burglars
[385 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15051-15052; Exhibit P-174, p. 15135.
H86 Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16658.
B87 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15048, 15052; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15136.
. [388 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15048, 15042. "[t]hey were in civilian plain
cloth [...].They were not in Kamajor uniform at all". Exhibit P-173, "TF 1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005",
pp. 15048, 15042.
mg Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15136.

---- End of Page 211 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T "`£ 18 May 2012
/ \l

592. Alex Bao further testified that one moming in late June 1997,*390 upon his arrival at
the Police station, he found a man whom he knew well called Bonnie Wailer who had been
taken into custody for alleged "house-breaking and larceny".*39* Bao described Wailer as
wearing "combat trousers and plain cloth" at the time of his detention.*392 VVhen Bao asked
Wailer why he was dressed in combat trousers, Wailer explained that he and his colleagues
"went to run a mission" but he ran out of luck and was caught, beaten and then taken to the
Police Station.*393 Bao further testified that later on that day, RUF Commander Sam
Bockarie accompanied by an AFRC Lieutenant and several RUF and AF RC men came to
the Police Station and took away Bonnie Wailer, supposedly for him to show them where
they could find Wailer's "colleagues". The group returned two hours later with Wailer and
two other men.*394 Bao knew one of the two men to be a "notorious criminal" but did not
know the other one.*395 Bonnie Wailer and the two men were lined up in front of the police
officers and many civilians who had gathered and Bao heard Sam Bockarie order his men to
kill the three suspects.*3% The AFRC juntas publicly executed the three suspects and left
their bodies on display for the rest of the day.*397 Later on at night, the three corpses were
loaded onto a military pickup vehicle and taken away.*398
*390 Exhibit P-17}, "TE1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15002.
*3°* Exhibit P—17}, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15002-1500}; Exhibit P—174, "TF1—122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 151}1; Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16684.
*393 Exhibit P-17}, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15002-1500}.
*3°3 Exhibit P—173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15002-1500}; Exhibit P—174, "TF1—122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 151}1; Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16684. Under cross-
examination in the RUF trial the witness further explained that "[a]ccording to what Bonnie Wailer told me, he
was arrested by civilian, right in the house where they went and broke into. The civilian beat him up and brought
him to the police station, where he was detained". Exhibit P-174, "TE1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p.
15201.
*394 Exhibit P-17}, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 1500}-15004; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 151}2-151}}; Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16685.
*3°5 Exhibit P-17}, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15003; Exhibit P-174, "TF1—122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 151}2; Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16686.
*3% Exhibit P—173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15006; Exhibit P—174, "TF1—122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 151}}.
*397 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15006; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 151}}; Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16689.
*333 Exhibit P-17}, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15006-15007; Exhibit P—l74, "TF1—122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", 7 July 2005", p. 151}4.

---- End of Page 212 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 2/ 18 May 2012

593. Adesanya Hyde,l399 a colleague of Alex Bao's who was a police officer and the
second-in-command at the Kenema District Criminal lnvestigation Department in 1997 and
19981400, also gave evidence regarding these killings. He stated in his prior testimonymm that
in the first week of the coup in May 1997,1402 Bonnie Wailer, Sydney Cole, Mr Bangura,
and an unknown man were brought to the police station by civilians on suspicion of
"burglary and larceny" charges.l4O3 Hyde stated that he was one of the police officers who
escorted Wailer to look for the other suspects. According to Hyde, the four men had
impersonated the AFRC/RUF rebels by dressing up in military unifonn and robbing
civilians at gun point. Hyde testified that the AFRC/RUF fighters who arrested the suspects
shot each suspect "more than ten times" in the legs before taking them to the police station.
1404
594. According to Hyde, the AFRC/RUF rebels were upset because "the suspects were
impersonating the juntas by wearing military fatigues and robbing civilians. As the
revolution was in its early stages, the rebels did not want this incident to tarnish the Junta's
— image".l4O5 After arresting the four suspects, the AFRC/RUF fighters sent word to the
citizens of Kenema Town that they should come to the Police compound to witness the
public executions.l4O6 The AFRC hierarchy including Eddie Kanneh and Massaquoi were
also present to witness the executions}407 Hyde stated that the four suspects were made to
lie down on the floor of the Police station and an RUF man shot each of the men at close
range on the orders of an AFRC officer.l4O8 Hyde stated that he left the scene after the first
shooting as he was too traumatised to watch and instead observed the scene from the safety
of his office window. MO9
mg Adesanya Hyde gave evidence for the Prosecution in the RUF trial which was admitted into evidence in the
Taylor Trial pursuant to Rule 92bis as Prosecution Exhibits P-178A and P-178B ("prior testimony"). Adesanya
Hyde, Transcript 23 September 2008, p. 17032. Hyde was cross-examined by the Defence in this trial regarding
his prior testimony. Adesanya Hyde, Transcript 23 September 2008, p. 16980.
Mm Exhibit P-178B (confidential), p. 15348; See also Adesanya Hyde, Transcript 23 September 2008, p. 16995.
ml Exhibit P-178B, (confidential); Adesanya Hyde, Transcript 23 September 2008, p. 16995.
lm Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", pp. 15315-15316, 15375.
1403 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", pp. 15314-15315; Exhibit P-178B
(confidential)., p. 15355
Mm Exhibit P-178B (confidential), p. 15371.
MOS Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", pp. 15314-15315.
"‘"° Eianbir P-178B, RUF Transcript p. 15365.
Mm Exhibit P-178B, RUF Transcript p. 15365.
MOB Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, RUF Transcript 12 May 2005", pp. 15314-15315.
"‘°" Eranbir 1>-17813, nur Transcript p. 15370.

---- End of Page 213 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // QB. 18 May 2012

Same
Findings
595. Although there are differences between the accounts of Bao and Hyde regarding the
number of suspects arrested and as to the person that pulled the trigger, their accounts
corroborate each other in many important respects. First, both witnesses testified that the
event happened soon after the coup of May 1997. Second, both witnesses stated that the
suspects were arrested by a combined team of AFRC/RUF fighters on allegations of
burglary and theft. Third, they both described at least one of the suspects as being a
"notorious criminal". Fourth, both witnesses stated that the execution of the suspects was
public and witnessedby the citizens of Kenema Town. Fifth, both witnesses stated that
although Bonnie Wailer was dressed in combat uniform he was, in fact, a civilian who was
impersonating the rebels. Sixth, according to both witnesses, the suspects had not officially
been charged in a court of law when they were executed. Lastly, the suspects were shot dead
by one of the AFRC/RUF fighters present on the orders of a superior commander.
596. Given that Hyde was traumatised and left the scene soon after the first shot, the Trial
Chamber relies more on the evidence of Bao who stayed and who testified that he heard Sam
Bockarie give the order to shoot the suspects. Accordingly, based on the above evidence, the
Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in late
May or June 1997 at Kenema Town Police Station, a group of AFRC/RUF fighters acting
under the orders of Sam Bockarie and in the presence of senior AFRC commander Eddie ~
Karmeh, intentionally killed three persons. Bao testified that it was three persons suspected
of burglary, including Bonnie Wailer, Sydney Cole and Bangura, all civilians who were not
taking an active part in hostilities.
597. In this instance, the evidence establishes that the AFRC/RUF commanders, including
Sam Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh, gathered the citizens of Kenema Town whom they
specifically wanted to witness the punishment meted out to civilians who would dare to
impersonate the rebels or bring their name into disrepute. These executions took place at the
police station and in full view of the police personnel and members of the public, and the
bodies were left at the scene on display for the rest of the day as an example to the residents
of Kenema Town. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds beyond reasonable doubt that the
perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence with the primary purpose
of instilling terror in the civilian population in Kenema.
(iv) Killing of a farmer at the NIC Building

---- End of Page 214 ---------------------------


Case No.: sCsL-03-01-T QM.; 18 May 2012

598. In his prior testimony, Alex Bao testified that at the end of the rainy season in 1997,
which is in September,W0 a group of RUF rebels caught a civilian man who was "brushing a
swamp" which is a colloquial way to describe preparing a field for farming.Wl Bao first saw
the man when the RUF rebels were marching him up Maxwell Khobe Street in Kenema
Town.W2 The man was wearing a "working cloth", had mud all over his body and was
carrying a cutlass in his hand.W3 Based on the man's appearance, Bao concluded that he
was a farmer who had been apprehended by his captors while he was working on his fields
in the swamp.W4 The rebels were dancing and singing that they had "captured a Kamajor,
and that they would take him to Sam Bockarie".W5 Bao followed them out of curiosityW6
but before he could catch up with them, he heard two gunshots from a pistol as he was
approaching the NIC building. On arrival at the scene he saw Sam Bockarie brandishing a
pistol in the air, standing over the f`a1rner's body which had bullet wounds in the head and
stomach.W7 The other onlookers confirmed to Bao that Bockarie had shot the f3I'1'I'1€1'.l4l8
Bao heard Bockarie say that he "must finish all of them", meaning Kamajors, and ordering
his "boys" to dump the farmer's body into a hole behind the NIC building. W9
Findings
599. The Trial Chamber finds Bao's account of this killing in the three trials, namely, the
RUF trial, AFRC trial and the current trial, to be detailed, consistent and credible. Based on
that evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the victim was a civilian farmer taking no active
part in the hostilities when he met his death. Although Bao's account of who actually shot
WO Exhibit P-173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15096, 15099—15100; Exhibit P—l74, "TF1—
122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15140.
Wl Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15007—15010.
W2 Exhibit P-173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15007—15009, 15086; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-
122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15140, 15226.
W3 Exhibit P—173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15095—15096; Exhibit P—l74, "TF1-122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15140.
W4 Exhibit P—173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15007—15008; 15095—15096; Exhibit P—l74,
"TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15140.
W5 Exhibit P—173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15010; Exhibit P—l74, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15140, 15228.
W6 Exhibit P-173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15009; 15095-15096; Exhibit P-174, "TF1—
122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15140, 15227—15228.
W7 Exhibit P—173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15009, 15085, 15097-15098; Exhibit P—l74,
"TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15141, 15228.
"'8 Exhibit P-173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 Jrrrir-> 2005**, p. 15098.
Wo Exhibit P—173, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15010; Exhibit P-174, "TF1—122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15141, 15228.

---- End of Page 215 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T QR 18 May 2012

2>8$o8
the farmer is based partly on circumstantial evidence and partly on hearsay from the
bystanders, the Trial Chamber finds that the circumstances relating to the arrest and shooting
of the victim, including: 1) the rebels dancing and singing while referring to the victim as "a
Kamajor, that they had captured and would take to Sam Bockarie", 2) the statements Sam
Bockarie made at the scene of crime that he must finish all the Kamajors and his brandishing
of the smoking gun over the victim's body; and 3) the statements of bystanders implicating
Bockarie in the killing, all lead to one reasonable inference that Sam Bockarie intentionally
shot and killed a captured farmer in cold blood because he suspected that he was a Kamajor.
The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that around September 1997 in front of the NIC building then housing the RUF rebels,
Sam Bockarie intentionally shot and killed a farmer that was not taking an active part in
hostilities.
600. In this instance, the AFRC/RUF fighters accused the farmer of being a Kamajor (i.e.
a perceived enemy of the Junta forces) prior to handing him over to Bockarie. After killing
the farmer in full view of the public, Bockarie announced that he would do the same to all
Kamajors, thereby sending a clear and unequivocal message to the civilian population not to
associate with the Junta's enemies. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
Sam Bockarie wilfully made the victim the object of such violence with the primary purpose
of instilling terror in the civilian population of Kenema Town.
(v) Killing of Santos and an alleged thief
601. In his prior testimony, Alex Bao testified that during the rainy season in November
1997,1420 an NGOMH filed a report with Kenema Police Station that thieves had broken into
the NGO's warehouse and stolen a large quantity of expensive drugs.1422 No sooner had the
police started investigating the complaint than Sam Bockarie came to the police station
asking how far the investigation had gone. Bockarie told the police officers, including Bao,
that he had information about the suspects and that he was going to "help the Police by
M20 Exhibit P-173, "24 June 2005, AFRC Transcript ofTF1-122", pp. 15012, 15092.
‘*2‘ Witness explained that he cannot remember whether this NGO was Medicines Sans Frontier (MSF) or the
Intemational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as both were based in Kenema Town. See Exhibit P—173,
"TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15093; Exhibit P-174, ‘"TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005",
%2;5E;l?ibit P-173, ‘"TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15012; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15143.

---- End of Page 216 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / arg I 18 May 2012

sssza **1
looking for the suspects". Bao stated that shortly thereaHer there was a widespread rumour
that Bockarie had arrested and killed the alleged thief and a boy named Santos in front of
Capital Cinema, where Santos worked}423 Bao stated that he knew Santos very well. Bao
stated that the corpses of the two people were 1eH in front of his house, opposite the Cinema
for three days before Sam Bockarie and "his boys" loaded the bodies onto their vehicle and
took them away. M4
Findings
602. The Trial Chamber finds Bao's account of these killings in the three trials, namely,
the RUF, AFRC and the current trial, to be consistent and credible. Although Bao's evidence
as to who killed the two people is partly circumstantial and partly based on hearsay or
"widespread rumour", the Trial Chamber finds that the circumstances surrounding these
deaths, including the inquiry by Sam Bockarie about the progress of the police investigation
into the alleged theH, his unsolicited offer to help the police by looking for the suspects, and
his collection of the bodies from the scene of crime three days later, all lead to one
reasonable inference that Sam Bockarie intentionally killed these two people, neither of
whom had properly been tried by a court of law. This circumstantial evidence corroborates
the hearsay evidence implicating Sam Bockarie in these killings. Accordingly, the Trial
Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in November
1997 in front of Capital Cinema in Kenema Town, Sam Bockarie intentionally shot and
killed two civilians, including one Santos, that were not taking an active part in hostilities.
603. Given that perpetrators summarily executed the civilian suspects without trial and
1eH their bodies lying in full public view for three days before taking them away, the Trial
Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Sam Bockarie wilfully made the victim the
object of such violence with the primary purpose of the killings to instil terror in the civilian
population in Kenema Town.
(vi) Killing of an alleged "Kamajor Boss" on Hangha Road
"23 Exhibit P—173, "AFRC Transcript bf TF1—122, 24 June 2005", p. 15013, 15092; Exhibit P—174, "RUF
Transcript ofTF1—122, 7 July 2005"’, p. 15143.
'"" Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript bf TF1-122, 24 June 2005", pp. 15012—15015; Exhibit P—174, **RUE
Transcript ofTF1—122, 7 July 2005", p. 15144.

---- End of Page 217 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T (LQ 18 May 2012

604. In his prior testimony, Alex Bao testitied that in late December 1997, AFRC/RUF
tighters launched an attack against the residents of Kenema Town which they named
"Operation No Living Thing".l425 One morning during that operation, Bao saw the body of
"a fat man dressed in plain clothes and not Kamajor uniform" lying motionless along
Hangha Road by the Sierra Leone Telecommunications building in Kenema Town.l426 Bao
saw the RUF/AFRC juntas dancing and singing aloud that "they had captured and killed the
Kamajor boss".l"m Bao saw one of the rebels split open the dead man's belly with a
bayonet, remove the intestines and stretch them across the street, using it as a checkpoint}428
The disembowelled body of the man remained at the "checkpoint" which was manned by the
AFRC/RUF tighters, for three days after which the AFRC/RUF tighters took the corpse
away}429 During cross-examination in this trial, Bao testified that "[t]he man is no Kamajor.
When they want to kill innocent people, they brand you as a Kamajor. That man was just a
peaceful citizen". 1430
Findings
605. The Trial Chamber tinds Bao's account of this killing in the three trials, namely, the
RUF, AFRC and the current trial, to be consistent and credible. Based on that evidence, the
Trial Chamber is satistied beyond reasonable doubt that the man described by the witness as
"a peaceful citizen" and as wearing "plain clothes and not a Kamajor uniform" was a
civilian not taking an active part in the hostilities when he was killed. Although Bao's
evidence as to who killed this man is circumstantial, the Trial Chamber tinds that the
circumstances surrounding that death, including the bizarre conduct of the AFRC/RUF
fighters in dancing and singing aloud that "they had captured and killed the Kamajor boss",
and disembowelling his body and using the entrails as a "check point", all reasonably lead to
one inference that the AFRC/RUF tighters intentionally killed this civilian suspecting him of
M25 Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript of TF1-122, 24 June 2005", pp. 15016, 15019; Exhibit P-174, "RUF
Transcript of TF 1-122, 7 July 2005", p. 15144. Bao explained that during this "Operation" the AFRC/RUF
routinely harassed civilians, stopping and searching them and looting their property under the pretext that the
AFRC/RUF were "looking for Kamajors".
1426 Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript of TF1-122, 24 June 2005", p. 15017-15018; Exhibit P-174, "RUF
Transcript ofTF1-122, 7 July 2005", pp. 15145-15146.
1427 Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript of TF1-122, 24 June 2005", p. 15017; Exhibit P-174, "RUF Transcript of
TF1-122, 7 July 2005", pp. 15145-15146,
bm Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15018; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15145-15146.
1429 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15018.
""° Alex Bao, Trarreerrpt 18 September 201 1, p. 16657. ‘

---- End of Page 218 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // I 18 May 2012 M

being a member of the Civil Defence Force, a perceived enemy of the AF RC/RUF forces.
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that in December 1997 on Hangha Street near the Sierra Leone Telecommunication
house, the AF RC/RUF fighters intentionally killed a civilian that was not taking an active
part in hostilities.
606. Given that this killing was part of the operation code-named "Operation No living
thing", the AFRC/RUF fighters’ bizarre conduct in disembowelling the man's body and
using the entrails as a "check point", and in leaving his body on public display for three days
before removing it, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
wilfi1lly made the victim the object of such violence with the primary purpose of the killing
to instil terror in the civilian population in Kenema Town.
(vii) Killing of Mohamed F ityia
607. Witness Karmoh Kanneh (a.k.a. Captain Eagle) a former civilian captured and
enlisted as a fighter by the RUF in 19911431 stated that his RUF contingent led by Sam
Bockarie was based at the NIC compound in Kenema Town for three to four months before
the ECOMOG Intervention took place in Freetown,1432 rrpm where the RUF routinely
conducted operations, including the capture of Tongo Fields.1433 When Kanneh was in
Kenema Town, members of the RUF and AF RC were looting civilian property. This led to
Sam Bockarie issuing an order to put the looting under control.1434 During the looting
outbreak Kanneh investigated an allegation by a Mandingo man that Mohamed Fityia, a
businessman, had driven soldiers in his car to loot the Mandingo man's house.1435 Kanneh
found out that F ityia had only offered to drive his car hoping that the soldiers would not
steal it.143 6 Kanneh told this to Bockarie, but the latter did not believe the story and became
very angry with Kanneh. Bockarie then shot and killed F ityia in front of Kanneh.l437
143 I Kamioh Kanneh, Transcript, 8 May 2008, p. 9312.
lm Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript, 8 May 2008, p. 9388. Since the ECOMOG intervention took place in February
1998, the Trial Chamber estimates that Karmeh was in Kenema Town from about October 1997 onwards.
lim Kannoh Karmeh, Transcript, 8 May 2008, pp. 9367-9369.
1434 Kamioh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9411. The timing of the event is prior to the killing of BS
Massaquoi. Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9411.
1435 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9409-9411.
*43** Kannoh Kaapah, rrapppppr 9 May 2008, pp. 9409-9410. .
lm Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9411.

---- End of Page 219 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (N 18 May 2012
N

3 531 1
608. Another witness, Alex Sheku Bao, testified in this trial regarding what he had heard
about the death of one businessman called Fityia in Kenema Town. Although Bao had said
nothing about Fityia's death in his prior testimony in the AFRC and RUF trials, Bao testified
in cross-examination in this trial, that sometime between 25 May 1997 and January 1998 he
heard from people in Kenema that a businessman called Fityia hired two AFRC and two
RUF fighters to rob a large amount of money from one Shekuna, a Lebanese diamond dealer
in Kenema Town.l438 Bao later heard rumoursthat Bockarie had killed Fityia because he
was suspected of this crime.l439 He went to the scene to investigate and found Fityia's dead
body lying on Sombo Street.l44O \Vhen asked by the Defence why his version of events
differed from that given by Karmoh Kanneh, Bao admitted that his version of events based
on hearsay was not as accurate as Kanneh's direct evidence, but that he had seen Fityia's
body lying in Sombo Street.
Findings
609. The Trial Chamber finds Karmoh Kanneh's eyewitness account of the killing of
Fityia credible and consistent. Kanneh was based at the RUF base at the NIC compound in
Kenema Town and was personally involved in investigating the complaint against Fityia. He
was also present when Sam Bockarie shot Fityia. The Trial Chamber accepts Bao's evidence
that he saw Fityia's body lying in Sombo Street but finds his evidence as to Fityia's alleged
involvement in the robbery of a Lebanese diamond dealer unreliable as it is based on
uncorroborated hearsay. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that a few months before the ECOMOG intervention, in
Sombo Street, Kenema Town, Sam Bockarie intentionally shot and killed Mohamed Fityia,
a civilian not taking active part in the hostilities.
610. Given the summary execution of a civilian suspect without trial, including
Bockarie's conduct in publicly exhibiting the corpse on Sombo Street, the Trial Chamber
finds beyond reasonable doubt that Sam Bockarie wilfully made the victim the object of
such violence with primary purpose of this killing to instil terror in the civilian population in
Kenema Town.
Im Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16662-16664.
*439 Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16664, 16669, 16671; Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September
2008, 16681.
M40 Alex Bao, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16664, 16669, 16671.

---- End of Page 220 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ \K·' 18 May 2012

(viii) The killing of Brima S. Massaguoi and others
61 1. In his prior testimony, Witness Alex Bao provides the most detailed account on the
circumstances surrounding the killing of Brima S. Massaquoi, the Chairman of Kenema
Town Council and other prominent residents in January 1998. Bao testihed that in late
January 1998, six prominent individuals, namely, Brima S. Massaquoi, the Chairman of
Kenema Town Council,l44l Brima Kpaka a prominent businessman in Kenema,l442 Andrew
Quee, a civil servant,l443 Issa Ansumana, Abdulai Bockarie and John Swanay were arrested
by the AFRC/RUF forces in Kenema Town and detained at the AFRC Secretariat located at
14 Hangha Road, on suspicion of being "Kamajor supporters".l444 Bao visited the AFRC
Secretariat and saw the prisoners lying on a wet floor with their hands tied tightly behind
their backs and with bruises on their bodies. The ropes had "eaten" into their flesh.l445 Bao
saw the RUF commander Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) brandishing his pistol in the air
and heard him say that the detainees were "supporters of Kamajors and he was going to kill
all of them". The AFRC Lieutenant in charge of the Secretariat was also present.l446 After
being detained at the AFRC Secretariat for three or four days, the prisoners were on 28
January 19981447 transferred to the Kenema Police Station where Bao was deployed to be
investigated on charges that they were supporting the Kamajors against the AFRC/RUF4444
612. Bao stated that the Police found no evidence supporting the allegations that any of
the six men were Kamajor collaborators and released them on bail.l449 Three or four days
later, when Bockarie learned that the six suspects had been released, he openly threatened
the Police Commissioner with death if the men were not returned within two hours.l45O As a
l44l According to the police log book or Diary admitted in this trial as Exhibit P-175 his formal name is Brima S.
Massaquoi, but he was commonly known as BS Massaquoi. Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June
2005", pp. 15020, 15044.
I442 Exhibit P·173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15020 ’
*444 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15020; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript of, 7 July 2005", p. 15148; Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008, pp. 16689-16690.
4444 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15021.
'445 Exhibit P—l73, "TF1—122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15021-15022.
4444 Bao stated that he does not remember the AFRC comrrrander's name. Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC
Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15021.
I447 Exhibit P-175, "Copy ofDiary", p. 15621.
4448 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15019-15021; 15042-15043; Exhibit P-174,
"TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15147-15148.
1444 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15023-15025; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15150; Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008, p. 16702—l6703.
'45° Exhibit P-174, "TF1—122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15151; Exhibit P-173, "TF1—122, AFRC
Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15026-15027, 15043-15044, 15288; Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008, pp.

---- End of Page 221 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /7/ QM 18 May 2012 M

result five of the suspects were re-arrested and detained at the Kenema Police Station1451 on
the orders of the Police Commissioner, with the exception of Brima Kpaka who had been
admitted to the Kenema hospital for treatment.1452 On 6 February 19981455 a lot of armed
AFRC/RUF forces led by AFRC Lieutenant A.B. Turay came to Kenema Police Station in
two military vehicles and took away five of the prisoners, namely, B.S. Massaquoi, Andrew
Quee, 1ssa Ansumana, Abdulai Bockarie and Jolm Swanay.1454 Bao heard Lt. Turay tell the
police that he was taking the prisoners to the AFRC Brigade headquarters on orders of the
Secretary of State East.1455
613. Bao further stated that two da s after the AFRC/RUF had taken the five risoners
Y P
into custody,1456 there were widespread rumours in Kenema Town that the AFRC/RUF
forces had killed the five prisoners and dumped their bodies in a river.1457 Bao searched in
vain for the five prisoners at the AFRC Brigade headquarters and Guinea Base. 1458 He found
the dead bodies of the five prisoners lying in a stream at Dorwala, on the outskirts of
Kenema Town.1455 Bao described the bodies as having gunshot wounds all over. Also there
was large cement block lying on Massaquoi's head.1460
614. Bao's testimony is to a large extent, corroborated by that of Adesanya Sanya Hyde
who was a police officer, and the second in command at the Kenema District Criminal
16704-16705. 1
1451 Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15151-15152; Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript
ofTF1-122, 24 June 2005", pp. 15027, 15085.
1452 Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript of TF1-122, 24 June 2005", pp. 15027, 15079. The police log book
records this as happening on 4 February 1998; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005",, p.
15152.
1455 Exhibit P-175, "Copy of Diary", p. 15690.
1454 Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript of TF1-122, 24 June 2005", pp. 15027; Exhibit P-175, "Copy of Diary", p.
15690.
1455 Exhibit P-173, "AFRC Transcript of TF1-122, 24 June 2005", pp. 15027-15029, 15045; Exhibit P-174,
"TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15152, 15290.
14515 Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15154.
1457 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15030-15031; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15154.
14515 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15030-15031; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15154-15155, 15243-15244; Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008, p.
16710-16711.
1455 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15031-15032; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122,
RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15155-15156, 15244-15245; Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008, p.
16710-16711.
14514 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15031-15032; Exhibit P-174, "RUF
Transcript of TF1-122, 7 July 2005", pp. 15155-15156; Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008, pp. 16711-
16712.

---- End of Page 222 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GTA 18 May 2012

A!/»/L

Investigation Department in 1997 and 1998. Hyde testified that close to the time of the
Intervention, the "AF RC hierarchy", including Eddie Kanneh and Sam Bockarie, ordered the
arrest of seven suspected Kamajor collaborators including B.S. Massaquoi, the Chairman of
the Kenema Town Council, Brima Kpaka, a prominent businessman, and Andrew Quee.4464
Hyde stated that the prisoners were detained at the AF RC Secretariat for six days, and then
transferred to the Kenema Town Police station for liirther investigation. 4462
615. As the Police could not find any evidence to support charges against the men, and
because of their injuries, the Chief of Police received permission from Eddie Kanneh to
release the suspects on bail, and BS Massaquoi and Brima Kpaka were released.l463
However, shortly afier the ECOMOG Intervention, Sam Bockarie ordered that they be re-
arrested.4464 Kpaka was not taken back as he had been admitted to the hospital, but B.S.
Massaquoi was returned to the station.4466
616. The next morning there was a rumour that the Kamajors and ECOMOG were five
miles away from Kenema.4466 At 6.30am the same day the AFRC forces, led by Lieutenant
A.B. Turay, removed the suspects from the Police Station and took them to the AFRC
Brigade Headquarters.6464 Hyde later heard from other residents of Kenema that Sam
Bockarie and his men had killed the suspects and that BS Massaquoi had been beheaded and
that his head had been tied to a wooden pole and paraded around Kenema. 4466 Hyde testified
however, that he never saw the dead bodies of any of the deceased. 4469
617. Another witness, Karmoh Kanneh, (a.k.a. Captain Eagle)1476 testified that Sam
Bockarie arrested B.S. Massaquoi, the City Council Chainnan, Ibrahim Gbacka, a motor-
spares dealer, and Dr Momoh, a medical doctor, and detained them at the Secretariat,
4464 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", pp. 15316-15317.
4462 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15317.
4463 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15318.
4464 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", pp. 15318-15319.
4465 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15319.
4466 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15320.
4464 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", pp. 15320-15321, 15334; See also Exhibit P-
175, "Copy of Diary", p. 15691.
4466 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15321.
4466 Exhibit P-178A, "TF1-125, AFRC Transcript 12 May 2005", p. 15321.
4446 This witness is a former civilian captured and enlisted as a fighter by the RUF in 1991. Karmoh K&I1H€h4S
RUF contingent led by Sam Bockarie was based at NIC compound in Kenema Town for three to four months
before the ECOMOG Intervention took place in Freetown.

---- End of Page 223 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // G1); 18 May 2012
//

accusing them of collaborating with the Kamajors.l47l Kanneh and his colleague Manowai
visited the suspects in detention and observed that they were badly beaten and bruised.
Gbacka, who hailed from the same region as Kanneh, confirmed to the latter that they had
been severely tortured.l472 Kanneh persuaded Bockarie to allow him to transfer Gbacka and
Dr Momoh to the hospital for treatment and while there, he assisted the two men to escape
and hide because he was concerned for their safety. Kanneh stated that as ECOMOG
advanced towards Kenema, Kanneh heard Bockarie say that "if the situations went out of
control the prisoners would not be spared".l473 Upon leaming that two of the prisoners had
escaped while in the hospital, Bockarie ordered that B.S. Massaquoi be put under "tight
custody". 1474
618. Karmeh testified that on the day that ECOMOG forces entered Kenema Town and as
the AFRC retreated,m5 he saw Bockarie put B.S. Massaquoi into a car and heard Bockarie
say he was going to execute Massaquoi.l476 Karmoh Karmeh and others including Eddie
Kamieh, followed Bockarie as he took Massaquoi to the Government reservation. While
there Kamieh saw Bockarie's securities take Massaquoi out of the car and shoot him.l477
Kamieh stated that after Massaquoi died, all of the men followed Bockarie back to the
brigade but were not happy with him for having carried out the killings.l478
619. A number of other Prosecution and Defence witnesses testified of hearing of the
death of B.S. Massaquoi as he was a key figure in Kenema Town. Prosecution Witness TF1-
590 heard that Sam Bockarie and his men arrested and killed B.S. Massaquoi.l479 However,
TF 1-590 did not see the corpse of B.S. Massaquoi, but only referred to the "widespread
rumour" that Massaquoi's body was lying in Hangha Road.l480 Defence witness Issa Sesay
testified that he heard from Major Gua and others that Sam Bockarie had, prior to the RUF
retreat from Kenema Town, arrested and killed B.S. Massaquoi and others on suspicion of
ml Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9403-9404.
1472 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9405.
*4*4 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9406.
*474 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9407.
*4*4 Karmoh Kalman, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9407.
*4*4 Karmoh Kapaah, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9406-9407.
*4** Karmoh Kapaah, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9406-9408.
*4** Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9408.
W9 Witness TF1—590, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12021.
MSO TF1-590, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 11917-11918, 12021.

---- End of Page 224 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (pk 18 May 2012

sending ammunition and food to the Kamajors.1181 Defence Witness Sam Kolleh (DCT-
102), a commanding officer in the RUF who was stationed in Kenema in February 1998,11182
also heard that Sam Bockarie had arrested B.S. Massaquoi and killed him on the day after r
the Ecomoc rm€rv€mrrm.'4*"
620. In addition to witness testimony, the Trial Chamber admitted into evidence two
independent reports on the unlawful killings that took place in Sierra Leone in the year 1998.
An Amnesty International report states:
[O1n 13 and 14 January 1998 several prominent members of the community in Kenema
were arrested by members of the RUF under the supervision of Sam Bockarie. They
included B.S. Massaquoi, the chairman of the Town Council, Dr P.B. Momoh, a medical
doctor, Paramount Chief Moinama Karrnor, a traditional leader and Ibrahim Kpaka, a
businessman. They were arrested at a time of fierce fighting between the Kamajors and the
AFRC and RUF forces around Kenema and were accused of supporting the Kamajors.
They were held at the AFRC Secretariat building in Kenema, which had been the local
SLPP headquarters, and some were later moved to the police station and army brigade
headquarters. They were stripped and repeatedly beaten with sticks, electric cables and
strips of tyres and were threatened with death. Their arms were tied tightly behind them.
One of those detained sustained a serious head wound and injury to his eye after being
beaten on his head with a gun. At least one of those detained died as a result of beatings.
Some of those arrested were released on 26 January 1998 and escaped to safety. B.S.
Massaquoi, however, was among those who remained held at army brigade headquarters.
He was killed by members of the RUF on 8 February 1998 as news arrived of ECOMOG's
offensive on Freetown and as Kamajors entered Kenema. Dozens of other people were also
reported to have been killed. The mutilated body of B.S. Massaquoi and 35 other people
were reported to have been found in mass grave near Kenema on 23 March 1998.11184
621. A 1998 Human Rights report `on Sierra Leone states:
[T]hroughout the year, AFRC and RUF rebels committed numerous egregious abuses,
including brutal killings, severe mutilations and deliberate dismemberments, in a
widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population known as "Operation No
Living Thjng" .... Many of the hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians killed by AF RC and
RUF insurgent forces in the conflict were executed deliberately for political motives. In
March RUF leader Sam Bockarie summarily executed 10 prominent residents of Kenema,
including former cabinet minister Bockarie S. Massaquoi and Paramount Chief Momoh
Tarawalie, for opposing the rebels. 1485
Findings
111111 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44006.
11182 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48440-48442.
11183 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48786.
11181 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone — 1998 — A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", pp. 9-10.
11185 Exhibit P-366, "Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, US Department of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 26 February 1999", pp. 2-3, ERN 22798-22799.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /·/ Ok 18 May 2012
/·’$ /·/'

3% Sl G
622. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of the two policemen, Alex Baol486 and
Adesanya Sanya Hyde regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of B.S.
Massaquoi, Andrew Quee, Issa Ansumana, Abdulai Bockarie and John Swanay, credible
and reliable. Both witnesses were deployed as policemen at Kenema Police Station during
the period of May 1997-February 1996 when the arrests, detention and killing of the
prisoners took place. Their testimony is corroborated by the Kenema Police Diary
documenting the arrest, detention and release of the prisoners by the police into the custody
of the AFRC/RUF, which information was not challenged. Although the evidence of these
two witnesses as to who killed the prisoners is partly circumstantial and partly based on
hearsay or 1"widespread rumour", the Trial Chamber finds that the circumstances
surrounding these deaths, including the initial arrest, detention and torture of the prisoners
by the AFRC/RUF fighters in Kenema, the unsubstantiated accusations by Sam Bockarie
that the prisoners were "Kamajor supporters" and his threat to execute them; Bockarie's
furious conduct upon learning that the police had released the prisoners and his ordering
their re-detention and repeated threat to execute them immediately prior to the ECOMOG
Intervention; and the dumping of the prisoners’ bullet-riddled bodies in a river, all lead to
one reasonable inference that the AFRC/RUF juntas led by Sam Bockarie intentionally
killed the prisoners on suspicion that they were Kamajor supporters.
623. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Karmoh Kanneh an
RUF insider closely associated with Sam Bockarie and based at the RUF headquarters in
Kenema Town at the material time, and finds it credible. His evidence relating to the arrest,
detention and torture of the prisoners on the orders of Sam Bockarie, is consistent with other
Prosecution evidence. More importantly, his eye-witness account of the killing of Massaquoi
by Bockarie's security men corroborates the earlier circumstantial evidence discussed above.
The hearsay evidence of other Prosecution and Defence witnesses referred to above and the
content of the two reports quoted above are further corroboration of these killings. Although
there are variations in the names of the prisoners as given by the various witnesses, the Trial
Chamber is of the view that a number of prominent civilians were executed on this occasion
but that most witnesses recall the most prominent of the deceased persons, namely B.S.
Massaquoi. Other witnesses including Kanneh recall particular prisoners like Dr Momoh
1486 In particular, the Trial Chamber notes that Bao's account was consistent in each of the three trials in which
he testified, namely: Prosecutor v. Brima et. al. (AFRC) trial; Prosecutor v. Sesay et. al. (RUF) trial and the
Prosecutor v. Taylor.

---- End of Page 226 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol-T / Om 18 May 2012

and Ibrahim Gbacka having known them before. The Trial Chamber also finds the timing of
the arrest, detention and killing of these civilians relevant. These events took place
immediately after the AFRC/RUF forces had been driven out of Freetown by the ECOMOG
forces and at a time when the AFRC/RUF forces in Kenema were anticipating a similar
attack and defeat by ECOMOG and Kamajor forces in Kenema. The victims, suspected or
perceived by the AFRC/RUF forces in Kenema to have been supporters of "the enemy
forces" (albeit without proof), were thus killed in revenge or reprisal for perceived support
of the Junta's enemies.
624. Based on the above oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in early February 1998 in Kenema
Town, AFRC/RUF forces led by Sam Bockarie intentionally killed a number of civilians not
taking an active part in hostilities, including B.S. Massaquoi, Andrew Quee, Issa Ansumana,
Abdulai Bockarie and John Swanay. Given the timing and circumstances of these deaths
described above, the Trial Chamber ii1rther finds beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie
wiliiilly made the victims the object of such violence with the primary purpose of these
killings to instil terror in the civilian population.
(b) Tongo Fields area
(i) Killing of three persons in a residential house
625. In his prior testimony from the AFRC trial admitted in this trial as Prosecution
Exhibit P-278, Witness TF1-062 testified that he was a trader and a diamond miner living in
a town called Tongo Fields in Lower Bambara Chiefdom about 27 miles from Kenema
Town when armed AFRC/RUF rebelsl487 led by Sam Bockariel488 took control of the area
on 11 August 1997.1489 Upon their arrival in Tongo Fields, the AFRC/RUF rebels carried
out widespread looting and indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population for three
days 1490
M87 The witness stated that the group comprised a combination of ex—SLA soldiers wearing combat uniform and
others that wore civilian clothing. See Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14915.
lm Witness stated that Sam Bockarie introduced himself to the civilians. See Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC
Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14916, 14949, 14960.
1484 Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14910—l4916.
1440 Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14916—149l8. Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29
September 2008, pp. 17496—17497.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T my 18 May 2012

Es; ze
626. Witness TF1-062 testified that one morning during this three day period, he was
sitting in his house in Tongo Fields when armed soldiers came to a residential house
opposite his.l49l The soldiers ordered the occupants of the house to open the door. When the
occupants declined to do so, the soldiers broke down the door and started shooting randomly
into the room, killing the three occupants.l492 The witness heard the soldiers refer to the
deceased as Kamajors. The witness however, did not believe this as he knew that there were
no Kamajors in Tongo Fields at that time}493 After the soldiers left the scene Witness TF1-
062 helped some civilians to take the corpses away.l494
Findings
627. The Trial Chamber finds the eye-witness account of Witness TF1-062 credible. The
evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators carried out these killings
in reprisal against persons they perceived or suspected to be enemies of the Junta forces.
Based on that evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that in August 1997 in Tongo Fields, RUF/AFRC fighters intentionally
shot to death three civilians that were not taking an active part in the hostilities. Given that
the perpetrators accused the victims of being "Kamajors" at a time when the AFRC/RUF
forces were under threat of attack from ECOMOG and the Kamajors, the Trial Chamber
further finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the
object of such violence with primary purpose of these killings to instil terror in the civilian
population by making an example of would-be enemies of the Junta forces, thereby
guaranteeing civilian loyalty.
(ii) Killing of 15 civilians at Bumpe near Tongo Fields around September 1997
628. Abdul Otonjo Conteh (TF1-060), who was a Secondary School teacher, part-time
miner and resident of Lalehunl495 in Tongo Fields testified that the AFRC/RUF Junta forces
under Eddie Kanneh and Sam Bockarie arrived in Kenema Town three days after the 25
M9! Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14919.
lm Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14919-14920; TF1-062, Transcript 27
January 2009, p. 23640.
lim Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14919-14920.
N94 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14919.
"°5 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17512. Witness stated that this location is two miles on the
outskirts of Tongo Town.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gb 18 May 2012

May 1997 coupl496 and entered Tongo Fields on 11 August 1997 amid heavy shooting and
rampant looting of civilian property.l497 Abdul Conteh testified that in the days following
the arrival of the AFRC/RUF forces in Tongo, the paramount Chief of Lower Bambara
Chiefdom appointed a 13 man Committee known as the Lower Bambara Advisory
Committee, to oversee the welfare of the citizens of the Chiefdom. The mandate of this
committee was to receive reports from the citizens regarding any problems encountered and
in turn to relay these complaints to the Paramount Chief and the AFRC/RUF
administration.l498 Conteh was appointed Secretary of that Committee and was resident in
Tongo Fields from 1 1 August to 10 November 1997.1499
629. Conteh testified that in his capacity as committee member, he received a report from
some citizens of Bumpe on 16 September 1997,1500 that fifteen people had been killed at
Bumpe, located about one mile on the outskirts of Tongo.l50l He went to Bumpe to
investigate and saw fifteen corpses of both men and women in civilian clothes, including
two girls aged 14 and 18 years, respectively, lying in the open. All the bodies bore bullet
wounds.l5O2 Bumpe was deserted as everyone had 1un away. Conteh testified that some of
the survivors of Bumpe told him that RUF fighters went to fight the Kamajors in Dodo
Chiefdom on 16 September 1997 and lost. Out of frustration the returning RUF fighters
killed whoever crossed their path during their retreat.l5O3 Those reportedly killed by the RUF
included the fifteen civilians at Bumpe; Chief Vandi Sei and a retired Policeman called John
Dakowah at Panguma}504 Conteh further testified that the civilians who returned to their
home from the bush were harassed, beaten or raped by the AF RC/RUF fighters who accused
them of being "relatives of the Kamajors".l5O5
14% Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17496-1751 1
l"‘" Abdui Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17496-17512
y lm Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17525-17528
1499 Abdul Conteh, Transc1ipt 29 September 2008, p. 17547
*500 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17531;
1501 Abdul Conteh, Transc1ipt 29 September 2008, p. 17529.
1502 Abdul Conteh, Transc1ipt 29 September 2008, pp. 17529-17530.
1503 Abdul Conteh, Transcnpt 29 September 2008, pp. 17531; Exhibit D-063, "Lower Bambura Chiefdom
Situation Report prepared by Abdul Conteh", ERN 101408.
1504 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17531; Abdul Conteh, Transcnpt 30 September 2008, p.
17555; Exhibit D-063, "Lower Bambura Chiefdom Situation Report prepared by Abdul Conteh", ERN 101406.
1505 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17532.

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Case No,: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

ESE 12
630. In addition, the Trial Chamber admitted into evidence several reports authored by
Abdul Conteh as "Secretary General of the Lower Bambara Care—Taking Committee".l5O6
According to one of the reports, Col. Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) on 8 September 1997
led a group of about 300 RUF/AF RC combatants to Dodo Chiefdom to confront Kamajors.
The group suffered heavy casualties and the survivors, on their return to Tongo Fields, killed
a retired Policeman called John Dakowa claiming that he was a Kamajor.l5O7 According to
another report, on 16 September 1997 the O/C Secretariat Tongolm led a group of about
800 RUF/AFRC combatants to Dodo Chiefdom to conrront Kamajors. The RUF/AFRC
combatants suffered heavy casualties and only 100 returned to Tongo. On their way back,
the RUF/AF RC combatants killed 15 civilians at Bumpe including one Saffa Balie, a
P prominent youth leader, and Pa Vandi Sei, the Town Chief of Panguma. The Lower
Bambara Care—Taking Committee reported these deaths to the O/C Secretariat Tongo who
A dismissed the report remarking that "all those killed were either Kamajors or collaborators
of Kamaj ors" and threatening to kill anyone found in Bumpe trying to bury the dead. 1509
Findings
631. The Trial Chamber finds Conteh's testimony credible. As a prominent member of
the Lower Bambara Care—Taking Committee that was charged with overseeing the welfare
of the citizens of the Chiefdom, he was privy to vital information regarding the treatment of
these citizens by the AF RC/RUF administration. Oftentimes he not only documented the
complaints received but also personally investigated some of them. The reports cited above
corroborate his oral testimony with regard to the 15 deaths in Bumpe and the two deaths in
Panguma. Based on that evidence the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that around 8 September 1997, at Bumpe on the outskirts of
Tongo Fields, AFRC/RUF fighters retreating from battle intentionally shot and killed 15
civilians including one Saffa Balie, who were not taking an active part in the hostilities. In
addition, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that around 16 September 1997 at Panguma, AFRC/RUF fighters retreating from battle
*5% Exhibit D-063, "Lower Bambura Chiefdom Situation Report prepared by Abdul Conteh".
'SO7 Exhibit D-063 "Lower Barnbura Chiefdom Situation Report prepared by Abdul Conteh", ERN101406.
mg Conteh testified that the Officer in charge of the AFRC Secretariat in Tongo during the Junta period was Lt.
Sakou Kunnateh, a former SLA soldier who joined the AFCR governrnent. See Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29
September 2008, pp. 17520-17521.
‘5°(’ Exhibit P-063 "A Confidential Report Against the Military Junta at Tongo (2) dated 17 September 1997".

---- End of Page 230 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T 6u 18 May 2012 E

33395
intentionally shot and killed Pa Vandi Sei, the Town Chief and John Dakowah, a retired
Policeman, both of whom were civilians not taking an active part in the hostilities. However
since the Prosecution did not specifically plead Panguma as a crime base in the Indictment,
the evidence in relation to the two deaths at Panguma serves only to prove the Chapeau
requirements of murder within Kenema District.*5*O
632. The above evidence establishes that the AFRC/RUF forces carried out revenge
killings after suffering heavy casualties during a previous military operation against the
Kamajors Civil Defence force. In this instance, the perpetrators, including Lt. Sekou
Kunnateh, the O/C of the AFRC Secretariat at Tongo, justified the killing of innocent
civilians by branding them "Kamajors or Kamajor collaborators" and preventing the other
civilians from burying the dead by threatening them with death. The Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such
violence with the primary purpose of these killings to instil terror in the civilian population,
thereby guaranteeing their loyalty.
(iii) Killing of civilians engaged in mining at Pandembu, Sandeyeima and Wuima
in Tongo Fields Area
633. Witness Abdul Conteh testified that during the Junta period, the RUF/AF RC fighters
forbade civilians to cany out any private or personal mining of diamonds in Tongo Fields
and that any civilian caught mining for himself was severely punished. He also stated that
the RUF/AFRC fighters would abduct civilians and force them to mine diamonds for the
Junta Government.*5** Conteh further testified that while serving on the Lower Bambara
Care-Taking Committee, he received a report*5*2 that Sam Bockarie sent RUF child
combatants*5*5 to Pandembu, a village in the Tongo Fields area,*5*4 with orders to kill
civilians who were carrying out personal mining instead of mining for the AFRC/RUF
Government.*5*5 The child soldiers shot and killed three civilians who were mining by a
*5 *0 Preliminary Issues: Issues relating to the Pleading in the Indictment. According to the Map of Sierra Leone
Exhibit P-176, Panguma is not part of the Tongo Fields Area.
*5** Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17532-17538.
*5*2 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17538.
*5 *5 Conteh described the ages of the RUF child combatants as being between 12 to 15 years old. Abdul Conteh,
Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17536.
*5 *4 Conteh stated that Pandembu was just 300 yards from the offices of the Lower Bambara Care-Taking
Committee. See Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008 p. 17538.
*5*5 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537-17538.

---- End of Page 231 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T * V M 18 May 2012

Samet
church in Pandembu.l5l6 Conteh and the other Caretaker Committee members went to
investigate, and saw the three bullet-riddled corpses of the civilians as well as other people
who had sustained bullet wounds.l5 17
634. Abdul Conteh testified that he received another report that RUF child soldiers killed
two civilians who were doing private mining at Sandeyeima and wounded several others.l5l8
He further testified that he received yet another report that RUF child soldiers killed three
civilians who were doing private mining at Wuima and wounded several others. The
Caretaker. Committee reported these three incidents to Lieutenant Sekou Kunnateh, the O/C
of the AFRC Secretariat in Tongo, who responded that "he was not going to take any action
as he had confirmed that the child combatants were acting in accordance with Sam
Bockarie's orders", and that "no civilian was allowed to mine privately in Lower Bambara
Chiefdom except for the AFRC Government".l5l9
Findings
635. Conteh's evidence, although partly circumstantial, and partly based on the reports
that he received from citizens of Tongo in his capacity as a member of the Care-Taker
Committee, is credible. He and other members of the Lower Bambara Care-Taking
Committee visited the scene of the shooting at Pandembu and saw the bullet riddled corpses
as well as the wounded survivors. Although Conteh did not see the child combatants in
action and was merely told about it, the response of Lt. Sekou Kunnateh, the O/C of the
AFRC Secretariat in Tongo confirms the report that Conteh received, namely, that Sam
Bockarie sent the child combatants to kill those civilians that were mining diamonds for
themselves. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that during the Junta's occupation of Tongo Fields,l52O AFRC/RUF child A
combatants acting under the orders of Sam Bockarie and with the approval of Lt. Sekou
Kunnateh, intentionally shot and killed three civilians at Pandembu, two civilians at
Sandeyeima and three civilians at Wuima, all of whom were not taking an active part in
hostilities.
1516 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537-17538.
lm Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17538.
lm Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17538.
1519 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17555-17556.
*520 Conteh stated that the Junta forces entered Tongo on 11 August 1997, while Witness TF1-062 testified that

---- End of Page 232 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % QL 18 May 2012

636. Given the slave—like conditions under which the AF RC/RUF Junta forced civilians to
mine for them and forbade them from mining for personal benefit, the Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such
violence with the primary purpose of the killing of the civilian miners in Tongo Fields to
instil terror in the civilian population, thereby guaranteeing their continued servitude and
continuing to control the mining activities in the District.
(iv) Killing of civilian miners at Cyborg Pit
637. In his prior testimony admitted as an exhibit in this trial,l5 21 protected Prosecution
Witness TF 1-062 testified that he was living in Tongo Fields, Lower Bambara chiefdom
during the AFRC/RUF Junta's occupation of Tongo Fields. He and his family had been
carrying on private mining of diamonds in Tongo Fields for 20 years before the AFRC/RUF
forces arrived}522 After the AFRC/RUF forces took over control of Tongo Fields, the
witness and other civilians were forced to mine for the AFRC/RUF forces using his
equipment and employees. Although he himself would not physically mine, he always made
sure that he personally supervised his workers on a daily basis and that any diamonds found
were surrendered to the AF RC/RUF commanders}523 The AFRC/RUF forces referred to this
forced mining as "Government work" but civilians were never compensated for work done
or diamonds produced}524 TF 1-062 testified that Sam Bockarie assigned an ex—SLA soldier
called Set Marah to oversee the mining activities of the AFRC/RUF forces in Tongo Fields
and that civilians were not allowed to mine without the permission of this commander}525
TF 1-062 also testified that any diamonds retrieved by the civilians were supposed to be
handed to the AF RC/RUF commanders who in turn would hand them over to Sam Bockarie.
Civilians who disobeyed this practice were severely punished or even killed. TF 1-062
the junta forces left Tongo Fields in January 1998. See Transcript 27 January 2009 p. 23634.
ml Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14910-14916. In the present trial, the witness
was cross-examined on his prior testimony. See TF1-062, Transcript 27 January 2009.
i.e. TF1-062 gave evidence concerning the killing of the child in Cyborg Pit in the AFRC trial, which was
admitted as prior testimony under Rule 92bis. He was also cross-examined by the Defence concerning the Rule
92bis evidence in this trial.
lm Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14911; See also TF1-062 Transcript 27
January 2009, p. 23618.
lm Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14933-14945.
lm Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14938-14940.
lm Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14928.

---- End of Page 233 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // ··d-ik 18 May 2012

witnessed a number of civilian miners killed for this reason by the AFRC/RUF soldiers at
Cyborg Pit, a mining area operated by the AFRC/RUP forces. 1526
638. TF1-062 testified that on one occasion he was standing by watching his workers
mining at Cyborg Pit when he saw an AFRC/RUF soldier try to take a bag of gravel, by
force, from a child miner. The child was preparing to "wash" the gravel in order to sort out
any diamonds therein. However, when the child refused to turn over his bag of gravel to the
soldier, the latter became angry and shot and killed the child.1527 On another occasion at
Cyborg Pit, an AFRC/RUF soldier who was guarding the civilian miners temporarily left his
bag of gravel by the river side where the civilians used to "wash" their own gravel. When
the soldier returned he found the bag missing and was very angry vowing that he would set
an example by killing a civilian.1528 The soldier then randomly fired into the crowd where
TF1-062 was, killing one civilian in the process. 1529
639. TF1-062 further testified that on many occasions when he went to supervise his
workers as they were mining, he would see two to three corpses of dead miners who were
brought out of the pit to the surface where he was standing. TF1-062 observed that the
corpses were always "oozing blood".15311 TF1-062 concluded that the victims must have been
shot and killed by the AFRC/RUF fighters guarding the miners Cyborg Pit, as they were the
only people who were armed.1531
Findings
640. The testimony of Witness TF1-062 regarding the various killings at Cyborg Pit is an
eyewitness account. His role as supervisor of his miners accorded him a rare opportunity to
observe the manner in which the AFRC/RUF commanders and guards were treating the
civilian miners on site. His testimony in relation to the death of the child miner and that of
the civilian killed by an angry soldier are therefore credible and reliable. As regards the two
or three corpses that he observed being brought out of the pit on a regular basis, the Witness’
1526 Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14932—14945.
1527 Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14942.
*52* Exhibit P-278, ‘·Tr¤1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14942.
*529 Exh1bitP—278, ··rr1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 Juni: 2005", p. 14942.
1530 Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14943-14944. See also TF1—062, Transcript
27 January 2009, p. 23634.
1531 Exhibit P—278, "TF1—062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14943—14944. See also Witness TF1—062,
Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23634.

---- End of Page 234 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gln 18 May 2012

3%% 23
account is based on circumstantial evidence. Although he could not say whether the oozing
of blood on these corpses was the result of bullet wounds or knife stabbings, nor attest to
hearing any gunshots inside the pit, the Trial Chamber is of the view that these miners did
not die from natural causes and must have met their death violently inside the pit. Secondly,
since the only people armed at Cyborg Pit were the AFRC/RUF guards and since they were
at liberty to mete out punishment or even death to disobedient or uncooperative miners, the
only reasonable inference is that these civilians were killed by these guards. Accordingly,
the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
between 11 August 1997 and January 1998 at Cyborg Pit in the Tongo Fields area,
RUF/AF RC guards intentionally killed an unknown number of civilian miners including a
child, all of whom were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
641. Given the slave—like conditions under which the AFRC/RUF Junta forced civilians to
mine for them and forbade them from mining forpersonal benefit, the Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such
violence with the primary purpose of the killing of the civilian miners at Cyborg Pit to instil
terror in the civilian population, thereby guaranteeing their continued servitude and
continuing to control the mining activities in the District.
(c) Alleged unlawful killings in locations in Kenema District not pleaded in the Indictment
642. The Trial Chamber received credible evidence of murder of civilians in a number of
locations within Kenema District not specifically pleaded in the Indictment including,
Mendekelema, Neama and Sandaru}532 As previously held, this evidence will only be taken
into account in relation to the chapeau requirements of the alleged crimes and not for proof
Or gu11t.‘5"
Conclusions
1532 In Exhibit P-078, Amnesty International reported at p. 14 that "attacks by rebel forces also escalated in
Kenema District from August 1998. Among the villages affected were Mendekelema, Neama and Sandam,
which was completely destroyed, less than 30 kilometres from the town of Kenema. One of the victims of the
.attack on Mendekelema in late August 1998 had both his hands amputated. Survivors of attacks consistently
described mutilation, rape, torture, killing and burning of houses. Entire local communities were displaced from
the area, many fleeing to the towns of`Kenema, Segbwema and Dam".
lm See Preliminary Issues, Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment.

---- End of Page 235 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2%/ hl 18 May 2012
/%~~ °

$83 2%
643. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between about 25 May 1997 and about 31 March 1998, in various
locations in Kenema District including Kenema Town and the Tongo Fields area, members
of the AF RC/RUF murdered an unknown number of civilians in Kenema District, as
charged in the Indictmentl534 and as shown in the above evidence.
644. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AFRC forces directed a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone. [535 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that each of the killings proved by the Prosecution in respect of
Kenema District formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were aware of this
fact. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment,
involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF .I536 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that for all of the aforementioned killings in Kenema District there was a nexus
between the killings and the armed conflict, that each of the victims was not taking an active
part in the hostilities at the time of death, and that the perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned killings in Kenema District constitute
murder as both a crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute and a war crime
under Article 3 of the Statute.
2. Alleged unlawful killings in Kono District {Between about 1 F ebruag; 1998 and 31
December 1998)
645. The Trial Chamber heard the following evidence, namely, that after the ECOMG
Intervention in Freetown in February 1998, the AFRC/RUF forces that were driven out of
Freetown fled northwards, trekking through a number of locations including Tombo, Fogbo
and Newton,l537 Masiaka, Lunsar, Makeni, Magbonkineh, Binkolo, Kabala, Matotoka,
Makali, and Sewafe and were finally based in Kono District. Senior AFRC commanders in
this group included Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of the AF RC, SAI Musa, SFY Koroma, A
Col. Foday, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara a.k.a. "Bazzy", Capt. Akim Turay, Moses Kabia a.k.a.
IS34 Indictment, para. 10
I535 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.
lm See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
lm These three places are in Koya rural District: Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7929.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T J '5(L 18 May 2012

"CSO Rambo",|538 Santigie Borbor Kanu a.k.a. "Five-Five", Col. Avivo Kamara and Hassan
Papa Bangura a.k.a. "Bomb-blast".|539 Senior RUF commanders in this group included Issa
Sesay, Denis Mingo a.k.a. "Superman", Morris Kallon, Mike Lamin and S.O. Williams.|540
Other AFRC commanders that were involved in military operations in Kono District during
this period included Colonels Foday Kallay, Franklyn Conteh a.k.a. "Woyoh", Idrissa
Kamara a.k.a. "Leatherboot", Idrissa Kamara a.k.a. "Rambo Red Goat", Ibrahim Bioh
Sesay, Abdul Sesay, Momoh Bangura a.k.a. "Do1ty" and Adams, and Lieutenants Tito,
Amara Kallay, Mohamed Savage a.k.a. "Changa-Bulanga", Mosquito,1541 Junior, Staff
Alhaji,l542 and Alex Tamba Brima a.k.a. "Gullit".l543 Other RUF commanders involved in
milita operations within Kono District durin this eriod included Emmanuel Williams
a.k.a. "Rocky", Isaac Mongor’, Komba Gbundema,1544 Gogomeh, RUF Rambo a.k.a.
"Premo"1545 and Gibril Massaquoi}546
646. The Trial Chamber heard further evidence that as the AFRC/RUF forces trekked
towards Kono District they were under the overall command of Johnny Paul Koroma.1547
Along the way, SAJ Musa addressed the AFRC/RUF forces at Kabala and ordered them to
recapture Kono District and to establish a new base there. He said "Kono would serve as a
strong base, since it was a diamondiferous area, and we will serve as a force to reckon with
by the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community". 1548 This order was
endorsed and reinforced by Johnny Paul Koroma at Magbonkinehmgand at Makenimo
where he told the AFRC/RUF forces to "capture the able bodied civilians in Kono and to
execute the rest". 1ssa Sesay of the RUF also endorsed the order, remarking that "civilians
Im Moses Kabia was the Chief security Officer for Johnny Paul Koroma. See Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7875; Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8383.
I539 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7927-7949.
mo Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7927-7949.
I5 41 Witness explained that this was an ex-SLA soldier different from RUF Sam Bockarie whose alias was also
"Mosquito". Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7965.
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7960-7972.
'543 wimsss TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12504.
1544 Alimamy Bobson Sesay ,Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7969-7971.
mj RUF Rambo was a Liberian Mandingo by tribe and the RUF Deputy Operations Commander, Kono. Witness
TF1-375, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2003; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7947;
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8357.
Im TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p.1 6520.
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7933.
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7939.
mq Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7942.
1550 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7943; Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7980.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / Ju 18 May 2012 EE
V"'?

were very dangerous to the Junta forces and the only way to ensure that they don’t base in
Kono is to bum down their houses and execute them".l55l Sam Bockarie a.k.a. "Mosquito"
of the RUF also endorsed this order amongst his forces and sent messages to all RUF bases
to "make Kono District Fearful so that ECOMOG would not base there". B52 Making an area
fearful, one witness explained, entailed "destruction of life and property, where there will be
killings, amputations, burning of houses, destruction of bridges, setting up road blocks. A11
those things would happen and that will have made the area fearful".l553 After this order the
AFRC troops led by Hassan Papa Bangura and the RUF forces led by Superman,
reorganised themselves into a single fighting force to attack Kono.1554 On arrival in Kono
District around early March 1998, the AFRC/RUF forces captured a village called Sewafe
and burnt down all civilian houses on the orders of Johnny Paul Koroma who called Sewafe
"a Kamajor strongho1d".l555 Thereafter, AFRC/RUF forces led by Superman captured Koidu
Town, the provincial capital of Kono District and executed the orders of their
commanders. 1556
647. While in Koidu, Johnny Paul Koroma reiterated his earlier order to the forces to
establish a strong Junta base there and declared Kono a "civi1ian no go area". He also ‘
reiterated his orders to bum down any civilian homes so as to discourage civilians retuming
to live there, and to kill any civilians that attempted to retum to the area, accusing them of
being Kamajor supporters. 1557 After Johnny Paul Koroma and his wife left Kono District and
went to Kailahun, the junta forces that remained in Koidu Town reorganised themselves. 1558
Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara a.k.a. "Five Five" was the commander of the AFRC/RUF forces that
went towards Bumpe, Yengema, Tombudu and Sewafe along the Masingbi Road axis while
Hassan Papa Bangura a.k.a. "Bomb-Blast" was the Deputy Commander and Operations
Commander. mg
ISM Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7952-7954; Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7980.
I552 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3150.
ISS} Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3150.
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7943.
I555 Bobson Sesay testified that Sewafe is located about 22 miles from Koidu Town, the provincial capital of
Kono district.
556 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7954.
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7950-7954.
I558 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7958.
mq Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7960.

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Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T / » 18 May 2012
61%

648. In relation to unlawful killings alleged to have taken place in Kono District between
1 February 1998 and 31 January 2000, the Trial Chamber has considered the testimony of
Prosecution witnesses F inda Gbamanja, Isaac Mongor, Alhaji Tejan Cole, Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Tamba.Yomba Nbekia, Mustapha Mansaray, Emmanuel Bull, protected Prosecution
Witnesses TF1-189, TF1-375, TF1-371, and Exhibit P-366,1560 Exhibit P-077 and Exhibit P-
(a) Koidu Town
(i) Killing of civilians at Yardo Road, Hill Station and Superman Ground in
F ebrua;y/ March 1998
649. Alimamy Bobson Sesay1562 testified that after the 25 May 1997 coup, he joined the
AF RC and was assigned as Military Transport Officer and security to Hassan Papa Bangura
(a.k.a. Bomb-Blast), a member of the AF RC Supreme Council.1563 Bobson Sesay stated that
after the ECOMOG Intervention in February 1998, he along with Hassan Papa Bangura and
the AFRC/RUF forces fled Freetown and trekked towards Kono District where they were to
establish a new Junta base.1564 As the AF RC/RUF forces approached Kono District around
March 1998, a number of Junta commanders including Johnny Paul Koroma, the AFRC
Chairman, SAJ Musa and Issa Sesay, ordered the forces to recapture Kono as it was "a
diamondiferous area", to abduct able-bodied civilians who would assist the forces and serve
as recruits, to burn down all civilian houses in order to discourage civilians moving back
into the area, to establish a strong Junta base in Kono against any Kamajor or ECOMOG
attacks and to execute any civilians that attempted to return to the area.1565
650. Bobson Sesay testified that after receiving the orders, he and the AFRC forces under
Hassan Papa Bangura together with RUF forces under Denis Mingo (a.k.a Superman),
captured Koidu Town.1566 Bobson Sesay told the court that in execution of the said orders,
1560 Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, US Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 26 February 1999; pp. 00025071-para 4, 00025072-para 6, 00025073-
paras 3-4, 00025074-para 9, 00025075- para 2, 00025077-para 5, 00025072-para 3.
1561 Amnesty International Report entitled "Sierra Leone — 1998 — A year of Atrocities against Civilians".
1562 He is an ex-SLA soldier that joined the AFRC after the May 1997 coup.
1563 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7860.
1564 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7927-7949.
1565 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7939, 7943, 7943, 7952, 7954.
15% Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7954.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ·* 18 May 2012
Z QL

3% 3% YL
he together with Hassan Papa Bangura and the RUF forces went to Yardo Road where they
met a group of civilians coming towards them. The AFRC/RUF forces opened fire on the
civilians and killed all of them. Sesay testified that in order to comply with the orders given
by their commanders to make the area "fear"ful", the AFRC/RUF forces displayed the
corpses of the civilians at the various junctions around Yardo Road in order to frighten off
any other civilians that might have wanted to come to or remain in Koidu Town.l567 Sesay
did not recall how many civilians were killed at Yardo Road. mg
651. Another Prosecution witness, Isaac Mongor, testified about the operations of the
AFRC/RUF forces in Koidu Town after the ECOMOG Intervention in February 19983569
Mongor stated that he was part of the retreating RUF forces that advanced from Sewafe to
Koidu Town, and that as they approached Koidu Town, they found many houses already
burnt down.l570 Mongor stated that he spoke to Moriis Kallon who explained that Sam
Bockarie had ordered the RUF forces "to burn down Koidu Town so that ECOMOG would
not be able to enter there and occupy the town". ml Mongor explained that the RUF in Kono
District adopted a policy of "making the area fearful" which meant that "they would kill,
burn down houses so that they make sure that the people who were living in the areas when
there was those things going on they would be afraid and that even the enemies against
whom they were fighting would also be afi·aid". mz Morris Kallon and other RUF forces that
carried out this order were promoted by Sam Bockarie as a reward.l573 Mongor iirriher
testified that he went around Koidu Town and saw many houses that were burnt, and on
looking inside the houses he saw property and an unspecified number of corpses of people
that were burnt inside those houses. lm
652. Mongor testified that soon after the AFRC/RUF forces captured Koidu Town, an
RUF commander called Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) arrested a group of 13 civilians.
Mongor stated that this group was composed of men, women and children and came from
the direction of the Guinea border, the same direction that the Kamajors had fled to prior to
IW Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7954-7955.
lm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7955.
lm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6216.
lm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6216.
ml Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6218.
lm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6224.
lm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6219.
1574 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6218-6219.

---- End of Page 240 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL-03-01-T Pm 18 May 2012

the AFRC/RUF capturing Koidu Town. 1575 The children amongst the group carried loads on
their heads.1576 Mongor stated that on seeing the civilians coming from the same direction
that the Kamajors had retreated, the AFRC/RUF forces suspected the civilians of being
enemy spies, and Superman shot all 13 civilians to death. Mongor was present when the
executions took place at a location called Hill Station. 1577
653. Prosecution Witness TF1-189 testified that after the ECOMOG Intervention in
February 1998, she and her whole family along with hundreds of other civilians, fled from
Yengema1578 and sought refuge at a location in Kono District.1579 In March 1998 while at
this location, TF1-189 heard gunshots and suddenly saw the community centre on fire.15811
AF RC/RUF rebel forces gathered all the civilians in one location at which the civilians were
held prisoner for a number of days. TF1-189 testified that rebels would routinely rape the
women and young girls at this location. On one occasion in early March 1998, the witness
saw the rebels light a candle and put it under an old man's scrotum. The old man screamed
with pain and died later that day.1581
654. TF1-189 further testified that on 12 March 1998 the AFRC/RUF rebel forces who
had captured her brought her to a location they called "Superman's compound" in Koidu
Town.1582 The rebels first offered her as a "wife" to CO Superman but the latter remarked
that "he did not want a wife". TF1-189 testified that she was taken into a big house or hall
filled with other captured civilians.1583 The witness heard one of the rebels saying that "since
Superman doesn’t want any wife, they are going to kill all of us".1584 One of the rebels took
a woman from amongst the group, put her against the wall and shot her to death in the
presence of the witness and the other people.1585 TF1-189 stated that she managed to escape
1515 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6216.
1516 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6216.
1577 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6215-6217.
1578 Witness TF 1-198 stated that in February 1998 she and her family fled because they heard bombardment and
saw people running away with loads on their heads.
1519 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16482-16487.
1581) TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16497.
1581 TF1-189 Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16497-16507.
1582 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16512-16513.
1583 TF 1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16513-16514. The witness said there were men and women in
the hall.
1584 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16514.
1585 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16513-1651.4.

---- End of Page 241 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T @5 18 May 2012

from captivity but that all the other civilians at Superrnan's compound were killed by the
Arrzc/RUF rebe1s.‘5"6
655. Prosecution Witness TF 1-375, who was a security to RUF commander Denis Mingo
(a.k.a Superman), and who took part in the attack on Koidu Town by the AF RC/RUF forces
during this period, also described the attack. 1587 According to this witness, the first junta
forces to attack Koidu Town led by Isaac Mongor and RUF Rambo were repelled by the
Kamajors.l588 The AF RC/RUF forces then planned a second attack led by Supennan, which
succeeded. AF RC Commanders involved in this joint attack included Gullit, Bazzy, Adams
and Sava e.l589 After takin control of Koidu Town the AFRC/RUF forces burnt houses,
E E
looted private property and captured and raped women and girls.l590 TF 1-375 explained that
the forces burnt houses where they suspected that Kamajors were hiding and stated that
"when we set the houses on fire, we would hear people shouting inside, screaming, "Oh we
are inside. We are inside" and sometimes the houses would burn down and we would see
their skulls and their bones".l5 91
656. The Trial Chamber also considered the following documentary evidence. A Human
Rights Report (Exhibit P-366) states:
[I]n March 1998, RUF forces executed 32 youths in Koidu for supporting Kamajor CDF
forces that previously had taken the town". 1 92
657. A report by Amnesty International (Exhibit P-078) states:
[I]n the days immediately after their removal from power by ECOMOG, AFRC and RUF
forces indiscriminately killed unarrned civilians, looted and burned houses, both in
Freetown and other towns. As the rebel forces were pursued eastwards by ECOMOG forces
through towns such as Bo in Southem Province, Kenema and Koidu in Eastem Province,
and Makeni in Northem Province during February, March and April 1998, they were
responsible for widespread killings, torture and ill treatment, including rape and other forrns
of sexual assault and abduction. Villages and towns were burnt to the ground, destroying
thousands of homes. Koidu, a major town in the diamond-rich Kono District, was almost
1586 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16520. The Witness explained in a closed session that she was
told about the murder of these civilians by the rebel who had captured and enslaved her. See TF1-189, Transcript
18 September 2008, p. 16558.
’5’" Witness TF1-375, rrnnseript 23 June 2008, pp. 12503-12504.
*5** Witness Tri-375, Transcript 23 June 2008,p. 12503.
’"" Witness TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12504. _
1590 Witness TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12505.
1591 Witness TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12505.
1592 Exhibit P-366, "Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, US Department of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 26 February 1999", p. 4, ERN25073.

---- End of Page 242 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/

38 EEST
totally destroyed by AFRC and RUF forces and villages between Njaiama-Sewafe and
Koidu repeatedly attacked. ‘5°3
Findings
658. Alimamy Bobson Sesay was part of the AF RC forces that fled from Freetown after
the February 1998 ECOMOG Intervention who were based in Koidu Town. He not only
participated in the meetings at which certain operational orders were given by senior
commanders but he also participated in the carrying out of those orders. The Trial Chamber
finds Bobson Sesay's above evidence reliable and credible. Isaac Mongor was also part of
the RUF forces that were based in Koidu Town after the ECOMOG Intervention. Like
Bobson Sesay, Mongor too was privy to operational orders that were issued by senior RUF
or AFRC commanders. The Trial Chamber finds his above evidence credible and reliable,
and that it corroborates the account of Bobson Sesay. Witness TF 1-189 was captured by the
AF RC/RUF rebels and her testimony is based on her experience in captivity and on what she
saw and heard. The Trial Chamber finds her above evidence reliable and credible. The Trial
Chamber also finds the evidence of Witness TF 1-375 reliable and credible. His eye—witness
account is based on his participation in the operations of the AFRC/RUF forces that
captured Koidu Town. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber finds that the accounts related by
each of the four witnesses relating to the attacks by the AFRC/RUF on civilians in Koidu
Town in the months following the ECOMOG Intervention, are consistent and accord with
the documentary evidence contained in Exhibits P—366 and P—078.
659. Based on the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, the Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in early March 1998 at Yardo Road in
Koidu Town, AFRC/RUF forces acting on the orders of SAJ Musa, Johnny Paul Koroma
and Issa Sesay, intentionally shot and killed an unknown number of civilians, all of whom
were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
660. Based on the evidence of Isaac Mongor, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in early March 1998 at Hill Station in Koidu
Town, an RUF commander called Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) intentionally shot and
killed 13 civilians including men, women and children, all of whom were not taking an
active part in the hostilities.
'5°3 Exhibit P-078, "Siena Leone — 1998 — A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty lntemational

---- End of Page 243 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-Ol-T ,q(iQ 18 May 2012


38 33 6
661. Based on the evidence of Prosecution Witness TF1-189, the Trial Chamber finds that
the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in early March 1998 at a location
named "Superman compound" in Koidu Town, AFRC/RUF forces acting under the orders
of Superman, intentionally shot and killed a woman, tortured to death an elderly man, and
executed an unknown number of abducted civilians, all of whom were not taking an active
part in the hostilities.
662. Based on the evidence of Witness TF1-3 75 and the documentary evidence above, the
Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in early
March 1998 AFRC/RUF forces acting under the command of Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman), deliberately burned to death an unknown number of civilians who were hiding
in their houses and who were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
663. The above oral and documentary evidence clearly establishes that the perpetrators
acting in accordance with orders given by their commanders, deliberately targeted civilians
in Koidu Town in order to prevent them from staying in or returning to Koidu Town and in
order to maintain the diamond-rich Kono District as a strong Junta base from which the
AFRC/RUF fighters would finance and mount further attacks upon their enemies including
ECOMOG and the CDF or Kamajors. In light of that evidence, the Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such
violence and the primary purpose of these killings to instil terror in the civilian population.
(ii) Killing of civilians in and around Koidu Town between April and May 1998
664. Witness Alex Tamba Teh, a church minister resident in Koidu Town, testified that in
1 April 1998 fighting broke out between the Civil Defence Forces (a.k.a. Kamajors) and
AFRC/RUF rebels,1594 forcing the witness, his family and large numbers of civilians to flee
to Tongoro bush.1595 Wrhile in hiding, Teh, along with 250 civilians including men, women
and children, were captured by a group of 5 armed AFRC/RUF rebels15% and taken to Sunna
Report", p. 1 1.
‘5°" The witness stated that he heard that by this time (April 1998) ECOMOG had taken ever control of Kono
from the AFRC/RUF. Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 687.
15115 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 680-686.
15% The witness described some of the rebels as wearing soldier uniforms worn by Sierra Leone army and others
as plain clothed. Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 687.

---- End of Page 244 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (AL 18 May 2012

Mosque in Koidu Town.l597 At Sunna Mosque three other rebels singled out one Aiah Abu
amongst the civilian abductees and immediately shot him to death, remarking that the
deceased had ‘"escaped from them before".l598
665. Teh further testified that at Sunna Mosque, AFRC/RUF rebels,l599 pretending to be
ECOMOG soldiers tricked the captives into "cheering and welcoming ECOMOG for saving
the civilians from the rebels".l6O0 The rebels then led the civilians to a secluded place called
"the Igbaleh" on Kamachende Street.l60l On the way, Teh counted "up to 50" corpses}602 At
the Igbaleh, Emmanuel Williams (a.k.a. Rocky) ordered the rebels to separate the captured
men from the women and children.l6O3 Teh heard Rocky saying to the civilians, "Today
those of you who were saying thanks to us and you were saying thanks to the ECOMOG,
now I want to tell you that we are not ECOMOG. We are the junta rebels, we are here .... "
After this, Rocky singled Teh out of the crowd because he was a pastor, and told him to pray
for everybody.l6O4 Rocky then asked one of the rebels to bring out his big gun called
"Bargege" and shot all the civilian men to death.l6O5 Afterwards, the deceased were all
decapitated by the SBUs on orders of commander Rocky.16O6 Later, Teh was taken back to
Sunna Mosque, where he heard Rocky tell Rambo that he had killed 101 men.l607
666. Teh further testified that while at the Igbaleh, he saw a young boy who was killed by
the SBUs after they amputated his arms and legs and then threw him in a pit latrine. The
young boy was screaming and pleading with the SBUs asking them why they were doing
this to him.l6O8
IW Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 690.
I598Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 688-689.
mg The witness explained that in fact these were AFRC/RUF rebels led by Rambo the AFRC Brigade
commander and an RUF commander called Emmanuel Williams a.k.a. "Rocky". There were also a number of
child soldiers or SBUs the witness describes as being 15-16 years of age and under. Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript
8 January 2008, pp. 691-698.
mm Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 691-696.
MOI Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 693. Teh explained that lgbaleh was about a half` mile away
from Sunna Mosque.
moz Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 693-694.
mo} Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 694.
IGO4 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 695-699.
MOS Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 696-697.
N6 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 697-698.
Ibm Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 700.
Im Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 699-700.

---- End of Page 245 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

667. Another Prosecution witness, Isaac Mongor testified that in April 1998 after
ECOMOG pushed the AFRC/RUF forces out of Koidu Town, the latter occupied a place
code—named "Supe1nran Ground" from where they canied out their operations. One such
operation was the attack on Kissy Town, behind Koidu Town on the road leading towards
the Guinea border.l6O9 Mongor told the court that the rebel group to which he belonged went
to attack the Kamajors in Kissy Town and in the process also killed all the civilians that they
found there because they suspected everybody to be a Kamajor. Amongst those killed were
men, women and children. 1610
668. Confidential Exhibit P-077, a report documenting rebel actions from May 1998 to
January 1999 states:
[A] teenage boy described an attack close to Koidu, in early May by "junta". He had gone
there with his family because they thought that ECOMG had arrived..They were wrong and
instead encountered rebels. The boy reported that he was the only survivor in a group of 50.
He had a deep laceration to the foot which doctors said was a clear case of a failed
amputation. The boy was taken to Makeni by ECOMOG.l6ll
669. Exhibit P-078, a report by Amnesty International states:
[A]n even more grotesque pattern of killing, rape and mutilation became evident in April
1998 and the numbers of victims increased dramatically. Rebel forces called their campaign
of terror against civilians "Operation no living thing". As fighting continued between
ECOMOG and rebel forces around Koidu, attacks on civilians in villages in the area
persisted and then spread west and north .... Unarnred civilians who were taking no active
part in the conflict were killed, their homes burned and their villages destroyed .... More
than 650 bodies, many of them women and children, were reported to have been buried
following fighting in the area around Koidu in mid-June 1998.l6l2
An Amnesty international delegation which visited Sierra Leone in May 1998 met some of
the victims of these atrocities at Connaught Hospital .... Another victim, a 15—year-old
schoolboy from Koidu who had arrived at Connaught Hospital on 10 May 1998, had
suffered severe lacerations to his right ankle in an attempted amputation. He and his family
- his parents and six brothers and sisters- had been hiding in the bush for more than two
months after being driven from Koidu after it was attacked by rebel forces. They had no
food throughout that time other than bananas. On 1 May 1998 the family had heard reports
that ECOMOG had arrived in Koidu and they went to enter the eastern part of the town.
They and those with them were attacked by rebel forces who accused them of supporting
President Kabbah. Almost 50 people were killed. The young boy stayed for four days in a
house without food or treatment of his severely injured leg". M3
_ mg Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008 p, 6219.
mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008 pp. 6219-6220,
'6" Eiiriibir 1=·-077 raiiiiiaciiiiiir), para. 19.
M2 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone — 1998 — A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 11
M3 Exhibit P-078, "‘Sierra Leone — 1998 — A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p.12 This report seems to refer to the same incident referred to in paragraph 19 of Exhibit P-077

---- End of Page 246 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M QQ 18 May 2012
Z//if 2//

SX 3 E9
Findings
670. Teh spent some time with the AFRC/RUF forces while in captivity and witnessed
some of their activities first hand. His evidence is based on an eye-witness account of what
he saw and heard. The Trial Chamber finds his evidence in relation to the killing of civilians
in Koidu Town between March and April 1998, reliable and credible. His evidence of how
civilians were sometimes tricked by the AFRC/RUF forces into believing that the latter were
ECOMOG, Only to be killed by the rebels, is corroborated by the account given in Exhibit P-
078 and confidential Exhibit P-077. Based on the ab0ve evidence, the Trial Chamber finds
that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that between April and May 1998
during an attack on Koidu Town: 1) AFRC/RUF forces intentionally sh0t and killed one
Aiah Abu at Sunna Mosque in Koidu Town; 2) an RUF C0mmander Ennnanuel Williams
a.k.a. "R0cky" acting under the orders of an AFRC Brigade commander called "Ramb0", 1
intentionally executed 101 captured men and had their b0dies decapitated at a place called
the lgbaleh in Koidu Town, and 3) child soldiers known as SBUs acting under the orders of
C0mmander Emmanuel Williams a.k.a. "R0cky" intentionally dismembered and killed a
y0ung b0y and threw his b0dy in a pit latrine at the lgbaleh in Koidu Town. The Trial
Chamber further Hnds that all the victims of the ab0ve-mentioned killings were civilians not
. taking an active part in the hostilities.
671. However, in relation to the 50 corpses that Teh saw on his way to lgbaleh, the
Prosecution did not provide evidence as to whether the victims were active combatants 0r
civilians, nor of who had killed them. Given Teh's testimony that heavyifighting was
reportedly going on between ECOMOG and the Junta forces in the area at the time,l6l4 the
Trial Chamber is unable to make a conclusive finding as to who these 50 people were 0r
how they died.
672. The ab0ve 0ral and d0cumentary evidence clearly establishes that the perpetrators,
acting in accordance with orders given by their commanders, deliberately targeted civilians
in Koidu Town in order to prevent them from staying in or returning to Koidu Town. The
deliberate tricking of civilians into showing their support for ECOMOG f`0llowed by mass
execution of those civilians by the AFRC/RUF forces underlines the campaign of reprisal
against the civilian p0pulation. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the
(confidential), albeit in greater detail,

---- End of Page 247 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 6% 18 May 2012

e etrators wilfull made the victims the ob`ect of such violence and the rimar u ose
P YP Y J P Y P YP
of these killings was to instil terror in the civilian population.
(iii) Other killings around Koidu Town between December 1999 and the
disannament1615
673. In his prior testimony,1616 Prosecution Witness TF1—077 testified that in early 1998 in
a month he does not recall, the whole of Kono District was attacked and he and his family
moved from Tombodu to the Guinea border for refuge. He described the attack on Kono
District at that time as "Operation No Living Thing". 1617 The witness said he and his family
stayed at the Guinea border "for a little whi1e" and then they heard that ECOMOG had
arrived in Kono District.1618 The witness testified that following the ECOMOG Intervention
and on hearing that ECOMOG had "c1eared Koidu Town", he left the Guinea border "in the
dry season"1619 in 1998 and retumed to Koidu Town. 16211 The witness further testified that on
16 December 1999 after he had retumed to Koidu Town,1621 as he was sleeping he heard
heavy gunfire. The gunfire went on for a long time. He went outside and heard shouting and
wailing. He ran and hid behind his house until daybreak. At dawn, he saw many corpses of
people that had been killed, including three children one of whom was his own child. 1622 The
witness further told the court that an armed RUF man dressed in military uniform1623
captured the witness and other civilians totalling 50 people in number and marched them to
Tombodu with loads of looted property on their heads.1°24 On the way to Tombudu, the
armed captors dressed in combat uniforms told the witness "We are the RUF. You are now
‘°"‘ Aiax rarnba ran, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 683-694.
1615 The disarmament in Sierra Leone was from approximately January 2001 to July 2001. See Transcript, 7
February 2008, p. 3391; Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5368; Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11330; Transcript 8 April
2008, p. 6883.
1616 Witness TF1-077 testified in the RUF trial and the transcript of his testimony was admitted in this trial
pursuant to Rule 92bis as Prosecution Exhibit P-196 ("prior testimony"). In the present trial he was cross-
examined on his prior testimon . See Witness TF1-077, Transcript, 14 October 2008, pp. 18232-18259.
Y
1617 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, pp. 18641, 18651.
*6*** Errinbn P-196, Witness rm-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18642.
1619 The Court took judicial notice of the fact that the dry season in Sierra Leone was in December. Exhibit P-
196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18652,
‘"" Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF rrannnrrpr, p. 18642. 1
1621 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, pp.18629-18631, 18651.
1622 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18629; See also Witness TF1-077 Transcript 14
October 2008, p. 18236.
1623 The witness explained that on their way to Tombodu, armed men wearing combat uniforms told the civilian
captives that the RUF was now in control of Koidu Town and ECOMOG was driven out. Exhibit P-196, Witness
TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18630.

---- End of Page 248 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /% 18 May 2012

38 3 Lt I
in our control. You are no longer in ECOMOG control".l625 ln Tombudu Town the captives
met other RUF commanders including Officer Med, Colonel Gibbo and Major Tactical who
told the captives that Issa Sesay had ordered that the abductees be taken to Tombudu Bridge
to mine}626 The witness testified that subsequently, he and many other civilians were forced p 1
to mine diamonds for the RUF at Tombudu Bridge ‘"until the disannament".l627 The witness
testified that throughout this period, civilians forced to mine were heavily guarded by RUF
child soldiers known as SBUs, mistreated and often died from disease for lack of medical
treatment or were killed for refusing to mine for the RUF.l°28 The witness saw one S.E.
Sogbeh who was summarily executed by an SBU for refusing to work and whose body was
thrown into the river with a warning from the RUF that "anybody who refused to do this
work, this will be your end". [629
Findings
674. The account by Witness TF1·077 of civilian deaths, including that of one of his
children, is based on circumstantial evidence. From his evidence it is clear that there was
exchange of fire between ECOMOG and the RUF forces the previous night. He was
fortunate enough to survive by hiding behind his house, but the presence of many corpses
the next morning is proof that a lot of civilians died during this exchange. His own child
was amongst the casualties. Based on this evidence however, the Trial Chamber cannot rule
out the possibility that the civilians were accidentally caught in the cross fire, nor can the
Trial Chamber rule out the possibility that some were killed by ECOMOG forces. The Trial
Chamber however, finds the witness's evidence regarding the death of civilians forced by
the RUF to mine at Tombudu Bridge, credible. Based on that evidence, the Trial Chamber
finds that the Prosecution has proved that from December 1999 until the disarmament, RUF
forces intentionally killed an unknown number of civilians who refused to mine for the
AFRC/RUF at Tombudu Bridge or who were denied medical treatment.
M4 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18629.
M25 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18630.
lm Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18630.
1627 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, pp. 18631-18633.
1628 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18632-18634.
*629 Exhibit P-196, Witness TF1-077, RUF Transcript, p. 18633.

---- End of Page 249 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gtk 18 May 2012

675. Given the slave—like conditions under which the AFRC/RUF Junta forced civilians to
mine for them and forbade them from mining for personal benefit, the Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such
violence and the primary purpose of the killing of the civilians who refused to carry out
forced mining at Tombodu Bridge was to instil terror in the civilian population and thereby
to continue controlling the mining activities in Kono District.
(b) Bumpe
(i) Killings in Bumpe between March and June 1998 A
676. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that the AFRC/RUF continued their campaign of
terror against the citizens of Kono District from March right through to June 1998 when he
and Commander Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast) withdrew from Kono. He stated
that the junta forces continued routinely attacking civilian homes and buming houses in
Bumpe even when there was no enemy in sight, with the aim of discouraging civilians and
ECOMOG from staying in or retuming to Bumpe}630 Apart from the area where the
battalion occupied, the whole of Bumpe was bumt down.l63 I Sesay further told the court that
during the attack on Bumpe in March or April 1998, the SLA battalion commander at
Bumpe,l°32 Lt. Amara Kallay and the AFRC/RUF troops that were present, decapitated
several captured civilians, put their heads on sticks and fixed the sticks on guard posts.l°33
The witness stated that this was done to create fear amongst the civilians and ECOMOG}634
Bobson Sesay also told the court that this display of human heads on sticks at checkpoints
was routinely done by the AFRC/RUF forces in other locations within Kono District
p including Tombodu,l635 Njaiama Sewafe,l636 and Yengema}637
677. Bobson Sesay further testified that AFRC/RUF forces engaged in burning houses in
Bumpe would lock and set houses on fire withcivilians inside. Despite the cries, the Junta
forces would guard the buming buildings at gun point to prevent anyone escaping. After the
mo Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7984.
Hm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7985.
M2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7964.
my Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7984-7985.
M4 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7984-7985.
M5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7984-7985.
M6 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7987.
`637 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7988.

---- End of Page 250 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 7 618 18 May 2012

building was completely destroyed, the Junta forces "would not bother... to go and watch
whether anything was in there because we knew the houses were completely burnt
dOWn»~1638
678. Alimamy Bobson Sesay's account is corroborated by the hearsay evidence of Alice
Pyne, a former radio operator for the RUF forces, who testified that she heard from Foday
Lansana on the radio that the AFRC/RUF forces that attacked Bumpe killed many civilians
in the process. 1639
679. In addition Prosecution Witness TF1-375 who took part in the AFRC/RUF attack on
Bumpe testified that the junta forces asked the civilians to leave Bumpe so that the junta
forces would be based there and that those civilians who resisted were shot dead. The
witness himself admitted that he participated in the killing of these civilians and in
decapitating their heads and displaying them on sticks at various check points. He explained
that this was done in accordance with the orders of their commanders to "make the area
fearful" in order to scare off ECOMOG and other civilians.1640 The witness also explained
that the RUF slogan that "civilians have no blood" meant that the lives of civilians did not
matter to the junta forces.l641
680. Another witness who was a victim of the rebel attacks in Bumpe after the ECOMOG
Intervention is Witness TF1-218.1642 Witness TF1-218 narrated how after the ECOMOG
Intervention of February 1998,1643 four rebelsl644 dressed in combat uniforms and black
boots and armed with guns and knivesl645 attacked her home in Bumpe at night. She stated
that the rebels captured her and locked her in a house at Cookery junction with other
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp, 7985-7987.
M9 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12201.
lm TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12511-12514.
M rrr-375, rmsmpt 23 June 2008, p. 12513-12514.
M42 Witness TF1-218 testified in the RUF trial and the transcript of her testimony was admitted in this trial
pursuant to Rule 92bis as Prosecution Exhibit P-198 ("prior testimony"). In the present trial she was cross-
examined on his prior testimony. See Witness TF1-218, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18346-18359.
M3 Although this witness was illiterate, she clearly explained in her prior testimony and in cross-examination
that the rebels attacked Bumpe after ECOMOG had restored President Tej an Kabbah to power in Freetown and
after the rebels had been driven away from Freetown. See Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February
2005", pp. 18876 & 18887; and Witness TF1-218, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18351-18352.
[644 The witness described how after she was taken to the house at Cookery junction, one of the captors asked the
civilians who they thought he was and when the civilians could not say he said "we are the rebels". Exhibit P-
198 , "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005, p. 18879.
M45 Witness TF1-218, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp.18353, 18355, 18358.

---- End of Page 251 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T // Glas 18 May 2012

captured civilians.l646 The witness described how two rebels stripped her naked and raped
her.l647 She testified that she managed to escape from the house after a rebel had threatened
to kill all the civilians with an axe and shot the witness’ left hand.l648 She later returned to
the house to look for her son the next morning and found her son alive but covered in blood.
mg TF 1-218 testified that her son, who was present during the attack, told her that all of the
civilians she left in the house were killed in the room from which TF 1-21 8 had escaped the
night before. M50 Her son explained to the witness that he escaped death only because "as the
rebels were shooting these people, he was lying flat on the ground and most of the people
who were shot fell on top of him". MSI
681. Perry Kamara, a radio operator who was based at Superman ground after the
ECOMOG Intervention in 1998, told the court that sometime before June 1998,l652 the RUF
forces under the command of Sam Bockarie, Morris Kallon and CO Rocky attacked Bumpe
and its surrounding areas. Upon their return to Superman Ground after the operation, the
RUF forces reported that they had killed civilians, amputated others and burnt most of the
town in accordance with Bockarie's orders to "make the area fearful". M3
Findings
682. Based on his aforesaid position within the AFRC/RUF and his participation in their
operations in Kono District, the Trial Chamber finds Bobson Sesay's above evidence
reliable and credible. The Trial Chamber also finds that Sesay's evidence is amply
corroborated by the evidence of Alice Pyne and Witness TF 1-375. Further, the Trial
Chamber finds the account given by Witness TF 1-218 credible. Although her account of the
civilian deaths is based partly on her ordeal while in captivity and partly on the report by her
son who witnessed the killings, the Trial Chamber finds the evidence compelling and draws
the one reasonable inference that the rebels shot and killed many civilians in this house at
Cookery Junction. The Trial Chamber also found the evidence of Perry Kamara credible and
1646 Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005", pp. 18878-18881.
HM Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005", pp. 18878-18881.
1648 Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005", p. 18883.
1649 Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005", pp. 18884-18885.
M50 Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005", pp. 18885-18887.
ml Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Transcript 1 February 2005", p. 18885.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3154-3155.
M5} Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3152.

---- End of Page 252 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QL 18 May 2012

T $8 BL! S
reliable, given his position within the RUF at that time. His description of the orders by the
various RUF commanders to "make Kono District fearful" is consistent with the evidence of
Bobson Sesay.
683. Thus while the actual number of civilian deaths in Bumpe is unknown, the Trial
Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that between March
and June 1998, during an attack on Bumpe, the AFRC/RUF forces acting under the orders of
several commanders including Lt. Amara Kallay, Hassan Papa Bangura, Superman, Sam
Bockarie, Morris Kallon, CO Rocky and others, intentionally killed an unknown number of
civilians, all of whom were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
684. The above evidence clearly establishes that the perpetrators acting in accordance
with orders given by their commanders to "make Kono fearful", deliberately targeted
civilians in Bumpe in order to prevent them from staying in or returning to Bumpe. That
campaign of terror entailed not only murders but also the burning down of homes; mass
amputations and the bizarre display of human heads on sticks at various checkpoints. The
Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims
the object of such violence and the primary purpose of these killings was to instil terror in
the civilian population.
(c) Tombudu p
(i) Massacre of more than 20 civilians in Tombodu around March or April 1998
685. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he participated in an attack on Tombodu
around March or April 19981654 along with other RUF forces and commanders Bomb Blast
and Savage}655 The witness explained that when the AFRC/RUF forces first arrived in
Tombodu, they were dressed in military uniforms and arrived in vehicles. Pretending to be
government forces that had come to rescue the citizens, the AFRC/RUF forces gestured to
the fleeing civilians to stop running and to approach the fighters, saying "we are government
troops. We have come to reinforce and protect you".l656 The civilians stopped running and
1654 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8002.
1655 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7992.
1656 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7992-7993.

---- End of Page 253 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (Pg 18 May 2012

38 3 we
as s00n as the civilians approached within firing range, the AFRC/RUF forces 0pened fire
0n the civilians, killing over 20 of them. 1657
Findings
686. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a participant in
this attack, credible and reliable. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved
1 beyond reasonable doubt that around March or April 1998 the AFRC/RUF forces that
attacked T0mb0du intentionally massacred m0re than 20 civilians in T0mb0du, all of whom
were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
687. The ab0ve evidence clearly establishes that the pe1petrators, acting in accordance
with orders given by their commanders to "make Kono f`earful", deliberately targeted
civilians in T0mbudu in order to prevent them from staying in or returning to T0mb0du. The
deliberate tricking of civilians into showing their support for what they believed were
"Government forces", f`0llowed by mass execution of those civilians by the AFRC/RUF
forces, demonstrates the Juntas’ reprisal against the civilian p0pulation. The Trial Chamber A
finds beyond reasonable doubt that the pe1petrators wilfully made the victims the 0bject of`
such vi0lence and the primary pu1pose of these killings was to instil terr0r in the civilian
p0pulation.
(ii) Second Massacre at T0mbudu involving 77-78 civilians around April 1998
688. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that T0mb0du was attacked again one month after
Savage was based there as battalion commander.1658 After capturing about 77-78 civilians,
Savage sent a message to Masingbi headquarters inviting commanders B0mb-Blast, Bazzy
and Alimamy Bobson Sesay to come and meet the "civilian visitors".1659 Savage explained
to the commanders and the witness that he had tricked the civilians into believing that
ECOMOG had come to save them. The civilians had rej0iced at the news Only to be
captured by Savage.161’O The witness described how Savage assembled and paraded the 78 ’
1657 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7992-7993.
1651* Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7994. From the context of the witness's testimony, this
event ooourred approximately one month after the AFRC and RUF took oontro1 of T0mb0du after Koidu Town
had been captured. The attack was likely in March or April 1998. See Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7995, 8002.
11159 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7995-7997.
1111111 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7996.

---- End of Page 254 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T // (LQ 18 May 2012

civilians before the commanders and the witness.1661 Fifteen of these civilians were locked
up in a building by Savage and burned alive.1662 The witness heard them scream and saw
their charred skeletons afterwards. Another 15 civilians were amputated by Savage and his
subordinates including Guitar Boy and Staff Alhaji and some SBUs.1666 The witness heard
Savage telling the amputees to "go and tell ECOMOG that Savage was now the battalion
commander in Tombodu".1664 The rest of the civilians were decapitated by Savage and their
bodies thrown into a pit known as the "Savage pit".1666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that
after this incident, Commander Savage was nick-named "Changa Bulanga" because he was
"very good at using machete. He was very good at amputating people". *666 Bobson Sesay
further testified that Superman came to Tombodu just after this incident had taken place and
that Savage showed Superman the decapitated bodies in the pit as well as the charred bodies
of the civilians that he had burnt. Superman was reportedly shocked and warned Savage that
what he had done amounted to crimes against humanity. However, Superman did not punish
Savage and instead joined everybody in drinking palm wine to celebrate the incident.1667
689. Prosecution Witness TF 1 -375, a subordinate of Superman during this period, told the
court that Savage led an attack on Tombodu.1666 The witness travelled to Tombodu shortly
after this attack and accompanied Superman whom Savage had invited to drink palm
wine.1666 On anival, Savage showed Superman and the witness a big pit where he had
dum ed the co ses of executed civilians.1676 Witness TF 1-375 described the it as a former
P YP P
diamond mining pit where he saw corpses of old people, young people and children and
severed limbs. 1671
*66* Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7995-7997.
*662 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7995-7997.
*666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7995-7997.
*666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7997.
*666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7995-7997.
*666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7966 and Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7999.
*667 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7999.
*666 TF1—375, Trrrrrscript 23 Jrrrrc 2008, p. 12514.
*666 TF1—375, Transcript 23 Jrrrrc 2008, p. 12514.
1676 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12514-12515.
*67* T1¤1-375, Trrrrrscript 23 June 2008, pp. 12514-12515.

---- End of Page 255 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~ [TU. 18 May 2012

E8 3%
690. Perry Kamara, a radio operator with the RUF at Superman's headquarters known as
Superman Ground, confirmed in his testimony that he received reports in 1998 that Savage
had killed more than 30 civilians in Tombodu}672
Findings
691. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay credible as he was
A an eye—witness to the killings. Furthermore, his evidence is corroborated by that of Witness
TF1—375, who saw the large pit containing bodies of civilians and severed limbs, and of
Perry Kamara who received reports of the civilian killings. Based on the above evidence, the
Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that around
April 1998, AFRC/RUF forces led by Savage, and with the approval of commanders
Superman and Bomb Blast, intentionally killed about 63 civilians in Tombodu, that were not
taking an active part in the hostilities.
692. The evidence establishes that the AFRC/RUF Juntas acting in accordance with
orders earlier given by their commanders to "make Kono fearful", deliberately targeted the
civilian population in order to prevent them from staying in or returning to Tombodu.
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding these killings, including the deliberate tricking
of civilians into believing that the rebels were ECOMOG forces that had come to their
rescue only to then massacre those civilians; the indiscriminate amputations accompanied by
sarcastic messages to the ruling Government; as well as the public disposal of numerous
dead bodies into an open pit, demonstrate the rebel campaign of reprisal and terror against
the civilian population. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the
perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose
of these killings was to instil terror in the civilian population.
(iii) Third Massacre of over 53 civilians in Tombudu in April 1998
693. Mustapha Mansaray and Ibrahim Fofana, two civilians that were captured by the
AFRC/RUF forces and taken together to Tombudu around April 1998, testified before the
Trial Chamber. Mustapha Mansaray was captured by "rebels and soldiers"l673 from Wordu
W2 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3159.
lm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19592 (where witness describes his captors as "soldiers
and rebels").

---- End of Page 256 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T GQ 18 May 2012 M

Sandor,l674 while Ibrahim Fofana was ca tured b soldiers wearin milita uniforms in
P Y 8 YY
Paema}675 Both men walked for three days carrying looted goods belonging to the captors
and were taken to Tombodu where they met 53 other civilians that were also captured by the
Junta forces}676 Mansaray, Fofana and the other captured persons were taken to Staff
Alhaji's headquartersl677 where they were stripped naked and forced to sit on the ground. [678
Staff Alhaji, who the witness was told was the rebel commander, asked for a mortar to be
brought and amputated the hands of six men including Mansaray and Fofana}679 Staff
Alhaji told the amputees that "now they would never be able to vote for President Kabbah
again and that they should keep their hands out of politics".l68O Mansaray told the court that
four of the amputees later died from their wounds and that only he and Fofana survived. ml
694. Mansaray testified that Staff Alhaji ordered the rebels to lock the 53 civilians in a
building and to bum them alive. Aiier locking the 53 civilians in a building, the rebels
s rinkled etrol on the buildin and set it ali t bumin everyone inside to death}682
P P 8 8
Mansaray heard the people inside, including women and children, crying.l683 Mansaray
explained that the people inside the building could not escape because the doors and
windows were locked with nails and soldiers stood guard with guns}684 Mansaray and
Fofana leii before the house finished burning. [685
695. Witness Ibrahim Fofana was captured by soldiers wearing military uniforms in
Paema.l°86 He testified that he was with five persons who carried loads for the captors to
Tombodu at gunpoint}687 All five persons reached Tombodu on 5 April 1998l688 and were
taken to a person called Staff Alhaji. Fofana stated that while he and the others were tied to
M4 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19592-19593.
M5 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19334.
I676 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19597, 19599; Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October
2008,PD. 19334, 19336-19337.
M7 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19601-19602.
lm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19602-19603.
mg Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19603-19605.
mm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19607.
msi Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19606-19607.
lm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19609.
lm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19608.
M4 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19609.
lm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19609.
M6 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19334.
M7 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19334, 19336-19337.
1688 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19343.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V @,5 18 May 2012

an orange tree in the compound, the rebel soldiers brought 53 other captives from a village
called Masundu and locked them in a big house}689 Fofana heard a soldier report to Staff
Alhaji that the 53 civilians had been captured and Staff Alhaji gave an order that they be
locked up in a house and the house be set on fire.l69O The rebels locked the 53 civilians in the
house, sprinkled petrol on it and set it on fire.l°9l Fofana testified that he heard people
screaming until the house bumed down completely. 1692
696. Fofana said that aHer the house had been completely bumt, that he and the others in
the group of five had their hands amputated by Rambo who was dressed in a military
uniforrn}693 Fofana testified that only he and Mustapha Mansaray survived the
amputations,l694 as the other three were elderly and were bleeding profusely.l695 The three
fell down somewhere on the way to Lebanon and died}696
Findings
697. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of both Mustapha Mansaray and Ibrahim
Fofana reliable and credible. Although Mansaray's account of the events differs in a number
of respects from that of Fofana,l697 the Trial Chamber finds that their story is consistent and
corroborated and is satisfied that the discrepancies in the witnesses’ testimonies can be
reasonably accounted for by the passage of time and the physical and emotional trauma
suffered by both witnesses. Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that in April 1998, AFRC/RUF forces
under the orders of Staff Alhaji intentionally caused the deaths of 56 civilians in Tombodu,
including 53 who were bumed inside a building and 3 who subsequently died from
amputations.
1689 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19338.
1690 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19340. ,
ml Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19340.
1692 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19340.
1693 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19341.
[694 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19341.
1695 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19342.
M6 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. l9342·l9343.
1697 For example, Mansaray said they were captured on 12 April 1998 while Fofana said it was on 5 April 1998.
Mansaray said he found the 53 civilians already in Tombodu while Fofana said the civilians were brought after
he had aready arrived in Tombudu. Mansaray said that Staff Alhaji himself carried out the amputations while
Fofana said it was an officer called Rambo.

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Case No.: SCSL·O3—O1—T 7/% @0 18 May 2012 %

698. The circumstances under which the AFRC/RUF forces captured and collected in a
single place such a large number of civilians, as well as the cruel manner in which their
death was executed, demonstrate the campaign of terror unleashed by the Junta forces. The
Trial Chamber further tinds that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such
violence and the primary purpose of these killings was to instil terror in the civilian
population.
(iv) Killings of civilians in and around Tombodu between March and May 1998
699. The Trial Chamber heard evidence of other killings of civilians in Tombodu during
the period April to May 1998. Prosecution Witness TFl—064 told court that "during the dry
season",l698 while residing in Foendor, Kono District, civilians who fled from Koidu and
Tombodu came and told her that "rebels have started killing people".l699 The witness and r
her family hid in the bush outside of Foendor. While in hiding, rebelsmo claiming to be
"ECOMOG soldiers", including one she knew before named Tamba Joe,l7Ol captured a
group of civilians including the witness and her family members, and took them back to
Foendor Town.l702 Once in Foendor Town, the rebels killed all of the civilians including her
family and her young children}703 TFl—064 testitied that only she and a Temne man
survived. The rebels forced her and the Temne man to carry a bag containing human heads
to Tombodu.l7O4 On the way, the rebels ordered the witness to laugh as she carried the bag
dripping with blood. TFl—064 testified that when they arrived at Tombodu, the bag was
emptied and she saw the heads of her children.l705 ln Tombudu, TFl—064 saw a commander
called Capay cut the Temne man's throat, killing him.l706 The Temne man's corpse was
lm TF1-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17636, 17638.
‘6"" TFl-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, p. 17636.
mo The witness said at that "some of the rebels were dressed in combat fatigues while some wore civilian
c1othing". TFl-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, p. 17642.
ml TF1-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17641-17644.
lm TFl-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17647-17648.
lm TFl-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17649, 17652-17653.
1704 TFl-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17656-17657. The children were killed in Foendor and their
heads were taken to Tombodu. See TFl-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17 652-17653.
lm TFl-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17657.
HO6 TF1-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17658.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ `6\l 18 May 2012

taken to a pit of water.11111 The witness escaped from the rebels at night and went to
Kokuima where ECOMOG was stationed. 111111
700. Another Prosecution witness Sahr Bindi testified that AFRC/RUF forces first came
to Tombodu sometime "between the rainy and dry seasons".11119 After addressing the citizens
and telling them that the AFRC and RUF were in Koidu and that the civilians should not be
afraid, the juntas retumed to Koidu.11111 Less than a month later, the rebels returned to
Tombodu amidst heavy gunfire.1111 Bindi said that some of the men had red cloth tied
around their heads.1112 The witness fled and hid in the bush.1113 The shooting did not subside
until almost evenin .1114 When Bindi returned rrcm the bush, he saw two co ses of men
S YP
who had been shot.1115 One man was wearing civilian clothing.1116 The other man was
known to the witness to be a civilian. 1111
70l. After this incident Sahr Bindi fled to Guinea with his famil and 0nl returned to
Y Y
Tombodu a month later when they heard on the radio that ECOMOG had come to Kono
, District.1118 On his way back rrcm Guinea, Bindi was captured by RUF/AFRC fighters1119
and taken to their commander called Staff Alhaji in Tombodu.11211 Staff Alhaji ordered his
men to lock u the witness and his brother sa `n that the 0u would be killed the next
P Y1 S SY P
day. 1121 Towards the evening, Bindi heard people being beaten and pleading on the veranda
not to be killed1m but at some point the screaming and pleading subsided.1123 When the
1707 TF1-064, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17657, 17658.
17011 Because the witness refers to ECOMOG being stationed in Kokuima, it can be inferred that the killing of the
Ternne man occurred around April or May 1998. Other witnesses have testified that ECOMOG was in Koikuma
in February to May 1998. See Kumba Bindi, Transcript 29 October 2008, p. 19506; Sheku Bah Kuyateh,
Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19715.
"°" Sahr Brrrdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18465-18466.
1710 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18464-18466.
'"' Sahr Brrrdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18466-18467.
"'2 srtrrr Brrrdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18466.
1713 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18467.
""‘ Sahr Brrrdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18467.
"'5 Sahr Brrrdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18467-18468.
1716 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18468-18469.
1717 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18468-1 8469.
17111 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18480-18481. 1
1719 Describing his captors the witness said that "They had military clothes and a mixed uniform. Some would
have the trousers and the civilian clothes and there were others who had the full uniform". Sahr Bindi, Transcript
16 October 2008, p. 18483.
1720 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18482-18485, 18490-18491.
1721 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18491-18492.
1722 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18492.

---- End of Page 260 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GIA 18 May 2012

3835 5
witness came out of the cell, he saw three corpses lying on the ground with ropes tied around
their waists and rocks attached to the ropes.m4 The corpses were dressed in civilian clothing
and appeared to have been beaten.l725 Bindi and the others taken out of the cell were told to
carry the bodies and dump them in an old mining pit that had a large quantity of water in
it.m6 Bindi later learnt that the pit was called "Savage pit".m7 The witness managed to
escape from captivity in the night. mg
Findings
702. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of both witnesses above credible and reliable
as they each give an eye-witness account of what they saw and heard. Based on the evidence
of Witness TF1-064, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between April and May 1998 in Foendor near Tombodu, AFRC/RUF
fighters pretending to be ECOMOG, beheaded an unknown number of civilians including
two of the witnesses' children and that soon thereafter, an AFRC/RUF fighter named Capay
intentionally killed a Temne man in Tombodu by slitting his throat. The Trial Chamber also
finds that all the civilians murdered were not taking an active part in the hostilities. The Trial
Chamber notes however, that since Foender is a location not pleaded in the Indictment, the
evidence relating to the civilian deaths there can only be used to prove the chapeau
requirements of the crime of murder and not for guilt.l729
703. Although Bindi's account of the death of three civilians at Staff Alhaji's veranda is
based on circumstantial evidence, the Trial Chamber finds, based on the screams and
pleading that Bindi heard; the threats of death made against him; the state of the corpses and
the method of their disposal; that the only reasonable inference is that these civilians were
murdered by the AFRC/RUF forces under the command of Staff Alhaji, who as the Trial
Chamber has noted above, routinely killed civilians and threw their bodies into a pit named
the "Savage pit". Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that between April and May 1998 in Tombodu, AFRC/RUF forces
Im Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18492.
Im Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18493—18497.
Im Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18497.
Im Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18496, 18498.
Im Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18499
mg Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18501
Im See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment supra.

---- End of Page 261 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T QQ 18 May 2012

3339+
under the command of Staff Alhaji, intentionally killed three civilians who were not taking
an active part in the hostilities.
704. The above evidence further illustrates the campaign of terror waged by the
AFRC/RUF forces in carrying out indiscriminate abductions and killings of innocent
civilians in Kono District around this time. The bizarre practice of beheading victims and
forcing civilians to carry the heads in a bag from one place to another, as well as the cruelty
of forcing a mother to "laugh" at her own children's beheading, are acts that demonstrate the
brutality of the AFRC/RUF forces. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence and the primary
purpose of these killings was to instil terror in the civilian population.
(d) Koidu Geiya or Koidu Gieya
(i) Killings of civilians at Koidu Geiya around May to June 1998
705. The Trial Chamber heard the evidence of several witnesses regarding the killing of
civilians in Koidu Geiya around the period of May to June 1998. These witnesses include
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Alice Pyne and Prosecution Witness TFl—375.
706. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that the AFRC/RUF forces based in
Gandorhun attacked Koidu Geiya around May or June 1998 and successfully captured it
from Kamajors.173 0 Sesay testified that these forces comprising RUF and SLA members
were commanded by an RUF commander called Rambo.1731 In Koidu Geiya, the
AFRC/RUF forces captured two Kamajors. Sesay testified that one of the AFRC/RUF forces
. called Ahchebe slit open one of the Kamajor's stomach, removed the heart and ate it raw.1732
Because of this, the other AFRC/RUF forces nicknamed Ahchebe "Charma—Raw", a Krio
word meaning "one who eats raw meat". Sesay told the court that this was done in the
presence of Commanders Hassan Papa Bangura, Dennins Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and two
other senior commanders, none of whom reprimanded Ahchebe for the killing of the
mo Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8014.
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8060.
lm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8014.

---- End of Page 262 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03-01—T ... 18 May 2012
6\>·>

Kamajor. Mingo merely reprimanded Charma-raw for cannibalism but not for killing the
Kamajor. I 733
707. Witness TF1-375 confirmed that during the period May/June 1998, the AFRC/RUF
forces fought against the Kamajors in Koidu Geiya and overpowered them.m4 According to
TF1-375, the AFRC/RUF forces needed to take control of Koidu Geiya from the Kamajors
in order to enable Johrmy Paul Koroma to cross through this area on his way to Kailahun}735
After defeating the Kamajors and taking control of the area, Superman designated an RUF
commander called Rambo to be based in Koidu Geiya. Witness TF1-375 told the court that
Rambo ordered his troops to burn down civilian homes, kill civilians and amputate others in
order to "make the area fearful".m6 TF1-375 was not present when the civilians were
allegedly killed, but he learnt of Rambo's orders being carried out from some of Rambo's
bodyguards including CO Bakarr and one of the AFRC commanders, who came from
"Rambo's ground".m7 Soon afterwards, Superman sent the witness to Koidu Geiya to take
ammunition to Rambo and that is when TF1-375 saw corpses of civilians, burnt houses and
cars and a lot of destruction in Koidu Geiyamg
708. Alice Pyne, a radio operator working for the RUF throughout the conflict testified
that the RUF used to carry out attacks on civilians, especially in areas where ECOMOG
troops were based and where the civilians thought they were safe. When the RUF attacked,
the civilians were unable to escape as quickly as ECOMOG}739 Pyne told the court that
Koidu Geiya was a location where the RUF would run such an operation in 1998 "while the
witness was at PC ground and before the death of Sani Abacha". M40 Pyne further told the
court that the RUF sent a message to her to the effect that they attacked Koidu Geiya, but the
message made no mention of any civilian deaths.l74l Pyne told the court that the attack was
Im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8014-8015.
Im TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12518-12519.
"35 TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jump 2008, p. 12518.
'"° TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jupp 2008,p. 12519.
"37 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12519-12520.
mg TF1—375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p.12519.
mg Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12198.
mo Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12198. The Trial Chamber notes according to Agreed Fact No. 11,
"1n June 1998, Sani Abacha died and was succeeded by Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar". Prosecutor v.
T ay/or, SCSL-03-1-PT-227, Joint Filing by the Prosecution and Defence Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April
2007, Agreed Fact 11. The Trial Chamber Ends accordingly that Pyne's evidence relates to the period after
ECOMOG had arrived in Kono following the Intervention in February 1998 but before June 1998.
ml Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12199.

---- End of Page 263 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ok 18 May 2012

38'$S`t¤
led by RUF commanders Rambo and Banya because they were the commanders in
Gandorhun from where the radio message came}742 Pyne stated that later she heard from
Claris, another radio operator based in Gandorhun where the attacking RUF forces had come
from, that the forces had indiscriminately killed a lot of civilians in Koidu Geiya, including
children. 1743
Findings
709. The Trial Chamber finds the testimony of Alimamy Bobson Sesay more reliable with
regard to the attack on Koidu Gieya as it is based on first—hand knowledge of the attack. The
testimony of TF1—375 although based partly on hearsay and partly on circumstantial
evidence, is also credible and reliable given his aforesaid position in the RUF at that time.
Moreover, the destruction of Koidu Geiya that he described seeing, including corpses of
civilians, accords with evidence that the Trial Chamber has considered above of the
campaign of terror that the AFRC/RUF routinely carried out whenever they wanted to scare
off the civilian population. The irresistible inference to be drawn is that the RUF forces that
had carried out the attack on Koidu Geiya had deliberately killed these civilians. Pyne's
evidence although based largely on hearsay, is corroborated by that of Bobson Sesay and
TFl—375. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that during their attack on Koidu Geiya around May/June 1998,
AFRC/RUF fighters intentionally caused the deaths of an unknown number of civilians
including children and one Kamajor, all of whom were not taking an active part in the
hostilities.
710. The evidence establishes that consistent with the rebel Commanders’ orders to
"make the area fearful", the rebel perpetrators targeted civilians by buming their homes,
killing many indiscriminately and amputating others in Koidu Geiya. The bizarre act by one
of the rebels ("Charma—Raw") of publicly eating a raw human heart demonstrates the
campaign of terror that served as a waming to the civilian population not to oppose the Junta
forces. The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of
such violence and the primary purpose of the killings in Koidu Geiya was to instil terror in
the civilian population there.
mz Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12199.
W3 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12198-12200.

---- End of Page 264 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / @5 18 May 2012

(e) Koidu Buma Q-
(i) Killings of civilians at Koidu Buma around May to June 1998
711. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in May or June 19981744 the AFRC/ RUF forces
in Kono District heard on the radio that ECOMOG forces were in Makeni and were coming
to recapture Kono.1745 Immediately after this the AFRC forces under the command of
Hassan Papa Bangura and Bazzy travelled from Masingbi and joined Superman's RUF
forces at Dabundeh Street. The combined AFRC/RUF forces took the Gandorhun route to
go to Koidu Geiya to attack the town.1746 On the way to Koidu Gieya, the group met RUF
Rambo, the Deputy Commander of Operations in Koidu Buma.1747 Alimamy Bobson Sesay
testified that he saw the corpses of 15 civilians who had been "hacked to death" by RUF
Rambo, but he did not witness the actual killings.17411 The witness explained that RUF
Rambo had gone ahead of the other fighters and was waiting for them at Koidu Buma.1749
RUF Rambo explained to the witness and the other commanders including Hassan Papa
Bangura and Superman, that he killed the civilians and displayed their bodies in the street in
order "to create fear so that no civilians would come to that area".1i750
Findings
712. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay regarding the
deaths of the 15 civilians in Koidu Buma, credible and reliable, as it is based on the corpses
of civilians he saw and the explanation given by Rambo. The Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in May/June 1998, and with the
approval of Commanders Hassan Papa Bangura, Bazzy and Superman, RUF Rambo
intentionally caused the death of 15 civilians during an attack on Koidu Buma, all of whom
were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
713. The evidence establishes that, consistent with the rebel Commanders’orders to
"make the area fearfi1l", the aim of the rebel commander known as RUF Rambo in targeting
1714 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8059.
1745 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8012.
1746 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8012, 8014.
1747 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8012-8013.
17411 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8012-8013.
1719 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8013.
1750 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8013.

---- End of Page 265 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI,-03-Ol-T / Ga 18 May 2012

ESBS8
these 15 civilians and displaying their corpses in the street was "to create fear so that no
civilian would come to that area". The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrator wilfiilly
made the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose of the killings in
Koidu Buma was to instil terror in the civilian population there.
(f) Yengema
(i) Killings of civilians at Yengema around March/April 1998
714. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in March or April 19981751
AFRC/RUF forces led by a commander called Tito attacked Yengema and completely
burned the town down, killed every civilian they found there, and displayed the corpses and
human heads on sticks at various checkpoints.1752 Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he
learned of the attack and killings while on patrol in Yengema with Commander Bomb
Blast.1753 Commander Tito explained to the Witness and Bomb Blast that some civilians
escaped and had their houses set on fire, while others were captured and those amongst the
captives who were "not strong enough" were killed.17511 The witness also told the court that
whenever he would go on patrol with this commander throughout Kono District, the
AF RC/RUF forces would tell them that the buming of houses and killing of civilians was "a
daily affair" and "an organised command". 1755
Findings
715. Based on his aforesaid position within the AFRC/RUF forces; what he was told
during the patrols and the explanation he was given by Commander Tito, the Trial Chamber
finds the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay credible and reliable. The Trial Chamber finds
that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in March/April 1998 during an
attack on Yengema, AF RC/RUF forces under the command of Tito and with the approval of
patrol commander Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast), intentionally caused the death
of an unknown number of civilians, all of whom were not taking an active part in the
hostilities.
1751 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8058. T A
1752 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7988, 7991—7992
1753 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7988.
1751 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7990.
1755 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7988—7989. `

---- End of Page 266 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01·T / du 18 May 2012

716. The evidence establishes that consistent with the orders of their superior
commanders to "make the area fearfu1", the AFRC/RUF forces routinely mounted attacks
upon civilians in many towns within Kono District including Yengema, which attacks
involved burning of houses and killing of civilians, and the macabre practice of displaying
dead bodies and human heads on sticks was an integral part of these attacks. The Trial
Chamber Ends that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence
and the primary purpose of the killings in Yengema was to instil terror in the civilian
population there.
(ii) Killing of civilians at the Yengema Training base between December 1998
and January 2000
717. Prosecution Witness TF1-362, testiHed that the more than 100 trainees at the
Yengema Base comprised civilian recruits transferred from the Bunumbu base as well as
civilians captured by Superman, Morris Kallon and Rambo around Koidu Town.1756 Other
commanders at the Yengema Base included 1ssa Sesay, Denis Mingo, Richard Cooper,
David Kanneh and a "Black guard" called Mohammed.1757 TF1-362 told the court that
civilian deaths were a regular occurrence at the base and that reports of the deaths were
regularly made to General Issa Sesay, usually through radio communication and written
records thereof kept.1758 Recruits of all ages died during the rigorous physical training
known as "halaka"1759 or "crawling" and other recruits who attempted to escape from the
training base were captured and either killed or had the letters "RUF" carved on their
foreheads or chests using a knife or broken bottle.1760 TF1-362 explained that 1ssa Sesay
gave the order that any civilian recruit attempting to escape should be killed in order to deter
the others from escaping.1761 She further explained that recruits were "marked" with the
letters "RUF" so that wherever they went, they would be easily identiHed, and also to scare
off others from attempting to escape. 1762
"5° T1¤1-362, Trsrtscrrpt 27 February 2008, p. 4917.
"57 T1¤1-262, Trsrrscrrpt 27 February 2008, pp. 4917-4919.
"SS T1¤1-262, Trsrtscrrpt 27 February 2008, p. 4923.
1759 Describing the training called "ha1aka" the witness told the court that the trainres would shoot live bullets
over the heads of the recruits as the latter crawled and that many recruits were accidentally shot to death in this
way. TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4846 (CS).
17611 TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4927-4929.
"°' TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4929.
1762 TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4927.

---- End of Page 267 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Z (iq 18 May 2012 g

718. TF1-362 testified that on one occasion when General Issa Sesay was the over all
commander of the RUF, six recruits including a child soldier or SBU, were caught
attempting to escape from Yengema base. Upon receiving the witness's report of the
attempted escape, Issa Sesay ordered the witness to kill all six recruits but the witness
hesitated, pleading that the younger ones amongst them should be spared. The Black Guards
at the training base reported the witness to Issa Sesay who took her to task for disobeying his
orders. Issa Sesay's bodyguards summarily executed three of the errant recruits and the
Black Guards killed the other two. One child soldier (SBU) was spared because of his tender
age. After this incident, the SBU was nicknamed "Long life". 1763
719. Witness TF1-362 also testified that the RUF forces at Yengema Training base would
go on "food-finding missions" in surrounding villages whereby they would attack civilians
and rob them of their food. Civilians who would resist were shot or beaten to death and their
food taken. N64
720. Mustapha Mansaray, a member of the Internal Defence Unit of the RUF from 1994
to 1999, testified that while serving at Ngaiya in Kono District,1765 he heard from miners
who used to go to Yengema that Issa Sesay killed recruits at the Yengema training base.l766
Mansaray stated that his colleague, Pa Kosia, a general security officer for the RUF,1767
investi ated the alle ations and asked Issa Sesa about the deaths of recruits at Yen ema. Pa
S S Y S
Kosia told Mansaray that Issa Sesay told him that if he pursued the questioning then he too
would be punished.17°8 Mansaray also testified that Pa Kosia told Mansaray that the training
commander at Yengema training base confirmed to Pa Kosia that Issa Sesay came to the
base and killed several recruits and that his bodyguards also shot some of the recruits.1769
Findings
721. Based on her position in the RUF and particularly at Yengema training base, the
Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Witness TF1-362 relating to the mistreatment and
*763 TF1-362, Transcript 27 rcbmary 2008,p. 4929.
N64 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4904-4905. ‘
ms Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, p. 5235 stated that he served as RUF mining commander in
Ngaiya from January to June 2001.
*766 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5354-5355.
lm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5356.
1768 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5354-5355.
mq Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5355-5356.

---- End of Page 268 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T j @3. 18 May 2012

23 Ee I
killing of civilians at the training base, credible and reliable. That evidence establishes that
civilian recruits of all ages were regularly mistreated by the RUF trainers at the Yengema
base and that many died in the course of training as a result of this mistreatment. The
evidence of Mustapha Mansaray, although based on hearsay, confirms the account of TF 1-
362, who was present at Yengema training base when five civilian recmits were shot to
death for attempting to escape. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that between the end of 1998 and the disarmament in
2000 at Yengema training base, Issa Sesay and his body guards intentionally executed five
civilians. The Trial Chamber further finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that RUF forces under the command of Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie
regularly intentionally killed civilian recmits at Yengema training base as a form of
punishment for attempting to escape or during food finding missions. The Trial Chamber
also finds that these civilians were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
722. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the execution of civilians caught trying to
escape from the training base, or those trying to protect their food from being looted by the
fighters, served as a warning to those who would dare to disobey the RUF fighters. The Trial
Chamber finds that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence
and the purpose of the killings at the Yengema Training base was to instil terror amongst the
civilian population, thereby ensuring the continued loyalty of the abducted trainees.
(g) Paema or Peygma
(i) Killings of civilians in Paema around March/April 1998
723. Witness Ibrahim Fofana lived with his family in Paema Town, Kono District in
February 1998.1770 Fofana testified that a "squad of soldiers"ml arrived in Paema Town in
Febmary 1998 and forcibly took people's property, in what the soldiers called "Operation
Pay Yourself".lm F ofana stated that the "soldiers" left Paema for Sefadu for an unspecified
period of time and later returnedlm When the soldierslm returned, Fofana heard them say
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19316.
` ‘"‘ The witness stated that the soldiers who attacked Paema were armed with guns and were dressed in the
military uniform wom by the Sierra Leone Army. Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19319.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19318.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19320-19322.
'"4 The witness stated at that the soldiers who retumed to Paema also wore military uniform and carried guns.

---- End of Page 269 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f dh 18 May 2012

"Today there will not be any living thing". He heard the soldiers refer to "Operation No
Living Thing".m5 The witness stated that the soldiers killed three civilians whom he knew
well, namel , Ali Ban ali, Sori and Pa Jannehmé Fofana testified that Ali Ban ali was a
Y S S
farmer and that he was shot dead while making bricks for his house because he refused to
give the soldier money or diamonds.m7
724. After the burial of Ali Bangali, Fofana heard a gunshot from the market areamg and
when he went to check, he found the body of Sori, a caterpillar operator, lying in a pool of
bloodmg Fofana testified that as he and his famil were fleein from Paema, he saw the
Y S
corpse of Pa Janneh, a security man who used to guard the caterpillar, on the road going to
Sandor.I78O Fofana helped to bury all three "useful civilians" after the assailants had left the
Town 1781
725. F ofana further told the court that after the death of the three civilians, he fled with his
family towards the Guinea border where they took refuge for about a month and a halfm;2
He retumed with his family to Paema on hearing over the BBC that ECOMOG forces had
overcome the fighters and were calling all citizens of Paema to retum and to take care of
their property.l783 Fofana stated that when they retumed to Paema, they were ambushed by
soldiers wearing military uniforms. WM F ofana and four other men were captured by soldiers
and taken to Tombodu.l785 Fofana's children,l786 his Aunt Isatu Bangura, and his mother
called Mammy Isatu were also captured and bumt alive by the soldiers.l787
726. In cross-examination, the Defence tendered into evidence a video filmed at
Connaught Hospital in Freetown in 1998 wherein Ibrahim Fofana was interviewed about his
Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19323.
W5 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19322.
W6 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19323-19324.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19324-19325.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19325.
mq Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19325.
Im Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19326.
ml Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19326.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19328.
1783 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19328.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19334.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19334.
H86 The witness stated that the children who died in the fire included a daughter Kadiatu Fofana and two sons,
Mohammed Fofana and Dauda Fofana. Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19350.
lm Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19334-19336.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T g` 18 May 2012

experience during the war}788 In the interview, when asked by the interviewer what
happened to his wife and children, Fofana answered that he "left them in the bush when
those guys went and attacked us".l789 He did not mention his children or his aunt having
been burnt alive.l79O Explaining this apparent inconsistency in cross-examination, Fofana
stated that he forgot to mention the fate of his family because "he was not in a good state of
mind when he was being interviewed for the video". ml
727. Ibrahim Fofana was also featured in Exhibit P-014, an excerpt from the documentary
"Blood Diamonds". In this second interview, Fofana did say that his wife and children were
burnt alive, but indicated that he had learned this later. W2
728. The Trial Chamber has also taken into consideration the Amnesty International
Report Exhibit P-078 which describes "Operation No Living Thing". W9}
Findings
729. Ibrahim Fofana is a witness who suffered much physical and emotional trauma
during the conflict, arising from the double amputations he sustained and the loss of his
mother and children, amongst others. The Trial Chamber finds his evidence credible and
com ellin , notwithstandin the inconsistencies therein raised b the Defence. Those
P g g Y
inconsistencies were well explained by the witness in cross-examination. Fofana's
description of "Operation No Living Thing" is corroborated by the account given by
Amnesty International in their report cited previously. Based on that testimony, the Trial
Chamber Hnds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that around
March/April 1998, rebel soldiers of the AFRC/RUF who attacked Paema intentionally killed
a number of civilians including Ali Bangali, Sori, Pa J anneh, Mammy Isatu, Isatu Bangura,
Kadiatu Fofana, Mohammed Fofana and Dauda Fofana, all of whom were not taking an
active part in the hostilities.
lm Exhibit D—072, "Video File — Interview of TF1—216 Taken at Connaught Hospital".
lm Exhibit D—072B, "Witness TF1—216, 28 October 2008, English Interpretation of Exhibit D—72"; Ibrahim
Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19359.
N90 Exhibit D—072B, "Witness TF1—216, 28 October 2008, English Interpretation of Exhibit D—72"; Ibrahim
Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. l9358—19359.
ml Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19362—19363.
""2 Exhibit P-014, ··v1d€O cup NO. 4*1
*793 Exhibit P—078, "Sierra Leone — 1998 — A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 1 1.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gl 18 May 2012

730. The above evidence establishes that the perpetrators went on a ramEnd of Page in the
villages, indiscriminately looting civilian property and killing innocent civilians, in
accordance with superior orders by rebel commanders to leave "no living thing" in the area.
The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the
object of such violence and the primary purpose of the murder of civilians at Paema was to
instil terror in the civilian population there.
(h) Bomboa Fuidu
(i) Killings of civilians in Bomboa Fuidu around March/April 1998
731. Prosecution witness Musa Koroma was living in Bomboafuidu, Kono District at the
start of the rainy season of 1998.1794 He testified that during the remainder of the rainy
season he and other civilians from Bomboafuidu hid in the bush after being warned that
rebels were approaching the village.1795 The warning was delivered by one Gbessey Sesay
who had just had one of his hands amputated by the rebels. 17% After spending two months in
hiding,1797 Koroma and about 20 other civilians went back to Bomboafuidu to "clear the
road for ECOMOG". While sleeping at night, the witness and his friend Sheku Mansaray
were awakened by two armed men, one of whom wore a combat uniform and the other,
native Kamajor dress. The two men described themselves as "saviours who had come to
save the civilians of Bomboafuidu".1798 The rebels, numbering about 50, gathered a number
of civilians includin the witness on the veranda of a house belon in to one Alhai Te`an
S S S J J
Cole and told the civilians that they were "going to perform a sacrifice for the civilians". 1799
732. Koroma testified that he and the other civilians were forced to watch as three rebels
laid a Limba woman on the floor, held her down and slit her throat until she died.18110
Koroma testiried that the Limba woman was "aged" and that he had known her for a long
time because they had lived together in the same village. 1801 He further testified that before
the rebels left, they ordered the civilians to strip naked and forced the men to have sexual
""" Musa Kprprrra, Transcript is February 2008, pp. 3959-3960.
1795 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, pp. 3960-3963.
17% Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, pp. 3961-3962.
1197 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3962.
1198 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3964.
1799 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, pp. 3966-3968.
18011 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, pp. 3966-3969.
18111 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3967.

---- End of Page 272 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GLX 18 May 2012
V ..

intercourse with the women as the rebels watched. The rebels then flogged the women and
amputated or mutilated approximately 20 civilians, including the witness. The rebels told the
amputees to "go and tell President Tejan Kabbah to give them new hands and feet".18112 The
rebels also told the civilians to leave the village and that "if they come back next time and
meet us in the villa re, the will kill all of us".111113 Koroma told the court that as he and the
2; Y
other amputees walked on foot for several days to Njiama Sewafe to seek medical help from
ECOMOG, two of the am utees died alon the wa from their in`uries.18114
P g Y J
733. The Trial Chamber also admitted in evidence the transcript of the testimony of Alhaji
Tejan Cole from the AFRC trial.18115 In his prior testimony Cole, who was a resident of
Bomboafuidu in April 1998, confirmed that he was present during the events described by
Musa Koroma. His prior testimony corroborates that of Koroma in all material respects. At
the veranda of his father's house the rebels gathered the civilians on the night of Saturday,
12 April 1998.18116 He testified that the rebels, numbered over 200,18111 were armed with guns
and RPGs and had boxes of ammunition carried by civilians for them. 18118 Some rebels wore
full combat uniform, while others wore a mixture of combat trousers and a civilian
"polo".18119 The rebels spoke in a variety of languages including Krio, Mende and "Liberian
accents".18111 They also had several child soldiers amongst their ranks. 1811
734. Alhaj i Tejan Cole confirmed how the rebels killed an old Limba woman calling it "a
sacrifice",1812 how the rebels forced seven civilian men to have sex with seven civilian
women,1813 and how the rebels amputated several civilians including the witness, Musa,
Mohammed, Sheku, Musa Marrah, Adama, Alfa Kabia, lbrahim, Mohamed Kanu, Abdul
111112 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3987.
1803 Musa Komma, Transcript 15 Febmary 2008, p. 3990.
1804 Musa Koroma, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3993.
_ 18115 Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 19663-19737 ("prior testimony").
111116 Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", p. 19673. It should be noted that 12
April 1998 was a Sunday.
18117 Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", p. 19677.
18118 Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 19673, 19677.
*801* Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 19674, 19677.
18111 Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 19675, 19678.
11111 The witness stated that he saw more than six small boys aged 12 years, dressed in combat and armed with
guns, amongst the rebels. Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", p. 19692.
11112 Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 19679-19681.
11113 Exhibit P-202, "A1haji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 19682-19684.

---- End of Page 273 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jg; (Kb 18 May 2012

,583 66
Kargbo, Pa Osman, Abdul Rahan, Sahr Aruna, Sahr Lebbie and ldrissa Gborie.l8l4 He also
confirmed that the rebels told the amputees to "go and tell President Tejan Kabbah to give
them new hands". 1815 Cole testified that when the events occurred Cole stated that during the
amputations, a civilian named Pa Saiyo resisted and was immediately killed by the
rebels.l8l6
Findings
735. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of witnesses Musa Koroma and Alhaji Tejan
Cole credible and reliable. The witnesses corroborate each other in all material respects.
That evidence shows that the rebels deliberately targeted and killed a number of civilians
including an old Limba woman, one Pa Saiyo and two amputees who died on their way to
seek help. The Trial Chamber also finds that the victims were not taking an active part in the
hostilities. Based on the evidence of the manner of dress and languages spoken by the
rebels, the Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators were a mixed group of AFRC/RUF
rebels. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that in April 1998 during an attack on Bomboa Fuidu, AFRC/RUF rebels
intentionally caused the death of several civilians including an old Limba woman, one Pa
Saiyo and two amputees, all of whom were not taking an active part in hostilities.
736. The Trial Chamber further finds that the manner of the rebel attack, often surprising
civilians at night when they were asleep in their homes, the indiscriminate killings,
including the ritualistic murder of a helpless old woman, and the indiscriminate amputation
of innocent civilians accompanied by sarcastic messages to "President Kabbah to give them
new arms", are all acts that demonstrate the campaign of terror waged by the rebel forces
against the civilian population. The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators wilfully made
the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose of the murders in Bomboa
Fuidu was to instil terror in the civilian population there.
(i) Njaima Nimikoro or Nimikoro
(i) Killing of civilians in Nimikoro between F ebruag; and June 1998
lm Exhibit P-202, "Alhaji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. l9685—19692.
lm Exhibit P—202, "Alhaji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", p. 19691.
W6 Exhibit P-202, "Alhaji Tejan Cole, AFRC Transcript 28 June ZOO5", pp. 19688.

---- End of Page 274 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—O3—O1—T 7%/ gu 18 May 2012

737. The Trial Chamber considered the following evidence of civilian killings in
Nimikoro. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator was with the RUF forces based at
"Superman ground"l 81 7 in Kono District from where they launched an attack on Nimikoro
and surrounding areas "sometime in 1998 before the death of President Sani Abacha of
Nigeria".m8 Kamara told court that while he was based at Superman ground, he attended a
parade where Morris Kallon addressed the RUF forces and gave them a message from Sam
Bockarie that "they should try and make Kono District fearful to ECOMOG so that they
could not base there".l8`9 Morris Kallon also appointed CO Rocky as commander over the
attack. Kamara explained that "making the area fearful" entailed "destruction of life and
property, where there will be killings, amputations, buming of houses, destruction of
bridges, setting up road blocks. All those things would happen and that will have made the
area fearful". `820 He further explained that the amputated civilians were to be sent to
ECOMOG with a message to "keep their hands off the war".`82` Kamara testified that the
RUF forces that attacked Nimikoro and its surrounding areas reportedthat they had killed
civilians, amputated others and bumt most of the town in accordance with Bockarie's
orders.1822 Kamara also told court that the RUF forces were based in Nimikoro "for some
timci, 1823
738. In April 1998,l824 Emmanuel Bull was abducted with other members of his family,
including his father, by members of the AFRC/RUF and taken to Njaima Nimikoro where he
stayed for approximately one week}825 ln Njaima Nimikoro, the AFRC/RUF set up a kind
of headquarters at the home of Emmanuel Bull's grandfatherl826 and reported to a
commander called Bai Bureh}827 One moming, the AFRC/RUF declared that they "did not
want any grandpa or old person at their headquarters and that everybody around must be
iw Perry Kamara Transcript, 5 February 2008, p. 3149.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3154-3155. Sani Abacha died in June 1998. Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-1-PT-227, Joint Filing by the Prosecution and Defence Admitted Facts & Law, 26 April 2007,
Agreed Fact 1 1.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3150.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3150.
ml The witness quoted a Krio expression frequently used by the rebels, namely, "Pul yu an pa di war", meaning
"take your hands off the war". Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3154.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3152.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3152.
my Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17280-17281.
lm Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17289.
*826 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17281.
Hm Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008. pp. 17281-17283.

---- End of Page 275 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

active".1828 The AFRC/RUF assembled the old men and women amongst the captured
civilians, stating that they were going to take them to Bumpe.1829 Bull leamed from an
AFRC/RUF member named Esther Koroma, who he had befriended, that this was a false
lan and that, in reali , the AFRC/RUF forces were oin to kill the older civilians
P 8 S
including the witness’ father.1g3O Esther helped Bull's father escape from the group.1831
About five AFRC/RUF members, including Cobra and Bobby, took about six or seven of
the older men, including Pa Mansaray, a friend of Bull's father, away in the direction
opposite to Bumpe.1832 After approximately three to five minutes, Bull heard two gun shots
and a roximatel five minutes later, Bobb and Cobra retumed.1833 The older men were
PP Y Y
never seen again.1834 Later the witness heard Cobra and Bobby bragging that they had lined
the old men in two straight lines and used a single bullet to shoot through each line.1835
Findings
739. The Trial Chamber is of the view that by virtue of his position as radio operator,
Perry Mohammed was in a position to receive regular reports on the activities of the RUF
forces that were based in Kono District after the ECOMOG Intervention. Thus although his
evidence is based on reports and messages that he received from the fighters rather than on
his own participation in the RUF operations in Nimikoro, the Trial Chamber finds that
evidence credible and reliable. That evidence shows that the RUF forces in Nimikoro, like
their colleagues elsewhere in Kono District, carried out a terror campaign against the civilian
population in Nimikoro which involved the killing of civilians. The Trial Chamber also
finds the evidence of Emmanuel Bull regarding the murder of seven old persons by the
AFRC/RUF forces at Njaima Nimikoro, also credible and reliable. Although essentially
circumstantial, his account leads to one reasonable conclusion that the seven senior citizens
were murdered. Based on this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
roved be ond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF that attacked N`aima
P Y J
Nimikoro around April 1998, acting in accordance with the orders of their commanders
1828 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17292.
1829 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17291-17292.
1830 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17292.
1831 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17292-17293.
1832 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17293-17294.
1833 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17295.
1814 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17294.
1835 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17295

---- End of Page 276 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gy 18 May 2012

38 3 écl
including Sam Bockarie, Morris Kallon, CO Rocky, Cobra and Bobby, intentionally killed
an unknown number of civilians, including seven senior citizens, all of whom were not
taking an active part in the hostilities.
740. The Trial Chamber further finds that in wantonly murdering innocent civilians,
carrying out amputations and destroying civilian property in Nimikoro, the perpetrators were
carrying out the orders of their superior commanders to "make the area fearful". The Trial
Chamber finds that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence
and the primary purpose of the murder of civilians at Nimikoro or Njaima Nimikoro was to
instil terror in the civilian population there.
Q) Mortema I
(i) Killing of civilians in Mortema gor Motemap between February and June 1998
741. The Trial Chamber has considered the following evidence relating to killings in
Mortema. Prosecution Witness TF1—375 estimates that it was about three months after the
ECOMOG Intervention in Freetown that the AFRC/RUF forces attacked Mortema.l836 The
witness told the court that the attack on Mortema was led by a commander called "Short Bai
Bureh" and that before the attack he was given orders by senior officers in Kono at that time,
including Superman, Gullit, Isaac Mongor and others]837 to "go and make the area
fearful".l838 The witness explained that to the RUF, making an area "fearfi1l" meant "to kill
civilians, burn houses and to instil fear into ECOMOG, or any other opposing troop that
would want to get into that area easily".l839 The witness testified that when the AFRC/RUF
attacked Mortema, there were only civilians there and no opposing force. 1840
742. Although he himself did not participate in the Mortema attack, Witness TF1—375
testified that after the AFRC/RUF forces returned from Mortema, Short Bai Bureh directly
called Superman over the RUF radio and gave him a report of the destmction that they had
carried out on Mortema. The witness was present in the radio room with Superman and
Im Witness TF1—375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12517.
1837 Witness TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12511.
mg Witness TF1-375, Tramcnpt 23 June 2008, p. 12510.
1839 Witness TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12510.
mo Witness TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12510.

---- End of Page 277 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 7%/ `AA 18 May 2012

heard the report.l84l The witness further told the court that when the RUF forces returned
from Mortema, some of his friends amongst them told the witness what had happened there
and even brought some girls with them as their "wives". [842 In his testimony, Witness TF1—
375 did not specifically attest to civilian killings in Mortema.
743. Another Prosecution witness, Samuel Bull, was in Mortema on 21 April 1998 when
the AFRC/RUF or "People's Army" attacked. [843 The witness and his family hid in Fakoyia
bush for almost two months.l844 On 5 May 1998 the witness and his family returned to
Mortema after hearing on the BBC Radio that ECOMOG had taken control of the area
including Njaiama Nimikoro, Sewafe and Mortema. The witness found a lot of houses burnt
in Mortema except one big building on the main Masingbi Highway where the witness and
his family settled along with approximately 50 civilians.l845 On the night of 12 June 1998,
"rebels" attacked Mortema again. IS46 Samuel Bull observed fighting between ECOMOG
troops and the rebels from the window of the house, and saw that the ECOMOG forces had
begun to retreat. [847 An RUF fighter entered the house where Bull was and shot dead an old
woman called Ma Gbojo.l848 The witness escaped through the window and hid in a banana
plantation approximately 45 feet from the house.l849 From the banana plantation, Samuel
Bull saw the rebels gather all the other civilians who had remained in the house, line them
outside and shoot them. {S50 The witness testified that in the morning he saw the bodies of 21
civilians killed in his neighbourhood including 17 who were killed at his house.l85l Amongst
the dead were six of his family members.l852 The witness participated in burying the 21
civilians in a mass grave after ECOMOG arrived and drove away the rebels. [853 The witness
Hm Witness TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12510.
**42 warmers TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jurre 2008,p. 12510.
IS43 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17062-17063.
A I844 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17064. The witness explained that Fakoiya is about 3 miles
from Mortema.
@45 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17113-17114.
IS46 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 171 13-171 14.
IS47 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17115.
lm Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 171 16.
@49 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 171 17, 171 19.
lm Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17119-17124.
ml Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17124.
lm The witness named his family members as Aiah Sandy, Dorcos Sandy, Sia Sandy, Ma Gbojo, Komba
Modeneh and Kadiatu Lebbie.
lm Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17124

---- End of Page 278 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

later learned that the rebel commander who led the attack in which the 21 civilians were
iaiiea was mired Lt. car. Fixo Bm.'854
744. The testimony of Samuel Bull is corroborated by that of Tamba Mondeh, one of
many civilians who took refuge at Samuel Bull's house. Tamba Mondeh initially fled his
home village of Mortema and hid in the bush with his family1855 on hearing reports from
various villages in Kono District that "rebels were killing and mutilating people".185 8 While
in hiding he heard that "ECOMOG had gone to Freetown and they’ve come again to
Nimikoro up to Motema and from Motema they went to Yengema and from there they also
captured Koidu and were in Njaiama Nimikoro".1857 Encouraged by these reports, the
witness and his family returned to Mortema.1858 On arrival, the witness stayed in a storeyed
building that was incomplete and that belonged to one Samuel Bull.1859 He explained that
many other civilians including Samuel Bull (the owner's son) were staying in that house.1888
745. One night while everyone was asleep, rebels wearing uniforms and carrying guns
surrounded the storeyed house and told the occupants to gather outside, saying "You people
do not want us. You said that you want ECOMOG. You will know what will happen to you.
When our boss passes the command, we will kill all of you".1881 The witness told the court
that when he went outside he met the rebel "boss" face to face and recognised him to be
Fixo Bio, a person he knew before. 1882 One rebel entered the house and fired several shots in
order to force out the civilians. The shots killed a man called Aiah with his daughter and
in`ured the witness’ chin.1888 The rebels asked the civilians to ueue in front of the house
J Q
and shot at them, killing several and wounding others. The witness hid in a nearby bush until
1888 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17126-17127
1888 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp.17438-17445.
1888 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17439-17444.
1887 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17445
188 8 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17447-17448.
1889 The witness explained that the building belonged to Samuel Bull Senior and that the son, Samuel Bull Junior
also took shelter in this building and was in charge of the refugees. The witness also explained that many other
civilians took shelter at this house and that in the morning everybody would go to his respective place to find
food. Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17449.
1888 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17449, 17456.
1881 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17451-17452.
1888 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17458.
1888 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17454-17455.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T ST 18 May 2012

ECOMOG rescued him. Mondeh later learnt from Samuel Bull that the rebels killed 25
people during this incident and that the dead were buried in mass graves. *864
Findings
746. The Trial Chamber finds both Samuel Bull and Tamba Mondeh to be credible
witnesses. Their accounts are consistent, although at times diverged in details based on their
different vantage points. Although Mondeh was, due to illiteracy, unable to give the date of
the attack on Mortema, he made it clear that it was sometime after the ECOMOG
Intervention. Samuel Bull however, placed the time of this attack around at 12 June 1998.
The evidence also shows that these were reprisal killings against the civilians whom the
rebels perceived to support ECOMOG. Based on the evidence of these two witnesses the
Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that around 12
June 1998, AFRC/RUF rebels led by "Fixo Bio" intentionally executed 17-25 civilians at
the Bull residence in Mortema, all of whom were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
747. The evidence further shows that the perpetrators, in preying upon sleeping civilians
at night and wantonly shooting them, were carrying out the orders of their superior
commanders to "make the area fearful". Accordingly the Trial Chamber finds that the
perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose
I of the murder of civilians in Mortema was to instil terror in the civilian population there.
(k) Alleged unlawful killings in Other Locations in Kono District not pleaded in the
Indictment
748. The Trial Chamber received credible evidence of the murder of civilians in a number
of locations within Kono District not specifically pleaded in the Indictment including,
Baima,l865 Goldtown}866 Yekeyor,l867 Kondeya,l868 Mambona,l869 and othersmo As
1864 Tamba Mondeh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17463- 17464.
1865 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18502-18505 (The witness stated that he saw two corpses in
civilian clothing following the AFRC/RUF attack on Baima in 1998). Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January
2009, pp. 23850-23857 (The witness stated that upon retuming to Baima after the ECOMOG Intervention, she
was captured by rebels. A rebel shot and killed the witness's father in her presence and then forced the witness
and her mother to laugh).
*866 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3155-3156: The witness participated in an ambush of
vehicles in Goldtown (between Masingbi and Sewafe along the Kono-Makeni highway), in which the rebels
bumed vehicles and killed civilians.
1867 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17891-17894, 17900-17903 (The witness stated that rebels
killed his uncle and sister and that he saw the decomposing corpses of two males in civilian clothing at a location

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Case No.: SCSI,-03-01-T im 18 May 2012

previously held, this evidence is only taken into account in relation to the chapeau
requirements of the alleged crimes and not for proof of guilt. 1871
Conclusion
749. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 January 2000, in various
locations in Kono District including Koidu Town, Tombudu, Koidu Geiya, Koidu Buma,
Yengema, Paema or Peyima, Bomboafuidu, Nimikoro or Njaiama Nimikoro and Mortema,
members of the AFRC/RUF murdered an unknown number of civilians, as charged in the
Indictmentlm and as shown by the evidence.
750. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AFRC forces directed a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.l873 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that each of the killings proved by the Prosecution in respect of Kono
District formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were aware of this fact. The
Trial Chamber also recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment, involving
among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF. W4 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that
for all of the aforementioned killings in Kono District there was a nexus between the killings
and the armed conflict, that each of the victims was not taking an active part in the hostilities
between Yekeyor and Dewawu).
ISGS In Exhibit P-078, Sierra Leone ~ A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report, p. 12
(Amnesty International reported an incident in Kondeya in Kono District on 9 April 1998 when a group of about
50 rebels captured about 120 civilians; strangled one of the civilians and threw a crying baby into a river. Also
27 of the civilians were later attacked with machetes and some were decapitated.)
IW Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17093-17108 (The witness stated that in April 1998, RUF
rebels killed at least 5 civilians in Mambona including one ‘SK’ who was stabbed to death with a knife. The
witness saw all of the five corpses. The witness also described how the rebels killed a Kamajor called Kai Sandy
and displayed his head and private parts on a stick.)
mo Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 19610-19616 (The witness testified that he saw five
corpses of civilians on the road between Tombodu and Lebanon; Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008,
pp. 688-690 (The witness testified that one man was killed by rebel forces between Kania and Koidu Town);
Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6220-6221 (The witness testified that the RUF attacked a village
called Kissy Town, which is behind Koidu Town, in Kono District where they suspected Kamajors to be. The
RUF forces killed many civilians including men, women and children whom they suspected to be Kamajors or
Kamajor supporters.)
ml See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment.
lm Indictment, para. 11.
W3 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GQ 18 May 2012
J U"}

at the time of death, and that the perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the aforementioned killings in Kono District constitute murder as both a crime
against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute and a war crime under Article 3 of the
Statute.
3. Alleged unlawful killings in Kailahun District gbetween about 1 February 1998 and
about 30 June 1998)
751. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Prosecution witnesses Varmuyan
Sheriit, Mohamed Kabbah, Augustine Mallah and Witness TF1—168; Defence witnesses
Fayia Musa, Issa Sesay, DCT—292 and DCT—068 as well as Exhibits P—277 and P—60lB.
(a) Kailahun Town
(i) Massacre of around 60-65 civilians in Kailahun Town in February 1998
752. Augustine Mallah a member of the RUFl875 testified that in February 1998, after
ECOMOG had dislodged the AFRC/RUF Juntas from Freetown, Sam Bockarie (a.k.a.
Mosquito) the RUF leader, assembled most of the RUF commanders in Daru and told them,
"This is Kailahun District, we are not going to let it be occupied by anybody else, be you
ECOMOG or Kamajors. You might resort to killing all of us, but we will not leave Kailahun
for anybody. We had been in Kailahun here when the soldiers plotted a coup against
Kabbah. They invited us, we went and joined them. Being that we have now returned to
Kailahun, we should defend the place".l876 Mallah stated that after this speech he travelled
from Daiu to Kailahun Town with Mosquito and over 100 ARFC and RUF soldiers whom
Bockarie had instructed to "go and defend Kailahun District". 1877
753. On their arrival in Kailahun Town, Mosquito went to Augustine Gbaomg to check
on the fate of 65 civilians who Mosquito had arrested and sent to Gbao for "investigation"
IW See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
M5 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20057-2006O (stating that he was abducted and
forcibly conscripted into the RUF at a very early age).
W6 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20l85—20l86.
1877 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20177. The witness also stated that the AFRC/RUF
forces took more than 400 civilians with them to Kailahun as "manpower". Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13
November 2008, p. 20172.
1878 Mallah explained that Augustine Gbao was an RUF Vanguard who also served as the G5 (in charge of
civilians travelling with the RUF), the Agricultural Unit and the Intelligence Unit within the RUF.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-0l-T / EQ 18 May 2012

because he suspected them of betraying the RUF by surrendering to the Government}879 On
arrival in Kailahun Town, Mosquito asked Gbao how the investigations went. Mallah heard
Gbao report to Mosquito that "Those people are all in the cell. They were about 65 in
number. With all the investigations we have conducted we have realised that these people
are Kamajors. They are not fit to live amongst us here as long as we are not satisfied with
them and with the present circumstances". 1880 On hearing Gbao's report, Mosquito ordered
Joe Fatomalggl to bring out the 65 civilians. Mosquito personally shot three of the civilians,
remarking that "We need to kill these people". Mallah told the court that up to 100 AFRC
and RUF including Mallah himselt, participated in the summary execution of those civilians
and that he counted 45 bodies. 1882 Mallah also told the court that after the killing had started,
he saw "a Liberian commander" talking to Mosquito. Mallah explained that he met this
commander and his three bodyguards in Kailahun and that the commander did not
artici ate in the killin of the Kama`ors.l883 The Liberian commander left for Buedu in a
P P S J
convoy with Sam Bockarie. 1884
754. Augustine Mallah further told the court that after the massacre of the 65 civilians, he
travelled with Sam Bockarie from Buedu to Dam, and they passed through Kailahun Town
again because "Mosquito wanted to ensure whether the order that he had given was
complied with".lg85 Describing the atmosphere as they drove through Kailahun Town,
Mallah told the court that it was obvious that people had been killed in the town because
there were several human heads and skulls displayed on sticks on both sides of the road to
Pendembu.l8g6 Mallah told the court that on this occasion, Augustine Gbao and Joe Fatoma
told Bockarie that they had accomplished the mission by killing all the civilians as Bockarie
had ordered. 1887
1879 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20177.
‘*’"’ Augustine Me11ert, rmsenpr 13 November 2008, p. 20177.
ml Mallah explained that Fatoma was an RUF Junior Commando and a MP (Military Police) within the RUF.
1882 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20178-20180.
1883 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20178.
1884 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20179.
1885 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20184.
1886 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20183-20184.
1887 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20184.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / JL 18 May 2012

755. Witness Varmuyan Sherif testified that he arrived in Kailahun Town in February
1998 bearing a message for Mosquito "then leader of the RUFM888 from President Charles
Taylor. M9 On arrival in Kailahun Town, Sherif spoke to Bockarie's bodyguards who
pointed out Sam Bockarie and asked Sherif to wait until Bockarie had finished "talking to
some Kamajors".l890 Sherif testified that he saw Sam Bockarie taking people out of a
building and heard him saying "these people are Kamajors and we are going to finish them".
Sherif testified that he saw Bockarie personally shoot five of the men with a gun. ml Sherif
further told the court that after executing the five people, Sam Bockarie said "I am moving
now. Before I come back, the remaining people, I want all of them dead",l892 whereupon
Bockarie drove away to Buedu in a convoy of three cars. Sherif followed the convoy to
Kailahun and did not see what happened to the remaining people. M3
756. In cross-examination, the Defence confronted Sherif with a record of his first
interview with members of the Prosecution on 23 February 2005 in which he did not
mention Bockarie's execution of civilians. In this interview, Sherif is recorded as stating that
when he went to Kailahun Town, he arrived at night after Sam Bockarie had already left and
proceeded to Buedu.l894 Sherif explained that the incident described in the interview took
place in Pendembu and that in this first interview, he was afraid and did not trust the
investigators.l895 Sherif insisted however, that in subsequent interviews with the
Prosecution investigators, he did talk about Bockarie executing five persons.l896 The
Defence also confronted Sherif with a second interview with Prosecution investigators
which took place on 29 and 30 November 2006 and 4 December 2006.l897 In this interview
Sherif is recorded as meeting Sam Bockarie in Kailahun Town upon the instruction of
Charles Taylor and seeing Sam Bockarie shoot prisoners one at a time. mg
mg The witness explained that he did not personally know Sam Bockarie beforehand, but that he used to hear
that Foday Sankoh was detained in Nigeria and that Sam Bockarie was the leader of the RUF. Varmuyan Sherif;
Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 985-987.
M9 Varmuyan Sherif] Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 828-829.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 831-832.
ml Varmuyan Sherif] Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 832-833.
M varnruyan Sherif, rranaprrpr 9 January 2008, pp. 832-833.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif; Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 833.
fm Varmuyan Sherif; Transcript 1 1 January 2008, pp. 1087-1088.
mj Varmuyan Sherif; Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1155-1158.
IW) Varmuyan Sherif] Transcript 1 1 January 2008, pp. 1087-1091.
*897 varnruyan srrprrr, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1 155.
mg Varmuyan Sherif; Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1 155-1158.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T _3\Q 18 May 2012

757. Witness Mohamed Kabbah1899 was the RUF regional commander in charge of
communications in Kailahun from the AFRC coup in May 1997 to the ECOMOG
Intervention in February 1998.1900 Part of his duties entailed receiving and dispatching radio
messages between the front lines and other assignment areas and Sam Bockarie, the overall
comrnander.19111 Kabbah testified that he was present in Kailahun Town on the day of the
killings.19112 He testified that ECOMOG had pushed RUF fighters out of Daru and that they
had regrouped in Kailahun Town.19113 Sam Bockarie arrived in Kailahun Town with his
bodyguards including a tall Liberian called Senegalese.19114 On the evening of their arrival, p
an ECOMOG `et flew over Kailahun Town and caused dama e.19O5 Kabbah testified that at
J 8
this time, 60 male "civilians who were Kamajors but who were not carrying arins" were held
in custody by the RUF at the MP prison in Kailahun Town. 191111
758. Kabbah testified that alter the jet passed, Sam Bockarie ordered five of the Kamajor
risoners to be brou t to the roundabout so that "he ma set an exam le of them".1907 A
P Y P
visibly distressed Kabbah told the court that when the prisoners were brought to the
roundabout in the center of Kailahun Town, Bockarie shot two of the prisoners in the
forehead and ordered Issa to execute the remainin three, and that Issa shot the remainin
8 8
three prisoners with his pistol.19118 Kabbah was approximately 7 to 8 metres away when he
saw the risoners killed.19119 Kabbah stated that alter the first five risoners were killed, Issa,
P P
his bodyguards and Bockarie's bodyguards went behind the police station and executed the
1899 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16088- 16093. The witness stated that he was captured
by RUF rebels and conscripted into their fighting forces in 1991. He was trained by various "Liberian
commanders?
10011 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16099-16100, 16105, 16111.
1901 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 161 1 1
1002 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 161 12.
1903 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 161 12.
19114 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 161 13.
19115 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 161 12.
19116 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 161 12, 16125. See also Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript
12 September 2008, pp. 16113-16120 (describing that the prisoners had been investigated and that some had
Kamajor markings on their bodies).
19117 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16114.
1908 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 161 12.
1909 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp, 16122, 16124.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

remaining 55 prisoners. 19111 Kabbah did not see these persons killed, but heard about it from
"some boys"1911
759. Explaining how the 60 civilians had come to be detained by the RUF, Kabbah told
the court that before the Intervention, Kamajors used to attack some of the RUF positions
and this created anic within the RUF controlled areas. Durin that eriod, the RUF
P S P
interrogated a civilian from Jojoima whom they said was sent to spy on RUF positions.
Based on that information, Bockarie had sent a radio message to all military police within
the Kailahun District to escort all those civilians that entered the RUF-controlled territory to
Kailahun Town and to assemble them in Kailahun Town "so that they could be screened in
order for the RUF to know who was a Kamajor or who was a genuine civilian".1912 This is
how these 60 civilians came to be detained and later executed by the RUF in Kailahun
Town. Kabbah told the court however, that the Kamajor suspects fell into two categories,
namel , those who confessed to havin been Kama`ors in the ast but had disarmed; and
Y S J P
those that bore Kamajor markings on their bodies. Kabbah stated however, that none of the
60 suspects were armed or actively fighting when they were arrested. 1913
760. Prosecution Witness TF1-168, a prominent member of the RUF, gave a vivid
account of the Kailahun massacre.TF1-168 told court that he and six other colleagues were
held in detention by senior RUF commanders1914 for 30 months1915 on suspicion of
"betraying Foday Sankoh to the Nigerians", and that while in detention they were tortured
and moved around several prisons within Kailahun District.1916 TF1-168 testified that he and
his fellow-detainees were moved to a detention facility in the centre of Kailahun Town
around the end of December 1997, and that on 19 February 1998 they were transferred to the
town police station in Kailahun Town.1917 At the police station the detainees were guarded
by RUF MP John Duawo and his deputy Joe Fatoma. Augustine Gbao was the overall
1910 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 161 12-16113.
1911 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16124.
11112 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 161 14.
1913 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 161 15-16116.
1914 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23315 (where the witness cited Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie and
others).
1915 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23320-23328 (where the witness stated that they were arrested in
March 1997 and eventually released in October 1999).
11116 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23315-23322.
"’" TF1-168, raaaampt 22 January 2009, p. 23334. e

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
’ n

commander in charge of Kailahun Town. mg TF1-168 told the court that there were 65 other
civilian detainees in detention at the police station who told him that they were citizens of
Luawa Chiefdom in Kailahun District who were being held by the RUF leadership.l9l9 The
detainees had fled Kailahun District before the 25 May 1997 coup d’etat but after the coup
had been persuaded by Sam Bockarie to return to their homes. Upon their return to Kailahun
District, these civilians had been arrested and detained by the RUF on suspicion of being
Kamajors. mo
761. TF1-168 told the court that on the afternoon of 19 February 1998 John Duawo told
all the detainees to go back inside their cells because Sam Bockarie had arrived and did not
want to see anyone outside their cells. The witness returned to his cell from where he
observed through a window what was going on outside. The witness told the court that he
saw Duawo remove 10 of the Kamajor prisoners from their cells and take them outside
towards the roundabout.l92l TF1-168 testihed that the prisoners were brought outside
towards the roundabout and that not too long after, he heard gunfire}922 The witness stated
that from his vantage point, he could see them fall}923 TF1-168 later learned from the
military police that it was General Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) who had fired the first
shot.l924
762. TF1-168 said that MP guards took the remaining Kamajor suspects from their cells
in groups of four and five and took them towards the valley where they shot them to
death. I925 TF1-168 stated that as he was awaiting his own fate in his cell, he heard the guards
saying "bring out the remaining five prisoners", and thought that they were referiing to him.
TF1-168 learnt from the MPs the following day that 64 of the prisoners, all males, were
killed during this incident and that one person was saved. M6
mg TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23338—23339.
"’" TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009,p. 23339.
‘°2° TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23339-23341.
ml TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23344—23345. The witness testified that amongst the ten was an
SLA called Charles Kaiyoko whom Duawo had accused of "being the cause of all this troub1e".
"m TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009,p. 23345.
"’" Tri-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23348.
m4 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23346. The witness described that the first shot he heard was one of
"suppressive"’or "rapid f`1ring"and made the sound "pop pop pop pop pop pop pop". Transcript 22 January 2009,
p. 23348.
mj TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23346.
M6 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23349. The witness explained that he learnt that the prisoner who

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 2/ wrg 18 May 2012

0 $@30
763. TF1-168 stated that he had the opportunity to speak with some of the Kamajor
suspects before they were killed and that they explained that although some of them
belonged to the Kamajor society and bore Kamajor markings on their bodies, they never
participated in the fighting against the AFRC/RUF}927 Others explained to the witness that
they were civilians that had simply volunteered to carry loads for the Kamajor fighters but
they did not participate in the fighting}928 TF1-168 told the court that he and his colleagues
were transferred to Kangama on 21 February 1998 because the Kailahun Police station was
filled with the stench of the decomposing bodies. mi)
764. The Trial Chamber has also examined confidential Prosecution Exhibit P-277, which
in the Trial Chamber's view, corroborates the testimony of witness TF1-168.
765. Issa Sesay, a former RUF commander and Defence witness in this case, testified that
he was in Gandorhun when he heard from one Major Gua that 60 suspected Kamajors had
been arrested and executed in Kailahun Town on the orders of Sam Bockarie}930 Sesay
stated that upon travelling to Kailahun Town shortly thereafter, he saw 10 corpses which had
been moved from the roundabout to the roadside, but did not see corpses behind the MP
office because he did not go there.l9?’l Sesay estimated that from the way the bodies were
starting to decompose, he must have arrived about five to six days after the killings had 2
taken place}932 In cross-examination, Sesay ruled out the possibility of his own involvement
in the Kailahun massacre, stating that "these people were killed before he arrived in
Kailahun".l933 He also told the court that Sam Bockarie gave orders that the corpses of the
people who were killed should not be buried and that is why there was such a stench in the
air·1=>34
got away was a relative of F aroma and that the latter had helped this prisoner escape to safety after leaming the
fate of the other prisoners. Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23351.
*927 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp, 23351—23352.
*928 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 22251-23252.
1929 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23353—23354.
1930 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44004-44008, 44010.
193 I Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 44010.
mg rm spsay, Transcript is Augusr 2010, p. 44010.
lm Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46207—46209.
19] 4 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46209.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012

766. Witness Fayia Musa another prominent member of the RUF, confirmed to the court
that he and six other colleagues were held in detention by senior RUF commandersl935 for
30 monthsl936 on suspicion of "betraying Foday Sankoh to President Kabbah and the
Nigerians" and that while in detention they were tortured and moved around several prisons
within Kailahun District.l937 Fayia told the court that he and his fellow prisoners were
transferred from Kangama to Kailahun Town "after the ECOMOG intervention" and
remained in detention there until 29 March 1998. Fa ia testified that in the same Kailahun
Y
Police station, the RUF had detained 69 civilians from Daru and some SLA soldiers who
were arrested and brought to the prison in Kailahun Town}938 On 28 March 1998 Sam
Bockarie came to Kailahun to check on the prisoners}939 The witness who was in another
cell, stated that an SLA soldier called Kaioko and nine of the 69 prisoners were taken out of
the cell on the order of Sam Bockarie and around five to ten minutes later he heard
gunshots. 1940 Bockarie also ordered that the remaining prisoners be brought out in groups of
five, with younger people being killed first.l94l Fayia and his colleagues were terrified as
they thought they too were going to die, but they were spared. Fayia told the court that he
was told 68 of the other prisoners were shot or hacked to death, that their bodies were
"scattered all over the place", and that only one escaped}942 On 29 March 1998, the witness
and his colleagues were transferred to Buedu where they remained until their release in
August 1999."’43 p ·
767. The Trial Chamber also considered the evidence of Protected Defence Witnesses
DCT-068, DCT-292 and DCT-102, all of whom gave hearsay accounts of the Kailahun
Town massacre. IQ44 These hearsay accounts accord with the direct evidence of the witnesses
cited above and confirm the fact that the AFRC/RUF forces acting under the orders of Sam
Bockarie massacred over 60 un-amied civilians in Kailahun Town.
M5 Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39112—39126. The witness cited Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie and
others as being responsible for his detention. Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39115.
M6 The witness stated that they were arrested on 29 March 1997 and eventually released in August 1999. Fayia
Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39118.
I937 Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39125-39126.
*938 Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39126.
l939Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39126-39128.
"""’ Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39127.
ml Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39127-39129.
vm Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39128.
'°‘*’ Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39129,

---- End of Page 289 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T $() 18 May 2012


38382
Findings
768. The Trial Chamber finds the above evidence consistent. ln particular the evidence
proves that after the ECOMOG Intervention of February 1998, AFRC/RUF Junta forces fled
to Kailahun District where they were temporarily based. While there, Sam Bockarie, the
RUF leader issued orders to the senior AFRC/RUF commanders to "defend Kailahun
District" against their perceived enemies including ECOMOG and the Kamajors. The
evidence further proves Sam Bockarie's distrust of the civilians from the Luawa and
Bambara Chiefdoms, many of whom had fled their villages before the 25 May 1997 coup,
but who had since retumed totheir homes having been encouraged by Bockarie to do so.
Additionally, the evidence proves that around 60-65 unarmed male civilians from these two
chiefdoms were arrested on suspicion of being Kamajors or Kamajor collaborators, on
Bockarie's orders and interrogated by Augustine Gbao. The evidence further proves that
Gbao's verdict against these civilians was based on mere suspicion and/or speculation that
they were Kamajors or Kamajor collaborators and not as a result of due process. Moreover,
the evidence proves that the executions in about mid to late February 1998 at the Kailahun
Town roundabout and Military Police prison, were clearly reprisal killings by Sam Bockarie
and AFRC/RUF forces acting under his orders, against unarmed civilians that were
perceived to be enemies of the AFRC/RUF. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in about mid to late February 1998, the
RUF forces under the command of Sam Bockarie intentionally killed around 60-65 civilians
in Kailahun Town, all of whom were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
769. The Trial Chamber further finds in view of the above evidence that the perpetrators
wilfully made the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose of the
Kailahun massacre, including the bizzare public display of human heads and rotting corpses
of the victims, was to instil terror in the civilian population in Kailahun.
Conclusion
770. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 June 1998, in various
locations in Kailahun District including Kailahun Town, members of the AFRC/RUF
[944 DCT-068, Transcript ll March 2010, pp. 37092-37095; DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41982-41983
and Exhibit P-601 B (RUF Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, pp. 89-90).

---- End of Page 290 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03 -01-T _ Gi}, 18 May 2012

murdered an unknown number of civilians, as charged in the Indictmentll)45 and as shown by
the evidence.
771. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AFRC forces directed a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone. M6 The Trial
. Chamber is satisfied that each of the killings proved by the Prosecution in respect of
Kailahun District formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were aware of this
fact. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
. doubt that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment,
involving among others, members of the RUF, AF RC and CDF .l947 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that for all of the aforementioned killings in Kailahun District there was a nexus
between the killings and the armed conflict, that each of the victims was not taking an active
part in the hostilities at the time of death, and that the perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned killings in Kailahun District constitute
murder as both a crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute and a war crime
under Article 3 of the Statute.
4. Alleged unlawful killings in Freetown and the Western Area gbetween about 21
December 1998 and about 28 February 1999;
772. The Trial Chamber received the following credible documentary evidencell)48
regarding the situation in Freetown and the Western Area during the period December 1998
to February 1999. One report records:
[I]n the early hours of January 6, 1999, rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
launched an offensive against the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, capturing it from
government troops and the soldiers of the Nigerian~led peace keeping force known as
ECOMOG .... The battle for Freetown and the ensuing three week rebel occupation of the
capital was characterised by the systematic and widespread perpetration of all classes of
atrocities against the civilian population of over one million inhabitants, and marked the
most intensive and concentrated period of human rights violations in Sierra Leone's eight~
year civil war. As the rebels took control of street after street, they turned their weapons on
the civilian population. By the end of January, both government and independent sources
estimated that several thousands of civilians had been killed ,..,
M5 Indictment, para. 12.
M6 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.
lim See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
lm This evidence was received pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

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Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T ’ JJ Gtk 18 May 2012

E%%8%
In December 1998, following the capture of Kono District and Makeni, thousands of RUF
fighters started moving towards Freetown and that by early January 1999 they had reached
the peninsular on which Freetown is located and gathered less than 20 miles west of the
capital. On 6 January 1999 the rebels broke through the highly stretched and poorly manned
ECOMOG defences, and proceeded to march through the eastern suburbs and straight into
the city centre .... While the rebels were only able to occupy the city center for less than one
week, it took ECOMOG forces over three weeks to flush them from the three densely
populated eastern suburbs of Kissy, Wellington and Calaba Town. It was in these three
suburbs, particularly towards the end of the occupation that the vast majority of atrocities
occurred.
The rebels made little distinction between civilian and military targets, They repeatedly
stated that they believed civilians should be punished for what they perceived to be their
support for the existing government .... The largest number of killings took place within the
context of attacks on civilians gathered in houses, compounds and places of refuge such as
churches or mosques .... Human Rights Watch took testimonies from scores of witnesses to
such atrocities including a January 6 attack on a family in which all but one of their seven
children were killed; a January 19 attack on the church of the Brotherhood of the Cross and
Star in Wellington, in which twelve people were gunned down; a January 21 attack on a
compound in Kissy in which seventeen people were murdered and later burned; and a
January 22 attack on the Rogbalan Mosque in Kissy, in which sixty-six people were
massacred .... There were also frequent accounts of people being burned alive in their
houses, often having been wounded. Children and the elderely were particularly vulnerable.
Witnesses described rebels throwing civilians, sometimes children, into burning houses and
shooting at those trying to escape. Family members trying to rescue their children or other
relatives from a burning house were threatened with death and forced to abandon them to
the fire .... While most victims were seemingly chosen at random, the rebels directly
targeted a few groups, namely Nigerian nationals, unarmed Policemen and journalists. At
least sixty-three Nigerians, most of whom were traders or businessmen, were hunted down
and murdered in particularly brutal ways. The rebels also killed at least 85 unarmed Police
officers, and several local and one international journalist .... The Catholic archbishop, four
Xavierian fathers, and six Sisters of Charity were abducted and held for over ten days. The
rebels later killed four of the sisters and wounded one Xavierian father. 1949
773. Another report records:
[R]ebel fighters belonging to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999. The rebels
attacked the city from the east and penetrated as far as the centre, which they held for four
days before being forced to withdraw by a counterattack. The fighting resulted in the deaths
of between 3000 and 5000 persons, including rebel fighters, soldiers of the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), members of the Civil
Defence Force (CDF) militia who were defending the capital and large numbers of civilian
inhabitants ....
In late January and early February, UNOMSIL human rights officers visited Freetown to
conduct an assessment of the situation there. The assessment team travelled extensively
within the city and interviewed numerous people, including victims of mutilations and other
human rights violations .... The team found that the ultimate responsibility for the fighting,
for most of the civilian casualties and for the related humanitarian emergency in Freetown
rested with the rebel forces. Though it was impossible to state with precision the actual
number of civilian casualties, most estimates put the total casualty figure at between 3000
and 5000, including rebel fighters, ECOMOG and CDF combatants. It is feared that at least
2000 of those casualties were civilian inhabitants of Freetown. Many civilians were killed
while being used by rebels as human shields in combat, or because they reportedly refused
W9 Exhibit P-328, Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone - Getting away with murder, Mutilation, Rape,
New Testimony fiom Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol.11 No.3(A), Part I-Summary, ERN 22999-2300].

---- End of Page 292 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0 l-T J w 18 May 2012

5838 5
to come out on the streets to demonstrate in favour of the rebels. Many were killed while
trying to protect family members from death or rape, or while trying to protect their
property from looting and destruction.
Much of the killing seems to have been arbitrary and to have been carried out by child
fighters or rebel fighters under the influence of drugs or alcohol. However, there is also
evidence that some of the murders were targeted, including, reportedly, the murder of 200
Police personnel. The Solicitor general was killed during the fighting, as were the resident
Minister for the North, an adviser to President Kabbah and at least two journalists. Other
victims who appear to have been deliberately targeted include senior officials of the Sierra
Leone National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Council of Churches
and the National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reintegration, as well
as Nigerian nationals. WSU
774. An Expert Report that was admitted into evidence as Confidential Prosecution
Exhibit P-077 stated the following conceming the killing of civilians in Freetown and the
Westem area during the period January-February 1999:
[R]ebel forces advancing into and through the city on 6 and 7 January, frequently forced
civilians into the streets for use as human shields. People who refused to comply were
either killed or had their properties destroyed. Many reports have also been received of the
killing of persons who refused to obey instructions to dance and make music on the streets.
A number of interviewees describe the execution of the entire populations of residential
compounds for such rnisdemeanours. There are reports of compounds housing up to 50
people being targeted in this manner. Similar reports indicate that then and later, people
were executed because of their efforts to deter looting and to protect family members from
assault or rape. Persons caught attempting to escape from rebel custody, were frequently
killed. One witness saw 6 children killed at Wellington in mid-January in one such incident. r
Much of the killing also appears to have been entirely arbitrary. Witnesses report such
killings of men, women and children by rebel fighters, including an instance in which the
perpetrator is stated to have been about l0 years old, and another implicating an eight-year-
old boy. It is frequently stated that the perpetrators of such acts were under the influence of
cocaine and other drugs, including alcohol. Killing occasionally occurred in the context of
games in which people were lined up and the executioners teasingly chose who to kill and
who to spare. In one such incident at Fourah Bay Road, around 21 January, three children
were executed and their three sisters had limbs amputated or mutilated. One man has
described how he was ordered to choose between the execution of his entire family and the
surrender of his daughter to a rebel fighter.
Some of those who were burned to death in their homes had been locked in or first been
disabled by gunshots. A number of elderly people and infants also died in this manner.
Others died while attempting to escape. One five—year-old girl survived being thrown into a
fire, at Blackhall Road, on 28 January. A six-year-old girl was executed together with her
mother on 23 January at Wellington.
Rebel forces targeted many individuals and categories of persons for execution. It is
reported that over 200 Police officers were killed, either at home or at their barracks in such
locations as CID Headquarters, Kingtom and Kissy. The means of execution included
knives, machete and gunshot. One incident on January 6 at the city center Cotton Tree,
involved the killing by stabbing of 11 Policemen. A number of prison officials appear to
have been killed during and after the assault on Pademba Road Prison on 6 January. An
escapee from Pademba Road Prison is reported to have allegedly led an attack on the
NSU Exhibit P-310, UN Security Council, 5th Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March l999, paras 20-22.

---- End of Page 293 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 62} 18 May 2012

Solicitor General, who was killed and decapitated. Two senior Government officials, the `
Resident Minister for the North and an Advisor to the President, were captured and killed.
At least 2 journalists were sought out and killed (while other journalists, including foreign
nationals, though not specifically targeted, were killed, injured or abducted.) ·
A senior member of the human rights monitoring committee of the National Commission
for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) was killed together with her
husband...Executed senior officers of the Council of Churches and the NCRRR may have
been targeted on the basis of their positions .... Nigerian nationals also appear to have been
targeted. One witness, on 8 January, observed 2 Nigerian traders whose throats were cut
apparently on the basis of their nationality. . 1951
775. The Trial Chamber heard the evidence of many witnesses that gave first-hand
accounts of civilian killings in Freetown and the Western Area during the period December
1998 to about 28 February 1999. The Chamber took into account the following evidence
which is corroborated by the documentary evidence referred to above.
776. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a combatant who took part in the Freetown invasion of
January 1999, testified that a group of about 1000 troops made up of members of the AF RC,
RUF ,195 2 30 Special Task Force (STF) members1953 and 20 other "Liberian fighters",195 11
captured Benguema from ECOMOG around Christmas of 1998 and while based there,
reorganised themselves into seven "battalions"1955 in preparation for a final assault on
Freetown.1956 Alex Tamba Brima, a.k.a. Gullit was the overall commander of the brigade
after SAJ Musa died at Benguema. Other AF RC commanders included Ibrahim Bazzy
Kamara1957 a.k.a. "Bazzy", Santigie Borbor Kanu1958 a.k.a. "Five-Five", Franklin Conteh
Woyoh,1959 Hassan Papa Bangura1960 a.k.a. "Bomb Blast", Col. "O-Five",1%1 Lt. Col. "Papa-
‘"‘ Exhibit P-077 rcppiidcmiaij, pp. 9292-9293.
1952 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8200-8201. Bobson Sesay testifiied that O-Five also
came with a platoon of 30 RUF members to reinforce the troops preparing to invade Freetown.
1953 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8195-8199. In his testimony, Bobson Sesay explained
that the Special Task Force were a group of Liberians that had served within the Sierra Leone Army during the
NPRC Govemment of Valentine Strasser in the early 1990s.
1954 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193-8195. In his testimony, Bobson Sesay explained
that a Commander O-Five brought with him a group of 20 Liberians from Kailahun who were to reinforce the
AFRC/RUF troops that would invade Freetown. According to the witness, O-Five explained to the brigade that
these Liberians were former NPFL fighters who had undergone training with the Armed Forces of Liberia
(AF L).
1955 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp 8248-8250. Bobson Sesay testified that the Brigade at
Benguema was restructured tocomprise the IS1 Battalion, 21111 Battalion, 3111 Battalion, 4111 Battalion, 5[11 Battalion,
the Rapid Deployment or RDF Battalion and the Red Lion Battalion. Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8248-8250.
Bobson Sesay explained that the STF and the former NPFL fighters who came to reinforce the invading troops
were exclusively based in the Red Lion Battalion. Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8203.
1056 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8243-8251.
1957 Bazzy was the Deputy Chief in command of the Brigade.
1958 Five-five was the Chief of Army Staff of the Brigade.
1959 Woyoh was the Director/Operations of the Brigade.

---- End of Page 294 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

17,,,*962 FAT Sesa ,*963 rumor shcmg "’°‘* Mau r1m,‘°" Frida Bah Marah{966 a.k.a.
Y J Y
"Bu]ld0ze", Ma`0r Arthur,{997 Junior Geor e Johnson{969 a.k.a. "Junior Lion", Lt. C0]. Saidu
J g
Kambolai a.k.a. "Basky",{999 C0]. Lamin Sidique a.k.a. "Terminator" or "NPFL",{979 Med
Bajehjeh,{97{ C0]. Foy0h,{972 Lt. C0]. Konj0r,{973 "R0adb]0ck",{974 Adamu a.k.a. "Chicken
Sou ", Adama "Cut 1—Iand",{975 Tarrawali a.k.a. "G0]d Teeth",{979 Idrissa Kamara a.k.a. "
P
Rambo Red G0at",{977 and Amidu Kamara Keforkeh. Bobson Sesa ex lained that he was in
Y P
the 599 Battalion and served as Intelligence Officer.{979 Amongst the RUF that came to
reinforce the Freetown invasion were Captain Stagger, Washington, King Perry, Alfred
Brown, and Dukulay.{979 The evidence relating to the composition of these forces is
corroborated b that of Perr Kamara, an RUF radi0 0 erator that travelled with the 0u to
Y Y P gr P
Freetown. {999
777. Bobson Sesay further testified that prior to the invasion of Freetown, while at
Benguema, Gullit communicated on radi0 with Sam Bockarie informing him that the tr00ps
were ready to advance on Freetown but that they needed manp0wer reinforcement from
{999 Bomb Blast was the Operations Commander of the Brigade.
{96{ Colonel O-Five was the deputy Operations Commander of the Brigade.
{992 Bobson Sesay testified that Lt. Col. Papa 17 was appointed by SAJ Musa and is a different individual from
Hassan Papa Bangura. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8234.
{963 FAT Sesay was the Brigade administrator. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8289.
{994 Junior Sherrif was the Deputy Operations Commander of the Brigade.
{965 Tito was the Commander of the 19 Battalion.
{966 Bulldoze was the Commander of the 2"9 Battalion.
{997 Arthur was the Commander of the 3rd Battalion.
{969 Junior Lion was the Commander of the 491 Battalion.
{999 Basky was the Commander of the 591 Battalion.
{979 Terminator was the Commander of the RDF Battalion.
{97{ Bajehjeh was the Commander of the Red Lion Battalion.
{972 Foyoh was the missions Commander.
{973 Konjor was the Battlefield Inspector.
{974 CO Roadblock was the Military Police Commander
{975 Sesay testified that Adama was a female combatant who was given the nick-name "Cut Hand"because she
always carried a machete with her and was not afraid to amputate people. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23
April 2008, p. 8336.
{976 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8221. Adamu and Tarawali were some of the military
inspectors/ supervisors.
{977 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8358. The witness explains that this Rambo came to
reinforce the rebel troops invading Freetown.
{979 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8251.
{979 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8201-8202. The witness explained that King Perry
and Alfred Brown were RUF radio operators. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8240.
{999 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3185-3188.

---- End of Page 295 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T Z *"’ 18 May 2012

35358
Bockarie.{98{ Bockarie responded saying that reinforcement was on its way from Kono,
Kailahun and Dam but that the reinforcing troops under Issa Sesay and Superman needed to
weaken the ECOMOG forces in Kono and Segbwema before they could arrive to reinforce
the invading troops. Bobson Sesay further told the court that the invasion of Freetown was
planned jointly between the AFRC and RUF, with three flanks planning to attack jointly.
One flank led by Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, RUF Rambo, Akim Turay and lsaac Mongor
would come from Kailahun and attack from the eastern part around Kono area, and after
capturing Kono and Makeni from ECOMOG they would proceed to reinforce the forces
invading Freetown.{982 The second flank led by Gullit, Bazzy and Five—Five would attack
from the north. The third flank led by Denis Mingo a.k.a. Superman and Brigadier Mani
would attack from the Kailahun-Dam axis and assist in capturing Makeni from ECOMOG,
after which they too would proceed to reinforce the forces invading Freetown.{983 Bobson
Sesay learnt of this plan by monitoring conversations between the AFRC and RUF High
Command in the areas that the SLA and RUF occupied. {984
778. Bobson Sesay further told the court that as the rebel troops were waiting on the
outskirts of Freetown{985 for reinforcement, they came under heavy bombardment by the
ECOMOG jets and this caused Gullit to order the rebel troops to start the Freetown invasion
without waiting for reinforcement.{986 ln the witness's presence, Gullit instructed the
invading rebel troops to "ensure that they burn down all Police Stations, open the central
prisons and free the prisoners including Foday Sankoh, kill all collaborators of the
Government and ECOMOG and opponents of the AFRC/RUF forces, loot any valuables
from the civilian population and kill any civilians that resist the looting, and capture a good
number of civilians to use as human shields if the troops encountered any resistance".{987
Sesay further told court that the over 1000 rebel troops who entered Freetown were "well—
armed with support propelled grenades (SPGs), 60 millimetre commando motars; 81
{QM Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8253.
{982 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008 p. 8305.
{983 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008 pp. 8254-8258.
{984 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008 pp. 8286, 8287, 8289, 8300-8312.
{W5 The witness stated that the troops were camped in a "prirnar~y jurrg1e"around Allen Town until 5 January
1999. Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8269.
{986 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8270.
{987 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8270-8271.

---- End of Page 296 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL 03 01 T qéb 18 May 2012

millimetre motars; rocket ro elled enades RPGs ; li t automatic rifles LARs ; sub-
P P SY
machine guns (SMGs); AK—47 and machetes".'988
779. Bobson Sesay further testified that on 6 January 1999, the whole Brigade comprised
of AFRC, RUF, STF and Liberian fighters moved from Allen Town and commenced their
attack on Freetown.'989 The invading rebel troops spent three and a half weeks in Freetown
before they were repelled by ECOMOG forces.'99O
780. The Trial Chamber heard the following evidence of civilian killings in Freetown and
the Western Area. 1
(i) Killing of civilians and ECOMOG soldiers around State House in Freetown
781. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that the rebel forces led by Gullit captured
"Statehouse" or the Office of the President at 6.00 a.m. on 6 January 1999.1991 Sesay told the
court that on that morning Major Tito captured 20 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers and brought
them to Gullit for instruction as to what to do with them.'992 Gullit ordered Tito to have
them summarily executed. The witness was present when Tito took the soldiers who were
hors de combat to the washing bay behind State House and shot them all to death.l993
Bobson Sesay explained that the invading rebel troops had a policy that required the
civilians to show respect for the rebels and that any civilian perceived to "overlook" (i.e.
disrespect) the rebels would be summarily shot".'994 Bobson Sesay told court that he saw "so
many corpses of civilians littered around the State House axis" and counted over 20 dead
bodies of civilians on 6 January 1999, all of whom had been shot dead by the invading rebel
troops for simply "overlooking the rebels".'995
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 'Transcript 22 April 2008, p .8272.
1989 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8272-8280. The witness explained that the rebel
troops attacked from two flanks and entred through the following locations within Freetown, namely, Calaba
Town, Brewery, Old Wellington Road, New Freetown-Waterloo Road, Kissy Mess Mess, Saroula, Fisher Lane
Old Road, PWD Junction, Kissy Road Cemetery, Upgun, Savage Sguare, Mountain Cut Junction, Eastern Police
station and State House.
*990 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8294.
wg} Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 'Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8280.
*992 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8289.
*993 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 'Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8292.
mg" Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8291.
*995 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 'Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8291.

---- End of Page 297 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / all 18 May 2012

782. Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operatorl900 with the rebel troops that invaded
Freetown, testified that when the troops entered Freetown they would either kill ECOMOG
soldiers on the front line or capture them and present them to Gullit who was the commander
in charge at State House.0)97 Kamara testified that Gullit consulted Sam Bockarie by radio as
to what to do with these prisoners of war and that Bockarie responded that "he had no prison
for ECOMOG".l090 Kamara testified that as a result of that response, the rebel forces never
spared any ECOMOG soldiers and that a total of 10-15 captured ECOMOG soldiers were
shot and killed under the Cotton Tree,0)09 which was 100 metres from State House.2000 In his
evidence, Kamara also refers to "massive killings around Cotton Tree" next to State House
on 6 January 1999.
783. The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence the prior testimony of Abu Bakarr
Mansaray.200l Mansaray, a mechanical engineer testified that while living on Waterloo
Street in Freetown,2002 he was abducted by three "rebel boys" dressed in ECOMOG
uniforms on 8 January 19992003 and forcibly taken to State House where Gullit was in
command.2004 Mansaray explained that by the term "rebel" he meant a mixed group of RUF
rebels and AFRC soldiers. The three rebels were armed with AK-47 rifles and spoke Krio
with "a Liberian accent".2005
1000 The witness explained that although he was an RUF radio operator, he and another RUF radio operator
called Alfred Brown were instructed by Mosquito and Morris Kallon to join Gullit's AF RC group at Rosos in
order to establish effective communications between the two groups (RUF and AFRC) in preparation for "a big
joint operation". Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3184-3185.
"’°7 Perry Kamara, rrarraerrpr 6 February 2008, pp. 3230-3231.
1000 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3230-3231.
1000 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3230-3231.
2000 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3231.
2001 Abu Bakarr Mansaray's testimomy in the AFRC trial was admitted as Exhibit P-222 under Rule 92bis
("prior testimony"). In the present trial, Mansaray was cross—examined on his prior testimony. See Abu Bakarr
Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, pp 19517-19568.
2002 Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, p. 19518; Exhibit P-222, "TFl-024, AFRC Transcript, 7
March 2005", p. 20427.
2003 In his prior testimony, the witness testified that he was captured on 8 January 1998. However, in cross-
examination at p. 19543 he corrected himself to state that he was in fact abducted in January 1999. See Exhibit P-
222, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005, Witness TF1-024, pp. 43/20427, 62-63/20446-20447; Abu Bakarr
Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, p. 19543.
2004 Exhibit P-222, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005, Witness TF1-024, pp. 20428-20430.
2005 In his prior testimony Mansaray stated that the three rebel boys spoke "Liberian English". See Exhibit P-222,
"TF1-024, AFRC Transcript 7 March 2005" at p. 20428. In cross—examination however, he stated that the rebels
spoke Krio with a Liberian accent. See Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, p. 19557.

---- End of Page 298 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dl; 18 May 2012 `%

35391
784. At State House, on the orders of Gullit, the rebels tried in vain to force Mansaray and
50 other civilian captives to join them in fighting against ECOMOGZOO6 Mansaray and the
50 civilians refused to join the rebels as requested and were locked up in the kitchen of State
House for four days. F rom the kitchen window Mansaray observed the rebels at State House
gunning down about 35 civilians for refusing to join the rebels. He testified that the rebels
shot and killed three women and two men in his presence, and thereafter shot and killed 30
of the 50 civilians that were with Mansaray.2OO7 The rebels threw the bodies of the civilians
over the State House wall and also into the Paramount Hotel's compound.2OO8
Findings
785. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Perry Kamara
credible. Each of these witnesses took part in the Freetown invasion of 6 January 1999 and
given their unique position among the invading forces, each was privy to the preparations
that took place amongst the rebel troops immediately prior to that invasion. In particular
each of them was present at State House during the first crucial hours after the take-over of
power by the rebels and had a first-hand observation of what went on there. Bobson Sesay's
testimony proves that on 6 January 1999 at the State House washing bay in Freetown, a
rebel commander called Major Tito acting on the orders of Commander Alex Tamba Brima
a.k.a. Gullit, intentionally killed 20 Nigerian soldiers who were hors de combat. The
evidence further proves that on the same day at State House, rebel forces made of the
AFRC/RUF/STP and Liberian fighters intentionally killed over 20 civilians that were not
taking an active part in the hostilities, as punishment for "disrespecting" the rebel forces.
The evidence of Perry Kamara, which largely corroborates that of Bobson Sesay, proves
beyond reasonable doubt that on 6 January 1999 at the Cotton Tree near State House, rebel
forces made of the AFRC/RUF/STP and Liberian fighters acting on the orders of Gullit and
Sam Bockarie intentionally killed at least 10-15 Nigerian soldiers who were hors de combat
and an unknown number of civilians that were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
786. The Trial Chamber further finds the first-hand account of Abu Bakarr Mansaray to
be credible. His evidence, which also corroborates that of Sesay and Kamara, proves that on
20% Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, pp. 19554-19555; Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC
Transcript 7 March 2005", pp. 20431-32.
2007 Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript 7 March 2005", pp. 20484-20485.
2008 Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript 7 March 2005", pp. 20431-32, 20456-20457, 20485-20490.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T }

8 January 1999 at State House, rebels including members of the AFRC/RUF intentionally
killed at least 35 civilians who were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
787. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that between 6 and 8 January 1999 at State House in Freetown, rebel forces including
members of the AFRC/RUF/STF and Liberian fighters intentionally killed (i) at least 35
Nigerian soldiers who were hors de combat at the time of death; and (ii) at least 55 civilians
that were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
788. The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators were acting in accordance with the
orders of the top Commander Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) to carry out indiscriminate
killings, mass abductions and raping of civilians, and burning and destruction of civilian and
public property in Freetown during this period as part of the campaign of terror waged
against the civilian population. The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators wilfully made
the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose of the killings at State
House was to instil terror in the civilian population.
(ii) Unlawful killing of civilians in Kissy area around J anuary 1999
789. Mohamed Sesay, a petty trader living on Falcon Street in the Kissy Shell Company
area testified that on 6 January 1999 he heard a lot of shooting in the night and in the
morning and when he woke up he saw rebels everyvvhere.2009 He and his family stayed
indoors for five or six days after the rebels had taken over Freetownmm and then went with
other civilians to buy food at the Marbela market in the eastern part of Freetown.20H On the
wa back the came to a check oint manned b the "rebels and SLAs" at PWD, which is
Y Y P Y
near Ferry Junction.20l2 There were many people gathered at the checkpoint, including the
former President Momoh who was being carried in a hammock.20l3 The rebels ordered the
civilians to sit down and then took two men from the civilians saying they were going to
2009 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3901. The witness stated that "the rebels had guns. Some
of them had machetes. Some of them had axes. Some of them, the way they were dressed, some of them had
socks on without having shoes, some had military shirts on without the pants, some of them will have the
military pants without shirts on".
M0 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3901.
ml Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3902.
M2 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3902.
ZOB Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3903.

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Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T / OM 18 May 2012 %
\

offer them as "a sacrifice".2Ol4 ln the witness's resence, the rebels shot and killed one of the
P
men and stabbed the other one to death after which they collected the latter man's blood into
a bowl.2O15 Sesay and the other civilians at the checkpoint were then allowed to pass through
and he retumed home.20l6
790. Mohamed Sesay further testified that two or three days later he was sitting under a
mango tree behind his house on Falcon Street with other civilians when five armed "rebels ‘
and SLAs" joined them including an RUF rebel called Issa Conteh that the witness
reviousl knew.2Ol7 As the sat under the tree, two other "rebels" a roached the
P Y Y PP
witness.2Ol8 One of the rebels was a woman dressed in trousers, a T-shirt and boots but did
not carry a gun. She also spoke "Liberian language". The other rebel was a man who wore
"ful1 unif`orm" but no boots.2Ol9 The woman fighter told the fighters sitting under the tree
that "because they refused to fight, Pa Kabbah had sent ECOMOG to fight against them, so
now she was orderin them to be `n O eration No Livin Thin 72020 Sesa testified that he
g gl P g g Y
saw Issa Conteh shoot and kill an old woman that was passing by.2O2l Sesay also saw an old
man who was passing fall down and die, but he did not see the person who shot him.2O22
791. Mohamed Sesay further testified that two days later "rebels" carrying fuel in a
container came and set fire to his home. The witness was in the house when it caught fire but
esca ed to hide first in the house of one Pa Bobodin, and later sou t refu e in the house of
P g
one Mr Abass.2O23 There were more than 50 civilians, includin old men and women, who
g
had also sou t refu e at Mr Abass’ house, which house had also been bumt.2O24 Sesa
g Y
testified that on 19 J anu 19992025 he was on the veranda at Mr Abass’ house when he saw
MY
seven "rebels" arrive, including a "commando" who was giving the other rebels orders.2O26
M4 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3902-3903.
M5 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3904.
M6 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3904, 3907.
M7 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3907, 3911-3912.
M8 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3907-3908.
M9 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3908.
2020 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3907-3910.
mm Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3911.
2022 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3910-3911.
2023 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3914-3916.
2024 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3917-3918.
2025 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3936; Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p.
3931.
20% Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3917. The witness stated that the person referred to as

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QQ 18 May 2012

The witness testified that the commando carried a pistol, one rebel carried a machete,
another rebel carried an axe and four others carried guns.2O27 The commando ordered the
fighters to select the young men out of the house. The rebels selected 24 young men from
the house, including the witness, and took them to the junction where they asked them to
ueue u in re aration for havin their arms am utated on a lo which had been laced in
Cl P P P S P S P
front of them.2O28 The commando ordered the first man in the line to put his arm down to be
amputated, and when he pleaded with him not to, the commando shot the man in the face,
killing him.2O29 When the second man in line pleaded with the commando not to amputate
him, the commando shot him in the chest, killing him as well.2O30 When the third man
pleaded with the commando not to amputate him, the commando used rapid fire to shoot and
kill six of the men in the queue.203l
792. Mohamed Sesay further testified that after the commando had shot the first eight
men, he ordered the fighters to split open the heads of the remaining young men in the queue
with axes and machetes instead, saying "he was not going to waste his bullets anymore".2O32
Sesay told the court that after the rebels had smoked marijuana, they used an axe and
machete to split open the heads of five of the men and killed them.2O33 Although the witness
wanted to look away because he was frightened, the rebels forced him and the other civilians
to watch the gruesome executions.2033 Mohamed Sesay further testified that after the rebels
killed the civilians, they proceeded to amputate both his hands, and that the rebel that
actually did this was barely 13 years old.2O33
793. The Trial Chamber admitted in evidence the transcript of testimony Prosecution
Witness TF1-098 from the AFRC trial.2O3° Witness TF1-098 testified that on 18 January
"commando" was in fact the commander of the group and was issuing operational orders to the group.
2037 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3919.
3023 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3918-3919.
3029 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3919-3920.
2030 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3920.
ml Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3921-3922.
3032 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3922.
2033 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3922.
3034 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3923.
3033Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3924-3927.
3036 Witness TF1-098 testified in the AFRC trial, which was admitted as Exhibit P-2 10 ("prior testimony") under
Rule 92bis. ln the present trial, the witness was cross-examined on this evidence. See Witness TF1-098,
Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19147.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

1999, "rebels", whom the witness identified as members of the SLA,2O37 came to the house
on Manfred Lane near Kissy road where he was hiding with his younger brother, cousins
and other civilians and led them by gunpoint to a primary school on Fataraman Street.2O38
While there a Krio-speaking rebel named Tommy, who was from the Freetown area and
who wore a combat uniform, amputated the witness's left hand and the hands of 6 other
civilians with an axe and told them "to go and tell Pa Kabbah that they were in control, and
not ECOMOG". 2039 One of the seven amputees who was related to the witness, died from
the amputation.2O4O ln cross—examination, Witness TFl-098 explained that Tommy belonged
to the same group as "Captain Blood".2O4l
794. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in the third week of January 1999,2042 as the
rebel troops were retreating from the ECOMOG forces in Freetown, they hid in the hills
overlooking the east of Freetown from where they observed "civilians singing and dancing
as they welcomed the ECOMOG forces".2O43 The witness heard Gullit remarking, "Now the
people in Freetown have changed their song, the song which they were singing: that they
were our brothers, we want peace. Now the people are singing it otherwise: That our
brothers have come, they have come to steal. So now we should move to Ferry Junction. So
wherever we meet people singing that song...those people were betraying us, we should kill
them".2O44 After this remark, Gullit reorganised the rebel troops and sent them to Ferry
Junction, Low Cost area and Kissy, instructing them to "burn all the remaining houses and
kill all the civilians".2°45
795. Bobson Sesay testified that upon receiving Gullit's orders, his group which included
Rambo Red Goat and Bajehjeh went to Kissy Market where they saw civilians singing
"They are our brothers". Immediately the rebels, including the witness, went and shot all the
civilians. They even shot civilians who were in their homes.2O46 The witness said that while
he used his gun to shoot the civilians, some of his colleagues used machetes to kill the
2037 Witness TF1—098, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19131.
203* Exhibit P~2l0, "TF1-098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", pp. 20688—20689.
2039 Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", pp. 20689-20690.
2040 Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20692.
2041 Witness TF1-098, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19131.
2042 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8361.
2043 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8353.
2044 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8351.
2045 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8353-8354.

---- End of Page 303 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03-01-T %/ 6}* 18 May 2012

civilians while others burnt civilians alive in their homes.2O47 The witness could not estimate
the actual number of casualties but stated that they were many. The witness further testified
that the rebel group that attacked Low Cost area came back aHerwards and reported that they
too had carried out burnings and amputated and killed civilians there. The witness explained
that this second group was led by commander "Changa Bulanga".2O48
796. Bobson Sesay further testified that the day aHer the operations in Kissy Market and
Low-Cost areas, Gullit informed the fighters that he had heard that civilians were hiding
ECOMOG forces in the mosque on Old Shell Road by having them take off their uniforms
and pose as civilians.2O44 Gullit then ordered "Five-Five" to lead a group of fighters to the
mosque and to kill everyone there.2O5O The witness was in this group of fighters which was
made up of over 100 AFRC, RUF, STP, and Liberian fighters, including "Rambo Red Goat"
and Med "Bajehjeh".2O5l Bobson Sesay testified that upon reaching the mosque, they saw
that the mosque was full of people, they did not search and they just started shooting
randomly into the crowd. The rebels killed everyone who was not able to escape, including
people he believed to be ECOMOG officers, men, children, nursing mothers, and old
women.2O52 Bobson Sesay estimated that his group killed more than 20 people in this
attack.2O53 Bobson Sesay further testified that aHer the Lomé Peace Accord his uncle
informed him that two of his female cousins were among the victims of the attack.2O54
Bobson Sesay testified that as they withdrew from the mosque they met Commander Gullit
at Crazy Yard, and "Five-Five" reported to Gullit that they had destabilized the mosque and
killed the people. 2055
797. Bobson Sesay further testified that aHer the killings at Rogbalan Mosque, Gullit
ordered Foday Bah Marrah (a.k.a. Bulldoze) to execute four white nuns they had captured
when they were withdrawing from Eastern Police and that Bobson Sesay saw Bulldoze
2**6 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8355-8356, 8359.
2047 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8360.
2048 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8360.
20*9 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8361-8363.
2050 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8362.
2051 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8362-8363.
M2 Alimamy Bpbspp Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8363-8365.
2053 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8364.
2054 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8364-8365.
2055 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8365-8367.

---- End of Page 304 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T 7%/ QU 18 May 2012

shoot and kill the four nuns at a location called "Crazy Yard".2O5° The nuns had been
captured along with a Bishop Ganda and a Father Mario, both of whom had managed to
escape.2O57 Gullit gave the order to execute the four nuns saying "he did not want them to
escape like Bishop Ganda and Father Mario as that would not be good for the rebel troops
The murder of four white nuns is corroborated by documentary evidence in Exhibit P—328
which describes the nuns as "Sisters of Charity".
798. The Trial Chamber admitted in evidence pursuant to Rule 92quater the transcripts
and confidential witness statement of Witness TF1—021 from the AFRC and RUF trials.2O58
He was not cross·examined in the present trial regarding his prior testimony as he is now
deceased. ln his prior testimony, Witness TF1·021 testified that he was leading prayers at
the Rogbalan Mosque at about 12:30pm on a Friday in January 1999 when he saw more than
15 men armed with guns and machetes jumping over the fence and into the compound.2O59
They had disguised themselves in different ways, some wearing plastic bags on their heads,
and some with their faces and/or bodies painted with blue, charcoal or white substances.2O6O
Some of the men were wearing black polo shirts and long trousers or shorts.2O61 The mosque
was overflowing with men, women and children, as people were there not only to pray but
also to seek refuge.20°2
799. Some of the arrned men approached TF1—021 and told him that they were going to
kill everyone in the mosque.2O63 TF1·021 tried to stop them by giving them 80,000 Leones
collected from people at the mosque, but after taking the money the armed men said that
they would still kill all the civilians in the mosque.2O64 TF1·021 then accepted his fate,
2056 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8365-8367, 8368.
2057 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8367.
2058 Exhibit P-287, "TFl-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005"; Exhibit P-289, TFl-021, "RUF Transcript 15
July 2004"; and Exhibit P-288A (confidential), were all admitted in evidence pursuant to Rule92quater.
2059 Exhibit P-287, "TFl-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", pp. 18735-18737; Exhibit P-289, TF1-021,
"RUF Transcript 15 July 2004", pp. 18726-18728; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), p. 18814.
2060 Exhibit P-287, "TFl-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", p. 18736; Exhibit P-289, "TFl-021, RUF
Transcript 15 July 2004", p. 18727; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), p. 18815.
206* Exhibit P-288A (caiiaaciitiaii, p. 18814.
2062 Exhibit P-287, "TFl-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", p. 18737; Exhibit P-289, "TFl-021, RUF
Transcript 15 July 2004", p. 18727; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), p. 18814.
2063 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", p. 18738; Exhibit P-289, "TF1-021, RUF
Transcript 15 July 2004", p. 18728; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), p. 18816.
2064 Exhibit P-287, "TFl-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", p. 18739; Exhibit P-289, "TF1-021, RUF
Transcript 15 July 2004", p. 18728; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), 25 February 2003", p. 18816.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J Gu 18 May 2012

telling the armed men that "it would happen if it was God's will".2666 The armed men
taunted the civilians for believing in God and then began shooting randomly at the crowd
inside the mosque.2666 As the armed men were shooting, they said it was not their fault, but
the fault of Tejan Kabbah, who refused to have peace talks with them.2667 When the shooting
ceased, TF1-021 counted 71 dead eo le inside and around the outside of the mos ue.2666
P P Cl
800. The Trial Chamber also admitted in evidence pursuant to Rule 92quater the transcript
of the testimony of Witness TF1-083 from the AFRC trial.2669 He too was not cross-
examined in the present trial regarding his prior testimony as he is now deceased. ln his
prior testimony, the witness stated that in January 1999 he was living in Kissy, Freetown.2676
On 22 January 1999,267l he went to the Rogbalan Mosque to seek shelter after his hand was
amputated.2672 When he arrived at the mosque he saw what he estimated to be 70 corpses
wearing civilian clothes outside of the fence surrounding the compound, inside the
compound gates, and inside the mosque.2676 Among the dead were children, old persons,
men, and women.2674 lnside the mosque he also saw tripods, spoons, and clothes spread
about.2676 He testified that he stayed in the mosque from after his hand was cut-off at about
12.00pm until about 6.00pm that evening.2676
2666 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", p. 18739; Exhibit P-289, "TF1-021, RUF
Transcript 15 July 2004", p. 18728; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), 25 February 2003", p. 18816.
2666 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", p. 18739; Exhibit P—289, "TF1—021, RUF
Transcript 15 July 2004",,p. 18728; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), pp. 18816—18817.
2667 Exhibit P-287, "TFl-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", pp. 18739, 18745; Exhibit P-289, "TF1-021,
RUF Transcript 15 July 2004", pp. 18728-18729; Exhibit P-288A (confidential), p. 18817.
2666 Exhibit P-287, "TFl-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", p. 18740; Exhibit P-289, "TF1-021, RUF
Transcript 15 July 2004", p. 18728. In both the AFRC and RUF trials, and in his confidential witness statement,
TF1-021 identified a similar but different list of victims. In the AFRC Trial he listed Memuna Kalokoh,
Marnmy Bangura, Pa Alfred Bangura, Mammy Sawdatu from Kailuhun, Mrs. Farmer, and his son. Exhibit P-
287, "TF1-021, AFRC Transcript 15 April 2005", pp. 18741—18743. In the RUF trial he listed Mohammed
Tombu, Pa Bangura, "[a]nother Mamie", "another Ya Memuna", Ibrahim, and TF1-021's son. Exhibit P-289,
"TF1-021, RUF Transcript 15 July 2004", pp. 18730-18731. In his confidential witness statement he listed Pa
Bangura, a Loko Pastor, Mammy Safratu, Memunata Kalokoh, lman Issa Kamara, Mamie Bangura, Mariatu
Kamara, Alieu Kamara, Alusine Sankoh, Musa Sankoh, and Amadu Tombo Bangura. Exhibit P-288A
(confidential), p. 18819.
2°°" Exhibit P-29oA, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April zoos?
2676 Exhibit P-290A, "TFl-083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18764.
2671 Exhibit P-290A, "TFl-083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", pp. 18775-18786, 18803.
2672 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18787.
2673 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", pp. 18787-18788.
2674 Exhibit P-290A, "TFl-083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18788.
2675 Exhibit P-290A, "TFl—083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", pp. 18787-18788.
2676 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", pp. 18788-18789.

---- End of Page 306 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {tig 18 May 2012

801. Witness Corinne Dufka,2O77 a senior researcher for the African Division of Human
Rights Watch,2O78 testified that she reported on a massacre of 60 individuals at the Rogbalan
Mosque on 22 January 1999.2079 Dufka interviewed 10 witnesses to the massacre who told
her that the rebels gave the people in the mosque two days advance warning that they would
come to kill them, but the people inside the mosque stayed because they had nowhere else to
go.2O8O Witnesses to the attack told Dufka that when the rebels came, one group went inside
and randomly shot at the civilians in the women's and men's sections, while the other stayed
outside and shot at eo le as the ran outside to esca e.2O8l
P P Y P
802. Prosecution Witness Ibrahim Wai testified that rebels attacked his home village of
Tombudu around 23 December 1998 and he fled to Kissy and took refuge at the home of his
brother-in-law called Brima, in Kissy.2O82 While there in January 1999 a rebel commander
that the witness previously knew very well, called Mohammed (a.k.a. Captain Blood)2°83
came to the house with his bodyguards and attacked the witness and his brother-in-law's
family. Wai immediately recognised this same Captain Blood as the rebel that had attacked
Ibrahim Wai's home in Tombudu on 23 December 1998. Captain Blood asked the witness
for money and electronics and when the latter said he had nothing to give, Captain Blood
am utated Wai's hand with a machete and told him to " o to Pa Kabbah who had brou t
P 8
many hands for the civilians".2O84 As Wai ran to hide inside a toilet, the rebels also
amputated the hands of his brother-in-law's younger brother.2O85 Wai further told court that
later on that night, the rebels set his brother-in-law's house on fire and his brother-in-law
called Brima, who was trapped inside the house, was burnt to death.2O86
2077 Corinne Dufka initially prepared a Report for the Prosecution entitled "Report of Corinne Dufka, Human
Rights Watch, to the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra leone, 13 May 2007". This report was not
admitted in evidence following an objection by the Defence. Ms. Dufka's oral testimony however, was admitted
in court.
0000 cunnna Durka, Transcript 21 January 2008, p. 1745.
2079 Corinne Dufka, Transcript 21 January 2008, pp. 1797, 1803.
0000 cunnna Durka, rrannanpt 21 January 2008, pp. 1802-1803.
000' cpnnna Dufka, Transcript 21 January 2008, pp. 1802-1803.
0000 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript, 16 oatubar 2008, pp18581~18585
2083 Wai testified that "Captain Blood" was one of Bazzy's security men and that his real name was Bob Lahai.
See TF1—334, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8462, 8489.
2084 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18588—l8592.
0000 rrnannn Wai, rranuanpt 17 oatpbar 2008,p. 18594.
20% Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18566—18597.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Qt 18 May 2012

35 ¤-1 is 0
803. Exhibit P-328 documents the 22 January 1999 attack of Rogbalan Mosque in which
66 people were killed, as one of the events in a section describing mass killings and
massacres.20g7
804. Witness TF1-104 gave evidence in another trial and the Trial Chamber admitted the
transcript of his prior testimony as evidence in the present trial.2088 In his prior testimony,
the witness told the Court that he was working as a nurse at the Good Shepherd Hospital in
Kissy in January 1999.2089 On 15 January 1999, while at the hospital, he saw a group of
RUF/AFRC Juntas shoot a civilian man in the nearby cemetery. The civilian was from
Fourah Bay and sustained serious gunshot wounds to the stomach from which he later died
in the hospital.2090 On 18 January 1999 a group of "RUF and juntas" went to search the
Good Shepherd hospital accusing the staff there of "treating ECOMOG and Kamajors". The
J untas forced every body out of the hospital, including staff patients and visitors, and started
beating them with a stick called a "coboko".209l The juntas took Witness TF1-104 along
with 200 other civilians2092 to one Pa Zubay's house located a short distance from the
hospital. On the way to this house, the AFRC/RUF fighters shot to death a Nigerian
businessman called Ike who had been admitted for treatment of his gunshot wounds in the
Good Shepherd hospital.2093 A number of Junta commanders had gathered at Pa Zubay's
house including one "Captain Shepherd" whom the witness had previously met and one
"Captain Blood". The civilians were made to stand against a wall and the J untas opened fire,
shooting randomly at the civilians. The witness testified that 15 civilians were shot to death
as a result, and that he was lucky to escape with bullet wounds on his elbow, knee and
hip 2094
Findings
2087 Exhibit P-328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape, New Testimony
from Sierra Leone, July 1999", pp, 23000-23001.
2088 Exhibit P-212A, "TE1—104, APRC Transcript, 8 April 2005" and Exhibit P-212B (confidential). The witness
was cross-examined on his prior testimony on 23 October 2008.
2089 Exhibit P-212B (confidential), pp. 5-9.
2""° Exhibit E-21212. qbbiihtibiitiai), p. 19.
M Exhibit P-21212. tbbiihtibiitiai), pp. 22-24.
2092 Exhibit P-212B (confidential), p. 25.
2093 Exhibit P-212B (confidential), p. 24.
""’* Exhibit E-21212. qbbiihtibiitiai), pp. 24-29.

---- End of Page 308 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI,-03-01-T % QTQ 18 May 2012

$6H 0;
805. The Trial Chamber finds, based on the reliable and credible evidence of Mohamed
Sesay, that the Prosecution proved that (i) around l2 January 1999 at PWD near Ferry
Junction, two civilian men were intentionally killed in a ritualistic murder by the invading
rebel forces described by the witness as "rebels and SLAs," (ii) that around 15 January 1999
at Falcon Street, an RUF rebel called Issa Conteh intentionally killed an old civilian woman
as part of "Operation No Living Thing," (iii) that around 18 January 1999 at the house of
one Abbas, a rebel called "Commando" intentionally shot and killed 8 young civilian men
who had refused to surrender their hands to him for amputation; (iv) and that on the same
occasion rebels acting under the orders of "Commando" intentionally hacked to death 5
other civilian men who had similarly refused to surrender their hands to him for amputation.
The Trial Chamber also finds based on the credible evidence of Witness TF1—098 that (v) on
18 January 1999 a rebel called Tommy intentionally amputated and caused the death of one
civilian at Fataraman Street in Kissy. Additionally, the Trial Chamber finds based on the
credible evidence of Ibrahim Wai that (vi) in January 1999, rebels led by a commander
called Captain Blood intentionally killed a civilian named Brima who was set ablaze in his
house at Kissy. The Trial Chamber further finds based on the credible evidence of Witness
TF1—104 that (vii) in January 1999, at the Good Shepherd Hospital in Kissy, AFRC/RUF
junta forces under the command of Captain Blood intentionally executed 17 civilians
including Ike the Nigerian businessman and another civilian shot at a nearby cemetery. The
Trial Chamber further finds that none of the civilian victims in the above instances was
taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of death.
806. The Trial Chamber further finds, based on the reliable and credible evidence of
Alimamy Bobson Sesay (viiii) that in the third week of January 1999, rebels comprising
members of the AFRC, RUF, STF and other Liberian fighters acting on the orders of
Commanders Gullit, Rambo Red Goat and Bajehjeh, intentionally killed an unknown
number of civilians at Kissy Market and Low Cost area in Kissy whom they suspected of
supporting ECOMOG, and (ix) that on 22 January 1999 after the massacre at Rogbalan
mosque, a rebel called Foday Bah Marrah (a.k.a. Bulldoze) acting on the orders of Gullit,
intentionally shot and killed four white nuns. The Trial Chamber finds that none of the
civilians in the above instances were taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of
death.

---- End of Page 309 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T OL 18 May 2012

38Moz
807. The Trial Chamber further finds, based on the reliable and credible evidence of
Alimamy Bobson Sesay as corroborated by Witnesses TF 1-021; TF1-083; Corinne DuH
and Exhibit P—328 that (x) on 22 January 1999 at Rogbalan Mosque in Kissy, rebels
including members of the AFRC, RUF, STP and Liberian fighters under the command of
Gullit, Five-Five, Rambo Red Goat and Bajehjeh, intentionally killed over 60 civilians who
had taken refuge in the mosque, on suspicion that they were harbouring ECOMOG forces.
The Trial Chamber also finds that none of the civilians in this instance was taking an active
part in the hostilities at the time of death.
808. Further the Trial Chamber takes note of evidence relating to comments by rebel
commander Gullit inciting the rebel forces to "burn all the houses and kill all the remaining
civilians" in Kissy, all of whom he perceived to have "betrayed the AFRC/RUF". The Trial
Chamber particularly takes note of the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians including
Catholic nuns, women and children seeking refuge in places of worship like the Rogbalan
Mosque. The Trial Chamber also takes particular note of the public or ritualistic execution
of the civilians often by gruesome means as hacking by axe or machete, and the declaration
of "Operation No Living Thing" as means by which the rebels terrified the civilian
population. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the perpetrators wilfully made the
victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose of the murders in Kissy was to
instil terror in the civilian population.
(iii) Unlawful killing of civilians in Fourah Bay in late J anuary 1999
809. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in the second week of January, ECOMOG
forces dislodged the rebel forces from State House and the latter retreated to Eastern Police
where they stopped to wait for reinforcement that had arrived and was waiting at Allen
Town.2O95 While there, the rebel troops ambushed and captured a Government delegation
consisting of one Doctor Daboe and two Ministers. The rebels sent the captives to Ferry
Junction where Gullit was situated. Gullit ordered the summary execution of the three
Government officials saying "they were collaborators and they were the people who fought
2095 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008 pp. 8322-8324.

---- End of Page 310 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 310 QA 18 May 2012

$$14 03
against us that led us to go into the bush". Bobson Sesay testified that the three Govemment
officials were executed at Ferry Junction and their bodies displayed there.2O%
810. Bobson Sesay further testified that sometime after the third week of January 1999,
when the rebel troops had been reinforced by a group of 50 SLAs and RUF members led by
Rambo Red Goat and had recaptured State House,2O97 they heard on BBC radio that Sam
Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) had rejected a ceasefire and peace talks with the Govemment.
Thereafter, Mosquito called Gullit on the radio set, and after waming the latter that the
Government was "just trying to reorganise themselves to flush us out of Freetown",
Mosquito instructed Gullit "to kill civilians and bum down strategic areas so that there
would be no govemment and there would be no one for the govemment to rule".2O98 After
this message, Gullit ordered his senior commanders to distribute fuel to the forces in
Freetown, who started buming buildings as they withdrew from State House where
Ecoivioo had attacked t1tam?"°9
811. Bobson Sesay was with the advance team of the rebels during the withdrawal that
moved from State House to Eastern Police and then Mountain Cut.2mO Gullit, Five-Five, and
Bazzy met them near Savage Squarezml and told them that civilians had challenged them by
killing an AFRC fighter in Fourah Bay.2 102 ln response, Gullit ordered Sesay and some other
men, including the witness, Bazzy and Five-Five, to bum down Fourah Bay and kill the
people there.2m3 Bobson Sesay, who participated in this operation, stated that on arrival at
Fourah Bay the rebels bumt a lot of houses and killed a lot of civilians by either buming
them alive inside of their homes, or by forcing them outside of their homes and killing
them.2m4 Explaining how the rebels attempted to burn all of the houses down and kill all of
the civilians in Fourah Bay, the witness stated, "Whenever we went on such a mission we
would always make sure that nobody escapes and even there we did not allow anybody to
esca e .... we would not `ust set fire to a house and move. We will stand there until we see
P J
2096 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008 pp. 8326.
2097 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008 pp. 8327-8328.
2098 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328-8329.
2099 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8330-8331.
2100 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8332.
2101 Witness TF1-104 testified that Fourah Bay is an area within Kissy, around Savage Square. See Exhibit P-
212B (confidential), p. 20732.
M2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8332-8333.
2103 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8333-8334.

---- End of Page 311 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gk 18 May 2012 g
t

381404
that everything was burnt to the ground".2lO5 The witness told court that the whole team
including Gullit, Bazzy and Five-Five participated in the Fourah Bay operation, in
vengeance for the death of one of the rebels.2m6
812. The Trial Chamber also considered Exhibit P-077. In the context of describing
arbitrary attacks by the retreating rebels against civilians in Freetown in January 1999,
Exhibit P-077 referred to an incident around 21 January 1999 at Fourah Bay Road where
three children were executed and the limbs of their three sisters were amputated or
mutilated.2lO7
Findings
813. The Trial Chamber further finds, based on the reliable and credible evidence of
Alimamy Bobson Sesay (i) that in the second week of January 1999, three civilian
Government officials including Dr Daboe and two Ministers, were intentionally killed at
Ferry Junction on the orders of Gullit as punishment for being "collaborators" of the
Government; and (ii) that in the third week of January 1999, rebels comprising members of
the AFRC, RUF, STF and other Liberian fighters acting on the orders of Commanders
Gullit, Bazzy and Five—Five intentionally killed an unknown number of civilian in Fourah
Bay area by either burning them alive inside of their homes, or by forcing them outside of
their homes and killing them, in revenge for an AFRC fighter that had been killed in the
area. The Trial Chamber further finds based on the documentary evidence in Exhibit P-077
(iii) that around 21 January 1999 at Fourah Bay Road, retreating rebels intentionally killed
three civilian children. The Trial Chamber also finds that none of the civilians in the above
instances was taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of death.
814. Further the Trial Chamber finds based on the above evidence that the civilian killings
in Fourah Bay area were part of the reprisal killings by the rebel forces as they fled
Freetown. In this regard, the Trial Chamber takes note of comments by rebel commanders
that the captured Government officials were "collaborators" who deserved to die and that the
civilians of Fourah Bay also deserved to die for killing an AFRC fighter. The Trial Chamber
gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8333-8334.
MOS Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8334,
2‘°*‘A1imamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8334.
ZW Exhibit P-077 (confidential), p. 9292.

---- End of Page 312 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T GL; 18 May 2012

articularl takes note of the ublic dis la of the bodies of the three Government officials
P Y P P Y
at Ferry Junction and the random bumings and amputations that accompanied the civilian
killings, as means by which the rebels terrified the civilian population. The Trial Chamber
finds, based on the above oral and documentary evidence that the perpetrators wilfully made
the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose of the murders in Fourah
Bay was to instil terror in the civilian population.
(iv) Unlawful killing of civilians in Calaba Town in the third week of January
1999
815. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that after the rebel troops had withdrawn from
Rogbalan Mosque and killed the nuns, Gullit told them that he had received information that
the Guinean ECOMOG forces were moving from Kambia to Waterloo in pursuit of the
rebels. Consequently, Gullit ordered the rebel troops to withdraw from PWD to Allen Town
in order to esca e the advancin ECOMOG forces and "to burn as man buildin s and
P 8 Y 8
capture as many civilians as possible along the way in order to force the Government to
recognise them".21O8 Bobson Sesay explained that en route, the rebel forces21O9 went through
Kissy Mess Mess, the Porty Market area, Brewery, Calaba Town and Allen Town, engaging
ECOMOG forces, burning buildings, amputating and/or capturing many civilians as they
went.211O
816. On this initial retreat from Kissy, Bobson Sesay testified that they passed through
Calaba Town without stopping because there was an attack around the area, and then
stopped in the hills of Allen Town.2111 Although there were civilians in the hills of Calaba
Town when the fighters went through, Gullit ordered the rebel troops to advance at once to
Allen Town.2112
817. Describing the rebel withdrawal at this time, Bobson Sesay told the Court, "When
we were moving we were like wounded lions, because the way we withdrew we were so
21118 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8340.
21119 The witness explains that by this time, the initial rebel forces comprising members of the AFRC/RUF/STF
and Liberian fighters were reinforced by SLA and RUF members who had come with Rambo Red Goat and
some of the former prisoners that had been freed by the rebels from Pademba Road Prison. Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8340-8341.
2"° Alimamy BODSOII Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8368-8369.
2111 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8370.
2112 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8371.

---- End of Page 313 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / Qu 18 May 2012 M

desperate that we were burning along the way whilst we were coming. Taking civilians from
out of their houses, those that we saw were not fit enough we would execute them and we
advanced because it was a mass withdrawal".2113 Bobson Sesay testified that they captured
many civilians as they withdrew from Freetown, including men, women and children and
guarded them well so they could not escape, while executing those that were not fit enough
to move with the rebel troops.2114 When asked whether the houses they bumt had people in
them, he testified that "Some were empty, some had people in them, but we were moving.
Because the brigade was very long, so while the fighting force was ahead we would attack
and burn and the other fighting forces on the back would do the same. Some would capture
civilians and other would be executing them whilst we would be advancing and withdrawing
from the area".2115 Bobson Sesay fi1r‘ther testified that when they set fire to a house with
people inside, that the "people were screaming and they died".2116
818. Bobson Sesay told the Court that the retreating rebel forces met resistance from
ECOMOG at Calaba Town and quickly proceeded to Allen Town. However, once they
arrived at Allen Town, Gullit ordered Hassan Papa Bangura to organise fighters to go back
to Cabala Town to attack the ECOMOG forces and to ensure that "anywhere civilians were
and houses were they should burn down the area so that Freetown becomes
ungovernable".2117
819. Bobson Sesay testified that a team of more than 200 fighters, including members of
the RUF, AFRC, STP and former NPFL fighters led by Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb
Blast), Rambo Red Goat, Med Bejehjeh and the witness, attacked Calaba Town but did not
see any ECOMOG forces there.2118 lnstead the rebel fighters set about burning buildings
and killing civilians as ordered by Gullit. They shot and killed most of the civilians, but
some of them were hacked to death in order to preserve bullets, and some burned to death
2113 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8369.
2114Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8346-8347, 8370. The witness stated that the civilians
captured from Freetown, and in the course of the rebel withdrawal from Freetown, were referred to by the code
name "family members"and were closely guarded by the whole brigade so that none escaped. These civilians
were also used by the brigade to carry "loads" of food and ammunition as well as cook for the brigade. Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8350, 8371.
2115 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8370.
2116 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8370.
21 17 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8371.
21 18 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8371-8372.

---- End of Page 314 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /2 Gil}, 18 May 2012

inside their homes, which had been set on fire.2119 Bobson Sesay testified that the rebel
troops killed an unknown number of civilians and that "We all killed, let me tell you that. l
m self 1 killed. Other men killed".2120 After this mission ended the a ain withdrew to
Y Y E
Allen Town.2121
820. The Trial Chamber admitted in evidence the transcript of testimony of Prosecution
Witness TF1—029 given in the RUF trial.2122 ln her prior testimony, Witness TF1—029
testified that after she and 50 other civilians were captured in Wellington by RUF and AFRC
fighters including the SLA soldier Major Arif on 22 January 1999, they all travelled en
masse together to Calaba Town, where they stayed for two weeks.2123 On the way from
Wellington to Calaba Town TF1—029 saw the rebels buming houses and killing civilians.2124
During the two weeks that TF1—029 stayed in Calaba Town she also testified that the rebels
cut off the head of an ECOMOG fighter, and that an AFRC fighter named Colonel Tito shot
and killed one nun and shot two other nuns in their hands.2125 The body of the dead nun was
buried near the kola tree.2126
821. While TF1—029 testified consistently conceming this event in both the RUF trial and
this trial, the Defence did question TF1—029 regarding Prosecution interview notes from 24
November 2003 wherein she purportedly stated that all three nuns were killed by Colonel
Tito. TF1—029 testified that the interviewer recorded her words incorrectly and that only one
nun had died and the other two were injured.2127
822. Osman Jalloh testified that he was in Calaba Town in January 1999.2128 J alloh further
told the Court that in the second or third week of January 1999, rebels travelled through
Calaba Town into the hills with loads on their heads, but wamed the residents of Calaba
2* "’ Arinnnny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 Apni 2008, p. 8372-8373.
2120 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8371—8372.
2121 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8372.
2122 Witness TF1—029 testified in the RUF trial. The transcript of her evidence was admitted as Exhibit P—206
("prior testimony") under Rule 92bis. In the present trial, the witness was cross—examined. See Witness TF1—029
Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18969-18983.
2123 Exhibit P—206, "TF1—029, RUF Transcript 28 November 2005", pp. 19415-19418.
2124 Exhibit P—206, "TF1—029, RUF Transcript 28 November 2005", p. 19418.
M5 Exhibit 1>~206, ·‘Tr1~029, RUF Transcript 28 November 2005**, p. 19419.
2126 TF1—029, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18979.
2127 TF1-029, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18978—18979.
2128 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17675.

---- End of Page 315 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T i Gu 18 May 2012

Town that they would be back to "disturb" them.2l29 J alloh had heard that ECOMOG had
driven these rebels from Freetown, Wellington and Kissy.213O Jalloh testified that two to
three hours after the rebels had gone into the hills he heard gunshots and went to the
compound of his neighbour, Mr Jalloh, to hide.213l The witness and ten others, including
elderly people and suckling children, hid in a little tin shack for six days, until an aimed man
wearing civilian clothes and a goat horn on his head knocked on the door asking for
money.2l32
823. The man searched the witness's pockets and took 2,000 Leones that he found
there.2133 When the aimed man did not find any money on the other civilians he put them
back into the tin shack, set the straw mattress inside on fire, and left them there for about
five minutes before allowing them to come out.2l34 The aimed man then said that even
though the other civilians did not have money, they should give him something else if they
did not want to be burnt a1ive.2l35 Otick, the owner of the compound, told the aimed man
that he would give him 86 bags of 1ice.2136 The aimed man opened the compound door and
about 100 rebels dressed in civilian clothes came into the compound, taking the bags of
1ice.2l37 The rebels left and the civilians remained in the compound.2138
824. The following day a tall rebel came to the house and took the civilians to Sayinoh
Junction, which was between Calaba Town and We11ington.2139 The rebel said that it was
"for their safety because if another group of rebels came the civilians would have nothing to
ive them, and would be ki11ed".2l40 J alloh testified that as the walked from Calaba Town
E Y
to Sayinoh Junction he saw "a lot of corpses lying by the road".2l4l J alloh further testified
that he could not identify the corpses lying in the street, but that he assumed that they were
mg Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17682.
mo Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17678, 17682.
ml Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17683.
lm Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17684—17690.
3*33 osman .1311011, Transcript 1 october 2008,p. 17688.
M4 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17691.
mj Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17692.
M6 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17693.
M7 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17693—17694.
mg Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17695.
mi) Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17695—17698.
2140 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17696.
fm Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17698.

---- End of Page 316 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T [ CN 18 May 2012

civilians because they were wearing civilian clothing and not military uniforms.2l42 There
were old people, women and children among the corpses.2l43 Jalloh estimated that there
were approximately 100 corpses over a 200 yard stretch of road, and testified that there were
so man that the had to walk in a "zi za " to avoid ste in on them.2l44 The onl lace he
Y Y 3 3 PP 3 Y P
stopped seeing corpses was "the culvert" between Calaba Town and Wellington.2l45
825. Jalloh testified that when they arrived at Sayinoh Junction, there were over 100
armed rebels there dressed in civilian clothes who spoke in bad Krio and sitting on the floor
of one Mr Okabia's house.2 M6 The Commander was the only person seated in the house on a
chair.2l47 Children around the age of 10 years old were 50 yards away from the house
packing stones on the highway to prevent ECOMOG from coming through.2 148 The rebels
ordered the captives to go to the top floor of the two story house, and to wam the rebels
whenever the ECOMOG helicopter referred to by the rebels as the Alpha Jet or "Wowo
Boy", was going to come to attack them. The rebels wamed the civilians that if they failed to
wam the rebels as ordered, they would punish the civilians by amputating their hands.2l49
Jalloh told the court that when the Alpha Jet came and shot at them, the rebels ran outside
and 1r1r1.2*5"
826. When the Alpha Jet had left, the rebels started amputating the hands of civilians.
Otick refused to place his hand on the mortar two times, and the rebel then chopped him two
times in the head with a cutlass.2l5l Jalloh testified that blood spilled out all over and that
Otick fell to the ground. Jalloh testified that the rebels told him to place his hands on the
mortar block and they chopped them both off, one at a time.2l52 The rebels then told J alloh
"to tell Pa Kabbah and the ECOMOG that if they came to meet the fighters that they would
be chopped in the same way".2l53 Jalloh left the house and walked until he came upon
2*42 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17699—17700.
2143 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17701.
M4 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17701.
2*42 ocrrrarr Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17702.
M6 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17703—17705.
M7 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17705.
mg Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17707—17708.
2149 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17709—17710.
mo Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 1771 1.
2*2* Osman Jalloh, rrarrccrrpt 1 October 2008,p. 17717.
2*22 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17718.
M3 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17719.

---- End of Page 317 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 0; 18 May 2012

ECOMOG soldiers who took him to Connaught Hospital.2154 J alloh saw Otick again at the
Connaught Hospital, and testified that Otick died there three days later.2155
827. At Connaught Hospital J alloh was also told that Ya Sampa, who was his neighbour
and who had been with him at the house when his hands were amputated, had been
"chopped up" and subsequently died.2156 However he did not see her corpse, nor did the
others that made their way to the hospital from the scene of the criminal event.2157 Jalloh
testified that he believed that his hand was amputated on 28 January 1999 because this was
the date he was told it was when he was admitted to Connaught Hospital.2158
828. Paul Conteh2159 testified that on 19 January 1999 he was in Calaba Town.21611 At this
time the fighting between ECOMOG and the "rebels" was "so immense" that he decided to
flee to Jui by way of Allen Town.2161 On the main road to Allen Town he was forced to tum
back two days later because the ECOMOG were "shedding bombs" and there were civilians
moving toward Allen Town.21°2 On his way back to Calaba Town, as he was passing
through Thomas Place, he saw approximately 40 civilian corpses dressed in "plain
cloth".2163 He testified however, that he did not know how they had died.2164
829. In his prior testimony, Prosecution Witness TF l-0982165 testified that on 6 January
1999 he was near the East End Police and Mountain Cut area of Freetown when the rebels
attacked.2166 During this time he observed civilians, Kamajors, and ECOMOG soldiers
coming fiom Calaba Town to the East End Police area.2167 Two days later, Witness TF 1-098
2154 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17719-17721.
2155 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17718.
21511 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17726.
2157 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17726.
**5* Osman Jaucir, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17734.
2159 Paul Conteh gave evidence concerning murders in Calaba Town in the AFRC trial, which was admitted as
prior testimony under Rule 92bis. Paul Conteh, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19314. He was cross-examined
by the Defence concerning this testimony in this trial.
2160 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 20814.
21111 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 20815.
2162 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 20816.
2163 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 20816.
21114 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 20816.
21115 Witness TF1-098 gave evidence concerning murders in Calaba Town in the AF RC trial, which was admitted
as prior testimony under Rule 92bis. Witness TF1-098, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19147. He was cross-
examined by the Defence concerning this testimony in this trial.
**°° Exhibit P-210, *·TF1-098, Aruc Transcript 5 April 2005**, p. 20682.
**6* Exhibit P-210, *·rr1-098, Arno rrarrccript 5 April 2005**, p. 20682.

---- End of Page 318 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T % OA 18 May 2012 @
\

3 6411
left to attempt to find his mother in Calaba Town.2l68 From Ferry Junction he used the Old
Road to travel to Calaba Town, and testified that he saw many corpses of men, women and
children along the way.2l69 After locating her there, he returned back to the East End Police
area using the New Road, and testified that he again saw many corpses of civilians.2l7O A
Findings
830. The Trial Chamber finds the above first—hand evidence credible and reliable. While
Bobson Sesay participated in the Calaba Town attack, the other witnesses were civilian
victims of the attack and gave first—hand accounts of their experiences. Based on the above
evidence the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence proves that around l8 to 22 January
l999, on the orders of commanders Gullit, Bazzy and Five—Five, members of the RUF,
AFRC, STF and former NPF L fighters led by Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast),
Rambo Red Goat, Med Bejehjeh and the witness, intentionally massacred hundreds of
civilians at Calaba Town by shooting, burning or hacking them to death including (i) a
civilian nun who was intentionally shot dead by an AF RC commander called Tito, (ii) Otick
and Ya Sampa who were civilians who were intentionally hacked to death with machetes
and (iii) an ECOMOG soldier who was hors de combat was intentionally beheaded. The
Trial Chamber finds that none of the victims in the above instances was taking an active part
in the hostilities at the time of death.
831. Further the Trial Chamber is satisfied based on the above evidence that the civilian
killings in Calaba Town were in reprisal for the defeat that the retreating Junta forces had
suffered in Freetown. In this regard, the Trial Chamber takes note of the large numbers of
Junta forces that participated in this attack, the mass abduction of civilians by the retreating
rebel forces, the orders issued by rebel commanders Gullit "to burn as many buildings and
capture as many civilians as possible along the way in order to force the Government to
recognise them" and the comments by the rebels as they amputated Osman Jalloh and sent
him "to tell Pa Kabbah and the ECOMOG that if they came to meet the fighters that they
would be chopped in the same way". The Trial Chamber also takes note of the public
display of the hundreds of corpses of men, women and children left strewn along the
highway in the area. The Chamber finds that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the
M8 Exhibit P—2 10, "TFl—098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20683.
M9 Exhibit P—2l0, "TF 1-098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20685.

---- End of Page 319 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T GX 18 May 2012

$$1-1 12
object of such violence and the primary purpose of the murders committed in Calaba Town
was to instil terror in the civilian population.
(v) Unlawful killing of civilians in Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill areas
832. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that around the second week of January 1999, while
the rebel forces still occupied State House, Gullit received information that ECOMOG
forces were poised in Kingtom, a suburb of Freetown, and were preparing to attack the rebel
forces at State House. Gullit remarked that "it was the civilians who went and called on the
ECOMOG to go and base in Kingtom".2*7* Consequently, Gullit declared the area from
Siaka Stevens Street, Kingtom Road, the Cotton Tree Area through to Pademba Road area,
up to Tower Hill, a "killing zone wherein anybody who came around that area was
considered an enemy and that person should die".2*72 Gullit ordered his commanders
including Basky to go to Kingtom "to repel the ECOMOG forces and put the situation under
control". Bobson Sesay testified that he was part of the group of l50 rebels comprising
members of the AFRC/RUF/STF and Liberian fighters that attacked Kingtom on Gullit's
orders.2*73 Sesay further testified that in Kingtom, the rebels attacked ECOMOG but also
killed many civilians and burnt buildings before withdrawing back to State House.2*74 Sesay
told the Court that the civilians in Kingtom were killed "because they had gone and called
ECOMOG to base in there", and that they were either pulled out of their houses and shot to
death or burnt alive in their homes.2*75
833. Bobson Sesay testified that other Commanders who killed civilians in this "killing
zone" during the second week of January l999 included Junior Lion, who told the witness
that "he went on patrol in the Tower Hill area and had captured and executed some
civilians",2*76 and "Captain Blood"2*77 who captured and beheaded seven young men in
Guard Street for "collaborating with the Nigerians".2*78 Bobson Sesay also testified that
while the rebel troops were temporarily based for two days at Allen Town awaiting further
2*70 Exhibit P—2l0, "TFl-098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20685.
2*7* Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8294.
2*72 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8296-8297.
2*73 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8295,8298.
2*74 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8295-8298.
2*75 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8295-8296.
2*76 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8297.
2*77 The Witness explained at p. 8299 that Captain Blood was assigned to commander Bazzy.

---- End of Page 320 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03·0l-T /( Gu 18 May 20l2 W

orders from Gullit, they would go out into the surrounding areas looking for food, and that
an civilians the found on the wa were killed because the rebels "did not want an civilian
Y Y Y Y
in that area for them to go and tell ECOMOG that we were based around that area. So when
we met them we killed them".2l79
834. Akiatu Tholley testified that she was at home with her family in Wellington on 5
January 1999 when she heard that rebels had attacked Wellingtonmo She and her family
were hiding inside their house when a group of anned rebels dressed in black T·shirts2l8l
and black jeans with bandanas or mufflers on their headszm forced their way into the
witness's house. Three of these men dragged Tholley out of the house while kicking and
whipping her with belts. The rebels also amputated the hand of a three·year·old child they
found hiding in the witness's house and threatened to amputate the witness's mother.2l83 The
witness stated that when the rebels dragged her outside, she "saw rebels killing and burning
down houses".m4 However, she did not specify who she saw killed in Wellington.
835. Tholley testified that rebels came for a second time to her house at night and wanted
to rape her, but her mother pleaded with them.2l85 The rebels stayed with their wives at
Tholley's house for two days.2l86 An STP rebel named J ameszm captured the witness and
took her and many other civilian captives (including men and women) from Wellington to
Allen Town. The witness and other civilian male and female captives were forced by the
rebels to cany ammunition.2l88 Although Tholley's condition was not feeling well from the
beatings she had suffered, she forced herself to cany the ammunition because she "had seen
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8299.
mt) Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8373.
mo Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19172-19173.
ml Tholley stated that the T-shirts had the inscription "2-pac"(or "Tupac") on them. Akiatu Tholley, Transcript
23 October 2008, p. 19174.
M2 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19194.
2183 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19175.
M4 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19175; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp.
19193-19194.
M5 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19193—19195.
M6 The witness explained in cross-examination that in fact the rebels visited her house three times, on 5, 6 and 7
January 1999 and that on the third time it was her mother that invited one of the rebel commanders with his two
bodyguards to come and stay at their house. Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19240—19241.
gm Tholley testified that James told her he was a former member of ULIMO and that he was an STP, and had
fought in Liberia. Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19236-19237, 19272.
2188 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19176—19178.

---- End of Page 321 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gm 18 May 2012

eo le killed for refusin to ca loads".21119 The witness did not however, s ecif where
P P g ITY P Y
she saw people killed in this way. Tholley iiirther testified that as the group moved from
Wellington to Allen Town she saw the rebels killing people, buming down houses,
am utatin eo le, and lootin eo le's ro ert .2190
P g P P g P P P P Y
836. The witness further testified that when they reached Allen Town, she and a group of
the civilians decided to drop the boxes of ammunition because they were tired of carrying
them.2191 Rebels (referred to by the witness as "James's boys") stripped the witness and her
companions naked and pushed them to the ground, threatening to hack them to death for
refusing to carry the loads of ammunition.9199 At that moment, fighter jets came and flew
over them, and everybody ran to hide.2193 Tholley hid in the house of a woman named
Fatmata who was one of J ames's wives. Fatmata gave the witness clothes to wear. 2194 James
found Tholley in Fatmata's house, and took her to Mammy Dumbuya's church.9195 In the
church Tholley saw the beating and raping of many "small girls" who were "not even adult"
and the killing of some of them.2196 Tholley testified that the fighters were killing the girls
who refused to be raped by stabbing them with their bayonets.2197
837. Tholley further testified that while she was in the church, James raped her and she
became unconscious.21911 Tholley told the Court that she herself was a virgin and "had not
et be n her menses" at the time of ca ture.2199 She re ained consciousness in a small hut
Y gu P g
in "a place after Allen Town" where an old woman was tending to Tholley's wounds with
medicine in order to sto her bleedin .2200 The old woman told Tholle that some eo le
P g Y P P
had brought the witness to her for treatment.2291 Later, the rebel called James came to the hut
21119 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19179.
2199 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19179.
2191 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19180.
2199 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19180-19181.
2199 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19181. 1
2194 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19181-19182.
2195 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19182.
2196 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19182.
2197 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19183.
2*1* Akram Tholley, rrarrscrrpr 23 October 2008, p. 19184.
2199 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19183; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p.
19224.
2299 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19184-19185.
22191 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19185.

---- End of Page 322 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL; 18 May 2012 %
\. /

?;i’>l-I 15
and killed the old woman by shooting her in the forehead as Tholley was pleading to him
stop,2202 and then forcefully took Tholley with him on the way to Waterloo.2203
838. In cross—examination the Defence questioned Tholley as to inconsistencies between
her pre—tria1 statements and her testimony concerning how many times she had been forced
by the fighters to eat human hearts. In particular, in 2003 she had told the Prosecution that
James had forced her to eat the heart of the old woman in the hut after he had killed her.2204
Tholley insisted on cross—examination that she had not been forced to eat the heart of the old
woman, but she did not explain the discrepancy. The witness was also confronted with her
prior statement where she told the OTP investigators that in her presence, rebels killed her
uncle and aunt and raped her cousin to death in the jungle.2205 The witness made no mention
of these alleged murders in her evidence in—chief. While admitting that she gave the said
statement to the OTP investigators, the witness testified that the deaths of her uncle, aunt
and cousin did not in fact take place "in her presence" and that instead it was her mother
who had told her about the alleged deaths.2200
Findings
839. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Akiatu Tholley relating to the deaths she
witnessed in Wellington too general and unreliable. Consequently, The Trial Chamber has
not relied on her evidence in relation to the killings that took place in Wellington. The Trial
Chamber however, finds her testimony credible in relation to (i) the killing of civilians she
saw on the way from Wellington to Allen Town; (ii) the young girls she saw killed in a
church for resisting rape and (iii) the death of the old woman shot in the forehead by a rebel
called James. The Trial Chamber finds on the basis of the above evidence that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF/STP
intentionally killed an unknown number of civilians in the vicinity of Wellington and Allen
Town in January 1999.
840. The Trial Chamber further finds the first—hand evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay
who took part in the rebel attacks, credible. That evidence proves that in the second and third
2202 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19230.
2203 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19185.
2204 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19230—19233.
2205 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19250—19253.
2200 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19252.

---- End of Page 323 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T X qu 18 May 2012 M

38m la
weeks of` January l999, on the orders of Gullit, (i) rebels comprising members of the
AFRC/RUF/STF and Liberian fighters intentionally killed an unknown number of` civilians
suspected of` collaborating with ECOMOG forces, in Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill,
an area referred to by the perpetrators as a "killing zone;" (ii) a rebel commander called
Junior Lion intentionally executed several civilians in Tower Hill and, (iii) a rebel called
"Captain Blood" intentionally beheaded seven young civilian men suspected of`
collaborating with ECOMOG, in Guard Street. The Trial Chamber finds on the basis of` the
above evidence that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in the second
and third weeks of` January 1999, members of` the AFRC/RUF/STF and Liberian fighters
intentionally killed an unknown number of` civilians in Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower hill
areas.
84].. Further the Trial Chamber is satisfied based on the above evidence that the civilian
killings in Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill, were in reprisal f`or the humiliating defeat
suffered by the retreating Junta forces at the hands of` the ECOMOG troops. In this regard,
the Trial Chamber takes note of` the large number of` rebels that participated in this attack,
the orders issued by rebel commander Gullit declaring this particular area a "killing zone
wherein anybody who came around that area was considered an enemy and that person
should die" because in his view, the civilians "had gone and called ECOMOG to base
there". The Trial Chamber also notes that the civilian killings were often coupled with
rampant amputations and burning of` buildings in these areas as part of` a deliberate plan to
terrorise the civilians whom the Junta forces perceived to support their enemies including
the Government, ECOMOG and the Kamajors. The Trial Chamber finds that the
perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of` such violence and the primary purpose
of the murders in Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill, was to instil terror in the civilian
population.
(vi) Unlawful killing of` civilians in Tumbo
842. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of` Prosecution Witness Ibrahim Wai
in relation to the unlawful killings alleged to have taken place during this time period in
Tumbo. Ibrahim Wai was a fisherman living in Tumbo in December 1998.2207 He testified
that on 23 December 1998, at 3:00a.m. in the moming, AFRC and RUF soldiers attacked
2207 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18559.

---- End of Page 324 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL] 18 May 2012 %
r

315141 ir
Tumbo by buming houses and killing people.221111 The attack was led by a man dressed in full
combat uniform called Captain Mohamed, also known as "Captain Blood",22119 who had
been a fiiend of the witness.22111 During the attack Wai hid in the hills, and then retumed to
Tumbo the next moming.2211 As he walked toward Krio Town he saw the three dead bodies
of Pa Pratt's children lying next to a bumt down house.2212 One of the dead children was
named Elcu and the other two were twins.2213 I-Ie also testified that the rebels killed Bai
Usu's 10—year—old son, whose head had been "shattered, probably by a bullet;"2214 a man
named Joseph who had been shot,2215 and one other man that he did not identify,2216 and that
he saw their corpses. Wai testified that Captain Blood subsequently met him again in Kissy
and amputated Wai's hand, telling him to "go to Pa Kabbah who had brought many hands
for the civilians".2217
Findings
843. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of` Ibrahim Wai credible. Although his
evidence relating to the deaths in Tumbo is circumstantial in that he only saw the dead
bodies of the six civilians when he came out of hiding and did not see the killers, the fact
that AFRC and RUF rebels had attacked Tumbo the previous night looting, shooting and
buming a lot of houses, points to one reasonable conclusion that these rebels were the cause
of death of the three children of Pa Pratt as well as the death of three other civilians
including Bai Usu's son. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that AFRC/RUF fighters led by Commander Mohammed
a.k.a. Captain Blood, intentionally killed six civilians including a 10 year—old boy, in Tumbo
on 23 December 1998.
844. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the killings in Tumbo or Tombo were part of the
campaign of reprisal and terror waged by the retreating Junta forces against the civilians of
2208 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18560.
2209 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18586-18588, 18609.
2210 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18561; Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18577.
2211 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18563.
2212 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18565; Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18620.
2213 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18567.
2214 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18565—18566; Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.
2 .
i§?Ib)rahim Wai, Transcripts 16 October 2008, pp. 18565—18566; Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18578, 18620.
2216 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18567.

---- End of Page 325 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T gu 18 May 2012 M

*38 #18
Freetown and the Westem Area. In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that the widespread
bumings, amputations and killings that occurred in Tumbo as the rebels advanced towards
_ Freetown, the fact that these atrocities involved innocent civilians including children, and
that one child's head was shattered by a bullet. The Trial Chamber also notes the rebel
instructions to amputees to "go to Pa Kabbah who had brought many hands for the
civilia.ns", as indicative of the reprisals that civilians were subjected to for supposedly
supporting President Kabbah's govemment or ECOMOG. Accordingly the Trial Chamber
finds that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence and the
primary purpose of the murders in Tumbo was to instil terror in the civilian population.
(vii) Unlawful killing of civilians in Waterloo
845. The Trial Chamber has considered the oral evidence of Prosecution Witnesses TF 1-
028 and TF 1-026, Witness Patrick Sheriff as well as documentary evidence contained in
Prosecution Exhibits P-308, P-341A, and P-341B admitted pursuant to Rule 92bis, in
relation to the unlawful killings alleged to have taken place at Waterloo by rebels during
their advance towards, and withdrawal from, Freetown between late December 1998 and
early January 1999. 1
846. Exhibit P-308 is a UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) S/ 1999/20, dated 7
January 1999. It reported that on 22 December 1998, rebels in the Westem area attacked
Waterloo, resulting in heavy casualties among the civilian population,2218 and the looting
and burning of property, and the displacement of around 12,000 persons that fled from
Waterloo to Freetown.2219
847. Exhibits 341A and 341B are an audio clip and its accompanying transcript,
respectively, of a BBC "Focus on Africa" interview that took place on 22 December 1998
between Kwabena Mensah, a BBC reporter and Abubakar Sesay, a forest guard for the
Waterloo district.222O In the interview Mensah reported that an ECOMOG commander had
2217 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18593-18594.
mg Exhibit P-308, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999", p. 21473.
2219 Exhibit P-308, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999", p. 21477.
22211 Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December l998"; Exhibit P-34lB, "BBC Focus on Arrica
Transcript, 22 December 1998".

---- End of Page 326 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GJ" 18 May 2012 M

confirmed that the RUF had attacked Waterloo in the early hours of the morningml
Abubakar Sesay explained to Mensah that "collaborators of the AF RC and RUF juntas in an
extension of Waterloo called Lumpa had secretly brought approximately 50 fighters into
their homes two nights previously".m2 At 3:00a.m. the rebels began their attack, which
i lasted for two hours until ECOMOG, who had initially retreated, returned with ammo tanks
and drove them out.2223 Sesay stated that during the two-hour attack there was a lot of
shooting and that the rebels burnt some houses and killed some civilians, including Mr
W`henzle, the Secretary-General of the YWCA.2224 Sesay reported that the rebels were
fighting because they wanted their leader released and stated that "they are just bandits,
going around villages, stealing people's goods, and...killing innocent people .... Their target
is...civilian targets — that's what they do".m5 Sesay did not witness the attack, as he was in
a different section of Waterloo.2226
848. Prosecution Witness TF 1-028 testified that she was captured in Karina, Bombali
District by AF RC and RUF fighters around the time of the ECOMOG Intervention in
Freetown.2227 She lived in captivity in Rosos for six months and then was moved to a
location called Tufayim or Eddie Town.2228 The witness testified that Commanders at Eddie
Town included Gullit, Five—F ive, Woyoh, Col. Eddie, FAT and Leather Boot, and that
Commanders Tito, Alabama, and RUF Mohammed all brought troops to reinforce the ones
in Eddie Town. The witness stated that RUF Superman also sent troops and ammunition
from Kurubonla to reinforce the rebel troops at Eddie Town, as they prepared to invade
Freetown.2229 The witness told the Trial Chamber that the RUF group that came from
Kurubonla were led by Mohammed Bajehjeh, and comprised about 100 men, some of whom
ml Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Aiiica Clip, 22 December 1998"; Exhibit P—341B, "BBC Focus on Afiica
Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590.
2222 Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Aiiica Clip, 22 December 1998"; Exhibit P~341B, "BBC Focus on Afiica
Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590.
2223 Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Aiiica Clip, 22 December 1998"; Exhibit P~342B, "BBC Focus on Afiica
Transcript, 22 December 1998", pp. 23590-2359l. .
2224 Exhibit P-341A, "BBC Focus on Aiiica Clip, 22 December 1998"; Exhibit P~342B, "BBC Focus on Africa
Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590.
2225 Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Aiiica Clip, 22 December l998"; Exhibit P~342B, "BBC Focus on Africa
Transcript, 22 December 1998", pp. 23590~23591.
2226 Exhibit P-341A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December 1998"; Exhibit P~342B, "BBC Focus on Aiiica
Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590.
2227 TFl—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9136, 9151, 9163, 9166.
2228 rrr-028, rrarraarrpr 7 May 2008,p. 9201.
Em TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9205-9210.

---- End of Page 327 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T J G}; 18 May 2012
./

were Liberians and were called the "Red Lion" group.223O A week after the arrival of the
reinforcements, the rebel troops left Eddie Town and trekked to Freetown, taking the witness
and other captured civilians with them.223 I
849. On the way to Freetown they passed through Port Loko Road, Freetown Highway,
Four Mile and stopped at Waterloo, where she saw the rebel fighters buming houses and
killing people.2232 She saw the corpses of women and children in civilian clothes lying in the
streets.2233 From Waterloo, the rebel troops moved through Benguema, Tumbo, Grafton,
Calaba Town and then into Freetown.2234
850. Prosecution Witness TF 1-026 was also captured by RUF rebels led by a commander
called CO Rocky2235 on 6 January 1999, from her home in Wellington at the age of 14 years.
She and 50 other civilian captives from her village travelled for several days with the rebels
from Wellington through Calaba Town, Waterloo and then to Makeni.2236 The witness
testified that when the rebel troops and captured civilians arrived in Waterloo, the residents
of Waterloo were frightened of the rebels and started running away. The witness saw the
rebels shooting and killing the civilians as the latter tried to flee.2237 The witness told the
Trial Chamber that the rebels stayed in Waterloo for about one week under the command of
one RUF commander called CO Rambo2238 before moving to Makeni.2239
851. Patrick Sheriff testified that in December 1998 he was living in Lumpa2240 in the
Waterloo Rural District.224l He testified that on 17 December 1998 rebels attacked Lumpa
mo TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9216-9218.
223* TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9220-9223.
2232 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9223-9224.
2233 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9224.
2233 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9224-9226.
2233 Tri-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3847
2233 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3847-3865.
2233 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p.3864.
2233 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p.3865.
2233 TF1—026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p.3865.
mo Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17807-17809. The witness explained that Lumpa and
Waterloo share a common boundary at a bridge where the motor park is located. Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3
October 2008, p. 17870; Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17765-17766. See also the statement of
Abubakar Sesay, who was interviewed by the BBC concerning the attacks on Waterloo and described Lumpa as
an extension of Waterloo. Exhibit P-341A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December 1998;" Exhibit P-341B,
"'BBC Focus on Africa Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590.
22** Patrick sirprrfrg rrarraprrpr 1 October 2008, p. 17765.

---- End of Page 328 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

?>&»m.t
with ns at about 4.00a.m.2242 Sheriff hid in the bush for five da s before bein ca tured
gu Y S P
and whi ed b the rebels. Durin the five da s, the rebels burnt hundreds of civilian homes
PP Y S Y
in Lum a and Waterloo Town, in what a eared to the witness to be a coordinated
P PP
campaign. The witness described the rebel operations stating "When they came they
distributed themselves into various groups, Lumpa, Waterloo and all other villages around,
and they set a time. And at any time they were doing something at a particular place, the
other groups in the other areas were doing similar things in the other places. lt was like
simultaneous exercise".2243 After he was captured by rebels dressed in "black polo shirts
with the inscription "Tupac, All Eyes on Me" and "short trousers", Sheriff witnessed the
rebels shoot and kill three civilian captives who had been told to lie on the ground.2244
Sheriff himself narrowly escaped death but the rebel commander ordered that he be given
150 whip lashes, which the rebels carried out.
852. Sheriff further testified that on 10 January 1999 he was living in Malambay, about
half an hours walk from Lumpa,2245 when he learnt that rebels had burnt down Lumpa
village and Waterloo Town for the second time. The rebels also announced that they would
kill any civilian found hiding in the bush around Lumpa.2246 Sheriff moved back to Lumpa
and was staying at the Mannor Connor section of the village of Lumpa which was under the
control of a rebel commander named Peleto, who was also known as "Friday" because he
was known to go on killing sprees of civilians every Friday of the week around Lumpa.2247
One early Friday morning in February 19992248 Sheriff saw Peleto shoot and kill a man
named Mr Kai who had been reading his Bible and a Limba man who had been eating rice in
a pot.2249 Both victims were close neighbours of Sheriff.2254 Sheriff saw Peleto coming
toward his house and before running into the bush to hide he told an old woman who was
staying there to tlee.2254 She could not run and went to hide in her room instead.2252 Shortly
after leaving the house, Sheriff heard a gunshot, and that evening when he returned to town
2242 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17766.
22*3 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17770.
2244 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17771-17777.
2245 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17804-17806.
2244 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17807-17808.
2247 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17809, 1781 1.
2248 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, p. 1781 1.
2244 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17809, 17812-17813, 17867-17868.
2250 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, p. 17813.
ml Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17810, 17813.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T l! Qls 18 May 2012 Vw

$$5*+11
he found the dead body of the woman in the house lying in a pool of blood.2253 Sheriff had
heard of Peleto before these killings, but was able to identify him at the time because after
he killed Kai and before he killed the Limba man the people in the area were very afraid of
this commander and were yelling "Peleto is coming".2254
Findings
853. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Witnesses TF 1-028 and TF 1-026 credible.
They each spent a long time with the rebel forces in captivity during the rebel invasion of
Freetown and moved with them during the withdrawal from Freetown. Their first hand
evidence of civilians being indiscriminately killed by rebels in Waterloo is corroborated by
the documentary evidence in Exhibits P-308, P-341A, and P-341B. Furthermore, the Trial
Chamber also finds the evidence of Patrick Sheriff who was a victim of rebel attacks on his
village of Lumpa in Waterloo, credible. His evidence relating to the coordination of rebel
attacks in Waterloo is corroborated by the. description provided by Abubakar Sesay in
Exhibits P-341A and P-341B. Based on the above oral and documentary evidence, the Trial
Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that between late
December 1998 and February 1999 rebels, including members of the AFRC/RUF/STF and
Liberian fighters, attacked Waterloo and intentionally killed an unknown number of civilian
men, women, children including (i) Mr VVhenzle, the Secretary-General of the YWCA; (ii) i
Mr Kai, a Limba man and an old woman, who were summarily executed by Commander
Peleto in Lumpa Village in Waterloo. The Trial Chamber finds that none of the victims in
the above incidents were taking an active part in the hostilities.
854. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the evidence of such callous indifference to
human life by the rebels clearly indicates that the killings in Waterloo were part of the
campaign of reprisal and terror waged by the retreating Junta forces against the civilians of
Freetown and the Western Area. In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes the evidence of
Sheriff referring to the fact that the rebels would attack in the early hours of the morning
while civilians were sleeping in their homes, and that Commander Peleto, who used to go on
regular killing ramEnd of Pages "every Friday", was greatly feared by the civilians. The Trial
Chamber also notes the vindictive marmer in which the rebels carried out massive burnings
2252 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17810, 17813.
2253 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17810, 17813—17814, 17868.

---- End of Page 330 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T QL; 18 May 2012

and afterwards lured back civilians who had fled the area, pretending to protect those
civilians, only to harm or kill them. The Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators wiliiilly
made the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose of the murders in
Waterloo was to instil terror in the civilian population. .
(viii) Unlawiiil killing of civilians in Wellington
855. Prosecution Witness TF 1-026, referred to above,2255 told the Trial Chamber that nine
armed RUF rebels attacked her house in Wellington on 6 January 1999.2256 The rebels
ordered the whole family to go outside on the veranda but the witness's sister kept crying
out of fear. The rebels shot TF 1-026's sister to death because they said "she was causing
noise".2257 Witness TF 1-026 iixrther testified that as she was held in captivity by RUF rebels
in Wellington, she saw the rebels amputating a lot of civilians and burning a lot of
houses.2258 The witness heard the rebels tell one man whose hands they amputated to "go
and tell the people that the rebels were coming". The amputated civilian fell down and died
from his wounds.2259 TF 1-026 also saw the rebels set a house on fire in which Mr Wilson, a
crippled teacher, was burnt to death. 2260 The witness also testiHed that she saw the rebels
shoot and kill another civilian man on the way to Calaba Town.2261
856. The Trial Chamber admitted in evidence the transcript of the testimony of
Prosecution Witness TF 1-023 given in another trial.2262 In her prior testimony, Witness TF 1-
023 testified that she was a captive of the AF RC from 22 January 1999 until August
1999.2263 She testified that at one point during this time, on the way to being taken to
2254 Patrrcic sircrrtr, rrcrrccrrpt 8 October 2008, p. 17815.
2255 This witness was captured by RUF rebels led by a commander called CO Rocky on 6 January 1999, from her
home in Wellington at the age of 14 years. She and 50 other civilian captives from her village travelled for
several days with the rebels from Wellington through Calaba Town, Waterloo and then to Makeni.
2256 TFl-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3843.
2257 TFl-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3843.
225* TFl-026, Transcript 14 rcbrtrcry 2008,p. 3844.
2259 TF1—026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3845.
m TFl—026. Transcript 14 rcbrmry 2008, p. 3846.
2261 TFl-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3849.
22°2 Witness TFl-023 testified in the AFRC trial. The transcript of her evidence was admitted as Exhibit P-205A
and P-205B ("prior testimony") under Rule 92bis. In the present trial, the witness gave further evidence. See
Witness TFl-023 Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. l8928—l8967.
2263 Exhibit P-205A, "TFl-023, AFRC Transcript 9 March 2005", pp. 19314-19354 and Exhibit P-205B
(confidential), pp. 19356-19375. See also TFl-023, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18950, 18956.

---- End of Page 331 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JZ 18 May 2012

?>B49—’*1
Waterloo, she heard, but did not see, that the rebels killed some nuns.2264 However, the
Defence confronted Witness TFl—023 with a previous written statement that she gave to
Prosecution investigators wherein she stated that "she had seen the nuns, and then had not
seen them again", and that she "had not seen the rebels commit abuses during the walk to
Waterloo but many civilians and rebels were killed by the Alpha Jets".2265 The witness
confirmed that she had made these statements and that they were truthful.2266
857. Witness Sarah Koroma was living in Loko Town, Wellington with her husband and
six children on 6 Janua 1999.2267 The witness and her famil ran and hid in the bush for a
week, on hearin that rebels armed with ns and knives had attacked Wellin on.2268 The
witness stated that when the rebels arrived, the were dressed in combat uniforms and found
no civilians in Wellington as everybody had run away. The rebels then sent a message
tellin all the civilians to return to their homes and that an one found in the bush thereafter
would be considered an enemy.2269 The witness and her family left the bush to return home
but on the way, the rebels captured them and hacked her husband to death.227O
858. The rebels abducted the witness along with many other civilians. While in captivity,
she saw them hack to death a six- ear—old child whose mother had attem ted to esca e. In
addition, the rebels amputated the witness's left hand and sent her to "go and tell President
Kabbah that they want peace". They also tried to amputate her right hand but it was not
severed.227l On her way to the hospital, the witness ran into a group of drunken rebels who
made fun of her in`uries and accused her of bein "Te`an Kabbah's mother".2272 The witness
fell in a gutter where the rebels repeatedly kicked her, pelted her with empty beer bottles and
stole her money. She Hnally made it to Conaught Hospital alive.
Findings
2262 rr1-023, rrcrrccrrpt 22 October 2008, p. 18956.
2262 TF1—023, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18956—18957.
2266 TF1—023, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18957.
2262 TF1—33 1, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp 1898}-18987.
mg TF1—331, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18989.
22°° TF1-33 1, Trcrrccrrpt 22 October 2008, p 18990.
222° TF1-33 1, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18991.
222* TF1-331, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18994.
2222 r1¤1-331, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18999.

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T J {ZL 18 May 2012

38’—l9.S`
859. Given the major inconsistency in the evidence of Witness TP 1-023 relating to any
alleged killings that she might have or have not seen committed in Wellington, the Trial
Chamber cannot rely on that evidence. The Trial Chamber however, finds the evidence of
Witness TF 1-026 reliable and credible. Based on that evidence the Trial Chamber finds that
the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that between late December 1998 and
February 1999 rebels, including members of the AFRC/RUP/STP and Liberian fighters,
attacked Wellington and intentionally killed an unknown number of civilians including (i)
the sister of witness TP 1-026 who was shot and killed simply because she was crying, (ii)
Mr Wilson, a crippled teacher who was bumt to death in his house; and (iii) another man
who was shot to death on the way to Calaba Town. Based on the evidence of Sarah Koroma,
the Trial Chamber also finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
around mid-January 1999, APRC/RUP rebels in Loko Town, Wellington, intentionally
killed her husband and a six-year old girl, both civilians, by hacking them with machetes.
The Trial Chamber finds that the victims were not taking an active part in the hostilities.
860. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the killings in Wellington were part of a
campaign of reprisal and terror directed against the civilians of Freetown and the Westem
Area by the retreating Junta forces. In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes the widespread
bumings and amputations that accompanied the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians
in Wellington and the callous comments by rebels to amputees to "go and tell the people that
the rebels were coming", or "tell Kabbah that they want peace" which comments coupled
with the amputation were intended to instil fear in the civilian population perceived by the
rebels to have voted Kabbah's Government into power. The Trial Chamber finds that the
perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence and the primary purpose
of the murders in Wellington was to instil terror in the civilian population.
1 (ix) Unlawful killing of civilians in Hastings
861. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he was part of the rebel troops led by
commanders Basky, Junior Lion and others that attacked Hastings on 3 January 1999, on the
orders of Gullit,2273 in order to fight the ECOMOG troops that were based there. Bobson
2273 Alirnamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008 p. 8267.

---- End of Page 333 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-0l-T @* 18 May 2012

Sesay told the Court that during the attack, the rebels captured three Nigerian soldiers and
shot them to death.2274
Findings
862. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that on 3 January 1999 at
Hastings, rebel forces comprising of members of the AFRC/RUF/STF and Liberian fighters,
intentionally killed three Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers who were hors de combat at the time
of death.
(x) Unlawful killing of civilians in Benggema
863. Prosecution Witness TF1-143 was 12 years oldzm when he and 50 other boys and
girls were captured by RUF rebels in September 1998 in Konkoba. The rebels turned him
into a child soldier after carying the letters "RUF" on his chest.2276 TF1-143 testified that
when he was with the fighters in Colonel Eddie Town2277 that his direct superior, Kabila,
told him that SA] Musa had ordered them to go to Freetown to overthrow the
Government.2278 Kabila said that SAJ Musa had further ordered that when they arrived in
Freetown they should not kill any civilian or burn any houses.2279 The witness heard
Commander Kabila state that SAJ Musa's order would not work, and that instead the rebel
troops would carry out an earlier order from O-Five called "Operation Spare No Soul",
which meant that "even humans, ants, goats, all should be killed".228O
864. TF1-143 further testified that when his group of rebel fighters reached Benguema on
their way to Freetown, SAJ Musa was injured when a bomb exploded in the weapons stock
room and died.228l Kabila told TF1-143 that after SA] Musa had died, "a priest prayed on
the corpse and O-Five and Gullit gave an order for a sacrifice for us to perform so we would
go to Freetown and succeed, the mission would be successful, that we should bury the
co se together with a fair complexion lady and the lady should be buried alon side SA]
IP S
2274 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8263.
2272 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8970.
2276 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8970-8977.
2277 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8970-8976.
2278 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9013-9014.
mg TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9013-9018.
2220 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9013-9018.
22"' TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9023-9024, 9060.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OL 18 May 2012
/

Musa alive".2282 According to Kabila, they tied a woman's legs up and buried her alive with
sA1 Musais body.2288
865. Witness TF1-0292284 referred to above2285 testified that after she and 50 other
civilians were captured in Wellington by RUF and AFRC fighters led by Major Arif on 22
January 1999, they all travelled together to Calaba Town and then to Bengmema.2286 TF1-
029 further testified that as they travelled from Calaba Town to Bengmema, the rebels were
attacked by ECOMOG and Kamajors in a battle that involved a lot of civilian deaths.2287 The
rebels killed babies that were travelling with them because "they did not want them to make
noise".2288 TF1-029 testified that when the group reached Bengmema, a rebel called Colonel
"Coal Boot" killed a civilian woman prior to them leaving Bengmema on 10 March 1999.2289
866. Paul Conteh,2298 who was captured on 23 January 1999 by AFRC soldiers, including
Colonel Bastard, testified that one night while he was a captive under the control of a rebel
called Lt. Gunboot at Bengmema, Conteh heard a 16 year-old girl crying next door. Conteh
knew this girl as she used to pass by his residence to fetch water. Conteh said that although
he could not see what happened, the apartment that he was staying in was close enough to
Gunboot's apartment that he could hear the young woman crying and asking him "to leave
her alone".229l One of Gunboot's "boys" confirmed to Conteh that Gunboot had killed the
young woman with an axe.2292 Conteh did not see the young woman again after this
incident.2298
2282 TF1 -143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9025.
2283 TF1 -143, Transcript 5 May 2008,p. 9025.
2284 Witness TF1-029 testified in the RUF trial. The transcript of her evidence was admitted as Exhibit P-206
("prior testimony") under Rule 92bis. In the present trial, the witness was cross-examined. See Witness TF1-029,
Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18969-18983.
2285 In her prior testimony, Witness TF1-029 testified that after she and 50 other civilians were captured in
Wellington by RUF and AFRC fighters including the SLA soldier Major Arif on 22 January 1999, they all
travelled en masse together to Calaba Town, where they stayed for two weeks.
2286 Exhibit P-206, "TF1 -029, RUF Transcript 28 November 2005", pp. 19415—19418.
2287 Exhibit P-206, "TF1-029, RUF Transcript 28 November 2005", pp. 19422-19423
2288 Exhibit P-206, TF1 -029, RUF Transcript 28 November 2005", p. 19423.
2288) Exhibit P-206, TF1-029, RUF Transcript 28 November 2005", pp. 19424-19425, 19436.
2290 Paul Conteh gaveievidence concerning murders in Benguema in the AFRC trial, which was admitted as prior
testimony under Rule 92bis. Paul Conteh, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19314. He was cross-examined by the
Defence concerning this testimony in this trial.
ml Exhibit P-215, "TFl-227, AFRC Transcnpt 1 l April 2005", ll April 2005, p. 20838.
mz Exiiibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 1 1 April 20051*, p. 20838.
8298 Exhibit P-215, "TF1 -227, AFRC Transcript 1 1 April 2005", pp. 20839-20840.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

$$/4 18
Findings
867. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Witnesses TF 1-143, TF 1-029 and Paul
Conteh credible. Based on that evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that between December 1998 and February 1999 at
Beng1ema, rebels including members of the AFRC/RUF intentionally killed an unknown
number of civilians, including (i) a woman who was buried alive with the body of SAJ Musa
as a sacrifice, (ii) a young woman killed by a rebel called "Coal Boot" or "Gun Boot", and
(iii) babies travelling with the fighters were also killed because they were "making noise".
The Trial Chamber finds that none of the victims in the above incidences was taking an
active part in the hostilities at the time of death.
868. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the killings at Beng1ema were part of a wider
campaign of terror waged against the citizens of Freetown and the Western Area by
AF RC/RUF forces. The Trial Chamber notes in this regard, the fact that civilians, including
the said witnesses were captured and kept by the rebels against their will and often tortured,
including Witness TF 1-143 who was at a young age branded with the letters "RUF"on his
chest and sent out to fight, as well as the female victims of rape. The Trial Chamber finds
that the perpetrators wilfully made the victims the object of such violence and the primary
purpose of the murders in Beng1ema was to instil terror in the civilian population.
Conclusion
869. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between about 21 December 1998 and 28 February 1999, in various
locations in Freetown and the Western Area including State House, Kissy, Fourah Bay,
Upgin, Calaba Town, Allen Town, Tower Hill, Hastings, Wellington, Tumbo, Waterloo and
Beng1ema, members of the AF RC, RUF, STF and Liberian fighters murdered an unknown
number of civilians, as charged in the lndictment2294 and shown in the evidence above.
870. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AF RC forces directed a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.2295 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that each of the killings proved by the Prosecution in respect of
2294 Indictment para. 13

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Case No.; SCSL—03—0l—T QM 18 May 2012

fsu 2*1
Freetown and the Westem Area formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were
aware of this fact. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the
Indictment, involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF.2296 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that for all of the aforementioned killings in Freetown and the Westem
Area there was a nexus between the killings and the armed conflict, that each of the victims
was not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of death, and that the perpetrators
knew this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned killings in
Freetown and the Western Area constitute murder as both a crime against humanity under
Article 2 of the Statute and a war crime under Article 3 of the Statute.
2295 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.
22% See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / @1 18 May 2012

ESM 2.0
B. Counts 4, 5 and 6 {Sexual Violence;
General Allegations and Submissions
87l. The Prosecution submits that "Throughout the war in Sierra Leone, the Indictment
perpetrators engaged in widespread sexual violence against women and girls. Widespread
sexual violence included rape, sexual slavery and outrages upon personal dignity. Sexual
violence was an integral part of the fighting forces’ modus operandi that peaked during the
rebels’ military operations and occurred countrywide as the rebels sought to capture more
territory. These widespread and systematic acts of sexual violence against civilian women
and girls typically began with an armed attack against a civilian village, town or city and/or
as part of operations. After taking control of all or part of the village, town or city, the
attackers would exercise control over that area and against the women and girls by raping
them, often repeatedly, many of whom they later abducted and used as "bush wives".2297
872. The Prosecution further submits that "While the RUF, like the NPFL, had an official
line against rape, the evidence shows that the practice was to selectively use sexual violence
against women to fit into the RUF's general policy of using terror against civilians and to
motivate its own unpaid soldiers. The only rape or abuse of women which was punished was
where the woman was the wife or "property" of another RUF fighter. But the purpose of
such punishment was to maintain organisational control rather than punish the crime.
However, as with periods of looting, rape and sexual slavery were used as rewards and
motivation for fighters2298....Moreover, the nature, extent and bmtality of the sexual
violence used to terrorize civilians is reflected by women and girls repeatedly being raped by
one or more combatants including with foreign objects, in the presence of husbands or other
family members. These rapeswere carried out under threat or other forms of coercion, often
in public. These women had generally been forcibly abducted nom their homes or hiding
places and then held in captivity for the purpose of sexual gratification and to perform
domestic chores for their "rebel husbands".2299 P
873. Furthermore, the sexual violence unleashed caused terror as it violated cultural
norms. Young girls, in particular virgins, women old enough to be grandmothers and
2297 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras. 847-848.
2298 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 849.
2299 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 852.

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Case No.; SCSL—O3—Ol—T Q; 18 May 2012
y -

38*1 Z!
mothers of the perpetrators, pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers were all targeted.
Part of the terror experienced by victims included the fear of being stigmatised as victims of
rape or other sexual violence, and the children conceived through such violence were often
rejected by family and society".23OO
1. Count4gRape[
Allegations and Submissions
874. The Indictment alleges that "members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or
alliance and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under
the direction and/or control or, and/or subordinate to the Accused, committed widespread
acts of sexual violence against civilian women and girls", including rape.23Ol
875. Rape is alleged to have occurred between about 1 February 1998 and about 31
December 1998 in Kono District,23O2 between about 30 November 1996 and about 18
January 2002 in Kailahun District,2303 and between about 21 December 1998 and about 28
February 1999 in Freetown and the Western Area.23O4
876. The Prosecution submits that rape was committed as part of widespread acts of
sexual violence against civilian women and girls throughout Sierra Leone and that the
evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt the Accused's guilt with respect to rape (Count
4).2305 The Prosecution further submits that "[r]ape was used in myriad forms to instill terror
amongst the civilian population, often in association with the other crimes charged in the
Indictment. For instance, the fact that rapes were committed with other gruesome and
horrific atrocities, including killings, mutilations, brutal gang rapes, rapes of children, rapes
A in front of family members, rapes with objects and in public, clearly show that the ultimate
objective of rape was to terrorize the innocent civilian population. Arbitrary terror was
further instilled by sexual acts that directly assailed accepted cultural norms, violating not
only the victim but also their family or the wider community. The rebels forced civilians to
commit incest, a brother forced to rape his sister, fathers forced to rape their daughters. Old
2300 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 853.
230* Indictment, para. 14.
M2 Indictment para. 15.
2303 Indictment para. 16.
2304 Indictment para. 17.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1-T Oy 18 May 2012 `%

?>3/-KS2
women and breastfeeding mothers were also raped, which violated a Sierra Leonean cultural
norm in which these women are presumed not to be sexually active. Child combatants raped
women who could have been their mothers or grandmothers. Sacred places were deliberately
targeted; victims report being raped in mosques, churches, and sacred places of
initiation".23O6
(a) Kono District
877. The Indictment alleges that between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December
1998 members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or Alliance, and/or Liberian Fighters,
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of
and/or subordinate to the Accused, raped an unknown number of women and girls at various
locations throughout Kono District including Koidu, Tombodu or Tumbodu, Wondedu and
AFRC and/or RUF camps such as "Superman Ground", "Guinea Highway" and "PC
Ground".23O7 The Trial Chamber will not consider instances of rape in locations that have
not been specifically pleaded in the Indictment for findings of guilt,23O8 although this
evidence has been considered in relation to the chapeau requirements. I
878. In arriving at its factual findings in Kono District, the Trial Chamber has considered
the evidence of witnesses Gibril Sesay, Finda Gbamanja, Corrine Dufka, Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Alex Tamba Teh, TF1-375, Isaac Mongor, Alice Pyne and TF1-189 in addition to
relevant documentary evidence in P-073, P-336 and P-078.
(i) I Evidence of widespread rape in Kono District
879. In her expert report,23O9 Prosecution expert witness Beth Vann reported that an
estimated 500,000 refugees fled from the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone into Guinea in
1998-1999. The report did not specify precisely the numbers of Liberian refugees or of
Sierra Leonean refugees. Sierra Leonean refugees fled from the RUF and AFRC forces in
approximately March to April 1998. They were primarily from the Kono and Kailahun
Districts and arrived in camps along the border in neighbouring Guinea. Another "large
2305 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 854-855.
2*06 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 857-858.
2307 Indictment, para. 15.
mg See Preliminary Issues; Issues Relating to the Pleading of the Indictment.
mq Exhibit P-073, "Repor"t to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Siena Leone, Conflict-

---- End of Page 340 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // Qlto 18 May 2012

group of Sierra Leoneans sought refuge in Guinea from the January 1999 joint AFRC/RUF
attack of Freetown".23 10 The largest concentration of camps was in the Gueckedou-
Kissidougou prefectures, just across the border from the Kono and Kailahun Districts of
Sierra Leone. The refugees described atrocities committed by armed groups, including the
RUF and AFRC, in Kono and Kailahun Districts. These atrocities included war-related .
sexual vio1ence.23H
880. Vann is a master's level social worker with 25 years experience in health and social
services. Since 1996 her work focused on sexual and gender based violence against women
and children in populations affected by armed conflict. She interviewed approximately 60
victims of sexual violence during the course of her work in Guinea in 1998-1999 and
reported: "[g]ir1s as young as 13 and women up to age 55 described having been abducted
while fleeing fighting or gathering food or firewood, and then raped, often repeatedly, and
often by several men. Some were held for only a day, others were held for two months
before they were able to escape. All described seeing many other captives who were also
raped, forced to serve as ‘wives’ (cooking, cleaning and used for sex)".23 I2 She reported that
during the year she worked in Guinea, several times a month 13-20 year old girls would
P arrive at one of the camps and most would eventually disclose that they have been abducted
and held as sexual slaves or "wives", and had been repeatedly raped by one or more
" combatants. Eighty-four percent of those interviewed were able to identify their attackers;
the RUF was "c1ear1y...the perpetrator in the majority of sexual violence incidents
re orted". Other named armed rou s or "rebe1s" were also named.23 13
P 8 P
881. Vann also conducted focus group sessions with groups of refugee men, women and
adolescent irls taken from a total of 110 eo le livin in three cam s com rised exclusivel
S P P 8 P P Y
of refugees from Kono and Kailahun Districts who fled in the first half of 1998. She states,
"A11 of the participants described witnessing at least one public rape of a civilian female in
or near their home town/village just before flight or during the time they were running to
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone".
mm Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4.
ml Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4.
mz Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 8.
2m Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-

---- End of Page 341 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 0* 18 May 2012 \%

refuge in Guinea. Approximately one-third of the women participants disclosed that they
themselves had been sexually assaulted — some with weapons or other objectsinserted into
the vagina, others forced to perform oral sex. Most participants identified the attackers as
"rebels" or "RUF" or "Junta". "Many indicated that it was sometimes impossible to know
for sure which faction the group belonged to" but later studies showed 40% of rape attackers
were RUF. Notably, all participants disclosed that they knew of at least one woman or girl
from their community who had been taken by the ‘rebels’ and was never seen again".2314
882. Vann reported that in "the middle to late 1998 and beyond", a group of medical
personnel reported to her that there were very high rates of` sexually transmitted infections,
unwanted pregnancies due to sexual violence, and large numbers of women/girls with
traumatic injuries in the genital and anal areas.2315 Vann reported that, as a consequence of
war-related sexual violence among the 60 victims she interviewed, the primary concem
related to their mental health. They exhibited signs of post-traumatic stress disorder; most
were socially isolated and expressed feelings of shame, anger and depression and feared
stigmatisation, rejection and retribution. Many feared others would find out what had
happened to them. They also suffered from sexually transmitted diseases.2316 Based on
reports and interviews Vann concluded that war-related sexual violence among the refugee
o ulation in Guinea was underre orted due to fears of sti a and re`ection, and the lack of
P P P gm J
assistance services.2317
883. Vann reported that some women and girls who were abducted remained with their
captors. Based on reports and her research she concluded that the reasons for this included a
belief that they had no choice once they had children and particularly economic dependence,
identification with the abductor, drug addiction, more desirable food options reportedly
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 1 1.
2314 Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 8.
2315 Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 10.
2316 Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 10.
2317 Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 10.

---- End of Page 342 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T GL 18 May 2012

3&a$5
available in the bush, fear of rejection by their families and communities, and customisation
to their new way of life and surrogate families were also factors.23 18
884. Vann's observations are mirrored by an Amnesty lntemational Report, entitled
"Sierra Leone, 1998 — a year of atrocities against civilians", which documents that as the
AFRC and RUF rebels were pursued eastwards by ECOMOG forces to towns including
Koidu from February through April 1998, the rebels were responsible for widespread rape
and other forms of sexual assault and abduction.23 lg Similarly, Medecins Sans Frontieres
(MSF) reported that "[a]ccording to the patients, the civilian population of Kono is terrorised
by various armed groups, who have been carrying out executions, mutilations, rapes and
kidnappings. Attacks are reported to be very systematic, with groups of people rounded up
and killed, wounded, or raped, one by one".2320
885. While this evidence is not sufficiently specific to prove any individual instances of
rape, it demonstrates that rape was committed on a widespread basis in Kono District and
may be relevant as corroboration for specific instances of rape described by witnesses
testifying before the Trial Chamber.
(ii) Koidu Town
886. The Prosecution submits that following the ECOMOG Intervention of February
1998, retreating AFRC/RUF forces travelled to Kono District, specifically Koidu Town.
"Their pattern of terror by committing widespread rapes reached unprecedented levels in
February, March and April 199872321 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of
Prosecution witnesses Gibril Sesay, TF1-189 and Finda Gbamanja in relation to these
allegations.
a. Evidence of Rape upon the Capture of Koidu Town
mg Exhibit P-073, "Repo1t to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", pp. 17-19.
23 W Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone, 1998- a year of atrocities against civilians- Amnesty 1nternational", p. 11.
mo Exhibit P-079, "Medeeins Sans Frontiéres Press Release: Mutilation of Civilians on the lncrease in Sierra
Leone".
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 862.

---- End of Page 343 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T J OL, 18 May 2012

887. Witness Gibril Sesay testified that after the ECOMOG Intervention, rebels arrived in
Koidu Town.23 22 The witness stated that when the rebels arrived, they began looting and
raping civilians.2323 He learned about the rapes when he went to the hospital and spoke to Dr
Gborie as well as some of the women who explained what had happened to them.2324
888. The Trial Chamber cannot make findings on this evidence without further
information regarding the perpetrators and circumstances of the rapes alleged, however, the
evidence demonstrates that rape was widespread in Koidu Town and may be relevant as
corroboration for specific instances of rape described by witnesses testifying before the Trial
Chamber. .
b. Rape of Finda Gbamanja
Evidence
889. ln February 1998, witness Finda Gbamanja, her parents and siblings lived in Koidu
Town.2325 Gbamanja testified that she was captured with her family by Peppe, a rebel in
Superman's group,2326 in Baima Town where they were hiding.2327 After having been taken
to Koidu Town by the rebels, she was detained by Peppe despite "his colleague" telling him
that she was ‘"a small girl".2328 Her parents interceded and sought her release but Peppe beat
her mother and killed her father.2329 That night, Peppe took Gbamanja to Koidu Town. On
the way, a rebel named "Sergeant Foday" who also was a member of Superman's group,2330
fought Peppe for possession of Gbamanja. Peppe threatened to kill Gbamanja so that neither
could have her. Another rebel, named "Well Man", intervened and "awarded" Gbamanja to
2222 oibrii Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19383-19384.
2222 oinrir Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19383-19384.
222* Gibril scsay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 193 83-19384.
2222 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23835.
2226 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23851—23853, 23860. Superman was an RUF
commander.
2327 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23836, 23840; Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23851-
23852.
2222 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23852.
2222 See Factual and Legal Findings on the Alleged Crimes, Sexual Slavery infra.
222" Finria Gbarrranja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23863.

---- End of Page 344 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T V GL 18 May 2012

Peppe.33 3 3 Peppe later took her to his house and "slept" with her. She testified that he raped
her causing her to bleed and be so weak that she could not stand.33 3 3
890. Subsequently, Peppe took Gbamanja to his sister Hawa's "place" where she found
many other "wives of rebels" who had been trained as fighters.33 3 3 She was forced to work.
Hawa sent Gbamanja and two other girls to search for vegetables.33 3 3 Gbamanja stated that
while she was haryesting pepper Sergeant Foday met her, threatened her and, under duress,
she followed him to his house close to the Opera in Koidu Town.3333 She stated, "l was there
as his wife", and that "1 was there for some time",33 3 3 which she explained meant that
Sergeant Foday had sex with her every night.33 3 3 Gbamanja testified that she did not
"volunteer" to have sex with Sergeant Foday but "had no option" but to do so.33333 She
remained at Koidu Town until it was attacked by ECOMOG. She then travelled with
Sergeant Foday to Superman Ground.3333 She could not specify how long she was with
Sergeant Foday.
891. The witness did not know her age at the time of the incident3330 but she had not yet
started her menses.3333 Gbamana was able to recall that she was ca tured after Johnn Paul
J P Y
Koroma was overthrown from power in Freetown3333 on or about 14 February 19983333 as
she had heard that over the radio.3333 The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the crimes
took lace durin the lndictment eriod.
P 8 P
892. The Defence challenged several aspects of Gbamanja's testimony as compared with
her prior statements.3333 She was not challenged on her evidence that she was raped by
3333 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23857-23859.
2332 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23856, 23859.
23 33 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23860-23862.
23 34 Fmda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23860, 23862.
3333 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23862.
3333 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23862.
3337 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23862.
13*8 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23862.
2339 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23864-23865, 23936-23937.
M Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23890-23893.
2*** Finda Gbamanja, rrannnnpr 29 January 2009, pp. 23859, 23893.
3333 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23898-23899.
23 33 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-l-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December
2007, Annex A, Fact AD.
3333 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23837.
3333 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23897-23898, 23 896, 23900-23901, 23941-23942.

---- End of Page 345 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / AL 18 May 2012 M

Peppe and Sergeant Foday. The witness explained the inconsistencies highlighted by the
Defence as errors of transcription.2346 The Trial Chamber considers that these
inconsistencies are immaterial to the substance of Gbamanja's testimony of the rapes. The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that Gbamanja's testimony of the rapes she suffered is reliable.
Findings
893. Gbamanja testified that Sergeant Foday had sex with her every night and that she had
no option but to comply. Considering the coercive environment, Gbamanja's young age at
the time, and her testimony that Sergeant Foday threatened her and that she followed him
under duress, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Sergeant Foday, a
0 member of the RUF, intentionally engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with
Gbamanja during the time that she stayed in his house and that he knew of the victim's non-
consent.
894. Given the coercive circumstances and the young age of Gbamanja, her capture by
Peppe and her testimony that she was "raped" by him, the Trial Chamber also finds beyond
reasonable doubt that Peppe, a member of the RUF, intentionally engaged in non-consensual
sexual intercourse with Gbamanj a and that he knew of her non-consent.
c. Rape ofTFl-189
Evidence
895. Witness TF 1-189 testified that she was raped by five male "rebels" whose ages
ranged, in her estimation, from 15-25 years in the living room of a house in a village in
Kono in March 1998. Other villagers were outside on the veranda.2347 The witness testified
to similar rapes of other girls and young women on preceding days in a house with the door
2346 The Defence cross-examined the witness on the reliability of her memory, particularly considering her
very young age. She may have been too young to remember such details as dates and her length of stay at
various locations. See eng., Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23897-23899. During an interview,
the witness was recorded as saying "JPK was escorted through Baiama after they had spent nearly a month.
Witness states at the time she was too young to know how long they took in the village but they had stayed for
long which looks like about a month". Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23903.
2347 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16510-16513.

---- End of Page 346 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Q·`~ 18 May 2012

open and people gathered on the veranda.2348 She stated ". .. they do it deliberately for us to
see what they are doing".2349
896. She was then abducted by the five rebels and brought into Koidu Town to their "boss
Superman" and offered to him as a wife. When he rejected her she was taken to a hall where
other eo le were held.235O Followin an attem ted esca e and reca ture she was held in a
P P 8 P P P
house with 13 other girls.23 51 She remained there from approximately mid-March 1998 to
August 1998.2352 At this house she and other girls were forced to work and she had to be a
"wife" to the erson who brou t her and to other men. She ex lained that she had to have
P P
sexual intercourse with men at "any time anyone can just...72353 TF1-189 explained that this
meant that she had sexual intercourse with these men.2354 She named several SLA, Junta and
RUF perpetrators including one referred to as Commander A in private session.2355
897. TF1-189 testified that five other females who sta ed in the same com ound were
Y P
similarly forced to be "wives" to their captors.2356 She never refused to have sexual
intercourse with her captors because she was afraid of the consequences. She was forbidden
to leave the com ound under threat of death.2357
P
Findings
898. Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that several
men who were members of the RUF/AFRC junta, including those named in closed session,
intentionall en a ed in non-consensual sexual intercourse with TF1-189. Given the
Y 8 8
coercive circumstances of captivity and threat in which these acts occurred the Trial
Chamber is satisfied be ond reasonable doubt that the e etrators knew of TF1-189's non-
Y P YP
consent.
2348 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16497—16506.
55*5 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16506.
2550 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16513.
2351 TF1—189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16514—16516.
2352 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp, 16512, 16517.
2353 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 165 18.
555* TF1—189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16518.
2355 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16516-16518. See also Transcript 18 September 2008, pp.
16556-16558 (PS).
5555 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16518.
5557 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16519.

---- End of Page 347 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ M 18 May 2012

38HLm
(iii) Tombodu
899. The Prosecution submits that AFRC and RUF forces settled in Tombodu in or about
March 1998, with Mohamed Savage as commander, and that rapes were committed.2358 The
Trial Chamber has examined the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Perry Kamara and
Sahr Bindi in relation to allegations of rape in Tombodu during this period.
Evidence
900. Periy Kamara provided evidence regarding the practice of having "wives" in
Tombodu.2359 His evidence is insufficient to prove the elements of the crime of rape, but
A may be relevant as corroboration for specific instances of rape described by witnesses
testifying before the Trial Chamber.
901. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that "many" young women between the ages of 8
and 15 were captured by AFRC and RUF fighters in Kono District. The witness stated,
"[w]e captured them, so whatever they did we were forcing them to do it because we had
guns" and explained that this meant "we had sex with them" and some became pregriant.236O
The witness testified that the young women lived with various SLA and RUF commanders
and that some of the commanders made them into their "wives". The witness explained that
he had captured a young girl in Kono District who stayed with him. He did not marry the
girl he had captured. Alimamy Bobson Sesay further testified that the young women cooked,
laundered and helped to pound rice in addition to having sexual intercourse with the
commanders, both senior and junior.23 61
902. Alimamy Bobson Sesay stated that this conduct occurred between March and June
1998 and that it occurred in various locations in Kono District, including Koidu Town,
Bumpe, Tombodu and Yengema.2362
2358 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 867.
2359 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 Februaxy 2008, p. 3157.
2360 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8006-8007.
2361 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8006-8008.
2362 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8064-8065.

---- End of Page 348 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 348// QQ 18 May 2012

903. Witness Sahr Bindi testified that he was captured by AFRC/RUF soldiers2363 and
taken to Tombodu in around April 1998.2364 Bindi testified that while he and two other men
were tied to a mango tree, he saw a Limba woman named Sia Lappia, a suckling mother
with a child strapped on her back, being "brought" to Staff Alhaji who was on the veranda of
a house.2365 Staff Alhaji told her to take the child off her back and when she was "reluctant"
and "refused" he then pointed a gun at Lappia's ear. Bindi watched as the woman put down
her child and was forced to take off her clothes at gunpoint. He saw Staff Alhaji hit Lappia
on her genitals and then have sex with her.2366
Findings
904. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an SLA commander and perpetrator, provided clear and
reliable evidence of how commanders captured women, forced them to have sex with
commanders and of the coercive environment in which such acts took place. Based on his
evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that in Tombodu between
March and June 1998, commanders of the AFRC, including Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
intentionally engaged in non—consensual sexual intercourse with an unknown number of
women and that they knew of the women's non—consent.
905. Bindi's evidence was clear, based on direct observation and reliable. Based on this
evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Staff Alhaji intentionally
engaged in non—consensual sexual intercourse with Sia Lappia and that he knew of the
victim's non—consent.
(iv) Wondedu
906. The Prosecution submits that rape was also widespread in Wondedu.2367 The Trial
Chamber has considered the evidence of Alex Tamba Teh in relation to this incident.
Evidence
2363 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18482·18484, 18543 (while on direct examination, Mr Bindi
stated that he was captured by RUF and AFRC, and on cross-examination it was elicited that the man who led
the captors was a member of the AF RC).
2364 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18480, 18482-18484.
*65 sam Bindi, Transcript 16 optpbpr 2008, pp. 1848648488
2366 sam Bindi, Transcript 16 optpbpr 2008, pp. 18488-18489.
2367 Prosecution Final Trial Briefi para. 869.

---- End of Page 349 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ GL 18 May 2012

38 HAD,
907. Teh testified that at some time after the Intervention, he and fellow villagers were
captured by armed men, some in military uniform and some in "ordinary trousers" under the
command of Rocky and Rambo.2368 Teh was taken by Rocky to Wondedu.2369 There the
witness heard women screaming at night and heard them say "[y]ou have not married me,
now you want to use me as your wife". He often spoke to these women the next day. He
described a conversation in which one woman, Rebecca, told him that women had been
abducted at gun point and forced to have sex with their captors. She stated, "They [...] bring
us, use us, use - forcefully sex us". The witness concluded that "this was the time I realised
that they were being raped".2370
Findings
908. Teh clearly heard women objecting to being "used" during the night and Rebecca
gave a contemporaneous account of her rape following her abduction. The Trial Chamber
finds that the direct evidence of the women's protests and the words used clearly show that
Rebecca and other women were forced to have sex with their captors. Accordingly the Trial
Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that men under the command of Rocky
intentionally engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with Rebecca and with an
unknown number of other women, and that they knew of the victims’ non-consent.
(v) AFRC and/or RUF Camps
909. The Prosecution submits that on or about April 1998, the AFRC/RUF lost control of
Koidu Town, but retained bases in Kono District, including Superman Ground, Guinea
Highway and PC Ground. The Prosecution further submits that Isaac Mongor, SLA, STF
and RUF fighters captured civilians and brought them to the bases where women captives
had sex with fighters under coercive circumstances.23 71
910. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Isaac Mongor, Finda Gbamanja,
TF 1-375 and Alice Pyne in relation to allegations at AFRC and RUF camps in Kono District
during this period.
2368 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 686-697. The Trial Chamber has found that Emmanuel
Williams (a.k.a Rocky) was a member of the RUF.
2369 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 704. e
lm Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 704-705.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 870-873.

---- End of Page 350 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T "V 18 May 2012

361+0 E:
a. Superman Ground
Evidence
911. Witness Isaac Mongor, a high ranking RUF commander, testified that armed
members of the RUF, SLA, and STF including the witness himself would take civilian
women to "Superman Ground" as wives.2372 Mongor explained that "to take as [...] wife"
meant "they will take them to go and sleep with them, to use them, to have sex with
them".2373 A captured civilian woman "had no choice. You were under the sole control of
the gunman and the gunman was going to take you as his wife".2374
912. F inda Gbamanj a, who was abducted and taken to Kono, testified that after staying in
Sergeant Foday's house, AFRC/RUF members including Sergeant Foday and Peppe, took
her and other captured civilians to Superman Ground in Meiyor when ECOMOG attacked
Koidu Town.23 15 Gbamanja testified that at Superman Ground, she and a captured boy
stayed with Sergeant Foday "for a long time" and that Sergeant Foday "used to have sex
with" her.23 16 She testified that she never agreed to have sex with Sergeant Foday but that
"there was no option".23 17 Sergeant Foday sent her to "Mamie's house" when his wife Fatty
came from Kailahun. Fatty was jealous and fought Gbamanja but Sergeant Foday continued
to have sex with Gbamanja at Mamie's house "whenever he needed [her] to have sex".23 18
Gbamanja testified that she was with Foday for "a long time" and at Mamie's house "for
some time again".2379
Findings
913. Isaac Mongor, an RUF commander and perpetrator, provided clear and reliable
evidence of how captured civilian women were forced to have sexual intercourse with
members of the RUF, AFRC, and STF, includin the witness himself and of the coercive
g
environment in which such acts took place. Based on his evidence, the Trial Chamber finds
2372 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5764-5765.
2373 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, p. 5763.
2374 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5762-5763.
2375 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23864-23866.
2376 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23866.
2377 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23866.
2378 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23867.
2379 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23866-23867.

---- End of Page 351 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QR 18 May 2012

358 #14+4
beyond reasonable doubt that members of the RUF, AFRC, and STF, including the witness
himself, intentionally engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with an unknown
number of women at Superman Ground in April 1998. Considering the coercive
environment where the sexual intercourse occurred, the Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators knew of the women's non-consent.
914. The Trial Chamber finds the testimony of Finda Gbamanja to be credible. Based on
her evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Sergeant Foday, a
member of the RUF, intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse with the witness at
Superman Ground and that, owing to the coercive environment, the witness did not consent
and Sergeant Foday knew of her non-consent.
b. Guinea Highway
915. The Prosecution did not adduce any evidence of rape at the AFRC/ RUF camp called
"Guinea Highway" in Kono District.
c. PC Ground
Evidence
916. Witness TF1-375 testified that when the AFRC/RUF rebels retreated to PC Ground
after being forced out of Koidu Town by ECOMOG, women and girls were taken by the
rebels to PC Ground. The witness further testified that "[a]ll women had men. All of them
had their husbands they were with them as wives".238O When asked to clarify the meaning
of the term "wife" as used by the witness, TF1-375 explained that "[w]hen you captured
somebody, whether she was willing or not when you want her you would make her your
wife, so forcibly or willingly she has to become a wife for you have to become the wife [oQ
whoever liked you".2381 TF1-375 elaborated that there was no ceremony involved, "[t]he
only ceremony is to go and sleep",2382 meaning that RUF rebels had sexual intercourse with
abducted women and girls. 2383 The Trial Chamber finds that this evidence is insufficient to
M0 TF1—375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12522.
M r1¤1 -375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12601.
23**2 TF1~375, Transcript 24 Jupp 2008, p. 12601.
23*3 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12601-12602.

---- End of Page 352 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3~O1 ~T Ws 18 May 2012
J, /4/

3% NHS
establish the elements of the crime of rape, but that it may be relevant as corroboration for
specific instances of rape described by witnesses testifying before the Trial Chamber.
917. Alice Pyne testified that AFRC/RUF fighters at PC Ground would capture civilians,
men, women, and children. Fighters would take women away, bring them to the base and
tum the women into their wives.2384 Pyne explained that "they would sleep together".2385
\Vhen questioned as to whether women volunteered to become wives of the combatants,
Pyne answered no.2386 Although this evidence suggests that involuntary sexual intercourse
occurred, the Trial Chamber finds that it does not establish the elements of the crime of rape.
However, this evidence may be relevant as corroboration for specific instances of rape
described by witnesses testifying before the Trial Chamber.
918. Mongor also testified that at PC Ground civilian women would be taken to be the
wives of the gunmen, members of the RUF, AFRC and STF and that captured civilian
women had "no choice".2387 The witness further clarified that the wording "to take as [...]
wife" meant "they will take them to go and sleep with them, to use with them, to have sex
with them".2388 Mongor testified that he had taken a civilian woman as a "wife" at that time
at PC Ground and stated "I did not give any money for her, I did not ask her parents, so I
N take her as my wife too".2389 Mongor's evidence shows that he and other RUF, AFRC and
STF members had sex with captured women who had "no choice".239O
Findings
919. Isaac Mongor, an RUF commander and a perpetrator, provided clear and reliable
evidence of how captured civilian women were forced to have sexual intercourse with
members of the RUF, AFRC, and STF, including the witness himself and the coercive
environment in which such acts took place. Mongor's evidence is corroborated by TF1-375
and Pyne. Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
members of the RUF, AFRC, and STF, including Isaac Mongor, intentionally engaged in
2384 Alice Pyne, Transcript, 18 June 2008, pp. 12195—12197.
2385 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12196.
2386 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. l2l95—12196.
2387 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5762-5764.
238* Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5763.
2389 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5764.
2390 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5763. .

---- End of Page 353 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gln 18 May 2012
\

Exuaé
non-consensual intercourse with an unknown number of women in PC Ground in or about
April 1998. Given the coercive environment in which the sexual intercourse occurred, the
Trial Chamber finds that perpetrators knew that the women did not consent to sexual
intercourse.
(vi) Rape of Sia Kamara
Evidence
920. Witness Sia Kamara, whose testimony in the RUF trial was received pursuant to
Rule 92bis, was cross-examined in the present trial on 15 October 2008. ln her prior
testimony Kamara testified that she, her husband and his younger brother fled Tongo when it
was attacked by Kamajors. They fled to Segbwema, Bunumbu, and Gandorhun and arrived
in Kainako, Kono "Chiefdom" in the dry season. Two days later they fled to the bush when
they were informed by other civilians that Kamajors "who had transformed into
soldiers/rebels" had entered Koidu. Kamara explained that she meant that "they ran away
from Kamajors", but later they were told that "it was now rebels and not Kamajors
again".239l On cross-examination, she explained that she had encountered civilians fleeing
from Koidu Town who told her that Kamajors had entered Koidu Town.2392 Kamara testified
that the bush she fled to was close to Yegbema,2393 about two and a half miles from
Gandorhun and about one and a half miles from Kainako.2394
921. Approximately three weeks later, Kamara saw about seven vehicles passing by. She
"heard" that it was Johnny Paul Koroma heading towards the "Guinea end". She saw the
same vehicles "coming towards Koidu end" about a week later.2395 On cross—examination,
Kamara confirmed that she first saw Johnny Paul Koroma after the ECOMOG Intervention,
when the AFRC and RUF were driven out of Freetown and he passed through the area
where she was living. 1-Ie was disguised as a woman.2396
ml Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 7.
2392 Sia Kamara, 15 October 2008, p. 18437.
2393 See Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 8 (the location was recorded as
"Ngegbema [phoen]"). During cross-examination during this trial, the location was spelt on the record as
"Yegbema". See Sia Kamara, 15 October 2008, pp. 18436—18437.
2394 Exhibit P—20l, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 8.
23% Exhibit P—20l, ··RU1¤ riiai riaiisciipi 1 February 2005, sia Kamara", p. 9.
23% Sia Kamara, 15 October 2008, pp. 18434 -18435.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X! GA 18 May 2012 %

38H¢+*l·
922. As the ECOMOG Intervention that ousted the AFRC and RUF fiom Freetown
occurred in February 1998; Koidu Town was captured by the RUF in late February to early
March;2397 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Kamara was in the bush near Yegbema in
approximately March/April, 1998.
923. Kamara testified that while her husband was away finding food, she was discovered
by two "rebels". The first was wearing a soldier's uniform and was armed with a gun. The
second was wearing civilian clothing with combat khaki trousers and was armed with a stick
with red cloth tied to it. The rebel with the gun pointed it at Kamara and ordered her to
undress and lie down, which she did. He raped her. Kamara was unable to refuse due to the
coercive circumstances. As this was happening, a third rebel, also armed with a stick,
arrived. The other two rebels stood by as the rape occurred. After the first rebel raped her,
Kamara was raped by "the other one". She testified that she did not agree to have sex with 1
him, but the rebel with the gun was standing by them so she could not fight. After she had
been raped by the second rebel, she was raped by the third. Kamara testified that these rapes
happened in the "middle of the forest in the open".239g
924. After the three rapes, the rebels took Kamara "into the hills" where she saw a number
of other civilians who had been captured, some of whom she recognised. She and the other
civilians were given loads to carry to Sawoa while the rebels walked in fiont and behind
them. Kamara testified that she thought the rebels were going to kill her and could not think
of escaping. Kamara estimates that it was over two and a half miles to Sawoa which was in
the Kono "area". 2399
i 925. In Sawoa, Kamara heard the rebels address a man as "Lieutenant T" and heard him
say that ECOMOG had captured Kailahun Town and Kono, that they were going to "show
them that we own the country" and that it was now Operation No Living Thing. Lieutenant
T ordered the rebels to kill the civilians.24O0 The Trial Chamber has found that the AFRC
forces lost control of Kono District in April 1998.24Ol
2397 Military Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998).
mg Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 9-14.
2399 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 15-18.
2400 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 19.
m' Military Operations: Operation Fitti-Fatta.

---- End of Page 355 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T J QL 18 May 2012

926. Kamara testified that the rebels asked one of the captured civilians about Kamajors
and Kabbah. When the civilian replied that she knew nothing, the rebels beat the civilians.
Kamara testified that a boy of approximately 14 years brought a mortar and cut off the right
hands of all the captured men, five in total, including Kamara's brother, who was seated next
to her. After the five men had their hands amputated, Kamara was also struck on the upper
arm. The rebels then separated out the young "virgins" from the women and took them
away. 2402
927. Kamara testified that the rebels took her and the remaining captured women, six in
total, in the direction of Benguema Fiama. Some of the rebels were armed with guns and
some with sticks. At Fall Road, the rebels ordered the women to undress and lie down,
which they did. Kamara thought that the rebels were going to kill them. A rebel with a gun
undressed and had sex with her. She was unable to refuse. There were many other rebels
standing by. Then another rebel, armed with a stick, also had sex with her. When he had
finished, he took the stick and shoved it into her vagina. Kamara testified that she
experienced great pain and bleeding and that she continued to feel pain at the time of her
testimony some years later. Kamara testified that she then heard another rebel say that the
women were to be killed.244)3 She then fled to a swamp, where she spent the night. She was
bleeding and became unconscious. The following day, she was able to find her husband and
three days later, she was brought to Connaught Hospital in Freetown by ECOMOG. She
testified that she remained there "unti1 the time the rebels entered Freetown".24O4
928. On cross-examination, Kamara admitted that she could not distinguish between the
SLA and RUF, and that she considered anyone who was carried a gun and who "terrorised"
civilians was a rebel.24O5 She insisted, however, that she was captured by "rebels" and not
Kamajors and testified that the persons who captured her threatened to amputate her hand
because they suspected her of being a Kamajor or a Kamajor supporter. She was unable to
say who Lieutenant T's "boss" was but testified that the rebels said they had come from
Freetown and were heading for Fiama. She stated that the men spoke Krio, Mende and
2402 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 21-24.
2403 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 24-27.
2404 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 27-28.
2405 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 53-54; Sia Kamara, 15 October
2008, pp. 18434 -18437.

---- End of Page 356 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GQ 18 May 2012

2% Ll 4 9
"Liberian".2406 By "Liberian" Kamara clarified that she heard them use the phrase "My meh,
let's go" which she testified is the way Liberian people speal<.24O7
Findings
929. Kamara's description of events corresponds with the movements of the AFRC and
RUF. Given her testimony that one of the rebels who captured her was dressed in a soldier's
uniform; that "Lieutenant T" stated that they would show ECOMOG that "we own the
country" and that it was now Operation No Living Thing; that the rebels asked the civilians
about Kamajors and Kabbah and that they suspected Kamara of being a Kamajor; and her
testimony that the rebels stated that they had come from Freetown, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Kamara was abducted by members of the
AFRC/RUF and not Kamajors.
930. On the basis of Kamara's testimony, the Trial Chamber finds that Kamara was
abducted from a location in the bush near Yegbema in March/April 1998 by members of the
AF RC/RUF, that she was forced to engage in sexual acts by three members of the
AFRC/RUF in this same location, and that she was later forced to engage in sexual acts and
sexually brutalised by two other members of the same group of AFRC/RUF at Fall Road
between Sawoa and Benguema Fiama. The Trial Chamber finds from Kamara's testimony
of her inability to refuse to submit to these acts and from the environment of violence and
coercion that Kamara did not consent to these acts. The Trial Chamber finds that the five
members of the AF RC/RUF who detained, raped and forced Kamara to carry loads intended
to exercise these acts. Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable
doubt that members of the RUF and AF RC intentionally engaged in non—consensual
intercourse with Kamara in approximately March/April 1998 in Kono District. Given the
coercive environment in which the sexual intercourse occurred, the Trial Chamber finds that
perpetrators knew that Kamara did not consent to sexual intercourse.
2406 Sia Kamara, 15 October 2008, pp. 18437—18439,
2407 Sia Kamara, 15 October 2008, pp. 18439—18441.

---- End of Page 357 ---------------------------


Case No.: SiCSL—03—01—T 3;/ 18 May 2012


Conclusion
931. The Trial Chamber finds the elements of the crime of rape have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt for each of the following incidents:
i. Finda Gbamanja was raped in Koidu Town by an RUF rebel named Peppe in
February 1998;
ii. Finda Gbamanja was raped by RUF Sergeant Foday in Koidu Town and at
Superman Ground in 1998;
iii. TF1-189 was raped in Koidu Town by her SLA and RUF captors between
March and August 1998;
iv. AF RC commanders, including Alimamy Bobson Sesay, raped an unknown
number of women and girls in Tombodu between March and June 1998;
v. Sia Lappia was raped by RUF Staff Alhaji in Tombodu in approximately April
1998.
vi. Rebecca and an unknown number of women were raped at Wondedu by RUF
men under the command of Rocky in 1998;
vii. An unknown number of women were raped in Superman Ground by RUF,
AFRC and STF fighters in or about April 1998;
viii. An unknown number of women and girls were raped at PC Ground by RUF,
AF RC and STF fighters including Isaac Mongor in or about April 1998;
ix. Sia Kamara was repeatedly raped by AFRC and RUF fighters in approximately
March/April 1998 in Kono District.
932. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AF RC forces directed both
a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.2408 The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that each of the rapes proved by the Prosecution in respect of
2408 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.

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Case No.: SCSL·O3·Ol·T >/X 18 May 2012

38aSt
Kono District formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were aware of this fact.
Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned rapes in Kono District
constitute rape as a crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute.
(b) Kailahun District
933. The Indictment alleges that between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January
2002 members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or Alliance, and/or Liberian Fighters,
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of,
and/or subordinate to the Accused, raped an unknown number of women and girls in
locations throughout Kailahun District.24O4
934. Several witnesses testified to acts of rape in areas of Kailahun District. As no
locations were pleaded in the Indictment for Count 4 in relation to Kailahun District such
evidence does not fall within the scope of the Indictment, and is relevant only insofar as it
demonstrates that the activity was widespread or systematic, and therefore assists in
establishing the chapeau requirements.
935. Witnesses Mustapha Mansaray, Perry Kamara, Isaac Mongor, Issa Sesay, TF 1-168,
TF 1-375, Edna Bangura and DCT—068 gave evidence relevant to allegations of rape in
Kailahun District, in addition to Exhibits P—073, P—078, P—077 and P—277.
936. In 1998, Amnesty International reported that "[i]n those areas of the country which
remained under the control of rebel forces thousands of civilians, including women and
children, effectively remained captive, many of them in Kailahun District, a stronghold of
the RUF since the beginning of the internal armed conflict. Some estimates put this number
as high as 10,000. They were used to carry goods, as human shields or for sexual
I slavery".24lO Expert Witness Vann reported that a majority of rape victims from Sierra Leone
that she interviewed in Gueckedou Camp in Guinea named the perpetrators as members of
the Arno/RUF or "rebels".24H
2404 Indictment, para. 16.
2410 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone: 1998 — a year of atrocities against civilians — Amnesty Internationa1", p. 12,
15,
24H Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 1 1.

---- End of Page 359 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012 M

?;~i5H5'J.
937. Expert witness TF1-150 documented human rights abuses in Sierra Leone from May
1998 through 2000. This witness had published a report by July 1998 which documented
that "rebels" were holding large numbers of civilian captives, including women and girls
who were being used for forced sexual activity, in various areas of Sierra Leone, but mostly
in Kailahun District.24l2
938. TF1-174 worked at an interim care centre in Makeni where captured girls were
provided with assistance. TF1-174 stated that the girls at the centre had been captured from
districts including Kailahun District. The girls that TF1-174 worked with had been raped
and tumed into "wives" of RUF commanders. One girl was said to have been a "wife" of
Issa Sesay. She was 14 or 15 years old.24l3
939. While this evidence is not sufficiently specific to prove any individual instances of
rape, it demonstrates that rape was committed on both a widespread and systematic basis in
Kailahun District.
(i) Rape of women bythe RUF throughout Kailahun District
940. Witness Isaac Mongor testified that he would visit Kailahun District at unspecified
times.24l4 Mongor stated that RUF fighters used captured women in Kailahun District for
sexual purposes and some were trained as soldiers.24l5
941. TF1-371 testified that aner the 1991 attacks on Sierra Leone by RUF and NPFL
fighters, captured women and girls would become the "bush wives" of RUF
commanders.24l6 These women and girls would be the sexual partners of the commanders
and have children by them, and would also do domestic chores.24l7
Defence Evidence
24'2 Exhibit 1=·-077 (comndi-mai), para. 28.
p 2413 TF1-174, Transcript 28 Januaiy 2009, pp. 23779-23780, 23792.
2414 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6208.
M5 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6208.
M6 TF1-371, Transcript 25 Januaiy 2008, p. 2232 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2506-2507 (CS).
2417 TF1-371, Transcript 29 Januaiy 2008, pp. 2506-2507.

---- End of Page 360 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18M 2012
0 ff Gm ay Vg

942. Issa Sesay testified that rape was not allowed and that rape was punishable by
death.24l8 Sesay testified that he did not hear about or see rape in Kailahun from 1992
through disarmament.‘44l9 Sesay stated that he did hear about rape occurring in other parts of
Sierra Leone, but said that actions were taken against the perpetrators.242O
943. DCT-068, who had been a member of the RUF from August 1992,2421 was in
Kailahun District from 1992 to 1998.2422 The witness testified that he had never seen women
being raped and that anyone in the RUF who committed rape would be disciplined.2423 He
further testified that women were not assigned to commanders and only women combatants
would be assigned work in a particular area. DCT-068 gave the example of Sam Bockarie,
and explained that if Bockarie wanted a woman for love, he would talk to that woman in
respect of love2424 and stated that the RUF members could not force anyone to have any kind
of relationship with them.2425 However, DCT-068 also stated that "in that situation because
of fear certain people accept certain things because they want their life to be saved".2426
DCT-068 conceded that he had never seen an RUF commander in an area where the RUF
had taken control approach women to offer their 1ove,2427 but he also stated he had received
no complaints about rape in his capacity as a G5,2428 responsible for civilians.2429
944. Based on the witness's admission that women were in an enviromnent of fear and his
evasive demeanour while giving evidence on this topic, the Trial Chamber finds DCT-068's
statements that abducted women were not forced to have sexual relations to be contrary to
the overwhelming volume of evidence and to be disingenuous and unreliable. The Trial
Chamber recalls its finding that Issa Sesay's evidence must be treated with caution and
requires corroboration.
2444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44614-44616.
2449 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44614-44616.
2420 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44614-44616.
4421 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37075
2422 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010,p. 37085
2*23 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37119-37120.
2424 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37119.
2425 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37120,
2426 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37120.
2427 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37120.
mg DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010,p. 37121.
2429 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37120

---- End of Page 361 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /• #1Q 18 May 2012

Evidence of Edna Banggra Li S [*1*
945. Witness Edna Bangura testified that she was captured from her school in Masingbi,
Tonkolili District in 1994.2430 At the time, she was 10 years old.243l Bangura testified that an
RUF patrol commander named "CO Blood"2432 took her to Buedu where she was forced to
remain until November or December 1998.2433
946. Bangura testified that shortly after arriving in Buedu in 1994, she was assigned to
stay with a rebel commander named CO Scorpion and his wife, Hawa.243 4 She was assigned
to a small girls unit.2435 She did domestic chores for Hawa.2436 Bangura's testimony is
inconsistent as to how long she stayed with Hawa, stating at one point that it was less than a
year and at another point, that it was many years.2437 However, Bangura stated that she
stayed with Hawa after CO Scorpion left for Freetown, and that she left Buedu with Hawa,
following the fighters.2438 Bangura testified that when she went to Makeni, she was still with
Hawa.2439
947. Bangura testified as to two specific rapes being committed against her in Buedu prior
to 30 November 1996.2440 Both instances of rape were perpetrated by CO Ray,244l who
2430 Edna Bangura, Tranapnpt 20 optdbar 2008, pp. 18665-18667.
2434 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18665-18667.
2*32 Edna Bangura, Tranapnpt 20 oprdbnr 2008, pp. 18667-18668.
2*33 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 oprdbar 2008, pp.18668-18671, 18677.
2434 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18672, 18676, 18679.
2435 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18678-18679.
2*36 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 oprdbnr 2008, p. 18679.
2437 During examination-in-chief, the witness testified that she was almost always with Hawa, Edna Bangura,
Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18690, Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18701-18702 (during
cross-examination, the witness agreed that she was with Hawa for many years, then stating that she was only
with Hawa until the time CO Ray was her "husband", then stating that she was with Hawa for less than a year,
and then stating that she was still with Hawa after 1995 because CO Ray was under Scorpion's command, so 1
they all lived in the same house). See also Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18724-18726 (in a prior
statement to Prosecution investigators, Bangura stated "1 was with Hawa until Johnny Paul sent a message that
we come out of the bush to join them"); Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18730 (Bangura states that she and Ray
lived with Hawa in the same house so she was with Hawa throughout and seeks to explain her earlier
discrepancy by stating that she had confused Hawa and CO Ray, which would mean that she was with CO Ray
for less than a year); Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18730-18731 (witness disavows prior statement indicating
that she had gone to Makeni with CO Ray).
2438 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18693-18694.
2444 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18695, 18724.
2440 The witness's first two children were fathered by CO Ray. Only one of these children is living. Bangura
testified that the surviving child was born on 27 February 1995. It follows that the surviving child was conceived
about nine months earlier, which would have been sometime around May 1994, unless the child was not carried
to full term. In any event, this child was conceived in the pre-indictment period. Bangura testified that the
deceased child was born before the surviving child. Necessarily, both sex acts must have occurred prior to 30

---- End of Page 362 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T _ @95 18 May 2012 M

Bangura stated, "...raped me. He forced me. He forced me into sex" but these instances
occurred before the Indictment period.
948. Bangura testified that women would be captured by fighters when they went to the
war front and that these women became "wives" or would stay with fighters as either house
help or as bodyguards.2442
949. Bangura also testified that CO Musa was her husband in Buedu after CO Ray
died.2443 She did not provide any details during her direct examination as to the length or
nature of her relationship with CO Musa other than that he was her husband. On cross-
examination, when asked for how long she was CO Musa's "wife", Bangura explained,
No, I cannot tell now. Like I am saying, if it was like when I am at this age now that such a
thing happened to me I would have been able to tell you the exact particulars, but at that
time I was a small child. I was not mature enoughoto be thinking about or remembering a
whole lot of things. I was a small child at that time.4444
950. The Defence challenged the witness on a record of an interview with the Prosecution
which records her as saying, "CO Musa was killed some time in 1994 during one of the
attacks, after which the witness was raped by one CO Ali, an RUF rebel. The witness was
taken as a wife by CO Ali, and not CO Musa".2445
951. During her cross-examination before this Trial Chamber, Bangura stated that CO Ali
and CO Musa was the same person. It was only when Defence counsel confronted the
witness with exhibits and testimony in a prior case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone
which indicated that CO Ali and CO Musa were different people did the witness agree,2446
stating that counsel's question confused her.2447
952. Issa Sesay testified that Bangura could not have been taken to Buedu from 1994 to
1998 because the NPRC, not the RUF, controlled Buedu from October/November 1993 until
November 1996. See Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18664-18665; 18683-18684.
2441 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18684.
2**2 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18685.
2443 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18965.
2444 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18736.
2445 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18738.
2446 See Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18741-18744.
2447 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18746-18747. O: Why? What was it about the question
that I asked that you suddenly thought Musa and Ali were one and the same person`? A: You confused me. I
was confused and so I cou1dn’t say the right thing.

---- End of Page 363 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / r\p·Q 18 May 2012

gausa
April 1995.2448 Sesay further testified that people were not brought from Kangari Hills to
Kailahun until the AF RC coup in 1997.2444
953. Issa Sesay's testimony on this point is corroborated by the testimony of TF 1 -1 68 and
by Exhibit P-277.
Findings
954. Given the inconsistencies in Bangura's testimony regarding the time of the alleged
rapes in 1994-1998, the Trial Chamber is unable to find beyond reasonable doubt that these
events occurred after 30 November 1996.
(ii) Rape of women in Buedu that were abducted in Kenema in the wake of
"Operation Pay Yourself"’
955. The Prosecution submits that "[i]n February 1998, when ‘Operation Pay Yourself"
was declared by Sam Bockarie in Kenema, more than 400 civilians [...] were abducted and
taken to Daru in Kailahun District".245O The Prosecution further submits that "these abducted
women were taken to Buedu and forced to have sex with their captors".245l
956. The Trial Chamber has considered the testimony of Augustine Mallah and Aruna
Gbonda in making its findings.
Evidence
957. Witness Augustine Mallah testified that when the AF RC and RUF left Kenema
District in February 1998,2452 they captured civilians, including beautiful women who were
held against their will and would become "wives".2453 He estimated that more than 400
civilians were captured and taken to locations controlled by the AFRC and RUF throughout
2448 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46380-46381. See also Transcript 5 July 2010, pp, 43681-43682
(testifying that by the end of 1993, NPRC forces had pushed back the RUF to the border and that the only areas
still controlled by the RUF were Giema and small villages around Koindu by the border); TF 1-168, Transcript
21 January 2009, pp. 23230-23233, 23236-23243 (CS).
2444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46380-4638l.
2450 Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, para. 877.
2*5* md.
2*52 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20165-20167.
2453 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20172-20173.

---- End of Page 364 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T
Kailahun District, including Kailahun Town, Pendembu and Dodo.2444 The AFRC and RUF
also brought civilians who had been previously captured and who had been with the troops
forsome time.2444 Mallah testified that he went to Buedu with Sam Bockarie, RUF and
AF RC troops and most of the captured civilians.2444
958. Mallah testified that he found his niece, Aminata, who was approximately 13 years
old, in Daru.2447 She told him that she had been captured by an "RUF boy" called Ibrahim in
Kenema, who had sex with her and told her that she was going to be his "wife".2444 Mallah
took his niece away from lbrahim.2449
959. Mallah stayed in Buedu for approximately two months.2444 Both the AFRC and RUF
were in Buedu and everyone reported to Bockarie.2444 Mallah testified that the captured
civilians in Buedu were there to cook and to have sexual intercourse with the AFRC and
RUF soldiers who captured them.2442 Mallah did not witness women refusing sexual
intercourse, and stated that the women were forced by their captors to have sex.2444
960. Witness Aruna Gbonda testified that after Tejan Kabba had been reinstated,4444
which was in March 1998,2444 he saw that Mosquito and the other rebels came to Kailahun
District from Kenema District with male and female civilians.2444 The captured civilians
included adult women and girls who were from Kenema.4447 The women were taken to
Kailahun Town and other villa es.2444 W`hen the rebels and the civilians arrived in Kailahun
8
Town, food was scarce and Gbonda stated that they would ask him where they could find
bananas.2449 When Gbonda spoke to the women and girls, they said that the rebels under
2454 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20172.
2444 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November2008, pp. 20172-20173.
2*56 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20172-20173, 20176-20177.
2457 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20175.
2458 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20175-20176.
2444 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20176.
4444 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20203.
4444 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20203-20204.
4442 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20206.
2463 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20207.
4444 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4293-4294.
4444 Decision on Judicial Notice, Fact E.
4444 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4294.
4444 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4294-4295.
4444 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4294-4295.
4444 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4294-4295.

---- End of Page 365 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Mosquito and Issa Sesay had forcefully captured them and that when they were dislodged
from Freetown, some were brought by the rebels to Buedu and some to Kailahun Town.247O
The women told Gbonda that the rebels had turned them into their wives and "put them into
their homes forcefully".247l Gbonda stated that there were many captured women and girls,
and that he had personally spoken to about twenty.2472
Findings
961. Based on the evidence of Augustine Mallah and Aruna Gbonda, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that in Buedu and Kailahun Town beginning in February
1998, AFRC and RUF fighters held an unknown number of women in captivity, and
intentionally engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with them. Given the coercive
circumstances that resulted from the women being held captive, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators knew of the victims’ non-consent.
(iii) Rape after February 1998 of captured women in Buedu from March to
December 1999
962. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Dennis Koker in relation to the
evidence of sexual slavery in Buedu from February 1998 to December 1999.
Evidence
963. Witness Dennis Koker testified that he left Koidu Town in February 1998 and went
to Kailahun District together with 1ssa Sesay, Eldred Collins and others.2473 He passed
through Gandorhun,2474 Maburaka2475 Mendebumra, Mendelaema, Manowa, and was sent to
the front lines in Jokibu.2476 He arrived in Buedu approximately one month after the
ECOMOG lntervention.2477 Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. "Mosquito"), was in charge in Buedu.
2470 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4295-4296. if
2471 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4296.
2472 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4297.
2473 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1250.
2474 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1246.
2475 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1319-1321.
2*76 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp 1250-1245, 1322-1325.
2477 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1257.

---- End of Page 366 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T RI 18 May 2012

Members of the RUF and AF RC were also present including Johnny Paul Koroma, Edward
P. Kanneh, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and others.2474
964. Mosquito made Koker a Military Policeman (MP) and then an adjutant at the MP
office, in which capacity he issued passes to civilians and soldiers.2474 Koker testified that
civilians captured in Masiaka, Makeni and Koidu were brought to Buedu.2440 A pass and
screening system through the MP Office was in place to count and manage the captured
civilians in Buedu and to prevent them from escaping.2441
965. Koker testified that many women were captured by the RUF and AF RC and detained
in Buedu and that "they would many them without paying bride prices".2442 Sometimes,
commanders would come to Koker's office with women and ask him to "confine" them
because they had "overlooked" i.e. been disrespectful. The commanders would ask Koker to
"confirm" or charge the women. Koker left Buedu on 16 December 1999, the day after Sam
Bockarie left for Liberia.2483 During the entire time he was at the MP office, he believes
there may have been up to 1,300 civilians captured, including men, women and children.2484
Findings
966. Based on Koker's evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
AFRC/RUF members detained women in a coercive enviromnent and intentionally engaged
in non—consensual sexual intercourse with them from March 1998 to December 1999. Given
that they were forcibly detained against their will, the Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators knew of the women's non-consent.
(iv) TF1-189 raped by RUF members in Kailahun Town
Evidence 0
967. Witness TF 1-189, whom the Trial Chamber has found was captured by RUF/AF RC
rebels in Kono District in March 1998 and raped in Koidu Town by Commander A (named
247B Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1257-1260.
2479 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp 1260-1261, 1326-1329.
2480 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1261.
4441 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp 1262-1265.
2*82 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp 1265-1266.
2483 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1276-1278.

---- End of Page 367 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / lm 18 May 2012

by the witness in closed session) and other RUF rebels from March through August
1998,2485 testified that she was taken by the rebels and "SLA Juntas" to Kailahun Town
when Koidu Town was attacked by ECOMOG. The overall leader of the group that left was
an RUF commander named Supennan.2486
968. TF1-189 testified that they anived in Kailahun Town in August 1998, during the
rainy season and remained there less than two months until September 1998. TF 1-189 was
forced to stay with a commander named Gogomeh, together with five other female captives
and four rebels.2487 TF 1-189 testified that during this time, she and the other captured
women and girls were forced to cook, wash the rebel's clothes and were "wives".2488 In
private session, TF 1-189 testified that Commander A also continued to have sex with her in
Kailahun Town.2489
969. In September, TF 1-189 left Kailahun Town because it was being attacked by
ECOMOG jets. She went to another location in Kailahun District together with 40 captives
and a rebel.249O TF 1-1 89 revealed the location in rivate session.249l
P
Findings
970. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that between August and
September 1998 in Kailahun, an RUF rebel named Commander A intentionally engaged in
non-consensual sexual intercourse with TF 1-189, and that Commander A knew of TF 1-
189's non-consent to these sexual acts.
Conclusion
971. Based on the evidence above the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002 members of the AFRC/RUF
raped TF 1-1 89 and an unknown number of women in the Kailahun District.
2484 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1277.
2*85 Rape, Kono District, Findings.
2484 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16520—16522.
2487 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16523-16524.
2448 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16524.
2489 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16559 (PS).
4490 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16532.
2444 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16560 (PS).

---- End of Page 368 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

38Qél
972. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AFRC forces directed both
a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.2492 The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that each of the rapes proved by the Prosecution in respect of
Kailahun District formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were aware of this
fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned rapes in Kailahun
District constitute rape as a crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute.
(c) Freetown and the Westem Area ·
973. The Indictment alleges that between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February
1999, members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of
and/or subordinate to the Accused "raped an unknown number of women and girls
throughout Freetown and the Westem area".2493 The Prosecution further submits that rape
was an intrinsic element of the "reign of terror" unleashed by the AF RC and RUF when they
entered Freetown on 6 January 1999,2444 and that rape was a standard practice of the rebels
as they advanced towards and attacked Freetown.2495
974. The Prosecution led evidence of acts of rape occurring in the Westem area outside of
Freetown.2446 In arriving at its factual findings in Freetown, the Trial Chamber has examined
the testimony of Perry Kamara, James Kpumgbu, Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, TF1—O85, TF1—028, Ibrahim Wai and TF1—083, TF1—O29 and TF1—023 in addition to
relevant documentary evidence.
(i) Rape in Freetown
975. Witnesses Perry Kamara and James Kpumgbu provided evidence that rape occurred
as part of the January 1999 Freetown attack without providing details about the victims,
2442 See supra para. 57.
2*93 Indictment, paras. 14, 17.
2444 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 883.
2445 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 881.
44% See, eg., Exhibit P-206, RUF Trial Transcript, 28 November 2005, TF 1-029, pg. 19415-19422; Exhibit P-
205A, AFRC Trial Transcript, 9 March 2005, TF1-023, pp. 19330-19340; TF1-026, Transcript 14 February
2008, pp. 3851-3862.

---- End of Page 369 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI,-03-01-T % Gi)., 18 May 2012

perpetrators or the specific circumstances.2457 Witness TF1-358, a doctor, testified that a
number of female patients, mostly from Freetown, narrated histories of rape during January
1999 by "rebels" to him.2495 Histories included "gang rape" and rape in front of husbands
and relatives2455 in various locations including Freetown.25O0 Reports from organisations
such as Human Rights Watch,25Ol Amnesty lnternational,25O2 FAWE,25O5 UNOMSlL25O4 and
experts25O5 also provide evidence of widespread rape and sexual abuse occurring as part of
the Freetown invasion in January 1999. The evidence contained in the documentary
evidence is hearsay and/or not sufficiently specific to prove any individual act of rape.25O6
However, as the evidence demonstrates that rape was widespread throughout Freetown in
the lndictment period, it may be relevant as corroboration for specific incidents of rape
described by witnesses testifying before the Trial Chamber. The evidence has been
considered for the chapeau requirement that the crimes be widespread or systematic.
a. State House
976. The Prosecution submits that while AFRC and RUF fighters were based at the State
House, commanders forced young girls aged 14 to 16 to have sexual intercourse with
them.25O7 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses Abu Bakarr
2497 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3231, 3251-2; James Kpumgbu, 13 October 2008, pp. 18115-
18116.
5498 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20649.
5459 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20656
5500 TF1-358, Transcript 20 November 2008, pp. 20723
250] Exhibit P-328 "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone — Getting Away with Murder, Mutiliation, Rape,
New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol. 11 No.3(A), Part I — Surnrnary", p. 22999-23001; Exhibit P-
330 "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone — We’ll Kill You If You Cry — Sexual Violence in the Sierra
Leone Conflict, Vol. 15, No. 1 (A), January 2003", pp. 23142-23159. See also Corrine Dufka, Transcript 21
January 2008, p. 1798, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1822-1823.
5502 Exhibit P-331 "Amnesty Intemational Report, Sierra Leone — Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence
Against Girls and Women, 29 June 2000 (parts marked) — CMS pgs 23194-23l97".
5505 Exhibit P-204B (confidential), p. 20587-20591.
2504 Exhibit P-310 "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999", p. 21599.
2505 Exhibit P-077 (confidential), p. 9620; Exhibit P-073 "Expert Report of Beth Vann Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence in Sierra Leone, MSW, 14 May 2007 — 00031550-00031571".
5505 For example, the alleged systematic rape of virgins in Cline Town: Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 884;
Exhibit P-330 "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone — We’ll Kill You If You Cry — Sexual Violence in the
Sierra Leone Conflict, Vol. 15, No. 1 (A), January 2003, End of Pages 25-46 — CMS pgs 23140-23161", p. 23156. See
also Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 885, 888-889.
5507 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] paras 890-891.

---- End of Page 370 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

Mansaray and Alimamy Bobson Sesay in relation to rapes allegedly taking place in the State
House area.
i. Rape of women and girls on the grounds of the State House
Evidence
977. Witness Abu Bakarr Mansaray, whose testimony in the AF RC trial was tendered into
evidence through Rule 92bis, was cross—examined in this trial on 29 October 2008. He
testified that he was captured by rebels in Freetown in January 1999 and taken to State
House where he was detained in a kitchen for four days.25O8 Mansaray testified that each
night he was detained at State House he observed "many women" and young girls being
raped outside.25O9 He was able to witness the rapes through the window, as the rebels around
the State House used a lamp.25m Mansaray testified that he knew what he saw was rape,
because all the women were crying, and some said, in Krio, "we not agree. We are small
child. We are school-going girls".25H The victims included women and little children and
the perpetrators were rebels.25 12 Mansaray did not know which faction the perpetrators
belonged to.25l3 However, Mansaray testified earlier that Gullit and "his boys" had been at
the State House.25l4
978. Although the witness initially gave the date of his capture as January 1998, he later
clarified that he meant January 1999.25lS As it is clear that his capture occurred in the
context of the January 1999 attack on Freetown, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
alleged rapes fall within the Indictment period.
2508 Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, pp. 20427-20428, 20432-20434, 20447.
2509 Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, pp. 20424, 20429, 20433-20434, 20458-
20461.
mo Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, pp. 20433-20434, 20458-20461.
Z5" Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, pp. 20433-20434, 20458.
2512 Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, pp. 20433-20434.
Z5'} Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, p. 20434.
ZM Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, pp. 20430-20432.
2515 Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, p. 20447.

---- End of Page 371 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T /%/ 18 May 2012 %
1

979. Mansaray stated that he saw some of the victims being raped and sexual intercourse
taking place. He also testified that he heard screaming and all of the victims crying, and the
voices of some of the women and girls.2516
Findings
980. Mansaray was cross-examined on his tendered evidence but not on that part of his
evidence cited above, which the Trial Chamber finds credible. On the basis of his direct
observations, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that "rebels", which
included AFRC, RUF, STF and Liberian fighters under Gullit's command, intentionally
engaged in sexual intercourse with an unknown number of women and girls on the grounds
of the State House, over a period of three nights in January 1999. The Trial Chamber further
notes that these instances of sexual intercourse occurred in a public area, perpetrated by
rebels who had just invaded the city. Considering the evidence that the women and girls
were crying and protesting, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the sexual
intercourse was non-consensual, and that the perpetrators knew of the victims’ non-consent.
ii. Rape of grls inside State House
Evidence
981. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that a&er the junta captured State House on
6 January 1999, the SLA and RUF captured young girls in Freetown and brought them to
State House, which had many rooms.2517 All of the commanders captured young girls;2518
most of the girls were aged 14 to 16. The SBUs also captured girls, aged around 8 to 9 to use
for sex.2519 Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that the girls "were forced to do anything, so
they accepted...to have sexual intercourse with the commanders".25211
982. When asked in cross-examination if he raped any women between 1997 and June
2000, Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he captured a young girl and had sex with her
2516 Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1-024, pp. 20458-20461.
2517 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8279-8280, 8289-8290.
2518 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8290.
2519 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8290.
25211 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8289-8290.

---- End of Page 372 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / l8 May 20lZ

"when we came to Freetown".252l As Bobson Sesay distinguished this from events in
Freetown after the 1997 coup the Trial Chamber is satisfied that he is referring to the time of
the 1999 Freetown attack. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this incident falls within the
Indictment period.
Findings
983. The Trial Chamber finds that it is clear from Alimamy Bobson Sesay's testimony
that the girls who were brought to State House were captured by members of the AFRC,
RUF, STF and Liberian fighters who intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse with them.
Based on his statement that the girls "were forced to do anything, so they accepted to have
sexual intercourse with the commanders" and in light of the coercive circumstances of their
capture by these forces, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the girls did
not consent to sexual intercourse with the forces and that the perpetrators knew of their non-
consent.
984. The Trial Chamber further finds Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a commander in the
AFRC, captured and intentionally had sexual intercourse with a young girl in Freetown
during the 1999 attack. Given the coercive environment and the fact that the girl was
captured the Trial Chamber finds that she did not consent to the sexual intercourse and that
Bobson Sesay knew of her non—consent.
b. Blackhall Road
i. Rape of captured girls in J anuary 1999
985. The Prosecution submits that when RUF and Junta fighters entered Freetown, RUF
rebels brought girls aged 12 to 13 years to a house on Blackhall Road and raped them.2522
The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF 1-028 in relation to the allegation.
Evidence
25 21 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8866.
2522 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 887.

---- End of Page 373 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 1// 18 May 2012

986. Witness TF1-028 testified that she was captured by Juntas in Karina,2523 and then
travelled through Rosos to Eddie Town.2524 ln Eddie Town, SAJ Musa held a meeting
announcing that everyone was to go Freetown.2525 The witness and the Juntas travelled to
Benguema, where SAJ Musa died, and then continued towards Freetown.2526 Once the group
7 arrived in Freetown, the witness stayed at Ferry Junction for about two weeks.2527 TF1-028
was then moved to Blackhall Road, where she was held for approximately one week and
several days.2528
987. At Blackhall Road, the witness testified that the Juntas and the RUF would bring
"small children", girls of about 12 to 13 years, to the house she was staying in and rape them
in her presence. The witness testified that she pleaded with the RUF, but that they did not
listen to her.2529
988. The witness could not remember the year that this occurred, but she remembered it
was in January.253O However, in light of her description of her journey and of SAJ Musa's
death, it is clear that she is refening to the Freetown attack which occurred in January
1999.2531 As such, the alleged rapes fall within the Indictment period.
Findings
989. TF1-028's evidence that members of the RUF intentionally engaged in sexual
intercourse with young girls is based on her direct observations while in the same room as
the victims, and is credible. The witness provided an estimate of the ages of the victims.
Given that this was a situation in which young girls were captured by rebel forces in the
context of an attack on a city, and noting that the rebels had sexual intercourse with them in
the presence of others including TF1-028, who pleaded with them, the Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the victims did not consent, and that the perpetrators knew of
their non-consent.
2523 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9146, 9151-9157.
2524 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9192, 9205.
2525 Tr1~028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9221-9223.
2526 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9224-9226. .
2527 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9227-9229.
252* TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9227-9229.
2529 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9229.
2530 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9226.
253* Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion.

---- End of Page 374 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012

(ii) Kissy
a. Rape of girls in Kissy on or about 22 January 1999
990. The Prosecution submits that in Kissy, rebels raped girls aged 13 to 15.2332 The Trial
Chamber has considered the testimon of witness Ibrahim Wai in relation to the alle ation.
Y S
Evidence
991. Ibrahim Wai was in his family's house in Kissy around 22 January 19992333 when a
rebel named Captain Blood2334 and another rebel entered the house and amputated his
hand.2333 After his amputation, the rebels pushed him outside, and he went to the nearby
outside toilet where he sat for some time.233° While he was in the toilet, he testified that he
saw the rebels bringing girls, laying them outside in the open and raping them.2337 The rebels
asked the irls how old the were, and some re lied that the were 13, 14 or 15.2338 The
S Y P Y
witness testified that when the last rebel came to rape one of the girls, she said she was
tired.2333 She screamed and cried and asked "that the should et u awa from her".234O
SPY S P Y
The rebel then called his leader, who was a woman. This leader said if the girl did not lie
dpwh she wpurd tau tha rebel hay tp kill her.2343 Atta that tttha boy" had sex with her.2342
The witness testified that he was able to see what was happening, because the toilet he was
in had no door, the girls were in an open place, and although it was night the area was bright
because of the flames from burnin houses.2343
8
Findings
2532 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 882.
2533 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18634.
2534 Captain Blood was a "rebe1 conm1ander". See paras. 181, 319, 555, 658 [paragraphs subject to change].
2333 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18580, 18585-18592.
2333 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18594.
2537 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18584, 18597-18600.
2538 Ibrahim Wai, 17 October 2008, p. 18597.
2539 Ibrahim Wai, 17 October 2008, p. 18597.
3340 Ibrahim Wai, 17 October 2008, p. 18597-18598.
M Ibrahim wai, 17 October 2008, p. 18597-18600.
2542 Ibrahim wat, 17 October 2008, pp. 18697-18600.
3333 Ibrahim Wai, 17 October 2008, p. 18598.

---- End of Page 375 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Vx) 18 May 2012

992. Based on Wai's direct observation, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt
that AFRC rebels under the Command of Captain Blood intentionally engaged in sexual
intercourse with young girls, aged 13-15 years, in an open area, despite resistance by at least
one victim, in circumstances in which there was violent coercion. The Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, given the coercive environment and threats, there
was no consent by the girls and that the perpetrators knew that the victims did not consent.
· (iii) Rape of TF 1-029 in Wellington, Calaba Town and Benguema
993. The Prosecution submits that TF 1-029 was abducted by Major Arif and taken to
Calaba Town and Benguema where she was forced to have sex with him. The Trial Chamber
iiee considered the evidence er TF1-029. 2544
Evidence
994. Witness TF 1-029's evidence in the RUF trial was introduced through Rule 92bis.
She was cross-examined in the instant trial on 22 October 2008. TF 1-029 testified that she
was abducted from her house in Wellington by the "RUF and the SLAs" on 22 January
1999.2545 On cross-examination in the RUF case, she confirmed that the men who came to
her house were all wearing soldier's uniforms, canied weapons and were part of a mixed
ou of soldiers and RUF rebels includin five small bo s.2546 She was ca tured b an SLA
SY P 8 Y P Y
soldier named "Major Arif".2547
995. The mixed group of RUF and SLA fighters brought the witness, together with 50
other civilians who were captured in the same house, to Calaba Town.2548 The witness was
held there for two weeks.2549 The witness testified that during this time she lived in Major
Arif’ s house together with his cousins and other RUF and SLA soldiers2550 and was raped
there by Major Arif ten times.255l By "rape", the witness stated that she meant he "forced me
2544 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 921.
2545 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp, 7, 9.
2546 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 23-26.
2547 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 7-9.
2548 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 8-10.
2544 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 10.
2550 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 10.
M Exhibit P-206, ~RU1¤ riiiii rieiieeiipt 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 12. 1

---- End of Page 376 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4 dk 18 May 2012

to have sex".2 5 5 2 The witness was sixteen years old when this occurred.25 5 5 TFl-029 further
testified that she saw that the other women who were abducted were also raped.2 55 4
996. The rebels then took the witness to Benguema.25 5 5 She testified that when they
arrived in Benguema, she was again raped ten times by Major Arif .2555
997. TF1-029 testified that the RUF and SLAs also raped other girls while in Benguema.
The witness knows this because the girls who had been captured and raped told her what had
happened to them.2557
998. Major Arif permitted the witness to leave Benguema on 10 March 1999.25 5 5 On-
cross-examination, TF1-029 insisted that the rebels were mixed RUF and SLA but that most
of the people she "dealt with" were SLAs, including Colonel O-Five, Brigadier Five-Five,
Colonel Tito, and Colonel Rambo. O-Five, Tito and Five-Five were in control of the soldiers
from Calaba Town up to Four Mile.2555
Findings
999. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
between 22 January 1999 and 10 March 1999, which is during and after the Indictment
eriod, in Wellin on, Calaba Town and Ben ema, Ma`or Arif, an SLA soldier,
P gu J
intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse with TF1-029. Based on the evidence of the
environment of violence and abduction, as well as the witness's testimony that she was
"forced to have sex", the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that she did not
consent to these acts of sexual intercourse and that Major Arif knew of her non-consent.
(iv) Rape of Akiatu Tholley in Allen Town and Waterloo
5555 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 12.
5555 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 12.
2554 Exhibit P-206, ‘"RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 12.
2555 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1—029", pp. 13-15.
2555 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 15-16.
5557 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 15-16.
2558 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 17-18.
2555 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 30-31.

---- End of Page 377 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / N 18 May 2012

1000. The Prosecution submits that Akiatu Tholley was abducted from Wellington and
raped in the Western Area.2566 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Akiatu
Tholley.
Evidence
1001. Witness Akiatu Tholley testified that she was in Wellington when "rebe1s" came to
her house on the night of 5 January 1999.256l Rebels came to her home on three subsequent
occasions as detailed in the section on unlawful killings.2562 On cross-examination, Tholley
denied a prior statement taken by the Prosecution in which she stated that the rebels came to
her house for the first time on 6 January 1999, the day aiier they entered Wellington.2563
1002. Tholley was captured by a rebel named James. Tholley testified that James was
accompanied by his "boys" whom he had captured and who carried his ammunition. J ames’
boys gave Tholley and other captured civilians ammunition to carry and took them to Allen
Town. James also had his "wives" with him.2564 On cross-examination, Tholley testified that
her cousin Amina was captured again on this occasion and that she did not see Amina again
until she returned to Freetown.2565
1003. Tholley testified that James took her to the Mammy Dumbuya Church2566 where she
saw rebels raping, beating and killing many young girls, although she was not able to
estimate how many.2567 Tholley testified that she refused to have sex with James, and that he
raped her and damaged her in her vagina. She had not yet had her menses. Tholley lost
consciousness2568 and when she awoke, she found herself in a small hut with an old woman
who told her that "they" had brought Tholley to her and that she had treated Tholley's
injuries with herbs. Tholley testified that James then arrived and killed the old woman.2569
2566 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 923.
256lAkiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19172-19174.
2562 Cross reference paras 259-261.
2563 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19237-19239.
256* Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19176-19179.
2565 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19245-19250.
2566 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19181-19182.
2567 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19182—19183.
2566 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19183-19184.
2569 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19184-19185.

---- End of Page 378 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01—T / CL 18 May 2012

1004. James took Tholley to Waterloo, Western Area together with his "wives" and
"‘boys", the other rebels and other captured civi1ians.257O The group was led by F ive—Five.25 71
Tholley testified that she remained with James in Waterloo for a ‘"1ongtime" but was unable
to say how 1ong.25 12 Tholley testified that after James captured her and raped her in the
Mammy Dumbuya Church, he continued to have sex with her against her will.25 13 Tholley
did not want to be his "wif`e".2574
1005. Tholley testified that the rebels she was with were a "mixed group" and the leader
was Five—Five.2575 James told Tholley that he belonged to the STF and ULIMO and that he
had been part of the Liberian war until "the time they joined the rebels". She did not know to
which group Five—Five be1onged.25 16
1006. The Trial Chamber finds that Tholley's evidence of her movements with the rebels is
consistent with other evidence of the pattern of RUF/AFRC movements at this time. The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that James was an STF member and that he captured Tholley prior
to the retreat from Freetown in late January 1999 and that she remained under his control in
the Western Area until early April 1999.
Findings
1007. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
between late January and early April 1999, James, an STF fighter, intentionally engaged in
sexual intercourse with Tholley in Allen Town and in Waterloo. Based on the evidence of
the enviromnent of violence and her abduction, as well as the witness's testimony that she
was "f`orced to have sex", the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Tholley did
not consent to these sexual acts and that James knew of her non—consent.
(v) Rape of TF 1-023 in Calaba Town, Benguema and Four Mile by a member of the
AF RC from late January until March, 1999
2570 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19185—19187.
2571 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp, 19187—19189.
2572 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19198, 19258.
2573 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19202-19203.
2574 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p, 19202,
2575 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19187—l9188; Transcript 27 October 2008 pp. 19197-
19198,
2576 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19205; pp. 19236—19237.

---- End of Page 379 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T // Gu 18 May 2012

Evidence
1008. Witness TF 1-023, whose evidence in the AFRC trial was introduced through Rule
92bis, was cross-examined in the present case on 22 October 2008. She testified that she and
her family sought refuge when the AF RC invaded Freetown. They moved from Cline Town,
where they were living, back and forth to various places including Wellington and Portee in
Eastern Freetown.2577 On 22 January 1999, TF 1-023 was in Wellington when it was attacked
so she fled to Consider Lane in Calaba Town. That same afternoon, she and five or six
others were captured by a group of rebels. The witness was captured by a "young boy" who
was wearing combat trousers and a T-shirt and who was armed with a gun. He was part of a
group of approximately 200 people, some of whom were wearing combat uniforms and
others civilian clothes with head ties. They were armed with guns and cutlasses. There were
also captured civilians among the group. The witness was 16 years old at the time and was
not armed.2578
1009. The rebels brought TF 1-023 and the other captured civilians to an unidentified
location and then to Allen Town. There, they encountered a group of approximately 300-400
rebels and captured civilians. The witness and other captured civilians were prevented from
escaping by the Small Boys Unit.2579 The witness was held at Allen Town for about 3
days;5580 and was then taken by a rebel, whom she named in a Confidential Exhibit,258l to
Calaba Town.2582 Trial Chamber will refer to the rebel as "Captain A". The witness testified
that there were approximately 50-100 rebels in Calaba Town. Some were in combat uniform
and some were wearing jeans and T-shirfs.2585
1010. ln Calaba Town, Captain A handed TF 1-023 over to a commander, whom she named
in a Confidential Exhibit.2554 The Trial Chamber will refer to the commander as "Colonel
B". Captain A told the witness that she should be Colonel B's "wife" and Colonel B
2577 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", pp, 29-30; Exhibit P—205B (confidential),
pp. 7-9; TFl-023 Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18953.
2575 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", pp. 30-31; Exhibit P—205B (confidential),
pp. 10-1 1.
2579 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", pp. 33-35.
2550 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl—023", p. 36.
M Exhibit P-267 (caiiriiieiitiiii).
5585 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", pp. 37-39.
5585 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", p. 38.
2554 Exhibit P-268 (Confidential).

---- End of Page 380 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / ., 18 May 2012

accepted this. Colonel B did not ask for the witness's consent. There was no marriage
ceremony.2555 That night, Colonel B threatened the witness, shouted at her and forced her to
have sex with him. It was the first time she had sex. Alter that night, she continued to "sleep
with" Colonel B.2556
1011. TF 1-023 remained in Calaba Town for three days. On the third day, she and the
rebels walked to Allen Town, Waterloo and then Benguema where they remained for about
four days. They then continued on to Lumpa and Four Mile where they stayed for about a
month.2587 On cross-examination, the witness clarified that she remained with "the armed
men" in Freetown from 22 to 29 January. She left Freetown on 29 January, and it took about
two days to reach Benguema, where they spent about three days. From Benguema TF 1-023
and the other ca tured civilians were forcefull taken to Four Mile where the sta ed for
P Y Y Y
approximately a month.2588 Colonel B was not always with the witness; he joined her in
Benguema and again in Four Mile. The witness does not know where he was in the
interim.2589
1012. The witness lived with Colonel B for about three weeks in Four Mile, after which he
left her and went to Makeni. During those three weeks, he asked her to cook, but she did not
as she did not know how. During those three weeks she continued to sleep with him because
he told her that she was his "wife". He never asked her consent before sex. The witness was
not able to leave.2590 There were approximately 400 armed rebels at Four Mile. Some
"people" at Four Mile tried to escape but they were beaten. This made the witness afraid and
she decided not to try to run away.259l Colonel B also had an armed guard follow her so she
could not escape.2592
1013. When Colonel B left for Makeni, he left the witness in the "care of" a captain, whom
the witness identified in a Confidential Exhibit.2595 The Trial Chamber will refer to the
5585 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 45-46.
5585 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 46-47.
2557 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 47-49.
2555 Exhibit P-205B (confidential), pp. 31-32.
5555 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 47-49.
2550 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 49-52.
255I Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 52-53.
2552 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005. TF1-023", p. 53.
2555 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", p. 49; Exhibit P-269, (Confidential).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z gp, 18 May 2012

?>z¢+¤#+
captain as "Captain C". The witness remained in the custody of Captain C from
approximately March through August.2594
1014. TF1-023 testified that the rebels she named in the exhibits told her that they were
members of the AFRC. 1 She first saw their senior commander, Brima or "Gullit" in
Benguema. He was a Brigadier at the time. At Four Mile, Colonel B told her that the senior
commander was "Bazzy". He used to visit Colonel B and the witness would see him
regularly.2595 On cross-examination, TF1-023 testified that a boy called Alhassan identified
Bazzy to her at Four Mile, but that "everyone" told her that Bazzy was the senior
commander. She did not talk with Bazzy.2596 On cross-examination, TF1-023 testified that
throughout her "joumey" the rebels were a mixed group of AFRC and RUF, but that the
ones she had direct contact with were all AFRC. 2597
Findings
1015. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that between 22 January and
approximately March 1999, which extends beyond the Indictment period for Freetown and
the Westem Area, Colonel B, a member of the AFRC, intentionally engaged in sexual
intercourse with TF1-023. The Trial Chamber finds, based on the evidence of the
environment of violence and coercion to which TF1-023 testified, that she did not consent to
these sexual acts, and that Colonel B knew that she did not consent.
Conclusion
1016. Based on the evidence above, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt that:
i. Men and boys, members of AFRC, RUF, STF and Liberian fighters, under the
command of Gullit, raped an unknown number of women and girls in the
grounds of the State House over three nights in January 1999;
ii. AFRC, RUF, STL and Liberian commanders and fighters raped an unknown
number of girls inside State House during the Freetown attack of January 1999;
2594 Exhibit P—205A "AFRC Trial Transcript 7 November 2005, TF1-023", p. 53 (CS).
5595 Exhibit 1=·-20512 (pppndppuai), pp. 13-16, 24-33.
25% Exhibit P—205B (confidential), pp. 26-28.
2597 TF1-023, Trar1sc1ipt22 October 2008, pp. 18958-18959.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6u 18 May 2012

3% *+}-5
iii. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a commander in the AFRC, captured and raped a
young girl in Freetown during the 1999 attack;
iv. RUF fighters raped an unknown number of girls in a house on Blackhall Road
during the Freetown attack of January 1999;
v. Rebels under the command of` Captain Blood raped an unknown number of girls
in Kissy on or about 22 January 1999;
vi. Major Arif an SLA soldier, raped TF1-029 between 22 January 1999 and 10
March 1999, which is during and after the Indictment period, in Wellington,
Calaba Town and Benguema;
vii. James, an STF fighter, between late January and early April 1999 raped Akiatu
Tholley in Allen Town and in Waterloo;
viii. Colonel B, a member of the AFRC, raped TF1—023 between 22 January and
approximately March 1999.
ix. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or
AFRC forces directed both a widespread and systematic attack against the
civilian population of Sierra Leone.2598 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that each
of the rapes proved by the Prosecution in respect of Freetown and the Western
Area formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were aware of this
fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned rapes in
A Freetown and the Western Area constitute rape as a crime against humanity
under Article 2 of the Statute.
2598 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.

---- End of Page 383 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03·01—T / GIA 18 May 2012

ésaaé
2. Count 5 (Sexual Slavery)
Allegations and Submissions
1017. The Indictment alleges that "members of RUF, AF RC, AF RC/RUF Junta or alliance,
and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the
direction and/or control of, and/or subordinate to the Accused, committed widespread acts of
sexual violence against civilian women and gir1s", including using them as sex s1aves.2599
These acts of sexual violence are alleged to have been carried out in various Districts of
Sierra Leone, including Kono District between 1 February 1998 and about 31 December
1998, Kailahun District between about 30 November 1996 and 18 January 2002; and
Freetown and the Western Area between about 21 December 1998 and 28 February 1999.
1018. The Prosecution has not pleaded specific locations with regard to sexual slavery. In
accordance with established jurisprudence, the Trial Chamber has found that due to the
continuous nature of the crime of sexual slavery, the pleading of particular locations is 1
impracticable.2600 Therefore, the Trial Chamber has considered evidence of sexual slavery in
all locations in Kono District, Kailahun District and Freetown and the Western Area.
1019. In its Final Trial Brief the Prosecution submits that "sexual slavery involved the
abduction of women and girls and holding them in captivity as sex slaves. These women
were ofien referred to as "wives", "bush wives", "jung1e wives", or "rebel wives". The
victims were expected to carry out the traditional functions of a wife and more. A wife
carried loads on her head, gratified her "husband's" sexual wishes without question; cooked
and did his laundry. Moreover, she would be severely punished for refusing to perform her
conjugal duties or if found to be unfaithful to him. In the vast majority of cases, the victims
had no option to refuse the "marriage". Rather, an atmosphere of coercion generally
prevailed, characterised by the use of violence or the threat of violence by the Indictment
perpetrators to force their victims into submission".260l
1020. The Prosecution further submits that "The subjugation of women and concomitant
reign of terror was instilled in numerous ways. The Indictment perpetrators instilled fear in
2599 Indictment, paras 14-17.
2600 See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment.
2601 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 896-897.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01~T / GA 18 May 2012 w

38*1 $1;}-
their "wives" by telling them their families would not take them back, that they would be
blamed for what happened to them. Indeed, the practice of creating bush wives was not
subject to customary marital practice, thus creating a sense of social stigma for the victims.
The Indictment Perpetrators also terrorised their "wives" by beating or killing women that
did not consent to them and in some cases, ordered armed guards to prevent their escape. In
other instances, women were forced to choose between being the "wife" of one commander,
which carried the benefits of food and protection, or risk being sexually used by multiple
combatants. The insidious nature of sexual slavery made it difficult to escape from,
demonstrating the potency of its terror. The Indictment Perpetrator's practice of using
women as sex slaves was accepted, open and endemic. Senior commanders enjoyed priority
over lower ranking subordinates in their choice of the captured women assigned as wives. In
addition, combatants traded assigned women amongst themselves. According to one former
commander, "the SBUs also used women as wives, having sexual intercourse with them.
The girls were from the ages of 8 and above". Those girls not assigned to a single husband
were called "govemment women" and were, therefore, free for any other person".2602
1021. The Defence submits that it has not substantively addressed the crime base evidence
in its submissions because its position from the outset is that it accepts that crimes were
indeed committed in Sierra Leone although it denies that the Accused is responsible for
these crimes.26O3 The Defence maintains however, that the onus of proving beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of the crimes charged in the Indictment as well as the guilt of
the Accused, lies squarely upon the Prosecution.26O4 In addition, the Defence requests the
Trial Chamber to exclude Prosecution evidence of crimes that falls outside the temporal or
geographical scope of the Indictment or to impose strict limits on the degree to which such
evidence may be taken into consideration during deliberations.26O5
(a) Kailahun District A
1022. The Indictment alleges that from 30 November 1996 to 18 January 2002, members
of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters assisted and
encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of and/or
2602 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 898-899.
2603 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1557.
2604 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 27.
2605 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 42-46.

---- End of Page 385 ---------------------------


Case No.:SCSL-03-01-T / 65 18 May 2012

subordinate to the Accused "abducted many victims from other areas of the Republic of
. Sierra Leone, brought them to locations throughout the District, and used them as sex
SlaV€S>>·26()6
1023. The Prosecution submits that "[T]he sexual slavery which occurred throughout
Kailahun District is best understood in the context of the District's role as an RUF
stronghold throughout the conrlict".2607
1024. The Prosecution further submits that "[F]ollowing the Intervention, returning
combatants took many captured women and girls to Kailahun. The women were distributed
by the G5 to commanders or soldiers and were expected to work for and have sex with them.
The women had little choice in the matter. The presence of specific personnel to organize
and administer sexual slavery illustrates its acceptance and permanence in the rebel
mnksvlzoox
1025. Given the continuous nature of the crime of sexual slavery, the Trial Chamber will
consider all evidence of sexual slavery in Kailahun District.
(i) Women used as sexual slaves by the RUF throughout Kailahun District
1026. Witnesses Mustapha M. Mansaray, Perry Kamara, Isaac Mongor, Dennis Koker,
Finda Gbamanja, TF1-375, TF1-371, TF1-189 Edna Bangura, Issa Sesay, and DCT 068
gave evidence relevant to allegations of sexual slavery in Kailahun District, in addition to
Exhibits P-073, P-078, P-077 and P-277.
Documentary evidence
1027. The expert report of Beth Vann stated that Sierra Leonean refugees fled AFRC and
RUF forces in approximately March-April 1998 and arrived in camps along the border in
neighbouring Guinea.2°09 The largest concentration of camps was in Gueckedou-
Kissidougou prefectures, which borders Kono and Kailahun Districts in Sierra Leone.2610
The refugees described atrocities committed by armed groups, including the AF RC and RUF
2606 Indictment, paras 14, 16.
2607 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 912.
M8 Prosecution moor roar Baer, para. 913.
2609 Exhibit P—073, "Expert Report, Conf1ict—Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4.
MO Exhibit P—073, "Expert Report, Conf1ict—Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4.

---- End of Page 386 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J Q\` 18 May 2012 `%

3‘5#t}°i
in Kono and Kailahun Districts.26H Vann reported that the refugees included many victims
of war—related sexual violence.26l2
1028. Vann further reported that according to the victims she interviewed, sexual slavery
was a common practice, especially amongst the RUF and AFRC. The report explains that
sexual slavery "involves the abduction of females — whether young girls or old women —
who are then forced to serve as de facto ‘wives’ to officers and troops. Serving as a ‘wife’
includes finding food, cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, complying with forced sexual
relations, bearing and caring for children".26l3 The majority of rape victims from Sierra
Leone that she interviewed in Gueckedou Camp named the perpetrators as members of the
AFRC/RUF or "rebels".2°l4 The majority of documented incidents of sexual violence
reported took place between 1997 and 1999.2615
1029. ln 1998, Amnesty lntemational reported that "[i]n those areas of the country which
remained under the control of rebel forces thousands of civilians, including women and
children, effectively remained captive, many of them in Kailahun District, a stronghold of
the RUF since the beginning of the internal armed conHict. Some estimates put this number
as high as 10,000. They were used to carry goods, as human shields or for sexual
slavery".26l6
1030. Expert witness TF1-150 documented human rights abuses in Sierra Leone from May
1998 through 2000. This witness had published a report by July 1998 which documented
that "rebels" were holding large numbers of civilian captives, including civilians who were
being used for forced sexual activity, in various areas of Sierra Leone, but mostly in
Kailahun District.26l7
1031. Prosecution Witness TF1—174 worked at an interim care centre in Makeni where
captured girls were provided with assistance. TF1-174 stated that the girls at the centre had
been captured from different districts and brought against their will to Kailahun District,
ml Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4.
M2 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4.
Em Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 8.
M4 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 1 l.
2615 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 9.
2616 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone: 1998 — a year of atrocities against civilians — Amnesty International", p. 12,
Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 28.

---- End of Page 387 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gh 18 May 2012

where they were forced to satisfy the fighters’ "sexual desires". The girls that TF1-174
worked with had been raped and tumed into "wives" of RUF commanders. One girl was said
to have been a wife of Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander. She was 1-4 or 15 years old.26l8
1032. While this evidence is not sufiiciently specific to prove any individual instances of
sexual slavery, it demonstrates that sexual slavery was committed on a widespread basis in
Kailahun District and may be relevant as corroboration for specific instances of sexual
slavery described by witnesses testifying before the Trial Chamber.
1033. Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor testified that he would visit Kailahun District at
unspecified times.26l9 Mongor stated that RUF fighters used captured women in Kailahun
District for sexual purposes and some were trained as soldiers.262O Mongor explained that
captured women had no choice but to remain with the RUF fighters and submit to them, but
did not indicate what duties "wives" were expected to perform.2°2l
1034. Prosecution Witness TF1-371 testified that after the 1991 attacks on Sierra Leone by
RUF and NPFL fighters, captured women and girls would involuntarily become the "bush
wives" of RUF commanders.2622 These women and girls would be the sexual partners of the
commanders and have children by them, and would also do domestic chores, such as
cooking and laundry.2623
1035. Defence Witness Issa Sesay testified that rape was not allowed and that rape was
punishable by death2624 and that he did not see or hear about any instances of rape in
Kailahun from 1992 through to the time of disamrament.2°25 Sesay stated that he did hear
mg TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23779-23780. 23792.
2619 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6208.
2620 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6208.
ml See Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6206-6208.
2622 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2232 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008. pp. 2506-2507 (CS). TF1-
371 testified that "I can't say they were voluntary because they captured these girls and before even coming into
the [indiscemible] they already have them as a bush wife, you know? In our custom in Sierra Leone that is not
the way for somebody to become a wife to somebody. I mean there are norms that govern how people become
husband and wife, but that was a different situation". Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2507 (CS).
2623 TF1-371. Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2506-2507.
2624 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44614-44616.
2625 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44614-44616.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z gx 18 May 2012

35%:
about rape occurring in other parts of Sierra Leone, but said that disciplinary action was
taken against the perpetrators.2626
1036. Defence Witness DCT—068, who had been a member of the RUF from August
1992,2627 and who was in Kailahun District from 1992 to 1998 2628 testified that he had
never seen women being raped or assigned to commanders. DCT—068 gave the example of
Sam Bockarie, and explained that if Bockarie wanted a woman for love, he would talk to
that woman in respect of 1ove.2629
1037. DCT—068 insisted that women were not coerced into working as domestic servants to
commanders but did acknowledge that women, other than the wives of commanders, were
relied upon when the RUF needed people to assist with domestic work or farming.2630
1038. Based on the witness's admission that women were in an environment of fear and his
evasive demeanour while giving evidence on this topic the Trial Chamber finds the
witness's statements that abducted women were treated with "1ove" and not forced to have
sexual relations, to be contrary to the overwhelming volume of evidence and to be
disingenuous and unreliable.
(ii) Captured civilians used as sexual slaves in Pendembu
1039. Prosecution Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray was a member of the RUF Defence
Unit (IDU) in Kailahun District from approximately November 1996 until July 2000, with
the exception of a two—week assignment in Makeni.263 I Mansaray testified that the IDU was
responsible for investigating violations of RUF laws. Investigations were undertaken by a
panel of the Joint Security Board of Investigation composed of an IDU representative, an
Intelligence Officer of the G5 (responsible for protection of civilians), a representative of the
Military Police and representatives from other units.2632
26% Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44614-44616.
2627 Dcr-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37075.
2628 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37085.
M Dcr-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37119.
2**0 Dcr-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37122.
ml Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5230-5234; Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5318.
2632 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, p. 5237.

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Case No.: S SL-03- -T qu 18 May 2012 M

1040. Mansaray testified that while he was assigned as 164 Brigade IDU chief in Pendembu
in May/June 1999, one of his duties was to "screen" civilians who had been captured by
fighters.2666 He recorded their names, dates of birth, their village or town of origin in
addition to records of the numbers of captured civilians.2664 Civilians were captured from the
areas around Dam and Segbwema2666 and others were "retumees" from Liberia.2636
Mansaray estimated that there were about 500 captured civilians staying with the fighters at
Pendembu.2667
1041. Mansaray testified that after the captured civilians had been screened, their captured
family members already in Pendembu, if any, could "sign for them" and take them to live
with them as the fighters did not have enough space to keep them or to provide food for
them.2666 Some of the civilians without family members were signed for by fighters who
took the civilians to their houses to do domestic work.2669 Mansaray testified that some of
these fighters took the captured women to their homes to have sexual intercourse with them
and would tell him that they had "mar1ied" them.4646 Mansaray also testified that some
fighters did not report the women they had captured.2644 Rather, they took the women
directly to their houses. Mansaray is not aware of what happened to such women.2642
1042. On cross-examination, Mansaray testified that after having been captured, some
women were willing to stay with the fighters and others were not.2646
1043. The Trial Chamber finds that by depriving the women of their liberty, forcing them
to engage in sexual acts, and in some cases forcing them to do labour, the perpetrators
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over them, thus committing the crime of sexual
slavery in Pendembu from November 1996 to July 2001.
(iii) Evidence of sexual slavery in Buedu from November 1996 until 1998
2666 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5319-5320.
2664 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5320.
4646 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5320.
2666 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5319-5321.
2664 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5321.
M Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5320-5321.
2636 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5321-5323.
2646 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5327.
2644 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5323, 5326.
2642 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5323-5327. »
6646 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, p. 5448.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G-TLA 18 May 2012

364%
1044. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witness Edna Bangura, Issa
Sesay, TF 1-168 and Exhibit P-277 in relation to alleged instances of sexual slavery in
Buedu.
1045. The Prosecution submits that "Buedu was the AF RC/RUF headquarters from about
February 1998 to 2000. During this time, the RUF captured girls aged 15 and 16 through to
their mid-20's during combat missions. Some of the abducted women were forced to
become sexual partners to RUF commanders".2644 It further submits that Edna Bangura was
a sex slave in Buedu from 1994 to 1998.2645
Evidence
1046. The evidence of witness Edna Bangura of her capture and subsequent detention in
Buedu has been recited in the section dealing with rape.2646
1047. Bangura testified that women would be captured by fighters when they went to the
war front and that these women became "wives" or would stay with lighters as either house
help or as bodyguards.2647 Bangura explained that when a woman became a "wife" in the
context of rebels capturing women, they did not go to perform mariiage rites anywhere.
They would just capture them and bring them and consider them to be their wives and the
women in return would do everything to them just like a husband and wife.2648
1048. In relation to her own experience, Bangura stated from the day CO Ray "invited" her
to his room to have sex with her; he regarded her as his "wife".2649 CO Ray died at an
unspecified time before the witness left Buedu.2°5O Bangura also testified that CO Musa
became her "husband" in Buedu after CO Ray died.265l She did not provide any details
during her direct examination as to the length or nature of her relationship with CO Musa,
other than that he was her "husband".
2644 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 876, 914.
2645 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 915.
2646 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape).
2647 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18685.
2648 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18685.
2649 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18696.
2650 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18695—18696.
2651 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18965.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T GLB 18 May 2012 %

1049. The Defence challenged the witness on the record of an interview with the
Prosecution which records her as saying, "CO Musa was killed some time in 1994 during
one of the attacks, after which the witness was raped by one CO Ali, an RUF rebel. The
witness was taken as a wife by CO Ali, and not CO Musa",2652 and on a number of
inconsistencies between her testimony and the statement that she gave to Prosecution
investigators on 29 October 2003 concerning CO Musa.
1050. During cross-examination before this Trial Chamber, Bangura stated that CO Ali and
CO Musa was one and the same person. It was only when Defence counsel confronted the
witness with exhibits and testimony in a prior case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone
which indicated that CO Ali and CO Musa were different people that the witness agreed,2653
admitting that Counsel's question confused her.2654
1051. Issa Sesay testified that Bangura could not have been taken to Buedu to be used as a
sexual slave from 1994 to 1998 because the NPRC, not the RUF, controlled Buedu from
October/November 1993 until April 1995.2655 Sesay further testified that people were not
brought from Kangari Hills to Kailahun until the AF RC coup in 1997.2656
1052. Issa Sesay's testimony on this point is corroborated by the testimony of TF 1-168 and
by Exhibit P-277, which reports that "[t]owards the end of 1993, the RUF was almost
pushed out of Kailahun district by the govemment forces and early in 1994 Cpl. Sankoh was
forced to move out of Kailahun district for Kenema district".2(’57 The remaining RUF
fighters in Kailahun were concentrated in Ngeima town, Luawa Chiefdom and other jungle
hideouts, while govemment troops controlled the major villages and towns, including
Buedu.2658
2652 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18738.
2653 See Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18741-18744.
2654 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18746-18747 ("Q: Why? What was it about the question that
I asked that you suddenly thought Musa and Ali were one and the same person'? A: You confused me. I was
confused and so I couldn’t say the right thing.") I
2655 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46380-46381. See also Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43681-43682
(testifying that by the end of 1993, NPRC forces had pushed back the RUF to the border and that the only areas
still controlled by the RUF were Giema and small villages around Koindu by the border); TF1-168, Transcript
21 January 2009, pp. 23230-23233, 23236-23243 (CS).
2656 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46380-46381.
2657 Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), p. 77. See also TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23230-23233, 23236-
23243 (CS).
2658 Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), pp. 39-40. See also TF]-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23230-23233

---- End of Page 392 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T M 18 May 2012 w

525 *1255
Findings
1053. Given the inconsistencies in Bangura's testimony regarding the time of her alleged
sexual enslavement(s) in 1994-1998, the Trial Chamber is unable to find beyond reasonable
doubt that these events occurred after 30 November 1996. Further, due to inconsistencies
relating to the perpetrators and the location of the alleged crimes, the Trial Chamber is also
unable to determine the identity of the person or persons who committed the crimes alleged
or the location in which they occurred. However the Trial Chamber accepts Bangura's
evidence that women would be captured by fighters when they went to the war front and that
these women became "wives" or would stay with fighters as either house help or as
bodyguards.2°59 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has not proved the
required elements for the crime of sexual slavery in relation to this witness from November
1996 through November or December 1998 but that Banguara's evidence that women were
captured and used as "wives" and house help demonstrates that sexual slavery was
widespread in Buedu and may be relevant as corroboration for specific instances of sexual
slavery described by witnesses testifying before the Trial Chamber.
(iv) Evidence of sexual slavery in Kailahun District after February 1998
1054. The Prosecution submits that "[I]n February 1998, when ‘Operation Pay Yourself
was declared by Sam Bockarie in Kenema, more than 400 civilians, including ‘beautifi1l
ladies to convert into a wife’ were abducted and taken to Dam in Kailahun District".2°°0 The
Prosecution further submits that the "abducted civilians were distributed in villages within
Kailahun District" and that "these abducted women were taken to Buedu and forced to have
sex with their captors. These women feared for their safety within this group of armed men
as refusing to have sex meant they wouldbe kicked about like a football". 2661
1055. The Trial Chamber has considered the testimony of Augustine Mallah and Aruna
Gbonda in making its findings.
Evidence
(CS). p
2659 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, p. 18685.
2660 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 877.
2661 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 877.

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Case No.; SCSL—03—0l—T J Gil 18 May 2012 M

1056. The testimony of witness Augustine Mallah of the capture of women and their lj
forcible transfer and detention in locations controlled by the AFRC and RUF throughout
Kailahun District, including Kailahun Town, Pendembu and Dodo 2662 has been recited in
the Section on rape. 2663
1057. Mallah stayed in Buedu for approximately two months.2664 Both the AFRC and RUF
were in Buedu and everyone reported to Bockarie.2666 Mallah testified that the captured
civilians in Buedu were there to cook and have sexual intercourse with the AFRC and RUF
soldiers who captured them.2666 Mallah did not witness women refusing sexual intercourse,
although he stated that it may have been possible for a woman who had been with the RUF
for a long time to leave, the man if she had a good reason2667 but
[tjhe moment you would be, say for example, leaving Vandi you should get married to
Momoh, because if you did not do that you would just be there like a football [...] When
Musa comes he will kick you and you will go to Vandi and he too will kick you. Like me, if
1 come and 1 want to have an affair to have sex with a woman and 1 don’t have a woman
and you are there without a husband, 1 would just go to you.6666
1058. Mallah explained that the women were forced by their captors to have sex2666 if the
women did not want to die. "[T]hey just have to do it, whether they were willing or not".2676
Mallah also testified that there was a pass system in Buedu which controlled the movements
of captured civilians.267l Q
1059. Witness Aruna Gbonda testified that after Tej an Kabbah had been reinstated,2672
which was in March 1998,2676 he saw Mosquito and the other rebels come to Kailahun
District from Kenema District with male and female civilians.2674 The ca tured civilians
P
6662 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20172.
6666 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape).
2664 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20203.
2665 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20203—20204.
2666 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20206.
2667 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20206—20207.
2666 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20206—20207.
2666 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20207.
2676 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20207. The pass system in Kailahun is described in
more detail in the rape section. For example, in the testimony of Dennis Koker. See Factual and Legal Findings
on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape).
MI Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20207—20208.
2676 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4293-4294.
2673 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, Fact E.
6674 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4294.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 6k 18 May 2012
K A

A included adult women and girls who were from Kenema.2675 The women were taken to
Kailahun Town and other villages.2676 When the rebels and the civilians arrived in Kailahun
Town, food was scarce and Gbonda stated that they would ask him where they could find
bananas.2677 When Gbonda spoke to the women and girls, they said that the rebels under
Mosquito and Issa Sesay had forcefully captured them and that when they were dislodged
from Freetown, some were brought by the rebels to Buedu and some to Kailahun Town.2678
The women told Gbonda that the rebels had turned them into their wives and "put them into
their homes forcefully".2679 Gbonda stated that there were many captured women and girls,
and that he had personally spoken to about twenty.268O
Findings
1060. Based on the evidence of Augustine Mallah and Aruna Gbonda, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an unknown number of women were held in captivity
by AFRC and RUF fighters, who thereby exercised powers of ownership over them and
forced to work for them and to have sexual intercourse with them in Buedu and Kailahun
Town. The Trial Chamber is further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
intended to use the captured women and girls as sexual slaves as shown by the restriction on
their movements and the repeated sexual acts perpetrated upon them under the threat of
force. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of sexual slavery in Kailahun District from February to April
1998.
(v) Evidence of Sexual Slavery after Februgy 1998 to December 1999 in Buedu
1061. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Dennis Koker in relation to
evidence of sexual slavery in Buedu from February 1998 to December 1999.
2675Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4294-4295. A 1998 Human Rights Report on Sierra Leone
stated that the practice of "kidnapping youngsters and women" continued. Women were forced to act as sexual
slaves. In particular seven girls aged between 7-15 years were abducted in March 1998 from the Ben Hirsh
childcare centre in Kenema. Exhibit P-366, "Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,
US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 26 February 1999, p. 3, ERN 25072.
2676 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4294-4295.
2677 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4294-4295.
2678 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4295-4296.
2679 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4296.
2680 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4297.

---- End of Page 395 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / @ 18 May 2012 %/

Evidence
1062. The testimony of Witness Dennis Koker that he left Koidu Town in F eb1uary 1998
and went to Kailahun District where he was appointed as a military policeman and adjutant
has been recited in the section on rape.268l
1063. Koker testitied that during the period 1998-1999 many women were captured by the
RUF and AFRC and detained in Buedu and that the captors "wou1d mairy them without
paying bride price".2682 Sometimes, commanders would often come to Koker's office with
captured women and ask him to "contine" or discipline the women because they had
"over1ooked the commanders", i.e. been disrespectful.2683 While in detention, the women
would in the absence of their captors, explain to Koker that the RUF commanders had
captured them on the front line and forcibly "tumed them into wives" but that in fact the
commanders were not their real husbands.2684
1064. Koker recalled one incident when "CO Victor Kallon", an RUF Major, brought a girl
to the oftice and said she had disrespected him. CO Kallon had stripped the girl down to her
underwear and given her 50 lashes with a long cable made from a vehicle tyre, before asking
Koker to lock her up.2685 CO-Kallon asked Koker to detain her. When CO Kallon left, the
girl explained to Koker that CO Kallon had captured her in Kono and taken her "as his
wife", but that the commander was in fact not her husband. VVhen she refused to have
intercourse with him he beat her and brought to Koker's MP oftice.2686
1065. Koker testitied about the various things he observed happening to civilians in Buedu
throughout the time he was there, some 21 months,2°87 until the ceasetire. Koker left Buedu
on 16 December 1999, the day after Sam Bockarie left for Liberia.2°88 During the entire time
2681 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape).
2682 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1265-1266.
26*3 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1273-1274.
M4 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1272- 1273. 0
2085 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1274-1276.
2086 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1273-1275.
2687 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1276-1278.
2688 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1276-1278.

---- End of Page 396 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012 %
I

he was at the MP of`fice, he believes there may have been up to 1300 civilians captured,
including men, women and children.2689
Findings
1066. Based on Kolbeyond reasonable doubt that between 1998 and 1999 AFRC/RUF members in Buedu
captured and detained women and girls for long peri0ds thereby exercising p0wers of
ownership over them, and that while in captivity, these women and girls were used for
» sexual purposes by their captors. The Trial Chamber further finds beyond reasonable doubt
that the AFRC/RUF members intended to use the captured women as sexual slaves. The
Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
that AFRC/RUF members in Buedu committed acts of sexual slavery against an unknown
number of women and girls from March 1998 to December 1999.
(vi) TF 1-189 used as a sexual slave by RUF members in Kailahun Town from
Auggst 1998 until September 1998
Evidence
1067. Witness TF1—189, whom the Trial Chamber has f`0und was captured by RUF/AFRC
rebels in Kono District in March 1998 and subjected to sexual slavery in Koidu Town by
C0mmander A (named by the witness in closed session) and other RUF rebels from March
through August 1998, testified that she was taken by the rebels and "SLA Juntas" to
Kailahun Town when Koidu Town was attacked by ECOMOG in August 1998. The overall
leader of the group that left was an RUF commander named Supemian.269O
1068. TF 1-189 testified that they arrived in Kailahun Town in August 1998, during the
rainy season and remained there less than two months until September 1998. TF 1-189 was
forced to stay with a commander named G0g0meh, together with five other female captives
and f`0ur rebels.269l TF 1-189 testified that during this time, she and the other captured
women and girls were forced to perform the f`0llowing duties, namely to c00k, wash the
2689 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1277.
2690 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16520-16522.
ml TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16523-16524.

---- End of Page 397 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % dk 18 May 2012 %

clothes of male and female rebels, and to be "wives" to the rebels.2692 ln private session,
TF 1-189 testified that in addition Commander A had continued to have sex with her in
Kailahun Town.2693
1069. TF 1-1 89 testified that she was allowed to leave Gogomeh's place only twice, on both
occasions to accompany a female rebel to shop for food items.2694 She did not try to escape
because she was warned that if she tried to do so "it would not be good for her". None of the _
other captured women and girls escaped.2695 The witness learned from Commander A2696
that the commanders in Kailahun Town included Colonel Mike Lamin and Issa Sesay who
were both members of the RUF, "Akim" who was an "AFRC Junta", CO Gogomeh and
Superman.2697 Other commanders included CO Koko and "Old Ma F atty".2698
1070. ln September, TF 1-1 89 left Kailahun Town because it was being attacked by
ECOMOG jets. She went to another location in Kailahun District that she named in private
session, 2699 to ether with other 40 ca tives and a rebel.27O0
8 P
Findings
1071. The Trial Chamber finds that between August and September, 1998 in Kailahun, an
RUF rebel named Commander A, named by TF 1-1 89 in private session and loyal to
Superman, together with Gogomeh and/or other rebels, exercised the powers of ownership
over TF 1-189 by holding her in captivity and forcing her to labour for their benefit. The
Trial Chamber also finds that Commander A forced TF 1-1 89 to have sexual intercourse with
him, as he had done previously in Koidu Town. The Trial Chamber finds that Commander A
intended to use TF 1-189 as a sexual slave. Accordingly the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
the elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
1072. Given the coercive capture of female civilians, their forced detention and inability to
leave, and the forced sexual acts perpetrated upon them during their capture the Trial
M TF1-189, rrrmeerrpt 17 September 2008, p. 16524.
2693 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16559 (PS).
2694 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16524-16525; Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16529-16530.
M TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16530, 16558.
26% TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16559 (PS).
2697 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16531-16532.
2698 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p.· 16559 (PS).
M9 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16560 (PS).

---- End of Page 398 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T O'), 18 May 2012

Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that AFRC/RUF members used and intended to
use the captured women and girls as sexual slaves. Accordingly the Trial Chamber finds that
the Prosecution has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual slavery occurred in the
Kailahun District from November 1996 to 18 January 2002.
Conclusion
1073. The Trial Chamber finds in each of the aforementioned crimes mentioned in this
section concerning Kailahun District, that the perpetrators intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over their victims by depriving them of their liberty, and in some cases forcing
them to work, and in all cases the victims were forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature
thus constituting the crime of sexual slavery.
1074. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that:
(i) An unknown number of women and girls captured in Kenema District were used
by AFRC and RUF members as sexual slaves between February and March 1998
in Buedu and Kailahun Town;
(ii) Between March 1998 and December 1999, an unknown number of captured
women and girls were used as sexual slaves by AFRC/RUF members in Buedu;
(iii) TF 1-189 was used as a sexual slave by a member of the RUF at Kailahun Town
from August to September 1998.
1075. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the lndictment, the RUF and/or AF RC forces directed both
a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leonezm The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that each of the incidences of sexual slavery proved by the
Prosecution in respect of Kailahun District formed part of the said attack and that the
5 perpetrators were aware of this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
2700 TF1—189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16532.
Nm See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.

---- End of Page 399 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ @4 18 May 2012
"M

3%*/ 9 2.
aforementioned incidences of sexual slavery in Kailahun District constitute sexual slavery as
a crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute.
(b) Kono District
Allegations and submissions
1076. The Indictment alleges that members of RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance,
and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the
direction and/or control of, and/or subordinate to the Accused "abducted an unknown
number of women and girls from various locations within the District, or brought them from
locations outside the District, and used them as sexual s1aves".27O2
1077. In relation to Kono District, the Prosecution submits that "The AFRC/RUF abducted
an unknown number of civilian women and girls from various locations within Kono
District, or brought them to the District from other parts of Sierra Leone, and used them as
sex slaves between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998. The locations in Kono
specifically mentioned in Count 5 are best understood in the context of the period following
the Intervention and the forces’ settlement in the District. Following the Junta's removal
from power, the retreating troops captured many women and young girls in Freetown and
also while en i"out€ to Kono District. Those captured aged from about 8 to 20 were under the
full control of junior and senior SLA and RUF commanders, who forced the victims to
become wives, perform domestic chores for them and have sexual intercourse".2703
1078. The Prosecution further submits that "The retreating AFRC/RUF forces continued
capturing women in Koidu Town and the surrounding villages in Kono District to be wives.
Captured women were often institutionalised in sexual slavery, where an apparatus of terror
made them the powerless subjects of their rebel commanders .... Women were commoditised
en masse, reduced to mere objects. Between March to June 1998, women and girls were
forced to become wives to fighters at the rebel headquarters in Masingbi Road, Koidu Town,
at Superman's base on Dabundeh Street and in other areas in the District including
Yengema, Bumpe, Tombodu, .1 agbwema Fiama .... The "wives" were forced to have sex with
their husbands and gave birth to their children. In addition, the wives were obliged to cook,
2702 Indictment, paras 14, 15.
2703 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] paras 901-902.

---- End of Page 400 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J Oxb 18 May 2012

.€$"{·‘1 Z
pound rice and do laundry. The terror inflicted upon these women controlled much of their
lives, not only disenfranchising them from their sexual autonomy, but further subjugating
them to their daily chores and responsibilities".2704
1079. The Prosecution further submits that "When the forces retreated to AFRC and/or
RUF camps such as Superman Ground, Guinea Highway and PC Ground, women captives
held were used as wives. The forced unions were not marked by any ceremony. The women
were used sexually and for domestic chores by the RUF against their will. In effect, women
were bartered as battlefront commodities .... At PC Ground, women were used as "wives" by
the combatants and so slept with and worked for them "just like a woman would work for
her husband in the home" .... Small girls who were captured stayed with combatants and
when old enough became their wives.2705
(i) Evidence of sexual slavery in Kono District
1080. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of Dennis Koker, TF 1-375, Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Perry Kamara, Isaac Mongor, Alice Pyne and Alex Tamba Teh to be relevant to
allegations of sexual slavery in Kono District, in addition to Exhibits P-051, P-073, P-77, P-
78 and P~366.
Documentgy evidence
1081. The Report of Expert Witness Beth Vann270° documenting accounts by refugees of
sexual slavery committed by the AFRC/RUF in Kono and Kailahun Districts has been
referred to above.
1082. An Amnesty International report entitled "Sierra Leone, 1998 — a year of atrocities
against civilians" reports that as the AFRC and RUF rebels were pursued eastwards by
ECOMOG forces to towns, including Koidu, from February through April 1998, the rebels
were responsible for widespread rape, other forms of sexual assault and abduction.2707
(ii) Abducted Women from Bombali and Kono Districts used as sexual slaves in
Koidu Town and Superman Ground
2704 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 903-905.
2705 Prosecution Final Trial Briei para. 909.
27% Exhibit P—073, "Expe1t Report, Conflict—Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", pp. 8, ll, 16.

---- End of Page 401 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03_—01—T // 61.5 18 May 2012

gs 494+
1083. Witness Perry Kamara testified that following the retreat from Freetown in February,
1998, the leadership of the RUF and AFRC including Johnny Paul Koroma, Issa Sesay,
Isaac Mongor, SAI Musa, Brigadier Mani, General Bropleh, Denis Mingo a.k.a. Superman,
Morris Kallon, Five Five, Gullit, Bazzy and Colonel Tee, convened a meeting in Makeni,
Bombali District.27O8 At the meeting it was decided to conduct "Operation Pay Yourself ’.
Kamara testified that this meant that the fighters were free to take anything they wanted
from the civilians and to abduct them. Following the meeting, fighters were permitted to
gather food, abduct people and to "take people's wives away from them". They burned
houses and raped many women. Women who resisted were killed.27O9
1084. Following the meeting, SAI Musa led a break—away group to Kabala, Koinadugu
District and the rest of the commanders and fighters broke into three groups and went to
Koidu Town.27m Kamara's ou assed throu Ma buraka, Matotoka, Makali, Sewafe,
sr P P 8
and Bumpe before reaching Koidu Town. Kamara testified that throughout this route, the
AFRC, RUF and STF fighters looted civilian's food, abducted children and "women from
their husbands", and killed civilians.2m Although not categorically stated, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied on the evidence that civilians abducted en route were in the group that
reached Koidu Town. The remained in Koidu Town for a roximatel a weekmz and then
Y PP Y
retreated to Superman Ground, one or two miles away along the highway towards
Guinea.27l3 In the areas surrounding Superman Ground and the various nearby camps,
including Banya Ground, Sewafe bypass, Yomandu, Tombodu, and Gandorhun Highway,
fighters would go on food—finding missions and abduct civilians, including men, women and
children for various purposes including doing domestic chores27M and mining diamonds.27l5
Kamara testified that "forceful marriage" occurred, because the fighters needed civilian
women to "marry them as bush wives".27l6
2707 Exhibit P-078, "Amrresty International, Sierra Leone: 1998 - a year of atrocities against civilians", p. 1 1.
2708 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3094-3095.
2709 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3098.
2710 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3099-3100.
lm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3100-3102.
fm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3104.
2713 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3112.
fm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 31 13-31 15.
2715 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 16.
2716 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 16.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J GQ 18 May 2012

é%qa§
1085. Kamara identified Exhibit P—051 as a record of various lists that were normally kept
by Superman and the Joint Security.2717 The witness recognised his own name amongst a list
of soldiers and their ranks at Superman Ground.2718 Other RUF/AFRC commanders listed
include Denis Mingo, Isaac Mongor, Morris Kallon, RUF Rambo a.k.a. "Premo", Peter B.
Vandi, Hector B. Lahai (AF RC), Lansana Conteh, Major Bai Bureh, Matthew Barbue,
Martin George and CO Rocky.2719
1086. The document includes another hand—written list entitled "Name of Civilians at
Banya Ground" dated 13 July 19982720 and "Name of Civilians from Banya Ground and
Their Care Taker" (undated).2721 Kamara explained that the civilian women named in the list
lived with commanders against whom their names were listed. He stated that some of the
women were used as labourers and others were "wives" to the commanders with whom the
Y
stayed.2722
1087. Exhibit P-05 1 also includes hand—written lists entitled "Names of Civilians from
Banya Ground", dated 30 November 1998,2723 "Names of new captives along Guinea/Sierra
Leone highway", dated 6 December 1998,2724 and "Names of Civilian Women and Officers
in charge", dated 15 July 1998.2725 Kamara confirmed that the latter list indicates civilians
under the control of RUF and AF RC fighters who were used for domestic work, hard labour
2717 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December l998"; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February
2008, pp. 3121-3122. The Independent Defence Office (IDU), Military Police (MP) and the Intelligence Officer
Unit were involved in the maintenance of the document. See Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3138.
2718 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December l998", ERN 00025574(A); Perry Kamara,
Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3123-3124.
2719 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December l998", ERN 00025573-00025574(A); Perry
Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3124-3125.
2720 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998", ERN 00025579.
2721 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December l998", ERN 00025583.
gm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3125-3126.
2123 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998", ERN 00025591.
212* Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December l998", ERN 00025591.
2725 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December l998", ERN 00025592-00025595.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ Q), 18 May 2012

?>%¤1a <¤
and as sex slaves.2726 Kamara testified that the Joint Security sent a copy of this document to
all the various commanders within the RUF units comprising of G5, MP, IO and IDU.2727
1088. DCT-068, a G5 in Buedu at the relevant time, to whom this document was shown,
denied that it indicated that women were assigned to commanders and ventured the opinion
that "it's possible that these women knew what these commanders did for them...so they
decided to stay with this commander"2728 He denied that they were "wives".2729
Findings
1089. The Trial Chamber finds that between 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998 in
Koidu Town and at such camps as Superman Ground members of the AF RC, RUF,
AF RC/RUF Junta and Liberian fighters abducted an unknown number of women and girls
and forcefully detained them and forced them to have sexual relations. The Trial Chamber
finds that the Commanders of the RUF and AFRC knew, promoted and encouraged these
acts by promulgating Operation Pay Yourself. Based on the evidence and the context in
which the crimes occurred, the Trial Chamber finds that the acts of the perpetrators formed
part of both a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population and that the
perpetrators had knowledge that their acts formed part of a widespread attack against a
civilian population. However the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence is not sufficiently
specific to return a finding of guilt but that it may be considered as corroboration for specific
instances of sexual slavery described by witnesses testifying before the Trial Chamber.
(iii) Abducted Women from Koidu Town and Mortema used as sexual slaves
1090. Witness TF 1-375, an RUF rebel under the command of Superman, testified that in
March 1998 a second attack on Koidu Town was organised and led by Superman, hours
afier a previous failed attempt to take the town by the RUF forces under the command of
27% Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3131—3132.
2121 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3137—3138.
mg DCT~068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37121.
m DCT~068, Transcript 11 March 2010, pp. 371 18~37121.

---- End of Page 404 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01—T 4% 18 May 2012

isnt? Q-
Rambo and Isaac Mongor.273O TF1-375 testified that during this second attack, "some of the
commanders captured girls and made them into their wives".273l
1091. Following this attack, there were other attacks in Kono District. TF1-375 testified
that approximately three months after the attack on Koidu,2732 a joint AFRC and RUF attack
was launched against Mortema under the command of Short Bai Bureh.2733 TF1-375 did not
participate in this attack but some of his fiiends told him what happened.2734 He observed
that some of those who returned brought some girls with them as their wives.2735 TF1-375
did not ask the ages of the girls, but stated that some were 14, 15 and 20 years old.2736 Some
F of the girls remained in Koidu Town with the troops and some were taken to a combat
camp.2737 All of the women and girls were detained by the men who captured them "a.s
wives" and these women and girls were forced to retreat with their captors. The witness
explained that the captured women and girls were called "wives" because if captured
"whether you like it or not" (they) were treated as wives. 2738
Findings
1092. The Trial Chamber finds that between 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998 in
Koidu members of the AFRC, RUF, AFRC/RUF Junta and Liberian fighters abducted an
unknown number of women and girls and forcefully detained them and forced them to have
sexual relations. Given the context in which the crimes occurred, the Trial Chamber finds
that the acts of the perpetrators formed part of both a widespread and systematic attack
against the civilian population and that the perpetrators had knowledge that their acts formed
part of such an attack against a civilian population. However the Trial Chamber finds that
the evidence is not sufficiently specific to return a finding of guilt but that it may be
considered as corroboration for specific instances of sexual slavery described by witnesses
testifying before the Trial Chamber.
gm TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jtiria 2008, pp. 12503-12505.
ml TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12504-12505.
2732 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 125 16-12517.
2733 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12509-12510.
2734 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12509-12510.
2735 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12509-12510.
2736 TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jtiria 2008,p. 12515.
W TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jtiria 2008, p. 12515.
2738 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12523-12524.

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T // gg 18 May 2012

38498
(iv) Evidence of Sexual Slavery at Wondedu
1093. Witness Alex Tamba Teh testified that after he was captured in approximately April
1998,2739 an RUF commander named Rocky took Teh to his base in Wondedu.2740 Upon his
arrival, Teh saw other captured civilians there.274l The captured women were forcibly used
as "sexual objects" or "sex slaves".2742 Teh heard women screaming at night and spoke to
them during the day.2743 One of the women told him that she and other women had been
abducted at gun point and forced to have sex with their captors.2744 lt was at this time that
Teh realised they were being raped.2745
Findings
1094. Based on Teh's evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that RUF members detained an unknown number of women
thereby exercising powers of ownership over them and caused the women they had captured
to engage in acts of a sexual nature. The Trial Chamber further finds beyond reasonable
doubt that RUF members intended to use the captured women as sexual slaves. The Trial
Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that
RUF members in Wondedu committed acts of sexual slavery against an unknown number of
women and girls in April 1998.
(v) Women used as sexual slaves in Koidu Town in Februag 1998
Evidence
1095. Witness Dennis Koker retreated with the AFRC2746 when they were driven out of
Freetown in February 19982747 and fled with a group led by Johnny Paul Koroma, Eldred
Collins and other commanders2748 to Tombo,2749 Fogbo,275O Masiaka,275l Port Loko
2739 Aipx rah, rrarrsprrpr 8 January 2008, pp. 683-688.
""° Area rah, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 687-692.
274* Aiea rah, rrarraprrpr 8 January 2008, p. 704.
2742 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 704-705.
2743 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 705.
2744 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 705.
2745 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 705.
27*6 Dennis Kpkpr, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1313-1317.
2747 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1222-1223, 1313-1317.
2748 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1226-1228.

---- End of Page 406 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J 18 May 2012

3%%-Q 5
District;2752 and then Makeni, Bombali Districtzm where Issa Sesa was also resent.2754
Y P
Koker testified that the soldiers and rebels captured civilians from the villages surrounding
Masiaka2755 and in Makeni.2756 The civilians included men, women and children. He
testified that the RUF and °untas would sometimes "ma1r " ca tured women which meant
J Y P
that the would make them their "wives".2757
Y
1096. Koker testified that the ou then travelled to Koidu Town, Kono District.2758 He
ST P
estimated that the arrived in Koidu Town a roximatel one week after leavin
Y PP Y S
Freetown.2754 Koker remained in Koidu Town for a weel<276O and resided with Eldred Collins
and Morns Kallon at Guinea Highway, about 200 yards from the centre of town. "Issac",
Issa Sesay, Denis Mingo (a.l<.a. Superman),276l Gullit, Alex Tamba Brima, Johnny Paul
Koroma and others commanders were all resent in Koidu Town at that time.2762
P
1097. Koker testified that while he was in Koidu Town he observed that AFRC and RUF
"operations people"2743 captured civilians, including women and children, from Koidu Town
and the surrounding villages2764 and that, as in Makeni, women were captured to be wives.
He stated that this ha ened from the start of the war, it was common and ha ened
PP PP
"wherever they went". He saw it occur in Freetown, Masiaka, ‘MalKono.2765 On cross-examination, Koker admitted that he did not hear an order `ven b
31 Y
commanders to capture civilians in Kono in Febmary 1998, but explained that it was a
common ractice b eve fi ter as well as `unior and senior commanders.2766 It was ut to
P Y YY J P
2749 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1223-1224, 1318-1319.
2750 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1224-1226, 1319.
2754 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1319.
2752 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1229; Transcript 16 January 2008, p. 1387.
2753 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1232.
2754 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp 1232-1233.
2755 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1231-1232.
2756 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1234-1235.
2757 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1234-1235.
2758 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1235-1236; Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1319-1321.
W Dennis Knkar, Transcript is January 2008, p. 1236.
2760 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1238.
2764 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1237-1238.
2762 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1238.
2763 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1337-1339.
2764 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1243-1244, 1337-1339.
2765 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1245.
2766 Dennis Koker, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1342-1345.

---- End of Page 407 ---------------------------


Case No; SCSI.-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3 *6 Sub
Koker on cross—examination that he did not mention abduction of women and children from
Kono District in his first three interviews with the Prosecution but he was not given an
opportunity to explain this discrepancy.2767 As Koker was interviewed 10 times by the
Prosecution about numerous subjects, the Trial Chamber finds that not mentioning
abduction in the earliest interviews does not significantly affect his credibility.
Findings
1098. The Trial Chamber finds Koker's evidence that he travelled with the group of
captured civilians and was in Koidu Town where he observed AFRC and RUF fighters take
captured civilians as "wives" to be reliable. Based on Koker's evidence, the Trial Chamber
finds that an unknown number of women were captured in Masiaka, Makeni and Koidu
Town and detained by their captors and were forced to have sexual intercourse with them.
The Trial Chamber finds that these women were used as sexual slaves by the retreating
AFRC and RUF fighters in Kono District and further finds that AFRC/RUF members
intended to use the captured women and girls as sexual slaves. Therefore, the Trial Chamber
finds that the elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
(vi) Women used as sexual slaves in Koidu Town from March to June 1998
Evidence
1099. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that young women and girls were among
the civilians captured by the troops in Kono District during the RUF and SLA attacks of
March to June 1998.2768 These women lived with junior and senior SLA and RUF
commanders, some of whom made the women their wives.2769 The witness explained that
the commanders did not actually marry the women; rather, the commanders captured the
women and forced them to have sex with them.2770 Some became pregnant and later gave
2767 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1331-1332.
2768 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7982-8006, 8008.
2169 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8006.
2770 Alimarry Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8006-8007.

---- End of Page 408 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / {F 18 May 2012

3%,Scl
birth to children for the commanders.277l The women were responsible for cooking for the
commanders and some of the men.2772 Some helped to pound rice and did laundry. 2773
1100. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he himself had his own sex slave whom he
referred to as his "wife" whom he had captured in Kono District and who stayed with
him.2774 On cross—examination, he explained that he did not in fact "marry" the girl he had in
Kono; rather he captured her and "we would go and sleep together because she was under
captivity. It was against her will. I was using her against her will. So I was taking it that I
was ra in her, because I was ca in on and she had to a ee to what I said. Ifl sa , ‘Let
P g HY g SY Y
us lie down’, she will lie down".2775 Alimamy Bobson Sesay referred to this woman as his
"bush wrrr-#.2776
1101. The witness testified that the a es of the ca tured women who were taken as wives
g P
ranged from about 8 to 20 years old. Alimamy Bobson Sesay's own "wife" was about 15 or
16 years old.2777 Members of the Small Boys Unit took the younger girls, aged 8 to 10.2778
The SBUs lived with the captured girls and had sex with them.2779 Alimamy Bobson Sesay
testified that he saw this himself`.278O The commanders including Superinan, Bazzy and
Bomb Blast were aware of this but did not discipline "the boys" for these acts.278l The
witness stated that the commanders "were aware but nobody did anything about it. They told
them, ‘Boys, enjoy yourselves.’ They said, ‘This is your own time."’2782
Findings
1 102. Alimam Bobson Sesa , as an SLA commander who travelled throu out Kono
Y Y p
District, saw and knew about the conduct of fighters. He also stated that he had his own
sexual slave. The Trial Chamber finds his evidence to be reliable. The Trial Chamber finds
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8006-8007.
2772 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8007.
2773 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8007.
2774 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8007; Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8865.
2775 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8865. `
2776 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8865-8866.
2777 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8006-8007.
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8007.
2779 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8007-8008.
mo Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8007-8008.
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8007-8008.
2782 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8008.

---- End of Page 409 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T da 18 May 2012
2/

2 %§¤9..
beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AF RC/RUF intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over an unknown number of women and girls by depriving them of their liberty
and forced them to engage in acts of a sexual nature. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
(vii) RUF and AFRC fighters brought sexual slaves from Koidu Town to PC
Ground and Superman Ground in 1998
Evidence
1103. Witness TF 1-375, an RUF rebel under the command of Superman, testified that after
Koidu Town was lost by the RUF and the AFRC to ECOMOG, the AFRC/RUF troops
retreated to PC Ground and then to Superman Ground which was about six or seven miles
from Koidu Town.2788 The girls and women who had been abducted and brought to Koidu
Town were also brought by those who abducted them to PC Ground and later to Superman
Ground as their "wives".2784 TF1—3 75 describes these women as "wives" because "they were
with us as husband and wife, so we used to call them our wives. Whether you like it or not,
if somebody captured you and liked you, you would become his wife".2785
1104. Witness Isaac Mongor, at the time a frontline RUF commander under Superman,2786
testified that in 1998, members of the RUF, SLA and STF, including Mongor himself took
captured civilian women in Kono District and detained them against their will.2787 The
women were under the sole control of the fighters and could not refuse.2788 Mongor testified
that this meant they would take the women, use them and have sex with them.2789 They took
the women to PC Ground which was at Guinea Highway, behind Superman Ground, and
which was under the command of Major Konowa.2788) Mongor testified that civilian women
2788 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12522.
27*4 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12522-12523.
8785 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12523.
2788 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5742.
2787 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5762-5763.
2788 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5763.
2789 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5763.
2790 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5762-5764.

---- End of Page 410 ---------------------------


Case No.: L- - -T / dw 18 May 201

3°6S c> 3
who were captured on attacks were also taken to Superman Ground and given and used there
as "wives".2791 .
1105. Mongor testified that when the RUF would attack a village or town, they would
capture women.2792 They would turn some of them into their wives and some would be sent
to be trained to fight.2793 The women did not have a choice.2794
1106. In cross—examination, Mongor confirmed a prior statement to the Prosecution in
which he said that rape was very common amongst RUF soldiers and that this remained the
case for a long time, starting during the early stages of the war.2795 Mongor confirmed that
the RUF had rules against raping and looting, but it happened nonetheless.2796 If
commanders tried to stop it, soldiers would have gone to other commanders who tolerated
it.2797 He testified that some RUF combatants were disciplined for sexual assaults and that he
ersonall witnessed Issa Sesa execute three oun combatants in Makeni who alle edl
P Y Y Y 8 8 Y
gang raped a girl.2798 Mongor described this incident in a different interview as an
"exce tion to the rule" and stated that ra es occurred all the time and that "bush wives" were
P P
forced to have sex.2799 Mongor testified that there was a disciplinary system in place, but
that its implementation was limited primarily to offences by one soldier against another. He
testified that with re ard to serious offences, "the laws were there, but its im lementation
8 P
was limited".2800
1107. Witness Alice Pyne gave corroborating evidence of women brought from Kono
District used as "wives" at PC Ground. She testified that she came to PC Ground in March
1998 after ECOMOG took over Koidu and worked as a radio operator for Superman and
remained there for five months.2801 At that time, she observed that RUF fighters captured
civilians in areas around Kono District and brought them to the training base at PC Ground.
2791 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5764·5766.
2792 isaac Mongor, rrarrrprrpr 11 March 2008, pp. 6206-6207.
2793 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 6206.
2794 isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6206-6207.
2795 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6614.
27% Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6614.
3797 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6614.
2708 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 661 1·6613.
2799 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6613.
2800 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6614.
2801 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12155·12160, 12166·12167,

---- End of Page 411 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / Jl}, lg May 2012

3‘6S¤¤g"
She testified that the captured female civilians were made bush wives to the commanders
and were forced to have sex and perform domestic chores.28O2
Findings
1108. Based on the consistent evidence of Isaac Mongor, TF1-375 and Alice Pyne, in
addition to the evidence of Perry Kamara referred to above, the Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that an unknown number of women were intentionally abducted, held in
captivity and forced to have sexual intercourse with their AFRC, RUF and STF captors
throughout Kono District and in particular at PC Ground and Superman Ground. The Trial
Chamber finds that these women were used as sexual slaves by their AFRC, RUF and STF
captors who intended to use the detained women and girls as sexual slaves. Therefore, the
Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
(viii) TF1—189 used as a sexual slave by RUF members at Koidu Town
1109. The Prosecution submits that TF1—189 was used for sexual purposes by three rebels
at a compound in Koidu Town where she was "forced to have sex with her rebel
‘husbands"’.28O3 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-189 in relation to
the submission.
Evidence
1110. Witness TF1—189, whose evidence was discussed above in relation to Counts 2, 3
and 4, was captured and raped in a location in Kono District revealed in private session28O4 ‘
by rebels who identified themselves as RUF and Junta in March 1998.2805 The witness
testified as to the identity of one the rebels in private session.28O6 For the purpose of this
Judgement, the Trial Chamber will refer to this person as "Rebel A".
2*02 Alice Pyrrp, rrarrsprrpr is Jrrrrp 2008,pp. 12194-12198.
2803 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 906.
2804 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16485 (PS); Exhibit P-171 (confidential).
2805 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16496-16497, 16512.
2806 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16553-16554 (PS) (providing the name of the rebel commander
who raped and captured the witness).

---- End of Page 412 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / {gk 18 May 2012
\/

3 ssey
11 11. Rebel A and other rebels took TF1-189 to Superman's compound in Koidu Town.281)7
TF1-189 testified that she saw Superman at this compound.28O8 She stated that she heard
Rebel A address him as "C.O. Superman" and told Superman that they had brought a "wife"
for him.2809 Superman responded that he did not want a wife and told them to take the
witness away.2811)
1112. The rebels took her to a hall where other eo le were held.2811 After one attem ted
P P P
escape she was taken to the compound where Rebel A stayed, she remained at Rebel A's
"place" in Koidu Town until August 1998.2812 TF1-189 also testified that 13 other girls and
women were there.2813 The told her that the were ca tives and had all been abducted from
Y Y P
around Kono District.2814
1 1 13. TF1-189 testified that she and the other captured women and girls were made to cook
and ound rice.2815 She was afraid that she would be killed if she refused to erform these
P P
duties.2816 TF1-189 further testified that she and five of the captured women and girls were
forced to be "wives" to the rebels.2817 TF1-189 explained that being a "wife" meant that the
rebels would have sexual intercourse with them and they could not refuse.2818
1114. TF1-189 did not leave Rebel A's " lace" until Au st 1998 as he told her that she
P gu
would be killed if she tried to do so.2819 In private session, the witness testified that she was
made to be "a wife" to three of the rebels, Rebel A and two RUF rebels whose names she
28117 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16512-16514; TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp.
16553-16554 (PS).
2808 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16512-16514.
2809 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16512-16514; TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp.
16553-16554 (PS).
2810 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16513.
2811 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16516.
2812 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16515-16516.
2813 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16517.
2814 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16517.
2815 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16517-16518.
2816 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16518-16519.
2817 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16518.
28111 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16518-16519; TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p.
16558 (PS).
2819 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16518-16521.

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Case No.: scsr-03-01-r 6% ‘8 May ZM M

?>%S¤ Ca
did not know.2820 The witness also testified that to her knowledge, neither the rebels who
used her sexually nor anyone else was ever punished for this abuse.282]
1115. TF1-189 stated that Rebel A told her that the commanders in Koidu Town at this
time included C.O. Superman, Gogomeh and Gibril Massaquoi, who belonged to the RUF
and Five-Five who was an "SLA Junta".2822 She was taken to Gibril Massaquoi's compound
where the commander was CO Gogomeh. Commander A worked for Gibril Massaquoizm
but TF1-189 did not state that Gibril Massaquoi was present and named Gogomeh as the
commander.
Findings
1116. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that between March and
August 1998 in Koidu Town, Rebel A, a member of the RUF, exercised powers of
ownership over TF1-189 by holding her in captivity either independently or with the
assistance of other rebels and thereby deprived her of her liberty. Rebel A and/or the other
rebels working with Rebel A, forced TF1-189 to labour for their benefit.
1117. The Trial Chamber also finds that during this period, Rebel A and two other RUF
rebels engaged in acts of a sexual nature with TF1-189. From her evidence describing the
environment of violence and coercion, the Trial Chamber finds that TF1-189 did not consent
to these sexual acts and that Rebel A and the two other RUF rebels intended to use TF1-189
as a sexual slave.
1118. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the elements of sexual slavery have been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(ix) Use of Finda Gbamanja as sexual slave by a RUF member in Koidu Town
mo TF1—189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16556—16557 (PS).
ml TF1—189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16557 (PS).
ml TF1—189, Transcript 17 September 2008. pp. 16519—16520; TF1—189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p.
16557 (PS).
2823 TFl—189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16557 (PS).

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Case No.; SCSL—03-01-T j Gil} 18 May 2012

2 ssc?
1119. The Prosecution submits that Finda Gbamanja was taken as a wife in 1998 in Koidu
Town.2884 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Finda Gbamana in relation to
J
the allegation.
Evidence
1 120. Witness Finda Gbamanja testified that after "Paul Koroma" was removed from
power in Freetown,8888 between the dry season and the rainy season,8888 she and her family
left Koidu Town because it was attacked b "rebels".8887 The fled first to Baiama, then to
Y Y
the "bush" when Baiama was taken over by rebels8828 and then returned again to Baiama.8828
The witness was young at the time and did not remember her age.8880
1 121. The Trial Chamber notes that the ECOMOG invasion which ousted Johnny Paul
Koroma from ower was launched on 14 Februar 19988888 and that Koidu Town was
P Y
captured by the AFRC/RUF on in late February or early March 1998.2888 On the basis of the
evidence set out in the proceeding paragraph, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Gbamanja
and her family left Koidu Town in or after March 1998 and returned to Baiama Town
shortly thereafter.
1122. Gbamanja testified that three days after arriving in Baiama Town, she was captured
while she and her family were sleeping by a rebel named "Peppe"8888 who wore black and
green "combat", a red shirt8884 and a camouflage hat.2888 She later learned that he was a
member of Su erman's ou .2888 In cross-examination, Gbaman`a confirmed a rior
P gr P J P
8828 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 907.
2825 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23837.
8826 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23839; Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23898.
8887 F inda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23836.
8828 F inda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23840-23842.
8828 F inda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23850.
8880 F inda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23890—23893 (the witness confirmed on cross·examination
that she had not yet begun menstruating and that she was still a student in school).
8888 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007,
Fact AD.
8882 Military Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998).
2833 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23851, 23853.
8888 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23853.
8888 F inda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23923.
8888 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23860.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-0l-T {MQ 18 May 2012
`V
x

1 $%S.`¤‘2.
statement taken by the Prosecution in which she stated that although Peppe was older than
her, he was a "small boy" and not an adult.2837 ’
1123. As detailed in the section on Rape2838 Gbamanja testified that she was captured by
Peppe who detained and raped her, causing her injury, and then took her and left her with his
sister where she was forced to launder and cook.2839 She was subsequently captured and
detained by Sergeant Foday who threatened to kill her if she did not go with him. Foday had
earlier fought Peppe for possession of her.
1124. Under duress Gbamanja followed Foday to his house in Koidu Town and he made
her his "wife". Gbamanja remained at Sergeant Foday's house "for some time" and was
forced to have sex with him every night2840 and forced to launder, cook and fetch water for
Sergeant Foday. She could not mn away.284l Gbamanja testified that she remained in Koidu
Town until it was attacked by ECOMOG, at which point Sergeant Foday and other rebels
took her with them to Superman Ground, Kailahun District. Gbamanja stated that this
occurred when "it was close to the dry season".2842 On cross-examination, Gbamanja
testified that she could not recall how long she stayed with Sergeant Foday but that "it was a
long time". She denied prior statements taken by the Prosecution which stated that she only
stayed with him a week.2843
1125. The RUF/AFRC lost control of Koidu Town to ECOMOG, and RUF troops loyal to
Superman reassembled at Superman Ground around April 1998.2844 Considering
Gbamanja's evidence as a whole, including her evidence of prior and subsequent events, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that Gbamanja left Koidu Town to go to Superman Ground in
approximately April, 1998.
1126. On cross-examination, Gbamanja explained that Sergeant Foday kept her hidden in
his house even though he was more senior than Peppe. She testified that this was because of
2837 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23927, 23930-2393l.
2838 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape).
2839 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23860-2386l.
2840 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 2386l—23862.
2841 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23864.
2*42 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23864—23865.
2443 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23935—23936.
2844 Military Operations: Operation Fitti—Fatta.

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Case No.: SCSI.-O3-O1-T % $(1 18 May 2012

2.s$¤°i
the system whereby captured women were normally "kept" by the rebel who captured them
irrespective of the rebel's rank.2845
Findings
1127. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that between approximately
March and April 1998, in Koidu Town, Peppe and Sergeant Foday, RUF rebels loyal to
Superman, exercised powers of ownership over Gbamanja by holding her in captivity,
depriving her of her liberty and by forcing her to labour for their benefit. The Trial Chamber
also finds that Peppe and Sergeant Foday forced Gbamanja to engage repeatedly in acts of a
sexual nature. The Trial Chamber infers from the enviromnent of violence and coercion,
Gbamanja's young age at the time of the events, in addition to her evidence of capture
following the killing of her father, that Gbamanja did not consent to these sexual acts. The
Trial Chamber finds Peppe and Sergeant Foday intended these acts. The Trial Chamber
further finds the witness's evidence is indicative of a recognised system of ownership and
distribution of captured girls as sexual slaves among the AFRC/RUF troops loyal to
Superman. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the elements of the crime of
sexual slavery have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(x) Use of Finda Gbamanja as a sexual slave by rebels at Superman Ground
1128. The Prosecution submits that Finda Gbamanja was used as a sexual slave at
Superman Ground after ECOMOG attacked Koidu Town.284°
Evidence
1129. Witness Finda Gbamanja, whom the Trial Chamber has found was subjected to
sexual slavery in Koidu Town between approximately March and April 1998, by Sergeant
Foday, a rebel loyal to Superman, also testified that after Koidu Town was attacked by
ECOMOG, she was taken to Superman Ground, located at Meiyor, by rebels including
Sergeant Foday, Well Man and a rebel named Sidique.2847
2845 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23933-23935.
2346 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 907.
2347 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23864-23865.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (QQQ 18 May 2012
/·*`\.,/

?>%§ L o
1130. Gbamanja testified that she stayed at Superman Ground for a "long time" with
Sergeant Foday. During this time, she continued to cook and launder for Sergeant Foday and
he continued to force her to have sex with him.2848 Following the arrival of Foday's wife,
Fatty, Gbamanja was taken to the house of a rebel named "Mamie" who was Sidique's
wife2849 where she stayed for "some time". Gbamanja testified that while she was at
Mamie's house, Sergeant Foday continued to rape her and she was forced to pound rice,
launder and harvest palm oil for Mamie.285O On cross-examination, Gbamanja testified that
although it was a long time, she does not know how many weeks or months she stayed with
Mamie.285l She denied a prior statement taken by the Prosecution in which it was recorded
that she stayed with Mamie for three months.2852 Gbamanja testified that in the dry season,
Sergeant Foday forcibly sent her to work for his mother and the RUF "govermnent" in
Giema.2853 She was there during Christmas.2854 On the basis of this evidence, the Trial
Chamber finds that Gbamanja was held in Superman Ground first directly by Sergeant
Foday and later by Mamie from approximately April until at least October, 1998.
1131. Gbamanja testified on cross-examination that she did not know the difference
between the RUF and the AF RC2855 but that Peppe himself told her the rebels were RUF .2856
The Trial Chamber is satisfied from Gbamanja's description of the rebels and the events that
both Peppe and Sergeant Foday were rebels loyal to Superman. The Trial Chamber finds
that Gbamanja's evidence is corroborated by the record in Exhibit P-051 which was
identified by witness Perry Kamara as a record of civilians captured and under the control of
commanders who were used for domestic work, hard labour and as sexual slaves.
Findings
1132. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that between approximately
April and October 1998, at Superman Ground, Gbamanja was held in captivity by Sergeant
Foday and Mamie, both of whom forced her to labour for their benefit. During this time
2848 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23865—23866.
2849 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23866—23867, 23937.
2850 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23867—23868.
2851 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23939.
2852 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23940-2394l.
2853 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23876—23877.
ZW Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23879.
2855 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23920-2392l.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T wg 18 May 2012

3‘B$` 1 I
Sergeant Foday, with the assistance of Mamie, continued to intentionally exercise powers of
ownership over Gbamanja by depriving her of her liberty, forcing her to have sex, and by
ultimately sending her to work in Giema. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the
elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(xi) Use of Sia Kamara as a sexual slave by rebels near Yegbema and Sawoa
Evidence
1133. Witness Sia Kamara, whose testimony in the RUF trial was received pursuant to
Rule 92bis, was cross—examined in the present trial on 15 October 2008. In her prior
testimony Kamara testified that she, her husband and his younger brother fled Tongo when it
was attacked by Kamajors. They fled to Segbwema, Bunumbu, and Gandorhun and arrived
in Kainako, Kono "Chiefdom" in the dr season. Two da s later the fled to the bush when
Y Y Y
they were informed by other civilians that Kamajors "who had transformed into
soldiers/rebels" had entered Koidu. Kamara explained that she meant that "they ran away
from Kamajors", but later they were told that "it was now rebels and not Kamajors
again".2857 On cross-examination, she explained that she had encountered civilians fleeing
from Koidu Town who told her that Kamajors had entered Koidu Town.2858 Kamara testified
that the bush she fled to was close to Yegbema,2859 about two and a half miles from
Gandorhun and about one and a half miles from Kainako.286O
1134. Approximately three weeks later, Kamara saw about seven vehicles passing by. She
"heard" that it was Johnny Paul Koroma heading towards the "Guinea end". She saw the
same vehicles "comin towards Koidu end" about a week later.2S6l On cross-examination,
8
Kamara confirmed that she first saw Johnny Paul Koroma after the ECOMOG intervention,
when the AFRC and RUF were driven out of Freetown and he passed through the area
where she was living. He was disguised as a woman.2862
2*56 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23921—23923.
2857 Exhibit P—20l, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 7.
2858 Sia Kamara, 15 October 2008, p. 18437.
2859 See Exhibit P—20l, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 8 (the location was recorded as
"Ngegbema [phoen]"). During cross—examination during this trial, the location was spelt on the record as
"Yegbema". See Sia Kamara, 15 October 2008, pp. 18436—18437.
2860 Exhibit P—20l, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 8.
2861 Exhibit P—20l, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 9.
2862 Sia Kamara, Transcript 15 October 2008, pp. 18434 ~18435,

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Case No.: SCSL~03-01-T // 18 May 2012
/-~

3 rs 1 L
1135. As the ECOMOG Intervention that ousted the AFRC and RUF from Freetown
occurred in February 1998; Koidu Town was captured by the RUF in late February/early
March 1998,2666 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Kamara was in the bush near Yegbema
in approximately March/April, 1998.
1136. Kamara testified that while her husband was away finding food, she was discovered
by two "rebels". The first was wearing a soldier's uniform and was armed with a gun. The
second was wearing civilian clothing with combat khaki trousers and was armed with a stick
with red cloth tied to it. The rebel with the gun pointed it at Kamara and ordered her to
undress and lie down, which she did. He raped her. Kamara was unable to refuse due to the
coercive circumstances. As this was happening, a third rebel, also armed with a stick,
arrived. The other two rebels stood by as the rape occurred. After the first rebel raped her,
Kamara was raped by "the other one". She testified that she did not agree to have sex with
him, but the rebel with the gun was standing by them so she could not fight. After she had
been raped by the second rebel, she was raped by the third. Kamara testified that these rapes
happened in the "middle of the forest in the open".2664
1 137. After the three rapes, the rebels took Kamara "into the hills" where she saw a number
of other civilians who had been captured, some of whom she recognised. She and the other
civilians were given loads to carry to Sawoa while the rebels walked in front and behind
them. Kamara testified that she thought the rebels were going to kill her and could not think
of escaping. Kamara estimates that it was over two and a half miles to Sawoa which was in
the Kono "area". 2*65 A
1138. In Sawoa, Kamara heard the rebels address a man as "Lieutenant T" and heard him
say that ECOMOG had captured Kailahun Town and Kono, that they were going to "show
them that we own the country" and that it was now Operation No Living Thing. Lieutenant
T ordered the rebels to kill the civilians.2666 The Trial Chamber has found that the AFRC
forces lost control of Kono District in around April 1998.2667
2666 Military Operations: Operation in Kono (Early 1998).
2664 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 9-14.
2666 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 15-18.
6666 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", p. 19.
2867 Military Operations; Operation Fitti-Farm.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z dm- 18 May 2012

2%;; ¢ L
1139. Kamara testified that the rebels asked one of the captured civilians about Karnaj0rs
and Kabbah. When the civilian replied that she knew nothing, the rebels beat the civilians.
Kamara testified that a b0y of approximately 14 years brought a m0rtar and cut off the right
hands of all the captured men, five in total, including Kamara's brother, who was seated next
to her. After the five men had their hands amputated, Kamara was also struck on the upper
arm. The rebels then separated out the y0ung "virgins" fi*0m the women and took them
awayaxes
1140. Karnara testified that the rebels took her and the remaining captured women, six in
t0tal, in the direction of Benguema Fiama. S0me of the rebels were armed with guns and
some with sticks. At Fall R0ad, the rebels ordered the women to undress and lie down»,
which they did. Kamara thought that the rebels were going to kill them. A rebel with a gun
undressed and had sex with her. She was unable to refuse. There were many other rebels
standing by. Then another rebel, armed with a stick, also had sex with her. When he had
finished, he took the stick and sh0ved it into her vagina. Kamara testified that she
experienced great pain and bleeding and that she continued to feel pain at the time of her
testimony some years later. Kamara testified that she then heard another rebel say that the
women were to be killed.2869 She then fled to a swamp, where she spent the night. She was
bleeding and became unconsci0us. The following day, she was able to find her husband and
three days later, she was brought to Connaught H0spital in Freetown by ECOMOG. She
testified that she remained there "until the time the rebels entered Freetown".287O
1141. On cross—exarnination, Kamara admitted that she could not distinguish between the
SLA and RUF, and that she considered anyone who was canied a gun and who "terr0rised"
civilians was a rebel.2 871 She insisted, however, that she was captured by "rebels" and not
Kamaj0rs and testified that the persons who captured her threatened to amputate her hand
because they suspected her of being a Kamaj0r or a Kamaj0r supporter. She was unable to
say who Lieutenant T's "b0ss" was but testified that the rebels said they had come from
Freetown and were heading for Fiarna. She stated that the men sp0ke Kri0, Mende and
mg Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 21-24.
ml) Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 24-27.
2870 Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 27-28.
ml Exhibit P-201, "RUF Trial Transcript 1 February 2005, Sia Kamara", pp. 53-54; Sia Kamara, 15 Oct0ber
2008, pp,18434 -18437.

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Case No.: SCSL-0 -01-T J \ 18 May 2012 bg

East up
"Liberian".2872 By "Liberian" Kamara clarified that she heard them use the phrase "My meh,
let's go" which she testified is the way Liberian people speak.2873
Findings
1142. Kamara's description of events corresponds with the movements of the AFRC and
RUF. Given her testimony that one of the rebels who captured her was dressed in a soldier's
unifonn; that "Lieutenant T" stated that they would show ECOMOG that "we own the
country" and that it was now Operation No Living Thing; that the rebels asked the civilians
about Kamajors and Kabbah and that they suspected Kamara of being a Kamajor; and her
testimony that the rebels stated that they had come from Freetown, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Kamara was abducted by members of the
AFRC/RUF and not Kamajors.
1143. On the basis of Kamara's testimony, the Trial Chamber finds that Kamara was
abducted from a location in the bush near Yegbema in March/April 1998 by members of the
AFRC/RUF, that she was forced to engage in sexual acts by three members of the
AFRC/RUF in this same location, and that she was later forced to engage in sexual acts and
sexually brutalised by two other members of the same group of AFRC/RUF at Fall Road
between Sawoa and Benguema Fiama. The Trial Chamber finds that the members of the
AFRC/RUF intentionally exercised powers of ownership over Kamara by depriving her of
her liberty through her abduction and detention; by exacting forced labour from her by
forcing her to carry a load; and that she was forced to engage repeatedly in acts of a sexual
nature by multiple members of the group. The Trial Chamber finds from Kamara's
testimony of her inability to refuse to submit to these acts and from the environment of
violence and coercion that Kamara did not consent to these acts. The Trial Chamber finds
that the five members of the AFRC/RUF who detained, raped and forced Kamara to carry
loads intended to exercise these acts. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the elements
of the crime of sexual slavery have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
2*72 Sia Kamara, Transcript 15 October 2008. pp. 18437—18439.
2873 Sia Kamara. Transcript 15 October 2008, pp. 18439-18441.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T y JM _ 18 May 2012 xg

3 2 S • *5
Conclusion
1144. The Trial Chamber finds in each of the aforementioned crimes mentioned in this
section concerning Kono District, that the perpetrators intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over their victims by depriving them of their liberty, and in some cases forcing
them to work, and in all cases the victims were forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature
thus constituting the crime of sexual slavery.
1145. The Trial Chamber has found the elements of sexual slavery have been satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt for the following acts:
(i) An unknown number of women were used as sexual slaves by RUF and AF RC
fighters in Koidu Town in February 1998;
(ii) An unknown number of women were used as sexual slaves by RUF and AF RC
fighters in Koidu Town in March to June 1998;
(iii) An unknown number of women were used as sexual slaves by RUF, AF RC and
STF fighters at Superman Ground and PC Ground in around April 1998;
(iv) TF 1-189 was used as sexual slave by members of the RUF in Koidu Town
between 12 March 1998 and August 1998;
(v) An unknown number of women were used as sexual slaves by members of the
RUF in Wondedu in April 1998;
(vi) Finda Gbamanja was used as a sexual slave by a member of the RUF in Koidu
Town from approximately March/April 1998;
(vii) Finda Gbamanja was used as a sexual slave by rebels loyal to Superman at
Superman Ground from approximately April to October 1998, V
(viii) Sia Kamara was used as a sexual slave by members of the AF RC/RUF loyal to
Superman near Yegbema and Sawoa in approximately March/April 1998.
1146. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AF RC forces directed both

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Case No.; SCSL-O3-O1-T 18 May 2012
I

ass ¢ <»
a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.2874 The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that each of the incidences of sexual slavery proved by the
Prosecution in respect of Kono District forined part of the said attack and that the
perpetrators were aware of this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
aforementioned incidences of sexual slavery in Kono District constitute sexual slavery as a
crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute.
(c) Freetown and the Western Area
1147. The Indictment alleges that members of RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance,
and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the
direction and/or control of, and/or subordinate to the Accused, "throughout Freetown and
the Western Area, abducted an unknown number of women and girls and used them as sex
slaves".2875
1148. In arriving at its factual findings in Freetown and the Western Area, the Trial
Chamber has taken into consideration the evidence of Prosecution Witnesses TF1-029,
Akiatu Tholley (TF1—085), TF1—023, Alimamy Bobson Sesay (TF1—334), TF1—375, Perry
Kamara (TF1—360), TF1—081 as well as Prosecution Exhibit P—204B, P—330, P—331 and the
reports of Prosecution Expert Witness Beth Vann (P—073) and Prosecution Expert Witness
TF1—150(P—077).
(i) Evidence of sexual slaveg; in Freetown and the Western Area
1149. The Trial Chamber has considered the testimonies of` TF1—081, TF1—150, Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, TF1—375, TF1—029 and Perry Kamara and the evidence contained in Exhibit
P—073, Exhibit P—204A/B, Exhibit P—077 and Exhibit P—078 as relevant to the allegation of
sexual slavery in Freetown and the Western Area.
Documentary Evidence
1150. Prosecution expert witness Beth Vamr, as already discussed in relation to Kailahun
and Kono Districts, reported that Sierra Leonean refugees fled the RUF and AFRC forces
approximately March—April, 1998 and arrived in camps along the border in neighbouring
2874 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.
2875 Indictment, paras 14, 17.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T Z J M 18 May 2012

3%*5 fw
Guinea.2878 Vann reported that, according to the victims she interviewed, sexual slavery was
a common practice, especially amongst the RUF and AFRC.2877 Vann reported that "[a]ll of
the newly arriving refugees l spoke with during this period clearly identified the perpetrators
of these attacks as RUF and AFRC, [...] the most commonly used term was "rebels".2878 As
with the victims of sexual violence from Kono and Kailahun interviewed in Guinea by
Vann, victims from the Freetown area who fled in January (1999) suffered from mental
health problems and sexually transmitted diseases. Some were socially isolated.2879
1151. Vann also worked with the Sierra Leonean Chapter of the Forum for African Women
Educationalists (FAWE) from February—March 2002.2880 The FAWE sexual violence
counselling and health care programme, initiated after the 1999 Freetown invasion, cared for
1,862 female abductees within its first six months of operation, most from Freetown and
some from Makeni and Kono.288l As a resultof the sexual violence to which they were
subjected, many women and girls treated by FAWE were pregnant or had babies, were '
rejected by their families and had no prospects for the future.2882
1152. Prosecution Witness TF1-081, a gynaecologist working with FAWE following the 6
January 1999 attack on Freetown, whose evidence was received pursuant to Rule 92bis,
testified that in addition to the counselling team, a medical team was set up to give medical
treatment to abductees who had returned to Freetown.2888 From March through December,
1999, the program treated 1164 patients, 99% of whom had been abducted, the majority
from Freetown and a few from Makeni and Kono.2884 Of the 11682885 treated patients, 684
were victims of sexual abuse or rape.2888 Witness TF1—081 was not able to specify the exact
2878 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4.
2877 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", pp. 8, 11, 16.
2878 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", pp. 8-9.
2879 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 17.
2888 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 6.
2888 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 9.
2882 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 17.
2883 Exhibit 1>-204A tbbptitibptiai), pp. 4-6.
2**** Exhibit 1>-20412. tbbiibtibptiai), pp. 20587, 20589.
2885 During the witness's testimony during the AFRC Trial, the witness stated that the number was 1,164. See
Exhibit P-204A (confidential), p. 20535.
2886 Exhibit P-204E tbbiiiitibiitiai), pp. 20587, 20589.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 M 2012
number of patients who had been abducted during the January 6 invasion and did not know
how the patients returned to Freetown.2 887
1 153. In a report prepared by the witness based on data collected monthly between March
and December 1999,2888 TF 1-081 reported that 77% of patients were women;2889 58.5% had
been sexually abused or raped; 52% suffered from sexually transmitted diseases and 17.1%
had become pregnant.2890 He explained that the report was compiled as a scientific paper289l
with the purpose of documenting patient reports and illnesses and was not conducted for the
purposes of scientific or sociological research.2892
1154. Witness TF 1-081 testified that as a gynaecologist, the majority of gynaecological
and obstetric cases in the program were sent to him2893 and that the "vast majority" of the
patients he examined suffered from sexually transmitted diseases or other gynaecological
problems or were pregnant.2894 Witness TF 1-081 testified that it was not the purpose of his
interactions with his patients to discover the identity of the perpetrators of the reported acts
or to assess the truth of what they said,2895 but he recorded that his patients had been
abducted by the RUF and AF RC and that some had been "married" in the bush.2896
1 155. Witness TF 1-1 50, who documented human rights abuses during the Freetown
attack,2897 reported that rape was a "standard practice" of the rebel combatants during the
invasion and that some girls were subsequently abducted and taken away by the retreating
rebels. TF 1-150 documented reports of former abductees who indicated that women captives
were raped "as a matter of course".2898 Escapees reported that women and children were
8888 Exhibit 1>~204c tpbiiiitipiititii), pp. 19-20.
8888 Exhibit P-204A (pbiihtibiitibi), p. 6.
8888 Exhibit P-204B (pbiiiiiipiitibi).
8888 Exhibit P-204B (COI'1tiC1€I'1t1211), p. 20587.
288 Exhibit P—204A(confidentia1), p. 6.
8888 Exhibit 1¤~204c (COI"Lf1C1€I'1t1211), p. 23.
8888 Exhibit P-204C tbbiiiiiibiitibi), p. 21.
8884 Exhibit P—204A tpbiihtipiitibi), p. 3.
gm Exhibit P-204C (confidential), p. 26.
8888 Exhibit P-204A (pbiihdbiitibi), pp. 10-11.
8888 Exhibit P-077 (COI'1iiC1€I'1t131), p. 13.
8888 Exhibit P-077 (confidential), p. 16.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01·T jg 18 May 2012 Q

3sS ¤ cr
detained to cook and used for sexual purposes.2g99 Reports that boys and girls had been
taken for sexual purposes or to cook food continued into February 1999.2900
1156. Reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, tendered into evidence
by the Prosecution, also document instances of civilian women and girls having been
abducted and subjected to sexual slavery by members of the AFRC and/or RUF or by
"rebels" during the attack on Freetown in similar circumstances to the incidents detailed
above
(ii) Captured girls and women used as sexual slaves in Bengpema from
i approximately mid—February to March 1999 1
1 Evidence
1157. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a member of the AF RC,29Ol testified that following
the retreat from Freetown, his troops attacked Tombo in mid—February and thereafter were
based in Benguema until approximately March 1999.2902 He testified that captured civilians
brought by the troops to Benguema included young girls and women. The troops used the
captured girls and women to pound rice, to cook, to carry loads and as "jungle wives". The
women and girls were captured while the troops were in Kono and while en mute to
Benguema. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that the women were "subdued" with weapons
and would do whatever the troops wanted them to do, including having sexual intercourse
with them. This happened throughout Benguema.29O3 The girls and women were not free to
leave. Commanders who had "women under" them were required to monitor their
movements and would be required to produce "whosoever was missing".29O4
1158. Alimamy Bobson Sesay also testified that the SBUs in Benguema used the younger
girls to cook, launder and pound rice. They also "used them as wives" meaning that they had
28"" Eiiriibii P-077 (ciiiiiiiiciiiiiir), p. 17.
2900 Exhibit P-077 (confidential), p. 18.
2901 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7853.
2902 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8392.
M3 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8392-8393.
2904 Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8393-8394.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Q

3.SS"2.·;:>
sexual intercourse with them. The witness testified that he saw "things like that" happen
while he was with the group in Benguema.29O5
1159. Alex Tamba Brima, Five-Five, Hassan Papa Bangura, Abdul Sesay, Bioh Sesay,
SLA Rambo Red Goat, Foday Bah Marah aka Bulldoze, Saidu Kambolai aka Basky,
Tarawalli a.k.a. Goldteeth, O-Five, Junior Sherif and the witness were the commanders in
Benguema at that time.29O6
1160. Witness TF1-375, a bodyguard attached to Superman, was with RUF Rambo under
the command of Issa Sesay in Jui during the time of the Freetown invasion.29O7 He testified
that his group received reports from the forces in Freetown during the invasion.29O8 The
forces stayed in Freetown for two weeks. As the forces retreated, they started to burn down
houses and abducted a large number of girls.2909
1161. Witness TF1-029, whose evidence is discussed in further detail below, was abducted
from Wellington and used as a sexual slave in Calaba Town and Benguema by a member of
the AFRC. She testified that she heard that over a thousand other women had been abducted
were also raped by the SLAs and the RUF. This was explained to the witness by a friend
who told her that if they abducted a girl, "they have the right to rape you and [take] you to
be their wives".29w
1162. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator who testified that he was sent by
Morris Kallon and Sam Bockarie to join SAJ Musa and Gullit in order to establish effective
communications between the two groups prior to the invasion,29H testified that he was
among the troops who attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999.2912 He testified that when the
troops retreated he gathered information from commercial radio and BBC media that the
rebels in Freetown raped and abducted civilians.29l3 He stated that he heard a "radio
communication" that Rambo's group and the Red Lion battalion had retreated and joined i
2905 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008,pp. 8394-8395.
2906 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8397.
2907 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12608-12609.
2908 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12612.
2009 TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12613-12614.
2°'° Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 12-13.
ml Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3175-3183.
M2 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3221-3224.
lm Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3243-3244. 3251.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / m 18 May 2012 Q
i [

3% >- z
those who were retreating along the main highway to Waterloo and Masiaka.29l4 The group
was comprised of combatants as well as abducted civilians from Freetown, including women
who were being used as "bush wives".29l5
Findings
1163. As discussed in relation to his evidence of sexual slavery in Kono District, the Trial
Chamber notes that Alimamy Bobson Sesay was a commander who was present in locations
where crimes were occuning and finds his evidence to be reliable. Based on his evidence,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that members of the AFRC/RUF, the STF and Liberian
fighters intentionally exercised powers of ownership over an unknown number of women
and girls by depriving them of their liberty and controlling their movements in Benguema
until approximately March 1999. The Trial Chamber further finds that the women and girls
were forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature with their captors and that their captors
intended to use these women and girls as sexual slaves. The Trial Chamber therefore finds
that the elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been established beyond reasonable
doubt.
(iii) TF 1-029 used as a sexual slave in Wellington, Calaba Town and Benggema
1164. The Prosecution submits that TF 1-029 was used as a sexual slave in Calaba Town
and Benguema.29l6 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF 1 -029 in relation to
the submission.
Evidence
1165. As noted in the section on Rape Witness TF 1-029's evidence in the RUF trial was
introduced through Rule 92bis. She was called for cross-examination in the instant trial on
22 October 2008 and testified to her abduction and rape by Major Arif as particularised
above. The mixed group of RUF and SLA fighters brought the witness, together with 50
other civilians who were captured in the same house, to Calaba Town.29l7 The witness was
2914 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3251-3252. A
2915 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3252.
M6 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 921.
2917 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 8-10.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T AL 18 May 2012 @

gg; 7:2.
held there against her will for two weeks29l8 and while she was forced to live in Major Arif" s
house together with his cousins and other RUF and SLA soldiersww she was raped there by
Major Arif ten times.292U The witness was sixteen years old when this occurred.292l TF 1-029
further testified that she saw that the other women who were abducted were also raped.2922
1166. The rebels then took the witness to Ben ema.2923 She testified that when the
gu Y
arrived in Benguema, she was raped by Major Arif and that, again, she was raped ten
times.2924
1167. TF 1-029 testified that the RUF and "SLAs" also raped other girls while in
Benguema. The witness knows this because the girls who had been captured and raped told
her what had happened to them.2925
1168. Major Arif permitted the witness to leave Benguema on 10 March 1999.2926 On-
cross-examination, TF 1-029 insisted that the rebels were mixed RUF and "SLA" but that
most of the eo le she "dealt with" were SLAs, includin Colonel O-Five, Bri adier Five-
P P E S
Five, Colonel Tito, and Colonel Rambo. O-Five, Tito and Five-Five were in control of the
soldiers from Calaba Town up to Four Mile.2927
Findings
V 1169. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that between 22 January 1999
and 10 March 1999, which is during and after the indictment period, in Wellington, Calaba
Town and Benguema, members of the AF RC/RUF including Major Arif an AF RC soldier,
exercised powers of ownership over an unknown number of women including TF 1-029 by
abducting them and holding them in captivity either independently or with the assistance of
other rebels and thereby depriving them of their liberty. The Trial Chamber also finds that
during this period, members of the AF RC/RUF , including Major Arif engaged in acts of a
2918 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 10.
2919 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 10.
2920 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF 1-029", p. 12. ‘
ml Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF 1—029", p. 12.
2922 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", p. 12.
mf Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF 1-029", pp. 13-15.
2924 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 15-16.
mj Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 15-16.
2026 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 17-18.
2927 Exhibit P-206, "RUF Trial Transcript 28 November 2005, TF1-029", pp. 30-31.

---- End of Page 430 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 %

3%S2.3
sexual nature with an unknown number of women and girls including TF1-029, namely
repeated rape. The Trial Chamber is satisfied from the evidence of the environment of
violence and coercion, together with the testimony of TF1-029 that she was "forced to have
sex", that she did not consent to these sexual acts. The Trial Chamber finds that Major Arif
intended to use TF1-028 and an unknown number of women and girls as sexual slaves. The
Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
(iv) Akiatu Tholley used as a sexual slave in Allen Town and Waterloo
1170. The Prosecution submits that Akiatu Tholley was abducted from Wellington and
used as a sexual slave in the Western Area.2928 The Trial Chamber has considered the
evidence of Akiatu Tholley in relation to the submission.
Evidence
1171. The evidence of Witness Akiatu Tholley of the invasion of her home and her
subsequent abduction and rape has been recited in the sections on Unlawful Killings and
Rape 2929
1172. Tholley was captured by a rebel named James. Tholley testified that James was
accompanied by his "boys" whom he had captured and who carried his ammunition. J ames’
boys gave Tholley and other captured civilians ammunition to carry and took them to Allen
Town. James also had his "wives" with him.2930
1173. In Allen Town, James’ boys stripped all the civilians naked and made them lie down
on the ground, threatening to kill them. Tholley testified that in the same moment, an Alpha
jet flew over head and Tholley, the rebels and the other captured civilians all f`1ed.293l
Tholley fled to a house where she encountered a woman named Fatmatta, one of J ames’
wives, who gave her a dress to wear because she was naked. James soon discovered Tholley
at the house.2932
2928 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 923.
1929 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 2 & 3 (Unlawful Killings) and Count 4 (Rape).
2930 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19176—19179.
ml Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. l9180~19181.
2932 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19181—19182.

---- End of Page 431 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01~T Cpg 18 May 2012 Q
2 r [

3552-%-
1 174. Tholley testified that James took her to the Mammy Dumbuya Churchzim where she
saw rebels raping, beating and killing many young girls, and that he raped her there.2934
1 175. James took Tholley to Waterloo, Western Area together with his "wives" and
"boys", the other rebels and other captured civilians.2935 The group was led by Five-Five.2936
Tholley testified that she remained with James in Waterloo for a "long time" but was unable
to say how long.2937 After Waterloo, James took Tholley to Masiaka, Bombali District2938
where he was the ground commander and where the other commanders were Five-Five, ,
Gold Teeth, Daramy and Cartel.2939 Tholley testified that Gold Teeth and Daramy were also
among the rebels who came to her house in Wellington during the Freetown invasion.294O
Tholley testified that she stayed in Masiaka for more than two months and that Issa Sesay
was present.294l
1176. Tholley testified that the rebels she was with were a "mixed group" and the leader
was Five-Five.2942 James told Tholley that he belonged to the STF and ULIMO and that he
had been part of the Liberian war until "the time they joined the rebels". She did not know to
which group Five-Five belonged. 2943
1177. Five-Five, Gold Teeth, Daramy and Cartel are known members of the AFRC. The
AFRC passed through the villages of Waterloo, Hastings, Wellington and Kissy and invaded
Freetown on 6 January 1999; they retreated approximately three weeks later first to
Benguema and then Waterloo.2944 The Trial Chamber finds that Tholley's evidence of her
movements with the rebels is consistent with other evidence of the pattern of AFRC
movements at this time. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that James was a STF member and
2933 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19181-19182.
2934 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape); Rape of Akiatu Tholley in Allen Town
and Waterloo.
2935 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19185-19187.
2936 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19187-19189.
2937 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19198, 19258.
2938 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19201-19202.
2‘"" Akrrrttr rircucy, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19204-19206.
2""° Aicrattr rrrcucy, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19204-19207.
Zim Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19201, 19258.
2942 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19187-19188; Transcript 27 October 2008 pp. 19197-
19198.
2943 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19205, 19236-19237.
2944 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.

---- End of Page 432 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // Og 18 May 2012

3&S2.S`
that he captured Tholley prior to the retreat from Freetown in late January 1999 and that she
remained under his control in the Westem Area until early April 1999.
1178. Tholley testified that James was her "husband" because he had captured her and
because from the time he raped her in the Mammy Dumbuya Church, he continued to have
sex with her against her wi11.2945 Tholley did not want to be his wife.2946 During the entirety
of her capture, Tholley became pregnant three times.2947 Tholley testified that some of
James's other "wives" had also been captured during the fighting. Two were Liberian, one
was from Kono and five were captured in Freetown.2948
Findings
1179. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that between late January and
early April, 1999 James, an STF fighter, exercised powers of ownership over Tholley by
holding her in captivity and depriving her of her liberty. The Trial Chamber finds that during
this period James caused Tholley to engage in acts of a sexual nature, namely rape, by
having sex with Tholley against her will. The Trial Chamber finds that James intended to
use Tholley as a sexual slave. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the elements of the
crime of sexual slavery have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
(v) Evidence that TF1-023 was used as a sexual slave in Calaba Town, Benguema
and Four Mile by a member of the AFRC from late J anuag; until March, 1999
1180. The Prosecution submits that TF1-023 was used as a sexual slave in Calaba Town
and Benguema.2949 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-023 in relation to
the submission.
Evidence
1 181. The evidence of Witness TF1-023, whose evidence in the AFRC trial was introduced
through Rule 92bis, was cross-examined in the present case on 22 October 2008. In her prior
2945 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19202-19203.
2946 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19202.
2947 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19220.
M Airrrrttr rircucy, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19208~19209.
2949 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 922.

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Case No.: SCSL~03—01~T %/ (ig 18 May 2012 %

2%.32.%
testimony she testified about her abduction and detention by Captain A and subsequent
"handing over" to and rape by Colonel B as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs.
1182. TF1—023 remained in Calaba Town for three days. On the third day, she and the
rebels walked to Allen Town, Waterloo and then Benguema where they remained for about
four days. They then continued on to Lumpa and Four Mile where they stayed for about a
month.255O On cross—examination, the witness clarified that she remained with "the armed
men" in Freetown from 22 to 29 J anuaty. She left Freetown on 29 January, it took about two
days to reach Benguema. After three days at Benguema they went to Four Mile where they
stayed for approximately a month.255l Colonel B was not always with the witness; he joined
her in Benguema and again in Four Mile. The witness does not know where he was the
interim.255Z
1183. The witness lived with Colonel B for about three weeks in Four Mile, after which
time he left her and went to Makeni. During those three weeks, he asked her to cook, but she
did not as she did not know how. During the three weeks she continued to "sleep" with him
because he told her that she was his "wife". He never asked her consent before sex. The
witness was not able to leave.2555 There were approximately 400 aimed rebels at Four Mile.
Some "people" at Four Mile tried to escape but they were beaten. This made the witness
afraid and she decided not to try to mn away.2554 Colonel B also had an armed guard follow
her so she could not escape.2555
1 184. When Colonel B left for Makeni, he left the witness in the "care of" a captain, whom
the witness identified in a Confidential Exhibit.2556 The Trial Chamber will refer to this
erson as "Ca tain C". The witness remained in the custod of Ca tain C from
P P y Y P
approximately March through August.2557
2550 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", pp. 47-49.
2555 Exhibit P-205B (confidential), pp. 3l-32.
2555 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023". pp. 47-49.
5555 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", pp. 49-52.
5554 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005. TFl-023", pp. 52-53.
2555 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", p. 53.
2555 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TFl-023", p. 49; Exhibit P-269 (confidential).
5557 Exhibit P-205A "AFRC Trial Transcript 7 November 2005, TFl-023", p. 53 (CS).

---- End of Page 434 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ jb; 18 May 2012
V I

2·a.s’2-'+
1185. TF1-023 testified that she knew of other captured women in Lumpa who had been
given to rebels as "wives".2958 In Lumpa, she knew ten others whose "husbands" were
lieutenants or ordinary soldiers, but none of` the other women's rebel "husbands" were
commanders. As a commander's wife, the witness was given special treatment. She was not
forced to do "anything" and those with lower ranks gave her respect. To show her respect,
they would call her "de mammy".2959 The witness testified that her cousin was also captured
in Calaba Town and that Captain A took her cousin as his "wif`e".296O
1186. TF1-023 testified that the rebels she named in the exhibits told her that they were
members of the AFRC. She first saw their senior commander, Brima or "Gullit" in
Benguema. He was a Brigadier at the time. At Four Mile, Colonel B told her that the senior
commander was "Bazzy". He used to visit Colonel B and the witness would see him
regularly.2%l On cross-examination, TF1-023 testified that a boy called Alhassan identified
Bazzy to her at Four Mile, but that "everyone told" her that Bazzy was the senior
commander. She did not talk with Bazzy.2962 On cross-examination, TF1-023 testified that
throughout her ‘journey" the rebels were a mixed group of AFRC and RUF, but that the
ones she had direct contact with were all AFRC. 2963
Findings
1187. The Trial Chamber finds that between 22 January and approximately March, l999,
which extends beyond the Indictment period for sexual slavery in Freetown and the Western
Area, Colonel B, a member of the AFRC under the command of Alex Tamba Brima and
Brima Bazzy Kamara, exercised powers of ownership over TF1-023 by holding her in
captivity and depriving her of her liberty. The Trial Chamber finds that during this period,
Colonel B caused TF1-023 to engage in acts of a sexual nature, namely rape, by having
sexual intercourse with TF1-023 against her will. The Trial Chamber finds that Colonel B
intended to use Tholley as a sexual slave. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the
elements of the crime of sexual slavery have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
2958 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 53-54.
mg Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 56-58.
2960 Exhibit P-205A, "AFRC Trial Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023", pp. 32, 37-47.
Zim Exhibit P-205B (confidential), pp. 13-16, 24-33.
2962 Exhibit P-205B (confidential), pp. 26-28.
2963 TF1-023, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18958-18959.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T FLL 18 May 2012

3'i`$S'?.$
Conclusion
1188. The Trial Chamber finds in each of the aforementioned crimes mentioned in this
section concerning Kono District, that the perpetrators intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over their victims by depriving them of their liberty, and in some cases forcing
them to work, and in all cases the victims were forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature
thus constituting the crime of sexual slavery.
1189. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved the following instances of
sexual slavery beyond a reasonable doubt:
. (i) An unknown number of women and girls were used as sexual slaves by AFRC
fighters in Benguema until approximately March 1999,
(ii) TF 1-029 was used as a sexual slave by Major Arif; an ex-SLA/AFRC soldier, in
Wellington, Calaba Town and Benguema from late January to March 1999,
(iii) Akiatu Tholley was used as a sexual slave by an STP fighter named James in
Allen Town and Waterloo from approximately late January through early April
1999,
(iv) TF 1-023 was used as a sexual slave by a member of the AFRC in Calaba Town,
Benguema and Four Mile from late January through March 1999.
1190. The Trial Chamber finds in each of the aforementioned crimes mentioned in this
section concerning Kailahun District, that the perpetrators intentionally exercised powers of 2
ownership over their victims by depriving them of their liberty, and in some cases forcing
them to work, and in all cases the victims were forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature .
thus constituting the crime of sexual slavery.
1191. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AF RC forces directed both
a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.2964 The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that each of the incidences of sexual slavery proved by the
Prosecution in respect of Freetown and the Western Area formed part of the said attack and
2964 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para, 559 supra.

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3%$?r‘l
that the perpetrators were aware of this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
the aforementioned incidences of sexual slavery in Freetown and the Western Area
constitute sexual slavery as a crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute.

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$$530
3. Count 6 {Outrages Upon Personal Dignity)
Allegations and Submissions
1192. The Indictment alleges that "members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or
alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under
the direction and/or control of; and or subordinate to the Accused, committed widespread
acts of sexual violence against women and girls", including rape and sexual slavery.2965
1193. Outrages upon personal dignity are alleged to have occurred between about 1
February 1998 and about 31 December 1998 in Kono District,2966 between about 30
November 1996 and about 18 January 2002 in Kailahun District2%7 and between about 21
December 1998 and about 28 February 1999 in Freetown and the Western Area.2968
Evidence
1194. The Trial Chamber has found in the Preliminary Issues Section that it would not
consider evidence of sexual violence other than rapeand sexual slavery under Count 6,
Outrages Upon Personal Dignity,2969 as the Accused was not provided with notice that any
other forms of sexua1 violence were charged under this count.297O
1195. The Trial Chamber has therefore considered, for each district, the acts of rape and I
sexual slavery that it has found have been proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crimes
against humanity of rape, Count 4, and sexual slavery, Count 5, to determine whether they
also constitute war crimes under Outrages upon Personal Dignity, Count 6, and found that
they do in each case.
1196. Further, witnesses testified that the perpetrators of rape or sexual slavery forced
women and girls to undress, sometimes in public, as a prelude to the rape; that many women
and girls were raped or gang raped in public, frequently in front of neighbours or members
of their community and/or in the presence of husbands and/or relatives who were forced to
2965 Indictment, paras 14-17.
2966 Indictment, para. 15.
2967 Indictment, para. 16.
2968 Indictment, para. 17.
2969 In full, the crime is entitled °°Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault".
2970 See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T J RL 18 May 2012

Bsszi
watch. Several witnesses testified that an object, such as a piece of wood, was inserted into
the vaginas of victims after the rape or gang rape. The Trial Chamber considers that these
actions resulted in further humiliation and degradation of the victims, thus aggravating the
crime of outrages upon personal dignity. Therefore the Trial Chamber has indicated where
instances of rape and sexual slavery involved any such additional elements of humiliation
and degradation, such as forced undressing, sexual mutilation and/or public humiliation.
Documentag Evidence
1197. The Trial Chamber has also further examined relevant documentary evidence.
Exhibit P-073, an expert report entitled "Conf1ict—Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone"
authored by Beth Vann, recorded that:
Rape was reported by 84 of the 94 women reporting sexual violence in the PHR [Physicians
for Human Rights] study. Approximately one third of these women reported experiencing
gang rape, abduction, stripped of clothing, forced to undress. Respondents also reported
sexual slavery, molestation, forced marriage, and insertion of foreign objects into the
genital opening or anus.?)-/I
1198. The expert report also states that, in relation to focus group sessions conducted by
the author, "[a]ll participants described witnessing at least one public rape of a civilian
female in or near their home town/village just before flight or during the time they were
running to refuge in Guinea".2972
Findings
(a) Kono District
1199. The Trial Chamber finds that the acts of rape and sexual slavery that it has found to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt in Kono District also constitute in each case a serious
humiliation, degradation and violation of the personal dignity of the victims, and that the
perpetrators intentionally committed these acts and knew that their acts would produce this
effect.
1200. The Trial Chamber thus finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that:
29-/I Exhibit P—073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conf1ict—Related
Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 9, ERN 31558.
2972 Exhibit P-073, "Report to the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Conf1ict—Related
Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 4, ERN 31553.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / "| 18 May 2012


3&—$`3?-·
i. An RUF rebel named Peppe committed an outrage upon personal dignity by
raping Finda Gbamanja in Koidu Town in February 1998;
ii. SLA and RUF fighters committed outrages upon personal dignity by gang raping
TF1-189 in Koidu Town between March and August 1998;
iii. RUF Staff Alhaji committed an outrage upon personal dignity on Sia Lappia,
who had her clothes removed, was hit in her private parts and then raped at gun
point in the presence of other captured persons; including her child; in
approximately April 1998;
iv. AFRC commanders; including Alimamy Bobson Sesay, committed outrages
upon personal dignity by raping an unknown number of women and girls in
Tombodu between March and June 1998;
v. RUF fighters committed outrages upon personal dignity by raping Rebecca and
an unknown number of women in Wondedu in 1998;
vi. RUF; AFRC and STF fighters committed outrages upon personal dignity by
raping an unknown number of women at Superman Ground in April 1998;
vii. RUF; AFRC and STF fighters committed outrages upon personal dignity by
raping an unknown number of women at PC Ground in or about April 1998;
viii. Sergeant Foday committed an outrage upon personal dignity by raping Finda
Gbamanja in Koidu Town and at Superman Ground in 1998;
ix. A member of the RUF committed an outrage upon personal dignity on TF1-189
who was used as sexual slave in Koidu Town between 12 March 1998 and
August 1998;
x. Sergeant Foday committed an outrage upon personal dignity on Finda Gbamanj a
who was used as a sexual slave in Koidu Town from approximately March/April
1998;

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Case No.; SCSL—O3—Ol—T / wg 18 May 2012

3%;;
xi. Rebels loyal to Superman committed an outrage upon personal on F inda
Gbamanja who was used as a sexual slave at Superman Ground from
approximately April to October 1998,
xii. AFRC and RUF fighters committed an outrage upon personal dignity on Sia
Kamara who was repeatedly raped and used as a sexual slave in approximately
March/April 1998 in Kono District.
1201. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment,
involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF .2973 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that for all of the aforementioned acts of sexual violence in Kono District there was
a nexus between the acts of sexual violence and the armed conflict, that each of the victims
was not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of the sexual violence, and that the
perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned
acts of sexual violence in Kono District constitute outrages upon personal dignity as a war
crime under Article 3 of the Statute.
(b) Kailahun District
1202. The Trial Chamber finds that the acts of rape and sexual slavery that it has found to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt in Kailahun District also constitute in each case a
serious humiliation, degradation and violation of the personal dignity of the victims, and that
the perpetrators intentionally committed these acts and knew that their acts would produce
this effect. However, as no locations were pleaded in the Indictment for Count 6 in relation
to Kailahun District such evidence does not fall within the scope of the Indictment, and is
relevant only insofar as it demonstrates that the activity was widespread or systematic, and
therefore assists in establishing the chapeau requirements.
1203. The Trial Chamber thus finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that:
i. AF RC and RUF fighters committed outrages upon personal dignity on an
unknown number of women captured in Kenema who were used as sexual slaves
after February 1998 in Buedu and Kailahun Town,
2973 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T X W 18 May 2012

335 3%
ii. AFRC and RUF fighters committed outrages upon personal dignity on an
unknown number of women used as sexual slaves in Buedu, including an
incident of a woman who was considered to be "disrespectful" being stripped
down to her underwear and beaten, between February 1998 and December 1999
in Buedu,
iii. An RUF member committed an outrage upon personal dignity on TF1—189 who
was used as a sexual slave in Kailahun Town from August to September 1998.
1204. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment,
involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF.2974 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that for all of the aforementioned acts of sexual violence in Kailahun District there
was a nexus between the acts of sexual violence and the armed conflict, that each of the
victims was not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of the sexual violence, and
that the perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
aforementioned acts of sexual violence in Kailahun District constitute outrages upon
personal dignity as a war crime under Article 3 of the Statute.
(i) Freetown and the Western Area
1205. The Trial Chamber finds that the acts of rape and sexual slavery that it has found to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt in Freetown and the Western Area also constitute in
each case a serious humiliation, degradation and violation of the personal dignity of the
victims, and that the perpetrators intentionally committed these acts and knew that their acts
would produce this effect.
1206. The Trial Chamber thus finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that:
i. Men and boys, members of AFRC, RUF, STF and Liberian fighters, under the
command of Gullit, committed outrages upon personal dignity on an unknown
2974 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
/

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T fm 18 May 2012

3%S$..s’
number of women and girls who were raped in public in the grounds of the State
House where others viewed the acts over three nights in January 1999;
ii. AFRC; RUF; STL and Liberian commanders and fighters committed outrages
upon personal dignity on an unknown number of girls who were raped inside
State House during the Freetown attack of January 1999;
iii. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a commander in the AFRC, committed an outrage
upon personal dignity by raping a young girl captured in Freetown during the
January 1999 attack;
iv. RUF fighters committed outrages upon personal dignity on an unknown number
of girls in a house; in the presence of other persons; on Blackhall Road during
the Freetown attack in January 1999;
v. Rebels under the command of Captain Blood committed outrages upon personal
dignity on an unknown number of girls; who were raped in public and in view of
other persons, in Kissy on or about 22 January 1999;
vi. Major Arif, an SLA soldier, committed an outrage upon personal dignity on
TF 1-029 who was used as a sexual slave in Wellington; Calaba Town and
Benguema from late January to March 1999;
vii. James, an STF fighter; committed an outrage upon personal dignity on Akiatu
Tholley who was used as a sexual slave in Allen Town, where she and others
were undressed and raped in the view of other people; and in Waterloo from
approximately late January through early April 1999;
viii. A member of the AFRC committed an outrage upon personal dignity on TF 1-
023 who was used as a sexual slave in Calaba Town, Benguema and Four Mile
from late January through March 1999.
1207. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment,

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Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T @ 18 May 2012
•//r/ I

385 2 <¤
involving among others, members of the RUF, AF RC and CDF .2975 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that for all of the aforementioned acts of sexual violence in Freetown and the
Westem Area there was a nexus between the acts of sexual violence and the armed conflict,
that each of the victims was not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of the
sexual violence, and that the perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the aforementioned acts of sexual violence in Freetown and the Westem Area
constitute outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime under Article 3 of the Statute.
C. Counts 7 and 8 {Physical Violence)
Allegations and Submissions
1208. Count 7 of the Indictment charges "violence to life, health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment" and Count 8 charges "other inhumane
acts" and alleges that "[b]etween about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002,
members of RUF, AFRC, AF RC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, assisted
and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of, and/or
subordinate to the Accused, committed widespread acts of physical violence against
civilians:" in Kono District, Kailahun District, and Freetown and the Westem Area.2976
1209. The Prosecution submits that physical violence was inflicted on civilians throughout
the Sierra Leone conflict and was often accompanied by other atrocities, and that the
evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt the Accused's guilt with respect to physical
violence (Counts 7 and 8).2977 The Prosecution also submits that "[o]f special note is the
intentional public nature of these acts of physical violence, which compounded the mental
harm of civilians who were being victimized and of those who were forced to watch
helplessly as family, friends and even strangers were subjected to physical violence by
Indictment Perpetrators".2978
2975 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
2976 Indictment, paras 18-21 .
2977 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 952-953.
2978 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 950.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01—T I 18 May 2012

3e; s?
Evidence and Deliberations
1. Kono District gl Februagy 1998 to 31 December 1998)
1210. The Indictment alleges that between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December
1998 members of the RUF, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, assisted
and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of, and/or
subordinate to the Accused, "mutilated and beat an unknown number of civilians in various
locations including Tombodu or Tumbodu, Kaima or Kayima and Wondedu. The
mutilations included cutting off limbs and other body parts and carving "AFRC" and "RUF"
on the bodies of civilians".2979
1211. In arriving at its factual findings in Kono District, the Trial Chamber has taken into
consideration the evidence of witnesses Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Mustafa Mansaray,
Ibrahim Fofana, Samuel Komba, TFl—375, Sorie Kondeh and Alex Tamba, in addition to
relevant documentary evidence.
(a) Tombodu
1212. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Mustafa
Mansaray, Ibrahim Fofana and Samuel Komba in relation to these allegations.
Evidence
1213. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that around March to June 1998, he and other
AFRC and RUF commanders used and commanded small boy units to amputate the hands
of civilians298O in Yomandu and Tombodu. He saw amputations at Guinea Highway,
Superman Area, and Dabuneh Street. He and Bomb Blast targeted captured civilians and
used SBUs to amputate their arms. The SBUs executed these commands. The witness stated
that "it was a kind of message to the other civilians that they should fear us and they should I
tell ECOMOG about us".298l Fighters were ordered to perform amputations as a waming to
ECOMOG troops not to come to Kono.2982 The witness testified that Mohamed Savage also
2979 Indictment paras l8~l 9.
2980 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008 p. 7978.
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008 p. 7978.
2932 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008. pp. 8063~8065.

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Case No.: SCSL-03~0l~T Ok 1.8 May 2012

‘5sS$s
amputated the arms of civilians and was helped by SBUs.2983 lt is not clear from Sesay's
testimony if he personally saw Savage amputate civilians or relied on reports. However
given his active participation in amputations, his knowledge of the decision to send a
message to civilians that they should be in fear, and his knowledge of the implementation of
that decision, theTrial Chamber finds that Savage amputated the arms of an unknown
number of civilians.
1214. Alimamy Bobson Sesay also testified that he was in Tombodu in March or April
1998 and saw Savage, Guitar Boy and Staff Alhaji, members of the Junta, amputate the
hands of 15 civilians, young people, who had been rejoicing because "they thought we were
ECOMOG people". Alimamy Bobson Sesay stated that the victims were urged to seek relief
from ECOMOG troops.2984 The Trial Chamber finds that Savage amputated the arms of 15
civilians.
1215. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Mustapha Mansaray and Ibrahim
· Fofana, whose testimonies were discussed at length in the section on Unlawful Killings
taking place in Tombodu.2985 Both witnesses and four others had their hands amputated in
Tombodu in April 1998 by Staff Alhaji, a member of the AFRC.2986 While their testimonies
diverged in some descriptions, the Trial Chamber finds that both witnesses were in
Tombodu, and both witnesses had their hands amputated. Further both testified that Staff
Alhaji was present and that 53 captured civilians were burnt in a house on Staff Alhaji's
order. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the discrepancies in the witnesses’ testimonies can
be reasonably accounted for by the passage of time and the physical and emotional trauma
suffered by both witnesses.
1216. Samuel Komba testified that after March 1998, he was captured by "fighters" while
he was in the bush and forced to carry luggage to Tombodu.2987 When Komba arrived in
Tombodu, he and thirteen other captured persons were forced to lie on the ground.2988
Fighters commanded by Savage, a member of the AFRC, put a mattress on top of the
2983 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp, 8063-8065.
2984 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7994-7998.
2985 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Third Massacre of
over 53 civilians in Tombudu in April 1998 supra.
2986 Mustafa Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19602-19606; Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October
2008, pp. 19341-19342.
2987 Exhibit P-189, "Samuel Komba, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18440-18444.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gu 18 May 2012


$$5-Si
ersons and lit the mattress on fire.2989 Komba was able to free himself and kick the mattress
P
away.299O As a consequence, Savage ordered that Komba's right hand be cut off with a
cutlass.29°l The attempted amputation failed, leaving the witness's fingers mangled.2992 The
Trial Chamber finds that Savage attempted to amputate the hand of Samuel Komba.
Findings
1217. Based on Alimamy Bobson Sesay's evidence of the amputation of the arms of an
unknown number of people at Yomandu Guinea Highway Superman area and Dabundeh
Street, the 15 amputations in Tombodu, the amputation of the arms of Mustapha Mansaray
and Ibrahim Fofana and four other people, and the attempted amputation and injury to
Samuel Komba, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that in the time period of
March to June 1998 the AFRC and RUF fighters caused serious physical suffering and
injury to the victims. Given that the amputations were carried out by the AFRC and RUF
fighters as a punishment, and that the perpetrators evinced an obvious intention to inflict
suffering and injury, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that they intended the serious injury and
suffering to occur. The Trial Chamber is further satisfied on the evidence that the victims
were civilians and finds beyond reasonable doubt that they were not taking part in hostilities
at the time of the amputations
(b) Kagma
1218. The Prosecution submits that around May 1998, civilian men, women and children
were marked with the letters "RUF" and/or "AFRC" by mixed forces under the command of
Komba Gbundema in Kayima.2993 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-
375 and Sorie Kondeh.
Evidence
1219. Witness TF1-375 testified that, immediately after the Fitti-Fatta Operation in mid-
1998, he arrived in Wordu to meet RUF Commander Komba Gbundema, who had a number
2988 Exhibit P-189, "Samuel Komba, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", p. 18447.
mc) Exhibit P-189, "Samuel Komba, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18449-18450.
2990 Exhibit P-189, "Samuel Komba, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18450-18451.
299} Exhibit P-189, "Samuel Komba, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", p. 18452.
Zim Exhibit P-189. "Samuel Komba, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18452-18453.
W3 Prosecution Final Trial Briefi paras 972-973.

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T (jd 18 May 2012

3s.<4<>
of captured civilians with him.2994 The RUF fighters used razor blades or sharp knives to
carve the letters "RUF" onto the chests of the captured civilians, some of whom were
children aged five and older who had been abducted from Kayima and Wordu.2995
Gbundema also had adult and child civilian captives, on whom the RUF fighters carved the
letters "RUF" with knives and razors.2996 TF1-375 testified that fighters carved the letters
"RUF" on to the bodies of all of their victims and that males, females, adults, and children
were targeted indiscriminately.2997 The witness did not explain the purpose of these
markings. TF1-375 testified that these markings "sta1ted taking place in Kayima on to
Wordu".2998
1220. Sorie Kondeh was captured in Bayawandu in May 1998.2999 Kondeh was taken to
Kayima, where the commander in charge was Komba Gbundema.3O0O Once there, he and
seventeen others were lined up.3OOl An AFRC fighter named Bangali carved the letters
"RUF" and "AFRC" into the chest of the witness with a surgical blade.3O02 The others were
marked with "RUF" or "AFRC".3003 The witness had visible scars of the letters "RUF" and
"AFRC" on his upper chest.3004
Findings
1221. Based on TF1-375's evidence the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that immediately after the Fitti-Fatta Operation in mid-
1998 an unknown number of people "starting at Kayima" were mutilated by the carving of
RUF on their chests by RUF Commander Komba Gbundema. The Trial Chamber finds
2994 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12546.
2995 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12546.
29% TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12544-12546.
2997 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12546.
2""" Tri-575, Transcript 23 June 2008,p. 12545.
2999 Sorie Kondeh, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18198, 18203-18208; Exhibit P-191, "Sorie Kondeh,
AFRC Transcript 5 July 2005", pp. 12-13. The witness's written statement indicates that he was captured on 7
May 1998. See, Exhibit P-191, "Sorie Kondeh, AFRC Transcript 5 July 2005", pp. 35-36.
3000 Exhibit P-191, "Sorie Kondeh, AFRC Transcript 5 July 2005", pp. 13-14; Exhibit P-190, "Sorie Kondeh,
RUF Transcript 12 July 2004", pp. 10-11.
ml Exhibit P-191, "Sorie Kondeh, AFRC Transcript 5 July 2005", p. 14; Exhibit P-190, "Sorie Kondeh ,
RUF Transcript 12 July 2004", pp. 12-13.
3002 Exhibit P-191, "Sorie Kondeh, AFRC Transcript 5 July 2005", pp. 16-17; Exhibit P-190, "Sorie Kondeh,
RUF Transcript 12 July 2004", p. l1-13.
3003 Exhibit P-191, "Sorie Kondeh, AFRC Transcript 5 July 2005", p. 17; Exhibit P-190, "Sorie Kondeh, RUF
Transcript 12 July 2004", p. 13.
30*** israiibit P-192, "Photograph sr Witness TFl-074".

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Oi 18 May 2012

385% l
beyond reasonable doubt that Commander Gbudema caused, and intended to cause, serious
physical suffering and injury to the victims.
1222. Based on the evidence of Sorie Kondeh, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in May 1998 18 persons were carved with the
letters "RUF" and/or "AFRC" by AFRC fighters in Kayima, and that in doing so the AFRC
fighters caused, and intended to cause, serious physical suffering and injury to the victims.
1223. As the victims were captured civilians, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that the victims were not taking part in hostilities at the time of the
amputations
(c) Wondedu
1224. The Prosecution submits that captured civilians were marked with the letters "RUF"
and "AFRC" in Wondedu.3005 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Alex
Tamba Teh in relation to the allegations.
Evidence
1225. Alex Tamba Teh, whose evidence was discussed above in relation to unlawful
killings in Koidu Town,3006 testified that at some time between April and November
1998,3007 while he was being held captive by Rocky, an RUF commander, he saw rebels
under Rocky's command use sharp objects to carve "RUF" and "AFRC" onto the bodies of
an unknown number of captured civilian persons.3008 Teh stated that the rebels "said the
people shou1dn’t escape and go to ECOMOG. In fact they shou1dn’t escape and go, so with
that carving if you go to the side of the ECOMOG they will kill you, so you never had
anywhere else to go".3O09
1226. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Teh's first~hand evidence is reliable as to these
incidents. While Teh did not indicate the number of persons whom he saw being marked
3005 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 974.
3006 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Killing of
civilians in and around Koidu Town between April and May 1998 supra.
3007 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 683-684, 686, 736.
3008 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 706-707,
3009 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 707.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T AL! 18 May 2012

3zS Lt?.
with the letters ‘"RUF" and "AFRC", the Trial Chamber finds that an unknown number of
civilians who were captured were mutilated in this manner.
1227. Teh also testified that some time between April and November 1998, AF RC
commander Banya put a flat stick in Teh's mouth and used the butt of his gun to knock out
his teeth.3OlO Teh stated that Banya did this because Teh was alleged to have advised some
captured civilians to hide in the bush so that they could rest.3OH Banya told him, "[y]ou are a
very lucky man that I have been told not to kill you, but 1 will give you something, 1 will do
something to you that will remain with you everlasting".3 012
Findings A
1228. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, by the act of carving
the letters "RUF" and "AFRC" into the bodies of an unknown number of their captive
civilians some time between April and November 1998, RUF and AF RC fighters caused,
and intended to cause, serious physical injury and suffering upon their victims..
1229. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that by knocking out
teeth of Teh, a captive civilian, as punishment some time between April and November
1998, AFRC Commander Banya caused, and intended to cause, serious physical injury and
suffering to Teh.
1230. Further, as the victims were captured civilians, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that the victims were not taking part in hostilities at the time of the
mutilations.
Conclusion
1231. ln conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December 1998, in
various locations in Kono District, including Tombudo, Kayima, and Wondedu, members of
the AFRC and RUF committed acts of cruel treatment and other inhumane acts against an
mm Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 711-712.
wu Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 708-709.
mm Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 711, 736.

---- End of Page 450 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gb 18 May 2012

3%.51+3
unknown number of civilians ,as charged in the Indictment,3Ol3 and as shown in the evidence
above.
1232. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AFRC forces directed a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leonewm The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that each of the acts of physical violence proved by the Prosecution in
respect of Kono District formed part of the said attack and that the perpetrators were aware
of this fact. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that there was an anned conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the A
Indictment, involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF .3 015 The Trial
. Chamber is satisfied that for all of the aforementioned acts of physical violence in Kono
District there was a nexus between the acts of physical violence and the armed conflict, that
each of the victims was not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of physical
violence, and that the perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
that the aforementioned acts of physical violence in Kono District constitute other inhumane
acts as a crime against humanity under Article 2 of the Statute, and cruel treatment as a war
crime under Article 3 of the Statute.
2. Kailahun District g30 November 1996 to 18 January 2002)
1233. The Indictment alleges that between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January
2002, members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters
beat an unknown number of civilians in locations throughout Kailahun District.3 016
1234. No locations were pleaded in the Indictment for Counts 7 and 8 in relation to
Kailahun District. As previously indicated, the Trial Chamber finds that while evidence may
support proof of existence of crimes relating to physical violence on a widespread or
systematic basis, no finding of guilt for those crimes may be made in respect of locations not
pleaded in the Indictment.3 017
mm Indictment, para. 19.
M4 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.
W5 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
mm Indictment, para. 19.
mw See Preliminary Issues: Issues Related to the Pleading of the Indictment supra.

---- End of Page 451 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL 18 May 2012

3‘i•$SL1*\·
1235. The Trial Chamber will, therefore, only consider testimonies regarding Kailahun
District in relation to the chapeau requirements. For that purpose, the Trial Chamber has
considered the testimonies of TF1—362, TF1—189, Komba Sumana, TF1—026, Aruna Gbonda,
Augustine Mallah, Dennis Koker and Mustapha M. Mansaray.
(a) Bunumbu
1236. The Prosecution submits that hundreds of captured civilians, who were trained at
Camp Lion training base at Bunumbu, were subjected to physical violence during their
training.3018
1237. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1—362, TF1—189 and Komba
Sumana, and Exhibits P—088 and D—013.
(i) Beating of Recruits at Bunumbu Training Base
Evidence
1238. TF1—362 testified that the Bunumbu training base, also called "Camp Lion", was
established after the ECOMOG Intervention,3019 and operated until the end of 1998/ 1999.3020
1239. Exhibit P—088, a document dated 24 September 1998, lists roles for instructors and
staff
1240. Confidential Exhibit D—013, a document dated 21 May 1998, states that on that date
there were 603 total recruits at Camp Lion Training base in Bunumbu.3021
1241. TF1—362 testified that captured civilians, trained at Camp Lion training base in
Bunumbu, were required to undergo halaba/halaka training. This training was intended to
train recruits to dodge bullets. It took place in a round area surrounded by bricks, the
instructors stood around the circle holding canes. The recruits would enter the circle and
would then have to dodge being beaten by the canes. Halaka training would sometimes last
M Prosecution Fiiioi riioi Biioi, paras 979-981.
30*9 TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4866-4868, 4895-4899 (CS).
im TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4916-4917 (CS).
302* Exhibit D-013 (confidential), ERN 0007795.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (gm 18 May 2012

1 "$·ss‘<~tS`
1-l/2 to 2 hours, and recruits went through these exercises 2-3 times a week. Many incurred
injuries or died, especially the SBUs, SGUs, and the elderly.3O22
1242. TF1-362 also testified that the practice of physically disciplining recruits at the
Bunumbu training base was well known to the RUF High Command. Instructions to beat,
kill or mark recruits were passed from the high command to Pearson to Cooper, and then
carried out.3O23 In addition, the number of recruits who died on the base during training was
regularly reported to the second in command, Issa Sesay.3024
1243. TF1-362 described how Monica Pearson flogged and cut the hair of a recruit who fell
in love with Pearson's lover. Following this incident, Pearson was punished by Issa Sesay;
she was flogged, dismissed and placed in a water dungeon. When Bockarie arrived, he was
notified about the incident and promoted Pearson to the rank of full colonel.3O25
1244. TF1-189 testified that she heard that recruits at the training base at which C.O.
Monica was the commander in 1999 were flogged by C.O. Monica if they were not able to
run long distances or refused to do so.3O26
1245. Komba Sumana testified that he was trained at the training base in the bush outside
of Buedu during the rainy season for two months where he was under an instructor named
"Monica". The recruits at the training base in Kailahun were not treated well and were
beaten with a cane. He showed the Court scars on his legs which he stated were a result of
these beatings.3O27 The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that Sumana's military training
ended in approximately July or August 1998.
(ii) Attacks against civilians in Bunumbu Surrounding Area
3022 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4842-4845, 4903, 4906 (CS).
3023 TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5015-5019 (CS).
3024 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4905-4906 (CS); TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp.
4922-4923 (CS).
3025 TF1-362 Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4912-4915 (CS); TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp.
4996-5005.
3026 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16537-16539; TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp.
16548-49 (PS).
3027 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17928-17935.

---- End of Page 453 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T //4/ @5 18 May 2012

1246. The Prosecution submits that the recruits at Bunumbu training base were taught to
commit acts of physical violence against others.3U28
1247. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-3 62 and Komba Sumana.
Evidence
1248. TF1-362 testified that recruits participating in "food finding missions" went to
civilian houses to take food. The instructors and "base security" would carry arms while the
recruits carried knives and sticks. lf civilians resisted, the recruits and soldiers would beat
the civilians or kill them and take the food by force.3029
1249. TF1-362 also described a method of training used at the base in which recruits were
trained how to attack a city. During this training, villages near the base were alerted in
advance that at a certain time they should not come outside. Then, at 5.00am in the moming,
recruits and trainers would surround the village, 1ie in an ambush, and attack while the
civilians slept, entering their houses, tying them up, beating them with sticks, and taking
their properties.303O
1250. Komba Sumana testified that he and other recruits at the training base in Kailahun
District, where Monica was a trainer, were taught how to attack a town and burn houses.303 I
(iii) Marking "RUF" Letters on Recruits at Bunumbu Training Base
1251. The Prosecution submits that RUF recruits in Kailahun District were marked to
prevent escape.3O32
1252. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-362, TF1-026 and TF1-189.
Evidence
1253. TF1-362 testified that recruits who tried to escape from Bunumbu training camp
were marked with the letters "RUF" on their foreheads and chests by the instructors. These
3028 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 982.
3029 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4903-4905 (CS).
M0 Tri-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4901-4903 (cs).
303] Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17928-17931.
3032 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para 983.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // G". 18 May 2012

3%S=+*1—
markings were done publicly during formation so that the recruits’ colleagues would see and
be afraid.3033
1254. TF1-026 described how two girl recruits who were caught attempting to escape from
the trainin base in Buedu were ublicl shot and killed b Bockarie in order to deter other
8 P Y Y
recruits from escaping. Bockarie then passed an order to mark the remaining 17 girls recruits
with the letters "RUF" so that if they ran away and were caught they would be killed. The
letters "RUF" were carved on TF1—026's chest with a knife. The other 16 recruits were
carved as well.3034 The Trial Chamber has found that TF1-026 was trained at Bunumbu
training camp in Kailahun District from approximately February or March 1999 through
approximately November or December 1999.3035
1255. TF1—189 testified that after she heard about the attack on Freetown on 6 January
. 1999, the rebels sent 20 captives, aged 12 to 18, both male and female, away from
Mamboma village in Kailahun. The witness learned later on that they were sent to the
training base in Kailahun on the route to Buedu, where C.O. Monica was in charge.3030 She
heard from her cousin that those recruits were carved with a razor blade for protection from
gunshots and to classify them as part of the RUF. Males were caiyed on their backs with the
letters "RUF" while females were carved differently on their backs and arms.3037
(b) Violence towards Civilians who Resist Crimes Committed Against Them
1256. The Prosecution submits that civilians who were defiant or failed to comply with the
forces’ orders during the commission of crimes against them were beaten because of their
resistance.3038
1257. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Aruna Gbonda, Augustine
Mallah, Dennis Koker and Mustapha M. Mansaray.
Evidence
’"" TF1-362, Transcript 28 Fpbmary 2008, pp. 4926-4928 (cs).
""‘* rm-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3867, 3870-3874.
3035 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers) infra.
3030 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16534-16539.
3037 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16548-16551 (PS).
3030 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 984-985.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T W G9 18 May 2012

3 ~ZS°*—r-ii
1258. Aruna Gbonda, a rice farmer and Deputy Chiefdom Commander, testified that he and
other civilians at Talia were forced to farm rice for the RUF between 1996 and 2000. The
civilians would give the RUF personnel the rice and were not paid. Those who were
reluctant or delayed in doing so were beaten. Gbonda himself was beaten repeatedly by a
person named Tom Sandi after bringing only 40-50 persons instead of 300 persons to clear a
swamp in Gbaiama 3039
1259. Aruna Gbonda also described the violent treatment given to female civilians who
were forced to fish for the RUF. The witness saw a beating of a woman twice for delaying
collecting women to fish at Keyah River in Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun, in March "1997’,
199s".""*"
1260. Augustine Mallah testified that civilians were flogged by RUF/AFRC forces in
Buedu shortly after the ECOMOG Intervention in February 1998. Mallah testified that after
the Intervention, the AFRC and RUF forces captured civilians mostly from Kenema and
brought them to Buedu where they joined other civilians. The civilians performed domestic
duties for the commanders and cultivated fields during the farming season. Civilians who
refused to do those assignments and were not sick or very old were flogged until they were
willing. Mallah personally witnessed civilians being beaten for refusing to work. He testified
f that flogging those who were defiant was needed in order to set an example for the other
crv11ia¤S."°‘*‘
1261. Dennis Koker, an adjutant at the Military Police office in Buedu from approximately
March 1998 until approximately December 1999, testified that Victor Kallon from the RUF
brought a girl, who was already stripped to her underpants to the police station. She
subsequently told Koker that she had been beaten with 50 lashes. Kallon ordered that she be
detained because, he said, she had "overlooked" him. The witness then spoke to the girl
who told him that Kallon had kidnapped her from Kono and that he started beating her after
she refused to have sex with him.3O42
3039 Aruna Gbonda. Transcript 19 February 2008. pp. 4251-4255.
3040 Aruna Gbonda. Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4265-4268.
ml Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008. pp. 20171-20172. 20204-20206.
3042 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008. pp. 1260-1261. 1273-1276.

---- End of Page 456 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 %

3 rss'-ri
1262. Mustapha Mansaray, a member of the Internal Defence Unit (IDU) in Buedu from
December 1996 until March/April 1997, testified that upon Sam Bockarie's and Issa Sesay's
order, the RUF would order civilians to hand over to the RUF coffee, cocoa and Kola nuts.
When civilians from villages in the surrounding areas of Buedu and Kailahun Town refused
to do so, Bockarie's and Sesay's bodyguards would Hog them and take the products
forcefully. This conduct was reported to the District IDU, Francis Musa, but no action was
taken thereafter.3O43
Findings
1263. The Trial Chamber finds the witnesses who testified to the foregoing incidents to be
credible and their evidence supports proof of existence of crimes relating to physical
violence on a widespread or systematic basis. The Trial Chamber will, therefore, only
consider: the foregoing evidence regarding Kailahun District in relation to the c/uzpeczu
requirements.
3. Freetown and the Western Area g21 December 1998 to 28 February 1999)
1264. The Indictment alleges that, "between about 21 December 1998 and 28 February
1999, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters" mutilated and beat an
unknown number of civilians. The Prosecution alleges that these acts were perpetrated in
"various areas of Freetown, including the northern and eastern areas of the city, the Kissy
area around the State House, Fourah Bay, Upgun and the Kissy Mental Hospital, and
Hastings, Wellington, Tumbo, Waterloo, and Benguema in the Western Area". The alleged
mutilations included cutting off limbs. 3044
1265. The Trial Chamber has taken into consideration the evidence of witnesses TF1-358,
Abu Bakarr Mansaray, TF1-104, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1-026, Osman Jalloh, TF1-
029, Paul Nabieu Conteh, Akiatu Tholley, TF1-143, James Kpumgbu, Ibrahim Wai, Alusine
Conteh, Mohammed Sampson Bah, TF1-083, Mohamed Sesay, Corinne Dufka, TF1-028,
Alpha J alloh, TF1-150 and Sarah Koroma, in addition to relevant documentary evidence.
3043 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, p. 5230; Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp.
5273-5274; Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5289-5294.
W4 Indictment, paras 18, 21. ‘

---- End of Page 457 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / jk 18 May 2012

3 8550
(a) Freetown, including the northern and eastern areas of the city
1266. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-358, Abu Bakarr Mansaray
and TF1-104, as well as Exhibits P-227, P-249, P-250, P-251 and Confidential Exhibits P-
077 and P-232.
Evidence
1267. Witness TF1-358 was a medical doctor who ran a medical facility in Freetown.3045
He testified that on 8 January 1999, he ariived at his hospital to find it overwhelmed with
patients who were brought in on ECOMOG vehicles, in push carts and carried on peop1e's
backs.3O46 The witness was informed by ECOMOG as they brought victims to the hospital's
triage point that these patients were arriving rrem Freetown and "its immediate environs",
and later patients arrived rrem Kissy, Wellington and "the outskirts of Freetown".3O47 The
witness testified that "90 of the patients were suffering rrpm some form of war injury"3O48
The witness testified that he saw a few afresh amputations"3O49 and one case of a patient who
suffered a failed amputation of his two hands.305O This flood of patients continued for two to
three weeks, after which the main government hospital started to take cases.305l
1268. During this period, TF1-358 treated two brothers who had each had one hand
amputated by rebels in "the east end of town" while their parents watched.3O52 TF1-358
testified that the father of the boys told the witness that he was not able to intervene while
his sons were being amputated because he knew that others had been killed for
intervening.3O53
1269. TF1-358 also testified that the hospital had seen patients with tongue and eyeball
amputations, but not many.3O54 TF1-358 testified that a young male patient told him that he
3045 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20582.
3046 TF1·358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20633, 20636. The Trial Chamber takes note of Exhibit P-251,
a photograph depicting an elderly woman being conveyed in a pushcart. Exhibit P-251, "Photograph —
00034497, January 1999"; TF1-358, Transcript 20 November 2008, pp. 20727-20728.
3°‘" TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20638—20639.
3048 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20637.
3°"° TF1—358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20637.
mt TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20639.
"’5' TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20640.
W TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20643.
M TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20643.
3054 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20647. The Trial Chamber has also considered Exhibit P-227.

---- End of Page 458 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GR 18 May 2012

3 ss: t
had been amputated by rebels entering Freetown in January 1999. The patient had both his
right and left hands amputated. His assailants then cut off his tongue to prevent him from
telling others who had committed these acts against him. The patient pleaded with his
assailants to kill him because he would be useless in that physical condition. The rebels then
slashed the patient's right temple with a blunt instrument. The patient lost consciousness and
was taken for dead.3055 The Trial Chamber has also considered Confidential Exhibit P-232,
which depicts the bilateral amputee patient with TF1-358 at the entrance of the hospital.3050
1270. TF1-358 treated a young nursing mother whose eyes had been pulled out in January
but were still protruding from the sockets in January 1999. The incident occurred about
seven to ten days before she was brought in for treatment, so they were badly infected. The
patient stated that she had been gang raped by at least seven armed rebels while she was
searching for food around King Harmon Road in central Freetown. They took out her eyes
because if she could not see, she would be unable to identify them later.3057 TF1-358 had to
surgically remove both eyes. The victim was badly traumatised and became mentally
unstable. The Trial Chamber has also considered Exhibits P-249 and P-250, which depict the
patient and the injury to her eyes.3058
1271. Abu Bakarr Mansaray,3050 a mechanical engineer living in Freetown in January
1999,3000 testified that he was abducted by three "rebel boys" dressed in ECOMOG uniforms
on 8 January 1999306l when he was living on Waterloo Street in Freetown. By the term
TF1-358 testihed that he took this photograph in January 1999 in a cow shed outside the hospital. The third
patient with bandages wrapped around his head had both eyes removed. Exhibit P-227, "Photograph 0004444,
January 1999"; TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20673-20674.
3055 TF1—358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20647-20648.
3056 Exhibit P-232 (confidential); TF1-358, Transcript 20 November 2008, pp. 20687-20688.
3057 TF1—358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20648-20649; Transcript 20 November 2008, pp. 20724-20726.
3050 Exhibit P-249, "Photograph — 00034494, January 1999; Exhibit P-250, "Photograph — 00034495, January
1999".
3050 Abu Bakarr Mansaray gave evidence concerning physical violence at State House in the AFRC trial, which
was admitted as prior testimony under Rule 92bis. He was also cross-examined by the Defence concerning the
Rule 92bis evidence in this trial.
3000 Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, p. 19518; Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript, 7
March 2005", p. 20427.
mm Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AF RC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 43/20427, 62-63/20446-20447, Abu Bakarr
Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, p. 19543. During examination-in-chief the witness testined that he was
captured in 1998, but later corrected himself to state that it was 1999 on cross-examination. The Trial Chamber
is satisfied that the context of events places them in 1999 and considers that the witness’ trauma and anxiety may
have caused him to misstate the year.

---- End of Page 459 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T O-'· 18 May 2012

A $$*557-
"rebel", he testified that he meant a mixed group of rebels and soldiers.3O62 The three rebels
were armed with AK-47 rifles and spoke Liberian English.3O63 The rebels asked the witness
to join them because they had lost men.3064 Mansaray refused, so he was forcibly taken to
State House, where Gullit was in command.3065 The witness was beaten and then locked in
the kitchen for four days without food and water with 50 other captives.3O66 On cross-
examination, Mansaray testified that he sustained bruises from the beating.3O67
Findings
1272. TF1-358 was a medical doctor who saw the actual injuries sustained by people
coming to his hospital. He produced photographs he took of these patients and their injuries.
These included amputations and the patient whose eyes had to be removed. The Trial
Chamber finds his account to be detailed and credible. Given that these injuries were
sustained at the time rebels were in Freetown, and TF1-358's unchallenged evidence that
90% of injuries were war related together with Exhibits P-249, P-250, and Confidential
Exhibit P-232, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the rebels caused serious physical suffering and injury to the amputation and mutilation
victims. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, based on Mansaray's
first-hand evidence, that by beating Abu Bakarr Mansaray, the rebels caused serious
physical suffering and injury to him. Given the witness's description of the perpetrators the
Trial Chamber finds that the "rebels" were members of the AFRC/RUF who were invading
Freetown in January 1999.
1273. The Trial Chamber also finds that, given the nature of these acts and the degree of
the harm suffered by the patients of TF1-358 and by Mansaray, and given that the
perpetrators evinced an obvious intention to cause serious physical injury and suffering upon
their victims, that the members of the AFRC/RUF intended to cause the serious physical
injury and suffering. The Trial Chamber is satisfied, on TF1-385's description of the
mutilated persons who he treated that the victims were civilians and, further, that Mansaray
3062 Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", p. 20476.
3063 On cross—examination he admitted that he had previously testified that the rebels carried G3s. He further
testified that he cannot recall what weapons they carried, but that his memory was "fresher" when he testified in
the AFRC trial.3°"3
3064 Exhibit P-222, ‘"TFl—024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20427-20428.
3065 Exhibit P-222, "TFl-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20428-20430.
3066 Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20428, 20432-20433.

---- End of Page 460 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (pl 18 May 2012


3gSS3>
was a captured civilian and that none of these persons were taking part in hostilities at the
time of the amputations, mutilations and beatings.
(b) Kissy
(i) Beating of civilians outside Good Shepherd Hospital in Kissy
Evidence
1274. TF1-1043068 was a nurse at the Good Shepherd Hospital in the Kissy District of
Freetown in January 1999.3069 He testihed that when he went to work at 6.00am on the
morning of 6 January 1999, there were five people waiting for treatment.3O7O The witness
treated a Nigerian businessman named Ike, who had a very serious wound on his right wrist
and an amputated ear. He reported that he had been shot by "these junta guys" when he
attempted to escape.307l The witness also saw three other patients who had been shot by
‘·Ru1¤" Oi ‘juntas.3O72
1275. As found in the preceding findings in Unlawful Killings,3073 Junta and RUF fighters
came into the hospital accusing the staff of treating ECOMOG and Kamajors, forced 200
patients outside, beat them and took them and others to Pa Zubay's house were 15 people
were shot dead and others were wounded includin the witness who was shot in the ri t
8
arm, knee and right thigh.3074 They also took the Nigerian, Ike, "out" and later shot him.3075
1276. The wounded people were taken to the hospital where four wounded civilians,
including the witness, were treated. The witness was unable to count the number of people
3067 Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, pp. 19551-19553.
3068 Samuel John gave evidence concerning physical violence in Wellington in the AFRC trial, which was
admitted as prior testimony under Rule 92bis. Samuel John, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19148. He was
cross-examined by the Defence concerning the Rule 92bis evidence in this trial.
3°°° Exhibit 1>-212B (confidential), p. 20717.
W Exhibit P-21212 (confidential), p. 20721.
""‘ Eiaiibii 1>-21212 (confidc-:ntia1),p. 20721.
M Eiiiiiiiii 1>-21212. (ciiiinaciiiiiii), p. 20721-20723.
3073 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful killing of
civilians in Kissy area around January 1999, Findings supra.
3074 Exhibit P-212B (confidential), pp. 20739-20740.
W Exhibit P-21212 (c0iini1ciiiiii1),p. 20736.

---- End of Page 461 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GQ 18 May 2012

3 BSS Q-
injured during this incident, but he testified that there were more than the four being treated
in his unit.3O76
Findings
1277. Although TF1-104 saw and treated the injuries of the patients brought to Good
Shepherd Hospital on the morning of 6 January 1999, how the injuries were sustained
emanated from the statements of the patients and is hearsay. The witness's evidence of the
beating of approximately 200 people, including staff and patients not taking part in
hostilities is direct evidence of beatings and the Trial Chamber finds it credible. However, as
indicated previously, as the Indictment particularizes only mutilation and beating, the Trial
Chamber has not considered evidence of gunshot wounds in relation to Counts 7 and 8.3077
The Trial Chamber accepts TF1-104's evidence that a Nigerian man named Ike had his ear
amputated by the "Junta" and that Ike was a businessman. Given that Ike was brought to a
hospital in Kissy, the Trial Chamber considers it can safely infer this amputation occurred in
a location in Kissy and finds accordingly. The Trial Chamber finds that Ike was amputated
by Junta/RUF and that this caused serious physical injury and suffering. Given that the
beatings were carried out as punishment for allegedly treating ECOMOG soldiers and
Kamajors at the hospital, the Trial Chamber finds that the perpetrators intended to cause the
serious physical injury and suffering. Further, as the victims were injured and/or civilians at
the time of the beatings, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that they
were not taking direct part in hostilities at the time of the attack. The witness described the i
group of men as a mix of "juntas" and the RUF, and in cross—examination he testified he
knew some of perpetrators as RUF members and identified others by their dress. The Trial
Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were
members of the RUF and the AFRC.
(ii) Amputations of two men's hands in Kissy Market
Evidence
1278. TF1—143, an RUF child soldier, testified that after joining Adama Cut Hand during
the Freetown invasion, while on patrol in Kissy Market, he and another of "Adama Cut
M6 Exhibit P-21213 (rmnacmmiii, p. 20740.
3077 See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment supra.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G5 18 May 2012

Hand's boys"3O78 approached a shop and knocked on the door. The two men inside did not
open the door, so TF1-143 and his companion forced the door open and entered. After
entering the shop, the other "boy" suggested that they should amputate the men's hands
because they reiitsed to open the door. The witness then used a machete to amputate one
hand from each of the two civilian men inside the shop.3O79
Findings
1279. Based on the context, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that these amputations occurred
in January 1999, and, as TF1-143 and his companion were members of the RUF and the
AFRC respectively, that the amputations were perpetrated by members of the RUF /AFRC.
The Trial Chamber find beyond reasonable doubt that these AFRC/RUF fighters caused, and
intended to cause, serious physical injury and suffering to the amputation victims. Further,
as the victims were shopkeepers taking reiiige in their shop, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
that they were civilians who were not taking a direct part in hostilities.
(iii) Amputations of James Kpumgbu and others near Kissy Mental Hospital
Evidence
1280. James Kpumgbu testified that he lived in Kissy near the mental hospital when the
rebels came to the area on 6 January 19993080 and that on that day, he was on Thompson
Street on his way to the Kissy Mental Home with his child, sister and others in search of his
parents. He passed by his house and saw that it had been bumt down and was told that the
rebels had bumed it.3O8l As he approached the door of the mental home four rebels, all
dressed in black t-shirts, jeans, boots and some with headbands, called them.3O82 The rebels,
3078 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Findings on victim witnesses
in Freetown and the Western Area inha.
""° TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9035-9036.
3080 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18116. Although the witness testified that it was 1990, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the context of the events places them in 1999 and considers that the witness"
trauma and passage of time may have caused him to misstate the year. The Trial Chamber also finds that by
"rebels’" the witness is describing the AFRC/RUF forces, as in his testimony he stated that the "rebels" that
entered Freetown came on 6 January 1999. James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18136-18137.
ml James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 181 19.
im James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18120-18121.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GKS 18 May 2012

three of whom had guns and one of whom had a machete, ordered the witness and two other
men to sit beneath a mango tree outside the nearby St. Patrick's Church.3O83
1281. The four rebels then surrounded K um bu, and three of the rebels ointed guns at
P 3 P
him while the rebel carrying the machete ordered him to put his arm on the root of the
mango tree. The witness pleaded, but placed his arm as ordered and the rebel cut off his
right hand.3O84 Kpumgbu testified that the rebel then chopped his left arm, leaving his hand
still connected, but mutilated, and told him to "go and tell Tejan Kabbah that they are
fighting for power".3O85
1282. Aiier the am utation, K um bu walked with difficult down to Summertime, where
P P 3 Y
he spent one night before continuing on to Connaught Hospital.3O86 While at Connaught
Hospital, the witness met the two other men who had been detained with him outside the
Mental Hospital by the rebels during that same incident. Kpumgbu testified that one of
them, Mr Lansana, told him that the rebels had cut off his hands. The witness observed that
Lansana was missing both of his hands and that the other man, Mr Babah, had both hands
cut but not completely amputated.3O87
1283. Kpumgbu testified that he is unable to fully use his left hand, he experiences pain,
and his thumb and index finger do not function. He is unable to do anything to earn a living
and people must assist him.3O88 The Trial Chamber has also considered Exhibits P-187 and
P-188, which depict the witness’ amputated right arm and mutilated left arm.3O89
Findings
1284. Based on the above evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied be ond reasonable doubt
Y
that James Kpumgbu's hands were mutilated and amputated by AFRC/RUF "rebels" near
Kissy Mental Hospital on 6 January 1999. Kpumgbu observed Lansana and Babah's
3083 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18120~18122.
3084 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18122.
3085 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18123. The witness demonstrated for the court where his
arms had been cut and the record reflects that his right arm was amputated just below the elbow, while there is
an indentation where the left arm was cut between the elbow and wrist, but not completely severed. James
Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18126~18127.
3086 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18124.
3087 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18125~18126.
3088 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18130.
3089 Exhibit P~187, "Photograph — 00039129"; Exhibit P~188, "Photograph ~ 00039131".

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Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T 63% 18 May 2012

3 ass?
amputations and mutilations and the Trial Chamber accepts and finds that their hands were
also amputated and mutilated. Given that Kpumgbu, Lansana and Babah had been captured
and detained at the same time by the same rebels, the Trial Chamber accepts that these same
rebels also amputated and/or mutilated Lansana and Babah. The Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that by these acts the AFRC/RUF fighters’ caused, and intended to cause,
the victims serious physical injury and suffering
1285. Based on the witness's description of the perpetrators the Trial Chamber is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that they were members of the AFRC/RUF invading forces
identified by the Trial Chamber at Para 202/3 unlawful killings.3O9O The Trial Chamber is ,
further satisfied on the evidence that the victims were civilians and finds beyond reasonable
doubt that they were not taking part in hostilities at the time of the amputations.
(iv) Beating and amputation of Ibrahim Wai at Falcon Road in Kissy
Evidence
1286. Ibrahim Wai testified that in the early morning hours of 6 January 1999, he went out
of his house on Falcon Street in Kissy and observed "blazing fires" and "civilians coming
with bundles on their heads".3O9l He fled with his brother to go to PWD, and they
encountered many other people also fleeing until they were turned away by ECOMOG.
However they managed to cross the barrier and proceed to Berry Street.3O92
1287. Wai returned to Kissy alone after five days but en route a "30 years old RUF rebel"
asked him for money.3O93 Wai showed the rebel his wallet telling him that he did not have
any money, the rebel told him to stretch out his hand. Wai testified that the rebel then gave
him a dozen lashes on his hand, using a cable that the witness described to be about 0.7
centimetres in diameter.3O94 After lashing him, the rebel told Wai to go.3O95 Then a 14 year
old boy with a gun threatened to kill him. He then returned to Kissy. The Trial Chamber has
3090 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Urrlawiiil Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
SLl_D7'CZ.
""‘ Ibrahim war, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18569-18570.
3092 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18571.
3093 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p.18572.
3094 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18573; Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18579-18580.
3095 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18573.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QD 18 May 2012

Ass: 2
found that while Wai was staying at his in—law's, rebels under the command of Captain
Blood attacked the witness and the family and Captain Blood amputated Wai's hand and the
hands of Wai's brother—in—law's younger brother. In cross-examination he confirmed he saw
the amputation of "the boy's hand".3O% He did not see his brother—in—law's younger brother
come out of the house after that, and he observed that the house was later set on fire. Wai
testified that his brother—in—law's younger brother was still in the house when it was set on
fire, and that he died in the burning house.3O97
1288. The witness testified that on his way to Brookfields Hospital for treatment, he met
two other civilians whose hands had also been amputated.3O98 According to Wai by the time
they reached Brookfields Hospital he saw that there were "many whose hands were cut off"
and he named four other amputees in addition to himself. 3099
Findings
1289. Wai was challenged in cross—examination regarding the lashing he received, and the
Trial Chamber considers that he was consistent in this throughout his evidence and in the
view of the Trial Chamber he did not exaggerate or prevaricate. Therefore the Trial
Chamber accepts his account of being lashed by a cable and finds beyond reasonable doubt
that he was beaten by being lashed on the hand.
1290. Based on Wai's testimony regarding his treatment by Captain Blood in Kissy, the
Trial Chamber finds that Captain Blood struck Wai with the butt of a gun, and hit him on the
back with the flat side of a machete. The Trial Chamber also finds beyond reasonable doubt
that Captain Blood then amputated the witness’ hand and Captain Blood or persons under
his command amputated both hands of his brother—in—law's brother.
1291. The Trial Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
caused, and intended to cause, serious physical injury and suffering, to their victims. As the
witness and his relative were civilians in captivity at the time of these incidents, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that they were not taking an active part in hostilities.
30% Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18613.
3097 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18596-18597.
3098 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18603-18604.
mm Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18604-18605.

---- End of Page 466 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Z 18 May 2012

Z,‘éSS°\
1292. Wai observed that two men he met on his way to Brookfields Hospital had both of
their hands cut off The Trial Chamber accepts his first hand observation of these two men's
amputation and that he saw "that we were many whose hands were cut off" and accordingly
Ends that an unknown number of persons had their hands amputated. The Trial Chamber
therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused, and intended to cause,
serious physical injury and suffering to these amputation victims.
1293. Based on the witness's description of the perpetrators the Trial Chamber Ends
beyond reasonable doubt that they were members of the AFRC/RUF invading forces
A identihed bythe rmi Chamber3l00
(v) Amputations by Changa Bulanga in Low Cost Area and Shell Old Road Area
Evidence
1294. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testihed that in approximately the third week of January
1999,3101 when he and his righting force had retreated to the hills around Kissy Mental
Home, they observed the civilians below dancing and singing that their brothers had come to
steal and welcoming ECOMOG. Gullit told the witness and the other Hghters that the
civilians were betraying them by behaving this way. Thereafter, Gullit passed an order and
reorganised the troops to form Hghting teams.3 102 He appointed one squad to move to Low
Cost Housing area, instructing them to be sure to "amputate people and bum houses in that
area".3l03 The witness testified that Gullit commanded the witness’ group to "go as far as
Ferry Junction and do these things".3 104
1295. Osman, known as Changa Bulanga was part of the fighting force Gullit sent to Low
Cost area. The witness testified that when Changa Bulanga returned to Kissy Market, he told L
3100 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Ki11ings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
Supra.
MOI Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8361.
3102 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8351—8354.
im Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8352.
3104 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8352—8354. The witness further testified that his
group included Bajehjeh, Rambo, and Rambo SLA.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T f QQ 18 May 2012 Q

Bzsav
the witness that he had amputated arms and burned houses and he said he had completed his
mission.3105
1296. Alimamy Bobson Sesay further testified that Changa Bulanga also performed
am utations at Shell Old Road area.3106 The witness testified that he saw Chan a Bulan a
P 8 8
amputate the arms of three civilians, two at the elbow and one at the wrist, before they
moved to Crazy Yard to meet with Gullit and the brigade there. After amputating the
civilians’ arms, Changa Bulanga told the civilian victims to go see Pa Kabbah and ask him
for hands.3107
Findings
1297. Based on Alimamy Bobson Sesay's eyewitness testimony that Changa Bulanga, a
member of the AFRC, performed three amputations in Kissy and the amputation of an
unknown number of persons in the Low Cost Area. The Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused, and intended to cause serious injury, and
suffering to their victims. The Trial Chamber further finds beyond reasonable doubt, based
on Changa Bulanga's statement that he had completed his mission which was to "amputate
people...", that the victims were civilians who were not taking a direct part in hostilities at
the time.
(vi) Amputations of Banie and Alusine Conteh's hands at Parsonage and Leaden
Streets in Kissy
Evidence ’
1298. Alusine Conteh, a double amputee, testified that on the morning of 20 January 1999,
he was at the intersection of Parsonage and Leaden Hall Streets in Kissy with a group of
other civilians, including his wife, sister, his children, a friend, Julius, and his tenant Boi
Barrie.3108 The witness and his group encountered five men who told the witness and the
M5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8360-8361. The witness testified that Changa
Bulanga was also known as Osman Sesay. Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8345.
M6 Aliinamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8344-8345.
Sm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8344-8346.
mg Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24022-24024, 24026.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T y AQ 18 May 2012 y

Es; ra 1
others to halt or they would shoot them.3 1119 Four of the five men wore combat uniforms and
one wore civilian clothing and "disguised himself ’ with a "black cap like a net".311O
1299. Alusine Conteh testified that the men ordered Barrie to put down the things he was
carrying. One of them, dressed in combat uniform, who referred to himself as "Captain Two
Hand No Mercy" ordered the "civilian" with them to "take care of" Barrie.3111 The
"civilian" took an axe and he chopped Barrie's left hand once. As he chopped again, one of
Barrie's children walked behind him. One of the "soldiers" kicked her and she fell. Barrie's
right arm was struck twice with the axe leaving his hands dangling by the f1esh3112 and he
told him "go and tell Tejan Kabbah, no more politics, no more votes".3113
1300. The soldiers then called Alusine Conteh to come, and he placed his left hand on the
slab. The "civilian" among the soldiers then hacked once at the witness’ arm, severing his
hand.3114 Following Conteh's amputation, they tried to take the witness’ son, who was
strapped to his mother's back. Conteh pleaded with the soldiers to amputate his other hand
instead of amputating his son's hands.3115 The soldiers then told the witness to place his
right hand, and as he did, they severed his hand from his arm.3116 Before departing, the
soldiers told the witness that he should go to Tejan Kabbah and tell Kabbah that he was "a
messenger".3 1 17
Findings
1301. Alusine Conteh repeatedly referred to the individual dressed in civilian clothing with
the four soldiers as a "civilian". However, from Conteh's detailed testimony about the
actions of this individual, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the person
who amputated Boi Barrie's and Conteh's hands was not a civilian but that the perpetrators
31119 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24023-24024.
3* **3 Alusine cnnran, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24024-24025.
3111 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24026-24028.
31 12 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24028.
3 1 13 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24028.
3 1 14 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24029.
3* *3 Alusine canran, rranranpr 30 January 2009, pp. 24026, 24029.
3 116 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24030. The witness further testified that at the time that he
walked away from the place where the amputations took place his hands had been completely chopped off but
there was still flesh hanging. Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24031.
11 17 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24030-24031.

---- End of Page 469 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T @ 18 May 2012
» K

$25 1=°~
were members of the AFRC/RUF invading forces identified by the Trial Chamber in the
section on unlawful killings.3 I lg
1302. Based on the above evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that both of Bariie's
hands were mutilated and both of Alusine Conteh's hands were amputated by members of
the AFRC/RUF invading forces in Kissy on 20 January 1999. The Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators’ acts caused serious physical injury and
suffering. As the perpetrators told the witness to go and tell Tejan Kabbah "no more politic"
they evinced an obvious intention to cause serious suffering and injury upon their victims.
As all of the victims were civilians at the time of their amputation, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that they were not taking an active part in hostilities.
(vii) Amputation of Mohamed Sampson Bah's hand on Rowe Street in Kissy
1303. Mohamed Sampson Bah's testimony in the AFRC trial was tendered into evidence
pursuant to rule 92bis and he was cross examined in the instant trial. He testified that he saw
rebels beating people with belts and sticks and houses, including his house, being burnt. 3119
He and seven other people were captured by the rebels on Rowe Street in January 1999 and
taken to the commando Tafaiko. They were "placed in a queue", searched and their
belongings were confiscated. The commando ordered the other seven to be killed "at a .
stretch". They were shot and Bah witnessed all seven die.3 120 The commando took Bah's
gold—plated wrist watch, told him that he had "been sentenced" and that Bah's hand should
be amputated.} 121 The commando forced Bah onto the ground, placed a foot on his chest and
his arms were stretched out and Bah's hand was amputated.
Findings
1304. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Commando Tafaiko a
member of the AFRC/RUF invading forces identified by the Trial Chamber3l22 amputated
mg Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Westem Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
SLl1DI"Cl.
3ll9Mohamed Sampson Bah gave evidence on 22 and 23 October 2008 and his prior testimony in the AFRC trial
was tendered as Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Transcript, 6 April 2005", p. 20595.
mo Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Transcript, 6 April 2005", pp. 20597-20598.
im Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Transcript, 6 April 2005", pp. 20598-20599.
im Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Westem Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)

---- End of Page 470 ---------------------------


Case No.t SCSL-03-01-T / {PQ 18 May 2012

$$5 63
Bah's hand on Rowe Street in Kissy in January 1999. The Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused, and intended to cause, serious physical injury
and suffering. The Trial Chamber iirrther finds beyond reasonable doubt that Bah was a
civilian who was not taking part in hostilities at the time of the amputation.
(viii) Amputation of TFl-083, Pa Sorie and Musa in Samuels Area in Kissy
Evidence
1305. The testimony of TFl-083, who is now deceased, in the AFRC trial was tendered
into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 quaterfm He testified that on 22 January 1999 he was at
Old Road at Locust in the "Samuels area" when he, five men and some women including his
sister, were captured by "rebels" wearing caps that covered everything but their eyes, nose
and mouth.3l24 The rebels ordered TFl-083 and the other civilians to remove their clothes, a
rebel took the witness's shirt and wore it and as the witness removed his pants a rebel struck
him at the waist with a knife and took the money from his pockets.3 125 The rebels then began
leading them along a route stating that they said they would kill them.3l2° As they were
walking TF1-083 saw corpses on the ground and the rebels said "See those ones that are
lying down, they are sleeping. So you are going to sleep like this".3 m
1306. When the group reached the rebels’ commander, who had a fair complexion and who
was wearing a round hat and combat gear, the rebels told him "these are the people we
brought".3l28 The commander said "some we are coming to eat them and the others, we are
going to kill them".3l29 The cormnander ordered the five men, including the witness, Pa
Sorie, Musa, and two others to lie on their backs and said that some of them they would kill
and some of them they would "send", meaning amputate their hands.3 UO
Sllpfd.
M Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, Arno Transcript 8 Aprrr 2005*2
$[24 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 18775-18780.
3125 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 18780-18781.
mb Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 18781-18782.
Em Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 18782.
mg Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 18782.
W Exhibit P-290A, ¤·rr¤r-082., Arno rmsmpr 8 Aprrr 2005*: p. 18782.
mo Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 18783.

---- End of Page 471 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

/"
3 8.5 fc LP
1307. The commanders ordered that the hands of TF1-083, Pa Sorie, and Musa be cut of`f
and that the victims should "go to Kabbah and ask for Kabbah to give him a hand".3m A
rebel stabbed TF1-083 on his left arm near his bicep before amputating his right hand using
an axe.m2 TF1-083 was unable to see and fell into a gutter.3m However, he testified that he
heard the rebels take Pa Sorie and cut off his hand.3 134 Pa Sorie met him later at the
Connaught Hospital and told him that the rebels had cut off his hand.m5
1308. TF1-083 testified that the rebels took Musa, the last of the five civilians in the group,
and they cut off four of his fingers.3l36 Musa then heard the commander say "You should not
cut off Musa's fingers. You should cut off his hand, so that he can go to Kabbah and tell him
to give him a new hand".3m Musa then begged for the rebels not to chop off his hand, they
shot him and he fell down. TF1-083 testified that Musa was killedmg
Findings
1309. Based on TF1-083's evidence of his amputation, the Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that the hands of TF1-083 and Pa Sorie were amputated and the fingers of A
Musa were amputated before he was shot at the Samuels area of Kissy on 22 January 1999.
The Trial Chamber further finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused
serious physical injury and suffering to the victims, and as the perpetrators told the witness
to go to Kabbah, that they evinced an obvious intention to cause serious physical suffering
and injury upon their victims. As the victims were captured civilians and lying on their
backs at the time that these amputations occurred, the Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that they were not taking an active part in hostilities. Based on the
witness's description of the perpetrators, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt
that they were members of the AFRC/RUF invading forces identified by the Trial
Chamber. 3 I 39
**1* Errirrbrt P-2904, "TF1-082, Arno Trsrrscript 8 Aprri 20057, p. 18784.
3**2 Errirrbrt P-2904, ··TF1-082, Arno Trrrrrscript 8 Aprri 2005", p. 18784.
3133 Exhibit P—290A, "TF1—083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 18785—18786.
3134 Exhibit P—290A, "TF1—083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 18785.
1*35 Extrrbrt P-290A, "TF1—083, Arno Trrrrrscript 8 April 2005", p. 18786.
’*"’ 12X1irprt1>-290A, ·‘Tr1-082, Arno Trrrrrscript 8 April 20057, p. 18785.
M7 Exhibit P—290A, "TF1—083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 18785—18786.
mg Exhibit P—290A, "TF1—083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 18786.
mg Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful

---- End of Page 472 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T // 63. 18 May 2012 %

(ix) Amputation of Mohamed Sesay's arms in Kissy
Evidence
1310. Mohamed Sesay testified that he saw RUF and SLA who he referred to as the
People's Amiy3l40 on the morning of 6 January and five or six days later saw Captain Blood
at a checkpoint. The witness observed the "rebels and SLAs arguing"3l4l On 19 January
19993142 he was in Kissy hiding in the house of Mr Abass,3]43 after his home had been
burnt3M4 with about 50 other civilians, including old men and women.3l45 He saw seven
"rebels", including one "commando" arrive.3 M6 The commando carried a pistol, one rebel
carried a machete, another rebel carried an axe and four others carried guns.3l47 The
commando ordered the fighters to bring the 24 young men out of the house and to the
`unction where the asked them to ueue u in re aration for havin their arms am utated
J Y Cl P P P S P
on a log which had been placed in front of them.3 M8 As already found eight men were shot
and killed, and five others were killed by splitting their heads with a machete.3l49 The
witness and those with him were frightened.
1311. Sesay was then left as the first person in the queue and one of the rebels declared that
they would amputate his a1m.3l50 Sesay pleaded with the Commander to kill him instead,
and the other men also stood u and leaded.3l5l The Commander blew a whistle and man
P P Y
"rebels" came and surrounded the captive men, forcing them to the ground, tying them up,
and beating some of them.3]52 The Commando ordered the youngest of the fighters, a boy
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
supra.
M0 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3912.
NM Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3902-3905, 3912.
M42 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3936; Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3931.
WJ Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3914-3916.
MM Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 15 February 2008, p. 3915
M45 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3917-3918.
W6 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3917.
3m Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3919.
mg Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3918-3919.
mq Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful killing of
civilians in Kissy area around January 1999, Findings supra.
M50 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3923.
ml Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3923-3924.
M2 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3924.

---- End of Page 473 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / "Ck 18 May 2012

3351.. e
about 13 years old, to untie Sesay and amputate his arm.1151 The fighter attempted to cut off
Sesay's left arm with an axe, but when he failed the Commander came and hit Sesay's arm
with an axe twice, leaving it hanging by a small lump of flesh.1154 The fighters then put
Sesay's right arm on the log and the commander hit it once, also leaving this arm to hang by
the flesh.1155
1312. As the fighters were preparing to amputate the hand of another man, Rambo of the
RUF1156 arrived by vehicle with more than 40 "people" and ordered them to release the
remaining people, saying he would punish the fighters for what they had done. The rebels
saluted Rambo and conformed with his command.1157 Sesay testified that Rambo then told
all of them to follow him to his base, which was near the Kissy Mental Home, and before
sending the witness away put 100,000 of an unidentified currency in his pocket saying that
he should "endure, that was what God ordained". The witness became dizzy and fell and lay
until the followin mornin , Frida , when he went to ECOMOG at Helena and was taken to
S S Y
Connaught Hospital.11511
1313. When1159 Mohamed Sesay arrived at Connaught Hospital, he saw "so many others"
who had been amputated.11°O Some of those amputees told the witness that they had been
amputated in Freetown.11°1
Findings
1314. Based on Mohamed Sesay's account of the amputation of both of his arms in Kissy,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that on 19 January 1999 at Kissy
members of the Peoples Army under the command of Rambo amputated the hands of
Mohamed Sesay. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
1153 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp, 3924-3925, 3927.
1154 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3925.
1155 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3926.
3 1511 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3932; Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 15 February 2008, p.
3934.
1157 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3928.
11511 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3928-9.
11511 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3931. The record shows the witness said this was on
Thursday 28 January but given the witness's evidence that the amputation was on 19111 January and he went to
Connaught Hospital next morning, 20 January, it would appear that "28" is a typographical error as 28 January
1999 was not a Friday.
3160 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3929-3930.
1161 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3930.

---- End of Page 474 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / V 18 May 2012

BBSB i—
caused serious physical injury and suffering and that the perpetrators evinced an obvious
intention to cause this serious physical injury and suffering upon their victim. As Sesay was
a captured civilian when these amputations occurred, the Trial Chamber further finds
beyond reasonable doubt that he was not taking a direct part in hostilities.
1315. The Trial Chamber accepts Mohamed Sesay's evidence that at Connaught Hospital
he saw other people who had arms and hands amputated and that these amputations occurred
in Freetown and finds beyond reasonable doubt that an unknown number of persons had
their hands and/or arms amputated in January 1999 in Freetown.
(x) Other Amputations in Kissy
1316. The Trial Chamber has also considered the evidence of Corinne Dufka, TF 1-028, and
Exhibits P-142B, P-197, P-188, P-263, P-286A, P-356A-B and confidential Exhibit P-077.
1317. Exhibit P-263, a BBC Focus on Africa radio broadcast,3l62 described the atrocities
being committed by the retreating rebel forces in Kissy who were cutting "the limbs of
civilians". A Mr Bangura, who lived on Bypass Road, told reporter Lansana Fofana that he
had been lined up in a queue of 15 people to be amputated by the rebels. After the first two
in the queue had been amputated, the rest of them fled for their lives. Four young men
whose wrists had been mutilated told Fofana that the fighter who carried out these
mutilations was a Liberian fighter known as CO Cut Hand.3 163 Exhibit P-356B, another
Focus on Africa programme, broadcast on 22 January 1999, included a report by Winston
Ojukutu-Macaulay, who travelled with ECOMOG to Kissy. On their way back to Freetown
from Kissy, they transported five civilians who were amputated.3 164
1318. Confidential Exhibit P-077 reports that a five-year-old girl was thrown into a fire at
Blackhall Road on 28 January 1999.3165
M2 Exhibit P-263, "Audio File — Tab 17 Clip — D0000507 — Track One". Witness TF1-150 testified that "all life
seemed to stop in late afternoon in Siena Leone in those days so that people could listen to the program Focus on
Africa which was considered to be one of the reliable news sources for the situation in Africa". TF 1-150,
Transcript 18 February 2008, p. 4029.
M3 Exhibit P-263, "Audio File — Tab 17 Clip — D0000507 — Track One".
M4 Exhibit P-356B, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from Track 2 — D0000507, 22 January l999"; Exhibit P-356B,
"Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa Clip from Track 2 — D0000507, 22 January 1999".
3*65 Exhibit P-077 (confidential). p. 925, para. 43.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / O\L 18 May 2012

Bssex
1319. Witness TF1-028 lived in Karina, Bombali District when the junta attacked in
1998.3l66 The witness was taken as a member of a group that entered Freetown on 16
J anuary.3 M7 The group stopped at Ferry Junction before "RUF boys" speaking Liberian
language took the witness to Blackhall Road and then to Kissy Road. At Kissy Road, the
witness saw a "big bunch" of human hands that had been amputated, tied together, and
buried in the dirtflég She could not count them.3l69 She testified that as she knew the Junta
had entered Freetown, and she inferred that they must have been responsible for putting the
hands there.3 no
1320. Witness Corirme Dufka testified that she photographed a 13-year-old girl, who was
one of three girls "who were rounded up from Kissy by a group of rebels...around the 20th to
22"d of January...and taken up to a hill and had their hands amputated".3 m
Findings
1321. The Trial Chamber finds that the information contained in Confidential Exhibit P-
077 of physical violence committed in Kissy during the attack of Freetown is hearsay and is
insufficiently precise to make a finding on the identity of the perpetrators of this crime. The
Trial Chamber is unable to make a finding in relation to the crime of physical violence
against civilians based solely on this evidence. However, this evidence may be used to
corroborate other findings on specific incidents. i
1322. TF1-028's evidence that she saw a "big bunch" of human hands at Kissy Road
clearly shows that amputations took place but it is insufficient in and of itself to establish the
elements of Counts 7 or 8, as she did not witness the amputations, nor was she able to
identify the perpetrators except by inference. However, this provides corroboration of more
specific instances of amputation.
Wm TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9135.
M7 Although the witness was unable to specify the year, she testified that it was shortly after SAJ Musa died.
TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9225-9226. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the context of the events
places them in early 1999 and considers that the witness’ trauma and passage of time may have rendered her
unable to recollect the year.
M8 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9228-9231.
3169 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9230.
3170 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9230-9231.
3171 Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1851, describing Exhibit P-142B, a photo depicting a young
girl with both left and right hand amputations.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

3 ass Q
1323. The Trial Chamber finds that although the infomation contained in Exhibits P-263
and P-365A is hearsay, it is a contemporaneous account taken from the victims and eye
witnesses and is credible and reliable. The report clearly shows that the victims were
civilians and that the perpetrators were "rebels" or a Liberian fighter known as CO Cut
Hand. It is corroborated by other documentary evidence and the corroborative evidence of
the widespread nature of these amputations. Accordingly the Trial Chamber finds that two
civilian men, four young civilian men and five civilians had their limbs amputated in Kissy
in late January 1999 by AFRC/RUF invading forces.
1324. Although Corinne Dufka's account and the evidence of the amputation is based on
hearsay, the Trial Chamber finds her account to be credible, and it was corroborated by her
photographic evidence of the amputated 13 year old girl and the corroborative evidence of
the widespread nature of these amputations. Accordingly the Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that a 13 year old civilian girl not taking a direct part in hostilities had her
hand amputated on or about 20 to 22 January 1999 in Kissy.
1325. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that in each of the foregoing
incidents the perpetrators’ acts caused, and intended to cause, serious physical injury and
suffering to the victims . As the victims were civilians targeted by rebels the Trial Chamber
finds beyond reasonable doubt that they were not taking a direct part in hostilities. Based on
the girl's description of the perpetrators as rebels, the Trial Chamber finds that they were
members of the AFRC/RUF invading forces identified by the Trial Chamber.3 172
(c) Fourah Bay
1326. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Alpha Jalloh and TF1-150, and
Exhibits P-107, P-210 and Confidential Exhibit P-077.
Evidence
1327. Confidential Exhibit P-077 states that on 21 January 1999, three children were
executed at Fourah Bay and their three sisters had limbs amputated or mutilated.3 173
mz Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful killing of
civilians in Kissy area around January 1999, Findings supra.
W Exhibit P-077 (caiiiideiiiiiii), para. 42.

---- End of Page 477 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gb 18 May 2012 E %

3 SS 3-0
1328. Alpha J all0h3m testified that on 6 January 1999, "rebels" and soldiers 3175 first came
to his area in Y0unge Street.3 I 76 On 18 January 1999 rebels, some of whom were in
unifbrm,3 W came to the house on Manfred Lane where he was hiding with his y0unger
brother, cousins and other civilians and led them by gunpoint to a primary sch00l 0n
Pataraman Street.3 178 There the rebels put them into a queue and told them that they would
send them "t0 Pa Kabbah for Pa Kabbah to know that they were in control".3 179 The witness,
his brother and cousin sat in the line with four others, including Edward Conteh and Sheku
Bahn 80 and were called one at a time. A Kri0 speaking rebel named T0mmy from the
Freetown area who wore a combat uniform, cut off all of the hands of Conteh, Bah and the
witness's cousin with an axe,3l8l then he cut the witness's left hand off The rebels told the
amputees that they could go to Pa Kabbah to get m0re handsgm J all0h testified that he
heard that his "cousin couldn’t survive, so he died. Where he laid, that was the place he
died?) 3183
Findings
1329. Althoug,h the evidence in Confidential Exhibit P-077 is hearsay it is a
contemporane0us account and the Trial Chamber accepts the credibility and reliability of the
report and accordingly finds beyond reasonable doubt that on 21 January 1999 at F0urah
Bay three unnamed sisters had limbs amputated or mutilated.
1330. Based on J all0h's evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that seven persons, including the witness had their hands amputated by members of the
RUF/AFRC in F0urah Bay on 18 January 1999.
3 H4 Alpha Jallow gave evidence ccnceming the murder in Kissy in the APRC trial, which was admitted as prior
testim011y under Rule 92b1's. Alpha Jall0h, Transcript 23 Oct0ber 2008, p. 19147. He was cross-examined by the
Defence conceming this testim011y in this trial.
W5 Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20683.
M6 Alpha Jall0h, Transcript 23 Oct0ber 2008, p. 19131.
W7 Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20688.
3178 Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", pp. 20688-20689.
mg Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20688. '
mo Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20689.
ml Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", pp. 20689-20690.
M2 Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20689.
im Exhibit P-210, "TF1-098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20692.

---- End of Page 478 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / -» 18 May 2012

326+1
1331. The Trial Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
caused, and intended to cause, serious physical injury and suffering to the victims. As the
victims were captured civilians, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that they
were not taking direct part in hostilities at the time of the attack.
(d) Upgun
1332. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay.
Evidence
1333. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that around the third week of January 1999,3184
following the operation in Fourah Bay, he and those in his fighting force, including Gullit,
Bazzy and Five-Five, withdrew to Upgun where they mounted a defensive.3l85 Once in
Upgun, Five-F ive gave an instruction that they should start amputating limbs and he was
"going to demonstrate it". Alimamy Bobson Sesay witnessed Five-Five capture three
civilians and perform a demonstration by placing the captured civilians’ arms on a mortar
and giving one a "short sleeve" amputation, meaning an amputation at the wrist, and the
other two "long sleeve" amputations, meaning an amputation above the elbow. Thereafter,
according to Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Major Mines and Kabila captured and amputated an
unknown number of civilians.3l86
Findings
1334. Based on Bobson Sesay's eyewitness evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that F ive-F ive, a member of the AFRC, amputated the arms of
three individuals. The Trial Chamber further finds beyond reasonable doubt that an
unknown number of civilians had hands amputated by Major Mines and Kabila. The Trial
Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused serious
physical injury and suffering to the victims, and that the perpetrators evinced an obvious
intention to cause serious physical suffering and injury upon the victims. As the victims
were captured civilians at the time of these amputations, the Trial Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that they were not taking a direct part in hostilities.
M4 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8328.
M5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8334.
M6 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8337·8339.

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Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T bh: 18 May 2012

3 ss +2.
(e) Wellington
1335. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Sarah Koroma, TF1—026 and
Akiatu Tholley.
Evidence
1336. Sarah Koroma testified that she first saw many "rebels" in Wellington, Loko Town,
on 6 January 1999.3187 Upon seeing the rebels and hearing from other civilians that the
rebels were amputating people, Koroma fled to the bush with her children and husband.3l88
The witness remained in the bush for one week until the rebels threatened to kill anyone who
did not come out of the bush.3189 The rebels then captured Koroma, her husband and other
members of their group on their way back to their homes in Wellington.3190 Koroma testified
that the rebels killed her husband and another child by hacking them with machetes.319l The
rebels ordered the remaining civilians, including the witness, to sit in a line on the ground.
The rebels then used a machete to chop off her left hand, and told her that she should go tell
Tejan Kabbah that the rebels said they want peace.3l92 The rebels attempted to chop her right
hand, but were unsuccessful.3l93 Further, the witness testified that she did not see what
happened to the other civilians in the queue with her as she was "tormented".3194
1337. Sarah Koroma testified that she left the place where she was amputated and, as she
was walking near Brewery, she was beckoned by two rebels who were not in the group who
amputated her hand.3195 One of them, who carried a knife and gun,3196 told the witness that
he wanted to kill her because she was Tejan Kabbah's mother, but he hurled beer bottles at
$[87 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18987.
mg Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18988-18989.
No Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18990.
N90 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18990-18991.
M9! Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18991-18992. However, it is not clear from the witness`
testimony if she actually witnessed her husband's or the chjld's death.
M2 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18994-18995.
$[93 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18995-18997. The witness showed the Trial Chamber where
her left arm had been amputated at the wrist, and a scar where the witness testified that the rebels attempted to
sever her right hand.
W4 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18997.
W5 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18998-18999. TF1-169 testified that Brewery is located in
Wellington. TF1-169, Transcript 1 1 December 2008, p. 23991.
3 [96 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 19000.

---- End of Page 480 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GW 18 May 2012

B8: 43.
her instead because he did not have bullets in his gun.3l97 The other rebel, armed with a
gun,3l98 pleaded with him to leave the witness alone as she was suffering from a recent
amputation.3l99 Koroma testified that the rebel who threw the beer bottles at her also kicked
her into a gutter and hit her on her thigh; the beer bottles hit her and she still has scars on her
feet from the bottles.32OO On the third day after this incident, Sarah Koroma sought treatment
at Connaught Hospital, where she saw many patients with amputated legs. However, the
witness did not testify as to where or by whom the other patients had been amputated.32m
1338. Witness TF 1-026 testified that she was in her home in Wellington on 6 January 1999
when nine RUF rebels entered with guns. They began firing their weapons and shot her
sister, killing her.3202 The rebels who were under the command of CO Rocky 3203 then
forcefully took her from her home up a mountain. On their way out of the village, the rebels
bumed houses and amputated people's limbs.32O4
1339. Specifically, TF 1-026 testified that the rebels amputated the hands of seven civilians,
amputating the male civilians at the wrist and the women just above the elbow.3205 One male
civilian, wearing a white vest, died as a result of the amputation. Another male amputee was
ordered to go and tell people that the rebels were coming.32O6
1340. TF 1-026 was with the RUF rebels during the time that they were buming houses and
amputating civilians. The rebels told her she should be there to witness these acts because if
she attempted to escape, they would do the same to her.3207 1
1341. Akiatu Tholley testified that she was on her way to the market in Wellington on 5
January 1999,3208 when she heard that the rebels were coming. Tholley then ran home to
Em Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18998-18999.
mg Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 19000.
wg Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18998-18999.
3200 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 19000-19001.
ROI Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 19003.
mg rrr-026, Transcript 14 rpbmmy 2008, pp. 3843-3844.
mt TF1-026, Transcript 14 Fpbmmy 2008, p. 3847.
3204 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3844-3845.
3205 TF 1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3844-3845. TF1-026 firrther testified that the ages of` the male
victims were "24, 26, 25" and the female victims were "20, 22, 24".
*2% TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3845.
W TF1-026, Transcript 14 rpbmmy 2008, p. 3846
3208 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the context of the events places them later in January 1999 and considers
that the witrress’ young age at the time of these events, trauma and anxiety may have caused her to be confused

---- End of Page 481 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-O3-O1-T %/ OL 18 May 2012 %
· L

$$5:1**+
warn her family who locked themselves inside their house.3209 Tholley testified that an
unknown number of Krio-speaking men, wearing black t-shirts and black jeans entered the
house.32lO
1342. Tholley stated that when the men entered the house they amputated the first child
they saw, who was about 3 or 4 years old. Tholley testified that after seeing the amputation
she ran to hide in the wardrobe, where a rebel later found her and forced her outside. Once
outside, the rebels began beating and kicking her and asked her to go with them.32H Tholley
testified that upon seeing the rebels about to amputate her mother's hands, she told the rebels
she would not leave with them and that they would have to amputate her too.3 212 Tholley
testified that at that time, three rebels began beating her with the butt of a gun and a belt.3 213
According to Tholley, a rebel then dragged her under a mango tree, where she lay
unconscious and oozing with blood until another group of rebels came by and took her
along.3214
Findings
1343. The Trial Chamber accepts Sarah Koroma's evidence and finds beyond reasonable
doubt that her left hand was amputated and her right hand was mutilated by rebels in
Wellington on 6 January 1999. The Trial Chamber also finds beyond reasonable doubt,
based on her evidence, that on the same day a second group of two rebels beat Koroma by
throwing beer bottles at her, by kicking her into a gutter and kicking her in the thigh. Trial
Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused
serious physical injury and suffering to Koroma and that they evinced an obvious intention
to cause such serious physical injury and suffering.
and missmre the dare.
mg Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19173.
3210 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19174.
ml Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19175.
3212 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19175-19176.
3213 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19176.
3214 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19176-19177.

---- End of Page 482 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T OX 18 May 2012

3s$¤»·$`
1344. As Koroma testified only that these acts were perpetrated by "rebels", the Trial
Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that they were members of the AFRC/RUF
invading forces identified by the Trial Chamber.32l5
1345. The Trial Chamber finds, however, that Koroma's evidence about other amputees
she met at Connaught Hospital is insufficiently specific for it to make any findings in
relation to Counts 7 and 8.
1346. The Trial Chamber accepts TF1—O26's eyewitness evidence that rebels amputated the
hands of seven people in Wellington on 6 January 1999. The Trial Chamber therefore finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused serious physical injury and suffering,to
the victims, and that the perpetrators evinced an obvious intention to cause such serious
physical injury and suffering. . The Trial Chamber further finds beyond reasonable doubt,
based on the witness's evidence, that the amputations were perpetrated by the RUF, under
the command of CO Rocky a member of the RUF/AF RC forces which invaded Freetown on
6 January 1999.
1347. The Trial Chamber accepts Akiatu Tholley's evidence of witnessing the amputation
of a child and finds beyond reasonable doubt that the rebels amputated the arm of a child
aged three to four years in Wellington. The Trial Chamber further accepts her evidence that
she was badly beaten and lefi under a tree in Wellington. The Trial Chamber is therefore
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused, and intended to cause,
serious physical injury and suffering. As indicated in the section on Sexual Slavery, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that this incident occurred in late January 1999.3216
1348. As the victims in each of the foregoing findings were captured civilians at the time
that they were beaten or amputated, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that
they were not taking direct part in hostilities at the time of the attacks.
(f) Waterloo
1349. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Akiatu Tholley.
mj Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful killing of
civilians in Kissy area around January 1999, Findings supra.
mé Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); Akiatu Tholley used as a sexual
slave in Allen Town and Waterloo, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 483 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / GM 18 May 2012

3&S?'1¤
Evidence
1350. Akiatu Tholley testified that after being taken from her home in Wellington, she
accompanied a group of rebels to Waterloo.32l7 When she arrived at Waterloo, Tholley
witnessed rebels killing men women and children, and amputating the hands of men and
women. Tholley testified that when they reached Waterloo the group was "mixed", but that
she had often heard the rebels calling Five—Five's name and that he was the "overa1l boss"
"the leader of the group".3 2 18
Findings _
1351. The Trial Chamber finds that Tholley's evidence based on her own observations to
be credible and finds beyond reasonable doubt rebels amputated the hands of an unknown
number of men and women in January 1999. The Trial Chamber therefore finds beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators caused serious physical injury and suffering to the
victims, and that the perpetrators evinced an obvious intention to cause such serious physical
suffering and injury upon their victims. ~
1352. As the victims were civilians at the time that they were amputated, the Trial
Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that they were not taking direct part in hostilities at
the time of the attacks.
Conclusion
1353. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999, in
various areas of Freetown, including the northern and eastern areas of the city, the Kissy
area around the State House, Fourah Bay, Upgun, and the Kissy mental hospital, and
Hastings, Wellington, Tumbo, Waterloo, and Benguema in the Western Area, members of
the AF RC and RUF committed acts of cruel treatment and other inhumane acts against an
unknown number of civilians, as charged in the Indictment,3 219 and as shown in the evidence
above.
M7 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19196.
wg Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19196—19198.
nw Indictment, para. 21.

---- End of Page 484 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ox 18 May 2012

3 ss?-Q-
1354. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that at all times relevant to the Indictment, the RUF and/or AFRC forces directmi a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.322O The Trial
Chamber is satisfied that each of the acts physical violence proved by the Prosecution in
respect of Freetown and the Western Area formed part of the said attack and that the
perpetrators were aware of this fact. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that there was an aimed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times
relevant to the Indictment, involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and
CDF.3221 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that for all of the aforementioned acts of physical
violence in Freetown and the Western Area there was a nexus between the acts of physical
violence and the aimed conflict, that each of the victims was not taking an active part in the
hostilities at the time of physical violence, and that the perpetrators knew this fact.
Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned acts of physical violence in
Freetown and the Western Area constitute other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity
under Article 2 of the Statute, and cruel treatment as a war crime under Article 3 of the
Statute.
mo See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.
ml See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.

---- End of Page 485 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T Gi" 18 May 2012
n

_?>%S:i‘X
D. Count 9 {Child Soldiers)
Introduction
1355. The Prosecution alleges that "members of RUF, AF RC, AF RC/RUF junta or
alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under
the direction and/or control of and/or subordinate to the Accused, routinely conscripted,
enlisted and/or used boys and girls under the age of 15 to participate in active hostilities.
Many of these children were first abducted, then trained in AFRC and/or RUF camps in
various locations throughout the country, and thereafter used as fighters".3222 These acts are
alleged to have been carried out throughout the Republic of Sierra Leone between 30
November 1996 and about 18 January 2002.3223
1356. The Prosecution submits that child soldiers were ubiquitous in the Sierra Leone
conflict, that thousands of children under the age of 15 participated in hostilities3224 and that
the rebels used children because they were fearless and more obedient than adults —
characteristics that were then artificially enhanced with the forced administration of drugs
such as cocaine.3225 The Prosecution further submits that the RUF had a particularly high
proportion of child soldiers and that not only were children a formal and integrated part of
the rebel fighting forces3226 sanctioned and intended by commanders at the highest levels,3227
but that children were incorporated into the ranks from the RUF 's inception.3228 The
Prosecution argues that the evidence procured from former child soldiers, former members
of the rebel forces, experts, victims and bystanders in addition to ample documentary
evidence prove beyond reasonable doubt the Accused's guilt in respect of Count 9.3229
1357. The Prosecution has not pleaded specific locations with regard to conscripting,
enlisting and/or use of boys and girls under the age of 15 to participate in armed hostilities.
In accordance with established jurisprudence, the Trial Chamber has found that due to the
continuous nature of the crime of conscripting, enlisting and/or use of boys and girls under
3222 Indictment, para. 22.
3223 Indictment, para. 22.
3224 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 1029.
3225 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 1030.
im Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1029.
3227 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1036.
mg Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1034.
mi) Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1027.

---- End of Page 486 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

the age of 15, the pleading of particular locations is impracticable.323O Therefore, the Trial
Chamber has considered evidence of conscripting, enlisting and/or use of boys and girls
under the age of 15, in all locations in Sierra Leone.
1358. The Trial Chamber has first examined the evidence of conscription and enlistment of
children under the age of 15 years and subsequently examined the evidence of use of
children under the age of 15 years to actively participate in hostilities by districts. The Trial
Chamber, having examined the evidence in its entirety, has indicated the evidence on which
it has relied in arriving at its findings on each incidence of conscription or enlistment or use
of children under the age of 15 years in hostilities. `
1359. The Trial Chamber has considered several reports and expert evidence. Expert
evidence was tender in a report prepared by the expert Jessica Alexander for the
Prosecutionml This report was based on research into a database of 2,235 children who
were abducted when under the age of 15 years. It was created iiom information compiled by
the Child Welfare Section of the Sierra Leone Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and
Children's Affairs together with interviews of social workers and stakeholders involved in
the Family Tracing and Reunitication and the Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration programmes. The research covered the period 1996 — 2002 and examined,
inter alia, the age, place of origin, gender, abduction and length of stay with the armed
forces and made tindings on the abduction, military training, active combat, forced labour
and sexual violence to the children whose histories was reviewed.3232
1360. The Trial Chamber has also considered the (Confidential), "Human Rights in Sierra
Leone 1998 - 2000, Certain Aspects Relevant to the RUF/AF RC lndictments at the SCSL",
extracts from the report "Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Global Report on
Child Soldiers, 2001",3233 (which reviewed recruitment and deployment in each of the armed
R30 See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment supra.
ml Exhibit P—043, Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the Conilict
in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007.
3232 Exhibit P—043, Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the Conflict
in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007, pp. 5-8.
mi Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Exlribit P—335, "Coalition to Stop tlie Use of Child Soldiers; Global Report on
Child Soldiers, 2001".

---- End of Page 487 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01—T OM 18 May 2012

forces, CDF, RUF, AF RC and West Side Boys from 1991-2001) and the Sierra Leone Truth
and Reconciliation Report paras 148-149.3234
1361. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from many witnesses who observed children who
appeared to be under the age of 15 at training bases, or engaged in various war-related
activities, The Trial Chamber is aware that an official document if authenticated or
uncontested is more reliable evidence of age than a witness's perception but also
acknowledges that such documentary evidence is not available in many parts of Sierra
Leone. The Trial Chamber is also cognisant that these witnesses made estimations of age on
the basis of the child's appearance, height or physical development and/or the witness’
personal experiences, rather than on objective proof of age.3233 Given the inherent
uncertainties in such estimations, the Trial Chamber has exercised caution in determining
the ages of children associated with the rebel factions in its findings and has excluded all
evidence related to child soldiers where it is not satisfied that such evidence referred to
persons under age of 15 years. 3236
1. Finding on the AF RC and RUF as Armed Groups
1362. The Trial Chamber has found that the AF RC, RUF, the AF RC/RUF or junta forces
were armed groups.3237
2. Conscription and Enlistment of Child Soldiers
1363. The Prosecution evidence relates, almost entirely, to forcible conscription of children
under the age of 15 into an armed force or group in circumstances of coercion. The evidence
shows that in the majority of cases children were abducted and then trained.3238
1364. Children were trained in Masingbi Road,3239 Superman Ground3240 and Yengema in
Kono District,324l Rosos in Bombali District,3242 Port Loko,3233 and Bunumbu in Kailahun
3334 Exhibit D-012, "Confidcntial Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone TRC. Vol 2", paras 148-149.
3333 Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 13.
3236 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL-04-16-T-628, Judgement (TC), 20 June 2007, para 1246.
3 23 7 Law and Findings on the Genral Requirements, Article 3: War Crimes.
3238 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kal/on and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T-1234, Judgement (TC), 2 March 2009, para. 1695
"[w]e observe that either the abduction of persons for specific use within an organisation or the forced military
training of persons is independently sufHcient to constitute conscription, as both practices amount to compelling
a person to join an armed group".

---- End of Page 488 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T @1.. 18 May 2012 Q
1

District.3333 Although evidence was adduced on two locations called "Bunumbu", in the
west and in the east of Kailahun,3333 the Trial Chamber is satisfied, based on evidence on its
proximity to Buedu,3333 that the Bunumbu training base was located in the east of Kailahun
District.
1365. At the end of the training, children were given personal weapons3333 and assigned to
frontline commanders.3333
(a) Tonkolili District
Evidence
1366. Perry Kamara testified that he was a radio operator for the RUF,3333 and was
stationed in Kan ari Hills under the command of lsaac Mon or from earl 1996 to Ma
g g Y Y
1997.3333 At the time the RUF in Kangari Hills abducted many civilians, some of whom
were aged 12, 15 and 16.3331 Some boys were sent to the training base which had between
500 and 1000 abducted trainees. The were forcibl marked "RUF" on the forehead or back
Y Y
to prevent escape. Other abductees were forced to many, or used for hard labour.3333
Findings
3 333 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7976-7978; Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October
2008, pp. 17923, 17926-17927; Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18022-18023,
3333 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12155-12160, 12166-12167, 12194-12198.
3333 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4916-4917, 4919; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April
2008, pp. 8060-8061.
3333 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8092, 8102-8103; Exhibit P-043, "Expert Re ort of
P
Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p.
20; TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18813-18825..
3333 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19216-19217.
3333 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4866-4868; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 Janu 2008, p. 2058.
MY
3333 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1251-1252, 1261, 1266-1267.
3333 Exhibit P-276, "En1arged Section of a Map of Kailahun District (Marked by TF1-168)". See location #7
marked by TF1-168; TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16539; Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October
2008, p. 17928; Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18028-18030; TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p . 3867-
P
3868.
3333 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18813-18825; Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica
Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 20.
3333 TF1-362, Transcript 27 Februa 2008, p. 4911; Transcript 28 February 2008, p. 4295.
YY
3 233 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3089.
3333 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3085.
3333 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3087.
2252 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3088.

---- End of Page 489 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % GL 18 May 2012

$%S`% 7~
1367. The time period referred to Kamara, i.e. from early 1996 to May 1997, partly falls
outside the jurisdiction of the Court. However it is clear from his evidence that the
abductions and training occurred continuously throughout the period. The Trial Chamber
therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that an unknown number of
children aged below 15 years were abducted and conscripted, i.e. forcedly recruited with the
purpose of using them actively in hostilities, into an armed group, the AFRC/RUF at
Kangari Hills within the Indictment period. Given the prevalence of children in the RUF the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the perpetrators, including Kamara knew or should have
known that these children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is accordingly
satisfied that the elements of the crime of the conscription of children into an armed force
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to an unknown number of children
who were abducted and trained at Kangari Hills.
(b) Kailahun District
(i) Children abducted and trained by the RUF and AFRC at Bunumbu after 1
ECOMOG Intervention
Evidence
1368. TF 1-362 testified that the Bunumbu training base, also called "Camp Lion", was
established after the ECOMOG Intervention,3253 and operated until the end of 1998/ 1999.3 254
1369. The witness testified that the procedure at Bunumbu was the same as it had been at
Matru Jong,3255 which was a training base used by the RUF prior to 30 November 1996.
Children were first screened based on age and health, and then assigned to SBUs and SGUs.
SBUs were as young as seven. SGUs were nine to 15 years of age.3256 The training lasted
from two weeks to six months.3257 "Recruits" who tried to escape were either killed or
branded on their faces or chests with the letters "RUF".3258
3253 rFr-262, rrarraerrpr 27 February 2008, pp, 4866-4868, 4895-4899.
3254 TF1-262, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4916-4917.
3255 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4852-4853, 4901.
3256 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 48364840, 4899-4901.
3257 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 491 1.
*258 TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 4927-4928.

---- End of Page 490 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QQ 18 May 2012 \%

3 as 23
1370. The military training at Bunumbu including preparing ambushes,3259 dodging bullets
(Halaka training) and dismantling weapons.326O Some civilian "recruits" died during military
training exercises and the High Command was informed.326l After the training, SBUs were
sent to the front lines to fight or were assigned as bodyguards.32°2
1371. During the training, SBUs were forced to participate in food-finding by the AFRC
and RUF missions.32(’3
1372. Dennis Koker testified that approximately one month after the AFRC and RUF were
driven out of Freetown,32°4 they arrived in Buedu along with civilians they had captured on
the way from Kono, Quiva Road junction, Masiaka, Makeni and Koidu. The stronger ones
were taken for military training at Bunumbu, and after the training they were sent as
reinforcements to fight in the war. Some of those sent for training told Koker they were aged
12 or 14 and he saw that they were "very small" and "not fit for military work".3265 During
the 21 months Koker spent in Buedu up to 500 children were recruited as SBUs and given
guns. They did domestic chores and fought at the war front.326° Koker testified that SBUs
were small children aged 7 to 14.3267
1373. Albert Saidu heard that Monica Pearson was a training commander at Bunumbu
Camp Lion training base from 1998 to 1999.3268 He agreed with a previous statement given
to the Prosecution that after the ECOMOG Intervention, boys were abducted during the
retreat from Freetown and the strongest ones were sent to Bunumbu for training. He testified
that some of the children were as young as 8 years old.3269
1374. TF1-189 testified that after she heard about the attack on Freetown on 6 January
1999, the rebels sent 20 captives, aged 12 to 18, both male and female, away from
Mamboma village in Kailahun. TF1—l89 learned that the rebels took them to "the training
3259 TF1-562, rrarreerrpt 27 February 2008, pp. 4840-4841.
"°" TF1-362, rrarreerrpr 27 February 2008, pp. 4840-4845, 4906.
326* TF1-562, rrarreerrpr 27 February 2008, p. 4905.
3262 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 491 1-4912.
M3 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4904-4905.
3264 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1258.
3265 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1261, 1271-1273.
32% Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1265-1266, 1277, 1297.
3267 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1297.
3268 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10950.
3260 Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, pp. 1 1349-1 1350.

---- End of Page 491 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2(N2

,3 BS ‘B L}
base" at which C.O. Monica was the commander, where they were taught how to use guns.
After the training, the trainees were taken to the front lines.327O The witness was informed
about this recruitment from her cousin, who was one of those trained, and who was 16 at the
time of her abduction. Her cousin also s·aid that she was given a gun and was assigned to
guard a commander.327l
1375. Aruna Gbonda testified that from 1996 to 2000, some of the RUF rebels in Kailahun
were "litt1e children" aged 8 to 10 years old who were abducted and then trained. Some
carried guns.3272
1376. Exhibit D—013, a report by a Training Commander at Camp Lion, Bunumbu from 21
May 1998, records the presence of 53 SBUs at the base, but does not specify their age.3273
Findings
1377. The Trial Chamber accepts the testimony of witnesses Koker, Gbonda, Saidu, TF1-
189's and TF1—362's first—hand evidence about the training of children at Bunumbu from
approximately February 1998 until the end of 1998. TF1—362's evidence was unequivocal
and was corroborated by Exhibit D—013. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1 -189 testified that
the training occurred in January 1999, while TF1—362 testified that the training at Bunumbu
ended in December 1998 when the RUF was flushed out of the area, and that she then went
to Yengema. Given the detailed first—hand testimony of TF1—362, the Trial Chamber finds
that TF1—189 must have been mistaken about timing of these events but accepts her evidence
_ that these abductions and trainings occurred.
1378. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that an unknown number of children were
conscripted, i.e. abducted and forcedly recruited with the purpose of using them actively in
hostilities, into an armed group, the AFRC/RUF. Moreover, based on TF1—362's evidence
that the children were screened into groups of SBUs and SGUs based on their age, the Trial
Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that some of these children
were under the age of 15 years. Further, based on evidence of this screening process, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the perpetrators, including TF1—362, knew or should have
3270 TF1—189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16534—16239.
327} TF1—189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16548—16549.
3272 Amna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4280-4281.
3273 Exhibit D—013, "Confidentia1 Sierra Leone Peop1e's Army, Try Base Manpower Statistic, 21 May 1998".

---- End of Page 492 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T dg 18 May 2012

SES ES
known that these children were under the age of` 15 years. The Trial Chamber is accordingly
satisfied that the elements of the crime of the conscription of children into an armed force
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to an unknown number of children
who were trained at Bunumbu.
(ii) Abduction and training of Komba Sumana in approximately July/Augpst 1998
Evidence
1379. Komba Sumana testified that he lived in Tankoro village near Koidu Town at the
time when the "so1diers have overthrown".3274 On cross-examination, Sumana confirmed a
A rior statement in which he said he was in Koidu when he heard that ECOMOG had
P
dislodged the AFRC from Freetown, in approximately February 1998.3275 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied from this description that the event referred to by Sumana is the
Ecomoo rntewentien of14 February 1998.3276
1380. Approximately two months later, after the rainy season had begun, his parents and
siblings were captured by "rebe1s" outside of Pakidu village and taken in the direction of
Koidu Town.3277 Sumana then came under the care of an aunt. They travelled together to
Koidu Town, having heard that ECOWAS was there. On the way, they were attacked by
"rebe1s" and became separated.3278 Approximately a week later, still during the rainy season,
three "rebe1s" attacked Sumana and another civilian in the bush outside Koidu Town and
captured them. The rebels were male "youths" wearing military uniform trousers with a
black and green combat pattern and civilian clothes and were carrying guns. They spoke
Liberian Enghsh.3279
1381. On cross-examination, Sumana testified that he could not recall the month or the
ear in which he was abducted, but that it was durin the "man o season" and "at the time
Y 8 8
we were finally driven out of Koidu Town",328O some months after ECOMOG drove the
3274 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17883-17884.
3275 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18018-18029.
3276 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December
2007, Annex A, Fact AD.
3277 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17893—17900.
3278 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17899-17902.
3279 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17903-17909, 17912.
3280 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18007, 18009.

---- End of Page 493 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J 18 May 2012

3 *3 S8 Q
rebels out of Freetown.328l Sumana also denied having told the Prosecution that he was
abducted in approximately February 1998, as was recorded by an investigator in a prior
statement.3282
1382. The Trial Chamber recalls the evidence presented before it that the "mango season"
enerall be 'ns in A ril or Ma .3283 The Trial Chamber also recalls its findin Y that Koidu
S Y gl P Y Za
Town was captured by junta forces in late February/early March 1998 and that they were
forced by ECOMOG to retreat in early Apri1.3284 The Trial Chamber finds Sumana's
evidence consistent with evidence of these known events and concludes that he was captured
in around April 1998.
1383. Sumana testified that he was "very sma11" and did not yet have any facial hair at the
time of his capture.3285 He stated that before they were driven out of Koidu Town, his father
‘"used to te11" him that he was 14 years o1d.3286
1384. Sumana also testified that he was born in 1984 but he was unable to say in which
month.3287 He resented the court with a birth certificate which he testified was obtained b
P Y
his father at the end of the war. This certificate, issued on 22 June 2003, shows from hospital
records that he was born on 10 August 1984.3288 The Trial Chamber notes that Sumana
stopped his education in Class 4 and cannot read.3289
1385. Sumana also presented the Court with a voter identification card which he testified
he obtained in Freetown in 2002, during the e1ections.329O This card shows that he was "age
18"32ql and the date of the elections as 14 May 2002.
1386. Sumana testified that after he was captured, the "rebe1s" brought him to their base in
Kissi Town. There, Sumana saw many other captured civilians and "rebe1s". Their ‘"boss"
32** Kprrrba srrrrrarra, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18020-18021.
3282 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18011-18014.
32*3 Exhibit P-199A, "RUF Trial Transcript, 13 January 2005, TF1-034", p. 18967.
32*4 See Military Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998); Operation Fitti-Fatta infra.
3285 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17904.
32*6 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, p. 18009.
3287 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17879-17880.
3288 See Exhibit P-185, "Copy of Birth Certificate, Republic of Sierra Leone".
mg Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17881.
3290 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17905-17906.
ml See Exhibit P-186, "Republic of Sierra Leone, National Electoral Commission, Voter ID Card, Komba

---- End of Page 494 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / M 18 May 2012 Q
\

BBSB"}-—
was "Major Wallace", a former Liberian ULIMO Hghter who joined the STP and spoke
Krio, Liberian English and a Liberian tribal language Sumana did not recognise. Major
Wallace's "boss" in Kissi Town was "Superman". When they were in Liberia, Major
Wallace was under Colonel Alhaji Kromah.3292 Sumana learned his captors were named
Wuya, Opong and Alie.3293 On cross—examination, Sumana confirmed that all three were
former ULIMO fighters who had joined the STP .3294 The Trial Chamber is satisHed from
Sumana's description of his abductors and their associates that he was abducted by members
of the STP.
1387. Sumana testified that he became a member of the "SBU" and performed domestic
chores; he was not able to explain what SBU stands for.3295 Approximately three weeks after
Sumana was brought to Kissi Town, Issa Sesay assembled the captured civilians at PC
Ground and stated that Mosquito had requested that the civilians be sent to Kailahun for
training. Morris Kallon selected more than 200 men, women and children, including
Sumana, to participate in this training. At the time of selection, the civilians were held at
gunpoint and Sumana testiHed that "[t]hey said if anybody refused to go they would kill
. him".3296 On cross—examination, Sumana testiHed that this happened at the time the mangos
were ripening which may have been April.3297
1388. Sumana testiHed that the training took place during the rainy season in the bush
outside of Buedu. The trainees undertook two months of training under an instructor named
"Monica" who spoke Liberian English. Sumana was taught to crawl on the ground during an
ambush, how to shoot, dismantle, clean and reassemble an AK—47 gun, how to attack a town
and how to burn houses. The civilians were sometimes beaten and given little food. One
man fell ill and died. Sumana showed the Court scars on his right knee and ankle and on his
left shin which he testihed were the result of crawling on the ground during the training.3298
On the basis of his evidence, and on Sumana's testimony of later events set out below, the
Sumana".
mz Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17909—17913; Transcript 7 October 2008, p. 18022.
3293 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17913—17914.
3294 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, p. 18021.
3295 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17912—17913.
3296 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17923, 17926—17927; Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18022—
£2§9?omba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18024—18025.
3298 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17927—17936.

---- End of Page 495 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T QM 18 May 2012 %


$zSK%
Trial Chamber is satisfied that Sumana's military training ended in approximately July or
August 1998.
1389. On cross—examination, Sumana agreed that the "Monica" who conducted the training
was also known as "Colonel Monica" and that the training camp was located "in Buedu".
The Defence referred the witness to other evidence suggesting that Colonel Monica Pearson,
a known RUF trainer, was not in Buedu in 1998, but rather in Camp Lion in Bunumbu,
some 14 miles away. Sumana explained that "they" used to say that she was in Buedu, but
that "we" were in the bush and did not go to Buedu. He then reiterated that he was at a camp
"in Buedu" where he was trained by a female Liberian named Monica.3299 The Trial
Chamber notes that according to Exhibit P—276, a map of Kailahun District marked by TF 1-
168, Bunumbu is approximately 15 kilometres outside of Buedu.33O0 The Trial Chamber
notes that, in his own description of the location, the witness seemed to refer
interchangeably to "in Buedu" and the bush outside of Buedu. The Trial Chamber relies on
his repeated spontaneous descriptions of a location "outside of Buedu" and "in the bush" and
is satisfied that this is not inconsistent with the location of the training camp at Bunumbu.
Findings
1390. On the basis of evidence given by Sumana that he was forcibly abducted from
outside of Koidu Town in approximately April or May 1998 by members of the STF under
the command of Superman, that he became an SBU, that he was held by the RUF for three
weeks in Kissi Town, and that he was subsequently forced to participate in two months of
military training at Bunumbu, Kailahun District by members of the RUF under the
command of 1ssa Sesay and Sam Bockarie ending in approximately July or August 1998, the
Trial Chamber finds that Sumana was conscripted, i.e. abducted and forcedly recmited with
the purpose of using him actively in hostilities, into an armed group, the RUF.
1391. Sumana presented the Court with two official documents which appear to
incompatible with each other with regard to his exact age. The voter 1D card does not state
his date of birth nor indicates the time and place it was issued, nor does it show the
mg Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18028—18030.
mo Exhibit P—276, "Enlarged Section of a Map of Kailahun District (Marked by TF 1—168)". See location #7
marked by TF1-168,

---- End of Page 496 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T 18 May 2012
/ g
j 1

infomation used to support its issue, whereas Sumana's birth certificate, which he received
after his voter 1D card was issued, is based on actual hospital records.
1392. The Trial Chamber accepts that Sumana may not himself have known his exact age
at the time of his abduction, he was "very small" at the time and did not yet have facial hair.
His father "used to tell him" that he was 14, whereas according to his recently acquired birth
certificate he was actually only 13.
1393. Notwithstanding the apparent inconsistency between these two official documents
both show that Sumana was 13 at the time of his abduction, the Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied that he was about 13 at the time of his abduction in April/May 1998.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Sumana was under the age of 15 at the time of his capture. Given the prevalence of children
under the age of 15 in the RUF,33Ol the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the
RUF knew or should have known that Sumamna was under the age of 15 years. The Trial
Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the elements of the crime of conscription of a child
under 15 years into an armed force, the RUF/AFRC under the command of Sam Bockarie,
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to Komba Sumana.
(iii) Abduction and training of Edna Bangura
Evidence
1394. The evidence of witness Edna Bangura of her capture in Masingbi, Tonkolili District
in 1994 and subsequent detention in Buedu has been recited in the section dealing with
Count 4 (rape).3302
1395. ln Buedu, Bangura was assigned to CO Scorpion. The day after she arrived, CO Issa
ordered that she and other captured civilians be sent for training. Bangura testified that she
was not yet 11 when she was sent for training and estimated that the other people sent for
training were between 10 to 25 years old.3303 She was subsequently assigned to a Small Girls
Unit "for small girls between the age brackets of 8, 11, 12, 13" She saw small boys of
31 Ol Exhibit P—043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
mi Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape); Rape of women by the RUF throughout
Kailahun District supra.
im Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 1867l—18674.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

SS Q0
similar ages who were formed into Small Boys Units and who acted as secu1ities.33O4 She
was sent with others in 0u s of u to 20, some but not all of whom, were armed to villa es
BT P P 8
where they took "whatever we were able to see" and where they captured civilians, men,
women and children and forced them to carry the looted goods.33O5
1396. Bangura testified that she was trained "in Buedu" for two weeks by Monica Pearson
whom she believed was Libenan.3306 At the training, they were taught how to set an ambush,
how to retreat and how to use a gun. Bangura was trained with a two pistol grip gun. She
testified that she was very small and that she had to place the gun somewhere higher than
herself so that she could duck under the strap. Other people were trained with G3s and
LARs; Bangura was unable to explain what an LAR is. She estimated that there were 50 0r
m0re people trained with her.3307
1397. On cross-examination, Bangura explained that the training camp was not in fact in
Buedu Town but rather in a place that she estimated was about one or two hours walk
away.3308 Defence counsel suggested to her that Monica Pearson worked in a camp which
was 14 miles awa in Bunumbu and doubted that it was possible to walk this far in an hour
Y P
0r two. Bangura suggested that they used to mn. The Trial Chamber has noted that
according to Exhibit P-276, a map of Kailahun District marked by TF1-168, Bunumbu is
approximately 15 kilometres outside of Buedu.3309 Bangura went on to testify on cross-
examination that she knows of a place called Bunumbu but she does not know how far it is
fi0m Buedu nor does she know if there was an RUF training camp located there. However,
inconsistently, Bangura also stated that she had been to Bunumbu, then stated that she did
not know it was Bunumbu or the names of other villa es but was em hatic that she "was
8 P
trained somewhere around Buedu".33l0
Findings
3304 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, p. 18679.
3305 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, p. 18628
3*06 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, p. 18674.
3307 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18674-18677.
3308 Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18700-18702.
3309 Exhibit P-276, "Enlarged Section of a Map of Kailahun District (Marked by TF1-168)". See location #7
marked by TF1-168.
Bm Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18720-18723.

---- End of Page 498 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ Glo 18 May 2012

;%s’a I
1398. The Trial Chamber takes into consideration Bangura's young age at the time of the L
events and the fact that she stopped her education in Form 5.33 H Bangura appeared nervous
and shy during her testimony. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that her description of a
training base outside of Buedu where Monica Pearson was the training commander is not
inconsistent with the location of the training base at Bunumbu.
1399. However, other reliable evidence shows that Sam Bockarie sent Monica Pearson to
establish a training camp at Bunumbu only after the ECOMOG Intervention in February,
19983312 and that there is no evidence to suggest that Monica Pearson was at Bunumbu prior
to this time. lndeed, the evidence suggests that Pearson was in Pujehun,3313 Bonthe (Matru
Jong),3314 and Kenema Districts (Camp Lion in Zogoda) prior to leaving Sierra Leone for
Liberia in 19963315 and did not return to Sierra Leone until just prior to the ECOMOG
lntervention. 33 1 6
1400. The Trial Chamber finds this is inconsistent with Bangura's evidence that she was
trained by Pearson outside of Buedu within weeks of being captured in 1994 when she was
still 10 years old. Further, if Bangura is believed about the year of her capture, her alleged
conscription occurred before the indictment period.
1401. The Trial Chamber has considered that Bangura's detailed description of her training
at Bunumbu under Monica Pearson may be more reliable than her assertion of the year in
which she was captured as she is a child witness with little education recalling events which
occurred more than a decade ago. She is more likely to reliably recall events rather than
numeric representations of time. Trial Chamber concludes that Bangura was in fact trained
after February, 1998 and not in 1994 as she stated. The Trial Chamber finds this would be
inconsistent with Bangura's testimony that she was born in 1984 and was not yet 11 when
she was trained.
wl Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. 18663-18665.
33*2 TFl—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4868,
33'3 TFl—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4827.
33*4 TFl—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4826-4827.
W5 TFl—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4851; Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10949.
Bm TFl—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4858.

---- End of Page 499 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ·· 18 May 2012
/ 0* rg

3%$92
1402. Based on the inconsistencies in Bangura's testimony relating to the date and age at
which she was abducted, the Trial Chamber cannot be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the events described by the witness occurred within the Indictment period.
(iv) Abduction and training of TF1-026 from January to November/December 1999
Evidence
1403. TF1-026, born on 9 November 1984,3317 was 14 years old on 6 January 1999 when
nine RUF rebels, under the command of CO Rocky, came to her house in Wellington,
Freetown, where she lived with her fa1nily.33l8 The rebels abducted the witness, who went
with them unwillingly.33l9
1404. After her abduction, the witness was taken by the RUF rebels, commanded by CO
Rocky, to Calaba Town,332O and two days later to Waterloo where they met CO Rambo, an
RUF commander.332l From there they moved to Makeni, where they met "Brigadier 1ssa",
the "big man in Makeni", and Supennan, another "big man" of the RUF. During her three
week stay in Makeni, she did house chores in CO 1ssa's house.3322
1405. After this three weeks period in Makeni, Brigadier Issa ordered CO Rocky to take
the women to be trained in Kailahun. The witness and 19 other girls and women were taken
by a vehicle to Kono, and from Kono they walked to Buedu, Kailahun District. In Buedu
they were handed over to Mosquito, "the big man of all of them", who told CO Rocky to
take them to "Buedu field" to be trained.3323
1406. At the training field, CO Rocky handed over the girls and women to an RUF woman
Vanguard named Krio Mammy for training. Mosquito arrived at the field, said "they" should
start training them, and informed the girls and women that anyone caught trying to escape
would be killed. The trainees were then provided military training for six months. All the
trainees received a gun during the training and were trained how to use it, how to crawl
3317 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3842, 3847.
3318 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3843, 3851.
3319 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3844-3847.
im rr1-026, Transcript 14 rebmary 2008, p. 3862.
ml TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3863, 3865.
3322 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3865- 3867.
3323 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3867- 3868.

---- End of Page 500 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1 ¤/ @4 18 May 2012

$$92
while using arms, and how to shoot a gun, an "AK". They also had a G3. They were told the
training was needed in the RUF, and if the ECOMOG attacked they would need to know
how to shoot, crawl, roll and escape. The witness was 14 years old during her training, while
the others ranged in age from 18 to 26.3324
1407. During the training the witness tried to escape with three other female trainees. They
were told a boat would come and take them to Liberia. After finding out that Mosquito had
heard of their attempt, the witness and her friend returned to the training camp, while the
two other females were captured by Mosquito. Mosquito then shot and killed the two
recaptured girls in front of the other trainees, telling them that this was an example of what
would happen to them if they tried to escape. Another female trainee had already died
because the training made her ill. After the execution of the two trainees, all the remaining
17 trainees had the letters "RUF" carved onto their chests with a knife, so that if they "ran
away wherever (they) went if caught (they) would be killed"3325
1408. After the six months of training, Mosquito ordered that the women be brought back
to Makeni, Bombali District, and handed over to Brigadier Issa. The witness spent two
months in Makeni, during which she did domestic chores for Brigadier Issa and his wife.3326
She was forcibly married to a "RUF boy".3327 The witness escaped to her home village after
she became pregnant. She spent a total of nine months in rebel captivity.3328
Findings
1409. On the basis of TF 1—026's unchallenged testimony that she was forcibly abducted
from her home in Wellington and removed from her family, that she was detained by
Brigadier Issa in Makeni for three weeks while doing domestic chores, that she was taken to
Buedu field in Kailahun District and was militarily trained with a gun for six months; that
she tried to escape and was threatened with execution, that the letters "RUF" were carved on
her chest with a knife, that she was sent back to Makeni to do house chores for Brigadier
Issa and his wife, the Trial Chamber finds that TF 1-026 was conscripted, i.e. abducted and
forcedly recruited with the purpose of using her actively in hostilities, into an armed group,
ml TF1-026. Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3868-3870.
3325 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3870-3873.
3326 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3873-3874.
3327 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3875.

---- End of Page 501 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / Om 18 May 2012

38599*
the RUF/AFRC. The Trial Chamber finds this conscription was perpetrated by members of
the RUF under the command of Sam Bockarie and occurred in Kailahun District from
approximately February or March 1999 through approximately November or December
1999.
1410. On the basis of the witness's testimony that she was born in 1984, the Trial Chamber
is satisfied that she was 14, and thus under the age of 15 years, during her conscription and
training in 1999. Given the prevalence of children under the age of 15 in the RUF ,3 3 29 the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the RUF knew or should have known that
witness TF 1-026 was under the age of 15 years. Accordingly the Trial Chamber finds that
the elements of the crime of the conscription of a child under the age of 15 years into an
armed force have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to TF 1-026 and that the
perpetrators knew or should have known that children under the age of 15 were conscripted
into the armed force.
141 1. The Trial Chamber, however, is not satisfied that the performance of domestic chores
constitutes active participation in hostilities, as these activities are not related to the
hostilities and do not directly support the military operations of the armed groups, and
therefore does not made a finding that the domestic chores she performed at Issa Sesay's
house in Makeni shortly after her capture in 1999 constitute use of a child to participate
actively in hostilities.
(c) Kono District
(i) Children abducted and trained by the AFRC and RUF between March and
December 1998
Evidence
1412. Dennis Koker testified that approximately a week after the AF RC was expelled from
Freetown,333O they captured many children aged 12 or 14 years from Koidu Town and the
mg TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3877-3879, 3889.
*29 Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
mo Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1231, 1234-1236.

---- End of Page 502 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 61% 18 May 2012

surrounding area in Kono and forcefully used these children as reinforcements to fight for
them. The children had guns and fought for the RUF .3331
1413. Alice Pyne testified that in March 1998, while she was at PC Ground, the RUF
ca tured children from villa es near PC Ground and took them to the trainin base at
P S S
Superman Ground.3332 The captured children who were sent for training at Superman
Ground were aged 8-13. Aiier they "graduated" they would be distributed to commanders.
The training at Superman Ground was the same type of training the witness underwent at
Dia.33 3 3 At Dia, the training included how to attack, how to mount an ambush, how to crawl
and manoeuvre.3334
1414. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that SBUs, some aged 8 to 12, were given basic
weapon training at Masingbi Road from mid-March to April 1998, and was himself involved
in providing such training.3333 The witness also saw SBUs given basic training in Kono by
Junior Sherrif Savage, Tito in Yengema, Amara Kallay, Komba Gbundema, Emmanuel
Williams aka Rocky and Colonel Isaac Mongor.3333
1415. Emmanuel Bull testified that after April 1998, while he was with the RUF/AF RC
between Woama and Baima,3337 he heard that Bai Bureh had ordered the RUF/AFRC to
train young men. The witness and others were then trained for two weeks by Kallay Amara,
Anthony and Jah Spirit on how to use weapons. Some of the trainees were Small Boys A
Units, aged 13 and upwards. Usually at mid-day the trainees were sent on food finding
missions, accompanied by gunmen.3333
Findings
1416. The Trial Chamber notes that Koker did not provide any basis for his estimate that
the children who were captured in Koidu and who fought for the RUF were between 12 and
14 years old but that this aspect of his evidence was not challenged and that he had
333l Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1243-1244, 1257.
3332 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12155-12160, 12166-12167, 12194-12198.
3333 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12218-12219.
3334 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12055.
3333 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7976-7978.
3336 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7978-7979; Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8060-8061.
3337 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17315.
3333 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17316-17319, 17327.

---- End of Page 503 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012

3 2 :9 4-
experience of working with children in the RUF, and therefore accepts that these children
were under the age of 15. Given the prevalence of children in the RUF/AFRC, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that the perpetrators, including Koker knew or should have known that
these children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that an
unknown number of children were conscripted into the RUF/AF RC in Koidu Town and the
surrounding area after 14 February 1998 and that the Prosecution have proved beyond
reasonable doubt the crime of the conscription of children under the age of 15 into the RUF
in Koidu Town and the surrounding area after 14 February 1998
1417. The Trial Chamber notes that Alice Pyne's evidence of the age of the abducted
children was not challenged and that she had children herself at that time. On the basis of
this evidence, the Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
abducted children by members of the RUF/AF RC from villages near PC Ground were under
the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that the children were trained at
Superman Ground and subsequently distributed to commanders.
1418. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 conscripted by the RUF3339
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the RUF knew or should have known that
these children was under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that an
unknown number of children were conscripted, i.e. forcedly recruited with the purpose of
using them actively in hostilities, into the RUF/AFRC from villages near PC Ground in
March 1998 and in Koidu Town and surrounding area after 14 February 1998 and that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the crime of the conscription of an
unknown number of children under the age of 15 into the RUF at PC Ground and the
surrounding area in March 1998 and in Koidu Town and surrounding area after 14 February
1998.
1419. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified about the training of children at Masingbi Road.
Given his detailed account, and his lack of any motivation to lie in relation to this evidence,
the Trial Chamber considers his testimony to be reliable in relation to this incident. Bobson
Sesay testified that he knew the children trained at Masingbi Road were between 8 and 12
because the children were "mustered" and information about each recruit, including their
im Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22,

---- End of Page 504 ---------------------------


Case No.

3 EI? ?
names and ages, was recorded by one of the training commanders. The Trial Chamber is
therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that these children were under the age of 15
years. On the basis of Bobson Sesay's evidence the Trial Chamber finds that an unknown
number of children under the age of 15 were conscripted, i.e. forcedly recruited with the
purpose of using them actively in hostilities, into an armed group, the RUF/AFRC between
mid-March and April 1998 at Masingbi Road. The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that,
given this registration process, the members of the AFRC who were involved in training the
children, including Bobson Sesay, knew or should have known that these children were
under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the elements of the
crime of conscription of persons under the age of 15 years into an armed force have been
proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to an unknown number of children who were
conscripted into the RUF/AFRC at Masingbi Road from mid-March to April 1998.
1420. However, the Trial Chamber finds that Bobson Sesay's evidence regarding the
training given by other SLA and RUF commanders in parts of Kono other than Masingbi
Road is insufficiently specific as to the dates of the training and the ages of the "SBUs" that
were trained.
1421. The Trial Chamber notes that Emmanuel Bull was 17 years of age at the time of his
capture and enforced training. His siblings were aged 16, and 11 or 12, his brother, Titus,
being the youngest of those captured.334O His testimony that the children were "[s]mall boys
in the age of 13. You know, 13, 15" was not challenged. On the basis of this evidence, the l
Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that these children were under
the age of 15 years.
1422. Based on his evidence that these children were trained on how to use weapons, the
Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that members of the RUF/AFRC conscripted,
i.e. abducted and forcedly recruited with the purpose of using them actively in hostilities,
these children into their armed force. Moreover, based on the prevalence of children under
the age of 15 conscripted by the AFRC/RUF,334l the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
members of the AFRC and RUF knew or should have known that these children was under
the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that an unknown number of children
WO Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17287.
""' Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the

---- End of Page 505 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 0% 18 May 2012

were conscripted into the RUF in or about April 1998 in Kono District and that the elements
of the crime of the conscription of children under the age of 15 into the AFRC and RUF
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(ii) Children trained bythe AF RC and RUF after December 1998 in Yengema
Evidence
1423. TF 1-362 testified that at the end of 1998, when Kono was "cleared",3342 Yengema
training base was established.3343 The same procedures that had been used at Bunumbu
training base were employed at Yengema viz. dividing the recruits into five platoons,
including an SBU platoon.3344 The recruits were trained with live ammunition and were sent
on food finding missions. The youngest and oldest "recruits" died most often.3345 After the
training, the "recruits" were assigned to the frontline commanders including Moriis Kallon,
Denis Mingo and Rambo.3346 SBUs were also assigned to commanders as bodyguards.3347
Findings _
1424. The Trial Chamber has previously found that TF 1-362's detailed account of the
training of children at various bases in Sierra Leone is credible.3348 ln this instance, the Trial
Chamber finds that, based on TF 1-362's direct evidence of the training of children at
Yengema from approximately December 1998, that children were conscripted, i.e. forcedly
recruited with the purpose of using them actively in hostilities, into an armed group, the
RUF/AFRC. Moreover, based on TF 1-362's evidence that the children were screened into
groups of SBUs and SGUs based on their age, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt that some of these children were under the age of 15 years,
and that the perpetrators, including TF 1-362, knew or should have known that these children
were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
3342 TF1-362, Transcript 27 Fppmapy 2008, pp. 4916-4917.
3343 TFl-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4916-4917.
3344 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4919,
M TF1-362, Transcript 28 Fppmapy 2008, pp. 49224924.
3346 TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, p. 4295.
3347 TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, p. 4926.
3448 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Children abducted and trained by
the RUF and AF RC at Bunumbu after ECOMOG Intervention, Findings supra.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OL 18 May 2012

3 860 ¤>
leam how to dismantle a weapon, clean it and put it back together. The weapon was a large
gun with a round box and large chains.3362
1428. TF1-143 testified that the group from Konkoba eventually made its way to
Koinadugu Town, where TF1-143 and the other captured children were introduced to SAJ
Musa by their commanders. The commanders gave SAJ Musa two boys whom they had
reserved for him.3363 TF1-143 testified that the rebels who had captured him were under SAJ
Musa's group, which was a mix of`AFRC and RUF fighters.3364
1429. After meeting with SAJ Musa in Koinadugu Town, Kabila told TF1-143 that their
group was to be in the advance team to Freetown. Kabila, TF1-143, the other boy and
Kabila's "wife", a young woman he had captured, went to the forest, or "jorbush". In the
jorbush TF1-143 and the other boy underwent a second training. They learned how to
dismantle a weapon, clean it, couple it up, cock it, put it on safety, how to manoeuvre and
how to crawl.3365 ln the evening, they returned to Koinadugu Town from the jorbush.3366
Findings
1430. On the basis of TF1-143's testimony that he was forcibly abducted from a house in
Konkoba in Koinadugu District; that he was marked on the chest with the letters "RUF" by a
rebel commander named Kabila, that he was assigned to Kabila and taken to Koinadugu,
that he was trained by Kabila to dismantle and put together a weapon; that he later
underwent a second training in the jorbush near Koinadugu in which he leamed how to
operate a weapon, the Trial Chamber finds that TF1-143 was conscripted, i.e. abducted and
forcedly recruited with the purpose of using him actively in hostilities, into an armed group
the AFRC/RUF. The Trial Chamber is satisfied from TF1-143's description that this
occurred in approximately September 1998.
1431. Other than TF1-143 writing down his date of birth, no official document was
introduced to corroborate this date. However, the witness was confident about his age, and
about the fact that he was in Form Four at the time of his abduction, and was not challenged
3362 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8981.
3363 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8982-8983.
3364 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8985.
3365 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8987.
3366 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8987.

---- End of Page 508 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / w 18 May 2012

3360/
regarding his age during cross—examination. Moreover, he looked young at the time he gave
evidence in 2008 ten years after the incidents he testified about. The Trial Chamber is
therefore satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the witness was 12
years old at the time of his abduction, and thus under the age of 15 years during his
abduction and training. Finally, on the basis of the prevalence of the military training of
children under the age of 15 years by the AF RC/RUF , the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
members of the AF RC/RUF knew or should have known that the witness was under the age
of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution have proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that TF 1-143, a child under 15 years was conscripted into the
RUF/AF RC, an armed force in September 1998 at Konkoba
1432. The crime of conscription continues as long as the child remains within the armed
forces or reaches the age of 15 years.3367 TF 1-143 testified that he remained with the
AF RC/RUF until he was arrested by Nigerian armed forces after the Freetown attack in
January 1999. The Trial Chamber finds, therefore, that TF 1—143's conscription in the
AF RC/RUF continued until January 1999.
(d) Bombali District
(i) Children trained at Camp Rosos and used bythe AF RC in July 1998
Evidence
1433. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that small boys were captured during the "SLA"
attack on Karina in July 1998 and were assigned to the wives of SLA and RUF commanders
`to do "small works". Later on, the small boys were given "personal training" as SBUs in
Camp Rosos on weapons and guard duties.3368 At Camp Rosos, 77 people were trained, the
majority of whom were SBUs aged 8 to 12. They were trained for three weeks by Junior
Sherrii Major Eddie, Five—Five and the witness himself ln order to prepare them for the
attack on Freetown, SBUs were trained how to use weaponry, lay ambushes, and were given
drills in Fighting In a Built Up Area (FIBUA).3369
3367 See Applicable Law: Specific Elements of the Crimes; Count 9: Crimes Relating to Child Soldiers (Article
4(c) of the Statute) supra.
3368 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8092, 8102-8103.
3369 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8159-8161.

---- End of Page 509 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J GW 18 May 2012

3 XKD 2.
Findings
1434. On the basis that children were abducted by SLAs during an attack on Karina in July
1998 and that they were trained militarily for three weeks at Camp Rosos by AFRC/RUF
members, including the witness, the Trial Chamber finds that an unknown number of
children were conscripted, i.e. abducted and forcedly recruited with the purpose of using
them actively in hostilities, into an armed group, the AFRC/RUF under the command of SA]
Musa in Karina in July 1998. While Bobson Sesay provided no basis for his estimation that
the SBUs who were trained at Rosos were between 8 and 12 years old. However the Trial
Chamber notes that he was not challenged on this evidence and that he was involved in the
training of children of similar ages recorded at Masingbi Road, and was therefore familiar
with the physical appearance of children in this age range. Moreover, given that Bobson
Sesay testified that the children were aged between 8 and 12, it is reasonable to infer that the
children must have been very young. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that these children were under the age of
15 years, and that the perpetrators, including the witness, knew or should have known that
these children were under the age of 15 years and, accordingly, have proved beyond
reasonable doubt that an unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were
abducted and conscripted into the AFRC/RUF in July 1998 at Camp Ross, Bombali
District..
(ii) Children taken from care centre in Makeni in May 2000 and continued
recruitment until 2001
Evidence
1435. TF 1-174 testified that in mid—April 2000, he met with a British "MlLOB member",
Colonel Joe, the "CO" of KENBATT—5, Augustine Gbao and Morris Kallon to decide
whether the care centre for children in Makeni should continue to function. Gbao and Kallon
said that they must hear from Issa Sesay and Foday Sankoh before making a decision. When
the witness visited Gbao at Teko Barracks, "we" heard "them" talking in a room used to
communicate with Issa Sesay or Foday Sankoh. Eventually, the witness was told he could
move the children, but that he must give the RUF a list of the names.337O However, RUF
3370 TF1—174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23732-23737.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 61.9 18 May 2012
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32*603
personnel demanded the retum of children who "were good fighters".337l Between 1 and 5
May 2000 he saw RUF members taking more than 100 children from the centre.3372 By 14 or
15 May 2000 another 100 children were gone from the centre. One of the remaining children
told the witness that 45 children had been taken to fight in Lunsar but that they were killed
in an accident on the way.3373
1436. TF1-174's account is corroborated by Exhibit P-334, an Amnesty lntemational
Report, which reports that it is believed that 30 boys aged 14 to 17 were threatened and
intimidated to join the RUF in May 2000 at Makeni care centre.3374
1437. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reports that a group of 72 former
child combatants at Makeni rehabilitation centre were forced to re-join the RUF in 2001.3375
Findings
1438. On the basis of the witness’ evidence that he witnessed the RUF fighters taking
more than 100 children from the centre, which is corroborated in part by Exhibit P-334, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the RUF abducted these children.
Given the RUF commanders had previously demanded that their child "fighters" be retumed
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the RUF intended to use these children in combat. The
Trial Chamber cannot determine, on the basis of this evidence, whether the group of over
100 children were forcibly taken or whether they rejoined the RUF voluntarily. However as
it is a crime under Article 4(c) to conscript or enlist children under the age of 15 years into
an armed force it is irrelevant whether the children left voluntarily or under duress. While
TF1-174 did not testify about the age of the specific children who were abducted, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied, based on TF1-174's testimony that 60-70% of the majority of the
children at the interim care centre were below the age of 14 years, and on the basis that the
centre kept records documenting the ages of these children, that some of these children were
under the age of 15 years. Further, based on the prevalence of children under the age 15 who
fought with the RUF, and the familiarity of the RUF commanders with these particular
337* TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23730- 23731
3372 TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23742-23744.
3373 TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23743-23752.
3374 Exhibit P-334, "Amnesty International Report, Sierra Leone: Childhood - A Casualty of Conflict, 31 August
2000". p. 15.
3375 Exhibit P-335, "Coa1ition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Global Report on Child Soldiers, 2001", p. 379.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / m 18 May 2012

3 g 6 0 9*
children, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the RUF fighters knew or should have known
that these children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is accordingly
satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that an unknown
number of children under 15 years were conscripted into the RUF, an armed fbrce in May
2000 at Makeni.
1439. The witness did not personally observe the next 100 children being taken by RUF
fighters, as he was in Freetown at the time, he only noted that there were approximately 100
fewer children at the centre upon his return. He was also told that 45 had been taken to fight
in Lunsar. This evidence is hearsay but it is corroborated by TF1-174's observation that
children were missing and the evidence of the RUF requiring the return of child fighters
from the Centre. As it is crime under Article 4(c) to conscript or enlist children under the age
of 15 years into an armed force it is irrelevant whether the 45 children were taken
voluntarily or under duress. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a further unknown number of children under 15
years were conscripted into the RUF, an armed force in May 2000 at Makeni.
(iii) Abduction and training of TF1—158 in 1998
Evidence I
1440. TF1-158 testified that he was 10 years old when rebels attacked his town,
Bonoya,3376 Bombali District a few months before the AFRC attack on Freetown on 6
January 1999. After the attack on the village the rebels forced the witness to join them by
holding him at gun point. He testified that "if anybody refused to go that person would be
killed".3377 The rebels took him to Rosos and forced him to cany items looted from civilians
en route.
1441. On cross—examination, TF1—158 testified that Gullit, Five-Five, O-Five, Staff Alhaji
and Adama Cut Hand were in the group that captured him,3378 while the group's leader was
W6 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18815-18820.
3377 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18821.
mg TF1—158, Transcript 21 ocmber 2008, p. 18860.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gm 18 May 2012
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3960:
SAJ Musa.337Q The Trial Chamber is satisfied from his description of his abductors and their
associates that he was abducted by members of the AF RC.
1442. The Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-158 stated that some of the attackers of Bonoya
spoke a Liberian language. However, the witness’ explanation of how he knew it was a
Liberian languagemm is inconsistent with his prior statements and is implausible. The Trial
Chamber will thus disregard it in its evaluation of the evidence.
1443. On cross—examination TF 1-158 testified he was first captured when Kabbah was
President,338l but later confirmed a prior statement in which he stated that the attack on
Bonoya occurred after the overthrow of President Tejan Kabbah.3382 He also agreed with
Defence Counsel that he did not give the OTP a date for the events,3383 and that the date
"May 1998" referred to in his prior testimony in the AFRC trial was provided by
Counsel.3384
1444. The witness was in Rosos for five days before he escaped leaving his gun.3385
Findings
1445. On the basis of TF1-158's testimony that he was forcibly abducted from Bonoya,
Bombali District a few months before the attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999, that he was
taken to Rosos while being forced to carry items looted from civilians; the Trial Chamber
finds that TF 1-158 was conscripted, i.e. abducted and forcedly recruited with the purpose of
using him actively in hostilities, into an armed group, the AFRC/RUF under the command
of SA] Musa. The Trial Chamber finds this conscription occurred in the Bombali District for
an unspecified number of months before December 1998.
1446. Based on the witness’ testimony that he was ten years old at the time of his capture,
the Trial Chamber finds that he was under the age of 15 years. Based on the prevalence of
children under the age 15 who were militarily trained by members of the AFRC/RUF at
3379 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18889.
3380 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18850-18859, 18884-18887.
ml TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18887.
3*82 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18890.
3383'1`F1-158, Transcript 21 oprpbpr 2008, pp. 18904-18905.
3384 TF1-158,Transcript21 October 2008, pp. 18867, 18904-18905,
ms TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18825-28826.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T . Q" 18 May 2012
x

g 3 $750 6
Camp Rosos,33g6 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the AFRC/RUF knew or
should have known that TF1-158 was under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that TF1—
158 a child under 15 years was conscripted into the AFRC/RUF, an armed force in Bonoya
in late 1998.
(iv) Abduction and Training of TF1-1 58 in approximately July 1999
Evidence
1447. After escaping from Rosos, the witness was captured again in Kamayusufu, Bombali
District,3337 shortly after he heard about the Lome Peace Accord on the radio.3388 The Trial
Chamber is satisfied from the context that this event occurred in approximately July 1999.
Some of the rebels who captured the witness wore full military uniform, and others wore red
headbands, military uniform shorts or sleeveless shirts. Officer Demo, who was an SLA
soldier with Savage's group told him they would take him back as they had done before,
after which the rebels took him to Kamabai.3339 The Trial Chamber is satisfied from the
witness's description of his abductors and their associates that he was abducted by members
of the AFRC.
1448. In Kamabai, the witness was trained "how to go and attack Kabala" and how to
dismantle, clean and couple a gun. He testified that "[w]e were [aged] ten", and that other
trainees were aged 153390 On cross-examination the witness denied his testimony in the
AFRC trial where he approved a former statement to the OTP indicating that they had spent
5 days in Kabala during which the witness was taught "weapon hand1ing" by Savage.339l
Findings
1449. On the basis of the testimony provided by TF1—158, that he was forcibly abducted
from Kamayusufir, Bombali District after the Lome Peace Accord and that he was militarily
trained in Kamabai, Bombali District by members of the AFRC, the Trial Chamber finds
H86 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8159-8161.
W TF1-158, Transcript 21 october 2008,p. 18829.
3388 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18830.
mq TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18829-18832.
3190 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18831-18833.
H9, TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18912-18913.

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Case No; SCSL-03-Ol-T QL 18 May 2012 Q
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3 R 60 }·
that TF 1-158 was conscripted, i.e. abducted and forcedly recruited with the purpose of using
him actively in hostilities into an armed group, the AFRC/RUF. The Trial Chamber finds
this conscription was perpetrated by members of the AFRC/RUF under the command of
Savage and occurred in Bombali District from approximately July, 1999 through August,
1999.
1450. Based on the witness’ testimony that he was 10 years old when he was captured in
approximately September 1998 and that he was 10 years old during his training, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that he was under the age of 15 years during his second abduction and
training in July-August 1999. On the basis of the prevalence of children under the age of 15
given military training by the AFRC,3392 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of
the AFRC knew or should have known that TF 1-158 was under the age of 15 years. The
Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that TF 1-158 a child under the age of 15 years was conscripted into an armed force.
(e) Port Loko District
(i) Abduction of Akiatu Tholley from January to April 1999 A
Evidence
1451. Akiatu Tholley gave evidence of conscription of children into the armed factions and
their use in hostilities including evidence that she was trained militarily in Port Loko
District. The Trial Chamber has made findings in relation to aspects of Tholley's evidence
under Count 6, Sexual Slavery. The Trial Chamber has found, inter alia, that Tholley was
abducted from Wellington, Westem Area during the retreat from Freetown in late January,
1999 by a member of the AFRC named "James" who was under the command of Santigie
Borbor Kanu; that James repeatedly raped Tholley, that she was given weapons to carry to
Allen Town, that she was detained by James in Masiaka from approximately April through
May, 1999, that James taught her to use an AK-47 and a pistol, and that during this time she
was given military training in Port Loko District, that she unsuccessfully tried to flee after
which James gave her drugs which caused her to have "a change of mind" and was held in
W2 Exhibit P-043, "Expe1t Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 19.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T y / élh 18 May 2012 %
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l
3360 8*
captivity by James in Allen Town and Waterloo, Western Area until approximately April
1999 and thereafter in Masiaka, Bombali District for approximately two months.3393
1452. Tholley testified that she could not recall when she was born.3394 On cross-
examination she also testified that she did not recall her prior testimony given in April 2005
in the AFRC trial, in which she stated that she was born in February and knew from having
seen her birth certificate that she was 19 years old at the time she gave that evidence.3395
Defence Counsel put to Tholley a statement given during an interview with the Prosecution
in February/March 2005 in which it was recorded that she was born on 28 February, was 19
years of age and that her birth certificate had been eaten by rats. Tholley confirmed this and
repeated that she does not know when she was born.3396 On re—examination, Tholley
confirmed that in the same interview she had also stated, "I can’t remember the year. I know
I am aged 19 now. I thought I was older but found my birth certificate after my first
interview with the OTP. I no longer have it as it was eaten by rats".3397 The Trial Chamber
also notes that Tholley testified that she had not yet begun her menses at the time she was
raped by James in Allen Town,3398 an event the Trial Chamber has found occurred in late
January, 1999.
Findings
1453. On the basis of the evidence given by Tholley that she was forcibly abducted from
» her home in Wellington in late January, 1999; given weapons to carry to Allen Town;
detained by James in Masiaka from approximately April through May, 1999; that she
unsuccessfully tried to flee and was given narcotics by James and that James taught her to
use an AK—47 and a pistol, and that during this time she was given military training in Port
Loko District, the Trial Chamber finds that Tholley was conscripted, i.e. abducted and
forcedly recruited with the purpose of using him actively in hostilities, into an armed group.
The Trial Chamber finds this conscription was perpetrated by members of the AFRC under
the command of Santigie Borbor Kanu.
3393 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Ki11ings); Count 4 (Rape); Count
5 (Sexual Slavery); Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence) supra.
3mA13395 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19221- 19222.
33% Akiatu Tholley. Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19221-19224.
3397 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19274.
3398 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19183.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T CB 18 May 2012

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3860 7
1454. Although Tholley testified that she does not know her date of birth, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied from her confirmation on re—examination that she was 19 years old at
the time of the interyiew in February/March 2005 (making her not older than 13 in
February/March 1999, shortly after her abduction) and from her own description that she
had not yet had her menses when she was raped, that it has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt that Tholley was less than 14 years old at the time of her conscription in January
( 1999.
1455. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 conscripted by the
AF RC/RUF ,3399 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the AF RC knew or
should have known that Tholley was under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied that the elements of the crime of conscription of children under 15 have
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
1456. The crime of conscription under Art 4(c) continues as long as the child remains
within the armed forces or reaches the age of 15 years.34OO Tholley testified that she was later
taken to Kurubonla in Koinadugu District to fight, although she was unable to recall when
this was,34Of and that she surrendered to ECOMOG at Lunsar shortly thereafter.3402 The Trial
Chamber is unable to determine with precision when this occurred. It accordingly finds that
Tholley's conscription occurred from the time of her abduction in January, 1999 until at
least April/May 1999.
3. Using Children to Actively Participate in Hostilities
1457. Evidence was adduced that RUF and AF RC used children to fight on the front lines,
to carry arms and to work to support their hostilities.3403
3399 Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
3400 See Applicable Law: Specific Elements of the Crimes; Count 9: Crimes Relating to Child Soldiers (Article
4(c) of the Statute) supra.
ml Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19217.
3*02 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19218-19220.
3403 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23707-23709; Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23759; Augustine
Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-20146; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2344-2345;
Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2055-2058; Dennis Koker, 15 January 2008, p. 1257; Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8161-8162; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp.
1662, 1678; Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17705-17709; Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008,
p. 11340; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19217-19218, 19268-19270; TF1-158, Transcript 21

---- End of Page 517 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03-01-T qu 18 May 2012

335/ 0
1458. Children aged 10-14 years guarded civilians who were forced to mine34114 for
diamonds by the RUF, and carried weapons34O5 to ensure that these civilians did not
escape.34116 Several witnesses testified that if civilians tried to take diamonds from the
mining area, children were ordered to kill them.34117 The Prosecution alleges the diamonds
mined were used to purchase materiel used in hostilities.341144
1459. The guarding of military objectives amounts to active participation in hostilities.34119
This Trial Chamber has previously held that in the conflict in Sierra Leone, where diamonds
were mined and sold to raise revenue to finance war efforts, the use of a child to guard a
diamond mine put the child at sufficient risk to constitute illegal use of the child pursuant to
Article 4(c) of the Statute.34111 Control over the diamond mines in Kono and Kenema
Districts was crucial for the war effort of all armed groups in the conflict. As the diamond
mines were in highly contested and strategic locations, the Trial Chamber finds that they
were potential military targets for the warring factions. The Trial Chamber finds that due to
the high risk of enemy attacks, those children who were used to guard the mines were in
direct danger of being caught in hostilities. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that those
children who were used to guard the mines were being used to actively participate in
hostilities.3411 Based on the evidence, and on the context in which this mining occurred, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that these children were used by members of the RUF and AF RC
who knew or should have known that these children were under the age of 15 years.
October 2008, p. 18834; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone, 1998 — a Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty
International Report", p. 15; Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 53; Exhibit P-335, "Coalition to Stop the Use of
Child Soldiers: Global Report on Child Soldiers, 200l", p. 377.
4404 TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2344-2345; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp.
20144-20146; Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18237-18238.
4405 TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2334-2340; Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008,
pp. 17535- 17537; Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 25-35; TFl-567, Transcript 2
July 2008, pp. 12886-12888; Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18237-18238.
4406 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-20146; TF 1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009,
pp. 23773-23775.
4407 Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537- 17538.
44014 Eg. Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 348-349.
4404Prosecutor v. Sesay, Ka/lon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T-1234, Judgement (TC), 2 March 2009, para. 1725;
Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, para. 263.
44111 Prosecutor v. Brimcz et al., Trial Judgement, SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007, para. 1267.
3411 See RUF Trial Judgement, para. 1727.

---- End of Page 518 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OL 18 May 2012

1
i 33 6 //
1460. Evidence was adduced on the use of children as b0dyguards to military
commanders.34l2 Children were given arms to guard the commanders’ physical safety,
llOIT1€S, pI`Op€I`ty 31'1d WOIT1€H.34l3
1461. Several witnesses also testified regarding the participation of children in f00d finding
missions.34l4 These missions 0ccurred throughout the conflict where f`00d was scarce, and
children sent on these missions were sometimes a1med34l5 or accompanied by gunmen.34l6
1462. Evidence was adduced that children committed crimes including amputations,34l7
decapitation,34l8 rape,34l9 looting,342O buming structures,342l and capturing,3422 threatening,
beating,3423 and killing civilians.3424 Children were given weapons, sent on patrols, to0l< part

mz TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, p. 16549; TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2344-2345;
Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2055-2058; Jose Maria Caballer0, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp.
1676-1678, 1680-1683; TFl-362; Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4911-4912.
W3 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-20146; TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009,
pp. 23784-23785; Jose Maria Caballer0, Transcript 18 January 2008, p. 1678.
W4 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8191; Jose Maria Caballer0, Transcript 18 January
2008, p. 1678; TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23829; TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 4922-
4924; TFl-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2252-2254; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2008, p.
19279; TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8979; Exhibit P-051, "UN1CEF Exercise B00klet listing Names of
S0ldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border", p. 21.
W5 TF1-158, Transcript 21 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18825-28826; TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5021-5022.
W6 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17318-17319.
34m M0hamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3923-3926; Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008,
pp. 699-700; Exhibit P-202, "TF1-206, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 92, 105; Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7976-7978, 7996-7997, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8061-8064, Transcript 22
April 2008, pp. 8161-8162, 8191; Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8865-8870; TF1-174, Transcript 28 January
2009, pp. 23798-23799; Jose Maria Caballer0, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1680-1681; Exhibit P-201, "Sia
Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 8; Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 60; Exhibit P-328, "Human
Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone — Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape, New Testimony from Sierra
Leone, July 1999, p. 5.
mg Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 696-698.
W9 Jose Maria Caballer0, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1680-1681; Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 62.
4420 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23685, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23784-23785; TF1-362,
Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5021-5024; Jose Maria Caballer0, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1680-1681;
Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 19213-19216, 19268-19270.
ml Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 723; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp.
8161-8162; TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23784-23785, 23798-23799; Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14
Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18302-18303; Exhibit P-205A, "TFl-023, AFRC Transcript, 9 March 2005", p. 30.
3422 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8002, 8006-8008, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8290-
8291, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8392-8395.
3423 TFl-064, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17081-17082; Exhibit P-202, "TFl-206, AFRC Transcript 28
June 2005", pp. 92, 105; Samuel Kargb0, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10533, 10535-10537; TFl-122,
Transcript 8 July 2005, pp. 15211-15234, Transcript 19 September 2008, pp. 16745-16746.
3424 TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23784-23785, 23786-23788, 23798-23799; Jose Maria Caballer0,
Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1676-1678, 1680-1683; Abdul Otonj0 Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008,
pp. 17537- 17538; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 19213-19216, 19268-19270; Exhibit P-077
(confidential), para. 42; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone, 1998 — a Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty
lnternational Report", p. 15; Exhibit P-328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone — Getting Away with

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (hx, 18 May 2012

in ambushes, or used as spies to check whether enemy forces were in the surrounding
villages.3425
1463. Children were forced to carry ammunition during the movement of the armed
groupsmb and children who were captured during an attack on their village or town were
often forced to carry looted goods, often on their heads.3427
1464. The Trial Chamber has also heard evidence from various witnesses about the use of
children, both boys and girls, for domestic chores, such as laundering, cooking and cleaning
in the households of members of the armed groups 3428 and children being forced to move
with these households from location to location.
(a) Kenema District
(i) Children used at Tongo Fields by the AFRC and RUF
Evidence
1465. Witness TF1—567 testified that during the Junta period the RUF and AFRC abducted
civilians, who were forced to work in the mines in Tongo Fields, and were guarded by
armed soldiers, some of them as young as 14 years old.3429 Similarly, TF1—371 testified that
some of the armed guards at Tongo Fields during the Junta period were SBUs aged 13, who
carried AK—47s.3430 Augustine Mallah testified that he saw armed children, aged 10 and
above, guarding civilians who were mining at Tongo Fields at that timem I to ensure that
Murder, Mutilation, Rape, New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, p. 5.
3425 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8161-8162, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8396-8399,
8405-8407; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January 2008, p. 1678; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January
2008, p. 1435.
3426 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19178-19179.
3427 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8180-8181; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18
January 2008, pp. 1673-1676; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone, 1998 — a Year of Atrocities Against Civilians,
Amnesty International Report", p. 15; TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18878.
mg TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23773-23775; Dennis Koker, 15 January 2008, pp. 1234-1235;
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8102-8103; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January
2008, pp. 1673-1676; TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5021-5024; Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008,
p. 11340; Exhibit P—077 (confidential), paras 55, 60; TF1-026, Transcript 14 Febmary 2008, pp. 3865-3867,
3873-3874.
M Tri-567, Transcript 2 Jury 2008, pp. 12886-12888.
WO TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2334-2337; Exhibit P-5, "Map of Sierra Leone".
ml Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20138-20141.

---- End of Page 520 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {LL 18 May 2012 M

1
386 /3
they worked hard and did not escape.3433 Abdul Otonjo Conteh testified that armed RUF
combatants, including both adult and child combatants aged 12 to 15, guarded the mining3433
at Cyborg in Tongo Fields.3434 TF 1-375 testified that he was told by "Boise" after the 1997 `
coup that SBUs were guarding mining sites, and that Sam Bockarie ordered SBUs to shoot
and kill people who tried to take "gravel" from that area without permission.3433
1466. Abdul Otonjo Conteh testified that Sam Bockarie came to Tongo Fields every day
during the junta period, accompanied by a convoy of adult and child combatants, aged 12 to
14, to collect diamonds.343° Conteh also testified that Sam Bockarie sent child combatants to
attack civilians who were mining in the fields and he reported this in his capacity as a local
committee member. 3437 Three people were killed and many injured after child combatants
opened hre on civilians in Tongo Fields. Two civilians were killed and many others were
injured by child combatants in Sandeyeima.3433 The witness observed the two dead
bodies.3439 4
Findings
1467. Witness TF 1-567 estimated that the children who he saw guarding the mines were
aged from "14 upwards", Mallah estimated the children "[t]hey were about ten years, 12
years, 15 years, you know". Witnesses TF 1-567, TF 1-371 and Mallah were members of the
RUF, knew of the abduction of children and were aware of the ages of those targeted.
Conteh indicated that the children were "12 to 15" years of age. The Trial Chamber accepts
his estimate as he was the father of three children and had been a secondary school teacher
for several years prior to his capture.3440 The evidence of TF 1-375 corroborates the
foregoing testimony that children were used in guarding mining. Each of these witnesses
gave credible evidence of the ages of the children they saw and this evidence was not
challenged in cross-examination. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that children under the age of 15 years were used by the AF RC and
3433 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-20146.
3433 Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17535-17537.
3434 Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17531-17535.
3433 TF1 -375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp, 12498- 1 2499.
3433 Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17541-17542.
3437 Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17527-17530
3433 Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537—17538.
3439 Abdul Otonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17530.

---- End of Page 521 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (PL 18 May 2012 %


xaé/4
RUF during the Junta period to guard mining sites in Tongo Fields and that the members of
the AFRC and RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the age of
15 years. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crime of using
persons under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities have been proved
beyond reasonable doubt in relation to an unknown number of children in Tongo Fields
between May 1997 and February 1998.
1468. The Trial Chamber notes that Conteh did not give any evidence regarding the age of
the specific child combatants who killed civilians in Tongo Fields and therefore finds that it
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that these killings were committed by children
under the age of 15 years. However the Trial Chamber accepts his evidence that the children
who accompanied Sam Bockarie were between 12 and 14 and therefore finds that it has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the children who accompanied Sam Bockarie to collect
diamonds, were under the age of 15 years. Based on the prevalence of children under the age
of 15 used by the AFRC/RUF as bodyguards, the Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the
members of the AFRC/RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the
age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber finds that safeguarding the physical safety of military
commanders, in particular where children are used as bodyguards, constitutes using children
to participate actively in hostilities.344l The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that children under the age of 15 years were used by the
AFRC and RUF during the Junta period to guard mining sites in Tongo Fields and to collect
diamonds produced by civilians working in those mining sites. Based on the prevalence of
children being conscripted and used by the RUF and AFRC the Trial Chamber further finds
that the members of the AFRC and RUF knew or should have known that these children
were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the elements of
the crime of using children to participate actively in hostilities have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt in relation to this evidence.
(ii) Children committing crimes during the junta period
Evidence
MO Abdu10tonjo Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17438, 17496.
Bm See RUF Trial Judgement, para. 1731; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 Decision on Confirmation of Charges,
PTC I, 29 January 2007, para. 263.

---- End of Page 522 ---------------------------


Case No.:. 03 01 T 522 ~ 18 M 2012
33*6 /S"
1469. Alex Bao's testimony in the AFRC and RUF trials was tendered by consent4442 and
he was cross examined in this trial.4444 He testified that from 25 May 1997 to February
19984444 Issa Sesay had his "fighters", "boys" including small boys aged 12, 15 to 18 with
the AFRC and RUF rebel forces at the Hangh Road Secretariat, Kenema and where he lived
on Hangh Road, Kenema. These "boys" used to extort money from civilians.4445 ln this trial,
Bao reaffirmed his prior statement that Sesay's "boys" were armed and very dangerous and
would attack civilians and rob them.4446 The witness testified in the RUF trial that time they
assaulted a woman and took her money. When Bao tried to assist her he was beaten and
locked up for two hours.4444
Findings
1470. The Trial Chamber notes that Bao gave evidence that the boys at Hangh Road were
aged 12 to 18. When asked how he knew the ages of the children, Bao responded, "1 am a
father of so many children, so 1 know who is 12, who is 15, who is 18".4448 Bao testified
similarly in the RUF trial, stating, "l am the father of many children, so 1 know when a child
is 12 and above; 1 know".4444 Bao was not challenged on his estimates of the children's ages
in cross—examination in either trial.
1471. However, Bao did not give any evidence about the ages of the particular children
who were involved in extorting money, nor did he give other specific examples of such
incidents. With respect to the incident involving the attack of the woman, the witness did not
identify the age of the assailants, nor whether it was the "smal1 boys" with 1ssa Sesay who
had attacked her. 4450
1472. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the children involved in extorting money in Hangh Road or who attacked the
woman were under the age of 15 years.
4444 Exhibit P-173 "A1ex Bao, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005"; Exhibit P-174, ""Alex Bao, RUF Transcript 7
July 2005".
4443 Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008,
4444Exhjbit P-173, ‘"A1ex Bao, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15001.
3444Exhibit P-173, "‘Alex Bao, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15001-15002.
4444 Alex Bao, Transcript 19 September 2008, pp. 16745-16746.
4447 Exhibit P-174, "Alex Bao, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15128-15130.
4444 Exhibit P-173, ""A1ex Bao, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", pp. 15001-15002.

---- End of Page 523 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1 18 May 2012
//4 4* j

(b) Kailahun District
Evidence
1473. TF1—362 and TF1—189 testified that children who were trained at Bunumbu were sent
or taken to the frontlines. TF1—362 testified that during the training, SBUs were forced to
participate in f`ood—finding by the AFRC and RUF missions4454 They were accompanied by
"securities" who carried arms, the SBUs carried knives and sticks, and that they would beat,
or even kill civilians who put up any resistance.4452 On cross—examination, the witness
confirmed a previous statement in which she indicated that she sent her own SBU, aged
about 10, on food finding missions and gave him her own gun.4454
1474. Dennis Koker testified that the stronger civilians captured during the retreat from
Freetown,4454 were taken for military training at Bunumbu, and after the training they were
sent as reinforcements to fight in the war. Some of those sent for training told Koker they
were aged 12 or 14 and he saw that they were "very small" and "not fit for military
work".4455 During the 21 months Koker spent in Buedu up to 500 children were recruited as
SBUs and given guns. They did domestic chores and fought at the war iiont.3456 Koker
testified that SBUs were small children aged 7 to 14.4457
1475. Albert Saidu heard that many of the abducted children trained by Monica Pearson
were then sent to fight after their training. He testified that some of the children were as
young as 8 years old.4454
Findings
1476. Although TF1—362 and TF1—189 did not specify the ages of the children who were
sent to the frontlines the Trial Chamber is satisfied that this evidence relates to those
4444 Exhibit P-174, "A1ex Bao, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15123.
4450 Exhibit P-174, "A1ex Bao, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", pp. 15128-15130.
"‘5’ TF1-362, rrariaprrpr 27 February 2008, pp. -4904-4905.
4452 TF1-362, 'Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4904-4905.
4454 TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5021-5022.
4454 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1258.
4455 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1261, 1271-1273.
4456 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1265-1266, 1277, 1297.
3457 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1297.
3*58 Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, pp. 11349-11350.

---- End of Page 524 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X GQ 18 May 2012

EX 6/ 9
children who were trained and some of whom were under the age of` 15. Koker also testified
that SBUs were sent to the war front, and later clarified that SBUs could be defined as a unit
of` small boys aged 7 to 14. Koker ascertained the ages of children who were trained at
Bunumbu by asking them their ages. Further, based on the prevalence of children under the
age 15 who fought with the RUF, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the
RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the age of` 15 years. None
of the witnesses specified the role that the children played at the front line, nor the duties
they undertook while they were there, nor did they state if these children were armed.
However the Trial Chamber notes that the evidence that children were sent and/or taken to
the frontlines was not challenged and that "frontlines" was used in evidence to refer to the
fighting area. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the lives of these children were put at
risk by sending them to the fighting areas, and becoming a military target. Accordingly, the
Trial Chamber finds that children under the age of 15 years were used to actively participate
in hostilities.
1477. Koker also testified that children trained at Bunumbu were used to do domestic
chores. The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the performance of domestic chores
constitutes active participation in hostilities, as these activities are not related to the
hostilities and do not directly support the military operations of the armed groups
1478. ln the RUF case, Trial Chamber l held, in the context of food-missions in which the
children who participated were unarmed, that "although this activity supports the armed
group in a general sense, in our view it does not establish that the children openly carried
arms while on such missions"3459 and consequently found that such food-finding missions
did not amount to active participation in hostilities.346O
1479. The Trial Chamber concurs that not every instance in which a child participated in a
food-finding mission constitutes active participation in hostilities. However, to the extent
that a food-finding mission may be considered "activities linked to combat", that is, where
there is a clear link between the mission and the hostilities, the child's active participation in
such a mission may constitute "use". ln the context of food-finding missions in which
3459 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 1743.
3460 RUF Trial Judgement, para. 1743.

---- End of Page 525 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / 6h 18 May 2012
/‘~’

children carried arms and committed crimes against civilians, the Trial Chamber finds that
such activities constitute active participation in hostilities.
1480. TF1—362 testified that children were sent on food-finding missions with other recruits
armed with knives and sticks, and that they beat and killed civilians if they met with
resistance. She also sent her own 10 year old SBU, armed with a gun on one such mission.
1481. TF1-362 did not testify as to the exact ages of those people who were sent on such
missions. The Trial Chamber has accepted her evidence that the SBUs trained at Bunumbu
were as young as 7. Given her testimony that SBUs including her own 10 years old armed
SBU, were sent on food finding missions the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt
that some of the children were under the age of 15 years. As those who were sent on such
missions had already been screened by age the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable
doubt that the perpetrators, including TF1—362, knew or should have known that children
under the age of 15 years were sent on these food—finding missions and that they armed with
knives and sticks.
1482. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that an unknown number of children who were sent on food—finding
missions from Bunumbu between February to December 1998 were used to participate
actively in hostilities.
(i) Use as bodyguards
Evidence
1483. Samuel Kargbo testified that he was beaten in March 1998 in Buedu by Mike
Lamin's and Issa Sesay's securities, who included both men and small boys called SBUs.34°l
1484. Aruna Gbonda testified that from 1996 to 2000, some of the RUF rebels in Kailahun
were children aged 8 to 10 years old who were abducted and then trained. They carried guns
and followed commanders such as Issa Sesay, Mosquito and Augustine Gbao.3462 .
Findings
ml Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10520, 10533, 10535—10537.
3462 Amna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4280-4281.

---- End of Page 526 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—O1—T (il" 18 May 2012

386 x 9
1485. The Trial Chamber notes that Kargbo did not give any evidence about the age of the
children who were involved in his flogging, indicating solely that they were "‘SBUs".
Moreover, the witness did not mention that the flogging had been perpetrated by SBUs in
any previous statements, and the Trial Chamber finds that his explanation that the
Prosecution forgot to record this, is unconvincing. Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that it
has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that the children involved in this incident
were under the age of 15 years.
1486. Gbonda stated in his evidence that whilst he was Deputy Chiefdom commander from
1996 — 2000 he saw children, some aged eight, nine and ten, following commanders and
carrying guns. Gbonda's evidence of the age of the children was not challenged and he is the
father of several children, five of whom died during the time of the hostilities.3463 The Trial
Chamber accepts his evidence and finds that the children he saw were aged less than 15
years. The Trial Chamber finds that as these children were aimed with guns they were taking
part in amied hostilities. Based on the prevalence of children being conscripted and used by
the RUF and AFRC the Trial Chamber further finds that the members of the AFRC and
RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the age of 15 Years. The
Trial Chamber is therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that these
children were used to participate actively in hostilities between 1996 to 2000 in Kailahun.
(ii) Edna Bangura
Evidence
1487. The Trial Chamber has found that Bangura's testimony relating to the date of her
conscription into the RUF was inconsistent. Bangura gave further evidence relevant to the
use of child soldiers in Buedu but given the lack of precision of Bangura's evidence about
the timing of events, the Trial Chamber is unable to determine beyond reasonable doubt that
these events fall within the temporal jurisdiction of the court
(c) Kono District
(i) Children committing crimes in Kono in Februagg/March 1998
Evidence

---- End of Page 527 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OR 18 May 2012

» 38620
1488. Sia Kamara's testimony in the RUF trial was tendered by consent3464 and she was
cross examined in this trial.3465 She testified in the RUF trial that she was captured in
Yegbema near Kainako and Gandorhun,3466 and then taken to Sawoa, Kono District.3467 She
was captured shortly after the RUF and AFRC were driven out of Freetown. During the
retreat she saw Johnny Paul Koroma's convoy pass through Tongo Fields, where she was
living prior to her capture.3468 At Sawoa, Kamara witnessed "a little boy" "not up to 14" use
a cutlass to amputate the right hands of five men, including her brother. The women were
forced to clap and laugh while this was occuriing.3469 The small boy then chopped Kamara's
upper right arrn.3470
Findings
1489. Although the witness was not precise as to the age of the boy and could not tell
whether or not he had an Adam's apple347l her evidence as to his size and estimated age was
not challenged. The Trial Chamber considers that, as a mother of four children,3472 her
estimation is based on experience of young children. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that
it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the child who committed these crimes
was under the age of 15 years. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 used
by the AFRC/RUF to commit crimes,3473 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of
the AFRC/RUF knew or should have known that the boy was under the age of` 15 years.
1490. The Trial Chamber finds that the use of this child to amputate the hands of five men
and chop Kamara's arm constitutes active participation in hostilities and that the elements of
the crime of the use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities by
the AFRC/RUF have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial Chamber is satisfied
4463 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4285.
4464 Exhibit P—20l, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005".
3*65 Sia Kamara, Transcript 15 October 2008.
3*66 Exhibit P—20l, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 8; Sia Kamara, Transcript 15 October
2008, p. 18436.
3467 Exhibit P—20 1 , "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 17.
4468 Sia Kamara, Transcript 15 October 2008, pp. 18435—l8436.
4469 Exhibit P—20l, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", pp. 21-23.
3*70 Exhibit P—20 1 , "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 23.
4474 Exhibit P—20 1 , "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 22.
4472Exhibit P—20l, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 2.
4474 Exhibit P—043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.

---- End of Page 528 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T jl QTL 18 May 2012

from the context that this event occurred in Sawoa, Kono Province in February/March 1998
after the AF RC/RUF retreat from Freetown.
(ii) Children used for food-finding missions at Superman Ground in J uly 1998
Evidence
1491. Perry Kamara testified that Exhibit P-0513474 was the RUF nominal roll record for
Superman Ground, Kono District.3433 Kamara explained that the End of Page titled "list of
manpower to go for food" dated 13 July 19983476 lists the people who "will take over
security for them to go and guard the people who went for the food".3477 The End of Page included
three names with "SBU" written next to them. Kamara testified that the "SBU" notation
indicated that they were boys aged 12 to 15.3474 Kamara confirmed that the date written on
the End of Page coincided with his time at Superman Ground.3479
Findings
1492. While Exhibit P-051 lists the names of three individuals who are designated as
"SBUs" who were sent to get food, it does not indicate their age. While Kamara testified that
SBUs were between 12 and 15 years old, he did not provide any evidence about the age of
these particular SBUs. Moreover, although Kamara was at Superman Ground at the time at
which this roll record was written, he does not testify that he personally witnessed these
food-finding missions.
1493. In addition, the exhibit does not indicate whether the SBUs who went on these
missions were armed. Although Kamara testifies that the list indicates those who would
provide security and those who had weapons (i.e. AK-47), the names of the SBUs do not
specify that they were allocated weapons. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that it has
not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the children sent on these missions were
347* Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet Listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as Well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border". »
3473 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3121.
3 476 Exhibit P-051, "UNlCEF Exercise Booklet Listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as Well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border", p. 25589.
3477 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p, 3128.
3474 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3128.
3474 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3127.

---- End of Page 529 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T /5/ Q5 18 May 2012

Jxézz
under the age of 15 years, nor that these f`ood—finding missions constitute active participation
in hostilities.
(iii) Children used to guard mining in Tombodu in December 1999
Evidence
1494. The evidence of Tamba Yomba Ngekia in the RUF trial was tendered by consent in
this trial.34gO He testified that he was captured on 16 December 19993481 by the RUF in
Koidu, Kono District.3482 He and 50 captured civilians were taken to Tombodu, where
Officer Med, Colonel Jibo and Tactical brought mining equipment and infonned them that
"1ssa sent us to you, you the civilians".3483 Ngekia and other captured civilians went down to
the bridge in Tombodu and started mining, surrounded by boys aged 6 to 11 with guns.3484
Ngekia testified that he was forced to mine for six months during the dry season.3485
Findings
1495. Exhibit P—196 shows that Ngekia was challenged on his evidence of the ages of the
children who were guarding the mining at Tombodu in December 1999. He stated "when
you look at them in the face you will know that they were children" and "[i]t's easy to
recognise a child. All of them were 10 years, 1 1 years —· all of them were under 1573486 He
also stated that he was the father of six children.3484 Given his clear observations and his
experience as the father of children the Trial Chamber accepts his evidence as to the age of
the children at the mine and therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt
that these children were under the age of 15 years. Based on the prevalence of children
under the age of 15 being conscripted and used by the RUF the Trial Chamber is satisfied
3480 Exhibit P-196, "TF1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004"; Exhibit P-197 (confidential), "TF1-077, RUF
Transcript, 21 July 2004 (CS)".
4441 Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18241-18245.
3*82 Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18236-18237. The Trial Chamber notes that in
cross-examination, the witness testified that he could not remember the exact date he was captured. He had
stated in a 2002 interview that he was captured on 16 December 1999. The witness explained that in 2002 he
could recall the date, but he could not recall it at the time of his in-court testimony. The Trial Chamber is
satisfied with this explanation and finds that the events described by the witness took place during this time
period (Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18241-18245).
4483 Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18237.
3484 Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18237-18238.
3*85 Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18245-18247.
3486 Exhibit P-196, "TF1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004", p. 28.
4487 Exhibit P-196, "TF1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004". p. 15.

---- End of Page 530 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6-k 18 May 2012

38*623
that the members of the RUF knew or should have known that these children was under the
age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber has previously held that, in these circumstances,
children who were used to guard the mines were being used to participate actively in
hostilities. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that an unknown number of children who were used to guard
mining in Tombudu in December 1999 were used to participate actively in hostilities.
(iv) Children used in Koidu in 2001
Evidence
1496. TF1—174 testified that he assembled 150 children, aged 11 to 16, who had been with
the RUF in March 2001 on the way to Koidu. These children were then brought to the
Caritas interim care centre in Makeni. Some children who were assembled told the witness
that they had been digging for their adult commanders, others that they did domestic chores,
and some stated they manned pits while carrying guns.3488 Some children told the witness
they received new guns after trips to Liberia while accompanying their commanders.3489
Findings
1497. TF1—174's evidence is hearsay, which is uncorroborated. Moreover, the evidence is
inconclusive whether the specific duties were performed by children whose ages were below
15 years. The Trial Chamber is therefore, not satisfied that the elements of the crime of the
use of children to actively participate in hostilities have been proved beyond reasonable
doubt in relation to this evidence.
(v) Children used in Kono in March/April 1998
Evidence
1498. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he and Commander Bomb Blast used SBUs in
approximately March/April 1998 to amputate the limbs of civilians in Yomandu. Mohamed
Savage also used SBUs to help with amputations during this time period.349O Between
3*8* rm-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23773-23775.
3489 TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23775—23776.
WO Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8061-8064.

---- End of Page 531 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T // Gu 18 May 2012

3X62.·;
March/April and May/June 1998,4444 Savage, Guitar Boy and some SBUs amputated the
hands of approximately 15 civilians at Tombodu.4494 Sesay testified that around the same
time, "our" SBUs captured girls aged 8 to 10 years old at Masingbi Road and they lived with
these girls and had sex with them.4443
1499. Alex Tamba Teh testified that after he heard that ECOMOG had taken over Kono,
Rocky aka Emmanuel Williams shot and killed all the adult male captives at
Igbaleh/Kamachende close to Koidu. Upon Rocky's order, SBUs decapitated the men he had
just killed.4494 At Igbaleh, he saw SBUs amputating a small boy's hands and feet before
throwing him into a toilet pit.4495 At Wondedu, SBUs set five houses on fire after Captain
Banya instmcted them to "go and light candles".349°
1500. Samuel Bull testified that after his capture in Tongbodu in mid-April 1998,3497 Issa,
the commander, ordered a 14 year-old boy to take off his shirt and kill him. The boy took the
shirt off and told Bull to lie on the ground, but Issa then decided he should not be killed.3498
1501. In the AFRC trial, Alhaji Tejan Cole testified that on 12 April 1998, at Bombafoidu,
200 rebels, among them 6 small boys who carried guns, attacked the town.4449 Cole was
asked to undress by a small boy, aged about 12 to 14, who had a gun.3500
Findings
1502. Alimamy Bobson Sesay provided evidence which the Trial Chamber has already
accepted that the SBUs who were trained were between 8 to 12 years. Therefore, based on
his knowledge and experience of the age of SBUs, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been
roved beyond a reasonable doubt that the children who am utated the limbs of civilians in
P P
Tombodu and Yomandu and captured girls aged 8 to 10 years of age at Masingbi Road and
detained them for sexual purposes were under the age of 15 years and that they were used to
"°' Airmemy Bebeerr Sesay, rrerreerapt 21 Appr 2008, pp. 8064-8067.
4492 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7996-7997.
3*93 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8002, 8006-8008.
4444 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 687-689, 694-695, 695-698, 718.
4495 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 699-700.
4444 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 704-705, 723.
4444 TFl-064, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17078-17081.
3*9** TF1-064, Transcript 24 September 2008, pp. 17081-17082.
4449 Exhibit P-202, "TF1-206, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", pp. 85-105.
4500 Exhibit P-202, "TFl-206, AFRC Transcript 28 June 2005", p. 92.

---- End of Page 532 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QE 18 May 2012

3Xé as"
participate actively in hostilities. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15
p being used by the RUF/AFRC to commit crimes the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
members of the RUF/AF RC knew or should have known that these children was under the
age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the elements of the crime of using
persons under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities by the AF RC/RUF have been
proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to an unknown number of children from early to
mid·1998 in Yomandu, Tombodu and Masingbi Road.
1503. Tamba Teh testified that the SBUs were "small boys below the ages of 16, 15, right
down". He described some of the boys who Rocky ordered to decapitate civilians as so small
that they "could not even lift their guns up except that they drag the guns on the ground".350l
When asked about the age of the boy whose hands and feet were amputated, the witness
responded, "[w]ell, 1 can’t say 1 know exactly, but 1 am also a father and 1 know what age a
child is[...]"3502 ln cross·examination, Tamba Teh was not questioned about the ages of the
SBUs. The Trial Chamber accepts the witness's observation on the size and age of the
children who perpetrated the crimes and his personal experience as a father in assessing a
child's age and finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the children who decapitated those
people killed by Rocky and the children who amputated a young boy were under the age of
15. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 used by the RUF/AFRC to
commit crimes, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the RUF/AFRC knew or
should have known that these children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that children
under 15 years were used to participate actively in hostilities by members of the RUF/AF RC
in relation to each of these incidents. As Tamba Teh testified that these incidents occurred
after ECOMOG had driven the RUF/AF RC from Kono District, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that it occurred in around April 1998.3503
1504. Samuel Bull was not challenged on his evidence that the boy who was ordered to kill
him was 14. The Trial Chamber also notes that he is the father of five children,3504 some of
whom were in their teens at the time of this incident. The Trial Chamber therefore accepts
his evidence and finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the child was
350* Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 697.
3502 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 718.
mf See Factual Findings on Responsibility: Military Operations; Operation Fitti-Farta infra.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 6-Q 18 May 2012

3 Y6 ze,
under the age of 15. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 used by the
RUF to commit crimes, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of` the RUF knew or
should have known that this child was under the age of` 15 years. The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the child who was ordered to kill Bull by Issa Sesay was used to participate
actively in hostilities. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the elements of the crime of
using persons under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities by the AFRC/RUF
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to this incident in mid—April 1998 at
Tongbodu.
1505. Cole did not give any evidence about the ages of the boys who participated in the
attack on Bombafoidu beyond saying that they were small and did not give any reason for
his belief that the boy who asked him to undress was between 12 and 14 years old but he
was not challenged on this evidence. The Trial Chamber accepts his evidence and therefore
finds that it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that this child was under the age of
15 years. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 being used by the
AFRC/RUF the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the AFRC/RUF knew or
should have known that these children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that children
who ordered to Cole to undress were used to participate actively in hostilities.
(d) Port Loko District
(i) Use ofA1Evidence
1506. The Trial Chamber has recounted the evidence that Tholley was brought to Masiaka
in approximately April 1999 and remained there for approximately two months.35O5 Tholley
testified that when she arrived in Masiaka, Issa Sesay said it was "his town".35O6 On cross-
examination Tholley stated she heard Issa Sesay receiving orders from Foday Sankoh via
radio while Sankoh was incarcerated.
3504 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17056
3505 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); Akiatu Tholley used as a
sexual slave in Allen Town and Waterloo, Evidence supra.
1506 Arrrrrm T1rO11€y, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19201.

---- End of Page 534 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03—O1·T qw 18 May 2012

2% 2. ?···
1507. Tholley testified that after James brought her to Masiaka, she tried to escape but was
caught by a "rebel boy"35O7 who returned her to James. James beat her and gave her drugs
which made her "brave enough to do wicked things and did not cry and did not have feelings
of wanting to go home".35O8 James taught her how to use an AK-47 and a pistol. On cross-
examination Tholley agreed that this was not "actua1 training".35O9 Two days later, she was
sent by James, together with "his boys" on a food-finding mission.35m ln a village near
Masiaka, they met a woman and her adult daughters in a house and looted everything that
they had. One of the boys told Tholley to kill the woman since she refused to join them.
Initially, Tholley refused; however, he gave her marijuana to smoke and afterwards Tholley
shot the woman in the back and killed her.35ll They then gave the woman's children loads to
carry and went back to Masiaka.3 512
1508. Tholley testified that during the time she was in Masiaka, she was taken to Port Loko
by "some rebels" to be trained "how to fight". Tholley did not specify the names or factions
of the rebels that took her to Port Loko. She stated that she was taught how to load bullets,
how to shoot a gun and how to hide. Other people, both male and female, children and
adults, were being trained; however, Tholley was unable to estimate how many. Tholley
testified that the boys being trained were about 8 years old and older. There was a woman in
charge of the training, but Tholley did not know her name.35l3
Findings
1509. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has found that in the context of food-finding
missions in which children carried arms and/or committed crimes against civilians, that such
activities constitute active participation in hostilities.35l4 The Trial Chamber is therefore
satisfied that when Tholley was sent on a food-finding mission during which she looted
civilian property, used a weapon and killed a civilian woman in April or May 1999, she was
actively participating in hostilities. Based on the prevalence of children being conscripted
3507 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19209-1921 l.
3508 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 1921 1-19213.
3500 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19268-19270.
3510 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19279.
wl Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19269.
wz Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19213-19216.
M3 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19216-19217.
3514 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers) Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 535 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3.% 26*
and used by the RUF/AFRC the Trial Chamber further finds that the members of the
AF RC/RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the age of 15 years.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the elements of the crime of using children to
participate actively in hostilities have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to
this evidence.
(e) Koinadugu District
(i) Use of child soldiers in Koinadugu District
Evidence
1510. Sieh Mansaray testified that from February to mid-March 1998,3515 "the People's
Army" came through Kondembaia, Koinadugu District en route to Kono, and set up a
checkpoint at his house as part of "Operation Pay Yourself {W6 Mansaray witnessed
children aged 10, 12 and 15 with weapons as part of the People's Army.35l7
1511. Mansaray testified that on or about 20 or 21 May 1998,3518 he was captured by the
"Foday Sarrkoh rebels" in Kondembaia,35l9 and was present when "the boss" ordered the
rebels to burn down the houses in the village.3520 Mansaray saw boys aged 10, 13, 15 and
older with guns who were following the boss's command to burn down the houses in the
village. Mansaray was not certain if the boys were captured or relatives of the rebels.352l
Findings
1512. Mansaray was not challenged on his estimation of the ages of the armed children that
he saw with the People's Army in February to mid-March 1998. The Trial Chamber notes
that the witness was the father of eight children including a child who was 12 or 13 years at
the time of the incidents.3522 The Trial Chamber accepts his evidence and therefore finds that
it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that some of the armed children seen by
W5 Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18272.
3516 Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18262-18267.
3517 Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18268.
3518 Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18308.
mg Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18300.
3520 Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18302.
ml Sieh Mansaray, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18303.
tm srch Mcrrccrpy, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18262, 18269.

---- End of Page 536 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T A/Z QM 18 May 2012

Baca?
Mansaray and those children burning houses were under the age of 15 years. As these
children were travelling with the Peoples Army and were armed, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that they were taking an active part in hostilities. Further, based on the prevalence
of children under the age 15 who fought with the AFRC/RUF forces, also referred to as the
People's Army, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the AFRC/RUF knew or
should have known that these children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that an
unknown number of children under the age of 15 years was used to participate actively in
hostilities in Koinadugu District between March and May 1998.
(ii) Findings on victim witnesses in Koinadugp District
a. Akiatu Tholley used to participate actively in hostilities after April or
May 1999
Evidence .
1513. The Trial Chamber has found that Akiatu Tholley was conscripted into the
AFRC/RUF in January through April or May 1999. Tholley testified that after this, "they"
took her to Kurubonla, Koinadugu District to fight, although she was unable to recall when
this was.3523 On re—examination Tholley clarified that the woman who trained them was the
one who sent them to fight in Kurubonla.3524 There, Tholley fought with the rebels against
Kamajors and civilians while carrying a gun. Tholley stated that the rebels she was with,
"our colleagues", killed civilians and that is why "we too killed them"3525, which, taken
together with Tholley's further evidence, the Trial Chamber understands to mean that
Tholley herself participated in the killing of civilians. On cross—examination, Tholley denied
telling the Prosecution that she was sent to Kono to fight as recorded in a previous statement
and maintained that she fought in Kurubonla.3526 She testified that she was sent to fight, to
3523 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19217.
3524 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19281.
3525 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19217—19218, 19270.
7*526 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19267—19268.

---- End of Page 537 ---------------------------


Case No; SCSL—03—01—T 5;// Gin 18 May 2012

38630
kill civilians and loot property and agreed that he only fought in Kumbonla as a trained
soldier during the war.3527
1514. After she had killed civilians during the fighting in Kurubonla, Tholley dropped the
gun and ran away. She surrendered to ECOMOG at Lunsar. They thought she was a spy,
beat her and took her to the police station. The police men also beat her. Tholley gave the
police her address in Freetown and they contacted her family who came and collected her
from the Kissy Police Station.3528
1515. On cross-examination, Tholley denied a prior statement to the Prosecution in which
it was recorded that she said she was taken from Masiaka to Lunsar and that she stayed there
for over a month then moved to Makeni. Tholley denied ever going to Makeni and clarified
that she only went to Lunsar after she escaped from Port Loko on her way to Freetown.3529
Findings
1516. On the basis of Tholley's evidence that she fought with "the rebels" against
Kamajors and civilians, that she personally killed civilians and looted property while
carrying a gun, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Tholley actively participated in hostilities
and was used as a child soldier by members of the AFRC/RUF. The Trial Chamber has
previously found that Tholley was under the age of 15 during this time and that the
perpetrators knew or should have known that she was under the age of 15 years. The Trial
Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Akiatu Tholley, a child under the age of 15 years, was used to participate actively in
hostilities in Koinadugu District after April or May 1999.
b. Use of TFl-143 to participate in hostilities in September 1998
Evidence
1517. After being assigned to Kabila outside Konkoba village, TFl-143 accompanied
Kabila, other fighters and their "boys" on a food-finding mission. They arrived at a
farmhouse and Kabila ordered TFl-143 to rape the old woman they found there. TFl-143
3527 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19268-19270.
3528 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19218-19220.
*29 Airrctrr Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19265-19267.

---- End of Page 538 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QAPQ 18 May 2012

cried and refused to rape the woman, so Kabila made him lie in the sun with his eyes open
the entire day as punishment.353O
1518. After his training in maintaining a weapon TF 1-143 was forced to do push-ups for
live hours in a house in the village. Kabila would lift TF 1-143 and hit him against the wall
as punishment for disobeying his orders, starting from TF1-143's refusal to rape the old
woman in the farmhouse.353l In the evening, Kabila took TF 1-143 into the bush and
defecated. He ordered TF 1-143 to eat the faeces, or he would kill him and tell the others that
TF1-143 ran away. Again, this was punishment for TF1-143 disobeying Kabila's orders.
TF 1-143 complied and ate the faeces.3532
Findings
1519. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has found that in the context of food-finding
missions in which children carried arms and/or committed crimes against civilians, that such
activities constitute active participation in hostilities.3533 The Trial Chamber is therefore
satisfied that when TF 1-143 went on a food-finding mission shortly alter he was captured
with Kabila and other fighters, during which he was ordered to rape a women, constitutes
active participation in hostilities. The Trial Chamber has previously found that TF 1- 143 was
under the age of 15 and that members of the AF RC/RUF knew or should have known that he
was under the age of 15. Trial Chamber accordingly is satisfied that the Prosecution has
A proved beyond reasonable doubt that TF 1-143, child under the age of 15 years was used to
participate actively in hostilities in Koinadugu District in or about September 1998.
(f) Bombali District
(i) Children trained at Camp Rosos and used by the AF RC in July 1998
Evidence
1520. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that small boys who were captured during the SLA
attack on Karina in July 1998 were assigned to the wives of SLA and RUF commanders to
W TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008,p. 8979.
353* TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8981.
mz TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8981-8982.
3533 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers) Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 539 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

386 2 2.
do "small works" before being trained. After the training SBUs were sent on food finding
missions, used for ambushes and patrols, and engaged in attacks on armed forces.3534
1521. After the troops left Rosos in September/October 1998, Bobson Sesay testified that
SAJ Musa sent men, led by Major O-Five, as reinforcements for the Freetown attack.3535 O-
Five's group of fighters was comprised of SBUs, aged about 8 to 10. Some carried weapons
and some carried loads. According to O-Five, most of the SBUs had been captured in
Koinadugu and later trained.3536
Findings
1522. The Trial Chamber has already found that the children abducted and trained in
Karina and Camp Rosos in July 1998 were under the age of 15 years.3537 The Trial Chamber
is not satisfied that the performance of domestic chores constitutes active participation in
hostilities, as these activities were not related to the hostilities and did not directly support
the military operations of the armed groups. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the use
of the children to perform "small works" for the commanders’ wives does not constitute
active participation in hostilities.
1523. However, the Trial Chamber finds that given the military purpose and the presence
of adult fighters, children who took part in patrols, including food-finding missions, and
ambushes with the SLAs were actively participating in hostilities.3538 Therefore, on the basis
of the evidence that the SBUs trained at Camp Rosos were used to participate in ambushes,
patrols, and food-finding missions, and participated in attacks on armed forces, the Trial
Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these children were used to participate actively
in hostilities. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that AF RC/RUF members who had trained and
lived with the SBUs at Camp Rosos and who took children on these missions knew or
should have that the children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber accordingly
is satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that an unknown
3334 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 816l~8l62.
3535 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8l6l~8l63, 8l66~8167.
3336 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8l70~8174, 8l76~8l77, 8l80~818l.
3337 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Children trained at Camp Rosos
and used by the AFRC in July 1998 supra.
3338 See RUF Trial Judgement, para. 1717.

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Case No.: SCSL~03~0l~T Os 18 May 2012

Z 8*6 33
number of children under the age of 15 years, were used to participate actively in hostilities
in Bombali District in or about July 1998.
1524. Further, the Trial Chamber finds that carrying arms and ammunition constitutes
active participation in hostilities, as this activity is related to the hostilities and directly
supports the military operations of the armed group.3539 The Trial Chamber is therefore
satisfied that the children who Bobson Sesay saw with O-Five in September to October
1998, who were carrying ammunition for the rebels, were actively participating in hostilities.
While Bobson Sesay provided no basis for his estimation that the SBUs who were trained at
Rosos were between 8 and 10 years old, the Trial Chamber notes that he was not challenged
on this evidence and that he was involved in the training of children of similar ages at
Masingbi Road, and was therefore familiar with the physical appearance of children in this
age range. The Trial Chamber has found that these events occurred in August/September
1998.3540 The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that an unknown number of children under the age of 15 years, were used
to participate actively in hostilities in Bombali District on or about August! September 1998.
(ii) Children committing crimes after ECOMOG Intervention 1998
a. Children as bodyguards to commanders and committing crimes during
Operation Pay Yourself Q February 19981
Evidence
1525. TF1-174 testified that on 17 February 1998, the start of Operation Pay Yoursel£354l
the children at Teko Barracks in Makeni with whom the witness worked began carrying
guns and being with their "big ground commanders" again. They were involved in looting
and made the witness and others afraid of them.3542 The majority of the children at Teko
Barracks were under the age of 14/ 1 5.3543
Findings
3534 See AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 737.
3544) Factual Findings on Responsibility: Military Personnel; Red Lion Battalion iryia.
3541 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23671-23674.
35*2 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23685.
3544 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23665.

---- End of Page 541 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3 K6 2%
1526. The Trial Chamber finds that whilst TF1-174 did not testify about the age of the
specific children who carried arins, acted as bodyguards to commanders, and who were
involved in looting, the Trial Chamber is satisfied, based on TF 1—174's testimony that the
majority of the children at Teko Barracks were under the age of 14/15, that most of these
children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber has found that in the context of
the conflict in Sierra Leone, that the use of children to commit crimes against civilians
and/or safeguard the physical safety of military commanders, both constitute active
participation in hostilities.3544 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that those children
from Teko Barracks who acted as bodyguards to commanders and engaged in looting were
used by the RUF and AF RC to participate actively in hostilities. Based on the prevalence of
children being conscripted and used by the RUF/AFRC the Trial Chamber finds that the
members of the AF RC/RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the
age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber accordingly is satisfied that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that an unknown number of children under the age of 15 years,
were used to participate actively in hostilities at Teko Barracks in February 1998. The Trial
Chamber is therefore satisfied that the elements of the crime of using children to participate
actively in hostilities have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to this evidence.
b. Children participating in bumings and amputations in Rosos between
July and October 1998
Evidence
1527. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that during his stay in Rosos, between July and
October 1998, SBUs participated in bumings and amputations. During food finding patrols
in Rokulan and Royanka in Bombali, SBUs did the amputations as they were "the ones who
had machetes".3545
Findings
1528. The Trial Chamber has found that in the context of the conflict in Sierra Leone, that
the use of children to commit crimes against civilians constitutes active participation in
3 5 44 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.
3545 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8102-8103, 8161-8162, 8191.

---- End of Page 542 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T @*7 18 May 2012
I

34*/3s‘
hostilities.3546 The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that those children from Camp Rosos
who participated in burnings and amputations were used by the AFRC/RUF to actively
participate in hostilities. The Trial Chamber has already found that it has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt that children who were trained at Camp Rosos were under the age
of` 15 years, and that AFRC/RUF members who used them to participate in food—finding
missions, and to commit crimes against civilians knew or should have known that these
children were under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that an unknown number of children under
the age of` 15 years, were used to participate actively in hostilities at Rosos between July and
October 1998.
1529. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the elements of the crime of the use
of children under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt at Camp Rosos in J uly—October 1998.
(iii) Findings on victim witnesses in Bombali District
a. Use of` Komba Sumana to participate actively in hostilities from
approximately Auggst to December 1998
Evidence
1530. Komba Sumana testified that a1°ter his military training was complete, Mosquito
assembled the civilians into separate lines of adults and children. Sumana did not know the
ages of his "colleagues", but some were the same height as him and some were taller.
"Soldiers" coming from the direction of Buedu brought weapons which were distributed to
the adult civilians and then to the children. Sumana received an "AK".3547
1531. On cross-examination, Sumana testified that Monica personally gave him an AK-47
and denied a prior statement given to a Prosecution investigator that he did not receive a
weapon because he could not shoot, explaining that he had in fact stated he was not given a
gun that was large. ln the same statement, Sumana described the weapons distributed as
35% Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.
3547 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17936-17940, 17953-17954.

---- End of Page 543 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Qbx 18 May 2012
I .

313*6* 35

313*6* 35
"new" whereas in a later statement it was recorded that he stated some were new and some
old. Sumana explained that there were both new and old guns.354$
1532. Mosquito sent the trainees to "clear" Kono. They were joined by a number of
"rebels" he had not met before and who were under the command of a man named "Blood".
They marched for three weeks back to PC Ground where they met "1ssa". The trainees were
told that this was Operation No Living Thing and "Issa" said they would be sent to attack
Koidu Town. Sumana was scared and did not participate in this attack.3549 Instead, he gave
his gun to a rebel named "Wallace" and hid in his house in Kissi Town. From the house,
Sumana observed "Issa", Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao and Supennan pass by in a vehicle
and the others pass by on foot. Sumana learned from Wallace that the attack was not
successful.3550 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that an unsuccessful attack on Koidu
Town known as the Fitti—Fatta mission was launched by Supennan in approximately mid-
June 1998.555*
1533. Sumana remained in Kissi Town for about a week during which time Wallace
returned Sumana's gun to him. Towards the end of the rainy season, Supennan clashed with
Mosquito and left with all of the rebels in Kissi Town for Tombodu where they met an
"SLA" named "Savage". Together with Savage and his soldiers they continued on to
Kurubonla, Koinadugu District.3552
1534. Sumana testified that the commanders in Kurubonla were SAJ Musa, General
Bropleh, and F ive—Five. Shortly after his arrival in Kurubonla, a convoy of STF, RUF and
AFRC attacked the Guinean barracks at Mongor Bendugu. Sumana "fought" together with
Wallace and the other fighters. Other commanders present during the attack were Supennan,
SAJ Musa, Savage and Komba Gbundema. Sumana testified that they successfully
dislodged the Guineans and captured some large weapons including a 40 barrel and a tank
which they were not able to carry away and which they burnt. They also captured a large
3548 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18030-18040.
3549 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17940- 17942.
3550 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17942-17943.
3551 Factual Findings on Responsibility: Military Operations; Operation Fitti-Fatta infra.
3552 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp, 17943- 17949.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T mk 18 May 2012

amount of bullets including "AAs", "mortars" and "AKs" as well as AA guns which they 5
took with them.5555
1535. Approximately a week after the attack on Mongor Bendugu, after the rainy season
had ended, a group of soldiers and rebels commanded by Five—Five left Kurubonla for
Freetown. Sumana and others remained in Kurubonla for approximately a month and then
moved to Koinadugu Town. There SAJ Musa was the commander and was deputised by ·
Superman.5554 Following a meeting organised by SAJ Musa, they attacked ECOMOG and
the Kamajors at Kabala. Sumana testified that he took part in this attack. Sumana testified
that during this attack, some civilians were captured, including adults and some who were
the same height as Sumana but whose ages he did not know. The captured people were
given military training at the barracks.5 5 5 5
1536. A week after the first attack, the "rebels", the "SLAs" and the STF attacked Kabala
again. Sumana testified that he went on this attack with Wallace, under the command of
Superman. SAJ Musa also commanded a group during this attack. Guns, bullets and
civilians were captured and brought to Koinadugu where the captured civilians were
trained.5 5 5 6
1537. Sumana testified that after a conflict with Superman, SAJ Musa left Koinadugu
Town. The Trial Chamber notes that SAJ Musa s lit with Su erman in October 1998.5 5 5 7
P P
Superman remained the commander and General Bropleh the deputy. Later, Superman's
group joined SAJ Musa and Five—Five in Makeni, Bombali District.5 55 5 On the way to
Makeni, they attacked Binkolo and set houses on fire. Sumana testified that "there was a
house that they said we should bum down" and that Komba Gbundema "passed that order".
Sumana was with an RUF rebel from Superman's group named Blood and "together with
that man... we bumt it down".5559 Sumana testified that he travelled with Blood as his
bodyguard. Blood carried a communication set and was therefore unable to carry a gun.5 5 60
5 55 5 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17949-17959.
5554 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17959-17961.
5555 Kombat sttmatrtat, Transcript o October 2008, pp. 17961-17963.
5556 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17963-17966.
5557 Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 10.
5555 Kombat sttmatrtat, Transcript o October 2008, pp. 17966-17969.
5555 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17967-17971.
5550 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17971-17973.

---- End of Page 545 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 0* 18 May 2012 x
K

The Trial Chamber notes that on cross—examination, Sumana agreed with Defence counsel
that he fought as an RUF rebel but stated that he never killed or amputated anyone, never
burned a house, never looted and never raped.5 551
1538. At Makeni, Sumana's group attacked ECOMOG together with SAJ Musa's group.
They captured Makeni after two days. After it was captured, the RUF stayed in Teko
Barracks, the STF were at Waterworks and the SLAs were in the centre of Makeni Town.5552
Sumana testihed that he subsequently overheard a communication between Five—Five and
Superman at Superman's house in which Five—Five reported that SAJ Musa had been shot in
Freetown.5555 The Trial Chamber recalls that SAJ Musa was killed on 23 December
1998.5554
1539. Sumana's group was then taken to "Issa's" house and then to Lunsar where they
remained for a month under the command of Superman. Sumana testihed that during that
time they dislodged ECOMOG from Gberi Junction together with Rambo's group which
had come from Makeni5555 but he did not specify whether he personally joined this attack.
Sumana testihed that he then returned to Makeni where he remained for a year,5555 and
ultimately disarmed in Port Loko.5557
Findings
1540. Although Sumana did not testify to the exact nature of his participation in the
hostilities described, the Trial Chamber is satished on the basis of his testimony that he was
an "SBU", that he carried a gun, that he marched together with the troops from Kailahun to
Kono District; that he was present and fought during attacks carried out by RUF/AFRC
rebels under the command of Superman against enemy forces at Mongo Bendugu; Kabala in
Koinadugu District and at Binkolo and Makeni in Bombali District during the period of
5555 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, p. 18077.
5552 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17973—17974.
5555 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. l7976—17977.
5554 It is a judicially noticed fact that SAJ Musa was killed in an explosion in Benguema on 23 December
1998. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—04—01—T—987, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of
Adjudicated Facts from the RUF Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B), Fact 13.
5555 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17977—17980.
5 5 55 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17980—17985.
5557 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17991.

---- End of Page 546 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

35’€?7
approximately August through December 1998, and that he acted as a bodyguard to a rebel
named "Blood" that Sumana was used to participate actively in hostilities.
1541. The Trial Chamber has previously found that it was satisfied that Sumana's date of
birth was 10 August 1984. It is therefore satisfied that during the period from August to
December 1998, the witness was 14 years old and thus under the age of 15 years. Based on
the prevalence of the use of children under the age of 15 for active participation in hostilities
by the RUF/AFRC,3568 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the RUF/AFRC
knew or should have known that Sumana was under the age of 15 years. The Trial Chamber
is accordingly satisfied that the elements of the crime of the use of a child under the age of
15 years to participate actively in hostilities have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
b. Training and Use of TF1—158 to participate actively in hostilities from
approximately in 1998
1542. After witness TF1—158 was abducted from Bonoya, he was forced to carry rice and
groundnut that the rebels had taken from civilians. They went to Ndaria village, Mamboma,
Karina, Mateboi and then to Rosos. They travelled as a mixed group of RUF and AFRC, the
majority were AFRC.3569 On cross—examination, the witness denied telling the Prosecution
that he was taken to Karina, Kurubonla, Serkoya, Rosos and then Lunsar stating that only
after his second abduction, did he arrive at Lunsar.3570
1543. TF1—158 and his group spent three days in Rosos, during which the witness was
trained to fight under the direction of Staff Alhaji. He was trained to dismantle, clean,
couple, cock,357l fire and load a gun as well as how to fix a magazine on the gun and to
crawl.3572 The witness was given a "two pistol grip" gun. Approximately 300 other people
who were also trained, some 8 to 11 years old and some adults. After training, the rebels
gave the trainees drugs to make them bold and brave so they would not fear anything. The
rebels pierced the skin below the witness’ eye and applied cocaine, called "brown brown",
3568 Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
3569 TFl—l58, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18878.
3570 TFl—l58, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18874—18875.
3571 TFl—l58, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18832
3572 TFl—l58, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18822.

---- End of Page 547 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T / GL 18 May 2012

335660
on it, making the witness feel "like a mad person".3573 On cross-examination the witness
stated that while he was in Rosos he heard people talking about an attack on Freetown. After
his release he leamed the attack took place on 6 January.3574
1544. While in Rosos, the rebels took the witness and others on a food-finding mission in a
village nearby. Staff Alhaji assembled those who were to go in the moming and everyone,
including the witness, was given a gun. They took food items and livestock from civilians
and came back to Rosos. ln Rosos, Staff Alhaji reported to F ive-F ive and O-F ive but mainly
to Gullit.3575 The witness also testified that when he was in Rosos, he observed child
combatants being "marked" with "RUF" on their shoulders or marked on their faces in order
to make them brave.3576
1545. Defence Counsel cross-examined Witness TF 1-158 at length on his prior statements
to OTP and on the evidence he adduced during the AF RC trial. Neither the interview records
nor the transcript were tendered into evidence and the Trial Chamber is unable to consider
them in total. Witness TF 1-158 stated Counsel was "confusing me with questions"3577 and
denied or gave explanations for inconsistencies put to him. ln particular he stated that some
RUF, including Kill Man No Blood and Allusein were part of their group who came to
Rosos.3578
Findings
1546. The Trial Chamber considers that the removal and carrying away of looted goods is a
foreseeable and integral part of the appropriation of the private property of a civilian. The
taking and resultant carrying away of the property has a direct nexus with the conflict and
the use of children to carry loads constitutes active participation in hostilities, as these
activities were related to the hostilities. The Trial Chamber has found that in the context of
food-finding missions in which children carried arins constitutes active participation in
hostilities.3579 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the use of the witness to go on an
3573 TF1—158,Transcript21 October 2008, pp. 18813-18825.
3574 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18887-18888.
3575 TF1- 158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18825-18827.
3576 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18846.
3577 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18897
3578 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18883
3579 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers) Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 548 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ep" 18 May 2012 %
t

3364/
armed food-finding mission to loot food from civilians, in Rosos after September 1998
constituted active participation in hostilities. Based on the prevalence of children being
conscripted and used by the RUF/AFRC the Trial Chamber further finds that the members
of the AFRC/RUF who used the witness knew or should have known that these children
were under the age of 15 years.
1547. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the elements of the crime of the use of TF1-
158, a child under the age of 15 years, to participate actively in hostilities have been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
i. Use TF1-158 to participate actively in hostilities in
approximately July 1999
Evidence
1548. Witness TF1-158 testified that after he was trained, some RUF and AFRC (referred A
to as SLAs3580) came from Makeni. He knew some were RUF since some of them had
"RUF" tattoos on their shoulders. On cross-examination the witness stated that an order to
attack Kabala came from Makeni, clarifying a prior statement in which he said Brigadier
Issa was the one who ordered the mixed group to attack Kabala.3581 The joint group went
together to attack Kabala but were ambushed by Kabbah's soldiers, and shooting "all over"
ensued. Since they "were not actually allowed to attack the town", the witness went into a
shop and took a bicycle so he could return to Kamabai. While climbing on a hill he dodged
fire, crawled into a gutter, took out his gun and put it down until he saw Savage who told
him they were to go back. 3582
1549. After the attack, the witness returned with Savage to Kamabai, where they rested and
were further trained. During the training, the witness heard of a grudge between the RUF
and the AFRC in Makeni. At this time, the witness saw Superman and General Issa, of the
RUF, fighting against the AFRC. Superman and "General 1ssa" were in an AA van with a
two-barrel gun mounted on it. "They were shooting seriously and Savage too was retuming
mo E.g. TF1—158 Transcript 21 October pp. 18902-3, 18923 (in cross examination when citing a prior
statement recorded by Prosecution investigators).
358* TF1—158, rrarrsrrrpr 21 October 2008, p. 18902.
mg TF1—158, rrarrrcrapr 21 October 2008, p. 18834.

---- End of Page 549 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / Gu 18 May 2012 /

fire". Savage and the witness then went to Kabala. On the way to Kabala, Savage killed men
in F adugu.3583 lt was put to the witness that he did not mention this incident in his testimony
in the AF RC Trial and the witness explained that he forgot.3584
1550. On cross-examination, the witness testified this was the first time he saw "General
Issa", Issa Sesay3585 and stated that a record of interview in 2005 when he referred to
"Brigadier Issa" and that he saw Brigadier Issa once, in a vehicle, "during the time the
disarmament has taken place. He used to go to Karina" was incorrectly recorded.3586
1551. The witness, Officer Demo, Savage and the others in their group arrived at the
Makakura Checkpoint in Kabala where they surrendered to Pa Kabbah's soldiers who
disarmed them, including taking the witness’ gun. In order to enter Kabala, Kabbah's
soldiers gave the fighters either an "ex-combatant" wristband to adults or "ex-child
combatant" wristband to those who were small bo s. The witness was iven a "child
Y S
combatant" wristband. 3587
1552. On cross-examination, the witness estimated that he was 11 years old at the time he
disarmed and had been with the rebels for about 10 months, inclusive of the time he
escaped.3588 After a few weeks in Kabala, UN trucks came and took child combatants to a
care centre in Lunsar "under Caritas"3589. Then the RUF, which had not yet disarmed, came
to Lunsar. Some of the "child combatants", aged 10 to 15 and above, decided to join the
RUF and left with them.3590 On cross-examination it was put to the witness that he had not
previously testified to this evidence. He stated that he had given this information to the OTP
just prior to his testimony and denied being prompted. He stated that he thought he should
66Say it77·359l
Findings
35*3 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18833-18837.
3584 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18889-18903, 18913-18918. A
35**5 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18899.
3586 TF1-158, rrarrscrrpt 21 October 2008, p. 18914.
3587 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18838-18839.
3588 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, p. 18849.
3589 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18839-18840.
3590 TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18838-18841.
ml TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18918-18919.

---- End of Page 550 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012

E36 ¢.?
1553. The Trial Chamber accepts TF1-158's evidence that he went with a group to attack
Kabala while he was carrying a gun; that hostilities erupted between the two sides; that he
was in the line of fire and therefore had to hide in a gutter and hide his gun. Accordingly the
Trial Chamber finds that TF1-158 actively participated in hostilities and was used as a child
soldier by members of the AFRC/RUF under the command of Issa Sesay and Denis Mingo
in the Bombali District after 7 July 1999. On the basis of the witness's unchallenged
testimony that he was 10 years old when he was captured in approximately September 1998,
and during his training in J uly-August 1999, and based on his testimony that he was 1 1 years
old when he disarmed in 1999 and was acknowledged as a "child combatant" on his
surrender at Kabala, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that he was under the age of 15 years at
the time of this attack. Based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 used by the
AFRC/RUF in hostilities,3592 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the
AFRC/RUF knew or should have known that TF1-158 was under the age of 15 years. The
Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the elements of the crime of the use of TF1 -1 58 a
child under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities in Bombali District at an
unknown date after 7 July 1999 have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
ii. TF1 -143 used to participate actively in hostilities from
approximately September to December 1998
Evidence
1554. The Trial Chamber has already found that TF1-143 was abducted in Koinadugu in
September 1998.3593 He testified that they left Koinadugu with the rest of the advance team
consisting of more than 200 people. Kabila informed TF1-143 that the advance team was
mostly "AFRC dominant but was mixed",3594 and included some RUF.3595 After leaving
Koinadugu Town, the team was informed that Nigerian soldiers were stationed in Karina.3596
3592 Exhibit P-043, "Expeit Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Siena Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
im See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Abduction, Training and Use
of TF1-143 in September 1998 supra.
3594 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8988
3595 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8988-8989.
W6 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8989.

---- End of Page 551 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

TF1-143 testified that Kabila told him to stay in the bush and lie down. TF1-143 heard
gunfire and after the shooting had stopped, the group went through Karina.3597
1555. ln the second village afier Kanna,3598 O-Five ordered that boys who had been
captured and marked should be trained.3599 Kabila and Mohamed trained the boys for two
hours on how to parade with a weapon, how to escape and how to crawl. After this training
Kabila gave TF1-143 two blue tablets. TF1-143 testified that after he took the tablets he
"started feeling a way that [he] was not feeling before. [He] started being bold; [his] eyes
going red at the time".36OO
1556. TF1-143 testified that in the next village, Five-Five ordered that they should loot, kill
and burn down the town.36Ol At a house in the village Kabila and TF1 -143 found five people
— two men, a woman, her child and another child.36O2 Kabila killed one man as a
demonstration, and TF1-143 then killed the other four using a machete.36O3 TF1-143 testified
that Kabila had threatened to kill him if he did not kill the four people, and that he felt bold
enough to commit these acts because of the blue tablets he had ingested.36O4
1557. The group reached a village called Kamalo and took boats to cross a river to Kakuna,
where there were Nigerian soldiers. TF1-143 was told to stay in the forest outside Kakuna
Town, where he heard heavy firing.36O5 He testified that he was carrying some of Kabila's
ammunition and the machete he had used to hack the four people to death.36O6 He testified
that previously Kabila had made him carry his GMG gun which was large with a round box,
used large bullets and the ammunition was worn around the neck. However, the gun was too
large and heavy for TF1 -143, so Kabila stopped giving it to him.36O7
3597 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8990-8991.
mg TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9000.
""° TF1-143, naaampt 5 May 2008, pp. 8991-8992,
3600 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8992.
ml TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8997.
3**2 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008,p. 8998.
3603 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8997-8999. 5
3604 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8999-9000.
3605 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9001-9003.
M Tri-145, naaampt 5 May 2008, p. 9004.
W Tri-145, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9004-9005.

---- End of Page 552 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T M 18 May 2012 H

32* 6 s¢ 5*
1558. On cross-examination, TF 1-143 could not explain why there was nothing in the
previous statements to the Prosecution about Kabila's heavy gun stating that he remembered
telling the Prosecution about the gun in his 2007 interview.36O8
1559. Three villages before Colonel Eddie Town,36O9 Kabila trained TF1-143 on how to
shoot a weapon. The gun had two handles and could be held "at the back and in front". They
went to the riverside and TF 1-143 was instructed to shoot the gun and aim into the river. He
shot it once and they returned to town.36lO
1560. Kabila then brought out some marijuana and told TF 1-143 that he should start
smoking. Kabila continued to wrap marijuana for him and he would smoke it wherever they
went.36ll
1561. TF 1-143 testified that in the next village, Komba ordered "his boys" to capture a girl.
The boys captured her at gunpoint, stripped her naked and left her in a house for Komba.
TF 1-143 was standing guard at the door of the house with J olm, one of Komba's boys, while
Komba "used her" that is he raped her.3 612
1562. During the march from Colonel Eddie Town to Freetown, the group stayed in the
forest during the day and walked at night.36l3 TF1-143 testified that at a deserted village
along the way, SAJ Musa ordered the town to be burned. Kabila sprinkled petrol around a
house, and TF 1 -143 then struck a match and set the house on fire.3 614 9
1563. TF 1-143 testified that the group travelling from Colonel Eddie Town was comprised
of SAJ Musa's group and the Red Lion group. SAJ Musa's group was AFRC mixed with
RUF .3 615 The Red Lion group included Junior Lion, Gullit and Foday Pump Lock. On cross-
examination, TF 1-143 agreed that he had never specifically referred to the Red Lion group
by name to the Prosecution in any of his five previous interviews, the latest coming three
3608 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9057-9060.
3609 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9007.
M0 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9005.
Ml TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9007.
M2 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9008-9010.
M3 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9019.
W4 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9016, 9018.
W5 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9019-9020.

---- End of Page 553 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M dk 18 May 2012

A 3r6¢é
weeks before his examination—in—chief3(’I6 TF1—143 explained that the Prosecution had not
asked him about the two groups travelling from Colonel Eddie Town. He only told them
about the commanders who were present and SAJ Musa's group since that was the group he
was part of and knew.36'7 Additionally, TF1—143 explained that he had forgotten many
things that happened to him in the past, but as the interviews progressed he began to recall
most of the things he experienced.36'8 TF1—143 denied being asked to name the Red Lion
group during his testimony,3 619 or learning of any evidence that had been given earlier in the
case.3°2O
Findings
1564. The Trial Chamber notes that the witness omitted to mention both Kabila's heavy
gun, and the Red Lion group in previous statements to the Prosecution. However, it notes
that the witness was very young at the time that he gave his statements and had experienced
traumatic events while given narcotics, and therefore finds that his explanation that he began
to recollect more about the events that occurred as the interviews progressed to be
convincing. The Trial Chamber has therefore accepted TF1—143 's testimony.
1565. The Trial Chamber has found that in the context of the conflict in Sierra Leone, the
use of children to commit crimes against civilians and carrying arms and ammunition
constitutes active participation in hostilities, as this is related to the hostilities and directly
supports the military operations of the armed group.3 621 The Trial Chamber finds TF1—143's
evidence that he killed four civilians at a village near Karina on Kabila's orders, that he
partook in the capture of a girl who was then raped by Komba at a village near Colonel
Eddie Town, that he set fire to a deserted house in a village near Colonel Eddie Town; and
that he carried some of Kabila's ammunition and his gun during the journey from
Koinadugu to Colonel Eddie Town to be credible. Based on the prevalence of children being
conscripted and used by the RUF/AFRC the Trial Chamber further finds that the members
of the AFRC/RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the age of 15
M6 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9055-9057.
M7 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9055.
M8 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9053.
M9 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9052.
3620 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9057.
ml Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 554 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / Q5 18 May 2012 2
kr

years. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt that TF1-143, a child under the age of 15 years was used to participate actively in
hostilities by members of the AFRC/RUF.
(g) Freetown and the Western Area
(i) Children committing crimes in Freetown and the Western Area during and after
January 1999
Evidence
1566. In Exhibit P-335, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reports that 10% of
the armed forces which attacked Freetown in January 1999 were children.6622
1567. Confidential Exhibit P-077 reports that during the rebels’ attack on Freetown, 8 to 11
year old boys raped, killed and amputated the hands of civilians.3623
1568. ln Exhibit P-310, the UN Secretary-General reports that a significant number of rebel
fighters in the Freetown attack in January 1999 were children and that boys as young as 8 to
11 were killing and inflicting injuries.3624 In Exhibit P-328, Human Rights Watch reports
that RUF child combatants, armed with pistols, rifles and machetes, were seen actively
participating in killings and amputations during the Freetown attack.6625
1569. TF 1-174 testified that during the course of his work with children, some told him
they fought in Freetown in January 1999. The witness named four of these children in a
confidential exhibit.3626
1570. Mohamed Sesay testified that about a week and a half after the Freetown attack, he
was taken to a junction where a 13 year old boy was ordered to amputate his arm. The boy
6622 Exhibit P—335, "Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Global Report on Child Soldiers, 2001", p.
378.
6626 Exhibit P—077 (confidential), paras 42, 60.
3624 Exhibit P—310, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999", para. 25.
3625 Exhibit P-328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone ~ Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation,
Rape, New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999", p. 5, ERN 23003.
3626 TF1—174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23707~23709; Exhibit P—280 (confidential).

---- End of Page 555 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gm 18 May 2012

Jrxswt
hit Sesay's left arm with a ,machete. His arm was not amputated completely and the
‘commando’ took the axe from the boy and amputated both of Sesay's hands.3627
1571. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that during the Freetown attack, SBUs captured
young girls, about 8 years old, and brought them to the State House and "used them for
sexual purposes".3°28 From February to March 1999, at Benguema, SBUs captured young
girls aged 8 and had sexual intercourse with them.3629
1572. Witness TF1-023 testified in the AFRC trial that she was captured at Consider Lane
in Calaba Town on 22 January 1999 by a young rebel boy with a gun.363O Later that day,
TF1-023 was taken to Allen Town along with other captives.3631 At Allen Town, the
captured civilians were guarded by armed SBUs aged 13 to 15.3632
Findings
1573. The Trial Chamber finds that the information contained in Exhibits P-077, P-335, P-
310 and P-328 on the prevalence of children used by the rebels forces during the attack on
Freetown, is based on hearsay and does not give sufficient information of the locations,
times and perpetrators to return a finding in relation to the crime of the use of children under
the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities. However, this evidence may
corroborate other findings on specific incidents. Alimamy Bobson Sesay's evidence did not
provide the age range of the children used to capture young girls but the Trial Chamber
notes its findings above that Alimamy Bobson Sesay trained SBUs and that these units were
made up of children aged 5-17. The Trial Chamber finds that TF1-174's account, which is
based on hearsay and is uncorroborated, is insufficient to make findings on any specific
incident of the use of child soldiers, particularly as TF1-174 provides no information about
the ages of the children to whom he spoke.
1574. TF1-023 did not provide any evidence about the age of the "rebel boy" with the gun
who captured her in Calaba on 22 January 1999. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it
has not been established that this boy was under the age of 15 years. While she indicates that
3627 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3900-3901, 3915-3919, 3923-3926.
3628 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8290-8291.
3629 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8392-8399.
3630 Exhibit P-205A. "TF 1-023. AFRC Transcript, 9 March 2005", p. 30.
363] Exhibit P-205A, "TFl-023, AFRC Transcript, 9 March 2005", p. 32.

---- End of Page 556 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T {bs 18 May 2012

the children who guarded her and the other captives in Allen Town were aged 13 to 15 years
old, in cross-examination in the AFRC trial, TF 1-023 was questioned about the ages of the
small boys and testified, "I could not tell their actual age because I didn’t ask them for their
ages. So I only guessed".3633 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that these children were under the age of 15.
1575. The Trial Chamber notes that Mohamed Sesay's evidence was not challenged and
that he testified that he is the father of four children.3634 The Trial Chamber is therefore
satisfied that the "boy" who assaulted Sesay was under the age of 15 years at the time of this
attack and, based on the prevalence of children under the age of 15 used by the AFRC/RUF
in hostilities,33333 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the AFRC/RUF knew or
should have known that the boy who assaulted Mohamed Sesay was under the age of 15
years. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has found that in the context of the conflict in Sierra
Leone, the use of children to commit crimes against civilians constitutes active participation
in hostilities.3636 Accordingly the Trial Chamber is satisfied that it has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that a child under the age of 15 years was used to participate actively in
hostilities by members of the AFRC/RUF by assaulting and amputating the hands of
Mohamed Sesay in January 1999 in Freetown.
(ii) Children used by the AF RC and RUF after 6 January 1999
Evidence
1576. Osman J alloh testified that in January 1999,3637 he saw children who appeared to be
8 to 10 years old, who were canying guns, and packing stones on the highway to block
ECOMOG at Sanyinoh Junction, between Wellington and Calaba Town.3633
1577. Paul Nabieu Conteh testified that he saw about 25 children aged 10 to 14 wearing
military uniforms at Benguema after 19 January 1999, some carrying guns. The children
3332 Exhibit P-205A, "TF1-023, AFRC Transcript, 9 March 2005", p. 35.
3633 Exhibit P-205B (confidential), p. 12.
3334 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3898.
3635 Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
3 63 3 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.
3637 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17674-17677, 17682-17684.
3333 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17706-17709, 17695-17698.

---- End of Page 557 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6l,` 18 May 2012

.?6’6>’5
were attached to commanders such as Gunb00t, Tina Musa and Brigadier F ive-Five who had
5 to 10 children. The children were sent to f10g civilians who committed crimes.3333
1578. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that from February to March 1999, Benguema was
a military training centre. Every commander had a small b0y, aged 8 to 12, and they were
ordered to train them to help repel enemy attacks. The small b0ys were trained individually
by the commanders on weaponry, and taken on patrols.364O
1579. Bobson Sesay also testified that around March/April 1999, the tr00ps at Newton
were j0ined by RUF and "SLA" under the command of KBC who came with 8 fighters,
including 2 SBUs around 10 years 0ld, from Liberia, who had "AKs". KBC said that his
group was put together and sent by Charles Taylor.3343 At Newton, children participated in
ambushes and patrols until the tr00ps left in April-May 1999.3 342
1580. Exhibit P-310 reports that between 6 January and mid-February 1999 approximately
2000 children went missing in the aftermath of the Freetown attack. Escapees reported that
abducted b0ys were either selected for training as fighters, or used as porters.3643 Exhibit P-
077 records that there were 1,192 reports of children missing between January 6 and
Febmary 4, 1999. Escapees reported that y0ung b0y abductees tended to be used as porters
0r were selected for training as fighters.3344
Findings
1581. The Trial Chamber finds that the inf`0imation contained in Exhibits P-310 and P-077
is based on hearsay and is inconclusive whether the missing children were abducted by any
0f the warring f`actions. Bobson Sesay and Conteh's accounts corroborate each other that, in
the peri0d after the Freetown attack children were present at Benguema, carried guns, and
accompanied commanders. As Conteh testifies that these children were wearing military
unif`01ms, and were sent to f10g civilians, and as Bobson Sesay testifies that they were sent
3339 Exhibit P-215, "TFl-277, AFRC Transcript, 8 April 2005", pp. 93-98; TFl-277, AFRC Transcript, ll
April 2005" pp. 5-8, 15-23.
3340 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8392-8399.
3443 Alimarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8400-8404; Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8436-
8437.
3642 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8405-8407.
3643 Exhibit P-310, "UN Security C0uncil, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March l999", para. 26.
3444 Exhibit P-077 (confidential), paras 55, 60.

---- End of Page 558 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 7/ Gb; 18 May 2012

3:*55/
on patrol, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that these children were used to actively participate
in hostilities. Conteh testified that the children were between 10 and 14, and Bobson Sesay
testified that they were between 8 and 12, placing them in approximately the same age
range. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that some of the children who were
trained at Benguema and who accompanied commanders during this time were under the
age of 15 years. On the basis of the prevalence of the military training of children under the
age of 15 by the AFRC and RUF,3645 the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the members of the
AFRC and RUF knew or should have known that these children were under the age of 15
years. Further, based on Bobson Sesay's evidence that these children were trained militarily
by their commanders, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that these children were conscripted into
an armed group, the AFRC/RUF.
1582. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that an unknown number of children were
used to participate actively in hostilities by the RUF/AFRC forces in Benguema from the
end of January until March 1999. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied that the
elements of the crime of conscripting of children under the age of 15 years into armed forces
and of the crime of the use of children under the age of 15 years to participate actively in
hostilities have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(iii) Findings on victim witnesses in Freetown and the Western Area
a. TF 1-143 used to actively participate in hostilities in J anuagg 1999
Evidence
1583. As the group of fighters, including TF 1-143, who had left Colonel Eddie Town
approached Freetown, an advance team comprised of commanders and fighters was able to
take over the barracks in Benguema, where the Sierra Leone soldiers were being trained.3646
The advance team looted ammunition, and Kabila had TF 1-143 and his "other boy" carry
some looted ammunition.3°47
W5 Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 22.
3646 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9022-9023.
3647 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9023.

---- End of Page 559 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T %// Gm 18 May 2012

ggéfz.
1584. When they entered Freetown, the group went to Allen Town, where TF1—143 stayed
behind because his feet had become swollen.3646 TF1—143 joined Adama Cut Hand's team in
Allen Town. TF1-143 testified that although he had not heard the name Adama Cut Hand3649
nor met her before, he knew some of "her boys".
1585. On cross-examination, TF1—143 was questioned about prior statements he had given
to the Prosecution regarding Adama Cut Hand.3636 In his testimony, the witness denied
seeing Adama at Koinadugu, Benguema or Waterloo.363l Yet in his first interview with the
Prosecution on 7 April 2003, TF1—143 stated that Adama Cut Hand was in Koinadugu, he
was part of her Cut Hand Group and Adama was his immediate boss.3632 TF1—143 insisted
that he had made corrections to these previous statements and that Kabila was his boss from
the time he was captured up to Freetown.3633 In that same interview, TF1—143 stated that a
group from Makeni joined his group at Benguema, and that he saw most of the commanders
together at that time, including Adama Cut Hand.3634 TF1-143 explained that he was just
listing the names of commanders he knew, but also agreed with Defence Counsel that he
was listing the names of people who he had claimed to remember being at Koinadugu and
Waterloo.
1586. On re-examination, TF1—143 confirmed that during his interview on 16-18 April
2008, he had made corrections to his previous statements to the Prosecution regarding
Adama Cut Hand. TF1-143 stated that he "only met and worked with Adama Cut Hand
when the group entered Freetown. Before that time he had only heard her narne".3633 The
Trial Chamber notes that this correction is still inconsistent with TF1-143's examination-in-
chief; in which he claimed that he had not even heard Adama Cut Hand's name before he
met her in Allen Town.
1587. Adama Cut Hand's base was in Foamex. She informed TF1—143 that he would be
part of the patrol. One of her girls, Mariama, was injured, so TF1—143 took the girl's AK-
3646 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9027.
3649 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9026.
3636 TF1-143, Transcript 6 May 2008, pp. 9081-9087.
363l TF1-143, Transcript 6 May 2008, p. 9081. .
3632 TF1-143, Transcript 6 May 2008, pp. 9082-9083.
3633 TF1-143, Transcript 6 May 2008, pp. 9082, 9083.
3634 TF1- 143, Transcript 6 May 2008, pp. 9085-9086.
3633 TF1-143, Transcript 6 May 2008, p. 9098.

---- End of Page 560 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

47.3656 TF1—143 testified that at the base he saw two men being brought by Adama Cut
Hand's boys. She ordered the boys to hold the men's arms, and amputated one man's ami at
the wrist and the other's at the elbow.3657
1588. Adama Cut Hand ordered TF1—143 and "her boys" to loot and to bring her any
person who "refused or made comments against them". The witness went with a group of
eight boys to Kissy.3658 They looted a store where two men objected to the boys’ behaviour.
The boys took the two men to Adama Cut Hand, and she amputated their arins.3659 During
the amputations, TF1—143 pointed his weapon at the men.3660
1589. TF1—143 and "one of Adama's boys" then went on patrol to Kissy market.366l They
knocked on the door of a shop but no one answered. After forcing the door open, TF1—143
found two men inside.3662 Since the men had refused to open the door, TF1—143 and the
other boy agreed to amputate the men's hands. TF1—143 used a machete to amputate one
man at the wrist and the other at the elbow. Afterwards the boys took what they wanted from
the store and left.3663
1590. They returned to Foamex, where they heard heavy shooting, and so withdrew to
Allen Town, where TFl—143 hid in a mosque.3`364 After three days in hiding, TF1—143 was
arrested by Nigerian soldiers and questioned by the SSD, the Sierra Leone police. They were
able to locate TF1—143's brother, who retrieved him from the police.3665
Findings
1591. The Trial Chamber notes that the witness gave prior statements to the Prosecution
which are inconsistent on the material issue of whether he had met Adama Cut Hand in
Koinadugu, or whether he had met her for the first time in Freetown in 1999. The witness
was very young at the time that he gave his statements, and had endured traumatic events.
3656 TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9028-9029, 9035.
M7 TF]-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9028-9029.
3658 TFl—l43, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9032.
3659 TFl-l43, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9033.
Méo TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9034.
36m TF]-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9034.
3662 TFl—l43, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9035.
369 TFl—l43, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9035-9036.
3664 TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9036.
3665 TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9037-9038.

---- End of Page 561 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T / GL 18 May 2012

32;s"§¢
Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that the witness corrected the record of when he first met
Adama Cut Hand in a subsequent interview to the Prosecution, stating that he had first met
her in Freetown. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied, that despite these inconsistencies,
the witness is credible, and that his detailed account of his participation in atrocities during
the Freetown attack in January 1999 can be relied upon. Accordingly the Trial Chamber
finds that TF1-143, a child under the age of l5 years, carried looted ammunition, looted a A
store, held a gun to facilitate Adama Cut Hand amputating the arms of two civilian men,
with another child amputated the arms oftwo civilian men and looted their store.
1592. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has found that in the context of the conflict in Sierra
Leone, the use of children to commit crimes against civilians, and to carry arms and
ammunition constitutes active participation in hostilities.3666 Given that the Trial Chambers
has found that TF1—143 has committed crimes and carried ammunition the Trial Chamber
finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that TF1—143 was used to participate
actively in hostilities in Freetown in January 1999.
1593. The Trial Chamber has previously found that it has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt that TF1-143 was under the age of 15 at the time at which these events occurred, and
that the perpetrators knew or should have known that he was under the age of 15 years.
1594. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the elements of the crime of the use of a child
under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt in relation to this evidence.
(h) Findings in Relation to Other Districts in Sierra Leone
1595. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not adduced evidence of
conscription or use of child soldiers in Bonthe, Moyamba, Pujehun, Bo and Kambia
Districts.
Conclusion
1596. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that the requirements of Count 9
have been established with respect to the following:
3666 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 562 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--O3-O1-T QA 18 May 2012

JJJU
i. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were conscripted into
the RUF in Kangari Hills between 30 November 1996 and May 1997;
ii. Komba Sumana, a child under the age of 15 years, was conscripted into the
RUF/AFRC under the command of Superman from April/May 1998 to 10
August 1999 when he was abducted in Koidu, Kono District and trained in
Kailahun District;
iii. TF 1-026, a child under the age of 15 years, was conscripted into the RUF/AF RC
from February/March 1999 to November/December 1999 when she was
abducted in Freetown and trained in Kailahun District;
iv. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were conscripted into
the RUF/AFRC between February 1998 and December 1998 when they were
abducted and trained at Bunumbu, Kailahun District;
v. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were conscripted into
the RUF/AFRC from December 1998 onwards in Yengema; Kono District;
vi. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were conscripted into
the RUF/AFRC in March 1998 and trained at Superman Ground, Kono District;
vii. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were conscripted into
the RUF/AF RC in February 1998 in Koidu Town;
viii. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were conscriptedinto
the AFRC/RUF after April 1998 between Woama and Baima, Kono District;
ix. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were conscripted into
the AFRC/RUF from mid-March 1998 to April 1998 and trained at Masingbi
Road, Kono District;
x. TF 1 -143, a child under the age of 15 years, was conscripted into the RUF/AF RC
in approximately September 1998 in Koinadugu District;
xi. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were abducted at
Karina and conscripted into the AF RC/RUF in July 1998 at Camp Rosos,
Bombali District;

---- End of Page 563 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / GR 18 May 2012
. xé

3 KAJZ
xii. Approximately 100 children were enlisted or conscripted into the RUF after
being abducted from a care centre in Makeni, Bombali District in May 2000;
xiii. Approximately 45 children were enlisted or conscripted into the RUF after being
abducted from a care centre in Makeni, Bombali District in May 2000;
xiv. TF1—158, a child under the age of 15 years, was conscripted into the AFRC/RUF
from September to late 1998 in Bombali District;
_ xv. TF1—158, a child under the age of 15 years, was again conscripted into the
RUF/AFRC in Bombali District from July to August 1999;
xvi. Akiatu Tholley, a child under the age of 15 years, was conscripted into the
AFRC/RUF from January 1999 until April/May 1999 in Port Loko District;
xvii. An unknown number of children were used by the RUF/AFRC Junta to
participate actively in hostilities from May 1997 until February 1998 by
guarding mines in Tongo Fields, Kenema District;
xviii. An unknown number of children were used by Sam Bockarie to participate
actively in hostilities from May 1997 until February 1998 by attacking civilians
and by acting as bodyguards at Tongo Fields, Kenema District;
xix. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used by the
RUF/AFRC to participate actively in hostilities by their presence at the
frontlines between February 1998 and December 1998 from Bunumbu, Kailahun
District;
xx. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used by the
RUF/AFRC to participate actively in hostilities by participating in armed food-
finding missions between February 1998 and December 1998 from Bunumbu,
Kailahun District;
xxi. An unknown number of children were used by the RUF and RUF/AFRC to
participate actively in hostilities by their armed presence with commanders
between 1996 and 2000 in Kailahun District;

---- End of Page 564 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSIJ03-01-T Ok 18 May 2012

BKU9
xxii. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used by the
V AFRC/RUF to actively participate in hostilities by committing crimes against
civilians from mid—March 1998 to April 1998 at Masingbi Road; Kono District;
xxiii. A child was used by fighters to participate actively in hostilities at sometime
after February 1998 in Sawoa; Kono District by committing an amputation;
xxiv. An unknown number of children were used by the RUF/AFRC to participate A
actively in hostilities in December 1999 by guarding mines in Tombodu; Kono
District;
xxv. An unknown number of children were used by the RUF/AFRC to actively
participate in hostilities between March and June 1998 in Yomandu and
Tombodu; Kono District by committing crimes;
xxvi. An unknown number of children were used by the RUF/AFRC to participate
actively in hostilities in March/April 1998 in [gbaleh and Wondedu; Kono
District by committing crimes;
xxvii. A child under the age of 15 years was used by the RUF/AFRC to participate
actively in hostilities in mid—April 1998 in Tongbodu; Kono District;
xxviii. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used by
RUF/AFRC members to participate actively in hostilities on April 12; 1998 in
Bombafoidu; Kono District;
xxix. Akiatu Tholley; a child under the age of 15 years; was used by the AFRC/RUF
to participate actively in hostilities in approximately April or May 1999 in Port
Loko District;
xxx. Akiatu Tholley; a child under the age of 15 years; was used by the AFRC/RUF
to participate actively in hostilities in Koinadugu District in late 1999;
xxxi. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used by the
AFRC/RUF to participate actively in hostilities in Kondembaia, Koinadugu
District in February to mid—March 1998;

---- End of Page 565 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T % QR 18 May 2012

ZXJSK;
xxxii. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used by the
RUF to participate actively in hostilities in Kondembaia, Koinadugu District in
February to mid-March 1998 by committing crimes;
xxxiii. An unknown number of children were used by the RUF/AFRC to participate
actively in hostilities by carrying arms and ammunition in approximately
September to October 1998 in Koinadugu District;
xxxiv. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used by the
AFRC/RUF to participate actively in hostilities in July to August 1998 in Camp
Rosos, Bombali District;
xxxv. An unknown number of children under the age of 15 years were used to
participate actively in hostilities by looting and acting as bodyguards to
commanders in Makeni, Bombali District in February 1998;
xxxvi. Komba Sumana, a child under the age of 15 years, was used by the RUF/AFRC
under the command of Supennan to participate actively in hostilities from
August to December 1998 in Koinadugu and Bombali Districts;
xxxvii. TF1-158, a child under the age of 15 years, was used by the AFRC/RUF to
participate actively in hostilities by carrying looted items and participating in
food-finding missions from September to November 1998 in Bombali District;
xxxviii. TF1-158, a child under the age of 15 years, was used by the RUF/AFRC to
participate actively in hostilities when he took part in an attack on Kabala,
Bombali District, at an unknown date after 7 July 1999;
xxxix. TF1-143, a child under the age of 15 years, was used by the RUF/AFRC to
participate actively in hostilities from September to December 1998 in Bombali
District;
xl. TF1-143, a child under the age of 15 years, was used by the RUF/AFRC to
participate actively in hostilities in September 1998 near Konkoba Village,
Koinadugu District;

---- End of Page 566 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T / {15 18 May 2012

xli. An unknown number of children were conscripted into the RUF/AF RC in
6 Benguema, Western Area, from January to March 1999;
xlii. An unknown number of children were used by the RUF/AFRC to participate
actively in hostilities in Benguema, Western Area, from January to March 1999.
xliii. A child under the age of 15 years, was used by the AFRC/RUF to actively
participate in hostilities in approximately the third week of January in Freetown,
Western Area, by attempting to amputate a civilian's hands;
xliv. TF 1-143, a child under the age of 15 years, was used by the RUF/AFRC to
actively participate in hostilities during the Freetown attack in January 1999.
1597. Based on the foregoing substantial evidence relating to the prevalence of children
associated with armed groups fighting in Sierra Leone.6667 The Trial Chamber finds that
there was a consistent pattern of conduct among these armed groups, including the RUF and
the AFRC, of abducting children and forcing them into Small Boys Units (SBU) and Small
Girls Units (SGU).6666 These units were made of up children generally in the range of 5 to
17 years.6669
1598. Throughout the armed conflict in Sierra Leone the RUF and AFRC forcibly abducted
children of various ages from their homes or forced traditional rulers to provide recruits.6676
6667 Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1654-1655, 1658-1660, 1662-1665; Stephen Ellis,
Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1619-1620.
6666 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-20146; TF1-174, Transcript 27 January
2009, pp. 23669-23671; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6206.
3669 Exhibit P-215, "Paul Conteh, AFRC Transcript 11 April 2005", p. 27; TF1-029, Transcript 28 November
~ 2005, p. 13; TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12546; TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp.
23665-23669, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23773-23775; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008,
pp. 20144—20146.
3676 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3918-3923; Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp.
12194-12198; Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1231, 1243-1244; Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8
January 2008, p. 689; TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12546; TF1-174, Transcript 28 January
2009, pp. 23715-23716, 23773-23775; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8092, 8102-8103,
8175-8180; TF1-122, Transcript 24 June 2005, pp. 15056-15061; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January
2008, pp. 1673-1676; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3087, 3099-3101; Fayia Musa, Transcript
20 April 2010, p. 39456; Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting
Forces in the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", pp. 5, 19; Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 55; Exhibit P-
078, "Sierra Leone, 1998 — a Year of Atrocities Against Civilians", pp. 13-14; Exhibit P-310, "UN Security
Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone,
S/1999/237, 4 March 1999; TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3844-3847; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript
23 October 2008, pp. 19176-19178; TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18821, 18829; TF1-143,
Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8970-8975; Exhibit P-335, "Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Global
Report on Child Soldiers, 2001", p. 379.

---- End of Page 567 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T J GM 18 May 2012

35*6 6 0
Following their abduction, many children were forced to undergo military training3871 in
order for them to fight with the anned groups,3872 or defend themselves in case of an
attack.3873
1599. The training was generally comprised of instmctions on the use of weaponry,3874 at
times practiced with live ammunition;3813 how to attack a town, fight and kill,3878 how to
guard,3877 how to set an ambush,3878 and how to burn houses.3879 Children sometimes died
during the course of military training.38811
1600. The Trial Chamber also notes the RUF and AFRC's practice of giving children
narcotics. Cocaine was sometimes administered by opening a cut on a children's body,
putting cocaine on it and then covering it up with a plaster.3881 The Trial Chamber finds that
3871 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12194-12198; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008,
pp. 20144-20146; Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4280-4281; Demuis Koker, 15 January 2008,
p. 1261; TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16534-16238; TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp.
4895-4899; TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23700 — 23702; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18
April 2008, pp. 7976-7979, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8180-8181; TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp.
2629-2631; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1662, 1673-1676; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5
May 2008, p. 3088;Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting
Forces in the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", pp. 5-6; Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 55; Exhibit P-
078, "Sierra Leone, 1998 ~ a Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report", p. 15; Exhibit
P-3 10, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999; TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3867-3868, 3870-3873;
Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19216-19217; TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8980-8981;
p. 8991-8992, p. 9005; Exhibit P-335, "Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Global Report on Child
Soldiers, 200l", p. 377; Exhibit D-012, "Confidential Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone TRC, Vol 2",
paras 148-149; P-364, "Restricted Revolutionary United Front — Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Nominal Role of
Trained RUF Personnel".
3612 Dennis Koker, 15 January 2008, pp. 1243-1244; TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23698-23700;
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8396-8399, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8865-8870;
Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17316—17318, 17327.
W TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3868-3870.
3874 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7976-7978, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8092,
8102-8103, 8159-8161, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8396-8399; TFl-026; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27
October 2008, pp. 19216-19217; TF1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18813-18825, 18831-18833; TF1-
143, Transcript 5 May 2008, TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8980-8981; pp. 8991-8992, p. 9005.
3873 TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, p. 4295; Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp.
17316-17318, 17327; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1673-1676.
3878 TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 5008, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5014-5015; TF1-158,
Transcript 21 October 2008, pp. 18831-18833.
3611 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8092, 8102-8103.
3618 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8159-8161; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18
January 2008, pp. 1673-1676; TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3868-3870; TFl-158, Transcript 21
October 2008, pp. 18813-18825.
38781 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17927-17936;
38811 TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5017-5018.
368* TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23801 — 23803; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January
2008, pp. 1678-1679; Exhibit P-077 (confidential). para. 54; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone, 1998 — a Year of

---- End of Page 568 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Km 18 May 2012

this practice exemplifies a method of coercion used to make the children fearless and carry
out orders without hesitation,3`382 and shows that children would likely commit violent acts
while under the influence of such substances.
1601. The use of narcotics caused some children to develop drug addictions.3°83
1602. The foregoing evidence shows that children were of importance to the AFRC and the
RUF as they carried out orders "quickly" and "they followed their bosses’ way"3634
1603. The Trial Chamber finds that the existence of specific combat units, namely the SBU
and SGU, designated for children, demonstrates the institutionalized nature of conscription
and use of children by the AFRC and the RUF. Based on evidence that the leadership of the
forces was engaged in the abduction,3°33 military training,3633 and use of children,3687 and
that they acknowledged3°3g or must have observed that such persons were children the Trial
Chamber finds that the perpetrators knew or should have known that children under the age
of 15 were conscripted or used by the armed forces.
1604. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, frequent and brutal acts of violence directed
against civilians were a hallmark of the operations of the RUF and AFRC forces. The Trial
Chamber finds that the acts of children who participated in such acts of violence were
directly linked to hostilities. Further, such crimes typically occurred while the children were
armed and in the company of adult fighters and commanders. In these circumstances, and
Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Report", p. 15; TF 1-158, Transcript 21 October 2008, pp.
18813-18825.
3682 TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23801 — 23803; Jose Maria Caballero, Transcript 18 January
2008, pp. 1678-1680; TFl-150, Transcript 18 February 2008, pp. 4060-4061; DCT-292, Transcript 31 May
2010, pp. 41673-41674; Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19209-19213; TF1-143, Transcript 5
May 2008, pp. 8992, 9006-9007; Exhibit P-335, "Coa1itiorr to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Global Report on
Child Soldiers, 2001", p. 378; Exhibit D-012, "Confidential Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone TRC,
Vol 2", paras 148-149.
3383 Exhibit P-043, "Expert Report of Jessica Alexander, Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 4 May 2007", p. 24.
368* Exhibit P-215, "Paul Conteh, AFRC Transcript 11 April 2005", pp. 27; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31
March 2008, p. 6206. Throughout this overview section, the term "children" has been used generically.
3685 TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 237332 — 23737.
36*6 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-20146; Exhibit P-062, "AFRC/RUF
Alliance Command Structure After the Fall of the Junta, Circa March 1998, as indicated by TF 1-371."
3687 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-20146; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January
2008, pp. 2055-2058; Exhibit P-335, "Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Global Report on Child
Soldiers, 2001", pp. 378-379.
3683 Fayia Musa, Transcript 20 April 2010, pp. 39456-7; DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, p. 41821;
Transcript 3 June 2010, pp. 42025-42028; Martin George, Transcript 28 April 2010, pp. 40217-40219, 40242-

---- End of Page 569 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GW 18 May 2012

3%;;.
given the prevailing context of guerrilla warfare, these children would constitute legitimate
military targets as they would be perceived as actively participating in hostilities.3°89
Moreover, the purpose of these crimes was ultimately to damage or harm the adversary by
eradicating support for opposing forces, or destroying territory.369U The Trial Chamber
therefore finds that in the context of the conflict in Sierra Leone, the use of children to
commit crimes against civilians constitutes active participation in hostilities.369l
1605. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between 30 November 1996 and until 2000, in Tonkalili, Kailahun,
Kono, Bombali and Port Loko Districts, as well as in Freetown and the Western Area,
members of the RUF/AF RC, an armed force or group, conscripted, enlisted and/or used for
active participation in hostilities an unknown number of persons under the age of 15 and that
the perpetrators knew or should have known that such persons were under the age of 15, as
charged in the Indictment,3692 and as shown in the evidence above.
1606. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment,
involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF .3 693 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that for all of the aforementioned acts of conscription and/or enlistment into an
armed force or group and/or use for active participation in hostilities of persons under the
age of 15 years in the aforementioned areas of Sierra Leone there was a nexus between the
conscription, enlistment and/or use and the armed conflict, that each of the victims was not
taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of conscription, enlistment and/or use and
that the perpetrators knew this fact. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
aforementioned acts of conscription and/or enlistment into an armedforce or group and/or
40250.
3689 See RUF Judgement, para. 1723. As indicated by Trial Chamber I, the Trial Chamber is "mindful that an
overly expansive definition of active participation in hostilities would be inappropriate as its consequence would
be that children associated with armed groups lose their protected status as persons hors de combat under the law
of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber finds that the nature and purpose of the crimes committed
against civilians warrants their characterisation as active participation in hostilities. The Trial Chamber considers
this interpretation necessary to ensure that children are protected from any engagement in violent functions of
the armed group that directly support its conflict against the adversary, and in which the child combatant would
be a legitimate military target for the opposing armed group or groups".
3690 See RUF Judgement, para. 1722.
M9} Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers) Use of children to participate
actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Findings supra.
3692 Indictment, para. 22.
3693 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.

---- End of Page 570 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / M 18 May 2012
x,

35*63
use for active participation in hostilities of persons under the age of 15 constitute other
serious violations of intemational humanitarian law under Article 4 of the Statute.
1607. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber linds that the elements of the crimes of conscription,
enlistment and use of children to actively participate in armed conflict pursuant to Count 9
of the Indictment have been proved beyond reasonable doubt in the instances listed above.

---- End of Page 571 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / CU, 18 May 2012
'\/

Q? ?6'6y~
E. Count 10 glinslavementg
Allegations and Submissions
1608. The Indictment alleges that "[b]etween about 30 November 1996 and about 18
January 2002, members of RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian
fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or
control of and/or subordinate to the Accused, engaged in widespread and large scale
abductions of civilians and use of civilians as forced labour".3664
1609. Enslavement is alleged to have occurred between about 1 July 1997 and about 28
February 1998 in Kenema District, between about 1 February 1998 and about 18 January
2002 in Kono District, between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002 in
Kailahun District and between about 21 December 1998 and 28 February 1999 in Freetown
and the Westem Area.3665
1610. The Prosecution submits that the RUF and its allies enslaved the civilian population
in various locations in Sierra Leone and that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt
the Accused's guilt with respect to that enslavement (Count 10).3666
161 1. Defence witness DCT-068 agreed in cross-examination that civilians in Sierra Leone
were forced to carry ammunition boxes on footpaths.3697 Defence witness Isatu Kallon
agreed in cross-examination that the RUF forced civilians in Sierra Leone to cultivate farms,
to give their harvests to the RUF, and to carry produce to the riverside with Guinea to trade.
This witness also agreed that the civilians had no choice but to do these things and that it
was the rebels who would actually sell or trade the produce and would keep the money or
goods received in exchange.3698 The evidence of these two witnesses establishes that in none
of the incidents described by them were the civilians acting of their own free will. Thus on
evidence provided by the Defence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that members of the RUF intentionally exercised powers of ownership over civilians in
3664 Indictment, para. 23.
3695 Indictment, paras 24-27.
3666 Prosecution Final Tnal Brief, para. 1068.
3667 DCT-068, Transcript 12 March 2010, p. 37201.
3666 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 24 June 2010, pp. 43333·43335.

---- End of Page 572 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ C`}; 18 May 2012

3,3*66;*
Sierra Leone by depriving them of their liberty and forcing them to do work under the
control of the RUF.
1612. However, such Defence evidence does not specifically identify any particular district
as the place where these crimes occurred. What follows is a consideration of evidence of
enslavement in the specific districts of Sierra Leone alleged in the Indictment.
1613. The Trial Chamber has held that as enslavement is a crime of a continuous nature, it
is permissible for the Prosecution not to have pleaded specific locations within districts in
which it alleges instances of enslavement occurred.3699 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber has
considered evidence of enslavement in all locations within the districts, whether or not they
were specifically pleaded in the Indictment.
1. Kenema District
1614. The Indictment alleges that between about 1 July 1997 and about 28 February 1998,
members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance and/or Liberian fighters used an
unknown number of civilians living in the District as forced labour in various locations such
as the Tongo Fields area.370O
(a) Tongo Fields
1615. In relation to enslavement alleged to have taken place in Tongo Fields the Trial
Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses TF1—371, TF1—567, TF1—062, TF1—590,
DCT—068, Augustine Mallah, Issa Sesay, Dauda Aruna Fornie, Alex Bao, Kamioh Kanneh,
Abdul Conteh, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Charles Ngebeh and Exhibits P—173 and P—278.370l
1616. Witness TF1—062 confimied evidence he had given in the AFRC Trial and a
transcript of that testimony was admitted into evidence.37O2 TF1—062 was a miner who was
living and working in Tongo Field in 1997, and had six men employed to mine for him.37O3
*699 See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment supra.
3700 Indictment, paras 23, 24.
Sm The Prosecution also cited evidence in relation to the mining operations in Kenema from TF1-338, Sahr
Charles, Mustapha Mansaray, Finda Gbamanja, Isaac Mongor, TF1-367 and Mohamed Kabbah. The Trial
Chamber has considered the testimony of these witnesses and concluded that the evidence cited concerns
incidents which do not fall within the Indictment period and/or the Kenema District.
3702 TF1-062, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23612; Exhibit P—278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June
2005",
3703 Exhibit P—278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14911; TF1—062, 'Transcript 27 January

---- End of Page 573 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
//v I /

His evidence in the AF RC Trial was that he heard on the radio on 25 May 1997 that the
government in Freetown had been overthrown. At the time, CDF Kamajors were in control
of the Tongo area.371111 Sometime in August 1997, he heard gunfire and, soon after, observed
soldiers entering Tongo Field, some of whom he recognized as members of the SLA.37115 The
witness identified Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) as the commander of the men.31116
1617. Approximately three days after capturing Tongo, Bockarie gathered the civilians of
Tongo Field in a public meeting at Tongo Park attended by witness TF1-062.37117 Bockarie
told the civilians that the AF RC/RUF government, formed in Freetown, was now in control
of Tongo37118. Bockarie also told the civilians that they would be asked to mine for
diamonds.37119 Soon after this meeting, Bockarie left Tongo Field, leaving other SLA
commanders in charge of the mining. However, ‘Mosquito’ would continue to visit Tongo
Field more or less at weekly interva1s.37111
1618. Witness TF 1-062 stated that the civilians of Tongo Field were subsequently required
to elect a civilian chairman, named Mopleh,3711 who was responsible for organising the
civilian mining. Commander Pa Seth Marrah informed the civilians, through Mopleh, that
Bockarie had ordered that they should mine for "the Govemment" two days a week.3112
Thereafter, the AF RC/RUF would designate certain days as ‘government days’.3 713 On
‘ government days’, the civilians of Tongo Field were forced to go and work in the mines in
an area known as C bor Pit.37111
Y S
2009, p. 23618,
3704 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14913, 14949-14951.
37115 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14914, 14950-14952.
37116 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14914-14915, 14974.
3707 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14920.
37118 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14922.
37119 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp, 14922-4.
3710 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14932, 54,
3711 This commander is referred to in the transcript as ‘Mompleh’. The Trial Chamber has adopted the
spelling ‘Mopleh’ for consistency and is satisfied that this is the same person referred to in the evidence of
Augustine Mallah, Dauda Aruna F orrrie, Karmoh Karmeh and TF1-062 below.
3712 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14931-2.
3713 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14934.
3714 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp, 14929-14930, 14934.

---- End of Page 574 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J qu 18 May 2012

1619. Witness TF1-062 worked for the AFRC/RUF government at Cyborg Pit for about
four months, from August 1997 until they were ousted from Tongo Field by the CDF during
the Muslim month of Ramadan.37l5
1620. TF1 -062 estimated that over a thousand civilians worked in the mines on
‘government days’.37l6 The witness did not mine personally but instructed and supervised
his six men in their work.37l7 The AFRC/RUF administration did not provide the civilians
with food, mining equipment or payment for work undertaken.37l8 TF1-062 testified that
civilians would not refuse to work on ‘government days’ since they knew that if they did so,
the AFRC/RUF would mete out "discipline". The witness gave, as an example, the case of
one of his worker who hid in an attempt to avoid work, but was found and beaten.3 719
1621. On ‘govemment days’, civilians were compelled to hand over any diamonds found to
the AFRC/RUF fighters supervising the mining.372O The fighters at Cyborg Pit were armed
with guns, such as RPGs, LMGs, G3s, and AK-47s, and would watch the civilian miners to
ensure that all diamonds found were surrendered.372l Civilians who attempted to keep
diamonds found on a government mining day would be flogged almost to death.3722 On two
occasions, TF1-062 watched AFRC/RUF soldiers shoot and kill civilian miners who were
alleged to have disobeyed orders.3723 In addition, the witness regularly saw corpses being
brought out of Cyborg Pit, and he was informed by his workers at the pit that these civilians
had been shot by AFRC/RUF soldiers. To TF1-062's knowledge, no civilians in or around
the pit were in possession of guns.3724
1622. On non-government days, AFRC/RUF soldiers would also be present at Cyborg Pit.
The civilians were permitted to mine their own diamonds which they could sell3725 but the
W5 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005",`p. 14945.
W6 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14934.
W7 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14933.
mg Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14938-9.
ww Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14934.
3720 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14933-14934, 14940.
ml Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14938-14939, 14941-2.
3722 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14940.
3723 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14942-14943.
3724 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", pp. 14943-14944.
3725 Exhibit P-278, "TFl-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14936.

---- End of Page 575 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T { OL 18 May 2012

AFRC/RUF would still ask them to wash gravel for them and would take some diamonds
found by civilians.3726
1623. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence from Augustine Mallah, a security
commander to Mike Lamin3727 who initially spent one to two months mining in Tongo Field,
from approximately June to August 1997.3728 He went to Tongo with Captain Gweh, a junior
commando, to undertake some mining because ‘Mosquito’ had just recaptured the Tongo
area from the Kamajors.3729 He carried out both his own private and government mining but
prioritised the latter.373O
1624. Mallah estimated that between 600 and 700 civilians laboured in the Tongo
mines.373 I He testified hearing from the "OC Secreta1iat" about procedures the AFRC/RUF
had put in place in Tongo. First, any diamond weighing above five carats was designated a
govemment diamond.3732 lf it was less than five carats then it belonged to the ‘officer or
RUF soldier who took it’.3m Second, there was a civilian overseeing committee which
would ensure the provision of civilian manpower required for ‘govemment’ mining for the
AFRC/RUF junta. Third, the committee would also give guidance regarding where the most
productive mining could be found. Finally, the committee would ‘evaluate’ the diamonds
obtained from the mining.3734
1625. The witness personally visited govemment mining sites in Tongo and saw civilians
mining there.3735 Unless they were too sick or old to do so, civilians were forced to mine and
were not permitted to refuse. Mallah himself forced civilians to mine for him.3736 AFRC and
RUF armed guards prevented civilians from escaping and forced them to carry out the tasks
required of them.3737 Anyone found escaping would be shot. The civilians were deprived of
3726 Exhibit P-278, "TF1-062, AFRC Transcript 27 June 2005", p. 14937.
3727 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20102.
3728 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20139, Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November
2008, pp. 20365, 20149.
3729 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20138.
mo Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20143.
ml Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20146.
gm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20142-3.
3733 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20258.
3734 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20142-3.
ms Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20143-4.
37% Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20144-6.
3737 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20143-4.

---- End of Page 576 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3-O1-T \/ QN 18 May 2012 w

34* JK 7
food and rest and flogged if their work was not up to the standard expected. The witness
testified that he saw civilians flogged and killed and that he flogged civilians himself if they
refused to mine for him.3738
1626. Mallah testified that any diamonds found at the mines were collected by the
AFRC/RUF and evaluated at the OC Secretariat, who would then pass them on to PLO 2.
Members of the AFRC/RUF and PLO 2 told him that the diamonds were sent to Eddie
Kamreh, the resident Minister at the time who would take them straight to AFRC Johnny
Paul Koroma in Freetown. The witness was also present at a meeting in February 1998 on
Bockarie's veranda in Buedu when Johnny Paul Koroma referred to receiving diamonds that
the AFRC and RUF had mined in Tongo and Kono.3739
1627. The witness was sent back to Tongo in November 1997 to mine for Mike Lamin and
remained there for two months before returning to Kenema in January 1998.3740 He
witnessed that the conditions for the civilians in the mines had deteriorated3 741 He described
the procedure by which civilians were gathered to work in the mines: at daybreak, the OC
Secretariat, Captain Jalloh, would assemble a group of armed AFRC and RUF troops, split
them into subgroups and allocate them to areas in the town of Tongo, where they would
conduct house—to—house searches to capture civilians. The fighters stripped the captured
civilians naked, tied them together with their shirts and marched them to the Secretariat
where they were assigned to the various commanders for government mining.3742 During his
visits to Cyborg Pit, the witness saw the civilians working under ‘stricter’ conditions. As an
example, he described how civilians mining outside hours designated by the AFRC/RUF,
wou1d be flogged by guards and if they tried to escape, they wou1d be shot and possibly
killed.3743
1628. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence from Dauda Aruna Fomie ("DAF"), who
testified about organised diamond mining operations in Tongo for the combined RUF/AFRC
government. Fornie stated that he worked as a radio operator for the RUF/AFRC at the
3138 Augustine Mallah. Transcript 12 November 2008. p. 20144.
3739 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20195.
3740 Augustine Mallah. Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20165.
3741 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008. p. 20154.
37*2 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008. pp. 20154-5.
W3 Augustine Mallah. Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20155-6.

---- End of Page 577 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL—03-01—T 18 May 2012 %


battalion headquarters radio station in Tongo3744 for approximately three months from the
rain season3745 until November or December 1997,4746 durin which time he conducted
Y 8
mining for himself4747 F ornie testified that Bockarie organised the mining in Tongo
although he was based in Kenema. The witness personally saw him in Tongo on three
occasions3748.
1629. Fornie described the system of ‘organised mining’ in which the RUF/AF RC would
forcibly assemble civilians and take them to mine, particularly at Cyborg Pit. He witnessed
checkpoints set up along the roads by military police officers to whom commanders would
send requests for a particular number of civilians required for mining at Cyborg. At Cyborg,
the AF RC/RUF would put 150 to 200 civilians to work daily extracting gravel and washing
it. Some civilians were also appointed as supervisors but these supervisors were always
themselves supervised by soldiers, such as Major Gweh. A man named Mopleh would
collect all the diamonds at the end of the day and hand them to the commander in charge of
Tongo.3744
1630. Karmoh Karmeh, (a.k.a Eagle)3750, an RUF captain3 75 1, testified that he headed the
successful mission to ‘clear’ the enemy from Tongo Field.3752 The witness confirmed that
the attack took place in 1997 but could not remember the precise date.3753 After completion
of the mission, he remained in Tongo Fields for one month to ‘defend the area and put
[diamond] mining activities in place’. He also undertook some personal mining.3754 The
witness stated that Sam Bockarie was the senior commander in charge of Tongo Field and
Mopleh was in charge of the mining until he escaped with over a thousand diamonds.3755
1631. Karmoh Kanneh testified that the civilians did not mine willingly but were forced to
‘dance to [the] tunes’ of the soldiers with guns. Civilians who refused to mine would be
3744 Dauda Aruna Fornje, Transcript 8 December 2008, p. 21940.
4745 Dauda Aruna Fornje, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21418-9.
3746 Dauda Aruna Fornje, Transcript 8 December 2008, p. 21951.
3747 Dauda Aruna Fornje, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21421.
37*8 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21421.
3749 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21423-7.
3750 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9312.
"5‘ Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9355.
3752 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9367-8.
3753 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9373, 9386.
3754 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9378.
4755 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9376-9.

---- End of Page 578 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \u'Q 18 May 2012 M
! *

forced to work by being ilogged and beaten. The witness saw such floggings on two
occasions.3756 On the first occasion, soldiers arrested a civilian for refusing to carry out
diamond mining work. One of them beat the civilian on the buttocks and took him to
work.3757 On the second occasion, a civilian tried to hide to avoid work but was discovered
by soldiers, who beat him on his back and buttocks with a cane and took him back to
work.3758
1632. Karmoh Kanneh testified to the imposition of two ‘government days’ per week when
the civilians had to mine for the AFRC/RUF goverrm1ent.3759 Four days were ‘free’ mining
for soldiers and civilians and the seventh day was a rest day when no mining took place. The
witness stated that any diamond found on a government day belonged to the government and
was handed over to either a government committee, the AFRC, Mompleh or Sam Bockaiie
personally.3760 Even on a non-govermnent day, big diamonds were taken from the
civilians.376l
1633. Alex Bao, a civil police officer based in Kenema Town in the relevant period,
testified that the AFRC/RUF in Kenema Town, commanded by Issa Sesay and Akim,
fonned a strong force and left for Tongo Fields.3762 Several days later, he spoke with many
displaced civilians arriving in Kenema from Tongo, who told him that the AFRC/RUF had
captured many able-bodied men and forced them to mine diamonds for them.3763 The
witness later heard that RUF Banya was in charge of the RUF in Tongo Field.3764
1634. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that during the AFRC government period both the
AFRC and RUF were mining in Tongo under the control of the AFRC Secretaiiat led by
Staff Sergeant ‘Junior Sherrif’. The witness learned from a report by Sherrif that it was the
civilians who were doing the mining under the orders of the RUF and AFRC. The witness
knew the circumstances under which the civilians were mining in Tongo because he had
3756 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9368-9, 9371-3.
W Karmoh Kaaaah, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9374. ,
375* Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9374-5.
3759 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9373, 9375.
Nw Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 93 76-80.
ml Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9376-7.
3762 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15055
3763 Exhibit P-173, "TF1-122, AFRC Transcript 24 June 2005", p. 15056; Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF
Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15159.
lm Exhibit P-174, "TF1-122, RUF Transcript 7 July 2005", p. 15159.

---- End of Page 579 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % QN 18 May 2012

356 22
experienced the same thing in Kono, where the civilians were forced to mine under
gunpoint.3765 The witness testified that "what 1 knew was that they had what they called two
pile — two pile system. And they also used another way whereby civilians would excavate
the gravel and share it between the RUF and the civilians. There were areas where they
actually used force that you never had anything".3766
1635. Witness TF1-567 testified that he was one of the fighters who attacked and captured
Tongo Fields together with ‘Mosquito’ in 1997. He remained there until the Junta was
dislodged from Freetown and the Kamajors had dislodged the AFRC/RUF fiom Tongo.3767
Mosquito and Eddie Kamieh then organised mining in Tongo under the auspices of a
civilian chairman. A&er this Chairman escaped with some of the diamonds, Sam Bockarie
appointed one of his bodyguards, Mohamed Kanneh, to channel diamonds through to him.
Eddie Kanneh appointed Junior Sherrif to do the same.3768
1636. TF1-567 testified that fighters and civilians carried out ‘government’ mining in
Tongo Fields, and specifically at Sand Sand and Cyborg Ground.3769 Civilians were
‘collected’ by soldiers to do so.3770 Civilians who were mining were watched by soldiers
with guns. lf a soldier suspected that a civilian had stolen a diamond, he would demand that
the civilian present the diamond and if the civilian did not, the fighter would kill him. Any
civilians who refused to work would be beaten up and forced to work.377l Any diamonds
found during ‘government’ mining were given directly to Sam Bockarie. The witness
understood that Mohamed Kanneh also chamielled diamonds to Eddie Kamieh but never
personally saw such diamonds being handed over.3772
1637. Abdul Conteh was a secondary school teacher who was carrying out diamond mining
in 1996 and 1997 on land he had inherited in the village of Sandeyeima, Tongo Fields. In the
3765 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7913, 7915.
3766 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7913-7915.
W TF1-567, Transcript 2 Juiy 2008, p. 12890.
3768 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12884-5.
Wig TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12886, 12888-9.
WO TF1—567,Transc1ipt2 Juiy 2008, p. 12886.
377* TF1-567, Transcript 2 Juiy 2008, pp. 12886-7.
im TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12886-7.

---- End of Page 580 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QL 18 May 2012

relevant period, he was in Tongo Fields between ll August 1997 and 10 November
1997-3773
1638. The witness testified that on 11 August 1997, while he was at his mining site, he
heard heavy gunfire. He then saw a group of combatants, wearing red pieces of cloth tied to
their foreheads moving from Tongo Fields to Kenema. He identified one of these
combatants as Sam Bockarie, having later seen him in Tongo.3773
1639. Conteh testified that he was aware that the AFRC conducted surface diamond mining
during the relevant period in the Tongo Fields area, predominantly at Cyborg Pit, which he
estimated to be 400 yards from the township of Tongo.3773 The witness estimated that at
least 300 people worked there every day under the control of Sam Bockarie and his RUF
soldiers. The witness's office was located on the main road and he could see civilians being
marched to the township of Tongo. The wives of the captured civilians told him that their
villages had been raided by the RUF soldiers. He described how the civilians were tied
together in ‘twos’ by their shirts ‘like slaves’.3773 l
1640. Conteh was forced to stop mining his land completely because it was requisitioned
by the AFRC for their mining.3777 After the AFRC took over, there was no further civilian
mining undertaken because all mining was then done for the govemment.3773 He testified to
‘government’ mining being carried out at Cyborg, Wuima, Bomi, Pandembu and his own
area, Sandeyiema.3773
1641. The witness described three occasions in which he heard that the AFRC/RUF had
sought to prevent private civilian mining continuing in Tongo Fields. First, he heard that
Sam Bockarie sent child soldiers to Pandembu, a village in the Tongo Fields area,373O to kill
civilians who were mining for themselves instead of for the AFRC/RUF government.373l
3773 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 14796-7.
377* Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17514-5.
3775 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17532-3.
3773 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17534-5.
*777 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17535.
3778 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17537,
3779 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17535-6.
3730 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17538.
373l Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537-17538.

---- End of Page 581 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T j G1; 18 May 2012 w
\

.3% sw
Three civilians were killed by the child soldiers.3782 Conteh and the other Caretaker
Committee members went to investigate, and saw the three corpses with bullet wounds.3783
He also heard reports through the Caretaker Committee at Tongo that child combatants had
killed two civilians who were washing gravel and that several more had been wounded at his
former mine at Sandeyeima. He also heard that three civilians were killed and two were
wounded at Wuima.3784
1642. The witness saw armed RUF combatants guarding workers at Cyborg Pit.3785 He
stated that the civilians were mining in ‘very rough conditions’ and were fed ‘two cups of
garri’ after a day's mining. The civilian miners were not otherwise paid for their work. The
AFRC/RUF held the civilians in the ‘headquarters campus’ overnight and gave each group
rest after three-day work cycles during which time the civilians remained ‘under
command’.3786
1643. Abdul Conteh was introduced to Sam Bockarie on 16 August 1997 at the OC
Secretariat, Sekou Kunateh's office. He testified that Sam Bockarie did not stay in Tongo
Fields permanently but came each day with rebels to collect diamonds from Sekou Kunateh,
arriving every morning before 8am and leaving at 6pm for Kenema Town.3787 He also
testified to seeing AFRC soldiers in Tongo Fields during the relevant period but could not
estimate the exact number, except that it was less than the number of RUF rebe1s.3788 Conteh
testified that he saw diamonds being counted and weighed in the office of Sekou Kunateh,
the OC Secretariat. He said Kunateh told him that the diamonds were being forwarded to
Sam Bockarie.3789
1644. Charles Ngebeh, was one of the RUF rebels who took part in the attack on Tongo
Fields in 1997 and remained there to mine until the ‘AF RC left power’.379O He stated that the
attack took place during the rainy season of June/July 1997. He testified that the AFRC and
RUF mined in Tongo using the labour of civilians forced from their homes to carry gravel
3782 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537-17538.
3783 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17538.
3784 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537-8; Transcript 30 September 1998, pp. 17555-6.
3785 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17537-8.
3786 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17542-3.
3787 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17540-1.
mg Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17541-2.
3789 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17543-4.

---- End of Page 582 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T GNL 18 May 2012

A 3% 9*5*
and sand. lf someone refused to mine he would either be killed or beaten up. Civilians were
sometimes allowed to take a portion of the gravel for themselves.379l
1645. TF 1-590 testified that during the relevant period he lived in Kenema for 10 months.
In cross-examination, he testified to hearing about the RUF forcing people to mine
diamonds in Tongo. He saw civilians being harassed by the RUF and AFRC to undertake
‘ government mining’ and saw people who had their implements and money confiscated. The
witness's extended family members, including cousins and nephews, were forced to mine.
However, the witness was never personally prevented from mining in his village or from
keeping the diamonds he found.3792
1646. According to DCT-068, a member of the RUF3793 and former miner, who visited
Tongo Fields at some point in 1998 during the Junta period, the miners were guarded by
men with guns at the Tongo Fields mines for ‘security reason’ to protect them against enemy
attack, not to forcibly take the diamonds from them or for any other sort of ‘coercion’.3794
He agreed that there were incidents in which miners had been shot in the pits but played
down any suggestion that this was widespread, stating that the main cause of the shootings
of civilians were civilians crossing without permission into the AFRC/RUF-designated "no-
go" areas.3795
1647. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from another Defence witness, Issa Sesay, that
the RUF mined in Tongo Fields, in joint control with the AFRC, from August 1997 when
Sam Bockarie captured the area from the Kamajors until the Kamajors pushed them out
again in January 1998.37% He corroborated Karmoh Kanneh's evidence that he, Kanneh,
took part in the attack on Tongo in l997. Sesay stated that Bockarie then promoted Kanneh
to the rank of Captain and appointed him commander of the RUF in Tongo.3797 Issa Sesay
could not give detailed evidence about the conditions for civilians in Tongo during the Junta
period as he was not there on a daily basis. He testified however to having heard about
3790 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37864, 37886-7.
wl Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37871-3.
3192 TF1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11913-5.
3793 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, pp. 37075-37078.
3794 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, pp. 37142-3.
3795 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, pp. 37143-4.
37% Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44650-44651.
3797 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, pp. 44783-44785.

---- End of Page 583 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T OA 18 May 2012
t ,.

3 F! 9*4
forced mining there and that civilians were allowed to wash gravel for themselves on some
days-3798
1648. TF1-371, an RUF commander, testified that during the Junta administration, he
visited Tongo Fields, which was being run by the RUF through their mining commanders,
and SLA with an SLA Secretariat. He saw ‘hundreds of civilians in open fields mining
diamonds’ and digging for gravel, watched over by armed guards holding AK-47s.3799 He
was told by a commander there, Major Gweh, that the civilians were locals of the area who
had been captured during the fighting. Others were former CDF Kamajors or their
sympathisers38OO. He testified that workers in Tongo Fields were not paid.38Ol Diamonds
mined in Tongo Fields during the Junta period were handed over to Sam Bockarie and Issa
Sesay.38O2
Findings
1649. The Trial Chamber has already determined that the AFRC and RUF attacked Tongo
Fields in August 1997 and conducted mining operations there under the command and
control of Sam Bockarie. The AFRC and RUF left Tongo Fields in January 1998 when
attacked by the CDF and Kamajor fighters.38O3
1650. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the AFRC
and RUF abducted and forced a large but unknown number of civilians to engage in mining
in Tongo Fields during the relevant period. With the exception of Defence witness DCT-
068, all the witnesses testified to civilians being forced to mine in Tongo Fields,
predominantly at Cyborg Pit. Further, Augustine Mallah, Dauda Aruna Fornie, Alex Bao,
TF1—567, Abdul Conteh, Charles Ngebeh and TF1-371 provided testimony that civilians
were ‘collected’ or ‘captured’ and forced to go to the mines to work. Augustine Mallah is
the only witness to suggest that civilians were initially gathered for work by a committee of
civilian elders, with forcible abductions from civilians’ homes only occurring in late 1997.
The Trial Chamber notes however that Mallah's evidence pertaining to the earlier civilian
3798 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, p. 46373
3709 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2340 (CS).
3800 TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2339.
jam TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2337.
3802 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2341.
3803 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful

---- End of Page 584 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GL 18 May 2012 fm


ZXZ}?
involvement in the collecting of civilians to work in the mines is based on hearsay as Mallah
testified to hearing this from the OC Secretariat, whereas the later evidence of worsened
conditions, including the abductions of civilians, is an eye-witness account. The evidence of
the other witnesses points overwhelmingly to a systematic practice of civilian abductions as
a precursor to the enforced mining in the Tongo Fields.
1651. The evidence shows that those civilians who refused to work met with violence. For
example, Augustine Mallah testified to witnessing civilians both flogged and killed and to
flogging civilians himself if they refused to mine for him, while TF1-062 described how one
of the men working with him was beaten for seeking to avoid work. Karmoh Kanneh also
described two occasions when civilians were flogged or beaten for refusing to work.
1652. On the basis of the testimony of TF1-062, Augustine Mallah, Karmoh Kanneh, TF1-
567, Abdul Conteh, DCT-068 and TF1-371, the Trial Chamber finds that civilians were
forced to labour in the presence of` armed guards, who beat or killed those who attempted to
escape or committed other perceived breaches of the mining rules. The AFRC/RUF thereby
controlled the civilians’ physical environment and took measures to prevent their escape.
For example, Witness TF1-062 testified to watching, on two occasions, AFRC/RUF soldiers
shoot and kill civilian miners who were alleged to have disobeyed orders.
1653. The explanation provided by DCT-068 that the armed guards were stationed at the
mines to protect civilians from attacks by government forces is not accepted by the Trial
Chamber, since it is contrary to the wealth of evidence demonstrating that the armed guards
were there to prevent the civilians from escaping and/or stealing diamonds.
1654. The Trial Chamber further finds that such work was undertaken either entirely
without substantive pay or that civilians were given wholly insufficient compensation in the
form of meagre food items. Civilians were forced to deliver diamonds they found to
members of the AFRC or RUF and any attempt by a civilian to keep a mined diamond was
met with violence. For example, TF1—O62 testified that civilians received no food, mining
equipment or payment from the AFRC/RUF administration. Augustine Mallah described
how civilians were deprived of food and any diamonds found would be confiscated by the
AFRC/RUF, a fact corroborated by Dauda Aruna Fornie, Karmoh Kanneh and TF1-567.
killings in Kenema District (25 May 1997 to about 31 March 1998) supra.

---- End of Page 585 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3—O1—T Gx 18 May 2012

Abdul Conteh testified to witnessing miners being given only ‘two cups of g&I`I`1’ for their
work.
1655. Although the Trial Chamber heard evidence from TF1-062, Kamioh Kanneh and Issa
Sesay that civilians were permitted to keep and sell diamonds collected on some days of the
week and may have worked voluntarily on ‘non-government days’, this does not alter its
finding that, at least on ‘govemment days’ civilians were forced to mine without pay and
without their consent.
1656. Whilst the evidence before the Trial Chamber is not conclusive about the number of
civilians mining at any one time in the Tongo Fields area, witnesses provided estimates of
between 150-200 (DAF) and over 1000 (TF1-062). The Trial Chamber finds it reasonable to
conclude that the total number exceeds these figures given the testimonies it has heard
describing how civilians continued to be abducted and forced to work in Tongo Fields
throughout AFRC/RUF occupation.
1657. The Trial Chamber finds that the conditions in which civilians worked at the mines
cumulatively created an atmosphere of terror in which genuine consent was not possible.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that through abductions,
deprivation of liberty and forced mining without pay in 1997 and 1998, members of the
AFRC/RUF forces intentionally asserted and exercised powers of ownership over civilians
in Kenema District.
Conclusion
1658. The evidence adduced by the Prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that in
Kenema District during the Indictment period, members of the AFRC/RUF forces3804
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over a large but unknown number of civilians
T by depriving them of their freedom and forcing them to mine for diamonds in various
locations in the Tongo Fields area.
1659. The Trial Chamber has already found that the chapeau requirements in relation to the
crime of enslavement have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.3805 The Trial Chamber
3804 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kenema District (25 May 1997 to about 31 March 1998) supra.
3805 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para, 559 supra.

---- End of Page 586 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T // W 18 May 2012

gr! M
further finds in relation to Kenema District that the acts of the perpetrators in each of the
above crimes of enslavement formed part of the attack directed against the civilian
population and that the perpetrators knew that the abductions of civilians and their use as
forced labour formed a part of` that attack. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the
elements of enslavement as a crime against humanity (Count 10) have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Kono District
1660. The lndictment alleges that between about 1 February 1998 and about 18 January
2002, members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance and/or Liberian fighters
abducted an unknown number of civilians, and took them to various locations outside the
District, or to locations within the District such as AF RC and/or RUF camps, Tombodu or
Tumbodu, Koidu and Wondedu, and used them as forced labour.3806
1661. ln relation to enslavement alleged to have taken place in Kono, the Trial Chamber
has considered the evidence of witnesses Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Tamba Yomba Ngekia,
Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Komba Sumana, Dennis Koker, Perry Kamara, Alice Pyne, Finda
Gbamanja, Samuel Komba, lbrahim Fofana, Emmanuel Bull, Sahr Charles, Alex Tamba
Teh, Gibril Sesay and TF 1-362, as well as Exhibit P-078.
(a) Kono District in general
Evidence
1662. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that when he arrived in Kono around mid-March
1998, he brought with him some civilians that he had captured in Makeni and used them to
carry loads.3807 Johnny Paul Koroma held a meeting in Koidu Town in which he declared
Kono a no-go zone for civilians and ordered the troops "to get some able bodied civilians
who will assist us and they will serve as recruits".3808 Koroma ordered that only captured
civilians who were able-bodied were to be spared, the rest were to be executed.38U9 Soon
after this meeting the witness and other members of his squad, including the RUF, started
3806 Indictment, paras 23, 25.
3807 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7975-7976.
3808 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7950.
’8°" Alimamy Bobson Sesay, rmsmpr 17 April 2008, p. 7952. 1

---- End of Page 587 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /5/ Gu, 18 May 2012

executing Koroma's orders and shot to death an unknown number of civilians in Koidu
Town.381O The witness gave further evidence about organising food-finding patrols in the
Kono forest, capturing unarmed civilians, taking their food and using them to carry food
they had just stolen. They sometimes also took along civilians to carry the food they had
taken from other civilians.38l1
Findings
1663. Alimamy Bobson Sesay's evidence establishes that civilians captured by the RUF
and AFRC in Kono District were forced to carry loads, go on food—finding missions and
carry the looted food back, in circumstances in which they had no freedom of choice or
movement in that they were kept in captivity in a very wlnerable position by armed men.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that by depriving the
civilians of their liberty and forcing them to work, members of the AFRC/RUF forces38l2
. intentionally exercised powers of ownership over these civilians from around mid-March
1998.
(b) Koidu
(i) Cagng of Loads
1664. The Prosecution alleges that between 1 February 1998 and 18 January 2002, civilians
were abducted b the RUF and AFRC/RUF and forced to erforrn various t es of labour,
Y P YP
particularly carrying loads.3813 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Tamba
Yomba Ngekia, Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Komba Sumana and Dennis Koker, and Exhibit P—078
in relation to these allegations.
Evidence
1665. Tamba Yomba Ngekia confirmed evidence he had given in the RUF Trial} 814 and a
transcript of that testimony was admitted into evidence.3 815 He testified in the RUF Trial that
mo Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7954, 7955.
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7981.
im See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.
im Prosecution Final Trial Brief para 1093.
3814 Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18235.
W Exhibit P-196, "TF1—077, RUF riaiisciipi 20 Jury 2004".

---- End of Page 588 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / OL 18 May 2012

on 16 or 17 December 199988l8 he was asleep in his house in Koidu Town when he heard
heavy gun fire. At dawn he went outside and saw many corpses. He was captured by armed
RUF men — "they all had guns"88l7 — along with almost 50 other civilians and forced to carry
looted goods such as household equipment, clothes and radios to Tombodu. The men told
him: "We are RUF. You are now in our control. You are no longer in ECOMOG
eontrol".88l8
1666. Dennis Koker, who was in Koidu in early 1998 after the ECOMOG 1nte1vention,88l9’
testified that he saw RUF and ‘juntas’ capture civilians at gunpoint in Kono and use them to
carry looted property. lf a civilian refused, he would be shot.888) The rebels would fire
warning shots to frighten civilians and ‘put them under their control’.882l Koker personally
used civilians to carry loads to Gandorhun.8822 Women were also taken as ‘wives’.8828
1667. Koker also testified that RUF and ‘juntas’ captured civilians, including many women
and children, at gunpoint to provide ‘reinforcement to fight for them’ and forcibly ‘initiated’
them. Some were taken to the training base in Bunumbu.8824 Anyone who refused was shot.
He said that none of the top commanders tried to stop the practice because ‘they wanted the
civilians to work for them because it was for free. It was slavery.’8828
1668. Sheku Bah Kuyateh testified that he was captured in Koidu Town by an armed man
and taken to work at Kainkordu Road as a mechanic for the RUF commander CO Matthew,
88l8 On cross-examination in the present case, the witness confirmed that despite his evidence in the RUF trial
and his prior statement to the Prosecution, he did not recall the precise date on which he had been captured, only
that it was in "’98, towards ‘99". He later agreed that the 16 December 1999 should stand in testimony. See
Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18241-4. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, although he
exhibited some confusion about this date, that this event occurred in December 1999.
W Erincit P-196, ··Tr1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004", p. 18630.
88l8 Exhibit P-196, "TF1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004", pp. 18629-18630.
8818) Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1223, 1236.
8820 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1241-5. See also Demiis Koker, Transcript 16 January 2008,
p. 1342. The witness was answering questions that were asked specifically in respect of Koidu Town although in
his testimony he refers to Kono, not Koidu. ln view of the fact that the witness explains that the RUF/AFRC
were in control of ‘the surrounding vil1ages’ in Kono District as well as Koidu Town itself and that he personally
visited other villages (Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1244), the Trial Chamber finds that the
witness is not confining his evidence to Koidu Town but may additionally be referring to any of those
surrounding villages.
*2* Dcnnis Kciccr, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1243-5.
3822 Demiis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1246.
8828 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1245.
8884 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1261.
3825 Demiis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1257.

---- End of Page 589 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 861 18 May 2012

. gy632
who was a Liberian, between February and April 1998. The witness was placed under armed
guards so that he would not move without their knowledge and described himself as a
‘slave’. There was ‘nowhere for [him] to go away from them’. The witness met another boy,
a Fullah, who told him that he had also been captured by CO Matthew and worked for him
as a mechanic. The witness did not know whether the Fullah was free to leave or not.3826 On
cross—examination, he clarified a prior statement to the Prosecution in which he stated that
he had remained ‘over a month’ with CO Matthew, confirming that he had remained
between February and April. On re—examination, the witness testified that he knew that the
rebels were looking for mechanics at the time so, despite his modest training, he deliberately
told the Fullah boy that he was a mechanic so that the boy would not kill him.3827
1669. Komba Sumana testified that in approximately March/April 1998 he was hiding in
the bush and saw his parents and siblings captured by armed "rebels" in his father's hut
outside of Pakidu village.3828 Some of the rebels "had combats, full combats on. Some
others had combat trousers and civilian clothes".3829 The witness saw the rebels ask one man
for rice and when he replied that he did not have any they tipped the hot water heated for the
rice over his head. The witness saw a rebel tie a rope around his father's throat and ask him
for rice. When his father started crying they removed the rope and tied it around his
brother's throat and asked him for rice.3830 The man who had hot water tipped over his head
had wounds all over his head and he carries the scars to this day.383 1 The witness saw that his
father, mother, elder brothers and six other people had all been captured and he saw the
rebels put rice and other belongings they had looted onto the heads of these people and "ask"
them to carry the loads to Koidu Town.3S32 As these civilians carried the loads "there were
some rebels at their back and some in front and they were in the middle".3833 Sumana further
testified that his brother Kai was being held in a house in Koidu Town by "rebels" called
3*26 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, pp. l9695~70l. ,
3827 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, pp. 19766
3828 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17894, 17895.
3*29 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17897.
3830 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17896.
ml Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17897.
3832 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. l7893—l7900. The witness was unable to give a time period
for these events except that they happened in the months following the time ‘the soldiers overthrew the
government’ when the rainy season had started (Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17884, 17886,
17894). The Trial Chamber has previously found that this is a reference to the ECOMOG Intervention of 14
February 1998.
3833 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17900.

---- End of Page 590 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T J UU 18 May 2012

38*682
Killer and Peleto where he was tasked with domestic chores including doing laundry,
fetching water and pounding rice.3834
1670. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he took civilians on food-finding patrols in 1
Koidu in May/June 1998 and forced them to carry loads.3835 Bobson Sesay said that food
finding was "a continuous process": "From our entry into Koidu Town right to our
withdrawal it continued to happen".m6 (The circumstances under which these civilians were
forced to carry loads is more fully discussed under the heading "Kono District in general"
above.)
1671. Exhibit P-078, a report by Amnesty lntemational, tells of the abduction of a woman
and her five children from Njalia Nimikoro, a village 10 kilometres south-west of Koidu
around 18 August 1998 as well as the release by rebels of 250 captured civilians from Koidu
around 15 August 1998.3837
Findings
1672. Exhibit P-078 provides corroborative evidence that members of the AFRC/RUF
forcesmg abducted civilians in and around Koidu in August 1998.
1673. Considering the circumstances of N gekia's capture in Koidu Town in December
1999, with many corpses lying around and men armed with guns telling the civilians that
they were now in RUF control, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the civilians were forced
to carry the looted goods to Tombodu. The Trial Chamber is satisfred beyond reasonable
doubt that members of the RUF/AF RC, by depriving the civilians of their liberty and forcing
them to carry loads, intentionally exercised powers of ownership over the civilians.
1674. Dennis Koker's first-hand evidence that civilians were captured at gunpoint and
forced to carry loads under threat of being shot if they refused, establishes that civilians were
deprived of their liberty and forced to carry loads against their will. The Trial Chamber is
3834 Kcrrrba srrrrrarra, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17994-7.
3835 Arrmarrry Bobson sccay, Transcript 21 Appr 2008, p, 8067.
3836 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8068.
3837 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 4 1998 4 A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty lntemational
Report"; p. 15, para 3.
3838 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.

---- End of Page 591 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T J UU 18 May 2012

Bmw
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces thereby
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over them in early 1998. (Koker also testified
that other civilians were captured and recruited into their forces, and that some civilians
were brought to Bunumbu. His evidence in relation to the training of these civilians at
Bunumbu has been considered in the section on Bunumbu/Camp Lion in Kailahun
o1Smct."")
1675. Kuyateh gave first—hand evidence that when he was initially captured he was told by
his captor he would not be released and that he was put under armed guard while under RUF
CO Matthew's control. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that Kuyateh was deprived of his liberty and forced to work as a mechanic and that members
of the RUF/AFRC thereby intentionally exercised powers of ownership over him between
February and April 1998.
1676. ln relation to the carrying of loads by Komba Sumana's parents, brothers and other
civilians, the Trial Chamber is satisfied on the evidence that they were forced to do so. The
presence of armed men and the earlier demonstrations of violence by the rebels created
circumstances in which it was not possible that these civilians acted under their own free
will. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the rebels, who were members of the AFRC/RUF forces,3840 by depriving these civilians of
their liberty and forcing them to carry loads, intentionally exercised powers of ownership
over them in around March/April 1998.
1677. Further, Sumana gave first—hand evidence that his brother was prevented from
escaping from the house in Koidu Town where he was held captive by the rebels, who had
refused Sumana's requests for his release. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
Sumana's brother, Kai, was deprived of his liberty and forced to do domestic chores.
Consequently, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the
AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over him.
1678. ln relation to Alimamy Bobson Sesay's evidence that civilians carried loads on food-
finding missions, the Trial Chamber has found that these civilians were deprived of their
3839 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement); Bunumbu/Camp Lion infra.
3840 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killi11gS); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.

---- End of Page 592 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T gp 18 May 2012 E

3%%
liberty and forced to carry loads by members of the AFRC/RUF who intentionally exercised
powers of ownership over them (See under heading "Kono District in general" above).
(ii) Forced Military Training
1679. The Prosecution alleges that adults and young boys were forcibly recruited into
fighting forces and coercively trained in Koidu. These captive civilians were trained in
weaponry and were issued machetes with which they would be required to perform
amputations.384l
Evidence
1680. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that when he arrived in Kono around mid-March
1998, he brou t with him some civilians that he had ca tured in Makeni and used them to
P
carry loads. Some of the able-bodied ones, including women, were trained and used for
military purposes.3342 Johnny Paul Koroma held a meeting in Koidu Town in which he
declared Kono a no-go zone for civilians and ordered the troops "to get some able bodied
civilians who will assist us and they will serve as rec1uits".3343 Koroma ordered that only the
captured civilians who were able-bodied were to be spared, the rest were to be executed.3844
The witness testified that he and other commanders gave civilians basic weapons training at
Masingbi Road in Koidu Town from mid-March to April 1998. Training was going on in
two areas: "the RUF side and the SLA side".3843 Some of the civilians who were trained
were small boys (SBUs) around the ages of eight, ten and twelve; some were adults between
the ages of 25 to 30.3846 Some SBUs were issued with machetes and taken to Yomandu to
carry out amputations on civilians.33344
Findings 4
1681. The Trial Chamber finds on this evidence that it was not possible that these civilians,
in particular the small boys, were receiving military training of their own free will. The Trial
334l Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para 1094.
3*42 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7975-6.
3343 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7950.
3344 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7952.
3 *45 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7976.
3343 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7977.
W Aumamy Bpbspp Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7976-9.

---- End of Page 593 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T "’ 18 May 2012
I

Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AF RC/RUF forces,33343
by depriving these civilians of their freedom and forcing them to undergo military training,
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over them at Masingbi Road in Koidu Town
from mid-March until April 1998.
(c) Tombodu
(i) Carrgng of Loads/ F orced Labour
1682. The Prosecution alleges that civilians were abducted from various locations and
forced to carry loads to Tombodu.3349 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of
Samuel Komba, Tamba Yomba Ngekia, Ibrahim F ofana and Sahr Charles, and Exhibit P-
014 in relation to these allegations.333O
Evidence
1683. Samuel Komba333l confirmed evidence he had given in the AFRC Trial that in
March 1998,3332 soldiers dressed in uniform took him and his wife to Giema, told them to lie
down and gave orders for them to be shot if they tried to escape.3333 They then carried
luggage towards Tombodu. The soldiers also gave two other people loads to carry saying
that the people should come with them because the soldiers were going to save them. The
witness stated that on arrival at Tombodu, the soldiers put the loads of the civilians on the
ground and "we sat down on the ground and they stood on top of us. They were our
bosses".3334 The soldiers also referred to the civilians as slaves.3333
1684. Ibrahim F ofana described being tied up while a house containing his family members
was bumt. He and five other civilians were then given heavy loads of looted goods and
38*8 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killirrgs); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.
3339 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1092.
3330 The Trial Chamber has already considered Ngekia's evidence that he was forced to carry loads from Koidu
Town to Tombodu in the section on Koidu Town. Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10
(Enslavement); Koidu supra.
3333 Samuel Komba, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18145-18186.
3353 See Exhibit P-189, "TFl-072, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", p. 18441.
3*53 Exhibit P-189, "TFl-072, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18440-1.
3854 Exhibit r>~r 89, ··rrr-072, Arrrc Transcript r July 2005**, p. 18444.
3333 See Exhibit P-189, "TFl-072, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18440-6.

---- End of Page 594 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

36*6 8*}
made to carry them to Tombodu at gunpoint by soldiers in military uniform.385° Fofana
testified that this occurred before 5 April 19983857 and after the three men were killed by the
soldiers in February 1998 (as described earlier in his evidence).3858
1685. Sahr Charles3859 confirmed evidence he had given in the RUF case that in Tombodu
around Februar /March 1999,3860 rebels "asked" civilians "with ns over their heads" to
Y gu
bring old vehicles from the bush 3 miles away, which they did.3 861 The rebels also placed
packets of rice, looted goods and coffee on the heads of civilians at gunpoint and arrested
civilians to make them carry the goods from the looted homes back to Tombodu.38°2
Findings
1686. Samuel Komba's evidence establishes that he and three other persons, including his
wife, were forced to carry baggage rrpm Giema to Tombodu in March 1998. As the fighters
gave orders that the civilians should be killed if they escaped, and stood on top of the
civilians claiming that they were the "boss", the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the fighters
exercised physical control over the movements of the civilians, and that the civilians had no
choice but to carry these loads. As the fighters referred to the civilians as slaves, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that they acted intentionally in forcing the civilians to carry these loads.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
members of the AFRC/RUF forces38°3 intentionally exercised powers of ownership over
these civilians.
1687. The Trial Chamber accepts Fofana's evidence of being forced to carry loads by the
soldiers. His evidence is corroborated to a certain extent by Exhibit P-014, which is a video
clip concerning the rebel attack on Fofana's village and the subsequent atrocities committed
by them. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Fofana and four other civilians
were forced to carry heavy loads of looted goods to Tombodu. That they were forced to
3856 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19334-7.
3857 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19343.
3858 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19327.
3859 sam champs, Transcript 15 oprpbpr 2008, pp. 18361-18426.
3860 Exhibit P-199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 13 January 2005", p. 18929.
38m Exhibit P-199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 13 January 2005", pp. 18929-18935.
3862 Exhibit P-199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 13 January 2005", pp. 18929-18935.
3863 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Kil1ings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.

---- End of Page 595 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T (DN 18 May 2012
. J 1

carry these goods at gunpoint guarded by armed fighters indicates that the rebels exerted
physical control over their movement and that they had no choice but to perform this work.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
members of the ARFC/RUF forces6664 intentionally exercised powers of ownership over
F ofana and the other civilians sometime between February and April 1998.
1688. Sahr Charles’ evidence establishes that in February/March 1999 civilians were
forced to carry old vehicles from the bush to Tombodu and that they were also forced to
carry loads of food and looted items. As the civilians had been arrested and forced to carry
these goods at gunpoint, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the rebels exerted physical
control over their movements and that they had no choice but to perform this work. The
Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that members
of the AF RC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over these civilians.
(d) Wondedu A
(i) F ood-finding missions/ Domestic Chores
1689. The Prosecution alleges that enslaved civilians were kept under captivity in
Wondedu and marked with "RUF" and "AFRC" carved on their bodies to prevent them from g
escaping. Civilians were forcibly sent on food—finding missions sometimes 50 miles away
from Wondedu.3666
Evidence
1690. Alex Tamba Teh testified that after he was captured in approximately April 1998,6666
an RUF3667 commander named Rocky took Teh to his base in Wondedu.3666 Upon his
arrival, Teh saw other captured civilians there whom he described as being ‘under captivity’
and who were used as ‘manpower’ to go food-finding for the rebels up to 50 miles away in
Koronko, Koinadugu District.6669 Any food that was found was called ‘ government
6664 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.
3665 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1097.
6666 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 683-8.
6667 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 721. ,
6666 Alex Teh. Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 704.
3*66 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 705-6. 721. The Trial Chamber notes that the Koronko area lies
outside Kono District. However. as the civilians were sent from Kono District on missions to this area, and

---- End of Page 596 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / W 18 May 2012

property’ and civilians who touched it would be shot to death. They were also used to cut
palm nuts and palm fruits.387O All the captured civilians apart from Teh had "RUF" carved
on their fronts and "AFRC" on their backs to prevent them from escaping and going to
ECOMOG.387l Teh also testified that civilians were sent from Wondedu on food—finding
missions, inter alia, to Guinea under the command of AF RC Captain KS Banya.3872
Findings .
1691. The Trial Chamber is satisfied on the evidence of Alex Tamba Teh that in about
April 1998 civilians in Wondedu were forced to go on food-finding missions and carry out
domestic chores. It is further satisfied that all the civilians had "AFRC" and "RUF" carved
into their bodies to prevent them from escaping. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that
the civilians were deprived of their liberty and had no choice but to undertake the food-
finding missions and domestic chores. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over these civilians.
(e) Yengema 2
(i) Forced Military Training
Evidence
1692. The Prosecution alleges that more than 100 captured civilians were forcibly trained
at Yengema training base, located at Koidu Highway, from the end of 1998 until 2000.3873
1693. Witness TF1—362 gave evidence that a training base operated at Yengema, near
Koidu Highway from December 1998 until disarmament in 2000. Over a hundred civilians
were forcibly trained to fight there. Some of these civilians had been transferred from the
previous training camp in Bunumbu while others had been captured by the RUF in Koidu
Town. The witness testified that these civilians underwent physical and practical training,
retumed to the base in Wondedu with the food, the Trial Chamber considers that such missions fall within the
indictment locations.
3870 Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 704.
M Aian ran, rnanapnpr 8 January 2008, pp. 707, 721.
3*72 Aiax ran, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 708, 723.
3873 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 1101.

---- End of Page 597 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / Oo 18 May 2012 M
C X

K E"¢{7O
were trained to use live weapons and that many died during ‘crawling’ training.3874 The
witness testified that recruits who attempted to escape from Yengema were killed, and that
Sesay's b0dyguards, instructors and other recruits killed 5 civilians.3875 After the training,
the "recruits"' were assigned to the frontline commanders including Morris Kallon, Denis
Ming0 and Ramb0.3876
Findings
1694. TFl-362's evidence establishes that civilians died on the training base due to the
harshness of the training, and that those who attempted to escape were killed. The Trial
Chamber is therefore satisfied that the RUF/AFRC deprived these civilians of their liberty,
exercised control over their movements, and forced them to underg0 military training under
the threat of physical vi0lence. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that from approximately December 1998 0nwards, members of the
RUF/AFRC, including TF1-362, intentionally exercised p0wers of ownership over an
unknown number of civilians at Yengema.
(f) AFRC/RUF Camps §iD0mestic Ch0res/Forced Labour/F00d-finding Missions[
1695. The Prosecution alleges that from about 1 February 1998 to about 18 January
2002,3877 civilians were abducted and taken to camps run by the AFRC/RUF and subjected
to forced labour including diamond mining, c0llecting f00d, d0mestic ch0res, military
training and carrying arms and ammunition.3878
1696. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Finda Gbamanja, Peny Kamara,
K0mba Sumana, Alice Pyne, and Exhibit P-051 in respect of these allegations.
Evidence
1697. Finda Gbamanj a testified that she was a y0ung girl living in Koidu Town with her
family when the rebels attacked. She was unable to say what month or year this was, but
3874 TFl-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4916-4917, 4920; TF1-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp.
4921-4924.
3375 Tri-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, p. 4929
3876 TFl-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, p. 4925.
3877 Indictment, para. 25
3878 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1098, 1099, 1102.

---- End of Page 598 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T / G); 18 May 2012
1

remembers that prior to this she had heard on the radio that Johnny Paul Koroma had been
removed from power.3379 She and her family fled to Baima. They stayed there "for a long
period" but fled to the bush when the rebels came. She and her family left the bush during
the rainy season because of the rain and went back to Baima.388O She spent two days there
but on the third day she was captured by rebels. She saw the rebels club her mother with a
gun and shoot her father to death.3881
1698. Gbamanja testified that the rebels took her to Koidu Town, where she stayed with a
female rebel named Hawa and was forced to launder and cook. One day she was sent in
search of vegetables and encountered Sergeant Foday, who said to her: "Madam, which of
the two do you prefer, your life or going to my house‘?" The witness was then taken to
Sergeant Foday's house, where she was forced to have sex with him every night and was
forced to launder, cook and fetch water for him. She stated that she could not run away
because ‘they were all over the place’.3382
1699. The witness testified that when ECOMOG attacked Koidu Town she left with
Sergeant Foday and went to Superman Ground. At that location she was also forced to cook,
launder and have sex with him.3833 Eventually Sgt. Foday's wife came to stay with him, so
the witness was sent to Mamie's house. Mamie was the wife of a friend of Sergeant Foday,
and Mamie was also a rebel. While staying with Mamie, the witness was forced to pound
rice, launder and harvest palm oil.3884 The witness said that she saw how one civilian at
Superman Ground who attempted to escape was recaptured, forced to parade and then had
his testicles lacerated. Rebels then forced other civilians to kill him.3883
1700. Perry Kamara identified Exhibit P—051 as a record of various lists that were normally
kept by Superman and the Joint Security at Superman Ground.3883 The witness recognised
his own name amongst a list of soldiers at Superman Ground, which listed their names and
8878 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, pp. 23835—23837.
8888 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23850.
888' Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23851-23856.
8888 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 2386l—23864.
8888 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23864-23866.
3333 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23867.
8888 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23874
3 888 Exhibit P-051, "UNICEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998"; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February
2008, pp. 3121-3122. The Independent Defence Office (IDU), Military Police (MP) and the Intelligence Officer

---- End of Page 599 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GA 18 May 2012 Q

3*869 2.
ranks.3887 The document includes another hand-written list entitled "Name of Civilians from
Banya Ground and Their Care Taker", which is undated.3888 Kamara testified that the
document coincides with the time he was at Superman Groundmg and that the civilian
women named on the list lived with the commanders a rainst whom their names were listed.
E-
He stated that some of the women were "wives" to the commanders with whom they stayed
and could be used as labourers with the permission of their caretaker.389O
1701. Perry Kamara explained that in Exhibit P-051 under the heading ‘List of manpower
to go for food — SLPA3 891/RUF’3 892 the names listed on the left of the End of Page are civilians who
went for food and the names listed on the right are the armed guards who would accompany
them.3893 Exhibit P-051 has other lists entitled ‘Names of Civilians from Banya Ground’ and
‘Names of New Captives along Guinea/Sierra Leone highway’.3894 Kamara also stated that
the part of Exhibit P-051 entitled ‘Civilian Women and Officers in Charge’3895 indicates the
RUF/AFRC fighters for whom civilians could be required to perform hard labour, domestic
work or enter into a forced marriage.3896
1702. Perry Kamara testified that when the RUF went on food-finding missions from the
camps around Koidu Town, including Superman Ground, Gandorhun Highway, Banya
Ground, Tombodu, Sewafe pass and Yomandu, they would abduct civilians who would then
be forced to carry loads, mine diamonds, and carry out domestic chores in the camps. These
civilians were also used to build the Buedu airstrip and to collect arms and ammunition and
Unit were involved in the maintenance of the document. See Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3138.
3887 Exhibit P-051, "UN1CEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December l998", ERN 00025574(A); Perry Kamara,
Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3123-3124.
3mExhibit P-051, "UN1CEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998", ERN 00025583.
mr Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3127.
3890 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3125-3126.
3801 Kamara testified that SLPA stands for Sierra Leone Peop1e's Army. See Perry Kamara, Transcript 5
February 2008, p. 3127. `
3892 Exhibit P-051, "UN1CEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998", ERN 00025588 and Exhibit P-051,
"UN1CEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as Captives Along the
Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998", ERN 00025589-90.
mf Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 rpbmary 2008, pp. 3126, 3127.
3804 Exhibit P-051, "UN1CEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998", ERN 00025591.
3895 Exhibit P-051, "UN1CEF Exercise Booklet listing Names of Soldiers and Armed Serial Numbers as well as
Captives Along the Guinea and Sierra Leone Border, December 1998", ERN 00025592-95.
38% Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3125-3134.

---- End of Page 600 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T 2% (ZL 18 May 2012 g

3gQ93
food and drugs from Sam Bockarie in Buedu, Kailahun.3897 In order to get food, the RUF
rebels would go to a civilian zone, attack the civilians and force them to carry food from
their homes back to the RUF bases.3898
1703. Komba Sumana, who the Trial Chamber has found was captured in April/May
1998,3899 was taken shortly thereafter to a camp in Kissi Town. The witness said that he was
captured by men wearing "unifonn trousers and civilian clothes" who were speaking
Liberian English39OO. In the camp in Kissi Town he was taken to the boss of the rebels, a
Major Wallace, a Liberian.39Ol The witness said he wanted to leave but was told he had to
stay as he was going to become an SBU. On hearing this, the witness started crying. He
wanted to go and find his family but "they didn’t allow me".39O2 One evening someone came
from PC Ground with a message from 1ssa that all those who had been captured had to
assemble at PC Ground the next moming. The witness was told that "if anybody did not go,
if it was found out later you, whom they would find out, if you are a civilian they will kill
ou".39O3 At PC Ground, 1ssa Sesa assembled the ca tured civilians and stated that
Y Y P
Mosquito had requested that the civilians be sent to Kailahun for training. The selection
process then took place at gunpoint and then they walked for 3 weeks with rebels to
Buedu.39O4 The witness specifically recalled civilians being present at Kissi Town, Banya
Ground and PC Ground who had to carry out domestic chores. He testified that he
ersonall went on food-findin missions, ounded husk rice and fetched water
P Y S P
accompanied by an anned fi ghter.3 905
1704. Alice Pyne, who arrived at PC Ground in February 1998,3906 testified that the RUF
rebels used to go out into the villages around PC Ground and capture civilian men, women
and children. The women were taken as ‘wives’ of the RUF rebels to ‘work for him just like
a woman would work for her husband in the home’. Sometimes they were beaten but some
3897 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3113-7.
3898 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3116.
3899 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers); Abduction and Training of
Komba Sumana in approximately July/ August 1998 supra.
3900 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17908.
3901 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17910.
3902 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17912.
3°O3Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17925, 17926.
3904 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17926-7928
3905 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17912.
3906 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12160.

---- End of Page 601 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03·0l·T CX all 18 May 2012 %

$$59%
were cared for by their ‘husband’ who brought them clothes and food.3907 She testified that
y the civilians were forced to carry loads of property from the places where they were
captured by RUF fighters. They could not refuse because the rebels had guns and if they did
refuse, they would be beaten or shot.39O8
Findings
1705. The Trial Chamber is satisfied on Gbamanja's evidence that she was forced to
perform domestic chores for Hawa and Sergeant Foday in Koidu Town, for Sergeant Foday
and Mamie at Superman Ground and for Sergeant Foday's mother and the RUF at Giema.
The Trial Chamber accepts her evidence that in none of the circumstances described in her
evidence was she able to run away, that attempting to escape would be met by extreme
violence and that refusing to do work would also lead to punishment. The Trial Chamber is
therefore satisfied that none of the domestic duties she performed was done of her own free
will. (The Trial Chamber has previously found that she was also held in captivity by
Sergeant Foday and used as a sex slavewog. Evidence on this aspect of her captivity is
considered in the section dealing with the crime of sexual slavery.)
1706. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the
AFRC/RUF forceswm perpetrated the crime of enslavement in relation to Gbamanja in the
following instances:
i. The female rebel Hawa intentionally exercised powers of ownership over
Gbamanja by depriving her of her liberty and forcing her to perform domestic
duties.
ii. Mamie, a female rebel, intentionally exercised powers of ownership over
Gbamanja by depriving her of her liberty and forcing her to perform domestic
duties.
"’°’ Alice Pyrrp, Transcript 18 Jrrrrr 2008, p. 12195.
W Airpp Pyrrp, Transcript 18 Jrrrrp 2008, pp. 12197-8.
3909 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); Rape of F inda Gbamanja,
Findings supra.
wm Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Kil1ings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 F ebruaiy 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.

---- End of Page 602 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 6'L 18 May 2012 %
1

33 es QS
1707. The Trial Chamber is satisfied from the context that these incidences of enslavement
in relation to Gbamanj a occurred from around April until at least December 1998.
1708. Perry Kamara's evidence is consistent with the evidence given by Alimamy Bobson
Sesay that the RUF captured civilians and forced them to go on food finding missions and to
carry looted food back to RUF bases. Kamara's evidence also corroborates the evidence of
Finda Gbamanj a that captured civilians were used by the RUF to perform domestic chores at
Superman Ground. The Trial Chamber finds that Kamara's evidence is further proof to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the RUF captured civilians and intentionally
exercised rights of ownership over them by depriving them of their liberty and using them as
forced labour. (Kamara's evidence regarding the use of civilians to build the airstrip at
Buedu has been considered in the section on Kailahun.39l I)
1709. Sumana's evidence establishes that he and other civilians at Kissi Town, Banya
Ground and PC Ground carried out domestic chores such as pounding rice, fetching water
and went on food—finding missions. Sumana testified that he was captured by armed rebels,
that he wanted to leave Kissi Town but was told he could not, that he was told that any
civilian who did not assemble at PC Ground would be killed. The Trial Chamber is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt on this evidence that he was deprived of his liberty and forced to
perform these tasks and that members of the RUF thereby intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over him from around April/May 1998. (The Trial Chamber has considered
Sumana's evidence regarding military training in Bunumbu in the section on Kailahun.39l2)
1710. In relation to Alice Pyne's evidence regarding the use of civilian women as wives at
PC Ground, the Trial Chamber has previously found on this evidence that these civilians
were used as sex slaves.39l3 The Trial Chamber is further satisfied on her previously
considered evidence that civilians in PC Ground were forced carry loads of looted property
under threat of being beaten or shot if they refused. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that RUF fighters intentionally exercised powers
of ownership over these civilians from around February 1998.
ml Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement); Kailahun District infra.
im Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement); Kailahun District infra.
W3 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); RUF and AFRC fighters brought
sexual slaves from Koidu Town to PC Ground and Superman Ground in 1998 supra.

---- End of Page 603 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T \'4I

geese
(g) Other Locations
Evidence
1711. Emmanuel Bull testified that he was living with his family in Mortema, Kono, in
February 1998. ECOMOG had ousted the AFRC government and the AFRC/RUF forces
had fled from Mortema.39l4 However, one day Bull and his family heard approaching
gunfire and feared the return of the AFRC/RUF forces, so they decided to flee to another
village called Fakoyia. ln all, about 21 family members fled, including Bull, his father and
his elder brother Samuel. Rather than go to Fakoyia itself they decided that it was safer to
hide in a cave near there. They lived in the cave for more than a month; Bull spent his
birthday there on 2 March.39l5 One day Bull returned to the cave from gathering bush yams
and learned that AFRC/RUF fighters had been there and had raped two girls, "A" and "B"
(the girls’ real names were suppressed to protect their privacy) and had taken A away with
them. Bull was shocked. His love for A made him want to follow the fighters to rescue
her.39l6 He planned to befriend the fighters if he could, in order to find A.39l7
1712. Six or seven men, including Bull, his father and brother Samuel, set out to follow the
fighters in the direction of Mortema. On the way, they encountered five well·armed
AFRC/RUF fighters who warned them not to run away. Bull and his group all ran away to
the bush. Some escaped but Bull was captured, along with his father and brother. The
fighters took away their personal belongings and then threatened to kill them for running
away. The three men begged the fighters not to kill them.39l8 They were then forced to walk
at gun point towards Fakoyia. On the way, the fighters found some people hiding in the
bush. The people fled but the fighters captured one of them, a woman, and took her along
with them. The fighters made Bull and the others carry the belongings of the people who had
fled. Bull carried on his head a fowl coop and a gallon of palm oil. He had no choice as he
believed he would be killed if he refused. His father was driven away by the fighters, who
did not want old people walking with them.3 919
3914 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17194-17197.
3915 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17202-17206.
W6 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17212, 17238.
mw Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17219—17220.
3918 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17220-17222.
3919 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17225-17231.

---- End of Page 604 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T /6/ "W- 18 May 2012

1713. On the way, the fighters saw a palm wine tapper in a palm tree. One of them pointed
a gun at him and told him to climb down. While their attention was thus distracted, Bull's
brother ran away. One of the fighters threatened Bull that he would suffer for what his
brother did. Bull then begged them not to kill him.392O The fighters decided that Bull should
carry the load of rice his brother had been carrying. Oneof the fighters beat the palm wine
tapper viciously about the head with his gun butt, so that he was bleeding from the mouth,
nose and ears. Bull could not tell whether the palm wine tapper was dead but the fighters left
him lying there and they all moved on.392l Bull was now carrying a bag of rice, the palm oil
and the fowl coop. Bull testified that it was not easy; he was perspiring and exhausted but
carried on.3922 When they stopped to rest, Bull was able to befriend an AFRC/RUF fighter
named Pikin. Bull's motive in doing this was to go to the fighters’ camp in order to find A.
When the group reached a certain area the rebels told the witness that he could put the load
down and they would ask someone else to come and collect it. The witness had hopes of
finding A so he pleaded to remain with them and they agreed.3923 Pikin later allowed Bull to
meet A and Bull was able to give her some advice on how to survive. After this meeting,
Pikin told Bull to leave the group and Bull walked away into the forest.3923
1714. Bull testified that in April 1998 he was walking near Mamboma, Kono, when he was
ambushed at gunpoint and captured by 11 to 15 AFRC/RUF men. Later in the day, the same
men gave him a bag and a two—gallon rubber container of palm oil and told him to follow
them ‘the few yards’ to Mamboma.3923 When Bull entered Mamboma he saw dead bodies
and "a head cut off and placed on a stick". One of the fighters said to him: "You, that's the
way we are going to cut your head".3923 Bull then described how he, his father and brother
were instructed by AFRC/RUF men to carry loads of stolen property from Mamboma to
Njaiama Nimikoro. Bull said that the man in charge was called Cobra, an RUF Liberian
man, who was "the number 1 violence man, because he will go there threaten people, hit
people".3927 Everybody was heavily laden. His brother, who is handicapped, was still made
to walk. Everybody was tired and Bull was walking bare foot on thorns; "it was a really,
3930 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17231—17233.
3 933 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17234-17236.
3932 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17235- 17236.
3923 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17236-17239.
3934 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17239-17241.
mj Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17261-3.
3 936 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17264.

---- End of Page 605 ---------------------------


Case No.:

32 678
reall , reall , reall , sad ex erience". The AFRC/RUF fi ters ke t oin u and down
Y Y Y P P 8 8 P
urging the civilians to keep walking.33333 Cobra told them "if anybody close [sic] your eyes
on us...we are going to close our eyes on you". Bull understood this to mean that if anybody
said they were tired they would be executed.3329 A suckling mother who became tired was
shot and somebody took her baby.3930 About an hour away from Njaiama Nimikoro, a
quarrel broke out between the RUF and AFRC and Bull remembered one of them saying:
"Okay, let's put all the civilians on one side. We will kill all of them".393l However, the
situation was calmed and the civilians were told to remove the items the were carr in and
Y Y 8
Bull testified to walking this last stretch without load.3932 In Njaiama Nimikoro, individual
AFRC/RUF men selected civilians from the group whom they wanted to take away with
them. For exam le, one woman later told Bull that the AF RC/RUF man who had selected
P
her had taken her vir init and used her as his wife. A lot of women were in the ou , so
8 Y gf P
that one AFRC/RUF man would have four or five women. Children were also selected and
taken away by AFRC/RUF men.3933
1715. Finall , Bull testified that at a location between Woama and Baima, the AF RC/RUF
Y
rebels, acting on orders from Bai Bureh, forced around 16-20 civilians, including the
witness, to train for two weeks in weaponry and military manoeuvres. In relation to the
training, an AFRC rebel told him ‘if you don’t do it, you are dead’.3933 He testiiied to being
forced to do hard exercise during training while sick with malaria and malnourished. If the
trainees were perceived to be underperforming they would be hit on the back with a
machete.3933 The civilians were also sent on food-finding missions with armed fighters.33336
Findings
1716. The Trial Chamber is satisfied, based on Bull's evidence, that he and other civilians
were forced to carry loads from Mortema to an unidentified location. Alter being captured
3 337 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17267.
3333 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17272- 17273.
3 333 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17273.
3330 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p, 17275.
3331 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, p. 17279.
39*2 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17268-17280.
3333 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17285-17289.
3333 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17316-8, 17327.
333 3 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 173127-8
3 336 Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25 September 2008, pp. 17318-9.

---- End of Page 606 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J (ju 18 May 2012

3 8 6 Cl CI
by well-arrned AFRC/RUF rebels, Bull and the other civilians were threatened that they
were going to be killed, were forced to walk at the point of a gun, saw a palm wine tapper
viciously beaten, and were forced to carry very heavy loads. The evidence very clearly
establishes that these civilians were deprived of their liberty and did not carry loads for the
rebels of their own free will. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that it has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AF RC/RUF forces3937 intentionally exercised
powers of ownership over these civilians.
1717. Furthermore, Bull's evidence concerning the march from Mamboma to Njaiama
Nimikoro establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the witness and other civilians were
forced to carry their loads under threat of death. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AF RC/RUF forces
intentionally exercised rights of ownership over these civilians by depriving them of their
liberty and forcing them to carry loads.
1718. Furthermore, in relation to the training that Bull and 16 to 20 other civilians
underwent at a location between Woama and Baima, Bull's evidence establishes that he was
threatened with death if he refused to undergo the training, that he was required to perform
training exercises while he was sick, and that trainees who were perceived to be
underperforming were hit on the back with machetes. The Trial Chamber is therefore
satisfied that the perpetrators deprived the civilians of their liberty, exercised control over
their movement and took measures to prevent their escape. The Trial Chamber therefore
finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF
forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over these civilians at a location between
Woama and Baima. `
(h) @12 g
1719. The Prosecution alleges that the AFRC/RUF controlled diamond mining fields in
Kono District from at least January 1998 though the remainder of the Indictment period and
abducted and forced civilians to mine diamonds in many locations in the district.3938 The
Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF 1-367, TF 1-371, Albert Saidu, TF 1-516,
3937 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawiitl
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.
3938 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1088-90.

---- End of Page 607 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T E jg 18 May 2012

32900
Perry Kamara, Mustapha Mansaray, TF1-338, 1ssa Sesay, and Exhibit P-382 in respect of
these allegations.
Evidence
1720. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from TF1-367, who was a mining commander in
Kono from 1998 to 2000,3939 that civilians were captured either in the bush or by Morris
Kallon and Issa Sesay in towns such as Makeni and Magburaka and forced to work in the
Kono mines. The civilians worked because they ‘wanted to save their lives’ and those who
refused were beaten. They worked without pay and any diamonds found were ultimately
handed over to the witness. The civilian miners were guarded by armed ‘securities’ and
Black Guards who protected them from harassment or molestation by other people and
prevented the civilians from stealing the diamonds. The witness testified that there were
rules in place that if someone lost or stole a diamond, he would be killed or seriously beaten.
TF1-367 personally witnessed such a beating at Kokuima. TF1-367 estimated that on an
average day, 200-300 civilians would be mining in government mines in the Kono
District.394O g
1721. TF1-371 who was in Kono in 199739'H testified that the AFRC and RUF were
engaged in mining in Kono, including Koidu and ‘the township’. This mining was organised
and overseen by the AFRC Secretariat and representatives of the Supreme Council including
Gullit and SLA Cobra, the mining commander. Morris Kallon and Bockarie also visited
occasionally.3942
1722. TF1-371 witnessed more than 500 civilians working under the supervision of RUF
and SLA grards armed with AK-47s. These were local civilians who had been ‘taken’ by the
AFRC/RUF and ordered to mine. He observed that they were dishevelled and worked
3939 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14191-14192. TF1-367 was responsible inter alia for the sites in
Tombodu, Kaisambo, Benz Garage (Kokuima), Bondovulahun, Ngaya, Ndomahina and Bandafay. See TF1-367,
Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14194.
3940 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14198-14203; TF1-367, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14915-
14919; TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15053. The witness was clear that he was not giving evidence
about any ‘private’ sites where mining was conducted for the high command, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and
Superman about which he had no knowledge. See TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14200; TF1-367,
Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14907-8.
3""‘ TE1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008,p. 2447 (cs).
3942 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2335 (CS).

---- End of Page 608 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

‘grudgingly’ and without pay, and were not allowed to take diamonds for themselves.3943
The mined diamonds were given to the AFRC mining commander and transported to J ohrmy
Paul Koroma in Freetown.3944 TF1-371 testified that mining was still going on in Kono
during 1998.3945
1723. TF1-371 testified that when he went back to_ Kono in December 1999, he again
witnessed local civilians mining under armed guard in a similar way to what he had seen in
1997. The witness was unable to conclude whether the civilians were mining voluntarily
because the roads had been opened up by then and it was therefore possible for the civilians
to move to Freetown, Kenema or Makeni. TF1-371 stated that he knew that the armed
guards were present to prevent the civilians stealing the diamonds but he did not ask Issa
Sesay whether there was any other purpose for them.3946
1724. Albert Saidu, in cross-examination and re-examination, confirmed the substance of a
prior statement that he gave to the Prosecution in October/November 2007 in which he
stated that the RUF forced civilians to mine for them in Kono ‘after the first Irrtervention’3947
until disarmament. He said that some civilians also mined voluntarily for individual
commanders. All civilians were watched by RUF armed guards to prevent them from
stealing diamonds.3948
1725. TF1-516, who was mining in Bakundu in Kono during the Junta period,3949 testified
that at that time, civilians were forced at gunpoint to mine ‘whether [they] liked it or not’ in
demarcated government pits under the command of Captain Moriba and, ultimately, ‘Gul1it’.
If they refused, they would be floggedz the witness observed this happen in Bakundu Pit,
Number 11, Lebanon, Small Sefadu and Ngaiya, all in Koidu. Armed security was provided
to revent the workers esca in . When asked whether these ards ever used their wea ons,
P P 8 Su P
""" TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2335-2337 (cs).
3944 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2340-2341 (CS).
3**5 TF1-371, rrananrrpr 28 January 2008, p. 2488 (CS),
3**6 rrr -371, rrannnrrpt 29 January 2008, pp. .2447-2448 (cs).
3947 The Trial Chamber finds that the ‘first Intervention’ is a reference to the ECOMOG Intervention in February
1998. See also Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1148
3948 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11 147, 1 1150; Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, pp. 1 1344-5.
3949 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7119. The Trial Chamber notes that the Indictment only alleges that
enslavement occurred in Kono District from 1 February 1998 onwards, and that the Junta period ended on 14
February 1998. Evidence relating to the junta period therefore largely falls outside the indictment period for
enslavement in this district, and the Trial Chamber has only considered evidence of forced mining occurring
after 1 February 1998. See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment supra.

---- End of Page 609 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / Eu 18 May 2012
\

3 Es'}<>'D...
the witness stated that the terror was enough to make the civilians obey orders. Any
diamonds found were to be reported to the mining commander who informed Bockarie. The
witness stated that, unlike in other areas he visited, there was no system for sharing the
mined gravel with the workers.5550
1726. The witness also testified that after the ECOMOG intervention, everyone pulled out
of Kono and the mining stopped until it was re-instated in late 1998 under the control of the
mining commander.5551 The witness was no longer in Kono but heard about the mining there
on the radio.5552 He heard from ‘Augustine’ that, since there were no civilians left in Kono
when it was re-captured, a mining unit comprising both RUF soldiers and civilians was sent
from Kailahun to mine in Kono.5555
1727. TF1-516 testified that when Issa Sesay took over the mining in Koidu at the end of
1999, he was told by "Elevation", Sesay's radio operator, that mining had intensified in
Kono. He heard from people in Kono that Sesay had installed a ‘two-pile’ system whereby
one pile was reserved for the government and the other for the labourer. However, in
practice, if there was ‘something attractive’ in a pile belonging to a labourer, that pile was
also confiscated by the RUF. He was told that the mining was ‘open’ and that authority was
given to anyone who had the ability to mine. However, ‘ government pits’ also remained in
which civilians were still forced to mine.5554 The witness confirmed, however, that no radio
messages were sent through him at that time to his commander, Benjamin Yeaten about
civilians being forced to mine, even though Yeaten had requested reports on this mining
situation in Kono.5555
1728. Perry Kamara testified on diamond mining in Kono after the Freetown invasion in
early 1999.5556 He gave evidence that when the mining in Kono came under the control of
Issa Sesay, the RUF continued to use civilians to mine, including some who worked
permanently for the government without pay.5957
5550 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7119-26; TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7150-5.
555l TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7129-31.
5555 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7160.
5555 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7161.
5954 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7169-70, 7175-8. .
5555 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7178-81.
5556 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3262
5957 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3265

---- End of Page 610 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ 6], 18 May 2012

3%} o3
1729. Mustapha Mansaray, who was appointed mining commander in Ngaiya, Kono
District on 14 January 2001,3333 testified that he was in control of the villages of Ngaiya,
Yengema, Tongoma, Bandafay, and Small Ngaiya containing over 200 mining pits.3333 He
testified that he instructed AFRC/RUF fighters to gather civilians to wash gravel, which the
fighters would do ‘forcefully’ at gunpoint. If anyone resisted, he would be beaten or killed.
The witness ObS€I'V€d civilians being beaten but could not provide a first-hand account of
how many civilians had died in this way.3330 However, he stated that he had heard at-im his
staff that some civilians had been killed by AFRC/RUF fighters during shooting that broke
out after the civilians had refused to wash gravel.333l
1730. Mansaray testified that a two-pile system was in operation in Kono while he was
commander. Under that system, the gravel containing diamonds was split between the
RUF/AFRC administration and the civilians. The civilians were guarded even when washing
their own gravel and if a big diamond was found in a civilian's pile, the mining unit would
seize it and take it to the mining office. lf the office had anything to give the civilian in
return, they would do so. If the civilian refused to hand such a diamond over, it would be
taken from him. Mansaray was under orders at-im his overall commander to beat or kill
civilians who refused to hand over big diamonds to the RUF/AFRC. He gave evidence that
only beatings, not killings happened in his own area.3332 Mansaray stated that Issa Sesay's
bodyguards used to capture civilians at Number 11 mine and take them to mine for the
RUF2963
1731. TF1-338 testified that a two-pile system was in operation in RUF-controlled mines
between 2000 and 2002 whereby the gravel was shared between the RUF Commanders and
the "government"; and the civilians were not given anything.3364 He testified that Issa Sesay
forced civilians to mine in the government pits at this time.3333
3333 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5340. .
3959 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5341.
3 330 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5346, 5347-5350.
333l Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5342-5346; See also Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 6
March 2008, pp. 5399-5401.
3332 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5346, 5347-5350.
3 363 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5352-5353.
3334 TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15315-15318.
3333 TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15316.

---- End of Page 611 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X (QQ 18 May 2012

?>&’[—0k{..
1732. Issa Sesay gave evidence for the Defence that he took over control of the mining in
Kono in February 2000.3966 He testified that from July to December 1998 there was low-key
mining in the jungles around Koidu, but that there was no mining in Koidu Town itself in
that period because ECOMOG was in control there. The RUF maintained a mining unit in
Kono from 1998 to August 2001 when they disarmed in Kono. Effective mining
recommenced in December 1998 when the RUF recaptured Kono and lasted until
disarmament in July/August 2001.3967 He testified that in 1999, mining under the RUF
commander was purely for the RUF and nothing was shared. Civilians received food,
medicines and sometimes clothing, but never received money.3%S
1733. Issa Sesay testihed that when he was in command of mining in Kono from February
2000, civilians were not forced to mine in Kono. The RUF operated a two-pile system,
whereby the mined diamonds would be divided into two piles—one pile for the civilian
miners and one pile for the RUF. The RUF only had rights over the RUF pile.3969 Sesay
denies that the two-pile system was mere propaganda or that from February 2000 the RUF
forced any civilian from Makeni or Magburaka to go to mine in Kono. Everyone went of
their own volition.3970
1734. Exhibit P-382, a document dated 21 January 2001 issued by Issa Sesay's office,
ants safe assa e for the bearer who is in search of ‘man ower for overnment
gf P S P 8
mining’.3 971
Findings
1735. TF1-367 testihed that civilians were captured either in the bush or in other towns
such as Makeni and Magburaka and forced to work in the mines. Mustapha Mansaray also
testified that AFRC/RUF fighters would forcefully "gather" civilians to wash gravel for the
AFRC/RUF Hghters and that Issa Sesay's bodyguards used to capture civilians at Number
11 mine and take them to mine for the RUF. TF1-371 testified that civilians living locally
3966 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45200; Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46366-46367.
3967 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44638-44639; 44248-44249.
3%* rssa Sesay, Transcript 16 Augusr 2010, p. 46369.
3969 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44642-44643; Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45200; Issa
Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46366-46367.
3970 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, p. 46368
3971 Exhibit P-382, "Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone, Clearance, From the Office of the AG.
Chairman RUFP/ SL — Gen. Issa H. Sesay, to all Functional Areas", p.1.

---- End of Page 612 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / M 18 May 2012

3 Z}-DS
were taken by the AF RC/RUF and ordered to mine. Exhibit P-382 provides corroborative
evidence that the AF RC/RUF forces needed manpower to carry out their mining operations.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied on this evidence that members of the AFRC/RUF forces
abducted a large but unknown number of civilians from locations within and outside of
Kono District to labour in the mines.
1736. TF 1-367 testified that the civilians worked in the mines under armed guards in order
to save their lives. TF 1-371 testified that civilians working in the minds did so grudgingly
and without pay. Albert Saidu testified that the RUF forced civilians to mine for them under
armed guards. TF 1-516 testified that civilians were forced at gunpoint to mine and would be
flogged if they refused. Perry Kamara testified that the RUF used civilians to mine,
including some who worked permanently for the government without pay. Mustapha
Mansaray testified that civilians worked in the mines under armed guards and that he had
heard of some civilians being killed by AF RC/RUF fighters for refusing to work. TF 1-338
testified that civilians were not given anything from the two-pile system that was in
operation and that Issa Sesay forced civilians to mine in the government pits.
1737. All of such evidence contradicts Issa Sesay's testimony that civilians were not forced
to mine during this period. The Trial Chamber accordingly does not accept the testimony of
Issa Sesay. Not only is his testimony outweighed by the overwhelming evidence, but he also
has a motivation to downplay civilian mistreatment while he was in command of mining.
1738. The Trial Chamber finds that the overwhelming evidence led by the Prosecution
establishes that the civilians working in the mines were not doing so of their own free will.
Such evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that from at least January 1998 through the
remainder of the Indictment period members of the AFRC/RUF forcesym intentionally
exercised powers of ownership over a large but unknown number of civilians by depriving
them of their liberty and forcing them to work in the diamond mines in many locations in
Kono District.
a. Tombodu
gm Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killingsl; Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.

---- End of Page 613 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T J QQ 18 May 2012

1739. The Prosecution alleges that captured civilians were forced to mine in Tombodu for
no pay and had no way to escape.3973 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1-567, Tamba Yomba Ngekia, and Sahr Charles in relation to
these allegations.
1740. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, who was in Koidu Town in June 1998,3974 visited the
Tombodu mining area when on patrol and testified to seeing an unknown number of
civilians working there who had been captured by the SLA and RUF.3975
1741. TF1-567 moved to Koidu Town during 1999.3976 The witness testified that after the
RUF recaptured Koidu Town,3977 they began mining operations in the Tombodu area under
mining commander CO Lion. He described seeing civilians in the township and surrounding
area ‘captured forcefully’ to carry out the mining.3978
1742. Tamba Yomba Ngekia testified that shortly after 16 December 1999, three RUF
soldiers, who introduced themselves as Officer Med, Colonel Gibbo and Major Tactical told
the witness and a group of around 50 civilians that they had been sent by Colonel Issa to
take the group to mine at Tombodu Bridge. At Tombodu, the civilians were forced to dig
and mine at gunpoint and could not refuse. Ngekia described seeing a town chief, Major S.
E. Sogbeh, who refused to mine, shot and killed as an example to the other workers. He also
heard Officer Med command the boys guarding the miners to shoot anyone who refused to
work.3979 He testified that there were ‘many’ civilians on his shift and that 70 new miners
were delivered in chains and tied with rope around their waists. The miners were forced to
work naked and at gunpoint so they would not escape. There was no medication and miners
were given only one plantain a day to eat.398O Any diamonds they found were taken away by
Officer Med.3981
3973 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1091-1092.
3974 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8021.
3975 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8029-8030.
3976 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12925.
3977 The Trial Chamber has previously found that the RUF recaptured Koidu Town in December 1998. See
Factual Findings on Responsibility: Freetown Invasion; The Implementation of the Plan infra.
3978 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12926.
3979 Exhibit P-196, "TF1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004", pp. 18629-18632.
3980 Exhibit P-196, "TF1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004", pp. 18631-18634. See also Tamba Yomba Ngekia,
Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18251.
ml Exhibit P-196, "TF1-077, RUF Transcript 20 July 2004", pp. 18632. See also Tamba Yomba Ngekia,

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // (ko 18 May 2012

_ 3<3>;~¤ §·
A 1743. Sahr Charles confirmed testimony he had given in the RUF Trial;3932 and a transcript
of that testimony was admitted into evidence.3933 He testified in the RUF Trial that he was
living in Tombodu in 1999 when forced mining occurred in Benditu, Tombodu. Such
mining went on for two years. RUF Officer Med came to Benditu, Tombodu in April
19993934 and told the witness and other civilians that they would be forced to mine, despite
their refusal to do so. The rebels also collected civilians from other villages against their will
and brought them tied in ropes to mine in Tombodu.3933 The rebels guarded the miners with
guns to prevent them running away. If miners became tired, they recovered in sheds at the
mines but were not permitted to leave the pit. They could not refuse to mine because they
had ‘a gun over their head’ and if they stopped working, the rebels would throw stones at
them to force them to start again. The miners were not paid and were fed only gari.3933°
During the time the witness spent mining there, the number of civilians involved rose from
150 on the first day (the witness counted them) to 500. Any diamonds uncovered by the
miners were immediately taken by the rebels.3937 If the civilians failed to find diamonds they
were assembled and accused of witchcraft, taken to a cell called the guard room, stripped
naked and were flogged, stabbed in the head and rubbed with mud.3933 The witness denied
that there was any two—pile system in Tombodu in 2000.3 939
Findings
1744. The evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1—567, Ngekia and Sahr Charles
establishes that the AFRC/RUF forced an unknown number of civilians to engage in mining
in various locations in Tombodu. The Trial Chamber is satisfied on such evidence that the
AFRC/RUF forces systematically captured civilians from villages around Tombodu and
forced them to labour in the mines in Tombodu. Ngekia testified that new miners were
Transcript 14 October 2008, p. 18251.
3932 Sahr Charles, Transcript 15 October 2008, p. 18364.
33333 Exhibit 199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 12, 13, 14, 17 January 2004".
3 934 In cross-examination, the witness testified that the mining did not start until April 2000. Exhibit 199A, "TF1-
304, RUF Transcript 12 May 2004", p. 19011.
3933 Exhibit 199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 13 January 2005", pp. 18941-18946.
33333 Exhibit 199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 13 January 2005", pp. 18946-18948.
3937 Exhibit 199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 13 January 2005", pp. 18950, 18954.
33333 Exhibit 199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 13 January 2005", pp. 18957-18959.
39333 Exhibit 199A, "TF1-304, RUF Transcript 14 January 2005", p. 19136. See also Sahr Charles, Transcript 15
October 2008, pp. 18402-18403.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J (N- 18 May 2012

3%*1-Gi
brought to the mines in chains, and Charles testified that civilians were gathered in villages
against their will and tied together with ropes to be brought to the mines.
1745. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied from the evidence of Ngekia and Charles, that
civilians were guarded by armed fighters to prevent them from escaping and that, as Ngekia
testified, the miners were forced to work naked to prevent escape. Both witnesses described
how civilians were punished if they refused to work, or if they did not find diamonds.
Ngekia described how the town chief who refused to mine was killed to set an example for
the other miners, while Charles testified that civilians were stripped naked and flogged if
they failed to find diamonds. The evidence of Ngekia and Charles also establishes that the
miners worked without pay and were fed only subsistence rations.
1746. Ngekia testified that there were 50 civilians in his group that were taken to Tombodu
Bridge and that they were later joined by 70 other civilians. Charles testified that there were
initially 150 civilians mining at Bintuma but that this number grew to 500. As Ngekia was
mining at Tombodu Bridge, and Charles at Bintuma, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that up to
620 civilians were forced to mine in Tombodu during this period.
1747. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence
adduced by the Prosecution that members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised
power of ownership over a large but unknown number of civilians by depriving them of
their liberty and forcing them to work in mines in Tombodu, at around June 1998 and
throughout 1999-2000.
b. Koidu Town
1748. The Prosecution alleges that during the Junta period the AFRC/RUF forced enslaved
civilians to mine throughout Kono, including Koidu Town.399O Pursuant to the Indictment,
the Trial Chamber has considered evidence of forced mining occurring between about 1
February 1998 and about 18 January 2002.39% Witnesses Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Perry
Kamara and Foday Lansana gave evidence in relation to these allegations.
""’° Prosecution Trial Brief, paras 1095, 1096.
ml Indictment, para 25.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / @5 18 May 2012

3%?o¢]
Evidence
1749. Alimamy Bobson Sesay who was in Koidu Town in June 19983992 testified that
civilians captured by the AFRC/RUF were forced to mine at gunpoint at Five-F ive Spot,
Masingbi Road, and Koidu Town. These civilians were also engaged in ‘secret’ night-time
mining for Hassan Papa Bangura and ‘Bazzy’.3993 The diamonds that were mined were
"govermnent properfy", that is, they belonged to the RUF organisation and Superman, who
was in control of the mining, had orders from ‘Mosquito’ to take them.3994
1750. Perry Kamara testified that mining took place throughout 1998 at Superman Ground,
which was two miles from Koidu, under the direction of Sam Bockarie, Morris Kallon and
mining commanders such as CO Kennedy, Mr Abdul and Mr Coomber. Captured civilians
mined during the day under armed guard to prevent them escaping. They were then locked
in a house or shipping containers guarded by gumrren. Kamara gave evidence that all the
civilians had the letters "RUF" carved into their chests and foreheads to prevent them from
escaping and that anyone caught trying to escape was ki1led.3995
1751. Foday Lansana, who was in Kono from January 1998 to September 1998 testified
that civilians and Intemal Defence Units filed many reporfs that Morris Kallon was killing
civilians who refused to mine for him in Koidu Town.3996
Findings
1752. The Trial Chamber accepts the first-hand accounts of Alimamy Bobson Sesay and
Perry Kamara, as corroborated by Foday Lansana, that civilians were forced by AF RC/RUF
commanders to mine at various locations in and around Koidu Town, including Masingbi
Road, Five-Five Spot and Superman Ground. On the basis of their evidence that such
civilians were under armed guards, had "RUF" carved into their bodies to prevent them
escaping, and that anyone who tried to escape would be killed, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that from February 1998 onwards, members of the AFRC/RUF
3992 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8021.
3993 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8028-8030.
3994 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8034.
mj Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3143-3146.
30% Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4513-5415.

---- End of Page 617 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

$@:-1 cn
forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over these civilians by depriving them of
their liberty and forcing them to labour in the mines.
Conclusion
1753. The foregoing findings by the Trial Chamber establish that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces3997 engaged in
widespread and large scale abductions of civilians in Kono District and used them as forced
labour to carry loads, perform domestic chores, go on food—finding missions, undergo
military training, and work in diamond mines as detailed in the various crimes discussed
above.
1754. The Trial Chamber has already found that the chapeau requirements in relation to the
crime of enslavement have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.3998 The Trial Chamber
further finds in relation to Kono District that the acts of the perpetrators in each of the above
crimes of enslavement formed part of the attack directed against the civilian population and
that the perpetrators knew that the abductions of civilians and their use as forced labour
formed part of that attack. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the elements of
enslavement as a crime against humanity (Count 10) have been proved beyond reasonable
doubt
3. Kailahun District
1755. The Indictment alleges that between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January
2002, members of RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance and/or Liberian fighters
brought abducted civilian men, women and children to various locations within the District
and used them and residents of the District as forced labour.3999
1756. The Prosecution claims that the RUF and its allies brought abducted civilians from
other areas of Sierra Leone and used them alongside Kailahun natives as slave labour to
transport arms, ammunition and other materiel, to farm, to perform domestic work, and to
fight for the AFRC/RUF forces. Civilians were also forced to perform other duties such as
3997 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Kilhngs); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.
3098 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.
3999 Indictment, paras 23, 26,

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Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T ‘/ w 18 May 2012

aseru
laundry, cooking, gardening and road clearing. The Prosecution submits that if the civilians
refused to work they were flogged. The civilians did not have freedom of movement; if they
were caught travelling without a pass they were killed. The Prosecution also claims that
following the Intervention, the RUF ordered the residents of Kailahun to harvest agricultural
products which the RUF sold for revenue.4OOO
1757. In relation to crimes of enslavement alleged to have taken place in the Kailahun
District, the Trial Chamber has considered the testimony of witnesses Amna Gbonda,
Mustapha Mansaray, Edna Bangura, Augustine Mallah, Dennis Koker, Alex Tamba Teh,
Mohamed Kabbah, Perry Kamara, Abu Keita, Isaac Mongor, Finda Gbamanja, Komba
Sumana, Albert Saidu, TF1—371, TF1—375, TF1—026, TF1—189, TF1—362 and Exhibits D—013
and D—060.
(a) Buedu
(i) Carryjng Loads/Domestic Chores
1758. The Prosecution alleges that civilians captured by the AFRC/RUF forces in 1998 and
1999 from various locations in Sierra Leone were brought to Buedu and were forced to carry
loads from one town to another, to work on farms and to train as fighters. It claims that
groups of SBUs, SGUs and sometimes older people would go on food Ending missions,
capture civilians and use them to take looted items back to Buedufwm The Prosecution
further alleges that abducted women not claimed by commanders as sex slaves were forced
to do domestic work or serve as bodyguards. Washing, cooking and cleaning were done by a
"works unit", made up of girls belonging to various commanders.40O2
1759. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Augustine Mallah, Dennis Koker,
TF1—371 and Edna Bangura in relation to these allegations.
Evidence
4000 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1103-1 106.
400] Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras. 1107-1108. The Prosecution cites the evidence of Aruna Gbonda in
support of these allegations (see Prosecution Final Trial Brief, footnote 3142). However, his evidence relates to
the use of civilians to do domestic chores in Talia, not Buedu. The Trial Chamber has therefore considered this
evidence in the section on Talia. The Prosecution also alleges, under its submissions on Buedu, that civilians
were forced to work on the farms of Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon and to train as fighters (see
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paragraph 1107). The Trial Chamber has considered these allegations in the

---- End of Page 619 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z & 18 May 2012

37,}-tz.,
1760. Augustine Mallah was in Buedu for two months in around February—May 1998.4003
Mallah testified that not long after the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998, the AFRC
and RUF captured civilians mostly from Kenema4004 and brought them to Buedu where they
joined other civilians. The civilians performed domestic duties, and those who were neither
sick nor old were beaten if they refused to do the work assigned. Mallah personally
witnessed civilians being beaten for refusing to work. Chores included cultivating small
farms, laundering, cooking, cleaning and clearing roads.4005
1761. Dennis Koker, who was in Buedu between early 1998 and 16 December 1999,4000
testified that civilians who had been captured in Masiaka, Makeni and Koidu were taken to
Buedu. The civilians worked for RUF commanders without pay, taking loads from one town
to another. Those who refused to do so were beaten. Children were required to do household
chores for the fighter's wives.4007
· 1762. TF1—37 1, who was in Buedu from March 1998 to April 1999, witnessed civilians
being used to work for commanders. The civilians were used to do farm work, and to carry
loads for combatants across the Moa River. He testified that the civilians were not paid for
their work, and that they were forced to do it. They were also ordered to contribute cocoa
and coffee that they had harvested to the commanders, including Sam Bockarie, in Buedu.
The witness said that the RUF would go to their farms, "use them to haryest their coffee and
their cocoa, and use them to bring the produce to Buedu, and Sam Bockarie take what they
are producing and sell it to other businessmen who pay for it and they were not the recipient
of whatever revenue was generated from the product". TF1—371 added that the locals who
had cocoa and coffee farms were ordered by the RUF High Command to harvest that
7 produce, which was then sold by the RUF High Command to generate revenue to buy other
section on farming in Giema ,
4002 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1 108.
4003 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20203.
"°"" Augustine Mp11e1r, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20171—20172.
4000 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20204-20206.
4000 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1258, 1276-1277.
4007 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1261, 1265-1266.

---- End of Page 620 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

36%-* $
items for the fighters.4O08 Captured girls were part of the "works committee", and were used
to do d0mestic ch0res such as c00king and laundry.4O09
1763. Edna Bangura testified that she was captured in Masingbi in 1994 when she was 10
years of age. After being raped by three RUF rebels she was forced to carry a l0ad on her
head and walk to Buedu with other captured civilians. She said that she had no 0ption but to
carry the l0ad and would have been killed had she refused.4Om Sh011ly after arriving in
Buedu, she was assigned to stay with a rebel commander named CO Scorpion and his wife,
Hawafmll Bangura testified that while she was in Buedu, she and other SGUs had to perform
d0mestic ch0res, including laundry, c00king and p0unding rice. She and other civilians were
also sent by CO Scorpion on "f00d finding missions", which involved entering civilians’
houses, threatening them with guns, then taking their f00d. The witness testified that they
also made the captured civilians carry the looted items back to Buedu on their heads.4Ol2 The
witness stated that she was based in Buedu from 1994 until November or December 1998
and that these f00d finding missions 0ccurred throughout the time she was living in Buedu.
Findings
1764. Based on the testimonies of Mallah, K0ker and TF1-371, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that civilians were used to do d0mestic ch0res, such as laundry, c00king,
cultivating small farms and carrying l0ads. Given the testimonies of Mallah and K0ker that
they witnessed civilians being beaten for refusing to work, and TF1-371's testimony that the
civilians were forced to work and were not paid for their labour, the Trial Chamber is iimher
satisfied that the civilians had no 0ption but to work, and that this constituted forced labour.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
members of the RUF intentionally exercised p0wers of ownership over these civilians.
Although the witnesses testified about slightly different time peri0ds during which this
forced labour 0ccurred, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that this labour began after the
Intervention in around February 1998 and continued until some point in 1999.
4008 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2505-2506 (CS).
4009 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2504-2509 (CS).
wm Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18665-18668.
ml Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18672, 18676, 18679.
4°l2Edna Bangura, Transcript 20 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 18679-18683.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / {Fa 18 May 2012

3 EQ- M
1765. The Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of TF1—371 that civilians who owned cocoa
and coffee farms were forced to farm by the RUF and that the RUF took the produce and
kept the proceeds of its sale. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the civilians were not
farming of their own free will. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that it has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt that members of the RUF, by forcing these civilians to farm and to
hand over the produce, intentionally exercised powers of ownership over them from March
1998 to April 1999.
1766. Edna Bangura's evidence relating to domestic chores is vague as to the time period
in which she was forced to perform these chores. The Trial Chamber cannot therefore be
satisfied that such crimes occurred during the Indictment period. However, she testified that
the food—finding missions continued until she left Buedu at the end of 1998. The Trial
Chamber accepts her evidence and is satisfied that during the Indictment period she and
other civilians were forced to go on food—finding missions. The Trial Chamber therefore
finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the
AFRC/RUF forcesmu intentionally exercised powers of ownership over Bangura and other
civilians by depriving them of their liberty and forcing them to go on food—finding missions.
(ii) Carryng Arms and Ammunition
Evidence
1767. Alex Tamba Teh testified that he was taken from Superman Ground in Kono with
many other civilians under an RUF escort to Buedu. There he met other civilians who had
been "taken" from all different areas. The civilians were told by their captors that they had
been brought there to collect arms and ammunition from Dawa.40M Approximately 150
civilians from Buedu were ordered to go to Dawa and to carry arms and ammunition that
had arrived on a helicopter back to Bockarie's house at Buedu. The witness and other
civilians were then "asked" by Issa Sesay to carry some of this materiel on their heads to
Superman Ground in Kono.4m5
4013 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kailahun District (between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 June 1998) supra.
W4 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 728-731.
4015 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 734-736.

---- End of Page 622 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Of 18 May 2012

3&7‘l·l$`
1768. TF1—371 testified that Augustine Gbao assembled 200 civilians from Kailahun who
were ordered to carry arms and ammunition from Buedu across the Moa River towards
Koidu, for an attack on Koidu, in December 1998. He personally witnessed the civilians
carrying the loads to the crossing point of the Moa River. He testified that they did not carry
these loads voluntarily, but were ordered to do so.4016
A Findings
1769. Alex Tamba Teh's evidence establishes that approximately 150 civilians carried
loads of arms and ammunition from Dawa to Sam Bockarie's house in Buedu. His evidence
that Issa Sesay then ordered an unknown number of civilians to carry some of these arms
and ammunition to Superman Ground in Kono is corroborated by the testimony of TF1—371,
who testified that approximately 200 civilians were forced to carry arms and ammunition
from Buedu across the Moa River to Superman Ground in December 1998 and that they did
not do so voluntarily. The context indicates that this occurred at around
November/December 1998.4017 In the circumstances described by the witnesses, and given
that the AFRC/RUF forces were engaged in widespread and large scale abductions of
civilians in Kailahun District for use as forced labour, the Trial Chamber draws the
conclusion that these civilians carried arms and ammunition for their captors because they
were forced to do so. The Trial Chamber thus finds it proved beyond reasonable doubt that
members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over the
civilians by depriving them of their liberty and forcing them to carry arms and ammunition.
(iii) Forced Military Training
Evidence
1770. Witness TF1—026 testified that she was captured by RUF rebels at her home in
Wellington, Freetown on 6 January 1999. The rebels shot and killed her sister and told the
witness that if she did not stop crying or tried to escape she would also be killed.4018 The
RUF rebels took her and other captured civilians on a joumey through Calaba Town,
11116 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2415-2417 (CS).
41117 Issues relating to this shipment of arms have been addressed in the section on the responsibility of the
Accused. See Factual Findings on Responsibility: Freetown Invasion; The Plan in]$·a.
""'*‘ Tri-026, Transcript 14 rpbmary 2008, pp. 3843-3844, 3846.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T //4/ O1, 18 May 2012

3% EJB
Waterloo and Makenim`9 until ultimately, after about a month, she was taken to Buedu along
with 19 other civilian female captives.4020 The civilians spent six months being forcibly
trained in Buedu.402` They were told that anyone trying to escape would be killed. The
witness stated that "they will tell us to crawl using our arms and we will crawl and they will
tell us to roll from one point to the other. They also taught us how to shoot a gun".4022 When
two of the civilians were caught attempting to escape, they were publicly shot and killed in
order to deter others from escaping.4U23 This incident also resulted in Bockarie passing an
order that all detainees have "RUF" caryed into their chests with a knife in order to prevent
their escape.4O24
Findings
1771. Based on TF 1—026's first—hand evidence, the Trial Chamber is satished that at least
19 civilians were forcibly trained in Buedu from approximately February to July 1999. The
evidence that recruits who attempted to escape were publicly shot, and that "RUF" was
carved into the chests of the other recruits to prevent them escaping, establishes that the
rebels deprived these civilians of their liberty and exercised control over them, so that the
civilians had no choice but to undergo this training. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied
that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces,
including Bockarie, intentionally exercised powers of ownership over these civilians.
(iv) Construction of Buedu Airstrip
1772. The Prosecution alleges that, following Taylor's message that an airfield was
necessary for the delivery of arms and ammunition, Sam Bockarie ordered civilians to work
on the construction of the airstrip near Buedu. The Prosecution submits that the RUF sent
between 200 and 300 civilians to work on the airfield day and night with security escorts.4025
The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses Mohamed Kabbah, Perry
Kamara, Abu Keita, Isaac Mongor and Dennis Koker in relation to this allegation.
ww TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3848, 3862, 3865.
4020 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3867.
ml TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3870.
4022 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p.3869
4023 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3871.
4024 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3871.
4025 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1109.

---- End of Page 624 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / @ 18 May 2012 j

?>Evidence 4
1773. Mohamed Kabbah testified that in April 1998, Sam Bockarie arranged a meeting in
Buedu of over 100 persons, including AFRC representatives, at which he stated that an
airstrip was to be constmcted in Buedu.44426 Kabbah testified that the airfield was constmcted
by civilians and soldiers but was subsequently not used. Kabbah stated: "We constmcted the
airfield for a plane but we never saw a plane land there".4°27
1774. Perry Kamara testified that pursuant to Bockarie's order, 200 to 300 civilians were
sent by the RUF to Kailahun to work on the airstrip project. Kamara testified that civilians
were forced to work both da and ni t on the ro`ect and at all times were accom anied b
Y P J P Y
RUF security escorts.4028 Some civilians had "RUF" cawed into their chests or foreheads in
Y order to prevent their escape.4029
1775. Isaac Mongor testified that civilians worked on the airstrip in Buedu which was
being prepared by Sam Bockarie. Mongor testified that civilians had no option not to work,
and were not paid for their work, although they were fed by the RUF.40344
1776. Abu Keita testified that he was shown the site of the airstrip by Issa Sesay in late
September 1998. The MP commander Kaisoko and the G5 collected civilians from the
various towns to work on the airstrip. Keita testified that civilians were not paid for their
work.4044
1777. Demiis Koker told the Trial Chamber that the RUF captured civilians, who were
stripped naked and tied together with a rope in order to prevent their escape. They were
taken to Buedu to work on the airstrip.4032
Findings
4026 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16147-16148.
4027 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16147-16148.
4024 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3105. See also Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p.
3116.
4024 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3145.
4040 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6202-6204.
4034 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1987-1988.
4032 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1268, 1270-1271.

---- End of Page 625 ---------------------------


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3.% :1-12
1778. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that under orders from Sam Bockarie, at least 200
civilians were forced to provide their labour, both day and night, without pay, for the
purposes of constructing the RUF airfield outside Buedu at some point in 1998.
1779. Given evidence that the civilians worked on the airstrip without pay, that they were
forced to work both day and night, that they had "RUF" carved on their chests to prevent
them escaping and that they were accompanied by security escorts, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the movement of the civilians was controlled. lt further finds that the use of
violence and threats of violence by the perpetrators to deter escape indicates that the
civilians were deprived of their liberty and did not work of their own free will. The Trial
Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF
forces exercised the powers of ownership over at least 200 civilians who worked on the
airstrip at some point in 1998, and that they exercised these powers intentionally.
1780. The issue of whether the Accused gave the order to Bockarie to build the airstrip has
been addressed in the section on the responsibility of the Accused.4033
(b) Bunumbu/Camp Lion
1781. The Prosecution alleges that large numbers of captured civilians were forcibly
trained at the Bunumbu training base in Kailahun District, which was opened just after the
Intervention and was in operation throughout 1998.4034
(i) Forced Militag Training
Evidence
1782. Dermis Koker was in Buedu from February 1998 to December 1999, during which
time he served as the RUF Military Police (MP) Guard Commander and, later, as MP
Adjutant.4035 Koker testified that civilians captured by the RUF from different villages were
brought to Buedu to the MP office. All captured civilians had been given a pass by the
commanders who had captured them and at the MP office their passes were checked against
a list to make sure that no one had escaped. Anyone without a pass would either be shot or
4033 Factual Findings on Responsibility: Operational Support; Support and Training, Alleged Order to Build an
Airfield in Buedu infra.
4034 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1 1 18-1 1 19.
4035 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1260.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T EZ, 0* 18 May 2012

3s}\·=i
put into a dungeon.4040 Koker said that "the stronger ones were taken to the training bases —
Bunumbu".4047 Koker testified that the captured civilians in Buedu were not in good
condition. They were wom out, malnourished and worked without pay. Children were taken
away from their parents and sent for military training, some as young as 12 or 14 years of
age. Once trained, the civilians were sent to the front lines as reinforcements.4030 Koker
estimated that during his time in Buedu 1,300 captured civilians — 500 children and 800 men
and women — went through the MP office.4039
1783. TF1—362 testified that an RUF training base named Camp Lion was established in
Bunumbu in February 1998 on the orders of Sam Bockarie, and operated until the end of
1998.4040 She testiHed that there were approximately 200 recruits, who were captured
civilians from Freetown, Quiva and Dam, and included young boys, young girls, women and
old persons.4044 Some civilian "recmits" died during military training exercises and the High
Command was informed.4042 Recruits who tried to escape had "RUF" carved into their
foreheads and chest.4044 The trainees were also sent on food—finding missions, assisted the
commanders’ wives, performed domestic chores and cultivated farms.4044
1784. TF1—189 testified that she had been captured and raped in March 1998 by rebels
whom she described in various parts of her evidence as "RUF rebels and the junta SLA",4045
mor rebels" and "juntas",4040 rsarrircir rebels", "Charles Taylor rebels",4047 ··RUr¤ rebels"
and "junta fighters".4040 She was held captive in a location in Kailahun District when she
heard about the attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999. Some time after that the rebels took
away 20 captives, aged 12 to 18, both male and female, and she leamed that they had been
taken to "the training base" at which CO Monica was the commander, where they were
taught "how to use guns, how to fire them, and they have to crawl under a barbed wire". She
4030 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1261-1264.
4037 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1261. 4
4030 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1265, 1271, 1272.
4030 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1277.
4040 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4915-4917, 4867-4868 (CS).
‘°"‘ Tri-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4899-4900 (cs).
4042 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4905 (CS).
*043 Tri-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4927 (cs).
4044 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4906 (CS).
4045 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16492.
4040 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16497.
4047 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16501.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M In 18 May 2012

3%°’r2..€>
learned that if CO Monica "ordered you to do something and you refused, she will beat you
up". After the training, the trainees were sent to the front lines.44444
1785. Komba Sumana, who the Trial Chamber has found was trained at Bunumbu from
April/May 1998 to approximately August 1998,4454 testified that civilians were taught how
to handle weapons, and how to attack towns and houses.445l He said that civilians were
beaten during their training, and sometimes were not provided with food.4452
1786. TF1-371 heard that throughout 1998, Bunumbu training base in Kailahun was used
for training civilians who had been captured in Kono.4454
1787. Exhibit D-013, a report by a Training Commander at Camp Lion, Bunumbu from 21
May 1998, indicates that there were 603 recruits at Bunumbu training base in May 1998.4454
Findings
1788. The Trial Chamber accepts the first-hand evidence of witnesses Koker, Sumana and
TF1-362 regarding the military training of civilians at Bunumbu from approximately
February 1998 until the end of 1998, as corroborated by Exhibit D-013 and the evidence of
TF1-371 and TF1-189.
1789. Given the evidence that the recruits were beaten and sometimes deprived of food,
that some had "RUF" carved into their chests to prevent their escape, and given that they
were on the base in the presence of many armed fighters, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
the RUF exercised control over the trainees’ movements, and that the civilians were forced
to undergo military training under the threat of physical violence. Koker, TF1-362 and TF1-
189 testified that civilians who were trained at Bunumbu were later sent to the frontlines.
The Trial Chamber finds that this military training, which was a preparatory step to sending
these civilians to the frontlines as fighters, constituted forced labour. The Trial Chamber is
therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that from approximately February to December
4444 TF1-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16504.
"°‘° TF1-189, remeenpt is September 2008, pp. 16534-16239.
4454 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement); Abduction and Training of
Komba Sumana in approximately July/August 1998 supra.
4454 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17930-17931.
4452 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17931.
‘°" TF1-371, Transcript 4 Febmmy 1998, pp. 2949-2950. ·

---- End of Page 628 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T C1`; 18 May 2012
L,-`/

3%? 7-\
1998, members of the AF RC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over
an unknown number of civilians at Bunumbu.
(c) Locations in Luawa Chiefdom
(i) Mining
1790. The Prosecution alleges that civilians were forced to mine diamonds by Issa Sesay
and Sam Bockarie in Yandohun, Luawa Chiefdom, in 1997, and that civilians were also
forced to mine at a site between Monfidor in the Luawa Chiefdom and Sahbahun near the
Moa River.4055 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Amna Gbonda in relation
to these allegations.
Evidence
1791. Amna Gbonda testified that diamond expert Patrick Bangula, who was appointed by
Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie to look for diamonds, gathered and directed the civilians of
Yandohun in mining activities. When asked to give a date, Gbonda replied: "lt looks like it
was in ’97 or ’98, in between. That was the time that happened. 1 think so".4056 Gbonda also
told the Trial Chamber that he heard that there was mining by civilians at a location by the
Moa River between Monfidor and Sahbahun.4057 When asked about the treatment of
civilians in these locations, the witness stated that "they were capturing forcefully. lf you
were a civilian and they told you to do something, you had to do it".4058
Findings
1792. The Trial Chamber notes that Gbonda did not visit the mine in Yandohun or the
location between Monfidor and Sahbahun personally. He was told about the mining in
Yandorhun by civilians who had worked there, whom he spoke to in Buedu.4059 There is no
indication from his evidence of how he knew about the mining at the other location.
4054 Exhibit D-013, "Confidential Sierra Leone People's Army, Try Base Manpower Statistic, 21 May 1998".
0055 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1 1 10-1 1 1 1.
4050 Amna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4274-4276. The witness actually states that "it looks like"
it was between 1997 and 1998, and that he "thinks" that is when it happened.
4057 Amna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4276-4278.
4050 Amna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4290-4291.
4050 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4276.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f Im 18 May 2012

3 @4% 2.7...
1793. Gbonda's evidence did not indicate whether or not the civilians who worked in the
mines were forced to do so, or did so voluntarily. He did state that civilians had been
captured forcefully, but since he was not at either location mentioned above it is not clear
how he knew this. The Prosecution alleges that at the location between l\/Ionfidor and
Sahbahun, "civi1ians were beaten if they delayed the work, the witness himself was beaten
many times".4060 However, the witness did not state that civilians were beaten at these
locations, but at a location in Giema.40 61
1794. There was no other evidence of mining in Kailahun District, or that civilians were
forced to mine in these regions or in any other part of Kailahun District. Therefore, the Trial
Chamber finds that Gbonda's uncorroborated hearsay evidence fails to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that civilians were enslaved and forced to mine at these locations.
(d) Talia
1795. The Prosecution alleges that from 1996 to 2000, the RUF forced around 50 civilians
to farm rice in Talia, and that from 1997 to 1999, every adult in Talia was forced to work in
the production of palm oil during the month of March. It also alleges that women in Talia
were forced to Hsh for the RUF.4062 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of
Aruna Gbonda in relation to this allegation.
(i) Farming and Fishing
Evidence
1796. Aruna Gbonda, a rice famier and Deputy Chiefdom Commander, testihed that he
worked for the rebels near Talia village from 1996.4063 In Talia, the RUF would tell the
civilians to farm for them, and the civilians would clear the bush, farm the land, harvest the
rice and give it to the rebels. Up to 50 people farmed in Talia between 1996 and 2000.
4060 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, footnote 3151.
40m Further, it is not clear from his testimony on this point whether he actually witnessed this or was
extrapolating from his own treatment in the context of rice farming to the treatment of the civilians in the mines.
4062 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1112-1113.
4063 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4238.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T 18 May 2012

Erazz
Civilians were not paid for their work and were beaten for failing to perform the labour
assigned to them. The witness himself was beaten by a rebel for reiirsing to work.4444
1797. The witness said that in 1997, 1998 and 1999, civilians were also asked to contribute
cacao that they had harvested in Talia. They would then transport the cacao to the rebels at
the riverside near Kailahun Town, who would ultimately tum it over to Augustine Gbao.4O65
1798. Gbonda testified that from 1997 to 1999, Gbao told civilians to contribute palm oil.
The civilians harvested the palm oil and gave it to the rebels on three different occasions in
Giema or near the riverside near Kailahun Town. The rebels would then trade the palm oil
for rice, Maggi, salt and cigarettes and the civilians then carried these items to a store in
Kailahun Town.4066
1799. In addition, female civilians were forced to fish for the RUF in February and March,
between 1994 and 2000, and the witness saw one woman who refused to fish beaten by the
rebels.4O67 Male civilians were also forced to give game that they had hunted to Sam
Bockarie.40°8
Findings
1800. The Trial Chamber is satisfied on Gbonda's testimony that at least 50 civilians were
forced to farm near Talia from 1996 to 2000. While some of the time period during which
this farming occurred may fall outside of the Indictment period, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that such farming also occurred from 30 November 1996 until 2000. As the
civilians were not paid for their work and were beaten if they refused to work, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that they were forced to work against their will and that this farming
constituted forced labour. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that members of the RUF intentionally exercised powers of ownership over
at least 50 civilians in Talia from 30 November 1996 to some point in 2000. p
1801. Gbonda testified that from 1997 to 1999, civilians were told to contribute cacao and
palm oil to RUF rebels which was ultimately given to Augustine Gbao. Civilian men were
4044 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4251-4253. 1
‘"’°5 Aruna obppda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4259-4261.
4044 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4261-4265.
4067 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4265-4268

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / JQ 18 May 2012

3&%Lu
also told to contribute game that they had hunted to Sam Bockarie. However, there was no »
evidence that the civilians were forced to grow caca0 or palm oil or forced to hunt, or that
they were guarded or deprived of their liberty while doing so. While the evidence indicates
that the contributions were not voluntary, this does not constitute forced labour.
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crime of enslavement have not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to these incidents.
1802. Gbonda also testified that civilians had to carry items that had been traded for the
palm oil to a store in Kailahun. However, he provided no evidence about whether these
civilians did so voluntarily or whether they were forced to do so. The Trial Chamber
accordingly finds that the elements of the crime of enslavement have not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt in relation to this incident.
1803. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Gbonda's evidence does establish that RUF
members ordered women to fish, and that women who refused to fish would be beaten. The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the rebels exercised control over their movement, and that the
women had no choice but to fish for the rebels. While some of this time peri0d during which
. the fishing 0ccurred falls outside of the Indictment, there is evidence that this fishing also
0ccurred from 30 November 1996 until 2000. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that it
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that from 30 November 1996 to 2000, members of`
the RUF intentionally exercised p0wers of ownership over an unknown number of women
who were forced to fish.
(e) Giema
1804. The Prosecution alleges that large numbers of civilians were forced to cultivate a
swamp farm for Issa Sesay from 1996 to 2000, and that around 150 civilians were forced to
work on a big farm in Giema for the RUF in 1997.4069
(i)
Evidence
4068 Amna Gbcnda, Transcript 19 February 2008, p. 4271.
4069 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 1114.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / ® 18 May 2012

2. s >r LS
1805. Aruna Gbonda testified that he and approximately 150 other civilians were told by
rebels, including Issa Sesay, to cultivate a big farm in Kambama, just outside Giema in 1997
in order to supply the rebels with rice. According to the witness, "every village people [sic]
would have to cultivate a farm for rebels".407O Gbonda also testified that between 1996 and
2000 he and other civilians cultivated a swamp fann right outside Giema growing rice for
Issa Sesay.4(m
1806. Dennis Koker, who was in Buedu between early 1998 and 16 December 1999,4072
testified that civilians were forced to work on "Mosquito's fanns. Morris Kallon's fann [...]
Issa's farms". lf civilians refused to work on the farms, their property would be burned or
they would be detained in military cells.4O73 He testified that civilians worked on farms
without pay.4O74
Findings
1807. The Trial Chamber is satisfied from the evidence of Koker and Gbonda that civilians
worked on swamp farms outside Giema belonging to RUF commanders. Gbonda testified
that this fanning occurred from 1996 until 2000, while Koker, who was in Buedu from early
1998 to December 1999, does not give a precise time during which this farming occurred.
As the civilians worked on these farms without pay, and were threatened with detention or
having their property burned if they refused to work, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that they
were deprived of their liberty and had no choice but to work. The Trial Chamber is therefore
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the RUF, including Issa Sesay,
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over an unknown number of citizens who
worked on swamp fanns from 30 November 1996 to 2000.
1808. The evidence also establishes that civilians cultivated a large fann outside Giema in
1997 for Issa Sesay. Given Koker's evidence as to the fate of civilians who refused to work
on farms for the rebels, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the civilians did not cultivate this
large farm of their own nee will, but did so in fear of what would happen to them if they
refused to do so. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
4070 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4256-4258.
4071 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4258-4259.
4072 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1258, 1276-1277.
4073 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1266.
4074 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1265

---- End of Page 633 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3 s°r:>.<¤
those civilians were forced to work on the big farm and that members of the RUF thereby
intentionally exercised the powers of ownership over them.
(ii) Domestic Chores/Cultivation of Rice
1809. The Prosecution alleges that civilians were abducted in Koidu Town and taken to
Superman Ground and that some were then taken to other locations including Dodo,
Balahun, Talia, Ngeigor and Mamboma in Kailahun to work for relatives of AFRC/RUF
fighters or to engage in activities such as cultivation of rice.4075
Evidence
1810. Finda Gbamanja testified that while she was staying with Sergeant Foday's mother y
in Giema, she performed domestic chores such as pounding rice, cooking, laundering, and
fishing. She was also forced to do "govermnent work" for the RUF consisted of planting
seeds and weeding while she was in Giema and Ngeigor.4070 On one occasion, when she was
very tired and refused to do the government work, she was put in "the dungeon" for a day as
punishment. She spent one Christmas in Giema 4077 A
1811. TF1—189 testified that while she and other captives were at Mamboma, from
September 1998 to July 1999, they performed domestic tasks such as cooking, cleaning,
washing clothes and cultivating a farm for RUF rebels. She indicated that when they were
taken from Kailahun Town to Mamboma, she did not try to escape as she had been warned
not to.4070
Findings .
1812. Based on Gbamanja's first—hand evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that she
A performed domestic chores for Sergeant Foday's mother in Giema, and did other work, such
as weeding, in Giema and Ngeigor. Given that she was punished when she refused to do this
work, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that she had no choice but to do so. The Trial Chamber
is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces4070
4075 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1124.
4070 Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, pp. 23878, 23880.
4077 F inda Gbamanja, Transcript 29 January 2009, p. 23879.
*078 TF1-189, Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16533-16534.
4070 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 2 and 3 (Unlawful Ki11ings); Alleged unlawful

---- End of Page 634 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T Gl 18 May 2012

$@+1}-
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over Gbamanja. The Trial Chamber is satisfied
from the context that this occurred at some point in late 1998.4080
1813. Gbamanja also testified that civilians were sent to other towns such as Dodo,
Balahun and Mamboma, but her evidence did not indicate what they did in these
locations.408l However, TF1—189 gave evidence of what the captive civilians were forced to
do in Mamboma. The Trial Chamber is satisfied on her evidence that civilians were used to
perfonn domestic and other duties in Mamboma, and that they did so against their will. The
Trial Chamber therefore finds it proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the RUF
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over TFl—189 and other captive civilians by
depriving them of their liberty in Mamboma from September 1998 to July 1999.
(iii) Mining
Evidence
1814. Aruna Gbonda testified that he personally saw a mine at Giema, where the mining
workforce comprised "many" civilians.4O82 He testified that civilians who refused to work
were seriously beaten.4083
Findings
1815. The witness did not give any evidence capable of proving that the mining occurred
during the Indictment period. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt that civilians were enslaved at this location at a time relevant to the
p Indictment. S
(f) Kailahun Town
(i) Carrygng Loads/ Anns and Ammunition
killings in Kailahun District (between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 Iune 1998) supra.
4080 The witness was in Koidu in 1998, then was sent to Giema where she was stayed for a year (and was there
over Christmas, during which time these events occurred). She was then sent to Kailahun Town, and escaped at
the time when Bockarie left for Monrovia (December 1999).
ml The evidence in relation to Talia has been discussed in that section.
4082 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4277—4279; Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008,
pp. 4290-4292.
4083 Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4290-4292.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T % 18 May 2012

3% Q 2.%
1816. The Prosecution alleges that following the Intervention in February 1998,
AFRC/RUF forces retreating from Kenema captured more than 400 civilians, who were
forced to carry loads to Kailahun Town.4O44 It further alleges that in August 1998, civilians
were forced by the AFRC to carry ammunition and wounded soldiers from Koidu to
Kailahun Town.4085 The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Augustine Mallah,
Dennis Koker, and TF1-189, as well as Exhibit D-060 in relation to these allegations.
Evidence
1817. Augustine Mallah testified that when the AFRC and RUF forces retreated from
Kenema in February 1998, they captured over 400 civilians along the way, and took them to
Kailahun Town.4O86
1818. In Exhibit D-060, notes of an interview given by Sheku Alex Bao to the Prosecution,
Bao stated that he personally witnessed "soldiers/rebels" abducting civilians to carry their
loot when they left Kenema.4O84
1819. Dennis Koker testified that the RUF captured civilians in Kono, including women
and children. They were given loads to carry and those civilians who refused were shot.4O48
These civilians were brought to Kailahun Town with the fighters4089, and they were given
arms and ammunition to carry on their heads from Kailahun Town to J okibu on the
frontlines at some point after March 1998.4040
1820. TF1-189 testified that after ECOMOG attacked Koidu Town in August 1998, she
and hundreds of other civilians left and travelled with the rebels to Kailahun. The civilians
carried loads or boxes of ammunition on their heads, or carried wounded rebels. TF1-189
witnessed the rebels kill a 12-year old boy who had stopped because the box of ammunition
*084 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1115.
4485 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1117.
4086 Augustine Mallah, 13 November 2008, pp. 20171-20773.
*0*7 Exhibit D-060, "SCSL, Office of the Prosecutor, Interview Notes, 25 November 2004", para. 20.
4088 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1243-1245.
*0*9 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1246, 1250.
4040 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1251-1254.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T Jp 18 May 2012

Ei'}?-Ct
that he was carrying was too heavy. The rebels and SLAs were carrying guns during this
march.409l
Findings
1821. The allegation by the Prosecution that captured civilians were used to carry loads
from Kenema to Kailahun Town is not supported by the evidence. Mallah did not testify that
the civilians carried anything. The only mention Bao makes of civilians being forced to
carry looted goods was in an interview with the Prosecution on 25 November 2004 (Exhibit
D-060), but Bao did not mention any such fact in any of his swom evidence in the AFRC
Trial, the RUF Trial or the present trial.4O92 The Tnal Chamber therefore finds that is has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt on this evidence that civilians were forced to carry
loads from Kenema District to Kailahun Town during the retreat in February 1998.
1822. However, Koker's testimony leaves no doubt that the civilians carrying arms and
ammunition from Kailahun Town to Jokibu were forced to do so under fear of death. The
Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the RUF
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over these civilians by depriving them of their
liberty and forcing them to carry arms and ammunition some point after March 1998.
1823. Furthermore, TF 1-189 gave first-hand evidence that civilians were made to carry
loads of ammunition on their heads or carry wounded rebels on the way from Koidu to
Kailahun in August 1998, and that she witnessed a civilian being killed for refusing to do
this work. The Trial Chamber is satisfied on this evidence that the civilians had no choice
but to carry these loads. lt therefore finds that it has been established beyond reasonable
doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership
over these civilians.
(ii) Manual Labour/Domestic Chores
"’°‘ Tri-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 1652146523
*°"2 See TFl—l22, Trrmeerrpt 8 September 2008, pp. 16618-16760.

---- End of Page 637 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / w 18 May 2012

3 @30
1824. The Prosecution alleges that from 1996-2001, between 400 and 800 civilians were
forced to weed Kailahun Town using hoes and machines and that in 1998, other enslaved
civilians in Kailahun Town were forced to do domestic duties for commanders.4O93
Evidence
1825. TF1-189 testified that once the captured civilians from Koidu reached Kailahun she
was forced to stay with a commander named Gogomeh, together with five other female
captives and four rebels.4O94 TF1-189 testified that during this time, she and the other
captured women and girls were made to cook, wash the rebel's clothes and were "wives".4095
1826. TF1-189 said that she left Gogomeh's place only twice, on both occasions to
accompany a female rebel to shop for food items.4096 She did not try to escape again because
she was warned that if she tried to do so "it would not be good for [her]". None of the other
captive women and girls escaped.4097 The witness was in Kailahun Town from August to
September 1998.4098
1827. Aruna Gbonda testified that when he was deputy chiefdom commander in Kailahun
Town from 1996-2000, a rebel called Morrie Fekai would relay messages to him via another
rebel called Sellu to gather civilians to weed the grass in Kailahun Town. He estimated that
around 400-800 civilians were used to weed.4099
Findings
1828. The evidence that TF1-189 was forced to have sexual intercourse has already been
considered in the context of sexual slavery, and the Trial Chamber has found that TF1-189
was used as a sexual slave in Kailahun Town between August and September 2009.4lOO Such
evidence will therefore not be considered in this section.
4093 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1 1 16.
‘*"°" TFl-189, rrerreerrpt 17 September 2008, pp. 16523-16524.
4095 TFl-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16524.
40% TFl-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16524-16525; Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16529-16530.
W TFl-189, rrrmeerrpt 18 September 2008, pp. 16530, 16558
4098 TFl-189, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16523-165251; Transcript 18 September 2008, pp. 16558-16659
(PS).
4099 Amna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4272-4273.
4100 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); TFl-189 used as a sexual slave by
RUF members in Kailahun Town from August 1998-September 1998 supra.

---- End of Page 638 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 5 hx 18 May 2012

39+31
1829. TF1-l 89's evidence that she and other captured civilians were used to do domestic
chores and that they were threatened with the consequences should they try to escape,
establishes that they were forced to labour in the commanders’ homes against their will.
Consequently, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
members of the AFRC/RUF forcesium the rebels intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over her and the other civilians from August until September 1998 in Kailahun
Town.
1830. In relation to Gbonda's evidence that civilians were used to weed the grass in
Kailahun District, Gbonda stated that the civilians who did the weeding were gathered by
himself (not by the AFRC/RUF forces) and there was nothing in his evidence to indicate that
these civilians were forced to work against their will. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds
that, in this instance, forced labour has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
(g) Pendembu
1831. The Prosecution alleges that around 500 civilians were captured in Pendembu, and
that many were forced to do domestic work. It also alleges that from May/June 1999 to July
2000, fighters would sign up for women whom they would then take to their homes to be
used as sex slaves and for domestic work.4l02
(i) Domestic Chores
Evidence
1832. Mustapha Mansaray testified that between May 1999 and July 2000 he was in charge
of the screening in Pendembu, under the overall command of IDU commander Augustine
Gbao.4l03 The witness testified that during this time period, the RUF screened up to 500
civilians in Pendembu. Some women who were captured by the fighters were not brought to
the screening process but were kept by the fighters, and the witness never knew what
happened to them.4l04 Some of these civilians were assigned to fighters’ homes, where they
performed domestic duties. Women were also screened as part of this process and assigned
MOI See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kailahun District (between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 June 1998) supra.
NO2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1 121.
M3 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5318-5324.

---- End of Page 639 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI--03-O1-T / 18 May 2012

3 Q °r2>2.
to fighters’ h0mes where they were forced to have sexual intercourse and to perform
d0mestic duties.4405 When asked if they went with the fighters voluntarily, the witness
replied with an unequivocal "n0".44O6 When asked the same question later in his testimony
he stated that he did not know what was in the women's minds and did not know whether
they were willing or not.44O4 However, the witness stated that there were many complaints
from captured women that they had lost their property and had been forced to come with the
fighters.4444
Findings 4
1833. The Trial Chamber is satisfied from Mansaray's testimony that between May 1999
and July 2000 in Pendembu, civilians who had been abducted by the RUF were assigned to
fighters, and made to perform d0mestic duties. Based on his evidence, the Trial Chamber
finds that these civilians did not do so of their own free will. S0me women were also used as
sexual slaves (this aspect of their captivity is considered in the section dealing with sexual
slavery4404). According1y, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt that, by depriving the civilians of their liberty and forcing them to work, members of`
the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised rights of ownership over them.
4. Other L0cations
1834. The Prosecution alleges that in 1999, civilians captured in the Daru and Segbwema
area by RUF and AFRC fighters were forced to carry l0ads for the fighters.44444
1835. The Prosecution also alleges that in 2000, Albert Saidu was sent to Vahun, Liberia,
by Issa Sesay to take a letter to General 50 who, in response to the letter, gave Saidu
ammunition to take to B0maru. Strong civilian men in B0maru were made to carry the l0ads
0f` ammunition to Pendumbu, then to Manowa Ferry, and further into Kailahun.44 44
4404 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5232.
4405 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5327.
4446 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5321.
4407 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5326-5327.
4444 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5324.
4404 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: C0unt 5 (Sexual Slavery); Captured civilians used as sexual
slaves in Pendembu, Findings supra.
44 40 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1120.
44 44 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 1123.

---- End of Page 640 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 7, 4 QL 18 May 2012

3€?33
(i) Cagying Loads/Arms and Ammunition
Evidence
1836. Mustapha Mansaray testified that civilians captured by the RUF and AFRC in Daru
and Segbwema were brought to Pendembu for screening at some point after May/June 1999
when the witness was posted to Pendembu.4H2 In Exhibit D-060, notes of an interview
`ven by Sheku Alex Bao to the Prosecution, Bao states that when the rebels ca tured
EJ P
Segbwema, they abducted many civilians to carry their things.4l K3
1837. Albert Saidu testified that in 2000, strong civilians were used by rebels to carry
ammunition, which had come from Vahun, fiom Bomaru to Pendembu, then to Manowa
Ferry and further into Kailahun.4l I4
Findings
1838. Although Mustapha Mansaray stated that civilians were captured in Dam and
Segbwema by the RUF and AFRC in January 1999, there is no mention in his evidence of
civilians being forced to carry loads while travelling to Pendembu. Exhibit D-060 contains
notes of an interview given by Sheku Alex Bao to the Prosecution on 25 November 2004, in
which he stated that when rebels captured Segbwema, they abducted civilians to carry their
things. No indication is given in the document of when this occurred. Moreover, Bao did not
mention any such incident in his sworn evidence in this trial, nor in the evidence he gave in
the AFRC or RUF trials. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the elements of the crime of
enslavement have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to this incident.
1839. Albert Saidu's evidence is that civilians assisted the soldiers to transport the
ammunition, but there is no mention of the civilians having been forced to do so.
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the civilians were used as forced labour. M I5
(ii) Farming
M I2 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5318, 5320.
41 13 Exhibit D-060, "SCSL, Office of the Prosecutor, Interview Notes, 25 November 2004", para. 19.
4m Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11105-11110.
MI5 Factual Findings on Responsibility: Arms and Ammunition; Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused,
During Issa Sesay's Leadership (December 1999-January 2000) injia.

---- End of Page 641 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-O1-T // (QQ 18 May 3012

$$7*3%
1840. The Prosecution allegesthat from 1996 to 2000, civilians in Sandialu were forced to
harvest coffee which was ultimately given to RUF commander Augustine Gbao.4l I6
Evidence
1841. Aruna Gbonda testified that civilians in Sandialu contributed coffee which they had
harvested to the rebels, which was ultimately given to Augustine Gbao.4l 17
Findings
1842. Gbonda gives the only evidence of coffee harvesting in this particular location, and
his evidence is not strong. He did not make it clear whether he personally witnessed civilians
in Sandialu harvesting coffee or contributing it to the rebels, nor did he provide any specific
dates during which the harvesting of coffee at this location occurred. Further, his evidence
does not indicate whether the civilians contributed this produce voluntarily, or whether they
were forced to do so. The mere contribution of coffee does not of itself constitute forced
labour. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crime of enslavement
have been not been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to this incident.
Conclusion
1843. The foregoing findings by the Trial Chamber establish that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forcesmg engaged in
widespread and large scale abductions of civilians in Kailahun District and used them as
forced labour to carry loads, farm, fish, carry out domestic chores, go on food-finding
missions, undergo military training and construct an airfield as detailed in the various crimes
discussed above.
1844. The Trial Chamber has already found that the chapeau requirements in relation to the
crime of enslavement have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.4H9 The Trial Chamber
further finds in relation to Kailahun District that the acts of the perpetrators in each of the
above crimes of enslavement formed part of the attack directed against the civilian
M I6 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 1122.
lm Aruna Gbonda, Transcript 19 February 2008, pp. 4268-4269.
mg See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kailahun District (between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 June 1998) supra.
mq See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.

---- End of Page 642 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T w' \ 18 May 2012 A

3 ?>r$S’
population and that the perpetrators knew that the abductions of civilians and their use as
forced labour formed part of that attack. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the elements
of enslavement as a crime against humanity (Count 10) have been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
5. Freetown and the Western Area
1845. The Indictment alleges that between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February
, 1999, members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance and/or Liberian fighters
abducted an unknown number of civilians, including a large number of children, from
locations throughout Freetown and the Western Area, and used them as forced labour.4l2O
1846. Documentary evidence corroborates the sworn evidence discussed below that large-
scale abductions and crimes against humanity occurred in Freetown and the Western Area
during this period. Exhibit P-204B (Confidential), is a report in which it is calculated that
99% of the patients treated at the FAWE4l2l sexual violence counselling and health care
program in Freetown in 1999 had been abducted, with the majority abducted during the
Freetown attack.4l22 Exhibit D-191, a Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, reports that rebels abducted an unverifiable number of
people in Freetown.4l23 Exhibit P-365 states that 3000 children were reported missing and
believed to have been abducted by rebels.4l24
1847. Another report, Exhibit P-077 (Confidential), states that rebels advancing into the
city on January 6-7 forced civilians into the streets to act as human shields,4l25 that during
the attack, rebels abducted a large but unverifiable number of people,4l26 and that thousands
of children were abducted by rebels.4m Exhibit P-328, a Human Rights Watch report, states
that a centra1 feature of the Freetown attack was the use of civilians as human shields, and
4m Indictment, paras 23, 27.
4m Forum for African Women Educationalists.
4*22 Exiiibii P-20412 (eoiiiidemiiiii, p. 2.
4123 Exhibit D-191, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March l999", para. 26.
4124 Exhibit P—365, "Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, The
Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P. From David Pratt, M.P. Nepean—Carleton, Special Envoy To Sierra
Leone, 23 April l999". p. 00209247, para. 4.
M25 Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 41.
*26 Exhibit P-077 (coiiiiiieiiiiiii), paras 55-56.
**27 Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 60.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—01—T jh 18 May 2012

3 B'-}-3 (Q
that rebels marched in or behind thousands of civilians making up the human shield.4l28
Human Rights Watch also reported that thousands of civilians were abducted as rebels
retreated from the city, and family members were often beaten or killed if they attempted to
resist the abductions.4l29
1848. What follows is a consideration of the sworn evidence of enslavement alleged to
have been perpetrated in specific locations in Freetown and the Western Area.
(i) Carrying Loads
Evidence
1849. Ibrahim Wai testified that on 23 December 1998, "SLA/RUF" soldiers entered
Tombo and looted his goods. A commander named "Mohammed" then ordered the witness
to carry these goods to the "station" in Tombo. He was told that if he attempted to turn back,
he would be shot.4l3O
1850. Perry Kamara testified that by the time his convoy reached Benguema around 25
December 1998, the RUF/AFRC had more than 1,000 civilians carrying loads for them. He
stated that "the father who was among us was full of admiration saying that we were able to
control the civilians who were carrying loads for us".4l3 I
1851. Witness TF1-026 testified that on 6 January 1999, she was captured by RUF rebels
under the command of CO Rocky from her home near Wellington and that over 50 civilians
were forced to ca ba s of looted ro ert for the rebels on the wa from Calaba Town to
HY S P P Y Y
Waterloo. The rebels told them that they would be shot if they tried to escape, and the
witness saw them kill one man who tried to run away.4l32
1852. Abu Bakarr Mansaray confirmed evidence he had given in the AFRC Trial that he
was captured in Freetown on 8 January 1999 by three rebels armed with AK-47s, who were
J under the command of Gullit. They forced him to go to State House where he was locked in
mg Exhibit P-328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone - Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape,
New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol. 1 1 No. 3 (A)", p. 23000, para. 5.
4129 Exhibit P-328, Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone - Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape,
New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol. 1 1 No. 3 (A)", p. 22999, para. 2; p. 23001, para. 6.
*90 ibmhim wai. Transcript 16 oprpbpi 2008, pp. 18560-18563.
ml Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3214.
4m TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3843-3844, 3847-3850, 3862-3865.

---- End of Page 644 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gu 18 May 2012

` 3 5 :*3 7*
the kitchen with approximately 50 other civilians for four days without food or water. He
testified that civilians who attempted to escape were stopped by rebels who pointed guns at
them.4l33 He was then chained and forced to carry a heavy bomb for the 45 minute trek to
Calaba Town.4l34 On cross-examination (in the AFRC Trial), it was suggested to him that it
would have been im ossible for him to et from Freetown to Calaba Town in 45 minutes
P S
while carrying a heavy bomb after not having eaten for four days.4l35 Mansaray was also
cross-examined on this aspect of his evidence in the present trial and he explained that the
reason he stated a time of 45 minutes was because the rebels told him it had taken them 45
minutes to reach Calaba Town.4l36
1853. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in about the third week of January 1999, the
civilians who had been captured in Freetown moved with the RUF/AFRC rebels, including
the witness, through Kissy. The civilians, including women, were all given loads to carry of
oods that had been looted from Freetown includin rice, clothin and `eans. He testified
S S 8 J
that they were guarded so that they would not escape.4m
1854. Witness TF 1-023 confirmed testimony she had given in the AFRC Trialmg and a
transcript of that testimony was admitted into evidencemg The witness testified in the
AFRC Trial that she was abducted by rebels from Calaba Town on 22 January 1999 along
with four men, three women and a young child. They joined a group of other captured
civilians and moved with the rebels to Allen Town, where they joined another group of
captured civilians (totalling 100 in all). During the joumey, TF 1-023 was given a small bag
to carry. The civilians stayed at Allen Town for three days and were guarded by SBUs with
guns to prevent them escaping.4l40
1855. Paul Conteh confirmed testimony he had given in the AFRC Trial4l4l and a transcript
of that testimony was admitted into evidence4l42. Conteh testified that on 23 January 1999,
M3 Exhibit P—222, "TFl—024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20427—20429, 20432—20434.
M4 Exhibit P—222, "TFl—024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20432, 20435—20437, 20464—20467.
mj Exhibit P—222, "TFl—024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20464—20467.
4]% Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, p. 19561.
W Arrmamy Bpbspp spray, 23 April 2008, pp. 8346-8348.
"'" TFl—023, Transcript 22 oprpbpr 2008, p. 18932.
mg Exhibit P—205A, "TFl—023, AFRC Transcript, 9 March 2005".
4140 Exhibit P-205A, "TFl—023, AFRC Transcript, 9 March 2005", pp. l932l—l9325. The Prosecution alleges at
footnote 3194 of their Final Trial Brief that these civilians "had been captured to use as human shields", but this
is not supported by the evidence of this witness.

---- End of Page 645 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T 2 18 May 2012 %
I

ZSZHBX
during the retreat from Freetown, the AFRC looted his house and forced him to carry the
looted oods to a cam at Kola Tree, where a roximatel 200 civilians were also bein
S P PP Y S
held captive. During the journey, they beat him so that he would walk more quickly, and
after showing him the corpse of a civilian who had been shot, told him that this is what
would happen to him if he tried to escape.4443 After staying at Kola Tree, the civilians were
then forced to carry loads as they moved with the rebels towards Regent on approximately
28 January 1999.4*44
1856. Akiatu Tholley testified that she was captured in the RUF/AFRC rebel attack on
Wellington on 5 January 19994445 and was beaten up. She and other civilians were then
forced to carry heavy boxes of ammunition in a convoy to Allen Town. She testified that if
civilians refused to carry the ammunition, they would be killed. The witness personally saw
some civilians killed for refusing to carry these boxes.4446 When the civilians reached Allen
Town, they refused to carry the ammunition any further, and the rebels ordered them to strip
naked and told them they would be killed. The civilians escaped when jets flew overhead
and the rebels took shelter.4444
Findings
1857. The Trial Chamber is satisfied, based on Ibrahim Wai's first-hand evidence that he
was forced by RUF/AFRC soldiers to carry goods looted from his house to the station in
Tumbo, and that he was told that he would be shot if he turned back. The Trial Chamber
accordingly finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the
AFRC/RUF forces4448 intentionally exercised powers of ownership over Wai on 23
December 1998 in Tumbo, Western Area.
4444 Paul Conteh, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19286-19287.
4*42 Exhibit P-215, "T1=1-227, MRC Transcript 8 Apiir 2005r.
4*44 Paul Conteh, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19298-19299, 19301-19302; Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC
Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 20814-20822.
4*44 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 20830-20831.
4*45 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19173, 19174, 27 October 2008, pp. 19244, 19245.
4*46 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19173-19179.
4*47 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19180-19183.
4*44 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawlhl Killings); Alleged un1awli1l
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
SLlAD}"(1.

---- End of Page 646 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012
t

Lz °r3<=;
1858. The Trial Chamber finds that Perry Kamara's detailed first-hand account of how the
RUF/AFRC fighters controlled the civilians, and how the civilians were forced to carry
loads against their will, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF
forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over approximately 1000 civilians on the
way to Benguema on 25 December 1998.
1859. On the basis of TF1-026's first-hand testimony, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
she and over 50 other civilians carried bags of looted property from Calaba Town to
Waterloo. As the RUF rebels threatened the civilians with death if they tried to escape, and
as the witness personally saw them kill one civilian who had tried to run away, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that these civilians had no choice but to carry these loads. The Trial
Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that members of
the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over at least 50 civilians
from Calaba Town to Waterloo on 6 January 1999.
1860. Mansaray's first-hand testimony establishes that he and approximately 50 other
captured civilians were locked in a kitchen at State House under armed guards for
approximately 4 days without food and water. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that
the physical movement of the civilians was controlled. The Trial Chamber accepts
Mansaray's testimony of being forced to carry a bomb from there to Calaba Town in
January 1999. He has sworn this evidence on oath in both the AFRC Trial and the present
trial and although his estimate of 45 minutes may not be accurate, the Trial Chamber has no
doubt that he was telling the truth about being forced to carry a bomb. The Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces
intentionally exercised powers of ownership over him.
1861. Alimamy Bobson Sesay gave a detailed first-hand account about civilians carrying
loads through Kissy.. As the civilians had been previously abducted, and were guarded by
armed fighters as they moved through Kissy, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
AFRC/RUF fighters exercised physical control over the movement of the civilians, who had
no choice but to carry the loads. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that members of the
AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over an unknown number of
civilians in Kissy in the third week of January 1999.

---- End of Page 647 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL·03·01·T 18 May 2012 Lg

3%}*9
1862. On the basis of TF1-023's first—hand evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that she
was abducted with eight other people in Calaba Town, was told by the rebels to carry a bag,
and that she was taken to Allen Town where she was held for three days with 100 other
civilians. Given that the civilians were guarded by armed SBUs to prevent them escaping,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the rebels exercised control over the physical movement
of the civilians. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that it has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces exercised powers of ownership
over TF1-023 for approximately 3 days from 22 January 1999.
1863. On the basis of Conteh's first—hand testimony, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
AFRC/RUF fighters forced him to carry goods they had looted from his home to a camp in
Kola Tree on 23 January 1999, and that he and other civilians were then forced to carry
loads to Regent approximately 28 January 1999. As the witness was abducted, beaten, and
threatened with death if he attempted to escape, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that he had no
choice but to carry the loads. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that it has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised the
powers of ownership over Corrteh and other civilians on 23 and approximately 28 January
1999.
1864. Akiatu Tholley's evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that she and other
civilians were forced by RUF/AFRC rebels to carry heavy boxes of ammunition from
Wellington to Allen Town. Considering her evidence that they were threatened with death if
they refused to work, that she personally witnessed civilians being killed, and that they were
ordered to strip naked and threatened with death when they refused to carry the ammunition
any further, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that members of the
g AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over Tholley and an
unknown number of civilians from Wellington to Allen Town in late January 1999.
(Although the witness testified that this incident occurred on 5 January 1999, her subsequent
movement with her captors from Wellington to Allen Town to Waterloo to Masiaka
indicates that this occurred as the rebels withdrew from Freetown through Wellington later
in January 1999.)
(ii) Domestic Chores and other tasks
Evidence

---- End of Page 648 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /648 GIA 18 May 2012

3%}*1 1
1865. Patrick Sheriff testified that he and three other civilians were captured in the bush by
an armed AFRC member in Mabureh Town in the Western Area, on 30 December 1998.
They were forced to process palm fruits in order obtain palm oil, even though the witness
was injured. The witness stated that he did the job "to save his life". He also saw
a roximatel 30 ca tured civilians in the town, who were used b the rebels to cook, ound
PP Y P Y P
rice and collect water.4l49
1866. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that when the AFRC fighters were at PWD and
Ferry Junction towards the third week of January, they would use civilians to look for tyres
and burn them in order to light up the area.4l5O
1867. Alimamy Bobson Sesay also testified that 400 civilians4l5l were "placed under strict
monitoring" and forced by fighters based in Benguema in February—March 1999 to do
various tasks including pounding rice, cooking, laundering, going on patrols and ambushes,
going on food finding missions and cariying loads.4l52
1868. Paul Conteh's testimony in the AFRC Trial, a transcript of which was admitted into
evidence, was that on around 22 January 1999, at the camp in Kola Tree, civilians were
forced to work for AFRC commanders by cooking or doing domestic chores. One of the
AF RC fighters showed him a corpse and told him that this might happen to him if he tried to
escape.4l53
1869. Conteh gave further evidence in the AF RC Trial that a few days later, he went with a
group of captured civilians and rebels to Benguema, where there were already 200 civilians.
He testified that civilians were forced by AFRC fighters to destroy a bridge under the
supervision of armed fighters and to perform domestic duties, including cooking, laundry
and pounding rice.4l54
Findings
Mw Patrick Sheriff; Transcript 3 October 2008, pp. 17796-17800.
M50 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8434-8435.
M5 I Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8453.
M2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8391-8397.
M3 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", pp. 20819-20821.
M4 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 11 April 2005", pp. 20834-20838.

---- End of Page 649 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / OA 18 May 2012

3%?*\-2.
1870. Sheriff` s evidence establishes that he and three other captured civilians were ordered
to process palm fruits, despite the fact that he was injured, and that he did the job to "save
his life". The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that these civilians did not do the work of
their own free will. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of
ownership over four civilians in Mabureh Town around 30 December 1998.
1871. Sheriff also testified that he saw in Mabureh about 30 civilians carrying out domestic
chores, but did not state whether they were doing so voluntarily or not. The Trial Chamber
therefore cannot establish that the elements of enslavement are proved in this instance.
1872. Alimamy Bobson Sesay's evidence that civilians were used to look for tyres to burn
does not go so far as to give any indication of whether the civilians were forced to cariy
these tyres or whether they did so voluntarily, nor of how long the civilians were occupied in
doing this.4l55 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crime of
enslavement have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt in relation to this incident.
1873. As regards the Kola Tree incident, the Trial Chamber is satisfied on the first—hand
evidence of Paul Conteh that AF RC commanders used civilians to cook and perform
domestic chores around 22 January 1999. As the civilians had been abducted and brought to
Kola Tree against their will, and as one of the fighters threatened Conteh with death if he
attempted to escape, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the civilians had no choice but to do
this work. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership
over civilians at Kola Tree in Freetown around 22 January 1999.
1874. As regards the Benguema incident, Paul Conteh's and Alimamy Bobson Sesay's
first—hand evidence establishes that in approximately February—March 1999, civilians were
used by AFRC/RUF fighters to perform various duties, including domestic chores such as
cooking, laundry and pounding rice, as well as destroying a bridge. As one of the rebels
threatened Conteh that he might be killed if he attempted to escape, as the civilians were
supervised by armed fighters, and "under strict monitoring", the Trial Chamber is satisfied
4*55 While duration is not an element of the crime of enslavement, it may be relevant from an evidentiary
perspective. See Applicable Law: Specific Elements of the Crimes; Count 10: Abductions and Forced Labour
(Article 2(e) of the Statute) supra.

---- End of Page 650 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / lu 18 May 2012

S8? W 3
that the physical movement of the civilians was restricted and that there were means taken to
deter their escape. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that it has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that between February and March 1999, members of the AFRC/RUF
forces intentionally exercised powers of ownership over a group of approximately 400
civilians in Benguema, Western Area.
Conclusion
1875. The foregoing findings by the Trial Chamber establish that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces engaged in
widespread and large scale abductions of civilians in Freetown and the Western Area and
used them as forced labour to carry loads, perform domestic chores and destroy a bridge, as
detailed in the various crimes discussed above.
1876. The Trial Chamber has already found that the chapeau requirements in relation to the
crime of enslavement have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.4]56 The Trial Chamber
further finds in relation to Freetown and the Western Area that the acts of the perpetrators in
each of the above crimes of enslavement formed part of the attack directed against the
civilian population and that the perpetrators knew that the abductions of civilians and their
use as forced labour formed part of that attack. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the
elements of enslavement as a crime against humanity (Count 10) have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
M6 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 2: Crimes Against Humanity, para. 559 supra.

---- End of Page 651 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 5)*; 18 May 2012 %
x

3`B°f*·l·'~\~
F. Count ll (Pillar:)
1877. The Indictment alleges that members of RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance,
and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the
direction and/or control of and/or subordinate to the Accused, "engaged in widespread
unlawful taking of civilian property", including the following:4`57
(i) Kono District: Between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December 1998, in
various locations, including Koidu, Tombodu or Tumbodu and Bumpe;4`58
(ii) Bombali District: Between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 April 1998, in
various locations, including Makeni;4‘59
(iii) Port Loko District: Between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 April 1998, in
various locations, including Masiaka;4`60
(iv) Freetown and the Western Area: Between about 21 December 1998 and about
28 February 1999, throughout Freetown and the Western Area.4`6`
1878. The Prosecution submits that after ECOMOG dislodged the junta from Freetown in
February 1998, there was no money to pay the AF RC/RUF fighters, so Johnny Paul Koroma
declared "Operation Pay Yourself ’ over the international media, ordering the fighters to "go
around and loot and take whatever they wanted which was valuable to them" from
civilians. With the declaration of "Operation Pay Yourself ’ there commenced a "continuous
looting spree from civilians" by retreating AFRC/RUF forces.4‘62 The Prosecution claims
that the looting spree followed the route of the retreating AFRC/RUF forces from Freetown.
"Operation Pay Yourself ’ was declared in Masiaka, and the looting spree continued east as
the fighters further withdrew to Makeni.4‘63 In Makeni, senior AFRC/RUF commanders
reinforced the order for "Operation Pay Yourself" and strategically decided that "each
soldier should take responsibility [for] feeding himself". They "should gather food for
M7 Indictment, para. 28
mg Indictment, para. 29.
mg Indictment, para. 30.
Mw Indictment, para. 30A.
Mm Indictment, para. 31.
M2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1142, citing the evidence of witnesses Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 17 April
2008. pp. 7933-7935; TF1—375, TT, 23 June 2008, p. 12500; and Exhibit P-130, para 27.

---- End of Page 652 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / Gb- 18 May 2012

[themselves] and all that [they] needed to use during the time [they] were in the jungle.
"Operation Pay Yourself ’ meant [they] could take anything from [a] civilian".4l64
1. Kono District
1879. The Prosecution submits that the looting which occurred in Kono District "marked
the culmination of Operation Pay Yourself and, thereafter, the settlement of the District by
AFRC/RUF forces. Looting also took place during the Indictment timeframe in the context
of Kono being declared a ‘No Go Zone for Civilians"’.4l65
1880. Several witnesses testified to various acts of looting in areas of Kono District outside
of Koidu and Tomboduim'6 or to looting in the District generally, without specifying a more
precise location.4167 Such evidence does not fall within the scope of the Indictment, and is
relevant only insofar as it demonstrates that the activity was widespread, and therefore
assists in establishing the chapeau requirements. Evidence of looting in Kono District prior
to the Indictment period4168 and after the Indictment period4I69 has not been considered.
(a) Koidu Town l
1881. The Trial Chamber relies on the evidence of Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Samuel Bull, Perry
Kamara, TF1-371, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1-367, Dennis Koker and Issa Sesay in
relation to these allegations. i
""" Prosecution Final rmi Boor, paras 1144, 1147, 1150.
N64 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1443, 1150, citing the evidence of Perry Kamara, 5 February 2008, pp.
3096, 3098.
M65 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1154 (quoting Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp.
7950-7951).
4166 See, ag., Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12146-12148 (describing looting in Gaya); Mustapha
Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19598 (describing looting in Wordu); Emmanuel Bull, Transcript 25
September 2008, pp. 17221-17222 (describing looting on a footpath near Motema) and pp. 17265-17272
(describing looting in Mamboma); Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17077 (describing looting in
Fakoyia bush); p. 17086 (describing looting on a footpath near Motema); pp. 17111-17112 (describing looting in
Mamboma); Finda Gbamanja, Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23841 (describing looting in Baiama Town);
Erdribit P-199A, "Sahr Charles, RUF Trial Transcript, 12 January 2005", pp. 18896, 18899 (describing looting of
the witness's belongings in the bush two miles outside of Tombodu).
Mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6201; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6852; Samuel Bull,
Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17061; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7129; Mustapha Mansaray,
Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19598.
4m Shelcu Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 30 October 2008, pp. 19682-19683; Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October
2008, pp. 19369-19373, 19376-19377.
4l6° Exhibit P-196, "Statement of Tamba Yomba Ngekia", pp. 77-78; RUF Trial Transcript 20 July 2004, TF1-
077, pp. 77-78; Exhibit P-196, RUF Trial Transcript 21 July 2004, TF1-077, p. 21; Tamba Yomba Ngekia,
Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18236, 18242-18245.

---- End of Page 653 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / QA 18 May 2012

Es °t·¤tQ¤
1882. Sheku Bah Kuyateh, who was in Koidu Town in mid-February 1998,44744 testified
that "[t]he very day that we heard that ECOMOG had dislodged the juntas fiom Freetown,
on that same day the juntas [both AFRC and RUF troops]4474 started looting right fiom the
first day and the following day they continued their looting spree".4472 Although the civilian
population of Koidu Town temporarily "dis1odged" the "juntas"4474 and invited the
Kamajors in to defend the town,4474 the town came under attack two weeks later and the
witness fled along with much of the civilian population.4475 Upon returning to Koidu Town a
couple of days later, Kuyateh observed that those who had perpetrated the attack on Koidu,
were led by a member of the RUF4476 and "were looting and they were on an operation that
they referred to as Operation Pay Yourse1f".4477 This looting spree continued for two
days.4478 Kutateh further testified that later, in April 1998,4479 there was "rampant
looting"444O in Koidu Town.
1883. TF1-375 gave evidence that approximately a month after the ECOMOG Intervention
"[w]e attacked Kono and we took over the town. We started 1ooting".4484 Kuyateh and TF1-
375 described this as the first attack on Koidu following the ECOMOG intervention.4482
1884. Samuel Bull testified that in February 1998, Koidu Town was subject to "a lot of
looting [...] done by the AFRC and the People's Army. They broke into shops using guns
and they took everything fiom the shops".4484 The witness did not see the property taken
away but he saw the empty shops and other consequences of the alleged attack.4484
44744 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19685.
4474 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19690.
4474 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19689.
4474 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19689.
4474 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19692
4445 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19692
44744 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, pp. 19693, 19694, 19751.
4477 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19693.
4478 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19694.
4474 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, 31 October 2008, p. 19699.
44844 Sheku Bah Kuyateh, 31 October 2008, p. 19701.
4*8* rrr-275, Transcript 23 Jrrrrr. 2008,p. 12504.
4482 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12504-12505; TF1-201; Transcript 31 October 2008, p. 19692.
4484 Samuel Bull, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17060
4484 TF1-065, Transcript 24 September 2008, p. 17061 ("I was not present when they were doing those things,
but when I got to Koidu Town, around Opera, by Kaikondo Road, we saw shops were open and empty".).

---- End of Page 654 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 613, 18 May 2012

1885. Witness Alice Pyne testified that she was in Gaya, in Kono District, when she heard
from civilians and members of the RUP and APRC coming from Koidu Town that looting
took place in Koidu Town as part of "Operation Pay Yourself".4185
1886. There is also evidence of the looting of a bank in Koidu Town. In this regard, the
Prosecution asserts that before AP RC and RUP forces "bumed Koidu Town to the ground",
the Commercial Bank in Koidu Town was looted. The Prosecution submits that the "[w]hile
the details vary as to whether the raid was carried out on the orders of Superman, the
evidence is consistent that it was members of the APRC/RUP who carried out the raid and
that the money and diamonds taken were later taken to Sam Bockarie in Buedu".418°
1887. Witness TP1-367 stated that upon the arrival of in Koidu Town of the RUP/APRC
and STP fighters that had left Preetown following the February 1998 ECOMOG
lntervention,4187 a group of SLAs and STP organised to break into a bank in Koidu.4188 The
break-in occurred at night and was the first joint operation of the SLAs and the STP.41119
TP 1-367 testified that when Superman learned of the break-in fromthis bodyguards,41911
Superman ordered Ray, Peleto and others to go and find the perpetrators.4191 Some escaped,
but others were arrested and the money seized.4192 The money was in Superman's
possession when Sam Bockarie sent a message for Superman to give the money to TP 1-367
to take to Bockarie in Kailahun.4193 Superman then gave 56 million leones to TP1-367 in a
travelling bag to deliver to Sam Bockarie.4194
1888. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a member of the APRC, testified that he participated in the
looting of the bank just prior to the ECOMOG bombardment of Koidu Town which
occurred in the post-Intervention period.4195 The witness stated that he, Superman and Bomb
4185 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12147.
4186 Prosecution Pinal Trial Brief, para. 1158. p
4187 TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14133-14134.
41118 TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14141-14146.
4'8" TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14141.
""" TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14142.
4191 TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14141-14142.
4192 TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14141-14145.
""’3 TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14144-1414s.
·""" TP1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14146.
4195 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8008, 8016-8018. In cross-examination, Sesay stated
that Bazzy and Hasan Papa Bangura participated in the break-in of the bank. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript
21 April 2008, p. 8065.

---- End of Page 655 ---------------------------


Case No; SCSL-03-01-T / 61% 18 May 2012

3*8} Leia
Blast broke into the bank and took six bags of money.4446 The money was in Superman's
possession until it was given to Eldred Collins in Koidu Gieya to bring to Kailahun.4494 The
witness said that Superman told him and the other looters that Mosquito had called and told
them that the money should be taken to Kailahun.4444
1889. Witness TF1-371 was in Kailahun Town when he learned about the robbery of the
Commercial Bank in Koidu Town, which happened during the post-ECOMOG Intervention
period.4l44 TF1-371 testified that when Sam Bockarie heard about the looting, he instructed
Denis Mingo, aka Superman, to take the looted money from the bank and to bring it to him
in Buedu.4444
1890. Witness Dennis Koker testified that during the attack on Koidu Town in the post-
ECOMOG Intervention period, RUF and AFRC fighters broke into the bank and stole
money and diamonds.424)4 Koker stated that he saw the fighters break into the bank and saw
18 bags of money taken from the premises.4242 Koker testified that he was there and "saw it
all".42°4 After the bank was robbed, he left for Gandorhun with Johnny Paul Koroma, Morris
Kallon and others.4244
1891. Defence witness Issa Sesay testified that in early April 1998, AFRC, RUF and STP
fighters broke into a bank in Kono.4245 Issa Sesay heard that Superman arrested the
perpetrators when he found out about the break-in.424)6
1892. Witness Perry Kamara, a radio operator, was in Koidu Town at the time the
p Commercial Bank was looted during the post ECOMOG Intervention period., 4244 Kamara
testified that Superman implemented the orders of Sam Bockarie to "destroy" the bank.42448
Kamara stated that the bank was "destroyed" and that he saw leones, sterling pounds, US
4446 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8017.
4447 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8016-8017.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8017.
‘*‘°" TPl—37l, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2390-2391 (cs).
tm TPl—37l, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2390-2391 (cs).
4404 Dermis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1246-1247.
4202 Demris Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1247.
4444 Dermis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1247.
4204 Demris Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1248.
4205 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44058—44059.
4206 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44058—44059.
4247 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3105.

---- End of Page 656 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T _/M 18 May 2012
. A P"

dollars and a cup half filled with diamonds in Superman's house.424)9 The proceeds were
recorded and the infomation sent to Sam Bockarie.42l0
1893. Prosecution witnesses and Defence witness Issa Sesay all testified that the bank in
Koidu Town was looted by AFRC, RUF and STF fighters in February or March or April
1998. The evidence also establishes that cash was taken from the bank.
1894. ln another incidence of looting, witness Gibril Sesay testified that in Koidu in
February 19984211 a group of armed "juntas and RUF rebels"42l2 "went around midnight
knocking at doors, raping women, looting people's property"42l3 and that "[a]fter looting
people's property they took away those property".42l4 The witness went on to say that this
group looted his baling machine and some of his furniture.42l5 The witness estimated that the
baling machine had a market value of 500,000 leones but was unsure as to the value of the
furniture.42l6
(b) Tombodu
1895. Witness Sahr Bindi testified that members of the RUF and AFRC violently looted his
and his family's property42l7 in the "bush" around Tombodu.42l8 A group of AFRC and RUF
troops approached the hut in which Bindi was living, ordered the inhabitants to leave the hut
and demanded that they hand over food and valuable property, including diamonds, or face
death.42l9 Bindi stated that "they blindfolded us, they beat us up and they asked us to take
out the money and the diamonds, the palm oil, the rice and we said we did not have and they
tripped us and we fell into the ants, and they pointed a gun in my stomach and they said if 1
did not take out the money and the diamonds they would kill me".422O The witness was
beaten and stabbed in the head during this incident, leaving a scar that he showed to the Trial
4208 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3105-3106.
4209 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3106.
4240 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3106.
"2" crr1>rr1 Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19366—19377.
4212 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19378.
4m Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19376.
4244 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008. p. 19376.
4245 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19377.
4246 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19378.
4247 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18473—18474.
42*8 Sahr Brrrcrr, Transcript 16 October 2008,p. 18471.
4249 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18472-18476.

---- End of Page 657 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T mi 18 May 2012

3 &‘·`r·So
Chamber during his testimony.422l Fearing that "death was near" Bindi provided the fighters
wrrrr money, e bike epa 16611.*222
1896. Bindi estimated that the attack on Tombodu had occurred in February 19984223
durin the dr season4224. I-le stated that he had moved to Tombodu fiom Koidu because of
8 Y
an AF RC/RUF attack on Koidu Town. 1-Ie was unable to remember the date of the attack on
Koidu Town, but it had occurred after the re-instatement of President Kabbah.4225 President
Kabbah was re-instated in March 1998.4226 Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the
looting described by the witness took place during the Indictment period.
(c) Bumpe
1897. The Trial Chamber relies on the evidence of Perr Kamara and Ruko Tura in
Y Y
relation to allegations of looting in Bumpe.
1898. Pe Kamara testified that RUF and AFRC forces retreated fiom Freetown in
YYY
Februa 19984227, assin throu Bum e, amon st other towns and villa es, and that, as
YY P 8 P 8 8
the went alon , the looted civilian oods and abducted school children and women fiom
Y 8 Y 8
their husbands "and they killed the husbands".4228
1899. Ruko Turay confirmed testimony she had given in the RUF Case, a transcript of
which was admitted into evidence.4224 Tura testified in the RUF Case that, while in her
Y
home in Bum e in the rain season of 1998, a oun man in combat uniform — a rebel423O -
P Y Y 8
took "the better articles" fiom her ba . "The ones he didn’t want he threw awa . The others
8 Y
he went awa with them".424l The witness testified that later the rebels removed all her
Y
*222 sem Brpdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18474.
4241 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18476.
*222 sehr Brpdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18476-18478.
*222 sehr Brpdr, Transcript 16 oereeer 2008, p. 18465.
*22* sehr Bmdr, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18473.
*222 sehr Brpdr, Transcript 16 oereeer 2008, pp. 18460-18461.
4226 Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, Fact E.
4227 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3094-3095.
*222 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3100-3101.
4229 Ruko Turay, Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18346-18359; Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Trial Transcript,
1 February 2005".
*220 Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Trial Transcript, 1 February 2005"’, p. 18879.
4231 Exhibit P-198, "TF1-218, RUF Trial Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 18877. See also Ruko Turay,
Transcript 14 October 2008, pp. 18352, 18357 (for the first time frame).

---- End of Page 658 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GK 18 May 2012
-./

3 9*1-5 t
clothes and left her naked and she was then raped. She heard one of the rebels say: "We
have got clothes. We have got rice. We have got everything".4242 The rebel who had taken
her things came back with them and placed them down near her while he raped her.4233 The
witness stated that the rebels declared that they were going to kill her and the other women
held captive so, when she got the chance, she fled naked into the bush. As she fled, a rebel
shot at her, hitting her in the hand.4234
Findings
1900. Based on the evidence above, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December 1998 members of the
AFRC/RUF and STF forces4245 intentionally appropriated property without the consent of
the owners in Koidu Town, Tombodu and Bumpe in Kono District.
2. Bombali District
(a) Makeni
1901. Witnesses TF1-367, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Dennis Koker, Alice Pyne and TF1-
174 provided first-hand accounts of looting by RUF and AFRC forces in Makeni from
February to March 1998 during the looting spree referred to as ‘Operation Pay Yourself .4236
Their evidence is corroborated by the evidence of Issa Sesay, who arrived in Makeni after
the looting had occurred,4234 Charles Ngebeh4238 and Exhibit P-303, a "Humanitarian
Situation Report for Sierra Leone" from the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian
Coordinator, covering the period 21 January to 12 February 1998, which refers to the
"abduction" of vehicles in Makeni.
1902. Witness TF1-367, a member of the RUF, testified that he participated in looting in
Makeni, and that he and members of the AFRC/RUF and STF forces, shouting "Operation
*232 Exhibit P—198, "TF1—218, RUF Trial Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 18882.
4434 Exhibit P—198, "TF1—218, RUF Trial Transcript, 1 February 2005", p. 18882.
4234 Exhibit P—198, "TF1—218, RUF Trial Transcript, 1 February 2005", pp. 18883—18884.
4445 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Ki11ings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.
4446 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14137—14139; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008,
p. 7938; Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1232-1235; Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p.
12149.
4237 rm spray, Transcript 7 Jury 2010, pp. 439624296s, 43979.

---- End of Page 659 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T gm 18 May 2012
ty 2

3.‘B'}S‘2.
Pay Yourself", looted civilian property such as food, clothing, vehicles and "whatever you
came across that could be moved".4244
1903. The looting is corroborated by Alimamy Bobson Sesay, who saw RUF members and
others break into shops and loot food and other items during this time period.4240
1904. Alimamy Bobson Sesay also testified that he was in Makeni for two days during
Operation Pay Yourself4244 and that during this time, he, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and Hassan
Papa Bangura (also known as "Bomb Blast") broke into a bank and took money from a
safe.4242
1905. Dennis Koker testified that he saw RUF rebels looting clothing and household
property from civilians in Makeni during this time period.4243
1906. Alice Pyne testified that she saw Operation Pay Yourself taking place in Makeni,
where AFRC/RUF forces were looting civilians’ property from their houses.4244
1907. Witness TF1—174 testified that looting in Makeni began on 17 February 1998 and
continued until 2 or 3 March 1998.4245 The witness ave evidence that, durin this eriod,
8 S P
combined RUF and AFRC forces engaged in Operation Pay Yourself, in which they looted
the seminary, the schools, civilian houses, including his own, and the bishop's vehicles at
the mission.4246
1908. Defence witness Issay Sesay testified that AFRC/RUF forces carried out Operation
Pay Yourself in Makeni by taking people's property and cars forcefully from them. Shops,
houses and even a Catholic hospital were looted.4247
1909. Defence witness Charles Ngebeh admitted in cross—examination that AFRC/RUF
forces engaged in looting from the time they retreated from Freetown until they reached
mg ciurrrps Ngpbpu, Transcript 12 Aprrr 2010, pp. 38637-3 8368.
tm Tri-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14138.
4244 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7938.
424] Alirnarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7934-7938.
4242 Alirnamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7938.
*243 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1232-1235.
4244 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12148—12149.
42*5 TF1-174, Transcript 17 January 2009, pp. 23672—23674.
4446 TF1—174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23674-23676.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T {SP 18 May 2012

2`>8'%·S`3
Kono, including looting in Masiaka, Makeni, the Peninsula Road route, Fogbo and Koidu.
Ngebeh agreed that the looting was called "Operation Pay Yourself".4248
Findings
1910. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 April 1998, AFRC/RUF
forces intentionally appropriated property without the consent of the owners in Makeni in
Bombali District.
1911. The Prosecution also led evidence of looting in Karina Town in Bombali District,
which was not pleaded in the Indictment.4249 As the Trial Chamber has held above,4250 such
evidence does not fall within the scope of the Indictment but is relevant to proof of the
chapeau requirements.
3. Port Loko District
(a) Masiaka
1912. Witnesses TF1-371, Dennis Koker, Charles Ngebeh and Issa Sesay gave evidence of
looting in Masiaka by the AFRC/RUF forces in the period from 1 February 1998 to 30 April
1998.
1913. Prosecution witness TF1-371 testified that during this time period in Masiaka he
observed that civilians were forced out of their houses by the combatants, who looted
whatever civilian property they could lay their hands on.425l
1914. Prosecution witness Dennis Koker testified that he travelled through Masiaka during
the retreat from Freetown after the February 1998 ECOMOG Intervention, and that his
"colleagues" entered into civilians’ houses and took property from them, including food,
4247 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43962—43968, 43979.
*248 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38637-38638.
4244 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9140-9144; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1 153.
4250 See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment supra.
4254 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2352-2353 (CS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z W 18 May 2012

3%*1Sq-
motorcycles, and bicycles.4252 Koker testified that the perpetrators were "[t]he group in
which I was, RUF, the juntas, we were all one group now".4253
1915. Defence witness Charles Ngebeh testified in cross—examination that AFRC/RUF
forces engaged in looting from the time they retreated from Freetown until they reached
Kono, including looting in Masiaka, Makeni, the Peninsula Road route, Fogbo and Koidu.
Ngebeh agreed that the looting was called "Operation Pay Yourself {4254
1916. Defence witness Issa Sesay testified that when the AFRC/RUF forces reached
Masiaka they entered civilian homes and took people's property from them. Sesay said that
"that was what they called Operation Pay Yourself, because if you saw someone's vehicle
and you commandeered it, when the person was not willing to hand it over to you, that was
paying yourself {4255
Findings
1917. On the basis of this evidence the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that between about 1 February 1998 and 30 April 1998 members of the AFRC/RUF
forces intentionally appropriated property without the consent of the owners in Masiaka in
Port Loko District.
1918. The Prosecution also led evidence of pillage in Lunsar in Port Loko District, which
was not pleaded in the Indictment.4256 As the Trial Chamber has held above,4257 such
evidence does not fall within the scope of the Indictment but is relevant to proof of the
chapeau requirements.
4252 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1231—1232.
**253 Dennis Koker, rmsmpt 15 January 2008, p. 1231.
4254 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38637~38638
4255 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp.43963~43964.
4256 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008 pp. 7936-7937; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1 149.
See also Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43964.
4257 See Preliminary Issues: Issues Relating to the Pleading in the Indictment supra.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01~T J OL 18 May 2012

4. Freetown and the Westem Area
1919. The Prosecution submits that the looting in Freetown and the Westem Area from 21
December 1998 to 28 February 1999 occurred in the context of the Freetown attack, and that
it was widespread and committed in conjunction with other crimes.4258
1920. In considering these allegations, the Trial Chamber relies on the evidence of TFl-
143, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Perry Kamara, Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Paul Nabieu Conteh,
Allusein Conteh, Mohammed Sampson Bah, Samuel Radder John, TFl-021, TF1-083, TF1-
026, Ibrahim Wai, Akiatu Tholley, Sarah Koroma and Exhibits P-077 and P-328.
(a) Freetown and the Westem Area in general
1921. TF1-143 testified that he was a small boy when he was abducted by an RUF
commander named Kabilamg and taken to SAJ Musa's group, which was a mix of AFRC
and RUF fighters.42°0 "It was AFRC who made up — who was dominant, but they were
mixed. Some of them wore black and they had red bandanas on their heads. Kabila told us
that we were mixed in the group. That is SAJ Musa's group. We were mixed with RUF and
1922. TF1-143 testified that on the evening of SAJ Musa's burial,4262 he and the mixed
group of RUF and AFRC he was with came to Waterloo Junction and headed towards
Freetown.4263 He testified that his group broke into and looted shops on the way to
Freetown.4264
1923. Alimamy Bobson Sesay gave evidence that during the January 1999 invasion of
Freetown, he and the members of his "fighting force" captured civilians as ordered by
Gullit.4265 During their retreat from Freetown, these civilians were forced to carry large
quantities of goods that he and the other members of the fighting forces had taken from
4258 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 3288.
4259 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8976-8977, 8979, 8993.
4260 TF1-143,Transcipt 5 May 2008, pp. 8985, 9019, 9021, 9052, 9054.
‘"°' TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008,p. 8988.
4262 It is a judicially noticed fact that SAJ Musa was killed in an explosion in Benguema on 23 December 1998.
Proseculor v. Taylor, SCSL-04-01-T-987, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated
Facts from the RUF Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B), Fact 13.
*29 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008,p. 9025.
4264 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9025-9026.

---- End of Page 663 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T J Gu 18 May 2012

3 sas (cn
civilians in Freetown.4266 He further explained that "[t]hey were the people we took the
things from and, like l said, ‘from your pocket to my pocket,’ and if you refused you will
die".4267 The witness described the looted items as "[...] rice, sometimes valuable materials
like good clothing and jean materials. Those were ~ but they were more of valuables that we
moved with, more of food and valuable items. Those were the things that we looted when
we came to Freetown, and also money because we did not joke about money issues".4268
1924. Perry Kamara testified that he heard that, while Rambo's forces and the Red Lion
Battalion retreated from Freetown after the January 1999 invasion, the civilians who were
with them carried "loads of properties that had been looted from civilians in Freetown".4269
1925. Exhibit P~328, a Human Ri hts Watch Re ort from Jul 1999, stated that, in
8 P Y
conjunction with the January 1999 Freetown attack, "the rebels went on systematic looting
raids in which families were hit by wave after wave of rebels demanding money and
valuables".427O Confidential Exhibit P~077 also indicated that during the first days of the
January 1999 rebel offensive in Freetown and in the subsequent period, rebels engaged in
"widespread theft of money and looting of residences and business properties".427lFindings
1926. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that members of the AFRC/ RUF forces4272 intentionally appropriated property without
the consent of the owners throughout Freetown and the Western Area during the lndictment
period.
1927. The Prosecution also adduced the following specific incidences of looting at places
within Freetown and the Western Area.
4265 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8341, 8343.
4246 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8347.
4267 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8347.
4268 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8347.
*269 Perry kamera, Transcript 06 February 2008, pp. 3251-3252.
4270 Exhibit P-328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone—Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape,
New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol. 11, No. 3 (A), Part 1", p. 23000.
4271 Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 59.
4272 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killirrgs); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
Sllpfd.

---- End of Page 664 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // Gu 18 May 2012

Es}? ?’
(b) State House and Berry Street
1928. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that on 6 January 1999, he and other members of
the AFRC/RUF forces broke into the UN House and "commandeered" vehicles, which they
took to State House.4273 These vehicles were later used by Gullit and other senior
commanders.4274
1929. Witness Abu Bakarr Mansaray4275 confirmed testimony he had given in the AFRC
Case, a transcript of which was admitted into evidence.4276 In that case, he testified that he
was abducted by Gullit's forces as they retreated from Freetown following the attack on the
ca itol in J anu 1999.4277 Durin this retreat, the witness observed rebels looting
P_ my S
properties.4278 He testified that he saw the retreating rebels loot from the Vice President's
office, loot a car on Berry Street and also loot the car of the witness's father.4279 He also
testified that the rebels looted his shirt, trousers and shoes.428O
Findings
1930. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on this evidence that during
the Indictment period, members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally appropriated
vehicles without the consent of the owners, which they brought back to State House, and
also intentionally appropriated other civilian property without the consent of the owners
including a car from Berry Street, items from the Vice President's office, and clothing from
the witness.
(c) Kissy
1931. Witness TF1-143 testified that following SAJ Musa's burial428l he and seven other
boys working under the command of Adama Cut Hand looted things from a shop and loaded
4273 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8291.
4274 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8291.
4275 Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, pp. 19515—19568.
4276 Exhibit P—222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005.
*277 Exhibit P—222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1—024, p. 20435.
*27* Exhibit P-222, Ame rrirtr Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1—024, p. 20436.
4279 Exhibit P-222, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005, TF1—024, pp. 20436, 20467, 20470, 20471.
4280 Exhibit P—222, "TF1—024, AFRC Trial Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20436, 20470.
4281 It is a judicially noticed fact that SA] Musa was killed in an explosion in Benguema on 23 December 1998.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—04—01—T—987, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated
Facts from the RUF Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B), Fact 13.

---- End of Page 665 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 'G`5 18 May 2012
/

3% °r$=z’
them into a vehic1e.4282 While the boys were looting the shop, two men present in the shop
protested against the looting.4283 As Adama Cut Hand had instructed the boys to bring any
civilians to her who objected to having their possessions taken, the witness and the other
boys took the two men to Adama Cut Hand. She then amputated an arm from each man.4284
1932. Following this incident, TF1-143 went with another of Adama Cut Hand's boys, to
Kissy Market where the boys attempted to enter another shop with two men inside.4285 When
the two men would not open the door, they forcibly entered the shop and amputated a hand
from each man.4286 TF1-143 further recalled that, after the am utations, " w hilst the were
P Y
crying we just took what we wanted rrpm the shop and we went".4287
Findings
1933. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that TF1-143 and his
companions, who were members of the AFRC/RUF forces,4288 intentionally appropriated
civilian property from two stores in Kissy without the consent of the owners during the
lndictment period.
(d) Falcon Street
1934. Allusein Conteh testified that a "gang" arrived on Falcon Street in Kissy sometime
around 8 January 1999 and demanded to stay at his house.4289 The apparent leader of the
gang, as well as the women and children in the gang, wore civilian clothes, and there were
other men and boys in the gang also wearing civilian clothes.4290 The witness recalled that
they called each other "junta"429l and he concluded that they belonged to the RUF because
*282 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9032-9033.
*288 TF1—143, rrarraprrpr 5 May 2008, pp. 9032-9033.
*28* TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9033.
*288 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9034-9035.
*288 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9035-9036.
4287 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9036.
*288 Freetown and the Western Area, Physical Violence Findings; Arnputations of two men's hands in Kissy
Market
supra.
*282 Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 23998—23999.
4240 Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 23999-24000.
42% Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24000.

---- End of Page 666 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0 l-T Z M 18 May 2012

3 895 Ci
the were not wearin uniforms, the came in lain clothes and had oun irls with
Y S Y P Y S S
them.4292 P
1935. During their stay in the area, the witness testified that this gang took and slaughtered
a sheep and was "going around taking people's chickens and asking the boys around to take
people's chickens around and they killed them".4293
1936. Allusein Conteh testified further that two or three days after the departure of this
gang, two or three other men, whom he described as "combatants" because they were
wearing military uniforms,4294 came to his house on Falcon Street.4295 After searching the
house, the combatants threatened him and demanded money.4246 They then cocked a gun at
his back.4247 The witness ave the combatants 50,000 Leones and the went awa .4298
S Y Y
Findings
1937. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on this evidence that
members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally appropriated a sheep and chickens from
civilians in the area of Falcon Street, and also looted 50,000 leones without the consent of
the owners..
e owe ree
( ) R St t
1938. Mohammed Sampson Bah confirmed testimony he had given in the AFRC Trial,4299
‘ a transcri t of which was admitted into evidence.4304) In the AFRC case he testified that on or
P
about 6 January 1999 "rebels" dressed in military clothing arrived in Kissy and "raided the
area".43O1 The witness also testified that later in the month of January the rebels began
"takin eo le's ro erties".43O2 The "rebels" entered eo le's houses and took their
S P P P P P P
"televisions, radios, whatever is [a] valuable thing, they will take it, put it in a vehicle and go
4442 Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 24004.
4244 Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24001.
4444 Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24003-24004.
*295 Auusam camel], Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24001.
44% Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24003.
4247 Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24003.
4494 Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24003.
4244 Mohammed Sampson Bah, Transcript 22 — 23 October 2008, pp. 19032 ~ 191 12.
4300 Ekhibit P-207, , "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript 6 April 2005".
43m Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript 6 April 2005", pp. 20594-20595.

---- End of Page 667 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T / Gu 18 May 2012 M
V /

2% ¤¢G>¤
with it".4303 Bah also testified that a rebel named Akim threatened to turn Kissy into a
desert.4304
1939. The witness further testified that in January 1999 he, along with some other civilians
who were attempting to hide from the rebels, were arrested by the rebels on Rowe Street.4303
Upon their arrest, "[the rebels] took all we had with us".4303 After the civilians were placed
in a queue, the rebels searched the witness and the others and took what they had, including
money.4307 Bah testified that the rebels took his watch and 200 dollars from his pocket.4308
The rebel who took his wristwatch placed it on his own wrist.43O4 Shortly thereafter, the
witness's hand was amputated.43 10
Findings
1940. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on this evidence that on or
about 6 January 1999 in Kissy members of the AF RC/RUF forces43 ll intentionally
appropriated a watch and 200 dollars from Mohammed Sampson Bah without his consent,
and in January 1999 on Rowe Street intentionally appropriated other items, including
televisions and radios from civilians without their consent.
(f) Congress Road
1941. Samuel Radder John testified that when the rebels entered Freetown in January 1999
he met some RUF fighters that he had known some years earlier43l3 and also met someone
he had been to school with who was now an RUF rebel.43 13 The witness also confirmed
testimony he had given in the AF RC Trial, a transcript of which was admitted into
4302 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005", pp. 20595-20596.
4303 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005", p. 20596.
4304 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005", p. 20596.
"°°‘ Exhibit P-207, ··Tr¤1-084, AFRC mai Tmsmpr, 6 April 2005**,, p. 20597.
*306 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005", p. 20598.
4307 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005", p. 20598.
4304 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005",, pp. 20598-20599.
4304 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005", p. 20599.
4310 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Trial Transcript, 6 April 2005", p. 20599.
4311 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 7 & 8 (Physical Violence); Amputation of Mohamed
Sampson Bah's hand on Rowe Street in Kissy supra.
4313 Samuel Radder John, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19162-19163; see also Exhibit P-212B (confidential),
pp. 20724 - 20726.
4313 Samuel Radder John, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19163.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ GQ 18 May 2012

32 '>t~1<¤ 1
evidence.4314 In the AFRC Trial, the witness testified that on 18 January 1999 a group of
military men entered the establishment in Kissy where the witness was employed.4315 The
witness described the men as a mix of "junta" and RUF because of their "ordinary and
haphazard military attire".4316 These men used sticks to beat the witness and other
civilians.4317 Later that day he was shot and wounded by these men, but was able to run
aWay_431x
1942. The witness collected his family and hid in the hills for about two days. He and his
family then returned to his home on Congress Road to collect food and other belongings
before fleeing again.4319 While there, three of these men came back.432O The witness testified
that two of the men were wearing plain clothes and military trousers and the third man wore
a full military uniform and carried a gun.4321 The witness stated that these were the same
men he had encountered earlier at his place of employment.4322 While the witness was
arguing with one of the men, the other two took money and food from his bags, and left.4323
Findings
1943. The Trial Chamber finds that this evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that on
Congress Road in January 1999 members of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally
appropriated Samuel Radder J ohn's money and food without his consent.
(g) Rogbalan Mosgue
1944. Witness TF1—021, who is now deceased, testified in the AFRC Trial and a transcript
of that testimony was admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92quater.4324 TF1-021
testified in the AFRC Trial that he was present at Rogbalan Mosque on a Friday in January
"’*" Exhibit E-2 12E (confidential).
43*5 Exhibit E-2 12B (bbiiEt1biititi1), p. 20734.
43*6 Exhibit P-2 12B (bbiiht1bptiti1), p. 20734.
43*7 Exhibit E-2 12E (bbpht1bptiti1), p. 20735.
43*8 Exhibit P-2 12B (bbiihtibiitim), pp. 2073:3-20742.
**3*9 Exhibit P-2 12E (bbptit1bptiti1), p. 20742.
. 4320 Exhibit P-2 12B (confidential), p. 20742.
*2* Exhibit E-2 12E (bbiiEt1bptiti1), pp. 20734, 20742.
tm Exhibit E-2 12E (bbiiEt1bptiti1), p. 20734.
4323 Exhibit E-2 12B (bbiiht1bhtiti1), p. 20742.
4324 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T—720, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes C to E
Prosecution Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial Transcripts of Witnesses TF1—021 and TF1—083 Pursuant to
Rule 92quater, 5 February 2009; see also Exhibit P—287.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % gx 18 May 2012

s s=14»2
0f 1999, between n00n and 1 p.m., when a group of men in "mixed up dressings" with
charc0al covering their skin entered the m0sque.4323 The group consisted of at least 15 men,
some of whom were armed with guns while others were ar111ed with machetes.432`3 The
ar111ed men stated "...We are 0in to kill all of 0u..."4327 TF1—021 be ed the men to
8 8 Y gg
accept money and leave the civilians in peace, but the men refused the money.4323 TF1—021
then c0llected a sum of 80,000 Leones from the con e ation and offered it to the men "s0
EY 8
we [the civilians] could live".4329 The ar111ed men then told him and the others that "[e]ven if
y0u give us all the money that's in y0ur p0cket, we must kill all of y0u".4330 The men then
accepted the 80,000 leones from the witness, and began firing indiscriminately in the
m0sque, killing m0st of the people there.433l
1945. TF1—021 testified that he fell to the fl00r during this sh00ting, and that after the men
st0pped sh00ting, they stood on his stomach.4332 While he was still on the ground, the men
reached into his p0cket and took 15,000 Leones.4333
Findings
1946. The Trial Chamber is satisfied be 0nd a reasonable doubt on this evidence that
Y
members of the AFRC/RUF forces4334 intentionall a r0 riated mone from the witness
Y PP P Y
Due to the c0ercive circumstances that surrounded this event, the Trial Chamber finds
beyond reasonable doubt that the money was taken from the witness without his consent.
(h) Kola Tree
1947. Paul Nabieu Conteh confirmed testimony he had given in the AFRC Trial,4333 a
transcri t of which was admitted into evidence.4336 In that trial, he testified that on 19
P
Janua 1999, he and his family left Calaba Town in order to esca e hostilities involvin an
YY P 8
*333 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18736.
*326 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18736.
*337 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18738.
4333 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18738.
*329 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18738.
4330 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-02 1, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18739.
4334 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18739.
*332 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021, AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", pp. 18743-18744.
4333 Exhibit P-287, "TF1-021,AFRC Trial Transcript, 15 April 2005", p. 18744.
4334 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: C0unts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings) supra.
4333 Paul Nabieu Conteh;, Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2008, pp. 19284-193 14.

---- End of Page 670 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gx 18 May 2012
1/

?><;=i—exchange of fire between ECOMOG and the AFRC and RUF.4337 From Calaba Town, the
witness proceeded towards Allen Town, with Jui as his final destination.4338 Because of
ECOMOG barriers, the witness was unable to make it to J ui, so he went to Kola Tree where
he stayed at an unfinished house for three days.4339 While he was there, three soldiers, who
the witness identified as members of the AFRC, entered the house.434O The apparent leader
of these soldiers, who the witness referred to as Corporal Bastard, took the witness's
wedding ring and an unspecified amount of money from his pocket.434l The other two
soldiers went inside the other rooms and "started taking things".4342 They then made a big
bundle out of the items and lefi.4343
Findings
1948. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on this evidence that at
Kola Tree in approximately the end of January 1999 members of the AFRC forces
intentionally appropriated various items of civilian property from a house in Kola Tree, as
well as Paul Nabieu Conteh's wedding ring and an unspecified amount of his money,
without the owners’ consent.
(i) Thunder Hill and Samuels Area
1949. Witness TF1—083, who is now deceased, gave evidence in the AFRC Trial and a
transcript of that testimony was admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92quater.4344 TF1-
083 testified in the AFRC Trial that around 22 January 1999, two armed rebels dressed in
combat uniforms entered the house at Thunder Hill where the witness and other civilians
""° Eiaiiiiir P-215, TF1—227, Arno Trial riiiiiscripr.
4337 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Trial Transcript, 12 April 2005", p. 20814.
4338 Exhibit P-215, "TFl-227, AFRC Trial Transcript, 12 April 2005",, p. 20815.
4339 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Trial Transcript, 12 April 2005", pp. 20815-20816.
4340 Exhibit P-215, "TFl-227, AFRC Trial Transcript, 12 April 2005", pp. 20816-20817.
4341 Exhibit P-215, "TFl-227, AFRC Trial Transcript, 12 April 2005", pp. 20816-20817.
4342 Exhibit P-215, "TFl-227, AFRC Trial Transcript, 12 April 2005", p. 20817.
*343 Exhibit P-215, "TFl-227, AFRC Trial Transcript, 12 April 2005", p.208 17.
4344 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-720, Decision on Public with Confidential Aimexes C to E
Prosecution Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial Transcripts of Witnesses TFl-021 and TFl-083 Pursuant to
Rule 92quater, 5 February 2009; see also Exhibit P-290A.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QQ 18 May 2012

were staying.4345 Once inside, the rebels asked the civilians for money.4346 The rebels then
took an unspecified amount of money and left.4347
1950. TF1-083 testified that a second set of three rebels came to the same house later and
"[. . ] asked for money, they asked for change. They asked for valuable things. They asked
for things to wear".4348 TF1—083 and the others in the house gave the rebels money and other
items.4345
1951. TFl-083 testified further that a third set of rebels arrived at the house after the
second set had left. This third set of rebels also asked for money, which was handed over by
the people inside the house.455O This group of rebels then instructed the witness and other
civilians to leave the house because more rebels were coming who might kill them.435l The
witness, along with other civilians, left Thunder Hill and headed to New Road.4352 When he
arrived at the Samuels area, he encountered more rebels who were wearing caps that covered
most of their faces and carried guns and machetes.43 5 3 One of these rebels took the witness's
shirt and put it on. The rebels then ordered him and the other civilians to remove their
clothes, and as he was removing his trousers, one of the rebels struck him on the waist with
a knife and took an unspecified amount of money from his trousers.4354
Findings
1952. The Trial Chamber finds that given the violence shown by the AFRC/RUF forces
during the Freetown invasion, and given that the civilians in these incidents were confronted
by armed rebels, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt 4355 that members of the
AFRC/RUF forces intentionally appropriated the money and other possessions taken from
4345 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", pp. 18775, 18777-18778.
4346 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18778.
4347 Exhibit P-290A, rrri-082, Arno rriai Transcript, 8 April 20052 p. 18778.
4348 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18778.
4345 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18778.
4350 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18778.
4354 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", pp. 18778-18779.
4353 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18780.
4353 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18780.
43 54 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Trial Transcript, 8 April 2005", p. 18781.
4355 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful killing of
civilians in Kissy area around January 1999 supra.

---- End of Page 672 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ou 18 May 2012

3%Tt—~‘=S`
the civilians without their consent, and intentionally appropriated TF1-083's clothing and
money without TF1 -083 's consent.
(j) Calaba Town V
1953. TF1-026 testified that sometime after 6 January 1999 she and other captured civilians
were forced to carry bags filled with things the RUF rebels had taken from the homes of
civilians in Calaba Town and along the way to Waterloo.435°
Findings
1954. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on this evidence that
members of the AFRC/ RUF forces,4357 intentionally appropriated property from the homes of
civilians without their consent in Calaba Town during the Indictment period.
(k) Tombo
1955. Ibrahim Wai testified that on 23 December 1998 he was told by civilians in the area
that rebels had moved from Waterloo to attack Tombo.4358 That same night "SLA/RUF
soldiers" attacked his house in Tombo.4359 The witness recalled that he awoke in the night
and noticed that his neighbour's house was on Hre.436OThe witness took a bag with some
belongings and tried to escape his home, but met a rebel named Mohamed at his door.
Mohamed pushed him back inside and "[Mohamed] said I should gather all of my things.
He took my tape and my bag and he even had the money with him - a tape recorder, my
money, my bag". 4361
Findings
1956. The Trial Chamber is satisHed beyond reasonable doubt that on the night of 23
December 1998 a member of the AFRC/RUF forces intentionally appropriated the witness's
personal property in Tombo without his consent.
43% TF1—026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3843, 3865.
4357 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful killing of
civilians in Waterloo supra.
4358 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18561.
""" Ibrahim Wai, rrariaaript 16 October 2008, pp. 18559-1856l.
""° rbrarrim Wai, rrarraaripr 16 October 2008, p. 18561.
4361 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18561—18562.

---- End of Page 673 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 5.% 18 May 2012

z<8a-B Q
(1) Wellington
1957. Akiatu Tholley testified that her family home was looted on two separate occasions
in Wellington in January 1999.4662 She recalled that on the first occasion, on 5 January
1999, "[t]hey asked my mother to give them money and my mother responded that she
hadn't any money. They beat us up and they forced my mother to show them where she had
the money and she did and they took the money and returned".4666 The witness testified that
she did not know how much money the rebels took on that occasion.4664
1958. Tholley testified that rebels wearing black pants, black shirts and headbands returned
to her home the followin da .3363 Durin this visit, the rebels "took the food that we had
8 Y 8
and they took it away".4466 She was unable to identify which specific groups were involved
in these attacks, defining them only as "rebels" armed with pistols and machetes.4667
1959. Sarah Koroma, as mentioned previously in the section on physical violence, testified
that on 6 January 1999 she was at her home in Wellington when rebels wearing "combat"4466
arrived and she ran into the bush.4464 She came out of the bush about one week later and she
and her husband were captured by rebels who killed her husband and amputated her arm.4676
After her arm was amputated, the witness was then captured by another set of rebels near the
Brewery "around Calaba Town".4674 (Witness TF 1-169, in his statement dated 11 December
2008, places the Brewery in Wellington.4672) These rebels, who were armed with a knife and
gun, threw beer bottles at her, cut her, and while she lay in a ditch, they reached inside her
dress and took 50,000 leones that she had sewn into her underwear.4676 One of the rebels
4462 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19192-19193.
*333 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19192.
4464 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19192.
4665 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19193-19194, 19240.
4366 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19193.
4467 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19240-19241.
4466 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18988.
4464 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18985 — 18986.
4476 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18990-18991, 18994-18995.
4374 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18999-18900.
4472 Exhibit P-285 (confidential), "Statement, 1 1 December 2008", para. 12.
*333 Sarah Koroma, rrrmscrrpr 22 October 2008, p. 18987.

---- End of Page 674 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3%:1-b'-1—
then returned 5,000 leones to her so that she could seek medical treatment for her
amputation wound.4374
Findings
1960. The Trial Chamber finds that the foregoing evidence proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that in J anuaiy 1999 members of the AFRC/RUF forces3373 intentionally appropriated
food and money from civilians in Wellington without their consent.
(m) Benggema and Waterloo
1961. Witness TF1-143 testified that the mixed ou of AFRC and RUF437° that he was
ET P
with looted shops at Benguema "after they had buried SAJ", which was in late December
1998,4377 and that the then took the hi wa u to Waterloo and did the same there.4378
Y Y P
Findings
1962. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence of Witness
TF1-143 that in approximately late December 1998 members of the AFRC/RUF forces4379
intentionally appropriated property from shops in Benguema and Waterloo without the
consent of the owners..
Conclusion
The Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF
forces4330 committed the crime of pillage in the following places in Sierra Leone:
*374 Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008,p. 19002.
4375 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful Killings of
Civilians in Wellington supra.
*376 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9019, 9021, 9052, 9054.
4377 It is a judicially noticed fact that SAJ Musa was killed in an explosion in Benguema on 23 December 1998.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-04-01-T-987, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated
Facts from the RUF Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B), Fact 13.
*37* TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9071.
4379 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Unlawful Killing of
civilians in Benguema supra.
3330 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
SLl_D}'£Z.

---- End of Page 675 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/ "" V0

as °r*=·&
i. Kono District, between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December 1998, in
Koidu Town, Tombodu and Bumpe;
ii. Bombali District, between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 April 1998, in
Makeni,
iii. Port Loko District, between about 1 February 1998 and about 30 April 1998, in
Masiaka;
iv. Freetown and the Western Area, between about 21 December 1998 and about 28
February 1999, throughout Freetown and the Western Area and specifically in
State House and Berry Street, Kissy, Falcon Street, Rowe Street, Congress Road,
Rogbalan Mosque, Kola Tree, Thunder Hill and Samuels Area, Calaba Town,
Tombo, Wellington, Benguema and Waterloo.
106. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment,
involving among others, members of the RUF, AFRC and CDF .4381 The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that for all of the aforementioned acts of looting in Kono, Bombali, and Port Loko
Districts and Freetown and the Western Area there was a nexus between the acts of physical
violence and the armed conflict, that each of the victims was not taking an active part in the
hostilities at the time of physical violence, and that the perpetrators knew this fact.
Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the aforementioned acts of looting in Kono,
Bombali, and Port Loko Districts and Freetown and the Western Area constitute pillage as a
war crime under Article 3 of the Statute.
ml See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.

---- End of Page 676 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / gk 18 May 2012

2G. Count 1 (Acts of Terrorism)
Allegations and Submissions
1963. The Indictment alleges that "[m]embers of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), AF RC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or
Liberian fighters, including members and ex-members of the NPFL (Liberian fighters),
assisted and encouraged by, acting in conceit with, under the direction and/or control of,
and/or subordinate to the Accused, bumed civilian property, and committed the crimes set
forth below in paragraphs 6 through 31 and charged in Counts 2 through 11, as part of a
campaign to terrorize the civilian population of the Republic of Sierra Leone".
1964. The Prosecution submits that "the ultimate objective of the Indictment Crimes was to
forcibly control the territory and population and to pillage the resources of Sierra Leone, in
particular diamonds. However, the primary purpose of the criminal means by which these
ultimate objectives were to be achieved was terror. Terror was deliberate, organised and
spread via a campaign involving the commission of a multiplicity of crimes including
buming and the crimes charged in Counts 2 through 11 in the Indictment".4382 1
1. Primgg purpose of certain acts of violence
1965. As a preliminary obseryation, the Trial Chamber is of the view that certain acts of
violence are of such a nature that the primary purpose can only be reasonably inferred to be
to spread terror among the civilian population regardless of the context in which they were
committed.4383
1966. Conversely, the purpose behind an individual act of violence may not necessarily
correspond with that of the campaign in which it simultaneously occurs. It follows that
certain acts of violence, even when committed in the context of other acts of violence in a
campaign whose primary purpose may be to terrorise the civilian population, may not have
been committed in furtherance of such a campaign.4384 The Trial Chamber is of the opinion
4382 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 709.
4383 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL—04—l6—T—628, Judgement (TC), 20 June 2007, para.
1446.
438* See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kumara and Kanu, SCSL-04—l6—T—628, Judgement (TC), 20 June 2007, para.
1445.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T Z Gl 18 May 2012

?>%9·°ro
that this is the case with regards to certain acts of violence underlying Counts 9 (Child
Soldiers), 10 (Enslavement) and 11(Pillage), which will now be discussed.
(a) Enlistment, conscription and use of children under the age of 15 years to actively
participate in hostilities
1967. The Trial Chamber has found that children under the age of 15 years were abducted
and conscripted into the RUF and AFRC to be trained as SBUs in places such as
Tonkolili,4484 Kailahun,4446 Kono,4447 Port LolChamber has also found that children under the age of 15 years were used by the RUF and
AFRC for military purposes such as participating actively in hostilities by fighting at the
frontlines, acting as armed bodyguards to commanders, taking part in armed food—finding
missions, guarding mines, carrying loads, including anns and ammunition, and committing
crimes against civilians. Such instances occurred in the districts of Kenema,4340 Kono,4444
Kailahun,4442 Koinadugu,4444 Port Loko,4444 Bombali,4444 and in Freetown and the Western
Area.444°
1968. Such evidence, in the Trial Chamber's opinion, establishes that the purpose of the
conscription and use of child soldiers by the RUF and AFRC during the conflict in Sierra
Leone was primarily military in nature. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that such acts
were not done in furtherance of a primary purpose to terrorise the civilian population.
*385 Tonkolili District: Findings supra.
4446 Kailahun District: Children Abducted and Trained in Bunumbu, Findings supra.
4444 Kono District: Children Trained by the AFRC and RUF at Yengema; Children Abducted and Trained by the
AFRC and RUF between March and December 1998; Abduction and Training of TF 1-143 in September of 1998,
Findings supra.
4388 Port Loko District: Abduction of Akiatu Tholley January to April 1999, Findings supra.
4444 Bombali District: Children Trained at Camp Rosos July 1998; Children taken from Care Center Makeni May
2000; Abduction and Training of TF1-158 in 1998 and July 1999, Findings supra.
4444 Kenema District: Children Used at Tongo Fields; Children Committing Crimes, Findings supra.
4441 Kono District: Children Used to Commit Crimes February-March 1998; Children Used for Food-fmding at
Superman Ground; Children Used to Guard Mines at Tombudu; Children Used in Koidu; Children Used in
Kono, Findings supra.
4442 Kailahun District: Use of Children to Participate Actively in Hostilities; Children Used as Bodyguards
Findings supra.
4444 Koinadugu District: Use of Child Soldiers; Akiatu Tholley Used in Hostilities April-May 1998; TF1-143
Used in Hostilities, Findings supra.
4444 Port Loko District: Akiatu Tholley Used to Participate in Hostilities, Findings supra.
4445 Bombali District: Use of Children by AFRC After the ECOMOG Intervention 1998; Children as
Bodyguards; Children Used in Burning and Amputations July-October 1998; Komba Sumana Used in Hostilities
August to December 1998; Use of TF1-158 to Participate in Hostilities in 1998 and July 1999; Use of TF1-143
to participate in hostilities September-December 1998, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 678 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / @*0 18 May 2012

(b) Enslavement
1969. The Trial Chamber has found that wide—spread and large scale abductions of civilians
were carried out by the RUF and AFRC in Kenema Dist1ict,4397 Kono District,4398 Kailahun
District4399 and in Freetown and the Westerrr Area.4400 ln all of those areas civilians were
used as forced labour. ln Kenema District, civilians were forced to work in diamond mines.
ln Kono District, civilians were not only forced to work in diamond mines but to carry
loads, go on food—finding missions, carry out domestic chores and undergo military training.
ln Kailahun District, civilians were forced to carry loads, farm, fish, carry out domestic
chores, go on food—finding missions, undergo military training and construct an airfield. ln
Freetown and the Westerrr Area, civilians were forced to carry loads, perform domestic
chores and destroy a bridge.
1970. The Trial Chamber finds that the primary purpose behind the commission of
abductions and forced labour was not to spread terror among the civilian population, but
rather was primarily utilitarian or military in nature. The Trial Chamber does not discount
that the abduction of persons from their homes, their continued detention, and their
subjection to forced labour, including forced mining and living in RUF camps, under
conditions of violence may have spread terror among the civilian population. However, the
Trial Chamber finds that the "side—effect" of terror is not sufficient to establish the specific
intent element in relation to these crimes.
1971. As with evidence of the abduction and use of child soldiers, therefore, even where
abductions and forced labour occurred simultaneously with other acts of violence otherwise
examined by this Chamber with regards to the crime of acts of terrorsm, the Trial Chamber
is of the opinion that such acts cannot be considered to have been committed with the
primary purpose of spreading terror.
43% Freetown and the Western Area: Children Committing Crimes during and after January 1999; Children Used
by AFRC and RUF after January 1999; TF 1-143 Used in Hostilities in January 1999, Findings supra.
4397 Kenema District: Tongo Fields, Findings supra.
4398 Kono District: Tombudu, Wondedu, Yengema, Koidu and other areas by Carrying Loads, Forced Military
Training, Forced Labour, Domestic Chores, Food-finding, Findings supra.
4399 Kailahun District: Buedu, Bunumbu, Luawa Chiefdom, Talia, Giema, Kailahun Town, Pendembu, Daru, and
Segbwema by Carrying Loads, Domestic Chores, Carrying Amis and Ammunition, Forced Military Training,
Constructing Buedu Airstrip, Mining, Farming, and Fishing, Findings supra.
4400 Freetown and the Western Area; By Carrying Loads, Domestic Chores, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 679 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \j M 18 May 2012

1972. The Trial Chamber has found that there were numerous instances of looting that
occurred in Masiaka, Port Loko District, and Makeni, Bombali District, as part of Operation
Pay Yourself44O4 It has also found that in Kono District, money was looted from the
Commercial Bank in Koidu Town sometime between February and April 1998, and that
other items were looted from individuals in Koidu Town and Tombodu.44O2 Further, the Trial
Chamber has found that civilian property was looted by rebels during the Freetown attack
and during the retreat from Freetown in various locations including State House and several
areas of Kissy.44O3
1973. The declaration of an operation known as "Operation Pay Yourself’ in Masiaka
suggests that AFRC and RUF rebels appropriated civilian property for their own personal
gain, as they were not being paid by the rebel forces. Witnesses testified that there was a
strategic decision that "each soldier should take responsibility for feeding himself ’.4404 This
is reinforced by the fact that much of what was looted during this period in Bombali and
Port Loko Districts consisted of food, money and clothing.
1974. The fact that the looting in February-March 1998 in Kono District was part of
"Operation Pay Yourself" suggests that AFRC and RUF rebels appropriated civilian
property for their own personal gain, as they were not being paid by the rebel forces.
Moreover, the instances of looting that the Trial Chamber has found to have been proved in
Kono District were cases in which items were looted opportunistically. Similarly, the Trial
Chamber further finds that those who looted the Commercial Bank in Koidu Town were
4 motivated by profit.
1975. Given that many of the items that were taken during the advance and the retreat from
Freetown were food, money and clothing, the Trial Chamber finds that much of this looting
was undertaken in order to maintain the rebel forces during the attack and the retreat from
Freetown. TF1-143, for example, testified that the rebels took drinks to sustain themselves
4404 Port Loko and Bombali Districts: Findings supra.
4402 Kono District: Findings supra.
**03 Freetown and the Western Area: State House, Berry Street and Kissy, Findings supra.
4404 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3098; TF 1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12500.

---- End of Page 680 ---------------------------


Case No.:
on the advance to Freetown44O5 and Alimamy Bobson Sesay indicated that in their advance
towards Freetown, they took "logistics like rice and other things".44O6 In addition, the Trial
Chamber heard evidence that property such as vehicles may have been appropriated for
logistical or military purposes. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified, for example, that he and
other AFRC forces commandeered vehicles from the UN House which were later used by
Gullit and other commanders.4407
1976. The Trial Chamber does not discount that the widespread lootings of homes and
businesses during Operation Pay Yourself in Bombali and Port Loko Districts, in Kono
District, and during the attack on Freetown in which pillage was committed in the context of
several other crimes, may have had the side—effect of spreading terror among the civilian
population. However, the Trial Chamber finds that the "side—effect" of terror is not sufficient
to establish the specific intent element in relation to these crimes.
1977. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the pillage of civilian property that
occurred in these districts was not perpetrated with the primary purpose of spreading terror.
2. Kenema District
1978. The Trial Chamber has found in relation to the murders committed in Kenema
District that the elements of the crime of terrorism have been established beyond reasonable
doubt.4408
3. Kono District
(a) Burning
1979. The Indictment alleges that between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January
2002, members of RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance and or/Liberian fighters,
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of,
and/or subordinate to the Accused, engaged in widespread destruction of property by
burning in Kono District between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 December 1998, in
M5 Tri-142, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9025-9026.
4406 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008 pp. 8342-8343.
4407 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8291.

---- End of Page 681 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gl-\ 18 May 2012

3, 2 ?’+¤\~
various locations, including Koidu, Tombudu or Tumbodu, Sewafe or Njaima Sewafe,
Wendedu and Bumpe.44119
1980. The Prosecution submits that the burning of civilian houses and property "was an
essential part of the strategy to make an area fearful".441O In Kono District, it contends that
[w]hen the rebel forces retreated to Kono District following the Intervention, the strategy to
be pursued against civilians in this District was made clear by [Johnny Paul Koroma]. At a
meeting in Tankoro village attended by Hassan Papa Bangura, Dennis Mingo, Issa Sessay,
Mike Lamin and other commanders, he declared that "Kono...shou1d be a no go area for
civi1ians", and specifically directed that houses should be burned down. Between about 1
February and about 31 December 1998, this strategy underpinned the forces’ actions and
operations throughout the District resulting in attacks on various towns and villages
including those specifically mentioned in the Indictment [...]4411
1981. The Prosecution submits that operations in Kono District occurred pursuant to an
articulated strategy of actions and operations which resulted in attacks on various towns and
villages in Kono. Specifically, it submits that the attacks "pursued against civilians in this
District" were ordered by Johnny Paul Koroma, who declared that Kono "should be a no go
area for civi1ians" and that houses should be burnt down.4412
1982. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified he attended a meeting in Tankoro village near
Gandorhun in mid—March 19984413 alter retreating RUF and AFRC fighters reached Koidu
Town.4414 The witness stated that he, Hassan Papa Bangura, Denis Mingo, Issa Sesay, Mike
Lamin and others were present at the meeting.4415 Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that,
[I]n that meeting Johnny Paul [Koroma] said now that we have seen the people in Koidu
Town, that is Kono, they don’t like the junta and that they will go to places and bring the
Kamajors to base in Koidu and launch attacks on the junta, he said now he declares that
Kono should serve as a strong base for the junta forces and it should be a no go area for
civilians. And that as he was leaving we shou1dn’t encourage civilians and that, if we
encouraged them, the civilians will find a way to get them again to come back to town and
start fighting against us. So he said we should declare Kono a no go zone for civilians, and
then he said we should get some able bodied civilians who will assist us and they will serve
as recruits and that we should make sure that we burn down houses in Kono so that people
will not be able to base there. He said that now he was leaving and he was going to Liberia
to meet former President Taylor to see how they could arrange to get logistics to serve as
4404 Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Ki11ings): Alleged unlawful killings in Kenema District (25 May 1997 to about 31
March 1998) supra.
44119 Indictment, paras 6, 7.
4410 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 724.
4411 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 725.
4412 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 725.
4413 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7952.
4414 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7949—7950.
4415 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7950.

---- End of Page 682 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T QA 18 May 2012

3 sr? S`
support for us and then he will send them to Kono, because he said since Kono was a
[diamondiferous] area...4444 He said that if we allow the civilians to come and base in those
houses again they will find ways to fight against us. So, he said we should not allow that to
happen.4444
1983. Alimamy Bobson Sesay further testified that in March/April 1998, there was a
continuing attack against areas in Kono that involved the burning of houses.4444 During this
period, there was no "enemy threat".4444
1984. In addition to the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, the Trial Chamber has (
considered the evidence of witnesses TF1—371 and Issa Sesay, as according to Alimamy
Bobson Sesa , the were also resent at this meetin
Y Y P 8
1985. Witness TF1-371 does not mention the occurrence of such a meetin . Rather, he
8
testifies that a meetin took lace in Masiaka to reor anise the command.4420 After TF1—371
8 P 8
left Masiaka, he travelled to Makeni and then through Magburaka, Masingbi, Njaima
Sewafe, and Koidu en route to Kailahun District.4444 The only order to burn houses that he
heard was given by Morris Kallon in Koidu Town (as discussed below).4422
1986. Issa Sesa testified for the Defence that Jolmn Paul Koroma ave instructions to
Y Y 8
withdraw to Kono at a meeting held in his village, Magbonkineh. Morris Kallon was the
onl one of the RUF not resent at the meetin because he was not in Makeni. Other senior
Y P 8
commanders were present, including the witness, Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor, Superman,
Eldred Collins, Peter Vandi, SAJ Musa, Charles Conteh, Brigadier Mani, SFY Koromo,
General Bropleh and Boise Palmer of the AFRC. Johnny Paul Koroma told those present
that he had spoken with Bockarie and he then instructed Superman to mobilise the RUF to
move to Kono.4444 `
1987. In Exhibit P—078, Amnest International re orted that,
Y P
In the days immediately after their removal from power by ECOMOG, AFRC and RUF forces indiscriminately
killed unarmed civilians, looted and burned houses, both in Freetown and other towns. As the rebel forces were
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7950-7951.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, p. 7951.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7984. _
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7984.
4420 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2351 (CS).
4444 TFl-37l, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2353-2354, 2356-2357 (CS).
4444 TFl—371. Transcript 28 January 2008. pp. 2359-2560 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2625-2626 (CS).
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43991—43994.

---- End of Page 683 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / G`; 18 May 20l2

3 <8 4-27%
pursued eastwards by ECOMOG forces through towns such as Bo in Southern Province, Kenema and Koidu in
Eastern Province and Makeni in Northern Province during February, March and April 1998, they were
responsible for widespread killings, torture and ill-treatment including rape and other forms of sexual assault,
and abduction. Villages and towns were burnt to the ground, destroying thousands of homes. Koidu, a major
town in the diamond-rich Kono District, was almost totally destroyed by AFRC and RUF forces and villages
between Njaiama-Sewafe and Koidu were repeatedly attacked.4424
1988. This evidence of burning in Kono District corroborates the following evidence of
burning in specific places within that district.
(1) Koidu
1989. The Prosecution submits that as AFRC/RUF fighters retreated to Koidu Town after
the Intervention, fighters burned and looted houses for approximately two days. Houses
were often burned with people still inside and some of the houses targeted belonged to
Kamajors or Kamajor supporters.4445
1990. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-516, TF1-371, lsaac Mongor, ‘
Dennis Koker, Gibril Sesay, Perry M. Kamara, TF1-375, Sia Kamara, Exhibit P-201, Gibril
Sesay, Foday Lansana, TF1-567 and Issa Sesay in relation to burning in Koidu Town.
1991. Witness TF1-516 testified that after Superman recaptured Kono in 1998,4446 he heard
from a friend who went to Koidu Town that Morris Kallon offered promotions to his
bodyguards to burn houses in Koidu.4447 This resulted in burning of many houses, including
the witness's former house on Dabundeh Street in Koidu Town.4424
1992. TF1-371 was in Koidu Town for a couple of days when RUF and AFRC fighters
passed through after the capture of Koidu Town following the lntervention.4444 He testified
that he saw Morris Kallon burning houses in the villages in the outskirts of Koidu Town.444O
The witness had heard that Kallon had burned people inside the houses.4444 He confronted
4424 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone - 1998 - A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty lnternational
Report", pp. 1-2, 7, 11.
4425 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 726.
4424 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7129-7130.
4**27 TF1-516, rrarrsprrpr 9 April 2008, p. 7130.
4*28 TF1-516, rrarrsprrpr 9 April 2008, pp. 7130-7131.
**29 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2359 (cs).
4430 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2359-2560 (CS), Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2625-2626 (CS).
4444 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2359-2360 (CS).

---- End of Page 684 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 65 18 May 2012
,.»·»~/

3%‘i·°i:i··
Kallon with this information, and Kallon stated that he had burned Tamboros, those in the
civil militia from the north.4432
1993. Isaac Mongor testified that during the advance on Koidu Town, fighters were trying
to contain ECOMOG while they were advancing.4434 When Mongor reached Koidu Town,
buildin s had alread been burnt or were burnin down.4434 Mon or testified that he s oke
8 Y 8 8 P
with Morris Kallon, who told him that he had received orders to burn down buildin s in
g
Koidu Town from Sam Bockarie.4435 Morris Kallon then told RUF "boys" to burn down the
houses and that if the did, that the would be romoted.4434 Mongor stated that some eo le
Y Y P P P
were burnt to ether with the houses and that he saw the remains of some eo le who had
8 P P
died in the fires.4437 ·
1994. Dennis Koker testified that he spent approximately one week in Kono District
following the ECOMOG Intervention.4438 He testified that during the attack on Koidu, over
100 houses were burnt.4434 When the juntas and RUF fighters arrived in Kono, they started
burnin houses on the orders of Sam Bockarie as art of "O eration No Livin Thin ".444O
8 P P 8 8
Koker heard about the order from Eldred Collins and he ersonall observed 'unta and RUF
P Y J
fi ters burnin houses.444] Koker testified that the houses were owned b civilians and
8 Y
stated that the were burnt so that no soldier would be able to sta in Kono District and that
Y Y
when government forces and ECOMOG came to Kono, they would not be able to stay
there.4442 Koker further explained that fighters were shooting civilians, capturing civilians
and looting property.4443
1995. Gibril Sesay testified that after the ECOMOG Intervention, rebels arrived in Koidu
Town.4444 The witness stated that when the rebels arrived, they began looting and raping
4432 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2359-2360 (CS).
*433 rmt; Mpngpr, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6217-6218.
4434 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6217-6218.
4445 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6128.
4446 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6128-6219.
4444 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6218-6219.
4444 Dennis Koker, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1246.
4444 Dennis Koker, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1245-1246.
4444 Dennis Koker, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1241-1242.
444l Dennis Koker, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1242.
4442 Dennis Koker, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1243.
4444 Dennis Koker, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1243.
4444 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19383-19384.

---- End of Page 685 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T rjk 18 May 2012

3%:V+S
civilians.4445 Unlike other witnesses, Gibril Sesay stated that the Kamajors came to Koidu
Town and chased the rebels out of the town and that the Kamajors stayed in Kono for two to
three weeks,4446 during which period they killed and ate people who were accused of
sympathising with the RUF.4447
1996. Gibril Sesay further testihed that two to three weeks aiier the arrival of ECOMOG,
he heard gunshots coming from the Koikuma area.4444 Kamajors and civilians fled, including
the witness and his children.4444 He did not flee far and returned to Koidu to make a "scene
check".4450 He observed that both the Junta and the RUF had returned to Koidu Town and
were burning houses.4454 He was able to see Captain T and his men setting houses on
Hre.4452 He later learned that the overall commander of the attack on Koidu Town was Akim
Sesay.4454 The witness stated that civilians spent approximately three days in Koidu when
the RUF announced that they did not want civilians around Koidu Town and that they would
turn Koidu into a farm.4454 The witness fled Koidu Town for Wendedu, explaining "at that
time human bein s were not feelin ood and I was not feelin ood because we could not
S S S S S
imagine those juntas and rebels coming to just destroy [...]. They only went to destroy
eo le, so I did not feel ood about it- about them at all".4455
P P S
1997. Perry Kamara, who participated in the burning of Koidu Town, stated that Koidu
Town was burnt because they wanted to make the area fearful, did not want to lose it and did
not want ECOMOG forces to base there,4456 and that while at the parade ground, Morris
Kallon told the Hghters to make the Kono area fearful by burning the houses in the area.4457
4445 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19383-19384.
4446 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19384.
4444 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19384-19386.
4448 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19386-19389
4449 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 193 86-19389
""5° Gibril sccay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp, 19386—19389
445l Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19386-19389
*452 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19386-19389
4454 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19386-19389
*454 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19386-19389.
4455 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, p. 19390.
4456 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3109.
4457 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3150-3151.

---- End of Page 686 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL 18 May 2012
c F n X

384 wa
1998. TF1-375 testified that during the attack, the forces took over Koidu Town and then
started looting.4446 He stated that some of the commanders captured girls and made them
into their wives.4444 Other fighters bumed houses.4466 He did not know how many houses
were bumed.4464 He explained that one of the reasons particular houses were chosen was
because they were houses in which it was believed the Kamajors were based.4462 Another
reason was that people living in the houses supported the Kamajors.4463 The witness testified
that he bumed houses.4464
1999. Sia Kamara confirmed testimony she had given in the RUF Trial4464 and a transcript
of that testimony was admitted into evidence.4466 ln the RUF Trial, she testified that while
she was in the bush, she saw civilians with bundles on their heads.4464 She stated that the
civilians told her that Kamajors had entered Koidu and had transformed themselves into
soldiers and started buming houses.4466 Because the witness describes Johnny Paul
Koroma's convoy passing through the area, it is clear that the conversation she described
occurred during the retreat from Freetown in February 1998.4464
2000. Foday Lansana testified that when he arrived in Koidu, the junta and RUF were in
control of the town.4446 The witness stated that Superman was the overall commander and
that Isaac Mongor, Boston Flomo, aka Rambo, Bai Bureh Kamara, Peter Vandi, Savage and
Bomblast were also in Koidu.4444 Lansana testified that he stayed in Koidu with Superman
4454 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12504-12505.
4464 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12504-12505.
4466 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12504-12505.
""°’ TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008,p. 12505.
**62 TF1-375, rransmpt 23 June 2008,p. 12505.
4464 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12505.
"‘""‘ TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12505.
4466 Sia Kamara, Transcript 15 October 2008, p. 18433. I
"*°° Exhibit 1>-20 1, esia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005".
4464 Exhibit P-201, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", pp. 4-5.
4464 Exhibit P-201, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005", pp. 5-6.
**66 Exhibit P-201, "Sia Kamara, RUF Transcript, 1 February 2005"’, pp. 8-9. See also Decision on the
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, Fact AD.
4446 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4504.
4444 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4504.

---- End of Page 687 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 61 18 May 2012

gsireo
until ECOMOG pushed them out.4442 He said that "Koidu was bumt down while we were
still at the front line".4444
2001. Lansana testified that when they received infomation that ECOMOG was
advancing, Morris Kallon went to Superman's house and burnt it down. Kallon also gave
instructions "that the should set Koidu ablaze".4444 The witness ex lained that Kallon gave
Y P
the instructions because he was informed that Superman's vehicle "was hit" and did not
know where Superman was.4445
2002. Witness TF1-567 testified that he was informed by soldiers coming from Kono
District to Balahun that SLAs had bumed down Koidu Town so that it could be captured
easily.4444
2003. Issa Sesay testified for the Defence that ECOMOG drove out the AFRC/RUF from
Koidu Town in early May 1998.4444 During their retreat from Kono, the AFRC and RUF
took part in the buming of Kono. Advancing ECOMOG troops and the Kamajors also ‘"were
sending bombs into Kono and the Alpha Jets also[were] bombing Kono". Sesay heard that
Superman complained to Bockarie that the fighters were not going to the front line to fight
and so Bockarie told him to bum down their houses.4444 ln cross-examination, the witness
agreed that as ECOMOG were approaching Kono, Bockarie ordered that everything in
Koidu Town was to be bumt, houses, cars, everything.4474 "So the buming of Koidu Town,
RUF took part, the AFRC took part, and even the ECOMOG, the advancing ECOMOG, also
were dropping bombs in Kono and Koidu Town, so that also causes fire, so that was how
Koidu Town was bumt".4440 The witness said that he left Koidu Town before it had been
bumt.4444
4442 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4504.
4473 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4505.
4444 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4504-4505.
*475 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4504-4505.
*476 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12897-12898.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46211
447* Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45563
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46211.
4440 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46211-12
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46212

---- End of Page 688 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03-01-T J EM 18 May 2012 xw

3 $:181
Findings
2004. While there is some evidence that the buildings bumt in late February/March and late
April/May 1998 in Koidu were suspected of being the houses of Kamajors, Tamboros or, in
the case of bumings in May 1998, that the buildings were used by the RUF, the evidence of
the number of properties bumt and the articulated strategy behind the bumings establishes
beyond reasonable doubt that, overall, the acts of burning were intentionally directed against
civilians or their properties.
2005. There is also some evidence that the purpose of buming was to gain military
advantage by depriving enemy forces of the use of the buildings. However, the Trial
Chamber finds that the evidence of the large—scale nature of the bumings of buildings, some
of which were occupied by persons at the time, and of the stated objective of making the
area "fearful", proves beyond reasonable doubt that the burnings were committed with the
primary purpose of spreading terror amongst the civilian population.
(ii) Tombodu
2006. The Prosecution alleges that after Koidu Town was captured by AF RC/RUF fighters,
the town was used as a base from which other attacks could be launched. In one attack on
Tombodu, houses were burnt. After Tombodu had been secured, battalion commander
Savage commenced a reign of terror in which people were bumt in their houses. In April
1998, approximately 53 civilians including suckling mothers and children were bumt to
death in a house in Tombodu.4482 The destruction on Tombodu during the rebel occupation
was devastating.4483
2007. TF 1-375 testified that after the capture of Koidu Town in February/March 1998,
attacks were launched in other places, such as Mortema, Bumpe and Tombodu.4484 Before
fighters went on the Mortema attack, led by Bai Bureh, they were told that "they should go
and make the area fearful".4485 TF 1-375 testified that when the RUF used the term "fearful"
4482 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 729.
4483 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 730.
4484 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12509-12511.
**85 rrr-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12510. ·

---- End of Page 689 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-()1-T / QQ 18 May 2012 \%

is azz
it meant "t0 kill civilians and to burn houses and to instil fear into the ECOMOG, or any
other 0pposing tr00p".448°
2008. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he, Hassan Papa Bangura and others from the
headquarters in Kono District would attack locations as far as Y0mandu to make sure that
civilians actually left the area.4444 He stated that he and Hassan Papa Bangura and others
moved to T0mb0du where Savage was 10cated, and that "[w]herever civilians were we
attacked that place. That is what we did and we burnt m0st of the areas in T0mb0du,
Y0mandu".4484 The witness participated in an attack on T0mb0du.4489
2009. Alimamy Bobson Sesay also testified that in a subsequent attack4490 on T0mb0du,
when Savage was based there as battalion commander, Savage sent a message that 77 to 78
civilians had been captured.4494 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, B0mb Blast and others went to
T0mb0du to see those civilians.4492 The witness stated that when he anived in T0mb0du,
, Savage took about 15 civilians and put them into a house and burnt them inside the
house.4493 The other civilians had their aims amputated or were decapitated.4494 Alimamy
Bobson Sesay stated that Savage later showed Superman a pit where the civilians had been
"cremated".4445
2010. Sahr Charles confirmed testimony he had given in the RUF Trial44% and a transcript
0f that testimony was admitted into evidence.4494 ln the RUF Trial he testified that on a hill
in T0mb0du, there was a house with the inscription "Captain Savage" and underneath, it was
written "6,000 people m0re will die".4448 Charles further testified that he saw a house 0n
Yusufu R0ad where there were skulls and bones in each of the r00ms4449. Rebels told him
4446 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12509-12512.
4447 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7982-7983.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7982-7983.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7983.
4440 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7994-7995.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7994.
4442 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 7994.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7994. 7996-7997.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7994, 7996-7997.
4445 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7999-8001.
4446 Sahr Charles, Transcript 15 October 2008, pp. 18361-18426.
4447 Exhibit P-199A, "Sal1r Charles, RUF Transcript 12 January 2005".
4444 Exhibit P-199A, "Sahr Charles, RUF Transcript 12 January 2005", p. 18916.
4444 Exhibit P-199A, "Sal1r Charles, RUF Transcript 12 January 2005", p. 18916.

---- End of Page 690 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T w 18 May 2012

that it was Savage and Staff Alhaji who locked "all of those people into that house and set it
On Hf€,,‘4500
2011. Sahr Charles also testified that when he left Tombodu in March 1998, the census
indicated that there were 360 houses in the town.4504 When he returned to Tombodu in
February 1999, he counted 21 houses which were still intact.45442 All of the others had been
burnt down.4504
2012. Sahr Bindi testified that during the dry season at the end of 1998,4504 he was captured
and taken to Tombodu.4505 Bindi testified that he was put in a cell where he stayed until
evening, when the door was opened.4506 The witness stated that he could see fire and that
many houses were burning in Tombodu.4507 He stated that the RUF set the houses on fire
because they were staying in Tombodu.4508
2013. Ibrahim Fofana and Mustapha Mansaray (whose testimonies were discussed in
relation to unlawful killin s in Tombodu4509 testified that a house with 53 ersons inside
B P
was sprinkled with gasoline and was burnt down.4540 Staff Alhaji was the commander of the
soldiers who bumt down the house.4544
2014. Foday Lansana testified that in 1998, Superman received a complaint that Savage
had killed a large number of civilians in a five·room house in Tombodu. Later Superman,
Isaac Mongor, Peter Vandi and the witness went to Tombodu to observe the area where
civilians had been killed and they found that he had burnt them all into ashes.4542
4504 Exhibit P-199A, "Sahr Charles, RUF Transcript 12 January 2005", p. 18916.
4544 Exhibit P-199A, "Sa1rr Charles, RUF Transcript 12 January 2005", pp. 18912-18913.
4542 Exhibit P-199A, "Sahr Charles, RUF Transcript, 12 January 2005", p. 18913.
4543 Exhibit P-199A, "Sahr Charles, RUF Transcript, 12 January 2005", pp. 18912-18913.
4504 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18460-18461.
4505 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18479-18487.
*506 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 12500-12502.
*507 sam Bindi, Transcript 16 optpbpr 2008, pp. 12500-12502.
4544 Sahr Bindi, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 12500-12502.
4504 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Third Massacre of over
53 Civilians in Tombudu in April 1998 supra.
4540 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19338-19340; Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October
2008, pp. 19608- 19610.
4544 Ibrahim Fofana, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19338-19339; Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October
2008, pp. 19601-19602.
*5*2 TF1—275, Transcript 21 Fpbmppy 2008, p. 4512.

---- End of Page 691 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QQ 18 May 2012

és 4 s 4
2015. Samuel Komba confirmed testimony he had given in the ARFC Trial45 43 and a
transcript of that testimony was admitted into evidence.4544 ln the AFRC trial he testified
that after March 19984545 he was captured and taken to Tombodu.4546 He stated that soldiers,
upon the orders of Savage, took a group of 14 captured persons, including himself, placed
mattresses upon them and set the mattresses on fire.4547 He stated that the reason given for
the punishment was that he and the others were people who killed soldiers.4548
Findings
2016. Based upon the foregoing evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that civilian houses were burnt by members of the
AFRC/RUF forces in Tombodu in February/March 1998. The Trial Chamber further finds
that the evidence of TF 1 -375 and Alimamy Bobson Sesay proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the perpetrators wilfully made civilian persons and their property the object of the
attacks and that the bumings were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror,
in that the objective of the attacks was to make the area "fearfi1l" so as to cause civilians to
leave the area.
(iii) Sewafe
2017. The Prosecution submits that "Sewafe or Nj aimaSewafe [sic] was one of the villages
which the retreating AF RC/RUF forces attacked after the lntervention. Despite the absence
of any enemy forces, civilian houses in the village were burned on the orders of JPK"
[Johnny Paul Koroma].45 49
2018. Perry Kamara testified that AFRC, RUF and STF fighters "bumt down" houses in
some of the villages on their way to Koidu Town.4520 Kamara stated that Sewafe was one of
the villages affected.4524
*5*3 Samuel Kpmba, rrapspppt is optpbpr 2008, pp. 18145-18186.
*5** Exhibit P-189, ··rr¤1-072, Arrzc Transcript 1 Jury 2005".
4545 Exhibit P-189, "TF1-072, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18436, 18441.
4546 Exhibit P-189, "TF1-072, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18442—18446.
4547 Exhibit P-189, "TF1-072, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", pp. 18447-1845l.
4548 Exhibit P-189, "TF1-072, AFRC Transcript 1 July 2005", p. 18448.
4544 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para.731.
4520 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3100-3101.

---- End of Page 692 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T j, 18 May 2012

g%°l&S"
2019. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that around early March l998 he went to Sewafe
with the long convoy of retreating AFRC and RUF fighters after the ECOMOG
Intervention. The witness stated that when the group arrived, he, Superman and Hassan Papa
Bangura captured the "ground" and did not encounter any "enemy forces". When Johnny
Paul Koroma and the rest of the convoy arrived, Koroma ordered the village to be burned
down, as Sewafe was reported to be a Kamajor stronghold and the houses should be burned
in their absence. Civilian houses were then burned.4522
Findings
2020. Based on the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Perry Kamara, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that houses were burnt in Sewafe by AFRC,
RUF and STF fighters on the orders of Johnny Paul Koroma, that the fighters wilfully made
civilian homes the object of their attack, and that the primary purpose of the burning was to
terrorise the civilian population by demonstrating the repercussions of collaborating with the
enemies of the RUF and AFRC.
(iv) Wendedu ga.k.a. Wondedu;
2021. The Prosecution submits that just after April 1998, Wendedu, "aka Wondedu aka
Wendadu" was a village in which civilians "were under captivity" and being terrorised by
A rapes and mutilations. SBUs burned houses, acting on the orders of Captain KS Banya, an
AFRC commander.4523
2022. Gibril Sesay testified that when he arrived in Wendedu around April 1998 he saw
houses burnt down and rotting corpses.4524
2023. Alex Tamba Teh testified that while he was in Wendedu village after April 1998 he
saw five houses being burnt by SBUs on the orders of Captain Banya, an AFRC
commander, to "light candles" which the witness "later knew that it meant for them to go
and burn down houses".4525
4524 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3100-3101.
*522 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7944-7945.
4523 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 732.
4524 Gibril Sesay, Transcript 28 October 2008, pp. 19398-19399.
4525 Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 683, 722-723.

---- End of Page 693 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T /% Pjg 18 May 2012

Zsaab
Findings
2024. Based on the first—hand evidence of Alex Tamba Teh, the Trial Chamber finds that it
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that at least five houses were burnt in Wendedu
village after April 1998 on the orders of an AFRC commander, and that civilians or their
property were wilfully made the objects of such violence.
2025. Unlike other places in Kono District in which the burning of civilian property by the
AFRC/RUF forces occurred, in the case of Wendedu there was no evidence in which the
purpose of the burning was explicitly stated. However, the nature, manner and timing of the
wanton burning of the houses in Wendedu followed a pattern of similar burnings by
AFRC/RUF forces in other towns in Kono District which had the primary purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population. ln the Trial Chambers view, all of the
circumstances lead to the inescapable inference that the burnings in Wendedu were part of
the same campaign to terrorize the civilian population. The Trial Chamber is accordingly
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that primary purpose of the burning of the houses in
Wendedu was to spread terror among the civilian population.
(v) Bumpe
2026. The Prosecution alleges that Bumpe was burned by retreating forces on their way to
Koidu.4526 The Prosecution further alleges that Bumpe was attacked again in March/April
1998 by AFRC/RUF forces in order ‘to move civilians away from the entire area’ and that
civilians were specifically targeted by fighters because "it was believed they would pass
information to the enemy". The town was almost completely burnt down. ln some cases,
civilians were locked in houses and burned alive.4527
2027. Perry Kamara testified that when the SLA/RUF fighters were preparing for the
Bumpe mission in 1998, Morris Kallon ordered them to make the area fearful by burning
houses, and so when the fighters moved to Bumpe they burnt houses and killed civilians.4528
4526 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 733.
4527 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 733.
4528 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3150-3152.

---- End of Page 694 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01 —T % JQ 18 May 2012

3·°S’)·g `Q.
2028. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that from March—June 1998, the SLA/RUF moved
to various areas including Bumpe town, where they locked civilians in houses, set them on
fire and burnt them down completely, resulting in the deaths of the civilians.4529
2029. TF1—375 testified that around March 1998, during the attack on Bumpe, the
RUF/AFRC fighters, including the witness, burnt civilian homes resulting in deaths of many
civilians.453O
Findings
2030. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt
that civilian houses in Bumpe were burnt by members of the RUF/AFRC, that the
perpetrators wilfully made persons and their property the object of the bumings, and that the
. bumings were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror amongst the civilian
population.
(b) Unlawful Killings
2031. The Trial Chamber has found in relation to a number of murders which were
perpetrated in various pleaded locations in Kono District that the elements of the crime of
acts of terrorism have been established beyond reasonable doubt.453l
(c) Sexual Violence
2032. The Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that Finda Gbamanja
was raped in Koidu Town by a rebel named Peppe in February 1998; that Finda Gbamanja
was raped by Sergeant Foday in Koidu Town and at Superman Ground in 1998; that TF1—
189 was raped in Koidu Town by her AFRC and RUF captors between March and April
1998, that AFRC commanders, including Alimamy Bobson Sesay, raped an unknown
number of women and girls in Tombodu between March and June 1998; that Sia Lappia was
raped by Staff Alhaji in Tombodu in approximately April 1998, that Rebecca and an
4529 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 7985-7987.
4530 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. l2504—l2505
ml Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawhil Killings); Alleged unlawhil
killings in Kono District (Between about 1 February 1998 and 31 December 1998) supra.

---- End of Page 695 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QW 18 May 2012

S sass
unknown number of women were raped at Wondedu by men under the command of Rocky
in 1998; that an unknown number of women were raped in Superman Ground by RUF,
AFRC and STF fighters in or about April 1998; and that an unknown number of women and
girls were raped at PC Ground by RUF, AFRC and STF fighters including Isaac Mongor in
or about April 1998.4532
2033. Further, the Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that an
unknown number of women were used as sex slaves by RUF and AFRC fighters in Koidu
Town in February 1998; that an unknown number of women were used as sex slaves by
RUF and AFRC fighters in Koidu Town in March to June 1998; that an unknown number of
women were used as sex slaves by RUF, AFRC and STF fighters at Superman Ground and
PC Ground in around April 1998; that TFl—l89 was used as a sex slave by members of the
RUF in Koidu Town from 12 March 1998 to August 1998; that Finda Gbamanja was used as
a sex slave by a member of the RUF in Koidu Town from approximately March/April 1998;
that Finda Gbamanja was used as a sex slave by rebels loyal to Superman at Superman
Ground from approximately April to October 1998.4533 The Trial Chamber has also found
that all of these instances constitute outrages upon personal dignity.4534
2034. It is well established that rape, sexual slavery, forced marriages, and outrages on
personal dignity, when committed against a civilian population with the specific intent to
terrorise, amount to an act of terror.4535 Expert witness Beth Vamr stated in her report that
sexual violence was used as a tactic by the AFRC/RUF to "send a message" to the
enemy.4536 Exhibit P—330, a Human Rights Watch report, states that the "rebel forces have
used sexual violence as a weapon to terrorize, humiliate and punish, and to force the civilian
population into submission".4537 Experts who worked with victims of sexual violence
during the conflict in Sierra Leone reported that the victims suffered from sexually
transmitted diseases, exhibited signs of post—traumatic stress disorder, and were often
4532 Kono District: Count 4 (Rape); Conclusions supra.
4533 Kono District: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); Conclusions supra.
4534 Kono District: Count 6 (Outrages upon Personal Dignity); Findings supra.
4535 See RUF Trial Judgement, paras 1346-1352.
*536 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 7.
4537 Exhibit P-330, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone - We'll Kill You if You Cry - Sexual Violence in
the Sierra Leone Conflict, Vol. 15, No. 1 (A), January 2003", p. 35. See also P-331, Amnesty International
Report, Sierra Leone - Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence Against Girls and Women, 29 June 2000", p.
2.

---- End of Page 696 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gg 18 May 2012

és? sq
socially isolated, stigmatized and rejected by their families.4544 Such sexual violence was
therefore deliberately aimed at destroying the traditional family nucleus, thus undermining
the cultural values and relationships which held society together.4544
2035. In her expert report, in which she interviewed refugees from Kono and Kailahun
District, Beth Vann indicated that all of the interviewees described witnessing at least one
public rape.4540 There was evidence that Sia Lappia was forced at gunpoint to take off her
clothes in public and was then raped in front of a group of civilians, including her own
child.4544 Not only were victims publicly undressed and violated, but some were subjected to
perverse methods of sexual violence. For example, after Sia Kamara was raped, one rebel
inserted a stick into her vagina.4542
2036. The Trial Chamber finds that committing crimes of sexual violence in public was a
deliberate tactic on the part of the perpetrators to spread terror. Such crimes were part of a
campaign of rape and sexual slavery committed by members of the AFRC/RUF against the
women of Kono District not merely as a means of sexual gratification, but in order to spread
terror among the civilian population.
2037. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt
that members of the AFRC/RUF forces wilfully made the girls and women of Kono District
the object of acts of sexual violence with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the
civilian population.
(d) Physical Violence
(i) Tombodu
2038. The Trial Chamber has found that 15 civilians had their hands amputated and/or
were mutilated by Savage, Guitar Boy and Staff Alhaji in March or April 1998, that six
persons, including witnesses Ibrahim Fofana and Mustapha Mansaray, had their hands
4534 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 17; Exhibit P-240B
(Confidential), p. 20587.
4534 Exhibit P-330, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone - We'll Kill You if You Cry - Sexual Violence in
the Sierra Leone Conflict, Vol. 15, No. 1 (A), January 2003", p. 4. See also RUF Trial Judgement, para. 1349.
4540 Exhibit P-073, "Expert Report, Conflict Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", p. 8.
454l Kono District: Count 4 (Rape); Tombudu, Findings supra.
4542 Kono District: Count 5 (Rape); Rape of Sia Kamara, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 697 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T `/’ (lk 18 May 2012

SSFH0
amputated by Staff Alhaji or Rambo in April 1998, and that Samuel Komba's right hand
was mutilated in Tombodu by rebels after March 1998.4544
2039. The amputations and mutilations practised by the RUF were notorious, and served as
a permanent, visible and grotesque reminder to all civilians of the consequences of resisting
the AFRC or RUF or of supporting Kabbah or ECOMOG.
2040. Moreover, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, whose evidence the Trial Chamber has accepted
in relation to these incidents, testified that the civilians whose hands were amputated by 4
Savage, Guitar Boy and Staff Alhaji were targeted because they were thought by Savage to
be ECOMOG supporters, and that after their hands had been amputated, they were urged to
seek relief from ECOMOG troops.4544 These amputations occurred in the context of the
commission of widespread burnings and other crimes. The Trial Chamber therefore finds
that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the primary purpose of these
amputations and/or mutilations was to spread terror among the civilian population by
demonstrating the repercussions of collaborating or being perceived to collaborate with
ECOMOG.
2041. The Trial Chamber further finds that the amputations of Fofana's and Mansaray's
hands and the unsuccessful amputation of Komba's hand were also perpetrated with the
primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.
(ii) Kagma
2042. The Trial Chamber has found that 18 captured persons, including the witness Sorieh
Kondeh, had their bodies carved with the letters "RUF" and/or "AFRC" by AFRC fighters
in Kayima in mid-1998.4545 4
2043. The carvings practiced by the RUF were notorious, and served as a permanent,
visible and grotesque reminder to all civilians of the consequences of resisting or escaping
from the AFRC or RUF or of supporting Kabbah or ECOMOG. The Trial Chamber is
therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the AFRC fighters who carved the words
*543 Kono District: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Tombudu, Findings supra.
4544 Kono District: Count 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Tombudu, Findings supra.
4545 Kono District: Count 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Kayima, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 698 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T / w 18 May 2012

3% °P=i <
"AFRC" or "RUF" into the bodies of 18 captured persons were acting with the primary
purpose of spreading terror.
(iii) Wondedu
2044. The Trial Chamber has found that an unknown number of civilians had the letters
"RUF" and/or "AFRC" carved on their bodies by RUF fighters in Wondedu after April
1998, and that Alex Tamba Teh was physically injured in a serious and permanent manner
by AFRC Commander Banya, who used the butt of his gun to knock out his teeth.4546
2045. Such disfigurements practised by the RUF were notorious, and served as a
permanent, visible and grotesque reminder to all civilians of the consequences of resisting
the AFRC or RUF or of supporting Kabbah or ECOMOG. ln addition, Tamba Teh, whose
evidence the Trial Chamber has accepted in relation to this incident, testified that the rebels
"said that people shouldn’t escape and go to ECOMOG. ln fact they shouldn’t escape and
go, so with that carving if you go to the side of ECOMOG they will kill you, so you never
had anywhere else to go".4547 The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
the primary purpose of these disfigurements was to terrorise the civilian population by
demonstrating the repercussions of escaping from the AFRC or RUF, or of collaborating or
being perceived to collaborate with ECOMOG.
2046. However, with respect to the injuries caused to Alex Tamba Teh, the Trial Chamber
finds that this act was not perpetrated with the primary purpose of terrorizing the civilian
population, but was rather a spontaneous punishment inflicted upon him by AFRC
Commander Banya.
Conclusion
2047. The foregoing findings by the Trial Chamber establish that the Prosecution has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces in Kono District
wilfully made civilian persons or their property the object of acts of violence in the forms of
burning of civilian property (in Koidu, Tombodu, Sewafe, Wondedu and Bumpe), unlawful
killings, sexual violence and physical violence (in Tombodu, Kayima and Wondedu),
committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.

---- End of Page 699 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T %/ JF) 18 May 2012

· 3%?Qz
2048. The Trial Chamber has already found that there was an armed conflict in Sierra
Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment, involving, among others, members of the RUF
and AF RC.4544 Further, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that crimes
discussed in the above findings were directly linked to that armed conflict and that the
victims were civilians not directly taking part in hostilities. The Trial Chamber therefore
finds that the elements of the crime of acts of terrorism (Count 1) as a serious violation of
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Count 1) have
been proved reasonable doubt.
4. Kailahun District
(a) Unlawful Killings
2049. The Trial Chamber has found in relation to the unlawful killings perpetrated in
Kailahum District that the elements of the crime of acts of terrorism have been established
beyond reasonable doubt.4549
(b) Sexual Violence
2050. The Trial Chamber has found that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
an unknown number of women and girls captured in Kenema District were used by the
AFRC and RUF as sex slaves after February 1998 in Buedu and Kailahun Town, that an
unknown number of women and girls were used as sex slaves by RUF members in Buedu
and that TF1-189 was used as a sex slave by a member of the RUF in Kailahun Town from
August to September 1999.4550 The Trial Chamber also recalls that it has found that each of
these instances constitutes an outrage upon personal dignity.455l
4546 Kono District: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Wondedu Area, Findings supra.
4547 Kono District: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Wondedu Area, Findings supra.
4544 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
4549 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Kailahun District (between about l February 1998 and about 30 June 1998) supra.
4550 Kailahun District: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); Kailahun District after February 1998; TF1-189 Used as a
Sexual Slave by the RUF in Kailahun-August 1998 to September 1998, Findings supra.
4554 Kailahun District: Count 6 (Outrages Upon Personal Dignity); Findings supra.

---- End of Page 700 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \/ 18 May 2012

35 973
2051. The Trial Chamber has found that in Kailahun District the crime of sexual slavery
was both widespread and systematic. There was evidence that girls as young as 7-15 years
were used as sex slaves in Kailahun District,4552 and that victims of sexual slavery were also
humiliated and degraded. For example, witness Dennis Koker testified that in Buedu, CO
Kallon brought a woman who had been subjected to sexual slavery to his office saying that
she had disrespected him. He had then stripped her to her underwear and beaten her.4555 As
in Kono District, Trial Chamber is further satisfied from this evidence that the public nature
of these crimes of sexual violence was a deliberate tactic on the part of the perpetrators to
instil fear among civilians.
2052. On the basis of the evidence relating to sexual slavery in Kailahun District, the Trial
Chamber finds that the widespread and systematic use of women as sex slaves instilled fear
and a sense of insecurity among the civilian population, and is therefore satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF wilfully made the women of Kailahun
District the object of acts of sexual violence with the primary purpose of spreading terror
among the civilian population.
(c) Physical Violence
2053. The Trial Chamber has found that the evidence of physical violence perpetrated in
Kailahun District is relevant to proof of the chapeau requirements only.4554
Conclusion
2054. The foregoing findings by the Trial Chamber establish that the Prosecution had
proved beyond reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces wilfully made
civilian persons the object of acts of violence in the form of unlawful killings and sexual
violence in Kailahun District, committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror
among the civilian population.
4552 A 1998 Human Rights Report on Sierra Leone stated that the practice of "kidnapping youngsters and
women" continued. Women were forced to act as sexual slaves. In particular seven girls aged between 7-15
years were abducted in March 1998 from the Ben Hirsh childcare centre in Kenema. Exhibit P-366, "Sierra
Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, 26 February 1999, p. 3, ERN 25072.
4555 Kailahun District: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); Findings supra; Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp.
1273-1275.
4554 Kailahun District: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); November 1996-January 2002, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 701 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ QQ 18 May 2012

38 ?§y
2055. The Trial Chamber has already found that there was an armed conflict in Sierra
Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment, involving, among others, members of the RUF
and AFRC.4555 Further, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that crimes
discussed in the above findings were directly linked to that armed conflict and that the
victims were civilians not directly taking part in hostilities. The Trial Chamber therefore
Ends that the elements of the crime of acts of terrorism (Count 1) as a serious violation of
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Count 1) have
been proved reasonable doubt.
5. Freetown and the Western Area
(3) Qursmg
2056. The Indictment alleges that "members of RUF, AFRC, AFRC/ RUF Junta or alliance,
and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the
direction and/or control of, and/or subordinate to the Accused, engaged in widespread
destruction of civilian property by buming"4556 "as part of a campaign to terrorize the
civilian population of the Republic of Sierra Leone".4557 In particular, the Indictment alleges
that such acts occurred "between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999, in
locations throughout Freetown, including Kissy and eastem Freetown and the Fourah Bay, `
Upgun, State House, Calaba Town, Kingtom and Pademba Road areas of the city, and
Hastings, Goderich, Kent, Grafton, Wellington, Tumbo, Waterloo and Benguema in the
Western Area".4558
2057. In relation to acts of terrorism alleged to have taken place in Freetown and the
Westem Area, the Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Alice Pyne, TFl-375, Foday Lansana, Isaac Mongor, TF1-143, TF1-026,
TF1-028, Patrick Sheriff Akiatu Tholley, Ibrahim Wai, Peny M. Kamara, James Kpumgbu,
TF1-083, Dauda Aruna Fomie, Samuel Radder John, Alusine Conteh, Mohammed Sampson
Bah, TF1-358, Alpha Jalloh, Mohamed Sesay, Abu Bakarr Mansaray, TF1-029, TF1-150,
5555 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.
5555 Indictment, para. 6.
5557 Indictment, para. 5.
5555 Indictment, para. 8.

---- End of Page 702 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / ZH) 18 May 2012 M

Ze? WY
Osman Jalloh and Paul Nabieu Conteh in addition to Exhibits P—328, P—341B, P—356B and
P—3 57B and Confidential Exhibits P—284 and P—285.
2058. TF1—375 testified that after the death of SAJ Musa, Gullit's forces advanced to
Freetown. The witness knew about this movement because he heard it on the RUF radio
while he was in Masiaka. At that time Superman was at Gberi Junction and sent a car to
inform the group in Masiaka that the forces had attacked Hastings and were ready to enter
Freetown, so the witness's group should rush to take over Waterloo "because they left
Waterloo empty".4559
2059. After TF1—375's group passed through Waterloo, they advanced to Yams Farm,
which is located on top of a hill. TF1—3 75 testified that from there, he was able to see clearly
what was happening in Freetown. The witness saw the fighting, cars passing by, fire flaming
and houses burning.4560
2060. On 7 January 1999, Alice Pyne heard on the BBC radio that rebels had entered
Freetown and captured State House.456l Later that day, Sam Bockarie sent an order to
Superman in Lunsar and RUF Rambo in Makeni to join the troops that had entered
Freetown.4562 In the afternoon on 8 January 1999, a group of 200 fighters, including
commanders Superman, Foday Lansana and Gugumeh, left Lunsar. Pyne testified that they
went through Gberi Junction, Masiaka, Waterloo and were stopped at Hastings the next
morning by the ECOMOG forces there. The group retreated back to Yams Farm, which is
located immediately after Hastings towards the direction of Waterloo.45 63
2061. Alice Pyne testified that she was operating the radio set at Yams Farm and heard
communications between Sam Bockarie and Gullit. Gullit reported to Bockarie that
ECOMOG had pushed his troops out of State House. Bockarie then told Gullit that if
ECOMOG forced them out of Freetown, "they should burn the fucking place and that they
4559 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12604-12605.
4560 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12606-12607.
"56‘ A1ice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12274.
4562 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12277.
4563 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12278-12279.

---- End of Page 703 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V 18 May 2012


Zz? 976
should not spare anything".4564 The witness testified that this communication occurred one
day after they reached Yams F arrn.4565
2062. Foday Lansana testified that throughout the Freetown attack Gullit and Sam
Bockarie were in constant communication. The witness knew about these communications
because he "used to monitor the net between Sam Bockarie and Gullit and other
commanders that had communication sets".45°6
2063. One particular communication that Foday Lansana recalled was when Gullit reported
to Bockarie that the troops were experiencing serious threats and pressure from ECOMOG
in Freetown. Bockarie ordered Gullit and other commanders in Freetown to "make
themselves fearful" so that ECOMOG would not overtake the troops’ positions in Freetown.
Foday Lansana testified that Bockarie specifically ordered, "Gullit, if it causes you to kill all
the civilians, burn all the houses where you are, just so that you will not leave Freetown, you
should go ahead and make sure that you maintain where you were. You should chase
whosoever would want to chase you. You know that Freetown is surrounded with water.
You should chase them into the water. Burn any house. You should kill and make
yourselves fearful. Amputate arms. The civilians, let them go to the enemy. They will know
that we are on something serious".4567
2064. W`hen the rebels entered Freetown on 6 January, Isaac Mongor was around the Joru
axis. Mongor testified that he was constantly monitoring the radio in order to know what
was happening in Freetown.4568 The witness himself heard Gullit communicating with Sam
Bockarie about the mounting pressure from ECOMOG troops. In response, Bockarie
ordered that if the troops could not withstand the pressure, "they should start carrying out
some destruction, they should set fire on the Nigerian embassy and other areas".4569
2065. Perry Kamara, a member of the RUF, stated that when the rebels entered Freetown
the situation of the civilians was "pathetic" and they were suffering "raping, hard labour,
4564 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12280—12282.
*565 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12282.
4566 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4560.
4567 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4561.
4568 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5822-5824.
*569 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5825.

---- End of Page 704 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / JM 18 May 2012

Z4? 99 9**
execution, amputation, buming of the property".457O "During this time the RUF fighters,
AF RC, including the STF, were buming houses, amputating, looting, killing, raping, setting
road blocks, no transportation, no movement. Most of the civilians were indoors".4574
2066. Perty Kamara said that when the military situation changed his troops received a
message from Sam Bockarie saying that they should make the area more fearful than
before.4572 "[l-Ie] said if we did that the intemational body would intervene and ECOMOG
would stop and would be there and maybe they start calling for peace talks. That was what
he stated in his message".4575 However, they had received other messages from Bockarie to
make the area fearful before this. "Well, what I knew if before we entered Freetown if we
had a message that we should make an area fearful it was to destroy, kill, amputate, destroy
bridges, set road blocks. And in that message he talked about some areas as well and it was
not just one message".4574
Findings
2067. The Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of all of these witnesses as proof beyond
reasonable doubt that members of the RUF, AF RC, AF RC/RUF Junta bumed civilian
property in Freetown and the Westem Area, wilfully made civilians or their property the
object of such acts, and that the primary purpose of such acts was to spread terror among the
civilian population.
2068. The Prosecution also adduced the following evidence of incidences of buming at
specific places within Freetown and the Westem Area.
(i) Waterloo p
2069. The Prosecution submits that rebels, including some who spoke Liberian English,
attacked Waterloo for the first time around 22 December 1998 during their advance towards
Freetown. Waterloo was bumt for a second time during the rebels’ retreat.4575
45 70 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3231.
4574 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3232.
4572 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3234.
45 73 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3236.
45 74 Perry Kamara, Transcript, 6 February 2008, p. 3235.
4575 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 738.

---- End of Page 705 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T J GL, l8 May 2012

2070. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses TFl-143, TFl-028,
Patrick Sheriff and Akiatu Tholley in addition to Exhibit P-34lB.
2071. Witness TFl-143 was a small b0y who was abducted by an RUF commander named
Kabila in September 1998,4576 and was taken to SAJ Musa's group, which was a mix of
AFRC and RUF fighters.4577 The witness was with SAJ Musa's group and the Red Lion
group as they approached Freetown from Colonel Eddie Town.4578 After SAJ Musa's death,
the group went to Waterl00 Junction and took the main highway to Freetown. TFl-143
testified that along the way, the group would bum houses.4579
2072. TFl-028 testified that while she was in Eddie Town, also known as Tufayim,4580 the
junta commanders present were Colonel Eddie, Five-Five, Gullit, W0y0h, FAT and Leather
B00t. Tw0 junta b0ys came and announced that Superman was sending reinforcements fT0m
Kurubonla.458l The witness testified that the reinforcements sent by Superman were led by
M0hamed Bajehjeh, numbered about 100, were RUF and wore red headbands.4582 This
group was known as the Red Lion gmup.4583 SAJ Musa's group arrived in Eddie Town after
Bajehjeh's tr00ps.4584
2073. TFl-028 testified that the junta, RUF and civilians all left Eddie Town to travel to
Freetown via P0rt L0k0 R0ad, F0ur Mile and Waterl00.45g5 The witness stated that at
Waterl00 the RUF and junta were burning houses and killing people.45g6
2074. The BBC F0cus on Africa program reported that ECOMOG had confirmed that
around 3 a.m. on 22 December 1998 rebels started attacking Waterl00 and Lumpa, which is
"an extension" of Waterl00. According to Abubakar Sesay, a forest guard for Waterl00
district, rebels had arrived at Lumpa and Waterl00 two nights before and had been housed
by rebel c0llaborators. On 22 December 1998, the rebels 0pened fire. Abubakar Sesay stated
7576 '1`F1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8975-8979, 8993.
*577 T1¤1-148, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8985, 9019, 9021, 9052, 9054.
7575 TF1-145, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9019.
5575 TF1-145, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9025-9026.
*550 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9203.
75** TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9205.
4582 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9215-9216.
4583 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9218.
5555 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9221.
5555 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9223.
5555 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9224.

---- End of Page 706 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Q1 18 May 2012

that there were only about 50 rebels, not all armed, and they bumed some houses and killed
civilians.4597
2075. Patrick Sheriff testified that on 17 December 1998, he heard nshots in Lum a,
gu P
where he was living. The witness hid in the bush, and when he returned to his house two
days later the witness heard armed men shouting that they were rebels. Sheriff also heard the
armed men say that they were in Lumpa and Waterloo to burn down all the thatch
houses.4599 The rebels were speaking "in different languages, mostly the Liberian language.
lt was a mixed form of En lish".4599 That ni t the rebels started burnin houses.4599
8 8
2076. The witness a ain ran and hid in the bush alon with other civilians and sta ed there
8 8 Y
for five days.4594 When he came out of the bush he was met by a rebel "dressed in ia short
trousers, a black top, polo" who spoke in Liberian English. 4592 This rebel took him to the
rebel group where he saw a large number of rebels4595 dressed in mixed colours and some
did not have shirts on.4594 The leader of the group spoke with a Liberian accent and said that
they had come from Gbarnga in Liberia.4595 Some of the rebels had "RUF" tattooed on their
arms and the witness identified them as being RUF "from the inscription that was on their
arms, that was what indicated to me that they were RUF and it was tattoo. The real rebels
would always have that mark".4596 The witness said that the rebels "would not be afraid of
identifying themselves. They said that, ‘we are RUF, we are RUF’ and they were people that
were proud of their name".4597
4597 Exhibit P-341B, "Transcript ~ BBC Focus on Aliica, Clip from Track 1 ~ D0000523, 22 December 1998", p.
23590.
4589 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17766-17767.
4599 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17767.
4599 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17768. Although the witness testified that the burning occurred
two days after 17 December 1998, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that context of the events places them on 22
December 1998. See Exhibit P-308, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/20, 7 January 1999", para. 4; Exhibit P-340B,
"Transcript — BBC Focus on Aiiica, Clip from Track 1 ~ D0000524, 22 December 1998", p. 23589; Exhibit P-
341B, "Transcript ~ BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 1 ~ D0000523, 22 December 1998, "pp. 23590-
23591.
·‘5°' Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008,p. 17768.
4592 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17771.
4595 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17774.
45 94 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17775.
4595 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17790.
4596 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17829
4597 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17830.

---- End of Page 707 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03~01-T J! GL 18 May 2012

ZXZOO
2077. Patrick Sheriff testified that he knew the rebels bumed down 150 houses in Lumpa
during this time because he and other civilians had counted, but they did not count the
number of burned houses in Waterloo.4446 He liirther testified that on 10 January 1999,
rebels burned houses in Lumpa and Waterloo for the second time.4644 At the time the witness
was in Malambay, located 25-30 minutes from Lumpa,4666 and could see the blazes in the
Lumpa and Waterloo area. The next day the witness heard from others that many houses in
Lumpa and Waterloo had bumed.4664
2078. Akiatu Tholley testified that she was at her home in Wellington on 5 January
19994662 when she "heard people shouting that the rebels were coming, on their way they
were burning down houses and that they were amputating people".4664 The rebels threatened
to set her house on fire if her famil did not come outside.4664 Before her mother could o en
Y P
the door the rebels broke down the door and "amputated" a child aged around three to four
ears. `When the she went outside she saw them "bumin down houses and killin "4666 The
Y 8 8
witness described these rebels as speaking Krio and wearing black T-shirts, black
trousers4666 and headbands.4667 The witness later spoke to a small boy — only 6 years old —
who was with the rebels and who had been captured by the AFRC in Kono.4666 The boy told
her that the rebels were a mixed group of RUF and former SLA.4664
2079. The witness stated that the rebels took her from her home in Wellington to
Waterloo.4646 On the way to Allen Town, she saw rebels "killing people, burning down
houses, amputating people and looting people's property".4644 In Allen Town, the witness
4666 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17769—l7770.
4664 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, p. 17801.
4666 Patrick Sheriff, Transcript 3 October 2008, p. 17806.
4664 Patrick Sheriff Transcript 3 October 2008, p. 17802.
4662 Although the witness testified that this incident occurred on 5 January 1999, Tholley's subsequent movement
with her captors from Wellington to Allen Town to Waterloo to Masiaka indicates that this occurred as the rebels
withdrew from Freetown through Wellington later in January. Although mistaken as to the date, the Trial
Chamber neveretheless accepts her evidence of the incidents she described.
4663 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19173. ·
4664 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19174.
4666 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19175.
4606 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19174.
4667 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19194.
4666 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19195, 19244.
4666 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p 19245.
4646 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19196.
4644 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19178, 19179.

---- End of Page 708 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3-01-T //4/ Wd. J 18 May 2012

gXK¢>/
saw the rebels raping small girls, "not even adult".4°12 The girls were beaten-up and raped
and those that resisted were killed with bayonets.4643 It was here that the witness herself was
violently raped.46l4 As she approached Waterloo the witness saw the rebels burning down
houses, amputating people and looting more property.4645 A nursing mother was forced by
the rebels to bury her baby alive.46l6
2080. Akiatu Tholley stated that when she arrived at Waterloo she saw houses on fire and
rebels killing and amputating civilians.4647 She said that when they reached Waterloo the
group was "mixed", but that she had heard from the rebels that Five-Five "was the overall
boss, that he was the leader of the group".4648 In Waterloo, she was still with Captain James,
the man who had captured her.4649 She said that Captain James told her that he was with
Ulimo, had fought in Liberia, and was also STF.4624) r
Findings
2081. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt by the foregoing evidence
that members of the AF RC/RUF forces4621 burned civilian property in Waterloo and wilfully
made civilians or their property the object of such acts. Moreover, the similar circumstances
of the two separate instances of the burning of civilian property in Waterloo on around 22
December 1998 and in J anu 1999 res ectivel lead to the inesca able inference that they
my P Y P
were part of the same campaign to terrorise the civilian population. The Trial Chamber is
accordingly satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the primary purpose of the burning of
civilian property in Waterloo in December 1998 and January 1999 was to spread terror
among the civilian population.
(ii) Tumbo
4642 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p .19182.
4643 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19182, 19183.
4644 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19183.
4645 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p.19186.
46% Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 191 87.
4647 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p.19196.
4("8 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19196-19198.
4649 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19198.
4620 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19236, 19237.
4424 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Westem Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999),
Findings supra.

---- End of Page 709 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ JQ 18 May 2012

3Kyv Z
2082. The Prosecution submits that on 23 December 1998 around 3 a.m., RUF rebels and
SLA soldiers arrived at Tumbo, also known as Tombo, and started burning houses and
1ct11trr,.r_;."‘*22
2083. Ibrahim Wai testified that on 23 December 1998, he was in Tombo, where he had
lived for 17 years. The SLA/RUF rebels entered and attacked around 3a.m. and started
burning houses and killing.4623 Wai had been sleeping but woke up and saw his neighbour's
house burning. The witness gathered his money bag and attempted to leave his house, but
was met at the door and forced back inside by the very man who led the attack, his friend
Mohamed,4624 who was also known as Captain Blood.4625 Mohamed told the witness to pack
all his things and go with them and if he attempted to escape he would be shot. The witness
said that there were many RUF and SLA.4°26
2084. Wai went to Hospital Junction in Tombo with Mohamed, who threatened to shoot
him if he turned back. Wai created a diversion and was able to escape to the bush where he
stayed that night.4°27 The next morning the witness returned to the town with other civilians
who had also fled to the forest. He observed burnt houses and corpses. In particular, Wai
testified that the houses of Pa Pratt, Foday Breeze, Alhaji Tuah and Alimamy Kargbo had
burned down.4628 In total, the witness observed six houses that were burned down.4°29
2085. Confidential Exhibit P-284 is a statement by Witness TF1-169 that on 6 January
1999 he was at his home in Freetown when he was awakened by heavy firing and saw deep
smoke all over the city, especially in the east of Freetown. He was told by telephone that
rebels had entered Freetown; "they had joined forces and were maiming people". The
witness and his relatives had to stay in the house. "The rebels were also burning everything
down. The rebels had said on radio that they would kill and burn everything down, and they
4622 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 739.
4624 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18560. In cross-examination, Wai reiterated that by "rebel" he
meant mixed SLA and RUF. Although Wai categorized SLA and RUF "as the same people", he testified that he
could distinguish between them by their attire. Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18615.
4624 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18561, 18562.
4625 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18608~18609.
4626 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18562.
4627 rcrchrm war, Transcript 16 October 2008,p. 18563.
4624 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18565.
4629 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18567.

---- End of Page 710 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03~01~T f JQ 18 May 2012

3 8603
were doing that".463O He later leamed that the rebels were using storm—water tunnels to hide
in and to "sneak out at night and start killing people, shooting, setting buildings ablaze".463l
2086. After the rebels were pushed out of central Freetown, the witness became part of a
task force tasked with inspecting all public facilities burned down by the rebels. As part of
this task force, TFl-l69 travelled throughout Freetown and the Western Area and observed
damage and destruction of civilian property as well as of government property.4632 TFl-l69
stated that he saw a few civilian homes and vehicles bumt and damaged at Grafton,
Hastings, Waterloo, Goderich, Kent, Tombo, and Benguema but could not say the amount of
such damage because his assignment was to investigate the destruction of government
property.4633
Findings
2087. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces4634 burned civilian property in Tumbo and
wilfully made civilians or their property the object of those acts. Moreover, the nature,
manner and timing of the burning of houses in Tumbo followed a pattern of similar burnings
by AFRC/RUF forces in other parts of Freetown and the Westem Area which had the
primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population. Accordingly, the Trial
Chamber is also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the primary purpose of the burnings
in Tumbo was to spread terror among the civilian population.
(iii) Kissy and Fourah Bay in Eastern Freetown 1
2088. The Prosecution alleges that the AFRC/RUF forces bumed civilian property in Kissy
during their advance to Freetown in the early hours of 6 January l999, during the second
""° Eiiiiibii 1>-284 (caiiniieiiiiiiii, paras 5, 6.
{ml Exhibit P-284 (Confidential), para 7.
*632 Exhibit P-284 (Confidential), paras 9-l0.
*633 1;ii1ii1ii11>-2x4 (caiinaeiiiiaii, , para. ll.
*634 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Westem Area (between about 2l December l998 and about 28 February l999),
Findings supra.

---- End of Page 711 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / l8 May 20l2

3 Y Ev 4/
week of January 1999 and during the retreat.4635 The Prosecution also alleges that Fourah
Bay was attacked during the rebels’ withdrawal from Freetown.463°
2089. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Ibrahim Wai, Perry M. Kamara, James Kpumgbu, TF1-083, Dauda Aruna Fornie,
Samuel Radder John, Alusine Conteh, Mohammed Sampson Bah, TF1-358, Alpha Jalloh,
Mohamed Sesay and Abu Bakarr Mansaray, in addition to Exhibits P-328, P-356B and P-
357B and Confidential Exhibit P-285 (Interview Notes of TF1-169).
2090. Mohammed Sampson Bah gave evidence confirming testimony he had given in the
AFRC Case4637. In the AFRC Case he testified that in January 1999, he observed rebels in
Kissy beating people, burning houses and stealing people's property.4634 These rebels were
dressed in military trousers and military dress. He personally witnessed rebels sprinkling
petrol on houses and burning them.4634 He stated that a rebel named Akim threatened that he
was going to teach the Kissy people a lesson by turning Kissy into a desert. The rebels then
started burning the houses. The witness's own house was set ablaze and he jumped through
the window to escape the f`lames.464O
2091. James Kpumgbu testified that he lived in Kissy near themental hospital when the
rebels came to the area on 6 January 1999.4644 Kpumgbu testified that on that day, he was on
Thompson Street on his way to the Kissy Mental Home in search of his parents who had
gone there earlier to hide from the rebels.4642 On his way to the mental home the witness
passed by his house on Thompson Street and saw that it had been burnt down. He met his
landlord, who told him the rebels burned the house down.44443 At the mental home he was
taken away by four rebels dressed in black T-shirts, black jeans, black boots and three of
4645 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 740-742.
*636 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 745.
4647 Mohammed Sampson Bah, Transcript 22, 23 October 2008, pp. 19031-19112.
4644 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Transcript 6 April 2005", pp. 20594-20595.
*639 Exhibit P-207, "TF1-084, AFRC Transcript 6April 2005", p. 20595. I
*640 Exhibit P-207, ··rF1-084, AFRC Transcript 6April 2005", p. 20596.
4644 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18116. Although the witness testified that it was 1990, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the context of the events places them in 1999.
4642 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18117.
4444 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18119.

---- End of Page 712 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

3 5/ &¤ s"
them wore red headbands.4444 The rebels later amputated his right arm and attempted to
amputate his left arm.4445
2092. TFl-358 testified that around 8 January 1999, a hospital in Freetown was
overwhelmed with patients who were brought in on ECOMOG vehicles and also in push
cafts.4444 The witness was "indirectly" informed by ECOMOG as they brought victims to the
hospital's triage point that these cases were coming in from Freetown and "its immediate
environs", and later cases came from Kissy, Wellington and "the outskirts of Freetown".4647
One of the causes of the burncases brought to TFl-358's institution was "f`leeing from
torched homes".4448 The witness heard that younger people were able to escape the burning
homes, but "the older folks got burnt completely in the flames more especially from the
Kissy end of town".4444 TF]-358 testified specifically about one case in which a young
woman in Kissy had extensive burns to her upper and lower limbs from escaping the upper
flat in a torched building. The woman's grandmother was left upstairs and died in the
fire'4650
2093. Ibrahim Wai testified that in the early morning hours of 6 January 1999, he exited his
house on Falcon Street in Kissy and observed "blazing fires" and "civilians coming with
bundles on their heads".445l Thereafter the witness left with his brother to go to PWD where
they met many other people who were also fleeing. The witness and his brother were turned
away by ECOMOG, but managed to cross the barrier and proceed to Berry Street.4452
2094. Wai testified that, after five days, he returned to Kissy alone.4655 He observed the
rebels burning motor tyres at Kissy Crazy Yard around Falcon Street. The rebels also forced
civilians to sing that they wanted peace.4454 Wai was staying at his sister's house when a
4444 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, p. 18121.
4645 James Kpumgbu, Transcript 13 October 2008, pp. 18122, 18123.
4444 TF1-358, Transcript, 19 November 2008, pp. 20633, 20636. The Trial Chamber notes Exhibit P-251, a
photograph depicting an elderly woman being conveyed in a pushcaxt. Exhibit P-251, "Photograph — 00034497",
January 1999; TF1-358, Transcript 20 November 2008, pp. 20727-20728.
4447 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 2063 8-20639.
M8 TF1-358,rm¤iee¤pr 19 November 2008, p. 20645.
4644 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20645.
4650 TF1-358, Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20645-20646.
4454 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, pp. 18569-18570.
4452 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p. 18571.
4455 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 16 October 2008, p.18572.
4654 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp. 18580-18581.

---- End of Page 713 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QL 18 May 2012

5'8neighbour came to tell him and the others that ECOMOG was coming and they "did not
want to see any civilians outside".4(’55 Wai testified that "[i]t was not long after that the
rebels came".4(°56
2095. Wai testified that two rebels came to the door of the house where he and other
civilians were hiding. Wai described one rebel as wearing a "Sierra Leone military uniform" 4
carrying a machete, and the other as wearing "a combat shirt and civilian trousers" and
carrying a gun.4657 The rebels told the witness and his brother-in-law's younger brother that
if it had been ECOMOG that had come they would have come outside singing and clapping
for them, but because it was they (the rebels) who had come they did not want to open the
door. The rebels then threatened to set the house on fire if they did not open the door.4658
One of the rebels, Captain Blood - referred to as the "boss" by the others4(’59 - entered the
house and demanded 400,000 Leones from the witness. The witness responded that he did
not have that sum of money but offered Captain Blood the video or television or anything
else.4(’(’O
2096. Wai testified that his brother-in-law's younger brother's two hands were amputated
by Captain Blood inside the same house.466l Wai said that while he was outside he heard his
brother-in-law's younger brother screaming and crying from inside the house.4662 He did not
see his brother-in-law's younger brother come out of the house after that. The house was
later set on fire with his brother-in-law's younger brother still inside, and he died in the
burning house.4663 Their house was the first to be set on fire, and the whole area was burned
down.4664
2097. The witness Alpha Jalloh confirmed testimony he hadgiven in the AFRC Case.4665
In the AFRC Case, he testified that he was living on Younge Street near Kissy Road when
4655 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, pp.18582-18583.
6666 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18583.
6667 rbrebrm wer, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18584.
4°58 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18585.
4659 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18592—18593.
6660 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18585-18586.
666* Ibrahim wer, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18594.
6662 Ibrahim wer, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18594-1 ssss.
*663 Ibrahim wer, Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18596-18597.
6666 Ibrahim Wai, 'Transcript 17 October 2008, p.18596.
4465 See Alpha Jalloh, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19123 — 19148.

---- End of Page 714 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-O3-O1-T `/X QH 18 May 2012

ZZ E' K0 9
rebels attacked on 6 January 1999.6666 After one week, rebels came to his house looking for
a woman who worked at the bank. However, they were unable to find her and then used
etrol to set the house on fire. The witness’ brother broke a window and the famil 'um ed
P YJ P
out by the garage. They stood by the garage and watched as the house completely burned
down to the ground.4667
2098. Alpha Jalloh testified that he did not see the rebels who burned down his house, but
he described some of the rebels in the area during the week before his house was burned
down as wearing combat fatigues and some as wearing civilian clothes,6666 or as wearing
"soldier combats" and American mufflers.6666 On cross—examination, he confirmed that he
had heard that Captain Blood was the rebel commander of the area. The witness also
reaffirmed that he had seen many of the rebels in Freetown before January 1999 and that
most of them were former members of the Sierra Leone Anny.6676 The witness agreed that A
the majority of the rebels spoke Krio, but he said that some spoke the Liberian language.667l
He stated that some wore combat uniforms and some wore black T—shirts, most wore
headbands resembling the American flag, but some wore white headbands. The rebels had
civilians among them who also wore white headbands, so that it was difficult to tell the
difference between a rebel and a civilian.4672 The witness also stated that some of the rebels
were Liberians.6676
2099. Alusine Conteh testified that on 8 January 1999 "those who came from the bush, the
combatants" started harassing civilians in Kissy and told civilians to tie a white piece of
cloth on their door if they did not want to be punished. They also burned tyres on the street
while singing that they wanted peace. The witness said that some of the combatants wore
military uniforms while others did not; some were armed and others were not.4674 Some days
later a group came to stay at the witness's hut led by a man called "Tommy". He wore "a
y pair of jeans trousers and a pair of jeans jacket". Others in the group wore civilian clothes,
6666 Exhibit P—210, "TF1—098, AFRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20681.
6667 Exhibit P—210, "TF1—098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20686.
4666 Exhibit P—210, "TF1—098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", pp. 20683, 20685.
6666 Exhibit P—210, "TF1—098, APRC Transcript 5 April 2005", p. 20686.
6676 Alpha Jalloh, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19131.
467* Alpha ranch, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19132 -19134.
4672 Alpha Jalloh, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp.19132— 19133.
*673 Alpha Jalloh, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19135.
4676 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 23995.

---- End of Page 715 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T (Il; 18 May 2012

38808*
and there were women and boys among them. They called each other "junta". The group
stayed for around 3 days.4°75 The witness believed that this group were RUF because they
were not wearing uniforins. Also, some spoke with a Liberian accent, but the witness could
not tell whether this was because they came from the border area in Kailahun.4`576
2100. Around two to three weeks after 6 January 1999,4677 Alusine Conteh saw a fire
blazing around Crazy Yard by the Methodist church around 7 p.m. He also saw that a
neighbour's house was on fire as well as the house of a Mr Lahai. Conteh and his family hid
in the bathroom, which is separate from the house.4678 Houses in the area and the
neighbours’ houses were burning, so around midnight the witness sprinkled water on his hut,
which was constructed from tarpaulin, to prevent it from burning, and then returned to the
bathroom.4679 Conteh then heard two men arguing over whether they should burn the house
or not. One of the men called another man named Fire Force to burn the house. Fire Force
took pieces of cloth, sprinkled kerosene or petrol and used matches to set them on fire.
Alusine Conteh snuck out of the bathroom and used water to put out the fire. Because their
first attempt failed, the men returned and set the witness's mattress on tire. The witness and
his family escaped to the empty compound in the back of the house and hid in the banana
trees as they watched the house burn down completely.4680
2101. Because this occurred at night, Alusine Conteh was unable to see the men who set
his house on tire. The witness testified that they spoke in Krio.4°8l Conteh further testified
that tour of his neighbours’ houses were burned and many more throughout Kissy. The
witness also did not see any of the people who burned the other houses in his
neighbourhood.4682
2102. Alusine Conteh testified that while he was hiding in the banana trees, he saw some
men passing by Blackhall Road. One of the men was an "SLA" named Livington, who was
4675 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 23998— 24001.
4676 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24044.
4617 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24018.
4678 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24005, 24010.
*679 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24006.
4680 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 24006-24009.
4681 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24010.
4682 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24011.

---- End of Page 716 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-0l—T / GL 18 May 2012

JMO7
Conteh's neighbour.4444 The witness heard them discussing whether they should bum the
house of Livington's father. Livington told them to bum it. The men set the house on fire
and the witness could hear voices from the house crying, "Oh my children, oh my children".
Livington then told the people in the house, "Let Tejan Kabbah give you dollars".4644
2103. Witness TF1-083, who is now deceased, gave evidence in the AFRC Trial and a
transcript of that testimony was admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92quater.4444 TF1-
083 testified in the AFRC Trial that he was living in Kissy when "rebels" dressed in combat
came on 6 January 1999. TF1-083 testified that his understanding of "rebel" was someone
who "took my property by violence without me giving it to him".4444 The witness said that
on the moming of 6 January 1999, the rebels bumed all the vehicles at Grassfield.4447
2104. Ten days after the rebels had arrived in Kissy, the witness heard from others that a
4 pharmacy in their area had bumed down. After hearing this, the witness was afraid to leave
his house. However, three rebels kicked at his door, entered the house and asked for money.
Frightened, TF1-083 fled his house.4444 Outside, the witness saw a pharmacy in flames and
al1 the houses along the lane on fire. Although he did not know exactly who set the buildings
on fire, TF1-083 believed it to be the rebels "because they were tense".4444
2105. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that after the attack on Fourah Bay in the third
week of January 1999, the group set up a defensive in Upgun because ECOMOG had
advanced to Mountain Cut.4644 According to the witness, the commanders present in Upgun
included Med Bajehjeh, Junior Lion, Foday Bah Marah, Basky, Bomb Blast, Gullit, Five-
Five, O-Five and Rambo Red Goat.4444 As the ECOMOG forces attacked at Upgun, the
4444 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24012.
4644 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p. 24013.
4444 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-720, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes C to E Prosecution
Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial Transcripts of Witnesses TF1-021 and TF1—083 Pursuant to Rule
92quater, 5 February 2009.
4444 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 18766.
4687 Exhibit P-290A, ‘·r1¤1-083, AERC Tihhsbiipt 2; Apiir 2005", p. 18767.
W Exhibit P-290A, ·‘rE1-083, AERC ritittsbtipt 2; Aptii 2005", p. 18768.
4689 Exhibit P-290A, "TF1-083, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 18769.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8334.
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8335-8336.

---- End of Page 717 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G-! 18 May 2012

3 gg! 0
rebels withdrew to PWD Junction. Gullit ordered that they should start capturing civilians
and ordered the advance team to start burning from PWD.4692
2106. Alimamy Bobson Sesay was part of the fighting force that was left behind at PWD
Junction which consisted of RUF, STF and former NPFL with commanders O-Five,
Keforkeh and Med Bajehjeh.4699 As the group was retreating from PWD to Shell Old Road,
they captured civilians and set houses on fire, some of which still had people inside.
Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that the group retreated via Fisher Lane and the Saroulla
area.‘"""*
2107. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that while in the hills around Kissy Mental Home,
Gullit and the group observed the civilians in Kissy dancing and welcoming the Guinean
soldiers and ECOMOG forces. Taking this as a sign of betrayal, Gullit then ordered a group,
including the witness, to move towards Ferry Junction and to amputate and kill civilians and
burn all the remaining houses. Gullit appointed another squad, which included Changa
Bulanga's group, to do the same in Low-Cost Housing area.4696
2108. The fighting force that was dispatched to Ferry Junction numbered more than 1004696
and included Med Bajehjeh and SLA Rambo (also known as Rambo Red Goat and Idrissa
Kamara).4697 The group left Crazy Yard and moved toward Kissy market where they
attacked civilians and went as far as Ferry Junction. On the retreat back to Crazy Yard from
Ferry Junction, the group burned houses.4696 Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he was
present when Rambo Red Goat, Med Bajehjeh and Changa Bulanga reported to Gullit back
at Crazy Yard. Changa Bulanga reported that his group had amputated and killed people and
burned houses, completing their mission in Low-Cost Housing area.4699
2109. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that since ECOMOG was present at Shell Old Road
and New Road, Gullit said that the fighting force should attack the ECOMOG position and
clear the highway to advance to Allen Town. From Crazy Yard, the fighting force used Shell
*662 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8340.
4699 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8340-8341.
4694 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8344.
4696 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8352-8354.
4696 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8360.
4697 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8355-8357.
4696 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8359-8360.
4699 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8360-8361.

---- End of Page 718 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Old Road to pass through Kissy Police Station, Porty Market area, Brewery, Calaba Town
and then to Allen Town, where they set up base.44044 On their way to Allen Town, the
fighting force burned houses, took civilians from their houses and executed those civilians
who were unfit.4404
2110. Perry Kamara described the situation of civilians in Freetown during the attack as
"pathetic". I-le testified that the civilians in Freetown suffered "raping, hard labour,
execution, amputation, burning of property .... [and] when the ECOMOG had power over us
a ain all those atrocities that l had mentioned became more ram ant".44O2 The RUF, AFRC
S P
and STF were committing these atrocities, and the eastern part of Freetown was hit the
hardest.444)3
2111. Perry Kamara testified that during the Freetown attack, the rebels were in constant
contact with Sam Bockarie via radio. Every morning, afternoon and evening they would
send situation reports to Bockarie. ln response to reports that ECOMOG forces were
threatening the rebels’ position, Bockarie ordered: "Make that area fearful. Go and destroy
Kissy Terminal. Go and set up road blocks".44O4 Kissy Terminal was an oil refinery and the
witness stated that he was there himself, saw the fire and "made sure that the order was
implemented".44O5
2112. Dauda Aruna Fornie also testified about the frequent communication between Gullit
and Bockarie during the Freetown operation. Fornie claimed that an hour did not pass by
without there being some sort of comrnunication.44446 ln one such communication Bockarie
" assed a direct instruction that if it was ossible, if the had the chance, the should set the
P P Y Y
oil refinery] on fire. That is Gullit and others should set it on fire".44O4
2113. Samuel Radder John confirmed evidence he had given in the AFRC Trial and a
transcript of his evidence in that trial was admitted into evidence.44448 ln the AFRC Trial he
4400 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8368-8369.
4404 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8369-8370.
4402 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3231.
4703 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3232-3233.
4404 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3231-3232.
4405 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3235.
4406 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21589.
4404 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21592-21593.
4408 Samuel Radder John, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19151-19169.

---- End of Page 719 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T ({1.5 18 May 2012

38*8/ 2.
testified that on 18 January 1999, a group of junta and RUF came to Good Shepherd
Hospital because they heard that the hospital was treating ECOMOG soldiers and
Kamajors.47O° The civilians were beaten to "deal with" them for keeping soldiers at the
hospitalfmo The "junta guys" came back to the hospital and threatened that if they saw
anyone at the hospital later that night, they would kill the patients and bum down the
hospitalfml Thus, the witness went home to get his son, daughter and other relatives, and
together they went to the hills to hide. Aiier two days, the witness went back to his house on
Congress Road to collect food, but met three rebels there. Two rebels wore plain tops with
military bottoms and the other was dressed in full military gear. One of the rebels carried a
n. The rebels took the witness's food and money, set the curtains on fire, locked the
gu
witness in the house and leli the keys on the veranda. The witness was able to quell the
flames with water and managed to jump off onto the balcony to retrieve the keys from the
veranda.47l2
2114. On 6 January 1999, Mohamed Sesay was living in Falcon Street near Kissy Shell
company.4m Sesay testified that one evening later in January 1999 he was sitting in the
parlour of his home by himself when two rebels arrived. He observed from an open window
as one of the rebels, who was carrying a five-gallon jerry can, sprinkled fuel on the house
and the other lit a match and set the house on fire. One of the rooms was bumed down and
the fire had spread to the other rooms when the witness ran out of the house and escaped to
Pa Bobodin's house, where he spent the night.47l4 The next moming, the witness and other
civilians who were hiding at Pa Bobodin's moved to the house of Mr Abass, which had been
partially bumedfms The witness testified that the rebels had bumed many houses in the area,
including Falcon and Taylor Streets, Saroulla and Alpha Morlai.47l6
2115. Abu Bakarr Mansaray confirmed testimony he had given in the AFRC Trial and a
transcript of such testimony was admitted into evidence.47l7 In the AFRC Trial he testified
4709 Exhibit P-212B (confidential), p. 20734.
*7*0 Exhibit P-212B (bbpiiapiiriai), p. 20735.
‘*"' Exhibit P-21213 (bbiiiidpiiriai), p. 20741.
‘"'2EX1iibir P-212B (bbiiiiapiiriai), pp. 20742-20743.
lm Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3899.
W4 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3914-3915.
W5 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3916.
W6 Mohamed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3917.
"'7 Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, pp. 19515 Y 19568.

---- End of Page 720 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /c/» U 18 May 2012

that when Gullit and his troops were fleeing State House as ECOMOG approached, two
rebels gave him a bomb that he was forced to carry as far as Calaba Town.47l8 The witness
said that as they moved towards Calaba Town the rebels were burning people's houses and
looting properties at various locations along the way, including along Kissy Road.47l9
2116. The BBC Focus on Africa program reported "quite horrifying levels of carnage" in
Kissy. People fleeing Kissy told reporters that the rebels had been burning buildings and that
"along the two main arteries, there's practically no buildings intact".472O BBC correspondent
Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay travelled to Kissy with ECOMOG forces. When they reached
Kissy they were told that the rebels were further down the road, burning houses and
amputating hands. The correspondent reported that "Kissy is a deserted town. Virtually all
the residents of Kissy have moved out of Kissy".472l He stated that the rebels had retreated
to the hills and began to launch attacks from the hills. He also stated that "[t]he rebels have
reverted to their terror campaign of amputating civilians".4722 As they approached Blackhall
Road, Ojukutu—Macaulay could see thick smoke and reported that the rebels were burning
houses on their retreat as they moved to Wellington and Calaba Town.4723
2117. Human Rights Watch reported that during the retreat from Freetown, rebels "set
entire city blocks and suburban streets on fire". Housing authorities calculated that over 65
percent of the residential buildings in Kissy burned down.4724 E
2118. The interview notes of TF 1-1 69, which were admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule
92bis4725 as Exhibit 285, state that numerous properties, including private homes, vehicles,
shops, business centres and government buildings, were burned down in Kissy. TF 1-169
47** Exhibit P-222, "rr1-024, Arno rmsmpt 7 March 2005", p. 20435.
(mg Exhibit P—222, "TF1—024, AFRC Transcript 7 March 2005", p. 20436, 20437.
4720 Exhibit P—355B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 1 ~ D0000542, 18 January l999", p.
23626.
472l Exhibit P—356B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 — D000507, 22 January 1999", p.
23627.
4722 Exhibit P~356B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 — D000507, 22 January 1999", p.
23628.
mi Exhibit P—357B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 1 — D0000508, 23 January 1999", p.
23629.
4724 Exhibit P~328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone — Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape,
New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol. 11 No. 3(A), Part I", p. 23002.
*725 Prosecutor v. T czylor, SCSL—03—1~T—715, Order Pursuant to Confidential Prosecution Notice Under Rule
92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Freetown & Western Area — TF 1~169, dated 29
January 2009.

---- End of Page 721 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03—01—T ij GQ 18 May 2012

3 45*6*/ ‘f’
estimated that 30-40 percent of the private properties and businesses were destroyed. All
vehicles that were parked along the road were destroyed, but TF1-169 was unable to provide
a numerical approximation.4726
2119. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in the third week of January, as the rebels
withdrew from the ECOMOG attack on State House,4727 Gullit, Five-Five and Bazzy met
with the witness's group at Savage Square. They informed the fighters that one SLA soldier
had been killed in Fourah Bay, and that the civilians were challenging the rebels. Thus,
Gullit said that they should go down to Fourah Bay.4728 Subsequently, a group comprised of
RUF, SLA, STF, RDF and Red Lion Battalion members in addition to Gullit, Five-Five,
Bazzy and the witness attacked Fourah Bay. The group forced civilians out of their houses
and killed them. Some civilians stayed inside their homes and died as the houses burned
down. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that on these types of missions, the rebels would not
allow anyone to escape. The rebels would stay until the houses completely burned to the
ground before moving on.4729
2120. In Confidential Exhibit P-285, TF1-169 reported that, after Kissy, Fourah Bay
experienced the worst destruction in terms of burning. There were a number of second-hand
vehicle shops in Fourah Bay that displayed their vehicles along the road in front of the
stores. TF1-169 estimated that 90 percent of the vehicles parked along the road were burned,
totalling in the hundreds. TF1-169 was unable to approximate the number of homes that
were burned in Fourah Bay.473O
Findings
2121. The evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF
forces burned civilian properties in Kissy and Fourah Bay, that they wilfully made persons
or their property the object of such acts, and that such acts were committed with the primary
purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.
(iv) State House and Pademba Road
4726 Exhibit P—285 (Confidential), p. 23992, para. 21. A i
4727 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328, 8331.
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8332—8333.
4729 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8333—8334.
mo Exhibit P—285 (Confidential), p. 23992, para. 22.

---- End of Page 722 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / du 18 May 2012

3 K E"/J,
2122. The Prosecution submits that after State House was captured early on 6 January
1999, the rebels advanced towards the central prison on Pademba Road, en route burning
down the CID Headquarters located near State House. Buming and looting was also
observed in this area around 8 January 1999. The Prosecution also submits that when it
became clear that the AFRC/RUF force "had lost the battle" Gullit ordered the buming of
the Vice-President's office at Tower Hill and "people's houses down each roadside from
State House along Parliament Road up to Berry Street toward College".4734 Further, many
homes and vehicles on Pademba Road and surrounding streets were also burned by the
rebels.4732
2123. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Abu Bakarr Mansaray, TF1-358 and Confidential Exhibit P-285 (Interview notes of
TF 1-169).
2124. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that at approximately 6 a.m. on 6 January 1999, the
rebels attacked State House. One group, including the witness, came from Tower Hill while
the other group advanced from Cotton Tree to capture State House.4733 Gullit ordered them
to open the central prison, so a group of rebels, including Bazzy, advanced towards Pademba
Road. En route, they burned down the Criminal Investigation Department Headquarters
belonging to the Sierra Leone Police.473 4
2125. Alimamy Bobson Sesay said that in the third week of January 1999, RUF and SLA
forces recaptured State House.4733 At that time, Sam Bockarie announced on the
intemational media that he was not ready for any peace or ceasefire that the government
wanted to establish and that he was giving orders to his commander Gullit to start burning
strategic locations and capturing civilians in Freetown.4736 After the radio broadcast, the
witness heard Bockarie call Gullit on the radio set confirming such orders, "so that there
would be no govemment and there will be nobody for the govemment to rule".4737
473' Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 746.
4733 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 747.
4733 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8279-8280.
4734 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8280.
4733 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8327, 8328.
3736 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328-8329.
4737 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8329-8330.

---- End of Page 723 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \/ GLB 18 May 201.2

2126. Alimamy Bobson Sesay stated that aHer receiving the orders from Bockarie, Gullit
ordered his senior commanders to start distributing fuel to the troops in Freetown. At that
time, ECOMOG re-attacked State House, so the rebels began to withdraw. As they retreated,
the rebels burned houses. The retreating troops consisted of Rambo's group, the Red Lion
Battalion and RDP Battalion.4444 The witness was with the advance team during the
withdrawal.4444
2127. Abu Bakarr Mansaray confirmed evidence he had given in the AFRC Trial4444 that
ECOMOG was at the Cotton Tree, approaching State House, and the rebels were fleeing
because "they had lost the battle".4444 The civilians were forced to leave State House along
with the rebels. As the witness leli State House, he saw Gullit in a white Toyota Hilux van
ordering his boys to burn down State House and the Vice President's office.4442 Two rebels
gave the witness a bomb to carry, which he carried to Calaba Town.4444 The witness, along
with Gullit, who was ahead, and other rebels and civilians, "moved through Parliament
Road, right up to Berry Street towards College" on their way to Calaba Town.4444 Along the
way, the rebels were burning houses down each roadside and also burned the Vice
President's office at Tower Hill.4444
2128. Witness TF1-358 testified that at a hospital in the western part of Preetown, one
building was burned down and another building was completely looted and vandalised.
Although TF1-358 did not witness the burning first-hand, the people in the surrounding area
claimed that the rebels did the damage in January 1999 alier the government made an
announcement that all wounded should go to another hospital.4446
2129. ln interview notes admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis4444 as Exhibit P-
285, TF1-169 estimated that 60 percent of private homes and business buildings on
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8330-8331.
4439 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8332.
4440 See Abu Bakarr Mansaray, Transcript 29 October 2008, pp. 19515-19568.
4444 Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", p. 20435.
4444 Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", pp. 20434-20435.
4444 Exhibit P-222, "TFl-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", p. 20435.
4444 Exhibit P-222, "TFl-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", p. 20436.
4445 Exhibit P-222, "TF1-024, AFRC Transcript, 7 March 2005", p. 20436.
4444 TF 1-358, Transcript 20 November 2008, p. 20729; Transcript 19 November 2008, pp. 20633-20634; Exhibit
P-252, "Photograph 00034509".
4444 Prosecutor v. Tay/or, SCSL-03-1-T-715, Order Pursuant to Confidential Prosecution Notice Under Rule
92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Freetown & Western Area — TF1-169, dated 29

---- End of Page 724 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / JA 18 May 2012

Pademba Road were destroyed and that private vehicles were also burned during the
Freetown attack.474g
2130. On 18 January 1999 the BBC Focus on Afiica program reported that the "whole of
Pademba Road practically...has been burned to the ground".474°
Findings
2131. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence that in
January 1999 members of the AFRC/RUF forces burned civilian property in Freetown,
including State House and Pademba Road, and that they wilfully made persons and their
property the object of the burnings, the primary purpose of which was to spread terror
amongst the civilian population.
(v) Kingtom
2132. The Prosecution alleges that around the second week of January 1999 houses were
burned, often with civilians still inside, during an attack on Kingtom led by Bazzy to repel
ECOMOG forces. The Prosecution further alleges that civilians were deliberately targeted
because Gullit accused the civilians of calling on ECOMOG forces to come and set up base
in Kingtomfmo
2133. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
and Confidential Exhibit P-285 (interview notes of TF 1-169).
2134. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in the second week of January, while based at `
State House, Gullit received information from people living in the area that ECOMOG
forces were in Kingtom. Gullit ordered Baskyml and other commanders to go and repel the
ECOMOG forces in Kingtom. The witness was part of the group of more than 150 fighters
January 2009.
*7*8 Exhibit 1>-285 rcoiirideiiiiar), p. 23993, para. 25.
4749 Exhibit P-355B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track l — D0000542, 18 January l999", p.
23626.
4750 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 748.
4751 According to the witness, Lieutenant Colonel Basky aka Saidu Kambolai was the head of the 5m Battalion,
which was organised by Gullit .Contrary to what the Prosecution submits, Basky is not Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara
aka "‘Bazzy". See Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8224-8225.

---- End of Page 725 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T Gl); l8 May 2012

383*15
that went to Kingtom.4752 This group was made up of SLA, RUF, STF and former fighters of
the NPFL.4753
2135. In addition to attacking the ECOMOG forces in Kingtom, the group killed civilians
because Gullit told them that the civilians in Kingtom called ECOMOG to come and set up
base there.4754 The group also set houses on fire in Kingtom. Some of the houses were
locked and had people inside them. Regardless, the rebels set the houses on fire and made
sure that nobody inside was able to escape. The witness testified that the people inside the
burning homes died in the fires because the rebels did not move from there until the
operation was completed.4755
2136. In Confidential Exhibit P-285, TF1-169 estimated that 5-10 percent of the residences
in Kingtom were burned.4756
Findings
2137. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence that in
January 1999 members of the AFRC/RUF f`orces4757 burned civilian property in Kingtom
and that they wilfully made persons or their property the object of the burnings.
2138. Although there is some evidence to suggest that the purpose of the attack on
Kingtom was to repel ECOMOG forces, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence of the
burning of homes, some of which had people locked inside, and the evidence that one of the
stated objectives was to punish civilians for supporting ECOMOG, establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that the burnings were committed with the primary purpose of spreading
terror among the civilian population.
(vi)
*752 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8294-8295.
4453 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8298.
4454 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8295. _
4455 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8296.
4756 Exhibit P-285 (Confidential), pp. 23992-23993 para. 24.
4454 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
Sllpfd.

---- End of Page 726 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

;;&6’/ 7
2139. The Prosecution submits that private houses in Upgun were burned and that it can be
inferred that the burnings were committed by the AF RC/RUF forces during the invasion of
Eastern Freetown. Such an inference can be drawn because the AF RC/RUF advanced
through Upgun on entry into Freetown, rebels were present in the area during the invasion,
and widespread burning was part of the forces’ modus operandi during the attack.4758
Findings
2140. The only evidence of civilian property being burned in Upgun is Exhibit P-285 (the
interview notes of TF 1-169), which simply records that "few private houses were burned in
the Upgun area but the number of govermnent buildings burnt down was about 1074759
2141. The paucity of the available evidence does not permit the Trial Chamber to draw the
inference submitted by the Prosecution. Such evidence is not capable of proving beyond i
reasonable doubt that the burning of civilian property in Upgun was perpetrated by
AF RC/RUF forces, nor that the burning was committed with the primary purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population.
2142. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the elements of the crime of acts of
terrorism in relation to burning in Upgun have been established.
(vii) Wellington
2143. The Prosecution submits that on the advance to Freetown troops issued threats to
burn down houses as they passed through Wellington. The Prosecution further submits that
on the retreat some forces used a route from Crazy Yard to Porty Market area and then on to
Calaba Town, burning along the way.476O
2144. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Akiam Tholley, TF 1-026, TF 1-029 and Confidential Exhibit P-285.
2145. Akiatu Tholley testified that she was at her home in Wellington on 5 January
1999476l when she "heard people shouting that the rebels were coming, on their way they
4758 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 749.
‘"" Exhibit P-zss (cO¤aa€m1a1>, para. 23.
4760 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 750.
um Although the witness testified that this incident occurred on 5 January 1999, T holley's subsequent movement

---- End of Page 727 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T C0! 18 May 2012
;-—`/

gi! 2 0
were burning down houses and that they were amputating people".4762 The rebels threatened
to set her house on fire if her family did not come outside.4764 Before her mother could 0pen
the d00r the rebels broke down the d00r and "amputated" a child aged around three to four
ears. When the she went outside she saw them "bumin down houses and killin ".4464 The
Y S S
witness described these rebels as speaking Krio and wearing black T-shirts, black
trousers44`45 and headbands.4766 The witness later sp0ke to a small b0y — Only 6 years 0ld —
who was with the rebels and who had been captured by the AF RC in Kono.4764 The b0y told
her that the rebels were a mixed group of RUF and former SLA.44°4 The witness stated that
the rebels took her from her h0me in Wellington to Waterl00.4769 On the way to Allen Town,
she saw rebels "killing people, buming down houses, amputating people and looting
people's property".447O
2146. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testif1ed that during the retreat, the fighting force used Shell
Old R0ad to go from Crazy Yard to Kissy P0lice Station, Porty Market area,474l Brewery,
Calaba Town and then to Allen Town, where they set up base.4772 Alimamy Bobson Sesay
testiHed that on their way to Allen Town, the fighting force bumed houses, took civilians
from their houses and executed those civilians who were unit.4774
2147. TF 1-026 testified that she was in her home in Wellington on 6 January 19994774
when nine RUF rebels entered with guns, began firing their weapons and sh0t her sister,
with her captors from Wellington to Allen Town to Waterloo to Masiaka indicates that this occurred as the rebels
withdrew from Freetown through Wellington later in January. Although mistaken as to the date, the Trial
Chamber nevertheless accepts her evidence of the incidents she described.
*762 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19173.
4764 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19174.
4444 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, p. 19175.
‘"" Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 october 2008, p. 19174.
*766 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19194.
4767 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19195, 19244.
4764 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p 19245.
4764 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 27 October 2008, p. 19196.
4770 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19178, 19179.
4774 According to TFl-169, Porty Market area is located in Wellington. Exhibit P-285 (Confidential), para. 1 l.
4744 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8368-8369.
4774 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8369-8370.
4774 Although the witness testified that this incident occurred on 6 January 1999, TFl-026's subsequent
movement with her captors from Wellington to Calaba Town to Waterloo to Makeni indicates that this occurred
as the rebels withdrew from Freetown through Wellington later in January. Although the witness is mistaken
about the date, the Trial Chamber accepts her evidence of the incidents she described.

---- End of Page 728 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T g A/hq 18 May 2012

killing her.4775 The rebels then forcefully took the witness from her home. On their way out
of the village, the rebels burned many houses and amputated people.4776 TF1-026 told of one
specific instance in which Mr Wilson, a crippled teacher, died inside a burning house that
had been set on fire by the RUF rebels.4777 TF1-026 was with the rebels during the time that
they were buming houses and amputating civilians. The witness testified that the rebels told
her she should be there to witness these acts because if she attempted to escape, they would
do the same to her.4778
2148. TF1-029 confirmed testimony she had given in the RUF Trial4774 and the transcript
of that testimony was admitted into evidence478O. In the RUF Trial she testified that she was
in the industrial area of Wellington when she was captured with 50 other civilians on 22
January 1999 by the RUF and SLA, including Major Arif who was an SLA soldier.478l On
the way from Wellington to Calaba Town, the witness saw "the mixed group, the SLA and
the RUF" buming houses and killing people.4782
2149. In Confidential Exhibit P-285 (the interview notes of TF1-169), an estimated 20
percent of the buildings in Wellington were bumed down.4783
Findings A
2150. The evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that in January 1999 members of
the AFRC/RUF forces4784 bumed civilian property in Wellington, that the perpetrators
wilfully made persons or their property the object of the burnings and that the bumings were
committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror amongst the civilian population.
(viii) Calaba Town
4775 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3843-3844.
4776 TF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008, pp. 3844-3845.
4771 TF1 -026, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3846.
tm iF1-026, Transcript 14 February 2008,p. 3846.
4774 TF1-029, Transcript 22 October 2008, p. 18972.
4780 Exhibit P-206, "TF1-029, RUF Transcript, 28 November 2005".
ml Exhibit P-206, "TF1-029, RUF Transcript, 28 November 2005", pp. 19415-19417.
4782 Exhibit P-206, "TF1-029, RUF Transcript, 28 November 2005", p. 19418.
*7*3 Exhibit F-285 (Confidential), para. 27.
4784 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Western Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
Supfd.

---- End of Page 729 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T W 18 May 2012

7 CZK 2 2. 2.
2151. The Prosecution submits that around the third week of January 1999 Gullit, while
based temporarily in Allen Town, ordered a team to go as far as Calaba Town to bum down
houses so that Ereetown would become ungovernable.4785
2152. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TE 1-
150, Osman Jalloh and Paul Nabieu Conteh, Exhibit P—3 28 and Confidential Exhibit P—285.
2153. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that during the retreat to Allen Town from Crazy
Yard, Gullit's group encountered Nigerian troops at Brewery, so they pushed through to
Allen Town without stopping in Calaba Town.4786 Gullit decided to take the captured
civilians to the jungle to reorganise and strategize how to go back and attack the ECOMOG
forces. Gullit, Five-Five, O-Five, Bazzy and others were in the group that retreated to the
jungle.4787
2154. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that Gullit ordered Hassan Papa Bangura (also
known as Bomb Blast) to organise a team to go as far as Calaba Town to investigate the
situation and "ensure that anywhere civilians were and houses were they should burn down
the area and that they should ensure that Ereetown becomes ungovernable".4788 The team
that went to Calaba Town numbered more than 200 and included the witness, Bomb Blast,
Med Bajehjeh and Rambo Red Goat. This fighting team was comprised of RUP, SLA, STE
and former NPEL.4789
2155. At Calaba Town, the team killed civilians and bumed down houses.4790 Alimamy
Bobson Sesay testified that if people inside the houses attempted to run out they were shot,
so the civilians stayed inside and burned with the houses. After this operation in Calaba
Town, the team retumed to Allen Town and found out that the jungle team had already
advanced. Hassan Papa Bangura decided that the team should stay in Allen Town until
further instruction from Gullit, so they stayed in Allen Town for two daysfml
4785 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 751.
4786 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8370.
4787 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8371.
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8371.
4789 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8371-8372.
4790 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8372.
uml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8373.

---- End of Page 730 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / W 18 May 2012 \%


241*8 2 3
2156. Confidential Exhibit P-285 (TF1-169's interview notes) asserts that mostly private
homes, vehicles and stores were burned down in Calaba Town. Approximately 30-40
percent of` the homes and 15-20 percent of the businesses in Calaba Town were
destroyed.4m
2157. TF1-150 testified that approximately 90 percent of the buildings in Calaba Town
were destroyed. To his knowledge, there was no ECOMOG bombing in Calaba Town.4793
2158. Osman Jalloh testified that in late January 1999, a rebelii'794 wearing civilian
clothingw)5 threatened the witness and other civilians hiding in a tin shack that if they
continued to say they had no money, he would burn them all.4796 Because the civilians told
him that they had no money, the man took straw out of a mattress, set it on fire and locked
the witness and others inside the tin shack.4797 The room began to fill with smoke, and the
civilians started to sneeze and shout for help since they believed they would die. Afier five
minutes, the man let the civilians out. Since they did not have any money, the man asked
them what else they could give him to prevent them "from being bumt".4798 One of the
civilians in the house with the witness gave the man 86 bags of rice.4799 The man then gave a
signal and was immediately joined by over 100 rebels wearing civilian clothes and carrying
guns.48OO These rebels carried the bags of rice away.480l
2159. Witness Paul Nabieu Conteh confirmed testimony he had given in the AFRC Trial, a
transcript of which was admitted into evidence.48O2 In the AFRC Trial he testified that on 19
January 1999 he was in Calaba Town with his wife, daughter, brother-in-law and wife's
nephew. The witness testified that because they could see the "atrocity" coming towards
Calaba Town, he told his wife to leave immediately. The witness saw the exchange of
*792 cppndppuai Exhibit 1>-285, p. 23994, para. 28.
""’3 TF1—150, rrpmpppt 18 February 2008, p. 4069.
4794 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17685.
4795 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17690.
47% Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17690-17691.
4797 Osman J alloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, pp. 17690-17691.
*7% osmap 1311011, Transcript 1 optpbpr 2008, pp. 17691-17692.
4799 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17693.
4800 Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17693-17694.
*"°‘ opmap Jalloh, Transcript 1 optpppr 2008,p. 17698-17694.
**02 See Paul Nabieu Conteh, Transcript 27 October 2008, pp. 19284-19314.

---- End of Page 731 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / GE 18 May 2012

KKK ZY
bullets between ECOMOG and the rebels, the RUF and AFRC, and the buming of
houses.4803 T
2160. In Exhibit P-328, Human Rights Watch reported that housing authorities calculated
that some 80 percent of the residential buildings in Calaba Town had been burned down. 4804
Findings
2161. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence that in
January 1999 members of the AFRC/RUF forces burned down civilian houses in Calaba
Town, that the perpetrators wilf`ully made persons or their property the object of the
bumings and that the bumings were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror
amongst the civilian population.
(ix) Hastings, Grafton and Benggema
2162. The Prosecution, citing Confidential Exhibit P-284 (Witness Statement of TF1-169),
points out that it was observed that civilian houses and vehicles were burned in Hastings,
Grafton and Benguema following the Freetown invasion. The Prosecution submits that an
inference can be drawn that AFRC/RUF forces burned the civilian property at these
locations as burning was widespread during the invasion; these forces advanced and
retreated through Hastings and Benguema, while Grafton was part of the route taken on the
retreat; and it was part of the force's modus opemndi to burn towns and villages it passed
thmughfzstvs
Findings
2163. Confidential Exhibit P-284 records that during TF1-169's inspection he saw that a
few civilian houses and vehicles were burned and damaged in Grafton, Hastings, Waterloo,
Goderich, Kent, Tombo and Benguema. However, TF1-169 was concerned with government
4803 Exhibit P-215, "TF1-227, AFRC Transcript 8 April 2005", p. 20814.
4804 Exhibit P-328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone » Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape,
New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol. 11 No. 3(A), Part I", p. 23002.
4805 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 752.

---- End of Page 732 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

JK K25"
property and so could not say the amount of the damage as he did not pay attention to
privately owned property.48O6
2164. There is no other evidence of civilian property being burned in Hastings, Grafton and
Benguema.
2165. The paucity of the available evidence does not permit the Trial Chamber to draw the
inference submitted by the Prosecution. Such evidence is not capable of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the burning of civilian property in Grafton, Hastings and Benguema
was perpetrated by AFRC/RUF forces, nor that the burning was committed with the primary
purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.
2166. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the elements of the crime of acts of
terrorism in relation to burning in Hastings, Grafton and Benguema have been established.
(x) Goderich and Kent
2167. The Prosecution has made no specific submissions regarding Goderich and Kent,
although these locations were pleaded in the Indictment.
Findings
2168. The only evidence of burning in these areas is in Confidential Exhibit P-284, in
which TF1-169 records that during his inspection he saw that a few houses and vehicles
were burned and damaged in Grafton, Hastings, Waterloo, Goderich, Kent, Tombo, and
Benguema. However, TFl-169 was concerned with government property and so could not
say the amount of the damage as he did not pay attention to privately owned property.48O7
2169. The paucity of the available evidence is not capable of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the burning of civilian property in Goderich and Kent was perpetrated by
AFRC/RUF forces, nor that the burning was committed with the primary purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population.
2170. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the elements of the crime of acts of
terrorism in relation to burning in Goderich and Kent have been established.
*806 Exhibit P—284 (Confidential), para. 11.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol·T // W 18 May 2012

3 X8 ze
(b) Unlawful Killings
2171. The Trial Chamber has found in relation to the unlawful killings perpetrated in
Freetown and the Western Area that the elements of the crime of acts of terrorism have been
established beyond reasonable doubt.4808
(c) Sexual Violence
2172. The Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that: men and boys
under the command of Gullit raped an unknown number of women and girls in the grounds
of the State House over three nights in January 1999;48O9 AFRC and RUF commanders and
fighters raped an unknown number of girls inside State House during the Freetown attack of
January 1999; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a commander in the AFRC, captured and raped a
young girl in Freetown during the 1999 attack; RUF fighters raped an unknown number of
girls on Blackhall Road during the Freetown attack on January 1999; rebels, some under the
command of Captain Blood, raped an unknown number of girls in Kissy on or about 22
January 1999.*8*0
2173. The Trial Chamber has also found proved beyond reasonable doubt that: an unknown
number of women and girls were used as sexual slaves by AFRC fighters in Benguema until
approximately March 1999; TF1—O29 was used as a sex slave by Major Arif an ex-
SLNAFRC soldier, in Wellington, Calaba Town and Benguema from late January to March
1999; Akiatu Tholley was used as a sex slave by an STF fighter named James from
approximately late January through early April 1999; TF1—O23 was used as a sex slave by a
member of the AFRC in Calaba Town, Benguema and Four Mile from late January through
March 1999.48]] The Trial Chamber has also found that all of these instances constitute
outrages upon personal dignity.48l2
ml Exhibit P—284 (Confidential), para. 11.
4808 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings); Alleged unlawful
killings in Freetown and the Westem Area (between about 21 December 1998 and about 28 February 1999)
‘ Sllpfd.
4809 Freetown and the Western Area: Count 4 (Rape); Conclusions supra.
48m Freetown and the Western Area: Count 4 (Rape); Conclusions supra.
ml Freetown and the Westem Area: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery); Conclusions supra.
4m Freetown and the Western Area: Count 6 (Outrages upon Personal Dignity); Findings supra.

---- End of Page 734 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—01—T / J Q 18 May 2012

385 Z?
2174. The evidence establishes that the commission of acts of rape and sexual slavery in
Freetown and the Westem Area by the rebel forces were widespread and systematic, both
during the attack on Freetown and during the retreat. ln particular, the Trial Chamber has
found that there was a recognized system of ownership and hierarchy among captured
women in the rebel forces in Freetown and the Westem Area, as illustrated by TF1—023
being accorded special treatment as a commander's wife.48l3
2175. There was evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that girls were raped publicly
outside State House, that they were raped publicly on Blackhall Road in the presence of
other civilians, including TF1-028 who tried to stop them, and that girls were raped publicly
in Kissy.48l4 Many of the victims of these rapes were girls as young as 13.4815 Victims were
also humiliated and degraded, as they were often undressed prior to having intercourse, and
in some cases, were subjected to perverse methods of sexual violence. For example, Tholley,
who at that time had not yet had her menses, testified that a commander called James
"damaged her in the vagina" when she refused to have sex with him.48l6 The Trial Chamber
is satisfied from this evidence that the public nature of these crimes of sexual violence was a
deliberate tactic on the part of the perpetrators to instil fear among civilians.
2176. Given the geographical and temporal proximity of these crimes to each other, and to
the bumings, killings and amputations that occurred in Freetown and the Westem Area
during the advance towards Freetown, the attack and the retreat, the Trial Chamber finds that
the rebels regularly used rape and sexual slavery to spread terror among the civilian
population of Freetown and the Westem Area.
2177. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt
that members of the AFRC/RUF forces wilfully made the girls and women of Freetown and
the Westem Area the object of acts of sexual violence with the primary purpose of spreading
terror among the civilian population.
(d) Physical Violence
(i) Freetown
tm Exhibit P-205A, ‘·AFRc riiai Transcript 9 March 2005, TF1-023*; pp. 56-58.
W4 Freetown and the Westem Area, Count 4 (Rape); Rape ofCaptured Girls in January 1999, Findings supra,
W5 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2007, p. 18597.

---- End of Page 735 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T qw 18 May 2012

2178. The Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that two civilians had
their hands amputated, one civilian had his hands and tongue amputated, and one civilian
had both her eyes mutilated by rebels in Freetown in January 1999.4847
2179. The amputations and carvings practiced by the AFRC and RUF were notorious, and
served as a permanent, visible and grotesque reminder to all civilians of the consequences of
resisting the AFRC or RUF or of supporting Kabbah or ECOMOG. The gruesome nature of
these particular amputations and mutilations included the amputation of tongues, and a
woman whose eyes were pulled out so that they protruded from their sockets.4848 TF1—158
testified that he had treated patients who had been attacked and amputated or mutilated by
the rebels, and that when they were being attacked, "their immediate families were
positioned such that they will be in iiill view of what they were doing, especially for
those who suffered amputations and rape".4849 The Trial Chamber is satisfied on this
evidence that these amputations and mutilations were perpetrated with the primary intention
of spreading terror.
2180. The Trial Chamber has also found that Abu Bakarr Mansaray was beaten and
physically harmed in a permanent manner by rebels outside State House on 8 January
1999.4820 However, the evidence is not sufficient to establish the intent of the perpetrators,
and the Trial Chamber is thus not able to conclude that they acted with the primary purpose
of spreading terror.
(ii) Kissy, including Kissy Mental Hospital
2181. The Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that: a Nigerian man
called lke had his ear amputated and was wounded on his thigh in Kissy on 18 January
1999,4824 three persons, including witness James Kpumgbu, had their hands amputated or
4416 Akiatu Tholley, Transcript 23 October 2008, pp. 19184—19185.
4447 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Freetown, including the Northern and
Eastern areas of the city, Findings supra.
4414 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Freetown, including the Northern and
Eastern areas of the city, Findings supra.
4844 TF1—358, Transcript 19 November 2008, p. 20656.
4420 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Freetown, including the Northern and
Eastern areas of the city, Findings supra.
4421 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Beating of Civilians Outside Good
Shepard Hospital, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 736 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T f Gl 18 May 2012

3 ar? 27
mutilated near Kissy Mental Home by rebels on 6 January I999;4822 two civilians had their
hands am utated b TF1-143 and another bo in Kiss Market in Januar I999;4828 Ibrahim
P Y Y Y Y
Wai was physically harmed and his hand was amputated by Captain Blood in January
I999;4824 the brother of the brother-in-law of Ibrahim Wai had his hand amputated in Kissy
in Janua 1999;4885 Mohamed Sam son Bah's hand was am utated in Kiss b rebels led
YY P P Y Y
by Tafaiko in January 1999;4828 Mohamed Sesay's arms were amputated on 19 January
1999;4827 Alusine Conteh and Boi Banie's hands were am utated on 20 Janua 1999;4828
P YY
Witness TF1-083, Pa Sorie and Musa had their hands am utated b rebels on 21 Januar
P Y Y
1999;4824 three 13-year-old girls had their arms amputated by rebels around 20-22 January
I999;4884) three civilians had their hands amputated by Changa Bulanga at Shell Old Road in
Kissy in January 1999.4888
2182. In several of these cases, the rebels told their victims that they should show these
amputations to Kabbah, or ask him for new hands. Kpumgbu, for example, testified that the
rebel who amputated his hands then said that Kpumgbu "should go and tell Tejan Kabbah
that they were fighting for power".4882 Wai also testified that Captain Blood told him that he
should go to Pa Kabbah,4888 because "Pa Kabbah had brought so many hands for us, for
those whose hands are...0fK they should go to him".4884 The rebe1 who amputated Boi
Barrie's arms told him "go and tell Tejan Kabbah, no more politics no more votes", and that
4822 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Arnputation of James Kpumgbu and
others at Kissy Mental Hospital, Findings supra.
4888 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Amputations of two men's hands in
Kissy Market, Findings supra.
4884 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Beating and Amputation of Ibrahim
Wai, Findings supra.
4*25 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Beating and Amputation of Ibrahim
Wai, Findings supra.
*826 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Amputation of Mohammed Sampson
Bah hand at Kissy, Findings supra.
4*27 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Amputation of Mohamed Sesay's arms
in Kissy, Findings supra,
4888 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Arnputations of Barrie and Alusine
Conteh's hands at Parsonage and Leaden Streets in Kissy, Findings supra.
4824 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Amputation of TF1—083, Pa Sorie and
· Musa in Samuels Area in Kissy, Findings supra.
4880 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Other Arnputations in Kissy, Findings
supra.
4884 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Arnputations by Changa Bulanga in
Low Cost Area and Shell Old Road Area, Findings supra.
4842 James Kpumgbu, 13 October 2008, pp. 18123—18124.
*833 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Fourah Bay, Findings supra.

---- End of Page 737 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—O1—T % G-A 18 May 2012

ZXK35
rebels told Alusine Conteh, who had both hands amputated, that he should tell Kabbah that
he was a messenger.4835 Similar statements were made in relation to the amputations of TF 1-
083, Pa Sorie, and Musa, where the rebels told them they should go to Kabbah to get new
hands. Several of these amputations were performed by child soldiers, who were often
incapable of performing the amputations successfully, leaving victims with mangled hands,
or needing older rebels to finish the amputations, such as in the case of the Mohamed
Sesay.4836
2183. These amputations occurred in the context of widespread buming, rape and killing,
and in situations where rebels had been ordered to target civilians who they believed were
Kamajors or supporters of ECOMOG. In the case of the amputations performed by Changa
Bulanga at Old Shell Road, this operation was ordered by Gullit in order to punish civilians
who he believed had welcomed ECOMOG to Freetown. These incidents also occurred in a
context where witnesses observed bunches of human hands that had been tied together and
buried in the dirt at Kissy Road.
2184. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
amputations that occurred in Kissy from 6 January to 22 January 1999 were perpetrated by
members of the AFRC/RUF forces, who wilfully made civilians the object of the physical
violence with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.
(iii) Fourah Bay
2185. The Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that seven civilians,
including witness Alpha J alloh, had their hands amputated at F ourah Bay by members of the
SLA around 18 January 1999, and that an unknown number of civilians had their hands
amputated by Major Mines and Kabila at F ourah Bay.4837
2186. After the civilians had been amputated, the rebels told the amputees that they could
go to Pah Kabbah to get more hands.4838 The amputations also served as a message to
Kabbah and ECOMOG of the atrocities of which the rebels were capable. These
4834 Ibrahim Wai, Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 1 8594.
4835 Alusine Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, p, 24028.
4836 Mohammed Sesay, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3926.
4837 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); F ourah Bay, Findings supra.
4838 Exhibit P-210, TF1-098 AFRC Trascript 5 April 2005, p. 20189.

---- End of Page 738 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T /4/ dj 18 May 2012

amputations also took place in the context of widespread burning, rape and killing in
Freetown.
2187. The Trial Chamber is accordingly satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
amputations that occurred in Kissy from 6 January to 22 January 1999 were perpetrated by
members of the AF RC/RUF forces who wilfully made civilians the object of the physical
violence with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.
(iv) Upgun
2188. The Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that three captured
civilians had their hands amputated by Five-Five in Upgun in January 1999. One civilian
was given a "short-sleeve" amputation and the others "long-sleeve" amputations.4839 For the
reasons articulated above in relation to the other areas, and given that this amputation was
performed by Five-Five as a "demonstration", the Trial Chamber is satisfied that these
amputations were perpetrated by members of the AF RC/RUF forces, who wilfully made
civilians the object of the physical violence with the primary purpose of spreading terror.
(v) Wellington
2189. The Trial Chamber has found proved beyond reasonable doubt that Sarah Koroma's
len hand was amputated and her right hand mutilated in Wellington on 6 January 1999; that
seven civilians had their hands amputated in Wellington on 6 January 1999; that the hand of
a child between 3 to 4 years old was amputated in Wellington in January 1999 and that
Akiatu Tholley was beaten and physically harmed in a serious manner in Wellington in late
January 1999.4840 4
2190. The rebels who amputated Koroma's ann told her to go tell Kabbah that the rebels
wanted peace.484l The rebels also amputated the arm of a 3 to 4 year old child. Based on this
4 evidence, given the widespread burning, rape and killing that occurred during both the
rebels’ advance into Freetown in early January and their retreat in late January, and for the
reasons articulated above in relation to the other areas, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
these amputations were perpetrated by members of the AFRC/RUF forces who wilfully
4844 Freetown and the Western Area; Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Upgun, Findings supra.
4840 Freetown and the Western Area: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence); Wellington, Findings supra,
484l Sarah Koroma, Transcript 22 October 2008, pp. 18995-18997.

---- End of Page 739 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dp 18 May 2012

222rJZ
made civilians the object of the physical violence with the primary purpose of spreading
terror.
Conclusion
2191. The foregoing findings by the Trial Chamber establish that the Prosecution has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the AFRC/RUF forces in Freetown and
the Western Area wilfully made civilian persons or their property the object of acts of
violence in the forms of burning of civilian property (in Freetown and the Western Area,
Waterloo, Tumbo, Kissy, Fourah Bay, State House, Pademba Road, Kingtom, Wellington
and Calaba Town), unlawful killings, sexual violence and physical violence (in Freetown,
` Kissy, Fourah Bay, Upgun and Wellington), committed with the primary purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population.
2192. The Trial Chamber has already found that there was an armed conflict in Sierra
Leone at all times relevant to the Indictment, involving, among others, members of the RUF
and AFRC.4842 Further, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that crimes
discussed in the above findings were directly linked to that armed conflict and that the
victims were civilians not directly taking part in hostilities. The Trial Chamber therefore
finds that the elements of the crime of acts of terrorism (Count 1) as a serious violation of
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol ll (Count 1) have
been proved reasonable doubt.
4842 See Law and Findings on the General Requirements: Article 3: War Crimes, para. 573 supra.

---- End of Page 740 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·0l·T / 6u 18 May 2012
/0/

XXX};
VIII. FACTUAL FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF THE ACCUSED
A. Pre-Indictment Period {1988 to 1996)
2193. The Trial Chamber has considered evidence prior to the Indictment period only for
the purposes of clarifying the context, or establishing by inference the elements of criminal
conduct.
2194. The Prosecution alleges that, prior to the commencement of the armed conflict in
Sierra Leone, during meetings in Libya, Burkina Faso and Liberia, the Accused together
with Foday Sankoh and Dr Marmeh established a common plan to terrorize the civilian
population of Sierra Leone in order to forcibly control the population and territory of Sierra
Leone and to pillage its resources, in particular diamonds. This common plan involved the
commission of the crimes alleged in the Indictment including terrorizing the civilian
population, widespread and continuing killings, rapes, beatings and mutilations, looting and
burning of civilian property, and enslavement of the civilian population, including using
children as fighters.4843
2195. The Defence denies the allegation that the Accused's plan was to target the civilian
population and submits that this would be illogical and counter-productive since it would
cause the civilian population to become alienated from the cause. The Defence concedes that
military alliances were made but maintains that these alliances were purely political or
military and were not underlined by any criminal intent. The Defence submits that the
Prosecution evidence is imprecise and insufficient to support a conviction.4844
1. Alleged meeting in Libya around 1989
Submissions of the parties
4843 Indictment, paras 5, 33; Amended Case Summary paras 42-43; Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief paras 6-11;
Transcript 4 June 2007 (Prosecution Opening Statement) pp. 3-7; Prosecution Closing Arguments, Transcript 8
February 2011, p. 49150; Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 51-53, 572-582; See also Trial Chamber 11,
Decision on Urgent Defence Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment
Relating to the Pleading of ICE, 27 February 2009; Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Notice of Appeal
and Submissions Regarding the Majority Decision Concerning The Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended
Indictment, l May 2009.
4444 Defence Final Trial Briefparas 305, 381, 733-774.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 7/ Qlr 18 May 2012

j2KX,?<,¢
2196. The Prosecution submits that soon after their arrival in Libya in around 1989, the
Accused, Sankoh, Dr Manneh and others agreed on a common plan to launch a campaign of
terror in order to forcibly control the population and territory of Sierra Leone and to pillage
its resources, in particular diamonds. Witnesses TF1-371, Suwandi Camara, Moses Blah and
lsaac Mongor, and exhibits P-031 and P-277 provided relevant evidence.4445
2197. The Defence contends that the Prosecution failed to lead any direct evidence
regarding the meeting in Libya where the Accused and Foday Sankoh planned to terrorize
the Sierra Leonean civilian population. The Defence further submits that the Accused never
had contact with Sankoh in Libya since the latter was not a leader of the Sierra Leonean
group and the Accused only had contact with their leader, Ali Kabbah, during training at the
Mathaba, where the leaders of revolutionary groups received political and military training.
The Defence relies on the testimonies of the Accused, Witness DCT-125, Yanks Smythe and
Issa Sesay.4846
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Suwandi Camara
2198. Witness Suwandi Camara, an SSS member4844 and a Gambian national, was recruited
as an ‘intelligence man’ into the Gambian Revolutionary group called SOFA (Special
Operational Force for Africa) led by Dr Manneh (Kukoi Samba Sanyang) ata centre for
revolutionary groups called the Mathaba in Tripoli, Libya at the end of 1989.4448 During a
visit to Dr Manneh at the Mathaba in the beginning of 1990, Suwandi Camara saw Charles
Taylor greeting Dr Manneh, who informed him that Taylor was the leader of a Liberian
revolutionary group who had started a war in Liberia and that Taylor and his group were in
Libya in order to receive training and weapons from Libyan authorities. Suwandi Camara
saw Taylor again a few weeks later.4449 1
4845 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 51-53, 574; See also Prosecution opening Statement, dated 4 June 2007,
4444gl4;2efence Final Trial Brief, paras 306, 381, 733-756.
4847 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3458-3459, 3472, 3477-3479; Transcript 11 February
2008, pp. 3523, 3525.
4848 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3418-3422.
4444 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3436-3439.

---- End of Page 742 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

2199. During his visits to Dr Manneh at the Mathaba, Suwandi Camara also met Foday
Sankoh. Dr Manneh told the witness that Sankoh, the coordinator of the Sierra-Leoneans in
Libya, was acting as the leader of the Sierra Leonean group in Libya, since its leader Ali
Kabbah had left Libya with the money given by the Libyan authorities to his group to
support their fight. Camara stated that he did not see Taylor and Sankoh together.4550
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
2200. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,4554 learned from Foday Sankoh that Sankoh,
along with the second commander of the RUF, Rashid Mansaray, and third commander
Mohamed Tarawalli, was trained as a ‘Special Force Commando’ in Bengazi, Libya. Sankoh
further told him that, during this training in Benghazi, he met Charles Taylor, although
Taylor was not there for most of the training.4555
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
2201. Witness Moses Blah, an adjutant general within Taylor's group at the time,4855
attended training in the Tajura camp in Tripoli, Libya. According to Blah, Foday Sankoh,
the head of the Sierra Leonean group, used to pay courtesy calls to Taylor in the camp and
called him ‘"Chief’. During his stay in Libya, Taylor regularly visited the Tajura camp.4854
2202. Moses Blah testified that Ali Kabbah, as a leader, did not stay with the Sierra
Leonean group but rather stayed at the Mathaba. Blah testified that Sankoh was considered
to be the leader of the Sierra Leonean group only later, after he represented it during peace
talks in Togo.4555
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2203. Witness Isaac Mongor, a Liberian training instructor at Camp Naama who later
became a senior official within the RUF,4556 testified that while at Camp Naama, Foday
Sankoh told him that his brother Charles Taylor was training Sankoh's men for him, and that
4850 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3428-3432, 3439.
4554 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
4855 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2211-2212 (CS).
4555 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9943-9945.
4854 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9802-9815.
4555 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10145-10146.
4856 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
K

---- End of Page 743 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Sankoh had known the Accused for a long time. Foday Sankoh also told him that they had
all gone to Libya for training.4857
Prosecution Witness TF 1-168
2204. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member,4858 testified that he learned about military
training of Sierra Leoneans in Libya while he was at Camp Naama. He said that Foday
Sankoh said that he had trained there with Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli and Abu
Kanu 4859
Expert Witness Stephen Ellis/Prosecution Exhibit P-031
2205. Exhibit P-031 is a report written by Prosecution expert witness Stephen Ellis, senior
researcher at the African Studies Centre in the University of Leiden.486O ln his report, which
is based on interviews, UN reports, and documents in the Liberian archives, Ellis states that
the relationship between the Accused and the RUF can be traced back to 1988 at the military
training camps in Libya where the Accused met future Sierra Leonean revolutionary leader
Foday Sankoh and they became acquainted with each other.486l
2206. Stephen Ellis's court testimony was a reiteration of the statements contained in his
report regarding Taylor's meetings in Libyan training camps with future leaders of the
conflict in Sierra Leone, including Foday Sankoh, at the end of the 1980s.4862
Prosecution Confidential Exhibit P-277
2207. ln Confidential Exhibit P-2774863 it is reported that Foday Sankoh conceived of the
idea of an armed struggle against the APC Government in Sierra Leone while in prison in
1978. Between 1986-1988, some Sierra Leonean students such as Ali Kabbah, Abu Kanu,
Rashid Mansaray and Cleo Hanciles went to Libya in order to study Colonel Ghadaffi's
theories and to receive military training.
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
4857 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5667-5668.
4858 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (CS).
4854 TFl-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, p. 23585 (CS).
4360 Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1402-1405.
486l Exhibit P-031, "Char1es Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone,` Report of Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006",
ERN 26610; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1427-1428.
4862 Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1402-1409, 1428-1430; Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1530-

---- End of Page 744 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

2208. When Foday Sankoh arrived in Libya in the middle of the 1980's, he found the
group of Sierra Leoneans there led by Ali Kabbah.4864 According to the report, despite the
fact that Foday Sankoh had no group, he was recognised by Libyans as the rebel leader.
However, he was isolated by most of his fellow compatriots in the training camp and tumed
to Charles Taylor and his group, who were training to launch a guerrilla war in Liberia.
When Taylor and his men departed from Libya, Foday Sankoh followed them with the
assurance that Libya would help him later for his own revolutionary campaign in Sierra
Leone.4865
Prosecution Exhibits P-416A and P—416B
2209. Exhibit P-416A is an undated BBC clip of Mary Harper's interview of Charles
Taylor. Exhibit P-416B is an OTP unofficial transcript of this interview. In this interview
Taylor says that he has been fiiends with Sankoh for many years, before the revolution.4866
The Accused
2210. The Accused strongly denied having met Foday Sankoh in Libya and stated that he
had no contact with him before August 1991. He denied also having ever met Suwandi
Camara and explained that the alleged meeting, as described by Camara, could not have
taken place since only leaders of the revolutionary groups were allowed to go to the
Mathaba. 4867 .
221 1. At the Mathaba in Tripoli, the Accused said he only had contacts with group leaders
such as Kukoi Samba Sanyang a.k.a. Dr Manneh, the leader of the Gambian group, or Ali
Kabbah, the leader of the Sierra Leonean group. The other members of revolutionary groups,
1536.
*863 P-277, (confidential), pp. 18097-18185.
*864 P-277, (coaadcmiai), p. 18109.
*865 P-277, (coaadcmraiy, p. 18110.
*866 P-416 B, "Unofficial Transcript- BBC Clip — Mary Harper interyiew of Charles Taylor", p. 2.
4867, Transcript 9 September 2009, pp. 28450, 28459, 28460; Transcript 1 1 January 2010, pp. 33152—33159. The
Trial Chamber notes that at some points of his cross-examination, the Accused denies having ever met Foday
Sankoh (see Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 January 2010, pp. 33156: ‘I have never met Sankoh in my
entire life’).

---- End of Page 745 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T / 18 May 2012

such as Camara or Foday Sankoh, were based in Tajura training camps, approximately 30
miles from Tripoli. Taylor said he had absolutely no contact with them.4868
2212. With regard to his interview with Mary Harper, the Accused gave a confused
explanation of his statement that he had been friends with Foday Sankoh for many years
before the Revolution, saying:
I had never known Foday Sankoh. I said to her, it is known by everyone, that I had known Foday Sankoh
before the revolution, which was totally incorrect because I had not known him. And I'm saying to her that
everyone knows, and this is what is out there because this is 1998, I'm already President, I said it is known by
everyone that I knew Foday Sankoh, when in fact I did not.4869
Defence Witness DCT-125
2213. Witness DCT-125 was at the Mathaba in Libya in the late 1980s.4870 Witness DCT-
125 was aware of the presence of Sierra Leoneans in Libya's training camps but only knew
their leader, Ali Kabbah, and his assistant, Cleo Hanciles. Witness DCT-125 testified that he
met Foday Sankoh for the first time in Gbarnga, Liberia when he went to visit Charles
Taylor at the Executive Mansion.487l
2214. DCT-125 asserted that Taylor did not meet Foday Sankoh at the Mathaba as Sankoh
did not participate in events there. He also denied that meetings between Dr Manneh,
Sankoh and Taylor took place in Libya in December 1989, and denied that Dr Manneh ever
met Foday Sankoh in Camp Tajura, saying that before 1990 Dr Manneh did not know who
Sankoh was.4872
2215. DCT-125 denied that Camara was introduced to Taylor in the Mathaba in Libya or to
Foday Sankoh. The witness believed that at the beginning of 1990 Taylor was not in Libya
and said that during that time period, no one kr1ew the name RUF. He stated further that
Foday Sankoh never was the interim leader of the Sierra Leonean Pan-African
Revolutionary Movement.4873
4868 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, p. 24568; Transcript 9 September 2009, pp. 28450,
28459, 28460; Transcript 27 October 2009 p. 30389; Transcript 11 January 2010, pp. 33152-33159.
4869 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 January 2010, pp. 33153-33158, 33160.
*870 Dcr-125, Transcript, 3 March 2010, p. 36631 (Ps).
4871 D-411A, "La Mathaba Mondiale, Deuxieme Congres Mondial, 1987", p. 41; DCT-125, Transcript 4 March
2010, pp. 36697-36698.
*872 DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, pp. 36769-36773.
*873 DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, pp. 36842—36848 (Ps).

---- End of Page 746 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Defence Witness Yanks Smythe
2216. Witness Yanks Smythe, a.k.a. Butterfly, a Gambian and Assistant Director of
Operations for the SSS,4474 was trained in military intelligence and communication at Camp
Tajura, in Libya in 1987, and he became Charles Taylor's radio operator in 1990. Smythe
stated that the Libyan authorities provided training to several revolutionary groups such as
Gambians led by Dr Manneh, Liberians led by Charles Taylor, Sierra Leoneans led by Ali
Kabbah, and Sumatrans. 4878
2217. Smythe testified that Libyan authorities also supported revolutionary movements by
hosting their leaders in a place called the Mathaba. Smythe, who was not the leader, trained
with the other men at the Tajura Camp. However, between 1986 and 1988, he attended the
A annual meetings at the Mathaba which were attended by around 500 people from all over the
world. Smythe testified that Dr Manneh, Charles Taylor and Ali Kabbah attended the 1987
annual meeting. However the witness did not see Taylor during the annual meetings in 1986
and 1988. He said Foday Sankoh, who was an ordinary member of the Sierra Leonean
group, was not atithe Mathaba and did not attend any of these annual meetings and that
Taylor never visited Camp Tajura.4474 This testimony contradicted his pre-trial statement in
which he stated that Taylor was in and out of Tajura as early as 1987.4477
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2218. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,4474 and interim leader of the RUF
from 2000 until disarmament in 2002,4474 testified that Ali Kabbah was the leader of the
Sierra Leoneans in Libya until he was caught embezzling money Gaddafi had given him for
the welfare of RUF recruits. Kabbah went to America when the Sierra Leonean troops
returned to Liberia. Sankoh then called himself "the organiser" of the revolution until the
90-day ultimatum when he became the "1eader" of the RUF.4444 While at Naama, Sankoh
4874 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 23 February 2010, pp. 35730, 35747; Transcript 24 February 2010, pp. 35866-
35869; Transcript 25 February 2010, pp. 36003, 36014, 36019, 36023, 36031; 26 February 2010, pp. 36199,
36202, 36206, 36208.
4878 Yanks smymtp, Transcript 22 Fpbmapy 2010 pp. 35570-25588. 35598.
4874 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010 pp. 35579, 35586, 35588-35603.
4877 D-114B, "Copy of Witness Statement of DCT-179, Yanks Smyth/Yakube Samateh", p. 2 (Charles Taylor
was in and out of Tajura as early as 1987).
4878 Issa spsay. Transcript 26 Jury 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
4474 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, pp. 46424—46428. In March 1991, shortly before the RUF invasion of

---- End of Page 747 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QQ 18 May 2012 7

3X&¢U
told Sesay that Taylor was his fiiend and that he had met him for the first time in Libya but
Sesay did not hear anything else regarding their alleged relationship.488l
Deliberations
2219. The evidence unequivocally establishes that between 1986 and 1989, revolutionary
movements including the Gambian group SOFA led by Dr Manneh, the Liberian NPFL
group led by the Accused and the Sierra Leonean Pan—African Revolutionary Movement
who became later RUF led by Ali Kabbah, received training in Libya in a military camp
named Tajura.4882 The evidence also establishes that, during this period, leaders of the
revolutionary groups including the Accused, Dr Manneh and Ali Kabbah were lodged and
trained by Libyan authorities at a place called the Mathaba, located in Tripoli.4888 It is also
undisputed that Foday Sankoh was in Libya with the Sierra Leonean group and received
training.4884
2220. The issue before the Trial Chamber is whether, during this training in Libya, the
4 Accused met Foday Sankoh and Dr Manneh and formulated with them a common plan to
gain and maintain political power and physical control over the territories of Liberia and
Sierra Leone, terrorizing the civilian population in the process.
Sierra Leone, Sankoh gave an interview to BBC in which he gave the then President of Sierra Leone, Joseph
Momoh, a 90-day ultimatum to step down (See Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43597, 43633).
4888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 44953-44954 (PS). (Q. During the time you were in Camp Naama,
did you hear any discussion from anyone regarding Foday Sankoh having met and developed a relationship with
Charles Taylor in Libya? A. No. 1 did not hear that from anybody).
4882 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 303; Suwandi Camara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3419-3427; TF1—371,
Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2211-2212 (CS); TF1-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, p. 23585 (CS); Moses
Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9802-9803; P-031, "Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone, Report of
Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 26610; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1427-1428;
Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1428-1430; Transcript 18 January 2008, pp. 1530-1536; P-277 (Confidential), p.
18109; Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010 pp. 35570-35588, 35598, 35605-35609.
*883 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 302; Suwandi Camara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3420 ('Mahtaba is a
place that is the leader [sic] of the revolutionary party in Libya at that time and anybody who is a terrorist that is
their main office. That is their main office'. [U.] 'Mahtaba is a place just like a hotel. It is a lodge where
important people and people of the revolutionary [sic] and their leaders do host'); Moses Blah, Transcript 19
May 2008 p. 10145 ('1 remember Ali Kabbah. [...] He was in the camp, the next time he was at Mataba he had
more experience with Mataba'); Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35589—35590 ('Mataba had a
guesthouse where they could lodge leaders of revolutionary movements. Ali Kabbah, Taylor and Kukoi Samba
Sanyang a.k.a. Dr Manneh were at some points at the Mathaba); Transcript 22 February 2010 pp. 35579, 35586,
35588-35603 (Libyan authorities supported revolutionary movements by hosting their leaders in a place called
the Mathaba).
*884 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 51; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 745, 752.

---- End of Page 748 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QL ’ 18 May 2012

2221. At the outset, the Trial Chamber notes that the parties dispute the status of Foday
Sankoh.4885 The Prosecution evidence suggests that Sankoh was acting as the leader of the
Sierra Leonean group and that, as such, he met the Accused at the Mathaba in Tripoli. In
contrast, the Defence contends that Ali Kabbah was the sole leader of the Sierra Leonean
group and that Sankoh, as an ordinary member of the group, was not allowed to go to the
Mathaba and therefore could not have met the Accused.
2222. It is undisputed that, before 1990, the official leader of the Sierra Leonean group was
Ali Kabbah.4886 However, Suwandi Camara and Moses Blah, both of whom the Trial
Chamber finds to be generally credible witnesses, said that Foday Sankoh was acting as the
leader of the Sierra Leonean group in Libya after Kabbah left. This view is shared by the
authors of Confidential Exhibit P-277, which states that Sankoh was recognised by Libyans
as the leader of the Sierra-Leonean group.4887
2223. The Trial Chamber notes that this evidence relies solely on hearsay, which is
contested. Camara stated that he heard that Sankoh was the leader of the Sierra Leonean
group from Dr Manneh. However, Witness DCT-125, who was in a better position to know
and whom the Trial Chamber finds generally credible, denied that Dr Manneh ever
presented Sankoh as leader of the Sierra Leonean group. More importantly, Witness DCT-
125 denied that Camara was introduced to the Accused or Sankoh and stated that Dr
Manneh met Sankoh for the first time in Liberia, after he left Libya.
2224. Similarly, Moses Blah described Sankoh as "the head of the Sierra Leonean group"
but was unclear regarding the reasons supporting this statement.4888 The authors of
Confidential Exhibit P-277, state that Sankoh's wish to be recognized as leader of the group
was not successful. However, despite this split between Sankoh and the young men of the
group, Sankoh gained acceptance and recognition from the Libyans and was considered by
*885 Prosecution evidence suggests that Sankoh was the real leader of the Sierra Leonean group and that, as such,
he had meetings with Charles Taylor (Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 51-52). In contrast, the Defence
submits that Sankoh was an ordinary soldier who was not allowed to enter in the Mathaba (Defence Final Trial
Brief, paras 741-742, 746-747).
4886 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3431 (‘Sierra Leoneans they also have a group in Libya [H.]
But what my leader told me, who is Kukoi Samba Sanyang, that is Foday Sankoh is a person who is -who was
acting as a leader, but he was not the leader. The right leader was Ali Kabbah’), p. 3432 (‘This Ali Kabbah he
was the leader of the Sierra Leonean group in Libya’); Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, p. 35579,
(‘The leader of the Sierra Leoneans was Ali Kabbah’). See also Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), p. 18110.
*887 Exhibit P-277 (conndcmr.-31), p. 18110.
4888 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9812 (Foday Sankoh was the leader of the Sierra Leonean group

---- End of Page 749 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {NL XJ 18 May 2012

3X Ev 2
them to be the leader of the Sierra-Leonean group. The Trial Chamber notes the lack of
reference for this statement and finds it of limited probative value.
2225. In contrast, evidence suggests that at this time Ali Kabbah was the real leader of the
Sierra Leonean group, and that Sankoh, despite his wish, was not considered to be a
1eader.4889 Moses Blah explained that he did not take Sankoh seriously since Sankoh was
preparing tea for him.489O Yanks Smythe also described Sankoh as an ordinary member of
the group and stated that he was not at the Mathaba.489l This corroborates the Accused's and
Witness DCT-125's testimony, according to which Sankoh was not a leader and did not go
to the Mathaba. In the light of the foregoing, the evidence is insufficient to establish that
Sankoh was the leader of the Sierra-Leonean group.
2226. Regardless of his status as leader, the evidence that Foday Sankoh even met the
Accused in Libya is contested. Moses Blah testified that Sankoh used to pay courtesy calls
to the Accused but did not provide further information regarding his source of information.
The report of expert Stephen Ellis, Exhibit P-031, and Confidential Exhibit P-277 state that
the Accused met Sankoh while in Libya but without any reference to their source of
information. Isaac Mongor testified that while at Camp Naama, Sankoh told him that he had
known the Accused for a long time and that they had all gone to Libya for training.4892 TF 1 -
371 also testified that Sankoh told him that he had met Taylor during the training in
Libya.4898 The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that both Isaac Mongor and TF1-371 are
generally credible witnesses.4894
2227. Suwandi Camara stated that he had never seen Taylor and Sankoh together,4898
which does not preclude the possibility that they met. In an interview with the BBC, the
according to them); Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10145—10146.
4889 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3431 (‘Sierra Leoneans they also have a group in Libya [...]
But what my leader told me, who is Kukoi Samba Sanyang, that is Foday Sankoh is a person who is -who was
acting as a leader, but he was not the leader. The right leader was Ali Kabbah’).
4890 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9812 (‘Q. What was your impression of him? A. We didn't take him
serious, no, because he was in the tea shack making tea for me at the time, because I was adjutant, so I didn't take
him serious. I didn't take him serious’).
4891 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35579, 35586, 35588-35603.
4842 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008. pp. 5667-5668.
*893 TF1—371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2211-2212 (CS).
4894 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274; Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226.
4898 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, p. 3439 (‘Q. Mr Witness, you testified that you saw Charles
Taylor in Libya, you testified that you saw Foday Sankoh in Libya. Did you see them separately? A. Yes, I saw
them separately. I did not see them together’).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dk / 18 May 2012

Accused stated that he had been friends with Sankoh for many years before the
revolution48%, which he denied in cross-examination, testifying that he met Sankoh for the
first time in August 1991.4497 The Trial Chamber has heard other evidence indicating that the
Accused met Sankoh prior to August 1991 and finds the testimony of the Accused in this
respect to be lacking in credibility.4848
2228. Based on this evidence, although the exact circumstances of their meeting are not
specified, the Trial Chamber is convinced that the Accused met Sankoh while they were
both in Libya. However, there is no evidence that Sankoh, the Accused and Dr Manneh all
met together in Libya.
2229. More significantly, the Trial Chamber notes that no evidence was adduced regarding
the content of any alleged meeting if such meetings did take place. Nothing in the
Prosecution's evidence establishes that the Accused, Sankoh and Dr Manneh agreed in
Libya on a common plan to terrorize the civilian population to gain control of Liberia and
Sierra-Leone.
Findings
2230. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that between 1986 and 1989, revolutionary movements and their leaders received training in
Libya. The Trial Chamber further finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that at some point, between 1986 and 1989, the Accused, Foday Sankoh and Dr
Manneh were in Libya, and that the Accused met Sankoh in Libya during this time.
2231. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that during this time period, the Accused, Sankoh and Dr Manneh met together and
44% Exhibit P-416B, "Unofficial Transcript- BBC Clip — Mary Harper interview of Charles Taylor", p. 2. 4
4847 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 1 January 2010, pp. 33 153-33158, 33160.
4444 See for example, Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies of Materiel,
Burkina Faso; TFl-371, Transcript 24 January 2008 p. 2201 (CS) (Sankoh told TFl-371 that he had been in
Liberia fighting along with Taylor's lst battalion and that he was one of Taylor's military advisors); TFl-168,
Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23135-23139 (CS) (Witness TFl-168 testified that when he saw Sankoh in
1990, Sankoh had a badge identifying himself as "adviser on national and international affairs" and the red beret
of the NPFL Special Forces); See also Exhibit P-054, "NPFL command structure circca 1990-1991 as indicated
by Witness TPI-371", ERN 100162 (describing Sankoh as Taylor's military advisor); Exhibit P-277
(Confidential), pp. 181 10-181 1 1 (ln 1989, Sankoh became Taylor's adviser on national and international affairs.
In addition to his advisor role, Sankoh fought alongside with the NPFL fighters in Liberia).

---- End of Page 751 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T CM / 18 May 2012

established a common plan to terrorize the Sierra Leonean population and to forcibly control
the population and territory of Sierra Leone and to pillage its resources.
2. Alleged meeting between the Accused, Sankoh and Dr Manneh in Burkina Faso
Submissions of the Parties
2232. The Prosecution alleges that before the invasion of Liberia, at a meeting in
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, Sankoh and Dr Manneh agreed to assist the Accused in
waging war in Liberia and the Accused agreed to assist Dr Manneh and Sankoh in return.
Thereaiter Sankoh and others from his group, as well as Dr Manneh and members of his
group, fought for or assisted the Accused in Liberia.4899
2233. The Defence submits that the Prosecution evidence regarding an alleged meeting in
Ouagadougou between the Accused, Manneh and Sankoh lacks clarity and reliability and
relies solely on hearsay evidence. Furthermore, the evidence fails to establish that the
alleged plan involved the commission of any crime charged in the Indictment.49O0
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Suwandi Camara
2234. Suwandi Camara, a Gambian national member of the SOFA, testified that aiter their
training in Libya, the Liberian group led by Taylor, the Sierra Leonean group led by Sankoh
and the Gambian group led by Dr Manneh went to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso where they
established a base for their attacks against Liberia. Dr Manneh informed the witness that
during a meeting held in Ouagadougou, Taylor, Sankoh and Dr Manneh agreed to help each
other in their respective wars.490l As a result, Camara and numerous other Gambians of Dr
Manneh's group were sent to Liberia in order to fight along with Taylor's army.49O2
Prosecution Witness TFl -362
4809 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 52.
4000 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 386, 757-758, 763, 767.
490, Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3439-3447.
@02 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3450-3454.

---- End of Page 752 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ok ’/ l8 May 2012 H

335%/ f
2235. Witness TF1-362, a Liberian RUF member, testified that Foday Sankoh's wife,
Fatou Brown, told her that Sankoh informed her that he would assist Charles Taylor with his
war in Liberia and that, in exchange, Charles Taylor would then assist him in taking the war
to Sierra Leone.494)3
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
2236. Witness TF1-371, a senior member of the RUF ,4904 learnt from Foday Sankoh that,
after Libya, Sankoh and his special forces came along with Liberians to Burkina Faso in
order to be trained.49O5
2237. Witness TF1-371 further testified that while in Liberia in 1990, he met Foday
Sankoh at a hospital and Sankoh told him that he had been in Liberia fighting along with
Taylor's lst battalion and that he was one of Taylor's military advisors.49O°
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -1 68
2238. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member,49O7 testified that in October 1990, while he was
in detention in Harbel, Liberia, Foday Sankoh visited him and his 16 Sierra Leonean co-
detainees. Witness TF1-168 testified that Sankoh had a badge identifying himself as
"adviser on national and international affairs" and the red beret of the NPFL Special Forces,
meaning the NPFL forces trained in Libya. 4908
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
2239. Witness Moses Blah, an adjutant general within Taylor's group,49O9 testified that the
NPFL left Libya by groups of 20 or 30 men in order to go to Burkina Faso. Blah was among
the last groups which left Libya. When the NPFL groups left Tajura camp in Libya, the
Sierra Leonean group remained there.49m Before leaving, Taylor requested Blah not to
4903 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4803-4806 (CS).
4904 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
*905 TF1—371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2211-2212 (CS).
4906 TF1—371, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2201 (CS).
’*"°’ TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (cs).
*"°*‘ rrr-168, rranapnpr 21 January 2009, pp. 23135-22139 (cs).
4909 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9943-9945.
4940 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10145-10146.

---- End of Page 753 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T XJ 18 May 2012

discuss their departure or their destination with any other groups as it was supposed to be a
secret between the two of them. 4911
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
2240. Witness Jabaty J award, a clerk for Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie, Bockarie's
storekeeper4912 testified that in August 1991, he heard from Kaifa Wai that the NPFL and
RUF had common goals, which meant that Sankoh and Taylor would spread the revolution
in Sierra Leone, Liberia and other countries such as Guinea.4913
The Accused
2241. The Accused testified that, in the second quarter and in the middle of 1989, after
completing military training in Libya, the Liberian trainees who were split in three groups
moved to Burkina F aso where they stayed until October 1989.4914 The Libyan Government
and the Government of Burkina Faso supported Taylor and his men during their stay in
Ouagadougou.4915
2242. The Accused denied that Sierra Leoneans, including Sankoh, were ever with his men
in Burkina Faso. He stated that, at that time, there was absolutely no contact between the
Liberian movement and the Sierra Leonean one.4916
Defence Witness DCT—125
2243. Witness DCT-125, an official of the Gambian group,4917 testified that he left Libya in
1987 to go to Burkina Faso where Taylor was based, consistent with a plan established in
Libya.4918 Witness DCT—125 stated that Dr Manneh and his group were provided with
4411 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9815-9822; Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9947-9948.
4412 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13306, 13332; Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13383.
""’3 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 Jury 2008, pp. 13260- 13262.
4414 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 July 2009, pp. 24569-24571; Transcript 16 July 2009, pp. 24592-
24594, 24602.
4415 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 July 2009, pp. 24597-24598.
4916 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 July 2009, pp. 24595-24596; Transcript 23 September 2009, p.
29443.
4917 DCT-125, Transcript 3 March 2010, p. 36631 (PS).
4418 DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, pp. 36850—36853 (PS).

---- End of Page 754 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OK J 18 May 2012 %

housing by the Burkinabe authorities. As revolutionary Pan-Africanist leaders, Taylor and
Dr Manneh remained in contact and met frequently in order to discuss politics.49l9 ,
2244. Witness DCT-125 denied that Dr Manneh was in Burkina Faso to fashion a
conspiracy with Taylor to carry out acts of terrorism in West Africa.492O He further denied
that Sierra Leoneans were present and stated that, at that time, Dr Manneh did not know
Foday Sankoh, nor had the RUF been created.492l
2245. According to the witness, Charles Taylor never informed Dr Manneh about his plans
to invade Liberia. Dr Manneh first learned of the Liberian revolution over the BBC radio.4922
Defence Witness Yanks Smythe
2246. Witness Yanks Smythe, a Gambian and later Assistant Director of Operations for the
$88,4923, testified that he left Libya in November 1989 and went to Ouagadougou, Burkina
Faso. Other Gambian trainees from Camp Tajura were already there. Their leader, Dr
Manneh, arrived in Ouagadougou a few days after Smythe. The whole Gambian group,
including Dr Manneh, resided together in a house provided by Blaise Compaore, President
of Burkina Faso.4924
2247. Smythe heard that the Liberians had been to Burkina Faso but when he reached
there, they had already left for Cote d’Ivoire or Guinea in order to prepare their
revolution.4925 Mr Taylor was in and out of Ouagadougou at the time and had a residence
near the Gambians’ residence (around 0.5 to 2 km away), most likely provided by the
Government of Burkina Faso.4926 Smythe was unaware whether Foday Sankoh or Ali
Kabbah or any other Sierra Leonean came to Burkina Faso.4927
W9 DCT-125, Transcript 4 March 2010, pp. 36693-36695.
*220 nor-125, Transcript 4 March 2010, pp. 36695-36696.
""2' nor-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, p. 36884 (Ps).
2222 DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, p. 36774.
4923 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 23 February 2010, pp. 35730, 35747; Transcript 24 February 2010, pp. 35866-
35869; Transcript 25 February 2010, pp. 36003, 36014, 36019, 36023, 36031; Transcript 26 February 2010, pp.
36199, 36202, 36206, 36208.
4924 Yanks Smythe, Transcnpt 22 February 2010, pp. 35619-35620.
4925 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35616-35617.
4926 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35620-35621.
4927 Yanks Smythe, Transcnpt 22 February 2010, pp. 35618-35620.

---- End of Page 755 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (M J 18 May 2012

Prosecution Exhibit P-054
2248. Exhibit P-054 is a chart drawn by Prosecution Witness TF 1-371, an RUF
commander, representing the NPFL Command Structure circa 1990 - 1991. In this chart
Foday Sankoh and Dr Manneh are described as military advisors of Charles Taylor. 4928
Confidential Prosecution Exhibit P-277
2249. In Confidential Exhibit P-277, the authors state that during the invasion of Liberia,
Sankoh became Taylor's advisor on national and intemational affairs and fought alongside
the NPF L fighters in Liberia.4929
Defence Exhibit D-114 B
2250. Exhibit D-114B, is a witness statement of Yanks Smythe to the Defence. In his prior
statement, Yanks Smythe said that he joined Dr Manneh's group called SOFA in 1988 and
started working with him. Dr Manneh asked the witness to meet up with "the boys" in
Burkina Faso and "get them ready". This implied to Smythe that he should "prepare them
ideologically" and teach them ideology. Smythe left Tripoli in November 1989 and went to
Burkina Faso. He stated that Dr Manneh used to come to Burkina and had a villa at "Ouga".
Charles Taylor also had a residence in "Ouga" between 1987 and 1989 during the time of his
revolution, but the witness cannot remember where Foday Sankoh stayed. It was possible
that the three might have overlapped in "Ouga" but Foday Sankoh did not have any high
status at this time. When asked why the three groups were based in Burkina, the witness
opined that the climate was conducive for revolutionary activity. According to the witness,
from Burkina it was planned that NPF L would attack Liberia from different angles in
different countries. Yanks Smythe said that he never saw Foday Sankoh in Burkina Faso but
that he leamt that he was there. The witness was not aware that Charles Taylor ever asked
the Gambians to assist the NPFL.4930
4928 Exhibit P-054, "NPFL Command Structure circa 1990 /1991 as indicated by TF1-371", ERN 100162.
mg Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), pp. 181 10-181 11.
4930 Exhibit D-1 14B, "Copy of Witness Statement of DCT-179, Yanks Smythe/Yakube Samateh", paras 23-30. I

---- End of Page 756 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (lbs j 18 May 2012

Deliberations
2251. lt is undisputed that after their training in Libya, in the second quarter and the middle
of 1989, the NPF L moved in small groups to Burkina F aso.4434 The evidence also establishes
that, soon after the Liberian group arrived, Dr Manneh and his men left Libya and went to
Burkina F aso.4432
2252. The Prosecution alleges that Foday Sankoh and his men also went to Burkina
3 Faso.4433 There, Sankoh and Dr Manneh agreed to assist the Accused in waging war in
Liberia and the Accused agreed to assist Dr Manneh and Sankoh in return. 4434 The Defence
denies that Sankoh was present in Ouagadougou and that the Accused, Dr Manneh and
Sankoh met there.
2253. ln support of its allegation, the Prosecution relies on the hearsay evidence of
witnesses Suwandi Camara and TF 1-371 that Foday Sankoh went to Burkina Faso. Camara
heard from Dr Manneh that the Sierra Leonean group led by Sankoh joined the Gambian and
the Liberian groups in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso where they established a base for their
attacks against Liberia. There the Accused, Sankoh and Dr Manneh had a meeting where
they agreed to help each other in their respective revolutions.4433 The Trial Chamber recalls
its findings that Camara and TF 1-371 are credible witnesses.4436 However, DCT-125, a
higher level Gambian official who would have been in a better position to know, and whom
the Trial Chamber has also found to be generally credible,4437 denied that Dr Manneh ever
told Camara that the Sierra Leonean group were in Ouagadougou. He stated that the Sierra
Leoneans did not go to Burkina Faso.
443 4 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3439-3447; TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp.
2211-2212 (CS); Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10145-10146; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript
15 July 2009, pp. 24569-24571; Transcript 16 July 2009, pp. 24592—24594, 24602. See also Defence Final Trial
Brief para. 761.
4432 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3439-3447; DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, pp.
36850-36853 (PS); Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010 pp. 35619-35620.
4433 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3439-3447; TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp.
2211-2212 (CS).
4434 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 52.
4433 TFl—548, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3439-3447.
4436 Credibility Assessment, Suwandi Camara, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2222; Credibility
Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226.
4434 Credibility Assessment, DCT-125, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2223.

---- End of Page 757 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

EXE?
2254. TF 1-371 heard from Sankoh that he and his special forces went with Liberians to
Burkina Faso in order to be trained.4434 This evidence is inconsistent with the evidence of
two Gambians, Defence witnesses DCT-125 and Smythe, who were in Ouagadougou and
denied the presence there of any Sierra Leonean, including Foday Sankoh, at that time.4934
Prosecution witness Moses Blah testified that the Sierra Leonean group remained in
Libya.4440
2255. The Trial Chamber notes that all of the evidence that Foday Sankoh was in Burkina
Faso is hearsay, and that in addition to the Defence witnesses, a Prosecution witness, Moses
Blah, has testified that the Sierra Leoneans and Sankoh were not in Burkina Faso with the
Accused and Dr Marmeh.
2256. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that the evidence does not include any
mention of the alleged common plan to terrorise the civilian population. TF 1-362 heard from
Sankoh's wife, F atou Brown, that her husband informed her that he would assist Taylor with
his war in Liberia and that, in exchange, Taylor would then assist him in taking the war to
Sierra Leone.494] This testimony is third-hand evidence and lacks detail with respect to the
content of the alleged agreement.
2257. Turning to the question of whether or not Sankoh actually helped the Accused fight
in Liberia, Witness TF 1-371 testified that Sankoh introduced himself as one Taylor's
milita advisors.4942 Witness TF 1-168 also testified that in October 1990, he saw Sankoh
YY
with a badge identifying himself as "adviser on national and international affairs" and the
red beret of the NPF L Special Forces, meaning the NPF L forces trained in Libya.4943 While
the Trial Chamber has found that the Accused met Sankoh prior to 1991,4944 this evidence
adduced by the Prosecution merely indicates that Sankoh introduced himself as a military
advisor to the Accused and had a badge to this effect. It is insufficient to establish the
agreement alleged by the Prosecution.
4438 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2211-2212 (CS).
4434 DCT-125, Transcript 4 March 2010, pp. 36693-36695; Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp.
35618-35619.
*"*° Moses B1s1i. Transcript 19 May 2008 pp. 10145- 10146.
444] TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008 pp. 4803-4806 (CS).
4442 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2201; See also Exhibit P-054, "NPFL Command Structure circa
1990 /1991 as indicated by TF1-371", ERN 100162.
4444 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23135-23139.
4944 See Pre-Indictment Period: Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989.

---- End of Page 758 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

2258. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that there is insufficient evidence
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was a meeting in Ouagadougou between the
Accused, Sankoh and Manneh. Accordingly, there is insufHcient evidence to establish that
while in Ouagadougou, Sankoh and Dr Manneh agreed to assist the Accused in waging war
in Liberia and that the Accused agreed to assist Dr Manneh and Sankoh in retum.
Findings
2259. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in 1989, after their training in Libya, the Accused and his Liberian revolutionary group
and Dr Manneh and his Gambian revolutionary group went to Burkina Faso.
2260. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that during this time period, Foday Sankoh was also in Burkina Faso and that the
Accused, Sankoh and Dr Manneh met and agreed to support each other in their respective
wars.
3. Camp Naama
Submissions of the Parties
2261. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided Sankoh and the RUF with a
training base at Camp Naama which was used for training both the NPF L and the RUF. The
NPF L was stationed on one side of the camp while the RUF was stationed on the other side.
The Accused was taking precautions to limit knowledge of his association with the forces
that were being trained to attack Sierra Leone.4945 The Prosecution further submits that
Sierra Leonean and Liberian trainees at these bases had no separate chain of command, they
were all treated as one body under the command of the Accused.4946
2262. The Defence contends that the Accused had no knowledge of the recmitment and
training of RUF recmits at Camp Naama. It further submits that this was allowed by certain
senior NPFL officers whom Sankoh met in Libya, particularly Anthony Mekunagbe, who
acted without the Accused's approval. In any event, the training of a rebel force is not per se
4945 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] paras 66-75.
4946 Prosecution Pre Trial Brief} paras 23, 50-51, 58-59, 66, 80; Prosecution Opening Statement, Transcript 4
June 2007 p. 284; Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 29-30, 65-75.

---- End of Page 759 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T (nb 18 May 2012

EKAHQ
a criminal act and the Prosecution failed to adduce any evidence regarding the Accused's
mens rea.4947
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2263. Witness Isaac Mongor, a Sierra Leonean trader, testified that he was captured by
NPFL rebels in Nimba County, Liberia around Christmas 1989 and trained by force to
become an NPFL fighter. As such, Mongor became an NPF L soldier and one of Taylor's
bodyguards in 1990 and fought alongside him in Liberia.4948
2264. Mongor testified that in 1990 Taylor ordered the arrest of Sierra Leoneans and
Nigerians in Liberia. Some of the detainees were killed while the others were transferred to
Camp Naama base, a training camp belonging to the NPFL, to become RUF recruits.
Mongor transported the Sierra Leonean detainees to Camp Naama in a Toyota truck
provided by Taylor. Subsequently, in about March or April, 1990 Taylor assigned Mongor
to help Foday Sankoh in training these new RUF recruits.4949
2265. Mongor was the first instructor to arrive at Camp Naama. Six months later, other
trainers joined him at Camp Naama including Mohamed Tarawalli, Mike Lamin, Sam
Dripo, Rashid Mansaray and a man named "Gongano". Foday Sankoh would also
occasionally give training. Mongor testified that both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, who
varied in age, were trained at Camp Naama: Small Boys Units, WAC (the women's unit) as
well as adult men were trained there. The training included physical and ideological training
as well as weapons training. Some of the soldiers he trained included Issa Sesay, Morris
Kallon and Sam Bockarie.495O
2266. Foday Sankoh told the recruits at Camp Naama that they were being trained to fight
and free the people from the corrupt system in Sierra Leone. Sankoh further explained that
he was a poor man, but that his brother, Charles Taylor, would help him to take over the
country. Taylor never visited Camp Naama but provided the RUF recruits with food and
4947 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 391-397, 801; Defence Closing Arguments, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp.
49409-494 10; See also Defence Final Trial Brief paras 406-409
"""* imp Mppgpp, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5648-5655, 5664.
*9*9 Isaac Mongor, Transcript. 10 March 2008, pp. 5660-5663; Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 6311, 6320-6323.

---- End of Page 760 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G`,) / 18 May 2012

ZQEJS
medicine. In private, Sankoh told Mongor that it was Taylor who was training his men for
him, and that he depended on Taylor to do everything. Sankoh added that he had known
Taylor for a long time, since Libya, and when Sankoh was detained in Ghana, Taylor had
fought hard for him to be released.4954
Prosecution Witness TF 1-37l
2267. Witness TF 1-371, an RUF member,4452 testiiied that he was forced to join the NPF L I
when they attacked the township he was living in, in May 1990. Witness TF 1-371 was also
forced to participate in the attacks of the NPF L and was wounded during the attack on
Monrovia. While in F ibi Hospital, Witness TF 1-371 met Sankoh, an RUF leader, who
explained to him that he was a former military advisor of Taylor and was carrying on his
own operation, that is, the training of his own recruits in Camp Naama. Sankoh invited
Witness TF 1-371 to join him at Camp Naama, and in September 1990, after he recovered,
Witness TF 1-371 decided to go to Camp Naama. There he met Foday Sankoh and was
introduced to his deputy, Rashid Mansaray and some Liberian training instructors, including
Isaac Mongor and Red Devil. He said the Liberian training instructors were all NPF L
Hghters.4454 Mike Lamin taught ideology from a basic document about the philosophy of the
movement and the socio-economic situation of the country. Sankoh also distributed
brochures on basic Geneva Convention regulations on how to treat civilians and respect
them during the conflict. Other training at the base included the use of arms, basic guerrilla
training and how to raid villages where enemy troops were suspected to be located. Males
and females of 13 years and older received the same training.4954
2268. TF 1-371 testihed that he never heard any direct order to indiscriminately kill
civilians, or a direct order to amputate or mutilate civilians. It was not the policy at the
formation of the RUF in 1991 to terrorise civilians.4955 The witness also said that he was not
aware of any instructions to rape, bum or loot as this was not part of RUF ideology.4956
4450 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5662-5667.
4954 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5665-5668; Transcript 1 April 2008 pp. 6322-6325.
4452 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
4454 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2202 (CS).
4454 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2185-2206 (CS).
4955 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2633-2634 (CS).
4456 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2652-2655 (CS).

---- End of Page 761 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012 j

3225;
2269. TF1-371 stayed at Camp Naama from September 1990 until February 1991.4957 He
testified that most of the trainees at Camp Naama carrie from NPFL detention facilities at
Kakata and Buchanan. Foday Sankoh was able to remove people from these detention
facilities by way of a Directive from Taylor. Witness TF1-371 personally followed Sankoh
to Kakata, where Sankoh was able to get some Sierra Leonean detainees released from the
police station using that directive. Witness TF1-371 further testified that the clothing, food,
fuel and training supplies were procured by Foday Sankoh from the Accused at his mansion
in Gbarnga.4458 People who were trained at Camp Naama included Witness TF1-168, Sam
Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Lawrence Womandia.4954
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -1 68
2270. Witness TF1-168 was arrested in Harbel, Liberia, by NPFL soldiers in September
1990 because he was a national of a country that contributed troops to ECOMOG which was
fighting the NPFL. After two weeks of detention, in October 1990, Foday Sankoh visited the
16 Sierra Leonean detainees and asked them not to blame the NPFL for their treatment
saying that it was the Sierra Leone Government that was to blame. The detainees asked
Sankoh to take them to a secure place. Sankoh said he could not accommodate them all but
promised to return. Witness TF1-168 testified that Sankoh had a badge identifying himself
as Adviser on national and international affairs and wore the red beret of the NPFL Special
Forces, meaning the NPFL forces trained in Libya. 4460
2271. The next day, Sankoh returned and took the detainees from Harbel to Camp Naama
in Bong County. Along the way there were NPFL-controlled checkpoints, the witness noted
a checkpoint at 15 Gate, and later near Kakata. At each checkpoint the bus passed easily
when Sankoh spoke to the guards. 4964 Sankoh finally took Witness TF1-168 and the other
Sierra Leoneans to the training camp named Camp Naama. There, Witness TF1-168
received military and ideology training.4962
4957 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2203-2204 (CS).
4958 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2204-2205 (CS).
*959 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2206-2207 (CS).
4460 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23135-23139 (CS).
4%] TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23139-23141 (CS).
4462 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23128-23129, 23132-23134, 23139-23141 (CS).

---- End of Page 762 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T fb 18 May 2012

Q?X5’f(
2272. TF1-168 testified that the instructors in Camp Naama were both Siena Leonean and
Liberian. Siena Leonean instructors included Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli, and
Mike Lamin. Liberian instructors included Isaac Mongor, Gonkanu, Bropleh and Sam
Draper (a.k.a. "PI"), who was the principal instructor. The Liberian instructors were NPFL
fighters.4963
2273. TF1-168 testified that he was taught that the RUF would use guerrilla tactics to
overthrow the then government of Siena Leone, headed by Joseph Saidu Momoh. However,
Witness TFl-168 stated that he received instruction to give good treatment to civilians in
order to make them support the revolution.4464
2274. TF1-168 testified that between 130 and 150 trainees - men, women and children -
took the initial training up to December 1990. Sankoh said that the new recruits were not
sufhciently trained in guerrilla tactics and asked Taylor to supplement the RUF with some
old, experienced NPFL fighters who would stay with the trainees for three months, and then
they would all proceed to Siena Leone.4445 Around March 1991, the number of RUF recruits
was around 205, composed of Liberians and Siena Leoneans.4446
2275. Sankoh told the recruits that the RUF was acting on the will of Taylor and that
Taylor was providing the training base, food for recruits and other forms of materials and
assistance to reinforce the Siena Leonean recruits at Camp Naama.4467 However, Sankoh
told the recruits that if asked they should say they had been trained at Sokoto Base in
Nigeria in order to disassociate efforts in Siena Leone with Liberia.4968
2276. Witness TF1-168 remained at Camp Naama until March 1991 when he was sent on a
reconnaissance mission with eight other men to Siena Leone. A few days later, the RUF
attacked Siena Leone.4469
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -367
4444 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23153-23156 (CS).
4444 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009 p. 23182 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23395-23396 (CS).
4465 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23145-23148 (CS).
4464 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23145-23 153 (CS).
4467 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23151 (CS).
4448 TF]-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23142-23144 (CS).
4469 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23161-23166 (CS).

---- End of Page 763 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T UQ 18 May 2012

XXEIZ
2277. Witness TF1—367, an RUF member,4470 stated that in 1990, Sierra Leoneans were
molested and detained by the NPFL for being of the same nationality as the army which
fought the NPFL in Liberia. Witness TF1—367 said that another compatriot named Jarffer
Massaquoi, who was Sankoh's bodyguard, told him that Sierra Leoneans who were detained
by NPFL could be released by Sankoh if they agreed to train and fight along with the
2278. TF1—367 was also advised by his compatriot, Witness TF1—371, to join the RUF in
order to avoid being arrested by the NPFL. Witness TF1—367 agreed and he and Witness
TF1—371 decided to meet Foday Sankoh, the leader of RUF. Sankoh told them his plan to
attack Sierra Leone was modelled on what Taylor did for Liberia. He invited them to follow
him to his camp in order to be trained.4472
2279. TF1—367 accepted Sankoh's offer and went to a training camp named Camp Naama
in Liberia where he spent three months undergoing physical and ideological training. Those
who were brought to Camp Naama by Foday Sankoh were trained by Liberian and Sierra
Leonean instructors.4973 The witness named lsaac Mongor and Pl as two of the Liberian
instructors, both of whom were NPFL fighters.4974 The witness said that the Liberian
instructors had already trained under the NPFL, so were taken by Sankoh to train the RUF,
backed by Sierra Leoneans, such as Rashid Mansaray and Mohamed Tarawalli.4975 TF1—367
added that all the RUF commanders were trained at Camp Naama.4476
2280. TF1—367 heard from Sankoh that his war would be fully supported by Charles
Taylor, who provided food and clothes for the RUF at Camp Naama.4977
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -362
2281. Witness TF1—362, a Liberian and later an RUF member,4478 was recruited into the
RUF in 1990 by Fatou Brown, Sankoh's first wife, who informed her that Sankoh, supported
"°7° TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
447l TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14088-14089 .
4472 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14087, 14089-14091 .
4474 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14095 .
4474 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14096 .
4475 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14094-14097.
*976 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14090—14095.
*977 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14099.

---- End of Page 764 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M Z 18 May 2012 xg

XMI?
by Taylor, would start a war in Sierra Leone. Witness TF1-362 joined the RUF voluntarily
and was taken to Camp Naama in Bong County, Liberia where she trained and cooked for
the recruits. Witness TF1-362 testified that at Camp Naama, both NPFL and RUF fighters
received military training.4944 Recruits that she met included Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie,
Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao and Mike Lamin. Sierra Leonean trainers at the camp
included Rashid Mansaray, Patrick Lamin and Mohamed Tarawalli and Liberian trainers
included Isaac Mongor, Patrick Dripo, Gonkanu and Town Devil.4444
2282. Witness TF1-362 testified that the recruits were separated into several units, Small
Boys Units (SBUs), Small Girls Units (SGUs), WACs, and "Adults". The youngest of the
SBUs and SGUs were 8 years old. In addition to being trained as fighters, SBUs also
worked as bodyguards to NPFL commanders. WACs were women trained to fight. Women
captured by the NPFL and the RUF were also forced into marriage and to have sex with
them. Following her training, Witness TF1-362 was assigned to be one of Foday Sankoh's (
bodyguards.4944
The Accused
2283. The Accused testified that in July 1990, the NPFL forces had conquered most of
Liberia and surrounded Monrovia.4444 By February of 1991, Gbarnga was identified as the
. headquarters for the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly government and
preparations were on-going for the Accused's move there. His forces were still surrounding
Monrovia. The Accused testified that he was busy trying to set up a government while
‘ dealing with internal politics and security threats from ECOMOG. Therefore he did not have
any time to deal with RUF issues or to help in the organisation of the RUF as alleged by the
Prosecution. When in March 1991 the RUF attacked Sierra Leone, he was as shocked and
surprised as anyone. He did not understand the allegations of Momoh and of the
international community linking the NPFL with the RUF invasion of Sierra Leone.4944
4474 TFl-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4826-4827 (CS).
4479 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4806-4808 (CS).
4444 TFl-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4801-4808 (CS). Regarding the conditions of her recruitment into
RUF see also: TFl-362, Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 4943-4946 (CS).
4444 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4808-4814, 4822, 4826, 4901 (CS).
4444 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 July 2009, pp. 24659-24690.
4944 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24743-24750; 24764-24771; 24793-24794.

---- End of Page 765 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /6*/ 18 May 2012

EYKT?
2284. The Accused testified that Camp Naama was a pre—existing military base, located in
Bong County, approximately 30 miles outside of Gbarnga. lt was the largest military base in
Liberia, which hosted the artillery battalion and the engineering battalion of the AFL each of
more than a thousand men. Camp Naama first came under control of the NPFL in
approximately August/September 1990. The NPFL set up Camp Naama as a military
training base. The Accused did not recall who was in charge of training at Camp Naama, but
the commander of that region until the Accused arrived at Gbarnga was a member of his
Special Forces named Anthony Mekunagbe. The Accused thought that Mekunagbe would
have set up a training facility at Naama.4984
2285. The Accused suggested that it is unrealistic to think that he could have sent one man,
Isaac Mongor, who was not even a member of his Special Forces, to train an entire invading
force. Mongor, if he trained, never came back to report anything to him. Moreover, he had
no interest in supporting the RUF to invade Sierra Leone.4985
2286. Regarding the structure of NPFL, the Accused testified that from August/September
1990 until February/March 1991 the NPFL was decentralised in structure with himself as the
leader. He asserted that it was standard operating procedure to set up bases and train people
and therefore, no one came to ask him before setting up a base. The NPFL would capture an
area, set up a base, get volunteers, train, then move and leave the civilians alone.4986
2287. The Accused further stated that he was not aware that Foday Sankoh was recruiting
among Sierra Leoneans in Liberia and transporting them in trucks to Camp Naama where
they were trained. He testified that he knew nothing of Sierra Leoneans training at Naama.
He did not visit Camp Naama until after he moved to Gbarnga in mid—1991. The Accused
testified that he met Sankoh for the first time in August 1991 at Gbarnga when he took the
decision to contact the RUF in order to coordinate the fight against their common enemy,
ULrMo. *987
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4984 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24756-24757.
4985 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24751-24754; 24763-24764; 24784-24786.
4986 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24759-24761.
4987 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24755-24759, 24761-24763, 24794-24797.

---- End of Page 766 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ 1-Pl 18 May 2012

2288. Witness Issa Sesay, a Sierra Leonean trainee at Camp Naama, received training in
political ideology, courtesy and discipline, as well as physical and military training.4488
Sesay testified that children were also trained at Camp Naama, most of them because they
had family members at the camp. According to Sesay, the children were not engaged in
active military training, but took part in the ideology classes.4949
2289. Sesay stated that the training instructors at Camp Naama included Rashid Mansaray,
Mohamed Tarawalli and Mike Lamin. Isaac Mongor, Gonkanu and PI were also trainers but
came later.4990
2290. Sesay testified that while at Camp Naama, Sankoh criticized Isaac Mongor for
teaching the trainees that once they captured a town they should divide the civilians into two
groups and kill one group in order to obtain the loyalty of the other group.4994 Sesay stated
that the NPFL was in Camp Naama, but was not in that part of the camp known as Crab
Hole, which was occupied solely by the RUF. He denied that Taylor supported the training
at the camp in any way and said that Mongor, who anived in late December 1990 or January
1991, never told him that he had been sent by Taylor.4992
Defence Witness Martin George
2291. Witness Martin George joined Foday Sankoh's RUF in early 1991 and was brought
by Sankoh to the training camp at Naama.4993 George testified that Camp Naama was
divided in two parts, one called Crab Hole or Sokoto, occupied by Sierra Leoneans, while
the other part was occupied by Liberians. Liberians were not allowed to enter the Sierra
Leonean part of the camp. 4444
mg rm Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010,p. 43600.
4984 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43626.
4490 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43600.
4494 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43601. This was not put to Isaac Mongor in cross examination.
*992 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46396-46397, 46412-46417; Transcript 4 August 2010, pp.
45366-45367.
4993 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39615-39619 (Other recruits included Issa Sesay, John
Vincent, SK Solokhan, Monica Pearson, Joseph Brown, Theophilius Pearson, Fatou Gbembo, Musa Gbembo,
Florence Kallon, Isaac Mongor, Alfred Brown, Boston Flomo, Nabiu Bongo, Jonathan Parker (a.k.a. Base
Marine), Jonathan Kposowa, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Lawrence Womandia, Ben Bia, Mama Iye, Lewis
Punky, Matthew Barbue, Richard Cooper, Robertson Dowee, Abdul Rahman Bangura, Youssoufa Sillah and
Harris Ogbe).
4444 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39600-39603.

---- End of Page 767 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dwk 18 May 2012

JXXK0
2292. George stated that originally there were about 500 recruits at Crab Hole, but some
people left because the training was too hard.4495 Recruits received training in guerrilla
tactics and radio communications. Recruits had no weapons but trained with sticks. Mike
Lamin, a Sierra Leonean instructor, taught all the recruits how to take care of civilians
· during missions.4946
2293. George stated that he never heard of Sierra Leoneans in prison in Liberia and never
heard of anyone being recruited from prisons. The Sierra Leoneans he met told him that they
were simply working in Liberia when they were recruited.4947
Defence Witness John Vincent
2294. Witness John Vincent, an NPF L recruit and later a Liberian Vanguard
cornrnander,4498 was approached on 8 September 1990 by John Kargbo, who told him that
Foday Sankoh (a.k.a. Pa Morlai) was recruiting for the RUF in order to start a revolution in
Sierra Leone. Vincent decided to join the RUF and was taken to a training base called Crab
Hole located at Camp Naama from September 1990 to March 1991 together with Liberians
and Sierra Leoneans. Crab Hole was an area about the size of 2 or 3 football fields, in Bong
County, about 5 minutes walking distance from the main training area of Camp Naama. The
trainees were aged between 10 to 35 years old. Vincent testified that Sankoh lived at Crab
Hole, but had also a base in Firestone and he would go back and forth in order to find new
recruits for whom he had negotiated the release from jail in Liberia.4944
2295. At Crab Hole, Vincent underwent guerrilla training under CO Rashid Mansaray and
Mohamed Tarawalli, a Sierra Leonean trained in Israel, and ideology training with Mike
Lamin. The ideology class taught the trainees to take good care of civilians and to attack
only military installations. At Crab Hole, Vincent also met Isaac Mongor, a former NPFL
4445 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39604.
49% Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39610-39614 (Mohammed Tarawalli, aka Zino, taught guerrilla
tactics; Rashid Mansaray taught halaka, barbed wire and jumping while Foday Sankoh taught the recruits radio
communications); pp, 39629—39638.
*997 Martin George, 27 April 2010, pp. 40030-40038.
4444 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; 30 March 2010,
pp. 38226, 38239; 31 March 2010, p. 38390, 38408, 38460, 38461.
4444 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37984-37989, 37999-38002 (When he arrived in September
1990 Vincent estimated that 150 men were training at Crab Hole). He testified that, on 22 March 1991, when the
RUF left Crab Hole to attack Sierra Leone there were 328 people at Crab Hole including 252 Liberians, 75
Sierra Leoneans and one Ivorian (John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 38008-38011).

---- End of Page 768 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /<7,»/ 6`L 18 May 2012 %
1

jffé /
member who was introduced to the new recruits as an example to follow. However, Mongor
did not train anyone at Crab Hole.50O0
2296. During his stay, Vincent never saw Taylor visiting Crab Hole nor did he hear about
him.500] Moreover, no NPFL member was allowed into the RUF area at Crab Hole which
was located behind a bush downhill of Camp Naama and could not be seen from Camp
Naama itself, where the NPFL trained. Vincent stated that Sankoh asked RUF members to
refer to Crab Hole as Sokoto so that other people would believe they were being trained in
Nigeria. There was neither radio communication equipment nor telephones at Crab Hole.5UO2
2297. Vincent did not know who was the commander of the NPFL in Camp Naama but
testified that the first night he arrived at Camp Naama, Sankoh was arrested by NPFL
Special Forces and questioned about other training in Camp Naama. Sankoh was released
three hours later, alier the intervention of his fiiend Anthony Mekunagbe, one of the
commanders of the NPFL Special Forces.50O5
Defence Witness DCT-292
2298. Witness DCT-292, a Sierra Leonean, was arrested and detained by the NPFL and
released on the orders of Sankoh in November 1990.5505 DCT-292 and his co-detainees
were transported by Sankoh to Crab Hole in Camp Naama on 12 November 1990. A week
later, Sankoh told them that they would be trained in order to fight for Sierra Leone and to
release its citizens from inhumane activities. The detainees received military and commando
training as well as ideology training. Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli, Isaac Mongor,
Gonkanu, and two men named respectively Sylvester and One Man One were instructors in
military and physical trainings while Philip Palmer and Mike Lamin taught ideology.
Ideology training included lessons on how to treat civilians and prisoners. During the
training, RUF trainees were not allowed to have any contact with people outside of Crab
Hole and would have been killed if they had tried to escape.50O5
5050 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37994-3 7999, 38007-3 8008.
500] John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37995-37998.
5005 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 379991-37994.
5005 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 38003-38005.
5004 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41697-41698.
5005 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41698-41718; 41723·41724.

---- End of Page 769 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / OL 18 May 2012

Zrxéz
2299. The witness testified that Liberian trainers at Camp Naama were Sylvester,5OO6
Gonkanu, One Man One and Isaac Mongor.50O7 One Man One was one of the principal y
trainers at Camp Naama5O08 and the witness knew that when One Man One was at Camp
Naama he was an NPFL fighter.50O9
Defence Witness Isatu Kallon
2300. Witness Isatu Kallon, a Sierra Leonean trader in Harbel, Liberia, testihed that after
ECOMOG bombarded Liberia in 1990, the NPFL began harassing the Sierra Leonean
civilians because they believed Sierra Leone had contributed to ECOMOG. Kallon and her
family were arrested by the NPFL but were released after protests by other market women.
After her release, Kallon met Sankoh who told the people at Harbel that he had been sent to
help the Sierra Leoneans who were being harassed. Kallon testified that Sankoh also assisted
in the release of other Sierra Leoneans outside of Harbel. She does not know if Sankoh was
part of the NPFL at this time. Sankoh did not use force to secure the release of the prisoners,
but merely pleaded with the NPFL.5Om
2301. After her release, Kallon helped Sankoh in freeing the Sierra Leoneans detained by
NPFL. Thus she helped Philip Palmer to be released from prison and provided him with
lodging and food. Sankoh then visited Kallon every week. In the second week, he held a
meeting at the witness's house attended by more than 100 Sierra Leoneans, during which
Sankoh promised to do something about the harassment of Sierra Leoneans. However, he
explained to the attendees that they should blame the Sierra Leonean government for failing
to protect them from the harassment, not the NPFL fighters. Kallon was not able to follow
the meeting in detail since she was in the kitchen cooking food for the attendees.50ll
2302. After the meeting, Philip Palmer and "George", two educated Sierra Leoneans, wrote
down the names of the men who volunteered to follow Sankoh. The volunteers left in a truck
owned by Anthony Mekunagbe, one of Taylor's commanders. When Philip Palmer returned,
he infomied Kallon that the volunteers were taken to a place called Sokoto, in Naama.
5006 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, p.41710; Transcript 2 June 2010, p. 41866.
5007 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41710-41711; Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41866, 41867.
5008 DCT-292, Transcript 3 June 2010, p. 42032.
5009 DCT-292, Transcript 3 June 2010, p. 42033.
5010 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42633-42660.
SOM Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42661-42669.

---- End of Page 770 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Z 6; 18 May 2012

KFX!3
Sankoh was not present when the men were loaded onto the tmck. Kallon testified that
Philip Palmer never mentioned the name Taylor in her conversations with him.5Ol2
2303. Later in 1990, Sankoh came back to Kallon's house and asked her for cassava, palm
oil, soap and potatoes. Sankoh explained that he did not know the people around Camp
Naama, and that was why he went to Harbel for his supplies. Kallon agreed to buy the
supplies requested and gave them to Sankoh and Philip Palmer, who took them to Camp
Naama. Kallon stated that she contributed supplies to Sankoh two or three times a month but
did not know if other people did the same.5Ol3
2304. Kallon testified that she visited Camp Naama on two occasions during which she U
brought foods and prepared soup for the trainees. She testified that she did not see any NPFL
fighters, only Sierra Leoneans including Sankoh, Tarawalli and Philip Palmer. According to
her, NPFL soldiers were trained in another part of Camp Naama.5Ol4 Kallon further testified
that, while she was in Harbel, she heard an NPFL soldier named Isaac Mongor saying that
he had gone to Naama to assist Tarawalli.5Ol5
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
2305. Witness Sam Kolleh, a Liberian, was a student when he was captured by the NPP L at
Gbarnga in late 1990 and was taken to Crab Hole in Camp Naama where he received
military training and ideology training for 5-6 months. Thus, although he was a Liberian,
Kolleh became, by virtue of the training, a member of the RUF. Kolleh did not have the
choice to train, because even if he did not want to train he would have been killed if he had
refused. 5016
2306. The commanders at Crab Hole were Mohamed Tarawalli who was in charge of
physical training, Mike Lamin who was in charge of ideology, and Rashid Mansaray, who
sometimes assisted Lamin in the ideology training. Ideology training included advice on
how to treat civilians and prisoners but not on how to terrorize them. Terrorism was not the
Som Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42670-42677.
Sm Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42680-42689; Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42734—42735.
SOM Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42691-42707.
Sm Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42704—42706,
Som Sam Kolleh, Transcript l November 2010, pp. 48361%-48369.

---- End of Page 771 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / SQ 18 May 2012

ideology of the RUF. Foday Sankoh also participated in the training of Sierra Leoneans
within the RUF.50l7
2307. Several Liberians were also conducting the training at Crab Hole. Kolleh stated that
there was Isaac Mongor and also Gonkanu, who was a "volunteer trainer". Gonkanu was not
a commander but would come in the moming in order to do physical training and then leave
the camp.50l0 Another Liberian trainer was PI, who was an NPFL man.500)
2308. Kolleh testified that at one time, Anthony Mekunagbe, an NPFL general, came to
Crab Hole and confronted Sankoh about training people to go to Sierra Leone. Sankoh was
detained for a few hours after trying to deny this. When Sankoh was released he hurriedly
ordered the trainees to leave, and the RUF trainees, composed of 183 Sierra Leoneans and
Liberians, left Camp Naama in order to invade Sierra Leone.5020
Defence Witness DCT-025
2309. Witness DCT-025, a Sierra Leonean, decided, around 20 August 1990, to join Foday
Sankoh and the RUF because he had friends who were already recruits.502l DCT-025 was
brought together with 6 other recruits in a truck to Crab Hole or Sokoto, an RUF base within
Camp Naama. DCT-025 testified that Camp Naama was a big military base but that he, as a
RUF recruit, was restricted to the area down the hill where the RUF trained.5022
2310. DCT-025 estimated that there were about 300 people at Crab Hole. There were many
Sierra Leoneans and some Liberians, men and women but no children. DCT-025 was
unaware of any SBU unit at Camp Naama. 5023
2311. DCT-025 testified that there were four Sierra Leonean training commanders at Camp
Naama: Mohamed Tarawalli and Mike Lamin were in charge of training in guerrilla
warfare; Rashid and Foday Sankoh were in charge of training in ideology and Rashid was
SOM Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48368-48376.
Sm Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48371-48372.
5010 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, pp. 48670, 48671.
5"2" som 1502l DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37226-37231.
5022 DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37232-37237.
5023 DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, p. 37237-37246. DCT-025 recalled that about 15 women were at
Camp Naama including Memunatu Sesay, Monica, Krio Mammy, Narpam, Rebecca. Among the men present at
Camp Naama, DCT-025 mentioned Sam Kolleh, 1ssa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Jonathan Kposowa

---- End of Page 772 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z OL 18 May 2012 Q

3 Xyéf
also responsible for physical training. DCT—025 was never told why he was training, but he
knew he was being trained as military personnel. He was not armed during the training and
used sticks to practice. Ideological training included care of civilians, women and
children.5024
2312. DCT—025 testified that Mammy Iye, Pa Kallon and Sankoh brought food for the
trainees in picl<—ups and that was the only food provision they had. Sankoh told the trainees
to use the name Sokoto to disguise the name Crab Hole because their stay there had to
remain secret. DCT—025 left Camp Naama on 20 March 1991 for Koindu. During his
training DCT—025 never left Camp Naama because it was highly restricted and he could not
leave.5025
Defence Witness Edward Zayrnay
2313. Witness Edward Zaymay, an NPP L commander,5U26 testified that around April 1990,
Anthony Mekunagbe and Timothy Mulibah sold some captured arms destined for Taylor in
Gbamga to the RUF.5027 Zemay received information Hom Mekunagbe that Taylor had
brought in new arms and that all the captured arms were to be sent to Gbamga. Zemay
dispatched a consignment of these captured arms to Gbamga but the arms did not reach
Gbamga because Mekunagbe sold them to his "friends in Sierra Leone".5028
2314. Mekunagbe told Zemay that he sold weapons to a person named "CO Super". Zemay
testified that, when he met "CO Super", Menkunagbe introduced him as his "friend in Sierra
Leone" and suggested that they had a deal to have friendly forces in Sierra Leone to fight
runaway AF L soldiers in exile in Freetown who had organized themselves as ULIMO.5029
2315. Mekunagbe also told the witness that the supplies that Timothy Mulibah brought to
the base constituted the proceeds from the arms sale to the RUF that the witness sent to
and Isaac Mongor.
5°5" Dcr-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37246-37251.
5055 DCT—025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37248-3725l.
5026 Teman Edward Zaymay, Transcript 7 May 2010, p. 40681; Transcript 11 May 2010, pp. 40742, 40745,
40762, 40770; Transcript 12 May 2010, pp. 40855, 40863-40865; Transcript 18 May 2010, pp. 41048, 41066,
41071-41072.
5027 Edward Zaymay, Transcript 1 1 May 2010, p. 40746.
5028 Edward Zaymay, Transcript 1 1 May 2010, pp. 40746, 40748—40749.
5029 Edward Zaymay, Transcript 1 1 May 2010, pp. 40746-40748.

---- End of Page 773 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr-03-01-r / GK 18 May 2012 %
A .

ZX?/5
Gbamga. These included 150 bags of rice, three barrels of pig's feet, other foodstuffs and
three motorbikes.5O30
2316. Edward Zemay testified that around February-March 1992, Mekunagbe and Mulibah
were arrested.503l Taylor informed him that Menkunagbe and Mulibah were arrested because
he discovered that they sold his weapons. Menkunagbe's Special Forces colleagues,
including Yegbeh Degbon and Oliver Varney, were also arrested for conniving with
ULIMO.5032
Confidential Exhibit P-277
2317. In Confidential Exhibit P-277 it is alleged, inter alia, that Isaac Mongor taught terror
tactics to the RUF recruits by telling them that they should kill half of the civilians of any
village they captured and "tabay" (meaning tying both hands on the back of the body) the
rest.5O33
Deliberations
2318. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided Sankoh and the RUF with a
training base at Camp Naama, which was used for training both the NPFL and the RUF. The
Accused also provided the RUF recruits in Camp Naama with food and medicine, and he
provided the RUFiwith instructors who taught RUF recruits to use terror tactics against
civilians.5O34 The Defence denies that the Accused had any knowledge of the recruitment and
training of RUF recruits at Camp Naama.5O35
2319. Undisputed circumstances emerge from the record. The evidence unequivocally
demonstrates that, by August or September 1990, the NPFL, led by the Accused, had
conquered most of Liberia and taken control of the largest military base in Liberia, Camp
5030 Edward Zaymay, Transcript 11 May 2010, pp. 40749-40751.
503] Edward Zaymay, Transcript 11 May 2010, p. 40751.
5032 Edward Zaymay, Transcript 11 May 2010, pp. 40751-40752.
5033 Exhibit P-277 (confidential), pp. 85-86, ERN l8184—l8185.
5034 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 66-75; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5660-5663;
Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 631 1, 6320-6321.
5035 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 63-75.

---- End of Page 774 ---------------------------


Case No.:scsr-os-mfr Z @0 *8 my M c%

ZKX6'?
Naama, located in Bong County.5O36 Quickly thereafter, the NPFL set up a training base at
Camp Naama for NPFL soldiers.5O37
2320. The evidence further establishes that, in the course of 1990, Sierra Leoneans civilians
were molested, arrested and detained by NPFL soldiers in retaliation for the ECOMOG
bombings.5O38 Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, secured the release of some of the Sierra
Leonean detainees and brought them to Crab Hole, an RUF base located in Camp Naama, in
5036 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 66 ("By June, July 1990, the NPFL captured Gbamga [...] according to
the Accused, by August or September, nearby Camp Naama was in the hands of the NPFL as wel1"); Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24755-24759.
5037 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 66 (‘Taylor immediately opened a training base there’); Isaac Mongor,
Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5663 (‘The NPFL had a base in Camp Naama and used to train their men there. It
was a former AFL military base’); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24755-24759, 24761-
24763 (‘After its capture in 1990, Camp Naama was immediately set up as a NPFL training base’); Martin
George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39600-39603 (‘Camp Naama was divided into two parts, one called Crab
Hole or Sokoto which was occupied by Sierra Leonean, while the other part was occupied by Liberians’).
5038 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5660-5663; Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 6311, 6320-6321
(Taylor ordered to arrest the Sierra Leoneans’); TFl-371, Transcript 24 January 2008 p. 2198 (CS) (there were
reprisal killings of West African nationals by NPFL soldiers because of ECOMOG attacks; West African
nationals of ECOMOG countries were also put in detention camps); Transcript, 24 January 2008, pp. 2204-2205
(CS) (Witness TFl-371 testified that most of the trainees at Camp Naama were migrants from NPFL detention
facilities at Kakata and Buchanan); TFl-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23153-23154 (CS) (Witness TF1-
168 was arrested in Harbel, Liberia, by NPFL soldiers in September 1990 because he was a national of one the
ECOMOG countries which was fighting NPFL); TFl-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14088-14089 (in
1990, Sierra Leoneans were molested and detained by NPFL for being of the same nationality as the army which
fought NPFL in Liberia); DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41697-41698 (DCT-292, a Sierra Leonean, was
arrested and detained by NPFL and released on the orders of Sankoh in November 1990); Isatu Kallon,
Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42633-42642 (Isatu Kallon, a Sierra Leonean trader in Harbel, Liberia, testified that
after ECOMOG bombarded Liberia, the NPFL began harassing the Sierra Leonean civilians in Harbel who they
believed had assisted ECOMOG. Kallon and her family were arrested but released after protests of other market
women). See also Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), pp. 18111-18112 ("When Major Taylor's hopes were dashed
from seizing power, because of the ECOMOG interventions; he decided to punish all nationals of the nations
that contributed troops to ECOMOG. He therefore ordered his soldiers to arrest all nationals of nations
contributing troops to ECOMOG and detain them in NPFL held areas. Major Taylor declared that for every
Liberian killed by the Alfa Jet bombers, and ECOMOG ground troops, one national of each troop-contributing
nation must be kil1ed").

---- End of Page 775 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ N 18 May 2012 w

r?KX65’
order to be trained.5O34 Crab Hole was located within Camp Naama, but in a different part of
the camp than the NPF L base.5O4O
2321. Some Sierra Leoneans and Liberians also decided to join the RUF voluntarily and
received training at Crab Hole.504l The training at Crab Hole was comprised of military and
ideology training.5O42 The instructors and trainees were both Sierra Leoneans and
5034 TF1-371, Transcript, 24 January 2008, pp. 2204-2205 (CS) (Sankoh was able to remove the migrants from
the NPFL detention facilities by way of a Directive from Taylor. TFl-371 personally followed Sankoh to
Kakata, where Sankoh was able to get some Sierra Leonean detainees from the police station by using Taylor's
directive); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23128-23129, 23132-23134 (CS) (after two weeks of
detention, in October 1990, Sankoh came and released TF1—168 together with 16 other Sierra Leonean co-
detainees and took them by force to Camp Naama for training); TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14088-
14089 (Sankoh's bodyguard Jarffer Massaquoi told TF1-367 that Sierra Leoneans who were detained by NPFL
could be released by Sankoh if they agreed to train and fight along with RUF); DCT-292, Transcript 1 June
2010, pp. 41697-41700 (DCT-292 was arrested and detained by the NPFL and released on the orders of Sankoh
in November 1990. He and his co-detainees were transported by Sankoh to Crab Hole in Camp Naama on 12
November 1990); Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42633-42660 (Isatu Kallon testified that Sankoh did
not use force to release of the Sierra Leoneans prisoners, but merely pleaded with the NPFL soldiers).
5040 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 30 (‘a portion of the base and barracks were reserved for the RUF’), 66
(‘the NPFL were stationed on one side of the camp whilst the RUF were stationed on the other’); Defence Final
Trial Brief, para. 392 (‘Although the NPFL and RUF trained at Camp Naama at the same time, there is clear and
abundant evidence that within Camp Naama, the RUF recruits were kept separate from the NPFL combatants);
Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, p. 6323 (Q. ‘Were there two training bases there [in Camp Naama]: One
for RUF and one for NPFL? A. Yes. Q. Two separate training bases? A. Yes. Q. For two separate
organisations? A. Yes’).
5041 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4801-4808 (CS) (Witness TFl-362 joined the RUF voluntarily);
John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37984-37989, 37999-38002 (Vincent was approached on 8
September 1990 by John Kargbo who told him that Foday Sankoh aka Pa Morlai was recruiting for the RUF in
order to start a revolution in Sierra Leone. Vincent decided to join the RUF); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March
2010, pp. 37226-37231 (DCT-025, a Sierra Leonean, decided, around 20 August 1990, to join Foday Sankoh and
the RUF because he had friends who were already recruits); Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp.
39615-39619 (Martin George, joined Foday Sankoh's RUF in early 1991 as he was going to be the only young
person left back in his village).
5042 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 71 ("the recruits at Camp Naama received physical training, military
training and training in ideology"); Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 399-400 ("The training at Camp Naama
included all forms of training related to guerrilla warfare, like arms training [..]" and also ideological training);
Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5662-5667 (Mongor provided military training; Sankoh provided
ideological training); TF1—371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2200-2206 (CS) (Sankoh instructed Mike Lamin
to teach recruits ideology and military training in combat as well as warfare); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January
2009, pp. 23153-23156; Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23395-23396 (CS) (TFl-l68 received military and
ideological training from Sierra Leonean and Liberian instructors); TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp.
14090-14095 (TF1-367 underwent military/physical and ideological training for three months); Issa Sesay,
Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43600-43601 (Sesay received ‘physical training, political ideology, courtesy and
discip1ine’); Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39610-39614 (Mohammed Tarawalli taught guerrilla
tactics; Rashid Mansaray taught halaka, barbed wire and· jumping while Foday Sankoh taught the recruits radio
communications), pp. 39629-39638 (George testified about the various kinds of military training the recruits
were taught and also ideological training for missions); John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37994-
37999, 38007-38008 (Vincent testified that at Crab Hole, recruits were trained in guerrilla warfare, parading,
political ideology and arms training. He was taught to distinguish between military and civilian targets); DCT-
292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41698-41718 (DCT-292 received military and commando training along with
ideological training and treatment of civilians); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48368-48376
(Kolleh was trained in physical exercise and ideology at Crab Hole; This training did not include terrorism or
killing of civilians); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37246-37251 (DCT-025 testified that he received

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z G5 18 May 2012

ERM?
Liberians.5043 The main instructors at Crab Hole were Mohamed Tarawalli, Rashid
Mansaray, Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor, PI and Gonkanu, as well as Foday Sankoh
himself.5044 The RUF trained at Crab Hole until March 1991 when it attacked Sierra
Leone.5O45
2322. With much of the evidence undisputed, the Trial Chamber is left to detemiine
whether the Accused was involved in or aware of the recruitment and training of RUF
military training).
5043 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5665-5667 (Mongor testified that trainees and instructors were
both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians); TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2200-2207 (CS) (TF1-371 was
introduced to Liberian instructors called Isaac Mongor and another named Red Devil. The witness said that the
trainees were mostly Sierra Leonean migrants that were in Liberia as well as Liberians and NPFL Liberian
fighters); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23147- 23149, 23153- 23156 (CS) (TF1-168 testified to
having both Sierra Leonean, TF1-371, Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli, and Liberian, Gonkanu, Sam
Draper, instructors); TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14095-14097 (TF1-367 was trained by two groups
of trainers one being Sierra Leoneans (TF1-371, Mohamed Tarawalli and Rashid Mansaray) and the other
Liberians (Isaac Mongor and PI) The witness also testified that fellow co-trainees who were Sierra Leoneans and
Liberians who later assumed positions of commanders in the RUF); TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp.
4806-4808 (CS) (TF1-362, a Liberian, testified that her trainers at Camp Naama were both Sierra Leoneans
(Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli and Patrick Lamin) and Liberians (Isaac Mongor, Patrick Dripo and
Gonkanu)); Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39603 (George was trained by Sierra Leoneans and
mentioned the names of fellow Sierra Leonean recruits); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48371-
48377 (Kolleh was trained by both Sierra Leonean and Liberian trainers. Kolleh's fellow trainees were also both
Sierra Leoneans and Liberians); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37246-37248 (DCT-025 testified that
the group he trained with was a mixture of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians. DCT-025 was trained by four Sierra
Leoneans and knew the Liberian instructor Isaac Mongor).
5044 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5665 (Mongor testified about the presence of Mohammed
Tarawalli, TF1-371, Rashid Mansaray, Gongano , Sam Dripo and Foday Sankoh); TF1-371, Transcript 24
January 2008, pp. 2200-2202 (CS) (TF1-371 testified about the presence of Rashid Mansaray and Isaac Mongor
as instructors); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23153-23156 (CS) (The witness testified that there
were had both Sierra Leonean and Liberian instructors Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli, Mike Lamin,
Gonkanu, and Sam Draper); TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4807-4808 (CS) (The witness testified to
being trained by Isaac Mongor, Patrick Dripo, and also meeting other instructors such as Gonkanu, Foday
Sankoh, Rashid Mansaray was the instructor who taught her ideology, Mohamed Tarawalli taught her group
guerrilla warfare. Patrick Lamin taught them guerrilla tactics and sometimes infantry); Issa Sesay, Transcript 5
July 2010, p. 43600 (The witness testified to being trained by Rashid Mansaray, Special Forces, Mohamed
Tarawalli, Mike Lamin. The others instructors were Gonkanu and Isaac Mongor); John Vincent, Transcript 25
March 2010, pp. 37995-37999 (The witness testified to being trained by Rashid Mansaray, Mike·Lamin and
Mohamed Tarawalli); DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41709-41712; Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41866-
41867; Transcript 3 June 2010, pp. 42032-42033 ((The witness testified being taught by Rashid Mansaray
(ambush), Mohamed Tarawalli (how to escape for survival), Isaac Mongor, Gonkanu, Sylvester and Philip
Palmer)); One Man One was one of the principal trainers; Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42691-
42707 (The witness testified that she saw Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli and Philip Palmer as instructors
within the camp.); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48371-48373 ((The witness testified to the
presence of Gonkanu as a volunteer trainer, while Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli (physical exercise) and
Mike Lamin (ideology) were commanders and trainers.)); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010 pp. 37246-37251
(The witness mentioned four training instructors Mohamed Tarawalli, Mike Lamin, Rashid Mansaray and the
fourth was Pa Morlai).
5045 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 29, 77-79, 82, 625, 1226 (The evidence is undisputed that the training at
Naama lasted until the invasion of Sierra Leone in late March 1991); Defence Final Trial Brief paras 404, 411-
412; See also TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23161-23166 (CS); Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June
2010, pp. 42724-42742; Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48373-48377; DCT-025, Transcript 12
March 2010 pp. 37249-37251.

---- End of Page 777 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T % U" 18 May 2012
\

recruits and whether terror methods were taught at Camp Naama by instructors sent by the
Accused.
2323. Isaac Mongor is the sole witness providing first hand evidence of the Accused's
direct involvement in sending NPF L trainers to do RUF training at Camp Naama. Mongor
testified that in about March or April 1990 Taylor assigned him to help Sankoh in training
the new RUF recruits at Camp Naama.5O46 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Isaac
Mongor is a generally credible witness.5O47 Nonetheless, several issues regarding his
testimony specifically on Camp Naama were raised by the Defence,5O48 which the Trial
Chamber will address in this context.
2324. Mongor testified that he was captured by the NPFL before Christmas 1989 and
subsequently became an NPFL soldier. The Defence submits that this account is impossible
since the Liberian war had not even sta1ted.5O49 The Trial Chamber notes that Mongor's
testimony that he was abducted around Christmas 1989, in Nimba County close to the
border between Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, 5050 is consistent with the evidence adduced by
both parties regarding the history of the Liberian Conflict. Indeed, Taylor himself testified
that at the end of December 1989, he ordered an NPFL group led by Prince Johnson to
capture Gbutuo and advance to Tiaplay.505l NPF L troops advanced "westward" to Tappita,
Sanniquellie then Buchanan within Nimba County.5O52 Other evidence demonstrates that
fights were taking place at the border between Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire around Christmas
1989.5053 I
2325. The Defence further submits that Mongor's story regarding his capture by the NPFL
was "riddled with inconsistencies". However, this blanket allegation is not linked to any
particular inconsistency or any specific reference to the transcripts. 5054 A careful analysis of
5046 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5660-5663; Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 631 1, 6320-6321.
5047 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274.
55*5 Defence rmi rmi Briei paras 1555-1556.
5049 Defence Final Trial Briefpara. l555(2).
5050 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 6274-6278.
5051 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 July 2009, pp. 24607-24608, 24610-24615.
5052 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 July 2009, pp. 24613-24615.
5053 See ag., the accounts of the invasion of Liberia by NPFL soldiers from Cote d’Ivoire around Christmas
1989; Edward Zaymay, Transcript 7 May 2010, pp. 40652—40683; Edward Mineh, Transcript 29 April 2010. pp.
40317-40318, 40326-40328. See also Annie Yeney, Transcript 3 June 2010, pp. 42070-42071; DCT-179,
Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35623-35624.
5054 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. l555(2).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ou 18 May 2012

383* ?/
Mongor's account of his capture does not reveal any major inconsistency regarding this
event.5055 To the contrary, despite a lengthy cross-examination, Mongor was consistent on
his account regarding his abduction by NPFL soldiers around Christmas 1989 in Nimba
County and his subsequent involvement in the NPFL.5050
2326. The Defence also contends that, in his prior statement to the Prosecution, Mongor
said that he was recruited into the RUF b Sankoh and not b Taylor, as he testified in
Y Y Y
Couit.5057 Confronted with this inconsistency and questioned extensively on this point,
Mongor maintained that he had been recruited by the Accused and "handed over" to Foday
Sankoh to help him train the RUF men, and that subsequently Sankoh told him that he
should join the RUF.5058 Similarly, Mongor's prior statement to the Prosecution indicated
that Mongor was introduced to Sankoh by John Kargbo. However, in Court Mongor
explained that he had met Sankoh before but that Kargbo had brought Mongor closer to
Sankoh.5050 The Trial Chamber is satisfied by these explanations.
2327. In assessing Mongor's evidence, the Trial Chamber has considered the evidence,
including from Issa Sesay and several other Defence witnesses, that a number of NPFL
soldiers provided training at Crab Hole including Mike Lamin, Rashid Mansaray, PI,
Gonkanu, Red Devil and Sylvester.5000 Defence Witness DCT-292 also mentioned One Man
One as one of the NPFL instructors at Crab Hole.5001
5055 The Trial Chamber has noted that Mongor's previous statement to the Prosecution indicated "During the
early stage of the war in Liberia, he became associated with the NPFL" and that ‘""Mongor joined the NPFL in
1989 at the start of the revolution". However, the Trial Chamber also notes that the same statement explained
that Mongor was "[c]aptured by NPFL in early part of 1989 in Nimba County while operating business".
Mongor explained that he was captured by the NPFL but that the consequence of this capture was that he became
associated with it and therefore joined it. The Trial Chamber is satisfied by these explanations and does not find
that these minor differences, in the wording of a document not written by the witness himself affect the
credibility of Isaac Mongor (Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 6325-6334), 4
5 05 0 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 6274-6311.
5057 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1555.
Sm isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 6337-6341.
5050 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, pp. 6342-6343.
5000 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5662-5667; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23153-
23156; TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14090-14095; TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp.
4801-4808 (CS); Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p, 43600; Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37994-37999,
38007-38008, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38087-38088, Transcript 30 March 2010 pp. 38315—38324; DCT-
292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41709-41718 ; 41723-41724; Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48368-
48376; DCT—025,Transc1ipt 12 March 2010, pp. 37246-37251.
5001 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, p. 41711 (("Q. Any other names of any other people that you were
involved with who were trainers at Naama'? A. There were some other people but these people were brought
directly by this same Pa Morlai who came with other two men. They brought them in and they said, "This is One

---- End of Page 779 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 63, _ 18 May 2012
kx

2328. The Trial Chamber notes that Witness TF1-371 testified that he independently joined
the RUF and not that he was sent by Taylor.5062 Several other witnesses, including Defence
’ Witness Vincent, a former NPFL soldier, testified that they also joined the RUF
independently.5O63 Nonetheless, the fact that TF1-371 and others joined the RUF
independently does not exclude the possibility that others, including Mongor, trained the
RUF with the knowledge and the consent of the Accused. Moreover, in the Trial Chamber's
view, NPFL soldiers such as TF1-371 and John Vincent, who had been abducted into the
NPFL and joined the RUF, could not have done so without the Accused's agreement.50°4
TF1-168's evidence also supports this view. Indeed, TF1-168, whom the Trial Chamber
considers to be a generally credible witness, testified that Taylor provided Sankoh with
experienced NPFL soldiers, who were trained beforehand and had experienced war, who
would stay with the trainees for three months because the new recruits were not sufficiently
trained in guerrilla tactics.5O65
2329. The Defence submits that the fact that Mongor remained with the RUF after
operation Top Final contradicts Mongor's assertion that he was sent by Taylor.5O66 Mongor
testified that he was sent by Taylor and Sankoh then asked him to stay with the RUF. In the
Trial Chamber's view the fact that Mongor remained with the RUF after Camp Naama does
not exclude the possibility that he was initially sent by Taylor in order to train the RUF. The
Trial Chamber recalls that Mongor was abducted by the NPFL.5O67 In the Trial Chamber's
view, this could explain why Mongor remained in the RUF after Camp Naama and is not
inconsistent with Mongor's assertion that he was sent to Camp Naama by Taylor. The Trial
Man One. His name should not be disclosed". In fact, he didn't disclose any name. He said, "This is One Man
One and he's a brother and he's going to be here to monitor your affairs". And they brought another one also. Q.
Pause there. He's going to monitor your affairs. What did that mean? A. Okay, he is going to be with you as a
cornrnander of the base. That was he was on the compound of the soldiers. Q. Right. Did he train you in
anything? A. Only one of those people. He taught us the same ambush. That was One Man One".)
5062 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2185-2206 (CS).
5063 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37984~37989, 37999-38002 (John Vincent, an NPFL recruit,
was approached on 8 September 1990 by John Kargbo, who told him that Foday Sankoh was recruiting for the
RUF in order to start a revolution in Sierra Leone. Vincent decided to join the RUF and was taken to a training
base called Crab Hole located at Camp Naama from September 1990 to March 1991 together with Liberians and
Sierra Leoneans); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48368—48369.
5064 See also in support of this finding the fact that NPFL recruits were forced to train at Crab Hole; See for
example Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48368-48369 (Sam Kolleh, a Liberian, was captured by
the NPFL at Gbarnga in late 1990 and taken to Crab Hole where he received military training and ideology
training for 5-6 months; Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48368-48369; See also Martin George, Transcript 21
April 2010, pp. 39615-39619.
5065 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23145-23153 (CS).
5066 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1555.

---- End of Page 780 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Oli 18 May 2012 %
I

Chamber notes that Defence Witness DCT-292 mentioned One Man One among the NPFL
trainers in Camp Naama.5O68
2330. The Trial Chamber has also considered the evidence of numerous witnesses both for
the Prosecution and the Defence, who testified that in 1990 Sierra Leoneans arrested by
NPF L troops were released after SanlCrab Hole in order to be trained. TF 1-371 testified that most of the trainees came from these
detention facilities and that Sankoh was able to release them by way of a Directive from
Taylor.5O°9 The Trial Chamber has also considered the fact that Sankoh and the RUF recruits
were able to travel and pass check-points throughout NPP L controlled territory,5O7Oand the
credible testimony of Defence witness Isatu Kallon that following one recruitment, a truck
owned by Anthony Mekunagbe, one of Taylor's commanders, was brought to transport the
recruits. Taylor's mansion in Gbarnga was close to Camp Naama.5(m For these reasons, in
5067 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5648-5649, 5664 (Mongor was abducted by NPFL soldiers).
506** nor-292, Transcript 1 Jurrp 2010, pp. 41698-41718, 41723¢11724.
5069 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2205 ("Q. Did you learn how Foday Sankoh was able to take people
out of NPFL detention facilities? A. He showed me a directive which was given to him by the - from - he told
me, I mean, it was the instmction from Mr Taylor and he was using a directive to get the - I mean some of them
in the detention facilities. I personally followed him to Kakata and he used that directive to get some Sierra
Leoneans that were detained at Kakata police station and he brought them on the base").
5070 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23139-23141 (When Sankoh took the detainees from Harbel to
Camp Naama in Bong County, along the way there were NPFL-controlled checkpoints; TF1-168 noted a
checkpoint at 15 Gate, and later near Kakata. At each checkpoint the bus passed easily when Sankoh spoke to the
guards); Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46401-46402 (the area of Camp Naama was controlled by
NPFL. Sesay could not remember how many checkpoints he passed when he went to Camp Naama but
remembered there was one in Naama village); Yanks Smythe, Transcript 1 March 2010, pp. 36399-36400 (In
1990, in NPFL controlled areas, the NPFL had checkpoints which were also called gates; the people manning the
checkpoints were NPFL soldiers above 18); DCT-190, Transcript 10 June 2010, p. 42468-42472 (testified about
checkpoints in Madina, Sanganama, Singe and Tiene in 1990); John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp.
38117-381 18 (Vincent was stationed at an NPFL checkpoint in September 1990); DCT-292, Transcript 2 June
2010, pp. 41847-41849 (On the way to Gbamga, DCT-292 passed a number of checkpoints, in Totota, Gbatala,
Swakoko, Phebe and Gbarnga where the truck his intercepted by the NPFL. When the tmck approached each
checkpoint, Sankoh, who was travelling in a small green jeep, would communicate with the personnel at the
checkpoints); Transcript 2 June 2010, p. 41853 (From Gbarnga to Camp Naama, DCT-292 passed a checkpoint,
Belefanai, where Sankoh and his convoy were intercepted); See also Martin George, Transcript 26 April 2010,
pp. 39959-39961 (When George left Camp Naama in March 1991 to go in mission in Sierra Leone he met NPFL
soldiers on the way who asked them questions about their destination. However, George testiHed that there were
no checkpoints along the way; he passed in free zones); DCT-125, Transcript 10 March 2010, pp. 36939-36941
(DCT-125 explains that whilst he was in Liberia he passed many checkpoints that had been mounted for security
reasons from Loguato and all the way up to Buchanan; The checkpoints were small command post that blocked
the road); But see in contrast DCT-025, Transcript 18 March 2010, pp. 37484-37487 (DCT-025 passed through
Bong County, which was an NPFL controlled area at the time, but he was not stopped along the way by any
checkpoints or security personnel at checkpoints).
507l Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, p. 4641 ("Q. Now you are aware, are you not, that Camp
Naama is in the vicinity of Gbamga, yes? A. Yes"); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp.
24756, 24758: Naama was located about 30 miles from Gbarnga); DCT-025, Transcript 18 March 2010, pp.
37484-37487 (Gbamga is about a 45 mins-1 hour drive to Camp Naama on a dusty road).

---- End of Page 781 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

the Trial Chamber's view, the recruitment by Sankoh of NPFL soldiers, the release of
hundreds Sierra Leoneans prisoners from NPFL jails and their transport to Camp Naama
could not have happened without the Accused's approval.
2331. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that TFl-371, TF1-168, TF1 -367 and TF1-362
corroborate Mongor's testimony that, while at Camp Naama, Foday Sankoh said that he was
receiving support from Charles Taylor. This support included inter alia the use of Crab Hole
in Camp Naama as a training base, as well as provision of food and medicine.5072 Several .
Defence Witnesses testified that they never heard about the Accused's involvement in the
RUF training at Crab Hole.5073 However, the Trial Chamber notes that the fact that several
witnesses did not hear about his involvement does not negate the possibility that he was
involved. It is not disputed that the Accused never went to Camp Naama before the invasion
of Sierra Leone by RUF in March 1991.5074 Thus, he could have supported the RUF at
Camp Naama without the witnesses’ knowledge.
2332. The Trial Chamber considers that it would have been impossible for the several
hundred RUF recruits at Camp Naama to survive without NPFL's support. It accepts
Kallon's evidence that she provided Sankoh with goods twice a month.5O75 Isatu and Daniel
Kallon's support to the RUF troops in Crab Hole is confirmed by other evidence.5O76
However, in the Trial Chamber's view such small quantity would have been largely
insufficient in order to feed all the recruits during their training.5O77 Moreover, Isaac
5072 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5661-5663, 5666-5668; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009,
pp. 23148-51; TF1-371 Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2203-2209 (CS); Transcript, 29 January 2008, pp. 2509-
2510 (CS); TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14098-14099; TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12838-
12845, 12858; See also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28590-28593.
5073 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46396-46397, 46412-46417 (Sesay denied that Taylor supported
the training at the camp in any way); John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37995-37998 (During his
stay, Vincent never saw Taylor visiting Crab Hole nor did he hear about him).
5074 Isaac Mongor, 1 April 2008, p. 6343 (Taylor has never been to Camp Naama while Mongor was there);
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24755-24763, 24794-24797 (Taylor did not visit Camp
Naama until after he moved to Gbarnga in mid-1991, after the RUF attack against Sierra Leone); John Vincent,
Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37995-37998 (During his stay, Vincent never saw Taylor visiting Crab Hole nor
did he hear about him).
5075 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42680-42689 ; Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42734-42735.
5076 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43621-43622; DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010 pp. 41717-41718;
See also Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), p. 82.
5077 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23145-23153 (between 130 and 150 trainees - men, women and
children - took the initial training up to December 1990. Around March 1991, the number of RUF recruits was
around 205); Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39604 (There were originally about 500 recruits at
Crab Hole); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010 pp. 37237-37246 (DCT-025 estimated that there were about
300 people at Crab Hole).

---- End of Page 782 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Mongor, TF1-371, TF1-168, and TF 1-367 all testified that the Accused provided the base
with food for recruits and other forms of assistance. TF1-371 further testified that the
supplies were procured by Foday Sankoh from the Accused at his mansion in Gbarnga.
Mongor testified that Sankoh told him that he depended on Taylor for everything.
2333. Under these circumstances, and in the midst of a war in Liberia, Taylor's assertion
that he had no knowledge of RUF training at his main training camp is not credib1e.5O78 In
the light of the foregoing, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the
evidence in its entirety is that Taylor provided Sankoh with a training base, with NPFL
instructors, and with food and other supplies, and that he approved the recruitment by RUF
of NPFL soldiers and Sierra Leonean prisoners.
2334. With regard to the alleged training of terror methods in Crab Hole by NPFL
instructors, Confidential Exhibit P-277 contends that Isaac Mongor taught terror tactics to
the RUF recruits by telling them that they should kill half of the civilians of any village they
would capture and "tabay" (meaning tying both hands on the back of the body) the rest.5O79
This allegation is corroborated by Defence witness Issa Sesay, who testified that while at
Camp Naama, Sankoh criticized Isaac Mongor for teaching the trainees that once they
captured a town they should divide the civilians into two groups and kill one of the groups in
order to obtain the loyalty of the other group.5O8O However, substantial evidence was
adduced by both Prosecution and Defence witnesses stating that ideology training received
by RUF recruits in Camp Naama included basic Geneva Convention regulations on the
treatment of civi1ians.5 081 While the evidence suggests that Isaac Mongor may have
W neiepee riper refer Brief] para. 800,
W Exhibit P-277 (cepndepuer), pp. ss-86.
5080 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43601. These allegations were not put to Mongor in cross examination
5081 TF1—371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2203-2204 (CS) (Sankoh asked Mike Lamin to teach ideology and
provided him with brochures on basic Geneva Convention regulations on how to treat civilians and respect them
during the conflict); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23181-23182 (During the invasion of Sierra
Leone civilians were "not treated fine. They were not treated nicely, as opposed to our basic ideology that we
were taught at the base. In fact, it was surprising to me to see things happening that way"); TF1-168, Transcript
23 January 2009, pp. 23395—23396 (TF1-168 received instruction to give good treatment to civilians in order to
make them support the revolution); Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39612-39614 (George testified
that Mike Lamin, a Sierra Leonean instructor, taught all the recruits how to take care of civilians during
missions); John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37998-37999 (the ideology class taught the trainees to
take good care of civilians and to attack only military installations); DCT—292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp.
4l708—41709, 41714 (The ideology training in Camp Naama included: ensuring that a person who surrenders is
unharmed and handed them over to the nearest senior officer for screening; a prohibition against raping; the
correct treatment of captured civilians — soldiers needed to gather the civilians in one place and guard them.
Another element of the ideology was that whenever a town is captured, any material captured, including arms,
ammunition, clothing, and food had to be kept under the supervision of the commander. These materials then

---- End of Page 783 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T (P3 18 May 2012

advocated the use of terror tactics, it has not been established that he did so following the
Accused's orders. The Trial Chamber also notes that several other witnesses described
Mongor as merely a physical training instructor. In the light of the foregoing, the Trial
Chamber finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
as a matter of policy training instructors sent by the Accused taught terror methods to RUF
recruits at Camp Naama.
2335. In making this Hnding, the Trial Chamber has considered the allegation that, before
the invasion of Sierra Leone, the Accused said publicly on the radio, that "Sierra Leone
would taste the bitterness of war". The Accused testified that "no human being on this
planet" heard these words.5082 However, overwhelming evidence both from Prosecution and
Defence witnesses demonstrates that, contrary to the Accused's assertion, he made this
statement publicly.5083 In the Trial Chamber's view, this statement establishes that the
had to be shared among the civilians and the fighters); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, p. 48374
(Ideology training included advice on how to treat civilians and prisoners but not on how to terrorize them.
According to Kolleh, terrorism was not the ideology of the RUF); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp.
37248-37250 (ideological training included care of civilians, women and children); See also TF1-371, Transcript
30 January 2008, pp. 2633-2634 (CS) (TFl-371 never heard any direct order to indiscriminately kill civilians, or
a direct order to amputate or mutilate civilians. It was not the policy at the formation of the RUF in 1991 to
terrorise civilians); But see in contrast Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43601 (Sesay testified that while at
Camp Naama, Sankoh criticized Isaac Mongor for teaching the trainees that once they captured a town they
should divide the civilians into two groups and kill one of them in order to obtain the loyalty of the other group).
5082 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, p. 24736 ("Now that I would really call a recitation,
because I'm sure the Prosecution had all the time in this world to fmd this so-called BBC interview where I said
that they had this recitation before this Court every day that Taylor say that they would taste the bitterness of war
and I still hope they can go and find it, okay? I warned, I talked, I jawboned on the radio that Momoh should
stop this, we are Eiends, he should not let this happen, to warn them. But all this nonsense about Taylor saying,
there is no human being on this planet that heard in these words that Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of
war. It's a fabrication. But I spoke on the BBC and I threatened that if Momoh did not stop I mean he and I
would have a problem, because we were old friends and sol just thought to mention this at this particular time.
But it was mostly through radio interviews").
5083 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4333-4334 ("At exactly 5.06 while listening to the BBC
Mr Charles Taylor was being interviewed by Mr Rohm White. I heard him say to the world that if Sierra Leone
or ECOMOG doesnot stop using Sierra Leone or the Alpha jet from destroying his people in Liberia Sierra
Leone will also feel the bitterness of war"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5661-5662 ("I want
you to know that at the time we were fighting in Liberia, Mr Taylor used to talk over the BBC and at that time he
did say to the Sierra Leonean people that one day they will experience the bitterness of war"); Transcript 1 April
2008, pp. 6311-6312 ("...he would not want people to know that he was preparing people to go and fight in
Sierra Leone because he had said over the BBC that Sierra Leone will feel the bitterness of war. He had gone
over the air and said that and he would not want people to know that he was preparing people to go and fight
there".); Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 30 October 2008, p. 19629 (Why I was willing to come and testify? It
was for one reason: Because there was a man they used to call Charles Taylor. At the time there was war in
Liberia he said that that war that had come to Liberia, we would taste the bitterness of that one in Sierra Leone.
Everybody heard that in the radio. So if indeed the war came to Sierra Leone, and I am like this, this is my own
portion of the bitterness that I tasted. Both of my hands were amputated".); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript
l6 April 2008, p. 7851 ("Well, in 1991 just after I had sat my O-levels I heard an announcement when the
ECOMOG had their base in Sierra Leone and this announcement was over the international media. The former
NPFL leader, Charles Taylor, went over the air and said that Sierra Leone will taste the bitterness of war".);

---- End of Page 784 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 0% 18 May 2012

Accused was aware that a war in Sierra Leone would cause suffering to the civilian
population. Nonetheless, it does not establish that NPF L instructors in Crab Hole sent by the
Accused taught terror methods to RUF recruits.
2336. The evidence indicates clearly that RUF and NPF L trained in two different parts of
Camp Naama.5O84 In the Trial Chamber's view this evidence is inconsistent with a unified
command structure. Moreover, the evidence on the RUF command structure in Camp
Naama provided by Witness TF 1-168 described Foday Sankoh as the commander in chief
without mention of the Accused.5O85 Witness TF 1-367, who trained in Crab Hole, also
testified that Foday Sankoh was the only one whom the RUF recruits in Crab Hole knew as
the leader of RUF .5086 No other evidence in the record supports the submission of the
Prosecution that the RUF and NPF L trained at Camp Naama had the same chain of
command. .
Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10867 ("Well, we heard that Charles Taylor and his rebels were fighting
in Liberia. Then at one time we heard over the radio that he was saying that they were using Sierra Leone as an
ECOMOG base to launch attacks in Liberia, so Sierra Leone will face the bitterness of war one day"); Stephen
Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, p. 1463 ("There was a broadcast which, if memory serves me well, was on 4
November 1990, a radio broadcast where Mr Taylor threatened Sierra Leoneans that they would, as he put, taste
the bitterness of war and that phrase, I must say, is recalled to this day by many Sierra Leoneans, I've often heard
people say that to me and it's referred to explicitly in the TRC report") and 18 January 2008, p. 1553 ("And as I
wrote in my report which has been submitted as a document to this Court there is clear evidence that that war
was being prepared from November onwards when Mr Taylor had threatened that Sierra Leone would taste the
bitterness of war".); Dennis Koker, Transcript 16 January 2008, p. 1379 ("Well, I am telling you that I am not
telling lies, just tell the news did say Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of war. It was over the BBC. At that
time I had not joined the military and, indeed, the war reached there"); Alex Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008, p.
738 ("That was when I heard live source when Charles Ghankay Taylor said that, ‘President Momoh, if you
allow Sierra Leone to serve as ECOMOG base in 90 days Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of war."’);
Osman Jalloh, Transcript 1 October 2008, p. 17733 ("Yes. On the radio I heard that we will taste the bitterness
of war in Sierra Leone. .. It was Pa Charles Taylor who said so"). See also Exhibit P-031, ERN 26610 ("It was
in the same month that Charles Taylor publicly threatened in a radio broadcast that Sierra Leone would ‘taste the
bitterness of war"’); DCT-068, Transcript, 11 March 2010, p. 37082 ("Q: Sir, have you heard about Charles
Taylor making a radio broadcast, before the launch of the war in Sierra Leone that brought so much destruction,
threatening Sierra Leone because of its involvement in ECOMOG? A: Yes, I heard it over the radio. Q: And you
heard many people talk about that broadcast and Charles Taylor threatening to bring the bitterness of war to
Sierra Leone, didn't you'? A: I heard it over the radio".); Issa Sesay, Transcript, 17 August 2010, p. 46454 ("Q:
Mr Sesay, you've talked about hearing about Foday Sankoh's 90-day ultimatum over the BBC. Did you also hear
Charles Taylor before that threaten Sierra Leone that it would taste the bitterness of war if it continued to support
ECOMOG in Liberia? A: Yes, I heard that one); DCT-292, Transcript, 2 June 2010, p. 41897 (the witness heard
from others that Charles Taylor made that statement, but did not hear it himself).
5084 Prosecution Pre Trial Brief paras 23, 50-51, 58-59, 66, 80; Prosecution Opening Statement, Transcript 4
June 2007 p. 284; Prosecution Closing Brief paras 29-30, 65-75; Defence Final Trial Brief para. 392; See also
Mongor, Transcript 1 April 2008, p. 6323; 10 March 2008, p. 5663; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p.
23144; Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37992-37993.
5085 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009 pp. 23160-23161.
50*6 TF1-367, Transcript August 2008 p. 14101.

---- End of Page 785 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Oh 18 May 2012

338 5%*
Findings
2337. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that from August 1990 until March 1991, the Accused provided the RUF with the training
camp of Crab Hole, instructors, recruits and material support, including food and other
supplies.
2338. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that as a matter of policy NPF L instructors in Crab Hole taught terror methods to RUF
recruits.
2339. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Liberian and Sierra Leonean trainees at Camp Naama had no separate chain of
command and were treated as one body under the command of the Accused.
4. The Invasion of Sierra Leone
Submissions of the Parties
2340. The Prosecution alleges that in March 1991 in Voinjama, Lofa County, Liberia the
Accused, Foday Sankoh and Dr Manneh together with NPF L and RUF commanders held a
meeting during which they planned and organised the invasion of Sierra Leone, according to
the strategy and tactic hatched in Libya and Burkina Faso.5O87 The Prosecution further
contends that NPF L commanders and fighters sent by the Accused and obeying his orders,
were the primary participants in the invasion into Sierra Leone in March 1991 and during
the early stages of the conflict in Sierra Leone until they were withdrawn in about June
1992. NPF L soldiers were in command of all the operations during the invasion.5O88
2341. The Defence concedes that the invasion force included NPF L troops and that the
majority of RUF recruits were Liberians. However, the Defence submits that these men were
not sent by the Accused. The Defence denies that the Accused was involved in planning the
5087 Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, paras 77, 80; See also Prosecution Closing Arguments, Transcript 9 March
2011, pp. 49343-49346.
5088 Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, paras 29-30, 78-84, 206.

---- End of Page 786 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dk 18 May 2012

invasion of Sierra Leone and submits that he never went to Voinjama prior to the invasion of
Sierra Leone.5O89
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
2342. Witness TF1-371, a training instructor at Camp Naama, testified that at the end of
February 1991, he went to Sierra Leone for a reconnaissance operation in order to verify that
the road that would be used to attack Daru Barracks in Sierra Leone was safe. Six other men,
including RUF commander Mohamed Tarawalli, also went on the trip.
2343. On their way back to Camp Naama, TF1-371 and the other men met Sankoh and
Taylor in a convoy en route to Voinjama. Sankoh invited them into his car and drove them
to Voinjama to discuss with them the operational plans for the invasion of Sierra Leone on
23 March 1991. Witness TF1-371 spent his time at Voinjama in the house of an NPFL
member, Defence Witness DCT-025. 5090
2344. The next morning, at around 9.00am, TF1-371 attended a meeting at Anthony
Mekunagbe's house. Charles Taylor, Dr Manneh and senior officers and members of the
Special Forces and others participated in the meeting.509l During the meeting Taylor and
Sankoh discussed different plans to attack Sierra Leone. According to TF1-371, Taylor
dominated the meeting and took the decision to attack Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991 on
two fronts, Pujehun and Kailahun Districts, contrary to Sankoh's project to attack first Daru
Barracks.5092
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2345. Witness Isaac Mongor was an NPFL training instructor in physical exercise at Camp
Naama in early 1991. He testified that Foday Sankoh used to tell the recruits in the training
camp that Sierra Leone was corrupt and that the recruits were being trained to go and free
5089 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 410-423, 774-778, 806-816, 1351-1353.
5090 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2212-2214.
5091 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2218-2220 (The Witness mentioned the names of Anthony
Mekunagbe, Sam Larto, Sam Tuah, Charles Timber as attending the meeting).
mz TF1-371, 'Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2213-2218.

---- End of Page 787 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

_gg&?z>
the people from this system. Sankoh described himself as a poor man but stated that ‘his
brother’, Charles Taylor, would take over the country5O93
2346. After their training in Camp Naama, Mongor and his men went to Voinjama in Lofa
County. There, Mongor met Charles Taylor and his Special Forces, NPFL soldiers. Mongor
was invited into the house of General Dopoe Menkarzon (a.k.a. General Pepe) with Charles
Taylor and Foday Sankoh. General Francis Mewon, a member of the Special Forces,
Ibrahim Bah and a Gambian named Lamin also attended the meeting. During the meeting,
Taylor thanked Mongor for having trained his men and assigned him to the mission to fight
in Sierra Leone and take over power.5094
Prosecution Witness TF1-168
2347. Witness TF1-168, a RUF member,5O95 testified that in March 1991, Foday Sankoh
ordered him and eight other men to travel from Camp Naama to Sierra Leone on
reconnaissance missions. The eight men were divided in two groups of four: TF1-168 and
TF1-371 belonged to the first group, while the second group was led by Mohamed
Tarawalli. The mandate of TF1-168's group was to gauge the people's reaction to the
ultimatum given by the RUF, and to assess the military strength of the APC government.
After the first night in Baiwala, this group split; TF1-371 and John Sei went to Daru while
TF1-168 continued toward Kenema and Freetown.5O96 That morning, as he was leaving
Baiwala, TF1-168 heard gunfire and understood that the war had started.
2348. Two months later, when the RUF controlled the area where he was staying, TF1-168
complained to Sankoh that by attacking before they could come back from the mission
Sankoh had endangered their lives. Sankoh apologised and explained that the attack on
Sierra Leone was not supposed to take place so early but a fire exchange between NPFL
soldiers and Sierra Leonean border guards in Bomaru regarding a debt for looted goods
provided a good opportunity for the RUF to invade Sierra Leone.
The Accused
5093 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5667.
5094 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5667-5673; Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6668-6674.
5095 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009. pp. 23275-23282 (CS).
50% rrr-ina. rranrnrrpr 21 January 2009, pp. 23161-23166.

---- End of Page 788 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / dm 18 May 2012

ZX¢?f/
2349. The Accused denied having planned any attack on Sierra Leone. He stated that he
was not present at the meeting in Voinjama and did not discuss any strategies or plans with
F 0day Sankoh regarding the attack on Sierra Leone.5007 The Accused further denied being
the guiding force behind the plan to attack Sierra Leone. He stated that Sankoh did not need
his help.5000 The Accused further testified that the first and Only time he went to Voinjama
was at end of the last quarter of 1991.5000
2350. The Accused testified that he was surprised and very disturbed to hear of the
invasion in Sierra Leone. He heard it through his NPF L lnformation Officer who would
bring a summary of important news to him every day in Harbel, through the programme
F0cus on Africa on the BBC. The Accused decided to close the border immediately and
called President of Sierra Leone, M0moh. SI00 M0moh told the Accused that people with
NPF L ID cards were involved and told him that he was convinced that the Accused was
involved in the invasion. The Accused testified that the entire international community was
convinced that he was behind the invasion but it was a lie. 5101
2351. The Accused testified that, in August 1991, he took the decision to contact the RUF
to see if they could put together a "programme" to help him protect his border and to fight
J the common enemy, ULIMO. He contacted Sankoh through members of his Special F 0rces
and asked him to come to Gbamga. The Accused believed he sent D0p0e Menkarz0n to
convey this message. Sankoh was happy to meet with him, Taylor.5l02
2352. After August 1991, the Accused worked with F 0day Sankoh's RUF in order to fight
against ULIMO. He provided manp0wer, arms and ammunition, a guest house for Foday
Sankoh and radi0 r00m in Gbamga. The Accused had little to share as he was fighting a war
himself. However, he did, on 0ccasion, share with him limited quantities of materiel. There
were no arms coming in from the outside. The Accused was dealing with whatever he was
5007 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 9 September 2009, pp. 28450- 28460.
5000 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29742-29475; Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2009, pp.
30390-30393.
5000 Charles Ghankay T ayl0r, Transcript 22 July 2009, p. 24998; Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2009 pp. 30392-30394
$00 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24765-24770.
5101 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24764-24769.
5102 Charles Ghankay T ayl0r, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24794-24796.

---- End of Page 789 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dbi l8 May 2012
r

QZ? KK K
able to capture from the AFL.511)3 The Accused testified that this minimal assistance lasted
until May 1992 when he stopped any kind cooperation with the RUF .5104
Defence Witness DCT-125
2353. Witness DCT—125, a Gambian official, testified that Dr Manneh was not present
during the alleged meeting at Voinjama in March 1991 where Taylor, Sankoh and Dr
Manneh allegedly planned the invasion of Sierra Leone. DCT-125 denied that Dr Manneh
had ever been to Voinjama. He also stated that Dr Manneh did not know several of the other
alleged participants in the meetings.51115
2354. According to DCT—125, Dr Manneh learnt about the conflict in Sierra Leone through
the BBC Focus on Afiica and met Sankoh for the very first time in late 1991 or the
beginning of 1992, when the conflict in Sierra Leone had already started.511)6
Defence Witness DCT—025
2355. Witness DCT—025, an RUF recruit,511)1 was referred to in TF1—371's testimony as
having provided him lodging in Voinjama the night before TF 1—371 allegedly participated in
the meeting with Taylor and Sankoh.51011 DCT—025 denied having lodged TF 1—371 and
testified that he did not have any house or family in Voinjama. Moreover, he testified that he
had never stayed in Voinjama and only passed through once on his way to Koindu in
1991.51119
2356. DCT—025 testified that, before the invasion of Sierra Leone in March 1991, no one
left Camp Naama. Thus, TF1—371 and Mohamed Tarawalli did not leave Camp Naama in
February 1991. DCT—025 left Camp Naama on 20 March 1991 when the RUF decided to
attack Sierra Leone.51111
5103 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24806-24808, 24809-24812; Transcript 20 July 2009,
pp. 24825-24827.
5104 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24825-24827,
5"’5 DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, pp. 36814-36822.
51116 DCT-125, Transcript 9 March 2010, pp. 36794-36798.
51117 DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37219, 37273 (PS).
M r1¤1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2212-2214 (cs).
5109 DCT-025, Transcript 17 March 2010, pp. 37388-37390 (PS), 37443-37445. ~
5110 DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp, 37252-37255; Transcript 17 March 2010, pp. 37388-37390 (PS),
37414-37416, 37443-37445; Transcript 18 March 2010, p. 37546.

---- End of Page 790 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T » 18 May 2012 lg)
\

3 Eff]
Defence Witness DCT—292
2357. Witness DCT-292, an RUF recruit,5m testified that in March 1991 Foday Sankoh
came from Gbarnga and told the recruits that a friend informed him that a group of Liberians
had already crossed the border into Sierra Leone and were engaging in bartering. DCT—292
testified that this news prompted Sankoh to initiate the RUF invasion because Sankoh did
not want the SLA soldiers on the border to run away. DCT-292 understood Sankoh's
reaction as a way to get ammunition as RUF troops had no arms and ammunition to start the
Wansiiz
2358. DCT-292 testified that Sankoh called his commanders — Rashid Mansaray, Isaac
Mongor, Sylvester, and Mohamed Tarawalli — to discuss the strategy for the invasion.
Mansaray asked Sankoh how they would fight a war without ammunition. Sankoh told him
that the RUF struggle was purely self—reliant and that the commandos should be capable of
finding their own arms.5l I3
2359. DCT-292 stated that the first incursion into Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991 was
divided into two groups. The first group targeted Kailahun, and was headed by Jolm Kargbo.
The second group targeted Pujehun, and included Rashid Mansaray and Mike Lamin. The
first group was then separated into two, as it was decided that it was better to attack
Kailahun from two fronts — from Koindu and from Bomaru. Mohamed Tarawalli told the
group under Kargbo that they should target Bomaru and attack simultaneously. These
groups took Kailahun district.5 I 14
Defence Witness Yanks Smyghe
2360. Witness Yanks Smythe, a Gambian, was Taylor's bodyguard and radio operator from
1990 until 1995. Smythe testified that the first time he accompanied Taylor to Voinjama in
Lofa County was in October 1991, after the RUF attacked Sierra Leone. SHS According to
Sm DCT—292, Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41673—41674 (PS).
5I I2 DCT—292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41718—41721.
SH3 DCT—292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41721—41722.
SI M DCT—292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41722—41723, 41725.
SI I5 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 25 February 2010, pp. 36l00—36119.

---- End of Page 791 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / dm 18 May 2012

Smythe there had been no communication between Taylor and Sankoh before the RUF
attacked Sierra Leone.5l I6
2361. Smythe further testified that in March 1991, Dr Manneh was in Buchanan since
Taylor had asked him to stay there to help organize the civil administration. Smythe stated
that Dr Manneh and Taylor played no part in the invasion of Sierra Leone.5l I7
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2362. Witness Issa Sesay testified that, while in Camp Naama, he never heard any
discussion suggesting that Taylor and Sankoh developed a relationship. Sesay testified that
he sent TF1-371 and Mohamed Tarawalli on a reconnaissance mission into Sierra Leone
before the invasion but that they came back to Camp Naama before the convoy left for
Voinjama in Lofa County. They returned to Camp Naama in March 1991 and two days later,
the RUF invaded Sierra Leone.5ll8 Sesay stated that at no time did either man tell him about
attending a meeting in Voinjama to discuss the invasion of Sierra Leone with Taylor. More
enerall , Sesa never heard an discussion about Taylor overrulin Sankoh's lans for the
S Y Y p Y Y S P
invasion of Sierra Leone nor did Sankoh ever complain about Taylor for doing so.5l lg
Deliberations
2363. The Trial Chamber will first assess the evidence regarding the alleged meeting in
Voinjama before assessing the evidence regarding the invasion of Sierra Leone on 23 March
1991.
(a) Meeting in Voinjama
2364. The Trial Chamber heard significant evidence showing that, in late February 1991,
Foday Sankoh issued an ultimatum to President of Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh to resign
from the Presidency within 90 days or else face a revoltjmo Furthermore, it is undisputed
5116 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, p. 35674.
51 17 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35680-3568l.
A 5118 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43611, 43624.
5* *9 rm spray, Transcript 29 Juiy 2010, pp. 44956-44969 (Ps).
5120 Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38861—38862; Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp,
39642, 39645—39646; lsatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, p. 42714; Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp.
43597, 43633; TF1—168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23423—23425; DCT—068, Transcript 11 March 2010,
pp. 37067—37069; DCT—292. Transcript 2 June 2010, p. 41896.

---- End of Page 792 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T }/ 0}*. 18 May 2012
///

that, on 23 March 1991, before the expiration of Sankoh's ultimatum, troops composed of
NPF L and RUF soldiers invaded Siena Leone.5l2l
2365. In this context, the Prosecution, relying on Witness TF 1-371, alleges that before the
attack was launched on Siena Leone, the Accused, Foday Sankoh, some of the Accused's
subordinate NPF L commanders, including those who would enter Siena Leone as part of the
invading force, and some RUF personnel held a meeting in Voinjama, Lofa County. During
that meeting, the plan for the attack was decided. The Accused was in charge of the
meeting, at which he was domineering.5l22
2366. The Trial Chamber notes that Isaac Mongor and TF 1-371 provided relevant evidence
regarding an alleged meeting with the Accused in Voinjama. The Trial Chamber recalls its
findings that Mongor and TF 1-371 are generally credible witnesses.5123
2367. The Trial Chamber notes that Witness TF 1-371 and Isaac Mongor's testimonies
conoborate each other in placing the Accused at a meeting in Voinjama in March 1991.5124
Nonetheless, these testimonies differ significantly in their details. Witness TF1-371 placed I
the alleged meeting around 9 a.m. on the morning while Isaac Mongor placed it at night.5 125
Except for the Accused and Sankoh, the names of the persons attending the meetings are
entirely different.5l26 While Witness TF 1-371 testified that during the meeting Taylor,
Sankoh and Dr Manneh discussed different plans in order to attack Siena Leone, Isaac
Mongor did not mention discussion of any such plans. He testified that the Accused
assi ed him to the mission to fi ht in Siena Leone.5m Witness TF 1-371 laced the
an S P
Sm Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007 ,Annex A, Facts C and
N.
Sm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 77.
5123 Credibility Assessment TF 1-371 paras. 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras. 269-274.
SI24 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2213-2218; Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5667-5673;
Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6668-6674.
5125 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2213 (‘When I arrived at Voinjama I went to spend the night with
one of the commanders, and in the morning by 9 o'clock some security personnel came to fetch me from where I
was that I was wanted by Mr Sankoh in a meeting’). See in conzrast, Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p.
5670 (‘Yes, when we got to Voinjama I had told you that we got there at night. [U.] Then I was able to talk to
Mr Taylor that night’).
5126 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2218-2220 (CS) (TF1-371 mentioned Taylor, Sankoh, Anthony
Mekunagbe, Sam Larto, Sam Tuah, Charles Timber as attending the meeting); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10
March 2008, pp. 5667-5673; Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6668-6674. (Mongor mentioned Taylor, Sankoh,
General Francis Mewon, a member of the Special Forces, Ibrahim Bah and a Gambian named Lamin among
those who attended the meeting).
Sm The Trial Chamber observes that during his testimony in Court, Mongor stated that Taylor thanked him
personally for the job he has done in training his men (Isaac Mongor, Transcript 4 April 2008, p. 6668).

---- End of Page 793 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

alleged meeting at the home of Anthony Mekunagbe while Isaac Mongor placed the meeting
at the home of General Dopoe Menkarzon (a.k.a. General Pepe), although other witnesses
have referred to Anthony Mekunagbe as "General Dry Pepe".5 128 The details are so different
as to suggest that the witnesses may have been testifying about two different meetings but
the evidence does not establish that there were two meetings.5l29 In any event, the Trial
Chamber notes that there were many inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses.
2368. Additionally, TF1-371 testified that the meeting in Voinjama took place after he
came back from the reconnaissance mission in Sierra Leone. TF1-168, who was in TF1-
371 's group during this mission testified that, just after the group split, he heard gunfire and
understood that the RUF attacked Sierra Leone.5l30 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding
that TF1-168 is also generally credible.5l3 I However, Witness TF1-168's testimony is
inconsistent with TF1-371's account that he came back from the reconnaissance mission
before the start of the invasion. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-371's sequence of the
events is corroborated by Issa Sesay. Indeed, Sesay testified that TF1-371 returned from the
mission two days before the RUF invaded Sierra Leone.5l32 However, Sesay testified that
TF1-371 returned to Camp Naama and not directly to Voinjama as alleged by TF1-371.
Furthermore, Issa Sesay, who was close to TF1-371 and to Mohamed Tarawalli , testified
that he had never heard about this alleged meeting.5l33 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding
that the testimony of Issa Sesay must be treated with caution.5l34 Nevertheless, in the Trial
However, in the additional information on the proofmg notes dated 3 and 8 February 2008, Mongor explained
that Taylor did not talk specifically to him during that meeting but addressed all the commanders who were
present. Confronted with this discrepancy, Mongor explained that Taylor spoke to him personally during a first
meeting and addressed his greetings to all the commanders during a second one (Isaac Mongor, Transcript 4
April 2008, pp. 6668-6674). In both accounts, Mongor did not mention any discussion regarding the invasion of
Sierra Leone.
Sm See for example Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, p. 4656; Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 1
December 2008, p. 21330, Transcript 2 December 2008 p. 21413; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16
September 2009, p. 29125; Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, p. 42670.
5129 The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution brief does not suggest that there were two meetings
(Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 77, 80). The Prosecution, quoting Mongor, submits that ‘the morning after a
meeting with Taylor in Voinjama in which Taylor made the fmal decision as to how the attack would unfold
Isaac Mongor and his men were sent to Foya where they were armed’. There is no mention of a second meeting
and the characterization in the brief of Taylor's role in this meeting is not derived from Mongor's testimony but
apparently from TF1-371's testimony. The Prosecution seems therefore to consider that Mongor and TF1-371
were testifying as to the same meeting.
5130 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23161-23166 (CS).
Sm Credibility Assessment, TF1-168, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2328.
M ipsa Sesay, Transcript 5 Juiy 2010, pp. 43611, 43624.
Sm Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 44956-44969 (PS).
5134 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.

---- End of Page 794 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Chamber's view these discrepancies within the Prosecution evidence cast doubt on the
reliability of the evidence regarding the alleged meeting.
2369. The Accused denied having been in Voinjama in March 1991 and having planned the
attack on Sierra Leone. DCT-125 denied that Dr Manneh was in Voinjama and planned this
attack. This evidence is corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses. DCT-292 testified
that the planning of the invasion of Sierra Leone by Sankoh and his commanders including
Rashid Mansaray, Isaac Mongor, Sylvester, Mohamed Tarawalli took place in Camp Naama
and not in Voinjama as alleged by TF1 -371. SUS
2370. Yanks Smythe, who was with the Accused in March 1991, testified that Taylor was
not in Voinjama. He also testified that in March 1991, Dr Manneh was in Buchanan. Smythe
testified that the first time he accompanied Taylor to Voinjama in Lofa County was in
October 1991, after the RUF attacked Sierra Leone.5 13 6 The Trial Chamber notes, however,
that in a prior statement dated 26 February 2010, Smythe admitted having been in Voinjama
in March 1991. Confronted with this contradiction, Smythe explained that he changed his
version because he thought about it and realized he had made a mistake.5 B7 The Trial
Chamber is not convinced by this explanation and does not therefore accept Smythe's
evidence in this regard.
2371. DCT-025, who allegedly lodged TF 1-371 the night before he attended the meeting,
directly contradicted TF 1-371 's testimony.5 138 DCT-025 denied he had a house in Voinjama
and that he had hosted TF 1-371. In the Trial Chamber's view this casts further doubts
regarding TF 1-371 's account of events.5|39
2372. Finally, the Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-367 testified that when he arrived at Crab
Hole training camp, in 1990, months before the invasion of Sierra Leone, Sankoh told him
that he would enter Sierra Leone from two fronts "one in the Kailahun District and, two, in
Pujehun District".5 MO Thus, according to TF 1-367, whom the Trial Chamber has found to be
Sm DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41718-41721.
Sm Yanks Smythe, Transcript 25 February 2010, pp. 36100-361 19.
Sm Yanks Smythe, Transcript 2 March 2010, pp. 36506-36510.
mg DCT-025, Transcript 17 March 2010, pp. 37388-37390 (PS), 37443-37445.
5139 The Trial Chamber further notes that Witness TF1-371 described DCT-025 as a NPFL fighter while DCT-
025 testified that he was a RUF recruit. TF1-371's ignorance about DCT-025 belonging to the RUF raises
further doubt with respect to his account of the night he spent at DCT-025's house.
M Tri-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14098-14099.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /7 CL 18 May 2012

generally credible,5Ml Sankoh had already designed the plan for invading Sierra Leone on
two fronts, long before the alleged meeting in Voinjama.
2373. In light of the inconsistencies noted above, even among Prosecution witnesses, the
Trial Chamber is unable to accept TF1-371 's testimony without doubt. There is no evidence
other than the testimony of TF1-371 that the Accused participated in a meeting in March
1991 in Voinjama with Foday Sankoh and Dr Manneh that planned and organised the
invasion of`Sierra-Leone. 7
(b) Invasion of Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991
2374. The Prosecution alleges that NPFL commanders and fighters sent by the Accused
and obeying his orders, were in command of all the operations during the invasion into
Sierra Leone in March 1991 until they were withdrawn in about June 1992.5 [42
2375. While the Defence concedes that the invasion force included NPFL troops and that
· the majority of RUF recruits were Liberians,5l43 the Accused testified that he did not know
that NPFL soldiers participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone. He stated that he was
shocked, as anyone, to hear that there was an attack on Sierra Leone.5l44 The Accused added
that he discovered Mekunagbe and Vamey's involvement during investigations on Varney
and Mekunagbe from his first conversation with Sankoh in June 1991.5145 Following further
investigations, Varney, Mekunagbe and One Man One were arrested for a plot against him
around June 1992. Mekunagbe died in detention while Oliver Varney was convicted and
executed.5l46
2376. In the Trial Chamber's view, while this evidence suggests that NPFL Commanders
Anthony Mekunagbe and Oliver Varney carried on certain activities without the Accused's
Sm Credibility Assessment, TF1-367, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2446.
Sm Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 29-30, 78-84, 206.
Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 415-423, 774-778, 806-816, 1351-1353.
5144 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24747-24750, 24764-24769.
5145 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28936-28938; Transcript 25 November 2009,
pp. 32369-32370.
5146 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28936-28938, 28966; Transcript 16 September
2009, pp. 29129-29131; Transcript 4 November 2009, pp. 31103-31105; Transcript 2 December 2009, pp.
32961-32968; Transcript 3 December 2009, pp. 33005-33007; Edward Mineh, Transcript 29 April 2010, pp.
40348-40353, 40361-40363; Transcript 3 May 2010, pp. 40417-40419; Transcript 4 May 2010, pp. 40513-
40516; See also Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, p. 10178.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Obs 18 May 2012

ZKEK7
knowledge and consent, it does not cast a doubt on the overwhelming evidence of the
Accused's knowledge of and involvement in the invasion of Sierra Leone.
2377. At the outset, the Trial Chamber recalls that it has found that, prior to the invasion of
Sierra Leone, Taylor made a public statement on the radio that "Sierra Leone would taste the
bitterness of war".5m
2378. The evidence unequivocally establishes that NPF L soldiers constituted the large
majority of the invasion force on Sierra Leone.5M8 The evidence also shows that the RUF
troops who invaded Sierra Leone were composed of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans trained
Sm See supra para. 2335.
5148 Stephen Ellis, Transcript 17 January 2008, p. 1493; Transcript 18 January 2008, p. 1553 (according to the
report of the Sierra Leoneans TRC, the war in Sierra Leone was largely as a result of the NPFL forces. Also,
according to the TRC report, in the first three years of the conflict activities were described to the outside world
as RUF activities when in fact to a substantial extent they were the activities of Liberian fighters of the NPFL
operating inside Sierra Leone in alliance with a small number of RUF fighters); TF 1-371, Transcript 25 January
2008, pp. 2219-2221 (CS) (thousands of NPFL fighters were involved in the attacks in Sierra Leone on 23
March 1991), p. 2224 (CS) (NPFL soldiers Joe Tuah, Duopo Menkerzon and Joseph Brown participated in the
Kailahun attack in March 1991), p. 2225 (CS) (Nathaniel was a NPFL fighter who also participated in the
invasion of Sierra Leone in Pujehun district), p. 2227 (CS) (TF1-371 fought in Pujehun district under the direct
command of One Man One, the deputy commander to Oliver Varney); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008,
p. 5676 (The witness participated to the invasion of Sierra Leone. He testified that NPFL generals and NPFL
fighters participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone); TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14099-14100
(The witness stated that he was at the base when the NPFL first launched the attack on Koindu, Sierra Leone.);
TF1-168, Transcript, 21 January 2009, p. 23180 (CS) (The witness stated that it was a group largely of NPFL
fighters who attacked Pujehun districts.); Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23170 (CS) (TF1-168 was in RUF
junior commandos who entered into Sierra Leone on the Pujehun side; they reported to a NPFL Commander
named One Man One who was under the Command of Oliver Varney, Commander of the NPF L 6th Battalion);
Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5865-5867 (The witness testified that he led NPFL forces to
attack Sierra Leone.); DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41732, 41735 (The witness testified that there were
Liberian nationals at the Koindu attack and himself was part of NPFL.); TF 1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008,
p. 15109 (During the invasion of Sierra Leone the overall commander was Dopoe Menkarzon. He had had
various NPFL commanders including Sam Tuah, James Caway and Christopher Varinoh and Mon Ami from
Gambia.); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12826; (The witness testified the names of commanders and
soldiers in the NPFL group inter alia Dopoe Menkarzon, Francis Mewon, Jah Glory and One Man One); TF 1-
567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12829-12830 (General Samuel Tuah controlled the movement at that time and
he was an NPF L. NPF L commanders were in command of the front at this time. There were many NPFL soldiers ·
in Sierra Leone at that time. There were many Sierra Leonean RUF in the attack); Mustapha Mansaray,
Transcript 4 March 2008, p. 5258 (General One Man One was an NPFL fighter, but when the RUF entered into
Sierra Leone in 1991 he was the overall commander for the RUF movement in the Pujehun District); Moses
Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9859 ("At the initial stage there was a small group of Liberian soldiers moving.
They were a little bit more than the RUF"); Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12048-12055 (Alice Pyne
testified that she was abducted together with 100 able bodied civilians (boys, girls, women and men) by NPFL
Liberian fighters. The NPFL fighters dressed in civilian clothes who searched for arms and ammunition from
civilian houses, looted civilian money and forced the abducted civilians to train in a training camp were
commanded by a NPFL soldier named CO Dugba and his deputy Pele Boy); Foday Lansana, Transcript 20
February 2008, pp. 4341-4343 (There were two groups who invaded Sierra Leone. One was headed by
Mohamed Tarawalli of the RUF, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, and the other group, the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia, was headed by Sam Tuah, They were fighting side by side); Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28936-28938 (During the investigation on NPF L Commanders Oliver Varney
and Anthony Mekunagbe, at the end of 1991, Taylor discovered that they participated in the invasion of Sierra

---- End of Page 797 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gm 18 May 2012

3 KK Qt:
in Camp Naama, Liberia, before the invasion.5l49 The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that
the Accused provided the RUF with the training camp of Crab Hole, instructors, recruits and
material support, including food and other supplies.5l5O
2379. The NPFL/RUF troops invading Sierra Leone were led by NPFL Commanders
including Sam Tuah,5l5l Anthony Mekunagbe,5l52 Oliver Varney,5l53 One Man One,5l54 and
Leone).
mg TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2219-2221, 2235 (CS) (The RUF fighters were novice and new
recruits from the Camp Naama training base involved in the attack on 23rd March 1991 in Sierra Leone); DCT-
292, Transcript, 1 June 2010, pp. 41732, 41735; (DCT-292 was part of the attack on Koidu town with other RUF
fighters who were trained at Camp Naama); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5674-5676 (Mongor
was part of RUF newly trained recruits fighters who participated the Sierra Leone attack); TF1-567, Transcript, 2
July 2008, p. 12826 (Junior RUF recruits like Philip Palmer, Sam Bockarie trained in Camp Naama participated
in the attack of Sierra Leone); DCT-146, Transcript 1 April 2010, pp. 38602-38604 (The RUF members who
invaded Sierra Leone were Sierra Leoneans and Liberians who had fought under Taylor's command in Liberia
and were trained in RUF training camp at Camp Naama).
M50 Pre—Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama.
Sm TF1-371, Trabscript 25 January 2008 p. 2220 (CS) (The Strike Force Unit, composed of 90 men, was
involved in the invasion of Sierra Leone and Sam Tuah was their leader), p. 2222 (CS) (Sam Tuah was in
command of the attack on Bomaru); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12829-12830 (General Samuel Tuah
controlled the movement at that time and he was an NPFL.); Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp.
4341-4343 (There were two groups who invaded Sierra Leone. One was headed by Mohamed Tarawalli of the
RUF, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, and the other group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia,
was headed by Sam Tuah. They were fighting side by side); TFl-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15109
(During the invasion of Sierra Leone the he overall commander was Dopoe Menkarzon. He had had various
NPFL commanders including Sam Tuah, James Caway and Christopher Varmoh).; Charles Ghankay Taylor, 16
September 2009, p. 29061 (Charles Timba was one of the NPFL commanders that worked along with Sam Tuah
in Sierra Leone). See also Exhibit P-054, "NPFL command structure circa 1990-1991 as indicated by TF1-371"
(describing that Sam Tuah as Commander of the Strike Force Unit under the direct command of Michael Peager
and eventually Charles Taylor); Exhibit P-055, "NPFL command structure after the invasion of Sierra Leone on
March 1991, as indicated by TF1-371" (indicating that Sam Tuah was commander of the strike force under the
direct command of Sam Larto and eventually Charles Taylor); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12826-
12827 (TF1-567 testified that while he was training at the Pendembu training base from May 1991 to 1992, he
saw Foday Sankoh and the Liberian Special Forces Francis Mewon and Dopoe Menkarzon who came to replace
NPFL commander Samuel Tuah).
5152 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28936-28938 (during the investigation on
NPFL Commanders Oliver Varney and Anthony Mekunagbe, at the end of 1991, Taylor discovered that they
participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone); See also TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2220 (CS) (The
2nd and 6th Battalions participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone ); Exhibit P-054, "NPFL command structure
in 1990-1991 as indicated by TF1-371" (describing Anthony Menkunagbe as 2nd Battalion Commander (based
in Voinjama) under the direct command of Sam Larto and eventually Charles Taylor); TFl-338, Transcript 1
September 2008, pp. 15106-15107 (ln 1992, Anthony Mekunagbe, Charles Timber, Oliver Varney, Dopoe,
Menkarzon, Francis Mewon used to visit Foday Sankoh in Kailahun).
Sm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2222 (CS) (Oliver Varney was in charge of the operation on
Pujehun District; he was reporting to Sam Larto and then the report filter on to Charles Taylor who was by that
time residing in Gbange); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23170 (CS) (TF1-168 was in RUF junior
cornmandos who entered into Sierra Leone on the Pujehun side; They reported to a NPFL Commander named
One Man One who was under the Command of Oliver Varney, Commander of the NPFL 6th Battalion); Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28936-28938 (during the investigation on NPFL
Commanders Oliver Varney and Anthony Mekunagbe, at the end of 1991, Taylor discovered that they
participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone). See also TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008 p. 2220 (CS) (The
2nd and 6th Battalions participated in the invasion of Sieria Leone ); DCT-228, Transcript 19 May 2010, p.
41184 (Oliver Varney was the commander of the 6th Battalion, NPFL); Exhibit P-054, "NPFL command

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T W 18 May 2012 Q

3»S’@‘i/
Charles Timber.5l55 The chart drawn by TF1-371, admitted as Exhibit P-055, indicates an
integrated command structure, although the Trial Chamber notes that in this chart, while
RUF commanders are shown to be reporting to NPFL commanders for the purpose of
military command, Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, has no reporting line to the »
Accused.5l56 Given this level of involvement and this command structure, in the Trial
Chamber's view, it is impossible that such an important event, an attack involving two
major battalions of the Accused's army, against a neighbouring country, could have
happened without the knowledge and consent of the Accused.
2380. In making this finding, the Trial Chamber recalls the testimony of the Accused that
he was informed immediately of this invasion by his Information Officer in Harbel and by
structure in 1990-1991 as indicated by TF1-371" (describing Oliver Varney as commander of the NPFL 6th
Battalion based in Bomi Hills under the direct command of Sam Larto and eventually Charles Taylor); Exhibit
P-055, "NPFL command structure after the invasion of Sierra Leone on March 1991, as indicated by TF1-371"
(indicating that Oliver Varney was commander of the NPFL 6th Battalion under the direct command of Sam
Larto and eventually Charles Taylor); TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15106-15107 (In 1992,
Anthony Mekunagbe, Charles Timber, Oliver Varney, Dopoe, Menkarzon, Francis Mewon used to visit Foday
Sankoh in Kailahun).
Sm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2222 (CS) (Oliver Varney, together with his Deputy Charles
Timber, were in charge of the operation on Pujehun District; One Man One was their ground commander on the
field during the attack); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23170 (CS) (TF1-168 was an RUF junior
commandos who entered into Sierra Leone on the Pujehun side; They reported to a NPFL Commander named
One Man One who was under the Command of Oliver Varney, Commander of the NPFL 6th Battalion); See also
TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2220 (CS) (The 2nd and 6th Battalions participated in the invasion of
Sierra Leone ); Exhibit P-054, "NPFL command structure in 1990-1991 as indicated by TFl-371" (describing
One Man One as Deputy Commander of Oliver Varney in the 6th Battalion based in Bomi Hills). In Exhibit P-
054 Witness T F1-371 described Charles Timber, Rashid Mansaray, Mike Lamin, Nataniel, Sam Bockarie, Philip
Palmer and Lion as members of the 6th Battalion under the direct command of One Man One; Exhibit P-055,
"NPFL command structure after the invasion of Sierra Leone on March 1991 as indicated by TF1-371"
(describing One Man One as Deputy Commander of Oliver Varney within the NPFL 6th Battalion based in
Bomi Hills). In Exhibit P-055 TF1-371 also described Mike Lamin as RUF lst Battalion Commander under the
direct command of Rashid Mansary, Deputy Leader of One Man One; TF 1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12851
(In 1992, One Man One introduced himself as the commander of Tubmanburg); Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript
4 March 2008, p. 5258 (General One Man One was an NPFL fighter, but when the RUF entered into Sierra
Leone in 1991 he was the overall commander for the RUF movement in the Pujehun District); Dauda Aruna
Forrrie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21307 (One Man One was the battalion commander for the 6th Battalion
of the NPFL in 1992); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20074 (The commander in Pujehun
was One Man One also known as Scorpion).
5155 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2222 (CS) (Oliver Varney, together with his Deputy Charles
Timber, were in charge of the operation on Pujehun District; They were reporting to Sam Larto and "then the
report filter on to Charles Taylor who was by that time residing in Gbang"); Charles Ghankay Taylor, 16
September 2009, p. 29061 (Charles Timba was one of the NPFL commanders that worked along with Sam Tuah
in Sierra Leone); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12820 (Charles Timber was the training commandant of
Pendembu vocational secondary school compound, a training base in Kailaliun district); T F1-371, 25 January
2008 p. 2220 (CS) (The 2nd and 6th Battalions participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone ); Exhibit P-054,
"NPFL command structure in 1990-1991 as indicated by TF1-371" (describing Charles Timber as a member of
the 6th Battalion under the direct command of One Man One).
5*56 Exhibit P-055, "RUF Command Structure After the Invasion of Sierra Leone Circa March, June 1991", ERN
100161.

---- End of Page 799 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Jr? az
the radio programme Focus on Africa on the BBC. The Accused further stated that he was
also immediately informed by President Momoh that NPF L soldiers participated in the
invasion.5l57 However, when he learned of the involvement of NPF L soldiers in the invasion
of Sierra Leone, the Accused did not immediately react. To the contrary, it is undisputed that
around June 1991 following a meeting with the RUF leader Foday Sankoh, the Accused
provided NPF L fighters and commanders for reinforcement in Sierra Leone.5l58 These NPF L
commanders included Generals Francis Mewon5l59 and Dopoe Menkarzon.5l°O The evidence
clearly demonstrates that after June 1991, the Accused provided weapons and ammunitions
to his troops and RUF troops in Sierra Leone.5l6l The Accused also provided NPF L radios
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24764-24769.
5158 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32367 (in May/June 1991, Taylor contacted the
leader of RUF to get the RUF to cooperate with the NPFL in terms of security of the border because NPFL and
RUF had a common enemy); Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4350, 4354-4355 (While he was
in Foya, Lansana saw at least every day or after one or two days a group of people on board a truck with arms
and ammunition would come from Voinjama into Foya en route to Sierra Leone); Dauda Aruna Fomie,
Transcript l December 2008, pp. 2l32l-2l325 (While he was in Bomi Hills, Fomie saw NPFL reinforcement
coming from Liberia going to the front in Sierra Leone).
Sm TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23200-23202 (CS) (describing General Dopoe Menkarzon and
General Francis Menwon as NPFL Special Forces in charge of Kailahun district around May 1991); Foday
Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4370-4373 (describing NPFL commanders, like Anthony
Menquenagbeh, Francis Mewon or Duopo Merkazon as fully in control of supplies and monitoring and
dispatching of everything that went on in Sierra-Leone in 1992); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12826-
12827 (TF1-567 testified that while he was training at the Pendembu training base from May 1991 to 1992, he
saw Foday Sankoh and the Liberian Special Forces Francis Mewon and Dopoe Menkarzon who came to replace
NPFL commander Samuel Tuah); See also TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008 p. 2220 (CS) (The 2nd and 6th
Battalions participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone ); Exhibit P-054, "NPFL command structure in 1990-1991
as indicated by TFl-37l" (describing Francis Mewon as Deputy Commander of the lst Battalion Commander);
TF1-338, Transcript l September 2008, pp. l5l06-l5l07 (In 1992, Anthony Mekunagbe, Charles Timber,
Oliver Varney, Dopoe, Menkarzon, Francis Mewon used to visit Foday Sankoh in Kailahun).
5160 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28936 (Dopoe Menkarzon was not involved in
the initial invasion of Sierra Leone; he became involved after Taylor's meeting with Sankoh); TF1-168,
Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23200-23202 (CS) (describing General Dopoe Menkarzon and General Francis
Menwon as NPFL Special Forces in charge of Kailahun district around May 1991); Foday Lansana, Transcript
20 February 2008, pp. 4370-4373 (describing NPFL commanders, like Anthony Menquenagbeh, Francis Mewon
or Duopo Merkazon as fully in control of supplies and monitoring and dispatching of everything that went on in
Sierra-Leone in 1992); TF1-338, Transcript l September 2008, pp. l5l06-l5l07 (In 1992, Anthony Mekunagbe,
Charles Timber, Oliver Varney, Dopoe, Menkarzon, Francis Mewon used to visit Foday Sankoh in Kailahun);
TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12826-12827 (TF1-567 testified that while he was training at the
Pendembu training base from May 1991 to 1992, he saw Foday Sankoh and the Liberian Special Forces Francis
Mewon and Dopoe Menkarzon who came to replace NPFL commander Samuel Tuah); Exhibit P-065, "Letter
from Sankoh to Taylor dated 5 May l992" (mentioning the name of General Dopoe); Moses Blah, Transcript 14
May 2008, pp. 9865-9866 (Dopoe Menkarzon came back from Sierra Leone to Liberia after the Operation Top
Final. Menkarzon, got a job as head of security at the bureau of maritime affairs); But See in contrast TF1-371,
Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2224 (CS), (Dopoe Menkarzon, a NPFL special force commando, participated in
the Kailahun attack in March 1991); Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2220 (CS) (The 2nd and 6th Battalions
participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone ); Exhibit P-054, "NPFL command structure in 1990-1991 as
indicated by TFl-37l" (describing Dopoe Menkarzon as a member of the 2nd Battalion (based in Voinjama)
under the direct command of Anthony Menkunagbe, Commander of the 2nd Battalion).
SW Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24806-24808, 24809-24812 (Taylor provided
manpower, arms and ammunition guest house for Foday Sankoh and radio room in Gbarnga. Taylor had little to

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T Om 1.8 May 2012 (

and radio operators to the RUF.5l62*The RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was given a house in
Gbamga and basic facilities.5 I63
2381. Thus, when viewing the record as a whole, it can only be concluded that the Accused
was involved in the invasion of Sierra Leone. Widespread belief in his involvement was
acknowledged by the Accused himself as having been held by the international community
and President Momoh at the time of the invasion. 5 I64
2382. Turning to the motivations behind the NPFL and RUF cooperation in invading Sierra
Leone, the Prosecution alleges that the invasion of Sierra Leone was the prelude to the
achievement of the ultimate objectives of the common plan, design or purpose, namely to
terrorize the civilian population in order to forcibly control the population and territory of
Sierra Leone and to pillage its resources, in particular diamonds.5l65
share as he was fighting a war himself However, he did, on occasion, share with him limited quantities of
materiel); Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24825-24827 (Taylor provided minimal assistance to Sankoh from
August 1991 through May 1992. He sent small amounts of AK ammunition from time to time. Perhaps three or
five boxes. He also sent some RPG rockets. He did not send arms because Taylor needed those as he was still
fighting); Exhibit P-065, "Letter from Foday Sankoh to Charles Taylor dated 2 May 1992" (thanking Taylor for
the arms and ammunitions received but requesting more ammunition to continue the tight); Yanks Smythe,
Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35674-35677 (Between 1991 and 1992, Sankoh visited Gbamga and received
small amounts of arms and ammunitions from the NPFL); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12829, 12838-
12845 (in 1991, Sankoh was going to see Charles Taylor, and he brought back arms and ammunition together
with food), p. 12867 (in 1992, Taylor provided Sankoh with a good amount of arms and ammunitions including
RPGs, RPG boxes, AK rounds, GPMG in exchange of diamonds); Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008,
pp. 4350, 4354-4355 (while he was in Foya, Lansana saw at least every day or after one or two days a group of
people on board a truck with arms and ammunition would come from Voinjama into Foya en route to Sierra
Leone), pp. 4370- 4373 (describing NPFL commanders, like Anthony Menquenagbeh, Francis Mewon or Duopo
Merkazon as fully in control of supplies and monitoring and dispatching of everything that went on in Sierra-
Leone in 1992); Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3045 (in 1992, the RUF was getting arms,
ammunition, food and drugs from Taylor); Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, p. 37772 (During the
early stages of the RUF incursion into Sierra Leone, in 1991 the RUF received support from Mr Taylor in the
form of food, medicine and a small amount of ammunition).
5 162 Operational Support: Communications, Radio Equipment and Training.
5 163 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, p. 28597 (Taylor provided Sankoh with a house in
Gbamga from August/September 1991 until the end of his relationship with Sankoh in May of 1992); Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30042-30043 (Taylor agreed that he provided Sankoh with a
house in Gbamga in 1991); Yanks Smythe, 22 February 2010, pp. 35674-35677 (Between 1991 and 1992,
Sankoh visited Gbamga and received small amounts of arms and aminunitions from the NPFL); TF 1-338,
Transcript 1 September 2008 p. 15107 (in 1992, Foday Sankoh did many trips to Gbarnga in Liberia, including
two in company of TF1-338); Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38900-38901 (between April 1991 and
February 1992 Foday Sankoh was almost always in Gbamga); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12838-
12839 (the witness went together with Foday Sankoh to Gbamga twice, one time in 1991, one time in 1992).
5164 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, p. 24769.
5 165 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 575.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T $3 18 May 2012 %
•

3 as wt
2383. The Trial Chamber heard a considerable amount of evidence establishing that from
1991, NPFL soldiers in Sierra Leone committed crimes against Sierra Leonean civilians
including looting, abduction, rape and killing.5l66
2384. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that, after the invasion, the NPFL opened
training camps in which they trained abducted civilians including children. Specifically,
TF1-567, TF1-516, Albert Saidu and Alice Pyne testified that after the invasion of Sierra
Leone in March 1991, they were abducted by RUF and NPFL rebels invading Sierra Leone,
and forced to undergo military training in NPFL/RUF training camps in Kailahun
district.5]67 There, they found hundreds or thousands of other civilians abducted, including
M6 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2238-2239 (CS) (Sankoh told TF1-371 that he was going to
Gbange to complain to Taylor about the behaviour of NPFL soldiers who were killing, harassing and looting 4
civilians); Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, p. 35678 (Smythe heard that the reason of the departure
of NPFL forces from Sierra Leone was that Sankoh complained to Taylor that some of the NPFL soldiers were
misbehaving); Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9860-9861 (Sankoh told Blah: "the boys from NPFL,
whom the chief sent to help me, they got involved into a lot of atrocities, raping women, looting people's
property and killing people, and these are the people I have gone to liberate and I am losing respect amongst my
tribesmen. This was what I have come to consult with the chief on"); Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp.
12048-12055 (Alice Pyne testified that she was abducted together with 100 able bodied civilians (boys, girls,
women and men) by NPFL Liberian fighters. The NPFL fighters dressed in civilian clothes who searched for I
arms and ammunitions from civilian houses, looted civilian money and forced to train in a training camp
commanded by a NPFL soldier named CO Dugba and his deputy Pele Boy); Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22
January 2008, p. 1938 (Dufka states that the disagreements between RUF and NPFL about the NPFL combatants
involved in the perpetration of abuses in Sierra Leone, resulted in Operation Top 20, when the NPFL was
expelled from Sierra Leone; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24819-24820 (In about April
1992, Sankoh complained that Taylor's soldiers were murdering and raping); Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April
2010, pp. 38897-38906 (Testified about Top 20 and Top 40 during which killings and rapes by NPFL soldiers
took place as well as acts of cannibalism); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20085 (Mallah
testified about the NPFL crimes in Pujehun district: civilians were forcibly captured and trained, wives were
abducted and raped, properties were looted); Foday Lansana, Transcript, 20 February 2008, pp. 4374-4378
(Charles Taylor said on a message broadcast on the radio that he had received uncountable complaints of
infighting and poor treatment of civilians and so he was ordering the evacuation of NPFL troops back to Liberia
within 10 days); DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41882-41893 (lot of complaints against NPFL soldiers
harassing and killing civilians, and engaging in cannibalism, and rape. A Liberian named Bosco executed a
woman in the witness's presence because he wanted her daughter); TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.
15579-15580 (PS) (TF1-585 testified that many people were killed, raped, and pregnant woman and children
were mutilated in Sierra Leone in 1992); Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39684-39687 (George's
group arrived in Kailahun on 1 January 1993. He was told that NPFL troops had come to Kailahun and harassed
people, raped them and forced them to do work. The NPFL had organized a group called Top 20, then Top 40,
who started to kill civilians and take their properties); See also Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), pp. 18-20
(describing crimes committed by NPFL soldiers); Exhibit D-336 (Footpaths to Democracy, RUF, 1995) pp.
9707-9708 ("We do not deny that the fact that some of those who volunteered to join our cause were veterans of
the Liberian civil war but majority were of Sierra Leonean parentage. However, this minor "alien" involvement
in our just and human cause was curtailed as early as May 1992 when it became a nightmarish experience for our
civilian population").
5167 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12818-12820 (TF1-567 was in Pendembu Town, Kailahun district in
May 1991 when he saw rebels speaking Liberian English, shooting guns around town and capturing civilians.
TF1-567 who was 16 years old at the time, was captured together with sixteen other people. Some of the captives
were younger than the witness. They were then taken to Pendembu vocational secondary school compound to
undergo training); TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6813-6815, 6876; Transcript 1l April 2008, pp. 7332-
7333 (TF1-516 was 17 years old when he was abducted by a Liberian named Rambo in Kailahun town in March

---- End of Page 802 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T Ou 18 May 2012
/·/" .

zsaaé
children and women, who were divided into different groups by sex and age, including
SBUs (Small Boys Units), SGUs (Small Girls Units) and WACs.5 168 Recruits were trained
by Liberian NPP L trainers.5l69 Witness TFl—516 and Saidu testified that a recruit who tried
to escape was killed as an example to othersfm The Trial Chamber recalls its previous
findings that Pyne and Witnesses TFl—567 and TP 1-516 are all generally credible5m and
finds Albert: Saidu likewise to be generally credible. Similarly, Mansaray, Mallah and
Kamara, all generally credible witnesses,5mtestified that they were captured by RUF and
NPFL soldiers invading Sierra Leone around April 1991, and taken to Gissiwulo training
base in Pujehun district, where they received, together with hundreds of other civilians,
including children, military training by RUP and NPFL trainers.5m The evidence further
1991. Two weeks later, the witness escaped back to his village in Kailahun but one month after that he was
recaptured, again by Liberians); Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10865-10871 (Albert Saidu was
captured with 100 other civilians including young children by RUF and Liberian rebels invading Sierra Leone in
March 1991 and forced to follow military trainings at Pedembu in Kailahun district); Alice Pyne, Transcript 17
June 2008, pp. 12048-12049 (Pyne was abducted by NPFL fighters in March 1991 together with 100 other
civilians including boys, girls and women. The NPFL fighters including one Sierra Leonean named Gibba,
dressed in civilian clothes, searched for arms and ammunitions from civilian houses, looted civilian money).
5168 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12821-12826. (At the base, around 800 people, including children as
young as 13 years old, both boys and girls, underwent military training); TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp.
6815-6824, 6876 (TF1-516 testified that captive civilians arrived from other areas to a training base in Kailahun.
There were approximately 5000 "recruits" including children divided by sex into Small Boys Units and Small
Girls Units who were from 10 up to 20 years old); Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10871-10873
(abducted civilians who were divided into groups: SBUs aged 9-13 years and WACs girls aged 11-12 years who
were forced to be bush wives to the senior commanders); Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12051-12055
(Alice Pyne was taken with 100 other civilans to Dia training base between Manosewallu and Koindu where they
were militarily trained for 3 months. The training commanders, CO Dugba and NPFL fighter Pele Boy, divided
about 300 civilians into groups: 80 SBUs and SGUs aged 8-13 years, female and male adults).
5169 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12825-12826 (TF1-567 named Matthew and Jah Glory, two at the
camp. TF1-567 also mentioned Monica Pearson, a Liberian, as part of the group of commanders at the camp at
the time); Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10871-10872, 10874-10875 (Saidu spent three months
training in military tactics by NPFL Special forces instructors CO Big Darling, CO Nyamator, CO Rebel Baby.
In addition, Special force members in charge of training, CO Sam Tuah, Dopoe, and General Mustapha visited
the trainees at the base); Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12048-12055 (Pyne testified that she was
abducted by NPFL soldiers and trained by them at Dia training camp. NPFL CO Dugba was commander and
Pele Boy deputised him).
5170 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6820-6822 (a recruit who tried to escape from the training base was
killed as an example to others); Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10881-10883 (During the training, the
securities arrested two trainees who attempted to escape and beat them severely. In the presence of the witness
and others, CO Sam Tuah shot them dead and later dumped them in a bush). See also TF1-567, Transcript, 2
July 2008, pp. 12821-12823 (Those who refused to train were punished, meaning that they would be beaten.
Children as young as 12 were beaten for refusing to train, including both boys and girls).
Sm Credibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307; Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317;
Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras 275-284.
5 172 Credibility Assessment, Mustapha M. Mansaray, paras 254-262; Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara,
paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2522.
5 m Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20062-20074 (Augustine Mallah was captured in 1991
at Soriegbema and taken to Gissiwulo, Pujehun District for training. There were more than 1000 people aged
from 10 to 22 years that were being trained by NPFL training instructors at Gisiwulo); Mustapha M. Mansaray,
Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5213, 5223 (Mustapha Mansaray was captured together with other civilians in

---- End of Page 803 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T » 18 Ma 2012

3 $8 7
led attacks against Sierra Leonean civilians as well as junior RUF commandos. Around
April/May 1992 Sankoh met the Accused in Gbarnga, Liberia and complained that the
Accused's men were murdering and raping civilians and not respecting Sankoh as the
leader.5l76 In June 1992, RUF forces attacked NPFL soldiers in retaliation for their crimes in
an operation called Top Final.5m Subsequently, the Accused ordered all the NPFL troops in
Sierra Leone to withdraw.5l78
Menkarzon and James Karway, killed Sierra Leonean civilians and junior commandos); Exhibit P-277
(Confidential), pp. 21-22 (Part of the report describing the crimes committed by NPFL soldiers during the
operation Top 40); See also Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008 pp. 4370-4373 (Describing the struggle
for power between NPFL and RUF commanders in 1992, that resulted to serious infightirrg between the NPFL
fighting troops and the RUF vanguards in a series that was referred to as "Top 20", "Top 40" and "Top Final");
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 295 13-29515 (Firefights between NPFL and RUF
around May 1992); Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24819-24820 (In about April 1992, Sankoh complained that
Taylor's soldiers were murdering and raping and were not respecting him as the leader. Taylor said he would
send Francis Menwon to investigate but before he could, the RUF had taken matters into its own hands. By late
April/May Foday Sankoh had lost control and there was major combat between the RUF forces and NPFL
soldiers sent by Taylor. There were killings on both sides. Taylor ordered Menkarzon and all the NPFL in Sierra
Leone to return); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, pp. 20274-20276 (Mallah heard that Top 20
and Top 40 were fights among the NPFL Liberians and the Vanguards. Rashid Manasaray, deputy to Foday
Sankoh and his junior commando bodyguards were killed during these operations which took place in 1992. .
Mallah also heard that in 1992, most of the NPFL Liberian fighters returned to Liberia).
5176 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24819-24820 (In about April 1992, Sankoh
complained that Taylor's soldiers were murdering and raping and were not respecting him as the leader. Taylor
said he would send Francis Menwon to investigate but before he could, the RUF had taken matters into its own
hands. By late April/May Foday Sankoh had lost control and there was major combat between the RUF forces
and NPFL soldiers sent by Taylor. There were killings on both sides. Taylor ordered Menkarzon and all the
NPFL in Sierra Leone to return); TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2238-2239 (CS) (Sankoh told TF1-
371 that he was going to Gbange to complain to Taylor about the behaviour of` NPFL soldiers who were killing,
harassing and looting civilians); Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010 p. 35678 (Smythe heard that the
reason of the departure of` NPFL forces from Sierra Leone was that Sankoh complained to Taylor that some of`
the NPFL soldiers were misbehaving); Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9860-9861 (Sankoh told Blah:
"the boys Hom NPFL, whom the chief sent to help me, they got involved into a lot of atrocities, raping women,
looting peop1e's property and killing people, and these are the people I have gone to liberate and I am losing
respect amongst my tribesmen. This was what I have come to consult with the chief on"); TF1-168, Transcript
21 January 2009, pp. 2321 1-23213 (CS) (TF1-168 learnt through his wife that Sankoh complained to Taylor who
recalled the Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone back to Liberia. This operation was called Top Final and took
place in June 1992. Ruthless NPFL soldiers were asked to leave, and those who did not want to leave were
chased out of Sierra Leone by RUF forces); Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38905-38912 (After Top
40 the civilians sent a message to Foday Sankoh in Gbarnga telling him that he would lose their support if the
killings continued. Sankoh informed Charles Taylor of` the killings. Charles Taylor instructed one of` his
commanders, Dopoe Menkarzon, to enter the RUF territory and instruct Liberians who did not belong to the
RUF to return in Liberia. This forceful eviction of` non-Sierra Leoneans was known as Operation Top Final and
took place between June and July 1992. Dopoe Menkarzon conducted these arrests himself assisted later by the
RUF); DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41882-41893 (A Liberian named Bosco executed a woman in the
witness's presence because he wanted her daughter. Witness DCT-292 reported this crime to Sankoh and asked
him to complain to the leader of these Liberians. Sankoh decided to go to Gbarnga, and when he came back
Dopoe Menkarzon and James Kawie arrested all the RUF officers and took them to Gbarnga. The group that was
arrested included Edward Fembeh, Daniel Kallon, Augustine Kargbo, Abraham Dugbeh, and Mon Ami).
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24819-24820 (In about April 1992, Sankoh
complained that Taylor's soldiers were murdering and raping and were not respecting him as the leader. Taylor
said he would send Francis Menwon to investigate but before he could, the RUF had taken matters into its own
hands. By late April/May Foday Sankoh had lost control and there was major combat between the RUF forces

---- End of Page 805 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J 61% 18 May 2012

$@3 G/@
and NPFL soldiers sent by Taylor. There were killings on both sides. Taylor ordered Menkarzon and all the
NPFL in Sierra Leone to return); TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14945-14947 (PS) (Top Final was the
operation to rid bad NPFL soldiers from Sierra Leone. Taylor ultimately withdrew his soldiers committing
crimes); John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38078-38079 (John Vincent met Dopoe Menkarzon during
Top Final, when Dopoe was sent to repatriate the NPFL soldiers who had misbehaved); Issa Sesay, Transcript 5
July 2010, p. 43649 (Top final took place in June 1992); Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 11237 (Top
Final was the removal of NPFL Special forces from Sierra Leone to Liberia); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January
2009, pp. 23211-23213 (CS) (TF1-168 learnt through his wife that Sankoh complained to Taylor who recalled
the Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone back to Liberia. This operation was called Top Final and took place in
June 1992. Ruthless NPFL soldiers were asked to leave, and those who did not want to leave were chased out of
Sierra Leone by RUF forces); Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38905-38912 (After Top 40 the
civilians sent a message to Foday Sankoh in Gbarnga telling him that he would lose their support if the killings
continued. Sankoh informed Charles Taylor of the killings. Charles Taylor instructed one of his commanders,
Dopoe Menkarzon, to enter the RUF territory and instruct Liberians who did not belong to the RUF to return in
Liberia. This forceful eviction of non-Sierra Leoneans was known as Operation Top Final and took place
between June and July 1992. Dopoe Menkarzon conducted these arrests himself assisted later by the RUF);
Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39684-39687 (George's group arrived in Kailahun on 1 January
1993. He was told that RUF commanders in Kailahun, CO Mohammed and Sam Bockarie organized an attack
(called Top Final) to get rid of the NPFL troops and push them out of Sierra Leone. The witness was not in
Kailahun during Top Final); TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13082-13083: Top Final was an operation
during which, RUF junior commands and RUF vanguards drove away the NPFL soldiers who were killing the
Sierra Leonean civilians and junior commandos. NPFL members who did not cause trouble stayed in the RUF.
Top Final took place in 1992; Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1938 (Dufka states that the
disagreements between RUF and NPFL about the NPFL combatants involved in the perpetration of abuses in
Sierra Leone, resulted in operation Top 20 [sic], when the NPFL was expelled &om Sierra Leone); See also
Exhibit D-336, "Footpaths to Democracy, RUF, l995", pp. 9707-9708 (We do not deny that the fact that some of
those who volunteered to join our cause were veterans of the Liberian civil war but majority were of Sierra
Leonean parentage. However, this minor "alien" involvement in our just and human cause was curtailed as early
as May 1992 when it became a nightmarish experience for our civilian population); Moses Blah, Transcript 14
May 2008, p. 9865 (Christopher Varmoh and Dopoe Menkarzon told Moses Blah that they left Sierra Leone
because there was a conflict between them and Foday Sankoh); Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008,
pp. 4370-4373 (Describing the struggle for power between NPFL and RUF commanders in 1992, that resulted to
serious infighting between the NPFL fighting troops and the RUF vanguards in a series that was referred to as
Top 20", "Top 40" and "Top Final").
Sm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1139; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 429-430; Yanks Smythe,
Transcript 22 February 2010, p. 35678 (All the NPFL soldiers fighting ULIMO in Sierra Leone were
withdrawn); Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4372 ("In May 1992 there was an instruction from
Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor to Anthony Menquenagbeh that all the generals of the Special Forces, the battalion
commanders, that they should evacuate all the NPFL fighting men &om Sierra Leone back to Liberia"); Charles
Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, pp. 37763-37765 (In August 1991, infightings between NPFL and RUF
members; Taylor heard rumours that Liberians were being killed and sent General Dopoe Menkarzon to Quiva to
investigate what was going on at the base. Subsequently, Taylor ordered the NPFL forces under his command to
withdraw &om the country within 72 hours, and to bring back all the arms that had been brought into Sierra
Leone. Taylor ceased providing assistance to the RUF. From the year 1992 to 2001, the RUF engaged in a self-
reliant struggle); Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38905-38912 (After Top 40 the civilians sent a
message to Foday Sankoh in Gbarnga telling him that he would lose their support if the killings continued.
Sankoh informed Charles Taylor of the killings. Charles Taylor instructed one of his commanders, Dopoe
Menkarzon, to enter the RUF territory and instruct Liberians who did not belong to the RUF to return in Liberia.
This forceful eviction of non-Sierra Leoneans was known as Operation Top Final and took place between June
and July 1992. Dopoe Menkarzon conducted these arrests himself assisted later by the RUF); Isaac Mongor,
Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6615-6618 (In 1992 there were a serious disagreement between the RUF and the
NPFL over the behaviour of NPFL members in Sierra Leone. By the middle of 1992 Taylor ordered the
withdrawal of all active NPFL personnel from Sierra Leone. A few NPFL members decided to stay in Sierra
Leone and join the RUF. Two men of Mongor died in this battle between the RUF and NPFL); Foday Lansana,
Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4374-4378, 4521 (Charles Taylor said on a message broadcast on the radio that
he had received uncountable complaints of infighting and poor treatment of civilians and so he was ordering the
evacuation of NPFL troops back to Liberia within 10 days. This directive was written in the log book and copies
were made for the various commanders who were going to Pendembu, Kailahun, Quiva and wherever NPFL

---- End of Page 806 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / G25 18 May 2012
/ I

2385. In the Trial Chamber's view, while it is established that NPFL soldiers committed
atrocities in Sierra Leone after the invasion, the evidence fails to establish that these crimes
were committed pursuant to an agreement between Taylor and Sankoh. To the contrary, the
evidence regarding Sankoh's meeting with Taylor in May 1992, during which Sankoh
expressed his concems regarding crimes committed by the NPFL contradicts the
Prosecution's allegation that Taylor and Sankoh had a common purpose to terrorize the
civilian population in order to forcibly control the population and territory of Sierra Leone
and to pillage its diamonds. If Sankoh and Taylor had agreed to terrorize the civilian
population, Sankoh would not have been surprised by the atrocities committed by NPFL
troops, let alone complained to Taylor about them.
2386. The Trial Chamber also recalls the evidence that initially, the ideology of the RUF
was not to terrorise civilians and that, while in Camp Naama, the RUF recruits received
training including basic Geneva Convention regulations on the treatment of civilians.5l79
Moreover, then Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of Prosecution Witness TF1-579, who
testified that prior to the invasion of Sierra Leone, he heard Sankoh telling Oliver Varney
that he did not want any looting during the invasion or any civilian to be harassed. 5180
troops were based in Sierra Leone. Lansana was part of the group that went to Vahun on the basis of that
instruction).
5179 TF 1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2203-2204 (CS) (Sankoh asked Mike Lamin to teach ideology and
provided him with brochures on basic Geneva Convention regulations on how to treat civilians and respect them
during the conflict); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23181-23182 (CS) (During the invasion of Sierra
Leone civilians were "not treated fine. They were not treated nicely, as opposed to our basic ideology that we
were taught at the base. In fact, it was surprising to me to see things happening that way"); TF1-168, Transcript
23 January 2009, pp. 23395-23396 (CS) (TF1-168 received instruction to give good treatment to civilians in
order to make them support the revolution); George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39612-39614 (George testified
that Mike Lamin, a Sierra Leonean instructor, taught all the recruits how to take care of civilians during
missions). Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37998-37999 (the ideology class taught the trainees to take
good care of civilians and to attack only military installations); DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41708-
41709, 41714 (The ideology training in Camp Naama included: ensuring that a person who surrenders is
unharmed and handed them over to the nearest senior officer for screening; a prohibition against raping; the
correct treatment of captured civilians - soldiers needed to gather the civilians in one place and guard them.
Another element of the ideology was that whenever a town is captured, any material captured, including arms,
ammunition, clothing, and food had to be kept under the supervision of the commander. These materials then
had to be shared among the civilians and the fighters); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48374
(Ideology training included advice on how to treat civilians and prisoners but not on how to terrorize them.
According to Kolleh, terrorism was not the ideology of the RUF); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp.
37248-37250 (ideological training included care of civilians, women and children); See also TF 1-371, Transcript
30 January 2008, pp. 2633-2634 (CS) (TF1-371 never heard any direct order to indiscriminately kill civilians, or
a direct order to amputate or mutilate civilians. It was not the policy at the formation of the RUF in 1991 to
terrorise civilians); But see in contrast Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43601 (Sesay testified that while at
Camp Naama, Sankoh criticized Isaac Mongor for teaching the trainees that once they captured a town they
should divide the civilians into two groups and kill one of them in order to obtain the loyalty of the other group).
5180 TF1—579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19794-19795.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GIA 18 May 2012
/2%/ K

ze C7 0 0
2387. The Accused testified that he supported the RUF in order to fight ULIMO and the
Sierra Leonean Government in Sierra Leone without having to fight ULIMO and the Sierra
Leonean army in Liberia.51"1 The Defence suggests that this could be seen as a strategic
expansion creating a frontier buffer zone behind which the revolution in Liberia could be
adequately protected.5182 lndeed, significant evidence was adduced showing that the
Accused's main objective was to fight the Liberian insurgency group formed in Sierra
Leone,5183 along with the Sierra Leonean Government allegedly supporting them.511"1 This
common objective is not criminal per se.
5181 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28692-28693; Transcript 15 September 2009,
pp. 28939-28940.
5182 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 428.
5183 Exhibit P-277 (Confidential), p. 18 ("Despite President Taylor's total involvement in the Sierra Leone crisis,
he had no territorial ambition in Sierra Leone. His main interest was material wealth and to use the Sierra Leone
borders as buffer zones to forestall the efforts of dissident Liberians United Defence Force, LUDF, which later
was transformed into United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia, ULIMO"); Mohamed Kabbah,
Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16324-16325 (Mohamed Kabbah heard that NPFL assisted the RUF in order
to push back the Sierra Leonean Government inland and that they would leave Sierra Leone afterward );
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20080 (ULIMO and Sierra Leonean were the enemies of
the RUF / NPFL); See also DCT-228, Transcript 19 May 2010 p. 41250 (ULIMO was formed in Sierra Leone
and attacked the NPFL from Sierra Leone); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16321-16325
(ULIMO was looking in Sierra Leone for Liberians and Sierra Leoneans of Mandingo ethnicity in order to fight
NPFL); Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, p. 10193 (ULIMO forces were mostly made up of former Doe's
supporters and ex-Liberian army soldiers); Dauda Aruna Fornie, 1 December 2008 p. 21334 ("A group emerged
in 1991 from the Sierra Leone area which was fighting against Mr Taylor [...] called ULIMO"); Hassan Bility,
13 January 2009, p. 22468 ("ULIMO was composed of displaced Liberians, many of whom were former Doe
supporters, former Liberian soldiers"); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, p. 29317
(ULIMO was a group formed in Guinea and Sierra Leone composed primarily of former AFL soldiers under
Doe's regime); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33276-33277 (reading End of Page 125 of the
Liberian TRC final report volume 2: "A Mandingo faction Movement For the Redemption of Muslims -l\/LRM-
founded by Alhaji Kromah and a Krahn faction Liberia United Defence Force -LUDF- organised by a US-
trained Special Forces officer who was also once Doe's Minister of Defence and ambassador to Sierra Leone,
Albert Karpeh, together merged into the United Liberation Movement For Democracy — ULIMO — on May 29,
1991"); John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 38033-38034 ("ULLMO forces were formed in Sierra
Leone, but they were Liberians who were coming back to fight against the NPFL"); DCT-228, Transcript 19
May 2010 p. 41236 ("ULIMO is an armed group that attacked the NPFL fighting to dethrone Mr Taylor");
Exhibit P-031, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone,
Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 7; Exhibit D-026, "Submissions to the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Appendix 2, Statement by His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah, 4 August 2003".
5184 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 965-966; Transcript 11 January 2008, pp. 1028-1029
(Sherif was a former senior member of ULIMO; He testified that ULIMO received assistance from Sierra Leone
and Guinea); Corrine Dufka, 22 January 2008, p. 1905 ("Sierra Leone government used Liberian ULIMO rebels
to fight the Sierra Leone government's battle with the RUF. In exchange for its assistance ULIMO used Sierra
Leone as a back base for its war against the NPFL and on several occasions were joined by Sierra Leone Anny
soldiers (SLA) who accompanied them on military operations into Liberia"); Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May
2008, p. 10192 (Sierra Leone Government supported ULIMO); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November
2008, p. 20080 (ULIMO and Sierra Leonean were the enemies of the RUF/NPFL); Dauda Aruna Fornie, 1
December 2008 p. 21334, 8 December 2008, p. 21989 ("ULIMO was fighting alongside with Sierra Leonean
Government"); TF1-174, Transcript 28 January 2009 p. 23811 (ULIMO operated from Sierra Leone); Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009 p. 32367 (Taylor received information that ULIMO fighters

---- End of Page 808 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dk 18 May 2012
/

2388. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that crimes were committed by
NPFL soldiers during and after the invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991. However, in the Trial
Chamber's view, the evidence is insufficient for a finding that the Accused's support for the
invasion of Sierra Leone was undertaken pursuant to a common purpose to terrorize the
civilian population.
Findings
2389. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that in Voinjama in March 1991, the Accused, Foday Sankoh and Dr Manneh together
with NPFL and RUF commanders held a meeting during which they planned and organised
the invasion of Sierra Leone in accordance with the strategy hatched in Libya and Burkina
Faso.
2390. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused supported the invasion of Sierra Leone.
2391. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that after the invasion, NPFL troops committed crimes against Sierra Leonean civilians.
2392. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the support of the Accused for the invasion of Sierra Leone was undertaken
pursuant to a common purpose to terrorize the civilian population of Sierra Leone.
5. Attack on Kono {November 1992 to January 1993)
Submissions of the Parties
were armed by the Sierra Leonean government); John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 38033—38034
("ULIMO forces were formed in Sierra Leone, but they were Liberians who were coming back to fight against
the NPFL"); Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39670-3967l (ULIMO joined the government troops
of Momoh who gave them ammunition); DCT—228, Transcript 19 May 2010, p. 41250 (ULIMO was formed in
Sierra Leone and attacked the NPFL from Sierra Leone); DCT—190, Transcript 25 June 2010, p. 43467 (DCT-
190 testified that he was fighting against the RUF on behalf of ULIMO with the Sierra Leone government);
Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. l6324—l6325 (Mohamed Kabbah heard that NPFL assisted
the RUF in order to push back the Sierra Leonean Government inland and that they would leave Sierra Leone
afterward ); Dauda Amna Fornie, 8 December 2008, p. 21989 ("ULIMO alongside with the Sierra Leonean
Government was fighting against the RUF and the NPFL); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November
2009, p. 32367 (the purpose was to fight also Sierra Leonean Government which was supported ULIMO
fighters); Exhibit P—03l, "Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra
Leone, Stephen Ellis, 5 December 2006", p. 7; Exhibit D—026, "Submissions to the Sierra Leone Tmth and
Reconciliation Commission"; Appendix 2, Statement by His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah, 4 August 2003.

---- End of Page 809 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T rV/_, Eh 18 May 2012
i x

za? 0 1
2393. The Prosecution alleges that from the very inception of the conflict in Sierra Leone,
diamonds were looted from Sierra Leonean civilian and commercial companies in Pujehun
and Kailahun Districts and taken to the Accused. Foday Sankoh travelled from Sierra Leone
to Gbarnga taking looted diamonds to the Accused and the Accused rewarded Sankoh with
arms, ammunition and other supplies which Sankoh took back to Sierra Leone.5l85 The
Prosecution further submits that by mid-1992, the Accused and Sankoh had formed a plan to
capture Kono District because it was a diamondiferous area. Sankoh subsequently explained
the plan to senior members of the RUF, including Sam Bockarie, 1ssa Sesay and Morris
Kallon. Sankoh explained to them that they should capture Kono to get more diamonds so
that they would be able to continue the war.5l86
2394. The Prosecution also submits that by late 1992, the Accused directed Sankoh to
capture the diamond mining area of Kono and supplied the arms and ammunition needed for
the mission. Sankoh brought back the looted diamonds to the Accused in exchange for arms
and ammunition to continue the RUF war effort. 5187
2395. The Defence acknowledges that in the early years of the Sierra Leone conflict,
although the RUF was not engaged in organized mining, it nevertheless had diamonds in its
possession captured from civilians. The Defence submits that all these diamonds were
"given to the RUF's External Delegation for their sustenance in the Ivory Coast".5l88 The
Defence contends that nothing in the Prosecution's evidence supports the assertion that the
Accused directed Sankoh to capture Kono.5lg9 Moreover, the Defence submits that evidence
suggesting that the acquisition of diamonds might also have underlined the JCE directly
contradicts other Prosecution evidence that Sankoh in fact discouraged diamond mining,
especially in the early years of the war.5l90
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
5185 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 344-345.
Sm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 86-88, 92.
5187 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 92, 347-348.
mg Defence Final Trial Brief paras 459-460, 792-793, 1204-1206.
mg Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 74.
SNO Defence Final Trial Brief para. 777. See also Defence Final Trial Brief paras 792-793, 1208.

---- End of Page 810 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T du 18 May 2012

389 O3
2396. Witness TF1-567 testified that he accompanied Sankoh on two occasions to Taylor's
mansion in Gbamga, Liberia, in 1991 and 1992, crossing the Sierra Leonean-Liberian border
and the NPFL checkpoints without any problem. During his first trip to Liberia in 1991,
Witness TF1-567 did not see Taylor personally but was informed by Sankoh that Taylor
provided him with arms and ammunitions. TF1-567 and Sankoh came back from Gbarnga
with a truck loaded with arms and ammunition.5m
2397. TF1-567 testified that during his second trip with Sankoh to Gbamga, in 1992,
Taylor provided the RUF with a truck loaded with food and other supplies. TF1-567 and
Sankoh escorted the truck to Bomi Hills, where they met RUF soldiers Philip Palmer, Pa
Moriba, Smiling P, and Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito), as well as their commander, the
NPFL commander One Man One. There, Sankoh, One Man One and Philip Palmer held a
meeting during which they agreed that the RUF soldiers should go back to fight in Kailahun
district, which had been captured by Governmental forces.5 [92
2398. After this meeting, TF1-567 and Sankoh returned to Gbamga where Sankoh met
Taylor again. During the meeting, Sankoh and Taylor agreed to attack Kono as a priority
because Kono was a diamond mining area. ln order to attack Kono, Taylor provided arms,
ammunition and food to Sankoh, which were loaded onto a truck from Taylor's mansion.
While they were at Taylor's mansion, TF1-567 saw Charles Taylor for the first time.
Witness TF1-567, Sankoh and Bockarie drove the truck back to Pendembu, Sierra Leone.5l93
2399. Three days after their return to Pendembu, Sankoh called a meeting that was
attended, among others, by Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon, during which Sankoh told the
RUF soldiers that they should capture Kono in order to get diamonds to buy more arms and
ammunition. Sankoh appointed Bockarie as commander of the attack on Kono.5l94 Witness
TF1-567 testified that the fighters who went with Bockarie to attack Kono were composed
of both genders and ranged in age from fourteen upwards. Bockarie and his troops captured
Gandorhun and advanced on Koidu Town. Despite Bockarie's advice not to do so, Sankoh
moved to Koidu accompanied by Witness TF1-567. While there, Witness TF1-567
Sm TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12839-12844.
Sm TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12844-12851.
Sm TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12852-12856.
Sm TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12857-12858.

---- End of Page 811 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 81 I 18 May 2012

personally saw, on two occasions, Bockarie giving Sankoh plenty of diamonds captured
from civilians during the attacks.5l95
2400. By late 1992 Sankoh left Koidu Town, leaving Witness TF1-567 there to supervise
the distribution of rice and other materials to the RUF soldiers. Witness TF1-567 heard from
Bockarie that Sankoh had been summoned by Taylor to Gbarnga. Sankoh sent a message to
Bockarie that Taylor had provided more arms and ammunition but that ULIMO had blocked
the road back to Sierra Leone, between Voinjama and Kailahun. Bockarie told Sankoh not to
worry, that he would get some men to go and clear the way to Kailahun.5l96 When Sankoh
finally arrived in Kailahun, he asked Bockarie to come and meet him. Witness TF1-567
joined Bockarie on his journey to Kailahun, during which they captured civilians along the
way to carry items that the RUF had looted from civilians.5l97 When Witness TF1-567 and
Bockarie arrived in Kailahun, Sankoh called a meeting. During this meeting, Sankoh said
that he had given some of the diamonds looted from Kono to Taylor, who in exchange
provided him with more arms and ammunition including RPGs, GPMGs and AK rounds.
These weapons were later distributed to the front lines.5l98
Prosecution Witness Peg; Kamara
2401. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF recruit, testified that in 1992, ULIMO attacked the
RUF troops forcing them to retreat to Pujehun and to cross the border with Liberia. Kamara
was among the RUF soldiers who crossed the border to take refuge in Kakata, Liberia.5l99
Kamara testified that in early November 1992, during the parade, Isaac Musa, one of
Taylor's commanders, explained that Taylor had requested him to regroup all the RUF
soldiers of Kakata and the surrounding villages in order to allow Foday Sankoh to collect
them and bring them to Sierra Leone for "a very big mission".5200 While Isaac Musa was
conveying this message, Sankoh, Taylor, his commanders and bodyguards arrived at the
parade in a convoy.520l Foday Sankoh requested the fighters to return to Sierra Leone and
M5 TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12858—12863. (TFl-567 testified that he saw Bockarie giving Sankoh a
parcel of some 15 bigger diamonds and some 5 sizeable diamonds on the first occasion and plenty on the
second).
SW6 TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12863—12865 (CS).
W rrr-567, Transcript 2 Jury 2008, pp. 12865—12866.
Sm TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12866—12867.
mg Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3033-3034.
5200 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p, 3034.
520] Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3034.

---- End of Page 812 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gi·>·· 18 May 2012 / I

is 89 05
explained that Taylor gave him trucks, arms and ammunitions.5202 Two hours later, trucks
carrying arms and ammunitions covered with bags arrived. The RUF fighters then boarded
the trucks and moved to Taylor's headquarters in Gbarnga.5203 Kamara travelled with RUF
members including Commander Rashid Mansaray and some Liberians. ln the first instance,
some men went to Libya, some to Pujehun District in Sierra Leone, and another group,
which Kamara moved with, went to Kakata. The first group, to which Kamara belonged,
moved to Kailahun and then was based in Pendembu.5204
2402. Kamara further testified that in late l992, Sankoh summoned a meeting in which he
told RUF soldiers that he had just returned from Liberia with ammunition and that during
this trip, Charles Taylor told him to use the ammunition to attack Kono in order to acquire
diamonds and money to buy more ammunition. Mohamed Tarawalli was appointed to lead
the attack on Kono. During the attack, the RUF captured diamonds, which were used to
purchase more weapons. Kamara testified that he personally saw diamonds in a big bottle
and US Dollars that Mohamed Tarawalli brought from Kono a&er the attack.5205
Prosecution Witness TF1-168
2403. Witness TF1—168 was among the RUF soldiers in Pujehun District under the control
of One Man One after the invasion of Sierra Leone. He testified that when the NPFL and
RUF troops captured Pujehun District, diamonds were taken. The NPFL/RUF forces
captured the mining company MMC, killed its manager and captured its diamonds.
However, Sankoh did not want his soldiers to conduct mining operations since he
considered that such operations could make soldiers forget about war.52O6
2404. TF1—168 testified that in 1992, Sankoh informed him that he had taken the diamonds
captured during the attack of Pujehun to his brother, Charles Taylor, in Gbarnga. On cross-
examination TF1 -168 stated that he did not know if Sankoh was telling him the truth. 5207
5202 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3035.
5203 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3035.
5204 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3036.
5205 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008 pp. 3045-3046.
5206 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23 180-23181 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23482-23483
§§§TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23180-2318l (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23482—23483

---- End of Page 813 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr-03-01-T 813 18 May 2012 w
\

. 3890 6
2405. TF1-168 further testified that around August 1991, the RUF was pushed back to
Liberia by UL1MO.52O8 Subsequently, TF1-168 moved to Bomi Hills where he stayed until
the NPRC coup in April 1992.5209 ln iam Apai 1992, TF1-168 mveiicd to Gbamga.52lO The
witness stated that during a meeting in Gbamga around May/June 1992, Sankoh told his
senior officers including TF1-168, Rashid Mansaray, Noah Kanneh and Pa Kallon that
Taylor was reducing his support to Sankoh's RUF without any reason. TF1-168 considered
that the fact that Sankoh was not bringing in precious minerals like diamonds for Taylor
anymore was probably the exp1anation.52H In June 1992, after discussion with Taylor about
crimes committed by NPFL soldiers in Sierra Leone, Sankoh left Liberia, taking with him
arms and ammunition he obtained from Taylor.52l2
2406. TF1-168 further stated that in October 1992, Sankoh returned to Gbamga and told
the RUF troops remaining in Gbamga that his plan was to advance toward Kono District.
However, he told the troops en route from Kailahun to wait until he was also on the ground
in order to launch the attack. Sankoh used NPFL radios to convey messages to the RUF
troops while he was mobi1e.52I3
2407. TF1-168 testified that shortly after he left Gbarnga, he was arrested and detained on
Sankoh's order for insubordination. Around October/November 1992, during TF1-168's
detention, the RUF troops led by Sam Bockarie captured Kono, but lost it in late January
1993.52‘4
2408. TF1-168 testified that the RUF wanted to capture Kono District because it was one
of the two roads to Freetown but also because Kono was a diamondiferous area.52l5
However, TF1-168 considered that between 1991 and 1996 diamonds did not really play any
major role in the war because no organised mining was taking place. TF1-168 stated that it
5208 TF1—168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23180—23186 (CS).
5209 TF1—168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23 184-23 191(CS).
5210 TF1—168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23191—23193(CS).
Sm TF1—168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23443—23444 (CS).
Sm TF1—168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23214—23215 (CS).
5213 TF1—168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23215 (CS).
5214 TF1—168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23222—23224 (CS).
5215 TF1—168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23224(CS).

---- End of Page 814 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /4/’" 18 May 2012 Q

389 0 9-
was Sankoh who, confronted with the lack of support of his allies, decided to use diamonds
as a way of financing the purchase of weapons for the RUF struggle. 5216
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -367
2409. Witness TF1—367, an RUF Vanguard, arrived in Koindu in the Kailahun District two
days after the NPFL invaded Sierra Leone. Witness TF 1-367 spent 3 months there, after
which he was sent by Sankoh to Gbarnga where he was appointed ground commander of
Sankoh's house in Gbarnga. 52U
2410. TFl—367 stated that while he was ground commander in Gbarnga he accompanied
Sankoh on several occasions on trips from Gbarnga, Liberia to Sierra Leone, during which
Sankoh brought the arms, ammunitions and condiments provided by Taylor to RUF troops
in Sierra Leone.52l8
2411. TFl—367 stated that in 1992, the RUF captured Koidu Town, Kono District, and
managed to keep control over it for approximately 3 months before being pushed back by
ULIMO. The RUF re—captured Koidu Town in 1995 after TFl—367 was appointed as
commander of this area.52l9
2412. In a prior statement to the Prosecution read by Defence Counsel during TF1—367's
cross—examination, TFl—367 had said that during all this period, RUF was not mining but
seized diamonds and other precious minerals from civilians which were taken to Charles
Taylor in Gbarnga. This was confirmed by the witness, TFl—367 himself escorted Sankoh
from Sierra Leone to Taylor's residence in Gbarnga on a couple of occasions. The witness
confirmed that he did not see the actual handover of diamonds from Sankoh to Taylor, but
he stayed with Taylor's bodyguards while Sankoh and Taylor entered a room together in
private.522O
SM TF1-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23483-23484 (CS).
Sm TF1-367, Transciipt 20 August 2008 pp. 14099-14102.
52*8 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008 pp. 14103-14105.
Sm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008 pp. 14108-14110.
Sm TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15057-15059.

---- End of Page 815 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Gia 815// 18 May 2012 L%

2413. In this prior statement, TF 1-367 stated that he attended a meeting during which
Sankoh told Bockarie and Issa Sesay to continue to bring diamonds to Charles Taylor during
his absence.522l
Prosecution Witness TF 1-371
2414. Witness TF 1-371, an RUF officer, testified that before 1996, the RUF did not
conduct mining operations in the areas they conquered. TF 1-371 heard from Sankoh that
even when the RUF conquered Kono district in 1992/ 1993, they merely washed the gravel
that the miners had already extracted to get diamonds without really mining. TF 1-371 stated,
however, that the NPF L commander of Bomi County, Oliver Varney, conducted mining
operations at Zimmi border in 1991 when the RUF initially invaded Sierra Leone.5222
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
2415. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie, an RUF radio operator, testified that during the 1992
rainy season, ULIMO captured Bomi Hills, forcing the RUF to retreat to the Liberian
border. Fornie was assigned by Sankoh to Kakata, Liberia. While he was there, Fornie heard
from Bockarie that Sankoh wanted the RUF soldiers present in the area to gather at the MP
headquarters in Kakata. Two days later, Sankoh came in a convoy with Charles Taylor. The
convoy was carrying various weapons including twin barrels. Sankoh alighted and spoke to
the RUF soldiers briefly, informing them that trucks would come to collect them to bring
them back to Sierra Leone. Fornie did not see Taylor because the door and the windows of
the vehicle remained closed, but Bockarie told Fornie that Taylor was in the vehicle. Fornie
testified that later a big three wiper [sic] Toyota truck was sent and brought around 70 RUF
soldiers to Kailahun, Sierra Leone passing through Gbamga.5223
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
2416. Witness Foday Lansana, a senior RUF radio operator, testified that in 1992, after the
National Provisional Ruling Council (N PRC) overthrew the legitimate government of Sierra
Leone led by Joseph Saidu Momoh, the NPRC called for a ceasefire with the RUF which
ml TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15058.
Sm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008,p. 2769 (cs).
5223 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21360-21371; Transcript 8 December 2008, pp.
21993-21999; Transcript 11 December 2008, pp. 22257-22258.

---- End of Page 816 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 0}; */,4/ 18 May 2012

was observed for a while. Later, however, the ceasefire was broken by the Guinean and
Nigerian contingents of the NPRC. During the attacks, the RUF captured a large quantity of
arms and ammunition. 5224
2417. Foday Lansana testified that after the attack, Sankoh contacted Taylor over the radio
and informed him that he had captured heavy artillery. Sankoh told Taylor that he could not
use the artillery because he had no ammunition and that he would need light weapons.
Taylor told Sankoh to come to Gbarnga with the artillery in his possession to exchange it for
light weapons and ammunitions. Lansana stated that he was the radio operator for this
conversation and that, as such, he heard the entire conversation.5225
2418. Foday Lansana further testified that, as a result of the conversation, Sankoh left
Pendembu for Gbarnga. Around mid—1992, Sankoh returned to Pendembu with a large
quantity of arms and ammunition. Upon Mr Sankoh's return, Mohamed Tarawalli , Sam
Bockarie, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon were instructed to go to Koidu, Kono District in
order to attack government troops and conquer the area because it was a diamond rich
mining area. Lansana did not participate directly in the operation but was aware of the
evolution of the operation when transmitting the radio reports sent by Mohamed Tarawalli to
Sankoh. Lansana testified that the operation went smoothly but that the RUF was chased out
of Koidu into Pendembu at the end of 1992.5226
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
2419. Witness Albert Saidu testified that Captain Ben, whom he knew because they had
been captured together in Bunumbu and taken for training,5227 came from Kono with
diamonds sewn into his trousers in the belt area.5228 Captain Ben showed the witness the
place where the diamonds were sewn and told the witness that he was taking the diamonds
to Foda Sankoh.5225 Saidu testified that Ca tain Ben took the diamonds to Sankoh, and that
he "felt" that Sankoh then took the diamonds to Charles Taylor.5250 The witness clarified
5 224 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4392—4393.
5225 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4393—4395.
5 226 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4395-4396.
Sm Arbm sardu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10907.
5255 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10912.
5259 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 109 12—10913.
5250 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10914.

---- End of Page 817 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T dbh / 18 May 2012

that he felt that way because "that's where he used to go to bring ammunition for us to
fight".523l Captain Ben also told the witness about his travels to Liberia, and said that they
used to bring back arms and ammunitions from Liberia for the revolution.5232
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
2420. Witness TF1-338 testified that Sankoh used to go to Taylor's mansion in Gbarnga
and return to Kailahun in Sierra Leone with arms and ammunition. TF1-338 himself
travelled twice as a security accompanying Foday Sankoh to Taylor's mansion in Gbarnga.
5233
Prosecution Witness Stephen Ellis
2421. Expert witness Stephen Ellis testified that at the beginning, the Sierra Leonean
conflict was primarily about political and social matters. However, in the late 1990s the
control of diamonds became a key factor in the hostilities because participants were able to
use the profits from diamonds to fuel the continuation of the war.5234 According to Ellis,
there were reports of RUF rebels smuggling diamonds from Sierra Leone to Liberia as early
as 1991. The expert witness noted that the Sierra Leone TRC identified three phases of the
Sierra Leonean war that is 1991-1994, 1994-1997, and the period after 1997. According to
gthe witness, it was only during the latter period that the diamond trade expanded.5235
The Accused
2422. The Accused testified that from August 1991 until May 1992 he provided small
amounts of arms and ammunition to Foday Sankoh and the RUF with the strategic purpose
of having the RUF fight ULIMO in Sierra Leone, so he would not have to fight them in
Liberia. ULIMO had been armed by the Sierra Leonean Goverrmient.523° The Accused stated
that he only provided the RUF with ammunition and not big weapons; the NPFL did not
have a strategic partnership with the RUF to enable the RUF to gain military power in Sierra
Leone. The Accused explained that he deliberately under-supported Sankoh. As a result, in
523* Albert Saidu, Tranapnpr 4 June 2008, p. 10914.
Sm Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10914.
5233 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15107-15108, 15200·15201 (PS).
52** Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1438-1440.
Sm Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. l470·1471.
5236 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28692-28693; Transcript 15 September 2009,

---- End of Page 818 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ovi / 18 May 2012 2

May 1992 Foday Sankoh wrote a letter expressing his disappointment, to which the Accused
responded that he did the best he could do. After May 1992, the links between Sankoh and
the Accused were severed and the Accused stopped providing arms and ammunition.5237
2423. The Accused also denied having discussed with Foday Sankoh the capture of Kono
as alle ed b the Witness TF1-567.5238 The Accused recalled that there was no link between
S Y
the NPFL and RUF after May 1992.5234 The Accused denied receiving diamonds or anything
from Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie or Issa Sesay.5240 The Accused further denied that his
motivation for stopping the provision of materiel to Sankoh was because he expected to
receive diamonds.5 241
2424. The Accused testified that he routinely visited Kakata. However, he did not recall
any instances when the RUF was repelled by ULIMO and had to retreat to Kakata. In any
event, there were no RUF soldiers in Liberia around November 1992 since the NPFL had
split with the RUF at that time.5242 He also denied Perry Kamara's testimony that he, Taylor,
gave a message to Musa to collect all the RUF in Kakata and take them to Sierra Leone for a
big mission.5243
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2425. Witness Issa Sesay testified that after April 1992, when the NPFL left Sierra Leone,
NPFL troops took their arms and ammunition with them. As a consequence the RUF was
short of weapons. In order to get arms and ammunition, the RUF set ambushes and traded
with Guineans. This continued from 1992 until the RUF joined the AFRC in 1997.5244
2426. Issa Sesay further stated that Charles Taylor did not provide any weapons to RUF
after he withdrew his troops in April 1992. There was no communication between Sankoh
pp. 28939-28946.
5234 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28694—28699, Transcript 15 September 2009,
pp. 28947-28953.
5248 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28694-28699.
5234 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28706—28707.
5240 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28939—28940.
5241 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28944-28946.
5242 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28976—28977.
5243 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28973-28974.
5244 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 4462l—44623; Transcript 17 August 2010, pp. 46463—46464.

---- End of Page 819 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T 18 May 2012

— and Taylor during this time. Sesay would have known if this were the case since he was
based in Kailahun from 1991 to 1997.5245
2427. Issa Sesay denied that the RUF sent to Taylor the artillery it had captured, as
recounted by Foday Lansana. Sesay testified that the artillery captured was used by the
RUF.5246 Sesay submitted that he was in a better position to know since he was on the front
lines while Foday Lansana was not.5247
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
2428. Witness Sam Kolleh, an RUF Vanguard, testified that around August/September
1991, the government troops and ULIMO attacked the RUF troops, forcing them to retreat
to the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia and to take refuge in the bush, where they
created "jung1es".5248
2429. Kolleh stated that, while he was in the bush, Sankoh assigned him to be a transporter.
As such, Kolleh transported letters from the different RUF Jungles to Sankoh's headquarters
in Zogoda.5249 On three occasions between 1994 and 1995, Sankoh also asked Kolleh to
transport diamonds to Issa Sesay. Kolleh testified that the diamonds were captured during
ambushes. After Kolleh took the diamonds to Kailahun to Issa Sesay, Kolleh and Sesay
moved to the Guinean border where they gave the diamonds to members of the External
Delegation Fayia Musa, Deen—Ja11oh and Philip Palmer. Kolleh never transported any
diamonds to Liberia, and he did not know whether the RUF provided Taylor with
diamonds.525°
Defence Witness Martin George
2430. Witness Martin George testified that in late 1992 or early 1993, Sankoh ordered Sam
Bockarie to launch an attack on Kono to capture the diamond mining area from Momoh's
soldiers because it was the government stronghold and a place which could support the
5245 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44623—44624.
5246 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p.46115—46116.
5247 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46117.
5248 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48376-48380.
5249 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48390-48394, 48398-48401.
5250 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48394—48398, 484324.

---- End of Page 820 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GA / 18 May 2012 fg?
~/Q . /f

gs 9 /5
RUF.525l George stated that when the Kono attack was successful, the RUF began looking
for diamonds. They did not dig mines but rather instructed civilians to wash gravel to find
diamonds. When diamonds were found, the mining commander gave them to Foday Sankoh,
who was also in Kono. The witness was not there himself and did not know what Foday
sadkdh did with the diamonds. 5252
Defence Witness Fayia Musa
2431. Witness Fayia Musa, an RUF officer, testified that after Operation Top Final and the
withdrawal of the NPFL from Sierra Leone, the position of the RUF in terms of weapons
was bad.5253 After Top Final, Sankoh never returned to Liberia; he was disappointed by
Charles Taylor, who had promised to provide him support but failed to do so. Sankoh made
it clear that from that point the RUF should rely on its own resources to run the
campaign.5254
2432. Fayia Musa testified that, in late 1992 and early 1993, things were becoming really
difficult for the RUF. The RUF forces had been pushed into the Kissi Teng chiefdom while
the rest of the country had been recaptured by government troops. The RUF was
surrounded.5255 Fayia Musa stated that Sam Bockarie used his military creativity and a trick
called ‘Poro sound’ in order to make the government soldiers believe that they were
surrounded and being attacked by a large number of RUF soldiers. The ploy worked and the
government soldiers retreated to Pendembu, leaving behind guns and ammunition.5256
2433. The RUF used these weapons to conquer more territory. ln December 1992, the RUF
captured Kono. However, the RUF was only able to stay in Kono until January 1993
because of looting and because the government forces pushed hard to kick the RUF out,
suspecting that if the RUF stayed long enough they would engage in mining.5257
2434. Fayia Musa stated that between 1991 and March 1996 the RUF did not engage in
diamond mining. lndeed, from the first day the RUF captured Kono, Sankoh prohibited the
5251 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39696~39698.
5252 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39698~39700.
5253 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38913—38915.
5254 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38915.
5255 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38924.
5256 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38925.
5257 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38925~38926.

---- End of Page 821 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03—01~T Gu 18 May 2012 Q

35 C7 /4
mining. Nevertheless, the government forces did not let the RUF stay in Kono long enough 1
to engage in mining. However, Fayia Musa testified that diamonds abandoned by the miners
of Kono were captured by the RUF.5258 Fayia stated that the diamonds captured during the
attack on Kono were taken to Sankoh in Kailahun, where he kept them until he left to start
the peace process in Abidjan. The diamonds were then given to Ms. lsatu Kallon, an RUF
procurement officer.5259
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
2435. Witness Charles Ngebeh, an RUF recruit, testified that in 1992 Captain Strasser and
his NPRC forces overthrew the APC government. Strasser announced that he would not
negotiate with the RUF and that he would push them out of the country.5260 Shortly after
this announcement, Sam Bockarie attacked Gandorhun. During the attack, the RUF captured
a lot of ammunition, as well as two grenade launchers.52(’l Ngebeh also stated that in June or
July 1992, on his way to attack Kono, Sam Bockarie's troops captured a war tank with
ammunition from the NPRC that enabled the RUF to capture Kono. Ngebeh denied that the
RUF received any materials from Liberia and testified that the struggle was entirely self-
reliant.5262
Defence Witness DCT-025
2436. Witness DCT-025, an RUF soldier in charge of stores of supplies and weaponry,5263
testified that Foday Sankoh did not leave Sierra Leone in 1992. At times Sankoh went to
Pendembu or Mobai, but he always returned to Kailahun afterwards. Witness DCT-025
never heard of Sankoh going to Gbarnga to see Taylor during this period and bringing back
food, arms and ammunition. Similarly, Witness DCT-025 was not aware of the RUF mining
for diamonds and had not seen Sankoh with diamonds during this period. 5264
Prosecution Exhibit P-018
5258 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38927, 38938.
5259 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38928.
5260 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, pp. 37780-37781.
Sm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, pp. 37781 - 37782.
5262 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, p. 37785.
5263 DCT-025, Transcript 18 March 2010, pp. 37536—37538.
5264 DCT—025, Transcript 16 March 2010, pp. 37299—37300; Transcript 18 March 2010, pp. 375.32—37538.

---- End of Page 822 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

2437. Exhibit P-018 is the Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1306. Paragraph 67 of the Report states as follows:
The Revolutionary United Front initiated the war in 1991. Until 1995, RUF diamond
mining and digging was probably done on a sporadic and individual basis. By 1995,
however, the RUF and its patrons were clearly taking a much greater interest in the
diamond fields of Kono District, and had to be removed forcefully at that time by the
private military company, Executive Outcomes. From then on, the RUF interest in
diamonds became more focused, especially with the 1997 imprisonment of Foday Sankoh
in Nigeria. During his imprisonment and subsequently, the diamond areas of Kono and
Tongo Field became a primargl military focus of the RUF, and diamond mining became a
major fund-raising exercise.52 5
Prosecution Exhibit P-065
2438. Exhibit P-065 is a letter from RUF leader Foday Sankoh to Charles Taylor, dated 5
May 1992. In the letter Foday Sankoh thanked Charles Taylor for his offer of boxes of AK—
47 ammunition and ten boxes of RPG rockets but states that what was offered was not
enough to carry out "Operation Capture Daru". In the letter, Sankoh asked Taylor to increase
the amount to 20 boxes of AK-47 ammunition and 12 RPG rockets plus some Beretta rounds
and states that this would sustain the RUF "while awaiting the long term supply that you
have promised us".5266
Prosecution Exhibit P-497
2439. Exhibit P-497 is Volume Two of the Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. Paragraph 130 of Volume Two of the Report states:
The RUF was responsible for the first sustained assault on Koidu Town, Kono District, from October 1992
until February 1993. This assault resulted in a spate of violations against local residents including the killing of
Chiefs, government officials, businesspersons and members of the Lebanese community.5267
Prosecution Exhibit P-498 p
2440. Exhibit P-498 is Volume Three of the Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. Paragraph 49 of Volume Three of the Report states:
The Commission's research demonstrates that the RUF could not have eamed all the money
· attributed to it in official reports from conflict diamonds alone. Except for a brief period in
1992 when the RUF occupied Koidu, the headquarters of the diamond-rich Kono District, it
5265 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306", p.
16 (para. 67).
5266 Exhibit P-065, "Letter from Foday Sankoh to Charles Taylor", 5 May 1992.
5267 Exhibit P-497, "Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission-Volume Two", para. 130.

---- End of Page 823 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 1

did not have access to the major diamond—producing areas of the country until 1995, when
it occupied Koidu again for four months before being driven out by Executive Outcomes.
RUF 's diamond pickings in those areas could not have constituted the colossal amounts
reflected in the literature. Figure 1 shows that, except in 1986, Belgian imports of diamonds
from Liberia have always outstripped those from Sierra Leone. Yet Liberia is not reputed to
have substantial diamond deposits and does not have gemstone-quality diamonds. The
conclusion to be drawn from the above tables and Figure 1 is that diamond smuggling
within the axis of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d’[voire has been going on for
more than 30 years, with Liberia being the principal conduit. This would suggest that those
involved in diamond smuggling had developed networks and contacts in Liberia, which
facilitated their smuggling and export of diamonds from within the region. Even in 1990,
before the war in Sierra Leone started, Liberia exported more than 5 million carats of
diamonds.5268
Defence Exhibit D—123G
2441. Exhibit D—l23G is a photo of a long—range artillery gun which was given to the
NPFL by Foday Sankoh. lt came from Sierra Leone in late 1991 or early 1992.5269 Taylor
testified that this gun was donated to him by the RUF. The picture was taken during its
delivery.5270
Deliberations
2442. It is undisputed that after June 1991 the Accused provided the RUF with arms and
ammunition.527l However, while the Defence submits that the cooperation between NPFL
and RUF stopped entirely after the withdrawal of NPFL forces from Sierra Leone around
May/June 1992,5272 the Prosecution contends that even after the withdrawal the Accused
continued to provide the RUF with materiel in exchange for diamonds. The Prosecution
submits that by mid—1992 the lull in the supply of diamonds from the RUF to the Accused
corresponded to the diminution of materiel from the Accused to the RUF.5273
J 2443. ln this context the Prosecution, relying on the testimony of Witness TF1—567, alleges
that during a meeting in Gbarnga in November 1992, the Accused and Sankoh formed a plan
5268 Exhibit P-498, "Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission-Volume Three," para. 49,
5269 Exhibit D—123G, Photograph-DP 7 "Marked and signed by Charles Ghankay Taylor."
5270 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 July 2009, pp. 24999-25003.
ml See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 88; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 428, 815; See also Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2.0 July 2009, p. 2481 1; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28692-28693; Transcript
15 September 2009, pp. 28939-28940.
5272 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 428, 430,
5273 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 348.

---- End of Page 824 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

to attack Kono in order to get diamonds.5274 The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution
also alleges that the Accused directed Foday Sankoh to capture Kono District.5275
2444. The Trial Chamber will first assess the evidence regarding an alleged provision of
diamonds in exchange of arms and ammunition, before turning to the evidence regarding the
Accused's alleged involvement and support in the attack on Kono in late 1992.
Provision ofdiamonds in exchange ofarms and ammunition in 1991-1992
2445. Evidence from both Prosecution and Defence witnesses shows that during the
invasion of Sierra Leone, RUF soldiers captured diamonds from civilians and companies.5276
Witness TF1—367 testified that he accompanied Foday Sankoh on several trips from
Gbamga, Liberia, to Sierra Leone, in which Sankoh brought arms, ammunition, and
condiments provided by Taylor to RUF troops in Sierra Leone.5277 In a prior statement to the
Prosecutor, affirmed in his testimony under cross—examination, Witness TF1—367 said that
diamonds seized from civilians were taken by Sankoh to Taylor in Gbarnga and that the
witness himself escorted Sankoh on a couple of these trips.5278
2446. With regard to Witness TF1—367's general credibility, the Trial Chamber notes that
he provided generally clear and comprehensive evidence. The Trial Chamber does not
consider the witness's apparent confusion as to the date he became mining commander in
Kono5279 to be detrimental to his overall credibility. Under cross—examination, TF1—367's
5274 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 86.
5275 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 348.
5276 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009 (CS), pp. 23180-23181 (testified that when the NPFL and RUF troops
captured Pujehun District diamonds were captured. Thus the NPFL / RUF forces captured the mining company
MMC, killed its manager and captured its diamonds); TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008 p. 15042 (In 1992
the RUF obtained their diamonds from the houses of civilians); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008 pp. 12861-
12862 (TF1-567 saw Mosquito giving diamonds to Sankoh. Mosquito explained that his troops got these
diamonds when they attacked the town and when they searched civilians we took these diamonds from them);
Sam Kolleh, 1 November 2010, p. 48434 (Kolleh testified that the diamonds he gave to Issa Sesay for the
External Delegation came from ambushes when the war was advancing).
5277 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14103-14105.
5278 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15057-15059.
Sm Throughout his testimony, the witness gave evidence suggesting he had become mining commander at
various dates between the end of 1997 and December 1998. See TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp.
14158-14161: in examination-in-chief, TF1-367 testified that he was appointed "at the end of ’97 to the
beginning of ‘98" at a time when ECOMOG was in control of Koidu Town. The Trial Chamber recalls that
ECOMOG regained control in around April 1998 [Military Operations: Operation Fitti-Fatta] and that it was .
retaken by the troops commanded by Issa Sesay in December 1998 [Military Operations: Freetown,
Implementation of the Plan]; TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14297-14298: the witness testified to
being appointed at the end of 1998, "because when [Johnny Paul Koroma] was molested Charles Taylor received
the information so he called upon him to go to Monrovia". The Trial Chamber recalls that the incident to which

---- End of Page 825 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % l8 May 2012

testimony remained consistent although the Defence raised a number of inconsistencies with
his prior statements. ln that regard, the witness openly admitted that large parts of his first
statement to the Prosecution were untrue528O but the Trial Chamber accepts his explanation
that he was motivated to lie by fear of arrest by the Special Court.528l The Trial Chamber
finds the remaining inconsistencies to be generally minor5282 and is largely satisfied by the
explanations TFl-367 provided, particularly in view of the consistency with which the
witness maintained his in-Court testimony. The Trial Chamber therefore finds TFI-367 to be
enerall credible and will consider lixrther issues relatin to his credibilit in context as
S Y S Y
they may arise.
2447. While TF1-367 was the only witness who testified that he was with Sankoh when
Sankoh took diamonds to the Accused during this period, the Trial Chamber notes that his
evidence is corroborated by Witnesses TFl-168 and TFl-567, both of whom testified that
Sankoh told them that diamonds were brought to the Accused. 5283 Witness TF1-168 stated
that he was unable to tell if Sankoh was telling the truth.5284 Witness TPI-567 testified that
he saw Bockarie give Sankoh plenty of diamonds captured from civilians5285 and that at a
meeting called by Sankoh, Sankoh said that he had given some of the diamonds looted from
Kono to the Accused in exchange for arms and ammunition. 5286
2448. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber concludes that Sankoh gave
diamonds to the Accused. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that the evidence does not
he was referring, the confiscation of diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma, took place around March 1998
[Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused]; TFl-367, Transcript l September 2008, pp. 15041-
15043: he agreed to a date of December 1998 proposed by Defence Counsel; TFl-367, Transcript 28 August
2008, pp. 14905-14906: The witness denied a prior statement placing his appointment in December 1998, saying
he did not recall the month.
5280 The witness was cross-examined on his first prior statement at TFl-367, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp.
14879-14926. See in particular TFl-367, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14879-14884, 14926.
5281 TFl-367, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14879-14884. See also TFl-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p.
14276: the witness explained that after Issa Sesay et al had been arrested, there were rumours that anybody who
had been in the RUF would be arrested.
5282 See for example TFl-367, Transcript l September 2008, pp. 15025-15029 regarding whether, as recorded in
his prior statement, TFl-367 travelled to Monrovia with Bockarie two or three times or, as he testified, TFl-367
went to Liberia two or three times but to Monrovia only once.
5283 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12866-12867; TFl-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, (CS), pp. 23180-
23181.
5284 TFl-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23482-23483 (CS).
5285 TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12858-12863 (TFl-567 testified that he saw Bockarie giving Sankoh a
parcel of some 15 bigger diamonds and some 5 sizeable diamonds on the first occasion and plenty on the
second).
5286 TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12866- 12867.

---- End of Page 826 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GUS % 18 May 2012

conclusively establish that these diamonds were given to the Accused in payment for arms
and ammunition. ln his letter to Taylor, dated 5 May 1992, Foday Sankoh did not mention
any kind of payment - including diamonds- in exchange for the support he was seeking from
the Accused.5287 The Trial Chamber recalls also that significant evidence has been adduced
showing that the Accused's main reason to support the RUF during the early years of the
Sierra Leonean war was his desire to avoid fighting ULIMO in Liberia.5288 Moreover,
Witness TF1-168 testified that between 1991 and 1996 diamonds did not play a major role
in the Sierra Leonean war.5289
2449. ln the Trial Chamber's view the evidence adduced, and in particular the alternative
explanation for the Accused's support to the RUF, in the interest of fighting ULIMO,
suggests that during the early years of the invasion the provision of materiel by the Accused
to the RUF was not necessarily in exchange for diamonds, although the delivery of
diamonds to the Accused may have been one consideration among others.
T he Accused 's alleged involvement and support in the attack of Kono in late 1992.
2450. Witness TF1-567's testimony that at a meeting Sankoh and Taylor agreed to attack
Kono because Kono was a diamond mining areaw)0 is corroborated in part by Perry Kamara.
The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that both TF1-567 and Kamara are generally credible
witnesses.529l Kamara testified that in early November 1992, during a parade in Kakata,
5287 Exhibit P-065, letter from Foday Sankoh to Charles Taylor dated 5 May 1992.
5288 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28692-28693; Transcript 15 September 2009,
pp. 28939-28940 (Taylor testified that from August 1991 until May 1992 he provided small amounts of arms and
ammunition to Foday Sankoh and the RUF in order to tight ULIMO and the Sierra Leonean Government in
Sierra Leone to avoid having to fight ULIMO and the Sierra Leonean army in Liberia); Exhibit P-277
(Confidential), p. 18 ("Despite President Taylor's total involvement in the Sierra Leone crisis, he had no
territorial ambition in Sierra Leone. His main interest was material wealth and to use the Sierra Leone borders as
buffer zones to forestall the efforts of dissident Liberians United Defence Force, LUDF, which later was
transformed into United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia, ULIMO"); Mohamed Kabbah ,
Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16324-16325 (Kabbah heard that NPFL assisted the RUF in order to push
back the Sierra Leonean Government inland and that they would leave Sierra Leone afterward ); Dauda Aruna
Fornie, 1 December 2008, p. 21334 ("A group emerged in 1991 from the Sierra Leone area which was fighting
against Mr Taylor [...] called ULIMO"); DCT-228, Transcript 19 May 2010, p. 41250 (ULIMO was formed in
Sierra Leone and attacked the NPFL from Sierra Leone); Hasan Bility, 13 January 2009, p. 22468 ("ULIMO was
composed of displaced Liberians, many of whom were former Doe supporters, former Liberian soldiers");
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, p. 29317 (ULIMO was a group formed in Guinea and
Sierra Leone composed primarily of formers AFL soldiers under Doe's regime); DCT-228, Transcript 19 May
2010 p. 41236 ("ULlMO is an armed group that attacked he NPFL fighting to dethrone Mr Taylor").
5289 TFl-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23483-23484 (CS).
5290 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12852-12856.
ml Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317; Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.

---- End of Page 827 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OX / 18 May 2012 H

Liberia, he saw Sankoh, Taylor, his commanders and bodyguards arriving in a convoy.5292
Sankoh said that Taylor had given him trucks, arms and ammunition5293 and af`ter bringing
back these materials to Sierra Leone, Sankoh called a meeting of RUF soldiers at which he
said that Charles Taylor had told him to attack Kono in order to acquire diamonds and
money to buy more ammunition. Witness TF1—567 testified that Bockarie was appointed to
lead the attack on Kono, while Kamara testified that Mohamed Tarawalli was appointed to
lead the attack,5294 but apart from this detail, the witnesses corroborate each other on the fact
that around November 1992, in Gbarnga, Taylor provided Sankoh with arms and
ammunitions to attack Kono.
2451. Witness TF1—567's account is further corroborated by Dauda Aruna Fornie who
testified that while he was in Kakata, Sankoh told the RUF soldiers that trucks loaded with
ammunitions would come to collect them to bring them back to Sierra Leone. While Kamara
saw Taylor, Fomie testified that he did not see Taylor because the door and the windows of
the vehicle remained closed, but he said Bockarie informed him that Taylor was inside the
vehicle.52°5
2452. Foday Lansana also corroborates the account of these witnesses in his testimony that
Sankoh returned from Gbarnga to Pendembu with a large quantity of arms and ammunition
and that upon his return, Mohamed Tarawalli, Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon
were instructed to go to Koidu, Kono District in order to attack government troops and
conquer the area because it was a diamond rich mining area.5296 While Lansana placed this
event in mid—1992 his account corresponds in all other respects to the other witnesses’
testimony and the Trial Chamber therefore accepts this evidence. 1
2453. 1n light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber does not accept the blanket denials of the
Accused5297 and of Issa Sesay that there were no links between the NPFL and RUF after
May 1992 or the blanket denial, made also by Charles Ngebeh, 5298 that no materiel was sent
5292 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3034.
5293 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3035.
5204 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3045—3046.
5295 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21360—21371; Transcript 8 December 2008, pp.
21993—21999; Transcript 11 December 2008, pp. 22257—22258.
52% Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4395—4396.
5297 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28694—28699, 28706—28707; Transcript 15
September 2009, pp. 28939—28940.
5298 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, p. 37785.

---- End of Page 828 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012
L

to the RUF after this time. Moreover, the Trial Chamber does not find credible the
Accused's denial of having received diamonds from Sankoh. Defence witness Sam Kolleh
testified that he did not know whether the RUF provided Taylor with diamonds. Defence
Witness Martin George testified that diamonds found after the successful attack on Kono
were given to Sankoh, and he said he did not know what Sankoh did with the diamonds.529"
Fayia Musa's testimony that diamonds from Kono were given by Sankoh to Isatu Kallon
does not in the Trial Chamber's view negate the possibility that diamonds were also given
by Sankoh to the Accused. In the Trial Chamber's view, the testimony of these Defence
witnesses does not raise any doubt that the Accused was involved in the attack of Kono by
providing arms and ammunitions to Sankoh.
2454. Finally, regarding the Accused's involvement in the decision to attack Kono, the
Trial Chamber notes that Witness TFl—567 testified that Sankoh and Taylor had agreed or
"arranged" to capture Kono53"O while Perry Kamara testified that Taylor told Sankoh to
capture Kono.53Ol The Trial Chamber recalls that none of the witnesses was present during
Sankoh's meeting with Taylor. As their testimonies are unclear and inconsistent on Taylor's
exact role in the decision to attack Kono, the Trial Chamber is unable to determine what this ~
role was. The Trial Chamber further notes that Witness TFl-168 testified that around
October 1992, Sankoh went to Gbarnga in order to explain to the RUF troops remaining in
Gbarnga that his plan was to advance towards Kono District.5302 This testimony of Witness
TFl—l68 therefore suggests that the plan to attack Kono was made before Sankoh's trip to
Gbarnga. ‘
W Marrrrr George, Trarrsprrpr 22 Aprrr 2010, pp. 39698-39700.
5300 TFl—567, Transcript 2 July 2008 p. 12854 ("Well he told him that he and his brother had arranged that this
was the time that they were to capture Kono, because Kono was a diamond mining area and that they should try
and capture there. Later Charles Taylor gave the arms and ammunition. Q. And what type of arms and
ammunition —— JUDGE LUSSICK: Well I am sorry to interrupt, but it is just that I don't understand that last
answer. The answer was "Well, he told him that he and his brother ..". It looks as though there is a third person
in there somewhere. MS HOLLIS: Thank you, your Honour, I will clarify that: Q. Mr Witness, you said that
Foday Sankoh went to his brother Charles Taylor and "... he told him that he and his brother had arranged that
was the time that they were to capture Kono". Now when you say, "... he told him that he and his brother had
arranged .."., who told whom? A. Well he was trying to talk to us that he and his brother, he and Charles
Taylor, have arranged that Charles Taylor was to help with arms and ammunition to go and capture Kono
because Kono had diamonds. Q. Just to be absolutely clear, when you say, "He and Charles Taylor", who is the
"he"? A. Foday Sankoh").
5301 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008 p. 3046 ("The RUF leadership summoned a meeting and that was
Foday Sankoh. He said he just returning back from Mr Taylor and now he said he is there to organise us so that
we will use this ammunition to attack Kono so that we will be able to get diamonds and money that will help us
to get more ammunition. That was what he said Taylor told him. So he sent Mohamed Tarawalli on that
particular mission. Luckily for Mohamed Tarawalli he succeeded").

---- End of Page 829 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T // l8 May 20l2 Q
r

3 8952 2
2455. The Trial Chamber considers that it has insufficient evidence to determine when and
where the decision was made to attack Kono. It can only be concluded on the basis of the
evidence adduced that the Accused and Sankoh discussed the decision to attack Kono, not
that Taylor ordered it or planned it with Sankoh.
2456. Finally, turning to the motivation behind the Kono attack, the Trial Chamber heard
substantial evidence establishing that the presence of diamonds was indisputably one
motivation behind the attack.53O3 However this was not the only motivation. For example,
Witness TF1—168 testified that the RUF wanted to capture Kono District because it was a
diamondiferous area but also because it was a strategic road to Freetown.5304 Furthermore,
the evidence on record shows that while in control of Kono, the RUF did not try to start
mining operations.53O5 Expert witness Stephen Ellis testified that it was only during the later
1990s that diamonds became a key factor in the hostilities. In the Trial Chamber's view, this
failure to start mining operations suggests that the acquisition of diamonds was not the
primary purpose of the attack on Kono, although it notes the evidence that diamonds were
seized from civilians when Kono was captured.53U6
Findings
2457. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that, around November 1992, the Accused provided Sankoh with arms and ammunition for
an attack on Kono.
2458. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that during this time the Accused received diamonds from Sankoh.
2459. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that in 1992 the Accused and Sankoh formed a common plan to capture Kono, or that
the Accused directed Sankoh to capture Kono, because it was a diamondiferous area.
5302 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23215 (CS).
5303 See for example TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12852—12856.
5304 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23224 (CS).
5305 See for example TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23180-23181 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009,
pp. 23482-23483 (CS); TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008 pp. 15057-15059.
5306 See for example TF1—367, Transcript 1 September 2008 pp. 15057—15059.

---- End of Page 830 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01- l` 18 May 2012
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6. Alleged RUF Assistance to Fight ULIMO in Liberia
Submissions of the Parties V
2460. The Prosecution alleges that throughout the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
Taylor made free use of his proxy force, the RUF. Specifically, the Prosecution submits that
in 1993, at Taylor's direction, Sankoh sent RUF personnel under the command of Morris
1 Kallon to Liberia to fight with Taylor's NPFL against ULIMO. Kallon was tasked to open
the way to Gbarnga and get materiel from Taylor. The attempt was unsuccessful and Kallon
returned to Sierra Leone from Liberia in about 1994 via Guinea, without arms or
ammunition.5307
2461. The Defence concedes to a mutual pact between Taylor and Sankoh to neutralise
ULlMO.5308 It submits however that this cooperation stopped after Operation Top Final and
the withdrawal of NPFL forces from Sierra Leone.53O9
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Perry Kamara
2462. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,53 10 testified that in 1993 the RUF
supply route was blocked by ULIMO. Taylor asked Sankoh to send a group in order to fight
ULIMO there. Accordingly, Mr Kallon led a group to Liberia and attacked ULIMO
positions in order to enable the RUF to access supply routes to Taylor's headquar"ters.53ll
Prosecution Witness TFl—567
2463. Witness TF1—567, an RUF member,53l2 testified that in 1993, ULIMO captured the
areas of Kailahun, Foya, and Voinjama, blocking the routes of the RUF to Liberia. Witness
TFl—567 testified that during a meeting Sankoh explained that Charles Taylor suggested to
5307 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 384.
5308 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 779.
5309 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 343, 431, 778, 1237-1239. See also Defence Response to the Prosecution
Final Trial Brief para. 84 ("Para. 384 is pre-Indictment and thus is Rule 93 evidence, which the Trial Chamber
should not accept. In any event, Morris Kallon returned to Sierra Leone without arms or ammunition, so it is
unclear how Taylor could be responsible under aiding and abetting when there was no substantial assistance
actually giverr").
SNO Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
Sm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3272.

---- End of Page 831 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /f OJ 18 May 2012
. A /!

58 924]-
him that he should send some soldiers from Sierra Leone in order to get more arms and
ammunition. Accordingly, Foday Sankoh selected some RUF Liberian soldiers, including
Morris Kallon, and asked them to go to Liberia. Morris Kallon and his men left but never
managed to pass through the border. The border was closed until 1998, cutting off the road
of communications between the RUF and NPFL.5313
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2464. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF Commander,5314 testified that around 1993, ULIMO
occupied Voinjama in Liberia. Sankoh called Mongor and told him that Taylor asked him to
send RUF troops in order to repel ULIMO troops from Voinjama. Mongor left for Voinjama
and fought together with NPFL troops. Together the NPFL and RUF managed to capture
vomjama from ULIMO.5315
2465. Mongor testified that while he was fighting in Voinjama, Kallon and his men,
together with NPFL troops, also fought ULIMO but could not dislodge them. Kallon
planned to take a bypass to go to Gbarnga, but all his men were killed. Morris Kallon was
the only one who survived that attack.5316
Prosecution Witness TF1 -168
2466. Witness TF 1-168, an RUF officer,5311 testified that by J anuary/February 1993
ULIMO had spread into Lofa County in Liberia, threatening the supply route to Gbarnga.
Witness TF 1-168 said that Sankoh informed him that the RUF received a message to send
RUF troops to Mendekoma going towards Voinjama, in order to help NPP L troops to stop
ULIMO from closing the route to Gbarnga. Most of the Liberian vanguards volunteered to
go on that mission under the command of Morris Kallon. Witness TF 1-168 testified that the
5312 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833; Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
5313 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12867-12868.
5314 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
5315 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5677-5679,
5316 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5681-5683.
5317 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (CS).

---- End of Page 832 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G4) 18 May 2012 Q
r /

mission failed and the supply route to Gbarnga was completely cut off None of the men
except Morris Kallon returned.53 `8
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
2467. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,5319 testiHed that before
April 1992, the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone was still open. However, after the
NPRC led by Strasser King overthrew Momoh's govermnent, ULIMO intensified their
attacks and the RUF lost Kono and were pushed back to the Koindu border, cutting the
supply road between Sierra Leone and Liberia.5320
2468. Albert Saidu testified that before the border was cut off Morris Kallon entered
Liberia with RUF soldiers to bring back ammunition, but he was still in Liberia when
ULIMO took over the border. Around 1993, Morris Kallon and his men, together with
NPFL soldiers, tried to open the border but failed to do so. Albert Saidu testified that RUF
lost fighters during the fight but that Morris Kallon managed later on to reach the RUF
territory, passing through Guinea. 5321
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
2469. Witness J abaty J award, an RUF soldier based in Pendembu,5322 testified that after the
invasion of Sierra Leone, RUF arms and ammunition and food supplies were coming from
the NPFL territory in Liberia. Jaward used to see Foday Sankoh passing through Pendembu
from Gbarnga in trucks loaded with arms and ammunition.5323
2470. J award stated that in 1993, ULIMO conquered the border between Sierra Leone and
Liberia, cutting off the RUF supply route from Liberia. Before the border was completely
closed in November 1993, Sankoh sent a group of fighters led by Morris Kallon across the
border to go to Gbarnga for arins and ammunition, during which time they were cut off
53*8 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23226—23227 (cs).
""’ Albert samp, Transcript 4 Jppp 2008, p. 10895.
Sm Aippp samp, Transcript 4 Jppp 2008, pp. 10934—10936.
5321 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 10936-10939.
Sm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13306, 13332; Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13383.
Sm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008 pp. 13261-13263.

---- End of Page 833 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gu 18 May 2012
. /

J award testified that the group was not able to come back to Sierra Leone and that Morris
Kallon had to pass through Guinea in order to come back to RUF tenitory.5324
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
2471. Witness TF1-516, an RUF member,5325 testified that while he was at a muster parade
in Buedu, in early 1993, Sankoh informed the RUF that ULIMO had captured Voinjama,
Kolahun and Foya, cutting off the RUF from the NPFL. Sankoh asked Morris Kallon to go
to Gbarnga in order to get materials and gave him a good number of RUF fighters for this
mission. The RUF fighters crossed into Liberia and manoeuvred on to Gbarnga. When
Morris Kallon and those men arrived, a radio message was sent to Sankoh explaining that
the RUF fighters, led by Morris Kallon, arrived in Gbarnga, though they had met some
obstacles on the way. Kallon only came back after the AFRC coup in 1997.5326
The Accused
2472. The Accused testified that between August 1991 and May 1992, he provided
minimal assistance to Sankoh by sending small amounts of ammunition from time to
time.5327 However, after 1992 and Operation Top Final, the Accused cut off all links with the
RUF and gave them no assistance.5328 Moreover, ULIMO had closed the entire border
between Liberia and Sierra Leone around August 1992. 5329
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
2473. Witness Charles Ngebeh, an RUF soldier,533O testified that in 1994 Morris Kallon
was in Liberia. Ngebeh did not know whether Sankoh sent Kallon to Liberia to assist the
NPFL but testified that Kallon came back from Liberia to Sierra Leone, passing through
Guinea.53 31
532* Jabaty Jawprd, Transcript 9 July 2008 pp. 13263, 1328943293
5325 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
5326 TF1—516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7043—7047, 7050, 7077-7081.
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24825—24827.
5328 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24822-24825.
5320 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 21 July 2009, pp. 24820~24822, 24937—24940; 24848-24857, 24890—
24891.
5330 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37847.
Sm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38733—38734.

---- End of Page 834 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T @5 18 May 2012 i

Deliberations
2474. lt is undisputed that after Operation Top Final and the withdrawal of NPFL forces
from Sierra Leone,5332 UL1MO and Sierra Leonean government troops intensified their
attacks against the RUF, cutting off the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone and
preventing the RUF from getting any supplies from Liberia. 5333
2475. ln that context the Prosecution alleges that in 1993, in an unsuccessful attempt to
keep the supply lines open and at the Accused's direction Sankoh sent RUF personnel under
the command of Morris Kallon to Liberia to fight with the Accused's NPFL against
UL1MO. The Prosecution further submits that Kallon was tasked to open the way to
Gbarnga and get materiel from the Accused but that Kallon retumed to Sierra Leone from
Liberia in about 1994 via Guinea, without anns or ammunition.5334 While the Defence
concedes to a mutual pact between the Accused and Sankoh to neutralise UL1MO, it denies
that this was pursuant to any Joint Criminal Enterprise and submits that this cooperation
ended after Operation Top Final around June 1992.5335
2476. The evidence establishes that in 1993, Sankoh sent a group of RUF fighters led by
Morris Kallon to Liberia in order to open the border controlled by UL1MO and to purchase
anns and ammunition.5336 The mission failed and most of the border was cut off5337 Monis
Kallon survived and came back later to Sierra Leone, passing through Guinea.5338 The
Sm Pre-lndictrnent Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.
5333 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 216-218; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 342, 426, 434-436.
5334 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 384.
5335 Defence rmi rmi Baer, paras 343, 779, 431, 778, 1237-1239.
5336 Perry Karnara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3272; TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12867-12868;
Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13292; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7043-7047, 7050, 7077-
7081; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38733-38734; See also Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March
2008, p. 5677 (Sankoh asked Mongor to fight ULJMO in Voinjama).
5337 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5681 ("they couldn't dislodge the UL1MOs. Since they could
not overpower the ULlMOs he planned to take a bypass to go to Gbarnga, but they couldn't make it up and the
manpower that he had all of them were killed"); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23226-23227 (CS)
("The mission failed became as we learned later ULIMO sealed off the area so the supply route to Gbarnga was
completely cut off and then by then [sic] even our men that went on the mission, we didn't see anybody return,
not until later on"); Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 10937-10939 (Morris Kallon and his men together
with NPFL soldiers failed to open the border. The RUF lost soldiers during the fight).
5338 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5681 ("Morris Kallon was able to escape. He survived that
attack" [...] "He returned, but not immediately after the incident"); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp.
23226-23227 (CS) ("Surprisingly, while we were in the Koindu jungle, one morning we just saw Morris Kallon.
He returned alone [...] when he was going on the trip he had over 50 fighters with him, but upon his return 1 saw
him alone"); Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10939 (Morris Kallon managed later on to join the RUF
territory passing through Guinea); Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13293 (Morris Kallon had to pass

---- End of Page 835 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (pb 18 May 2012

question for the Trial Chamber is whether the Accused requested Sankoh's assistance to
open the border controlled by ULIMO.
2477. Witnesses Perry Kamara and TFl—567 testified that Sankoh sent Kallon and his men
at Taylor's direction. Similarly, Isaac Mongor testified that at the same period, Sankoh sent
him to fight ULIMO, saying that this was at Taylor's request. Witness TFl-l68 testified that
Sankoh told him that he had received a message asking him to send troops in order to help
NPFL troops to stop ULIMO from closing the route to Gbamga, although TFl-l68 did not
specifically mention the Accused.5339 The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that Kamara,
TFl—567, Mongor and TFl -168 are all generally credible witnesses.5340
2478. Witness TFl—567 and Mongor testified that it was Sankoh who informed them that
Taylor requested the RUF's assistance to fight ULIMO in the border area.534l Kamara did
, not explain how he obtained this information.5342
2479. The evidence shows that ULIMO was advancing toward the border and cutting off
the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. In this context, it is evident that despite
NPFL's withdrawal from Sierra Leone, Taylor and Sankoh both still had an interest in
fighting their common enemy ULIMO. Even after the withdrawal of the NPFL, the RUF
still needed NPFL military support in order to fight ULIMO and the Sierra Leonean
Government forces. At the same time, Taylor's NPFL needed RUF troops to attack ULIMO,
in order to prevent major attacks on Liberia. In this context, it is credible that Taylor would
call Sankoh and request his assistance to fight their common enemy, as they had done
continuously since June 1991.
through Guinea in order to come back to the RUF territory); Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38734
(Kallon came back from Liberia to Sierra Leone passing through Guinea),
5339 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23226—23227 (cs).
5340 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317;
Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274; Credibility Assessment, TF1-168, Pre-Indictment period
(1988-1996), para. 2328.
5341 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12867-12868; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5677-
5679.
5342 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p, 3272 ("1993 a group went there and even up to the time when
we had disarmed Taylor sent instructions for the RUF to go there as a stand-by force in case UNAMSIL would
attempt to attack our positions. In 1993 when our supply route was blocked by ULIMO Mr Kallon had to send -
I am sorry, Mr Kallon had to lead a group to go and fight in Liberia. It was a request from Mr Taylor to Sarrkoh
at that time. That was the first group I can remember went to Liberia. They were the ones who went and formed
- I mean they attacked ULIMO positions so that we could get supply routes to Mr Taylor's headquarters").

---- End of Page 836 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G-’> 18 May 2012 .1 [
\ 2/

2480. In the light of the foregoing evidence, and particularly the testimonies of Perry
Kamara, TF 1-567 and Isaac Mongor, who all specifically mentioned the Accused, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that Sankoh sent RUF forces to Liberia at the request of the Accused.
Findings
2481. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in 1993, following a request from the Accused, Sankoh sent RUF persormel under the
command of Morris Kallon to Liberia to fight with the NPF L against ULIMO.
7. Alleged Supply of Materiel to the RUF from Guinea during ULIMO Occupation
Submissions of the Parties
2482. The Prosecution submits that at the end of 1993/beginning of 1994, the border area
between Liberia and Sierra Leone was controlled by ULIMO. Such severe restriction of
access to the border areas effectively cut off the direct supply lines from Taylor in Liberia to
the fighters in Sierra Leone. However, Taylor devised other means of delivering materiel to
his surrogate force there, the RUF. He instructed Joseph ("Zigzag") Marzah to establish a
relationship with persons in Guinea in order to take materiel into Guinea for the RUF. To
that end, Taylor provided Marzah with a vehicle and the "start up" money to establish the
relationship. In this way, Marzah was able to transport ammunition into Guinea and hand it
over to one of Taylor's Special Forces, Tiagan Wantee, who was at that time Taylor's
"ambassador to Guinea" for onward transit to Sierra Leone. This was a similar method to
that established with Isatu Kallon when she went to Guinea from Taylor's controlled
territory in Liberia by way of the NPF L stronghold in Danané, Cote d’Ivoire. Just as he did
with Marzah, no doubt Taylor gave this trader the "start up" money and other assistance to
secure a trading alliance with Guineans in Guinea. From that alliance she was able to
purchase or barter for ammunition which she then provided to the RUF. In this way Taylor
was able to indirectly provide some amount ofmateriel to his proxy force in Sierra Leone at
a time when the direct overland route was not completely open to him.5343
5343 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 218.

---- End of Page 837 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.—03—0l—T / Og, 18 May 2012 g
V l. f

2483. The Defence challenges Marzah's general credibility5344 and submits that the
allegation is characterized by hyperbole, duplicity and made purely by assumption.5345
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
2484. Witness Joseph ("Zigzag") Marzah, an NPFL soldier,534° testified that alrer 1991,
ULIMO occupied Lofa County in Liberia blocking the supply road between Liberia and
Sierra Leone.5347 As a result, Taylor instructed Marzah to "penetrate through" with arms and
ammunition. Taylor gave Marzah $USD 1,600 and a Nissan pickup. Marzah pretended to be
a businessman selling kola nuts and established relationships with a couple of Guinean
customs officers who, alter being given a balawala bag of kola nuts, assisted him in
transporting the kola nuts bags as far as Kissidugu. Marzah testified that ammunition from
Charles Taylor, like rockets, was hidden in the bags. ln Kissidugu, Tiagen Wantee and a
Mandigo friend collected the kola nuts bags and brought them to the Liberian Embassy in
Conakry.5348
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -168
2485. Witness TF 1-168, an RUF officer, was with Sankoh in the RUF headquarters until
the end of 1994. Witness TF 1-168 testified that from 1993 unti1 December 1994, the only
source of weapons were those captured from the enemy. TF 1-168 further stated that the
RUF was not receiving arms from Guinea since it was not controlling the Kailahun area but
had retreated to the jungle of Zogoda.5349
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -375
2486. Witness TF 1-375, an RUF member, testified that Tiagen Wantee was an ambassador
to Guinea, but later he was chased out of Guinea and came to Liberia.535O
5344 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1430-1448.
5345 Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 42, 44.
5346 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 6053-6055.
5347 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5871-5782.
5348 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5872-5875.
5349 TFl-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23449-23451 (CS).
5350 TF1-375, Transcript 22 August 2008, p. 14377 (PS).

---- End of Page 838 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T T 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
2487. Witness Jabaty Jaward, a former RUF member and a SSS member, testified that
Tiagen Wantee was the former Liberian ambassador to Guinea.535l
The Accused
2488. The Accused denied having given any instruction to Marzah to transport materials
through Guinea. He admitted having an ambassador named Tiagen Wantee in Guinea but
only after late 1997, when he was elected President of Liberia.5352
Deliberations
2489. It is undisputed that around 1993, ULIMO took control of Lofa County in Liberia,
cutting off the supply road between Liberia and Sierra Leone. 5353
2490. The Prosecution, relying on Joseph Marzah's testimony, alleges that in 1994 the
i Accused instructed Marzah to establish a relationship with persons in Guinea in order to take
materiel into Guinea for the RUF .5354 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Marzah's
testimony, particularly as it relates to his personal interaction and communication with the
Accused, must be considered with caution and requires corroboration.5355
2491. Marzah did not provide any specific dates for his alleged trips to Guinea. However,
he testified that he made his trips to Guinea while ULIMO occupied Lofa County in
Liberia.5356 No other witness corroborated Marzah's account that while the supply road
between Liberia and Sierra Leone was blocked by ULIMO, Taylor devised another means of
delivering materiel to the RUF. To the contrary, Witness TF 1-168, an RUF officer who was
with Sankoh at the RUF headquarters until the end of 1994, testified that the only source of
weapons for the RUF were those captured from the enemy. Witness TF 1-168 further stated
specifically that the RUF was not receiving arms from Guinea.5357 In the Trial Chamber's
5351 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13931-13932. But see prior statement "Tiagen Wantee was an
assistant to the Guinean Ambassador" (Jabaty Jawad, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13933-13934).
5352 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 September 2009, pp. 29834-29848.
5353 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 216-218; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 342, 434-436.
5354 Prosecution Closing Brief para. 218.
5355 Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268.
5356 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5871-5782.
5357 rrr- 168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23449-23451 (cs).

---- End of Page 839 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G3 18 May 2012

view, this testimony from a well informed RUF officer, casts further doubt on Marzah's
uncorroborated testimony.
2492. In light of the evidence of TFl-168, whom the Trial Chamber has found to be
generally credible,5358 and its general reservations regarding Marzah's evidence, which is
not corroborated with regard to this allegation, the Trial Chamber does not find that the
allegation has been established.
Findings
2493. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused instmcted Joseph ("Zig2ag") Marzah to establish a relationship with
persons in Guinea in order to take materiel into Guinea for the RUF.
8. Sierra Rutile
Submissions of the Parties
2494. The Prosecution submits that Taylor advised Sankoh to attack a major place and
terrorise the area, starting with the civilians, including white employees, in order to raise the
concem of the intemational community and to force the government and intemational
community to agree to a peace deal. Following this advice, San1villages and dead civilians in their wake as they moved to Sierra Rutile and its environs.
During the attack on Sierra Rutile and environs, the RUF also abducted staff and looted a
substantial sum of money from the company. After the attack, Sankoh reported to Taylor via
NPFL radio stations. Taylor told Sankoh to save the money in order to buy ammunitions,
food and drugs for the fighters and to establish diplomatic relations with the outside world.
The Prosecution relies primarily on the testimonies of Augustine Mallah and Perry
Kamara.5359
2495. The Defence contends that the testimony of Augustine Mallah and Perry Kamara
lacks credibility and contradicts the testimony of other Prosecution witnesses. The Defence
5358 Credibility Assessment, TF 1-168, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2328.
5359 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 122-124, 417.

---- End of Page 840 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL O3 O1 T U15 18 May 2012 V?
/

3 8 7 33
further submits that this evidence is an elaborately made up story deliberately designed to
directly implicate Taylor in the planning of RUF combat activities in Sierra Leone.536O
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
2496. Witness Augustine Mallah, a former RUF member,536l testified that at the end of
1994, while he was at the RUF base in the jungle in Zogoda, Foday Sankoh told him that he,
together with Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and Jalloh, a Sierra Leonean RUF Junior .
Commando, would be sent on a mission to Sierra Rutile under the command of CO
Mohamed Tarawalli (a.k.a. Zino).5362
2497. F our or five days later, Sankoh assembled a formation and said that he had received
advice from "the other side", to attack and terrorise the area of Sierra Rutile by killing
civilians, burning villages and abducting white employees of the Sierra Rutile mining
company located there. Sankoh told Mallah later that "the other side" meant Charles Taylor.
Sankoh explained that the purpose was to frighten the population and the soldiers there and
to raise concern in the international community in order to force the international
community to concentrate on peace in Sierra Leone.5363 Mallah stated that while he was at
Zogoda, in 1994, he saw Sankoh having conversations with Taylor by radio on a daily basis.
Mallah heard their conversations clearly because the radio had a speaker.5364
2498. In accordance with Sankoh's order, Mallah and the other RUF soldiers attacked
Sumbuya, Tikonko, Bo Town, Njala University and Kanbaima. Most of the towns were
burned and civilians were killed. Sierra Rutile mining company was burned and its
equipment destroyed. Three employees of the company were captured. Mallah further
testified that four employees of a company named Sironco Company were also captured and
sent to Sankoh at Zogoda. During the attack, Mallah and other RUF soldiers reported to
Mohamed Tarawalli, who informed Sankoh regularly of the crimes committed. Mallah
5360 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 437-438, 776, 820-835, 1238-1239, 1354-1358.
5%] Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20092—20094. Mallah was an RUP commander of the
Sankoh Strike Force Cornrnanders Unit.
Sm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20096-20097.
5363 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20096—20099.
5364 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20109-20112; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20294-20295.

---- End of Page 841 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T %/ 841 18 May 2012 /1%

3 @@3 4
testified that when Mohamed Tarawalli spoke to Sankoh, all the RUF commanders listened
to the conversation with radio sets. After the attack Mallah remained in Sierra Rutile for
eight months, after which he came back to Zogoda. 5365
Prosecution Witness Per_ry Kamara
2499. Witness Perry Kamara, a former RUF Junior Commando536° and an RUF radio
operator, testified that in 1994, Taylor and the RUF used to have radio communications
every two or three days.53`57 As a radio man he received and monitored the radio
transmissions and read from the log books. Kamara testified that Sankoh "was always
advised by Mr Taylor" and that "any time Mr Sankoh received message from Mr Taylor we
will undertake a serious attack".5368 ln late 1994-1995, Taylor advised Sankoh to attack
major places like Kono or Sierra Rutile. As a result, Sankoh informed his men, including the
witness, that he wanted to attack the mining company of Sierra Rutile in Bonthe district, in
the southern part of` Sierra Leone.53`59 The RUF mission on Sierra Rutile was commanded by
CO Mohamed Tarawalli. During the attack on Sierra Rutile, RUF soldiers captured the
manager of the company and other white men. After the mission, the commander Mohamed
Tarawalli came back with money wrapped in a rice bag. When Tarawalli came back to the
base, Sankoh reported to Taylor who advised him to buy ammunitions, food and drugs for
his fighters with the money looted.537O
2500. Taylor also advised Sankoh to use the money and the white hostages in order to
establish diplomatic relations with other countries. More specifically, he said Sankoh should
send educated RUF members to Cote d’Ivoire in order to establish RUF representation there.
Fayia Musa, Deen J alloh, Philip Palmer and their families were chosen for this diplomatic
mission.537l
Prosecution Witness TF1-168
5365 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20101—20102.
5366 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3024-3027.
5367 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3049.
Sm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3053.
5369 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054.
5370 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3054.
5371 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3056.

---- End of Page 842 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Qk 18 May 2012
I

5 89 3 5
2501. Witness TF 1-168, an RUF officer,5572 testified that by late 1994, the RUF soldiers at
RUF Headquarters in Zogoda were having difficulty surviving without food and under
constant attack by ULIMO and Govemment troops.5575 Sankoh and other RUF officers
decided that it was time to leave the jungle and to meet the intemational community in order
to negotiate peace. For this purpose, on 11 December 1994, Sankoh sent RUF members
including Philip Palmer, Deen-Jalloh, Isatu Kallon, Daniel Kallon, Philip Sannoh, Alhaji
Kamara and Issa Sesay to Cote d’Ivoire in order to establish a public relations campaign for
the RUF. The members of the RUF delegation left Sierra Leone passing through Guinea.5574
On or about 13 December 1994, while in Gueckedou on their way to Cote d’Ivoire, Philip
Palmer and Alhaji Kamara were arrested by an anti gang unit of the police for being
members of a rebel group. They were moved to Conakry and detained there until May 1995.
After being released in May 1995, Palmer remained with the Sierra Leonean Ambassador to
Guinea, in Conakry, for two weeks.5575
2502. Witness TF 1-168 further testified that Foday Sankoh had European, American and
Sierra Leonean hostages, abducted from Sierromco and Sierra Rutile. The hostages were
held prisoners at the RUF's headquarters in Zogoda and later turned over to a special envoy,
who in tum delivered them to the lCRC.5575
Prosecution Witness TF 1-567
2503. Witness TF 1-567, an RUF security officer in Zogoda,5577 testified that in 1994,
Foday Sankoh asked Mohamed Tarawalli (a.k.a. Zino) and Superman to come to Zogoda.
There, he instructed them to attack Sierra Rutile and the westem jungle and to open a base in
the Western Area, because it was close to Freetown. Witness TF 1 -567 went there with Zino.
He testified that while there, the RUF used to set ambushes on the highway to get food from
civilian vehicles and arms and ammunition from military vehicles.5575
The Accused
5572 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (CS).
5575 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23239-23240 (CS).
5574 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23245-23248 (CS).
5575 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23248-23252 (CS). ·
5575 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23263-23265 (CS).
5577 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
5575 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12876-12878.

---- End of Page 843 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

2504. The Accused denied having any contact with Foday Sankoh from 1992 onwards and
denied giving any advice to attack Siena Rutile.5379 He added that he did not know what or
where Siena Rutile was 5380 The Accused also denied advising Foday Sankoh that RUF
should establish diplomatic relations with the outside world.538l
Defence Witness Martin George
2505. Witness Martin George, an RUF Lieutenant,5382 testified that, around mid-1994, he
went to the RUF headquarters in Zogoda and attended a meeting during which Sankoh
assigned Mohamed Tarawalli to capture Siena Rutile and Sam Bockarie to capture Matru
Jong. Sankoh explained that Siena Rutile was an important target because it was a major
government base and if they "got it" they would "shake up the govemment". The witness
never heard Sankoh speak of Charles Taylor during the meeting or mention that this attack
had been ordered by Taylor. George stated that the decision came from Sankoh directly.5383
George further stated that during the meeting with Sankoh at Zogoda he did not hear anyone
saying that the RUF should tenorise, capture or kill any civilians. The objective of the
mission was to capture Siena Rutile, a mining company which was an important source of
supply for the Govermnent.5384
2506. George testified that Sam Bockarie and Mohamed Tarawalli both passed by his base
in Ngolahun Vaama on the way to Siena Rutile and Matru—Jong and on their return.
Moreover, the witness and his radio operator, Dauda Aruna Fomie, received frequent reports
on the operations by radio. During the operation in Siena Rutile, Mohamed Tarawalli took
16 hostages including three white British citizens. The hostages were taken to Sankoh's base
in Zogoda. Sankoh had the 3 British nationals escorted to Guinea and released upon the
request of the intemational community. The witness did not know what happened during the
attacks in Siena Rutile or in Njala, Kambaima or Sumbuya since he was not part of the
mission. 5385
5379 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 28999.
5380 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25131-25132.
5 3 81 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29000.
5382 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39592; Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39627, 39708, 39710;
Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39766, 39787-39795.
Sm Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39708-39713; Transcript 27 April 2010, pp. 40091·40092.
5384 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39722-39728; Transcript 27 April 2010, pp. 40092-40094.
5385 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39712-39716; Transcript 27 April 2010, pp. 40093-40097.

---- End of Page 844 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T mg 18 May 2012
/

2507. George testified that during the attacks on Sierra Rutile and Matru Jong, he never
heard that the RUF was in communication with anyone in Liberia nor of arms and
ammunition being sent from Liberia. The witness stated that the RUF obtained arms and
ammunition to attack Sierra Rutile and Matru Jong by attacking military bases belonging to
Momoh's soldiers.538°
2508. George did not remember the name of Augustine Mallah. However he did remember
the nickname of OG. He testified that OG was part of the mission attacking Sierra Rutile.
However, he said OG was not an RUF commander.5387
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2509. Witness 1ssa Sesay, senior RUF commander,5388 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,5389 testified that in 1995 RUF troops, led by Mohamed
Tarawalli and Superman, attacked Sierra Rutile from the Kangari Hills. During the attack,
the RUF captured American and British expatriate workers who were taken to the Sankoh
headquarters in Zogoda.539O Between April and June 1995, the ICRC contacted Foday
Sankoh on the radio in order to organise the release of` the hostages. Sankoh agreed to
release them and asked Sesay to escort them to the Guinean border. Sesay escorted them to
the Guinean border where they were received by the ICRC.5391
2510. Sesay testified that the order to release the hostages did not come from Charles
Taylor but from Sankoh. Similarly, it was Sankoh himself who ordered the attack on Sierra
Rutile. At this time, Sankoh was angry at Taylor and refused to talk to him. Accordingly, the
RUF and Taylor had no communications.5392
Defence Witness F ayia Musa
M Marrrrr George, rrarrrcrrpr 22 Aprrr 2010, pp. 39716-3971 7.
5387 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39722—39723.
53*8 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-4459], 44596.
5389 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588—43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
""" ipsa Sesay, rrarrscrrpr 6 Jury 2010, pp. 4374741374s.
539] Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43748, 43750—43752.
5302 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43749—43752.

---- End of Page 845 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T ZJ Gu 18 May 2012

3 8 7 3 8
2511. Witness Fayia Musa, an RUF member of the External Delegation,5393 testified that,
in 1994 Foday Sankoh gave the order to attack Sierra Rutile in order to expand his te1rit01"y
before the peace talks started. Sankoh knew that peace talks would begin s00n and that
military activity would lose its relevance. Many individuals were captured during this
Operation. Among those captured at Sieromc0 mines was Dr Barrie, a Sierra Leonean, who
decided to j0in the RUF External Delegation after he was offered release instead of being
returned to Freetown.5394
2512. Fayia Musa further testified that in December 1994, Sankoh agreed to send out an
External Delegation comprised of lbrahim Deen-Jall0h, Isatu Kallon, Agnes Deen—Jall0h,
Philip Palmer, Kono Manyi and Alhaji Brima Kamara. 5395 The delegation was picked up by
Mr Addai—Seb0 in Kailahun and went to C0te d’lv0ire passing thrcugh Guinea. Fayia Musa
explained that the m0st direct route from Sierra Leone to C0te d’1v0ire was through Liberia,
but that the RUF decided not to have anything to do with Liberia.5396
2513. The External Delegation did not reach Danané without incident. Madame lsata
Kallon managed the programme p00rly, and when the RUF delegation reached Guecked0u,
police officers arrested Mr Kamara and Palmer. Palmer was held in Guinea until July
1995.5397
Defence Witness Charles N gebeh
2514. Witness Charles N gebeh, an RUF member, testified that in late 1994, Foday Sankoh
ordered CO M0hamed Tarawalli to carry out an attack on Sierra Rutile, where a ship laden
with arms and ammunition intended for the NPRC was sitting in the port.5398 RUF tr00ps
attacked Sierra Rutile and captured a 10t of materiel including AK—47, RPG, GPMG, and
anti-aircraft arms.5399
5393 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38942—38950. Fayia Musa was a member of the RUF extemal
delegation that Sankoh sent to C0te d’1v0ire in 1995 to negotiate a peace deal.
Sm Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39007-39008.
5395 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38947.
53% Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38942-38944
jim Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38945—38946.
Sm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37809.
Sm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37810.

---- End of Page 846 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T OHL 18 May 2012

2515. Ngebeh did not participate in the attack on Sierra Rutile but was sent together with
Gibril Massaquoi to Mile 91 on 25 December 1994, during which the RUF captured arms
and ammunitions.5400
Defence Witness lsatu Kallon
2516. Witness lsatu Kallon testified that while she was at the refugee Camp at Danané in
C0te d’Iv0ire, she met a Red Cross of`ficer named "Dr Seb0" who told her that the Red
Cross sent him to Sierra Leone in order to assist in the release of five white men who had
been abducted, and requested the witness's help. Kallon heard over BBC radi0 that five
white persons had been abducted from Kabala and Panguma but did not know who abducted
them.540l She did not hear that Taylor advised the RUF to capture these men.5402
Defence Witness J 0hn Vincent
2517. Witness John Vincent, a Liberian Vanguard commander,5403 testified that a mission
in Sierra Rutile was planned. However, Vincent was not in Z0g0da at that time and could
not provide iiirther information. Vincent stated that Sam Kolleh or Martin George would
know m0re about this mission than he did.5404
Deliberations
2518. Having reviewed the evidence, the Trial Chamber notes that it is not disputed that in
late 1994 or early 1995, at the RUF headquarters in Z0g0da, Foday Sankoh ordered his
Deputy C0mmander CO M0hamed Tarawalli to attack the international mining company
Sierra Rutile in B0nthe District.54O5 ln accordance with Sankoh's order, M0hamed Tarawalli
together with Denis Ming0 (a.k.a. Superman) attacked Sierra Rutile.540`5 During this attack
5400 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37810-37813.
540] lsatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42809-42811.
5402 lsatu Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, p. 43104.
5403 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; Transcript 30
March 2010, pp. 38226, 38239; Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38390, 38408, 38460, 38461.
5404 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 38054-38055.
5405 TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12876; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054;
Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38653; Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39712-
39716; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43747.
5406 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20098-20101 (Sankch directly ordered the attack of
Sierra Rutile, the killings of civilians and the abduction of the Sierra Rutile empl0yees); Perry Kamara,
Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054 ("Sankoh told us that he wanted to 100k for a maj0r place that he
would attack according to Mr Taylor's advice [...] As a result he chose to attack Sierra Rutile and the attack 0n

---- End of Page 847 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T 18 May 2012 j
z' Y
f

several employees of the mining company and some British and American expatriates were
abducted and taken hostage to Zogoda.54117 Subsequently, following discussion with ICRC
officials, Sankoh ordered the hostages to be taken to Guinea where they were released.54O8
2519. The Prosecution, relying on the testimony of Augustine Mallah and Perry Kamara,
alleges that the attack on Sierra Rutile happened after Taylor advised Sankoh to attack a
major place and terrorise the area. Augustine Mallah and Perry Kamara testified that in
accordance with Taylor's guidance, Sankoh's troops terrorised the civilian population
committing murders, lootings and abductions.
2520. Augustine Mallah, an RUF officer and commander of the Sankoh Strike Force
Commanders Unit, testified that Sankoh told him that he had received advice from Charles
Taylor to attack and terrorise the area of Sierra Rutile.54O9 Mallah stated that while he was at
Zogoda, in 1994, he saw Sankoh having conversations with Taylor on a daily basis.541O
Mallah further stated that he heard their conversations clearly since the radio they used had a
speaker and Mallah was in the room.5411
2521. Before evaluating the merits of Augustine Mallah's testimony, the Chamber will
consider his general credibility.
Sierra Rutile was a successful one"); TFl—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. l2876—12878 (Sankoh instructed
Mohamed Tarawalli and Superman to attack Sierra Rutile); Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010 p. 39712
(The instruction to attack Sierra Rutile came from Foday Sankoh directly); Transcript 27 April 2010 p. 40091
(The attack on Sierra Rutile was ordered by Foday Sankoh); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43749
(Sankoh himself ordered the attack on Sierra Rutile); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39007—39008
(Sankoh gave the order to attack Sierra Rutile); Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37809 (Sankoh
ordered CO Mohamed Tarawalli to carry out an attack on Sierra Rutile).
5407 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20l0l—20l02 (Three employees of the com any were
P P
captured. Mallah further testified that four employees of a company named Sironco Company were also captured
and sent to Sankoh at Zogoda); Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3054 (During the attack on Sierra
Rutile, RUF soldiers captured the manager of the company and other white men); Martin George, Transcript 22
April 2010, pp. 39712—397l5 (During the operation in Sierra Rutile, Mohamed Tarawalli took 16 hostages
including three white British citizens. The hostages were taken to Sankoh's base in Zogoda); Issa Sesay,
Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43747—43748 (During the attack, the RUF captured American and British expatriate
workers who were taken to the Sankoh headquarters in Zogoda).
54118 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23263—23265 (CS) (The American and British hostages were held
prisoners at the RUF's headquarters in Zogoda and later turned over to a special envoy, who in turn delivered
them to the ICRC); Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39715—39716 (Sankoh had the 3 British
nationals escorted to Guinea and released upon the request of the international community); Issa Sesay,
Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43748, 43750—43752 (Sankoh agreed to release them and asked Sesay to escort them
to the Guinean border Sesay escorted them to the Guinean border where they were received by the ICRC).
W Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20006-20099.
5410 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20109-201 12.
5411 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20l09—20l12; Transcript 14 November 2008 pp.
20294—20295.

---- End of Page 848 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / GX 18 May 2012
. I

2522. Mallah gave generally coherent and detailed testimony although the Trial Chamber
observed that on a few occasions, his evidence became confused, particularly when
providing extensive answers during his examination—in-chief.SM2 Mallah was careful to
distinguish between those events about which he had direct knowledge, and those events
which he had not personally witnessed and openly admitted not personally knowing key
figures such as lbrahim Bah.54l3 Despite holding a position which allowed him close access
to the RUF high command, Mallah admitted that his main focus during the conflict was on
military operations and that he "did not have much concerns [sic] about government".54l4 In
the Trial Chamber's view, this explains otherwise incongruous gaps in Mallah's knowledge,
such as his uncertainty over the meaning of the term "Honourable"54l5 and his use of the
nomenclature "Yamoussoukro Peace Accord" to refer to the Abidjan Peace Accord.54l6
When confronted on cross-examination by prior inconsistent statements, the Trial Chamber
found Mallah's testimony to be consistent and candid when addressing inaccuracies in his
rior statements.54l7 Althou his ex lanations did not, as discussed below, cure all these
P P
inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber noted that his testimony was substantially corroborated
by other reliable witnesses. On the basis of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds
Augustine Mallah to be generally credible and will consider further issues relating to his
credibility in context as they may arise.
2523. In this particular instance, the Trial Chamber notes that Mallah's testimony evolved
considerably between his initial statement to the Prosecution on 1 March 2003 and his
testimony in Court in November 2008. In a statement dated 1 March 2003, Mallah said that
he inferred that Taylor communicated with Sankoh because he saw a man named Action
Man bring two letters from Taylor requesting to talk with Sankoh in 1994 and 1996.54lg
Mallah admitted that what he said to the Prosecution investigators at that time was "not
correct" but explained that he had his reasons for doing so.54l9 ln a subsequent document
dated 16 July 2006, the Prosecution's investigator noted Mallah as having stated that "the
Sm See for example Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 20085-20090.
5m Augustine Mallah, 17 November 2008, p. 20372; Transcript 18 November 2008, pp. 20481-20482.
Sim Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20386.
SMS Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20382-20386.
W6 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20109, 20136; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20306-20309.
5417 See for example Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, pp. 20324-20326.
Sm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, pp. 20294-20295.
W9 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, p. 20296.

---- End of Page 849 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / Ob 18 May 2012 _ E7

radio operator never told him what Charles Taylor wanted Foday Sankoh on the radio and he
is not aware of the nature of their conversation".542O Mallah read this statement again on 23
May 2007 and signed it on 3 July 2007.542l He was offered the opportunity to change his
statement on several occasions but did not choose to do so.5422 He acknowledged the
2 inconsistency between his prior statements and his testimony, maintaining that he had his
reasons for not having made truthful statements, although he did not say what those reasons
were. The Trial Chamber notes that Perry Kamara's testimony corroborates Mallah's
evidence that the Accused advised Sankoh to attack major places in Sierra Leone, and that
the Sierra Rutile attack followed upon such advice.
2524. Perry Kamara also testified that Taylor and the RUF had radio communications
every two or three days and that Taylor advised Sankoh to attack major places such as Sierra
Rutile, resulting in attacks, including the attack on Sierra Rutile.5423 As a radio man, Kamara
received and monitored radio transmissions and read the logbooks.5424 The Trial Chamber
notes that when describing the conversation, Kamara quotes the Accused's alleged statement
as if he directly heard this conversation.5425 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Perry
Kamara is generally a credible witness.5426 Kamara testified that following the Sierra Rutile
attack, Sankoh reported to Taylor who advised him to buy ammunitions, food and drugs
with the money that had been looted, and to use the money and the hostages taken to
establish diplomatic relations with other count1ies.5427 This evidence does not indicate that
the Accused advised Sankoh to loot and capture hostages. However, it does indicate that the
Accused was aware of these crimes and advised Sankoh on the use of the money and the
5420 Augustine Murruh, Transcript 14 November 2008, p. 20297.
M Augustine Murruh, rruuuuupt 14 November 2008, pp. 20297-20200.
5422 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, pp. 20297-20300.
5423 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3049.
5424 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3053 ("You know, as we all observed the process in Sierra
Leone, Mr Sankoh always - was always advised by Mr Taylor. At any time Mr Sankoh received message from
Mr Taylor we will undertake a serious attack. The RUF will attack the government troops. On many occasions
as a radio man of the RUF I received, I monitored, I read from the log books, for example, when a place like
Sierra Rutile, because Sankoh told us that he wanted to look for a major place that he would attack according to
Mr Taylor's advice" [...] "And so in his conversation with Taylor he said, "You should either attack the major
places like Kono or Sierra Ruti1e". As a result he chose to attack Sierra Rutile and the attack on Sierra Rutile was
a successful one").
5425 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3053 ("And so in his conversation with Taylor he said, ‘You
should either attack the major places like Kono or Sierra Ruti1e.’ As a result he chose to attack Sierra Rutile and
the attack on Sierra Rutile was a successful one"). The Trial Chamber finds that when mentioning "he", Kamara
meant "Taylor". Read in the context of his testimony, there is no other reasonable explanation.
5426 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.
5427 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3054-3056.

---- End of Page 850 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M (M 18 May 2012
4/
2 r .

hostages. The Trial Chamber notes that according to Kamara, Taylor advised Sankoh to send
RUF members to Cote d’Ivoire to establish RUF representation there. As discussed in the
context of the External Delegation that was subsequently sent to Cote d’Ivoire, the Trial
Chamber has noted and considered the inaccuracy of Kamara's account of the travel of the
delegation and related issues.5428
2525. Numerous other witnesses, both for the Prosecution and the Defence, gave evidence
with regard to Sankoh's order to attack Sierra Rutile.5429 None of those witnesses mentioned
the Accused's involvement in this attack. However, the Trial Chamber notes that there is
nothing inconsistent in their testimony that Sankoh ordered the attack on Sierra Rutile with
the testimony of Mallah and Kamara that the Accused advised him to do so. The Trial
Chamber does not find the testimony of these witnesses probative as it does not confirm or
refute the involvement of the Accused.
Findings
2526. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
* that in 1994, the Accused advised Sankoh to attack a major place in Sierra Leone, and that
pursuant to this advice Sankoh ordered the RUF to attack Sierra Rutile. Following the
attack, the Accused gave Sankoh further advice with regard to the use of the money looted
and the hostages abducted during the course of the attack on Sierra Rutile.
9. Operation Stop Election ( l996[
Submissions of the Parties (
2527. The Prosecution submits that after the initial invasion and early years of Hghting and
throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone, the Accused continued to provide the leaders of the
RUF, RUF/AFRC with strategic instruction, direction and guidance in relation to a range of
5428 Peace Process: Extemal Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire.
5429 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12876-12878 (Sankoh instructed Mohamed Tarawalli and Superman to
attack Sierra Rutile); Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, p. 39712 (The instruction to attack Sierra Rutile
came from Foday Sankoh directly); Transcript 27 April 2010, p. 40091 (The attack on Sierra Rutile was ordered
by Foday Sankoh); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43749 (Sankoh himself who ordered the attack on
Sierra Rutile); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39007-39008 (Sankoh gave the order to attack Sierra
Rutile); Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37809 (Sankoh ordered CO Mohamed Tarawalli to carry
out an attack on Sierra Rutile).

---- End of Page 851 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Ou 18 May 2012
/

25 8 94 4
political, military and other matters.5430 The Prosecution submits in particular, that in
accordance with the Accused's approval and guidance, Foday Sankoh implemented an RUF
campaign of terror in 1996, known as "Operation Stop Election" during which the hands of
any civilian captured would be amputated in order to terrorise the civilian population to gain
the international community's attention and to prevent civilians from voting in the 1996
elections. The aim of the operation was to disrupt the elections by instilling terror in the
civilian population and preventing them from voting, while at the same time raising concern
of the Government and international community about holding the said elections before the
signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement.543 I The Prosecution alleges that, although this plan
was not devised by the Accused, Sankoh sought the Accused's approval for it, and the
Accused told him in response that the plan was "not a bad one".5432
2528. The Defence does not dispute that Foday Sankoh ordered the RUF to carry out
Operation Stop Election in early 1996 to disrupt the electoral process. The Defence argues,
however, that while the RUF's plan was to make the operation fearful, Sankoh's orders did
not involve planned atrocities, and challenges the credibility of witnesses Isaac Mongor5433
and Alice Pynem'4. It submits iilrther that the Accused played no role in Operation Stop
Election, as cooperation between NPFL and RUF ceased in 1992 after Taylor withdrew his
fighters from Sierra Leone in the operation known as "Top Final".5435 The Trial Chamber
considered the evidence of Prosecution witnesses Isaac Mongor, Augustine Mallah, Alice
Pyne, Samuel Kargbo and protected witnesses TF1—371, TF1-168 and TF1—375, and
Defence witnesses Charles Taylor, Martin George, Issa Sesay, John Vincent, and Fayia
Musa, and Exhibits P—568, P-277 and D—O62.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5430 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1 19.
5431 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 130-131.
***2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 130-133, 135, 401, 417, 427, 613, 956, 963, 1273.
54* Defence Final Trial Briar, paras 839-841, 1359, 1555.
5434 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1494.
54*5 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 343, 431, 444-445, 778, 836-841, 1237-1239, 1359, 1494, 1555, See also
Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 13-14.

---- End of Page 852 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 852 Ou 18 May 2012 ,5
X 1

2529. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF commander,5455 testified that in 1996, while the RUF
was still in the bush, they leamed that elections were going to be held in Sierra Leone.5454
Foday Sankoh called the RUF Commanders to his base at Zogoda in Kenema District and
expressed concem that while fighting was still going on between the N PRC Government and
the RUF, the former had decided to hold national elections without involving the latter.
Sankoh told the RUF Commanders that since the Government did not acknowledge the
RUF, the latter should carry out an offensive to stop the elections.5455
2530. Mongor attended this meeting in Zogoda along with several other RUF commanders
including Mohamed Tarawalli, Issa Sesay, Augustine Gbao, CO Rocky (Emmanuel
Williams), Rambo (Boston Flomo) and Jungle (Daniel Tamba).5455 While Mongor was
there, an RUF radio operator named Z—Man544O told Sankoh that Charles Taylor wanted to
speak with him on the radio set. Mongor joined Sankoh and both went to the thatched hut
where the radio was located. Mongor stood just in front of the radio room within earshot as
Sankoh spoke to Taylor.544l During the radio conversation, which lasted 20 to 25 minutes,
Mongor overheard Sankoh explain to Taylor that the RUF had been cut off by ULIMO5444
and were not getting supplies from Liberia anymore, that the NPRC Government had
decided to carry on with the elections; that Sankoh had summoned his commanders to
instruct them to carry out an offensive to disrupt the elections; and that the offensive entailed
a plan to instil terror in the voters by amputating the hands of captured civilians who had
artici ated or were oin to artici ate in the votin and askin them to "take their hands
P P S S P P g g
off the election". Mongor overheard Taylor responding that "the plan was not a bad one".
After the radio conversation, Sankoh told the RUF commanders that he had discussed the
planned offensive with Taylor who considered it "not a bad plan at all".5445 Two days later,
the RUF launched "Operation Stop Election".5444
5454 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5647, 5691-5692.
5*37 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5689.
5*38 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5688-5689. A
5459 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5689-5690, 5694-5695.
5 440 Elsewhere Mongor refers to this radio operator as "Zedman". See Isaac Mongor, Transcript 2 April 2008, p.
6448.
544l Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5690-5691.
5442 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5695.
5445 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5689-5692.
5*44 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5690-5695. At End of Page 5696 Mongor states that the meeting of
the RUF Commanders took place two days after the radio communication between Sankoh and Taylor.

---- End of Page 853 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T Wm 18 May 2012 M

38946
2531. At the meeting, each commander was assigned an area to attack. Mongor was to
attack Masingbi, Mohamed Tarawalli and Supennan were to attack Magburaka and Makeni,
while RUF Rambo and Mosquito were to attack Kenema Town.5445 Mongor testified that
Operation Stop Election was not successful in Masingbi as his Hghters were unable to
overrun the SLA and Kamajors or to capture or amputate any civilians taking part in the
elections there.5446 However, he heard that Mohamed Tarawalli and Supennan successfully
carried out the operation in Magburaka where RUF Commanders captured civilians,
amputated their hands and carved RUF on their chests with razor blades.5447
2532. The Defence cross-examined Mongor at length as to why he failed to mention the
alleged conversation between Taylor and Sankoh regarding "Operation Stop E1ection" in his
4 September 2006 statement to the Prosecution investigators, and instead waited until
February 2008, just before his testimony, to do so. Mongor stated that he did mention the
information to the investigators in 2006 but that they failed to record it.5448
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
2533. Witness Augustine Mallah, a former RUF Hghter,5444 testihed that in 1996 just
before the elections in Sierra Leone, while he was at RUF headquarters in Zogoda, Foday
j Sankoh called a formation where most of the senior commanders were present, and Sankoh
was giving instructions to soldiers and the commander he had named to attack Kenema,
Morris Kallon. During this meeting, Sankoh explained that the Sierra Leonean Government
had contacted him and told him that it had decided, despite the RUF's opposition, to hold
elections while the peace process was not completed and that in response, Sankoh had
decided to "teach the Government and the international community a lesson" by obstructing
the elections.545O The plan known as "Operation Stop Election" would entail the RUF
attacking all the major towns where the elections were scheduled to take place and shooting
dead or chopping off the hands of civilians going out to vote, in order to discourage others
5445 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5693-5696.
5446 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5697, Transcript 2 April 2008, p. 6453.
5447 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5696-5698.
5448 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 2 April 2008, pp. 6468-6503.
5444 Augstine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20063—20073.
5450 Augstine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20104-20105.

---- End of Page 854 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % Gig 18 May 2012

from voting.5454 Sankoh said that the ultimate objective was to raise the concern of the
international community and to call for peace before elections.5456
2534. Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay were in charge of the operation in Kenema Town.5454
Augustine Mallah participated in this operation. He testified that he would fire at any
civilian he would find on the street and that he witnessed three civilians in Kenema Town
who had their hands cut off by RUF soldiers.5454 Mallah stated that although the RUF did
4 not succeed in stopping the elections altogether, they succeeded in dissuading a lot of
otential voters who ultimatel did not o to vote for fear of the RUF re risal.5455
P Y g P
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
2535. Witness Alice Pyne, a former RUF radio operator,5456 testified that while at Black
Water in 1996 before the elections, she was monitoring radio frequencies used by the SLA
and RUF when she overheard President Maada Bio and Foday Sankoh agree over the radio
to observe a ceasefire in order to bring the war between the RUF and the SLA to an end.5457
The next day Foday Sankoh sent a radio message to all the RUF frontlines ordering the RUF
to observe a ceasefire.6456 A month later, discussions about a proposed Abidjan Peace
Accord took place.5459 Around the same time, Maada Bio contacted Sankoh again by radio
and informed him of their wishes to organise free and fair and genuine elections in Sierra
Leone but that the fighting should cease before free and fair elections could be held.6466
Soon afterwards, there was a media announcement that Te`an Kabbah and his SLPP Part
J Y
and the people of Sierra Leone had chosen to hold the elections before negotiating peace
with the RUF.546l After the media announcement, Sankoh who at this time was in Cote
d’Ivoire,5462 sent a radio message through CO Mohamed5463 to all the RUF frontlines to mn
5454 Augstine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20105-20106.
5452 Augstine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20106.
5454 Augstine Mallah, 'Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20106.
5454 Augstine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20107-20108.
5455 Augstine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20109.
5*% Aupp Pyne, Transcript 17 Jump 2008, pp. 12046~12047.
5457 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12100-12101; Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12112-12114.
5466 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12113—12116.
5*59 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 121 18.
5466 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12129—12120.
5464 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12121, 20 June 2008, p. 12349.
5462 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12122, 20 June 2008, p. 12350.
5466 Pyne stated at pp. 12122-12124 that at the time instructions were issued for "Operation Stop Election", CO

---- End of Page 855 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (ily 18 May 2012

"Operation Stop Election" by going to all the major cities where the elections were
scheduled to take lace, b shootin in ublic laces and causin anic in the civilian
P Y 8 P P 8 P
population with a view to disrupting or stopping the elections.5464 Alice Pyne did not
participate in the attack but testified that CO Isaac Mongor led armed RUF men and attacked
anyone participating in the election, along the Matotoka — Masingbi axis.54°5 Pyne stated that
"Operation Stop Election" was "not successful" in that the elections went ahead and were
won by Tejan Kabbah.5466 The Abidjan Peace Accord was signed after the elections on 30
November 1996.5467
Prosecution Witness TF1—371
2536. Witness TF1—371, an RUF officer, testified that while he was at the outpost called
Blama Highway in 1996, the commander of the outpost, a former SBU named Base Marine,
told him that before the general elections of 1996 Sankoh ordered the RUF to carry out an
operation called "Operation Stop Election". Base Marine told TF1—371 that the purpose of
this operation was to stop people from voting and that although no specific orders were
given to amputate civilians, some RUF soldiers used the operation to cut off people's hands.
5468
Prosecution Witness TF1-168
2537. Witness TF1-168, an RUF officer, testified that while he was out of the country, a
national forum was held in Sierra Leone in early 1996 under the Maada Bio regime, which
unanimously agreed that elections in Sierra Leone should be held before peace.5469 The RUF
did not attend the forum although they were invited.547O In response, Foday Sankoh called a
meeting of the RUF leadership,547] held in Zo goda, during which he expressed his dismay at
Mohammed replaced Sankoh at Zogoda after the latter travelled to Abidjan to negotiate the Abidjan Peace
Accord, accompanied by other senior RUF officials including Gibril Massaquoi, Fayia Musa, Philip Palmer,
Osmon Tolo, Memunatu Deen, Philip Sannoh and Martin Moinarna.
54°4 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12121-12122.
M5 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12119-12123.
5466 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12123.
5467 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12349.
5468 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2260 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2461-2462 (CS);
Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2996 (CS).
W rrr-168, rrarreerrpr 22 Jarrrrary 2009, p. 23264 (cs).
W TF1-168, rrarreerrpr 22 Jarrrrary 2009, pp. 23265-23266 (cs).
Sw At Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23266 TF1-168 (CS), states that the RUF External Delegation was
represented by spokesperson Fayia Musa who specifically travelled from Danané in C6te d’Ivoire to Zogoda to

---- End of Page 856 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-O1-T / jig 18 May 2012
\ A

the decision taken by the national forum and told those present that both he and Brigadier
Julius Maada Bio, whom Sankoh had consulted, were not in favour of holding elections
before negotiating peace.5472 Sankoh ordered RUF combatants to go to the polling stations in
all major towns where the elections were scheduled to take place and to run an operation to
stop the elections, by cutting off the hands of the people taking part in the vote.5473
Prosecution Witness TF1—375
2538. Witness TF1-375, a former RUF fighter,5474 testified that in 1996, while in the
Western Area, he received orders from Superman to go to the crossing points at Kangari
River in order to meet CO Mohamed (a.k.a. "Zino")5475, who would tell them about a
mission, Peace Before Election.5476 There CO Mohamed addressed the RUF soldiers at a
muster parade at which he stated that Sankoh had gone for peace talks leaving him in charge
of the RUF. He then ordered the RUF soldiers to attack Magburaka during which they
would cut off the fingers of anybody who took part in the voting. TFl—375 did not
participate in the mission but heard on the radio that a lot of amputations took place during
this operation.5477
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
2539. Witness Samuel Kargbo testihed that prior to the 1996 elections, while he was
serving as an NPRC soldier in Freetown,5478 he was sent to Jom near Kenema with
instructions to repel the RUF who had declared "Operation No Election".5479 After repelling
the RUF from Jom, Kargbo went to Kenema National Hospital to visit some NPRC soldiers
who had sustained injuries during the attack.5480 At the hospital, Kargbo observed one or
two people who had four fingers cut off leaving them with only the thumb. These mutilated
attend the meeting and who reported back to the external delegation upon his return.
5*12 rrr-1623, rpanaanpt 22 January 2009, p. 23267 (cs).
5473 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23265-23267 (CS).
5474 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp 12475-12482 stated that in 1991 when he was abducted by the RUF
and taken to Pendembu Training Camp, he was only 11 years old. In 1996 he was barely 16 years old when he
was made SBU Battalion Commander in the RUF.
5475 The Trial Chamber notes that the witness is referring to Mohamed Tarawallie.
5416 Tri-375, rnanannpt 23 June 2008, pp. 12482.
***11 rrr-375, rnanaanpt 23 Jana 2008, pp. 12482-12483.
5478 Samuel Kargbo, T. 21 May 2008, pp. 10414, 10421-10423.
5474 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10422-10423.
5440 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10422-10423.

---- End of Page 857 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/ 3
x

civilians to1d Kargb0 that the RUF soldiers cut of`f` their fingers and sent them with a
message to the G0vemment soldiers that the RUF did not want an e1ection.548l
The Accused
2540. The Accused denied any involvement in "Operation St0p E1ection" and stated that he
did not hear of the RUF committing atrocities in Sierra Leone in 1996 or carrying out
amputations to st0p elections.5482 The Accused refuted Isaac Mong0r's testimony
implicating him, stating that after the breakdown of`re1ations between the NPP L and RUF in
1992 (referring to Operation T0p Final) he had nothing to do with Foday Sankoh or the
RUF.5483 The Accused further testified that as a member of the C0ur1ci1 of State in Liberia at
the material time, he was busy trying to broker peace in Liberia in preparation for his own
election as President the f`0l10wing year and as such had everything to 10se in st0pping the
elections in Sierra Leone as that would Only have disrupted peace in the whole sub-
region.‘4484
Defence Witness Martin George
2541. Witness Martin George, a former RUF fighter,5485 testified that in early 1996 he was
based in Ng01ahun Vaama, and that he visited the RUF headquarters in Z0g0da every
weekend.5486 George stated that in 1996, Kabbah decided to h01d elections before
completing peace talks with RUF. However, the RUF considered that these elections would
not be free and fair, and Sankoh decided that the RUF shou1d sabotage the elections.
According1y, Sankoh convened a forum in Z0g0da with vari0us RUF jungle commanders.
George attended the meeting.5487 During the meeting, Sankoh ordered the RUF to attack the
soldiers guarding the p01ling stations on e1ection—day in order to disrupt the e1ections.
George clarified that Sankoh's orders were targeted at the G0vemment soldiers guarding the
p01ling stations but not the civilians.5488 George stated that Sankoh initiated the order
5481 Samuel Kargb0, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10427-10429.
5482 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 Novernber 2009, pp. 32375-32378.
5483 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 July 2009, pp. 25031-25032; Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2009, pp. 30407-
3041 1.
5444 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 July 2009, pp. 25031—25032.
5**5 Mmm George, Transcript 21 April 2010 p. 39591.
5486 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010 pp. 39713-39718.
W Mmm Geerge, Transcript 22 April 2010 pp. 39718-39719.
5444 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010 pp. 39719.

---- End of Page 858 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Ot 18 May 2012
Z

himself and that he (George) did not hear Foday Sankoh or anybody else say that the order
to stop the elections came from Liberia or from Charles Taylor.5459 At the meeting Morris
Kallon was assigned to head the attack on polling stations in Kenema while Boston Flomo
was to head the attack on those in Bo.5440 Refuting the testimony of Witnesses Augustine
Mallah, Fayia Musa and Exhibit P-277, George stated that he did not hear Sankoh issue
orders to amputate civilians taking part in the voting in order to raise the concern of the
international community.5494 However, in cross-examination George admitted that he heard
about the RUF amputating civilians who had ink on their thumbs on polling day.5442 George
did not participate in the operation but heard that on polling day "bullets were f1ying". 5455
Defence Witness 1ssa Sesay
2542. Witness Issa Sesay testiHed that he was in Cote d’Ivoire with the RUF External
Delegation from November 1995 until April 1996.5494 While in Cote d’Ivoire in March
1996, Sesa travelled with the RUF External Dele ation, which included Phili Palmer,
Y S P
Fayia Musa, Deen J alloh and Tom Nyuma, to Yamoussoukro where they met Foday
Sankoh.5495 In Yamoussoukro, Sankoh and the RUF Extemal delegation met with Maada
Bio and the NPRC delegation including Tom Nyuma, Kes Boya and the former Chief of
Defence Staff, Carew.545° Sankoh and Maada Bio agreed that elections should not come
before disarmament.5494 Maada Bio devised a plan that if the NPRC politicians in Freetown
forced him to hold an election before peace, the RUF should attack the cities of Bo, Kenema
and Magburaka on the day of the election. In response, Maada Bio would instruct his army
to withdraw from these areas, letting the RUF take control. Thus with part of the country
under the control of the RUF, no free and fair elections could be held.5445 Following this
a eement, Sankoh ave the order from Cote d’Ivoire, instructin Mohamed Tarawalli e
gf S S
***9 Mama George, Transcript 22 April 2010 p. 39720.
5450 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010 pp. 39720-39721, 39740.
5444 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010 pp. 39740-39743, 27 April 2010, pp. 40056-40066.
W Mama George, Transcript 27 April 2010 pp. 4005540056
5445 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010 pp. 39720-39723.
5444 Sesay states at Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43741 that he had gone to Danané for medical treatment during this
period.
5455 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43741.
5*% ieee Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43739.
54441ssa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43592; Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43738.
5445 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43592, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43738-43739, 43743.

---- End of Page 859 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T j @5 18 May 2012 p

(a.k.a. Zino) in Zogoda by radio that the RUF should attack Bo, Kenema and Magburaka.5499
5 The RUF carried out Operation Stop Election by attacking those locations but Maada Bio
did not withdraw his troops as planned.55OO The RUF, having encountered stiff resistance
from the NPRC forces, resorted to carrying out amputations.55Ol
2543. Sesay was not aware of a direct order from Sankoh to carry out amputations and
claimed that they arose spontaneously as a consequence of the betrayal of the RUF by the
NPRC forces.55O2 Refuting the testimony of Isaac Mongor, Sesay stated that Taylor could
not have ordered the RUF to carry out Operation Stop Election as Taylor and Sankoh had no
contact during this period.55O3 Sesay stated that he did not attend the January 1996 meeting
of RUF commanders convened by Sar1koh in Zogoda;55O4 neither was he in Sierra Leone at
the time of Operation Stop Election, nor was he able to monitor the radio message in which
Sankoh issued the orders for the operation.55O5 However, he heard that the amputations
happened in the Northern jungle under the command of Isaac Mongor.5506 Sesay also stated
that although the RUF carried out some amputations during Operation Stop Election, the
majority of amputations in Sierra Leone were committed by the AF RC in the Districts of
Kono, Koinadugu, Bombali, Port Loko and Freetown during the period February 1998 to
January 1999.55"’
2544. In cross-examination however, Sesay admitted that Foday Sankoh gave the order for
the RUF to arnputate civilians during Operation Stop Election.55O8 He also conceded that the
meeting between Maada Bio and Foday Sankoh in Yamoussoukro in March 1996 took place
after the Sierra Leone elections when Tej an Kabbah was already President elect.5509
5499 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43744-43745; Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45379.
5500 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43745.
55"’ Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 Jniy 2010, pp. 43739-43740, 437424m46.
5502 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43746; Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46498.
5503 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43743-43747; Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45378; Transcript 17
August 2010, p. 46494.
5504 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45379-453 84.
5505 Issa saaay, r1anannpt6 Jniy 2010, p. 43743.
5506 Issa Sesay Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46494; Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46200.
5507 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43591; Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46205.
5508 Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, pp. 46502-46503.
5509 Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46500. Sesay was confronted with Exhibit P-568 showing that "In
the 1996 elections, the frst round was held on 26 and 27 February 1996. The second round was held on 15
March 1996. When Maada Bio met with Foday Sankoh on 25 and 25 March, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was
President elect. The elections were over with".

---- End of Page 860 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % dm 18 May 2012 7

Defence Witness John Vincent
2545. Witness John Vincent, a former RUF fighter,55lO testified that in early 1996 he was
assigned with the RUF to Kangari Hills, in the Northern Jungle.55ll Vincent stated that the
RUF was opposed to the 1996 elections in Sierra Leone, which took place before any peace
was made between the RUF and the Sierra Leonean Govemment.55l2 The RUF developed a
strategy to sabotage the elections by targeting the military personnel guarding the polling
stations and harassing citizens so that they would be too scared to vote.55l3 Vincent stated
that during the operation, the RUF did not intentionally target civilians, but that during the
fighting civilians were accidentally killed.55l4 However, Vincent did not participate in this
operation and did not know if any civilians were injured or amputated in the operation.55l5
Defence Witness Faga Musa
2546. Witness Fayia Musa, a former senior RUF officer,55l6 testified that the RUF Extemal
Delegation officially launched the RUF publication "Footpaths to Democracy"55l7 in
December 1995 in Cote d’1voire55l8 in the context of peace process.55l9 Also in December
1995, a National Forum of all stakeholders was held in Freetown under the NPRC regime of
Brig. Julius Maada Bio, where a decision was taken overwhelmingly to hold national
elections before signing a peace accord.552O Although the RUF was invited to the forum,
Sankoh did not send a representative and was unhappy about the outcome as he preferred a
completion of the peace process before holding elections.552l
2547. Musa travelled to the RUF Headquarters in Zogoda in Sierra Leone in January 1996,
taking with him copies of the publication "Footpaths to Democracy" for distribution in
""’ Jprm vmppm, Transcript 24 March 2010 pp. 37959·37960.
SSH John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 p. 38055; Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38331.
5512 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 p. 38055.
5513 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 p. 38056.
5514 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 pp. 38056·38057; Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38334.
5515 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 p. 38057, Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38332.
5516 Fayia Musa was part of the RUF External Delegation and served as RUF spokesman.
5517 See Exhibit D·336, "Footpaths to Democracy".
5518 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38995. The witness stated at pp. 38999-3900l that immediately
after the launch, the External Delegation met Charles Taylor in Hotel D’Ivoire in Abidjan, who congratulated the
delegation upon "achieving the first leg of the peace process" and donated 10 million CFA francs (approximately
$USD 22,000) to the delegation for their upkeep in C6te d’Ivoire.
5519 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38995·3859'7.
5520 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39016.

---- End of Page 861 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·0l·T % JM 18 May 2012

RUF-held territory.5522 As representative of the RUF Extemal Delegation, the purpose of
Musa's journey to Zogoda was firstly, to try and persuade the RUF Leader to respect the
peace process by accepting the decision of the National Forum in Freetown and secondly, to
"come out of the bush" as the armed aspect of the struggle was no longer relevant and to
encourage him to take refuge in Cote d’Ivoire pending the completion of the peace process
and the transition to democratic elections in Sierra Leone.5525
2548. Musa confirmed that he attended a meeting in Zogoda in January 1996 where
Sankoh told the RUF commanders present that in his opinion, the proposed elections could
not be free or fair while part of the country was still at war and that it was necessary to attain
peace first before holding democratic elections. Sankoh further stated that he had talked to
Brig. Maada Bio who was also not in favour of holding elections before peace.5524 Sankoh
then instructed his combatants including "Mosquito" and "Fula Mon Ami",5555 to "stop the
election" by disrupting polling stations in all major towns including Kenema, Bo and
Magburaka, and ensuring that any civilians insisting on tuming up to vote have their hands
amputated.552° After the meeting, Musa and Mohamed Tarawallie spoke to Sankoh
expressing their displeasure at his instruction to amputate and harm the very civilians that
the RUF claimed to save.5527 Musa later leamed that the RUF had carried out Sankoh's
instructions by buming polling booths and amputating voters.5528 He stated that this was the
first time during the Sierra Leone conflict he heard of the RUF amputating civilians.5529
2549. After spending a week in Zogoda, Fayia Musa retumed to Cote d’1voire.5550 In
March 1996 Foday Sankoh arrived in Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire for talks with, inter alia,
officials of Intemational Alert and of the Ivorian Govemment, seeking intemational support
for the peace process.555l
5551 Fayia Musa, Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39176.
5522 Fayia Musa, rraussupr 14 April 2010, p. 38998.
5555 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39005—39006; Transcript 16 April 2010, pp. 39176-39177.
5524 Fayia Musa, Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39177.
5525 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 Apui 2010, p. 39017.
5526 Fayia Musa, Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39177.
5527 Fayia Musa, Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39178.
5525 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39017.
5525 Fayia Musa, Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39178.
5550 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39006.
5551 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 3901 1-39014.

---- End of Page 862 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T % cj}.? 18 May 2012 %

Prosecution Exhibit P-568
2550. Excerpts of a draft publication entitled "African Elections Database" admitted into
evidence as Exhibit P-568 show that the first round of voting in the 1996 Sierra Leone
election took place on 26-27 February 1996, while the run-off or second round took place on
15 March 1996.
Confidential Exhibit P-277
2551. An excerpt of Confidential Exhibit P-277 states in paragraph 5.5:
At the end of the National Forum on whether there should be elections before peace or
Vice—versa held in Freetown in 1995, delegates from all walks of lite in the country voted
by a large majority for elections before peace. The only interest group conspicuously absent
at that forum was the RUF though she was invited.
The RUF argued that peace before elections would provide a conducive atmosphere for
democratic elections to be held in all parts of Sierra Leone. The National Elections
Commission, using the mandate given her by the National Forum, set the time table for
proportional representation (PR) system of elections for February 1996. Cpl. Sankoh then
held a meeting with his senior battle front commanders at his Zogoda headquarters in
February 1996 in the presence of RUF spokesman Fayia Musa who had travelled from Cote
d’Ivoire to Zogoda on Cpl. Sanko's instruction. ln that meeting, Cpl. Sankoh launched
"Operation Stop Election" and appointed Sam Bockarie (Mosquito) and Mohamed Jalloh
(F ullah Monamie) as the mission commanders to Kenema and Bo, respectively.
Cpl. Sankoh informed his Commanders that he had received assurances from the NPRC
that the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) would collaborate with the RUF in stopping the election
process. He gave a very firm instruction that if citizens still came out of their homes to vote
on that polling day, the very hands the citizens would use to cast their votes should be
immediately chopped off The then RUF Field Commander Mohamed Tarawallie (Zeno)
arrived in Zogoda after the meeting was over and the missionaries had left. But he was
disappointed that Cpl. Sankoh could instruct his combatants to cut the hands of the very
Sierra Leonean his revolution came to save. He therefore tried to prevail on his leader
(Sankoh) to reverse that instruction but to no avail.
The mission itself failed as the SLA was on full alert in every village and town on polling
day thus preventing the RUF from entering Kenema and Bo. In the ensuring [sic] battle, the
RUF sustained a lot of casualties, much to the dismay and anger of the RUF fighters and
their leader Cpl. Sankoh. Though the cutting of hands was done during that mission on a
small scale, it continued uncontrolled within RUF circles even after "Operation Stop
Election". However, the amputations and mutilations on a very large scale was carried out
by members of the AFRC that invaded Freetown on February 6, 1999.5532
Defence Exhibit D-062
2552. An excerpt of a document entitled "Chronology of Sierra Leone, Special Report,
Africa Confidential: April 1998" admitted into evidence as Exhibit D-062 shows at p. 4 that
5532 Exhibit P—277 (coniidential).

---- End of Page 863 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-Ol-T J 18 May 2012

on 26 February 1996 Presidential and Legislative elections were held but none of the
presidential candidates won the required percentage of votes in the first round. On 15 March
1996 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP won the second round with a 59.9% of the
votes.5533
Deliberations
2553. The Trial Chamber observes that the evidence establishes the following sequence of
events in Sierra Leone, leading up to "Operation Stop E1ection". In December 1995, a
National Forum was held in Freetown to decide whether the people of Sierra Leone wanted
to hold elections before the peace process was completed or whether they preferred to
complete the peace process before holding the elections.5534 The RUF, although invited, did
not attend or take part in the Forum, which decided by an over-whelming majority to hold
elections before peace.5535 Subsequently, the NPRC Government under Brig. Julius Maada
Bio conducted elections in February and March of 1996 in which Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of
the SLPP was elected President.5536 Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, opposed the decision to
hold democratic elections before the completion of the peace process, and considering that
holding the elections during a period when parts of the country were inaccessible due to the
war would unfairly prejudice the RUF.5537 Consequently, before the elections, Sankoh
summoned a meeting or meetings of his commanders at the RUF headquarters in Zogoda
and instructed them to disrupt the elections in an operation dubbed "Operation Stop
E1ection".5538 The operation was cariied out on polling day, with limited success, as Alhaji
5533 Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Diamonds,
Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 4.
5534 While TF1-168 surinised that the National Forum was held in January 1996, the most reliable account of
when it actually took place is in the excerpt of Exhibit P-277 referred to above, as confirined by Fayia Musa.
However, evidence as to the purpose and outcome of the National Forum is consistent.
5535 Augustine Ma11a1i, TF1-168, Fayia Musa aaa Exhibit 1¤·-277.
5536 Although testimonial accounts vary as to the actual dates of the 1996 Sierra Leone elections or the regime
under which they were conducted, the Trial Chamber finds most reliable the documentary evidence in Exhibits
P-568 and D-062 both of which establish that the first and second rounds of elections were held on 26-27
February 1996 and 15 March 1996, respectively.
5537 Witnesses Isaac Mongor, Augustine Mallah, Martin George and Fayia Musa directly heard Sankoh express
his disappointment with the decision to hold elections before peace, while TF 1-1 68, TF 1-371 were told about it
by someone else. See also Exhibit P-277.
5538 While accounts as to the timing of the Zogoda meeting vary, Witnesses Isaac Mongor, Augustine Mallah,
Martin George Flomo and Fayia Musa all of whom attended the said meeting are consistent as to the location
and purpose of the meeting called by the RUF leader. These witnesses are corroborated by Witnesses TF 1-168,
TF1-371, TF 1-375, John Blamah Vincent, and Exhibit P-277. The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of witness
Alice Pyne to the effect that Sankoh was in Cote d’Ivoire and not in Zogoda when he issued the instructions for
Operation Stop Election by radio message, doubtful in light of the chronology of events discussed above.

---- End of Page 864 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T [ Q}? 18 May 2012

Tejan Kabbah was elected President.5539 In March 1996 Sankoh travelled to Yamoussoukro,
Cote d’Ivoire to continue the peace process.554O
2554. Regarding the specific orders given by Foday Sankoh to the RUF commanders, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied based on the testimony of witnesses Isaac Mongor, Augustine
Mallah and Defence witness Fayia Musa, all of whom attended the Zogoda meeting or
meetings, that Sankoh gave orders to attack and burn polling stations in all major towns
including Kenema, Bo and Magburaka and to shoot and kill or to amputate the hands or
fingers of any civilian believed to participate in the elections. The Trial Chamber is also
satisfied that Sankoh's objective was to disrupt the elections by instilling terror in the
civilian population and preventing them from voting, while at the same time raising concern
of the Sierra Leone Government and international community about holding the said
elections before the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement. The above evidence is
corroborated by Witnesses Alice Pyne, TF1-168, TF1-375, Samuel Kargbo and Exhibit P-
277. In the Trial Chamber's view, the fact that Martin George "did not hear such an order",
or that Issa Sesay "was not aware of such an order" does not negate the credible evidence
establishing that such an order was in fact issued.
2555. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied based on the above evidence that Sankoh
also issued orders assigning specific commanders to lead the attack on specific areas. These
include CO Mohamed Tarawallie (a.k.a. Zino) and Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) to attack
Makeni and Magburaka;554l Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito), Morris Kallon, Augustine
Mallah, RUF Rambo and Issa Sesay to attack Kenema Town and Magburaka;5542 Isaac
Mongor to attack Matotoka and Masingbi;5543 and Boston Flomo and Fula Monami to attack
BO 5544
5539 Witnesses Isaac Mongor, Augustine Mallah, Alice Pyne, Samuel Kargbo and Issa Sesay all described
"Operation Stop Election" as "partially successful" in that while the RUF carried out‘acts to disrupt the voting,
its stated purpose of actually stopping the election was not achieved.
5540 The Trial Chamber finds the detailed account of Fayia Musa to the effect that Sankoh travelled to
Yamoussukro, Cote d’Ivoire in March 1996 after the elections, credible, This account is corroborated by
Exhibits P-277 and P-568. Alice Pyne's evidence as to where Sankoh was when he sent a radio message to
Mohammed Tarawallie is not reliable as it is based on her speculation or assumption through monitoring various
conversations rather than from direct knowledge. Issa Sesay conceded in cross-examination that Sankoh
travelled to Yamoussukro after Tejan Kabbah was elected President.
5541 Witnesses Isaac Mongor and TFl-375.
5542 Witnesses Isaac Mongor, Augustine Mallah, Martin George, Fayia Musa and TF 1 -375.
5543 Witnesses Isaac Mongor, Alice Pyne and Issa Sesay.
5544 Witnesses Martin George, Fayia Musa and Exhibit P-277.

---- End of Page 865 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T %/ Orb 18 May 2012

3 87 5 2
2556. It is undisputed that it was Sankoh, not the Accused, who planned and ordered
Operation Stop Election.5545 Nonetheless, the Prosecution, relying solely on the evidence of
Isaac Mongor, alleges that before ordering his troops to launch the operation, Sankoh
received a radio call from the Accused during which he told the Accused of the plan to instil
terror and amputate civilians to prevent or punish their participation in the elections, and the
Accused commented that the plan to disrupt the elections "was not a bad one".5 5 45
2557. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Mongor is a generally credible witness.5547
It has considered Mongor's testimony that the alleged radio conversation took place inside a
hut and that he was not inside the hut when he over—heard the conversation but rather was
eavesdropping from outside the hut. Mongor further stated that apart from over—hearing the
said radio conversation between Taylor and Sankoh, the latter in his subsequent address to
the meeting of RUF commanders in Zogoda, told them that "he had discussed the planned
offensive with Taylor who considered it not a bad plan at all".5545 However, of the other
witnesses who attended a meeting or meetings in Zogoda, including Augustine Mallah,
Martin George, and F ayia Musa, none mention hearing Sankoh openly make such a
statement during the meeting. On the contrary, a number of these witnesses refer to
Sankoh's statement that he had consulted Brig. Julius Maada Bio of the NPRC (not Charles
Taylor) who shared the RUF's preference for "peace before elections" and who was
prepared to "cooperate" with the RUF plan to sabotage the said election.5 5 45 The evidence of
Fayia Musa in this regard is particularly noteworthy as he was part of the RUF External
delegation and had on previous occasions met with and received assistance from the
Accused. The Trial Chamber finds that F ayia Musa is a generally credible witness.
2558. The Trial Chamber has considered whether or not there may have been two
meetings, as Augustine Mallah in his testimony did not name, other than Sankoh, any of the
many commanders Mongor named as having attended the meeting, and the commander
Mallah named to lead the attack, Morris Kallon, was not mentioned by Mongor in his
5545 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 130-132 ("Although this plan was not devised by the Accused, the RUF
leadership sought Taylor's approval and guidance before going forward with the plan"); Defence Final Trial
Brief, para. 1359; Sec also Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Briei paras 13-14.
5555 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 132, 417 quoting Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5689-
55(5?Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274.
55 55 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5689-5692.
5555 Fayia Musa, Augustine Mallah, Witness TF1-168 and Exhibit P-277.

---- End of Page 866 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ Gb:. 18 May 2012 Ay

38 C? 5 CZ
testimony as having beenpresent at the meeting. However, the content of the meeting
described by both witnesses is fairly consistent, and the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude
definitively that these were two separate meetings.
2559. ln the light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is of the view that given that Mongor
was not inside the hut where the conversation allegedly took place but rather was
eavesdropping from outside, where he may have misheard or taken certain information out
of context, and given that other witnesses at a meeting in Zogoda which may have been the
same meeting did not say that Sankoh mentioned the radio conversation with the Accused to
the meeting, the Trial Chamber cannot rely solely on the testimony of Mongor that Sankoh
sought Taylor's approval and guidance in relation to the plan known as Operation Stop
Election, and that Taylor told him in response that the plan was "not a bad one".
2560. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber finds based on the above evidence that during
Operation Stop Election the RUF did in fact carry out attacks on various areas including
Bo,555O Kenema,555l Magburaka,5552 Matotoka and Masingbi5553 and carried out unlawful
killings and amputation of hands or fingers of civilians.
Findings
2561. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in early 1996 before the elections, Foday Sankoh ordered the RUF to attack and burn
polling stations in all major towns including Kenema, Bo and Magburaka and to shoot and
kill or to amputate the hands or fingers of any civilian believed to participate in the
elections, an attack dubbed "Operation Stop Election".
2562. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that before ordering the attack, Sankoh sought the approval and guidance of the
Accused.
5550 Issa Sesay and Flomo George.
5551 Mallah, Kargbo and Sesay.
5552 Mongor and TF1—375.
5553 Pyne and Sesay.

---- End of Page 867 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T j GL 18 May 2012 %

Summary of Findings
2563. The Trial Chamber has found that —
(i) Between 1986 and 1989, revolutionary movements and their leaders received
training in Libya. The Trial Chamber further finds that at some point, between
1986 and 1989, the Accused, Foday Sankoh and Dr Marrneh were in Libya, and
that the Accused met Sankoh in Libya during this time.
(ii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that between 1986 and
1989, the Accused, Sarrkoh and Dr Marrneh met together and established a
common plan to terrorize the Sierra Leonean population and to forcibly control
the population and territory of Sierra Leone.
(iii) 1n 1989, aiier their training in Libya, the Accused and his Liberian revolutionary
group and Dr Marmeh and his Gambian revolutionary group went to Burkina
Faso.
(iv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in 1989, Foday
Sankoh was also in Burkina Faso and that the Accused, Sankoh and Dr Marmeh
met and agreed to support each other in their respective wars.
(v) From August 1990 until March 1991, the Accused provided the RUF with the
training camp of Crab Hole, instructors, recruits and material support, including
food and other supplies.
(vi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that from August
1990 until March 1991, as a matter of policy NPFL instructors in Crab Hole
taught terror methods to RUF recruits.
(vii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Liberian and Sierra
Leonean trainees at Camp Naama had no separate chain of command and were
treated as one body under the command of the Accused.
(viii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in Voinjama in
March 1991, the Accused, Foday Sarrkoh and Dr Manneh together with NPFL

---- End of Page 868 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / QQ 18 May 2012 M

and RUF commanders held a meeting during which they planned and organised
the invasion of Sierra Leone in accordance with the strategy hatched in Libya
and Burkina Faso.
(ix) The Accused supported the invasion of Sierra Leone.
(x) After the invasion, NPF L troops committed crimes against Sierra Leonean
civilians.
(xi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the support of the
Accused for the invasion of Sierra Leone was undertaken pursuant to a common
purpose to terrorize the civilian population of Sierra Leone.
. (xii) Around November 1992, the Accused provided Sankoh with arms and
ammunition for an attack on Kono.
(xiii) During this time the Accused received diamonds from Sankoh.
(xiv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in 1992 the
Accused and Sankoh formed a common plan to capture Kono, or that the
Accused directed Sankoh to capture Kono, because it was a diamondiferous
area.
(xv) ln 1993, following a request from the Accused, Sankoh sent RUF personnel
under the command of Morris Kallon to Liberia to fight with the NPF L against
F ULIMO. V
(xvi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
instructed Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah to establish a relationship with persons
in Guinea in order to take materiel into Guinea for the RUF.
(xvii) In 1994, the Accused advised Sankoh to attack a major place in Sierra Leone,
and pursuant to this advice Sankoh ordered the RUF to attack Sierra Rutile.
Following the attack, the Accused gave Sankoh further advice with regard to the
use of the money looted and the hostages abducted during the course of the
attack on Sierra Rutile.

---- End of Page 869 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T V // db 18 May 2012 %

3 8 762.
(xviii) In early 1996 before the elections, Foday Sankoh ordered the RUF to attack
and burn polling stations in all major towns including Kenema, Bo and
Magburaka and to shoot and kill or to amputate the hands or fingers of any
civilian believed to participate in the elections, an attack dubbed "Operation
Stop Election".
(xix) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that before ordering
Operation Stop Election, Sankoh sought the approval and guidance of the
Accused.
Conclusion
2564. At the end of the 1980s, a number of West African revolutionaries were trained in
Libya, including the Accused, Ali Kabbah and Foday Sankoh from Sierra Leone and Kukoi
Samba Sanyang (a.k.a. "Dr Marmeh") from the Gambia.5554 The Accused met Sankoh in
Libya, although the exact circumstances of their meeting are not known.5555 Contrary to the
Prosecution's submissions, the evidence did not establish that prior to 1996, the Accused,
Sankoh and Dr Manneh participated in any common plan, nor that the three men even met
together.
2565. After the invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991, the findings of the Trial Chamber relate
only to the relationship between Sankoh and the Accused. The Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has failed to prove that Sankoh and the Accused established a common plan.5556
The evidence rather shows that the Accused's NPF L and Sankoh's RUF had parallel goals 1
and aspirations.
2566. During the pre—1ndictment period, the Accused provided the RUF with a training
camp, instructors, recruits and material support, including food and other supplies. However,
again contrary to the Prosecution's submissions, the evidence did not establish that the RUF
was under the superior authority of the Accused or the NPP L chain of command, or that they
were instructed in NPF L terror tactics.
5554 Pre—1ndictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989.
5555 Pre—[ndictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989.
5556 Pre—1ndictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989.

---- End of Page 870 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T GX 18 May 2012

3 @765
2567. The Accused supported the invasion of Sierra Leone in March 1991 and NPFL
troops actively participated in it. However, the Prosecution failed to prove that the Accused
participated in the planning of the invasion. The Prosecution also failed to prove that the
support of the Accused for the invasion of Sierra Leone was undertaken pursuant to a
common purpose to terrorize the civilian population. Rather, the evidence shows that the
Accused and Sankoh had a common interest in fighting a common enemy, ULIMO, a
Liberian insurgency group in Sierra Leone, and the Sierra Leonean Government forces
which was supporting ULIMO.
2568. The Accused withdrew his NPFL troops from Sierra Leone after the fallout between
_ the NPFL and RUF troops in 1992, culminating in Operations Top 20, Top 40, and Top
Final. While the Defence maintains that the Accused had no further contact or cooperation
with Sankoh after 1992 following Top Final, the Trial Chamber has found otherwise.
Although the Liberia—Sierra Leone border was closed by ULIMO and the Sierra Leone
Government forces, it remained porous, enabling the flow of arms, ammunition and other
supplies from Liberia during the remainder of the pre—Indictment period. The Trial Chamber
has found that the Accused provided arms and ammunition to Sankoh for an attack on Kono
in November 1992, and that he advised Sankoh prior to and following the attack on Sierra
Rutile. The Accused also asked Sankoh to send troops in 1993 to help him fight ULIMO.
2569. Having failed to prove the existence of a common plan formulated in Libya and
Burkina Faso, the evidence relied on by the Prosecution indicates that during this pre-
Indictment period Sankoh operated independently of the Accused, and while relying at times
on his guidance and support, did not take orders from the Accused.

---- End of Page 871 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T 6% 18 May 2012

35%.4
B. The Role of Intermediaries
2570. Before turning to the specific allegations of the Prosecution relating to the role of the
Accused during the Indictment period, the Trial Chamber has considered generally the role
of several intermediaries alleged to be acting on behalf of the Accused. The Trial Chamber
notes that the roles of Benjamin Yeaten, Daniel Tamba (a.l<.a. Jungle) and Ibrahim Bah
during the Indictment period are heavily disputed by the parties throughout their
submissions. For this reason, the Trial Chamber has considered their roles on the basis of the
evidence as a whole, and has drawn some preliminary conclusions with respect to each of
them individually. These preliminary conclusions are subject to further consideration in the
context of specific events and in light of specific evidence related to those events as it is
considered by the Trial Chamber.
1. Benjamin Yeaten
Submissions of the Parties
2571. From 1995 until 1997 Benjamin Yeaten served as Deputy Director of the Special
Security Service ("SSS") of the Government of Liberia. A&er the Accused's election to the
` presidency, Yeaten became the Director of the sss.5557 He was promoted to Deputy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in around 2000, putting him in charge of the generals
of the Liberian armed forces for combat taking place within Liberia.5558 .
2572. The Prosecution refers to Yeaten as the Accused's "most trusted military man" and
his "tmsted subordinate".5559 When the RUF submitted a request for materiel to Yeaten he
indicated that he would pass the request on to his "dad" Taylor, or "the father" or "the
pa",556O and the Prosecution describes him as a "skilled, vicious subordinate who was
completely loyal to Taylor, carrying out all of Taylor's directives without a second
thought".5565 The Prosecution contends that the claim of the Defence that Yeaten engaged in
trading of arms and ammunition without the Accused's knowledge is "both implausible and
5555 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1096, 1098, 1118. Yeaten was promoted to Deputy Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in around 2000, putting him in command of the generals of the Liberian armed forces for combat
taking place within Liberia.
5555 Defence Final Trial Briei para. 11 18.
5559 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 170, 276, 367. 368.
5550 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 276-277, 318, 556.
5555 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 410.

---- End of Page 872 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / Xl 18 May 2012

3576 5
incompatible with the Accused's own claims that his forces had no arms or ammunition to
give because of disarmament. 5562
2573. The Defence submits that "[d]ue to his access to President Taylor, Yeaten may have
become more powerful than the vice—president and other ministers. Significantly, he became
powerful enough that he could act without first receiving orders from Charles Taylor, and
without Taylor learning of his actions". ln his supervisory capacity of the RUF Guesthouse
in the second half of 1998, Yeaten was an intermediary between the RUF and the Accused,
and possibly developed a "close personal relationship" with Bockarie during that time with
"no hierarchy involved".5563
2574. The Defence contends that under the directive of Yeaten, intermediaries such as
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), Sampson Weywhee5564, and
other unnamed individuals, delivered arms and ammunition to the RUF throughout 1998 and
possibly into 1999. The Defence describes this alleged operation as a "private enterprise that
was mutually beneficial to themselves, but unknown to President Taylor".5565 The Defence
submits that the evidence shows that Yeaten was "established as an intermediary, but it is
not clear how much was actually relayed back to the Accused about Yeaten's dealings with
the RUF at the Guesthouse", and that "even evidence to the effect that Yeaten gave Bockarie
ammunition [...] stating that it was from Charles Taylor for Sankoh, says nothing about
Taylor's actual role or knowledge. Thus, based on circumstantial and incredible evidence,
Taylor cannot be held responsible for any ultra vires dealings between the RUF and
Yeaten".556°
2575. The Defence additionally submits that it is possible that the Accused was unaware of
Yeaten's activities as from 1998 to 2003 Liberia was under threat from LURD and MODEL,
and there were inadequate numbers of security personnel to patrol the border. The Accused
had reason to send arms and ammunition with his own fighters to the border areas,
"especially with Generals such as Yeaten and his SSS bodyguards. ln a poverty—stricken,
war-torn society it is quite understandable that these same people would look for any
5562 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 1254.
5563 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 935, 1013, 1098.
5564 Also spelled Weah.
5565 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1091.
5566 Defence Final Trial Brief] para. 1021.

---- End of Page 873 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T O1.}, 18 May 2012

38 ‘/66
possible way to supplement their meagre income". The Defence argues that nonetheless it is
"not self-evident that Taylor should have known that some of it was given instead to the
RUF by Yeaten".5557 Further, the Accused denies that he supplied arms or ammunition to
the RUF during the Indictment period.5555
2576. Concerning Yeaten's alleged role in this "private enterprise", the Defence relies on
evidence from the Accused, TF1-371, DCT-008, Moses Blah, TF 1-567, Sam Kolleh,
Varmuyan Sherif Abu Keita, Dauda Aruna Fornie, and Issa Sesay, as well as Exhibit P-018.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
2577. Witness Moses Blah, Inspector General of the NPFL from 1990 to 1997,5559 Liberian
Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000,5570 and Vice-
President of Liberia from 2000 to 2003,557] testified that he first met Benjamin Yeaten in
Tajura Camp in Libya when Yeaten was about 14 to 15 years old. Because Yeaten was very
effective in training, Charles Taylor recognised him and drew him nearer to him by
appointing him to be his bodygrard and to be director of certain units that would be close to
the President at the time. Eventually Yeaten became the Director of the SSS. Yeaten
maintained his relationship with Taylor until Taylor left Liberia.5572 Only Taylor could give
Yeaten orders. Blah stated that "[n]obody could disobey an order from Taylor. You would
be punished severely, including myself We could not disobey his orders".5575
2578. Blah testified that in 2003 Yeaten took a group of Liberian men who had been
wounded in battle to the Mahare River and executed them. Blah was informed about the
event a few days later but he did not ask Taylor or Yeaten about it in part because Blah had
limited authority if the Executive Mansion Guards were involved and because he was "not
authorised, more especially when Benjamin Yeaten was involved". Blah further testified that
5557 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1135.
5 555 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1 134.
5555 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9943-9945.
5570 Moses Blah. Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884.
557l Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884; Blah became President of Liberia for 60 days from 1 1
August to 1 1 October 2003: Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10065.
5575 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9848.
5575 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9849.

---- End of Page 874 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // OQ; 18 May 2012
391

aa as?
"[k]nowing [Yeaten] to be a crucial man and a most powerful man working with the
President, I left that up to him. It was up to him to tind it out by himself Z5574
2579. Blah stated that there were various commanders in charge of each and every unit but
Yeaten was the overall commander and could move from unit to unit taking instructions and
carrying messages from President Taylor.5575 During the latter part of Taylor's presidency
"Yeaten grew so powerful that he did not even have regard for the Vice-President of Liberia
[...] and the defence minister also was not considered to be anything in the face of Benjamin
Yeaten and his powers".557° However, Yeaten was not more powerful than Taylor.5577
2580. Blah testitied that even the commander of one unit could not give orders to the
commander of another, and that commanders did not take orders from him, even as
Inspector General and even as Vice President of Liberia. Taylor "was the sole commander of
everything, even the defence minister could not give orders at that time. [Taylor] was the
sole commander-in-chief of the entire operations of the army".5578
2581. Blah testitied that in 2003 he had a conversation with Taylor conceming Sam
Bockarie's presence in Liberia, as Sierra Leone was searching for him. Blah advised Taylor
to tum Bockarie over to the Sierra Leonean government in order for the Liberian
government to maintain "a good face".5579 Later Blah was driving back to Monrovia when
he came upon a road block and could not pass through. Yeaten was at a nearby camp and
asked to speak to Blah. Yeaten told Blah to look in his pick-up truck to see the mission he
had been on the night before, and Blah saw the dead bodies of Sam Bockarie and another
person. Yeaten said he was sending the pick-up with the corpses inside to the Chief in
Monrovia. A week or two later, when they were back in Monrovia, Yeaten jokingly told
Blah that he had killed Bockarie to destroy evidence so they would not be exposed, and that,
in reference to Blah's advice to Taylor conceming Bockarie, "[t]he way you were thinking
was the wrong way". When Blah arrived in Monrovia he went to White Flower and reported
5574 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9936-9940.
5575 Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10045.
5576 Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, pp. 10045-10046.
5577 Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10046.
5578 Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, pp. 10044-10045.
5579 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9975-9976.

---- End of Page 875 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Gln; 18 May 2012 %
r

- what he had seen. Taylor told him that it was not his, Blah's, business as it was a military
operation.5580
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
2582. Witness Joseph Marzah, an SSS member,5 5 81 testified that he made 20 to 40 trips to
Sierra Leone carrying arms, ammunitions and artillery. He testified that these trips were
undertaken "on the direct instructions of Charles Taylor". He further stated that Taylor led
the "government that had a constitution" which governed the country, "anything we did was
by his orders".5582
Prosecution Witness TF1 -371
2583. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,5583 testified that Issa Sesay had complained to
him that Benjamin Yeaten had taken for himself $USD 30,000 from the proceeds of mining
that was meant to go to Charles Taylor. Sesay confronted Yeaten who admitted that he did
take the money, but he also said that he would pay it back.5584 The witness further testified
that he agreed that behaviour such as this by Yeaten and other "honourab1es" was indicative
"of a general sense of indiscipline and private enterprise which pervaded much of the
behaviour of many people involved in this conf1ict".5585
2584. TF1-371 also testified on cross-examination that the commanders were in a habit of
bribing Yeaten so that they would not be delayed in their missions in Monrovia. More
specifically, when Sarn Bockarie would go to Monrovia, "because Mr Taylor can be very
busy [...] he takes some time with Benjamin Yeaten, the commander, before he sees Mr
Taylor. So, they had this habit of giving him a present, sometimes diamonds or money, to
have [...] quick access".5586 TF1-371 said that all access to Taylor for the RUF, including
5580 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9986-9991.
ml Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 6053-6055.
5582 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5876-5877.
55*3 rrr-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
558* TF1-371, nanaanpt 50 January 2008, pp. 2660-2661 (CS).
5585 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2662 (CS).
55*6 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2409 (CS). This testimony was made in reference to questioning
concerning Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF
Defence Staff, 2nd December 1998", p. 4. In this exhibit, which is a report on the meeting that Sam Bockarie
convened in order to report on the external mission to Burkina Faso in December 1998, Bockarie "inferred re
that he went with a two and half carats (2 1/2 carats) diamond and some other items which he gave as present to
a senior security — Benjamin inorder [sic] to facilitate easy access to all chances for the undelayed success of our

---- End of Page 876 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T s / GM 18 May 2012

even Sankoh, went through either Musa Cisse or Benjamin Yeaten.8887 When asked on re-
examination who, other than the RUF, was looking to line their own pockets, TF1-371 stated
" n orrnall like Sam Bockarie and Issa, I mean those that were in the osition, I mean
Y P
senior comrnand".8888
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie A
2585. Dauda Aruna Fornie ("DAF"), an RUF radio operator8888 who worked in Buedu from
early 1998 until late April 1999,8880 testified that throughout this period, Bockarie, through
his radio operators, would contact Benjamin Yeaten or Taylor to request military
su lies.888l Base 1 was the station that coordinated between Sam Bockarie and Mr Taylor.
PP Y
Sunlight would tell Bravo Zulu to inform Mosquito to switch on his satellite phone.8882 ~
Yeaten's radio operator, Sunlight, would then respond that Bockarie should wait while
Yeaten consulted with "the Papay", or "the old man"8888 or "Zero-Four-Seven", which
Fornie understood to refer to Taylor.8884
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
2586. Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,8888 testified that Bockarie would send vehicles
to collect deliveries of arms and amrnunitions from Foya and bring them to Buedu.
Civilians were used to carry loads from the Moa River. Bockarie would then send a message
to his commanders "that he had brou t ammunitions from Mr Charles Taylor".88% Food,
Y
including rice, was also sent from Liberia, and Bockarie would send a message to the RUF
that he had received food or ammunition - "whatever he get [sic] from Taylor".8 8 87
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
mission".
8887 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2828 (CS).
8888 TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2983 (CS).
8888 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
8880 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21457-21458, 21615.
8888 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21477-21480.
8882 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21480.
8888 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21482.
8884 The Accused testified that "Zero-Four-Seven" or "047" was one of the code names used for him by radio
operators (Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 28992).
8888 Periy Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
8888 Periy Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 18.
8887 Peny Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 17.

---- End of Page 877 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ ®)> 18 May 2012

587 920
2587. Witness TFl-567, an RUF member,5598 testified that the RUF guesthouse was
established in 1999, pursuant to Taylor's instruction. Sankoh appointed a caretaker of the
guesthouse with Benjamin Yeaten's agreement and told the caretaker that Benjamin Yeaten
was his immediate boss because Yeaten was in Monrovia and because he was the security
commander for Taylor. Sankoh also instructed the caretaker to take a record of everything
that was going on. Yeaten instructed the caretaker that as he, Yeaten, was the security
commander under Taylor's govemment, he would act as a "mediator" for any messages
from Taylor because "his dad" Taylor had too many things to do to speak to them directly.
The caretaker would also act as a "mediator" on behalf of the RUF for any messages from
the RUF side. TF1-567 testified that when Issa Sesay wanted arms and ammunition, he
would send the message, which the caretaker would take to Yeaten, and Yeaten would say
"he will send it to his dad", meaning Taylor. 5599
2588. TFl-567 testified that Sankoh instructed the caretaker to take "record of everything
that was going on"5600 but that Yeaten also instructed the caretaker that he should not keep
any documents pertaining to any transaction between Taylor and the RUF. Yeaten explained
that "he did not want there to be any proof in the future that would show a document
between the RUF and Charles Taylor". Sometime in 2000, when Yeaten discovered that,
despite his strict warning, the caretaker was maintaining records of materials, arms and
ammunition that were being taken from the guesthouse, Yeaten punished him by sending
him to the front line in the Voinjama area. Yeaten informed Issa Sesay of` this incident, and
Sesay responded that as Yeaten and others were their "big brothers" the caretaker should
follow their instructions.56m
2589. TFl-567 testified that in 2000 to 2001 Yeaten was the overall commander in charge
in the Foya area. He knew this because Yeaten said that Taylor had appointed him to be the
Joint Chief of Staff to command all the other front line commanders and generals.56O2 TFl-
567 further testified that "[a]t all times when ammunition were given Benjamin Yeaten will
say that it is his dad Charles Taylor who provided them"56O3 and "as far as I was concerned, I
5508 TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. l2986—l2988 (PS).
5599 TFl-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 12992 (PS).
5600 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12987 (PS).
5601 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12987-1299O (PS).
5602 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13199-1320l.
5603 TF1—567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13040.

---- End of Page 878 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr--03-01-r /¢/’ 6)*9 18 May 2012 Vg

3867 if /
knew that whatever arms and ammunition that were coming from Benjamin Yeaten and he
himself told me, 1 knew that they were from Charles Taylor. 5504
Prosecution Witness Varrnuyan Sherif
2590. Witness Varrnuyan Sherif, a former ULIMO-K fighter who was the Assistant
Director of Operations for the SSS from August 1997 until the end of 1999, described the
relationship between Taylor and Yeaten as being "1ike father and son". Sherif testified that
"Mr Taylor, made it clear to all of us, the SS members, that Benjamin Yeaten is like his
son." He said that if Yeaten did anything, he would not be questioned and that ‘°sometimes
in fact he did certain things before taking instruction from Mr Taylor and, even when Mr
Taylor got to know about it, he would just forget about it". He mentioned one occasion
when the Special Court of Sierra Leone wanted to arrest Taylor in Ghana, and within an
hour Yeaten had executed two of the ministers in Liberia and arrested the Vice-President.
\Vhen Taylor came, he explained publicly on the radio to the Liberian people that they
should consider this as just a mistake.5555
The Accused
2591. The Accused testified that he met Benjamin Yeaten in 1987 in Libya because he was
one of his special forces who were taken to the base. Taylor did not closely follow the
"progression" of Yeaten through the ranks until 1994, when Yeaten was identified to him as
someone who showed promise in command capabilities throughout the combat period. The
Accused testified that prior to this, he had met Yeaten many times. He thought that Yeaten
spoke Gio and English, and was one of the few members of the Special Forces who had a
high school education.5556
2592. From 1994 to 1995, when the Accused was serving on the Council of State, Yeaten
was the Deputy Director of the SSS.5607 He became Director of the SSS fairly quickly after
the election of the Accused as President of Liberia. As Director of the SSS, he was
responsible for the personal protection of the President, his family, and other senior
members of the govermnent and their families, VIPs, and all very important individuals
5604 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13097-13098.
5605 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 924-925.
5606 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, pp. 321 18-32124.
5507 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, pp. 32124-32125.

---- End of Page 879 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Q
/ ¤

38 9 ?,Z
within the govemment. According to the laws of Liberia, he reported directly to the Minister
of State. The Accused testified that he could order Yeaten to instead report directly to him,
but that he would not, as he thought that would be in violation of the law.56O8 The Accused
chose Yeaten to be the Director of the SSS because he had fought brilliantly during the war,
and had taken not just military but security and secret service training. He was
recommended highly by the military and by the Minister of State during the vetting process,
and he was nominated by the Senate.56O9
2593. The Accused testified that the amount of contact he had with Yeaten depended on
when he wanted to see Yeaten, as the Director of the SSS did not have any direct physical
reason to be with the President. The Accused estimated that he would meet with Yeaten
once or twice a week if he had to speak to him about a specific matter, but it was not a part
of Yeaten's official duties to meet with him. However, beginning in 1998 Yeaten began to
report to the Accused conceming specific assignments related to Sam Bockarie and "dealing
with military situation [sic] of that sort". Otherwise Yeaten was only obligated to report to
the Minister of State.56lO
2594. The Accused elaborated on Yeaten's responsibilities towards Bockarie as falling
under the duties of the SSS as "VlP Protection". The Accused explained further that when
the RUF wanted to come to Liberia, the SSS was put in charge of the entry and exit of those
military personnel into Liberia and their protection. Written reports regarding this were
submitted to the Ministry of State, and the Accused would read them and ask to see Yeaten
in his capacity as Director of the SSS if he had any questions. The Accused did not believe
that Yeaten had contact with Bockarie until Bockarie's first trip to Monrovia to meet the
Accused in September 1998.56H
2595. When questioned about the importance of the position of Director of the SSS, the
Accused agreed that it was an important position as this person was charged with protecting
the President's life. The Accused did not agree that the position required someone who was
5608 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 17 November 2009, pp. 31892-31893; Transcript 19 November 2009,
pp. 32124-32126; But see Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 2 February 2010, pp. 34637-34645 wherein on
cross-examination the Accused disagreed with the Prosecution that the Director of the SSS actually reported to
the Director General of National Security for the Administration of the SSS.
5600 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, pp. 32126-32127.
M) Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, pp. 32127-32128.
SW Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, pp. 32128-32129.

---- End of Page 880 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GIA 18 May 2012

B 5 7 83
extremely l0yal, and said instead that "we tried to make [the SSS] professional", and that
Yeaten was vetted and selected based on his qualifications at the time. The Accused agreed ‘
that Yeaten was l0yal to him on a personal level from NPFL times, but that his l0yalty lay
first with the Republic and that he was also l0yal to his President.56i2
2596. During direct examination, the Accused was questioned on the testimony of
Prosecution Witness TFl—579, who had testified that on his second trip to Liberia, which he
took with Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), and Sampson Weah,
they drove to Benjamin Yeaten's house in Monrovia. Yeaten told them to follow him "t0 the
warehouse which was right at Taylor's house, on the left hand side" and which was located
just up the hill from Yeaten's house. Yeaten gave a list of things that they needed to the G4
section. The Commander there was Moses Du0h.56i3
2597. The Accused denied that there was a warehouse attached to his residence in
` Monrovia and that Du0h was the G4. He stated that Du0h was one of the workers in the SSS
building "located outside [...] in the vicinity of White Flower", which was separated by a
fence from White Flower. A man named Kai S0ny was in charge of the warehouse, which
was a two story building that hosted the SSS. On the top fl00r were the SSS offices, and 0n
the bottom fl00rs were where the SSS kept the supplies that they needed for presidential
protection, including f00d. This warehouse was under the command of the SSS Director,
Benjamin Yeaten. The Accused stated that Yeaten's house is "a little, it's far" and then
stated that the house is located several houses away from White Flower. The Accused did
not have direct access to the warehouse.56M
2598. The Accused was read the testimony of Moses Blah that "Benjamin was moving
everywhere, wherever there was fighting. I didn’t know whether it was by the order of the
President or himself [...] He became so powerful that he could do anything and g0
anywhere".56l5 The Accused agreed that Yeaten could go practically anywhere, and stated
that Blah was referring to the time peri0d in 2001 and the war in L0fa against LURD. At this
SM2 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, pp. 32129-32130.
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30621, 30637; 29 October 2009, p.30638. TF1-
579 tcstihcd that this trip occurred in October of an uiiidcntihcd year (TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008,
pp. 19839-19840).
W4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30628-30631. See also Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 19 November 2009, p. 32147 (testifydng that Yeaten's house was two to three city blocks away from
White Flower "depending on normal city blocks").
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 4 November 2009, p. 31108.

---- End of Page 881 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dn" 18 May 2012 Q

389 f4
time Yeaten was not only Director of the SSS but a General, and one of the brave people
that could go to the front lines. Further, Yeaten was moving to any place where there was
major combat and he did not require the Accused's consent to move around. At this time the
SSS was mostly~being run by Montgomery, Yeaten's Deputy, and during the tough part of
the war Yeaten was made Deputy Chaimian of the Joint Chiefs in Charge of Combat.
Therefore, he visited the different front lines and divisional headquarters.56l6
2599. Concerning Blah's testimony that Yeaten "became so powerful that he could do
anything", the Accused testified that he did not claim to know everything that Yeaten did,
nor did he claim that he was aware of, or that he ordered Yeaten to do everything that he did.
However, "as far as being so powerful that he could do anything within the law that reached
to me, yes, there are a lot of things that he could do and a lot of things that Moses was
powerful too that he could do". When asked again by Defence counsel whether "Yeaten was
all powerful and could do anything", the Accused replied "No".56l7
2600. The Accused addressed Blah's evidence that Yeaten could go anywhere with
Taylor's pemiission, and that "Each time you see Benjamin you will see the chief He had
greater power in a way. The only person that was above Benjamin at that time that I know
was President Taylor. Nobody else". The Accused responded that Blah saw things from a
different perspective, and was "saying this in the context of Benjamin's refusal to take his
order to carry out a coup d’etat" but that this "other power in the land" did not exist.56l8
2601. The Accused was also questioned on the testimony of Vamiuyan Sherif that Taylor
and Yeaten had a very cordial relationship like father and son and that because of this
"Yeaten would not be questioned". The Accused agreed that there were times when Yeaten
acted without first seeking instructions from him because "[i]f a President had to operate
with everyone calling and getting instructions before he could take certain crucial decisions I
don’t think the President would have a minute of his own. So most individuals in fact are
5616 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 4 November 2009, p. 31 108. The Accused testified that by June 2003 .
Yeaten was not just Director of the SSS but also the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he was in
charge of the military operations of the entire Republic. Prior to this he carried the rank of lieutenant general but
he did not perform with the army (Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, p. 32139).
5617 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 4 November 2009, pp. 31 109-31 1 10.
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 4 November 2009, pp. 31 1 10-31 1 12.

---- End of Page 882 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (lu 18 May 2012

589 7 5
trained to take "pn1dent decisions". The Accused added that there was nothing cordial
between Yeaten and himself Yeaten was a general, "[he] performed".56l9
2602. In reply to the evidence of TF1-567 of Yeaten's role as a mediator between the
caretaker of the RUF guesthouse and Taylor, the Accused testified that he disagreed with the
characterisation of Yeaten as a mediator, and said that it was more accurate to say that
Yeaten, as the Director of the SSS, was "just a security responsible for their protection".5620
2603. The Accused testified that during the time that Yeaten, as Director of the SSS, had
"total" involvement in supervising the RUF guesthouse, Yeaten and Bockarie developed a
close relationship.562l The Accused further testified that Bockarie was a good friend of
Yeaten and would visit him from time to time.5622 However, Taylor also testified that he
never appointed Yeaten to be "an immediate boss for the guesthouse." The Accused
explained that he would not have needed Yeaten to pass messages to him from the caretaker
of the RUF guesthouse, because at that time the Accused was in direct contact with Foday
Sankoh, who would only needed to have called him from Freetown.5623
2604. When questioned about TF1-375's testimony that Benjamin Yeaten was the second
man to the President, the Accused countered that this was total nonsense, asserting that
"[t]here were a whole line of other people that [...] had ten times more power than the SSS
Director. Far, far, far more", including the Vice President, the Speaker, the Defence
Minister, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.5624
2605. The Accused also testified that he never provided Sam Bockarie with arms or
ammunition.5°25
2606. When read the testimony of TF1-371 that RUF Commanders were in the habit of
bribing Yeaten with diamonds and other items in order to facilitate quick access to Taylor,
the Accused testified that if he had known that Yeaten was accepting these bribes he would
have never been SSS Director. The Accused queried the necessity of such a bribe, asking
5619 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30801—30804
5620 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28773—28774 (PS).
562] Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 2601 1-26012.
5622 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, p. 30309.
5623 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28776 (PS).
*24 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 2889 1 -28897.
Sw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, p. 2861 1.

---- End of Page 883 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 4/ O'! 18 May 2012

"wh would he want to a Ben`amin when either I sent for him or I know he is comin ‘?"
Y P Y J 8
He further explained that
I can see now that there were some things going on that I didn’t know about. I would not have known that. But
it's possible that they would have done that because I...] at this time there is a lot of corruption, there is a lot of
things going on, but I am not aware of it.5626
2607. Further, when asked whether in hindsight he should have dismissed Yeaten rather
than allowing him to maintain his position until Taylor left Liberia in August 2003, the
Accused responded that "a person is innocent until proven guilty" and said he would
reappoint him again today unless there was factual evidence that Yeaten had been charged
and convicted of a crime, that "[u]ntil now and up until there was nothing before me or that
had been brought in any way that would have led me to not reappointing him".5f’27
Defence Witness DCT—008
2608. When questioned concerning the testimony of Prosecution Witness Mohamed
Kabbah stating that the RUF and the government of Liberia were like brothers and sisters,
Witness DCT—008, a Liberian radio operator,5628 countered that it was incorrect because the
connection between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten was a personal connection, and not
because Yeaten was representing the interests of the government of Liberia.5629 He also
denied Kabbah's testimony that there were daily communications from the RUF to Taylor
through Sunlight stating that "Sunlight being used by Benjamin Yeaten to communicate
with the RUF was not to the knowledge of the President of Liberia".5°30
2609. DCT—008 testified that Yeaten had told Sunlight, a radio operator assigned to Yeaten,
I that Charles Taylor did not know about the relationship between Yeaten and Bockarie, and
that Sunlight must also keep it a secret.563l Yeaten said that this secret should be disclosed to
5626 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29580-29582 (PS). See also Charles Ghankay
Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, p. 26716—26718 where Taylor testified that in 1999 corruption was at a very
high level, and that it was "a very troubling period" in which as President, he "had no real control to a great
extent". The Accused believed that it was highly probable that officials in his government, such as Yeaten who
he "was hearing about" were engaged in such activities.
5627 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34205—34206.
5628 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46948—46951 (PS).
5629 DCT-008, Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47741.
5630 DCT—008, rmsenpr 1 September 2010,p. 47742.
ml DCT—008 testified that Benjamin Yeaten told Sunlight that, "‘What I have told you should be kept to
yourself and [sic] must not share it with any other government radio operator or anyone around you, not even
your wife, because this relationship between myself and the friend over there,"’ that is Sam Bockarie, "‘the
President does not know about it [ .... ] and you should keep it as a secret to yourself."’ He iirrther went on to say

---- End of Page 884 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T j OB 18 May 2012

no one, because if Taylor discovered it, he would arrest Yeaten and "finish" him. Yeaten
also threatened that he would "deal with" whoever disclosed this secret first.5632
2610. DCT-008 testified that there was never an occasion when Yeaten himself used the
radio at Base 1 to communicate with the RUF, nor did he communicate on the radio on
behalf of Liberia as he was afraid of being intercepted, and he did not know the
communication codes.5633 When asked whether in late 1998 there were communications
between Base 1 in Monrovia and any other RUF stations, DCT-008 testified that the
relationship between Bockarie and Yeaten was only between themselves, so the
communication was only between Base 1 and Bravo Zulu 4 and was limited to the two of
them 5634
2611. When asked why it was important to keep the communication between Bockarie and
Yeaten secret, DCT—008 testified that after Bockarie's first visit to Monrovia5635 they
became very close friends, and within this friendship they made secret deals between
themselves. There were very many secret deals that Charles Taylor did not know about,
mostly concerning the selling of ammunition to Bockarie for cash.5636 These deals included
Musa Cissé, who was also doing business with the RUF or with Bockarie at this time.5637
2612. When asked to clarify that his testimony was that Yeaten "was stealing ammunition
under the nose of the President of Liberia and selling it to the RUF ", DCT—008 responded
affirmatively that Yeaten used to send people all around to collect ammunition including
from the ex-Liberian Peace Council ("LPC") in the south—eastern part of Liberia, that he
would then sell to Bockarie without the knowledge of Taylor.5638 DCT—008 further explained
that, "if this secret is disclosed to anyone and the President discovers this, 1 will be arrested by the President and
1 will be finished. But before the President deals with me, I would have dealt with that person first" (DCT—008,
Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47047). See also DCT—008 concerning the satellite phone conversations between
Yeaten and Bockarie: "[Taylor], I believe, did not know about this communication. The reason is that, earlier,
Ben had told Sampson, Sunlight, and those close to him that his relationship with Sam Bockarie was personal
and secret, and [Taylor], or even the Government of Liberia, does not know about it, so they should be very
careful so that they wouldn’t disclose this relationship to the President" (DCT—008, Transcript 24 August 2010,
p. 47386).
5632 ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47046-47047.
5633 DCT—008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47386.
563* ocr-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47387.
5635 DCT—008 testified that Jungle, "the runner for Sam Bockarie", told him that this September 1998 visit was
Bockarie's first visit (DCT—008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47392).
5636 DCT—008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47387-47388.
5037 DCT—008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47388, 47393.
5638 DCT—008 testified that Yeaten would send people to collect ammunition in the south—eastern part of Liberia,

---- End of Page 885 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

/287%)
aj
that things were difficult during this time and as a result there was a lot of corruption by
officials in the govemment that Taylor was unaware of including these ammunition sales.
Taylor was also unaware that the ex-ULIMO members in Lofa County were selling
ammunition to the RUF.5639 For example, on one occasion Bockarie told Jungle, who told
DCT-008, that Varmuyan Sherif, an ex-ULIMO fighter, had sold ammunition to him.
Yeaten's close bodyguards knew about these transactions so he instructed them to keep it
very secret because if Taylor found out he would arrest and prosecute Yeaten, and Yeaten
himself would "deal with" whoever exposed the secret before he was arrested.5640
2613. VVhen asked how Taylor would not have gotten word of these clandestine sales as
there would have been many people involved in handing the ammunition over to the RUF
and transporting it out of Liberia, DCT-008 testified that Taylorwas too far up the line to
know what was going on. Further, because Yeaten, as Director of the SSS, and Cissé, as the
President's Chief of Protocol, were high-ranking govemment officials, they and even their
bodyguards would not be searched when they were driving around. Therefore these people
used their positions to carry out these secret transactions without the knowledge of the
President. DCT-008 testified that he knew these things because he travelled with Yeaten and
saw that when they came to checkpoints, no one would check their car. He added that
Yeaten was highly respected and that people feared him a lot.564l
2614. DCT-008 testified that these secret deals began in late 1998 after Bockarie's first
visit to Monrovia. Because Bockarie and Yeaten were very close, Yeaten would send
ammunition using Jungle or Sampson who would then take the ammunition to Bockarie. On
some occasions they would pick up the ammunition from Yeaten or Cissé's yard at night.
DCT-008 testified that "we" discussed these things, and that on most occasions Jungle
would tell him about these things.5°42
2615. The movement was always done at night by Sampson and Jungle because that is who
Yeaten normally sent, and sometimes they would be escorted by Joseph Marzah (a.k.a.
specifically Grand Gedeh, Sinoe, and Maryland because before the 1997 election those areas were occupied by
the LPC (DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47389, 47393),
5639 DCT-008 testified that Sampson told him that prior to the Liberian presidential election in 1997, ULIMO-K
had not completely disarmed. Therefore, after the election Samspon and Jungle used to go there to buy
ammunition from them (DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47394).
5640 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47389, 47394.
WI DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47390.

---- End of Page 886 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4%/ 18 May 2012 3%

J 67 7
Zigzag), who was one of the drivers. Sometimes they would use Yeaten's pick—up and
sometimes they used a four—tyred Nissan pick—up. Conceming the amount of ammunition,
DCT—008 testified that on one occasion when he saw them leaving with ammunition, they
had approximately five boxes of AK—47 rounds and a few RPG rockets in rice bags.6644
2616. During the times that Jungle came to Base l, Jungle did not transmit any messages
on behalf of Benjamin Yeaten.5644 Sometimes Sellay from Base 1 asked for Jungle but
Jungle was absent. However, there was one occasion in 1998 when Sellay gave a message to
Sunlight asking him to tell Jungle that Bockarie wanted him to go to Cissé and tell him that
they needed food. Sunlight gave the message to Jungle, who then left.6645 Furthermore, at
one point Bockarie, who was in Sierra Leone, contacted Jungle, who was at Base 1, and told
him to tell Cissé and Yeaten that they were running out of food and asked for their
assistance. This occurred after Jungle's first communication with Sellay. DCT—008 is
unaware of whether Yeaten or Bockarie responded to this request.5646
2617. DCT—008 testified that the secret deals or radio contact between Bockarie and Yeaten
ended in December 1999 when Bockarie moved to Liberia to seek refuge for himself and for
his family from the Liberian government, because the deals were only between Bockarie and
Yeaten, and not the RUF and Yeaten.5647
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2618. Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,5646 and interim leader of the RUF from 2000
until disarmament in 2002,5644 testified that around January or February 2000 Foday Sankoh
appointed a caretaker of the RUF Guesthouse.5656 As far as Sesay was aware, the caretaker's
duties were limited to taking care of the house. He was not a radio operator, he did not have
any assigmnents relating to the procurement of ammunition from any source, and did not
have custody of any ammunition. Sesay testified that the caretaker only had contact with
5555 ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47391.
5555 ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47392.
6644 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47396.
4646 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47396·47397.
5555 ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47394—47395.
4647 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47395-47396.
6646 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
66441ssa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
6666 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44556; Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46032.

---- End of Page 887 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T [ 18 May 2012 %
I

Yeaten when Sesay was in Monrovia and Yeaten came to the guesthouse to take Sesay to
Roberts International Airport. The caretaker also did not run any errands specifically relating
to the delivery of ammunition from Liberia to Sierra Leone during the time that he was
based in Monrovia.555l
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
2619. Sam Kolleh testified that he agreed with the statement that "corruption can occur in
any army where people are selling small amounts of arms and ammunition for their own
rofit" but denied that the RUF sold ammunition.5652 I~Ie said he did not know who
P
Benjamin Yeaten was, and had never met him or heard about him.5655
Prosecution Exhibit P-018
2620. Exhibit P-018 is a Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-
S/2000/1195, adopted on 20 December 2000. In pertinent part, the report describes efforts
made by the UN and ECOWAS to stop the trade of arms in West Africa in 1997 and 1998. It
also states that
[g]uerilla armies receive weapons through interlmked networks of traders, criminals and
insurgents moving across borders. Arms also travel from one unstable zone to another, and
rebel movements or criminal gangs in one country sell their arms to groups they are aligned
with elsewhere. In other instances governments may see opportunities for their own
regional ambitions in West Africa, supplying rebel groups with weapons in order to further
these ambitions [...] Few States in the region have the resources or the infrastructure to
tackle smuggling, a situation that creates opportunities for the smuggling of weapons across
all major borders in the region. Officials acknowledge the existence of a large and largely
uncontrolled informal weapons trade and outright illicit trafficking. The extent of such
practices, far beyond normal levels of informal trade, aggravate corruption and
criminalization throughout the region.5654
Deliberations
2621. Both Prosecution and Defence witnesses testified that Yeaten was extremely
powerful but still subject to the Accused's authority. Moses Blah, whom the Trial Chamber
has found to be a credible witness,5555 said Yeaten had no regard for the Vice-President or
M rssu Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 46032-46024.
5652 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 3 November 2010, pp. 48653-48654.
5555 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 5 November 2010, pp. 48892-48900.
5654 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195, adopted on 20
December 2000", paras 167-172.
565 5 Credibility Assessment, Moses Blah, Pre-Indictment Period (1988- 1996), para. 2222.

---- End of Page 888 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T j (ju 18 May 2012 B
l

3578 7
the Defence Minister and called him "the most powerful man working with the
President".5656 The Accused agreed, responding to Blah's testimony, that Yeaten was
powerful and able to move around without Taylor's consent, but when asked whether
Yeaten was "all powerful and could do anything", the Accused replied "No".5657 The
Accused notably downplayed Yeaten's power, saying that "[t]here were a whole line of
other people that [...] had ten times more power than the SSS Director. Far, far, far
mOre".""
2622. The Trial Chamber notes that when asked whether in hindsight he should have
dismissed Yeaten, the Accused replied that that he would appoint him again today unless
there was factual evidence that Yeaten had been charged and convicted of a crime, and that
then and now "there was nothing before me or that had been brought in any way that would
have led me to not reappointing him".5659 The Trial Chamber finds this testimony of the
Accused inconsistent with a belief that Yeaten was trading arms and ammunitions without
his knowledge.
2623. Varmuyan Sherif characterised the relationship between the Accused and Yeaten as
one of father and son and said that there were times that he did things "even before taking
instruction from Mr Taylor" but that Taylor, upon learning this, would "just forget about it".
The Trial Chamber notes its finding that Sherif is a generally credible witness.5660 The
Accused agreed that there were times when Yeaten acted without seeking instructions from
him but explained that this was a normal delegation of decision-making as the President
would not have time for everyone to call and get instruction before taking action. The Trial
Chamber notes that in neither Sherif` s nor the Accused's evidence on this point is there the
suggestion that the actions taken were covert rather than simply without specific
authorisation, and recalls Blah's testimony that it was rare for someone to disobey Taylor as
they would be severely punished.566l It is clear from the evidence that Yeaten had a close
relationship with the Accused, which bypassed the line of reporting to the Minister of State
5656 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9936-9940.
5657 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 4 November 2009, p. 31109.
5658 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28891-28897.
5659 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34205-34206.
5660 Credibility Assessment, Varmuyan Sherif, Arms and Ammunition, para. 5324.
566* Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9849.

---- End of Page 889 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T JQ 18 May 2012 %

referred to by the Accused in his testimony and emboldened Yeaten to take action without
prior direction from the Accused.
2624. There is also evidence that Yeaten did certain things on the Accused's behalf that
were kept rrpm others, though not from the Accused. Blah recalled his encounter with
Yeaten after Blah had advised Taylor to turn Bockarie over to Sierra Leone. Yeaten showed
him Bockarie's corpse and told him ‘"The way you were thinking was the wrong way".
When he reported back to Taylor, Taylor told Blah this was not his business. Similarly, TF1-
567, whom the Trial Chamber has previously found to be a generally credible witness,5662
testified that Yeaten punished the caretaker of the RUF Guesthouse for maintaining records
of dealings between the RUF and Taylor, which Yeaten had warned him not to keep.5663
There is no indication in his testimony that these private dealings did not involve the
Accused. TF1-567 repeatedly maintained in cross-examination that Yeaten himself always
said that the arms and ammunition in question came from Taylor. 5664 VVhen the caretaker of
the RUF Guesthouse sent messages from Sesay to Taylor seeking arms and ammunition,
Yeaten would say "he will send it to his dad".5665
2625. The Trial Chamber notes that DCT-008 is the only witness who testified that
Yeaten's arms trading was being carried out independently of and covertly from the
Accused.5666 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of DCT-008 must be
treated with caution and requires corroboration5667 and notes that the testimony of the
Accused does not corroborate this testimony of DCT-008.
2626. Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes the evidence contradicting DCT-008's testimony,
such as the testimony of Dauda Aruna Fornie that when Bockarie contacted Yeaten to
request military supplies through his radio operators,5668 Yeaten's radio operator Sunlight
would respond that Bockarie should wait while Yeaten consulted with "Zero-Four-Seven",
which Fornie understood to refer to Taylor.5669 Perry Kamara testified that Bockarie would
5662 Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317.
5663 rrr-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12987-12990 (Ps).
5664 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13097-13098.
5665 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 12992 (PS).
M ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47046-47047.
M Credibility Assessment, ocr-008, paras 373-380.
5668 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21479.
5669 The Accused testified that "Zero-Four-Seven" or "047" was one of the code names used for him by radio
operators (Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 28992).

---- End of Page 890 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % G" 18 May 2012 %
I

send messages to his commanders "that he had brought ammunitions from Charles
Taylor",567O and TF1-567 testified that Yeaten would say when ammunition was given to
them "that it is his dad Charles Taylor who provided them".5(’7l The Trial Chamber recalls
its findings that Fomie, Kamara and TF1-567 are all credible witnesses.5672 At the same
time, the Trial Chamber finds no corroboration of DCT-008's evidence that Yeaten was
acting independently of the Accused, while there is substantial evidence that Yeaten was
representing, and was perceived to be representing, the Accused.
2627. The Defence also relies for support of its submission that Yeaten was acting
independently of the Accused in arms transactions on the evidence of Prosecution Witness
TF1-371 that "a general sense of indiscipline and private enterprise" spread through the
actions of many involved in the conflict,5673 as well as Exhibit P-018, a United Nations
Panel of Experts Report which states that there was a significant amount of materiel being
traded informally in a corrupt and uncontrolled environment.5674 The Trial Chamber does
not consider that this evidence rebuts the direct evidence that Yeaten was acting with the
Accused's knowledge and direction.
2628. Witness TF1-371, whom the Trial Chamber has found to be a generally credible
witness,5675 also testified that Yeaten took some money that was meant to go to Taylor and
that when confronted, Yeaten admitted taking the money but said he would pay it back.5676
TF1-371 further testified that Yeaten was regularly bribed with diamonds and money to get
quick access to Taylor. This evidence indicates corruption in Yeaten's conduct. However, it
does not implicate Yeaten in covert arms trading independently of the Accused. To the
contrary, TF1-371 testified that Yeaten pocketed the mining proceeds destined for Taylor.
Findings
2629. In light of these considerations, the Trial Chamber finds that the Defence arguments
and the evidence of DCT-008 do not in themselves establish that Yeaten was engaged in the
5670 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February, 2008, p. 31 18.
W TF1-567, rraaaarrpr 7 Juiy 2008, p. 13040.
Sm Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346-358; Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras
227-236; Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317.
561* Daranaa Fina1Tria1Brief, pam. 1091.
5674 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 138.
5615 Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226.
5676 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 2660-2661 (CS).

---- End of Page 891 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T g/Z GN 18 May 2012 `W

trade of arms and ammunition for the RUF independently and without the knowledge of the
Accused. More specitic allegations relating to the role of Yeaten and the role of the Accused
in transactions for arms and ammunitions will be addressed in the context of the Trial
Chamber's consideration of those transactions.
2. Daniel Tamba ga.k.a. Jungle5677)
Submissions of the Parties
2630. The Prosecution submits that Daniel Tamba (aka. Jungle), a Special Security
Service ("SSS") member, acted under the Accused's orders as his subordinate. 5678
According to the Prosecution, Tamba was one of a number of escorts, couriers and liaisons
that the Accused provided to the RUF.5676 The Prosecution alleges that in this capacity,
Jungle was a messenger who conveyed instructions, directions and guidance to the RUF and
AFRC/RUF;5666 a security escort who ensured that outside forces did not interfere with the
Accused's directives for movement of materiel or personne1;566l and, a courier of diamonds
to the Accused from RUF, AFRC/RUF territories, 5666 and materiel from the Accused to the
RUF, AFRC/RUF forces.5666 ln this way, Tamba acted as the Accused's "eyes and ears",5666
spending a considerable amount of time in AFRC/RUF territory during the time crimes
a ainst civilians were bein committed.5665 The Prosecution further submits that Tamba was
3 3
killed by the Accused's men after the indictment against the Accused was issued, as Tamba
was a ke liaison between the Accused and the RUF throu out the Indictment eriod.5666
Y P
The Prosecution relies upon witnesses TF1-371, TF1—579, TF1—567, Dauda Amna Fornie,
TFl-375, TFl-585, Jabaty Jaward, TFl-516, Mohamed Kabbah, John Vincent, Mustapha
Mansaray, TFl-539, Joseph Marzah, Suwandi Camara, Abu Keita, Augustine Mallah, TFl—
6677 TF 1 -371 distinguished Jungle from Jungle Jim, who was the chief diamond broker for Taylor at Lofa Bridge
and not the same person as Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) (TF1-371, Transcript 28 August 2008, p. 14837).
5676 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 194, 224.
6676 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 300.
5666 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 175, 194, 301, 305, 357.
6661 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 301.
6662 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 18, 349, 355-357, 368.
5683 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 268, 302-304.
6664 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 428.
6666 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 300. J
6 666 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 39, 1 184. The Trial Chamber has considered this allegation in the section
of this Judgement on the Suppression of Evidence. See Preliminary Issues: Suppression of Evidence.

---- End of Page 892 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f {M 18 May 2012

38%/@5
367, Isaac Mongor, TF1—168, Karmoh Kanneh, DCT—008, and Albert Saidu as well as
exhibits P—045A—B, P—068, P—153A—B, P—163, P—069 and P—600C in support of its allegations.
2631. The Defence challenges the Prosecution's evidence that Tamba was present in
Kenema from May 1997 until the Intervention in February 1998, or that he delivered
ammunition to the RUF during this period, arguing that the RUF's only source of
ammunition at that time was the AFRC.5°87 The Defence also disputes the evidence that
Daniel Tamba was a liaison between the Accused and Sam Bockarie.5688 According to the
Defence, it was Yeaten who coordinated with Tamba, as the Accused did not know Tamba
and had no contact with him, and that Tamba and Bockarie formed their own relationship
based on the time they spent together, and their tribal links.5689 The Defence notes the
significant body of evidence that arms and ammunition were delivered to the RUF
throughout 1998 into 1999 under Yeaten. However, the Defence avers that Tamba, and
others involved, acted independently of the Accused transporting arms and ammunition in
the operation of their own private enterprise without the Accused's lmow1edge.569O
2632. The Defence contends that Tamba went with the RUF delegation to Lome and that
by December 1999 Tamba left Sierra Leone and the RUF along with Sam Bockarie. Alier
leaving the RUF, Tamba joined Benjamin Yeaten in fighting against LURD.5°9l The
Defence alleges that Tamba died during a gunfight in 2003, possibly from "friendly fire".5692
2633. The Defence relies upon the Accused, DCT—008, John Vincent, Sam Kolleh, Issa
Sesay, Jabaty Jaward, TF1—371, TF1-567, TF1-516, TF1—585 and Exhibit D—316 in support
of its submissions.
5687 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1060.
Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 537.
56*9 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 935.
5""° Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 537, 935, 1091, 1095.
569* Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1117.
5692 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1117.

---- End of Page 893 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—0l—T {la 18 May 2012
/ Z

Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-579
2634. Witness TF1-579, an SSS member,6666 identified Jungle in Exhibit P-153A and
Confidential Exhibit P-068.6666 TF1-579 testified that around 1990 or 1991, he first came
across Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), in Gbamga, when Jungle was assigned to Sankoh. The
witness saw Jungle again around the time of the Camp Johnson Road incident in September
1998,6666 when the witness, Tamba and Sampson Weah brought ammunition, including
enades, 106 rockets,6666 LAR rounds and AK—47 rounds, to Sam Bockarie in Buedu.6667
ST
The witness knew Jungle to be Sankoh's senior aide-de-camp and the chief liaison officer
between the RUF and NPFL.6666 The witness testified that Tamba also used to receive $USD
400 in pay from the SSS, and was issued an SSS ID card.6666 The witness also testified that,
prior to the September 1998 trip to bring ammunition to Bockarie, Jungle had been bringing
ammunition to Sierra Leone on previous trips.6766 According to the witness, in 1998, Tamba
lived in a house that Bockarie rented at the Young Women's Christian Association
(" Y WCA") in Monrovia with his family, the witness, Joseph Marzah and Sampson
Weah.6766 The witness further testified that "Jungle was one of Mosquito's main men" and
an RUF member,6762 and that he took orders directly from Yeaten and Taylor.6766 The
witness explained that the RUF and NPFL were "one" at that point, meaning that the RUF
6666 TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19822-19823.
6694 TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19813, 19854-19855.
6666 TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19793-19794, 19830. The Trial Chamber notes that the witness
could not provide a year, but is satisfied based on the testimony of other witnesses that the Camp Johnson Road
incident that the witness is referring to occurred in 1998.
6666 The witness described "106 rockets" as a "very long rocket", which the Trial Chamber has distinguished
from a quantity of 106 rockets (TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19832-19833).
6667 TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19813, 19830-19831, 19834; Transcript 25 November 2008, pp.
21088, 21090, 21095, 21102, 21109, 21138-21140.
6666 TF]-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19830, 19832-19833; Transcript 25 November 2008, p. 21119;
Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21273-21274. The witness explained that the NPFL became the NPRAG after
the Accused became president of Liberia, but referred to the NPFL and NPRAG synonymously throughout his
testimony.
6666 TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19832.
6766 TFl-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21089, 21095-21096, 21138-21141.
6766 TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19832, 19847; Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21118, 21138-
21139.
5702 TFl-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21103, 21107.
6766 TFl-579, Transcript 26 November 2008, p. 21274.

---- End of Page 894 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 0* 18 May 2012 9
/I/r K.

commanders could go to Monrovia to a special guesthouse and the NPFL could go to RUF
controlled areas.571)4
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Karmeh
2635. Witness Karmoh Kanneh, an RUF commander,57115 identified Jungle in Confidential
Exhibit P-068.5706 Karmeh testified that, sometime after Abidjan in late 1996,5707 he was
present at a meeting with Foday Sankoh and other senior commanders at Sankoh's
Executive Mansion Ground ("EMG"), where he saw Jungle.5708 At the meeting, Sankoh
introduced Jungle as Mr Taylor's representative and Jungle reiterated what "the Pa",
meaning Sankoh, had said.57O9 Bockarie also told the witness that Jungle was present when
Bockarie was speaking to Mr Taylor over the satellite phone after the capture of Tongo
Fields.5711) Kanneh said that Jungle was "always with the top commanders from one
commander to the other" but that on that da , he did not sa an hin .5711
Y Y g
2636. ln 1998, after the Intervention, the witness was present at a meeting where Sam
Bockarie told Johnny Paul Koroma and the AFRC that Jungle was Taylor's representative in
RUF territory and the witness concluded that Jungle was the person that linked the RUF to
Taylor.5712 Jungle spoke and buttressed Bockarie's comments and said that "he would do his
utmost best to see that things worked out well".5713 On cross-examination, the witness
clarified that during that meeting Sankoh told the men that Jungle was Taylor's
re resentative, but the witness did not know if that had been arran ed throu Taylor. The
P g Y
witness understood that Jungle was Taylor's "eye in the movement", and before becoming
Taylor's representative, he was an NPFL member.5714
W rrr-579, rmeenpt 26 November 2008, p. 21281.
5705 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.
5706 Exhibit P-068 (confidential); Kamioh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9517, 9524.
5707 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9673.
5708 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9356.
5709 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9358-9359, 9371; Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9436; Transcript 13
May 2008, pp. 9671-9672; Transcript 14 May 2008, p. 9756.
5710 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9369-9371.
5711 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9371.
5712 Kamioh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9395, 9399; Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9436; Transcript 14
May 2008, p. 9756.
5713 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9398.
5714 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9671-9673.

---- End of Page 895 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QM 18 May 2012 %
1 I

Prosecution Witness TF1 -371
2637. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,57l5 testified that he met Dennis Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle) in Freetown around October 1997.5716 Tamba came from Kenema to meet Sesay,
2 who to1d the witness that Tamba was a liaison between the RUF and NPFL.?/17 The witness
also learned from Foday Sankoh that Tamba had been a runner between the RUF and NPFL
in 1992. In addition to Sesa 's statements, the witness also learned, throu his interactions
Y
with "other securities", like Sampson and Marzah, in 1998, that Tamba was a liaison
between the RUF and NPFL.57l8 The witness understood that Jungle was a member of Mr
Taylor's securities, and later learned that Jungle had been with Musa Cissé before he was
"recognized" by Mr Taylor.57l9
2638. During 1998, the witness was present at various meetings in Buedu with Bockarie,
Jungle, Marzah and Sampson, where Bockarie briefed them on the movement of the
operations to ca ture Kono and Freetown.5720 At first the would sta at Bockarie's house,
P P Y Y
but during the latter part of 1998 they stayed with their gir1iiiends.572l The witness said that
Tamba, Marzah and Sampson were runners who conveyed information about RUF actions to
Taylor.5722 The witness stated it was no secret that they did so as they were part of the senior
securit of Taylor, workin with his SSS director.5723
Y Y 8
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
2639. Witness TF1-567, an RUF member,5724 testified that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), a
Kissi Liberian, was not an RUF fighter. The witness first knew Jungle in 1992, when he
came with Foday Sankoh to Gbarnga. Later, the witness saw Jungle "close" to Sam
Bockarie, and later again with Foday Sankoh.5725 The witness testified that at the end of
1997 he visited Bockarie in Kenema and met Daniel Tamba, who told the witness that
57*5 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (cs).
57*6 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2372 (cs).
5717 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2372-2373 (CS).
5718 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2373 (CS).
5719 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2372-2374 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2454-2455 (CS).
5720 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2424 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2453 (CS).
5721 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2425 (CS).
Sm TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2452-2453 (CS).
5723 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2452-2453 (CS).
572* TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833; Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
Sm TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, p. 13150.

---- End of Page 896 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %·’ W-; 18 May 2012 M
( \ [

5 87 89
Charles Taylor sent him and that he told Bockarie not to be too involved in the APRC
government.5726
2640. The witness stated that after diamonds were taken from Johnny Paul Koroma, he met
Bockarie in Buedu, who had just returned from Monrovia with Tamba and other Liberian
securities. Bockarie introduced them as "the Liberian brothers sent by Charles Taylor".
Tamba and Marzah were wearing blue/black overalls, and SOD was written on the side of
the pocket. Later, Tamba told the witness that SOD meant "Special Operations Division",
which was a police branch directly under Taylor. Thereafter, the witness saw the Liberians
at other occasions when he visited Buedu. Sampson, Tamba and others used to come to
Buedu, and according to what they told the witness, they came with a truck which contained
food, arms and ammunition from Taylor.5727
2641. TP 1-567 also testified that when the RUP delegation was in Lomé for the peace
negotiations, Tamba and Ibrahim Bah went to Lomé to speak to Sankoh on two occasions.
During Tamba's first visit, the witness overheard him telling Sankoh that Charles Taylor had
sent him to come and see him to find out how the conditions were. The witness did not
overhear their conversation during Tamba's second visit. During Lomé Sankoh also sent
Tamba and Bah to see Taylor.5728
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Pornie . 7
2642. Witness Dauda Aruna Pornie ("DAP"), an RUP radio operator,5729 testified that
Jungle was part of the Liberian SS unit that was with Yeaten, a direct security to Yeaten and
"one of the liaisons from the Liberian side" between Yeaten and Sam Bockarie, or the RUP
directly.573O Jungle frequently escorted ammunition from Monrovia to Sierra Leone and
there were only a few trips where materials were brought to Sierra Leone in which Jungle
5726 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12889-12890, 13150-13152.
5727 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12903-12906.
5728 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12969-12972.
Sm Dauda Aruna Pomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
5730 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21491; Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21534;
Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21755.

---- End of Page 897 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dui 18 May 2012 %

was not involved.573l Fornie also testified that Jungle visited Lomé during the
negotiations.5732
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
2643. Witness Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), an SSS member,5733 testified that Jungle was
"one of the ke men o eratin under Marzah from the directive from Charles Taylor. He
Y P 8 Y
used to trans ort the ammo and arms to Freetown".5734
P
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
2644. Witness J abaty J award, a clerk for Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie, Bockarie's
storekeeper5735 and a member of the ATU from early 2000,5736 identified Colonel Jungle,5737
a Liberian, and Issa Sesay in exhibits P-045A and P-163.5738 The witness testified that
Jungle was an NPFL fighter who remained with him and the RUF in the jungle in 1994 for
about a ear.5739 Jun le then crossed throu Guinea and into Liberia, and became art of
Y 8 P
Charles Taylor's securities.574O The next time that Jaward saw Jungle was in 1998 at Sam
Bockarie's house in Kenema.574l At that time, Jungle was a coordinator between Sam
Bockarie and Charles Taylor, "especially in terms of the arms deal".5742 Later, when the
witness went to Monrovia in 2000, he "recognised" Jungle as an SSS.5743 Jaward testified
that Jungle was well known "as one of the members of the Special Security Services of
Charles Taylor",5744 and J award personally knew that Jungle was an SSS member because
ml Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21492.
Sm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 1 December 2008, p. 22198.
5733 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 6053-6055.
5734 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5931-5932.
5735 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13306, 13332; Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13383.
5136 Jabaty Jaward Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13455-13457.
5737 The witness recalled Jung1e's real name to be Daniel Fallah. However, based on the context of Jaward's
entire testimony, and his identification of Jungle in Exhibit P-045A, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Jaward's
testimony is about Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) (Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13357).
5138 Exhibit P—045A, "Photograph 38533"; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, pp. 13642-13644.
Sm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, p. 13642.
5740 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13354-13355.
51** Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13354- 1 3355.
5742 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13827, 13830-13831.
51*3 Jabury Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, p. 13642.
5744 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13387—13388.

---- End of Page 898 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GA 18 May 2012

Jungle ‘"always used to say it".5745 Jaward further testified that Colonel Jungle was one of
Benjamin Yeaten's bodyguards who came with Yeaten to Gbankoi around 2002 or 2003.5746
2645. The witness testified that Colonel Jungle was one of the escorts that brought supplies
of arms and ammunition and food from Liberia to Buedu in 1998 and 1999, under Charles
Taylor's instructions.5747 He testified that the escorts used to ‘"express their relationships"
with Charles Taylor's government in Liberia when they came.5748 He said that Jungle went
to Buedu once in a while, and sometimes he would spend some time there before returning
to Liberia, as he had a `rlfriend in Buedu.5749
gl
2646. On cross—examination, the witness affirmed his prior statement to the Prosecution
that, after Bockarie left Sierra Leone for Liberia in 1999, "Colonel Jun le came with
S
additional messages from" Taylor to Bockarie, that ‘"Bockarie supporters could either be
trained as ATU and put on salary, or they could stay on their own in Liberia, where they
would not be protected by anyone".5750
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
2647. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,575l testified that when he was in Zogoda and Danané in 1994, he heard about
CO Jungle from RUF commanders like Mosquito, Superman, and Issa in the Kailahun area.
They told him that Jungle was a liaison and protocol officer who would go from Taylor's
base in Gbarnga to Buedu, Kailahun District, and "‘from Sierra Leone, to Liberia and
back".5752 On the two occasions that the witness saw Jungle in Buedu, he was with two other
people.5753
5745 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13353; Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13387-13388.
5746 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 1 1 July 2008, pp. 13543-13544.
5747 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13385-13386, 13443; Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13823;
Transcript 18 July 2008, pp. 14035-14036.
5**8 Jaimy Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13387.
5749 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13392.
5750 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13851.
Sm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13 November
2008, pp. 20209-20210.
5752 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20130-20131, 20133.
5753 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20437.

---- End of Page 899 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03—01—T %/ Cr" 18 May 2012 Q

2648. Mallah clarified that Jungle was not permanently based in Buedu in 1998.5754 Mallah
further testihed that in 1999, Jungle left the RUF,5755 and from that point on, he was not
familiar with the movements of Jungle. After Mosquito left Sierra Leone, he did not hear
about Jungle anymore.5756 On cross-examination, the witness testified that between
December 1998 through to October 1999, Mosquito and Jungle moved ammunition between
Liberia and Sierra Leone in spite of the border closure.5757
Prosecution Witness TF1-375
2649. Witness TF1-375, an RUF Hghter,5758 testihed that Jungle5759 was an SSS member in
Liberia, and a bodyguard to Taylor, as part of a close protection unit.576O The witness
testified that he knew Jungle from 1997 to 1999,576l but was officially introduced to him in
1998 at the Gbarnga farm.5762 Jungle explained to the witness that "the President"
sometimes sent him to get ammunition from "White Flower, the Executive Mansion", to
take it to Sam Bockarie in Kenema.5763 He told the witness that he was serving as a liaison
between Bockarie and Taylor and that he took diamonds to Taylor in return for ammunition
Y Y
to take to Sierra Leone.5764
2650. The witness further testihed that, in 1999, he saw Jungle with Bockarie, Varmuyan
Sherif and a senior officer in a car going to the Executive Mansion.5765 The witness testified
that Jungle had a satellite phone.5766
2651. The witness became ve close to Jun le until his death, before which Jun le
IY 8 8
explained that he was having personal problems with Bockarie in 2001.5767 Jungle had said
575* Augustine Muiiuh, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20427.
5755 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20435.
5756 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20429-20430, 20432, 20434-2043 5.
5757 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20439. The witness confirmed on cross-examination
that they did not transport arms, only ammunition (Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20436).
5758 TF1-375, Transcript 23 Juue 2008, p. 12485.
5759 The witness clarified that Jungle is not the same person as Jungle Jim (TF1-375, Transcript 28 August 2008,
p. 14837).
5760 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12490, 12535; Transcript 27 August 2008, p. 14744.
5761 ·
TF1-375, Transcript 22 August 2008, p. 14744.
Sm TF1-375, Transcript 27 August 2008, p. 14749.
5763 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008,p. 12491.
5764 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12492.
5765 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12631; Transcript 27 August 2008, p. 14806.
"°° TF1-375, Transcript 24 Juue 2008,p. 12631.
5767 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12491-12495. On cross-examination, the witness explained that the

---- End of Page 900 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / &~° 18 May 2012 E

that Bockarie was side-lining him, and that he, Jungle, was the one who created contact
between Taylor and Bockarie, that he talked to Taylor about Bockarie and the diamonds
they used to give.5768
Prosecution Witness TFl-367
2652. Witness TFl-367, an RUF member,5769 described Jungle as "Charles Taylor's
bodyguard and [...] a friend of the RUF".577O Later he was a bodyguard in a special unit for
Taylor, the SSU (Special Security Unit), which the witness knew from his own
observation.577l The SSU had special black uniforms, which Jungle wore, and Jungle was
friendly to all of the officers including the witness.5772 The witness also saw Jungle in
Liberia and Buedu, when ECOMOG was deployed in Lofa district before the AFRC
coup.5773 The witness further saw Jungle when Jungle met Issa Sesay in Sierra Leone during
the Junta time period, and Jungle said he was going to Sam Bockarie in Kenema because "he
was his best friend".5774
2653. During cross-examination, the witness clarified that Jungle was an NPFL, who was
also an RUF member because the NPF L and RUF were families.5775
Prosecution Witness TFl -516
2654. Witness TFl-5l6, an RUF radio operator,5776 testified that Jungle was a Liberian
soldier "working under command" from 50, who obtained commands from his chief
Charles Taylor.5777 A
Prosecution was in error by writing that the witness described himself as Jung1e's "best friend" (TF1-375,
Transcript 27 August 2008, p. 14744).
5768 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12492-12495.
5769 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
5770 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14126, 14129, 14133.
Sw TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14129-14130.
im TF 1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14129-14130.
Sm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14130-14131.
5774 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14132-14133.
5775 TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14986-14987.
5776 r1¤1-5 16, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
W TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7000-7002.

---- End of Page 901 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness TF1-5 85
2655. Witness TF1-585, an RUF radio operator,5778 identified Jungle in confidential
Exhibits P-068 and P-169.5779 TFl-585 testified that Jungle was Liberian and an SSS
member in Liberia for Charles Taylor.578O According to the witness, between early 1998 to
mid-1999, Jun le fre uentl brou t arms, ammunition, food, clothin , shoes and many
8 (1 Y 8
other things to Buedu whenever Sam Bockarie requested it.578l According to the witness, in
2000 Sampson, Jungle and Bockarie lived in four houses in Monrovia given to them by
Charles Taylor.5782
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
2656. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,5783 also gave accounts of
an RUF meeting in 1998, after they were "pushed out of the city", in which Colonel Jungle
and Ibrahim Bah were introduced as guests while sitting at a high table in front of the
meeting facing the delegates. Colonel Jungle addressed the meeting saying that he was there
to tell them that the relationship between the RUF and AFRC was recognised by Charles
Taylor. Bah reiterated Jungle's speech, that Taylor sent them to prove to the RUF that he
was still with them, and that the relationship between Taylor and the RUF was still
strong.5784
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
2657. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,5785 testified that Jungle became a
member of the RUF during the Intervention. He explained that Jungle was part of the RUF
since he was the one movin directl from Charles Taylor's mansion to the RUF with
S Y Y
information and ammunition. He stated that even during the Junta regime, he saw Jungle
going to Bockarie in Kenema, through Kailahun, because he was now part of the RUF. At
that time there was no "war" and therefore Jungle would see Bockarie to "take whatever
5778 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.15589—15592 (PS).
5779 Exhibit P-068 (confidential); TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, p. 15788.
5780 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15606-15607; Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15639.
ml TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15652, 15682-15683, 15686, 15732; Transcript 9 September
2008, p. 15793 (PS).
Sm TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15743-15744; Transcript 1 1 September 2008, pp. 16012-16015.
5783 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
5784 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11054-11056, 11059-11060.

---- End of Page 902 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T MM [ 18 May 2012

little things" Bockarie had. He did that until ECOMOG pushed the Junta out of power, but
J ung1e's movement even continued when Bockarie moved to Buedu.5786
Prosecution Witness TF1—168
2658. Witness TFl—168, an RUF member,5787 testified that Jun le was an NPFL member
8
that he met in 1993.5788 After Ma 1996, the witness testified, Bockarie sent Jun le to
Y 8
Danané via Liberia to meet Co oral Sankoh in Abidan.5789 Sankoh gave Jun le $USD
YP J 8
7,000, of which $USD 2,000 was for food and $USD 5,000 for ammunition, which Jungle
gave to Bockarie, who said that he could get ammunition from ULIMO fighters along the
Sierra LSOHG-L1b€I`18.H border.579O Accordin to the witness, Sankoh knew Jungle was
8
comin for the mone because Bockarie told Sankoh on the radio that Jun le would
8 Y 8
come.579l Durin cross—examination, the witness testified that over time, Jun le became a
8 8
trusted member of the RUF.5792
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
2659. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of UL1MO—K who
later became commander of the Sco ion Unit,5793 identified Jun le in exhibits P—045A and
YP 8
P—045B.5794 Keita testified that Jungle was a bodyguard to Benjamin Yeaten.57q5 According
to Keita, Jun le onl went to Sierra Leone when Yeaten sent him.5796 Keita testified that he
8 Y
saw Jungle often during the couple of years that he was with the RUF in Sierra Leone.5797
5785 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
5786 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16165-16168.
5787 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (CS).
mg TFl-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23282 (cs).
5789 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23282-23283 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23536-23537,
23539, 23545, 23552 (CS).
5790 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23284-23285 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23536-23537,
23545, 23552 (CS).
S"' TF1-168, rrannarrpr 26 January 2009,p. 23537 (cs).
5792 TF1—l68, Transcript 26 January 2009, p. 23536 (cs).
5793 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000;
Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.
5794 Exhibit P-045A, "Photograph 38533"; Exhibit P-045B, "Photograph 385l9"; Abu Keita, Transcript 23
January 2008, pp. 1989-1990.
5795 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1967-1968, 1990, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2125.
57% Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1991.
W7 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1991.

---- End of Page 903 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gb; 18 May 2012

When in Liberia, Jungle reported to Yeaten, and when he would go to Sierra Leone, he
would go to either Sam Bockarie or Issa Sesay.5798
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -539
2660. Witness TF1-539, a member of various fighting groups,5799 testified that Colonel
Jungle was an SSS or SS member, that he was always with Mosquito and that he represented
the Liberian Government.58OO The witness also referred to Colonel Jungle as one of
"Boc1Upon his release, he travelled with Colonel Jungle and others to Kangama to see Johnny
Paul Koroma.58O3 The meeting with Koroma was recorded and Jungle was given a cassette
of the recording, to take to Monrovia to "His Excellency".58O4 After the meeting, Jungle, the
witness and others travelled to Buedu.5gU5
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2661. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander,58O6 testified that Jungle was in
Buedu as a liaison officer between the RUF and NPFL. Jungle carried messages and brought
ammunition from Monrovia.58O7 In 1998, Jungle was part of the Executive Mansion guards,
but the name later changed to the "SS unit". Jungle told the witness that he reported to Mr
Taylor.58O8
The Accused
2662. The Accused testified that he did not personally know Jungle or Daniel Tamba and
that the first time that he heard those names was before this Trial Chamber.58O9 The Accused
5793 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1990; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2125.
5799 TF1-539, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11374 (PS); Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11391, 11469-11471;
Transcript ll June 2008, pp. 11532, 11561-11562.
5800 TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11519, 11522, 11527, 11530, 11542.
"°‘ TF1-539, Transcript 11 Jnnc 2008,p. 11522.
5802 TF1-539, Transcript 11 Jnnc 2008, p. 11509.
5803 TF1-539, Transcript 1 1 Jnnc 2008, p. 1 1526.
5804 TF1-539, Transcript ll June 2008, pp. 11527, 11530; Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11715.
5805 T1=1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008,p. 11531.
5806 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
5807 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5784-4785.
5808 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5785-5786.
5809 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28717-28718; Transcript 15 September 2009,

---- End of Page 904 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T j 0]:% 18 May 2012

did not recognise Jungle in the photographs identified by other witnesses during the
Prosecution case.58lO The Accused generally denied that Jungle worked directly with or for
him, and that Jungle reported to or had any association with him.58ll
2663. The Accused testified that the "Daniel Tamba" mentioned on a list of SSS personnel,
Exhibit D-316,58lZ as a member of the "Presidential Advance Team", was not the same
individual known as Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and testified about by other witnesses.58l3
An individual who was the Accused's runner and assumed the duties asserted by other
witnesses to have been carried out by Jungle would have at least been at the rank of Major or
Lieutenant Colonel, and the "Daniel Tamba" listed in Exhibit D-316 had the rank of a
Second Lieutenant, which was a very low ranl<.58l4 The Accused testified that he had no
reason to disbelieve the evidence of other witnesses that there was an individual named
Daniel Tamba or Jungle who was in the SSS, but he did not personally know that
individual.58l5 The Accused also testified that Exhibit D-316 was not a complete listing of
all SSS personnel. Rather it was an assignment roster of` those that have responsibility with
the President, either in escorting him or at his residence. He confirmed that every SSS
member charged with the security of the President or VIPs was named in that document.58l6
When counsel asked whether the list was time specific, noting that Exhibit D-316 is dated 9
November 2001, the Accused confirmed that it was, but qualified his answer by explaining
that while the individuals listed were not always assigned to the same duties listed in the
document, the document faithfully represented the organisational structure of those
p. 28859; Transcript I6 September 2009, p. 29018; Transcript 22 September 2009, p. 29334; Transcript 30
September 2009, pp. 29918-29919; Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30102-30103; Transcript 28 January 2010,
pp. 34354-34355.
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, p. 28016. '
SKU Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, p. 30231; Transcript 27 October 2009, p. 30414;
Transcript 28 January 2010, p. 34355.
Sm See Exhibit D-316, "Assignment Roster, Republic of` Liberia, Special Security Service, Executive Mansion,
Monrovia, Liberia, November 9 2001", p. 4 (No. 9 on the list).
Zim Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009. pp. 27989-27990.
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 27989-27990.
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 2801 1-28012 ("A. I really think that Jungle was in
the SSS. I want to believe so. From what I have seen here I - you know, unless I'm told to the contrary, I have no
- I'll put it this way: I have no reason to doubt that there was someone in the SSS called Jungle or Denis Tamba,
but I don't know him personally"). See also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3l August 2009, pp. 27988-
27990 (stating that Jungle could have been assigned to Benjamin Yeaten but since he did not know Jungle
personally, he was not sure).
W6 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3l August 2009. pp. 28011-28012.

---- End of Page 905 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T l8 May 2012

responsible for the various duties and the persons generally responsible for this type of VIP
protection,58l7
2664, While acknowledging that Jungle may have been in the SSS, the Accused denied, as
a number of Prosecution witnesses asserted, that Jungle served as his bodyguard or close
protection officerfglg Referring to Exhibit D-316, he stated there was no such person named
Jungle or Daniel Tamba on the list of persons assigned to the close protection unit of the
SSS,58l9 Of the three men that Abu Keita testified were "close protection" to the President,
Sampson, Jungle and Marzah, the Accused stated that he only knew Sampson as a cousin of
Benjamin Yeaten and that all three were personal bodyguards to the SSS director, Benjamin
Yeaten.582O Similarly, in response to the testimony of TFl-371, the Accused stated that
although he was not certain whether Jungle was an SSS member, he was sure that Jungle
never provided personal security for him,582 I
2665, The Accused denied, as TF1-375 testified, that Jungle was a liaison between the
Accused and Bockarie,5822 The Accused stated that there was no need for a liaison between
himself and Bockarie because whenever he wanted to communicate with Bockarie, he called
him directly by radio, and all their communications were conducted via official channels,
The Accused denied that Jungle established initial contact between himself and Bockarie,
stating that instead, he received a letter in August 1998, from Ambassador Taigen Wantee
that Sam Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh wanted to meet the Accused and with the approval of
ECOWAS Committee of Five,5g23 The Accused also queried why there would be any
necessity for "runners" such as Jungle, Marzah and Sampson, as TFl-371 testified, to
facilitate communications between Bockarie and the Accused, stating that as of late 1998, he
5817 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 'Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 27012-27014.
Sm See TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12488; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008; p. 1968; TFl-371,
Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2372.
SSH) Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28853-28 856.
5820 Charles Ghankay Taylor; Transcript 22 September 2009; p. 29334.
5821 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, p. 29560 (PS); Transcript 28 January 2010; p.
34354. The Accused made other similar denials throughout his testimony: Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript
15 September 2009; p. 28854; Transcript 22 September 2009; pp. 29333-29334; Transcript 23 September 2009,
p. 29560 (PS) (testifying that there was no individual called Jungle or Daniel Tamba in the close protection unit
of the SSS and there was no individual called Jungle who was always with Taylor when he moved around and
that Jungle was never close to him).
5*22 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009; p. 28858; see also Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29004-29005 (denying that Jungle was a liaison between the Accused and the
RUF); Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30267-30268 (denying that Jungle was a coordinator between the
Accused and Bockarie).

---- End of Page 906 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T k% qlx 18 May 2012

sent for Bockarie whenever he needed to and whenever Bockarie wanted to go to Liberia.5824
The Accused further denied that he ever gave Jungle instructions over the radio to promote
Bockarie or Johnny Paul Koroma.5825
2666. The Accused expressed scepticism that Jungle, who was "not even a commander in
Lofa at the time of the [Liberian civil] war", would then become a principal link between
himself and the RUF.5826 The Accused denied that Jungle carried ammunition or arms on his
behalf to Sierra Leone,5827 and that Jungle was his runner in relation to diamonds
transactions.5828 The Accused also denied that Jun le, Sam son and Junior were his envo s
g P Y
to Johnny Paul Koroma.5829 ln response to evidence from Albert Saidu that whenever RUF
saw Jungle they were expecting Jungle to be coming directly from the Accused, the Accused
denied that Jungle ever worked directly with him.583O
2667. The Accused denied, as TFl-371 testified, that Jungle acted as a liaison between
Musa Cissé and the RUF. He doubted that Jungle was "hooked up to Musa Cissé" or living
in Cissé's house, as alle ed b TFl-371. He considered it was more likel that Jun le knew
g Y Y g
Benjamin Yeaten.583 I
2668. The Accused testified that the only person that told the truth about Jungle before this
Trial Chamber was TFl-168,5832 who according to the Accused, testified that Jungle was
"one of those men that were left behind after ULIMO cut off the NPFL. He was a Gissi boy
who got in touch with his brother Sam Bockarie and they were together since l993".5833 He
believed that Jungle was like a brother to Bockarie because they were both Kissi.5834 The
Accused testified that Jungle was the deputy commander to "General Fayia" who was
5823 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28858—28860.
5824 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, p. 29591 (PS).
5825 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30860, 30889·30890.
5*26 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, p. 30407.
5827 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28853—28856; Transcript 16 September 2009,
pp. 29016·29017; Transcript 27 October 2009, p. 30414.
5828 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30089-3009l, 30100—30l03 (in relation to
Augustine Ma1lah's evidence); see also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30267—30268
(denying TF1-388's evidence that Jungle took diamonds from Sam Bockarie to the Accused in 1998).
5829 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l October 2009, pp, 30147—30149.
5830 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 3023 1·30232.
5831 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29556·29559 (PS).
5832 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, p. 29558 (PS).
5833 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29556·29558 (PS). Trial Chamber notes that
"Gissi" is a variant spelling of"‘Kissi".

---- End of Page 907 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03—01 —T Z GK 18 May 2012
\.

commanding the forces in Lofa at the time that ULIMO cut off border access to Sierra
Leone.5835 On the basis of information garnered during the course of the current
proceedings,5836 the Accused maintained throughout his testimony that Jungle was a member
of the RUF since 1992 or 1993.5837 The Accused accepted that because Jungle was Liberian,
he could also pass easily between borders and "switch between the two". Jungle was Kissi,
located on the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, which would explain why, as TF1-
371 testified, he was able to speak both Liberian and Sierra Leonean dialects.5838
2669. Concerning Karmoh Kanneh's evidence that Sankoh introduced Jungle to a meeting
of Bockarie, Issa Sesay and others as the "pa's representative" in 1996, the Accused recalled
another Prosecution witness who testified that it was in fact Bockarie who introduced Jungle
to Sankoh. ln any case, the Accused maintained that if] according to TF1-168, Jungle joined
the RUF around 1992 or 1993, they would have known him for four years before this point
and would not have required any introduction.5839 Similarly, the Accused noted that TF1-
371 had given evidence about first meeting Jungle in 1997, and pointed out that anyone who
had spent time with the RUF "long enough" would have known Jungle prior to 1997.5840
2670. In relation to TF1-585's testimony that he bought a house or compound for Bockarie
in Monrovia, in which Jungle also resided, he acknowledged that the Liberian government
leased a compound for Bockarie, his family, senior officials and his entourage in December
1999. Although the Accused did not dispute that Jungle and Sampson visited Bockarie at
that residence, he denied that Sampson and Jungle ever lived there.584l
2671. Concerning TF1-371's testimony that Jungle took a route through Danane, Cote
d’Ivoire and Guinea into Sierra Leone in around 1993 and 1994 when he was sent by Musa
Cissé to meet with Sankoh, the Accused testified that Jungle would not have to use such a
route if Jungle were working for him in Liberia. The Accused stated that at the point at
583 4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29017-29019.
5835 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 29918-29919.
5*36 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29017-29019.
5*37 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29017-29019; Transcript 24 September 2009, p.
29717; Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30561-30562.
5834 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29559-29560 (PS).
5844 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30562.
5840 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, p. 29558 (PS); Transcript 1 October 2009, pp.
30090 (the Accused made a similar point in relation to Augustine Mallah's evidence about meeting Jungle at
Bockarie's residence in Kenema in 1997-1998).

---- End of Page 908 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (nb 18 May 2012
\

which Jungle was alleged to have used that route in 1993 and 1994, when the border with
Sierra Leone was occupied by ULIMO, Jungle was in Sierra Leone and was not under the
Accused's control. If Jungle was "sent" by anyone, he was sent by Sankoh.5842
2672. The Accused denied, as TP 1-567 had testified, that Jungle was an SBU, whom he
had sent with a message to Bockarie not to be involved with the APRC, noting that Poday
Sankoh had already instructed Mosquito and RUF to join the APRC in May 1997.5843 The
Accused further denied sending Jungle to the Lomé Peace negotiations, testifying that if
Jungle went to Lome, he went with Sankoh because he was with the RUF.5844 The Accused
asserted that TP 1-567 lied when he testified that Jungle and Ibrahim Bah visited him, the
Accused, in Monrovia.5845
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2673. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUP commander,5846 testified that he knew Daniel
Tamba personally. He stated that Jungle came from Poya Tinkia and was bom to a Sierra
Leonean mother and Liberian father.5847 Sesay stated that Jungle spoke only Kissi, not
Mende.5848
2674. Sesay testified that he first met Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) in 1992 when Jungle,
then an NPP L fighter based in Poya, crossed the border after ULIMO took control of Lofa
and `oined the RUP in Bendu.5849 Sesa described Jun le as his friend, ex lainin that the
J Y S P S
two of them became close "before Sam Bockarie"585O because they had been together in
Kailahun since November 1993. They were at the border together until 1994 and in 1995 in
Giema,585 I where they lived in the same village, they would see each other daily. Sesay then
584l Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30200-30202.
5842 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29653-29654.
5843 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28718.
5844 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28741, 28744; Transcript 24 September 2009,
p. 29616.
5845 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28744.
5846 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596. A
5**7 rssa sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45020 (Ps).
584* Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45021 (PS).
54441ssa sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43802.
5850 The witness explained that Bockarie was in Kenema, not Kailahun, between 1994 and 1995 (Issa Sesay,
Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43806).
5451 The witness explained that Jungle stayed in Koindu until Sankoh left in 1994 and then went to Giema (Issa
Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43802-43803; Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44792; Transcript 29 July 2010, p.

---- End of Page 909 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03-0l-T Z pc 18 May 2012 Q

left Jungle to go to C0te d’1v0ire.5852 When Jungle came to Preetown during the Junta
peri0d, they were still friends and spent time together there.5853
2675. Sesay identified Jungle in a number of ph0tographs: Exhibit P-045A,5854 Exhibit P-
163,5**55 Exhibit P-153A5856 and Exhibit P-153B.5857
2676. Sesay noted the existence of other individuals called Jungle. He testified that when
Senegalese came with Mike Lamin in 1997, he came with ULIMO Jungle, not Daniel
Tamba. This Jungle became commander for the RUF in Mat0t0ka in the late part of 2000
aha 2001.5858
2677. Sesay testified that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) was a member of the RUF from
1992.5859 Sesay testified that Jungle was not a liaison between the RUF and NPP L, was not a
runner between the RUF and NPP L in 1992 and the early 1990s, and was not a mnner
between Taylor and Mosquit0.58°0
2678. Between April and June 1996, Sankoh called Jungle to Abidjan to j0in him there as
one of his security guards. Sesay did not know Jungle as an agent of Charles Taylor at this
time and between 1992 and 1996, Jungle did not travel to Libe1ia.58°l Specifically, Sesay
testified that he did not hear of any 0ccasion when Sankoh sent Jungle to Liberia to meet
45021 (PS)).
5852 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43806.
5*53 ixxx sbxxy, Tixtixbiipt 6 July 2010, p. 43808.
5854 Exhibit P—045A, "Ph0tograph 3853". Issa Sesay testified that the man in the middle of the three men is
Jungle (Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47141).
5855 Exhibit P—163, "Ph0tograph 29865". Issa Sesay identified himself as the man on the right and Jun le as the
8
man in the vertically striped top on the left, sitting next to him holding his hand. He testified that the ph0t0 raph
E
was taken in July or August 1997. Sesay explained that they were holding hands because they were friends (Issa
Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43808—43810).
5856 Exhibit P—153A, "Ph0tograph P672". Sesay identifies the man in the front with the helmet, camouf1age vest
and pink shirt with the automatic weapon as Benjamin Yeaten and the other man over his right shou1der with a
blue shirt as Jungle (Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47139).
5857 Exhibit P—153B, "Ph0tograph P772". Sesay recognised Daniel Tamba as the man in the middle wearing the
blue gown (Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47134—47135).
5858 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45953—45956.
5859 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43803.
5860 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43801—43802, 43809; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45019—45020 (PS),
45073 (PS); Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45962.
Sm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43804; Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44096—44103.

---- End of Page 910 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012 Q
/'\/P \

Taylor while Jungle was in Cote d’Ivoire.5862 Jungle remained at Sankoh's Cocody house
until after the Intervention in 1998.5863
2679. In response to the testimony of Karmoh Kanneh regarding a meeting called by
Sankoh in Giema in November 1996, Sesay testified that when Sankoh retumed from
Abidjan, there was a meeting of senior officers at Sankoh's mansion ground but denied that
Sankoh said Jungle was Taylor's representative during this meeting, and denied that Jungle
was even present at the meeting in Kailahun because he was in Abidjan at the time and did
not travel with Sankoh to the meeting.5g(’4
2680. Also in response to Kanneh's testimony, Sesay testified that Jungle was in Abidjan
when Tongo Fields was captured in August 1997. He was not in Sierra Leone with the
commanders after the attack, as Kanneh claims.5g65
2681. When Sankoh went to Nigeria, he would call Jungle on the telephone to pass a
message on to Bockarie and this continued until the 1997 coup.5866 During the AF RC time
period, Pa Kallon sent Jungle to Freetown to get supplies "food money" from Bockarie and
that was the only time that Jungle went to Sierra Leone during the days of the AFRC; he was
there for three days.58°7
2682. Jungle remained at Sankoh's Cocody house until after the Intervention in 1998.5868
Sesay denied that Jungle was in Buedu in 1998. In 1998, Sesay only saw Jungle when he
was in Mamma in Aprri 1998.5869
2683. VVhen Sesay travelled to Monrovia in April 1998, Jungle travelled from Abidjan
under the instruction of Sam Bockarie to meet Sesay there.5870 It was on this trip that Sesay
5862 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43806.
5863 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43799, 43802-43804, 43808; Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44099-
44100; Transcript 27 July 2010, pp. 44792, 44797-44798; Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 44996 (PS); 2 August
2010, p. 45184; Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45963-45964.
5864 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, pp. 44792-44793; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44843-44844.
5865 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, pp. 44797-44799.
5866 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43799; Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45184-45185.
5867 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43804, 43808-43809; Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44099; Transcript 27
July 2010, pp. 44797-44798; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 44982 (PS), 44987 (PS), 44995-44996 (PS), 45017-
45018 (PS); Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45956-45957.
5868 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43799, 43802-43804, 43808; Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44099-
44100; Transcript 27 July 2010, pp. 44792, 44797-44798; Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 44996 (PS); Transcript 2
August 2010, p. 45184; Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45963-45964.
5869 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45141-45142.

---- End of Page 911 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G), 18 May 2012 Q

lost the parcel of diamonds in the rain.5 871 Jungle was transiting from Abidjan through
Monrovia on his way to Buedu to answer a summons from Bockarie. He was staying with
his brother while he was in Monrovia. Jungle delayed going to Buedu until June 1998
because he was afraid to face Bockarie after the diamonds were lost. 5**72
2684. Around June 1998, Jungle came to Buedu in Sierra Leone. From then until about
December 1998, Bockarie sent Jungle to Liberia to buy cocoa and coffee from two Lebanese
men based in Monrovia.5873 Jungle told Sesay that he would also buy rice, medicines and
other supplies; Sesay described Jungle as a runner for Sam Bockarie.5874 When Jungle went
on these trips, he would sometimes stay for one week to one month and at times visited his
family in Foya Tengia or his mother in Foya.5875 Sesay did not witness Jungle bringing
ammunition from Liberia.5876
2685. Sesay did not recall that Jungle worked with Musa Cisse during the time that he was
with the RUF and Sesay was not. aware that Jungle was a bodyguard to Taylor, or a member
of the SSS at any time before he left the RUF in December 19995877 and testified that he
never saw Jungle wearing a Liberian uniform.5878 However, Sesay stated that he would not
dispute the possibility that Jungle joined the SSS.5879
2686. According to Sesay, Jungle was not a middle man between the RUF and Taylor, he
was not Taylor's agent and Sesay was not aware that Jungle was working for Taylor.588O
5870 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44307; Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45141-45142; Transcript 4
August 2010, p. 45405; Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45963—45964; Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44101;
Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44799; Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45141—45142.
5871 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44307; Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45141—45l42; Transcript 4
August 2010, p. 45405; Transcript 11 August 2010. PP. 45963-45964.
Sm Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44096-44103.
5873 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43803—43805; Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 4410l—44102; Transcript 28
July 2010, pp. 44865—44866.
5874 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43805-43808; Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44094—44098, 44101;
Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44274-44275; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45072—45074 (PS); Transcript 30 July
2010, pp. 45l4l—45142; Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45405.
5875 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44l0l—44102.
5876 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45405.
5877 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45020 (PS).
5878 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46087.
5879 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44102; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45020-4502l (PS), 45073 (PS),
45078 (PS); Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45184; Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47l33—47135, 47137, 47140;
Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47229.
5880 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43804; Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45184; Transcript ll August
2010, pp. 45957, 45963—45965; Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46087; Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47140.

---- End of Page 912 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

3 Q 0 0 5
Sesay did not know that Daniel Tamba had created contact between Charles Taylor and Sam
Bockarie.588l Sesay testified that Jungle left the RUF with Bockarie in 1999 and never came
back to Sierra Leone until the end of disarmament by the RUF.5882
2687. Seasy denied that, in his role as a runner, Jungle met him in early 2001 and conveyed
him to Monrovia. 5883
2688. When presented with Exhibit D—3165884, Sesay did not comment upon Jungle's
alleged position in the SSS as "because that was in Liberia" but confirmed that Tamba was
not a member of the RUF between January 2000 and November 2001.5885
Defence Witness DCT-008
2689. Witness DCT—008, a Liberian radio operator,5886 identified Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle) in exhibits P—153A, P—153B and P—068,5887 as a Liberian RUF member from Lofa
County, Foya district.5888 In late September 1998, Sampson introduced Daniel Tamba to
Sunlight, and informed him that Benjamin Yeaten said the witness should bring Tamba to
Sunlight so that he could use the radio to Sierra Leone.5889 The witness testified that this was
the first time that Sunlight saw Jungle.5890 Sunlight understood that Jungle was one of
"San1explained that he had previously taken Jungle to the seventh floor of the Executive Mansion,
for Jungle to secretly communicate with the RUF in Sierra Leone, without the President or
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45965.
5882 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45078 (PS).
5*83 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45078 (PS).
5884 Exhibit D—316, "Assignment Roster, Republic of Liberia, Special Security Service, Executive Mansion,
K Monrovia. Liberia, November 9 2001".
5**5 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 1 47229.
Sm Der-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 4694846951 (Ps).
58*7 Exhibit P-153A, "Photograph P672"; Exhibit P-153B, "Photograph P772"; Exhibit P-068 (confidential);
DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, pp. 47535-47537; Transcript 3 September 2010, p. 47875; Transcript 6
September 2010, pp. 47811-17812 (PS).
5888 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47035-47036, 47043-47044; Transcript 30 August 2010, p.
47448; Transcript 6 September 2010, p. 48029 (PS).
58*9 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47035-47036, 47040, 47042-47043, 47045, 47049; Transcript 30
August 2010, p. 47448; Transcript 31 August 2010, pp. 47533, 47535-47537; Transcript 1 September 2010, p.
47761; Transcript 6 September 2010, pp. 47949, 48028-48029 (PS); Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48141,
48143, 48147, 48161-48163.
5890 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47041; Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47761; Transcript 7
September 2010, pp. 48148-48149.
""‘ ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47036.

---- End of Page 913 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ Q); 18 May 2012

government, or other radio operators knowing about it.5898 However, Yeaten had ordered
Sunlight to permit Jungle to come to his home from that point on.5898 Yeaten had also told
Sunlight that his relationship with Sam Bockarie was a secret, and that neither the President,
nor the govemment of Liberia knew about it.8898 Upon arriving to use the radio, Jungle gave
Sunlight the RUF 's frequency or call signal.5885 Jungle then connected to Buedu, and
communicated with Sellay, the RUF 's chief radio operator assigned to Bockarie, in Krio.5898
The witness testified that Jungle came to Yeaten's house a few more times after that
occasion to use Sunlight's radio to connect to Sellay in Buedu.5897
2690. Following the first time Jungle came to use the radio, he retumed with Sampson to
use the radio again. Sellay, in Buedu, connected him to "the Brother", who was Sam
Bockarie.5898 The men spoke in Krio, and Sunlight did not understand, but Jungle told
Sunlight that Bockarie had said that they were running out of food and that he, Jungle,
should give the message to Yeaten and Musa Cissé in order for them to assist Bockarie with
food.5899 Jungle came again a week after the second time and told Sunlight that Bockarie
wanted to see him at the Young Women's Christian Association and subsequently, Sunlight,
Sampson and Jungle went there, where Jungle introduced Sunlight to Bockarie.598)0 The
witness testified that Jungle did not transmit any messages on behalf of Yeaten.59O8 On
occasion in late 1998, Sellay radioed to Base 1 looking for Jungle when Jungle was not
around. On one occasion, Sellay asked Sunlight to tell Jungle that Bockarie wanted Jungle to

8898 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47040-47041, 47048; Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47374;
Transcript 1 September 2010, pp. 47696, 47706; Transcript 2 September 2010, p. 47799; Transcript 7 September
2010, pp. 48132, 48136-48139, 48141-48142, 48149, 48161.
8888 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47049; Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47416.
8898 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47047.
8898 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47036—47037, 47042; Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47379; 30
August 2010, p. 47485; Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48166-48167.
88% DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47042—47043, 47046, 47048; Transcript 30 August 2010, pp.
47485-47486; Transcript 3 September 2010, p. 47906; Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48146, 48148-48149,
48157-48158, 48161-48163.
SW ocr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47048.
8898 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47048; Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47394-47395, 47397.
8889 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47049; Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47394—47395, 47397;
Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47409.
58800 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47050-47052, 47054; Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47370-
47371.
5°"‘ DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47396.

---- End of Page 914 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T J Gu 18 May 2012 5
I

0 to Pa Musa to inform him that the needed food. Sunli t ave Jun le the messa e and
8 Y 8 8 8
Jungle then left.59O2
2691. The witness knew that Jungle had been a member of the RUF since the beginning of
the RUF, but did not know how he became a member.59O3 Jungle was not a senior security to
Charles Taylor,5904 and the witness never saw or heard of any movement of Jungle into
Sierra Leone under Yeaten's instruction or by himself after Bockarie's entry into Liberia.59°5
2692. During cross—examination, the witness testified that he knew only one Daniel
Tamba.59O6 The witness said that Jungle was able to enter the Executive Mansion under the
" rotective win s" of Sam son Weh ee and that it was common for SSS officers to brin
P 8 P Y 8
other people.5907
Defence Witness John Vincent
2693. John Vincent, an RUP member,5908 identified Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) in exhibit
P-045A.5909 ln 1998, on the day of the Waterworks meeting near Buedu, the witness met
Jungle for the first time in Buedu at Jungle's house, and Vincent was "made to understand
that Jungle was always in and out" of Liberia and Sierra Leone.59lO
Prosecution Exhibit P—045A—B
2694. Exhibit P-045A is a photograph depicting three men.59H Exhibit P—045B59l2 is a
photocopy of the same photograph as P—045A with identifications of the man on the left—had
side of the photo as Zigzag Marzah, the man in the middle as "Daniel Jungle" and the man
on the right as Abu Keita.
5902 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47397; Transcript 3 September 2010, pp. 47905—47906.
5903 DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p. 47575.
5904 DCT-008, Transcript 2 September 2010, p. 47818 (PS).
5905 DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p. 47624.
5906 DCT-008, Transcript 6 September 2010, pp. 47949, 48028 (PS).
5907 DCT-008, Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48137, 48139-48141.
5908 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; Transcript 30
March 2010, pp. 38226, 38239; Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38390, 38408, 38460, 38461.
5909 Exhibit P-045A, ‘"Photograph 38533""; John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38106, 38109;
Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38260; Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38451-38452.
Sm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38110; Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38260.
5"" Exhibit P-045A, ·<1>1iOmgiiip1i 38533**.
Sm Exhibit P-045B ‘"Photograph 385 l9"".

---- End of Page 915 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ul., 18 May 2012 @

39 0 0 §
Prosecution Exhibit P-068
2695. Exhibit P-068 is a confidential photographic exhibit.59l3
Prosecution Exhibit P-153 A
2696. Exhibit P-153A is a photograph of a man wearing a red t-shirt, camouflaged vest, a
camouflaged hat and holding an automatic gun. There are several other men in the
background of the photo.59 M
Prosecution Exhibit P-153B
2697. Exhibit P-153B is a photograph depicting three men.59l5
Prosecution Exhibit P- 1 63
2698. Exhibit P-163 is a photograph of two men sitting on a sofa. The man on the left-hand
side is identified as "Col. Jungle" and the man on the right-hand side is identified as "Gen.
Issah Sesay".59l6
Prosecution Exhibit P-069
2699. Exhibit P-069 is a confidential photographic exhibit.59l7
Prosecution Exhibit P-6OOC
2700. Exhibit P-6OOC is a photograph marked, signed and dated by Sam Kolleh. The photo
depicts three men, one of whom is labelled "Issa Sesay", and a second man is labelled
ttbOdyg_u31_dn·59l8
Defence Exhibit D-316
2701. Exhibit D-316 is entitled "Assignment Roster, Republic of Liberia, Special Security
Service, Executive Mansion, Monrovia, Liberia".59l9 It is dated 9 November 2001. The
""" Exhibit 1>-068 tbbhiitibtitiai).
""‘ Exhibit P—l53A, ‘·1¤hbtbgtaph P672".
W5 Exhibit P—l53B, "Photograph P772".
W6 Exhibit P—l63, "Photograph 29865 (Marked by TFl—388)".
W Exhibit 1>-069 tbbtititibtitiai).
Sm Exhibit P—600C, "Photograph 3 Marked, Signed and Dated by DCT-lO2".

---- End of Page 916 ---------------------------


Case No; SCSL—03—0l—T // I8 May ZOIZ M

document is addressed to "U—50", who the Accused testified was Unit 50, meaning
Benjamin Yeaten, the director of the SSS.592O The document was submitted by the Deputy
and Assistant Director's of Administration, the Deputy Director of Operations and the Chief
of Protective Services of the Liberian Government,5921 and offers recommendations for "out—
station assignments" for military persormel.5922 The name Daniel Tamba appears once as a
"2/Lt.", under the heading "Assignment, Presidential Advance Team".5923
Deliberations
2702. The parties generally agree, and the evidence clearly establishes, that Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. Jungle) was a Kissi—Liberian, who was a member of the NPFL until about 1992 when
ULIMO pushed the NPF L from Lofa County. Jungle was part of a group of NPFL soldiers
who then joined the RUF and remained with them until about 1994.5921 TF1-168 testified
that Jungle was an NPFL member in 1993, and later became a "trusted member of the RUF".
Although the parties dispute Tamba's whereabouts and activity from about 1994 to 1996,5925

5919 Exhibit D-316, "Assignment Roster, Republic of Liberia, Special Security Service, Executive Mansion,
Monrovia, Liberia, November 9 2001".
59211 Exhibit D-316, "Assignment Roster, Republic of Liberia, Special Security Service, Executive Mansion,
Monrovia, Liberia, November 9 200l", p.1; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 27979-
27986.
5921 Exhibit D-316, "Assignment Roster, Republic of Liberia, Special Security Service, Executive Mansion,
Monrovia, Liberia, November 9 2001", p. 15.
Sm Exhibit D-316, "Assignment Roster, Republic of Liberia, Special Security Service, Executive Mansion,
Monrovia, Liberia, November 9 200l", p. 1.
5923 Exhibit D-316, "Assignment Roster, Republic of Liberia, Special Security Service, Executive Mansion,
Monrovia, Liberia, November 9 200l", p. 4.
5924 Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9357; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2372-2374
(CS); TFl-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23243-23245 (CS); Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23282 (CS);
Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23534-23535 (CS); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12890; Suwandi
Camara, Transcript ll February 2008, pp. 3509-3512, 3533-3536; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp.
1991-1992; TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15606-15607; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp.
13353-13354, 13357; Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13387-13388; Transcript 14 July 2008, p. 13642; Transcript
15 July 2008, p. 13758; Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13823-13825, 13830-13831; TFl-367, Transcript 20 August
2008, pp. 14126-14129; Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15011; Transcript 29 August 2008, p. 14987; Isaac
Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5682-5683, 5687; Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5782-5784; Transcript
2 April 2008, pp. 6486, 6504; Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6508; TFl—5l6, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6914-
6915, 6951-6952; Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7128; Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7780-7782; Mustapha
Mansaray, Transcript 5 march 2008, pp. 5296-5298; John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38109, 381 12;
Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38414; Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48385, 48427, 48500;
Transcript 4 November 2010, p. 48748; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43799, 43802-43804, 43808;
Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44100; Transcript 27 July 2010, pp. 44792, 44797-44798; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp.
44966, 45021 (PS); Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45184; Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45405.
5925 The Defence alleges that in 1994-1995, Tamba fought with the RUF in Sierra Leone, and in May 1996
Bockarie sent him to Cote d’Ivoire where he remained, apart from a detour to Freetown to request financial
support for the Cote d’Ivoire delegation in 1997, until the Intervention in February 1998. In mid-1998 Tamba
retumed to Sierra Leone as a station commander in Kono. In July 1998 he retumed to Bockarie, to whom he

---- End of Page 917 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GI}; 18 May 2012 Q
. 1

the Trial Chamber considers a finding on that dispute to be unnecessary for purposes of the
Prosecution's submissions.
2703. ln considering Jungle's relationship to the Accused from 1997, the Trial Chamber
notes the multiple characterisations and descriptions reflected in the witnesses's testimony
about Jungle's role or position. Many Prosecution witnesses, including F0mie, Mallah,
Mong0r, TF1-371 and TF1-375, testified that Jungle was a liaison between the RUF and the
NPFL. TF1-579 even referred to Jungle as the "chief liaison" between the RUF and NPFL,
although he characterised him as an RUF member. Witnesses Karmoh Kanneh and TF1-539
characterised Jungle as a "representative" of the Accused or the Liberian government, and
TF1-579 testified that he was present in meetings with RUF commanders where Jungle was
referred to before those congregated as the Accused's representative. Albert Saidu testified
that at one meeting, Jungle sat at a "high table" and addressed the meeting, stating that he
was there to tell them that the relationship between the RUF and AFRC was recognised by
Charles Taylor.
2704. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that Albert Saidu is a generally credible
witness592° while the evidence of both TF1-539 and TF1-579 must be treated with caution
and requires corroboration.5927 With regard to Karmoh Kanneh, the Trial Chamber considers
that he provided generally clear, calm and well-0rganised evidence and 0penly admitted
when he did not know the answer to questions.5928 VVhen confionted by prior inconsistent
statements on cross-examination, the Trial Chamber found Kanneh's testimony to be largely
consistent and 0bserved that he was candid about failures on his part to provide corrections
to his prior statements.5929 There were 0ccasions on which the witness appeared to
experience difficulty under cross-examination in answering Defence C0unsel's questions but
the Trial Chamber considers that this was as a result of confusion about the nature of what
was being asked rather than an attempt by Kanneh to evade the question.5930 Similarly, the
reported henceforth. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence challenges the evidence that Tamba was in
Kenema during the Junta peri0d (Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1060-1061, 1093). Issa Sesay testified that
Tamba did not enter Liberia from 1992 to 1996 (Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43803).
5926 Credibility Assessment, Albert Saidu, Pre-Indictment Peri0d (1988-1996), para. 2384.
$(,27 Credibility Assessment, TF1-539, paras 296-303; Credibility Assessment, TF1-579, paras 339-345.
5928 See for example Karmoh Kaimeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9351, 9356-9357, 9379-9380,
Sim See for example Karmch Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9544-9547, 9587-9590; Transcript 13 May
2008, pp. 9641-9645.
5930 See for example Karmch Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9678-9679.

---- End of Page 918 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Cl"` 18 May 2012 Q


370//
‘ Trial Chamber does not find Kanneh's occasional con1i1sion regarding specific dates593l
detrimental to his overall credibility. Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that the majority of`
Kanneh's evidence was corroborated by other witnesses. The Trial Chamber therefore finds
Kamioh Kanneh to be generally credible and will consider further issues relating to his
credibility in context as they may arise.
2705. The Trial Chamber notes that a number of` witnesses testified that Jungle was an
NPFL tumed RUF member, or that he was at times both an NPFL or Special Security
Services member and an RUF member. Mohamed Kabbah, whom the Trial Chamber has
f`ound to be a credible witness,5932 testified that Jungle was an RUF member during the
Intervention, not a liaison or an SSS member; however, the Trial Chamber notes that his
basis f`or concluding that Jungle was an RUF member was Jungle's constant movement
between the RUF and the Accused's mansion with "inf`ormation and ammunition". TF 1-539,
who testified that Jungle was an SSS member, and a representative of` the Liberian
government, also referred to him has "one of Bockarie's men". TF 1-579 testified that Jungle
possessed an SSS identification card and that he received pay as an SSS; however he later
testified that "Jungle was one of` Mosquito's main men" and an RUF member. TF 1-579
explained that around 1998 the RUF and NPF L were like "one". The Trial Chamber does
not consider that witness testimony characterising Jungle as both RUF and later, or
simultaneously, an SSS member to be contradictory, but rather a reHection of` the perception
that he was tied closely to both the RUF and the Accused. By virtually all accounts, Jungle
was constantly back and forth from Sierra Leone to Liberia.
2706. Witnesses TF 1-579, Fomie, Keita, TF 1-585, Jaward, Mallah, TF 1-539, Mongor and
TF 1-375 all testified explicitly that Jungle worked f`or the Special Security Services of` the
Accused, a Liberian governmental agency under the direction of` Benjamin Yeaten. TF 1-367
testified that Jungle was "Taylor's bodyguard and a fiiend of` the RUF", who later joined the
"Special Security Unit" (SSU), and that Jungle wore the SSU's "special black unif`orm".5933
Kanneh testified that prior to being appointed as the Accused's representative, Jungle was an
NPFL member,5934 and TF 1-371 testified that Jungle was part of the Accused's "senior
5931 See Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9393; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9600-9601, 9678
regarding the date of the meeting at which the Fitti-Fatta Operation was announced.
5932 Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338.
5"’" TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008,pp. 14126, 14129-14130, 14133.
5934 Karrnoh Karmeh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9661-9673.

---- End of Page 919 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T [ {LQ 18 May 2012

security".5935 TF1-567 saw Jungle sometime after April 1998 wearing blue/black overalls
with SOD written on them, and Jungle told him that SOD stood for "Special Operations
Division?5936 TF 1-516 referred to Jungle as a "Liberian soldier".5937 The Trial Chamber
notes that TF 1-371, TF 1-567, TF 1-516 and TF 1-367 are all generally credible witnesses.5938
2707. The Trial Chamber notes the significant amount of testimony that Jungle worked
under Benjamin Yeaten and/or that he took orders from Yeaten. TF 1-567 testified that
Jungle took orders from the Accused and Yeaten, TF 1-371 testified that Jungle worked with
the "SSS director", and Jabaty Jaward and Abu Keita both testified that Jungle was one of
Yeaten's bodyguards. Witness TF 1-516 also testified that Jungle worked under "50"'s
command, who in turn took commands from the Accused.
2708. The Trial Chamber recalls that Abu Keita is a generally credible witness.5939 With
regard to J abaty J award, the Trial Chamber observed that he provided clear, comprehensive
and measured testimony during which he showed a good recollection of events and patently
endeavoured to ensure that his evidence was as accurate as possible,594O discerning carefully
between his own first-hand and hearsay evidence. Jaward did not exaggerate his own role,
admitting that he was a low level individual within the RUF with whom Bockarie would not
have discussed important matters.594l J award's testimony remained consistent throughout his
cross-examination although the Defence raised a number of inconsistencies with Jaward's
prior statements. The Trial Chamber finds these to be generally minor5942 and is largely
satisfied by the explanations Jaward provided. The witness openly confinned that he had
received around $USD 1,500 from the OTP as well as 32,685,000 leones (approximately
$USD 10,895)5943 from the Witness and Victims Service for himself and his family5944 and
5935 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2452-2453 (CS).
"’° TF1-567,Trar1script2 July 2008, pp. 12903-12906.
W TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7000-7002.
5938 Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317;
Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras 275-284. Credibility Assessment, TF1-367, Pre-Indictment period
(1988-1996), para. 2446.
5939 Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219.
5940 See for example Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 15 July 2008, p. 13801.
SW Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 15 July 2008, pp. 13797-13801.
5942 For example whether the witness lived in Sam Bockarie or Issa Sesay's house or both in Buedu in 1998-1999
(Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13839-13843)
5943 Conversion based on the rate of approximately 3,000 Leones/ US dollar.
5944 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, pp. 13674-13675.

---- End of Page 920 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / R 18 May 2012
4**1

{
{ 390 /3
that WVS continued to be his only source of income.5945 The Trial Chamber accepts
J award's testimony that he initially refused payment from the Prosecution and was
motivated to testify against the Accused not by money but because he felt he had important
information to give to the international community about the Accused's involvement in the
Sierra Leonean war and to abide by the pledge he had made to do so.5946 In light of the
foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds J abaty J award to be generally credible and will consider
further issues relating to his credibility in context as they arise.
2709. The Trial Chamber notes TF1-5l6's cross-examination testimony in which he was
confronted with a prior statement to the Prosecution in which he said that Daniel Tamba
"was a Liberian soldier in the ATU" but that he did not know Tamba by an alias. The
witness testified that he made a correction to that statement to the effect that Daniel Tamba
was the same person as Jungle,5947 although he could not explain why he had not made the
correction earlier.5948 TFl-516 was also confronted with a prior statement that Jungle Jim
and Jungle was the same person. The witness testified that the statement was not correct and
that he changed the statement before giving his testimony, a change that was reflected in the
witness's interview record.5949 ln spite of these inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber notes that
TF1-5l6's prior statement was consistent on the point that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle)
reported to Yeaten (a.k.a. 50).5950 Furthermore, the witness maintained on cross-examination
that he knew Jungle before 1998.5951 Because the witness was forthright about his prior error
and because he corrected it of his own accord, in addition to the Trial Chamber's finding
that he is a credible witness, the Trial Chamber does not consider these inconsistencies to be
detrimental to his credibility. Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that TFl-516's testimony
on this point is corroborated by the testimony of TF1-371, TFl -567, J abaty J award and Abu
Keita, all of whom were consistent regarding their testimony of Jungle and were not
successfully challenged on cross-examination.
5945 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 15 July 2008, p. 13680.
5046 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, pp. 13673-13676; Transcript 15 July 2008, pp. 13678, 13681-13682,
13684, 13687.
5947 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7780.
5948 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7784.
5949 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7780-7784.
WO TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7780.
595] TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7784.

---- End of Page 921 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012

5 90/ 9*
2710. The Trial Chamber has made findings elsewhere in the Judgement with regard to the
role of Jungle in transporting arms to the RUF and diamonds to the Accused throughout the
Indictment period, as well as messages back and forth. The Trial Chamber has elsewhere
considered and rejected5952 the Defence contention that the movement of arms and
ammunitions, and diamonds, between Sierra Leone and Liberia was undertaken in the
context of a "private enterprise" under Benjamin Yeaten, unbeknownst to the Accused.5953
271 1. In addition to testimony of Jungle's role as a member of or liaison between the RUF,
NPFL and/or SSS, as a subordinate of Benjamin Yeaten, the Trial Chamber notes the
testimony of several witnesses who connected Jungle directly to the Accused. For example,
TF1-579 testified that Jungle took orders directly from Yeaten and the Accused, while TF1-
516 testified that Jungle "worked under 50" but took "commands" from the Accused. TF1-
371 testified that Jungle, in his capacity as an SSS, delivered information to the Accused.
Isaac Mongor testified that Jungle told him that he reported to the Accused, and Kanneh
testified that he heard Bockarie tell Koroma that Jungle was the RUF's "link" to the
Accused. Mongor's testimony that he was told by Jungle that Jungle directly reported to the
Accused is corroborated by the evidence of TF1-579, TF1-516, TF1-371 and Kanneh. The
Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination Isaac Mongor testified that he recalled that
Jungle's last name was Tamba, but that he was familiar with calling him Jungle. Mongor
was then confronted with a prior statement in which Mongor stated that he only knew Jungle
as Jungle and that he did not know "Daniel Tamba or anything else". Based on this
contradiction, the Defence submitted that Mongor did not know Jungle at all. In the Trial
Chamber's view, this inconsistency, in light of the fact that the witness was consistent
throughout that he knew "Jungle" in spite of whether he knew or had forgotten "Tamba",
does not undermine Mongor's credibility on this point.5954 It is clear from the context of
Mongor's testimony about Jungle in comparison with the testimony of other witnesses about i
Jungle, that he is testifying about the same individual. Moreover, the Trial Chamber recalls
its finding that Mongor is generally a credible witness.5955 Although TF1-579's testimony
should be considered with caution and requires corroboration, and did not contain a basis of
knowledge for his assertion that Jungle took orders directly from the Accused, the Trial
5952 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).
5053 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1091.
M4 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 2 April 2008, pp. 6486, 6504-6506; Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6508.

---- End of Page 922 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL 03 01 T QM l8May..012

3 9 0 /5
Chamber considers that the corroboration of the other witnesses lends reliability to his
testimony. Similarly, the Trial Chamber considers that the corroboration by other witnesses
regarding Jungle's role corroborates the testimony of` TFl—539 to the extent that his
testimony regarding Jungle in this context is reliable.
2712. The Trial Chamber notes the Accused's testimony that he knew a Daniel Tamba who
was not the same as the Tamba known as Jungle, whom other witnesses testified about, and
was not the same Daniel Tamba listed in D—3 16, as well as Sesay's testimony that there were
other individuals called Jungle. However, the Trial Chamber also notes that witnesses
Jaward, Vincent and DCT—OO8 consistently identified Jungle in Exhibit P—O45A and that
witnesses Kanneh, TFl—585 and DCT—OO8 consistently identified Jungle in Exhibit P—O68.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay's identification of Jungle in P—l63 is
consistent with the other witnesses’ identification of Jungle in P-068. Based on these
identifications and the context of the testimony of the identifying witnesses, together with
the testimony of` witnesses who did not identify Jungle in photographs, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that all of the relevant witnesses testified about the same Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle).
2713. The Defence denies that Jungle carried out his actions as the Accused's subordinate.
The Accused himself also denied knowing the Daniel Tamba testified about by other
witnesses as "Jungle", saying he first heard of him in these trial proceedings. He further
stated that the Daniel Tamba, a Second Lieutenant appearing in the roster, Exhibit D—3l6,
could not have been a "runner" for him because he was not ranked highly enough. The
Accused conceded that Jungle could have been an SSS member, but maintained that he
never provided the Accused with personal security. The Accused also testified that he did
not have, and had no need for, a liaison between himself and Sam Bockarie. The Trial
Chamber does not find these arguments convincing, and in particular finds it telling that
Tamba's name appears on the official assignment roster for the Executive Mansion security
services, Exhibit D—3 16. In the Trial Chamber's view the testimony of the Accused does not
raise a doubt with regard to the overwhelming evidence of Prosecution witnesses, as well as
the documentary evidence, that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) worked for the SSS and was a
subordinate of the Accused. A
5955 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274,

---- End of Page 923 ---------------------------


Case No.:

§ 9 D Ié
2714. The Trial Chamber notes DCT—008's inconsistent testimony on cross—examination
regarding5Jungle's position, first stating that he did not know if Jungle was an SSS, and
moments later stating that Jungle was not an SSS, without explanation.5956 The Trial
Chamber also recalls its finding that the testimony of DCT—008 must be treated with caution
and requires corroboration.5957
2715. Although the Trial Chamber notes that there is evidence to support the accusation
that the Accused facilitated the murder of Tamba,5958 the Trial Chamber recalls its
discussion of allegations pertaining to the suppression of evidence, elsewhere in the
judgement.5959 Therefore, the Trial Chamber has not considered that evidence here.
2716. Finally the Trial Chamber notes that Defence witness Issa Sesay confirmed that the
Tamba listed in Exhibit D—316, the official roster of the Executive Mansion, is the same
Tamba as Jungle and said he would not dispute the possibility that Jungle joined the sss.5""°
The Trial Chamber notes that D—316 is a document created and issued by officials in the
Accused's government, and that its authenticity has not been challenged by either party. In
the Trial Chamber's view, the presence of Daniel Tamba's name on End of Page 11 of the
document, as well as Sesay's confirmation that that Daniel Tamba is the Jungle at issue,
establishes that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) was a member of the SSS. The Trial Chamber
therefore rejects the Accused's evidence that the Daniel Tamba appearing in the document is
not the same as the Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) at issue here.
2717. Based upon the evidence of the aforementioned witnesses, as well as the
documentary evidence admitted as Exhibit D—316, the Trial Chamber finds that Jungle was
an SSS member who worked for Benjamin Yeaten and the Accused as a courier of arms,
diamonds, and messages back and forth between the Accused and the AFRC/RUF
throughout the Indictment period. A
5555 DCT—008, Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48141, 48149,
5557 Credibility Assessment, DCT-008, paras 373-380.
5555 TF1—579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19989—19990; Transcript 6 November 2008, pp. 19997-20001;
TF1-375, Transcript 26 August 2008, pp. 14558-14559 (PS); Transcript 28 August 2008, p. 14844 (PS). But see,
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 29916, 29921; Transcript 27 October 2009, p.
30372; DCT—008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47509—47512; Transcript 6 September 2010, p. 47997; John
Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38368-38369.
5 555 Preliminary Issues: Supression of Evidence.
5550 Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47138.

---- End of Page 924 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Q
AJ .

390 / 7
Findings
2718. The Trial Chamber finds the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) worked for the SSS as a subordinate of Benjamin Yeaten and
the Accused and served as a courier of arms, diamonds and message back and forth between
the AFRC/RUF and the Accused throughout the Indictment period.
3. Ibrahim Bah
Submissions of the Parties
2719. The Prosecution refers to Ibrahim Bah as the Accused's "personal liaison",
"representative", ‘"long—time associate", "trusted subordinate", and "emissary".5%l It submits
that Ibrahim Bah met Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma in Freetown and arranged the
Magburaka shipment on the Accused's directive and under his instructions.5962 The
Prosecution further submits that aRer the Intervention, Ibrahim Bah spoke on behalf of the
Accused at a meeting regarding the preparation of an airstrip, convened by Bockarie with
Daniel Tamba.5%3 According to the Prosecution, when the AFRC and RUF were taking
steps to presewe their hold on Kono in the post-Intewention period, there was a secret
meeting in which Ibrahim Bah said that he was part of the Liberian government working for
the Accused, and he spoke on the Accused's behalf stating that the AF RC/RUF relationship
was recognised and that they should work together to take hold of Kono District in order to
obtain diamonds.5964 The Prosecution submits that during Bockarie's and Sesay's leadership,
Sesay gave Eddie Karmeh diamonds, and he in turn gave them to Ibrahim Bah, who would
deliver them to the Accused.5%5 Furthermore, the Prosecution submits that Bah reported to
the Accused to keep him informed of the activities of the RUF and the AF RC/RUF .5966
2720. The Prosecution states that when Liberian security closed the border throughout
1998 and 1999, Ibrahim Bah was the only person who was allowed to cross into Sierra
Leone with trucks filled with mining equipment.5967 According to the Prosecution, in 1999
5""' Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 3, 18, 20, 154, 194, 227, 354, 367-368, 381, 428, 612.
W Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 18, 227-228, 354, 367-368.
5%} Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 149.
5964 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 154.
5965 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 381.
5966 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 428.
SW Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 20, 368, 611, 1264; Arms and Ammunition: Preliminary Issues, Closure

---- End of Page 925 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.- -01-T A _.-~r 18 May 2012

the Accused used Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), his SSS subordinate, and Ibrahim Bah, his
long-time associate, as personal liaisons to Sankoh during the Lomé peace negotiations. The
Accused also sent Ibrahim Bah and Memunatu Deen with $USD 20,000 for Sankoh's
personal use. Prior to travelling to Lomé, Ibrahim Bah and Omrie Golley met with the
Accused in Monrovia and received instructions to pass on to Sankoh in relation to positions
to take at Lomé5%8
2721. The Defence submits that Ibrahim Bah met the Accused in 1990, when he "was art
P
of the Gambian force that entered Liberia during the NPFL invasion, but [they] had limited
contact thereafter" and that the Accused was not in a position to issue orders to Ibrahim Bah
after RUF/NPFL cooperation disintegrated.5969 According to the Defence, Ibrahim Bah left
the NPFL in 1993, remained in Sierra Leone, and began dealing directly with the RUF.597O
The Defence argues that he was not the Accused's emissary or agent, "Taylor did not
communicate with the Junta through any subordinates or intermediaries such as Ibrahim
Bah" and that Ibrahim Bah had an "independent relationship with the RUF, which even pre-
dated the Sierra Leonean war".597l Bah never fought for the RUF, but °‘became close friends
with Foday Sankoh", whom he met in Libya. 5972 He was a "liaison who coordinated with the
RUF's affairs outside of Sierra Leone" and a key player throughout the 1990s in "arranging
weapons and munitions transactions on behalf of the RUF and/or J unta", particularly from
Burkina Faso and Libya.5973 According to the Defence, he provided the RUF with radio
equipment, "vehicles, food, mining equipment, computers, telephones, and other items".5974
Ibrahim Bah also introduced various business partners to Bockarie and Sankoh.5975
2722. The Defence submits that Sankoh encouraged the Junta to work with Ibrahim Bah to
purchase arms in Burkina Faso for the Magburaka shipment and that the ‘°shipment was
of Border/Arms Embargo.
5968 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 194- 195.
5"°" Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1044.
5970 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1044.
5971 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 861, 935, 1079, 1088, 1201.
5972 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 861, 935, 1044.
5973 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 458, 619, 864, 1044-1046, 1073, 1079.
5974 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 996-997, 1002, 1079.
5975 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 939, 1002, 1079-1080.

---- End of Page 926 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T in 18 May 2012 kg

l 590 /9
based on a pre-arranged deal, lunded by Sankoh, arranged by Bah, and renewed by JP
Koroma".5976
2723. The Defence argues that Ibrahim Bah was a "businessman who operated throughout
the sub-region and could have obtained mining equipment from any source in the diamond
trade industry, other than Taylor".5977 The Defence agrees that the Accused saw Ibrahim
Bah and Omrie Golley before they left Liberia for Lomé.5978
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
2724. Witness TF 1-371, an RUF member,5979 testified that during the Junta, in 1997, Sam
Bockarie and Ibrahim Bah said that Mr Taylor sent Ibrahim Bah to Freetown, and he
received diamonds and money from Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma in order to
organise the Magburaka shipment to get arms and ammunition for the Junta; Ibrahim Bah
came upon the instruction of and with the "directive from Mr Taylor".598O He testified that
Ibrahim Bah fought with the NPF L, was an advisor and good friend to Foday Sankoh, that
Ibrahim Bah doubled with Omrie Golley as a member of the External Delegation, and that
both Ibrahim Bah and Mr Sankoh were "military advisors to Mr Taylor" at one point in
time.598l TF 1-371 added that "[Bah] stuck with Mr Taylor throughout".5982 The witness
testified that he learned through an "interaction" with Ibrahim Bah, whom the witness called
a middle man and conduit of Mr Taylor, that he came to Buedu in 1998 "u on the
Y P
instruction of Mr Taylor" to see Sam Bockarie and he was given diamonds to take to Mr
SW6 oprpppp rmi rmi Brief para. 1052.
5977 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 592-593, 862, 864, 936, 1046, 1052, 1162, 1555.
5978 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 94, 571.
5979 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (cs).
5980 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2111-2113; Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2308-2310, 2313-
2314, 2374 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2671 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2682-2686, 2701-
2702, 2704, 2736, 2738 (CS); Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 2955-2956, 2978-2979 (CS).
ml TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2291 (CS); Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2437-2438 (CS);
Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2736, 2754 (CS).
5982 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2736 (CS).

---- End of Page 927 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T v/% GN 18 May 2012 Q

3 9 0 Qc
Taylor to help Taylor get more arms and ammunition for the RUF .5993 According to TF 1-
371, Sam Bockarie trusted Ibrahim Bah.5994
2725. The witness testified that before November or December 1998, Sam Bockarie told
him that Ibrahim Bah would escort Sam Bockarie and others to Ouagadougou to get a
shipment of ammunition for a major attack.5985 According to TF 1-371, General Abraham is
Ibrahim Bah.5986 The witness stated that Ibrahim Bah was a liaison with Charles Taylor, and
the witness was present in 1999 when Ibrahim Bah, who said he was sent by Mr Taylor,
gave $USD 20,000 to Mr Sankoh in Lomé.5997
Prosecution Witness TF 1-567
2726. Witness TF 1-567, an RUF member,5989 testified that Foday Sankoh said that Ibrahim
Bah, from Burkina Faso, was his friend, that Ibrahim Bah was with the NPF L, and that he
was helping the establishment of the RUF movement as an agent for the RUF .5989 According
to the witness, any time Jungle went to see Charles Taylor, Ibrahim Bah would join him, and
Sankoh told "us" that he often sent Ibrahim Bah on missions to see Taylor.5999 Issa Sesay
told the witness that he gave diamonds to Ibrahim Bah, who said that he had business
artners, and Ibrahim Bah rovided satellite hones, com uters, food, and $USD 50,000 for
P P P P
the RUF movement between 1999 and 2001.5991 The testified that he and others went to
I·Iotel Boulevard with diamonds to meet General Ibrahim to make arrangements, and
Benjamin Yeaten would take Issa Sesay and General Ibrahim to bring the diamonds to
Charles Taylor.5992
5993 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2366-2368, 2370, 2374-2375, 2377, 2407-2408 (CS); Transcript
31 January 2008, pp. 2705, 2754-2755 (CS).
5994 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2705 (CS).
9995 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2402-2403 (CS).
5996 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2407 (CS).
5987 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2438 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2442, 2510 (CS).
5989 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
5999 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12971; Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13121.
5999 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12972.
599] TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13006 (PS); Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13121.
5992 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13004-13007 (PS); Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13020 (PS), 13121.

---- End of Page 928 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-O3-O1-T Z \j fQ 18 May 2012 %

Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor {
2727. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander,5993 testified that in 1991 Ibrahim
Bah was a general who was present at a meeting with Mr Taylor, General Dopoe, Francis
Mewon, Foday Sankoh, Lamin and others.5994 Ibrahim Bah was a soldier of the Special
Forces and of the foreign forces which were part of the NPFL.5995 During the time that
Mongor was a member of the Supreme Council,59% Ibrahim Bah came to meet Mongor and
other RUF authorities who had fought alongside him before in Sierra Leone, at Bockarie's
house in Freetown.5997 Ibrahim Bah said that he was sent by Mr Taylor with a message
"asking" that the AFRC and RUF work together.5998 He said that Ibrahim Bah was a liaison
officer who had been with the RUF .5999 After this meeting, the witness took Ibrahim Bah to
Johnny Paul Koroma's house and Ibrahim Bah said again that Mr Taylor sent him with the
message that they should work together.60O0
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
2728. Witness Foday Lansana, an RUF radio operator,(’OOl testified that General Ibrahim
was a businessman working with Sam Bockarie when Mr Sankoh was in prison in Nigeria,
and after the release of Mr Sankoh, he became finance controller of the RUF; he gave
money to people who needed it when they were in Liberia, under the instruction of Sam
Bockarie.°OO2 Foday Lansana met Ibrahim Bah in December 1999 at Hotel Boulevard.°OO3
Later, Ibrahim Bah said that he was instructed by Mr Sankoh to give $USD 500 to the
witness for shopping; the money was given to the witness at the Congo Town guesthouse on
22 December.60O4 Ibrahim Bah told Foday Lansana that he was an international businessman
5993 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
59** Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5672, 5706; Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5712.
5995 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5672, 5705-5706.
59% Isaac Mongor testihed that the Supreme Council was where "authorities" including Johnny Paul Koroma,
Tamba Brima, SO Williams, Issa Sesay, Gullit, and Mosquito, would discuss and plan "things" during the war,
in order to continue the war (Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5704).
5997 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5705; Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5712.
5998 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5705; Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5712-5717.
5999 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5713.
6000 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5713-5714.
wm Foday Lansana, T. 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
6002 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4473-4474.
6003 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4473
(M4 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4473-4474.

---- End of Page 929 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T , $ 18 May 2012 %
‘

f
Baoia
who purchased diamonds and gold and that he and Sam Bockarie were friends and business
partners.6666
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
2729. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,6666 testified that during a
meeting in 1998 or 1999, after Issa Sesay had diamonds that went missing, Sam Bockarie
introduced General Ibrahim as a guest.6667 The witness thought he was a Liberian
general.6666 General Ibrahim was sitting at the high table and introduced himself as part of`
the Liberian government working under Charles Taylor and said that he was sent directly by
the Accused, that the Accused was still with the AF RC/RUF and they should not worry, that
he was trying to get more materials for them to capture more places like Kono.6666
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
2730. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief` of` staff` and commander of` ULIMO-K who
later became commander of` the Scorpion Unit,6616 testified that others told him that Ibrahim
Bah was a f`ormer fighter of` the NPF L and Ibrahim Bah said that he would find a buyer for
RUF diamonds in order to help the RUF get radio communication.6611 In 2000, the witness
was present when Ibrahim Bah showed Sam Bockarie diamonds at the Boulevard Hotel and
the witness also saw Ibrahim Bah in Kono with Eddie Kanneh and f`our Lebanese in order to
get RUF diamonds.6612
Prosecution Witness Suwandi Camara
2731. Witness Suwandi Camara, an SSS member,6616 testified that his nephew, Mustapha
Jallow, who was close to Ibrahim Bah, told the witness in 2002 that Ibrahim Bah was a
6665 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4473-4474.
6666 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
6667 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11055, 11059, 11068, 11135.
6666 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1055.
6006 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11059-1 1060. V
6616 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000; 24 January 2008,
pp. 2110, 2145.
6611 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1974-1975.
6616 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1974-1976, 2025-2026.
6616 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3458-3459, 3472, 3477-3479; 11 February 2008, pp.
3523, 3525.

---- End of Page 930 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QQ 18 May 2012 Q

5 90 2 3
liaison officer between the NPFL and RUF, and that he was engaged in the diamond
business between the RUF and Charles Taylor.6614
Prosecution Witness TF1-l 68
2732. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member,6615 testified that Ibrahim Bah was one of the
Gambian Special Forces attached to Dr Marrneh and that he was involved in setting up
business deals for Sankoh.6616 Ibrahim Bah knew members of the Burkina government and
he went to Libya with Pa Sankoh.6617
The Accused
2733. The Accused testified that he met Ibrahim Bah, a member of the NPFL, in 1990
when Bah went into Liberia with Kukoi Samba Sanyan (a.k.a. Dr Manneh), but Ibrahim Bah
left in 1993 or 1994.6616 The Accused said that Ibrahim Bah was Senegalese and that he
"was one of the regular security personnel and was not assigned directly with [him]" when
he met him in 1990.6616 The Accused testified that Ibrahim Bah was an "ordinary officer", I
but not his associate, friend, special bodyguard, agent, or military advisor, and that he never
had a business relationship with Ibrahim Bah, nor did Ibrahim Bah ever work for him, the
Accused, after he left Liberia.6626 The Accused testified that General Abdulai Bah was "the
most senior Gambian military officer" and is not the same person as Ibrahim Bah.6621 He
maintained that Ibrahim Bah was not a Liberian general.6622 The Accused heard that after
1994 and after he became president, Bah came to Liberia a few times as a businessman.6623
6614 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 11 February 2008, pp. 3572-3574, 3577-3578.
6615 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275—23282 (CS).
60*6 TF1-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 22461-22462 (cs).
6617 TF1—168, Transcript 23 January 2009,p. 23462 (CS).
6616 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26039; Transcript 11 August 2009, p. 26516;
Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27563-27564; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28743-28744; Transcript 17
September 2009, p. 29263; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29551 (PS), 29562 (PS); Transcript 27 October
2009, p. 30360.
6619 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27563, 27662, 27664; Transcript 17 September
2009, pp. 29264-29265.
6626 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26039; Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27564;
Transcript 9 September 2009, p. 28479; Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28813 (PS); Transcript 15 September
2009, pp. 28910-28911; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29539, 29551 (PS), 29562 (PS); Transcript 29
September 2009, p. 29785; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30359-30361; Transcript 5 November 2009, pp.
31275, 31315; Transcript 9 November 2009, pp. 31449, 31453, 31456.
6621 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 9 September 2009, pp. 28476-28479.
6622 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, p. 30234.
6623 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27563-27564.

---- End of Page 931 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T m 18 May 2012

He testified that Ibrahim Bah "is now fully with Foday Sankoh, based on even evidence
before this court" and that he had 110 reason to doubt that Ibrahim Bah helped Foday Sankoh
c00rdinate RUF affairs outside of Sierra Leone between 1996 and 1999.6024
2734. The Accused testified that he never connived with Ibrahim Bah in diamond trading,
never received diamonds from Ibrahim Bah and did not 0rganise a Magburaka shipment
through Ibrahim Bah.6O25 He testified that he had no lqrowledge of Ibrahim Bah purchasing
satellite phones and computers for the RUF.6O26 He also testified that he had no knowledge
0f` Ibrahim Bah being in Monrovia in early Oct0ber 1997 but that it would not be unusual as
Ibrahim Bah was a businessman.6027 He said he did not lmembers of the RUF were dealing in diamonds in Monrovia.°O28 He also said that Ibrahim
Bah was not a liaison officer between the NPF L and RUF.6O29 The Accused testified that he
never sent Ibrahim Bah to Freetown to meet .I0hnny Paul Koroma or to Buedu to meet Sam
Bockarie or anywhere else.6O3U
2735. According to the Accused, Ibrahim Bah was a "senior individual" and "0fficial of the
RUF" delegation; he was "working for and with Foday Sankoh;" and he was a "special
guest" who was representing the RUF at Lomé; the Accused said that he saw Ibrahim Bah
for the last time before he left for Lomé in April 1999.6031 The Accused testified that he did
not give Ibrahim Bah $USD 20,000 to give to Sankoh in Lomé.6O32
0024 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript ll August 2009, p. 26516; Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29262-
29264; Transcript 26 Oct0ber 2009, p. 30235; Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2009, pp. 30359, 30413.
6025 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27106; Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27562,
27565, 27596; Transcript 9 September 2009, p. 28529; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28810-28811 (PS);
Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28910-28911; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29564-29565 (PS);
Transcript 29 September 2009, pp. 29781, 29787-29788; Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2009, p. 30361; Transcript 5
Ncvember 2009, pp. 31276, 31278.
6026 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28812 (PS); Transcript 22 September 2009, p.
29350; Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29669-29670.
6027 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29349-29350; Transcript 23 September 2009, p.
29541.
6028 Charles Ghankay T ayl0r, Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27565.
6029 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 9 September 2009, p. 28525.
6030 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29550-29551 (PS); Transcript 29 September
2009, pp. 29765-29766, 29768; Transcript 26 Oct0ber 2009, p. 30235; Transcript 27 Oct0ber 2009, pp. 30361,
30413-30414.
Ml Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript ll August 2009, pp. 26503-26504, 26509, 26516, 26534-26535;
Transcript 13 August 2009, p. 26787; Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27575-27576; Transcript 9 September
2009, pp. 28524, 28530; Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28742; Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29262-
29263; Transcript 22 September 2009, p. 29302; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29551-29552 (PS);
Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29609-29610, 29737; Transcript 1 1 November 2009, p. 3161 1; Transcript 28

---- End of Page 932 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2736. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,6633 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,6634 testified that Ibrahim Bah was not an advisor, but
instead was an agent and "a runner to Mr Sankoh" and the RUF.6635 He explained that
Ibrahim Bah brought business partners for Mr Sankoh and diamond dealers to Sam Bockarie
and himself6636 In July or August 1997, Johnny Paul Koroma gave Ibrahim Bah $USD
90,000 to hire a flight to transport arms and ammunition from Burkina Faso for the AF RC
and RUF.6634 Ibrahim Bah was based in Ouagadougou and would take the RUF delegation to
Burkina Faso, as he was working with Mr Sankoh and he was his fiiend.6636 Issa Sesay
testified that Johnny Paul Koroma only sent people whom he trusted with Ibrahim Bah and
Bah arrived on the plane with the ammunition.6634 The witness went to Burkina Faso with
General Ibrahim Bah to get ammunition in April.6646 According to Issa Sesay, Ibrahim Bah
introduced Michel and Louis, "two white men" from Belgium, to Issa Sesay and Bockarie in
Buedu in June of July of 1999 and introduced them to Sankoh in Monrovia.664l Issa Sesay
heard from the commander in Buedu that the Liberian border was closed between mid-
December 1999 to May 2000 and the only person who crossed was Ibrahim Bah in
December 1999.6642
Prosecution Exhibit P-018
2737. Exhibit P-018 is a report of the Panel of Experts from 20 December 2000, which was
sent to the President of the Security Council. According to this report, internal RUF reports
show that Bah took diamonds to the Accused late in 1998.6643 Bah is "said to be a Burkinabe
January 2010, pp. 34333-34334.
6642 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29610.
_ 6033 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596, and
6644 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
6035 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 29 Jtriy 2010, p. 44980 (Ps).
6646 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 44980 (PS).
6037 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43857, 43859-43862, 43872.
6666 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43860, 43911-43912.
6644 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43869-43870.
6646 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43981.
°""‘ 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44476-44479, 44481.
6642 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44464-44465, 44476-44479, 44482, 44485, 44490; Arms and
Ammunition: Preliminary Issues, Closure ofBorder/Arms Embargo.
6644 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195, Adopted on 20
December 2000", p. 17, ERN 4387.

---- End of Page 933 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QQ . 18 May 2012 \%

military officer" and is also known as "Ibrahima Baldé and Baldé lbrahima", a key player in
the AFRC/RUF axis, and "instrumental in the movement of RUF diamonds from Sierra
Leone into Liberia and from there to Burkina Faso".6644 According to the report, Ibrahim
Bah helped make arrangements for the procurement of military equipment.6644 It also states
that Ibrahim Bah is said to handle much of the "financial, diamond and weapons transactions
between the RUF, Liberia and Burkina Faso", shuttling regularly between Monrovia and
Ouagadougou and he is a "senior logistics expert in the movement of weapons and
diamonds between Burkina Faso, Liberia and Sierra Leone".6646
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
2738. Exhibit P-067 is a situation report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander. According to this report, a large quantity of diamonds was taken from Johnny
Paul Koroma and given to "Mr Ibrahim (General) [...] to travel with the parcels directly to
President Taylor" and "to this development, the High Command was able to receive the first
satellite phone".6647 This exhibit also states that Ibrahim Bah had important contacts for
"materials" such as ammunition and arms.6648
Prosecution Exhibit P-063
2739. Exhibit P-063, dated 2 December 1998, is the minutes of a forum with the external
delegates led by the RUF Defence Staff which was held at the RUF Defence Headquarters.
According to this document, Eddie Kanneh asked those present at the forum to "remember
outstanding external friends of his movement like General Abraham", and the CDS (Sam
Bockarie)6649 congratulated General Abraham for his "sincerity and honesty in delivering the
parcels that were given to [him] for our father across".6656
6044 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195, Adopted on 20
December 2000", p. 17, ERN 4387.
6645 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195, Adopted on 20
December 2000", pp. 17, 20, ERN 4387, 4390.
6646 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195, Adopted on 20
December 2000", pp. 35, 60, ERN 4405, 4430.
6647 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Arm, Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander",
ERN 9675.
6646 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Arm, Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander",
ERN 9675-9676.
6644 Exhibit P-063 begins with "The Chairman CDS—Brigadier Sam Bockarie welcomed [...]" which indicates
that CDS is Sam Bockarie. CDS stands for Chief of Defence Staff (see TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p.

---- End of Page 934 ---------------------------


Case No.1 SCSL-03-01-T `· 18 M 2012
ase o QM ay KX

Prosecution Exhibit D-003
2740. Exhibit D-003 is a radio log book. According to this log book, on 12 January 2000,
General Ibrahim informed "Smile" that he was leaving for Monrovia that day as all their
rovisions were finished and "the lon er we dela for now, the more we accumulate losses".
P S Y
He wrote that he had identified all the problems and knew the needs in order to "speed up
the process". He wrote that he would give "excellent info" when he had access to
communication and he pleaded to "info Monrovia" to pick him up at the border that same
day or the following day.00 51
Defence Exhibit D-030
2741. Exhibit D-030 is Volume Two of a report of the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. According to this report, Ibrahim Bah was classified as one of
the prominent leaders within the AFRC Faction under the heading "Miscellaneous AFRC
"Special Envoys"."0052
Defence Exhibit D-393
2742. Exhibit D-393 is a summary report ofa Belgian criminal investigation. According to
this investigation, various notes by Ossaily Samih, a Belgian diamond dealer, indicate that
he had extensive contacts with Ibrahim Bah in Hotel Boulevard in Monrovia.0053
Deliberations
2743. The Trial Chamber notes that there is a broad range of evidence in the record
regarding the role of Ibrahim Bah. There is evidence that Bah was part of the Liberian
Government and represented the Accused. There is also evidence that he was working for
the RUF. Other evidence indicates that Ibrahim Bah was an independent businessman,
working as an intermediary between the RUF and the Accused and/or as an agent involved
2326 (CS)).
0050 Exhibit P—063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2nd December 1998", p. 3, ERN 15489.
0051 Exhibit D—003, "Radio Log Book Three", ERN 8779; Arms and Ammunition: Preliminary Issues, Closure of
Border/Arms Embargo.
0052 Exhibit D—030, "Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone TRC, VOL 2, Names of the AFRC
Leadership, 2004", p. 65.
0053 Exhibit D—393, "Belgian Investigation made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", pp. 10, 18, ERN 102152, 102160.

---- End of Page 935 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T {w 18 May 2012 %
I

in certain transactions for the RUF and other transactions for the Accused. With regard to
3 speciHc events, the Trial Chamber has reviewed the evidence in the context of its
consideration of those events. More generally, the Trial Chamber has reviewed the evidence
in an effort to come to preliminary general conclusions with regard to Ibrahim Bah's alleged
role and afHliation with the Accused and/or the RUF.
2744. It is not contested that in the early 1990s Ibrahim Bah was a member of the NPFL
and there is some evidence that he came to the NPFL with the Gambian Special Forces of Dr
Manneh. Isaac Mongor testihed that in 1991, Bah was a soldier of the Special Forces and
foreign forces, which were part of the NPFL, and TF1-168 also testihed that before he met
him, Ibrahim Bah was a Hghter for the Gambian Special Forces, attached to Dr Manneh.0054
TF1-371 testihed that Bah fought with the NPFL.0055 The Accused testihed that Bah was a
member of the NPFL in 1990 but that he left the NPFL in 1993 or 1994.0050 Abu Keita
testiHed that he heard Bah was a former NPFL Hghter.0057 TF1-567 testiHed that Foday
Sankoh told him that Ibrahim Bah was from Burkina Faso, and that he was with the
NPFL.0050 The Trial Chamber recalls its Endings that Isaac Mongor, TF1-168, TF1-371,
Abu Keita and TF1-567 are generally credible witnesses 0059.
2745. Ibrahim Bah was referred to as General Ibrahim by a number of witnesses,0000 and
TFI-371 testihed that General Abraham was Ibrahim Bah.0000 The Accused testihed that
Bah was an "ordinary ofHcer" and distinguished him from General Abdulai Bah, a senior
Gambian military ofHcer who was not the same person.0002 However, the evidence does not
0054 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5672, 5705-5706; TFl-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp.
23461-23462 (CS).
M TFl-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2291 (cs).
0050 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26039; Transcript ll August 2009, p. 26516;
Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27563-27564; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28743-28744; Transcript 17
September 2009, p. 29263; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29551 (PS), 29562 (PS); Transcript 27 October
2009, p. 30360.
6057 Abu Kaua, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1974-1975.
0050 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12971.
0059 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274; Credibility Assessment, TFl-37l, paras 220-226;
Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219; Credibility Assessment, TFl-567, paras 313-317. Credibility
Assessment, TFl-l68, Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996), para. 2328.
0000 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12971, 13004-13007 (PS); Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13020 (PS),
13029 (PS), 13121-13122; Foday Lansana, Transcript, 21 February 2008, pp. 4473-4474; Albert Saidu,
Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11055, 11059-11060, 11083, 11085, 11087; Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp.
43856, 43981.
000l TFI-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2407 (CS).
0002 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 9 September 2009, pp. 28476-28479.

---- End of Page 936 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % N 18 May 2012 %

suggest any confusion between these two men, as Ibrahim Bah was not referred to as
General Bah but rather as General Ibrahim. There is little evidence other than this title that
Ibrahim Bah was a general for the NPFL. Mongor testified that he was a general in 1991.0000
Albert Saidu testified that he thought Bah was a Liberian general because at a meeting he
introduced himself as part of the Liberian Government working under Charles Taylor.0004
The Accused denied that Bah was a Liberian general.0000 While it is clear that Bah was a part
of the NPFL at some time in the early 1990s, the Trial Chamber cannot conclude, in the light
of such divergent evidence regarding his role, that he was in fact a Liberian government
official or military officer during the Indictment period.
2746. A number of witnesses testified that Ibrahim Bah worked for the Accused or
re resented the Accused durin the Indictment eriod. TF1-371 testified that Bah "stuck
P g P
with Mr Taylor throughout" and mentioned a number of specific incidents in which the
Accused sent Bah on his behalf — to Buedu in 1998 and to give Sankoh $USD 20,000 in .
1999.0000 Several witnesses, including TF1-371, testified that Bah was sent by Taylor to
arrange for the Magburaka arms shipment.0007
2747. However, the Trial Chamber notes that a number of witnesses who testified that Bah
worked for the Accused testified that he also worked for the RUF. Mongor, for example,
testified that the Accused sent a message with Bah that the AFRC and RUF should work
together, but he also testified that Bah was a liaison officer who had been with the RUF.0000
Suwandi Camara testified that he was told in 2002 that Bah was a liaison officer between the
NPFL and RUF, and engaged in the diamond business between the RUF and Taylor.0000 The
Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Suwandi Camara is a generally credible witness.0070
0000 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5672, 5706.
0004 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11059-11060.
0000 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, p. 30234.
0000 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2366-2368, 2370, 2374-2375, 2377, 2407-2408, 2438 (CS);
Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2442, 2510 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2736, 2754-2755 (CS).
0007 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Magburaka Shipment; TF1-371,
Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2111-2113; Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2308-2310, 2313-2314, 2374 (CS);
Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2671 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2682-2686, 2701-2702, 2704, 2736,
2738 (CS); Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 2955-2956, 2978-2979 (CS).
0000 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5705; Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5712-5717.
0000 Suwandi Camara, Transcript 11 February 2008, pp. 3572-3574, 3577-3578.
0070 Credibility Assessment, Suwandi Camara, Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996), para. 2222.

---- End of Page 937 ---------------------------


Case No.: ScsL—03-01-T % QIIQ 18 May 21112

2748. The Trial Chamber notes that evidence from TF1-371, TF1-567, Suwandi Camara,
as well as Exhibits P-018, P-063, and P-067, all indicate that Ibrahim Bah delivered
diamonds to the Accused.667l Witness TF1-371 testified that the Ibrahim Bah was the
Accused's middle man and conduit.6672 However, much of the evidence does not clearly
indicate any affiliation for Bah to a particular person or group; it shows that he acted as an
intermediary. The report of the Panel of Experts, for example, states that Bah handled
financial, diamond and weapons transactions "between the RUF, Liberia and Burkina
Faso".6673 Similarly, Exhibits P—067 and P-063 both indicate that diamonds were given to
Ibrahim Bah to deliver to Taylor, without expressly stating his role other than as an
intermediary.6674
2749. The Trial Chamber notes that Issa Sesay testified that Bah brought business partners
and diamond dealers to himself, Bockarie and Sankoh.6675 Foday Lansana described Ibrahim
Bah as a businessman and business partner of Bockarie, but also as a finance controller for
the RUF.6676 TF1-567 testified that Bah was an agent for the RUF, whom Sankoh oiien sent
on missions to the Accused.6677 Abu Keita testified that Bah said he would find the RUF a
buyer for diamonds to help them get radio communication.6676 TF1-168 testified that Bah set
up business deals for Sankoh.6679 However, Exhibit P-063, the minutes of an RUF meeting,
indicates that Eddie Kanneh referred in the meeting to General Abraham as an "external
667I TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2111-2113; Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2308-2310, 2313-
2314, 2366-2368, 2370, 2374-2375, 2377, 2407-2408 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2671 (CS);
Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2682-2686, 2701-2702, 2704-2705, 2736, 2738, 2754-2755 (CS); Transcript 4
February 2008, pp. 2955-2956, 2978-2979 (CS); TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13004-13007 (PS);
Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13020 (PS), 13121; Suwandi Camara, Transcript 11 February 2008, pp, 3572-3574,
3577-3578; Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195,
Adopted on 20 December 2000", pp. 17, 35, 60, ERN 4387, 4405, 4430; Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence
Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2nd December 1998", p. 3,
ERN 15489; Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Arm, Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Comrnander", ERN 9675.
6672 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2705, 2754-2755 (CS); Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2851 (CS).
6673 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195, Adopted on 20
December 2000", pp. 35, 60, ERN 4405, 4430.
6674 Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2nd December 1998", p. 3, ERN 15489; Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Ami, Situation Report to Foday
Sankoh from the Black Guard Comrnander", ERN 9675.
6675 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44476-44479, 44481; Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 44980 (PS).
6676 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4473-4474.
6677 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12971-12972; Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13121.
W Abu Keita, rranarrrpr 23 January 2008, pp. 1974-1976, 2025-2026.
6676 TF1-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23461-23462 (CS).

---- End of Page 938 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Sl}? 18 May 2012

friend".6O8O The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-371, TFl-567, and Issa Sesay all testified that
Ibrahim Bah was a good friend of Foday Sankoh.6O8l TF1-371 testified that Sam Bockarie
trusted Ibrahim Bah and Foday Lansana testified that Bah was a best friend of Sam
Bockarie.6O82
2750. Although none of the witnesses suggested that Bah was an agent of the AF RC, the
report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission classified Bah as a
miscellaneous AF RC "Special Envoy".6083
2751. The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused testified that he never sent Ibrahim Bah
anywhere and that he never received diamonds from him.6O84 In light of the overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, the Trial Chamber finds the testimony of the Accused in this regard
lacking in credibility.
2752. In light of all the evidence indicating that Ibrahim Bah was perceived by various
witnesses as working for the RUF, or the Accused, or both the RUF and the Accused, the
Trial Chamber concludes that Ibrahim Bah was a trusted emissary who represented the RUF
at times and the Accused at times, and served as a liaison between them at times. He was a
businessman who helped arrange arms and diamond transactions, and did not maintain an
ongoing affiliation as a subordinate or agent with either the RUF or the Accused. At times,
however, he did represent the RUF and the Accused in specific transactions or on specific
missions. With regard to particular events, the Trial Chamber considers that his status and
relationship to the parties involved is to be determined on the basis of relevant evidence in
the context of those particular events.
6080 Exhibit P-063, ‘"RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence
Staff] 2nd December 1998", p. 3, ERN 15489.
ml TFl-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2736 (CS); TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12971; Issa Sesay,
Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 4391 1-43912.
6082 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2705 (CS); Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4473-
4474.
6083 Exhibit D-030, ""Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone TRC, VOL 2, Names of RUF Leadership,
2004", p. 65.
6084 Charles Ghar1kay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27106; Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27562,
27565, 27596; Transcript 9 September 2009, p. 28529; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28810-28811 (PS);
Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28910-2891 1; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29550-29551, 29564-29565
(PS); Transcript 29 September 2009, pp. 29765-29766, 29768, 29781, 29787-29788; Transcript 26 October
2009, p. 30235; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30361, 30413-30414; Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31276,
31278.

---- End of Page 939 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / E 18 May 2012

Findings
2753. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Ibrahim Bah was an
independent businessman who worked, at various times and for particular purposes, for both
the RUF and the Accused. He also sewed as a liaison between the RUF and the Accused but
had no permanent affiliation with either the RUF or the Accused.

---- End of Page 940 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol-T . QU; 18 May 2()l2

C. Military Operations
1. Alleged Message fiom Base 1 to Troops Retreating fiom Kono
Submissions of the Parties
2754. The Prosecution alleges that during the Intervention, while the forces in Kono were
communicating with Buedu, they received a message fiom Base 1, Yeaten's radio station in
Monrovia, to the AFRC/RUF forces asking why they were pulling out of Kono while other
AFRC/RUF were still in Makeni and other areas toward Freetown.6O85
2755. The Defence submits that TF1—516's evidence regarding the radio message fiom
Base 1 is "suspicious" and should be approached with caution for six reasons. First, the
allegation is unsupported. Second, on TF1—516's evidence, this communication is the first
fiom Base 1 to the RUF, "yet the witness seems to treat such communication as standard"
rather than the RUF expressing outrage or surprise that they were being monitored by a
radio station in Monrovia. Third, there is evidence that Base 1 had not been established at
this time. Fourth, Prosecution evidence suggests that Base 1 was not then in possession of
the RUF radio codes. Fifth, there is evidence that the Liberian codes are different fiom the
RUF codes. Finally, "this account seems to be contradicted" by Mohamed Kabbah's
evidence that he did not see or hear any message fiom Taylor ordering the RUF to hold
Kono.6O86 The Defence submits that "although Kabbah referred to Taylor in this context,
Kabbah's treatment of Sunlight is as an extension of Taylor, so if he knew of Sunlight
sending such a message, he is likely to have mentioned this".6087
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -5 1 6
2756. Witness TF1—516, an RUF radio operator,6088 testified that during the Junta rule,
while he was in Buedu, Mohamed Kabbah commanded him to go to Kono to collect battery
acid from the station commander CO Nya. When he arrived, Perry Kamara (a.k.a. King
Perry) assigned him to the mining site at Koidu where he remained engaged in overseeing
@85 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 151.
@86 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1497.
6087 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1497, footnote 4063.
°°*" Tri-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.

---- End of Page 941 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-O3-O1-T % W 18 May 2012

mining in a designated RUF pit and a private mining pit, and undertaking some radio work
until 1998 after the ECOMOG Intervention when Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), the
overall commander in Kono, ordered everyone back to Buedu.6669 The witness testified that
while he was in Kono, he went to the radio room in the morning to transmit any messages
before going to the mining site.6696
2757. The witness testified that while he was communicating with the station in Buedu to
inform them that the AFRC/RUF forces were about to pull out from Kono, he received a call
from "across the other side", meaning it was from Liberia,669l it was from Sunlight at Base
1, enquiring why they were pulling out from Kono. The witness indicated that Base 1 had
ascertained that the troops were withdrawing by Sunlight monitoring AFRC/RUF radio
communications and intercepting their call.6692 Gullit ordered the witness to communicate
the response to Base 1 that "he had something very much important to discuss with Sam
Bockarie" and accordingly he was insisting that the fighters pull out from Kono down to
Kailahun.6693 TF1-516 identified Base 1 as a radio set assigned to Benjamin Yeaten, the SSS
director of Liberia situated in Congo Town.6664
2758. On re-examination the witness explained that during his time in Kono, he did not
transmit any messages for the AFRC with the exception of the message he sent to Buedu on
Gullit's behalf when it was time for them to retreat.6695
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
2759. Witness Mohamed Kabbah (a.k.a. Tourist), an RUF radio operator,6696 testified that
he did not see or hear any message from Charles Taylor ordering the RUF to hold Kono
after the AFRC/RUF retreat from Freetown in early 1998, nor did he recall hearing or seeing
any radio message that would have come from Charles Taylor whereby orders were given
about operations in Kono or any other aspect of the retreat from Freetown.6697
60*6 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6846, 6848-6852; Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7512-7513.
°°"° TF1-516, Transcript 14 Appr 2008, p. 7517.
°°"‘ TF1-516, Transcript 8 Apri12008, p. 6853.
6662 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6940.
6663 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6852; Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7518-7519.
6664 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6853.
6095 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7827.
6666 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
6667 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 1998, pp. 16338-16339.

---- End of Page 942 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T A/6 18 May 2012

370 25
Defence Witness DCT-008
2760. When TF 1-516's evidence about the February 1998 communication was put to
Defence Witness DCT-008, a Liberian radio operator,(’O98 who was in a position to know the
activities of the radio operator Sunlight, he denied that Sunlight intercepted Gullit's
communication about the retreat from Kono to Kailahun in February 1998. In February
1998, Sunlight was not under the direct supervision of Benjamin Yeaten; he was a radio
operator at the Executive Mansion where he did not intercept any radio communications
from Sierra Leone and to the best of his knowledge, the Executive Mansion or Government
of Liberia was not communicating with the RUF. Further, there was no radio in Liberia in
February 1998 with the call sign Base 1.6099 He stated that Base 1 was not established until
after the Camp Johnson Road incident in mid-September 1998 when Sunlight also became
the radio operator there.6lO°
Deliberations
2761. The Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-5 16's evidence on the alleged radio message from
Base 1 is uncorroborated, and contradicted by DCT-008. DCT-008 denied that a radio
message was sent and denied further that Base 1 was operational at the time the radio
message allegedly was sent, having only been established at Yeaten's house in September
1998.6101
2762. With regard to the Defence's submission that Base 1 was not in operation at the time
TF 1-516 allegedly received the radio message from Sunlight, the Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that Base 1 was operational at the time of the lntervention.6lO2
2763. The Defence has given a number of other reasons why, in its submission, it has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt that TF 1-516's evidence is true. The Trial Chamber
will address these in turn.
2764. The Defence submits that TF 1-516's evidence should not be believed because he
seemed "to treat such communication as standard" when, in its submission, the RUF is more
6098 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46948-46951 (PS).
6099 DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, pp. 47600-47601.
MOU DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47026-47030.
MOI DCT—008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47026-47030; Transcript 31 August 2010, pp. 47600-47601.
NO2 Operational Support: Communications, RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.

---- End of Page 943 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f img 18 May 2012

390 2 é
likely to have expressed surprise or outrage at the first call received from Base 1 which
would have alerted them to its monitoring of RUF communications. The Trial Chamber is
unable to draw conclusions based on speculation as to how a radio operator should or would
respond to such a communication and therefore places no weight on such considerations.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes its finding that RUF radio codes were shared with the
NPFL0100 and that NPF L radio operators were therefore able to monitor transmissions.0104 It
is therefore not surprising that the transmissions were monitored.
2765. The Defence maintains that the Liberian and RUF codes differed and that the radio
operators in Liberia were not in possession of the RUF radio codes in February 1998, citing
the evidence of Dauda Aruna Fornie.0100 The Defence submits that Fornie testified that "the
Liberians were only given the RUF radio code when he took the code to them on Bockarie's
second visit, later in 1998". The Trial Chamber has reviewed the evidence cited and notes
that the witness testified that he brought new radio codes to Base 1 during this visit to
1 Monrovia in mid—1998 because they, together with the frequencies, were changed every two
or three months.0100 This evidence does not in itself preclude the possibility that the
Liberians had the radio codes in February 1998. It is therefore irrelevant that the Liberian
codes were different. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the codes were
necessary for purposes of security and confidentiality, but that the codes were not necessary
for communication to take place.0107
2766. The Trial Chamber notes that communications were restricted between the Liberian
and Sierra Leonean radio stations. 0100 However, the evidence shows that this was a matter of
protocol rather than a technical barrier.0109 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber notes that a
communication from Base 1 to Gullit's forces in Kono rather than RUF headquarters would
not have been in accordance with the protocol. In light of the circumstances suggested by the
message, namely concern over the imminent withdrawal from Kono by Gullit, the Trial
Chamber is of the view that a direct communication might well have been undertaken due to
0103 Operational Support: Communications, RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.
0104 Operational Support: Communications. RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.
0105 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1497. in which it refers to the testimony of Dauda Aruna Fornie. Transcript 2
December 1998. p. 21516.
0100 Dauda Aruna Fornie. Transcript 2 December 2008. pp. 21516-215 19.
0107 Operational Support: Communications, RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.
0100 Operational Support: Communications. RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.
0100 Operational Support: Communications, RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.

---- End of Page 944 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T Jug 18 May 2012

3902 7
the urgency of the situation and does not find that this breach of protocol raises a doubt as to
the credibility of the allegation.
2767. The Trial Chamber does not find dispositive Mohamed Kabbah's evidence that he
did not see or hear any message from Charles Taylor ordering the RUF to hold Kono or any
radio message that could have come from Charles Taylor whereby orders were given about
operations in Kono or the retreat from Freetown. First, the communication in question,
asking why the troops were retreating from Kono, does not fall into any of the categories of
message he was cross·examined on, even if it had clearly emanated from the Accused.
Second, the message was said to have come from Sunlight, and the Trial Chamber does not
agree with the Defence's assertion that Kabbah treated Sunlight as an extension of Taylor.
There are instances in Kabbah's testimony where he makes a clear distinction between
messages emanating from Sunlight and from Taylor.6l 10 Finally, notwithstanding the
foregoing, the evidence of one radio operator that he never saw a particular message is not
conclusive of the fact that it was not transmitted, particularly in view of the fact that it was
allegedly sent to a radio station in Kono, not Buedu or Kailahun where Kabbah was based
during this period.
2768. While the testimony of TF1—516 with regard to the message received from Base 1 is
uncorroborated, the Trial Chamber notes its finding that TF1·516 is a generally credible
witness.6m In light of the foregoing considerations, the Trial Chamber does not find that
the arguments of the Defence raise doubts as to the credibility of his testimony with regard
to this message.
Findings
2769. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that when the AFRC/RUF forces were pulling out of Kono during
the Intervention, the radio station of Benjamin Yeaten in Monrovia, intercepted a radio
transmission between AFRC/RUF radio stations about the withdrawal and intervened to ask
why the forces were withdrawing.
mm See for example Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16365.
bm Credibility Assessment, TF1—5 16, paras 275-284.

---- End of Page 945 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

2. operations in Kono(’112 (amy 1998)
Submissions of the Parties
2770. The Prosecution alleges that when Johnny Paul Koroma was retreating from
Freetown after the Intervention, the Accused told him to secure Kono, following which
Koroma gave orders to all the fighters and commanders to go and capture Kono. After the
initial attempt was unsuccessful, the Accused again instructed Koroma to try to capture
Kono, which the forces then did.6113 The Prosecution submits that the instruction was given
in order to enable the Accused to send a helicopter from Monrovia to pick up Koroma and
his family.6114 The Prosecution alleges that, consistent with the earlier instruction from the
Accused, Koroma held a meeting after he arrived in Koidu Town and talked about the
necessity to hold the ground in Kono.6115
2771. The Prosecution also submits that the Accused instructed Bockarie to hold Kono
because it was one of the prominent diamond mining areas of the country. Bockarie passed
this message on repeatedly, making it clear that securing Kono would enable the RUF to
obtain materiel and other supplies from Taylor. Finally, the Prosecution alleges that the
instruction to hold Kono was reiterated by the Accused at a secret meeting of AFRC/RUF
fighters through his representatives lbrahim Bah and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. J ungle).61 16
2772. The Defence challenges the allegation that the Accused instructed Johnny Paul
Koroma to attack on Koidu Town based on the fact that the key witness to the alleged
conversation, Samuel Kargbo, admitted that he did not actually hear the conversation
between Taylor and Koroma and on Mohamed Kabbah's evidence that he did not hear or see
any message from Taylor telling the RUF to hold Kono.°117 The Defence denies that the
6112 The Trial Chamber notes that witnesses also refer to Koidu Town, the principal town in Kono District as
(most frequently) Kono and (occasionally) Sefadu. See for example Pemy Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008,
pp. 3102, 3163 where he explains that although people use all the names, Kono is more frequent. See also Alice
Pyne, 19 June 2008, p. 12238; TF1—263, Transcript 8 October 2008, p. 18054.
6113 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 145, 151, 359.
6114 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 145, 151, 359.
61 15 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 152.
6116 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 153-154, 359.
61 17 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 29.

---- End of Page 946 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jg) 18 May 2012

Accused communicated with Johnny Paul Koroma via satellite phone at any time until
· 1999.6* *8
2773. The Defence also denies that Taylor instructed Bockarie to hold Kono.6l 19
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
2774. Witness Samuel Kargbo, an AFRC Supreme Council member,6l2O testiHed that
during the Intervention, he travelled from Kono and drove Johnny Paul Koroma, his family
members, radio man, Banjah Marrah, and his bodyguards from Fogbo to Masiaka, where
they stayed part of the night, and then to Magbonkineh via Makeniém Upon their arrival in
Magbonkineh, Koroma used a satellite phone to make two calls. The first call was to the
BBC, telling them that he was "up the hills" in Freetown and would soon return to the city.
Kargbo stated that Koroma did not mention Operation Pay Yourself in this call.6l22 The
second call was to Taylor requesting him to send a helicopter to pick them up.°l23 Taylor
told Koroma that a helicopter could not land in Magbonkineh on account of ECOMOG jet
raids, and so Koroma decided that the group should move to Kabala. The witness explained
that he could hear Koroma speaking but not Taylor.6l24
2775. Kargbo then travelled with Koroma and his group to a village close to the Guinean
border near Kabala, but Koroma's wife was recognised and so the group returned to the
outskirts of Magbonkineh in order to avoid detection.6l25 At that point, Koroma told the
6l IS Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 860.
6119 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 29-30.
Gm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10439, 10448, 10450; Exhibit P-058, "Excerpts from the Sierra
Leone Gazette No. 52, 4 September 1997", ERN 7703-7704.
ml Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10484-10486.
Gm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10486-10487; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10793.
Gm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10487.
6m Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10486-10487, 10491. In the witness's first account of this call
he testified that afterwards, Koroma told them they were going to wait for the helicopter (Samuel Kargbo,
Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10487). In the second account, Kargbo testified that Taylor told Koroma that it was
not possible for the helicopter to come to Magbonkineh because of the Alpha Jet raids by ECOMOG and that
Johnny Paul Koroma therefore decided to move to Kabala (Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10491).
On cross-examination, Kargbo stated that after this phone call with Taylor, Koroma told him that the helicopter
would not be possible and they, Koroma and Kargbo, then decided to go to the Liberian border through Kailahun
(Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10753).
6*** Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp, 10491-10494.

---- End of Page 947 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JQ 18 May 2012

witness that he had spoken to Taylor again who had instructed him to capture Kono6l26 as it
would be easier to collect them via a helicopter from there.6m Kargbo testified that on
Koroma's orders he, Akim, Rambo and Superman then went back to Kabala to call all the
RUF and AFRC commanders in the villages there to a meeting in Kabala Town. At the
meeting they made arrangements for the attack on Kono and thereafter "everyone" headed
for Makeni, where they joined other AF RC and RUF fighters and assembled as a team to
advance on Kono.6l28 Superman, Akim Turay and Hassan Papa Bangura were in the advance
team. Koroma was in the middle group with the witness and SAJ Musa and Issa Sesay's
group was at the back.6l29
2776. Kargbo testified that after the initial attack on Kono failed because they had met
resistance at the Mamudu checkpoint, he returned with Koroma and others to Makeni, where
Koroma contacted Taylor via satellite phone. Taylor reiterated the instruction to capture
Kono and said that if Koroma did so, Taylor would send a helicopter for Koroma and his
family. Kargbo said that he knew about this conversation because he was close to Koroma
although he did not hear what Taylor was saying. At that point, the credit in Koroma's
satellite phone ran out.6l30 Kargbo gave evidence that following this phone call, Koroma told
inter alia Superman and the witness to go talk to the AFRC/RUF troops to convince them to
advance again on Kono. They did so and this time the Junta fighters were successfulém The
witness noted that Johnny Paul Koroma did not disclose to the troops that a helicopter would
be picking him up.6l32
2777. One or two weeks after Koidu Town was captured, Koroma decided to travel to
Kailahun when Superman delivered a radio message from Bockarie in Buedu to the effect
that Bockarie had spoken with Taylor, who had instructed that Koroma and his group should
travel to Kailahun, since it would not be possible to land a helicopter in Koidu Town on
M6 The Trial Chamber notes that Kargbo tends to use Kono and Koidu interchangeably. When asked directly
what he means by Kono, he refers to the whole District but when then asked where the fighters recaptured, he
says Koidu Town despite having referred to it as Kono (Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10499-
10500).
M7 The witness gave contradictory testimony as to whether the Accused called Koroma (Samuel Kargbo,
Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10492) or vice versa (Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10494) on this
occasion.
mg Samuel kargba, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10494-10496.
mo Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10496, 10499.
M0 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10496-10497.
ml Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10497-10498.
bm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10497; Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10511-10512.

---- End of Page 948 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T >% QM l8 May 2012 %
r

account of the jet raids. Kargbo testified that Koroma could not contact Taylor himself using
his satellite phone since he had no credit after the last call with Taylor and he did not possess
a radio set.(’l33
2778. Koroma accordingly convened a meeting of the AF RC and RUF high command at
which he announced that he was going to meet Taylor in Monrovia but would be back. He
ordered the fighters to "hold the ground" in his absence.6l34 The witness testified that he and
Rambo were appointed to accompany Koroma to Kailahun together with Issa Sesay and
Mike Lamin.6l35
2779. Kargbo testified that they arrived in Buedu in the last week of Febmary or early
March. The next day, Sam Bockarie met Koroma in the witness's presence and told him that
Charles Taylor had told him that he would send vehicles to pick Koroma up. About one or
two weeks into March, four or five white Land Rovers arrived without registration plates.
The witness saw Colonel Jungle and a raw SS men in blue combat uniforms as well as some
men in civilian clothes. These men were subsequently introduced to him by Bockarie as
Jungle, General Ibrahim, Mohamed Sekou Toure and Abu Keita. As they were preparing to
leave, the witness then described an attack by the RUF commanders on Koroma's party,
including himself`, during which he testified that he was flogged. They told Koroma to hand
over the diamonds he was planning to take to Liberia. Following the attack, Kargbo testified
that he was put into a dungeon with Koroma's entire family, with the exception of Koroma
himself, and Moses Kabia and his family, and their diamonds were taken from them.°l36 Issa
Sesay later told Kargbo that the attack had been provoked when Moses Kabia (a.k.a.
Rambo) had started complaining that Koroma's party was planning to escape to Liberia with
diamonds.6m Upon his subsequent release, Kargbo was told that the vehicles and men had
returned to Liberia and that Bockarie had accompanied them.6l38
6133 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10500-10501. On cross—examination, the witness explained
that although they had two radio handsets with them, one belonging to Johnny Paul Koroma's radio operator
Banjah Marrah and Kargbo's own, they stopped functioning as they reached Masiaka/Makeni because Nigerian
forces had tampered with the receiver (Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10791—l0792).
6134 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10501.
mj Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 1050l—10504.
6136 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10520, 10523—l0540.
6137 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10530-1053 1.
mg Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10542—10543, 10618—10619.

---- End of Page 949 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness TF 1-371
2780. Witness TF 1-371, a senior RUF member, testified that he retreated from Freetown
with Johnny Paul Koroma and the Junta leaders after the 1ntervention.6l39 After a meeting in
Masiaka to discuss, inter alia, the location of a new AF RC command post the group
proceeded to Makeni. Koroma had already moved to his home village on the Makeni-Kabala
highway.6l4O ln Makeni, a second meeting was convened at Teko barracks at which
Kailahun Town in Kailahun District was chosen as the new AF RC headquarters. A convoy
1 was then organised to head for Kailahun via Kono District.°m The witness testified that he
stayed in both Masiaka and Makeni for a couple of days.6l42
2781. When the first attack on Koidu Town failed due to heavy resistance on the outskirts
of Koidu, a number of the Junta commanders, including the witness and 1ssa Sesay, decided
to rctrcat but others, one of whom was Koroma's Chief Security Officer Rambo and "one
called Papa", remained in the outskirts of Koidu and reorganized for a second attack.°l43
During the retreat from Koidu, but "halfway to Makeni", someone from the frontline came
and informed the retreating commanders that Koidu Town had been captured. Johnny Paul
Koroma was with the witness when he entered Koidu.6l44
2782. After a short time in Koidu, the witness moved with Johnny Paul Koroma, his
securities, Moses Kabia (a.k.a CSO Rambo), Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and most of the
AF RC ministers to Kailahun, arriving some time in mid-March.6l45 The witness testified that
the order to take Johnny Paul Koroma to Kailahun Town came from Sam Bockarie.6l46
Throughout the journey from Kono to Kailahun, they had a VHF radio on which they were
communicating with Bockarieém
6139 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2348-2349 (CS).
6140 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2350-2352 (CS).
6141 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2354-2356 (CS).
6142 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2352; 2354 (CS).
bm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2357-2358 (CS).
°""‘ Tri-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2358-2359, 2361 (cs).
M45 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2361-2363 (CS).
°‘*° TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2361 (cs).
6**7 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2363 (cs).

---- End of Page 950 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T w 18 May 2012
t/

2783. Shortly after they arrived in Buedu, the witness saw Ibrahim Bah who told him that
he was there on Taylor's orders.6l48 The witness described how, while Bah was in Buedu,
there was a disagreement between Moses Kabia and Johnny Paul Koroma's wife, as a result
of which Kabia told the witness, 1ssa Sesay and Morris Kallon that Johnny Paul Koroma
was intending to escape with diamonds.6l49 Sam Bockarie ordered that the diamonds be
taken from from Koroma.6l50 Bockarie then travelled with Ibrahim Bah back to Monrovia to
take the diamonds to Taylor.6l5l When Bockarie retumed from Monrovia, Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. Jung1e)6l52 was accompanying him.6l53
2784. When Exhibit D-008 was put to the witness on cross-examination, TF1-371
confirmed that "Big Brother"6l54 is Charles Taylor but he did not know who "Benjamin"6l55
was.6l56 "Bra"6l57 is Sam Bockarie.6l58 TF1-371 then testified that the Adjutant General,
Rashid Sandi, who was with Bockarie at the time, was trying to explain about the meeting
that they had with Benjamin Yeaten at Koindu. The reference to an instruction "to sneak
with J.P.Koroma to Monrovia to avoid suspicion",6l59 comes from Rashid Sandi's report
about the meeting with Benjamin Yeaten in Koindu and was to be done to avoid the alarm of
ECOMOG who were still in the axis on the "Lofa, Gbamga and Monrovia" highway.6l60
TF1-371 agreed6l6l that they later decided to send Issa Sesay on the mission to Burkina Faso
for "1ogistical materials".
6'48 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2366-2367 (CS).
(M9 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2367 (CS).
M50 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2368 (CS).
ml TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2370-2371 (CS).
6'52 The witness called this person "Denis Tamba" but given the similarity of this name to Daniel Tamba and the
witness's use of the pseudonym "Jungle", the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the witness is referring to Daniel
Tamba.
bm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2372 (CS).
Gm With reference to Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion
between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959 and ERN 12960.
M55 With reference to Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion
between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959. The witness was read
the passage "this...coincided with Benjamin leaving for Monrovia also".
M6 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2940, 2942, 2944 (CS).
6'57 With reference to Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion
between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959 and ERN 12960.
6*58 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008,pp. 2940, 2943 (cs).
mg With reference to Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion
between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959.
mw TFl-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2941 (CS).
mm With reference to Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion

---- End of Page 951 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T in 18 May 2012

2785. TF1-371 also testified that after one of the trips to Monrovia in 1998, Bockarie came
back excited because he had made contact with Taylor and confirmed that the diamonds that
had been taken from Johnny Paul Koroma were in Taylor's possession.6l62 At a meeting
attended by the witness after Bockarie's return, Bockarie mentioned that he had received a
"specific instruction" from Taylor that the RUF should "ensure that we maintain Kono". The I
witness explained that, after that, Bockarie intensified the mining in Kono and Tongo Fields
"so as to enable [him] to pay for those materials". He stated that Kono had always been the
"bread basket" for the Junta — the only source of sustaining the armed rebellion through the
diamond products.6l63
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2786. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander,6l64 testified that he was amongst
those who fled Freetown during the Intervention.6l65 The witness testified to a pre-existing
lan made in Freetown durin the Junta eriod for J ohnn Paul Koroma to visit Taylor in
P 8 P Y Y
Monrovia.6l66 During the retreat from Freetown, he received a radio message from Johnny
Paul Koroma to go to Makeni. Upon his arrival, he met a number of the AFRC/RUF
commanders like Superman, Gullit, Issa Sesay and Five-Five. Koroma was not there,
however, as he was in his village, Magbonkineh, which is situated around 1.5 miles from
Binkolo.6l67
2787. While in Makeni, Mongor received an instruction from Sam Bockarie, telling him to
bring Johnny Paul Koroma to Kailahun and to stay with him in the meantime to ensure that
nothing happens to him. When the witness met with Koroma in his village, he explained
Bockarie's order and they agreed that it was time to execute the plan to visit Taylor; Koroma
told the witness that he would move to Buedu in order to enable him to cross over into
between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12957.
mw TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2384 (CS).
(M3 TF1-371. Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2384-2385 (CS).
Gm See for example: Isaac Mongor. Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750. 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206. 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513. 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
M65 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008. pp. 5733-5735.
(`I66 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5717-5718. 5725-5726.
(M7 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5735-5736.

---- End of Page 952 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % JQ 18 May 2012 %
I /

gw ¢-5
Liberia easily because it was so close. The witness then returned to Makeni to 0rganise the
attack on Koidu Town with Superman.6l68
2788. Mong0r was one of those at the front of the convoy heading to Koidu Town. He
testified that he told Superman that it would be better for him to stay with "the Pa",
Koroma, while the witness led the advance. During the advance, the AFRC/RUF fighters
were ambushed, which forced some of them to retreat with Johnny Paul Koroma to Makeni.
Mong0r was one of those who did not retreat, but continued fighting and managed to
successfully enter Koidu Town. He stated that he was later told that Johnny Paul Koroma
had retreated so he went back to Makeni and brought Koroma to Koidu Town.6l69 A while
after they arrived in Koidu Town, the BBC announced that Koroma was there so they
decided to send him to Kailahun straightaway. The witness testified that he therefore cleared
the road to Gand0rhun before sending for Koroma who then advanced with Issa Sesay,
Akim Turay, Leatherb00t and some other commanders to Kailahun.6l70 Prior to leaving for
Buedu, Johnny Paul Koroma restructured the AFRC/RUF tr00ps in Koidu Town and
informed the commanders that he had sp0ken to Taylor and was going to meet him in
Monrovia.6m
2789. Mong0r said that Sam Bocka1re gave the order to hold Kono. He thought that the
order was given "because it was in Kono we did 0ur mining. It was there we g0t 0ur
diamonds from".6m
Prosecution Witness Peg Kamara
2790. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radi0 Operator,6m who was in Makeni in February
1998,6174 testified that after the Interyention, the main RUF commanders, including Johnny
Paul Koroma, escaped Freetown and came to Makeni.6l75 Kamara attended the Junta
meeting in the Flaming0 area at which the Kono attack was 0rganised. The meeting had
6m Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5735-5737.
M9 Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5737-5738.
WO Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5738.
ml Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5740-5742.
W2 Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5744-5745.
W3 Perry Karnara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
W4 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3094.
W5 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3094-3095.

---- End of Page 953 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T im 18 May 2012

iw 44 6
been established on the orders of Bockarie who had sent a radio message, to which the
witness had been privy, instructing them to call an immediate meeting to discuss how to get
Johnny Paul Koroma from Makeni to Buedu, how to feed the fighters in the jungle and how
to organise themselves for the move from Makeni to Kono. The witness testified that he left
the meeting early but was told later back at Teko Barracks by Gullit and Morris Kallon that
they would be attacking Kono.6l76
2791. After the meeting, the group divided into three, with the first group consisting of
RUF, AFRC and STF forces headed by Superman, followed by 1ssa Sesay and Johnny Paul
Koroma in the second group. The witness was in the third group.°m The convoy travelled
through Magburaka, Matotoka, Makali, Sewafe and arrived at Bumpe from where they
entered Koidu Town. Each group had a radio operator and while the troops were advancing,
Superman kept them informed of progress.6l78
2792. Kamara, who was working for Superman,6l79 said that immediately after the Junta
fighters captured Koidu Town, he monitored and wrote down a radio message from Sam
Bockarie to the RUF commanders Issa Sesay and Superman, telling them that he had
consulted with Taylor in Liberia and said "as long as we have Kono, we will not fail in
taking over the rest of Sierra Leone again". The witness explained, "because we already
knew that Kono was one of the prominent diamond mining areas in Sierra Leone".6l8O
Bockarie said that Taylor had told him that he should not lose Kono because from there he
could get diamonds which he could trade with Taylor for ammunition. To that end, Bockarie
instructed 1ssa Sesay to appoint Superman as commander and Morris Kallon as Deputy in
Kono while Sesay was to escort Koroma to Buedu, Bockarie told them to "hold fast to the
ground" and "not allow to lose the ground".6l8l Kamara also testified that Bockarie sent a
message telling Superman that "he had finally had an arrangement with Mr Taylor because
we were now in Kono and we should be able to take care of Kono".6l82 The witness testified
that Bockarie repeated the message to hold Kono "almost all the time but not every day",
6176 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3095-3098.
W7 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3098-3100.
6178 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3100-3101.
Wo Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3103.
mo Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3102.
Om Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3102, 3142.
M2 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3105.

---- End of Page 954 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JM 18 May 2012 %


saying that mining in Kono was very important for the RUF and would enable them to get
arms and ammunition, food and drugs from Charles Taylor.6m
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
2793. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC member6l84 and officer6l85 testified that
he was part of the force retreating from Freetown under the command of Hassan Papa
Bangura (a.l<.a. Bomb Blast).6l86 When he arrived in Masiaka, he met the ‘most important
commanders’ such as Johnny Paul Koroma, who was still in charge of the RUF and SLA
command, as well as Issa Sesay, SAJ Musa, SFY Koroma, Mike Lamin and Superman. The
witness also saw a number of commanders who had come from Kono District, including
Samuel Kargbo. They said that when they heard that the AFRC had been dislodged from
Freetown, they had come to collect Johnny Paul Koroma.6l87
2794. Before leaving Masiaka, Koroma announced Operation Pay Yourself over the
international media, telling Robin White (of the BBC) that he was still in the Peninsula and
did not have enough money to pay his soldiers.6l88 Koroma then moved towards Makeni
because he said he was moving to his village, Magbonkineh, which lies shortly after
Binl2795. After an expedition to Bo to rescue some troops who were trapped there, the witness
testified that he moved on to Makeni where he stayed for two days before moving on to
Kabala where he met SAJ Musa and Superman. The witness stated that he did not see
Johnny Paul Koroma in Kabala.6l90 In Kabala, the witness attended a meeting of RUF and
SLA senior commanders, including Superman, convened by SAJ Musa in which he
announced:
Gentlemen, now the ECOMOG have pushed us out of Freetown and now we‘ve got information that Gullit
ha[s] withdrawn from Kono. So it would be good for us, the troops, together with the RUF combined forces, to
6**3 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3135.
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7867, 7869; 28 April 2008, pp. 8684, 8689.
ms Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865-7866.
Om Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7929-7931.
Gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7930-7933.
M8 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7934.
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 'Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7935.
Gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7937-7938.

---- End of Page 955 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 'JM 18 May 2012
x

Z? 0 ¤» K
go back and recapture Kono so Kono will serve as a strong base, since it [is] a diamondiferous area, and we
will serve as a force to reckon with by the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community.
2796. Musa then instructed Superman and Hassan Papa Bangura to mobilise forcesélgl
2797. The witness then saw Hassan Papa Bangura, Superman and their respective soldiers
mount radio sets and contact Mosquito. Bockarie ordered the witness and Hassan Papa
Bangura to collect Johnny Paul Koroma from his village near Binkolo and head towards
Kono. They also informed Bockarie that SAJ Musa had mobilised troops to march on
Kono.6l92 A convoy with SAJ Musa, Superman, Hassan Papa Bangura and other
commanders moved to Johnny Paul Koroma's village where they met him, together with his
wife, CSO Rambo (a.k.a Moses Kabia), Akim Turay, and Samuel Kargbo (a.k.a Jungler).
Koroma reintbrced what SAJ Musa had said and re·confirmed that the troops should prepare
to move towards Kono because it is a diamondiferous area and he wanted the troops to build
a strong junta base in Kono. Johnny Paul Koroma then moved with the group back to
Makeni. The witness testified that, at this point, Koroma was in command of the SLA and
RUF troops.6l93
2798. In Makeni, Bobson Sesay witnessed Koroma brief the troops, telling them that they
should recapture Kono and establish a strong Junta base there against ECOMOG attacks.
After that, the troops reorganised and arranged a fighting force to move ahead with Koroma
to Kono; Hassan Papa Bangura was in charge of the SLA and Superman was in charge of
the RUF. Johnny Paul Koroma was in overall charge of the advance on Kono.6l94
2799. According to the witness, the advance on Kono began in early March 1998. The
troops moved as far as Sewafe, around 22 miles outside Koidu Town, without meeting
resistance from ECOMOG. The entire convoy, including Johnny Paul Koroma, then moved
to Bumpe from where they advanced on Koidu Town. Close to Koidu Town, near Five·Five
Spot, the troops encountered a heavy attack from the Kamajors and hastily withdrew to
Bumpe. At that point, Johnny Paul Koroma withdrew because he had been detected by the
Kamajorsf"95 After Koroma left, Issa Sesay, who was then in command, took out his pistol
bm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 7939-7940.
6192 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 7940-7941; Transcript l8 April 2008, p. 7975.
6193 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 794l-7943.
6194 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, p. 7943.
6195 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7943-7946.

---- End of Page 956 ---------------------------


Case No.: `Cr - - - 8 Ma ‘ 012
// $9 Y %

and shot one of the soldiers and told the troops to recapture Koidu Town, which the witness,
along with Hassan Papa Bangura, RUF Rambo and Superman successfully did.6196
2800. When Koidu Town had been captured, Superman went to look for Johnny Paul
Koroma. He was unable to find him in Masingbi so a group including the witness went to
look in Makeni, onto Kabala then onto Magbonkineh where they picked up inter alia
Koroma and brought him to Koidu Town and then on to a village close to Gandorhun
between Woama and Tankoro.6197
2801. ln around February or March 1998, shortly after the AFRC/RUF re-took Koidu
Town, Johnny Paul Koroma held a meeting in the village near Gandorhun at which he
declared that Kono should serve as a strong base for the Junta forces. He stated that he was
oin to see Taylor in Liberia, for the u ose of securing "lo 'stics", including arms,
8 8 Y P YP 81
ammunition and food so that they could continue to "hold the ground" in Kono because
Kono was a diamondiferous area whose control would bring the AFRC/RUF international
recognition.°198 At that same meeting, Koroma announced that he would travel to Burkina
Faso and Libya.°199 Ultimately Issa Sesay, Samuel Kargbo and other RUF/SLA troops
escorted Koroma to Kailahun while the witness retumed to Koidu Town.62011
2802. The witness testified that from 25 May 1997 until he was arrested in June 2000, he
never heard any conversation or reference to any conversation between any high—ranking
AFRC commanders and Charles Taylor.°2111
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
2803. Witness Foday Lansana, (a.k.a. Co Nya) an RUF radio operator,6202 was in Makeni
when the fighting started in Freetown.62113 A week later, a number of commanders including
Johnny Paul Koroma, SAJ Musa and Issa Sesay convened in Makeni where they mobilised
themselves in order to go to Kono. Lansana explained that according to Koroma, occupation
61% Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7946-7947.
6197 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7947-7950.
6198 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7950-7952.
6199 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, p. 8668.
621111 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7958.
6201 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, p. 8665.
@02 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.

---- End of Page 957 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 0}, 18 May 2012 %

39 w 50
of Kono and Tongo was very important to the junta so he urged Sesay and Superman to
ensure that both places were under the supervision or control of the AFRC and RUF forces.
He testified that they stayed in Makeni for over a week while the fighting was taking place
between Makeni and Kono after which time he travelled to Koidu with Denis Mingo.(’2O4
2804. The witness then stayed in Kono with his commander, Denis Mingo, for over a
month alter it had fallen to the AFRC/RUF junta. He testified that after Kono had been
recaptured, Bockarie sent a radio message to Issa Sesay requesting him to escort Johnny
Paul Koroma and his staff to Buedu. Later, Bockarie sent another message promoting Denis
Mingo to battle group commander. He said that Superman should be in charge of any
` fighting between the AFRC and ECOMOG in Kono. He should ensure that he
"consolidates" the area and fortify it if possible.°205
Prosecution Witness TFl—3 75
2805. Witness TFl—375, an RUF fighter,62O6 testified that around one month after the
Intervention, there were two attempts to re—take Koidu Town from the Kamajors. The
witness described the advance of troops in terms of three ‘teams’. Isaac Mongor and RUF
Rambo were in the advance team; they were "moving along with Johnny Paul's [team]".
There was then a middle team and a back team. The first attack was led by RUF Rambo and
Isaac Mongor's advance team but it was unsuccessful because the troops met resistance
from the Kamajors. Their troops then retreated to Bumpe where they met the witness's
troops which were under the control of Superman. Johnny Paul Koroma was also in Bumpe
at this point. In Bumpe, a fresh attack was planned under Superman's command which
commenced about two to three hours later and was ultimately successful.62O7
Prosecution Witness TFl—539
NO3 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4498.
6204 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4498-4499.
6205 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4499-4500.
6206 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.
6207 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12502-12504, 12508-12509.

---- End of Page 958 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % @ 18 May 2012 %

j?0$7
2806. Witness TF1-539, a member of various fighting groups,621)8 testified that he retreated
from Freetown alter the Intervention, arriving in Fogbo, from where he proceeded to
Masiaka and Makeni. From Makeni, he travelled with a number of commanders, including
Johnny Paul Koroma, Issa Sesay, Isaac Mongor and others to Kono. At Kokuima, they came
up against resistance from Kamajors and retreated to Bumpe where they re-organised.
Superman and Rambo mounted an ambush against the Kamajors which enabled the RUF to
push into Koidu Town.62O9
Prosecution Witness TF1-585
2807. Witness TF1-585, an RUF radio operator,621O testified that when she had reached
Buedu alter their retreat from Kenema, but before Johnny Paul Koroma arrived there, she
saw Sam Bockarie talking on the satellite phone. Alter the conversation, Bockarie came to
eat with Eddie Kanneh and the witness overheard Bockarie explaining to Kanneh that
Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. "50") had just given him instructions that they needed Johnny Paul
Koroma in Buedu. Bockarie said that Yeaten had told him that his dad, Charles Taylor, had
said that he, Taylor, and Sankoh had spoken regarding Johnny Paul Koroma and that
Bockarie, should try "by all possible means" to help bring Johnny Paul to Buedu since "they
have something for them" although at the time, she did not know what that meant.6211
Bockarie then said that he was going to instruct Superman to bring Johnny Paul Koroma to
Buedu and that, immediately alter the meal he went to the radio room to do so. The witness
confirmed that Bockarie called Superman and that "Superman brought him. Johnny Paul
came to Buedu".6212 Later in her testimony, the witness testified that she was in the radio
room when Bockarie sent the instruction to Superman in Kono District.°213
2808. TF1-585 testified that she understood that later, when Issa Sesay "raided" Johnny
Paul Koroma and took his diamonds, the "something for them" had been diamonds. She
witnessed Issa Sesay telling Bockarie in Bockarie's bedroom, "you see, the Pa had arrived
6208 TF1-539, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11374 (PS); Transcript, 10 June 2008, p. 11391, 11469-11471;
Transcript, 11 June 2008 pp. 11532, 11561-11562.
@09 TF1-539, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14136-14137, 14139-14140.
6210 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15589-15592 (PS).
6211 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15610-15611, 15613-15617; Transcript 8 September 2008, pp.
15641-15642; Transcript 10 September 2008, pp. 15908-15915.
6212 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15616.
6213 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15641-15642, 15646.

---- End of Page 959 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 %

and had not wanted to hand over the diamonds, so if we had not raided him he wouldn't have
handed over the diamonds to us". Sesay said that Koroma had wanted to escape with the
diamonds to Monrovia.62M
A 2809. TF1—585 recalled that about two or three weeks after Johnny Paul Koroma and his
wife arrived in Buedu, she heard gunsh0ts into the air for over 30 minutes so they ran into
the bush. After a few hours, they returned and saw bullet holes in Bockarie's house but
Johnny Paul Koroma and his wife were not there. The witness was told that Koroma was in
Kangama and the following day they took his wife, Makuta, to him.62l5 The witness stated
that during the raid, they took Johnny Paul Koroma's diamonds, his foreign currencies and
"all the things they had brought from Freetown". TF1—585 described it as "an arrangement
between Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie" explaining that it had been Issa Sesay who had
cariied out the Operation and that Bockarie had had little to do with it; he had been at the 0ld
sch00l building while the raid was being carried out.62l6
2810. On cross—examination, TF1—585 testified that the reason why Sesay attacked Johnny
Paul Koroma was that "Ramb0"62I7 told Sam Bockarie that Johnny Paul Koroma had come
with a l0t of diamonds and he "wanted to hide to go to Monrovia".62 lg
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
2811. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,6219 testified that in February 1998 he travelled from Kenema to Buedu with
Bockarie after the Intervention and then went to Gand0rhun to meet Johnny Paul Koroma,
Issa Sesay and Mike Lamin to bring them back to Buedu.6220 Mallah stated that on his
ariival in Buedu, Koroma held a meetin on the veranda of Bockarie's house which inter
8
alia the witness, CSO Ramb0 and Samuel Kargb0 attended, in which Koroma told Sam
62** rrr-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15644-15645.
°2'5 rrr-585, rrrmeerrpt 8 September 2008, p. 15646.
`bm TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15646-15647.
ww The witness explained that the Ramb0 that she was referring to was the one she had been told "had been an
ECOMOG befcre [he] was an SLA" and that she did not know anyone called B0ston F10m0 (TF1-585,
Transcript 10 September 2008, p. 15917).
bm rrr-585, Transcript 10 September 2008,p. 15917.
(mq Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 Ncvember 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13 Ncvember
2008, pp. 20209-20210.
6220 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 Ncvember 2008, pp. 20189, 20192-20196.

---- End of Page 960 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 5 18 May 2012 %
\

390 53
Bockarie that he had been receiving diamonds from the mines in Kono and Tongo. Koroma
said that he had not been in touch with Charles Taylor whereas Bockarie was, so he wanted
Bockarie to take him and a few other commanders to Monrovia to meet with Charles Taylor
with the diamonds so that Taylor would find ways and means by which they could get anns,
ammunitions and medicine to continue attacking ECOMOG.°22l
2812. Mallah testified that Bockarie and the others did not want Koroma to go on the
mission to see Taylor so, at this point, Bockarie told Johnny Paul Koroma that he (Bockarie)
was now the leader of the RUP and AF RC, that he would not take Koroma and his
commanders to Monrovia, and he demanded that Koroma hand over his diamonds. When
Koroma tried to resist, he was forced to hand over the diamonds at gunpointfm Mallah
explained that they were afraid that if they gave Koroma more time, he would escape with
the diamonds so Bockarie and Issa Sesay were anxious to have them.6223
2813. On cross-examination, Mallah testified that he did not know anyone by the name of
Ibrahim Bah and that he, therefore, did not know anyone with that name in Buedu at the
time the diamonds were taken from Koroma.°224 Mallah conceded that it was. possible that
CSO Rambo had told Sesay and others before the meeting about Koroma having diamonds
on him but maintained that Koroma also told them in the meeting.6225
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
2814. Witness Mohamed Kabbah (a.k.a. Tourist), an RUP radio operator,°226 testified that
he did not see or hear any message from Charles Taylor ordering the RUF to hold Kono
after the APRC/RUF retreat from Freetown in early 1998, nor did he recall hearing or seeing
any radio message that would have come from Charles Taylor whereby orders were given
about operations in Kono or any other aspect of the retreat from Freetown.6227
ml Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20194—20195; Transcript 18 November 2008, pp.
20480—20485.
mz Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20195—20196; Transcript 18 November 2008, p.
(iggtiiigustine Mallah, Transcript 18 November 2008, p. 20487.
6224 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 18 November 2008, pp. 20481—20482.
6225 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 18 November 2008, p. 20488.
6226 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
6227 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 1998, pp. 16338—16339.

---- End of Page 961 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Z GUS 18 May 2012 Q

3 90 54
The Accused
2815. The Accused testified that the first time he ever met, spoke to or had any kind of
dealing with Johnny Paul Koroma was in August 1999. He did not speak to him during the
Junta period, by radio or phone.6226
2816. VVhen Samuel Kargbo's evidence was put to the Accused, he denied speaking to
Johnny Paul Koroma on a telephone or having either a helicopter or any means to rescue
Koroma in early 1998. He said that if he had wanted Koroma to go Liberia he would have
just driven him across the border and that in any case, there were two Sierra Leonean
helicopters.6229 Furthermore, Taylor denied giving Johnny Paul Koroma any instructions to
capture Kono or repeating those instructions when the initial attempt failed.6266 He denied
sending vehicles to Koroma when he had arrived in Buedu, noting that Koroma was arrested
shortly after he arrived at Buedu and never left Sierra Leone.623l
2817. VVhen presented with Perry Kamara's evidence, the Accused denied any knowledge
of messages from Bockarie to his troops re-affirming the importance of the diamond mines
in Kono so that diamonds could be traded with Taylor for arms and ammunition, and denied
that any such messages came from him.6232
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2818. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,6263 testified that he was not in
Freetown at the time of the Intervention but travelled immediately to Fogbo to meet his wife
and child who had been trapped in Freetown. He then drove to Masiaka where all of the
main AFRC/RUF commanders were assembling.6234 He explained that he saw Johnny Paul
Koroma there being collected by Samuel Kargbo, who had driven from Kono when he heard
news of the Intervention. Koroma was driven by Kargbo to Masiaka, Makeni and onto his
6226 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp, 25436—25437; Transcript 23 September 2008, p.
29546.
6229 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp, 30834—30839.
6236 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30834—30839.
623 I Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30841-30842.
6232 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29019—29020.
M Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 Jury 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
6264 Issa Sesay, 'Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43953-43954, 43957-43960.

---- End of Page 962 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T / dw 18 May 2012 E

village, Magbonkineh, which is located 10 miles from Makeni.6235 Sesay testified that after
moving south to attack Bo, he retumed to Makeni.6236 At that point, Koroma was not there
because he had already left for his village.6237
2819. After three days in Makeni, the witness testified that Koroma called a meeting in his
village for Honourables and AFRC/RUF commanders, including the witness, Mike Lamin,
Isaac Mongor, Superman and ‘the Honourables’. At the meeting, Koroma ordered the
AFRC/RUF to withdraw to Kono because he was going to withdraw to Bockarie's location
in Kailahun. Koroma said that he had spoken to Bockarie who had agreed with the plan,
something which Bockarie confirmed during a conversation with the witness when he had
contacted Bockarie to report the failed Bo operation. Koroma wanted them to attack Kono
because they should not keep running away from ECOMOG. The witness explained that
taking Kono was part of the strategy for Johnny Paul Koroma to get to Kailahun. Sesay
understood that Koroma wanted to withdraw to Kailahun because he was growing
indifferent to his commanders whom he considered uncooperative and who were leaking out
information to ECOMOG and the SLPP and therefore considered Kailahun a safer
altemative.6266 Sesay testified that at no point in that meeting did Koroma say that the idea
came from Taylor or that he was making plans to visit Taylor, nor had Sesay ever heard that
he had such discussions with Bockane.6239 Acting on those orders, the troops went and
mobilised in Makeni to advance to Kono which the successfull ca tured from the
Y Y P
Kamajors.6246 The witness confirmed that, at this time, Johnny Paul Koroma, not Bockarie,
was in command of the troops in Makeni.6241
2820. After Koidu Town had been captured, Superman came saying that he was going to
collect Johnny Paul Koroma from his village. At that point, Sesay and others set off to move
towards Kono.6242 Koroma was accompanied by AF RC commanders including Samuel
6235 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43966, 43982.
62361ssa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43968, 43974, 43980-43981.
6237 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43982,
6236 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43986; Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43990~43994; Transcript 30 July
2010, p. 45139.
6239 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45139-45140.
6246 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43994-43995; Transcript 18 July 2010, pp, 46579-4658l.
624l Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 43994.
6242 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43995, 43997.

---- End of Page 963 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Qld 18 May 2012
I

390 5 A
Kargbo and Hassan Papa Bangura on his journey to Kono. Koroma arrived in Kono the
same evening. 6243
2821. According to Sesay, on his third day in Kono, Johnny Paul Koroma chaired a
meeting at his house in Kimberlite which the witness attended. Koroma encouraged unity
between the AFRC and the RUF, saying that he did not want any further conflict between
the parties as they were fighting for the same goal, and that it was time for them to stop
running away from ECOMOG. He promised the troops that when he got to Kailahun, he
would speak to Bockarie and ask him to send ammunition and rations to help the troops to
defend Kono.4244 Sesay and Mike Lamin then moved with Koroma to Kailahun where they
arrived in late February or early March.4245
2822. Sesay remembered Koroma having a satellite phone during the retreat and was
making calls on it in Kailahun but while he was in Kailahun, he ran out of credit. He took
the phone to Kangama but it was never topped up.4244 Sesay confirmed that up to the point
Koroma was sent to Kangama, he was in possession of a radio set called Control Station.4247
Sesay testified that when Koroma was in Masiaka, he spoke to the BBC saying that he was
just outside Freetown and would be retuming.4244
2823. When Samuel Kargbo's evidence was put to Sesay, he explained that he had left
Johnny Paul Koroma in Masiaka for his journey to Bo before Koroma travelled to
Magbonkineh but in the time that he was travelling with Koroma, Sesay never heard any
discussion about him seeking to arrange to be picked up by a helicopter sent by Taylor.
Koroma only said that he had phoned Bockarie on the field radio, telling him that he was
going to Kailahun.4249
2824. Sesay testified that Koroma told the RUF in Buedu that he had diamonds with him
which he was planning to take to Ghana to buy fighting materials, a proposal which
Bockarie accepted. Moses Kabia (a.k.a. Rambo) then ‘leaked’ that Koroma was planning to
4243 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43982-43983; Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 43999.
4244 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43999-44001; Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46581.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46583-46584.
4244 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45133
4247 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44027,
4244 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46579.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45135-45137.

---- End of Page 964 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ok 18 May 2012 %

flee permanently to Ghana with his family and securities. Sesay explained that diamonds
were considered as belonging to the 0rganisation -— the AFRC and the RUF. As head of the
0rganisation, Koroma had the right to have diamonds in his possession, but he was expected
to use them in the interests of the 0rganisation. If Koroma went to Ghana with the diamonds
and did not return, as Ramb0 claimed, then the RUF would have been left in the "h0t Hre".
The RUF and AFRC forces in Kailahun and Kono did not have materials at this time. For
this reason, Bockarie st0pped Koroma from travelling, had him hand over the diamonds, and
then sent him to Kangama.625O
2825. Sesay refuted Kargb0's story that, after Koroma's arrival in Buedu in late
February/early March 1998, Taylor sent Land Rovers with Jungle and other SS men to pick
Koroma up to take him to Monrovia. Jungle was not in Buedu in 1998, Sesay Only saw
Jungle when he was in Monrovia in April 1998.6251
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
2826. Exhibit P-067, an undated "Situation Report" from the Black Revolutionary Guards
to "the Leader" states:
...when the High-C0mmand returned from Liberia, he briefed J .P.K. pertaining to the latest devel0pment, and
met him personally to give him a helping hands [sic] with diamonds or any foreign currency he had brought
from Freetown for him to impress President Taylor.
As a result, J.P.K. denied bitterly that he had brought no diamond [sic] with him wereas [sic] the High
C0mmand had gathered informations [sic] that J .P.K. has brought l0ts of diamond [sic] with him, but he wants
to keep it on his own without financing the movement as we are now under one umbrella. Therefore the High
C0mmand gave instruction to Brigadier Issah Sesay [sic] and Brigadier Mike Lamin for them to properly
search J .P.K. and his b0dyguards. Later parcels of diamond was [sic] given to Mr Ibrahim (General) and sister
Memuna for them to travel with the parcels directly to President Taylor.
After General Ibrahim returned back to Burkina Fas0, the High C0mmand also received a g00d caraiage [sic]
0f diamond [sic] from Kono. He also plan [sic] to send another g00d parcel to General Ibrahim in Burkina
Fas0... The High C0mmand therefore decided to hand-over the said parcel of diamond to the B.G.C Brigadier
Issah Sesay inother [sic] for him to pass through Monrovia and make his way to Burkina Fas0 and meet
General Ibrahim. ..
He did not make his way through as he Only st0p in Monrovia and Information was later recieved [sic]
,..that the parcel of diamond has dr0ped [sic] from Brigadier Issa.6252
6250 ipsa Sesay, Transcript 14 Juiy 2010, pp. 44410-44416.
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45141-45142.
6252 Exhibit P-067, "RUF Pe0ple's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
C0mmander", ERN 9675-9676.

---- End of Page 965 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V GQ 18 May 2012

Prosecution Exhibit P—132
2827. Exhibit P-132 is a news update from the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. It
records that it was announced on BBC radio on either 14 February or 15 February 1998 that
Koroma had called the BBC from what he said was a location in the hills above Freetown
threatening that the AFRC "are going to fight back".6253 Further, it states that on Sunday, 15
February 1998, the BBC had announced that Koroma "was reported to be heading for
Liberia by way of Kailahun, in the northeast of the country".6254
Defence Exhibit D-008
2828. Exhibit D-008, an undated unofficial translation of a verbatim report on a recorded
discussion between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his cohorts on his return from detention in
Nigeria in 1999 explaining their activities during his detention in 1996 to 1999, reports:
Brigadier Mike:
...Rambo the CSO to Johnny Paul Koroma informed us that Johnny Paul Koroma is in possession of a plastic
containing diamonds including some United State Dollars, which he intends to escaped [sic] with together with
his family. Notwithstanding this, we have been monitoring him through intelligence source [sic] that he had
intentions to escape so we intimated Mosquito and Issa suggesting that we confront this brother and ask him to
hand over all government properties he had in his possession to enable us procure [sic] all the logistical
materials to carry out the operations they agreed with us and therefore confronted Johnny Paul Koroma in a
non-violent manner. Johnny Paul Koroma had to reason with us and handed over nine plastics containing
diamonds. We in turn handed over these diamond [sic] to mosquito for safe keeping and utility. .. Not too long,
Mosquito infonned me that he wanted us to contact the other brothers in Monrovia. Although he had already
made some contact with them, but [sic] he needs some of the gem stones to give to the leader in Monrovia to
facilitate these contacts. Before this, of course, we were aware that some transactions was going on as on
several occasions he made visit to Monrovia through the help of one Benjamin Legon, a Liberia Security
personnel; in collaboration with the Adjutant Genera1.6255
Pa Rogers:
...Next I was not present on the issue about Johnny Paul Koroma. I was made to understand that General
Ibrahim was presence [sic] at the time of that operation.
6253 Exhibit P-132, "IRIN-West Africa Update 146, 98.2.16, University of Pennsylvania — African Studies
Center, 14-16 February 1998", ERN 100146, para. 1.
625* Exhibit P-132, "IRIN-West Africa Update 146, 98.2.16, University of Pennsylvania — African Studies
Center, 14-16 February 1998", ERN 100147, para. 3.
6255 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficia1 Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday
Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 129571

---- End of Page 966 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ' @11, 18 May 2012

Adjutant General:
These diamonds were with Mosquito when we decided that we should made good use of it by creating an
avenue for outside contacts since the pressure was high against us. Then luckily, General Ibrahim arrived the
same day. There and then, we all agreed to move to Monrovia to meet the big brother this move coincided with
Benjamin leaving for Monrovia also. .. Bra told Benjamin that they had something that they want to presence
[sic] to Big Brother in Monrovia so that he will help us.
...Benjamin further said that he was instructed to sneak with J.P. Koroma to Monrovia to avoid suspicion.
Then ‘Bra’ replied that J .P. was not around, he then asked which area is J.P. presently. Brat [sic] said J.P. is
about fairly [sic] miles away from where we where [sic] at the time hence Benjamin has [sic] to leave.6256
JRR (Junior Rambo):
Yes, Sir, pertaining to the diamonds that General handed over to Brigadier Issa. I was with general when these
diamonds were brought from Kono. the High Command further instructed Issa to try his level best to reach
Burkina Faso to meet General Ibrahim for the said diamond sales. He was on this until we heard from Jungle
that he dropped these diamonds in Monrovia.6257
Defence Exhibit D-009
2829. Exhibit D-009, a Salute Report from Sam Bockarie to Foday Sankoh, dated 26
September 1999, states that after the RUF and SLAs retreated from Freetown:
We also rescued JP Koroma and his family and under the escort of Brig. Issa and Brig. Mike he was brought to
Kailahun as was advised by your brother.6258
Defence Exhibit D-084
2830. Exhibit D-084, a Salute Report from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh, dated 27
September 1999, states that after Sesay had sustained an injury fighting in Bo following the
Intervention, he moved back to Makeni in search of medical treatment.
6256 Exhibit D-008, "Unofiicial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday
Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959-12960.
6257 Exhibit D-008, "UnofHcial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday
Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12961.
6258 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major Sam
Bockarie", ERN 9661. The Accused and Issa Sesay both denied that ‘your brother’ referred to the Accused:
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26779-26780; Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010,
p. 46608. The Trial Chamber notes that Foday Sankoh referred to Taylor as his "brother" (see e.g. TF1-362,
Transcript 2008, pp. 4803-4804; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5741-5742; TF1-567, Transcript
4 July 2008, p. 12968) as did others e.g. JP Koroma (see e.g. Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5740-
5742). However, there is also evidence that "brother" was widely used to denote someone of the same village,
tribe or country (see e.g. TF1-375, Transcript 26 August 2008, pp. 14606-14607; TF1-516, 9 April 2008, p.
7081; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10567; Transcript 19 September 2008, p. 16727) or an
associate or ally (see e.g. P-272, a letter dated 4 December 1998 from Foday Sankoh to "Brother Mohamed
Tabili" in Ghana in which Foday Sankoh asks "you and your brothers" for SUSD 700,000; D-008, "UnofHcial
Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his
Return from Detention, ERN 12957 which records "Brigadier Mike" talking about "the Brother in Burkina").

---- End of Page 967 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T du 18 May 2012 @
x

Whilst in Makeni, I went to visit J P Koroma who was hiding in his village. J P Koroma
asked me to arrange and supervise the movement of his entire family to Kailahun as
ECOMOG were advancing and the Clandestine Radio 98.1 FM, had accounted that he was
hiding in his village.
I contacted General Mosquito and the order was given to escort the Former Head of State to
our Kailahun base. First we had to open a road to Kono. This was done in conjunction with
Superman and Brig. Mike Lamin.
One morning [in Buedu], the Chief Security Officer to the former AFRC Chairman J P
Koroma informed me that his boss was planning to escape to Ghana along with his entire
family. The CSO further told me that J P Koroma had a parcel of diamonds that he was
planning on selling once out of the country.
This information came as a surprise to me and found it hard to believe that at a time when
we were trying to put the fighting-men under command and control and provide necessary
logistics to halt our retreat and move forward, J P Koroma would keep diamonds for his
own use and flee leaving us with a problem that he had created.
Accompanied by Brig Mike Lamin and the CSO to J P Koroma I asked the latter to present
the diamonds for the use of the Revolution. He complied and the matter was settled.
While in Buedu, Captain Michael Comber of the Mining Unit reported with a parcel of
diamonds from Kono. The parcel was placed in my care by General Mosquito with the
instructions to move with it to a transit point where I could be met by General Ibrahim and
together we were to travel to a business associate of the Leader for arrangements and
... 6259
procurement of Military Equipment.
Deliberations
(a) Order to Attack Kono
2831. The evidence unequivocally demonstrates that after ECOMOG attacked Freetown,
the AF RC and RUF fighters and their families fled the Freetown Peninsula on or about 13 or `
14 February 1998 using boats which took them to Fogbo, from where they advanced to
Masiaka6266 and onto Makeni,626l where combined AFRC/RUF forces re-organised to attack
6259 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, From Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", ERN 7760-7762.
6266 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December
2007, Annex A, Fact AD; Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009,
Annex A, Fact 5; Exhibit D-155, "UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
in Sierra Leone, S/1998/249, 18 March 2008", p. 2, para 6; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10484;
TF1-371, 28 January 2008, pp. 2349-2350 (CS); Isaac Mongor, 11 March 2008, pp. 5734-5735; Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7930; TF1-539, 20 August 2008, p. 14134; TF1-375, 23 June 2008,
p. 12500; Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43960.
6261 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2353-2354 (CS); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp.
10495-10496; Isaac Mongor, 11 March 2008, p. 5735; Peny Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3095;
Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008, p. 4498; TF1-375, 23 June 2008, pp. 12501; TF1-539, 20 August 2008, p.
14136; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43991—43995.

---- End of Page 968 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gl-}, 18 May 2012 %

Koidu Town, the primary town in Kono District.6262 The first attack was unsuccessful, but in
a second attack, the AFRC/RUF forces managed to recapture Koidu Town.6263
2832. The Trial Chamber notes that Samuel Kargbo is the only witness who testified
regarding several satellite phone calls between Koroma and the Accused. Kargbo testified
that in Magbonkineh, Koroma used a satellite phone to talk with the Accused regarding
arrangements for Koroma and his family to get to Liberia by helicopter. The Accused told
him that the helicopter could not land in Magbonkineh because of jet raids.6264 Koroma then
went with Kargbo to a village near Kabala but returned from there when his wife was
reco ised and told Kar bo he had s oken a ain with the Accused who had told him to
an 8 P 8
capture Kono as it would be easier to pick him up there by helicopter.6265 Koroma then
waited in the bush while Kargbo and others rallied commanders in Kabala who then all
moved to Makeni to reorganise for the attack on Kono.6266 When the attack failed, Koroma
spoke again with the Accused by satellite phone from Makeni, where they had retreated, and
the Accused reiterated his instruction to Koroma to capture Kono and said that if he did so,
the Accused would send a helicopter.6267
2833. Kargbo said he witnessed the calls made in Koroma's village and after the retreat to
Makeni, although he only heard Koroma speaking.6266 Kargbo was not a witness to the first
call instructing Koroma to capture Kono. He said that Koroma told him that he had spoken
again with the Accused.6269 The Trial Chamber notes that Kargbo did not hear the content of
what the Accused is alleged to have said to Koroma and relied on Koroma for a report of the
call as well as the fact that Koroma was speaking with the Accused. The Trial Chamber
takes into account, however, when assessing the weight of his testimony, the fact that
6262 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7943; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2355
(CS); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10496; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3098-
3099; TF1-539, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14139.
6266 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10497; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2358-2359
(CS); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5737-5738; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April
2008, pp. 7946-7947; TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12503-12504; TF1-539, Transcript 20 August
2008, pp. 14139-14140.
6264 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10486-10487, 10491.
6265 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10491-10494.
6266 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10495-10496.
6267 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10496-10497.
6266 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10491 (regarding the call in Koroma's village); Transcript 21
May 2008, p. 10497 (regarding the call in Makeni).
6269 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10492, 10494.

---- End of Page 969 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T da 18 May 2012 %

g@é2
Kargbo was in close proximity to Koroma during two of the calls and able to hear his side of
the alleged conversation with the Accused.
2834. The Trial Chamber recalls that Samuel Kargbo is a generally credible witness.°27O
However, as the evidence of the phone calls with the Accused relies entirely on the
testimony of Kargbo, the Trial Chamber has carefully reviewed the extent to which his
account of these particular events is corroborated in other respects by witnesses who
testified with regard to the attack on and recapture of Kono. ln doing so, the Trial Chamber
is cogniscent of Kargbo's testimony that Koroma's plans to flee Sierra Leone by helicopter
were intended to be secret and were not therefore disclosed to other members of the
AFRC/RUF.627l
(i) Events surrounding the first call with the Accused at Johnny Paul Koroma's
ukge
2835. Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Issa Sesay corroborate Kargbo's account that,
immediately after the retreat from Freetown in mid-February 1998, he drove Koroma to his
village in Magbonkineh where Kargbo says the first call to the Accused was made.6272
2836. Kargbo's testimony with regard to Koroma's call to the BBC immediately prior to
the call to the Accused is corroborated by the testimony of 1ssa Sesay,°273 as well as
Prosecution Exhibit P-132,6274 which indicates that a call almost identical in content was
made to the BBC. Bobson Sesay also testified that Koroma spoke to Robin White explaining
that he was still in the Peninsula although according to Bobson Sesay's account, Koroma
also announced Operation Pay Yourself something which Kargbo denied happened during
the call.6275 However, Kargbo testified that Koroma made this call at the same time as he
6270 Credibility Assessment, Samuel Kargbo, paras 290-295.
ml Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10497; Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10511-10512.
Gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7941-7942; Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p.
Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46579.
6274 Exhibit P-132, "IRIN-West Africa Update 146. 98.2.16, University of Pennsylvania ~ African Studies
Center. 14-16 February 1998", ERN 100146, para. 1.
6275 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7934.

---- End of Page 970 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T gk 18 May 2012 E

39063
called the Accused, upon their arrival in Magbonkineh,6276 while Alimamy Bobson Sesay
and Issa Sesay both testified that Koroma made the call in Masiaka.6277
ll ven s prior o e irs a ac on ono
"Et tthf`tttkK
2837. No witnesses other than Kargbo testified with regard to Koroma's trip to the Kabala
area. The Trial Chamber is, however, cogniscent of Kargbo's evidence that he was travelling
alone with Koroma's party at this time. Bobson Sesay's testimony corroborates Kargbo's
account that there was a meeting in Kabala Town, attended by AF RC and RUF commanders
at which lans were made for the attack on Kono.627g Both Kar bo and Bobson Sesa
P 8 Y
testified that this meeting took place in Koroma's absence and both testified that Denis
Mingo (a.k.a Superman) attended. The Trial Chamber notes that each of these two witnesses
i excluded, either expressly or impliedly, the presence of the other at this meeting: Kargbo
testified that although he knew Bobson Sesay to be one of those who retreated from
Freetown, he was never with him and did not see him again until they met in Liberia,6279
Bobson Sesay testified that after the meeting in Kabala the group moved to Koroma's
village where they then met, inter alia, Samuel Kargbo.6280 Bobson Sesay testified that SAJ
Musa convened this meeting and ordered the attack on Kono there. Kargbo did not mention
SAJ Musa as having convened or attended this meeting but he said arrangements were made
at the meeting for the attack, which in the Trial Chamber's view is not inconsistent with
Bobson Sesay's testimony, though less specific.
2838. The Trial Chamber notes that witnesses Isaac Mongor, Issa Sesay and Bobson Sesay
testified that prior to the attack on Kono, they attended a meeting with Koroma in his
village, Magbonkineh, at which the attack on Kono was ordered by Koroma.628l Both Issa
Sesay and Bobson Sesay testified that Denis Mingo also attended this meeting.6282 Bobson
Sesay testified that Kargbo was present at this meeting. Sesay testified that "the
6276 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10486-10487.
6277 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46579; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7934.
6278 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10494-10496; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April
2008, pp. 7939-7940.
6279 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10663.
mo Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7942.
ml Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5735-5737; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43991-
43994; Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45139; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7941-7943.
See also Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, From Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", ERN 7760.
62*2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7941; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 43992.

---- End of Page 971 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T (ILA 18 May 2012 M

Honourables" were present6263 and Isaac Mongor also testified to the presence of Koroma's
"securities".6266 These accounts are inconsistent with Kargbo's testimony in a number of
ways. First, Kargbo did not testify to a meeting in Magbonkineh. Second, Kargbo testified
that Mingo had moved with him from Kabala Town directly to Makeni6265 before the troops
assembled for the Kono attack. In this case, Koroma and Kargbo would not have been in
Koroma's village for the meeting described by the other witnesses. By Kargbo's account,
Koroma did not return to his village after he had left following the first call to the Accused.
This contradicts Mongor's and Bobson Sesay's testimony that they travelled with Koroma
from the meeting in Magbonkineh to Makeni before the attack on Kono.6266 However, the
Trial Chamber notes that in cross—examination when Kargbo repeated his account, he
omitted reference to the `ourne to Kabala and stated that havin received the first call fiom
J Y g
the Accused, Koroma decided at that point to travel to Kailahun,6267 presumably fiom his
village where he received the call.
2839. Issa Sesay, Isaac Mongor and Foday Lansana corroborate Kargbo's testimony that
Koroma ordered the attack on Kono.6266 Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that SAJ Musa
ave the ori `nal order which Koroma ‘re—inforced’ when the commanders reconvened in
g gl
Koroma's village.6269 Perry Kamara testified that the decision to attack Kono was taken at a
meeting in Makeni convened on the orders of Bockarie partly for the purpose of discussing
how to get Koroma fiom Makeni to Buedu.6296 The Trial Chamber notes, however, the
testimonies of Issa Sesay and Alimamy Bobson Sesay that Johnny Paul Koroma was in
6283 Issa Sesay, Transcript x Jury 2010,p. 43992.
6284 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5736.
6285 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10496; after the meeting in Kabala "everybody" came down to
Makeni.
6286 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7942; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p.
5735: Mongor testified that before he moved to Magbonkineh, Bockarie told him to remain with Koroma at all
times and "not allow anything to happen to him".
6287 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10753.
6266 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43990-43992; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5736;
Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4498-4499.
6269 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7939-7942.
6296 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3095-3098. The Trial Chamber notes that although Perry
Kamara did not explicitly testify that Johnny Paul Koroma attended this meeting in Makeni, he testified "During
this meeting, all the names I have made mention of, they were present". Immediately prior to this, the witness
had given the names of several commanders, one of whom was Johnny Paul Koroma.

---- End of Page 972 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T GK 18 May 2012 %
A /

command of the forces in Makeni at that time and would therefore have had the ulimate
res onsibilit for the decision to attack Kono.629l
P Y
(iii) Events surrounding the second attack on Kono
2840. With regard to the second attack, there are varying accounts of what happened.
When the forces met resistance on their first attempt to take the Koidu Town, according to
Kargbo, they retreated to Makeni where Koroma received another order from the Accused to
re-attack, pursuant to which Koroma sent Kargbo and others to the liont line with an order
for the troops to re-organise themselves for a second, successful, attack on Koidu Town.6292
None of the other witnesses testified that Koroma expressly ordered the second attack on
Koidu Town or that the Accused ultimately issued such an order. In the main, however, their
testimonies do not substantially contradict Kargbo's account.
2841. The testimony of Isaac Mongor corroborates Kargbo's testimony that Koroma
I retreated to Makeni6293 Several other witnesses testified that Koroma withdrew when the
forces met resistance. Witness TF1-371 testified that he withdrew half-way to Makeni when
he heard that Koidu Town had been captured. His testimony that Koroma was with him
when he entered Koidu Town indicates that Koroma had also withdrawn.6294 Bobson Sesay
testified that upon learning of the initial retreat to Bumpe, Koroma retreated further and after
Koidu Town was captured, Bobson Sesay and others, including Denis Mingo, picked
Koroma up from Magbonkineh and brought him to Koidu Town.6295 That Koroma was
picked up from his village by Mingo is also corroborated by Issa Sesay.6296 Only Witness
TF1-375 testified that Koroma stayed with the advancing troops as they re-organised for the
second attack.6297
2842. While Bobson Sesay testified that the order for the second attack on Kono came from
Issa Sesay,629g Isaac Mongor, TF1-371, Bobson Sesay, TF1-539 and TF1-375 all testified
629] Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7943; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 43994.
6292 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10497-10498.
6293 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5738.
6294 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2358-2359, 2361 (CS).
6295 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7946-7949.
62% Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 43995.
W rrr-275, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12504.
6208 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 7946;

---- End of Page 973 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T / Eq} 18 May 2012 %

that this attack was organised amongst those who remained at the front line.6299 The Trial
Chamber is of the view that this does not preclude an order having been given by Koroma.
(iv) Koroma's Decision to move to Monrovia via Kailahun
2843. Following the recapture of Koidu Town, Koroma was taken to Kailahun. Initially,
Kargbo testitied that after the recapture of Koidu Town, Koroma received a radio message
from Bockarie, via Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman), directing him to go to Buedu.63OO
Koroma then announced that he was going to meet the Accused in Monrovia and ordered the
fighters to "hold the ground" in his absence.63Ol Kargbo testified that the message came
through Bockarie because Koroma's satellite phone had run out of credit and they did not
have a functioning radio set.
2844. There is substantial evidence that Bockarie wanted Koroma to travel to Buedu. Perry
Kamara testitied that the convoy which attacked Koidu Town was organised in Makeni for
the purpose of escorting Koroma to Kailahun.63O2 TF1—371's evidence that the convoy was
organised for the purpose of moving the AFRC headquarters to Kailahun is also consistent
with Kanrara's testimony.63O3 According to Isaac Mongor, Bockarie instructed him to bring
Koroma to Kailahun63O4 and Issa Sesay testitied that Koroma ordered the AFRC/RUF to
withdraw to Kono because he said Koroma had agreed with Bockarie that he would
withdraw to Kailahun.63O5 Sesay's evidence is corroborated by Defence Exhibit D—O84,
Sesay's own Salute Report written in September 1999 in which Sesay reported "I contacted
General Mosquito and the order was given to escort the Former Head of State to our
Kailahun base".63O6 Although all this evidence relates to the period before Koidu Town was
recaptured, the Trial Chamber considers that, in demonstrating Bockarie's intention to move
Koroma to Kailahun, it is consistent with Kargbo's testimony that Bockarie sent the
message to Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) that Koroma should come to Buedu.
6299 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5738; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2358 (CS);
Alimamy Bobsorr Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7946-7947; TF1-539, Transcript 20 August 2008, p.
14140; TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12502-12504, 12508-12509.
6300 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10500-10501.
6301 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10501.
M2 Perry Karrrara, rrarracrrpr 5 February 2008, p. 3095.
°"" rrr-371, Transcript 28 Jarrrrary 2008,p. 2355 (cs).
6304 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5735.
6305 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 43992.

---- End of Page 974 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T %/ 65 18 May 2012 \%

3 @6 7
2845. TFl-585's testimony that after Bockarie returned to Buedu, she heard him say that
Benjamin Yeaten told him to call Koroma down to Buedu, after which he said that he was
going to call Superman to bring Koroma to Buedu also corroborates the testimony of
Kargbo that Bockarie was conveying a message tram the Accused. According to TFl-585,
Bockarie said that Yeaten had told him that the instruction came from Charles Taylor.6307
TFI-585 also testiHed to seeing Bockarie make the call to Superman.6308 While the timing of
the message to bring Koroma to Buedu is unclear, the message itself was attested to by
many witnesses and their testimony is supported by contemporaneous documentary
evidence.
2846. The Trial Chamber notes that Issa Sesay corroborated Kargbo's testimony that the
satellite phone Koroma was using ran out of credit around this time. However, Sesay
testified that this happened when Koroma had already arrived in Kailahun,6309 which would
not have prevented him from calling the Accused after the recapture of Kono. The Trial
Chamber also notes that Witness TFI-371 testified that throughout the journey from Kono to
Kailahun, there was a VHF radio on which they were communicating with Bockarie. Perry
Kamara testified that after the meeting in Makeni, where the attack on Kono was planned,
the convoy travelled in three groups, each of which had a radio operator. The evidence
therefore suggests that, even if his own radio set could not be used, Koroma appears to have
had access to radio communications. However, the Trial Chamber notes Kargbo's testimony
that Koroma's discussions with the Accused regarding a helicopter were not disclosed to
others. The Trial Chamber also notes that satellite phones were a more secure and
confidential means of communication and that the radio stations in Monrovia were
"restricted frequencies".63 [0 ,
(v) The Accused's attempt to evacuate Koroma from Buedu
2847. The Trial Chamber notes that other than Kargbo, no witnesses testified about Land
Rovers sent by the Accused to Buedu with the intention of transporting Koroma's party to
6306 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, From Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", ERN 7761.
6307 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15610-1561 1, 15613-15617; Transcript 8 September 2008, pp.
15641-15642; Transcript 10 September 2008, pp. 15908-15915.
6308 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15616; Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15641-15642, 15646.
6309 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45133.
°3mSee Operational Support, RUP and NPFL Codes and Communications.

---- End of Page 975 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL 03 01 T 18 May 2012 ` %

Monrovia. However, Exhibit D-008 reports that the Liberian security Benjaminém "said that
he was instructed to sneak with J .P. Koroma to Monrovia to avoid suspicion" but that he left
without Koroma when Bockarie told him that Koroma was already "fairly [sic] miles away",
resumabl in Kan ama.°3 12 D-008 further corroborates Kar bo's evidence of a continuin
P Y S S S
plan at this stage to transfer Koroma out of Sierra Leone to Monrovia, although the details of
who was to do that are unclear, as Kargbo did not mention a "Benjamin" in his testimony.
2848. Issa Sesay refuted Kargbo's account regarding the Land Rovers, testifying that
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) was not in Buedu in 1998.6313 The Trial Chamber notes,
however, that it has heard evidence from numerous credible witnesses that Tamba travelled
frequently to Buedu with ammunition during 1998.6314 Sesay also denied that lbrahim Bah
was in Buedu at this time, testifying that he, Sesay, was the one who took Koroma's
diamonds to lbrahim Bah in Monrovia and that these were the diamonds that he lost
there.63l5 Kargbo's testimony that Bah was present in Buedu around the time the diamonds
were taken from Koroma is corroborated by the testimony of TF1-371 that lbrahim Bah
arrived in Buedu on the Accused's orders shortly after Koroma's party caniemé and by
Exhibit D-008,6317 while Sesay's testimony is at odds with his own contemporaneous Salute
Report, D-084, in which he stated that the diamonds that he lost at his "transit point"63l8
were brought to Buedu from Kono by a member of the Mining Unit and were not those
taken from Koroma.63l9 D-008 and P-067 both report that the diamonds taken from Koroma
6311 The Trial Chamber notes that "Benjamin" is a reference to Benjamin Legon, Liberian Security personnel
described by "Brigadier Mike" in the same document. See Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim
Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention",
ERN 12957. Whilst TF 1-371 initially testified that he did not know who this Benjamin was (TF 1-371, Transcript
1 February 2008, p. 2940 (CS)), he later implied that it may in fact be Benjamin Yeaten since the reference to an
instruction "to sneak with J .P.Koroma to Monrovia to avoid suspicion", referred to a meeting with Benjamin
Yeaten in Koindu and that the instruction was given to sneak Koroma away to avoid the alarm of ECOMOG
who were still in the axis on the "Lofa, Gbarnga and Monrovia" highway (TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008,
p. 2941 (CS). .
Gm Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday
Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959-12960.
Om Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45141-45142.
6314 Arms and Ammunitions, February 1998 to December 1999.
6315 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45015-45016; Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 46008, 46010.
6316 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2366-2367, 2370-2371 (CS).
(M7 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday
Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959.
6318 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the "transit point" referred to in Exhibit D-084 is Monrovia. See
Diamonds, Loss of Diamonds by Sesay.
6319 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, From Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September l999", ERN 7761-7762.

---- End of Page 976 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ Gi 18 May 2012 %

were given to Bah for forward transport to Liberia and that the diamonds taken by Sesay to
Monrovia originated in Kono.6320 In view of Augustine Mallah's own testimony that he did
not know anyone by the name of Ibrahim Bah, the Trial Chamber does not place any weight
on his testimony that he did not see Bah in Buedu at the time the diamonds were taken from
Koroma.632l In light of these considerations, the Trial Chamber does not accept Sesay's
challenge to Kargbo's evidence and finds it to be without foundation.
2849. Contemporaneous documentary evidence as well as several witnesses who were in
Buedu at the time corroborate aspects of Kargbo's account concerning the diamonds that
were taken from Koroma, in particular his evidence that new information that Koroma was
planning to use diamonds for his own benefit precipitated Bockarie's order to search
Koroma for diamonds. The testimony of witnesses TF 1-371 and TF 1-585 as well as Exhibit
D-008 corroborate Kargbo's evidence that the diamonds incident was precipitated by Moses
Kabia (a.k.a. Rambo) alerting the RUF to Koroma's plan to escape with diamonds.6322 Issa
Sesay also testified that the diamonds incident was triggered by a disclosure by Moses Kabia
that Koroma was planning to escape, although Sesay's testimony was that Koroma was
lannin I to travel to Ghana, not Liberia, for the u ose of bu `n wea ons.6323 The fact that
P E; P YP Y1 8 P
Koroma's Chief Security Officer, Moses Kabia alerted the RUF to Koroma's intention to
escape to Ghana is also reflected in Sesay's Salute Report, D-084.6324 Exhibit P-0676325 also
corroborates Kargbo's evidence that new information that Koroma was planning to use
diamonds for his own benefit prompted Bockarie's order to search Koroma for diamonds.
Augustine Mallah testified that Koroma himself brought the diamonds to Bockarie's
attention at a meeting in Buedu, which led Bockarie to take the diamonds away from him.
While Mallah recounts this sequence of events as immediate, without mention of Moses
Kabia, it is consistent with Issa Sesay's account that Koroma first told the RUF in Buedu
6320 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9675-9676; D-008, "Unofficial Translation - Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion
between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959, 12961.
$21 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 18 November 2008, pp. 20481-20482.
mz TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2367 (CS); TF1-585, Transcript 10 September 2008, p. 15917;
Exhibit D—008, "Unofficial Translation - Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday
Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12957.
@23 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44410-44416.
6324 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, From Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", ERN 7761.
6325 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9675.

---- End of Page 977 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 %

that he had diamonds with him, and it is consistent with the other accounts that the diamonds
were confiscated by Bockarie.6326 Even though she did not know what was meant when
Bockarie said that he had been told to bring Koroma and his party to Buedu because "they
have something for them", TF1-585's evidence also suggests that Bockarie may already
have known that Koroma was in possession of diamonds when he arrived in Buedu.
2850. While noting the discrepancies in detail regarding the accounts of the various
witnesses of what happened in Buedu, the Trial Chamber finds the larger picture to be
relatively consistent with Kargbo's testimony that Koroma was intending to travel with
diamonds to Monrovia, and that Bockarie intervened and confiscated the diamonds.
(vi) The Defence
2851. The Accused testified that he could not have promised to send Koroma a helicopter
as he did not have a helicopter at this time.°327 The Trial Chamber notes that Augustine
Mallah and Karmoh Kanneh both testified to the use of helicopters by the Accused or his
subordinates in 1998.6328 The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that Mallah and Kanneh are
enerall credible witnesses.°329 The Accused also ave conflictin testimon as to the date
g Y 8 g Y
at which the Liberian government acquired its own helicopters. First he stated that the
Liberian authorities first obtained helicopters in 2000.6330 However, later in his testimony,
the Accused stated that the Liberian government was in possession of Mi-2 helicopters from
the beginning of 1999.633] He then affirmed on cross-examination that the Liberian
government had one Mi-2 helicopter as of 1999, and two Mi-2 helicopters as of the end of
1999.6332 In light of the inconsistencies in the Accused's testimony and the corroborative
evidence of Mallah and Kanneh that the Accused did use helico ters in 1998, the Trial
P
6326 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20194-20195.
@27 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30834-30839.
6328 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20209: Mallah testified that the Accused sent a
helicopter to transport Bockarie from Foya to Monrovia in 1998; Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp.
9453-9455: Kanne}1 testified that he accompanied Bockarie to Foya where a helicopter carrying Benjamin
Yeaten arrived from Monrovia.
6329 Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2522; Credibility
Assessment, Karmoh Kanneh, The Role of Intermediaries, para. 2704.
6330 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27664.
ml Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30605; see also Transcript 16 September 2009, p.
29032 ("We don't get a helicopter until about 1999").
6332 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 January 2010, pp. 33723-33724.

---- End of Page 978 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % (Pg 18 May 2012

Chamber considers that the Accused has not raised a reasonable doubt as to Kargbo's
account on this basis.
2852. The Accused also made reference to two helicopters owned by the Sierra Leonean
government.6333 The Trial Chamber understands the Accused to imply that it would not have
been necessary for him to supply a helicopter when there were two already at the Koroma's
disposal. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that both these helicopters had already been
used on or around 13 February 1998 to fly other Junta commanders, including Victor King,
out of Freetown and been forced by ECOMOG to land in Monrovia6334 where they were
impounded. They were not therefore available to the retreating Koroma. Taylor himself
testified that ECOMOG detained the helicopters and their occupants in Liberia for "at least a
couple of weeks or more".6335 In any event, any helicopters in Sierra Leone may not have
been at Koroma's disposal after he fled Freetown following the collapse of the Junta.
2853. The Defence submits that the Accused did not communicate with Johnny Paul
Koroma via satellite phone at any time until 1999.6336 The Accused testified more broadly
that he had neither radio nor phone contact with Koroma before August 1999.6337 In addition
to assessing the credibility of the Accused's assertion more generally, it is relevant to the
Trial Chamber to consider in the context of the current allegation whether the Accused and
Koroma had communicated before the Intervention, such that Koroma therefore had a prior
relationship with the Accused and the means to contact him when he was seeking to escape
from Sierra Leone after the flight from Freetown. In that regard, the Trial Chamber has
heard credible evidence that Gibril Massaquoi brought telephone numbers for, inter alia, the
Accused to Koroma in the early days of the Junta regime6338 following which Koroma
6333 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30836.
6334 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, pp. 25575-25576; Exhibit P-132, "IRIN-West Africa
Update 146, 98.2.16, University of Pennsylvania — African Studies Center, 14-16 February 1998", ERN 100147,
para. 1. See also Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of Activities of
the Chief Executive of Liberia, August 2 1997 — December 31 1998", p. 239, which records that two helicopters
flew into James Spriggs Payne Airport where they were intercepted by ECOMOG. The Liberian Minister of
Defence requested ECOMOG to hand the personnel and helicopters over to the Liberian Government to which
ECOMOG responded that the personnel would be handed over at some future time.
6335 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, p. 25576.
6336 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 860.
M7 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2008, p. 29546.
6338 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10442; Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10666-10667, 10737. See
Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Realtionship with the RUF/AFRC, Junta Period.

---- End of Page 979 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z GLX 18 May 2012 %

390 7 Z
engaged in several telephone conversations with the Accused.6339 That the evidence
indicates that these conversations took place on a landline telephone is irrelevant since it
demonstrates that Koroma had the Accused's telephone number and had communicated with
him by telephone before the February 1998 Intervention. The Trial Chamber also notes Isaac
Mongor's evidence that before the Intervention, the Accused and Koroma had discussed by
radio the prospect of Koroma visiting the Accused in Monrovia.6340 In light of the foregoing
evidence, the Trial Chamber does not find the Accused's testimony credible.
2854. The Defence also contests the allegation by reference to Mohamed Kabbah's
evidence that he did not see or hear any message from Charles Taylor ordering the RUF to
hold Kono or any radio message that could have come from Charles Taylor whereby orders
were given about operations in Kono or the retreat from Freetown.63 41 It is Kargbo's
testimony that if such an instruction or advice was given to Koroma, this happened during
confidential conversations on a satellite phone, not over the radio where Kabbah could have
overheard them. As such, the Trial Chamber is not of the view that Kabbah's evidence
contradicts Kargbo's testimony.
(vii) Conclusions
2855. The Trial Chamber notes that Kargbo's evidence is substantially corroborated in
various aspects. With regard to some details it is inconsistent with the testimony of other
witnesses, but the Trial Chamber notes that there are numerous inconsistencies among all the
witnesses with regard to precisely when and where meetings took place, who was present at
those meetings, and how the miiltary events relating to the recapture of Kono unfolded. The
Trial Chamber considers that these discrepancies are not major and can be explained by the
disorder that generally surrounds a military retreat and regrouping. In the Trial Chamber's
view there is broad correlation among the accounts of the various witnesses. Recalling that
Kargbo's testimony is often imprecise,6342 the Trial Chamber finds that the inconsistencies
noted do not challenge his credibility and it accepts his testimony that the Accused was in
contact with Koroma and twice instructed him to capture Kono.
6339 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10445-10447, 10455; Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10667-
10668, 10671-10672, 10738. Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Realtionship with the RUF/AFRC,
Junta Period.
6340 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5717-5718, 5725-5726.
634] Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 29.
6342 Credibility Assessment, Samuel Kargbo, para 290-295.

---- End of Page 980 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % @A 18 May 2012

(b) Order to hold Kono
2856. With regard to the order allegedly given by the Accused to hold Kono after it had
been recaptured, the most detailed evidence in support of this allegation is in the testimony
of Perry Kamara. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Kamara is a generally credible
witness.6444 Perry Kamara testified that he took down a radio message from Bockarie to Issa
Sesay and Superman telling them that he had consulted with the Accused who told him not
to lose Kono because from there he could get diamonds to trade with Taylor for
ammunition.6444 Kamara said Bockarie repeated this message frequently saying that mining
in Kono would enable them to get anns and ammunition, food and drugs rrpm Taylor.6345
2857. TFl-371, whom the Trial Chamber also finds to be generally credible,6346 testified
that alter one of his trips to Monrovia in 1998, Bockarie mentioned that he had received an
instruction from the Accused that the RUF should "ensure that we maintain Kono".6344 The
Trial Chamber considers it most likely that this trip to Monrovia and the instruction
mentioned occurred later in time, because the witness mentions the diamonds that were
subsequently taken tram Koroma as having been given to the Accused. Nevertheless, the
Trial Chamber notes that the instruction is consistent with Kamara's testimony, and that
Kamara testified that Bockarie repeated it frequently.6446 Mongor's account corroborates
Kamara's testimony in so far as he testified that Bockarie gave the order to hold Kono
although he did not mention the Accused in this context.6446
2858. Samuel Kargbo testified that after Koroma received a message from Bockarie to
travel to Kailahun, he convened a meeting of the AFRC and RUF high command and
announced that he was going to meet Taylor in Monrovia but would be back. He ordered the
fighters to "hold the ground" in his absence.6456 However, there is no indication in Kargbo's
6443 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.
6344 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3102, 3142.
6345 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3135.
6446 Credibility Assessment, TFl-371, paras 220-226.
6347 TFl—37l, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2384-2385 (cs).
6646 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3135.
6444 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5744-5745.
6356 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10500-10501.

---- End of Page 981 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T dm 18 May 2012

3 70 7 4
testimony that the order ultimately came from the Accused. Similarly, Issa Sesay testified
that Koroma told the troops to "defend Kono" without any reference to the Accused.635l
2859. The Trial Chamber does not find dispositive Mohamed Kabbah's evidence that he
did not see or hear any message from Charles Taylor ordering the RUF to hold Kono or any
radio message that could have come from Charles Taylor whereby orders were given about
operations in Kono or the retreat from Freetown. It is Kamara's testimony that if such an
instruction or advice was given to Bockarie, this happened in person in Monrovia6652 and not
over the radio.
2860. The Defence contests the Prosecution's allegation regarding the Accused's order to
hold Kono by reference to Karmoh Kanneh's evidence regarding the meeting in December
1998 at which the offensive against Kono was planned. The Defence also relies on TF 1-
371 's evidence that Bockarie made plans with Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon after the failed
F itti-F atta mission in mid-1998.6353 The Trial Chamber does not find this evidence relevant
in deciding whether the Accused told Bockarie to hold Kono in February/March 1998. The
Trial Chamber will deal with this evidence in relation to the allegations regarding the
mission to attack Kono in December 1998.
2861. The Accused denied that any instructions that Bockarie may have made to his troops
to hold Kono originated from him.6354 In light of the credible evidence the Trial Chamber
has heard from both Perry Kamara and TF 1-371 that Bockarie was told by the Accused that
the AF RC/RUF should maintain control over Kono, the Trial Chamber does not accept this
denial.
2862. The Trial Chamber has reviewed the Prosecution's submission that the order to hold
Kono was reiterated by the Accused at a secret meeting through his representatives Ibrahim
Bah and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle)6656 and notes that the testimony of Mohamed Kabbah
and Albert Saidu cited does not contain any evidence relating to an order to hold Kono.
Indeed, the Prosecution's own summary of the evidence refers to an alleged direction from
635] Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44001.
6352 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3102-3142.
6653 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 29.
G1 54 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29020.
6355 Prosecution Final Trial Brief. para. 154.

---- End of Page 982 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.—03—01—T Gu 18 May 2012

the Accused to "take hold" i.e. capture, rather than to "hold" Kono.6356 This evidence will be
dealt with by the Trial Chamber in relation to the allegations regarding the subsequent Fitti-
Fatta mission in mid- 1 998.
Findings
2863. The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused told Johnny
Paul Koroma to capture Kono, and after a first failed attempt, the Accused gave instructions
for a second attack, which led to the ultimate recapture of Koidu Town in Kono District by
the AFRC/RUF in late February/early March 1998.
2864. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused told Bockarie to be sure to maintain control of Kono for the purpose of
trading diamonds with him for arms and ammunition.
3. Operation Fitti-Fatta
Submissions of the Parties
2865. The Prosecution alleges that when the AFRC/RUF were again pushed out of Koidu
Town, the Accused ordered them through his own Liberian subordinates and through Sam
Bockarie, to retake Koidu Town. Thereafter, "Taylor continua1ly issued directives and
encouragement to Bockarie conceming the urgency of recapturing Kono District".6357
2866. The Prosecution also alleges that the Accused planned Fitti-Fatta, the attack 0n
Koidu Town in June 1998,6358 as the first step in a "big mission" to recapture Freetown and
thus control Sierra Leone. According to that plan, the initial attacks would aim to first secure
the Kono District in the N0rth-East but formed part of a greater multi-axis Operation
encompassing attacks from the N0rth via Koinadugu and B0mbali and from the East via
Kenema District, with all groups converging on Masiaka before moving on to Waterl00.6359
2867. The Defence does not contest that the RUF, specifically Bockarie and Denis Ming0
(a.k.a. Superman), or Bockarie, Ming0 and Mike Lamin planned the Fitti-Fatta Operation
°35° Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 154.
6357 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 155, 158.
6358 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 6, 150, 157.
6359 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 150, 156, 159, 418.

---- End of Page 983 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G1.; 18 May 2012

which was launched in July 1998,6666 or August 1998,666l and which ended in failure.6662 lt
submits, however, that the Accused neither planned nor participated in the Fitti-Fatta
mission6666 and that the meeting to plan the mission was nothing m0re than that — a meeting
to plan an attack on Kono and there were no other targets discussed.6664 The Defence
challenges specific aspects of Perry Kamara's testimony regarding the overarching plan to
capture Freetown and thus Sierra Leone.6666
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Peg Kamara
2868. In early 1998, witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radi0 Operator,6666 was based with
Superman in Kono after the first attack on Koidu Town in 1998.6667 He testified that around
April or May 1998, he accompanied Superman to Buedu. Superman had been called to
Buedu in order for Sam Bockarie to explain to him the plan that he had brought from
Charles Taylor in Liberia so that Superman, in return, could come and explain this to the
other fighters and other camps on the ground. After they arrived, he and Superman attended
a meeting called by Bockarie at his house which was also attended by Mike Lamin, Isaac
Mong0r and Pa R0gers, as well as "other auth0rities on the ground". He testified that m0st
0f the battalion and brigade commanders were there.6666
2869. The first item on the agenda was Sesay's loss of the diamonds he had taken to
Monrovia. Bockarie confirmed that Sesay had been sent to Pendembu as part of his
punishment and that the matter would finally be dealt with when Foday Sankoh was released
from Nigeria.6666 Bockarie then showed the group to two r00ms in his house where they saw
6666 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 607.
666l Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 108.
6662 Defence Final Trial Brief] paras 606-607, 924, 1108, 1110.
6666 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 530, 877.
6664 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 606, 896; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 31,
f00tnote 29.
6365 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 891-898.
6666 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
6667 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3103, 3112-3115.
6666 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3159-3161.
6666 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3161-3162.

---- End of Page 984 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 61: 18 May 2012

S 7 9 7 7
arms and boxes of ammunition, a commercial radio and a satellite phone.677O In the meeting,
Bockarie also discussed the building of an airstrip in Buedu.°777
2870. Kamara explained that Bockarie had recently returned from visiting Taylor who had
given him a "very big plan" to take over Sierra Leone. After the group had inspected the
ammunition, they brought out a map of Sierra Leone and Bockarie said "this is how Taylor
has planned and he told [me] to come and implement it". Bockarie showed the attendees on
a map the towns that Taylor had told them to attack: Koidu Town (a.k.a. Kono, a.k.a.
Sefadu), Kabala, Makeni, Magburaka, Matotoka, Mile 91, Masiaka, Waterloo, Port Loko
and Kambia. Kamara said Bockarie "said that was what they planned before he left Mr
Taylor".°777
2871. Kamara testified that Taylor's plan required Superman and SAJ Musa to be jointly
responsible attacking Kabala and Makeni. The group that was going to join Gullit in Rosos
were going to be responsible for Port Loko and Kambia, including Lungi Airport. Those
who were left behind in Kono after Superman left were going to be responsible for Kono,
Sewafe, Makali, Magburaka and Mile 91. The meeting point for all the troops would then be
Masiaka because that was a main junction in Sierra Leone. After the troops reached
Waterloo, they should then make "a fresh plan, a new one". Bockarie said that that was what
Taylor had told. him.6373 The ultimate destination was to be Freetown after all these district
headquarters had been captured. 6374
2872. Kamara explained that the Fitti-Fatta mission was supposed to happen before, not as
part of, the big mission. The focus of Fitti—Fatta to attack and capture Koidu Town in order
to create panic among ECOMOG so that they would be confined to Koidu Town and "would
not be able to make moves towards us". Bockarie told them that the arms and ammunition
he had showed them were not for "this first mission plan". He said that Taylor had told him
that he would provide more ammunitions for this "big mission" later.6775
6370 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3162-3163.
@71 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3167.
6372 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3163-3164, 3179-3180.
6373 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3163-3164, 3174; Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3220.
6374 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3164.
6375 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3167, 3169-71; Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3180.

---- End of Page 985 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GB 18 May 2012 M

gf 0 7 C?
2873. According to Kamara, as part of the plan, Bockarie told Superman to join SAJ Musa
in Koinadugu District "for a fast and smooth operation, because SAJ Musa was not so good
at jungle operations". Bockarie therefore gave Superman ammunition for that location too,
saying that he should carry them directly to SAJ Musa's place after Fitti-Fatta.6376 Kamara
explained that SAJ Musa was already aware of this plan for Superman to go and join him
because before Superman left Superman Ground to come to Buedu, SAJ Musa, Superman
and Mosquito "always discussed on that". Kamara stated that there was a message to that
effect following a radio discussion: that Bockarie had gone and got instructions about a
mission from Taylor in Liberia. Bockarie said that Superman was to go to Buedu and that
Superman should go to SAJ Musa to explain to him anything that was discussed in Buedu.
Kamara explained that at times the three men called each other and sometimes they sent
messages.6377 While Superman, Mosquito and SAJ Musa had a relationship at that time and
spoke about this issue, SAJ Musa accepted that Superman should go to meet him so that
they could carry out their military exercise together.6378
2874. Kamara testified that the Fitti-Fatta mission commenced at night at 7.00pm and
ended the next morning. lt was short-lived because so many fighters were wounded and
killed.6379 After the Fitti-Fatta mission, around end-May 1998, Superman moved to
Koinadugu where SAJ Musa was stationed.6380
2875. Kamara testified that, around a week after Johnny Paul Koroma and Issa Sesay
arrived in Buedu, Koroma met with Sam Bockarie and transmitted a radio message for all
AFRC, RUF and STF saying that because he did not understand jungle exercise, he was
asking all the AFRC and RUF to be taking command from Mosquito and that, from the date
he wrote the message, Sam Bockarie should be leader for the movement from then on.63 81 In
response to the order, SAJ Musa said that he was an old military man and that Mosquito was
a guerrilla so he would not allow Mosquito to control him and he was not part of that
order.°382 Another group, comprising Gullit, Five-Five, Bazzy, Papa and Junior Lion, who
6316 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3164, 3167, 3169, 3171.
6377 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3168.
6318 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3166-3169.
6379 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3171.
6380 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3172.
6381 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3110-311 1.
6382 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3111.

---- End of Page 986 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03—01-T @$~ 18 May 2012 ji

were not happy with the order, "went and had their own area that was far from Kono".6666
Kamara later testified that they moved to Rosos in Bombali District when this incident
occurred.6664 Once they had established themselves at Rosos, Gullit contacted SAJ Musa
who informed Bockarie that they were there. Kamara explained that by that time they were
only able to communicate a little with SAJ Musa because the radio was not good at all.
Sometimes they could only manage once a week but SAJ Musa was able to give the details
to Sam Bockarie.6665
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
2876. Witness TF1-371, an RUF commander6666 who was in Buedu between March 1998
and April 1999,6667 testified that he did not recall any meeting between Denis Mingo and
Bockarie before Mingo moved to the Kabala axis. TF1-371 also testified that after one of the
trips to Monrovia in 1998, Bockarie mentioned that he had received a "specific instruction"
from Taylor that the RUF should "ensure that we maintain Kono...and at the same time to
ensure that we recapture Freetown, recapture Freetown".6666 TF1-371 testified that Bockarie
ordered a mission around mid-1998 led by "Kallon and others" which was called Fitti-Fatta.
It was aborted when they met strong resistance from ECOMOG. By "aborted", the witness
meant that they were unsuccessful in their mission to capture Kono.6669
6383 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 1 1.
mt Perry Kamm, Transcript 5 Fppmary 2008, pp. 3173—3174.
6665 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3173—3174.
6686 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555—2556 (CS).
63*7 TF1-371, Transcript 28 February 2008, p. 2389 (cs).
6366 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2384—2385 (CS) ("There was one particular time he came back he
was really very excited. Once he was able to establish contact with Mr Taylor, once he met Mr Taylor himself
and confirmed that the diamonds that he took from Johnny Paul Koroma were actually in the possession of Mr
Taylor, he was excited about that. Once he came we had a meeting where he mentioned about a specific
instruction that he had received from Mr Taylor and that was what he said: To ensure that we maintain Kono,
and that was the time when he intensified the mining operation in Kono so as to enable to pay for those
materials, and at the same time to ensure that we recapture Freetown, recapture Freetown. He mentioned that
briefly, one of those trips. So after that the mining at Tongo and Kono District were intensified. Well, Kono
was —— had always been the bread basket for the junta, for the RUF. 1t had always been the source of supporting,
or sustaining, the armed rebellion through the diamond products and that was the only source. 1 mean, in fact, we
had all the diamonds. That was the source that Johnny Paul Koroma had the diamonds from in the first place, so
that was the reason why he said he received that instruction, so I mean it was nothing really of surprise to any of
us").
6369 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2394 (CS).

---- End of Page 987 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J GK 18 May 2012 j

2877. TF1-371 testified that Bockarie made "a series of trips" to Monrovia throughout "the
latter part of 1998",639O "after June, July, August",639l "from 1998 ending to early 199976392
While he could specifically recall tl1ree trips that were essential, there were other trips, the
precise number of which he could not recall.6393
Prosecution Witness TF1 -375
2878. Witness TFl-375, an RUF fighter,6394 testified that about three weeks after they
retreated from Koidu Town, Bockarie contacted Superman via radio to advise that he was
sending "guests" from Buedu who had come from Liberia. Superman sent people to receive
them at the Moa River, and they retumed accompanied by up to eight Liberians. The men
had Liberian accents and brought arms and ammunition, as well as two medicine men who
marked the fighters to protect them. The medicine men told the fighters that they had done
the same to fighters "during the NPFL time under Taylor". TF1-3 75 testified that one of the
Liberians was an SSS officer named "Osebo Demy", whom he came to know subsequently
in Liberia as one of Yeaten's subordinates in the SSS. 6395
2879. The witness testified that two forums of senior officers were called. The witness
attended the first, an open forum, where the Liberians
said that they had brought arms and ammunition from Liberia. He stated that the Liberians
"want[ed] us to retake Kono, Koidu Town. .. because it would be important for us. When we
take back Koidu Town, mining would be going on and we would have a lot of support.6396
The second, closed-door forum, took place at Superman's house between Superman, the
Liberians, Rambo, and Honourable Adams of the AFRC. Superman also told the witness
after his meeting with the Liberians that they had also told him to take over Kono so that
mining could take place there and that that would help them move faster with the war.6397
""° TF1-371, rrrrrrrprrpr 1 February 2008, p. 2825 (cs).
639] TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2826 (CS).
6392 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2382 (CS) ("[...] from 1998 ending to early 1999 there were a lot of
activities, people coming into RUF controlled territories and Mosquito frequenting Mom·ovia").
6393 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2382-2383 (CS).
63** TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jrrrrp 2008, p, 12485.
(M5 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12523-12528.
°"" TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jrrrrp 2008, pp. 12524-12525.
""" fri-575, Transcript 23 Jrrrrp 2008, pp. 12524-12555, 12530.

---- End of Page 988 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T j 0-% 18 May 2012 ~

2880. TFl-375 stated that the goal of the Fitti-Fatta mission was "to just go on the ramEnd of Page
and retake over Koidu Town" but that it was unsuccessful.6398 TF1-375 testified that
Superman instmcted him to go to Wordu to join Komba Gbundema, to hand over the
ammunition to him and to go to Kumbonla to meet SAJ Musa to work with him to attack
Mongo Bendugu. On the basis of that instmction, the witness went to Wordu two days after
the Fitti-Fatta mission.°444
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
2881. Witness Karmoh Kanneh, a senior commander in the RUF,°4O0 testified to a meeting
called by Bockarie and attended by around 600 commanders and soldiers, including Johnny
Paul Koroma, Jungle, Issa Sesay, Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman), Isaac Mongor, Eddie Kanneh, "AB", "FOC", Akim Turay and SYB Rogers,
taking place on the Foya Road between Waterworks and Buedu between April and June
1998,°4m before the death of Sani Abacha. Kanneh said that Sam Bockarie had just returned
from Monrovia at this time and that the meeting took place in thick forest because they were
afraid of the air raids. Bockarie spoke at the meeting about, inter alia, his new promotion,
the command stmcture between the AFRC and RUF, the Fitti-Fatta mission, difficulties with
SAJ Musa, Bockarie's planned trip to Burkina Faso with General Ibrahim and the diamonds
that Issa Sesay had lost in Monrovia.6402 SAJ Musa was not at the meeting as he was in the
northern area.°4O3
2882. Kanneh stated that Bockarie said that "he would want us to go and clear the mining
area, that is Kono, and that the Pa, Charles Taylor, had told him that nothing goes for
nothing and that he had no machine to make arms".°4O4 Bockarie was planning to go to
6394 TFI-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12541; Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14824-14825.
6349 TFI-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12544.
6400 Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.
6401 Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9393. The Trial Chamber notes that the witness gave several
different accounts about when the meeting took place. On cross-examination, Kanneh testified twice that the
meeting took place after the death of Sani Abacha in June 1998 (Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp.
9600-9601, 9678). On the second of these occasions, he stated that it could have been around August or
September. Kanneh also denied that he had told the Prosecution Investigators in a prior statement that the
meeting took place before the death of Sani Abacha (Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9689).
4402 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9392-9394, 9399; Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9683-9684,
9689.
6403 Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9395; Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9687.
6404 Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9396.

---- End of Page 989 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % G9 18 May 2012

390 .€ 2
Burkina Faso "in that same month. After the month that we held the meeting, after the Fitti-
F atta operation..".6405
2883. Kanneh testified that Bockarie had told Taylor about "Operation Free the Leader",
the mission in which the RUF planned to capture Freetown and release Foday Sankoh. As
this plan would require heavy weaponry, Taylor had offered to "link us up where we would
be able to get direct material".640°
2884. Kanneh testified that after Bockarie had spoken, Jungle spoke and buttressed the
introduction Sam Bockarie had given and said that he would try his utmost best to see that
things worked out well. Johnny Paul Koroma and others also spoke during the meeting that
lasted for eight hours.6407 Jungle did not give any order on Taylor's behalf at the meeting.6408
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
2885. wtthsss Albert sarah, sh RUF sdjutshtfmg testified that th ststthd Aptti 19986410 he
was among those called by Bockarie to a forum in a secret location between Buedu and
Dawa. It was attended by a number of senior commanders including Issa Sesay, Peter Vandi,
Augustine Gbao and Superman. Colonel Jungle and General Ibrahim were also there as
guests. The witness was told by a colleague that the Liberian General seated close to Colonel
Jungle at the high table was General Ibrahim. Bockarie subsequently introduced him and
General Ibrahim subsequently introduced himself because "most of us did not actually know
him.64ll At this forum, Sesay's loss of the diamonds in Monrovia, pressure on the
AF RC/RUF from ECOMOG and the CDF, and the building of an airstrip in Buedu were
discussed. Bockarie said that the reason he called the meeting was for him to explain the
situation with the diamonds to everyone and that in the RUF they did not have any other
6405 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9397.
6406 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9397-9398,
°"°°7 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9398.
6408 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9684.
6409 Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10887; Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
MIO Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11353.
MH Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11054-11055, 11057-11059.

---- End of Page 990 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T /
way or means to get materials: it was only through the diamonds they passed over to Charles
Taylor in exchange for arms and ammunition.6412
2886. Saidu stated that Colonel Jungle addressed the meeting, thanking Sam Bockarie and
all of those who came saying that:
[H]e was praying that the cause of the revolution will be successful. He said he was there to tell us that the
RUF and the AFRC and the relationship between them was recognised by Charles Taylor, and that he was
saying that although we have been pushed out of the city, we shouldn’t worry ourselves, but that he was
advising that we try and get hold over Kono, that was where we will get our resources.6414
2887. General Ibrahim then addressed the meeting:
[He] buttressed what they came to do. What Colonel Jungle had already addressed us about, that Charles
Taylor sent them to come and prove to us that he is still with us, that we shouldn’t worry, although we have
been pushed out he is tiying to — we should be prepared to settle down and he is trying for us to get more
materials to strike again and so that we will be able to capture places like Kono and so many other places. 6414
He said that although most of us had seen Colonel Jungle before but [sic] he had now come to tell us that
indeed he is coming directly from Charles Taylor and that both of them, they have come to address us on the
relationship between Charles Taylor and the RUF and that the relationship was still going strong, that we
shou1dn’t mind although we have been pushed out. He said that the only thing that he was advising was that we
should try and recapture Kono and that the AFRC and us, we should always my and work hand in glove
because if there were infightings amongst us we will not be able to concentrate on the tighting.6415
2888. Saidu testified that when General Ibrahim introduced himself he said that he was
part of the Liberian govemment working under Charles Taylor and that was why he
came.6416
2889. The witness explained:
Well, Kono — we know that Kono is where diamonds are. That was where we were able to mine and get
diamonds very fast to speed up the revolution that we were fighting. But if we hadn't grips on Kono for us to
get money or diamonds to fight the revolution, because the materials were being bought, we will not be able to
get the materials except we will fight hard to get Kono for us to be able to sponsor the revolution.6417
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
6412 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1 1054-1 1056.
6413 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1 1055-1 1056.
6414 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1059.
4415 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1060.
‘*""’ Albert sardu, rrarrscrrpr 5 Jurre 2008,p. 11060.
4417 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1 1060-1 1061.

---- End of Page 991 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T JZ GL 18 May 2012

2890. Witness Mohamed Kabbah (a.k.a. Tourist), an RUF radio operator°4l8 in Buedu after
the 1ntervention,64l9 testified that around a month after he arrived in Buedu and after
Bockarie had been to Monrovia and retumed, he attended a meeting at a place called
Waterworks on the Dawa Road leading towards F oya.6420 Kabbah stated that a "large
crowd" attended including Issa Sesay, Denis Mingo, Monkey Brown, Operator Zedman,
King Perry, AF RC fighters and advisers such as Pa Rogers.642l
2891. At the meeting, chaired by Bockarie, Kabbah testified that the fighters discussed the
construction of an airstrip at a village near Buedu, how they were to take Kono from
ECOMOG so that they could undertake mining to get ammunition to continue the struggle,
and the issue of Sesay losing diamonds.6422 Kabbah explained that because Sesay had lost
the diamonds that he was supposed to be taking to Charles Taylor, Bockarie had gone back
to Monrovia. Kabbah said:
So the struggle had reached a point when these bits and pieces of ammunition that we were getting from
Liberia was dwindling because the area of the struggle had become large and, you know, it is ammunition that
fights war. So when Sam Bockarie returned it was at that time that he spoke about that, that he had discussed
that with Charles Taylor, that we should try and get Kono and when we would have taken Kono we would get
ammunition because when we get Kono we will get diamonds and he will help us to get ammunition. That was
the discussion; the retaking of Kono so that we can mine and get enough ammunition, because the bits and
pieces that he's6423 been giving us used to help us. But what we wanted did not happen. That was a clear
example, when he took that diamond the type of ammunition that he brought.6424
fW]hat 1 mean is that you want — you wanted a hundred boxes and when you go there somebody gives you ten,
you will take it because you had no option. So the hundred that we wanted, if we had our diamonds, when we
take them we will get our hundred.6425
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -585
M8 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
wg Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16126.
6420 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16145—16147.
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16147.
Om Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp, 16147—16148, 16151.
6423 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16151 (by "he", he was referring to Charles Taylor).
6424 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16149.
6425 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16150.

---- End of Page 992 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % Gm 18 May 2012

2892. Witness TFI-585, an RUF radio operator,6426 testified that in September 1998,6427
Sam Bockarie convened a meeting in his compound with Issa Sesay, Junior Rambo (CO
Isaac), Five-Five and Jungle. The purpose of the meeting was, in part, to discuss Sesay's
punishment for losing diamonds in Monrovia and how to encourage the disgruntled soldiers
to attack Kono in order to compensate for the diamonds lost by Sesay. TF1-585 knew that
the meeting was called for these reasons because she heard Bockarie discussing with Eddie
Kanneh about how Issa had lost the diamonds, that was a big setback for the movement and
that the soldiers were all disgruntled. Bockarie said Issa feared being sent to the front lines
so he wanted to convene that meeting "for the boys to be happy and everybody would come
up with the decision as to what punishment was to be meted out to Issa and to organise that".
The witness testified that Sam Bockarie was to organise the punishment and give more arms
and ammunition to send missions out to Kono and they would name the mission Fitti-Fatta.
TFI-585 stated that she did not attend the meeting herself but that those who attended told
her the same things about it. The outcome of the meeting was a decision to send Sesay to the
front line as punishment where he would lead the mission to recapture Kono Town: "He
should be there until Kono was captured. He should clear Kono".6428
2893. TF1-585 testified that after the meeting, she saw Bockarie supply arms and
ammunition to Issa Sesay, Rambo and the other fighters from the warehouse in front of his
house, as well as used clothing and brand new white sneakers. Everything was in V
abundance.6429
2894. TFI-585 said that the Fitti-Fatta mission was carried out around two to three weeks
after the meeting. She later read in the log-book that Superman, who was also around Kono
at the time, had sent a radio message to Sam Bockarie reporting that the soldiers had failed
to capture Koidu Town but had succeeded in capturing some ammunition and some Guinean
6426 TFI-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15582-15584, 15589-15592 (PS).
W7 During her examination-in-chief TFI-585 testified that three meetings took place in June, September and
December 1999. On cross-examination, she corrected her testimony to say that they occurred in 1998 (TFI-585,
Transcript ll September 2008, pp. 15972-15973). In view of TFl-585's testimony in chief that the three
meetings took place in the June, September and December before "January 6" (TFI-585, Transcript 8 September
2008, p. 15682), and that they took place within the same year that Johnny Paul Koroma was removed from
power in Freetown (TFI-585, Transcript 8 September 1998, p. 15672), together with the witness's correction
during her cross-examination, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the witness is referring to events that she
recalled occurring in 1998.
6428 TFI-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15666-15668; Transcript ll September 2008, p. 15975.
mg TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15668-15669.

---- End of Page 993 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T qbb 18 May 2012
Kaos;
soldiers. She explained that Superman sent the message because Issa Sesay was too
arra1a.6‘""
2895. TFl-585 testified that the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999 was discussed at
the next (third) meeting which was held in Buedu.6466
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2896. Witness Isaac Mongor, a senior commander of the RUF6462 based in Kono District
after the Intervention,6466 testified that about a month after he arrived in Koidu, ECOMOG
flushed them out of Koidu Town.6464 Mongor stated that he, along with Superman and other
commanders and Vanguards in Koidu, was called to Buedu for a meeting but that he was
unable to go. Mongor clarified that he was unable to go to the meeting because he and
Superman, as the two commanders, could not leave at the same time so Mongor sent
someone to represent him.6466
2897. After the meeting, Superman met Mongor at Gandorhun where he was based and
explained what had happened. Mongor stated that Superman came with a lot of ammunition.
Superman told Mongor that the meeting they had was for "us" to run a mission to capture
Koidu and dislodge ECOMOG there. The name of the mission was to be Fitti-Fatta. After
his conversation with Superman, Mongor then received a call from Mosquito who confirmed
what Superman had told him, saying that a small amount of ammunition had arrived and that
"Brother Jungle" had taken it from Taylor. Bockarie explained that they had sent them the
ammunition for them to endeavour to take Koidu Town from ECOMOG. Mongor said "he
showed me the ammunition and I agreed for us to go on that mission".6466 Mongor testified
that in that mission, "we were to ensure that we recaptured Koidu and we were to kill
anybody whom we could lay hands on". The attack on Kono was not successful. 6467 The
witness could not remember the precise month of Fitti—Fatta but confirmed that it was not
6436 TPI-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15669-15670, 16974-16975.
6464 TPI-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15691-15692, Transcript 11 September 2008, p. 15981.
6432 See for example Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
6443 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5742.
6464 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5751.
6436 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5747-5748.
6466 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5748.

---- End of Page 994 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T F! pg 18 May 2012

long after they had been pushed out of Koidu Town that they undertook the mission and that
it took place in the dry season of 1998, before the inception of the rainy season.6436
Prosecution Witness TFl-567
2898. Witness TF1-567, an RUF member,6434 testified that while he was stationed at
Balahun in Kailahun District, he received infonnation that Supennan had organised troops
who called themselves Fitti-Fatta and tried to re-attack Koidu Town. Supennan had received
his ammunition for the attack from Sam Bockarie.6446
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
2899. Witness Alice Pyne, an RUF radio operator,6444 testified that at some time after Issa
Sesay had lost diamonds in Monrovia6444 but before Sani Abacha died,6444 Bockarie called a
meeting in Buedu to decide what to do about the diamonds. There had been some disquiet
among the commanders following the incident because they felt that Bockarie had shown
favouritism to Sesay by punishing him so lightly, so Bockarie had called them to Buedu to
tell them what had happened and what they had to do.6444 The witness, Supennan and
around 150 of his men attended.6446 P ne testified that when she arrived in Buedu, Sam
Y
Bockarie's radio operator Sebatu came and told her that Bockarie was going to Foya in
Liberia, following which the witness saw Bockarie and his bodyguards leave in their
vehicles from her house, which was not far from Bockarie's. Later the same afternoon,
Bockarie returned.6446 The witness testified that she did not see the things they brought but
when she was ready to return to Supennan Ground, the things that they gave to Supennan
6467 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5750.
6*3* Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5751.
6439 rrr-567, rr.rrrSrr1pr2 Jury 2008, p. 12833 (Ps).
6446 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12907.
644] Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12074.
6442 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12209-12211; Transcript 19 June pp. 12233-12234.
6446 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12211; Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12246.
6444 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12209-12211; Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12233.
6445 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12211.
6446 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12236-12237.

---- End of Page 995 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T //' OA 18 May 2012
\_]

included arms, ammunition and alcoholic drinks and they said they had brought them from
FOYEL6447
2900. At Bockarie's request, Pyne then went with Superman into the zoebush outside
Buedu where there were up to seven herbalists and juju men who said they would mark the
RUF fighters to make them bulletproof at the "war 1iont".6448 Pyne testified that she also
saw Colonel Jungle in the zoebush at this time.°444 Pyne explained that she knew the
herbalists were from Liberia, both from the language they spoke and because that was what
Bockarie told Superman when he was handing them over to him. Pyne also testified that an
elderly Gbandi woman had told her that the herbalists had been sent to Bockarie by Charles
Taylor to help protect the RUF fighters, particularly those who would go to recapture Koidu
Town from ECOMOG, against bullets.°450 They then travelled back to Kono together with
the herbalists, where Pyne described further markings taking place.°45l
2901. The witness confirmed that the mission in question was called Fitti-Fatta.°452 Pyne
testified that before they left for the mission, Superman met with commanders and the men
whom these commanders had brought, and the men who were at her own base, and they
planned how to carry out this operation in Koidu, whereby all these commanders were to
attack Koidu from their own positions.°453 Pyne confirmed that she herself went on the
mission which lasted one night and was unsuccessful. However, she testified that when they
engaged the Guineans in combat, the Guineans ran away, abandoning their arms, heavy
weapons and "a lot" of ammunition, which the rebels took and put in a vehicle.°454 Pyne
explained that they withdrew because ECOMOG launched a bomb at Five-Five bridge,
killing over 20 RUF men. The witness was not sure exactly what time the other troops
withdrew but she left Koidu Town around 4.30am.6455
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
6447 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12237.
6**8 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12236-12238.
6449 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12236, 12310-12313.
6450 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 April 2008, p. 12238.
°"‘ Amp Pypp, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12239, 12241-12244.
4452 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 1998, p. 12239.
4454 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 1998, p. 12245.
4444 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12246-12247.
M55 Alice Pypp, 'Transcript 19 Jupp 2008, p. 12248.

---- End of Page 996 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T _% Gb! 18 May 2012

2902. Witness Foday Lansana (a.k.a. C0 Nya), an RUF radio operator,6456 was based with
Bai Bureh in Tefiya after the rebel forces were pushed out of Koidu.6457 He testified that
Superman sent Bai Bureh a message calling him to Superman Ground to discuss some
"pertinent issues". Bockarie had told Superman that Issa Sesay had lost diamonds in Liberia
and fighters in the jungle had become annoyed, so Bockarie had invited them to a general
forum in Buedu to try to calm things down.6458
2903. After consulting with his troops, including the witness, Superman travelled to Buedu,
returning a month later with some troops as well as arms and ammunition for an attack on
Koidu Town that he had been instructed to undertake, called Fitti-Fatta. Lansana explained
that the purpose of the operation was to attack and capture Koidu Town and to get sufficient
arms and ammunitions.6459 Lansana testified that King Perry and Alice Pyne both
accompanied Superman on his trip to Buedu and communicated with him while they were
there.646O
2904. The result of the mission was severe casualties for the RUF and ECOMOG which
revented the RUF from ushin further into Koidu.6461 Su erman evacuated the wounded
P P S P
soldiers rrpm Koidu and he continued to Kurubonla in order to attack Sama Bendugu in the
Koinadugu District.6462
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
2905. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC member6463 and officer64°4, who was part of the
group led by Gullit in mid-1998, testified that they were based at Camp Rosos from around
July/August to September 1998.6465 After the operation to Foro Loko, the witness described
how Gullit said that somebody should go ahead and search for a suitable place for them to
6456 Foday Lansana, T. 20 February 2008. pp. 4361-4362.
6457 Foday Lansana. Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4504. 4507.
6458 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4508, 4515.
°"° Fpday Lansana, Transcript 21 Fpbmry 2008, pp. 4515-4516, 4518.
(A60 Foday Lansana. Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4516.
MM Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4518.
6462 Foday Lansana. Transcript 21 February 2008. p. 4518.
0463 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008. pp. 7859-7867, 7869; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8684.
8689.
(M4 Alimamy Bobson Sesay. Transcript 17 April 2008. pp. 7865-7866.
6465 Alimamy Bobson Sesay. Transcript 21 April 2008. p. 81 1 1.

---- End of Page 997 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J du 18 May 2012

base and a Temne SLA support firer among them called Captain Olangba who knew the
area, was chosen. Olangba retumed saying that he had seen a nice village, called Rosos,
surrounded by water and recommended the group base there. So the troops left and captured
Rosos, Bombali District and based themselves there. This became Camp Rosos.6466
The Accused
2906. The Accused testified that he did not know about the Fitti—Fatta mission for re—
attacking Koidu Town, or what Fitti—Fatta means, and stated that he first heard about it
dunng the Prosecution case in court.6467 He testified that he had never met Bockane at the
time Fitti—Fatta is alleged to have been planned.6466
2907. The Accused was presented with Perry Kamara's evidence about a "big mission"
conceived before Fitti—Patta to capture Sierra Leone, including Freetown, on a number of
occasions. The Accused denied that he had ever created a plan to take over Sierra Leone,
that Bockarie was ever ordered to go to Liberia to get a plan from him, or that he told
Bockarie how to implement it. It is not true that, following such a meeting, Bockane
retumed to Buedu and called a meeting to discuss and organise the Fitti—Fatta mission as
well as a long term plan to capture Freetown.6464 He testified that he did not know Sierra
Leone or the importance of the towns cited by Kamara,6476 nor did he tell Bockarie that as
long as they had Kono, they would take over the rest of Sierra Leone.6474 The Accused stated
that he did not need anything from Sierra Leone as Libena already had diamonds.6472
2908. The Accused drew attention to the divergence between this and accounts of the
Freetown attack given‘by other witnesses which, he averred, showed that SAJ Musa and the
6466 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8122-8124.
6467 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25819-25821; Transcript 14 September 2009, p.
28733.
6466 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26223.
6464 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26220, 26222; Transcript 16 September 2009, pp.
29025-29026, 29030-29031; Transcript 18 October 2009, p. 29035.
6476 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29025-29027, 29030-29031.
6474 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26221.
6472 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25820-25822, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26222.

---- End of Page 998 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T clk 18 May 2012
4/

.3 90 ax
SLAs perpetrated the Freetown attack and that there was no contact between SAJ Musa and
the RUF.6473
2909. The Accused stated that he would not have undermined the peace process for the
sake of dealing with Sam Bockarie6474 and that he did not meet with Bockarie until
0 September 1998.6475 He explained that he never had any separate arrangements with
Bockarie outside the mandates given by ECOWAS and OAU. Every time the Accused
invited Bockarie to Liberia, he did so with the consent of ECOWAS.6476 The Accused said
that if he had had any inclination that Sam Bockarie and "his people" intended to perpetuate
the conflict, he would have told his colleagues and they would have tried to deal with it.6477
The Accused testified that every trip Sam Bockarie made to Liberia, he made with the
consent of ECOWAS Committee of Five, which was always informed of the meetings.6478 .
The Accused also testified that at this stage, in June 1998, they had already had a "strong
warning" from the United Nations about "accusations that are not true". He explained that
the President of the Security-Council invited the Liberian ambassador, "stated what was in
fact not the fact" and asked for an official explanation. The Secretary-General came to
Nigeria, where there was ‘"nothing else on [the] agenda but Sierra Leone". They met and
talked with "Tejani". The Accused called "nonsense" any idea that Bockarie came to Liberia
while this was happening to discuss Fitti-Fatta.6479
2910. In response to Karmoh Kanneh's testimony, the Accused denied that he had ordered,
or had knowledge about, or was involved in the Fitti-Fatta mission to ensure that the RUF
continued to purchase ammunition from him in exchange for diamonds, primarily on the
basis that he had no materials to give them at this time, March or April 1998. He also said
that it would have to be proven that he was receiving diamonds around this time for Karmoh
Kanneh's evidence to make sense.648O
Defence Witness DCT-068
W3 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29026.
6474 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29021. T
6475 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26223.
64% Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26223.
W7 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26221-26222.
6478 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26220-26223.
6479 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25819-25820.

---- End of Page 999 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dbs 18 May 2012 E


2911. Witness DCT-068, a member of the RUF,4444 testified, with reference to the period
afier the Lomé Accord, that Kono was not the most strategic area to hold onto: the RUP
were also in Makeni, Kailahun and Tonkolili. The witness disagreed that the RUF defended
the diamond-mining areas because of their value due to the diamonds. Rather, they would
have defended any land that belonged to them. DCT-068 stated that the resources of a
country belong to the country and the people. So if someone has power, for example as
President or Head of State, they control the resources because they negotiate who should
come to work them. Whilst the diamond resources were important, they did not however
necessarily equate to control of the country, which only came from controlling the seat of
power, Freetown. The witness agreed that the ultimate objective to really control the country
was to control Freetown.4442
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
2912. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF connnander,4483 testified that the Pitti-Fatta
mission was an unsuccessful attack led by Superman against ECOMOG in Koidu Town in
July 1998.6444 Sesay explained that Superman experienced heavy casualties because the
ammunition was not up to standard and there was not enough of it for such an attack, and
because they did not organise themselves properly.6444
2913. Sesay testified that Bockarie, Superman and Mike Lamin planned Fitti-Fatta in
Buedu afier which Superman and Mike Lamin visited Sesay in Pendembu and explained the
mission to him.6446 To his knowledge, the plan only ever related to Koidu Town, irrespective
of the success of the mission.4447 Sesay testified that King Perry accompanied Superman
6440 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30577.
4444 DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37083.
mz DCT-068, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37203—37204.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
6444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44064. Under cross-examination, he recalled that Fitti-Fatta could not
have taken place until late July or early August 1998 since Superman did not visit Buedu until July 1998 to
receive instructions for the operation to attack Koidu (Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46623-46624).
He then confined his estimate to early August 1998 (Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46625-46626).
He denied that the account of an attack on Koidu on 10 June 1998 cited in Exhibit P-571 is Pitti-Fatta but
confirmed that the rainy season in Sierra Leone runs from around May to October (Issa Sesay, Transcript 18
August 2010, pp. 46625-46626).
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44064-44065.
6486 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44070-44071; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44840-44841, 44845-
44846; Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46611.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 4661 1-46613.

---- End of Page 1000 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J gm 18 May 2012

when he came to Buedu to receive instructions from Bockarie for the Fitti-Fatta
operation.6488
2914. According to Sesay, there was no large meeting of fighters prior to the Fitti-Fatta.
Only Bockarie, Mike Lamin, as Bockarie's advisor, and the relevant commander who was
going to undertake the operation would have been present at the planning meetings because
they kept plans confidential until the day of the attack, or two or three days prior to it.6484
2915. Sesay stated that Charles Taylor did not plan the Fitti-Fatta mission because
Bockarie was not in communication with him at that time.6440
2916. Sesay testified that Kanneh was lying when he said more than 600 people attended a
meeting at Waterworks sometime between April and June 1998. No meetings were held at
Waterworks between February and December 1998. Nor was there a meeting there where
some 600 people were present. Bockarie held all of the meetings about the frontline during
this time in Pendembu, where Sesay was stationed.649l No meeting of the type described by
Kanneh took place between Waterworks and Buedu in 1998.6442 Further, according to Sesay,
Johnny Paul Koroma did not attend any meetings between March and August in Buedu. He
did not attend any meetings at which he addressed people, nor did he and Sam Bockarie
attend any meetings where they addressed people.6443
2917. Sesay testified, in relation to operations at the time of the January 1999 Freetown
invasion that the RUF was also fighting to get to Freetown because it was the "seat of
power, the seat of government".6444
Defence Witness Martin George
2918. Witness Martin George, (a.k.a. Mao Mao), an area commander of the RUF,6445 who
was based in Woama, Kono District at the time of Fitti-Fatta and participated in the mission,
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44054, 44069
4489 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44070; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44845~44846.
4440 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44070.
644l Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44836—44839, 44845.
6442 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44845.
6444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44844.
6444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45433.
6495 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39592; Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39627, 39708, 39710;

---- End of Page 1001 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T // dk 18 May 2012

testified that Fitti-Fatta was the first attempt to test their strength against ECOMOG, which
failed due to heavy shelling causing the rebels to retreat to their assignment areas. They lost
a lot of manpower because they had overlooked the strength of the enemy. The ammunition
they had at this time was suitable for defensive measures only.64%
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
2919. Exhibit P-067, an undated "Situation Report" from the Black Revolutionary Guards
to "the Leader", states in relation to the Fitti-Fatta attack on Koidu Town:
Brigadier Issah Sesay left the base and travel along with Col Jungle and some Liberia securities to Monrovia.
He did not make his way through as he only stop in Monrovia. Information was later recieved [sic] by the
High-Command that the parcel of diamond has droped [sic] from Brigadier Issah. He therefore return on base
and gave the same report to the High-Command.
The joint security therefore investigated the B.G.C. and took statement [sic] from him.
Later a forum was held pertaining this issue, and the senior officers and elders suggested to suspend the issue
until the arrival of the Leader.
Moreso, President Taylor continues to give helping hands with logistics which involves foodstuff and
materials. The High Command was called in every month to report to Monrovia for briefing.
The High Command later called Brigadier Denis Mingle (Superman) on a forum for a mission to be carry out
to capture the whole of Kono. They came up with an agreement to apply some guerrilla tactics to overrun the
strategic positions in Kono District. A plan was drawn, but Superman never went with the plan and the mission
fail without capturing Kono and over thirty (30) M.I.A. on our side. and also K.I.A.
After this said mission, Superman was abled [sic] to put some men-power together and proceeded to Kabala
axis and created a jungle.6497
Prosecution Exhibit P-078
2920. Exhibit P—078, a report prepared by Amnesty Intemational about the Sierra Leone
civilconflict in 1998, reports:
Foday Sankoh was released by the Nigerian government into the custody of the Sierra
Leonean authorities on 25 July 1998. The government subsequently reiterated a deadline of
8 August 1998 for an amnesty for rebel forces but there was no significant response.
Members of the RUF were subsequently reported as claiming that Foday Sankoh had made
Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39766, 39787-39795.
W6 Martin George, Transcript 27 April 2010, pp. 40128-40133.
W7 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9676-9677. Witness TF1-371 testified that in this document the "High Command" referred
to Bockarie and Sesay and the mission described was Fitti-Fatta (TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp.
2478, 2484 (CS).

---- End of Page 1002 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T f Gb 18 May 2012

these statements under duress and continued to demand his release. The RUF threatened to
continue their campaign of violence against civilians if he remained in detention. The
government announced its intention to prosecute Foday Sankoh for crimes committed
during Sierra Leone's intemal armed conflict. He was brought to trial on 24 September
1998 and convicted and sentenced to death the following month. This prompted iiirther
attacks by rebel forces against unarmed civilians in retaliation. 6498
Atrocities declined significantly during July and August 1998 as the rainy season advanced.
6499
On 27 July 1998 rebel forces attacked Kabala. The town of Kabala itself, earlier
attacked and held briefly by rebel forces in late July 1998, was again attacked on 18
September 1998...
Prosecution Exhibit P-080
2921. Exhibit P-080, a UN Security Council progress report of the Secretary-General on
the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone reports that on 1 July 1998 a meeting was
convened in Abuja between President Kabbah and President Taylor, the Heads of State of
Liberia and Sierra Leone, at which they reached an agreement on confidence-building
measures between the two countries and condemned the continued rebel atrocities.65OO
Further, it states that on 25 July 1998, the Nigerian Government released RUF leader
Corporal Foday Sankoh to Sierra Leonean custody in Freetown.65m
2922. With regard to rebel operations in Sierra Leone, P-080 reports that since the end of
June [1998], the military and security situation in Sierra Leone improved "somewhat" as
reports of atrocities committed by elements of the former junta had markedly declined.°5O2
Further, it said that "though incidents of mutilation appear to have greatly declined since the
6498 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone -1998- A Year of Atrocities against Civilians, Amnesty Intemational Repo11",
p. 2.
6499 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone -1998- A Year of Atrocities against Civilians, Amnesty Intemational Report",
p. 13.
6500 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council - First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", ERN 12387, para. 5.
GSM Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council - First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", ERN 12387, para. 8.
6502 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Obsewer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", ERN 12388, para. 10.

---- End of Page 1003 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T W 18 May 20l2

end of June .... in Koidu, a reliable source has stated that 663 bodies were buried following
the fighting in the area in mid-June".6563
Prosecution Exhibit P-571
2923. Exhibit P-571, an excerpt from the book, The Reversed Victory (The Story of
Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone) by Brigadier General Adeshina, describes an
assault by "rebels" on Koidu Town at around 1800 hours on 10 June 1998. After an
exchange of fire with ECOMOG troops and their progress further into Koidu Town blocked,
the rebels partially withdrew but retained control of their captured territories. At around
0430 hours on 11 June 1998, the rebels abandoned their territories and withdrew altogether.
The author describes how the Nigerian soldiers later found 27 rebel corpses.6564
Defence Exhibit D-008
2924. Exhibit D-008, an undated unofficial translation of a verbatim report on a recorded
discussion between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his cohorts on his return from detention in
Nigeria in 1999 explaining their activities during his detention in 1996 to 1999, reports:
Pa Rogers:
But with particular reference to Brigadier Superman when he was sent to Kono he was
not doing his work as required, Hence the CDS told us to call him and organise a better
operation so that the area will not fall to the enemies. Superman refused to come...6565
Defence Exhibit D-009
2925. Exhibit D-009, a Salute Report from Sam Bockarie to Foday Sankoh, dated 26
September 1999, states:
Back at headquarters, I renewed my contact with ULIMO and tried to secure materials from
them. It was out of these materials that I gave Superman a good quantity to attack and
capture Kono. This move I thought would pressure the government into abandoning their
6563 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", ERN 12393, para. 34.
6564 Exhibit P-571, "The Reversed Victory, (The Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone),
Brigadier Gen. R.A. Adeshina — Cover End of Page, Publication End of Page, Author Information & End of Page 89 (Four pag Exhibit
es)", p. 89. A
6565Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation — Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion between Cpl. Foday
Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12961-12962.

---- End of Page 1004 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ rl 18 May 2012

mock trial against you and provide us with the ground necessary to move the war and the
movement forward.
Superman used the materials to attack Kono and was able to control parts of Koidu Town.
Though they were able to raise the ammo dump, they then concentrated on looting and later
withdrew leaving the enemy to re—occupy the town. Even prior to that, all instructions to
maintain the ground were not implemented.
With the captured materials from Kono, Superman went to the Kabala axis to join SA]
Musa. I instructed him to send some materials to which he agreed. Later he refused to
dispatch the materials and refused to grant permission to the receiving officer to retum to
mclosoo
Brig. Issa insisted that the materials be handed over as Superman had not only misused
large amounts of ammo in his failed attempt to capture Kono but had also refused to give
account of materials captured when the Koidu Town ammo dump of ECOMOG was
captured. Superman continued to refuse and Brig. Issa accompanied by Brig. Kallon
entered his house and arrested all materials found. 6567
Defence Exhibit D-084
2926. Exhibit D-084, a Salute Report from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh dated 27
September 1999, states that:
...1 was issued with a liberal quantity of ammunition and instmcted to cross the Moa River
and re—capture Kono from the enemy. Prior to this, the same instmctions had been given to
Superman who misused the materials given to him and failed to capture the target.6566
Deliberations
2927. lt is uncontested that, after ECOMOG forced the AFRC/RUF to retreat from Koidu
Town, Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) led an unsuccessful mission to re-capture Koidu Town
in mid-1998.6666 The Prosecution alleges that ECOMOG retook Koidu Town between April
and June 19986616 and that the F itti-F atta attack took place in June 1998,66ll while the Defence
avers that the retreat occurred in A nl/Ma 19986612 and that the Fitti-Fatta operation was
P Y P
6506 Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major Sam
Bockarie", ERN 9662.
6507 Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major Sam
Boc16566 Exhibit D—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, From Brigadier Issa H Sesay A
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", ERN 7762.
6566 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 157, 254, 306; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 607.
""° Prosecution moi rooi Boor, paras 240, 252, 459, 775, 870.
65H Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 6, 150, 157.
65*2 Doroooo moi moi amor, para 1106.

---- End of Page 1005 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T L/[ W 18 May 2012

3 7 078
launched in either July 19986616 or August 1998.6614 Witnesses’ accounts and the documentary
evidence vary as to the dates upon which these events took place.66l6 The Trial Chamber has
reviewed this evidence and finds that the AFRC/RUF retreated from Koidu Town around
April 1998 and, relying in particular on the UN Security Council report admitted as
Prosecution Exhibit P-080 and the excerpt from the book The Reversed Victory by Brigadier
General Adeshina exhibited as Prosecution Exhibit P-571, that the Fitti-Fatta attack took place
in mid-June 1998.
2928. The issue for determination by the Trial Chamber is what if any role the Accused
played in planning or ordering this attack. The Prosecution adduced evidence of several
meetings prior to the attack, in which the involvement of the Accused was cited.
6m Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 607.
6514 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 108.
65lS Perry Kamara testified that the meeting in Buedu took place in April or May 1998 (Perry Kamara, Transcript
5 February 2008, p. 3160) and that Superman left for Koinadugu after the mission around end-May 1998 (Perry
Kamara, Transcript 5 February 1998, p. 3172). TF1-371 placed the mission around mid-1998 (TF1-371,
Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2394 (CS)). Albert Saidu testified that the meeting in Buedu at which the Fitti-
Fatta mission was announced took place in April 1998 (Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11353).
Mohamed Kabbah testified that the meeting at which Operation Fitti-Fatta was armounced happened around a
month after he arrived in Buedu (Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 1998, p. 16146). Karmoh Kanneh
testified that the meeting in Buedu where the Fitti-Fatta mission was organised took place between April and
June 1998 before the death of Sani Abacha (Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9393). However, the
Trial Chamber has already noted that on cross-examination, Kanneh testified twice that the meeting took place
after the death of Sani Abacha in June 1998 (Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9600-9601;
Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9678). On the second of these occasions, he stated that it could have been around
August or September. Kanneh also denied that he had told the Prosecution Investigators in a prior statement that
the meeting took place before the death of Sani Abacha (Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9689).
Alice Pyne testified that the meeting in Buedu took place after Issa Sesay had lost the diamonds in Monrovia and
before the death of Sani Abacha (Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12233-12234, 12246) and that the
mission took place less than two weeks before Sani Abacha's death (Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p.
12246). Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact 11 states
that Sani Abacha, the leader of Nigeria, died in June 1998. TF 1-585 testified that the meeting at which Fitti-Fatta
was planned took place around September 1999 (TF 1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15667). By reference
to TF 1-585's testimony that 3 meetings took place in the June, September and December before "January 6"
(TF 1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15682), and that they took place within the same year that Johnny
Paul Koroma was removed from power in Freetown (TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 1998, p. 15672), the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that the witness is referring to events in 1998. Isaac Mongor testified that the Fitti-Fatta
mission was run in the dry season of 1998, before the inception of the rainy season (Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11
March 2008,/p. 5751). During Issa Sesay's examination-in-chief, he testified that the attack took place in July
1998 (Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44064). Under cross-examination, he recalled that Fitti-Fatta could
not have taken place until late July or early August 1998 since Superman did not visit Buedu until July 1998 to
receive instructions for the operation to attack Koidu (Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46623-46624).
He then confined his estimate to early August 1998 (Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46625-46626).
P-571, the excerpt from the book The Reversed Victory (The Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra
Leone) by Brigadier General Adeshina, describes an assault by "rebels" on Koidu Town at around 1800 hours on
10 June 1998 and recorded that the rebels withdrew altogether around 0430 hours on 11 June 1998. P-078
reported that the attack on Kabala took place on 27 July 1998. P-080 reported information received that in
Koidu, 663 bodies were buried following the fighting in the area in mid-June.

---- End of Page 1006 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI,-03-01-T % gw 18 May 2012

590 97
2929. Perry Kamara testified about a meeting held at Bockarie's compound where the
diamonds lost by Issa Sesay were discussed, as well as the mission to retake Kono. Kamara
testified that Mingo had been called to Buedu so that Bockarie could brief him on the plan
he had brought fiom the Accused. He said the meeting was attended by Mike Lamin, Isaac
Mongor and Pa Rogers, among others, including most of the battalion and brigade
commanders. The Trial Chamber notes that Isaac Mongor testified that when Mingo was
called to Buedu for this meeting, Mongor was unable to go with him as they could not both
be gone at the same time.65`6 Corroboration of Kamara's testimony that Mike Lamin was
present at this meeting is also lacking. ·
2930. TF1-585 also testified about a meeting at Bockarie's compound with Issa Sesay,
Junior Rambo, Five-Five and Jungle present. Although the list of named participants present
at the meeting differs from Kamara's list, the agenda described by the two witnesses
suggests it may have been the same meeting. According to Kamara the first item on the
agenda was Issa Sesay's loss of` the diamonds he had taken to Monrovia, which is also what
TF1-585 described as the purpose of the meeting. Both witnesses also described the
forthcoming Fitti-Fatta attack as part of the discussion, Kamara in much greater detail. The
Trial Chamber notes that TF1-585 was not present at the meeting, and that she dates the
meeting as having happened in September 1998. However, TF1-585 testified that the Fitti-
Fatta attack took place two to three weeks after the meeting, which suggests that the meeting
took place closer to the timeframe described by Kamara, April or May 1998. Kamara
described Bockarie showing the group artns and boxes of ammunition in rooms in his house
after the meeting, and TF1-5 85 testified that after the meeting she saw Bockarie supply arms
and ammunition to the fighters fiom the warehouse in fiont of his house. In the Trial
Chamber's view, the vague nature of TF1-585's evidence, the fact that she was not at this
meeting and her mistaken testimony that Sesay, rather than Denis Mingo, had led the Fitti-
Fatta attack as punishment for losing the diamonds, renders it of little probative value other
than to corroborate Kamara's evidence that a meeting took place at Bockarie's compound.
2931. The Trial Chamber notes that Perry Kamara's description of this meeting suggests
that Bockarie and the Accused had come up with a detailed plan, which Kamara called "a
very big plan"65`7 to take over Sierra Leone. Kamara recalled Bockarie using a map to
6516 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5747-5748.
6517 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3163.

---- End of Page 1007 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z dm 18 May 2012

indicate the towns that Taylor had told them to attack. SAJ Musa and Mingo would be
responsible for Kabala and Makeni. The RUF left in Kono after Superinan's departure
would be responsible for the branch comprising Koidu Town (a.k.a. Kono, a.k.a. Sefadu),
Magburaka, Matotoka and Mile 91 while the group joining Gullit in Rosos would be
responsible for Port Loko and Kambia. The meeting point for all the troops would then be
Masiaka because that was a main junction in Sierra Leone. After all the troops reached
Waterloo, they should then make "a fresh plan, a new one". 65 18 The ultimate destination was
to be Freetown after all these district headquarters had been captured. 6519
2932. The testimony of Kamara was exceptionally specific and unlike the testimony of
other Prosecution witnesses, which was focused much more narrowly on Kono. Albert
Saidu,6520 TF1-585,6521 and Mohamed Kabbah,6522 who were all in Buedu at the time Fitti-
Fatta was announced, testified that the Fitti-Fatta mission was an operation intended to
capture Koidu Town. In addition, TF1-371 described Fitti-Fatta as a ‘°mission to recapture
Kono"6523 while Isaac Mongor testified that he was told by Mingo that the meeting he had
attended in Buedu was about a mission to recapture Koidu.6524 Mingo also told Foday
Lansana that he had been instructed to undertake a mission called Fitti-Fatta, the purpose of
which was to capture Koidu Town.6525 In her testimony, Alice Pyne discussed the
ammunition and herbalists who had been given to Mingo for the Fitti-Fatta mission to
recapture Koidu Town.6526 Moreover, Exhibit D-009, Sam Bockarie's Salute Report,
recorded that Bockarie instructed Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) to capture Kono. 6527
2933. Kamara in his testimony was somewhat dismissive of the importance recapturing
Kono, which he described as a diversionary tactic to create panic among ECOMOG. In
contrast, many other witnesses testified to the importance of capturing Koidu Town to
6518 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3163-3164, 3174; Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3220.
6519 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3164.
6520 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11055-11056, 11060.
652] TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15666-15668; Transcript 11 September 2008, p. 15975.
6522 Mohamed Kabbah,Transc1ipt 12 September 2008, pp. 16147-16148. »
M TF1-371, Transcript 28 rarmary 2008, p. 2394 (cs).
6524 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5748.
6525 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4515-4516, 4518.
6526 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12233-12244.
(627 Exhibit D-009, ‘"RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major Sam
Bockarie", ERN 9662.

---- End of Page 1008 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J Eli 18 May 2012

enable the AFRC/RUF to mine in Kono District.6526 Moreover, while it is logical that a plan
to recapture Freetown would have included at least some of the routes on the map to which
Kamara testified, the Trial Chamber recognises that elements of the plan which Kamara
described reflect events which had not happened and could not have been planned or
redicted b Bockarie and the Accused as earl as A ril or Ma 1998. For example, the
P Y Y P Y
evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay indicates that Brima did not move to Rosos until
July/August 19986525 and that Rosos was chosen as a site to base only after Brima's group
arrived at the Rosos re °on and sent out an SLA fi ter to surve the area.6556 Moreover, the
81 Y
Trial Chamber notes the evidence indicating that Brima left Koinadugu before Mingo joined
SAJ Musa's forces there655 1 and SAJ Musa would not therefore have been briefed by Mingo,
as Kamara testified, and aware of the plan when he dispatched Brima.
2934. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that Perry Kamara is a generally
credible witness.6552 That Kamara was in Buedu at the time the Fitti-Fatta operation was
planned is supported by Foday Lansana, who testified that Kamara and Alice Pyne both
accompanied Mingo on his trip to Buedu and communicated with him while they were
there,6555 Mohamed Kabbah who testified to seeing Kamara at the large forum which took
place in Buedu6554 and Defence witness Issa Sesay.6555 However, having considered his
evidence in this context the Trial Chamber is of the view that Kamara's testimony was
influenced by his subsequent knowledge of the events that unfolded in the latter halfof 1998
and that he has added detail to the events he recalled with the benefit of hindsight. For this
reason, the Trial Chamber will not rely on Kamara's testimony to support the Prosecution's
allegation that the Accused made specific plans in conjunction with the Fitti-Fatta operation
to recapture Freetown.
2935. The Trial Chamber considers the evidence of TF1-371 and Karmoh Kanneh cited by
the Prosecution in support of its allegation that the AFRC/RUF planned in a multi-axis
6526 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9396; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp.
16147-16148, 16151; Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11055-11056.
6525 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 81 11.
6530 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8122-8124.
6551 Provision of Military Personnel: Allegations Related to the Red Lion Battalion.
6552 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.
6555 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4516.
6554 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16147.
6555 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44054, 44069

---- End of Page 1009 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / {lg 18 May 2012

3 9 7 O 2
offensive starting in Kono to be irrelevant here since it pertains to plans allegedly made
during the Waterworks/Buedu meetings in December 1998 and to attacks undertaken against
LURD in Liberia, not the plan referred to by Perry Kamara.°536
2936. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber notes that other witnesses testified about a general
plan in early- to mid-1998 to retake Freetown. TF1-371, for example, testified that at a point
earlier in time, after one of his trips to Monrovia in 1998, Bockarie mentioned that he had
received a "specific instruction" from Taylor that the RUF should "ensure that we recapture
Freetown".°537 This message dated to well before Fitti-Fatta, including the instruction to
"maintain Kono" after it had been recaptured by the AFRC/RUF and before it had been lost
again. The Trial Chamber also notes Karmoh Kanneh's testimony that Bockarie had told
Taylor about "Operation Free the Leader", the RUF mission planned to capture Freetown
and release Foday Sankoh. ln the Trial Chamber's view, this evidence indicates that the
recapture of Freetown was mentioned by and discussed with the Accused at some point,
although, as discussed below, the timing of this discussion is unclear. The Trial Chamber
finds it likely that the attack on Kono would have been seen as a first step towards the
recapture of Freetown and more generally formed part of a long-term plan. On the basis of
the evidence, however, the Trial Chamber concludes that the immediate plan was to
recapture Kono.
2937. The Prosecution also relies on the evidence of TF1-375 relating to the eight
Liberians who visited Ming0 in Kono to support its allegation that the Accused ordered the
recapture of Kono. However, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1-375's testimony
must be treated with caution and requires corroboration.6538 The Trial Chamber notes that 0n
TF1-375's account, these eight Liberians brought two medicine men (herbalists) and recalls
its finding that the herbalists who came to mark the fighters before the Fitti-Fatta mission
were sent by the Accused.6539 However, TF1-375's account of these Liberians and herbalists
arriving while Superman was at Superman Ground does not accord with the testimonies of
Prosecution witnesses Alice Pyne654O and Perry Kamara654l as well as Defence witness 1ssa
6536 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 156, citing Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9425,
9460 and TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2411, 2417-2418 (CS). The reference to TF1-371, Transcript
28 January 2008, pp. 2384-2385 (CS) has already been dealt with above.
6537 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2384-2385 (CS).
6538 Credibility Assessment, TF1-375, paras 308-312.
6539 Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged Provision of Herbalists.
6540 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12239-1224l; Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged

---- End of Page 1010 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL! 18 May 2012

Sesay6542 that Superman brought the herbalists back from Buedu with him after the meeting
there at which the Fitti-Fatta mission was planned. In light of the discrepancy between TF]-
375 's account and the testimony of Pyne, Kamara and Issa Sesay, the Trial Chamber
considers that these were not the same herbalists as those sent by the Accused and that TF]-
375's evidence is therefore uncorroborated.
2938. The Trial Chamber notes that three other witnesses, Karmoh Kanneh, Albert Saidu
and Mohamed Kabbah, testified in support of the Prosecution's allegation that the Accused
issued directives and encouragement to Bockarie concerning the urgency of recapturing
Kono District. The witnesses testified that they attended a forum convened by Bockarie
somewhere in a secret location between Buedu and Dawa, according to Saidu,6546 on the
Foya Road between Waterworks and Buedu, according to Kanneh,6544 or on the Dawa Road
leading towards Foya, at Waterworks, according to Kabbah.6545 Several other aspects of
these three witnesses’ testimonies converge. For example, all three witnesses testified that
the issue of Sesay losing the diamonds was discussed at the meeting.6546 Kabbah and Saidu
both gave evidence that Bockarie spoke about the building of an airstrip in Buedu6547 .
2939. According to Kanneh, Bockarie had said that he had met the Accused in Monrovia,
who had told him to clear Kono and that "nothing goes for nothing and that he had no
machine to make arms".6546 Likewise, Kabbah re orted Bockarie as havin said at the
P S
meeting that he had discussed with the Accused in Monrovia that they should try to get
Kono and when they took Kono they would get ammunition for the diamonds they would
mine.6549 Kabbah explained clearly in his testimony that they were getting too few boxes of
ammunition and that if they had the diamonds they could get the ammunition they needed.
Provision of Herbalists.
6544 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3165-3166; Operational Support: Support and Training,
Alleged Provision of Herbalists.
6542 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44065-44066; Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged
Provision of Herbalists. A
6643 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11054.
65*4 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9392.
6545 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16145.
6546 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9392-9394, 9399; Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9683-9684,
9689; Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1l054-l1056; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September
2008,pp.16147-16148,1615].
6547 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11054-1 1056.
6546 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9396.
6544 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16149.

---- End of Page 1011 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

Without specific reference to Bockarie having met the Accused, Saidu recalled that Bockarie
had said that it was only through the diamonds they passed over to the Accused that they
could get arms and ammunition.6550 That Bockarie had visited Monrovia before this meeting
is corroborated by Exhibit P—067's reference to Bockarie's monthly briefings in
Monrovia.655l
2940. According to Kanneh and Saidu, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a Jungle) addressed the meeting
after Bockarie had spoken, on behalf of the Accused according to Saidu. Saidu testified that
Tamba conveyed to the meeting that the Accused recognised the relationship between the
RUF and AFRC and that he advised them to try and get hold of Kono, which was where
they would get their resources. Saidu further testified that Ibrahim Bah, whom he referred to
as General Ibrahim, spoke after Tamba and reinforced what he said, also reporting that the
Accused advised them to recapture Kono. Kanneh testified that Tamba supported what
Bockarie had already said. That Jungle was in Buedu at this time, is also corroborated by
Alice Pyne.6552
2941. The Trial Chamber finds Karmoh Kanneh to be a generally credible witness.6553 The
Trial Chamber notes, however, that there are several elements of Kar1neh's evidence which
suggest that his recollection of the meeting may have become confused with other events
occurring in 1998. For example, Karmeh's testimony was that he had informed the Accused
of Operation Free the Leader, his plan to capture Freetown and liberate Sankoh. Kanneh
appears to have been confused about dates as there is a significant body of reliable evidence
which shows that Foday Sankoh was not transferred fiom Nigeria to Sierra Leone until late
July 1998.6554 He also made reference in his testimony to the Burkina Faso trip that Bockarie
made the month of or the month after the meeting held to plan the Fitti—Fatta mission,6555 yet
it is well established that the Burkina Faso shipment arrived much later in the year.6556 The
5555 Albert saidu, rmscapt 5 June 2008. p. 11056.
M5! Exhibit P-067. "RUF People's Army— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander". ERN 9676.
5555 Alice Pyne. Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12236.
6553 Credibility Assessment. Kamroh Kanneh, The Role of Intemrediaries, para. 2704.
6554 Exhibit P-080, ‘"United Nations Security Council, First Progress Report of the Secretary General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", ERN 12387, para. 8; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra
Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International Repo1t", p. 2; Prosecutor v Taylor,
SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Fact U.
6555 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9397.
6556 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso Shipment.

---- End of Page 1012 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Trial Chamber notes that Albert Saidu dated the meeting to around April 19986557 and
accepts his testimony that the meeting happened around this time, particularly in view of the
su ort received b the albeit less s ecific testimony of Kabbah that it occurred around a
PP Y P
month after he arrived in Buedu.°558 The Trial Chamber is of the view that, although
Karmeh's evidence includes some aspects which appear displaced in time, this does not
detract from the evidence provided regarding the plarming of Fitti-Fatta which is largely
corroborated by Saidu and Kabbah.
2942. The Trial Chamber finds Mohamed Kabbah to be a generally credible witness.°559
The Trial Chamber notes that he conceded limitations on his knowledge pertaining to
sensitive military matters, on account of his position as a radio operator.°5°O For example,
when explaining that he did not know that Bockarie travelled to Burkina Faso in November
1998 to secure ammunition, he testified that arms deals may have been made without his
knowledge, as Bockarie and the others who assisted him in such matters were "big
people".65(’l ln this respect, the Trial Chamber also observes that Kabbah did not refer to the
operation by its well-known name, "Fitti-Fatta".
2943. The Trial Chamber considers Albert Saidu to be a generally credible witness.°562 lt
notes that his evidence of having attended the meeting contrasts with prior statements to the
Sesay Defence team when he met with them in 2005 and 2007, in which he indicated that he
was in Koindu at the time of the meeting and heard about it over the radio.°5°3 The witness
ex lained that the meetin he attended with Jun le and Bah was a se arate meetin from the
P 8 8 P 8
one which he had heard about over the radio, which related instead to Sesay's punishment
for losing diamonds.°564 He ascribed as an error of the Prosecution the prior statement in
which he described the meeting he attended with Jungle and Bah as the same one at which
6557 Arbem same, rmmempr 9 June 2008, p. 11353.
6555 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 1998, p. 16146. Kabbah testified that he arrived in Buedu
around three weeks after the Kailahun Town massacre (Mohamed Kabbah, 12 September 2008, p. 16126) which
the Trial Chamber has already found to have occurred in February 1998 (See Factual and Legal Findings on
Alleged Crimes, Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings)).
6559 Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338.
6560 In respect of Kabbah's evidence on his knowledge of Bockarie's communications (See Operational Support:
Communications).
656* Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16444.
6562 Credibility Assessment, Albert Saidu, Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996), para. 2384.
6563 Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 11167—11174; Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11129-11130, 11136-
11137.
656* Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 11170-11171, 11174-11175.

---- End of Page 1013 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gl; 18 May 2012

5 7/06
Sesay's punishment was decided.6565 The Trial Chamber accepts Saidu's testimony that he
was at the meeting, noting that he described it with detail and that the detail he described
was substantially consistent with the evidence of the other witnesses who attended the
meeting.
2944. The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence adduced from Samuel Kargbo,65°6 Bobson
Sesay,6567 and TF1-371,6568 cited by the Prosecution in support of its allegation that the
Accused issued directives and encouragement to Bockarie concerning the re-capture of
Kono, refers to an earlier time period than that alleged. Kargbo's evidence refers to the
period shortly after the Intervention before the first attack on Koidu Town in late
February/early March 1998. TF1-371 and Alimamy Bobson Sesay's evidence relates to the
period thereafter while the AFRC/RUF alliance was still in control of Kono. The Trial
Chamber recalls that it has reviewed TF1-371 and Samuel Kargbo's testimony previously
when considering the allegations that the Accused issued orders to capture and maintain
Kono after the Intervention6569 and will consider Alimamy Bobson Sesay's evidence in the
context of the materiel allegedly supplied by the Accused to hold Kono.657O
2945. The Trial Chamber has also considered the evidence of Issa Sesay concerning the
attack on Fitti-Fatta. Sesay's testimony that there was no large meeting of fighters prior to
the attack657l is belied by the evidence of several credible witnesses who attended such a
meeting. Issa Sesay's own testimony, corroborated by Kamara,6572 that he was not present in
Buedu because he was sent to Pendembu as punishment for losing the diamonds suggests
that he was not, in any event, in the best position to know. Sesay's testimony that Bockarie,
Lamin and Superman planned Fitti-Fatta in Buedu and would have kept it completely secret
is also inconsistent with the evidence adduced that the attack was discussed in advance. The
°5" Albert samp, Transcript 6 ippp 2008, pp. 11175-11178.
6566 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 155, referring to Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10494.
6567 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 155, referring to Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp.
8709-8710.
6568 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para 155, referring to TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2382-2385
gggirlilitary Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998).
6570 Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.
(ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44070; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44845-44846.
6572 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3161.

---- End of Page 1014 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T Kg 18 May 2012

.3% ;¢
Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Issa Sesay's testimony must be treated with caution6576
and does not accept his account of events leading up to the Fitti-Fatta attack.
2946. The Trial Chamber also finds the Accused's denial that he knew about Fitti-Fatta
untenable in light of the evidence. In this regard, the Trial Chamber recalls its previous
findings that the Accused sent both ammunition and herbalists for the Fitti-Fatta attack.6574
His testimony, supported by Issa Sesay, that he did not meet Bockarie until September of
that year is also untenable in light of reliable evidence of trips by Bockarie to meet the
Accused after the lntervention6575 and the record in Exhibit P-067 that Bockarie was called
every month to report to Monrovia for a briefing with the Accused before the Fitti-Fatta
mission.6576 Similarly, the Trial Chamber does not find credible the Accused's assertion that
his only contact with Sam Bockarie was for the purpose of peace. With regard to his
evidence that he met with the Secretary-General in Liberia, which is supported by Exhibit P=
080, the Trial Chamber notes that this does not preclude his involvement in Fitti-Fatta.
2947. The Trial Chamber cannot therefore accept Perry Kamara's account of the very
detailed plan made by the Accused together with Bockarie, as it is not consistent with the
evidence of other witnesses. However, based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that
the Accused discussed the Fitti-Fatta attack with Bockarie, and the references made to this
discussion thereafter have been reported by the relevant witnesses in various ways.
However, the Trial Chamber notes that the testimony of these other witnesses indicates
advice from the Accused for the Fitti-Fatta attack rather than planning.
2948. At the forum to which Karmeh, Saidu and Kabbah testified, the evidence indicates
that Tamba, Bah and/or Bockarie conveyed advice from the Accused, that he advised them
to try to get hold of Kono so as to get resources to fund the purchase of materiel. The
message as reported by both Kabbah and Kanneh was that the Accused was not going to
give them the weapons they needed "for nothing" and that if they wanted more ammunition
they needed more diamonds to get it.
6576 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
6574 Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged Provision of Herbalists; Arms and Ammunition: Use of
Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.
6575 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supplu by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).
6576 Exhibit P-067, ‘"RUF People's Army— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9676.

---- End of Page 1015 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (SQ 18 May 2012

2949. In light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber does not find that the
Prosecution has established that the Accused instructed the RUF, via Liberian emissaries
and/or Sam Bockarie, to recapture Kono, or that he participated in the formulation of a
multi—axis operational attack plan leading to Freetown, prior to the Fitti—Fatta attack.
However, in light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber Ends that the Accused was engaged in
discussion with Bockarie regarding plans for the Fitti—Fatta attack, and that his message of
advice to recapture Kono, so that the diamonds there could be used to purchase arms and
ammunition, was transmitted to RUF commanders through Bockarie himself and Liberian
emissaries, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and/or Ibrahim Bah.
Findings
2950. The Trial Chamber Ends that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused participated in the planning of or instructed the AFRC/RUF to
recapture Kono in mid—June 1998, as the first step in a detailed plan with an overarching
mission to recapture Freetown or otherwise.
2951. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused advised Bockarie to recapture Kono so that the diamonds there would be
used to purchase arms and ammunition. Such advice was transmitted to RUF commanders
both through Bockarie and Liberian emissaries, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and/or Ibrahim
Bah, and resulted in the Fitti—Fatta attack in mid—J une 1998.
4. The Freetown Invasion
(a) The Plan
Submissions of the Parties
2952. The Prosecution submits that after the failed Fitti—Fatta mission, the death of the
Nigerian President Abacha in June 1998 which resulted in weakening of ECOMOG forces,
the transfer of Foday Sankoh from Nigerian custody to Sierra Leone, and the announcement
of Sankoh's death sentence in October 1998, led to the planning of a major offensive by
Bockarie and the Accused. According to the Prosecution, the plan was to retake Kono
District, Tongo Field and the teriitory all the way to Freetown, thereby ensuring control over
the richest diamond areas and over Freetown, the city where Sankoh was believed to be

---- End of Page 1016 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T X 18 May 2012

37 70 7
held, and the city necessary for control of the territory and the population of Sierra
Leone.6577
2953. According to the Prosecution, during the second half of 1998 and up to the trip to
Monrovia and Burkina Faso in November, Bockarie visited Monrovia frequently to meet
with the Accused, and these meetings gave the Accused and Bockarie ample time to discuss
refining and implementing the plan, after the failed Fitti-Fatta mission. In its submissions,
the Prosecution relies, inter alia, on the Accused's testimony that he met Bockarie during his
visits to Monrovia in September, October, and November/December 1998.6578
2954. The Prosecution further alleges that upon Bockarie's return from his trip to Burkina
Faso via Monrovia in late November/early December 1998, Bockarie held meetings with
AFRC/RUF personnel in Buedu, including smaller meetings with senior commanders, and
that at these meetings with his subordinates, Bockarie reiterated the Accused's plan for an
operation to capture Kono, Makeni "and by all means", Freetown. According to the
Prosecution, Jungle was present at these meetings and "buttressed" what had been conveyed
by Bockarie, that they had discussed how the mission should be run with the Accused in
Monrovia, that they should not fear this time around and that no force could withstand
them.6579
2955. The Prosecution also submits that the plan included a ruthless terror campaign so that
in case of it being unsuccessful it would ensure their continued existence and a place of
power in the country, a tactic the Accused had used to his advantage in Liberia and had in
mind for Sierra Leone.658O According to the Prosecution, Bockarie briefed the Accused via
satellite phone on the outcome of the meetings and assured him that the plan would be
followed. The Accused and Bockarie determined how the plan was to be carried out,
deciding to save ammunition by making the operation even more fearsome than all other
operations before. After this contact with the Accused, Bockarie announced Operation No
Living Thing, which meant that anything that stood in their way should be eliminated, the
tactics of Operation No Living Thing typified the AFRC/RUF's treatment of civilians, and
*577 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 161.
6578 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 162-163.
6579 Prosecution Final Trial Briei paras 164-165.
6580 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 161.

---- End of Page 1017 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T _ 18 May 2012

3 Q //0
fighters were to raise concern of the international community by killing civilians and
burning.888l
2956. The Defence submits that the evidence fails to show that the Accused participated in
any way in the Freetown invasion,8882 contending instead that the invasion of Freetown in
January 1999 was purely an AF RC affair in which the Accused took no part. The Defence
relies on the testimony of Alimamy Bobson Sesay that the plan was conceived in
Koinadudgu, not in Liberia or Buedu,8888 so that by the time of the meeting in Buedu in
which Bockarie allegedly planned the invasion, in December 1998, the AFRC plan was
already underway.8888 The Defence further submits that the AF RC and the RUF had
different motivations for attacking Freetown: the RUF for the freeing of Foday Sankoh from
prison, while SAJ Musa's motivation was to reinstate the army, which was accelerated by
the execution of AF RC members by the Government. According to the Defence, the
different motivations, coupled with the race between the two factions to capture Freetown,
the RUF and SAJ Musa could not have been acting in the furtherance of any common
purpose.8888
2957. The Defence also disputes the proposition that the Accused ordered the commission
of atrocities in Freetown, and accepts Bobson Sesay's testimony that SAJ Musa ordered his
forces to proceed to Freetown without killing, looting or burning. It claims that Operation
No living Thing was declared around May or June 1998 during an attack on Kenema
District, not as part of the operation to invade Freetown.8888 The Defence further submits
that the allegation that the Accused said that the advance to Freetown should be more brutal
than any other and that nothing should stand in their way is not borne by any facts on the
ground of the RUF's conduct during their advance towards Freetown, as there is no
overwhelming evidence of wide scale atrocities in the places the RUF attacked on its way to
Freetown, such as Kono, Makeni, Lunsar, Port Loko "etc".8888 The Defence also challenges
the credibility of the accounts of Prosecution witnesses.
8888 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 168.
8882 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 877.
°5*" Defence rmi mei Brief; para. 911.
658* Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 912.
8888 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 914-915; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 32.
8888 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 919.
65 87 Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 923.

---- End of Page 1018 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-O3-O1-T / 18 May 2012

59 ///
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
2958. Witness TF1-371, an RUF commander, testified that after Foday Sankoh was
transferred from the custody of the Nigerian Government to the custody of the Sierra
Leonean Government, in July 1998, and sentenced to death in October 1998, the RUF
commanders were angry, Sam Bockarie was especially furious with regard to Sankoh's
death sentence and the execution of 24 military officers. Bockarie had a series of intewiews
over the BBC and VOA radio via satellite phone, in which at one point he threatened to
attack Freetown and release Sankoh. Bockarie also talked about Operation Spare No Soul,
which was the code name of the operation of freeing Sankoh.6588
2959. Prior to Sam Bockarie's trip to Monrovia in November or December 1998, Bockarie
met the witness, Issa Sesay and Kallon, expressing his conccm with expanding the fighting
to Kono, in particular after the casualties they suffered from the failed Fitti-Fatta operation.
Bockarie told the witness that he was leaving for a trip to meet with Charles Taylor and
Musa Cissé in Monrovia and to then get a shipment of ammunition from Burkina Faso for a
"major attack, major offensive".6989
2960. Bockarie went to Monrovia,6990 before flying with Ibrahim Bah and Musa Cissé to
Ouagadougou.699l He retumed to Sierra Leone two weeks later via Monrovia, along with
Zigzag Marzah, Sampson and Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian Mosquito).6992
2961. When Bockarie retumed to Buedu he off-loaded the materials into his warehouse and
gathered the witness and the other RUF members he left behind for a forum at Waterworks
to brief them about the trip.6993 The meeting was attended by RUF members including the
witness, Bockarie, Sesay, Morris Kallon, Peter Vandi and Isaac Mongor from the RUF, as
well as AFRC members including Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Akim Turay, Leather
6588 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2400-2401 (CS).
9589 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2402-2403 (CS).
°59° TF1-371, Transcript 28-January 2008, p. 2403 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2750 (CS).
C`59! TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2403 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2643 (CS); Transcript 31
January 2008, pp. 2702, 2750, 2762 (CS).
6592 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2403-2405 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2750 (CS).
9599 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2405 (CS).

---- End of Page 1019 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 61* 18 May 2012

Boot, Adams and others.6594 At this meeting in Waterworks, Bockarie explained that he had
sufhcient ammunition for an attack on Kenema Town as well as Koidu and Freetown.
Bockarie opened a map of Sierra Leone and discussed with the commanders the plan to
launch a two-pronged attack to enter Freetown. Sesay and Morris Kallon were given the
mission to attack Koidu and then move to Makeni, then to "Lunsar, Masiaka". In Masiaka
they were to be met by the second flank of troops, led by Akim Turay and Momoh Rogers,
which was to attack Kenema and Bo. From Masiaka the troops were to attack Waterloo and
then Freetown.65 95
2962. TF 1-371 said that this plan was not decided at the meeting in Buedu. Rather,
Bockarie came with that plan and was discussing it with the commanders,6596 as he made the
general plan after his "major trip" to Ouagadougou through Monrovia. The witness added
that the discussion among the commanders and Bockarie to go to Freetown, which was
prompted by the announcement of Sankoh's death sentence and the execution of 24 officers,
coincided with, and was parallel to, Bockarie's trips to Monrovia.6597
2963. Halfway through the briefing, Bockarie and a smaller group including the witness,
Eddie Kanneh, Sesay, Kallon, Jungle and one or two others went to eat lunch in Bockarie's
bedroom.6596 While they were eating, Bockarie left the room and spoke on his satellite phone
outside for 10 to 15 minutes. When Bockarie returned he was excited and said that he had
just spoken with "the Pa", Taylor, and that Taylor "gave the instruction directly to his
commander this is Operation No Living Thing. We should by all means capture Freetown.
That is [sic] instruction he had received to capture Freetown so as to force the government to
negotiation". Bockarie went on to say that he had been instructed by Taylor that no
commander should contest his authority in this particular operation, otherwise they would be
executed, conveying again that Taylor had given him authority. Bockarie also said that he
6596 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2410-2411 (CS).
6565 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2411-2412 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2640 (CS) (At
this point in time the RUF was in control ofSegbwema and Momoh Rogers was based there).
6566 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2411 (CS).
6597 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2640 (CS) (Bockarie "actual1y planned it after he came back from
Monrovia with the consignment of arms that he came with and that was sometime in December. He started the
operation where he called the commanders for a forum, for a meeting").
6566 TF]-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2412, 2415 (CS). Liberian Mosquito remained outside the
compound.

---- End of Page 1020 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

SC//B
did not want them to misuse the materiel that he brought because it was extremely difficult
for him to get and he "had to give account".6599
2964. On cross—examination the witness agreed that it was Bockarie who coined the phrase
for the operation to invade Freetown, Operation No Living Thing.66OO The witness explained
that the name, Operation No Living Thing, meant that enemies should not be captured or
brought to the headquarters, that anything standing in their way should be eliminated,
including civilians, fighters, enemy forces "whatever", and that the target was to capture
Freetown to force the government into negotiation.66Ol
2965. During the meeting, they received a visit from a Ghanaian friend of Taylor and
Sankoh called Dr Sebo, and another joumalist who said they were from Belgium. They took
the visitors to see about 22 Nigerian ECOMOG detainees who were captured in Kono and
held bythe RUF.°6O2
2966. Following this meeting, Bockarie went outside and "spread the same message" about
Operation No Living Thing to the other junior commanders. Bockarie gave instructions for
the distribution of materials and assigned the Scorpion Unit to link with the group in
Segbwema and assist in capturing Kenema. Bockarie gave "the bulk" of the materials that he
brought from Monrovia to Sesay and Kallon for the attack on Kono but also gave Akim
Turay his own materiel to link up with Momoh Rogers to attack Kenema. Denis Mingo left
to a nearby village "to see somebody" and Sesay and Kallon left the next day.66O3
2967. On cross-examination, the witness agreed with his testimony in the RUF trial in
relation to Operation No Living Thing that the RUF ideology was not to harrn civilians, and
that no RUF high commander was specifically ordered to rape and kill, but said that it was
implied from the order of Operation No Living Thing that "they don’t bring nobody". The
witness also agreed that when terrible incidents occurred they were usually due to the
indiscipline of the combatants and certain rogue commanders, that the leadership of the
revolutionary organization recognized that such behaviour would antagonise and alienate the
6599 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2412-2413 (CS).
6600 TFI-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2644-2645, 2650 (CS).
(fm TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2413-2414 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2650 (the purpose
was that no one should hamper the operation as they were going to Freetown to tbrce the government into
negotiation).
6602 TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2415 (CS).

---- End of Page 1021 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Gl); 18 May 2012 %

very people they wished to convert to their cause, and that given their political ambitions
they would not have ordered people to commit atrocities.66O4
2968. When asked on cross-examination whether Taylor specifically ordered the RUF 0r
Junta to carry out atrocities, the witness replied, "I can't recall when he talked to any AFRC
to go burn and kill civilians or what, n0".(’6O5
2969. Als0 on cross-examination, the witness agreed that the first move to invade Freetown
was not taken by the RUF and that at the time the RUF was "Johnny-come-latelies" because
the invasion had already been initiated by others and the RUF effectively "tagged on the tail
end".66O6 He agreed that the AFRC "b0ys", including SAJ Musa and Gullit, comrnenced the
assault on Freetown.66O7
2970. However, the witness did not agree that the RUF did not plan the invasion,
explaining that while the AFRC group might have had its own agenda and went to Freetown
0n its own, the RUF, already had its own "prior" "in-house" plan. to go to Freetown
because of Sankoh's death sentence and the execution of the 24 soldiers but did not have
sufficient ammunition at that time. That was why Bockarie endeav0ured to go on his trip to
Burkina Fas0. Once Bockarie returned from his trip to Buedu with the materiel, he had
instructions that he passed on to the commanders to first and forem0st capture Kono, Koidu
and then proceed to Freetown. Therefore, while the AFRC had their separate Operation, Sam
Bockarie had his own plan for an Operation to go to Freetown after he came back from his
trip to Burkina Fas0.66O8
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
2971. Witness Karmoh Kanneh (a.k.a. Eagle), an RUF commander, testified that at a
meeting in Waterworks around April/May/June, before the death of Abacha66O9 in which
Bockarie told them that the next Operation would be Fitti-Fatta, Bockarie said that Taylor
6603 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2414, 2416 (CS).
6604 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2650-2655 (CS).
6605 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2654-2655 (CS).
6606 TF1-371 , Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2643-2644 (CS).
6607 TFl-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2645, 2647 (cs).
0608 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2648-2649 (CS).
0609 Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9393, 9398. On cross-examination the witness said that the

---- End of Page 1022 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ OL 18 May 2012

told him that he would link Bockarie to Blaise C0mp0are, the President of Burkina Fas0, in
order to 0btain materiel, and that [brahim Bah would travel with him. The reason Taylor was
going to link Bockarie to Burkina Fas0 was because Bockarie had told Taylor about their
mission to free their leader which would require heavy "materials" in order to clear
ECOMOG forces before getting into Freetown. Bockarie went to Burkina Fas0 not long
after this meeting, within the same month.66l6
2972. Kanneh also testified that in December 1998, just as Bockarie returned from his trip
to Burkina Fas0, Bockarie convened a meeting for officers at his house in Buedu.66ll The
meeting commenced late at night, at around 11.00pm until approximately 2.00am, since they
did not want J 0hnny Paul to know.66l2 There were about 12 men at the meeting including the
witness, Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Kallon, Jungle, Eddie Kanneh, Maj0r Francis (a Gambian
who was part of the Special Forces who were the "senior men who started the revolution"
and who was trained with Sankoh in Libya), Matthew Barbor (a Liberian RUF fighter),
Junior Vandi (a.k.a. JR), Mike Lamin, SYB R0gers, and Gbessay Gb0bah (a.k.a Chucky)
from the RUF.66l3 Isaac Mong0r did not attend the meeting.66l4
2973. During the meeting, Bockarie explained that he had brought enough ammunition and
"logistics" to conduct any kind of Operation and said that they should now plan how to
move. The commanders then discussed a plan to retake Kono and then go to Freetown to
secure the release of the leader, Foday Sankch, and take over p0wer. Bockarie said that the
first target should be Kono, which would be followed by Makeni and then Freetown, while
the next target was Segbwema and Daru, towards Kenema, from where they should proceed
meeting was in June, after Abacha's death (Kami0h Kanneh. Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9688-9689).
""‘° Karmoh Kmmph, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9396-9398.
66H Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9416-9419, 9423-9424, 9429-9430. Bockarie told the
ccmmanders that he had travelled with General lbrahim to Burkina F as0 and that he had met with the President
0f Burkina F as0.
6612 See Kamioh Karmeh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9693-9695. Karmeh ccrrected his testimony in
examination in chief that the meeting ccmmenced at 9.00pm and lasted until midnight (Karmch Karmeh,
Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9429, 9433).
6613 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9419-9423, 9431; Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9703. The
witness ccnfirmed his prior statment in which he menticned that Mike Lamin and SYB R0gers also attended the
meeting.
6661 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9707-9708.

---- End of Page 1023 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / G" 18 May 2012

5 9//6
to the southern province. The witness said that Kono was the first target on account of its
diamond wealth.6°15
2974. The attack on Kono was to be led by Sesay as the overall commander for the
operation, Kallon as Sesay's deputy and Superman as the third in command.6616 From Kono
they were to go to Makeni before going to Freetown. Kono and Makeni were to be captured
first since they were "provincial headquarters" that they had to pass and make sure that they
were under control before proceeding to Freetown.°617 The witness was tasked with taking
Segbwema and Daru.°618
2975. It was agreed at the meeting that the first target for the men on arrival in Freetown
was to release Sankoh from Pademba Road Prison, and the second objective was to go to the
State House to overthrow President Kabbah and, if possible, to kill him.6°l9
2976. Bockarie told the attendees that this plan had been "designed" in Monrovia with
Charles Taylor and that he only brought it to brief them on the strategy which would bring to
their success in the war.6620
2977. Jungle also spoke at the meeting and spoke about the materiel that Bockarie had
brought back, saying that they should not fear this time around and that there was no force
that could withstand them. Jungle said that in Monrovia he and Bockarie had discussed with
Taylor "how the mission should go on", and that Taylor told him that their first target should
be Kono before they proceed.662l
2978. At the end of the meeting, before they were scattered, Bockarie and Jungle contacted
Taylor and briefed him "about how the plan was set". Bockarie spoke first and briefed
Taylor about the arrangements they had made for the mission, telling him that he had
convened the senior officers and that he had explained to them the same plan that Taylor
"had given" to him, Bockarie, in Monrovia. Because Jungle was Taylor's representative in
the RUF he then spoke with President Taylor and "buttressed the same topic", Jungle told
GMS Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9424. A
Gm Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9424-9425.
mw Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9425.
6618 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9426-9427.
M9 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008. pp. 9430-9431.
6620 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9424.
Om Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9431-9433.

---- End of Page 1024 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T 18 May 2012

37//if
Taylor that the plan discussed in Monrovia had been put to the senior officers who had
assured him that they would go ahead with the plan. Taylor in turn thanked them and told
them to carry on. Bockarie and Jungle used a satellite phone, and had a short conversation
with Taylor on the veranda at the back of Bockarie's house, where the 12 attendees of the
meeting, including the witness, were present. The witness did not hear Taylor's side of the
conversation but Jungle and Bockarie said before they called that they were calling Taylor in
order to brief him about the meeting, and the witness heard Taylor's name being mentioned
during the conversation.6622
2979. During the meeting, they also discussed SAJ Musa's disloyalty. Bockarie told the
attendees that he had complained to Taylor about SAJ Musa's disloyalty "towards the
mission", towards Bockarie's command, which meant to the RUF's command, and would
not take orders. Taylor in tum provided advice.6626 Bockarie told the attendees that SAJ
Musa "should not live to tell the sto1y", should die because he was a traitor, and that Musa
should only be shot and killed during a military operation. Bockarie made the attendees
understand that he had been discussing with Gullit killing SAJ Musa during a military
operation, even prior to Gullit joining SAJ Musa's forces.6624
2980. After the meeting, and before the attack on Kono, Bockarie sent a message to SAJ
Musa to attack Freetown but Musa refused and rejected the orders, saying that he could not
take orders from Bockarie. This resulted in a heated argument. The witness stated that SAJ
Musa was already disgruntled when Bockarie sent the message to all stations, and that
arguments had been going on also prior to the meeting.6625
2981. The day after the meeting, upon Bockarie's invitation, the witness went to Bockarie's
"ammo dump" to see the materiel and logistics that he had brought from Burkina Faso.662 6
After the witness saw the materiel, he was asked to meet the brigade commanders and begin
6622 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9431, 9434-9437; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9695-9697,
9728-9730( Before they called Bockarie said they were calling Mr Taylor or Ghankay Taylor).
6623 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9424, 9427, 9430.
6624 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9427-9429; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9720-9721.
6625 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9425-9426.
6626 Karinoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9437-9438.

---- End of Page 1025 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gl; 18 May 2012
xv

gathering men in order to carry out the mission he was given — to capture Segbwema and
Daru and, if possible, beyond.6627
2982. On cross-examination, the witness confirmed that during the meeting there was no
discussion about civilians.6626
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
2983. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF commander, testified that he came to Buedu from
Kono in early November 1998, during the dry season,6626 after he was summoned by Sam
Bockarie, his commander.6636 Upon his arrival, Bockarie welcomed the witness and told him
that he had been waiting for him to discuss how to proceed since their ammunition was
running out, and that they should have a commanders’ meeting in order to discuss what to
do next.663l
2984. The following morning, all the commanders in Buedu convened at Waterworks
including the witness, Bockarie, Jungle, SYB Rogers who was the RUF Secretary General
and Chairman of the War Council, and an SLA named Sambebe. They decided to send
Jungle with a letter to Charles Taylor and request ammunition because they "did not have
enough ammunition to continue their "offensive, or to fight, or to even defend our areas".
Rashid Sandy, the adjutant, then wrote the letter and read it out to the attendees.6632 Three
days after Jungle took the letter, Bockarie told the witness and others that he had received a
call from Taylor that he should go to Monrovia himself Bockarie went with Rashid Sandy,
SYB Rogers, Lawrence Wohmandia and Eddie Kanneh, leaving Issa Sesay in charge in
Buedu. The witness was told to go to Pendembu, since that was where Sesay was
stationed.6663 All in all, the witness stayed in Buedu for three days.6634
6627 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9438-9440.
6626 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9727-9728.
6626 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5782-5783.
6636 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5775-5778. (Bockarie invited him to discuss a disagreement
between Bockarie and Superman, and before Mongor left for Buedu he was told that Bockarie was planning to
kill him but he still decided to go and took his bodyguards with him).
663] Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5778-5779.
6632 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5779-5783.
6636 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5781-5783.
6664 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l1 March 2008, p. 5786.

---- End of Page 1026 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T / 18 May 2012

3 62//7
2985. The witness was in Pendembu for three weeks when he received a message that
Bockarie had retumed from his trip and was summoning commanders from other areas to
report to Buedu.6635 The next moming, in November 1998, the witness lelt for Buedu,
arriving in Buedu in the evening. Upon his arrival, the witness went to Bockarie's house.6636
At Bockarie's house, the witness and Bockarie went into Bockarie's room where Bockarie
briefed Mongor about the ammunition, food and medicines that he had brought, telling the
witness that the ammunition was provided by Taylor and was brought from Liberia.
Bockarie was happy that they now had ammunition which would enable them to carry out
"some missions". Bockarie also told Mongor that the delegation went to Burkina Faso, that
he met with the President of Burkina Faso and that they agreed to have an arrangement for
ammunition purchases. Bockarie showed the witness pictures of the hotel they were lodged
in, which depicted Bockarie and SYB Rogers.6637
2986. From Bockarie's room, Mongor and Bockarie went through a door in Bockarie's
room which led to the place a shop where Bockarie stored the ammunition and food he had
brought. Mongor was pleased to see plenty of ammunition which was packed "up to the
ceiling", approximately three meters high from the floor.6638
2987. Alter Bockarie showed the ammunition to Mongor, he told Mongor that he and
Taylor made a plan for an operation in which the ammunition would be used. Bockarie said
that Taylor took out a map and showed the locations that the RUF and the SLAs occupied.
Taylor came up with a plan for them to launch an operation to capture Kono, Makeni and
then advance towards Freetown. They were also to attack J oru and Kenema.6639
2988. Bockarie said that he had discussed with Taylor that either the witness or Superman
should attack Joru, followed by an advance towards Zimmi. Bockarie told Taylor that, as
Superman was in Koinadugu far away from the Buedu area the witness closer to "the place".
Therefore he said that the witness should attack Joru and that alter he captures Joru he
should advance to Zimmi where he would receive NPFL members who were coming from
Liberia as reinforcements. Superman and the witness were considered for this mission
6635 lsaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5788-5789.
W6 lsaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5789-5790 (Mongor arrived in Buedu in the evening because
he did not want to travel during the day due to Alpha Jet attacks, especially since they were using vehicles).
6637 lsaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5790, 5794-5795.
mg lsaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5790-5792.
6639 lsaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5795.

---- End of Page 1027 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T fl GB 18 May 2012

because both of them were former NPFL fighters and were familiar with the "NPFL
brothers".6646 In l998, NPFL fighters were Charles Taylor's men in Liberia. They were the
ones who were to join them "t0 run the Operation".6644
2989. Bockarie told Mongor that the reason for this attack on Kono and Freetown was to
free Foday Sankoh and others who were jailed in Freetown. They were also to ensure that
they seized power.6642 Bockarie said that he and Taylor discussed how the attack to free 5
Sankoh was to be carried out. Bockarie said that
After he had shown those places to him they discussed that we should run that mission to ensure that we free
Foday Sankoh and others and on the operation we should ensure that the ammunition is not wasted. We should
make the operation fearful than all the other operations that we had undertaken because we want to make sure
6643
that we take Freetown and hold on to power.
2990. At the time, Koidu Town in Kono was occupied by ECOMOG, Kamajors and SLAs
who were loyal to fonner President Tajan Kabbah. These forces were also in other areas of
Kono but the AFRC/RUF forces also had men "around them".6644
299l. The next morning, Bockarie held a meeting in Buedu with the commanders he had
summoned. Bockarie showed the attendees the ammunition that he brought and told them
everything that he had already explained to the witness about the mission the ammunition
was to be used for.6646 Present at this meeting were RUF commanders which included the
witness, Mike Lamin, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Augustine Gbao and Monkey Brown, as
well as SLA commanders including Leather Boot, Akim Turay and Eddie Kanneh.6646
Superman and SAI Musa did not attend the meeting as they were in Koinadugu District at
the time and could not have left it to come to Buedu because ECOMOG was in Koidu
Town.6647 Rambo from the RUF, who eventually attacked Makeni together with Superman,
did not attend the meeting as he was stationed around the Koidu area where they had their
"defences".6646
6646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5795-5796.
6644 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l l March 2008, p. 5798.
6642 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l l March 2008, p. 5796.
6646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5796-5797.
6644 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l l March 2008, p. 5799.
6646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l l March 2008, p. 5797.
6646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5797-5798.
6647 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l l March 2008, pp. 5798-5799.
6646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript l l March 2008, p. 5805.

---- End of Page 1028 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T £i//' 18 May 20l2

5 6//2/
2992. During the meeting, SYB Rogers thanked Bockarie and said that the war would
have ended quickly had Bockarie been the rebel leader when the war started because Foday
Sankoh had never brought that quantity of ammunition which they had brought now.6646
2993. During the meeting, it was agreed that Bockarie should send a radio message to SAJ
Musa and Superman's forces for them all to join hands in order to carry out the operation.
They all decided Johnny Paul should be the one to talk with SAJ Musa, not Bockarie, for
them to forget about the past, put the infighting behind and carry out the operation. Johnny
Paul was then able to speak with SAJ Musa and others and ask them to join hands together.
4 SAJ Musa agreed and accepted to carry out the operation. The witness knew about the
conversation between Johnny Paul and SAJ Musa and others since that was what had been
agreed about in the meeting, and his radio operator, who monitored the conversation, told
him about it.6666 At that time, there were RUF members who retreated from Makeni with
SAJ Musa, including Alfred Brown who was a senior radio operator, King Perry and "other
‘ fighters".666`
2994. After the meeting, at which each person was assigned to various targets, they were
supplied with ammunition. The only people who were not able to receive the supplies at that
moment were those who were in the northern jungle in Koinadugu District since there was
no way to transport the ammunition to them as their enemies, ECOMOG, Kamajors and
President Kabbah's loyalists, were based in Koidu Town. The witness received ammunition
to go to the "target" he was assigned to. Ammunition was given to commanders who had
"targets", such as Issa Sesay and Moriis Kallon and AFRC members attending the meeting,
including Akim Turay.6662
2995. On cross-examination, Mongor agreed that AFRC members were the ones who
entered Freetown, but stated that the plan that Bockarie brought from Taylor, to attack
several places and advance towards Freetown, did not encompass selecting a specific group
that would be the one that enters Freetown.6666 The witness said that the invasion of
6649 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5797.
6656 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5799-5800.
665l Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5800-5801 (the witness did not communicate directly with
Alfred Brown while Brown was in Koinadugu and did have direct contact with Brown when the offensive
started).
6652 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 I March 2008, pp. 5801-5804.
6653 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6720-6721.

---- End of Page 1029 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

5 6//2 2
Freetown by Gullit and SAJ Musa was in accordance with the plan Taylor made with
Bockarie, in which they planned to send the RUF to carry out the advancement.6654 The
witness confirmed his prior statement that the Freetown invasion was largely an AFRC
project. He explained that the AF RC, Gullit and SAJ Musa, "had the movement" but could
not have invaded Freetown without the attacks carried out by the RUF on the "other places".
They would not have been able to reinstate the army if they only depended on their small
group, they needed the RUF participation to reduce the burden, The witness's view was
based on his war experience.6655 Later in cross—examination, Mongor said that the reason he
told his investigators that the invasion of Freetown was mainly an AFRC project was
because many in the group that entered Freetown were AFRC members, and that they
refused to wait for the RUF group to join them. "They were doing it by themselves".6656
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna F ornie
2996. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie, an RUF radio operator, testiiied that in early
December 1998 he accompanied Bockarie, Rashid, SYB Rogers, Eddie Kanneh, Shabado
and others who he was unable to recall on a trip to Monrovia.6657
2997. While in Monrovia, F ornie stayed at Benjamin Yeaten's house. Bockarie remained in
Monrovia for up to 72 hours before departing for Burkina Faso. During this time, Bockarie
and Yeaten would go out for long periods of time, including overnight. Sometimes when
they would return to Yeaten's house, Bockarie would tell the witness that they had briefly
met with the "Papay".6°58
2998. Fornie was taken on this trip to act as a radio operator for Bockarie in Monrovia
while Bockarie was abroad. When Bockarie, Karrneh and SYB Rogers travelled to Burkina
Faso, Fomie remained at Base 1, the radio station at Yeaten's residence in Monrovia. While
M4 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, p. 6754.
M55 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6758·6760.
M6 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6763·6766.
6657 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21530; Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2154l·2l542,
§"§ib5auda Aruna Fcmre, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21545.

---- End of Page 1030 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·0l·T /’ 18 May 2012

there, he collected information from the various RUF front lines and passed this information
to Bockarie who was in Burkina Faso via telephone.6656
2999. Bockarie and his group returned to Monrovia from Ouagadougou at night about one
week later.6666 The witness did not see Bockarie on the night that he returned, but rather on
the next night when Bockarie came to Base 1 at Yeaten's residence, with Yeaten, Kanneh
and Bah.666l From Base 1, Bockarie called Issa Sesay and instructed the witness to send a
message to some of the commanders to meet Bockarie in Buedu.6662 While in the radio
room, before leaving for Buedu, the witness was present when Bockarie, Kanneh and Yeaten
discussed that Kono and Tongo were the first targets to be hit with the ammunition they had
brought back with them.6666 The delegation then left Monrovia from Yeaten's house in the
evening.6664
3000. After arriving in Buedu, Bockarie met with the various commanders he had sent for,
including CO lsaac, Saddam, Eagle, Akim Turay and Issa Sesay, in order to discuss the
strategy for the attack on Kono and Tongo. During their meeting, they discussed how to
successfully attack Kono and Tongo. Fornie was not present during these discussions and
said that his knowledge of them was based on a message sent from Bockarie's radio station
stating that "the other people should hasten up to come for the meeting".6666
3001. Bockarie then distributed the ammunition among the attendees. Some of the
ammunition he sent toward a target in Njama which is on the road leading to Joru in
Kenema, some of it went "to Eagle and others in their defensive area", but most of it was
sent with Issa Sesay towards Kono and Tongo.6666 Bockarie also distributed other supplies to
the commanders including "mora1e boosters" such as alcohol, rice, fuel and condiments,
which they had also brought with them to Sierra Leone.6667
6656 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21544-21547.
6666 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21546-21547.
6661 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21547.
6662 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21547.
6663 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21548-21549 (Pa Rogers did not attend this
conversation).
6664 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21549-21550.
6665 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21552-21554.
6666 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21552- 21553.
6667 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21554.

---- End of Page 1031 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ 6366 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
3002. Witness Augustine Mallah testified that at the end of 1998/early 1999 he was present
at a meeting convened by Bockarie in Buedu for ‘"senior men, officers" in which Bockarie
said that he was ‘"tired of sta `n like that in Buedu" and was "fed u with all of us sta 'n
Y1 S P Y] S
in Kailahun District". Bockarie said that he had something at hand and that he was trying to
>o to Liberia to seek advice from Charles Taylor, ex lainin that in Liberia he, Bockarie,
B Y P S
will "get our needs". Bockarie also said that after he will return from his trip they will "try to
do what really he wanted to do, he Mosquito". They then heard that Bockarie went to
Liberia.66°8
3003. Upon Bockarie's return from Liberia, at around November 1998,6669 Bockarie
convened a meeting for 60 to 80 persons who included civilians, representatives from RUF
deployment areas as well as AFRC, RUF and Liberian fighters under the command of Abu
Keita, who, according to Bockarie, had come as reinforcements "for a particular mission that
he wanted to undertake".6670
3004. At the meeting, Bockarie told those gathered that, as he told them before he left, he
had brought arms and ammunition from Charles Taylor in Liberia, and that they would "not
only sit by and just control Kailahun and still call ourselves RUF". Bockarie said that he
now had enough arms, ammunition and medicines in order for them to go and fight against
ECOMOG, saying that this operation would be called "Operation Free San13005. Following this meeting, Bockarie convened a meeting for around 35 to 40 senior
officers for a second meeting, at a location known as Waterworks, located outside of Buedu
in the direction of Dawa by the Liberian border.6672 Bockarie told the attendees that
everything was now available for RUF commanders to fight, and explained that the
6668 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20217.
6669 Mallah initially testified that Bockarie returned in 1999, but subsequently clarified that the meeting took
place in November 1998, before the attack on Freetown (Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp.
20217—20218, 20227).
6670 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20219—20220.
Wl Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20219—20220.
6672 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20219-20220, 20222.

---- End of Page 1032 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / /,7 18 May 2012

39/Ji 5
operation he was now announcing was to be taken seriously and that every commander
should do exactly as he said, otherwise they would be facing "a big problem" with him.6673
3006. Bockarie then said that "he himself ’ had planned Operation Spare No Soul, and that
what he meant by that was that this was not the type of mission where commanders "would
be womanising", capturing civilians and keeping those civilians when attacking a town.
Bockarie stated that he wanted "the land" and therefore when they encounter a civilian
running away they should let them run away and not capture them. He said, "Kill anybody
who comes your way. If that person doesn’t want to run away, don’t stay with that person at
all". Bockarie also said that they should destroy any town they "feel" is occupied by
ECOMOG and destroy the towns they capture — "let that be an open terrain", "we want the
ground".6(’74 Bockarie explained that fighting against ECOMOG would not raise the concern
of the "international committee" as would be the case if civilians are killed and towns are
burnt. According to Bockarie, that would permit the RUF to negotiate the release of Foday
Sankoh before they agree to peace, since "without Foday Sankoh there will be no peace" and
he would not be afraid to say that this was Operation Spare No Soul.6675 Bockarie told Issa
Sesay that those were the "guidelines" for the operation. Sesay in turn accepted and
supported Bockarie, saying that he would follow what Bockarie, "Master", had said.6676
Mallah confirmed that "Operation Spare No Soul", "Operation Free Foday Sankoh" and
"Operation No Living Thing" were the same operation. He was physically present in Buedu
when Bockarie passed the order for Operation Free Sankoh, and confirmed that "the
fighters" decided to call the operation "Operation No Living Thing".6677
3007. According to the plan, the witness was to go to Baiima with Eagle, Manawai and the
lst brigade commander from the RUF, CO Denis, a.k.a. Monkey Brown. The command was
to attack Bunumbu, Segbwema, Daru, Tondola, Bendu Junction, Jomukafebu, Kumbema
and all the way to Kenema.6678 Following this second meeting, Bockarie returned to Buedu
and provided the commanders who were to go on this mission — the witness, Manawai,
Eagle and CO Denis — with Abu Keita "and his reinforcement", as well as arms, ammunition
6613 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20220.
(’°7° Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008. pp. 20220-20221.
W5 Augustine Mallah. Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20221-20222.
W6 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20221.
6677 Augustine Mallah. Transcript 18 November 2008, pp. 20513-20514.
WS Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008. pp. 20222-20224.

---- End of Page 1033 ---------------------------


Case No.:SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

507 /51 6
and medicines, for them to attack the various areas. Bockarie then told CO Denis, the
brigade commander, to move ahead and pursue the mission.6679
3008. The witness also saw Bockarie providing arms, arrmiunition and medicines to Issa
Sesay, telling Sesay to go together with Akim, Soriba and other AFRC soldiers to Kono, to
join Superman and CO Rambo and attack Kono. Bockarie said that from there Akim should
attack Tongo while Sesay and Morris Kallon should advance to Makeni.668O
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
3009. Witness Albert Saidu testified that in October/early November 1998, he attended a
meeting in Buedu in which Bockarie said that he would go and meet Charles Taylor in order
to explain the situation- how they have tried to capture Kono but did not succeed since they
ran out of ammunition and that they "still needed Kono". This meeting was attended by CO
Eagle, the 2"d Brigade commanders such as Superman, Hi-Rash, Augustine Gbao and front
line commanders. Sam Bockarie then went to meet Charles Taylor in Liberia and left Issa
Sesay in charge of Buedu. In Bockarie's absence the witness's promotion was approved by
CO 1ssa.°68l
3010. The witness also testified about a meeting he had with Bockarie in 1998, "before that
big offensive that was to take place in Kono on the Bunumbu-Segbwema axis", in which
Bockarie showed him a "white paper" which contained diamonds. Bockarie called the
diamonds "stones" and said that he was taking the "stones" to the "Father", Charles Taylor,
to secure materiel quickly in order for them to launch "a big offensive" to recapture Kono.
This meeting was attended by senior RUF Vanguards, including Edwin Collins, and some
civilians.6682
3011. Bockarie left Sierra Leone for Liberia to bring "materials" and put Issa Sesay in
charge. Subsequently, the witness was promoted by Sesay in Bockarie's absence on 19
November 1998. When Bockarie returned, he returned with "a lot of materials".6(’83 Upon his
return, Bockarie convened a general meeting at Waterworks, in early 1999, at around the
6679 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20222-20223.
6680 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20223.
668] Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11066-1 1068.
6682 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. »11070—11072, 11075-11076, 11081.

---- End of Page 1034 ---------------------------


Case No.

time Sesay made the promotion. Saidu did not attend the meeting as he was in Koidu and
"under pressure" from their enemies, keeping up the defensive.6684
3012. The day after the meeting, the witness went to Buedu and was told about the meeting
by two of Bockarie's bodyguards, Shabado and Ray. They told the witness that Bockarie
held a meeting at Waterworks for all of the front line commanders and senior Vanguards
including Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh from the AFRC, Abu Keita and "some other Liberians",
Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay and SYB Rogers, as well as "the Liberian Government
representative", Colonel Jungle and lbrahim Bah.6°85
3013. According to Shabado, Ray and others, Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh returned from
Liberia to Sierra Leone and briefed the attendees on their travels and about the materiel they
had brought. They said that they went to Charles Taylor in Liberia and proceeded to Burkina
Faso, returning to Sierra Leone with "a lot of ammunition and arms".6686 The witness was
told that SYB Rogers, the War Council Chairman, thanked the delegation and addressed the
meeting. Other officers such as Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay also spoke at the meeting.6687
3014. According to Shabado and others, a war plan was drawn at the meeting for a major
offensive which will include the lst and 2"d brigades to go and attack Kono and the
Bunumbu-Segbwema axis simultaneously.6688 Bockarie, together with other senior officers
such as Issa Sesa , Morris Kallon and others, drew the war lan of how the operation was to
Y P P
be executed: Abu Keita and Tamba were assigned to go with the lst brigade to the
Bunumbu-Segbwema axis, while Issa Sesay, Superman and the 2"d brigade were assigned to
o to Kono. The divided officers at the meetin and from the meetin each erson was to
E Y E E P
go straight to the location they were assigned to with the materiel and commence an
M3 Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 1 1205-1 1207.
M4 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11081-1 1082.
6685 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11081-11085.
M6 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11082-11085. The witness referred to Bockarie as "the Master"
and to Taylor as "Father".
6687 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1085.
6688 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11082-11083, 11085 (they also told the witness that he might be
called to reinforce the troops).

---- End of Page 1035 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

5 9/O? 8
attack.6°89 The arms and ammunition that the delegation had brought was "consistent" with
the war plans that had been drawn for Kono and Kenema.°69O
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
3015. Witness TF1-567 testified that while he was in Superman Ground, in October 1998
Bockarie summoned Issa Sesay to Buedu and the witness joined Sesay. ln Buedu, Bockarie
said that they should attempt to recapture Koidu Town and that he was going to see Charles
Taylor in Monrovia, assigning Sesay to stay in charge of Buedu in his absence.669l
3016. The witness was in Buedu for two months when Bockarie returned in December
1998 with a large consignment of ammunition. Bockarie said that Taylor had told him that
the RUF should attempt to recapture Kono and other mining areas, in order to secure
diamonds to obtain more arms and ammunition. Bockarie gave the materials to Sesay, as
Sesay was in charge of organizing commanders.6692
3017. From Buedu, they returned to Superman Ground with the ammunition which was
transferred by captured civilians from Buedu and its surroundings before they departed from
Buedu. When they returned to Superman Ground Sesay convened a meeting which was
attended by Morris Kallon, Akim Turay, Banya, Gassama Mansaray, Rambo (a.k.a. Boston
Flomo) and others whom the witness could not recall. At the meeting, Sesay said that
Master, Bockarie, met with Taylor who provided Bockarie with "a lot" of arms and
ammunition for them to capture Koindu Town and other mining areas. Sesay further testified
that Bockarie reported that Taylor said that if they did not capture the mining areas he would
stop supplying them with arms and ammunition.6693
3018. Sesay organized the commanders at this meeting and directed how the mission was
to be carried out: Morris Kallon was to go and mount an ambush in the Goltown area,
behind Sewaf`e bridge, and Akim Turay was to go to the "other" area while Rambo, in whose
group the witness was, should proceed to "Five-Five spot" in Koidu Town. All the groups
were to come together and attack Koidu Town. Sesay said that after they captured Koidu
6689 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11085-11087.
6690 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1 1085-1 1086.
669} TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12912.
6692 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12912-12913, 12915.

---- End of Page 1036 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T · jk) 18 May 2012

Town Akim was to take troops towards Tongo Field, while Rambo was to go towards
Makeni.6664
3019. At that time, Superman was still in the Koinadugu area. Bockarie instructed
Superman that after they captured Koidu and advanced to Makeni, Superman should come
from Koinadugu and join them in Makeni.6666
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
3020. Witness Abu Keita testified that upon Bockarie's return to Buedu with 300 boxes of
ammunition, Bockarie called a meeting at his residence in Buedu. The meeting was attended
by Keita, 1ssa Sesay, Lawrence Wohmandia, SB Rogers, Akim and Leatherboot from the
AFRC, and other fighters ("the whole RUF"). Bockarie told those present that with the
ammunition he had secured, the fighters would attack Kono and Makeni and "terrorise the
highway", because Kono was a strategic area and its diamond mines would fund arms
purchases for the RUF.6666 Bockarie then convened a smaller meeting in his bedroom which
only the most senior commanders (the Vanguards), attended. Keita did not attend.6697
3021. After the closed meeting in Bockarie's bedroom, Bockarie called a muster parade of
the soldiers during which he ordered Sesay to undertake the attack on Kono and Makeni.6666
Bockarie told those assembled that Taylor had said that "they should be very vigilant and
maintain the ground of the RUF".6666 They then dispersed to carry out the operation in
Kono, Makeni, Masingbi, and Magburaka and the operation from Bunumbu to Segbwema to
Jumo Kafebu, Gbava, and Bendu Junction. Keita was part of the Bunumbu operation.
Koindu [sic] Town was taken over on Christmas Day 1998.6766
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
M TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12913-12914.
6°"" TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12914-12916.
°°"5 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12916.
6666 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2005-2007.
6667 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2006-2007.
6666 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2007-2008.
6666 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2008.
(*700 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2008.

---- End of Page 1037 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J W 18 May 2012

3 7/BO
3022. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, a radio commander in Buedu, testified that in 1999, afier
Sam Bockarie returned from Monrovia with the large shipment, of "heaviest ammunition"
Bockarie had ever brought from his travels to Liberia, Bockarie convened a meeting behind
Issa Sesay's house for front line commanders in order to plan how to launch an attack.°70l
3023. The witness did not attend the meeting as he was on duty at the radio station when
this meeting took place, and was therefore briefed about the meeting by Zedman when
Zedman returned from the meeting. Zedman told the witness that at the meeting there was a
plan to attack Kono: Morris Kallon was to be used to cut off the supply line between Kono
and Makeni so that Issa Sesay, Rambo, Banya and other commanders would attack
Kono.6702 The witness knew that the "planning meeting" was attended by Issa Sesay, Morris
Kallon and Amara Peleto, as messages had been sent to these front line commanders to
come.6703
3024. On cross-examination Kabbah said that he had never received a message from
Charles Taylor ordering the RUF to hold Kono, and conirmed that he could not recall
hearing or seeing any messages from Taylor ordering the RUF to hold Kono afrer the
AFRC/RUF retreated from Freetown in early 1998.6704 Kabbah confirmed his prior
statements that he did not recall hearing Bockarie or anyone else referring to instructions or
orders from Liberia regarding the planned attack on Kono in late 1998 when Bockarie
brought ammunition from Monrovia. However because Bockarie went to Monrovia and
talked about Kono when he returned "we believed" that he got the plan in Monrovia "or
from any other area" shortly before the meeting.6705
3025. The witness also confirmed his prior statement that he did not recall hearing or
seeing messages containing orders or instructions from Charles Taylor or one of his people
concerning the Freetown invasion, or from Taylor ordering Bockarie to attack Freetown, or
that Taylor discussing military strategy with Bockarie.67O6
670] Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16151-16154 (Kabbah stated that this shipment of
weapons arrived in Sierra Leone before 6 January and was used to attack Kono, Makeni and Lunsar, "even
before we thought about January 6").
6702 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16153—16154.
6703 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16154, 16159.
6704 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16338- 16339.
6705 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16340-16341.
6706 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16352-16353.

---- End of Page 1038 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-l` // W 18 May 2012


5 fi /5/
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
3026. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that at around the end of J une/beginning of
July 19986707 he was in a group with commander Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast)
who withdrew from Kono to Tombodu where they met "military supervisors" Gullit, Bazzy,
Woyoh, Abdul Sesay, as well as Ibrahim Bioh Sesay and other commanders, and about 200
civilians who were captured by both the RUF and SLAs from Makeni and Kono.67O8 The
group waited for Savage to join them the same day but Savage did not arrive. Gullit,
Bangura, the witness and others then left Tombodu the same day in two vehicles and arrived
in Mansofinia in Koinadugu District, about 50 miles from Tombodu, while Tito and other
commanders who did not have vehicles went with the civilians through the "footpath" to
Mansofinia.6709
3027. From Mansofinia the witness moved onto Mongo Bendugu in Koinadugu District,
along with Hassan Papa Bangura, Gullit, Junior Johnson, Junior Lion, Bazzy, Abdul Sesay,
Bioh and others. In Mongo Bendugu they met SAJ Musa who was there with "a mixed
force" including F ive—F ive, Musa's security called Alie Turay, and Alabama.67lO .
3028. After they arrived in Mongo Bendugu, a closed door meeting was convened. The
meeting was attended by SAJ Musa, Five—Five, Bazzy, Gullit, Hassan Papa Bangura, Abdul
Sesay, Bioh, SAJ Musa's Chief Security Officer and "some other securities".6m At the
meeting, Gullit told SAJ Musa that Bockarie took his diamonds from him while in Kailahun,
that he was not happy with this treatment, and sought advice from Musa about what should
be the next plan.(’7l2
3029. SAJ Musa then replied and said that Brigadier Mani had proceeded to the north in
search of a base to prepare for an advancement to Freetown, and that Gullit should proceed
and search for Brigadier Mani in order to set up an "advance base", while Musa would
ensure that F ive-F ive joins him. Musa said that this would enable them to have a strong front
line troop in the north to prepare for an attack on Freetown and "prepare the way", since at
6707 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8042.
6708 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8038-8039.
6709 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8039-8040.
bm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8040-8043.
(ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8044.
W2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8044 (at this meeting, Bazzy briefed the attendees on

---- End of Page 1039 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T QQ 18 May 2012

that time they did not have troops in the north. ln the base they would establish they would
later get reinforcements to advance towards Freetown.°m
3030. Following this meeting, the witness, Gullit, Hassan Papa Bangura and others
commanded by Gullit left for Mansofinia where they stayed for three days. Five-Five then
arrived in Mansofinia with about 100 people including a mixed force of RUF and SLA
members, and SBUs. The witness did not know how many RUF members were in that
ou , but Five-Five told Gullit that there were RUF members among his grou , and the
EY P P
witness "also got that from other RUF men that were there".67l4
3031. Bobson Sesay also testified that around 23 December 1998, SAJ Musa instructed
Foday Bah Marrah to lead the troops in an attack on Benguema. The troops, including
Bobson Sesay, encountered ECOMOG forces and captured Benguema.67l5 The witness was
attempting to fix a mounted 120 millimetre mortar near the ammunition dump in Benguema
military training centre with Bazzy, O-Five, and Colonel Eddie, when he heard a heavy
explosion. SAJ Musa's body was placed on a broken door and carried to where the witness
was. When O-Five was trying to give milk to Musa, people started saying that he had died.
Gullit said that it was an exploding bomb that had killed Musa.67l6 The witness saw that the
helmet that Musa was wearing was pierced by a bullet hole, and believed that Musa had
been shot. He said, "what 1 saw was a bullet hole that went through that hit SAJ, because
you can see where the bullet went through, where it was pierced, and so 1 believed that SAJ
was shot". Bobson Sesay testified that he heard a rumour around the brigade that Gullit had
killed SAJ Musa.°7l7 SAJ Musa died in the "morning hours" of 24 December 1998.6718 After
SAJ Musa's death, the witness left the scene.67l9 About a day after SAJ Musa's death, the
witness was brought by a patrol team to Gullit's location where he was surprised to see
Gullit fully dressed in Musa's helmet and unifonn. Alabama, who had been SAJ Musa's
what has happened in Kono, about the withdrawal and the events leading up to their arrival in Mongo Bendugu).
W3 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8044-8046 (Bobson Sesay explained that the "north"
is a large area and that they did not have a strategic area, but they went to the north since Makeni and "all those
areas" were in the north).
Gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8046-8047.
Gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8243-8244.
W6 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8244-8246.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8245-8246.
6718 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8247.
Gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8245.

---- End of Page 1040 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/ \i ‘

3 Cf /33
CSO was also very close to Gullit. Gullit told the witness that they had buried SAJ Musa in
the Koba Water area.6720
3032. On cross-examination the witness agreed that the 24 persons executed on 19 October
were all SLA members and none of them were from the RUF. The witness confirmed his
prior statement in which he said that when SAJ Musa arrived [in Colonel Eddie Town] he
summoned a meeting and said that they should head straight to Freetown, and that two days
later they heard that the 24 soldiers were executed. This caused Musa to convene another
meeting in which he said that since "we" are SLA members and they have started executing
soldiers in Freetown, "we should not just sit and see this happening". Musa said that they
were now going to Freetown to reinstate the army. The witness also confirmed his prior
statement that he did not know what Musa had in mind, but that is what Musa had said and
the attendees were happy about itém
3033. The witness agreed that in addition to the execution of the 24 soldiers Musa's intent
to reinstate the army was another factor that contributed to the invasion of Freetown . They
also heard that more executions would occur, including of members of the AFRC and the
RUF, and of other political prisoners at Pademba Road, including Foday Sankoh. On the day
the government announced the executions, Bockarie also "went on the air" i.e. broadcast
saying that he did not accept the execution of the 24 soldiers, and that the troops would
move as far as Freetown. "So it was through that that all of us said when SAJ Musa made a
statement that we’re not going to waste any time".6m The witness was then challenged that
the releasing of Foday Sankoh as a factor that led to the invasion of Freetown was not
mentioned in prior statements. The witness replied that when Bockarie "went over the air"
he said that "our men" will march onto Freetown as long as "our members" are being
executed, "and it happened at the time that we were fighting. We were together with them".
He confirmed that SAJ Musa stated that as long as those officers "have been executed we
should move at once and reinstate the army".°m
3034. The witness disagreed with the proposition that SAJ Musa's reasons for invading
Freetown had nothing to do with the RUF stating "we were together. We were all operating
6720 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8246-8247.
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8831-8832, 8834.
mz Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8833-8837.
mi Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8837-8838.

---- End of Page 1041 ---------------------------


Case No.:. ` - - - ` 18 May2012
C N SCSL 03 01T 1041 /w
f J Q

5 67/54
by the same aims and objectives and we wouldn’t have just moved without their support".
He stated that it had something with the RUF if they had left Colonel Eddie Town with the
intention to go to Freetown without weakening the other areas such as Kono, ECOMOG
would have "finished" them in Freetown. . He testified that it was an organized advance, but
those executions accelerated their advance towards Freetown.6724
Prosecution Witness TFl -367
3035. Witness TFl-367, who was stationed in Kono, testified that he heard from Rambo
that Bockarie went to see Charles Taylor, "Father", in Monrovia for arms and ammunition,
and that when Bockarie retumed Sesay would come to Kono and they will attack Koidu
Town. When Bockarie went to Liberia Sesay was left in charge of Buedu. Two to three days
after a radio message announced Bockarie's retum, Sesay retumed to Kono with
ammunition and a strong manpower which included his bodyguards and some officers. This
was new ammunition that they used in order to capture Koidu Town.6725
3036. After he arrived, Sesay sent a message to the senior officers to report for a meeting at
the headquarters. At the meeting they discussed and planned attacks on Koidu Town, and
commanders were given areas to attack on the road leading to Koidu Town. Akim and
Kailandu were given "a place to attack" while Rambo was assigned to attack with Five-Five.
Peleto, Sesay, the witness and others were assigned to the Guinea Highway, and Banya was
sent to Tankoro.6726 At the meeting, they also discussed the objective of the attack on Kono,
which was to suppress the government and force the release of Foday Sankoh by starting
with Koidu Town and then go straight to Freetown and release Sankoh. That was why the
operation was named "Operation Free Foday Sankoh". The only piece of advice that was
given to every soldier was that this operation was "do or die", that they should do everything
possible to iiee Sankoh and that nobody should sabotage the mission; "the operation should
be made fearful so we should conquer the enemy. We should make the operation
rwatirztm
Prosecution Witness TFl -585
6724 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8838.
6725 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14161-14162, 14181-14183.
6726 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14162-1-1164.

---- End of Page 1042 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JQ 18 May 2012
/ y

367 /35
3037. Witness TPI-585, an RUF radio operator, testified that the soldiers and commander
were happy at the time Sani Abacha died. His death brought to Bockarie to announce
Operation Spare No Soul, as he said that ECOMOG soldiers would now be discouraged
which will enable the RUF/AFRC forces to prevail. Operation Spare No Soul meant that
they were not to capture ECOMOG soldiers and bring them to Buedu, but rather kill any
ECOMOG soldier. Operation Spare No Soul took place around the "Kono axis" and was
commanded by Komba Gbundema. The witness learned from Alice Pyne and another radio
operator named Ebony that Gbundema reported to Superman and Bockarie that they had
killed many civilians and ECOMOG soldiers during this operation.°728
3038. The witness also testified that Bockarie convened a meeting for all Vanguards in
Buedu, in order to establish unity. This was since there was "no understanding" within the
command structure: soldiers were disgruntled after Issa Sesay had lost diamonds and was
not punished, and also did not succeed in capturing Kono; there was misunderstanding
between Superman and Issa Sesay and between Superman and Bockarie, and; after the
"raiding" of Johnny Paul Koroma and SAJ Musa's refusal to cooperate. Prior to this
meeting, Bockarie discussed with Eddie Kanneh on Bockarie's veranda a plan to conduct a
military operation starting with Kono and from Kono they were to advance towards
Freetown.6729 During the meeting with Eddie Kanneh at Bockarie's house, they discussed
how to attack Freetown by first capturing Kono. They said that it should be a uniformed
mission, that Superman and Komba Gbundema should act together with SAJ Musa and
others. After SAJ Musa would clear Kono they should go to Kabala and proceed to
Freetown. By then, there was no communication between Bockarie and SAJ Musa. Also
present at this meeting were CO Isaac, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Abu Keita and "some
other people".6730
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
3039. Witness Periy Kamara testified that around 25 December, SAJ Musa's forces that he
was with attacked and captured Benguema where ECOMOG had established their
headquarters in the province. There, they captured a lot of ammunition but it was too much
6727 TFl—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. l4l64—l4l65.
6728 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. l5688—l5680.
6729 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15691-15693.

---- End of Page 1043 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-0l-T JW l8 May 20l2

for them to carry into Freetown. SA] Musa said that if they left the ammunition there then
their enemies would use it against them so the best thing would be to set fire to the ammo
dump. After Musa and the officers had eaten and drunk in the ofHcers’ mess, they came and
stood by the road and SA] Musa passed an order to set fire to the ammo dump so that neither
ECOMOG nor the government troops could use it.673 1 He explained:
The whole place was set on fire, but in the ammo dump bombs were there, 180 millimetre bombs°m were there
and some other bombs and their tubes, so the fire exploded the roof and the bomb blasted. We just heard that
this bomb that had blasted, SA] Musa had dropped. When we went there he had fallen down, but it was not far
away from the house where this fire was. There were so many other soldiers there, so they took SA] Musa.
Everybody was coming to see. But before that other groups had moved. They had moved towards the
Peninsula Road. When you reach Waterloo you enter Benguema, you avoid the Freetown highway to go
Freetown directly. You use another route to come to Freetown that is called peninsula road. It is the bypass
through to Freetown. The other groups went there and stayed there. They had not known that SA] Musa had
died, or so and so thing had happened to SA] Musa, and we were not expecting that SA] Musa would die at
that time. They took SA] Musa and they placed him on a plank. They called the medical personnel who were
among us, they touched him and he was not moving and they said to leave him for a while. They took him to
some place. They thought he had just fainted away. They did that, but SA] Musa died. Some people said we
should carry SA] Musa along as we went along fighting until we finally bury him. Some people said no. Gullit
and others came together and said he was a dead man and so many people had died among these troops, we did
not carry them, so let us bury SA] Musa as a guerrilla, so they took some leaves and put them over SA] Musa.
Everybody was doing that until we finally left. We left that location and went in the middle of the forest.°m
3040. Kamara clarified that he did not see anyone else either injured or killed by the
eXploSion.6734
Prosecution Witness TF 1-143
3041. Witness TF 1-143, a child soldier, testified that he moved with SA] Musa's group
from Colonel Eddie Town towards Freetown.6735 When he arrived at Benguema barracks it
was night. He testified that the advance team, SA] Musa's group, comprising O-F ive, Five-
Five, Komba, Med and some other fighters, had gone ahead,6736 entered Benguema barracks
and was looting ammunition from the barracks. When it was time for the witness's group to
enter the barracks they were stopped at the gate and told not to enter because it would be
6730 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15700-1570 1.
""‘ Perry Kamara, rrrrrrsprrpr 6 February 2008, pp. 3214-3215.
Gm The witness clarified that these were mortar bombs. see Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3216.
W3 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3215-3216.
(734 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3217.
6735 TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9020.
°73° The Trial Chamber notes that the witness had previously testified that Gullit was in the group that went
ahead with SA] Musa when they left Colonel Eddie Town (TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9019).

---- End of Page 1044 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
v

37/3 ¥
risky due to explosion of bombs, as those in the barracks were looting the ammunition they
needed and were setting fire to the rest.6737
3042. The witness was told that SAJ Musa had gone to look at who had set the store on fire
and a bomb had exploded. The witness then saw SAJ Musa being carried past him in a
hammock at the gate to Benguema barracks. TF1—143 said that he then followed ten boys
carrying the hammock into the forest. They attempted to treat Musa but he died. The witness
testified that he stayed there for the whole day as they would move when it was dark. A
priest who they had captured was asked to pray over the corpse and Musa was buried in a
grave they had dug.6738 The witness said that he was told by his boss, Kabila, that Gullit and
O—Five gave an order for a "fair in complexion lady" to be buried alive with SAJ Musa as a
sacrifice to ensure success in the mission to Freetown.6739
The Accused
3043. The Accused testified that the tension between him and Sani Abacha ended when the
two met in Abuja,674O but stated that "towards the end of the Abacha years" with his passing
in June 1998, their relationship deteriorated, for example when Nigeria accused him of being
involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone.674l The Accused recalled Nigeria's statements after
the death of Abacha that it could no longer afford its commitment to ECOMOG and Sierra
Leone, but said that the ECOWAS leaders would have permitted Nigeria to withdraw from
Sierra Leone.6742 .
3044. The Accused also testified that he was upset by the execution of the 24 soldiers as he
felt that Kabbah had lied to him, since Kabbah promised Taylor that Victor King, who was
extradited from Liberia to Sierra Leone would not be executed but King was.6743 The
Accused said that he met Bockarie in September 1998 for a short "preliminary meeting", in
which they discussed a cessation of hostilities. The two met again in mid-October 1998
which was a follow up to their first meeting in September to discuss how to bring to the
Gm TF1 -143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9022-9023.
6738 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9023-9024.
6739 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9025.
6740 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 August 2009, pp. 26343-26345.
6741 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, pp. 26521 -26422.
M42 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32461-32462.
6743 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 September 2009, pp. 29754-29755.

---- End of Page 1045 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

implementation of the 1996 agreement. During the meeting in October, the Accused
provided the RUF with a guesthouse in Monrovia.6744
3045. The Accused said that he also met with Sam Bockarie brietly at around November
1998, when Bockarie passed on his way to Burkina Faso. Bockarie asked to pass through
Liberia with a delegation, which included Eddie Kanneh, en route to Burkina Faso where he
was to discuss peace with another member of ECOWAS. Bockarie also returned to Sierra
Leone through Liberia at around November 1998. Bockarie sought the Accused's help in
releasing Foday Sankoh.6746 The Accused denied that he planned the invasion of Freetown
with Bockarie during these meetings, or that he ordered or planned with Bockarie the
capturing of Kono, Makeni, Joru and Freetown. He denied providing Bockarie with advice
or that he was the mastermind behind the Freetown lnvasion. He also said that he did not
know that Kono was a strategic mining area.6746 He said that he would have had to be
Superman to both manage rebuilding Liberia and being part of the invasion of Freetown. ln
fact, he was outraged when he heard of the invasion because of his efforts and those of his
colleagues in ECOWAS since August 1998 to bring the RUF to the peace table. He had tried
to pressure the RUF by closing the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone in August
1998. He had no knowledge that the invasion was arranged, and it is impossible that he
ordered, planned or executed the invasion on 6 January.6747 The Accused denied that he
ordered the invasion of Freetown in order to force Kabbah into peace negotiations, saying
that Kabbah had given "a clear signal" to the international community, including ECOWAS,
that Sankoh would not be executed.6746
6744 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26004-26006; Transcript 22 September 2009, pp.
29337-29338, 293434 (the meeting with Bockarie in September 1998 was his first meeting with Bockarie,
which was conducted with the acquiescence of ECOWAS and was "very secret"); Transcript 29
September 2009, p. 29755; Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31737-31738.
6745 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26015-26016, 26037-26038, 26046-26047;
Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29247-29249 (Sam Bockarie was going to Burkina Faso on a "peace
mission". He was travelling with Eddie Kanneh and Musa Cissé, the Accused protocol officer, who
accompanied them in order to act as a translator since he spoke French and English while Bockarie did
not know French); Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29578-29579 (PS); Transcript 1 1 November 2009,
pp. 31608-31609; Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31748-31750; Transcript 7 December 2009, p.
33074.
6746 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25822-25823; Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26049-
26051; Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26219, 26225; Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30105-30106;
Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30415-30417.
6747 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24332-24333.
6746 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 September 2009, pp. 29755-29757.

---- End of Page 1046 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T [ gm 18 May 2012 j

37/3 7
3046. The Accused also denied that he gave instructions to Sam Bockarie to launch
Operation No Living Thing.6746 The Accused said that he had never denied that an orgy of
atrocities were committed in Freetown from 6 January 1999, but denied that he ordered,
incited, assisted or in any way encouraged the commission of atrocities, nor did he unleash
the violence in Freetown in order to teirorise the Sierra Leonean population, he stated that he
had no control over and contact with those who committed these atrocities. I-le questioned
what would he have to gain from it, and stated that as a result of the Freetown lnvasion,
hundred of thousands of refugees came to Liberia.6756
3047. The Accused said that he first heard of the invasion on the morning of 6 January
from his national security advisor, John T Richardson, who told him about the Freetown
invasion by the rebels.676l The initial report that the Accused received about the invasion
stated that Sam Bockarie said that he did not know anything about the invasion. The
Accused received this information from his minister of national security whom Taylor told
to contact Bockarie immediately to find out what was "going on".6762
3048. The Accused later said that as of the end of December 1998 he knew that there was
heavy fighting in different parts of Sierra Leone, and that he received the news about the
invasion on 6 January 1999 at about 10am from the national security adviser Lewis Brown,
and that upon Taylor's instructions, Brown called Sam Bockarie by phone. According to the
report given to Taylor, Bockarie stated that he did not know what was going on in Freetown.
After Taylor was told by "one security personnel" that Bockarie had said on the radio that
his men were in Freetown, Taylor told the security man to contact Bockarie again during
that evening. In this later call Bockarie said "oh, that's morale. The boys enter and it looks
like they are doing well and so, you know, l’m a big man too so l’m taking some claim for
it". Taylor's analysis of what happened was that Bockarie did not sound as if he had control
over the situation.6753
3049. On cross—examination the Accused said that he did not hear Bockarie on Christmas
Day 1998 threatening to launch an attack on Freetown by New Year's, unless the
6769 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26224-26225; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp.
29585-29586; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30420-30421; Transcript 28 October 2009. pp. 30582, 30587.
6756 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 1 August 2009, pp. 26470-2647l.
6751 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009. p. 24333.
6766 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009. p. 26050.
6753 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26225-26228.

---- End of Page 1047 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

government agreed to negotiate with the rebels, as he was not really following the news in
Sierra Leone in December 1998.6764 The Accused also did not hear Bockarie saying on 29
December 1998 that the shelling of Freetown would not stop until the Govemment of Tejan
Kabbah was ousted. When asked how he could be so ill-informed as a President of` a
neighbouring country, the Accused answered that he was not seised of the Sierra Leonean
conflict to the oint of knowin ever little detail as he had his own issues to deal with.6766
P 8 Y
Defence Witness Issa Sesay A
3050. Witness Issa Sesay testified that Bockarie made trips to Monrovia in September,
October and November 1998, which, as Bockarie told him, were meant to discuss the
Abidjan Accord.6766 Bockarie attempted to contact Taylor in May or June 1998 so that
Taylor would contact his fellow ECOWAS leaders about revisiting the Abidjan peace
Accord, and when this attempt fell through, Bockarie sent Eddie Kanneh to Conakry in
August 1998 to meet the Liberian Ambassador in Guinea, Wantee. After Eddie Kanneh's
visit with the Liberian Ambassador, Bockarie came again to Pendembu and told the witness
that he had received a message that Bockarie should meet General Dopoe Menkarzon at
Foya Tinkia on the border and Menkarzon would take him to see Charles Taylor, on
Taylor's invitation. Bockarie went with Menkarzon to Monrovia spending three or four days
in Liberia before sending a message that he had returned to Buedu.6767
3051. Bockarie went back to Monrovia in October 1998 for around a week by
invitation.6766 Taylor told Bockarie in October 1998 that he (Taylor) would contact President
Blaise and the ECOWAS leaders about revisiting the Abidjan Accord.6769
3052. Bockarie made a third trip to Monrovia, then Burkina Faso and Libya in late
November/early December 1998 and was gone from Sierra Leone for two weeks. SYB
Rogers, Eddie Kanneh, Lawrence Womandia, Rashid Sandy, Junior Vandi and the late
6754 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32574-3257 5.
6755 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32576-32577.
6756 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44122-44125; Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44665; Transcript 28 July
2010, pp. 44847-44848; Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46641-46645 (Bockarie to1d Sesay about the meetings
and, for the third trip, Bockarie asked Mike Lamin and Sesay to come to Buedu to be in charge until his return).
6757 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44120-44124; Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44302; Transcript 11
August 2010, pp. 45965-45966; Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47345.
‘"" rssa sesay, Transcript 9 Jury 2010,p. 44124.
6766 Issa Sesay, 'Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44847; Transcript 10 August 2010, p. 45899.

---- End of Page 1048 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

Shabado went with him to Monrovia and Burkina Faso. During this time, he called the
witness from Pendembu to be in Buedu together with Mike Lamin. From Burkina Faso
Bockarie went with one of a smaller group to Libya, where Gaddafi gave Bockarie USD
$50,0008760 Jungle was not part of the group went with Bockarie to Monrovia and then on
to Burkina Faso in November 1998. Jungle did not come with Bockarie when he returned
from this trip.676l
3053. Sesay knew that the purpose of the visit to Burkina Faso was to discuss the revisiting
of the Abidjan Accord because when Bockarie returned from his meeting with Taylor in
October 1998 he told Sesay that Taylor had organised a trip to Burkina Faso for Bockarie to
discuss with Blaise Compaoré, the O.A.U Chairman, revisiting the Accord so that the RUF
and SLPP government would discuss the peace process again. Taylor had told Bockarie that
he would speak to the other ECOWAS leaders as they were guarantors of the Accord.6762
Bockarie did not tell anyone throughout 1998, or before he went to Burkina Faso, that
Taylor was linking him with Burkina Faso to get materials for a mission to free Sankoh nor
did Bockarie have plans to attack Freetown upon his return.6763
3054. The day after Bockarie and the delegation arrived back in Buedu, around 1l°h or l2°h
December, a meeting was held at Waterworks, which was attended by the witness, SYB
Rogers, Mike Lamin, Eddie Kanneh, Rashid Sandy, and Lawrence Womandia. Bockarie
briefed them on his trip and ordered Sesay to attack ECOMOG positions in Koidu Town in
Kono.6764 The only AF RC member at Waterworks was Eddie Kanneh, who was simply there
as Bockarie's friend.6765 Isaac Mongor did not attend the meeting.6766 The meeting took
place in the afternoon.6767
3055. Bockarie said he wanted to attack Kono because Omrie Golley, who was in England,
had informed him that many ECOMOG and the Kamajors were there and that Sandline was
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44125—44128 (at the Waterworks meeting Bockarie told the attendees
that he had spent some of the money from Libya on the return trip, buying medicines in Monrovia and
ammunition from the AFL battalion commander in Voinjama and Benjamin Yeaten in Kolahun).
Gm Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44868—44869.
6762 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44125, 44174; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44846—44848; Transcript
10 August 2010, pp. 45899—45900; Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46013.
°7°3 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44849.
6764 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44129, 44136, 44138.
M65 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45046—45049.
6766 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45421—45422.

---- End of Page 1049 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T f qw 18 May 2012

Z Cf /4 ZL
mining the area. The aim was not to acquire the mining fields but rather to prevent Sandline
mining because they were mercenaries providing arms and ammunition to the Sierra
Leonean government and Kamajors.6768 After the meeting, Sesay went with Bockarie and
Mike Lamin to explain the plan to Johnny Paul Koroma in Kangama, and he, in return,
provided them with advice. Koroma had no control or influence over SAJ Musa's forces
from February 1998 when SAJ Musa and his group left Makeni for Kabala, until Musa's
death m December 1998.6769
3056. Sesay's instruction when he leff Buedu was to attack Kono. The plan only mutated as
the RUF moved across Sierra Leone because the tables turned and ECOMOG fled to
Nimikoro and later to Tongo, Sewafe and Baama Konta. The RUF then moved from Kono
to Makeni because ECOMOG was on the run and because they wanted to control more
space.677O
3057. Sesay explained that the attacks on Freetown and Kono were two separate, dissimilar
operations; a few members of the AFRC were involved in the attack on Kono, but the attack
was dominated by the RUF, while the Freetown attack was planned independently by the
AFRC and had nothing to do with the RUF because the RUF was not part of the army. The
RUF did not have control over the AFRC at the time of the attack nor did it plan or form
part of a common operation with the AFRC forces in the attack, while the AFRC and SAJ
Musa, did not make their plans known to the RUF. Bockarie did not order SAJ Musa to
attack Freetown (they were not in contact from February until the death of Musa in
December 1998), nor did he complain about Musa's refusal to accept such a plan to Charles
Taylor.6m Sesay disagreed with the proposition that from the time he captured Kono, it was
all part of a single chain of events which led to Gullit attacking Freetown, or if Sesay had
not attacked Kono Gullit would not have succeeded in Freetown. He testified that the AFRC
0767 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44861-44866.
6768 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44160-44161; Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46702-46703.
6769 Issa Sesay, 'Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44161; Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45426-45427.
6770 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47297—47298.
Om Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44160, 44168-44169; Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44187-44188;
Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44854—44856; Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45424-45425; Transcript 19 August
2010, p. 46698.

---- End of Page 1050 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / @9. 18 May 2012

had their own plans to attack Freetown and used the arms and ammunition they captured
from ECOMOG along the way, such as in Masiaka and Benguema.6772
3058. Sesay was not aware of any mission named "Operation Free the Leader" by Bockarie
aimed at capturing Freetown and freeing Sankoh,6773 but confirmed that Freetown, as the
seat of power, was the objective of the RUF throughout the war.6774 Sesay also said that
Bockarie would contact people and ambassadors to make threats on behalf of the RUF that
he would fight until his leader, Sankoh, was released.6775 However what happened on the
ground was different; Bockarie just said these things to "make himself fearful or wicked to
the world". As an example, Sesay said that he, himself did not commit atrocities in Makeni
where hundreds of Kamajors were captured and civilians killed.6776
3059. Sesay denied that there was any discussion at the Waterworks meeting prior to the
Kono attack about its strategic importance as a diamond—producing area,6777 stating that the
reason the RUF attacked Kono was in order to sabotage President Kabbah's plans by
removing the Sandline miners and ECOMOG from the district. The intention was not to
access the diamonds as such.6778 7
3060. Sesay testified that Bockarie did not mention Charles Taylor's name during the
meeting at Waterworks, and that Bockarie did not speak on the satellite phone to Charles
Taylor before, during or after the Waterworks meeting. Sesay denied that Taylor gave
Bockarie the order to attack and capture Kono,°779 saying that Bockarie did not tell him that
he had discussed with Taylor the recapture of Koidu or the capture of Kono or other mining
areas.675;0 There was no meeting in December 1998 at which Taylor gave the order for
Operation No Living Thing.67gl
6772 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47337·47338; Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46169-46170.
6773 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44849-44850; Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46707.
6774 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46177; Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46698.
6775 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46175-46177. Sesay explained that it was SAJ Musa who
attacked Freetown and Bockarie was not speaking on his behalf, nor did Bockarie send SAJ Musa to Freetown.
6776 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46178
6777 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45554.
6778 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45556.
6779 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44160-44161; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44852-44853, 44867-
44868; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45052, 45055.
6780 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 46013.
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45056.

---- End of Page 1051 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V/{ q\L 18 May 2012 M

3061. Sesay denied that there was a meeting at Bockarie's house before the December
1998 attack on Kono, stating that there was only the Waterworks meeting at which the
instruction was given to Sesay to attack Kono.6762 He also denied that there was a meeting at
which Bockarie explained a complete strategy of attack through to Freetown.6763 He stated
that there was no two—pronged plan showed on a map or created at the Waterworks meeting
for the RUF to attack Freetown together with the AFRC or alone, as no other place other
than Kono was mentioned as a target to be captured.6764 The primary target was Koidu
Town, the Headquarters of Kono District,6765 and there was no simultaneous plan for
Mongor to attack J oru and then advance to Zimmi. Mogor received the order to attack Joru
only after Sesay had captured Kono and was moving towards Makeni.6766
3062. Sesay said that at the meeting in Kono before the attack on Koidu Town, he gave
standing orders for the attack, appointed commanders who were to take over various targets.
He forbade looting and the killing and amputation of civilians or captured soldiers in any
circumstances. Sesay had heard on the BBC in 1998 (especially April to May) while he was
in Pendembu about the previous amputation of civilians in Kono, for example those in the
Tombodu axis carried out by Savage and Staff Alhaji. There were no amputations during the
RUF advance from Kono to Makeni.6767 Sesay admitted that looting took place after the
attack but reiterated that he did not ive an such orders.6766
S Y
3063. Making an operation "fearful" means destruction, committing crimes against
civilians and the opposing troops.6769 Whilst ‘°fearfi1l" things happened in Freetown in 1999,
the RUF was not involved in them. The fighting that the RUF carried out in Makeni, Makali,
Magburaka and Masingbi did not involve the same kind of atrocities.6796
Defence Witness Martin George
6762 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45041, 45046.
6766 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45050.
6764 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45050, 45052, 45057.
6765 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44861—44866; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45053, 45055 (it was not
contemplated at the Waterworks meeting that ECOMOG would escape; it was only when they did that Bockarie
gave the order to chase them to Masingbi and ultimately Makeni).
6766 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 4541 1.
6767 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46708-46710.
6766 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 4671 1.
6769 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45419,
6796 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45419-45420.

---- End of Page 1052 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // wb 18 May 2012 %

3064. Witness Martin George, an RUF officer, testified that Sam Bockarie convened a
meeting at Waterworks, near Buedu in Kailahun. This was a general meeting which
followed two other meetings in Superman Ground, "Kono Jungle", in which commanders
discussed how to "maintain the ground". There was then another meeting in Kono to discuss
the recapture of Kono.679l
3065. The meeting in December in Buedu was chaired by Bockarie, and included SYB
Rogers, Lawrence Womandia, Eddie Kanneh. Morris Kallon attended the meeting and
represented 1ssa Sesay who was in Kono at the time, and did not attend the meeting.6792
3066. There were many people who went to the Waterworks meeting including the witness,
John Vincent, some AFRC leaders such as Leather Boot and Akim, and 1ssa Sesay,
Superman,6793 and many commanders. Other commanders did not come as they needed to
stay in the front lines and "maintain the situation". Also at the meeting were fighters and
bodyguards who were based in Buedu, as well as women. They spent the night and then in
the morning went to Waterworks, on the road leading to Dawa crossing point. The purpose
of the meeting was to discuss how to re-take Kono, and from there advance towards Makeni
and Lunsar. The reason they wanted to be based in Kono was because it was a diamond
mining area. Kono was also "a target ahead of us" and they needed to go through Kono in
order to reach Makeni. The reason they wanted to reach Makeni was to regain the ground
from the enemy.6794 There was no discussion about attacking Freetown.°795
3067. One of the most important issues discussed at the meeting was where the
ammunition to capture Kono would come from, as they had enough arms that they had
captured from their enemies but needed ammunition.67% When asked what was said in
relation to ammunition at the meeting, the witness replied that during this meeting Bockarie
1 introduced Abu Keita, a Mandingo Liberian and former ULIMO-K general. Bockarie said
wm Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39773—39774.
°m Martin George, Transcript 28 April 2010, pp. 40174-40175 (the witness recalled that the meeting took place
in December but could not remember the date. The attack on Kono occurred in December, as the witness
remembers spending Christmas in Kono).
M9} On cross—examination the witness insisted that he did not say that Superman attended the meeting in Buedu,
stating that Superman was fully involved in the Kono attack (Martin George, Transcript 28 April 2010, pp.
40172—40174).
6794 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39774—39775.
6795 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010 p. 39775; Transcript 28 April 2010, pp. 40175-40177.
(N6 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39775—39776.

---- End of Page 1053 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J 6x` 18 May 2012

3 7/46
that Keita had brought the ammunition to recapture Kono and briefed the attendees on the
ammunition brought by Keita: 20 boxes of AK bullets and 5 boxes of RPG rockets. ln the
situation they were in, 20 boxes of ammunition was plenty. The ammunition Keita brought
was from ULIMO who had kept their ammunition after they lost the elections in 1997, as he
was the commander at Lofa Bridge. Since ECOMOG were searching for arms and
ammunition at various points, Keita was afraid, took the ammunition and "brought it for
sale".6797 The witness himself saw the ammunition Keita had brought at Bockarie's house in
Buedu, Dawa Road, and when it was brought to them in the "Kono Jungle" as they used it to
capture Kono.6798 The witness recalled two senior officers who came with Keita attending
the meeting, Colonel Jungle and Colonel Leo, both Mandingos. That was the first time the
witness saw these two in RUF territory.6799
3068. Bockarie did not say anything in relation to Charles Taylor at the meeting, or that
Taylor gave or send them ammunition to recapture Kono. Taylor had his own problems to
solve. He was elected in Liberia in 1997, while there was no fighting in 1997 and he was not
fighting. "How could he have given us instruction? How could he have given us
ammunition?"6866
3069. On cross—examination the witness said that he was never told by Bockarie about a
shipment from Burkina Faso, and the witness did not hear Bockarie giving a report at the
meeting about his trip.666l
Defence Witness John Vincent
3070. Witness John Vincent testified that at some point in 1998, Sam Bockarie called all
the senior vanguards and some junior officers who were made senior officers to Buedu in
order to meet at Waterworks and plan a new operation. The operation was meant to gain
territory and to bring "someone" to ask them to observe peace. The meeting was attended by
over 200 persons, including the witness and Issa Sesay.6662
6797 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39776-39778.
6796 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39778-39779.
6766 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, p. 39779.
6866 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39779-39780.
6661 Martin George, Transcript 28 April 2010, pp. 40175-40176.
6662 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38097—38099.

---- End of Page 1054 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6% 18 May 2012

3071. At the meeting, they discussed launching a "serious offensive" to free their leader,
Mr Sankoh. They discussed a "two days’ offensive" and capturing "major areas" will cause
concern for the international community who would intervene, bring peace and Sankoh
would be released. That is why they decided to attack Kono and "as far as Makeni". The
plan did not include attacking Freetown. "As far as Makeni" was the initial stage while the
next target would have been to go close to Freetown or to Freetown itself, but at the meeting
Freetown was not discussed.68O3
3072. The witness stated that the attacks on Kono and Makeni occurred in December,
while the Waterworks meeting occurred in around J uly/ August! September/ October.68O4
Prosecution Exhibit P-063
3073. Exhibit P-063 is the minutes of a forum held on 2 December 1998 at the RUF
headquarters. The document lists the attendees of the meeting: Sam Bockarie, SYB Rogers,
Edward Kanneh, Lawrence Womandia, Junior Vandi, Mohamed S. Banya, Rashid Sandi —
External delegates, I.H. Sesay and "members of various units".6805
3074. According to this document, SYB Rogers gave a salute report of a mission which he
described as "very big success" in tenns of what they were able to receive, and thanked the
CDS for his outstanding effort.68O6 Rogers noted with profound gratitude the effort of their
host government "on the other side" for granting them with "in-let and exit facilities even
with escort". According to Pa Rogers, he and the CDS paid a courtesy call on his Excellency
C G T 6807
3075. Colonel Eddie Kanneh (SLA Rep) addressed the meeting and stated that the trip was
successful. He stated that his impression of the CDS was that he was a person who can
6803 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38099-38100.
6804 John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38231-38232; Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38384-38285.
(M5 Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December 1998", ERN 15487.
6806 Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December 1998", ERN 15487.
6807 Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2nd December l998", ERN 15488.

---- End of Page 1055 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-0l-T j; 18 May 2012
1

predict results and asked not to view the CDS as power hungry saying that there must be
solidarity among them all.68O8
3076. The Chief of Defence Staff, CDS, Brigadier Sam Bockarie, "buttressed" the speeches
of Rogers and Kanneh and said that they were not financially strong to make the trip as
successful as it tumed out to be. Bockarie stated that in the first attempt, they stopped half
way and heard about the shocking ·news on Focus about the trial and death sentence passed
on their "Father and Leader" Cpl. Foday S. Sankoh and that they should now launch an
offensive against the Government of Tejan Kabba for the release of their Leader. The
Brigadier told the forum that he was able to formally hand over their struggle and petitioned
the matter of their Leader to the President of Burkina Faso, who was the current Chairman
of O.A.U., so that, as O.A.U. Chairman, he will step in and mediate peace between them and
the SLPP Government. Bockarie warned that now is the time to work together to secure the
release of their Leader and to avoid gossip which will lead to disunity among them.6809
3077. According to the document the Battle Field Commander, Issa Sesay, thanked the
delegates and promised that they will put their efforts into consolidating their strength for
victory. He said that they will "strike for the release of our Leader and the victory of our
movement". He further stated that "[a] commando will feel good when he attacks and
captures rather than been [sic] called to join with others — it will make no prospect".6810
3078. Col. Isaac Morego thanked the CDS and delegates for their grand effort and advised
everybody to work hand in hand for the victory of RUFSL. He said that they were not
fighting for Sankoh or the Brigadier but rather for themselves and their country, Sierra
Leone, for victory and peace.68H
(M8 Exhibit P—063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December 1998", ERN 15488.
6809 Exhibit P—063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December 1998", ERN 15489—15490.
Gm Exhibit P—063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the Extemal Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December 1998", ERN 15490.
Mm Exhibit P—063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the Extemal Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December 1998", ERN 15490.

---- End of Page 1056 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /
3079. Col. Mike Lamin thanked the CDS and the delegates who went with him on the
mission and warned that they must not talk on how the material was chamrelled to their base
for security reasons.°8l2
3080. Before ending the meeting "in ham1ony", the CDS amrounced a senior officers
meeting from where arrangements were to be done for full scale operations.68l3
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
3081. Prosecution Exhibit P-067, an undated "Situation Report" from the Black
Revolutionary Guards to "the Leader", states in relation to the December 1998 operation that
after the "High Command" and Eddie Karmeh retumed from Burkina Faso, they were given
"huge quantity of materials for serious offensive to start a campaign for the release of our
leader". The delegation retumed to Monrovia in November and then back to the base where
a forum was immediately held "for a serious offensive to commense [sic]". It reports that the
combatants were happy and agreed to start the operation to capture Kono.68M
Prosecution Exhibit P-078
3082. Exhibit P—078 is a report prepared by Amnesty Intemational about the Sierra Leone
civil conflict. According to this report, Foday Sankoh was transferred from Nigeria to the
custody of the Sierra Leone government. Subsequently, the RUF threatened to continue their
campaign of violence against civilians if Sankoh remained in detention. On 4 September
1998, Sankoh was charged for crimes committed during Sierra Leone's intemal armed
conflict. His trial commenced on 24 September 1998 and he was convicted and sentenced to
death the following month. This prompted further attacks by rebel forces against unarmed
civilians in retaliation.68l5
Gm Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2nd December l998", ERN 15490.
6813 Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December l998", ERN 15491,
Mm Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9678.
Gm Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone -1998- A Year of Atrocities against Civilians, Amnesty lntemational Report",
pp. 2, 23.

---- End of Page 1057 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gm 18 May 2012

3083. The Report further states that on 12 October 1998, 34 of the 37 defendants before the
court martial were convicted of treason, murder and collaborating with the enemy and
sentenced to death. On 19 October 1998, 24 of those sentenced to death were executed,
while the other 10 had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment.68l6
Prosecution Exhibit P-093
3084. Prosecution Exhibit P-093 is a comprehensive report from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay,
Battle Field Commander, to Major General Sam Bockarie, Chief of Defence Staff dated 26
January 1999. According to this report on 6th December 1998, Sesay left the Defence
Headquarters upon Bockarie's instruction for assignment and mission to attack Koidu, the
second (2nd) Brigade, RUF/SL axis. The report includes a list of ammunition provided to
Sesay in order to carry out the mission to attack Koidu and the "Sengema target".6817 On
December 9th 1998, they arrived safely to Guinea Highway, second (2nd) Brigade
Headquarters, and were welcomed by the Commander, Colonel Boston F lomo (a.k.a.
Rambo). A forum was convened which centred on the mission given to Sesay by Bockarie
to attack and capture Koidu Town, including Yengema and its airfield for quick
transportation of their "materials" by air.68l8
Defence Exhibit D-019
3085. Exhibit D-019 is a news article dated 18 April 1999, which reports that:
Nigeria, the most powerfhl state in West Africa, leads the intervention army fighting on the side of the Sierra
Leone government side, [sic] but wants to pull its troops out.(’8l9
Defence Exhibit D-084
3086. Defence Exhibit D-084 is a Salute Report from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh dated 27
September 1999. According to this report, "General Mosquito" went on a trip to secure
68% Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone -1998- ·A Year of Atrocities against Civilians, Amnesty International Report",
p. 26.
(M7 Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa
Sesay on the Take Over Koindu, 26 January l999", ERN 25503-25504.
Gm Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa
Sesay on the Take Over Koindu, 26 January 1999", ERN 25504-25505.
mq Exhibit D-019, "BBC News Article. 18 April 1999, World: Africa Rebel Leader Freed for Talks, 18 April
1999", p. 2.

---- End of Page 1058 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gl 18 May 2012

"materials" and upon his return he provided Sesay with "a liberal quantity of ammunition".
Mosquito then instructed Sesay to cross the Moa River and re-capture Kono from the
enemy.682O
3087. The report further states that upon Sesay's arrival in Kono, he called the Brigade
Commander, Rambo, and other senior officers to a forum in which "general security issues"
were discussed and a war-plan was made for the attack of Koindu [sic] Town.682l
Defence Exhibit D-169
3088. Exhibit D-169 is the second report of the Secretary-General to United Nations
Security Council on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. According to this
report, on 17 August 1998 the RUF announced a terror campaign against civilians, CDF and
ECOMOG if the Govemment failed to release Corporal Sankoh within seven days,
suggesting that peace negotiations could resume only thereafter.6822
Deliberations
3089. It is undisputed that in around November 1998, Sam Bockarie left Sierra Leone for
Burkina Faso with a delegation that included Eddie Kanneh, SYB Rogers and Lawrence
Womandia. On their way to Burkina Faso and on their way back to Sierra Leone, the RUF
delegation stopped in Monrovia.6823 Bockarie and his delegation returned to Buedu in
around late November/early December 19986824 with a large quantity of arms and
ammunition.6825 The Accused acknowledged that he briefly met Bockarie in Monrovia
6820 Exhibit D-084, ‘"RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report from Brigadier Issa H Sesay,
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. 7, ERN 7762.
6821 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report from Brigadier Issa H Sesay,
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. 8, ERN 7763.
6822 Exhibit D-169, ‘"Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone, 16 October 1998", p. 1, para. 4, ERN 12371.
6821 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 258 ("‘Around OctoberfNovember 1998... Bockarie travelled with a
delegation to Monrovia and then onward to Burkina Faso. Bockarie's delegation to Monrovia included his
security personnel, Rashid, SYB Rogers, Eddie Kanneh, radio operator Dauda Amna Fomie aka DAF and
others"); Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 619 ("1n late November 1998, Bockarie left Buedu and passed through
Monrovia on his way to Burkina Faso. Bockarie travelled with Eddie Kanneh, Lawrence Womandia and SYB
Rogers, among others"), 1073.
0824 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 9; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 620.
6825 Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peop1e's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9678.

---- End of Page 1059 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GK 18 May 2012
Z

before Bockarie proceeded to Burkina Fas0 and that he met him again on his way back to
Sierra Leone.6826
3090. Prior to Bockarie's trip to Monrovia, Bockarie told TF1-371 that the purpose of the
trip was to meet the Accused in Monrovia and to get a shipment of ammunition from
Burkina Fas0 for a "maj0r offensive".6827 Isaac Mong0r testified that in early November
1998, the comir1anders in Buedu met in Waterworks with Bockarie, Jungle, SYB R0gers and
others, and decided to send a letter to Taylor requesting ammunition.6828 Augustine Mallah
also testified to a meeting in which Bockarie said that he was "fed up" with staying in
Kailahun District and that he was trying to go to Liberia to seek advice from Charles Taylor,
and to "get 0ur needs".°829 The Trial Chamber has considered this aspect of the evidence,
relating to the request to the Accused for arms and ammunition, in the context of the
Burkina Fas0 shipment.°830
3091. F0llowing Bockarie's return from Monrovia in late November/early December 1998
Bockarie convened a meeting of commanders at Waterworks to brief them about his trip.
The Trial Chamber notes that while Defence witness Issa Sesay denied that other than Eddie
Kanneh there were no AFRC members represented at the meeting,°83 1 both Prosecution and
Defence witnesses stated that the AFRC as well as the RUF were represented at this
meeting, specifically Akim Turay and Leather B00t.6832 TF1-371 named Gullit as having
been at the meeting, but the Trial Chamber notes that he is the Only witness to place Gullit at
this meeting and considers that Gullit could not have been at the meeting as he was already
in Rosos by July/August 1998.3333
6826 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26037-26038; Transcript 17 September 2009 pp.
29250, 29261; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29578-29579 (PS). See also Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence
Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2nd December 1998", ERN
15488 (stating that the convoy gave "a courtesy" visit to C.G.T.), and TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp.
2405-2409 (CS) (identifying C.G.T. as Charles Ghankay Taylor).
3333 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2402-2403 (CS).
img Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5779-5783.
3333 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20217.
6830 Arms and Ammunition: A1legations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Fas0 Shipment.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45046—45049.
6832 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2410-2411 (CS); Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp.
5797-5798; Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39774-39775; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20219-20220 (Mallah affirmed that AFRC and RUF fighters were at the meeting).
3333 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 81 1 1.

---- End of Page 1060 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 65 18 May 2012
' 5

3092. The evidence suggests that at Waterworks a plan to attack Freetown via Kono and
Kenema was discussed. TF 1-371 testified that at the Waterworks meeting Bockarie said he
had sufficient ammunition for an attack on Kenema and Koidu, as well as Freetown. He
brought a map of Sierra Leone and discussed with the commanders a plan for a two-pronged
attack to get to Freetown, one prong via Kono then proceeding to Makeni, and another prong
via Kenema.ss34 Augustine Mallah described a plan in which the lss brigade was to attack
Bunumbu, Segbwema and all the way to Kenema,ssss while Bockarie told Sesay and Akim
to join Superman and Rambo and attack Kono, and from Kono Akim should proceed to
Tongo and Sesay and Morris Kallon were to advance towards Makenissss Abu Keita
testified that Bockarie told the attendees that the ammunition he had brought would be used
to attack Kono and proceed to Makeni, while Keita, as part of that operation, was assigned
to fight in the Bunumbu-Segbwema axis, leading to Kenemassu Albert Saidu, though not at
the Waterworks meeting himself, testified on the basis of what he was told of the meeting
that the plan was for the lss and 2'sd brigades to attack Kenema and Kono, respectively. He
said a war plan was made at the meeting and described the division of officers at the meeting
and their assignment to materiel for the attackssss The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that
TF 1-371, Augustine Mallah, Abu Keita and Albert Saidu are all generally credible
witnessesssss
3093. Isaac Mongor, whom the Trial Chamber has previously found to be generally
credible,ss4O testified that a day prior to the Waterworks meeting, he met Bockarie at
Bockarie's house, where Bockarie told Mongor that the ammunition he had brought would
be used in an operation he had discussed with the Accused, in accordance with which they
would capture Kono, then Makeni in an advance towards Freetown, while they would also
attack Kenema and J oru.ss4l Karmoh Kanneh, who attended a smaller meeting at Bockarie's
house, which he described as a briefing on the military strategy, stated that Bockarie said the
ssss TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2411-2412 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2640.
ssss Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20222-20224.
ssss Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20223.
stm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2005-2008.
ms Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11082—11086.
Osss Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219;
Credibility Assessment, Albert Saidu, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2384; Credibility Assessment,
Augustine Mallah, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2522.
6840 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274.
sw Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5795.

---- End of Page 1061 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

first target should be Kono to Makeni up to Freetown, and the next target should be
Segbwema and Daru, towards Kenema.6842 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that
Kanneh is also a generally credible witness.°843 TFl-585, whom the Trial Chamber has
found to be generally credible,6844 testified that at a meeting at Bockarie's house a plan to
attack Kono and from there advance towards Freetown was discussed.6845
3094. The Trial Chamber notes that other witnesses testified that the plan concerned Only
the capture of Kono, without planning to advance on to Freetown. Defence witness Issa
Sesay testified that he attended a small commanders’ meeting at Waterworks°846 and was
assigned to attack Kono. He testified that the Only plan mentioned at the meeting was to
attack Kono, and that there was no discussion on continuing to Makeni and_ then proceeding
to Freetown.6847 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Issa Sesay's testimony should be
treated with caution and requires colaboration.6848 While Defence witness Martin George
also testified that Freetown was not mentioned at the Waterworks meeting, he said that the
plan was to go from Kono to Makeni and then Lunsar.°849 The Trial Chamber is of the view
that if Lunsar was mentioned as a potential target, due to its proximity to Freetown, it is
implausible that Freetown would not have been discussed at the meeting. Moreover, the
Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination George claimed that Issa Sesay did not
attend a meeting at Waterworks, which is not Only contradicted by his own examination in
chief when he stated that Sesay attended the meeting,°85O but also by both Prosecution and
Defence witnesses,685l and by the minutes of the Waterworks meeting, recording that not
Only did Sesay attend the meeting, but that he also addressed it.6852 The Trial Chamber
therefore does not find Martin George's evidence to be credible and notes that it is also
6***2 Kappph Kamen, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9424.
6843 Credibility Assessment, Karmoh Kanneh, The Role of Intermediaries, para. 2704.
6844 Credibility Assessment, tri-585, paras 330-333.
6845 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15691-15693, 15700-15701.
6846 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44861-44866.
68*7 ipsa sppay, Transcript 29 Juiy 2010, pp. 45050, 45057.
6848 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 259-372.
6849 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39744-39775.
6850 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010 p. 39775; Transcript 28 April 2010, pp. 40174-40177.
6851 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2410-2411 (CS); Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp.
5797-5798; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20221 (Mallah mentioned that at the
Waterworks meeting Bockarie told Sesay the guidelines of the Operation and Sesay accepted); John Vincent,
Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38097-38099.
6852 Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the Extemal Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2"d December 1998", ElU\1 15487, 15490 ; Martin George, Transcript 28 April 2010, pp. 40178-40181.

---- End of Page 1062 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T MAK GLB 13 May 2012 E

inconsistent with Issa Sesay's evidence that the plan was only to capture Kono. As opposed
to Sesay, George did mention that the plan included proceeding from Kono towards Makeni
and Lunsar.
3095. Defence witness John Vincent testified that he attended a meeting in 1998 at
Waterworks in which an attack on Kono and "as far as Makeni" was planned, and that while
the next target would have been a place close to Freetown or Freetown itself, Freetown was
not discussed at the meeting.°853 However, the witness explained that the reason for the
operation was to free Foday Sankoh, saying that they wanted to capture major areas thereby
causing concern in the international community. This would lead to intervention, bring
peace and Sankoh's release Given this reason for the operation, the Trial Chamber finds it
implausible that Freetown would not have been mentioned as a target, as Sankoh was being
held in prison in Freetown. The Trial Chamber also recalls its finding that John Vincent's
evidence must be treated with caution and requires corroboration.6854
3096. Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that after Bockarie arrived in Buedu from his trip to
Monrovia and Burkina Faso, he convened a meeting in which a strategy of how to attack
Kono and Tongo was discussed. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Fornie is
generally credible.6855 However, Fornie's knowledge of the meeting is based on a radio
message that Bockarie sent to commanders to come and attend the meeting,6856 which does
not explain how the witness knew the content of the meeting. The Trial Chamber will
therefore not rely on his evidence.
3097. TF1-567 testified that he was present in Buedu when Bockarie returned from
Monrovia in December 1998 and that Bockarie said Taylor told him that they should attack
Kono and other mining areas in order to secure diamonds to obtain more arms and .
ammunition.6857 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1-567 is generally credible.6858
The witness did not say that he attended the Waterworks meeting, nor did he say that there
was no plan to advance towards Freetown. The Trial Chamber notes that Kono was one of
@53 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38099—38100.
($54 Credibility Assessment, John Vincent, Provision of Military Personnel, paras 4463-4464.
@55 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Anina Fornie, paras 346-358.
@56 Dauda Anina Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21552-21554.
°8" rrr-567, Transcript 2 rpiy 2008, pp. 12912-12913.
mg Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317.

---- End of Page 1063 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GT, 18 May 2012

E5 9/56
the first targets of the operation and finds that his evidence does not negate the possibility
that in Waterworks a plan to advance towards Freetown, beginning with Kono, was laid out.
3098. Mohamed Kabbah was told by a person named Zedman that at the Waterworks
meeting an attack on Kono and Makeni was discussed.6669 The Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that Kabbah is generally credible.6666 Given that Mohamed Kabbah was stationed in
Kono at the time, and was told about the plan to attack Kono by a person also stationed in
Kono, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Kabbah was told about a plan with regard to
his duties, which does not negate the possibility of a larger plan.
3099. On the basis of the aforementioned evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the plan
presented at the Waterworks meeting was for a two pronged attack on Kono and Kenema,
with Freetown as the ultimate destination.
3100. TF1-371, Isaac Mongor, and Kannoh Kanneh testified that in smaller meetings at
Bockarie's house, Bockarie told them that the plan was a plan that Bockarie had discussed
with the Accused and brought back with him from Monrovia.6666 Dauda Aruna Fornie
testified that while in Monrovia with Bockarie, he heard Bockarie, Kanneh and Yeaten,
Director of the Accused's Special Security Service (SSS),6662 discussing Kono and Tongo as
the first targets to be hit with the ammunition that they had brought back with them.6666 The
Trial Chamber notes that none of the witnesses testified that Bockarie announced at the
larger meeting, in Waterworks, that the plan came from Monrovia or that he had discussed it
with the Accused.
3101. Isaac Mongor's testimony is based on Bockarie's description of a conversation
Bockarie had with the Accused, during a meeting of Bockarie and Mongor at Bockarie's
house. The Trial Chamber notes that Mongor was cross-examined on his prior statements, in
which initially he did not mention the role of the Accused in the Freetown invasion.
Mongor acknowledged not having told the truth, but maintained that he knew all along that
the plan to attack Freetown was discussed by Bockarie with the Accused. He explained that
6669 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16153-16154.
6860 Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338.
6661 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2411 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2640-2642 (CS); Isaac
Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5795-5796; Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9424.
6662 The Role of Intemrediaries: Benjamin Yeaten.
6666 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21548-21549.

---- End of Page 1064 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-Ol-T / qw 18 May 2012

he was worried that he was himself at risk of prosecution, and that later when he was
reassured, he told the tmth.6864 While noting the evasiveness of Mongor's testimony on
cross-examination regarding his prior statements,6865 the Trial Chamber accepts his
ex lanation, notin that his testimon on the role of the Accused is corroborated b the
P S Y Y
testimony of TF1—371 and Karmoh Kanneh.
3102. Both TF1-371 and Karmoh Kanneh testitied about a smaller meeting at Bockarie's
house of the "inner core", as described by TF1—371, which included Eddie Kanneh, Issa
Sesay, Morris Kallon, Jungle and a few others. Karmoh Kanneh also testitied that the
meeting at Bockarie's house was attended by Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Jungle, Eddie
Kanneh, and SYB Rogers, among others.6866 According to both witnesses, during this
meeting Bockarie left the room and spoke on his satellite phone to the Accused on the
veranda. TF1—371 said Bockarie told him afterwards that the Accused had instructed him to
capture Freetown, to force the government to negotiate.6867 Kanneh testitied that he was
present when Bockarie and Jungle both spoke with the Accused to brief him on the
meeting.6868
3103. The Trial Chamber disagrees with the contention of the Defence that Karmoh
Kanneh's testimony that Bockarie called the Accused at 2.00am is incredulous.6869 In his
examination in chief, Kanneh stated that the call took place at around midnight,687O but he
corrected the time to 2.00a.m., when presented with his prior statement on cross-
examination.687l Whether the call was at midnight or 2.00a.m., the Trial Chamber is of the
view, particularly in light of his ofticial duties during the daytime and the clandestine nature
of this type of conversation, that a telephone conversation as described took place late at
night is not only plausible but in fact likely.
6864 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6735-6745,
6865 Later in his cross-examination Mongor agreed that the reason he did not tell his investigators in the
beginning that Bockarie told him that the attack on Freetown was Taylor's idea was because he had forgotten,
explaining that he is "a human being" (Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6766-6768),
(M6 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2413-2414 (CS); Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp.
9416-9423, 9431.
6867 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2412-2413 (CS).
6868 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9431, 9434-9436; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9695-9697,
9728-9730.
@69 Defence Final Trial Brief para, 906.
6870 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9429, 9433.
mm Karmoh Kanneh, 13 May 2008, pp. 9693-9695.

---- End of Page 1065 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X! dl.}, 18 May 2012

3 9 /58
3104. The Trial Chamber notes some inconsistencies in the testimony of TFl—371 and
Karrnoh Kanneh with regard to this meeting, including whether it took place during the day
or in the evening. Both witnesses said Jungle was at the meeting, but only Kanneh testified
that he spoke with the Accused as well as Bockarie. However, Kanneh testified that he was
present for the call, while TFl—371 only heard about it from Bockarie after he returned from
the veranda. The Trial Chamber does not consider these inconsistencies to be significant.
The accounts of the witnesses as to who attended the meeting, where it was, and the satellite
phone call between Bockarie and the Accused are consistent and further corroborate the role
of the Accused in planning the military operation.
3105. Defence witness Issa Sesay, who attended the "inner core" meeting, testified that
‘ Bockarie did not mention Taylor's name during the meeting, and that Bockarie did not speak
on the phone with Taylor before, during or after the meeting.6872 The Trial Chamber recalls
J its finding that Sesay's evidence must be treated with caution. Several witnesses did not
mention that Bockarie said that he had discussed the plan with the Accused, and both a
Prosecution and a Defence witness, Mohamed Kabbah and Martin George, respectively,
testified that Bockarie did not mention Taylor's name with regard to the instructions on how
to execute the operation.6873 However, these witnesses did not attend one of the smaller
meetings Bockarie held outside the larger Waterworks meeting. lt was only in smaller
meetings that Bockarie mentioned the role of the Accused in planning the operation. The
Trial Chamber therefore does not find these accounts of the Waterworks meeting to
contradict the testimonies of witnesses who did attend the smaller meetings at Bockarie's
house. In the absence of` corroboration and in light of the evidence of several Prosecution
witnesses, whom the Trial Chamber has found to be credible, the Trial Chamber does not
find Sesay's testimony to be truthful
3106. The Trial Chamber notes the evidence that Bockarie was already considering an
initiative to advance towards Freetown before he went to Burkina Faso. TF1—37l testified
that the announcement in October 1998 that Sankoh had been sentenced to death, and the
execution of 24 soldiers, provoked a rallying cry from the commanders, who wanted to go to
Freetown to free Sankoh. Bockarie was furious and started talking about going to free
6872 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44160-44161.
6873 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp.16338-16341, 16352-16353; Martin George,
Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39779-39780.

---- End of Page 1066 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // GQ 18 May 2012

Sankoh,6674 and TF 1-371 said that prior to Bockarie's departure to Monrovia in
November/December 1998, he convened a meeting with the witness, Issa Sesay and Kallon,
in which he said that the purpose of his trip was to meet with the Accused in Monrovia and
obtain ammunition for a "maj0r attack, major offensive".6676 On cross-examination TF 1-371
explained, "the idea of going to Freetown was discussed by Sam Bockarie among the senior
commanders, to iree Mr Sankoh, but the instruction to go to Freetown originated from Mr
Taylor, as expressed by Sam Bockarie to the senior commanders". TF 1-371 said that the
instruction to go to Freetown came when Bockarie returned tiom his trip, the discussion
among the commanders of going to Freetown had already started in Oct0ber.6676 The Trial
Chamber notes that there is further evidence that in reaction to the news of the execution of
the 24 soldiers over the radio, Bockarie said that he would march to Freetown as long as
"0ur men" are being executed.6677
3107. In this regard, the Trial Chamber recalls that Foday Sankoh was transferred from the
custody of the Nigerian Government to the custody of the Sierra Leonean Government in
July 1998,6676 and was sentenced to death in October 1998 by the High Court of Sierra
Leone.6679 Indication of Boclcam ai a ainst civilians, CDF and ECOMOG on 17 Au st 1998 if the Government
P SU 8 gu
failed to release Corporal Sankoh within seven days, suggesting that peace negotiations
could resume only therealter.6666 Several witnesses who attended the Waterworks meeting
testified that the operation announced at the meeting was meant to release Foday Sanland that the 0 eration was called "O eration Free the Leader" or "O eration Free
P P P
Sankoh",6662 indicating that the aim of the operation was to bring about the release of Foday
W4 TF1-371, rrauaarrpr 28 January 2008, pp. 2400-2401 (cs).
6675 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2402-2403 (CS).
**76 TF1-371, rrauaarrpr 30 January 2008, pp. 2640-2642 (cs).
6677 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8837-8838.
6676 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7
December 2007, Annex A, Fact U.
6676 Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Fact V.
6666 Exhibit D-169, "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone, 16 October 1998", p. 1, para. 4, ERN 12371.
6666 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2648-2649 (CS); Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp.
9423-9424; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5796; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November
2008, pp. 20221-20222; TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14164-14165; John Vincent, Transcript 26
March 2010, pp. 38099-38100.
6662 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9424; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5796;
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 18 November 2008, pp. 20513-20514; TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp.
14164-14165; John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38099-38100.

---- End of Page 1067 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

39/ 6 O
Sankoh from prison. Karmoh Kanneh and lsaac Mongor said that the purpose of the mission
was also to seize power.6883 y
3108. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF 1-371 is generally credible, and that
other Prosecution witnesses support TF 1-371 's evidence that Bockarie had already
envisioned a major attack prior to his trip to Monrovia. Augustine Mallah testified that
before going to Liberia, Bockarie expressed his frustration with staying in Kailahun District,
stating that he "had something at hand" and that he was trying to go to Liberia to seek advice
from Charles Taylor and to "get our needs".6884 Albert Saidu testified that before Bockarie
left to Liberia, he showed the witness diamonds and said that he was taking the diamonds to
Charles Taylor in order to secure materiel for "a big offensive" to recapture Kono.6885 TF 1-
567 testified that Bockarie told him in October 1998 that they should attempt to recapture
Koidu Town and that he was going to see Charles Taylor in Monrovia.6886 TF 1-367 testified
that he was told by Boston Flomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo) that Bockarie had gone to see
Charles Taylor in Monrovia to secure arms and ammunition and that when Bockarie would
return they would attack Koidu Town.6887 The Trial Chamber considers that this clearly
indicates that Flomo knew that a plan to attack Koidu Town was considered before Bockarie
returned from his trip.
3109. The Trial Chamber finds fiom the evidence that the idea to advance towards
Freetown was already in discussion when Bockarie went to Monrovia, which is consistent
with the request sent to the Accused for ammunition. Bockarie went to Monrovia to secure
the arms and ammunition, as well as advice, needed for a military operation. He returned to
Buedu with arms and ammunition, and a plan he had drawn up with the Accused.
3110. The Trial Chamber further notes that TF 1-567 testified that after retuming from
Buedu to Kono District, Issa Sesay convened a meeting for the commanders in the Kono
area, in which Sesay said that Bockarie had been told by Taylor that if they did not capture
Koidu Town and other mining areas, Taylor would stop supplying them with anns and
6*83 Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9424, 9430-9431; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March
2008, pp. 5796-5797.
6884 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20217.
6885 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, 11071-11072, 11075, 11081; Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 11205-
g8ig9l`ii1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12912.
6887 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14161-14162, 14181-14183.

---- End of Page 1068 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

ammunition.6666 Abu Keita, who attended the larger Waterworks meeting, testified that at
that meeting Bockarie said that they would attack Kono because Kono was a strategic area
as its diamond mines would fund arms purchases for the RUF.6869 The Trial Chamber recalls
Fornie's testimony that Yeaten told Bockarie that the first targets of the operation should be
Kono and Tongo,6866 which are diamond areas. Karmoh Kanneh testified that at the meeting
he attended in Buedu, Jungle said that he and Bockarie had discussed with the Accused
"how the mission should go on", and that Taylor told him, Jungle, that their first target
should be Kono before they proceed.689l The Defence claims that in his prior statement
Karmeh did not mention that Taylor planned the takeover of Freetown, since his statement
that Jungle said Taylor had advised them to target mineral areas first, as there would be no
success without money, does not show that Taylor planned the intricate details of the
operation.6892 The Trial Chamber notes that when confronted with this prior statement on
cross-examination, Karmeh maintained that his prior statement showed that the Accused was
"involved" in the planning of the operation, as he did not consider someone providing
advice on what should be a first target in a mission to be different from planning.6693 TF1-
371 also pointed out that Bockarie endeavoured to take his trip to Burkina Faso in order get
sufficient armrrunition to go to Freetown, and that after Bockarie returned from his trip he
had instructions that he passed on to the cormrranders to first and foremost capture Kono,
Koidu and to then go to Freetown.6894
3111. The Accused denied that he played any part in the planning or gave Bockarie advice
on the operation to attack Kono, Makeni, Joru and Freetown.6895 However, the Trial
Chamber finds the Accused's testimony that he was not aware of the strategic importance of
Kono on account of its diamond wealth not credible, in particular in light of the Trial
6666 TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12913-12914. On a meeting convened by Sesay in Kono following the
Waterworks meeting, in which he briefed commanders on the Waterworks meeting see Exhibit D-084, "RUF,
Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report from Brigadier Issa H Sesay, Battlefield Commander
RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. 8, ERN 7763, and Exhibit P-093, "Restricted
RUF/ SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa Sesay on the Take Over Koindu, 26
January 1999", ERN 25504-25505.
""" Abu Keira, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2005-2007.
6696 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21548-21549.
6661 Kamroh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9431-9433.
6662 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 908.
6663 Kamroh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9424; Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9754-9756.
6*64 TFI-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2648-2649 (CS).
6665 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26224-26225; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp.
29585-29586 (PS); Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30420-30421; Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30582,

---- End of Page 1069 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6% 18 May 2012 r

3 7/62
Chamber's finding that the Accused previously told Bockarie to attack Kono due to its
diamondiferous nature.6666 Moreover, the Trial Chamber has found that the Accused was
involved in Bockarie's purchase of a large consignment of arms and ammunition prior to the
operation,6667 and sent former SLA fighters who fled to Liberia afier the Intervention back to
Sierra Leone in order for them to participate in the operation.6666 Given the testimonies of
several credible witnesses on the involvement of the Accused in planning an operation to
advance towards Freetown by first attacking Kono, and given the other ways the Accused
assisted Bockarie to support the upcoming operation the Trial Chamber finds the Accused's
denial to be incredible.
3112. Based on the evidence the Trial Chamber finds that Bockarie came to the Accused in
Monrovia with an idea to advance towards Freetown and that the Accused participated in
planning the military strategy, emphasising the need to first capture Kono due to its diamond
wealth, and that Bockarie then brought the plan to Buedu where he briefed his commanders
on it, armed them with ammunition and assigned them to two brigades for a two pronged
attack on Kono and Kenema, to be followed by an advance on to Freetown. The Trial
Chamber notes that the Accused was briefed on the meeting from Buedu by satellite phone.
3113. The Prosecution submits that the Accused and Bockarie determined how the plan
was to be carried out, deciding to save ammunition by making the operation even more
fearliil than all other operations before, and that after Bockarie spoke with the Accused via
satellite phone Bockarie announced "Operation No Living Thing", which meant that
anything that stood in their way should be eliminated.6666 The Accused denied that he gave
instructions to Sam Bockarie to launch Operation No Living Thing,6666 or that he ordered, A
incited, assisted or in any way encouraged the commission of atrocities in Freetown, stating
that had no control over or contact with those who committed these atrocities. He questioned
30587.
6666 Military Operations: Operation Fitti-Fatta.
6667 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso Shipment.
6666 Provision of Military Personnel; Repatriation of Sierra Leoneans.
6666 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 168.
6666 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26224-26225; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp.
29585-29586 (PS); Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30420-30421; Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30582,
30587.

---- End of Page 1070 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /6/ 18 May 2012

what he would have had to gain and noted that as a result of the Freetown Invasion,
hundreds of thousands of refugees came to Liberia.69Ul
3114. TF1-371 testified that when Bockarie returned from his conversation with the
Accused over the satellite phone, Bockarie said that Taylor gave him an instruction for
Operation No Living Thing, and that they should capture Freetown "by all means" in order
to push the govemrnent into negotiations.6902 On cross-examination. TF1-371 agreed that it
was Bockarie who coined the name "O eration No Livin Thin ".69O3 He said "I can’t recall
P S S
when he [Taylor] talked to any AFRC to go bum and kill civilians or what, no".6904
However, he did not agree, as the Defence contends, that the Accused never gave such
advice or instruction to the RUF.
3115. In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes Augustine Mallah's testimony that Bockarie
said that he himself planned Operation Spare No Soul, in order to permit the RUF to
negotiate the release of Foday Sar11"Operation Free Foday Sankoh" and "Operation No Living Thing" were the same operation,
but that it was "the fighters" who decided to call the operation "Operation No Living
Thing".69O6 This is in contrast to the testimony of TF1-371 that the name Operation No
Living Thing was coined by Bockarie following his conversation with the Accused who told
him to capture Freetown by "all means". However, given that Mallah did not attend the
smaller meeting in which TF1-371 was told by Bockarie that he had spoken with the
Accused and then announced Operation No Living Thing, the Trial Chamber does not find
Mallah's evidence to undermine the testimon of TF1-371.
Y
31 16. Karmoh Kanneh testified that at the meeting he attended, Jungle said that they
should not fear this time around and that there was no force that could withstand them.69O7
Abu Keita testified that Bockarie said that Taylor had said that "they should be very vigilant
and maintain the ground of the RUF".69O8 Isaac Mongor testified that Bockarie told him that
wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 1 August 2009, pp. 26470-26471.
6902 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2412-2413 (CS).
6903 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2644-2645, 2650 (CS).
6"°" TF1-371, Transcript so January 2008, pp. 2654-2655 (cs).
6905 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20220-20222,
6906 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 18 November 2008, pp. 20513-20514.
6907 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9431-9433.
°""8 Abu Keira, Transcript 23 January 2008, p, 2008.

---- End of Page 1071 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / OQ 18 May 2012

37 /64
Taylor said that in order to ensure the freeing of Foday Sankoh and others they should
ensure that the ammunition would not be wasted and that the operation should be "fearfi1l"
in order to capture Freetown and hold on to power.6909 TF 1-367 testified that at a briefing
with commanders in Kono, Issa Sesay said that this operation was "do or die", that they
should do everything they could to free Sankoh, and that "the operation should be made
fearful so we should conquer the enemy. We should make the operation fearful".69m
3117. Based on this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused told Bockarie that
the operation should be "fearfu1" and that the RUF should use "a11 means" in order to
pressure the Government into negotiations for the release of Foday Sankoh.
3118. The Trial Chamber notes that Kanneh testified that SA.} Musa's disloyalty and his
refusal to take orders from Bockarie was discussed in the small meeting at Bockarie's house
and that Bockarie had said that he had spoken with Gullit about the idea that SAI Musa
should be shot and killed during a military operation.69H Kanneh stated that Bockarie said
that he had complained to the Accused about SAI Musa's disloyalty "towards the mission"
and towards Bockarie's command and the RUF.69l2 Kanneh also testified that after the I
meeting, Bockarie sent a message to SAI Musa before the attack on Kono, asking him to
attack Freetown, but Musa refused and said he would not take orders from Bockarie which
resulted in a heated argument. The Trial Chamber notes that Kanneh's testimony on
Bockarie asking SAI Musa to attack Freetown and SAI Musa refused, and that while trying
to coordinate planning with him, the RUF in Buedu was also quietly talking about having
Musa killed, is direct, detailed and consistent. The Trial Chamber therefore finds Kanneh's
testimony to be both credible and reliable.
3119. In contrast, Isaac Mongor testified that Bockarie told him that in Monrovia the
Accused showed Bockarie on a map the locations that the RUF and the SLAs occupied at
the time, and the two discussed a plan to launch an operation in which they would capture
Kono, Kenema and Jo1u.69l3 Mongor also said that during the Waterworks meeting it was
agreed that Johnny Paul Koroma should speak with SAI Musa and tell him to forget the past
6909 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5796-5797.
(M0 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14164-14165.
69]] Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9427-9429; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9720-9721.
M2 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9424, 9427, 9430.
W3 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5795.

---- End of Page 1072 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ 5% 18 May 2012

5 7 /65
infighting and j0in hands in the military Operation. Mong0r testified that Koroma sp0ke with
SA] Musa and that SA] Musa agreed to mn the Operation.69l4 The Trial Chamber notes that
n0 other witnesses testified to this agreement, which is also inconsistent with Kanneh's
evidence and with the Prosecution's own submissions that "it is indisputable that by Oct0ber
1998 SA] Musa was not going to cooperate with Bockarie and the RUF".69l5 Mong0r's
s0urce of information for this communication is second-hand from an unnamed radi0
Operator, and in light of the evidence concerning related events, the Trial Chamber considers
that Mong0r's testimony is inaccurate and accepts Kanneh's evidence that it was Bockarie
who called SA] Musa and that SA] Musa refused Bockarie's request to c00rdinate an attack
0n Freetown.
3120. Based on the evidence of Karmoh Kanneh that Bockarie said that he had complained
to the Accused about SA] Musa's disl0yalty and refusal to take orders from him, and on the
evidence of Isaac Mong0r that Bockarie and the Accused took into consideration the
locations in which both the RUF and the SLAs were stationed at the time of their discussion
0f the plan, and that following the Wate1works meeting Bockarie contacted SA] Musa and
requested or ordered him to cooperate, the Trial Chamber finds that the possibility that SA]
Musa would participate in the execution of the plan was contemplated by Bockarie and the
Accused at the time they designed the plan.
3121. C0upled with Musa's refusal to cooperate with the Wate1works plan, TF1-371's
testimony that the AFRC had their own plan to invade Freetown, while the RUF had its own
"in house" planning, indicates that there were two plans to attack Freetown, one made by the
RUF and one made by the AFRC group led by SA] Musa. This is consistent with Alimamy
Bobson Sesay's testimony that SA] Musa and Gullit, among others, had planned an advance
towards Freetown, and started their advance already at the end of ]une/beginning of ]uly
1998,6916 long before the Wate1works meeting in December 1998.
3122. The Trial Chamber also recalls that it is an Adjudicated Fact that at a meeting in
Koinadugu District, vari0us AFRC commanders met with SA] Musa to discuss the future
and devel0p a new military strategy. The commanders agreed that the tr00ps who had
anived f’rom Kono District should act as an advance tr00p, which would establish a base in
W4 Isaac Mong0r, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5799-5800.
M5 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 476.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T i/ OR 18 May 2012

the north-western area of Sierra Leone in preparation for an attack on Freetown. Their
u ose was to "restore the Sierra Leone Arm ".°ql7 It is also an Ad`udicated Fact that SAJ
P YP Y J
Musa left Koinadugu District to join the advance team and prepare for an attack on
Freetown in October 1998,6918 meaning Musa started advancing towards Freetown before
the Waterworks meeting in December 1998. Also an Adjudicated Fact is that upon Musa's
arrival in ‘Colonel Eddie Town’ in November 1998, he emphasised his disenchantment with
the RUF and stressed that it was vital that his troops arrive in Freetown before the RUF.69l9
3123. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that a meeting was convened by Musa two days
alter the news about the execution of the 24 soldiers in Freetown, on 19 October, and that
this execution was one of the reasons SAJ Musa decided to head straight to Freetown and
"reinstate the anny".6920 Bobson Sesay did not agree with the proposition that SAJ Musa's
goals were different from the goals of Bockarie and the RUF, which were to release Foday
Sankoh, explaining that on the day of the execution of the 24 soldiers, Bockarie went on the
air and said that he did not accept the executions and that "our men" will march onto
Freetown, which is what SAJ Musa had also told them.692l The Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that Bobson Sesay is generally credible.6922 However, the Trial Chamber notes that,
Bobson Sesay himself stated several times that he did not know what SAJ Musa had in
mind.6923 In the Trial Chamber's view, the evidence indicates that Musa's goal in attacking
Freetown was to reinstate the army while Bockarie's goal in attacking Freetown was to
release Foday Sankoh from prison.
3124. ln this context, the Trial Chamber notes the Defence's acceptance ofBobson Sesay's
testimony that SAJ Musa ordered his forces to proceed to Freetown without killing, looting
or burning,6924 indicating that he did not have a campaign of terror in mind, as Bockarie did.
According to Kanneh, Bockarie reported to those at the small meeting held in his house that
he had spoken to Gullit about the possibility of Gullit killing SAJ Musa during a military
6916 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8044-8046.
6917 Prosecuzor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 8.
6918 Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 10.
(mg Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 11.
6920 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 May 2008, pp. 8832, 8834-8837.
(ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 May 2008, pp. 8833-8838.
6922 Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285-289.
6923 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 May 2008, pp. 8832, 8834-8837.
Om Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 919. »

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—01—T 18 May 2012

5 ‘//6%
operation. This, in the Trial Chamber's view, indicates Bockarie's desire to bring the
separate plan of SAJ Musa together with the plan discussed at Waterworks that SAJ Musa
had rejected. Evidence was adduced suggesting that SAJ Musa was killed by Gullit during a
military operation as envisioned by Bockarie's conversation.6925 The Trial Chamber need
not make a finding as to how SAJ Musa was killed. What is relevant to the evolution of the
plan is the death of SAJ Musa on or around 23 December 1998.6926
3125. The Trial Chamber notes that both Bobson Sesay and Isaac Mongor explained the
invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999 as a plan of both the RUF and AF RC, as the forces
who eventually invaded Freetown, led by AFRC's Gullit, could not have done so without
the attacks on Kono and Makeni, which reduced the burden and weakened ECOMOG,
which was stationed in those other areas.6927 The Trial Chamber observes that both
witnesses testified to this fiom their own experience of war strategy. While in retrospect
these witnesses might be right with regard to the helpful impact of the RUF attacks on the
AF RC advance to Freetown led by Gullit, the evidence does not establish that there was a
coordinated plan in which the attacks on Kono, Makeni and the other areas were meant to
weaken ECOMOG forces in Freetown and thereby aid the AFRC advance. The evidence
rather shows that there were two separate plans to reach Freetown, and that while Bockarie
tried to consolidate the plan with SAJ Musa, Musa refused to cooperate with Bockarie.
Mongor himself agreed that in the end, the invasion of Freetown on 6 January was largely an
AF RC project, and that the AFRC group who entered Freetown refused to wait for the RUF
group to join them.6928 Mongor's concession that there were two separate plans is consistent
with the Trial Chamber's understanding that the AF RC invasion of Freetown started
independently of the RUF plan detailed at the Waterworks meeting. SAJ Musa had already
started his advance to Freetown by the time of the meeting, and he rejected the offer made
by the AF RC/RUF group at Waterworks to coordinate operations.
3126. Based on the evidence the Trial Chamber finds that the RUF plan made by Bockarie
and the Accused and launched at Waterworks, and implemented in the subsequent attacks on
6925 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8244-8247; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February
2008, pp. 3215-3216; TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9023-9024; Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March
2009, Annex A, Fact 13.
6926 Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 13.
6927 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6758-6760; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 May 2008, p.
gggiisaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6763-6766.

---- End of Page 1075 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.,-03-01-T J W 18 May 2012

36//68
Kono and Makeni, was separate from the plan of SAJ Musa, despite the presence and
participation of AFRC commanders at the Waterworks meeting and in the attacks that
commenced thereafter.
3127. On the basis of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused and Bockarie
made a plan in Monrovia, which Bockarie brought back to Buedu and shared with RUF and
AF RC commanders who were to implement it. The plan brought by Bockarie aHer
discussion with the Accused involved a two pronged attack where one flank would attack
Kono and proceed to Makeni while the other flank attacked Kenema. Both flanks would
then advance and capture Freetown, fulfilling their final objective of releasing their leader,
Foday Sankoh. The Accused advised Bockarie to make the operation "fearful" in order to
bring the Government of Sierra Leone to the negotiating table for the release of Sankoh. The
commanders who attended the Waterworks meeting undertook to implement the plan, using
the ammunition that Bockarie brought back with him from Monrovia.
3128. SAJ Musa, who was already operating on the basis of an independent plan to reach
Freetown, refused a request from Bockarie to coordinate the operations, and SAJ Musa
continued independently. Following the meeting in Monrovia, the Accused was updated by
Bockarie after the Waterworks meeting in Buedu and aHer the recapture of Kono.
Findings
3129. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in November/December 1998 the Accused and Sam Bockarie jointly designed a two-
pronged attack on Kono, Kenema and Freetown as the ultimate destination, the Accused
emphasising the need to first attack Kono District.
3130. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused told Bockarie to make the operation "fearful" in order to force the
Government into negotiation and free Foday Sankoh from prison and that aHer the
Waterworks meeting, the Accused told Bockarie to use "all means" to get to Freetown in a
satellite phone conversation. Subsequently, Bockarie named the operation "Operation No
Living Thing", implying that anything that stood in their way should be eliminated.

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Case No.: SCSI-—O3—Ol—T W 18 May 2012

36//67
(b) The Implementation of the Plan
Submissions of the Parties
3131. The Prosecution submits that SAJ Musa's death led to a resumption of full
coordination between Bockarie and his personnel and the forces led by Alex Tamba Brima
(a.k.a. Gullit).6929 According to the Prosecution, Gullit was a friend of Bockarie's and
willing to submit to his authority.°930 Moreover, the Prosecution argues, it was clear to
Gullit and his comrades that their ability to take over the country to negotiate a favourable
cessation of hostilities depended on allying themselves with the RUF .693 I The Prosecution
submits that when SAJ Musa died, Gullit established regular communication with Bockarie,
and kept him informed of all developments in Freetown, as well as communicating with
RUF Rambo, Superman and Issa Sesay.°932
3132. The Prosecution submits that as a result, although Gullit commanded the troops
within the city of Freetown itself and the majority of commanders in Freetown were AFRC
commanders, the attack on Freetown was a joint operation undertaken by AF RC and RUF
forces.6933 The Prosecution submits that "[a]fter establishing communication with Gullit,
before the troops entered the city, Sam Bockarie went on international radio and promised
that his men would enter Freetown within 72 hours".6934
3133. The Prosecution submits that the RUF provided four critical areas of support to the
invasion.°935 First, the Prosecution contends that Gullit and other commanders were in
regular communication with Bockarie and implemented his orders during the attack,
including orders that led directly to the commission of many of the atrocities.6936 Second, the
Prosecution contends that the RUF contributed military and operational support in the form
of communications support, manpower, including the Red Lion battalion, which came with
Gu1lit's forces from the North, RUF fighters freed from Pademba Road Prison, bodyguards
V of the RUF radio operators, and a force commanded by Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red
6929 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 10, 500.
(mo Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 501-502, 553.
6931 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 553.
W2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 505.
6933 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 513, 518.
6934 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 507.
6935 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 513.
6936 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 517. See also paras 553-564.

---- End of Page 1077 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 0`Q 18 May 2012

Goat); and 448 warnings of ECOMOG Alpha Jet attacks.°937 The Prosecution submits that
the force attacking Freetown was composed of "important RUF elements, including radio
operators King Perry and Alfred Brown, who had their own RUF bodyguards, and RUF and
Liberian fighters in the Red Lion battalion".°938 Third, it alleges that the RUF capture of
major ECOMOG bases and weaponry at Koidu and Makeni meant that Gullit's troops could
enter Freetown knowing that they would not be trapped by larger ECOMOG forces coming
from Makeni or other areas brought under AF RC/RUF control. Further, the joint force was
now in a position to move to block ECOMOG reinforcements likely to be sent from Guinea,
Lungi and Port Loko in response to an attack on Freetown".6939 Fourth, the Prosecution
submits that even though the majority of RUF forces never successfully entered Freetown,
that the "RUF attacks on ECOMOG forces at strategic locations outside the city affected the
battle insidt-s’.°°‘*°
3134. The Prosecution then submits that when attempts to join Gullit's forces in Freetown
failed and increasing pressure was placed on the troops in Freetown by ECOMOG, Bockarie
ordered Gullit to withdraw from Freetown and re—or anise for a new attack. Bockarie then
8
instructed his forces on the outskirts of the city to ensure a secure line of retreat for the
withdrawing troops.694l Finally, the Prosecution alleges that after Gullit's forces withdrew
from Freetown, his troops and those outside Freetown made joint attempts to launch an
attack to recapture Freetown.6942
3135. The Defence concedes that communication between Gullit and Bockarie resumed
after Musa's death at Benguema when Gullit took over leadership of the AFRC group that
was advancing on Freetown.6943 However, the Defence denies that the Freetown invasion
was a joint RUF and AF RC operation.6944 It contends that the RUF was not involved in the
Freetown attack and that "it was renegade elements of the Sierra Leone Army who, in their
6937 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 515. See also paras 528-546.
6938 Prosecution Final Trial BriefQ para. 496.
0939 Prosecution Final Trial BriefQ para. 514. See also paras 519-527.
6940 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 516. See also paras 547-552.
6941 Prosecution Final Trial BriefQ para. 565.
6942 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] paras 565-568.
6943 Defence Final Trial Brief] para. 613.
bm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 920.

---- End of Page 1078 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GIA 18 May 2012

anger and frenzy after their expulsion from Freetown by Nigerian—led intewentionist forces,
turned their bitterness on the civilian population".6945
3136. The Defence submits that Bockarie's radio operators did not know Gullit's group
entered Freetown until they heard it from the BBC and Gullit only contacted Bockarie
because the AF RC troops ran into "trouble and required assistance" and requested
reinforcements. The Defence submits that the request from Gullit was unexpected and that
Gullit and Bockarie argued.6946 The Defence contends that their lack of coordination is
illustrated by the fact that Bockarie sent Gullit a message while Gullit was in Waterloo
telling him to wait for reinforcements, Gullit did not agree and rather than waiting, he went
ahead and entered Freetown.6947 The Defence denies that the RUF had control over the
AFRC forces who attacked Freetown6948 and that Gullit was following orders from Bockarie
during the Freetown invasion.6949
3137. In relation to the alleged support provided by Bockarie, while the Defence
acknowledges that Bockarie told Gullit that the RUF was sending reinforcements and that he
had instructed Rambo, who was already in Waterloo, to link up with them,°950 RUF fighters
did not get any closer to Freetown than Waterloo.6951 The Defence points to the evidence of
TF 1-516 to submit that the RUF gave only advice in support of the fighters in Freetown,6952
and points to evidence that one of the reasons that the AFRC and the RUF fell out at
Waterloo after the invasion was because the AF RC was bitter that the RUF had not provided
assistance while it was under siege in Freetown.6953 The Defence contends that Prosecution
evidence that the military successes of the AF RC resulting in its takeover of Freetown were
due to the RUF 's attacks outside the city is opinion evidence, contradicted by that of Issa
6945 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 617.
6946 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 616-617.
6947 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 630.
6948 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 615.
6949 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 880.
6950 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 633.
695 1 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 636.
M2 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 901.
6953 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 889.

---- End of Page 1079 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~0l—T /,/( ® 18 May 2012

37/762
Sesay.6666 The Defence contends that it was clear that the two factions were "no more than
fighting a common enemy".6666
3138. Finally, the Defence submits that while there is some evidence of some atrocities in
Njaima Nimikoro in addition to some incidents of looting, that there is "no overwhelming
evidence of wide scale atrocities in the places the RUF attacked on the way towards
Freetown, such as Kono, Makeni, Lunsar, Port Loko etc".666 6
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
3139. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC member and officer,6667 testified that
when they arrived back from the operation in Koidu Geiya, Gullit had anived. Gullit told
them that Sam Bockarie had released him from Kailahun because he had told Bockarie that
he could settle the disputes that had arisen in Kono when Monis Kallon shot two SLAs in
around June 1998.6666 From Masingbi Road, the troops moved to Five-Five Spot where
Gullit held a meeting in which he briefed the troops about the diamonds that were taken
from him by Bockarie and that Bockarie had released him with some logistics to come and
advise the two sides. Gullit advised that because ECOMOG were piling pressure on the
· Kono troops, they should withdraw to Tombodu and from there withdraw immediately to
Koinadugu District where SAJ Musa was based in Mongo Bendugu. The meeting was
attended by lbrahim Bazzy, Hassan Papa Bangura and other commanders, who briefed the
troops on what had occurred.6666 The witness travelled to Tombodu6666 and then with Gullit
to Mansofinia in Koinadugu District,666l from where they travelled to SAJ Musa's position
in Mongo Bendugu.6662
6664 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 881.
6666 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 915.
666 6 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 923.
6667 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859—7867, 7869; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8684,
666666ilimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8023—8025, 8028.
6959 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8028.
6666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8038-8039.
666l Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8040.
6662 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8043.

---- End of Page 1080 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J GA 18 May 2012

3 if 923
3140. When they arrived in Mongo Bendugu, the witness attended a closed—door meeting
with inter alia Gullit and SA] Musa at which Gullit explained to SA] Musa about the
treatment he had received in Kailahun, and how Bockarie had taken his diamonds. Gullit
said that he was not very happy with that so now he wanted SA] Musa to advise him on the
next plan. SA] Musa responded that Brigadier Mani had gone ahead to the north to look for
a base to prepare for the advancement to Freetown and that he wanted Gullit to move with
the troop that would be joined by Five—Five to find Brigadier Mani, establish an advance
base and prepare for the attack on Freetown. Bobson Sesay explained that there was no
"front line troop" in the North at that time and SA] Musa wanted a strong troop there in
A preparation for an attack on Freetown. SA] Musa said that once the base was established, it
would later receive reinforcement to move to Freetown.6963
3141. Bobson Sesay testified that while they were based in Rosos, the troops undertook
operations in, inter alia, Gbomsamba in September/October 1998. Gullit called the
operation commanders, military supervisors and company commanders, saying that they had
been too quiet recently and therefore needed to "hit a town" to show that they were not
idling and that he had information that ECOMOG forces were based in Gbomsamba.
Because they had been out of` communication, Gullit said he wanted the brothers, the RUF
and SLA, in Koindugu, Kailahun and all the bases around Kono to know that they were still
attacking. The witness explained that they had been out of` communication for some time
because their communications man had run away so Gullit wanted the other groups to hear
about them through the international media.6964
3142. Around ]uly—August 1998, afier the operation in Gbomsamba, the radio man fixed up
the radio with a new mic, which a fighter called Captain Arthur had discovered during patrol
in Batkanu. Until then, they had only been able to monitor communications. Gullit resumed
communications with SA] Musa, Issa Sesay, Bockarie and Brigadier Mani on the same day.
Bobson Sesay said that Gullit spoke to Bockarie first to infonn him on operations in the
North and in Gbomsamba and told him "the extent to which he was leading the operation
now that he had based in Rosos". Bockarie responded that he had thought that Gullit had
surrendered but was happy that they had started communication and that Gullit was doing
0%} Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8044-8046.
(N64 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8132, 8133-8134, 8138-8142.

---- End of Page 1081 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {lg 18 May 2012

3 7/914
well. Bockarie said that Gullit would "get the full support at whatever time he needed".
Whatever assistance Gullit needed, he should contact Bockarie and he would follow up.6965
3143. Around the time that SAJ Musa called Gullit to say that he was leaving Koinadugu
and heading towards Colonel Eddie Town because he had clashed with Superman, Gullit
also communicated with Bockarie in Kailahun to brief him about his military operations in
Kukuna and Mange Bureh. The witness knew this because, for instance, after the Kukuna
operation, he saw Gullit mount the radio set and call Bockarie. The witness stated that this
was the only radio communication between Gullit and Bockarie during which he was
present. According to Bobson Sesay, Gullit also called SAJ Musa to tell him about the latest
developments, being the attack on Kukuna. The witness explained that whenever they had
an operation, Bockarie was the first person Gullit called before informing SAJ Musa. After
the Kukuna attack, Gullit also contacted Issa Sesay who, based on their monitoring appeared
4 to be in the Kailahun axis to explain to him about the "activities" they had undertaken.6966
3144. The witness explained that from the monitoring they were doing then, they knew that
RUF Rambo, lsaac Mongor, Peter Vandi and others were in and around the Kono axis.
Bobson Sesay said that the radio men always monitored the various communications that
went on and "presented this monitoring" to him, he presented the information to the
commander, who would pass it on to the operation commander. Hence they knew exactly
what was going on in all the areas occupied by the "junta troops", by which he meant the
RUF and SLA. The information would also be entered in a logbook.6967 The witness said he
knew this because he was with the operation commander and whenever communications
came, either through monitoring or when the radio man would send a runner, it was shared
with the commander who would then pass it on to the operation conunander.6968
3145. Around "20~something" December 1998, SAJ Musa ordered attacks on Magbuntoso
(Mile 38) followed by successful operations on RDF (Rapid Deployment Force, a base
settled by the NRPC) and Mamamah in Koya Rural District.6969 Just after the troops had
based at Mamamah, they heard on the intemational media radio Bockarie announcing that
6965 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8132, 8133-8134, 8138-8142.
6966 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8216-8218, 8219-8220; Transcript 23 April 2008, p.
304.
gw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8217-8220.
(M8 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8217-8220.
6969 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8237-8238.
F A 1082 g GL

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

37/725
AFRC and RUF joint force had captured the strategic military base of RDF and were
heading to Freetown, while other AF RC/RUF troops were advancing from the rear towards
Kono and Daru. Bockarie said the AFRC/RUF forces were "moving from all angles".69m
The witness recalled that following that announcement, SAJ Musa was angry with Alfred
Brown, one of the RUF radio operators, for giving information to Bockarie. Musa said that
he would not subject himself to the control of Bockarie, who was an SBU. Musa said that he
was a trained military man whereas Bockarie was not. Now that Musa was advancing
towards Freetown, he said he did not want Bockarie controlling him. The main aim was to
advance and capture Freetown and there was no need to take command from Bockarie until
he had done that.697l
3146. Bobson Sesay testified that, after SAJ Musa's death, he and others left for
Macdonald Hill where they met Basky, Foday Bah Marah and Junior Lion, leaving behind
Gullit, Bazzy, Bomb Blast and others. Later, they met Gullit dressed in SAJ Musa's helmet
and uniform, who informed them that SAJ Musa was buried at Koba Water. Bobson Sesay
stated that "[a]utomatically we all recognised him as the commander, so he was in full
control of the troops now".6972 Gullit ordered the troops to attack York at the peninsular but
were unsuccesshil and they retreated to their base at in Benguema.6973 ·
3147. Bobson Sesay testified that when the troops retumed from York, Gullit mounted a
radio set and communicated to Bockarie that the troops were prepared to advance to
Freetown but needed more reinforcement to capture Freetown.6974 Bobson Sesay, as well as
most of the senior commanders, were present when Gullit made the communication.6975
Bockarie assured him that Issa Sesay and Denis Mingo from Kono and Makeni would join
them in the advance on Freetown.6976 Bobson Sesay recalled that while Bockarie said the
reinforcements were on their way, Bockarie also said that there were "targeted areas that
N70 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8239-8240.
(ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8240-8241.
Om Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8246-8247.
6973 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8253.
6974 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8253-8254.
W5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8253.
(M6 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8254, 8303-8306.

---- End of Page 1083 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gus l8 May 2012

they needed to clear up" first in the sense of weakening ECOMOG.6977 Bobson Sesay
explained:
Well, as I earlier said, it was an operation that was planned. The RUF, SLAs who were in
the eastern part around that Kono area moved, those of us who were in the north moved and
those of us in that Kailahun-Daru axis also moved. So whilst wewere attacking they were
simultaneously attacking. So it was a strategy that we used so that the ECOMOG would
not reinforce each other in any other position. So those who were in Kono would not
reinforce those in Makeni. Those who were in Daru would not reinforce those who were in
Kenema. Those who were within Benguema would not be able to reinforce because we had
destabilised them in Freetown. So this was the strategy that we used and this was what
Bockarie was telling Gullit. He said now that the men were pushing to ensure that they
weakened ECOMOG they would come and reinforce us later and we will all bulldoze our
way to Freetown.°°7g
3148. Bockarie explained that RUF commanders Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Isaac Mongor,
Akim Turray and RUF Rambo had already moved from Gandorhun to capture Kono.6979 He
also said other troops had left from Kailahun to move to the Dam axis and Segbwema to
weaken the ECOMOG strategic bases so that ECOMOG troops based there would be unable
to send reinforcements to Freetown. The plan was that the troops led by Gullit, along with
the reinforcements sent by Bockarie, would push ahead and enter Freetown.6980
3149. Bobson Sesay testified that after this communication, the troops led by Gullit moved
to Hastings Hill around Freetown Highway as they waited for reinforcement. Gullit
communicated with Issa Sesay. The witness was present during this communication. Sesay
briefed Gullit that his troops had captured Kono and were heading towards Makeni and were
on course "to weaken the ECOMOG forces so that they can reinforce [...] Gullit so that all
of us can enter Freetown". Gullit responded that he would still wait for the
reinforcementfqgl The witness heard over international media that day that the AFRC/RUF
had captured Kono and were moving towards Makeni. Gullit also contacted Superman, who
affirmed that they were in Bumbuna with Brigadier Mani and were advancing in a two-
pronged attack towards Binkolo to capture Makeni6982 while Morris Kallon was going
6977 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8254.
6978 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8254-8255.
6979 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8254, 8303-8306.
6980 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8254-8256; Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8307.
wg! Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8257-8258.
6982 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8258-8259.

---- End of Page 1084 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J gk 18 May 2012 %
¤

through Mototoka to Makeni.6983 Gullit's brigade had a radio monitoring set that was
monitoring all areas of the AFRC/RUF advance.6984
3150. Subsequently, Bobson Sesay testified that Gullit's fighters moved to unsuccessfully
attack Hastings, having seen ECOMOG helicopters bringing reinforcements there.6985 After
that Gullit said the troops should prepare to advance towards Jui and Allen Town. On 3
January 1999, the troops captured Hastings, and on 4 January 1999 the troops captured Jui
‘ and Allen Town, establishing a temporary base at the latter.6986 They were in Allen Town
until 5 January 1999.6987 Around 1.00am on 6 January 1999, Gullit called all the battalion
commanders at Allen Town and addressed the troops, stating that they were about to enter
Freetown and ordering the troops to open the central prisons, ensuring that Foday Sankoh
and other political detainees were released and that persons opposing the RUF and SLA
forces should be killed.6988 At this stage, Gullit's troops numbered 1,000 and were well-
anned.6989 From Allen Town, the troops moved to Calaba Town, Brewery, and then went
through Wellington Old Road and New Freetown-Waterloo road into Freetown.699O
3151. Bobson Sesay stated that two groups of fighters moved to various locations within
Freetown as they advanced towards the State House, buming 50 vehicles at Old Road, the
Eastem Police and two police officers.699l One group advanced from Goderich street to the
Library around the State House towards Tower Hill while another advanced from Cotton
Tree and captured the State House. This occurred around 6.00am on 6 January 1999.6992
3152. Bobson Sesay stated that the first thing Gullit did when they entered the State House
was to set up the radio set and, in the witness's presence, call Bockarie and other
commanders to inform them that he had entered Freetown and "was still waiting for them to
reinforce him so that he would be able to capture the military barracks". Bockarie responded
that "there was now preparation under way and that as [...] Issa and Superman have
6983 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8256-8258.
6984 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8259.
6985 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8261-8262.
6986 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8264-8267.
6987 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8269.
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8270-8271.
6089 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8272.
6990 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8272-8274.
wg} Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8275-8279.
Nm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8279-8280.

---- End of Page 1085 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /// M 18 May 2012 `Z

captured Makeni and that they were now pressing towards where we were, that is Freetown,
to reinforce us".6666 Gullit also called Issa Sesay and Superman when he captured the State
House. These calls also took place in Bobson Sesay's presence.6664
3153. After the capture of the State House, the forces broke into Pademba Road Prison,
where they released around 3,500 SLA and RUF members and their supporters, including
Steve Bio and Gibril Massaquoi and lawyers and politicians including the former President
Joseph Saidu Momoh.6666 The witness later heard from Gullit that the lawyers and
politicians among the released prisoners were taken by RUP Rambo and Issa Sesay to
Makeni for security reasons.6666
3154. Bobson Sesay stated that when he returned to the State House, he heard on
international media Bockarie announcing that his troops led by Gullit had ousted the
government of Ahmed Tejah Kabbah, released prisoners from Pademba Road Prison and
- were based at the State House.6667 The same day Five-Five made a similar announcement on
the national radio and said the troop led by Gullit had overthrown the SLPP government and
in full control of the city, urging civilians to comply with their rules. The brigade
administrator6666 FAT Sesay also made an announcement that day over international media
confirming that he was based at State House, "that the commander that led the troop to
Freetown was Tamba Alex Brima and that State House was under their full control and that
he was asking that all military personnel should surrender".6666
3155. Bobson Sesay explained that at the State House, Gullit was the overall commander
of the troops, but reported to Bockarie. Bazzy was the Deputy Commander, Five-Five,
Woyoh and Bomblast were all based at the State House.7666 The troops had captured some
Nigerian ECOMOG, who were executed on Gullit's orders at the back of the State
House.7661 The troops remained in Freetown for around three and a half weeks.7662 1n the
6663 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8286-8287.
6666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8288.
6665 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8287-8288.
6666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8318.
6667 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8286.
6666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8289.
6666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8288.
7666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8289.
766l Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8292.
7662 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8294.

---- End of Page 1086 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4*// Gln 18 May 2012

second week of January, the troops in Freetown received news that the ECOMOG forces
were advancing towards the State House.70O3
3156. During the second week, while the troops were at the State House, RUF Rambo also
communicated to Gullit that he was preparing reinforcements to join Gullit because of the
threat Gullit was facing from ECOMOG. RUF Rambo stated that the SLA Rambo, also
known as Rambo Red Goat, was advancing together with Superman and others towards
Freetown.70O4 RUF Rambo explained that he had received the order to send these
reinforcements from Bockarie.7005 The witness was present at this conversation.70O6 The
witness explained that in the conversation RUF Rambo stated that he had moved with Issa
Sesay and SLA Rambo as far as Hastings, but added that the reinforcements had some fear
as they did not believe that SAJ Musa was dead.70O7 However, Bobson Sesay noted that
despite this fear, some men, led by Rambo Red Goat, were sent to join Gullit's troops in
Freetown.7008
3157. Bobson Sesay testified that Rambo Red Goat was with Superman's group in
Koinadugu. Although he had sided with SAJ Musa during his dispute with Superman, Red
Goat later decided to stay with Superman and went with Superman to capture Makeni. SAJ
Musa made the fact of Red Goat staying behind known to the forces at Colonel Eddie
-1-Own 7009
3158. While waiting for these reinforcements, due to ECOMOG attacks at the State House,
the troops retreated to the Eastern Police where they heard that the government had
announced a ceasefire.70lO
3159. Some time before the third week of January, Gullit appointed the witness and
Colonel Eddie to receive Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat), who came with 30 RUF
fighters and 20 SLA as reinforcements from Allen town.70H
7003 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8295.
7004 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8300-8302; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8321-8323.
7005 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8327.
7006 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8302.
7007 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8300-8302; Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8323.
7008 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8323.
7009 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8321-8322.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8323-8324.

---- End of Page 1087 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 55 18 May 2012 M
Zz! •

3160. The whole troop then moved to Ferry Junction, and later recaptured the State
House.7Ol2 The troops did not hold the State house for a long time. At some point after this,
the witness heard Bockarie on the BBC stating that he was not ready for any peace or
ceasefire that the government wanted to establish and was giving an order to Gullit to start
buming strategic positions in Freetown and to capture civilians.70l3 After that announcement
Bockarie called Gullit on the radio to instruct him to bum Freetown and other strategic
areas. This communication was made at the State House after its recapture in the presence of
the witness. Gullit responded: "Yes, sir, I will do according to your wish. Just as you have
`ven me order, I will also order the men now to start the operation to bum down and
gl P
capture people in Freetown".7Ol4 In the presence of the witness and others, Gullit ordered
senior commanders to distribute fuel as they bumt areas in Freetown. Gullit then withdrew
to the troop base in PWD, Ferry Junction area.7Ol5
3161. At the same time, ECOMOG re-attacked the troops at the State House and the
troops, including Rambo Red Goat and the Red Lion battalion, began withdrawing from
Freetown.7Ol6 A group of fighters, including Gullit and Bazzy, went to Fourah Bay, where
they bumt property and killed civilians.7Ol7 These troops then attacked Upgun area where
Five-Five ordered amputations.7Ol8 These troops included Rambo Red Goat and a female
fighter known as Adama Cut Hand.7Ow
3162. Of the rebel forces that were in Freetown, Bobson Sesay distinguished between the
"brigade", which comprised civilian members of the rebels, and the "fighting force" the
fighters who formed the attacking component of the group.7O2O During the withdrawal, Gullit
moved with the brigade towards Shell Old Road while the fighting force remained behind in
Freetown. The witness was part of the fighting force left behind, as was Rambo Red Goat
mu Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8301-8302; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8326-8327.
He testified that "this was almost during the third week of 6 January when we entered (Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8328).
M2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8327-8328.
mu Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328-8329.
M4 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8329-8330.
W5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8331-8332.
M6 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8330-8331.
mn Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8332-8334.
M8 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8335-8336.
""° Airrrrarrry Bpbsprr spray, rrarrsprrpr 23 April 2008, pp. 8335-8336.
7020 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8342.

---- End of Page 1088 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr-03-01-T // gb) 18 May 2012 gr

and the former NPF L fighters who came to reinforce Gullit.702l Some time after Gullit lefr
with the Brigade, the fighting force also withdrew to Mental Home, Shell Old road area.7022
Gullit ordered the fighting force to attack ECOMOG forces as it advanced to Allen town.
The troops burnt houses, captured civilians while others were killed as they moved from
Mental Home to Kissy Mess Mess, Approved School, Brewery and Calaba Town until Allen
town where they were based.7023
3163. Bobson Sesay explained that when he got to Allen Town, Hassan Papa Bangura
stated that the troops should wait for further instruction from Gullit, so they spent about two
days around Allen Town. Gullit notified them that he had reached Benguema with the
civilian brigade, and that reinforcements were coming to join them at Jui.7024 No
reinforcements arrived, and due to increasin ECOMOG attacks, the forces at Jui decided to
take the bypass to the Grafton Hastings jungle towards Benguema. On their way, Gullit
called them and warned that the troo s at Hastin s and Waterloo, commanded b Issa Sesa
and Superman, were confiscating valuables from the troops retreating from Freetown
because they felt that "at least those of us who were retreating, we should share with
them".7025 At Benguema, the witness met F ive-F ive and Gullit. Five Five requested that the
retreating troops surrender cash, diamonds and other valuables to Gullit, and the troops did
$07026
3164. Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, RUF Rambo and RUF/SLA fighters then joined them at
Benguema and they held a meeting at which Issa Sesay informed them of the instructions
from Bockarie to arrest Superman and send him to Kailahun. Afrer this meeting, in the
presence of Gullit, F ive-F ive, Superman, RUF Rambo, Rambo Red Goat, 0-Five, Issa Sesay
then planned an operation to recapture Freetown by using Tombo axis instead of the
Freetown-Waterloo highway, where ECOMOG forces were concentrated. Sesay told them
that he would bring ammunitions from Makeni so they could advance to Freetown.7027 The
commanders said that some men should o ahead as an advance team to settle a base at
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8340-8341.
7022 Alimarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8340-8346.
7023 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8368-8372.
7020 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8373-8375.
7025 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8375-8377.
7020 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8377-8378.
7027 Alimarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8378-8380.

---- End of Page 1089 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6U§ 18 May 2012 Q
I

Macdonald village, and the witness was chosen to command that mission with "heavy
manpower".7O28
3165. Bobson Sesay led some troops to Macdonald. The witness testified that later Issa
Sesay distributed ammunitions to the fighters who reinforced the troops at Macdonald and
they advanced towards Tombo axis.7029
3166. Around mid-February 1999, as instructed by Five-Five, Superman, Bomblast, RUF
Rambo Five-Five, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Med Bajejeh, Rambo Red Goat bombarded
Tombo village with a support propelled grenade (SPG) and were repelled by ECOMOG
troops which led to the retreat to Macdonald.7O30 Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and others
moved to Waterloo while Five-Five, the witness, Bomblast and others moved to Benguema
barracks where they spent a month.7O3l
3167. On cross-examination, Bobson Sesay was questioned about prior statements in which
he stated that SAJ Musa had cited the execution of 24 members of the AF RC on 19 October
1998,7032 and the need to reinstate the army as reasons to go to Freetown.7033 Bobson Sesay
explained that the execution of 24 SLA soldiers, the desire to reinstate the army, and the
desire to release the RUF and AFRC political detainees at Pademba Road Prison were all
factors that led to the invasion of Freetown by SAJ Musa's troops.7034
3168. On cooperation between the AF RC and RUF in re-attacking Freetown, Bobson
Sesay stated that at Benguema there was cordiality between the RUF and the AFRC because
they were able to organise to re-attack. He also noted that Issa Sesay "had command over
Gullit" but agreed that these were essentially two groups working together against a
common enemy, the Sierra Leonean government.7033
7038 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8380-8381.
7029 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8381-8385.
7030 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8385-8389.
""‘ Airmpmy Bpbspp Sesay, Transcript 23 Apn12008, pp. 8389-8391.
7032 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8829-8830, 8834.
7033 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8832, 8836.
7033 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8835, 8837.
7033 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8860-8861.

---- End of Page 1090 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gb) 18 May 2012 %
\

3169. On re—examination, Bobson Sesay testified that Issa Sesay, Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman) and Morris Kallon were in constant communication with the forces in
Freetown.7036
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
3170. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,7O37 testified that, around a week after
Johnny Paul Koroma and Issa Sesay arrived in Buedu, Koroma met with Bockarie and
transmitted a radio message for all AFRC, RUF and STF saying that because he did not
"understand jungle exercise", he was asking all the AFRC and RUF to take command from
Bockarie and that, from that date, Bockarie should be leader for the movement from then
on.7O38 In response to the order, a group, comprising Gullit, Five-Five, Bazzy, Papa and
Junior Lion, who were not happy with the order "went and had their own area that was far
from Kono".7O39 Kamara later testified that they moved to Rosos in Bombali District when
this incident occurred.7O4O Once they had established themselves at Rosos, Gullit contacted
SAJ Musa who informed Bockarie that they were there.7O4l
3171. Kamara also testified that, in accordance with the plan developed in Buedu,7O42 he
and radio operator Alfred Brown moved from Superman Ground to Koinadugu District
together with others to facilitate effective radio communication in Rosos. Kamara and
Brown were first sent to Koinadugu District to join SAJ Musa and Superman so that they
could "prepare [Kamara and Brown] with equipment to join Gullit at "Rosos, Colonel Eddie
Ground". Kamara spent about a week in Koinadugu before moving on to Rosos on 1
September 1998.7043
3172. Kamara testified that they took two radio sets and three operators from Koinadugu to
Rosos. When they arrived, they condemned the radio in Rosos because it was not good, reset
7036 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8937-8939.
7037 Perry Kamara. Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
703** Perry Karrrara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 31 10-31 11.
7039 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 1 1.
7040 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp, 3173-3174.
ml Perry Kamara. Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3173-3174.
7042 The witness referred to an alleged plan made prior to the Fitti-Fatta operation (See Military Operations:
Operation Fitti-Fatta).
7043 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3175-3176; Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3184-3185,
3187-3189. To the question "How long did your journey last to Rosos?" Kamara replied "The patrol lasted for
21 days". Kamara explained that he remembered the dates so well because he seriously wounded his hand on 28

---- End of Page 1091 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr-03-01-T j QA;} 18 May 2012 Q

39 /54
one they had brought with them and from that point on, this radio was used to communicate
from Rosos to all the other RUF stations.7O44 Kamara explained that, up to that point, the
ground at Rosos did not possess the RUF radio code. By bringing the code, Brown and
Kamara rectiHed the "major problem" with communications that had existed with Rosos
previously.7045 Kamara testiHed that at that time, they would monitor and write down any
communications that were happening in Buedu but they did not have any other "contact
outside" at that time.7O46
3173. The witness testiHed that he was aware of what was going on with the RUF
operations through listening to the communications. They would be informed of any
movements Bockarie made from Buedu to Liberia or anything he brought back.7O47
3174. Kamara testified that SAJ Musa arrived in Rosos around November 1998 after
falling out with Superman. The witness said that although he did not receive this message
personally because he was not operating, he would still go in the morning to sit with the
other operators who were working. Whenever they received a message, Kamara said he
needed to see it before it went to the commander.7O48
3175. When SAJ Musa arrived, he immediately went to the meeting ground and said that as
of that day, he was no longer either an AFRC or an RUF. Musa said that he had come to
Gullit for them to form their own movement that would lead to success and that Gullit
should no longer communicate with anybody. He said he knew now to whom he would
communicate and then ensured that no RUF operator operated the radio. He did this by
keeping them far away from the radio and decreed that all radio materials were to be
reported to him and that no radio communication should be sent anywhere except from his
house. Musa also gave a warning letter to all RUF personnel. Kamara said that he kept his
right through the time they were in Freetown.7O49
September 1998 and therefore spent time "read[ir1g] over",
7044 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3204-3205.
7045 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3205.
7046 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3205.
10*7 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3206.
7048 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3209.
7049 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3211.

---- End of Page 1092 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3-Ol-T / 61}) 18 May 2012 w

3 7 /85
3176. Kamara testified that around 25 December 1998, they attacked and captured
Benguema where SAJ Musa died.7O5O Kamara testified that they rested in the forest for the
day. Without SAJ Musa, Gullit was in charge. He and other men said that when SAJ Musa
had arrived, they had been working together and exchanging information with the RUF but
Musa had told them to have nothing to do with the RUF. They said that now that Musa had
died, they should call Bockarie and tell him that they had moved beyond Benguema to
Waterloo and seek his advice. According to Kamara, they decided that "[w]hatever he said
we would tell him to accept, so that we would work together again", although they would
not "tell him directly" about the death of SAJ Musa at that time.7O5l Some people were in
favour of contacting Bockarie, while others were not.7O52
3177. Initially Gullit called Bockarie but he did not respond. Then Gullit called Alfred
Brown, the supervisor, and all the RUF who had been told not to communicate and Brown
ordered the witness to cal1 Bockarie. This time Bockarie came on the radio, saying "Perry,
what happened? I have been calling you and I have not been getting any information from
you? You were the radio operator who we had sent at that place". Kamara said that he
responded saying that that was an issue to be addressed by Gullit and handed the mic over to
him. Gullit then infonned Bockarie that he was seeking advice. Bockarie responded, saying
"How can I give you advice when, in the first place, when you were getting ready to take off
you did not inform me? Even when you were operating you had the radio men, you had
radios, but nobody informed me". Gullit repeated his request for advice.7O53 Bockarie asked
Gullit to wait for Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Supennan and Rambo to join him before
entering Freetown. These commanders had at that time passed Lunsar and were moving to
Masiaka.7O54 Gullit stated that he had enough ammunition, and did not need to wait for
reinforcements to bring ammunition. Bockarie replied "No, that is not the reason. It is for the p
command structure. It will be strong for you".7O55
3178. Initially, when Kamara was ordered by Gullit to contact Bockarie he was reluctant to
do so as SAJ Musa had threatened to kill him if any contact with Bockarie was made.
7050 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3214-3217.
ml Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3217.
7052 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3382 (PS).
7053 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3218.
7054 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3220.
7055 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3218-3219.

---- End of Page 1093 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Gu 18 May 2012

However, Gullit told Kamara that he was safe as SAJ Musa was dead.7O5° When Kamara
contacted Bockarie, Bockarie had no idea what Gullit's troops were doing except from what
he heard from commercial radio.7057
3179. Gullit then summoned a short meeting to discuss the proposal with other AFRC
officers. At the meeting, it was decided by majority that they should not wait for Bockarie's
reinforcements, and "whenever the other groups came they would join us".7O58 Subsequently,
Gullit's groups attacked Hastings but were not able to capture York. They were able to
capture some ammunition and returned.7O59
3180. Kamara affirmed that on the way from Rosos to Freetown, when SAJ Musa was still
alive, he was not aware of any communication between SAJ Musa's group and other forces
moving towards Freetown. Communication only began after SAJ Musa's death.7O6O
3181. According to Kamara, on 6 January 1999, the fighters entered Freetown at night and
attacked until daybreak. As they entered, there was heaving fighting and the fighters moved
from the main highway in Waterloo to Freetown and from Kossoh Town entered the eastern
art of Freetown.706l Before attackin Freetown, the fi ters were divided into ou s and
P 8 EY P
instructed to attack Ferry Junction, Upgun, State House, National Stadium and another
group was to enter Pademba Road. Kamara was assigned to the group of fighters to go to
Pademba Road. This group was to release Foday Sankoh and other political detainees who
were supporters of AFRC/RUF, including former president J S Momoh, the former RUF
spokesman Gibril Massaquoi, and Steve Bio.")62 When the fighters who had been
imprisoned in Pademba Road were released, they were "even more angry than us" and
engaged in more killing, burning, and amputation, because "they had been jailed for
life".7O°3 Kamara explained that AFRC, RUF and STF troops were present in Freetown.7O64
"’56 Perry Kamara, rrarraarrpr 7 February 2008, pp. 3382-3383 (Ps).
W Perry Kamara, rrarraprrpr 7 February 2008, p. 3383 (Ps).
7058 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3218-3219.
7059 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3219.
7060 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3246. p
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3224.
7062 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3225-3226.
7063 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3227-3228.
7064 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3233.

---- End of Page 1094 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / Gia 18 May 2012 %
•

3182. Kamara stated that Massaquoi's role after he was released was to contribute to the
0rganisation of tighters and that he was involved in 0rganisational meetings held by Gullit,
Bazzy, Five—Five and others.70°5 Massaquoi reported on the military situation and meetings
held in Freetown to Sam Bockarie in Buedu. Kamara did not know whether Sam Bockarie
ever gave any orders to Massaquoi.7066
3183. Kamara testitied that in order to enable communications when the tr00ps tirst entered
Freetown, he entered one of the NGO 0t`tices and took one Yeasu radi0 which he used to
update Bockarie concerning all of the events since SAJ Musa moved to R0s0s to the time
they entered Freetown. He noted that lrom this radi0, Alfred Brown and Gibril Massaquoi
used to send inf0nnation about events in Freetown.7067
3184. Kamara explained that as the "auth0rities" became settled at the State H0use, they _
were able to communicate with Sam Bockarie. Kamara testitied that when Gullit told
Bockarie that they had been able to capture State H0use, National Stadium and Pademba
R0ad Prison, in response, Bockarie "urged" Gullit to "d0 as a military man" and provide
security for the persons released from Pademba R0ad. According to Kamara, Gullit used to
transmit messages to Bockarie concerning "whatever activities that was going 0n".7O68
Kamara monitored conversations between Bockarie and Gullit and recorded the relevant
inf0nnation in a logb00k. Further, if Gullit 0mitted any details it was Kamara's j0b to
inform Bockarie.7O69
3185. Kamara further testitied that as Bockarie told Gullit that there was no prison for
ECOMOG, any captured ECOMOG soldiers should be killed. Kamara stated that captured
fighters were executed under the c0tton tree near State H0use.7O7O
3186. Kamara testitied that while they were 0ccupying State H0use as part of the Freetown
attack, ECOMOG was b0mbarding State H0use from the air, and they would receive "448"
warnings over the radi0 from Buedu every two hours.7O7l
7065 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3257.
7066 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3257-3258 ("Alfred Brown used to come. Bockarie — s0rry,
Gibril Massaquoi himself was coming and had to send some m0re information about what had been happening
and the discussion by Gullit, that was going on through my radi0 communications set").
7067 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3228-3229.
7068 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3229.
7069 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3229-3230.
7070 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3230-3231.

---- End of Page 1095 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M Gb 18 May 2012

3187. Kamara stated that Gu11it's troops only occupied State House for about a day or two W
before they had to retreat. During this period, they would send situation reports to Bockarie
daily, "every morning, every afternoon, every evening", concerning the threat posed by
ECOMOG. Bockarie would then give the troops in Freetown instructions, such as: "Make
that area fearful. Go and destroy Kissy Terminal. [...] Go and set road blocks at this and
that place, places that are government owned".7O72 Kamara explained:
Well, what I knew if before we entered Freetown if we had a message that we should make
an area fearful it was to destroy, kill, amputate, destroy bridges, set road blocks. That was
the meaning of making an area fearful. And in that message he talked about some areas as
well and it was not just one message. 1 spoke about Kissy, Kissy Road, Kissy Terminal and
the ferry and some other important areas.7O73
3188. Kamara also testified that Bockarie gave specific instructions to attack certain areas,
such as the Kissy Terminal refinery, which was burnt.7O74 Kamara stated that these atrocities
did not stop ECOMOG from attacking. Bockarie told the troops to make the area fearful
because "the international body would intervene and maybe [...] start calling for peace
talkS»·707s
3189. Kamara stated that, confronted with ECOMOG's greater firepower, Gu11it's troops
retreated, first to Upgun turntable and then to Shell Road.7O76 Kamara testified that in
reaction to this, Bockarie sent a message that the troops should move to Waterloo and join
fighters led by Moriis Kallon, Issa Sesay, Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and RUF Rambo
in Water1oo.7O77 The group in Waterloo comprised AFRC, RUF and some STF troops.7O78
Bockarie stated that the troops at Waterloo had come as reinforcements for Gu11it's troops;
their intent was to enter Freetown.7O79 Kamara believed that if these reinforcements had met
Gullit outside Freetown before 6 January 1999, they would have entered Freetown
together.7O8O According to Kamara, in order to "c1ear the route" for the troops led by Kallon
A/fm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3231, 3236.
7072 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3231—3232.
7073 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234-3235.
7074 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3235.
7075 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3236.
1076 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3234.
7077 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234, 3237, 3245.
7078 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3245.
7079 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3236.
7080 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3237.

---- End of Page 1096 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % G), 18 May 2012

and Sesay to enter Freetown, Gullit's men had to attack K0ss0h Town with Superman's
group.7O8l However, Gullit did not send tr00ps to K0ss0h Town.7O82
3190. The tr00ps waiting at Waterl00 did attack K0ss0h Town, but were unable to capture
it. Among that group they had an AFRC "strong tighter" known as Ramb0 Red G0at. He
was able to gather a group of fifteen fighters and bypass ECOMOG to j0in Kamara's group
and the tr00ps in Freetown at Kissy R0ad. Ramb0 Red G0at informed the fighters in
Freetown that the Waterl00 group was unsuccessful in taking K0ss0h Town. 7083 The day
that this group arrived, Gullit passed an order to burn everything that the tr00ps could not
carry in preparation tbr retreat.7O84 Ramb0 Red G0at stated that he had not entered Freetown
simply to retreat and said he would stay in Freetown. Red G0at, Striker, the Red Lion
Battalion C0mmander along with other tr00ps under Gullit's command stayed in Freetown
while others, including the witness, went to Waterl00 to reorganise.7O85 There were m0re
than 4,000 rebels in Freetown at that stage, although m0st of them were unarmed, especially
those who had been released from Pademba R0ad Prison. The witness did not recall how
many men stayed in Freetown, although it was a sizeable number.7O86
3191. The decision to allow Ramb0 Red G0at, Striker and the "manp0wer" with them to
stay in Freetown was discussed between Bockarie and Gullit.7O87 Bockarie told Gullit that
he believed Gullit should leave Freetown but should "make the area fearful" until they came
back and reorganised themselves. He also instructed Gullit to bring the prominent prisoners
released from Pademba R0ad Prison to Waterl00 and dispatch them to Bockarie. Bockarie
stated "and then we will re—0rganise and regain Freetown".7088 Gullit ordered Red G0at to
make the area fearful after leaving him in charge of Freetown.7O89 The group that had
remained in Freetown did not have a radi0 but the witness heard on commercial radi0 that
ml Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234, 3237.
7082 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3237.
7083 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3237-3238.
7084 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3238.
7085 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3239.
7086 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3238-3239.
7087 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3239, 3241-3242.
7088 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241-3242.
7089 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241-3242.

---- End of Page 1097 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr-03-01-T // G1! *8 May 2012
l

"these rebels" were amputating and killing civilians, raping, and buming houses. They
eventually retreated from Freetown and joined other men in Waterloo.7O9O
3192. Kamara believed that he spent almost two weeks in Freetown before leaving for
Waterloo.709l O—F ive was among the group that retumed to Waterloo.7O92
3193. The purpose of retuming to Waterloo was to regroup and re—attack Freetown.7093
Aiier Gullit's contingent arrived at Waterloo, commanders Issa Sesay, Denis Mingo, Morris
Kallon, and RUF Rambo were also there. Kamara stated that at Waterloo "they held a
meeting and we were able to reorganise to re—attack Kossoh Town and we attacked twice but
we couldn’t make it".7O94 During their time at Waterloo, Gullit also sent the prisoners
released from Pademba Road directly to Makeni.7O95 Sam Bockarie requested that one of the
prisoners, Hilton F yle, a radio broadcaster be taken by Issa Sesay to Buedu. Aiier the
prisoners were released they were considered part of the RUF .7096
3194. Gullit's troops were at Waterloo for some time during which ECOMOG intensihed
their attack on Rambo Red Goat in Freetown, and also commenced attacking the contingents
at Waterloo.7O97 Gullit's contingent leii Waterloo and retreated to Four Mile, Six Mile, up to
Songo Junction going towards Masiaka. Aiier some days, Rambo Red Goat withdrew all his
troops from Freetown.7O98 The witness himself made his way to Masiaka, Makeni and then
later Lunsar where he established himself with Superman.7O99 Rambo Red Goat had also
retreated to join "the other men" in Waterloo. The troops at Waterloo then went to Four Mile
and Six Mile, and later came "and spread out" at Masiaka.7lOO Rather than using the main
road when they retreated from Freetown, Rambo Red Goat and his troops travelled through
the bush to Waterloo.7lOl On cross—examination, Kamara testihed that he did not believe that
the decision of the majority of the Gullit troops not to follow Bockarie's instructions for the
1°"° Perry rmm Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3242.
W Perry r7093 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3245.
7094 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3245.
7095 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3253.
7096 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3253-3254.
7097 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3245.
1098 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3245-3246.
1"°" Perry Krrrrrrrrrr, rrrrrreerrpr 6 Perrrrrrrry 2008, p. 3250.
HOO Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3250.
ml Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3250-3251.

---- End of Page 1098 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GH 18 May 2012 M
u

troops to stay in Waterloo to wait for the reinforcement was disobedience to Bockarie per se.
Gullit exercised his discretion and judgement as to whether those reinforcements were
necessary. Kamara pointed out that Gullit duly reported to Bockarie on capturing the State
Housemz Kamara disagreed with the suggestion of Defence counsel that Bockarie was
dissatisfied with the troops entering Freetown without waiting.7lO3
3195. The witness confirmed a prior statement in which he had stated that he was
monitoring the radio when Superman called Bockarie in Buedu to inform him that he was
now in Waterloo and that Bockarie should instruct Gullit to send a team from Freetown to
receive his reinforcements. In that prior statement, Kamara stated that this did not occur as
Gullit was unable to maintain sufficient command and control. Kamara explained that Gullit
was unable to assemble men to receive the reinforcements because his forces was scattered
across the city.7lO4 7
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
3196. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF commander,7lO5 testified that he knew Gullit from
the time the RUF joined the AFRC in Freetown.7l06 During the Junta period Gullit was in
charge of mining in Kono. When the troops were pulling out from Freetown, Gullit moved
from Kono to Buedu.7lO7 Although he was not in Buedum)8 while Gullit and Bockarie were
both there, he heard from Gullit that he and Bockarie had a cordial relationship. Mongor
stated that Gullit had plans to go to SAJ Musa and convince him to come to Buedu to talk as
he told Bockarie that SAJ Musa was his "own SLA brother". So Gullit came back to Koidu
where the witness was, stayed the night and then moved to Koinadugu to join SAJ Musa.7lO9
3197. Mongor also recalled that after Makeni was captured, Superman moved, attacked and
succeeded in capturing Lunsar, while SAJ Musa and Alfred Brown moved towards
Freetown and arrived in Masiaka. Brown contacted Mongor, telling him that they were in
NO2 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3384 (PS).
M3 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3385 (PS).
M4 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3388 (PS).
M5 See, for example, Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
7}% Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5816.
mw Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5817.
mg The witness said that he could not give any specific time frame for when Gullit was in Buedu before he
returned to Koidu.

---- End of Page 1099 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T ‘/ GI!) 18 May 2012

Masiaka, that their next target was Waterloo and that he would contact Mongor again when
they arrived there. Mongor understood that they had captured Masiaka and were resting
before moving to the next target.7110 SAI Musa's forces moved towards Waterloo but the
witness heard that they did not reach Waterloo and that Musa had died in Benguema. The
witness also heard that it was Gullit who took over the command.7111
3198. Mongor heard that SAJ Musa died in an attack on the barracks at Benguema.
Mongor stated that he "felt relieved" and "happy" when he heard that SAJ Musa had been
killed because there was a power struggle between SAI Musa and Bockarie and Mongor
himself did not have a good relationship with SAJ Musa. He was also happy because Gullit
did have a very good relationship with Bockarie and "they were doing things together".7112
3199. Mongor testified that before Gullit and his men moved to Freetown, Bockarie sent a
message to Gullit to wait for reinforcements. Mongor stated that Gullit and his fighters were
in Waterloo when this message was received. Mongor stated that after SAI Musa's death,7113
he had himself been instructed by Bockarie to move to Kailahun and then to Kono to collect
more fighters to reinforce the troops going to Freetown.7114 Mongor stated that Bockarie
wanted Gullit to wait for these reinforcements to arrive so that they could enter Freetown
together but, having realised that there would be a delay in these reinforcements arriving,
Gullit advanced and entered Freetown without waiting.7115 Mongor testified that, however,
Rambo and other fighters in Makeni advanced with Superman to Waterloo, fighting
ECOMOG on the way. They then advanced towards Jui, in the Hastings area.7116 Gullit's
troops used the hillside bypass to enter Freetown.7117 The witness himself began moving
towards Kailahun but stopped at Jojoima because he heard that Gullit's troops had entered
1109 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5817-5818.
11 11) Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5805, 5815-5816.
1111 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5816.
11 12 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5818.
11 13 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, p. 6752.
111`1 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5819. Note that although the transcript records Mongor as
stating that SA] Musa gave him this instruction, when asked to confirm that this was so, Mongor states that he
never referred to SAI Musa, and notes that it was Bockarie that gave him this instruction (Transcript 1 1 March
2008, pp. 5821-5822). He confirmed in cross-examination that SA] Musa was already dead by this point and that
he used the wrong name initially (Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6752-6753).
11 15 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5819-5822.
11111 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5819-5820.
11 11 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5820.

---- End of Page 1100 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % G1 18 May 2012 %
~ .. i

3 ¤, I ‘i 3
Freetown. When Superman and others got to Waterloo, they fought with ECOMOG.7H8
1 Mongor testified that when he and his troops heard on the BBC on 6 January 1999 that
Gullit's troops had entered Freetown, "we were happy and we were jubilating in all the
areas".7ll9 After this, Mongor did not continue towards Freetown but remained on the
defensive.7l2O
3200. When asked whether he was able to accomplish his assignment, to attack Joru and
Zimmi, as determined in the meeting in November 1998 in Buedu before the offensive,
Mongor stated that he was able to occupy Joru for three days before his group was pushed
out. He was not able to advance to the next target, Zimmiml
3201. Mongor further testified that when he was monitoring the radio while the troops were
in Freetown, he heard a number of exchanges between Gullit and Bockarie. He heard Gullit
tell Bockarie that his group had released various members of the RUF incarcerated at
Pademba Road Prison, including Gibril Massaquoi, and that "they all joined hands together
in the fighting".7I22 Mongor testified that he heard Gibril Massaquoi telling Superman and
Bockarie over the radio when he was released from prison that he was fighting alongside
Gullit's troops in Freetown.7l23
3202. Mongor also heard over the radio Gullit telling Bockarie that there was much
resistance from ECOMOG troops, and asked for reinforcements. However, because Rambo
and his group on the Hastings side of Freetown were unable to get into Freetown, Gullit's
forces decided to retreat. Bockarie instructed Gullit that if they were unable to hold their
ground in Freetown they should start a campaign of destruction.m4 Specifically, Mongor
stated that he heard Bockaiie on the radio ordering the Nigerian Embassy to be burnt.m5
Mongor personally heard these radio conversations, which were not encoded. Gullit called
Bockarie "Sir" when they communicated over the radio during the attack because Gullit
ll Ig Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5822.
7I IQ Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5822-5823.
lm Isaac Mcngcr, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5823.
ml Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5824.
7122 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5824.
lm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5827.
lm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5825.
ms Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5825-5826, 6161.

---- End of Page 1101 ---------------------------


Case No.; SC 1.- -01-T 18 May 2012
/ ‘"‘

3a 1 aq
knew Bockarie's position as "Chief of Defence". Gullit communicated with Bockarie
frequently, at half-hourly intervals.712°
3203. Additionally, when the fighters entered Freetown, Mongor heard the radio base in
Buedu as well as the monitoring team in Liberia sent out 448 jet warnings over the radio to
alert those in Freetown.7127
3204. Once ECOMOG concentrated its forces on defending the city, Gullit's men could not
withstand the pressure rrpm ECOMOG and prepared for retreat. They received instruction
rrpm Sam Bockarie that they should set buildings on fire, including the Nigerian
Embassy.7128 Gullit's men withdrew from Freetown to the Waterloo area.7129
3205. While Gullit's forces were fighting in Freetown, fighting was also taking place in the
Hastings area between Rambo's group against ECOMOG and the Kamajors.71311 Mongor
testified that this was of strategic importance to Gullit's forces in Freetown because it was a
forested and hilly area. When Rambo engaged the ECOMOG forces in the area, the men
who retreated rrpm Freetown were able to use the forest to come towards the Waterloo
area.7131
3206. Finally, Mongor testified that relations between the AF RC and the RUF were cordial
and that they had an understanding at that time that they were together as one.7132
3207. On cross—examination, Mongor denied that the invasion of Freetown was exclusively
the initiative of the AF RC, affirming his evidence in examination—in-chief that the invasion
of Freetown was a plan brought by Bockarie rrpm Charles Taylor and that plan did not
envisage a specific group going to Freetown.7133 Mongor conceded that throughout the
relationship between the RUF and AFRC there were problems but he believed that these
problems were manageable.7134
7126 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5825-5826.
7127 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5826-5827.
7128 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6161.
lm map Mppgpr, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 6162.
71311 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5831-5832.
I"' rpm Mppgpr, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6162.
lm rpm Mppgpr, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 6162-6163.
7133 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6720-6721.
7134 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6721-5722.

---- End of Page 1102 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCsL-03-0i-T %/ Ob) 18 May 2012

‘$.·=r t <*iS"
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
3208. Witness TF 1-371, an RUF member,m5 testified that when ECOMOG attacked
Freetown in mid-February 1998, Gullit was in Kono,m6 and subsequently travelled from
Kono to Kailahun.7m According to TF 1-371, when Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in Buedu
after the Intervention, he advised Bockarie to take the diamonds that were in Gullit's
possession to pay for rice for the army and RUF combatantsmg Bockarie then mandated
Issa Sesay to proceed to Kailahun, meet with Gullit and take diamonds from him.m9 When
Sesay returned to Buedu, he turned over the diamonds to Bockarie. Bockarie tried to
interrogate Gullit but they were "very good fiiends", so Bockarie did not implement the
instmctions from Johnny Paul Koroma to sanction Gullit and instead told Gullit not to leave
Buedu. Gullit stayed at the house of one of the other AFRC Honourables who was in
Buedu.7MO While Johnny Paul Koroma was still staying at Bockarie's house in Buedu, Gullit
asked Bockarie for leave to go back to Kailahun Town, which he did.7m
3209. TF 1-371 testified that AF RC fighters, led by Gullit and F ive-F ive, attacked the State
House in Freetown on 6 January 1999. According to TF 1-371, Gullit contacted Bockarie,
informing Bockarie that he was already at the State House, and they had a discussion over
the VHF radio. After an intense counter-attack, Bockarie told Gullit that he should not be
concerned and that "the RUF is already on the way to give them support".m2
A 3210. TF 1-371 stated that ECOMOG repelled the AFRC as far as Kissy, and that the
AFRC troops were trapped. TF 1-371 testified that Bockarie ordered Boston Flomo (a.k.a.
Rambo), who was in Waterloo, to link up with the AFRC troops, in the eastern part of
Freetown. TF 1-371 stated that they were successful in doing so. While the AFRC troops
were able to resist ECOMOG for some time, they eventually retreated to Waterloo along
with some of the prisoners freed from Pademba Road Prison, including Joseph Momoh.7l43
TF 1-371 testified that there was a misunderstanding between the AFRC and the RUF that
7135 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
7136 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2312, 2335, 2349 (CS).
7m TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2365 (CS). .
mg TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2364 (CS).
mg TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2364-2365 (CS).
7140 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2365-2366 (CS).
ml TP1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2366 (CS).
M2 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2426 (CS).

---- End of Page 1103 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dh 18 May 2012

Ea 1 qc
resulted in Gullit, Bazzy Kamara and other AFRC fighters going to Okra Hill instead of
joining RUF fighters in Masiaka "so there was a split at that point in time". Rambo's troops
retreated from Waterloo to Lunsar, where Denis Mingo was stationed.m4 The part of` the
AFRC that was led by Gullit and Bazzy fell out with the RUF at Waterloo and their
relationship was not mended throughout 1999.7l45
3211. There were media reports on the BBC and the VOA at this time concerning the
situation in Freetown as the RUF and AFRC were retreating. They reported on carnage in
the city, the burning of houses and the killing and amputating of civilians. This was
consistent with Sam Bockarie's description of "Operation No Living Thing". Bockarie was
interviewed by the BBC via satellite phone, during which he mentioned operations "No
Living Thing", "Spare No Soul" and "No Bush Shake". Operation "No Bush Shake"
referred to Bockarie's policy of zero tolerance of resistance.7l46
3212. On cross-examination, TF 1-371 testified that while he considered that the decision of
the AFRC to enter Freetownin January 1999 without waiting for the RUF to be hasty, he
did not consider the division to be serious.7l47 Generally, TF 1-371 testified that it was not
difficult for Bockarie to control commanders on the ground, but he did concede that there
were isolated instances when Bockarie could not control Superman, Gullit and Bazzy.7l48
3213. TF 1-371 stated on cross—examination that while the attack on Freetown was planned
by Sankoh and the RUF, the initiative in carrying out the invasion was taken by the AFRC
troops led by, among others, Gullit and SAJ Musa. The witness agreed with Defence
counsel's proposition that the RUF "effectively tagged on on the tail end".7l49 TF 1-371
further confirmed that during the Freetown invasion on 6 January 1999, Bockarie was in
Buedu, Issa Sesay was in Makeni and none of the senior leaders of the RUF, including
Morris Kallon and Superman, went to Freetown and the 1999 Freetown invasion was an
SLA-led initiative.7l5O
W13 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008. pp. 2426-2427 (CS). Y
7144 TF1-371. Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2427-2428 (CS).
M45 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2613-2616 (CS).
H46 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2428-2429 (CS).
7147 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2613 (CS).
mg TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008. pp. 2616-2618 (CS).
mr TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2643-2644 (CS).
mo TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2812-2813 (CS).

---- End of Page 1104 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gb 18 May 2012

3 Cr lf! Jr
3214. While he recalled hearing a message from a radio operator that SAJ Musa had died
on his way to Freetown, TF1-371 stated that he was not with SAJ Musa's group and did not
know much about their movements in December 1998 and January 1999 as they made their
way to Freetown.7l5l TF1-371 stated that the direct contact between Gullit and Bockarie of
which he was aware took place when Gullit was already in the State House.7l52
3215. However, TF1-371 disagreed with the proposition that the Freetown attack was
planned by a renegade group that only contacted the RUF once they ran into problems. TF1-
371 conceded that the AFRC "went to Freetown on their own" but stated that the RUF
already had "their own in-house planning" from the time they heard about the treason trial,
but that they did not have the arms and ammunition necessary to conduct such an operation.
The witness explained that:
I mean while those guys were having their separate operation, Sam Bockarie actually had
his operation to go to Freetown after he came, I mean, from that trip.
In fact he came out with the two axis, two approach to attack Freetown. [...] Those guys"
operations were separate. I mean they may have their own agenda, but the RUF at that
particular point in time had this plan and that was why Sam Bockarie went for those
materia1s.7`53
3216. During cross-examination, TF1-371 also confirmed the statement in Exhibit D-009
which stated that during the Freetown operation, as Gullit's troops were cut off from the
rear, Bockarie coordinated the positions of the fighters over the radio. Bockarie ordered
them to combine their forces and to join RUF troops at Benguema and Waterloo.7l54 TF1-
371 also affirmed, after being shown the statement in Exhibit D-009 concerning Gibril
Massaquoi's refusal to comply with Bockarie's instruction to go to Buedu after his release
from Pademba Road Prison, that there were tensions between Bockarie and fighters such as
Gibril Massaquoi. However, TF1-371 indicated that the description of events in Exhibit D-
009 is exaggerated, and that merely because there was a "misunderstanding" between these
personalities did not mean that the RUF was not a cohesive group.7l55
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -375
"5‘ TF1-371, Transcript so January 2008, p. 2647 (cs).
7*52 TF1-371, Transcript so January 2008, p. 2648 (cs).
fm TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2648-2649 (CS).
M4 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2866-2877 (CS).
M55 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2868-2881 (CS).

---- End of Page 1105 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / QH) 18 May 2012

3.¢11<1%
3217. Witness TF1-375, an RUF fighter,1166 testified that after the Red Lion Battalion
found and joined Gullit, Alfred Brown, Gullit's radio operator called SAJ Musa and
Superman in Koinadugu telling them that they had met up successfully. Brown said
"Oh, we have received our brothers here. Our brothers have reached us here and we are
happy to receive them". So they called Superman and Superman also called Bockarie's
radio station in Kailahun that, "The men who had been sent to go and look for Gullit have
arrived safely and that I have just received communication from CO A1fred", and CO
Alfred was the communications man for the RUF at that time. So, when they got there they
called - CO Alfred called. Everybody was happy.7151
3218. The witness explained that CO Alfred was a former NPFL fighter who later came to
the RUF. He was not an SLA.1156
3219. TF1-375 testified that the RUF attacked Makeni in December 1998. He was there but
he did not take part in a physical battle. The commanders of the forces attacking Makeni
were from the group of Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman).1159 Superman's group and Issa
Sesay's group joined forces to attack the Makeni Teko barracks. Makeni was defended by
Ni erian ECOMOG. It took three days for the fi tin to finish.1166 The witness was aware
8 8
of what was occurring in the fighting on the radio, because it was directly reported to Issa
Sesay.1161
3220. The witness and an advance team led by Komba Gbundema left Superman in Makeni
and went to Lunsar.1162 TF1-375 testified that the group advanced to Lunsar within about
five days.1163 He testified that the day after arriving at Lunsar, Superman joined them and
informed the troops that "the people in front of us have encountered problem". The troops at
Lunsar understood that SAI Musa had been killed at the Benguema barracks and that "we
should try and get to them".1164 TF1-375 stated that while some of the SLAs were saddened
by the news, some of the RUF, including Superman and Komba Gbundema, were happy
because they felt SAJ Musa was ambitious for power.1166 TF1-375 learrred that Ibrahim
7*56 TF1-575, rrarrrcrrpr 23 Jrrrre 2008,p. 12485.
7*57 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12574-12575.
7*55 TF1-575, Transcript 24 Jrrrre 2008,p. 12575.
7*5° TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12594-12595.
1166 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12597-12599
1161 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12595-12597.
1162 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12593-12595.
7*°5 r1¤1-575, rrarrsrrrrpr 24 Jrrrre 2008, p. 12600.
1164 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12592-12593.
7*55 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12593.

---- End of Page 1106 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T `/ jp 18 May 2012

Bawi
Kamara (a.k.a. Bazzy) took over leadership rrpm SAJ Musa. Gullit was there with them at
the time. Gullit had a good relationship with Superman at this time, and began
communicating after the death of SAJ Musa. Once Superman joined Gbundema at Lunsar,
the troops attacked Gberi J unction.7l66
3221. When TF 1-375 went to Lunsar, the troops previously commanded by SAJ Musa
were in Waterloo. TF 1-375 heard that these forces attacked Masiaka, and from there
Waterloo, and then Benguema Barracks.7l67 When the witness had reached Masiaka, and
Superman was at Gberi Junction, Superman informed them that Bazzy's forces had attacked
Hastings and were ready to enter Freetown. Superman came to the front line and led the
forces to Waterloo. Superman said that they should try to open the road to Freetown, to join
their "friends and brothers" in the city.7l68 The witness also heard from one of 1ssa Sesay's
bodyguards, who joined the operation in Waterloo and from Rambo and others that the
forces formerly led by SAJ Musa had continued to Kossoh Town, Calaba Town and were
headed for the State House.7l69 They invaded 6 January 1999.7170
3222. The witness heard from Superman and others that the forces entered Freetown. VVhen
they passed Waterloo, the witness stopped in Yams Farm, where he could view the capital
city, and saw that there were houses burning and fighting in Freetown.7m They also heard
over the BBC Bockaxie making a threatening remark regarding Freetown. The witness was
not always present in the radio room when Superman and Sam Bockarie communicated;
however, Superman said that Sam Bockarie will always be on the BBC and that the witness
should listen.7m The commanders of the forces that entered Freetown were Gullit and
Bazzy. TF 1-375 testified that Bazzy was senior to Gullit.7m
3223. At Waterloo, Superman, 1ssa Sesay, Komba Gbundema and other senior officers
decided that RUF Rambo should take a group to attack Hastings and get across the bridge to
7166 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12593—12594.
1*61 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12603-12604.
1*61 TF1-875, Transcript 24 Jrma 2008, pp. 12604-12605.
1'°" TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jrrrra 2008, pp. 12605—12606.
7170 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12617.
1*1* TF1-875, Transcript 24 Jrrrra 2008, pp. 12606-12607.
1*11 TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jaap 2008, p. 12607.
1*1* TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jrrrra 2008, p. 12607.

---- End of Page 1107 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / ddr 18 May 2012 MH

3q 2¤¤
go to Freetown to join their "brothers".7]74 Issa Sesay appointed an AF RC commander
known as Rambo Red Goat to lead the group that went to Freetown because, as Sesay stated,
Rambo Red Goat was once an SLA soldier and "knew his brothers in the city well".7]75 The
group led by Rambo Red Goat numbered roughly 60 to 65 and comprised some RUF men,
some SLA and some STF. The RUF were armed by Issa Sesay and Superman, the STF were
armed by General Bropleh and the SLA were armed by Brigadier Mani and Colonel T.7]76
3224. TF 1-375 also testified that while Rambo Red Goat was initially on SAJ Musa's side
in Musa's dispute with Superman in late 1998, when SAJ Musa left Koinadugu, Red Goat
"surrendered to" Superman, and was received well.7]77
3225. TF 1-375 testified that he was in Jui, a stronghold for ECOMOG, when Red Goat was
dispatched to Freetown. The forces could not cross the bridge connecting Jui and Freetown,
which was well defended by ECOMOG.7]78 Rambo Red Goat's group instead entered
p Freetown by way of an old road at the back of Jui that led to Kossoh Town. After Red
Goat's group set off, the witness's contingent went back to Yams Farm and stayed there for
a week before retreating.7]79 The witness leamed later, when Red Goat's group called, that
the troops in Freetown had taken over the State House and Pademba Road Prison and freed
the RUF and AF RC members imprisoned there, including Gibril Massaquoi. The witness
was monitoring this ca1l directly. Alfred Brown was the radio man in Freetown, although
Gullit was always in the radio room calling Superman or Bockarie directly.7]80 At the same
time, the witness also heard Bockarie speaking over the BBC that "any contingent that
attacked his forces in Freetown he will command his forces to bum all the embassies
down".7]8]
3226. These forces stayed in Freetown for two weeks. When they retreated, they started to
bum down houses and abducted a large number of girls. Bockarie called Superman and
informed Superman that he had received a ca11 from Gullit who said that his forces were
7m TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12608.
7m TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12609.
7% TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12610.
YW TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12581. g
7m TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12609-12610.
mg TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12610-12611.
mo TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12612.
ml TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12612

---- End of Page 1108 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / qu 18 May 2012

3°`12.<;>l
running out of ammunition and that Gullit's forces would need protection while they were
retreating from ECOMOG."82 Bockarie "instructed Superman and [...] Issa Sesay to
defend Gberi Junction, Benguema barracks and Waterloo so as to give free passage to the
forces that were in Freetown, that is Gullit and others, whilst they were retreating".7l83
3227. The forces in Freetown called for the TF 1-375's group to join them, but they were
unable to find a passage into Freetown and told the troops in Freetown to retreat.7l84 The
retreating forces went from Grafron, to the Peninsula, through the mountains and then to
Waterloo. Steve Bio died on the Peninsula route. During the retreat, the witness’ group
defended Waterloo, Klay, Benguema Barracks, and Gberi Junction, preventing the Guinean
contingent at Porto Loko from taking Gberi Junction. The Nigerian contingent from Jui was
attacking Klay, which was being defended by Superman and Rambo. Komba Gbundema
went and repelled the attack on Gberi Junction.7l85
Prosecution Witness Komba Sumana
3228. Komba Sumana testified that in 1998, afrer a conflict between SAJ Musa and
Superman, SAJ Musa lefr Koinadugu. Superman remained the commander and General
Bropleh the deputy. Later, SAJ Musa communicated to them that he was to move with Five-
Five to Freetown and requested Superman's group to move to Makeni.7l86 The witness and
others successfully attacked and captured Makeni, driving out ECOMOG and capturing
"everything" from them."87
3229. Describing any news about SAJ Musa's group he heard while in Makeni, the witness
stated:
Well, at the time that we were there we heard communication at the time that we went to
Brigadier Mani. I and Wallace went there and we were there when a call was made that
they wanted reinforcement. They were there together with Superman. They said they
wanted reinforcements and that SAJ Musa had been shot in Freetownmg
mz TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12613-12614.
7*88 rrr-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12614.
7*88 TF1-375, rrarrsprrpr 24 rurrp 2008,p. 12614.
ms TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12614-12617.
H86 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17966-17969.
7*87 Kprrrba srrrrrarra, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17973-17974.
mg Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17976.

---- End of Page 1109 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 7% Gu 18 May 2012

Zizpl.
3230. Sumana clarified that it was Five-F ive who made this call to Superman.7189 After this
call, and the news of Musa's death "spread everywhere", the witness and other fighters
assembled at Issa's house. Issa told the fighters that they "should take reinforcements to
Freetown".7190
3231. The witness travelled on a truck with other fighters, commanded by Superman, to
Lunsar, where they remained for a month. From Lunsar, the witness's group attacked Gberi
Junction and dislodged ECOMOG. Two other trucks went on towards Freetown.7191 The
witness's friend, "Rubber-Rubber" was on one of those trucks going on to Freetown.7192
VVhen both had returned to Makeni, Rubber-Rubber told Sumana that:
[T]hey went but they stopped at Waterloo. He said not all of them were able to go to
Freetown. He said they took the - they used a bypass and went to Freetown. He said when
they went they met Five-F ive and others. At the time that they went SAI Musa had already
drad."°’
3232. During the time Superman's group remained at Lunsar, they moved and attacked
Gberi Junction and dislodged ECOMOG fiom there.7194
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
3233. Witness Foday Lansana, (a.k.a. Co Nya), an RUF radio operator7195 who worked for
Superman in the North in mid- to late-1998,71% testified that between 1996 and 2000, he
used to be able to monitor the communications networks although he did not speak on the
net, oversee or control any communications.7197
3234. Lansana testified that from his position at the signal unit in Koinadugu, he knew of
three main sources of communication in Koinadugu: Superman and Bockarie used to
communicate with each other; both Bockarie and Superman would also communicate with
Gullit at Rosos, and Brigadier Mani, who was one of the expert military officers, the most
senior SLA in Kurubonla, and overall planning officer for operations, also used to
7189 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17976-17977.
7190 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17977-17978.
7191 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17977-17978.
7192 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17979-17980.
"°" Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 oarabar 2008, p. 17979.
7194 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17978-17980.
7195 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
71% Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4523.

---- End of Page 1110 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T du 18 May 2012

aa?-¤3
communicate with Bockarie, Superman and Tamba Brima f(a.k.a. Gullit).7I98 Lansana
explained that Brigadier Mani was the co-ordinator who used to settle disputes between the
senior military officers. He was the one who was able to convince Superman, Tamba Yamba
and Bockarie to send reinforcements to Gullit in Rosos when he requested them. Lansana
said he knew the reinforcements, manpower and ammunition, had been sent because they
were organised in his presence.7l99
3235. Lansana testified that after the infighting between Superman and SAJ Musa, they
retreated to a ground called Pumpkin Ground. While they were there, they received
information from the BBC that Foday Sankoh had been condemned in Freetown. Based on
that information, Bockarie called Superman over the radio and instructed him to get
instructed him not to waste time but to march to Freetown. He told Superman that he was
also in communication with Gullit. He instructed the Rosos troops to move on Lunsar and
advance on to Freetown, and instructed Superman's troops to attack Makeni and join the
troops from Rosos. Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon were instructed to move on Koidu Town
and then Makeni. Based on these instructions, Superman organised the troops under his
command, then moved from Pumpkin Ground to Alkalia and on to Makeni.72OO Lansana
stated that they successfully captured Makeni before 25 December l998 and the group from
Kono, headed by Boston Flomo (a.k.a. Rambo), Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon joined them
in Makeni.72Ol Lansana then testified that on 6 January l999, he was in Lunsar because their
attack had stopped there and they were waiting for the troops coming from Kono in order for
them to move as reinforcement for Freetown.72O2
3236. The witness explained that he knew where the other troops were moving because the
groups all informed each other of their positions and progress over the HF radio. At that
point, the group that was in Kono was in communication with Superman and, at the same
time, the group that was in Rosos was also in communication with Superman. The
communication used to flow from one point to the other based on the advancement of that
particular group. He described the information delivered by these communications as daily
W7 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4523.
7]% Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4525-4527.
me Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4526-4528.
7200 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4549, 4551.
ml Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4550.
7202 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4553.

---- End of Page 1111 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T % W l8 May 2012

gg iroky
"situation reports" made through the operators who were in charge of communications from
one commander to another.7203
3237. Lansana testified that he was in Lunsar with Superman waiting for reinforcements
from Kono when RUF and AFRC forces attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999.7204 He
remained in Lunsar throughout the attack.72O5
3238. Lansana stated that on 6 January 1999, he recalled hearing Sam Bockarie on BBC
radio being interviewed by Robin White. ln this interview, Bockarie said that he had
received a radio communication from his commander, Brigadier Gullit, in Freetown.
Bockarie also said in the interview that he had received information that Tongo had fallen to
the RUF and Junta.720° Lansana's recollection was that it was made clear on the news that
Brigadier Gullit was the Task Force Commander in Freetown.7207 After Exhibit P—085A was
played to the Trial Chamber, Lansana recognised it as the recording of this interview and the
voice of Sam Bockarie in the recording. Lansana testified that Bockarie was his commander
and he was familiar with his voice. Lansana then stated that Gullit was a former SLA and the
overall commander for the troops at Rosos that entered Freetown.7208 t
3239. Lansana testified that during the 6 January invasion, Sam Bockarie was in contact
with Gullit, Superman, Issa Sesay, and Boston F lomo. Lansana monitored the
communications from Lunsar.72O9 Gullit would communicate with Sam Bockarie on a daily
basis, and these communications were "uncountable".72l0 On the content of these
communications, Lansana recalled that before Gullit entered Freetown, Gullit informed Sam
Bockarie of the death of SAJ Musa. When Gullit captured the State House in Freetown and
advanced on Pademba Road Prison he also reported this to Sam Bockarieml
3240. Lansana recalled that he monitored one communication in which Bockarie gave an
order conceming the execution of Martin Moinina, who had been a witness against Foday
7203 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4551-4552.
7204 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4553.
7205 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4569-4970.
7206 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4554-4555.
7207 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4554-4555.
7208 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4555-4559, 4583.
7209 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4559-4560.
mo Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4560.
ml Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4560.

---- End of Page 1112 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-0l-T .- 18 May 2012 J

39 '2,¤S`
Sankoh during his trial in 1989 in Freetown.m2 Moinina was captured during the invasion
by Gullit's troops on 6 January 1999. When Gullit reported his capture to Bockarie,
Bockarie ordered that Moinina be executed as a traitor. Gullit "did as he was instructed".
Lansana learnt of the execution from Gibril Massaquoi when Massaquoi arrived in Lunsar
along with other combatants after the retreat from Freetown.7213
3241. Lansana also recalled that when Gullit reported to Bockarie that the troops in
Freetown were under serious threat from ECOMOG, Bockarie instructed Gullit and all the
other commanders in various positions in Freetown to make sure that they made themselves
"fearful" so that ECOMOG would not overrun their positions. Bockarie told Gullit that ‘"if it
causes you to kill all the civilians, burn all the houses where you are, just so that you will not
leave Freetown you should go ahead and make sure that you maintain where you were".72 14
Gullit's response to this instruction was "yes sir".72l5
3242. Lansana confirmed that Alfred Brown and Perry Kamara (a.k.a. King Perry) were
RUF radio operators present in Freetown during the January 1999 attack.72 16
3243. Superman also had two bodyguards named CY and Jumbo Blah who left Koinadugu
to join the Rosos group under the command of Gullit. Major CY informed Superman that
SAJ Musa had banned them from communicating with Superman during the time they were
in Rosos and up to Benguema and Waterloo because of the misunderstandings that occurred
between Superman and SAJ Musa in Koinadugu. After the death of SAJ Musa, however,
Major CY and Jumbo Blah used to communicate on a daily basis with Superman.m7
3244. Lansana explained that while O—Five, Jumbo Blah and Major CY were on the
operation in Freetown, they would constantly send reports on their defensive positions and
the areas captured by the troops. Gullit and other commanders sent reports of the positions
occupied by the Junta or the RUF troops. Superman would communicate with Major CY to
confirm that the information from Gullit was correctmg
mz Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4562-4563.
fm Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4562-4563.
UM Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4561-4562.
mj Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4563-4564.
M6 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4564.
1 M7 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4565.
mg Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4566-4567.

---- End of Page 1113 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012
\

3 <=; 2.0 lc
3245. Lansana testified that one of the first communications between Jumbo Blah and
Superman occurred after the capture of Benguema, when Major CY informed Superman that
they were clearing that area and they were not sparing any civilians from Benguema to
Freetownmg Major CY was part of the group that was stationed at the State House in
Freetown. Major CY confirmed that the order by Sam Bockarie to make themselves fearful
was passed by the top commanders down to the "least person".722O
3246. Lansana knew about the communications between Major CY and Superman because
he used to sit by the radio while Superman was communicating with Major CY and Jumbo
Blah. At this time, Alice Pyne was also present in Lunsar. She was the operator for
Superman. 722l
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna F ornie
3247. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie ("DAF"), an RUF radio operator,7222 testified that he
travelled to Kailahun after the ECOMOG intervention and believed relations between Gullit
and Bockarie were ‘cordial’.7223 Fornie acknowledged that once Gullit left Kailahun for
Kurubonla in 1998, communications between the two men were unpleasant; Gullit
"attacked" Bockarie verbally and accused Bockarie of having disgraced Johnny Paul
Koroma.7224
3248. Fornie testified that on 6 January 1999, he was in Buedu monitoring the radio
constantly. Any time that the RUF received a message, he would bring the messages from
the monitoring station to Bockarie's transmitting station to send to the front line
commanders.7225 At the monitoring station, he saw a message in the message logbook from
Gullit, who had the radio code name "Black J ar",m6 which said that "our men", the
mg Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4565-4567.
mo Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4567-4568.
ml Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4568-4569,
mg Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
7223 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21683.
7224 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21684-21685, 2171 1 (""When he went [to Kurubonla]
there was communication flowing and that was not a good one between the two men; that is Gullit and
Mosquito. Gullit attacked Mosquito verbally that Mosquito had disgraced Johnny Paul and those were the things
that he, Gullit, left the Buedu area, or the Kailahun area").
7225 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21562-21563.
m° The Trial Chamber notes that the transcript at p.21564 refers to `"Black J ar" and that he also spelled ‘"Jar" but
is satisfied that these are misspellings as the witness states that Gullit's call sign was ""Black Jah". Dauda Aruna
Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp.2 1568; 21619.

---- End of Page 1114 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T in 18 May 2012
/ it

3<>`Q.oQ~
"AFRC/RUF combatants who entered Freetown", had captured the State House in
Freetown.7227 On that day, the transmitting station in Buedu was in contact with the various
call signs within the RUF liberated zones, including "Superman, Gullit, Issa, Rambo, Akim
and others, Base 1 and so on".7228
3249. One of Fomie's responsibilities on 6 January 1999 was to monitor ECOMOG
communications, decode them, and then take them to Bockarie's transmitting station.7229 in
particular ECOMOG air mission requests for Alpha Jets to bomb RUF zones. He would
report such requests to the transmitting station, where they were sent to the particular target
station.mO Each target station had a bell, and any time a station heard a "448", that is, an
alert that an enemy aircraft was coming, the operator in that station would ring the bell in
order to alert everyoneml One speciHc example of this occurred when Fomie took an
intercepted message to "Bravo Zulu 4", and the operator on duty transmitted the message to
Freetown. Two RUF stations in Freetown to be attacked - in Tower Hill and Upgun —
received the message and by the time the jets arrived the Hghters had changed their
location.7232
3250. During the invasion of Freetown, Gullit sent information directly to Bockarie and
sought more materiel and reinforcements from Bockarie for further advances while Bockarie
requested updates from Gullit about progress in Freetown.7233 Gullit's main radio operator
was as SLA named Elongima,7234 but other radio operators with Gullit in Freetown included
Alfred Brown and King Perry.7235 While Bockarie seldom spoke directly with Gullit on the
air, the witness did monitor one direct conversation on 6 January 1999 between Gullit and
Bockarie in which Bockarie told Gullit to try to coordinate reinforcements with Rambo and
General Issa so that Rambo would move faster and meet Gullit in Freetown.7236
7227 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21564.
mg Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21564—21565.
7229 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21562—21563.
7230 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21566—21567.
ml Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21567—21568.
mz Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21596—21597.
7233 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21565—21566.
7234 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21565, 21568.
7235 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21565—21566.
7236 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21569.

---- End of Page 1115 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / OL 18 May 2012 %

3Ct 2.¤ E
3251. The witness recalled that when one of the SLAs entered the State House, one SLA
called the BBC and said that "we have entered Freetown", referring to both RUF and AFRC
forces. 7237 When this was broadcast on the BBC, Bockarie was in Buedu and heard the
broadcast. The witness did not see him in a bad mood, but heard him "grumbling" that
"maybe Gullit and others would want to turn themselves into presidents in Freetown".
Before the BBC broadcast, Gullit had already notified Bockarie that they had captured
Freetown. This was the same conversation in which Gullit requested reinforcements. The
BBC broadcast occurred two hours after the conversation between Bockarie and Gullit.7238
There had been some minor problems between Bockarie and Gullit, and Bockarie was
concerned that Gullit would take power in Freetown on his own. Bockarie assured Gullit
that Rambo was on his way to join him in the city, at which time Rambo and his contingent
was around the Masiaka area, on their way to Freetown.7239
3252. On the morning of 7 January 1999,7240 Gullit transmitted a radio message to
Bockarie via Kin Perr that the troo s in Freetown had released the olitical detainees iiom
S Y P P
Pademba Road Prison. Among those who were released included the late ex—President
Momoh, Steve Bio, Victor Foh, Osho—Williams, and other prominent Sierra Leoneans .724l
Bockarie instructed Mohamed Kabbah, a radio operator, to send a radio message to Gullit to
send the released prisoners to the rear for their safety.7242 The witness knew that the message
was received by Gullit because Gullit acted on Bockarie's instructions and sent the prisoners
to Makeni. When these freed prisoners were transported to Makeni, Steve Bio was killed by
an enemy bomb fragment.7243
3253. F omie described the communication between Bockarie and Gullit during the course
of the Freetown operation as "frequent" and "constant", with communications occurring at
least hourly.7244 The communication concerned requests from Gullit to Bockarie for
ammunition. As a result, Bockarie contacted Yeaten in tum to ask for ammunition.7245
7247 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21569~21570.
mg Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21578~21579.
7244 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21580~2158 1.
7240 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21589.
7244 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581, 21588.
7242 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21586-21588.
7243 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21589~21590.
7244 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21589 ("it did not take up to an hour when one of the
stations in Freetown did not call to Buedu directly, or Mosquito's station in Buedu did not call one of the stations

---- End of Page 1116 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T Z dm 18 May 2012
x

31 z=>°t
3254. Fornie recalled that, after ECOMOG had forced Gullit's troops to commence their
. retreat from Freetown, and after Fornie had returned from his trip to Monrovia,7246 he
monitored a live conversation in which Bockarie gave Gullit instructions to pass onto the
AF RC/RUF troops in Freetown to "cause a lot of mayhem in the city", including destroying
government facilities like the oil refinery and amputating civilians, in order to draw attention
and force the international community to intervene and the RUF would be able to negotiate
the release of Foday Sankoh. The witness was in the radio room when he heard this
communication but does not recall the date on which it occurred.7247 After this
communication, Fornie heard on the BBC that on their retreat from Freetown, the RUF left
behind amputees, corpses and had burnt many houses. The retreat occurred during January
1999 but F ornie could not recall the specific date.7248
3255. F ornie recalled hearing a BBC broadcast, Exhibit P—263, of a journalist reporting on
the burning of houses, amputations of civilians, killings by RUF and AFRC forces in the
Kissy District of eastern Freetown. Fornie testified that when Bockarie heard this broadcast,
he was "well p1eased", and that Bockarie then said ‘"well, they have not seen anything yet"
and would continue to engage in such atrocities until Sankoh was released.7244
3256. During the retreat, F ornie recalled hearing a communication from Bockarie to Gullit
in which the former instructed the latter to assemble around the peninsula and wait for
Rambo and others to join them in order to re—attack Freetown. The AF RC/RUF were
unsuccessful in their attempt to re—attack Freetown. Gullit called Bockarie "sir" or "master"
in these communications while Bockarie called Gullit "Black J ar" or "Gullit".725O A further
communication occurred at the end of February, when Gullit had almost retreated entirely
from Freetown. Gullit contacted Bockarie to say that he had established contact with
ECOMOG through a handset which he had captured in Freetown and that through this
in Freetown directly to get an update from there. It was constant communication that existed").
1245 Dauda Anma Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21593—21594.
7246 Dauda Amna F omie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21597.
1241 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21590—21593, 2l597—2l598
124* Dauda Anma Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21599.
1249 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21600-2 1601.
7250 Dauda Anma Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21602—21604.

---- End of Page 1117 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Z du 18 May 2012

sa Z1 <>
contact Sankoh suggested a temporary ceasefire to Gullit. Bockarie did not believe that
Sankoh gave instructions concerning a ceasefire.725l
3257. Aside from Gullit, Bockarie was also in communication with other commanders,
including Superman, General Bropleh, Boston Flomo (a.k.a. Rambo), Akim, Isaac Mongor
and Morris Kallon. Gullit was also in communication with Rambo, Superman, Issa Sesay,
and Five-Five.7252 The witness was aware that Boston Flomo, who had led the attack on
Kono and advanced to Masiaka, joined Gullit and others to re-attack Freetown on Bockarie's
orders because there was direct communication between Flomo and Gullit in which they
coordinated how their forces would meet. The communications between Issa Sesay and
Gullit also concerned how to recapture Freetown. The communications between Gullit and
these commanders was very frequent, occurring about two or three times an hour.7253
3258. When SAJ Musa died, King Perry sent a message to Bockarie to inform him. The
witness did not recall if he was present when this message came but read the message.7254
3259. On cross-examination, Fornie denied the suggestion of Defence counsel that the
invasion of Freetown was an AF RC effort, stating that both the AF RC and the RUF invaded
Freetown together.7255 He testified that those RUF fighters who entered Freetown on 6
January 1999 took "direct directions" from Sam Bockarie.725° Fornie named "Gullit, King
Perr , Alfred Brown, Five-Five and others" as members of the RUF who invaded Freetown.
Y
Fornie affirmed that both Gullit and Five-Five were members of the RUF .725 7 Fornie was
unable to provide an estimate of the number of RUF members amongst the troops that
entered Freetown. 7258
3260. F ornie agreed with Defence counsel's suggestion that SAJ Musa wanted his troops to
arrive in Freetown before the RUF under Bockarie's command. F orr1ie agreed that even afier
Musa's death, the objective of his group remained to get to Freetown ahead of the RUF .7259
ml Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2l602·2l604, 21611·21613.
7252 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21604-21605.
7253 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21605·21607.
7254 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21609.
7255 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21665·21666.
7256 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21666.
7257 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21667.
7258 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21728.
7259 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21723·21724.

---- End of Page 1118 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·0l·T f G` 18 May 2012

3**1*2.1 1
Fornie recalled hearing a BBC broadcast in which Bockarie was interviewed by the BBC
and claimed that it was RUF troops who were advancing on Freetown, but does not
remember a subsequent radio exchange between SAJ Musa and Bockarie in which Musa
insulted Bockarie and told him he had no right to claim that troops approaching Freetown
were RUF troops.726O
3261. F ornie disagreed that that the troops entering Freetown on 6 January 1999 were loyal
to SAJ Musa, insisting that they were directly subordinate to Bockarie. To illustrate his
point, Fornie noted that Gullit had contacted Bockarie to tell him about SAJ Musa's death
and that immediately upon his arrival in Freetown Gullit contacted Bockarie to inform him
of his movements. In the conversation after SAJ Musa's death, Bockarie had told Gullit to
wait for reinforcements before entering Freetown. Fornie noted that although Gullit did not
comply with Bockarie's instructions, Gullit believed his troops were in an advantaged
position in relation to ECOMOG and it was strategically necessary to advance forward.
Nevertheless, Bockarie ordered Rambo through Issa Sesay to join Gullit and Gullit and
Rambo then coordinated their movements.726l
3262. While Fornie agreed that the relationship between the AF RC and the RUF during the
AFRC regime was "not perfectly cordial" and that it got worse following the ECOMOG
intervention,7262 following the death of SAJ Musa, when Brima contacted Bockarie, "there
was a free flow of communication" between AF RC and RUF commanders.7263
Prosecution Witness TF 1-585 4
3263. Witness TF 1-585, an RUF radio operator,7264 testified that after Gullit and SAJ Musa
had pulled out of Freetown, they refused to go to Buedu, despite Bockarie's requests for
them to do so.7265
3264. The witness testified that Gullit and Bockarie started "some amount of
cornmunication" after the death of SAJ Musa. She explained that that occurred "through
Brigadier Mani", a boss in the AFRC who, the witness thought, was based around the Kono
fm Dauda Aruna Fernie, Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21725—21726.
726* Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21727.
7262 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21749.
7263 Dauda Aruna F ornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21749.
7264 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15589-15592 (PS).

---- End of Page 1119 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T GL 18 May 2012
/ yi

3 a 2.\ 2
area during this time. As a result, there were then communications between Bockarie, Gullit
and Brigadier Mani and Bockarie spent a lot of time in the radio room monitoring Gullit's
movements.7266
3265. Before SAJ Musa died, TF1-585 testified that there was no communication between
Bockarie and either SAJ Musa or Gullit. TF1-585 explained that there was no contact
between Gullit and Bockarie because "there were problems". However, even though there
was no understanding between them, Brigadier Mani used to relay information from SAJ
and others to Bockarie. "He was the one who mediated, who was in between them. He co-
ordinated. VVhatever information there was from Bockarie to SAJ Musa and others, he was
the one between them. Bockarie only got information from SAJ Musa and others through
Biigaaiai Mani at that iimw.7267
3266. TF1-585 testified that communication resumed between Gullit and Bockarie after
SAJ Musa's death.7266 The witness said that she learned about SAJ Musa's death when King
Perry informed Brigadier Mani, who spoke to Bockarie. Later Gullit came on the radio and
told Bockarie about SAJ Musa's death. This was the point when communication started
between Bockarie and Gullit. They spoke about "where they had reached, their position and
what they were going through?7269
3267. TF1-585 testified that after Bockarie had spoken to the BBC, saying that his troops
would enter Freetown in a certain period, he came to the veranda and said that he and Gullit
had no problem. He said the problem was SAJ Musa and as long as SAJ Musa was dead, he
6 and Gullit had no more problems. He trusted Gullit and knew that Gullit would make it to
Freetown.7276 The witness did not recall the month when Brigadier Mani began to facilitate
communications between Bockarie and Gullit after the death of SAJ Musa.727l
3268. On re-examination, the witness clarified that the communication between Brigadier
Mani and Bockarie commenced before SAJ Musa's death when Mani used to tell them about
7266 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15709.
7266 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15709.
7267 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15715-15716,
7666 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15709, 15715-15716.
7669 TP1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15716-15717.
7276 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15717-15718.
ml TF1-585, Transcript 11 September 2008, pp. 15992-15993.

---- End of Page 1120 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dx 18 May 2012


3 7 L 1 3
SA] and others movements, but that Bockarie and SA] did not have any direct
communication at the time when SA] was ahve.7272
3269. The witness recalled that on 6 ]anuary 1999, Bockarie was very frequently in the
RUF radio station and used to monitor the movements of Gullit and others towards
Freetown.7273 On around 3 ]anuary 1999, Bockarie had used his satellite phone to inform the
BBC that his troops would be in Freetown within three days time.7274 He was able to give
this timeframe because he and Gullit had already spoken and Gullit had told Bockarie his
position at that time, saying that he was "entering" Freetown. The witness heard this in
person, but from a distance.7275 After speaking to Gullit, Bockarie said that he and Gullit
had no problems, and that the problem had been with SA] Musa. Bockarie then stated that
he trusted Gullit and knew that Gullit would make it to Freetown.7276 Later, the witness
heard on FM radio that the rebels had entered Freetown. Bockarie then told the BBC that
"he was a man of his word. He had given three days that his men would enter Freetown and
indeed they had entered Freetown". Bockarie was speaking to the BBC on a satellite phone
out in the open and those around him were "dancing around".7277
3270. TF 1-585 testified that some time after his troops entered Freetown, Gullit informed
Bockarie over the radio that they were being pushed out of Freetown by ECOMOG.
Bockarie ordered Gullit to withdraw:
Sam Bockarie ordered Gullit that they should not challenge the ECOMOG troops. He said
as long as the troop was too heavy for them they should not challenge them, they should
pull out of the town, but before they should pull out of the town they should kill many
people and burn down many houses before they should leave the town. He said ‘If any bush
shake, fire should blaze’, but they should leave the town.7278
3271. While Bockarie was speaking to Gullit via a radio communication set, the witness
overheard this conversation because the radio station was not enclosed in a room and
Bockarie made these statements loudly and in the open.7279
7272 TF1-585, Transcript 1 1 September 2008, p. 16079.
7273 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15707.
7274 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15707, 15717-15719.
7275 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15717—15718.
1216 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. l57l7—157l8.
1277 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15718—15719.
7278 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15726.
7279 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15725-15727.

---- End of Page 1121 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03-01-T // CWS 18 May 2012

lcizi ut
3272. Eventually the ECOMOG forces pushed Gullit and his troops out of Freetown.
Brigadier Mani reported to Bockarie that Gullit had left Freetown. The witness knew this
because she read it in the logbook. Gullit carried out the instruction that Bockarie gave him
concerning the manner in which he should leave Freetown. TF1—585 heard on the public
radio that the rebels had killed many people and burnt many houses down before they left
Freetown.728O
3273. Alter the troops withdrew from Freetown, persons released from Pademba Road
Prison in Freetown, including Victor Foh, came to Buedu. The witness read in the radio
logbook that Bockarie had instmcted Superman to send them to Buedu. He also invited
Gibril Massaquoi, but Massaquoi did not comeml
3274. On cross—examination, TF1—585 testified that prior to the death of SAJ Musa, there
was no communication between Bockarie and SAJ Musa or Bockarie and Gullit in the lead
up to the 6 January 1999 Freetown attack.7282 TF1—585 did not recall the month when
Brigadier Mani began to facilitate communications between Sam Bockarie and Gullit after
the death of SAJ Musa. She testified that radio operators King Perry and Alfred Brown were
the most senior RUF members headed to Freetown.7283
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
3275. Witness Alice Pyne testified that on 6 January 1999, she was working as a radio
operator for Superman at Lunsar. On that day she was not working as an operator and thus
did not hear anything over the RUF radio.7284 However, at 5.30am on 7 January 1999, Alice
Pyne heard on the BBC that rebels had invaded Freetown and captured the State House.7285
The witness then switched on her radio around 7.00am. The witness heard radio operators
who had gone to Freetown as part of the group that left Rosos announce over the radio
network that they had entered Freetown.7286 She heard Gullit himself communicating to
Bockarie that they had captured Freetown and released prisoners including Gibril
7280 TF1·585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15727-15730.
ml TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15730-1573 1.
7282 TF1~585, Transcript 11 September 2008, pp. 15991·15992.
7283 TFl—585, Transcript 11 September 2008, p. 15993.
7284 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12272·12273.
7285 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12274.
7286 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12274.

---- End of Page 1122 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL·03-01·T / qw is May 2012 *4%

3 ct 9.\ *5"
Massaquoi, JS Momoh, Steve Bio, Martin Moinama and others. O—Five also communicated
to Superman and the witness that they had captured Freetown and had released prisoners
from Pademba Road.7287
3276. Pyne also testified that a written message was sent by O—Five to Superman that SAJ
Musa had died as the troops advanced to Freetown. The same day, Bockarie sent a message
to Superman at Lunsar instructing him to join RUF Rambo, who was then still at Makeni,
and proceed to invade Freetown.7288
3277. On 7 January 1999, Pyne and her commanders Superman, Foday Lansana, and
Gugumeh, as well as about 200 combatants, left Lunsar. They travelled to Gberi Junction,
Port Loko, Masiaka, Waterloo and then on to Hastings where they were forced to stop
because they were unable to dislodge the ECOMOG soldiers. The trip took around 13
hours.7289 After Hastings, the group travelled to Yams Farm where Pyne began operating her
radio set. She sent a message to Bockarie at Buedu station informing him that her group had
been unable to penetrate through to Hastings and was based at Yams F ar1r1.729O
3278. The following day,729l while monitoring on her radio at Yams Farm, Pyne heard a
message from Gullit sent to Bockarie that ECOMOG had dislodged the AF RC/RUF fighters
at the State House.7292 Bockarie then said that "if the men, that is the ECOMOG, forced
Gullit and others out of Freetown, they should bum the fucking place and that they should
not spare anything". Gullit responded "Yes, sir".7293 Bockarie was angry when he spoke.
The witness understood from Bockarie's message that he intended the indiscriminate
destruction of property and persons.7294
7287 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12274-12275 (She heard Gullit himself communicating to Bockarie
that they had captured Freetown and released prisoners including Gibril Massaquoi, JS Momoh, Steve Bio,
Martin Moinama and others). ‘
7288 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12276-12277.
7289 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12279, 12290 (Pyne states that she arrived at Hastings on 8 January
1999).
7290 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. l2278—l2279.
ml Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12282.
mz Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12280-12281. A
7293 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12281-12282.
mt Arm Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12283.

---- End of Page 1123 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 %
k

3 at ‘2..1(¤
3279. The witness was in Yams Farm for over two weeks before returning to Lunsar.7295
After the witness heard that the troops in Freetown had lost control of the State House,
Bockarie ordered Superman and his fighters to remain at Yams Farm to ensure there is "a
safe corridor for those coming from Freetown".72% Pyne testified that by "safe corridor", she
meant:
if we were not at Yams Farm at that time when the men in Freetown, headed by Gullit and
O-F ive, were dislodged they could not come to Yams Farm. We made - we created a safe
area, that was Yams Farm, for ECOMOG not to be able to base there, so those who would
be coming from Freetown would come and join us safely.7297
3280. The witness also heard that Superman had asked for Gibril Massaquoi, who was
fighting with O-F ive in Freetown.7298
Prosecution Witness TF 1-516
3281. Witness TF 1-516, an RUF radio operator7299 testified that he was with Gullit when
Gullit ordered the retreat from Kono to Buedu after the 1998 Intervention. The witness was
then based in Buedu as a radio operator for Bockarie until June/July 1999,7300 He
testifiedthat on the day following their arrival in Buedu he saw Gullit on board a vehicle
with Bockarie and they told the witness that they were moving down to Dam. From that
time, the witness "never set eyes on him again".73Ol
3282. While the witness was in Buedu, Bockarie asked Johnny Paul Koroma to address
AFRC/RUF officers such as Gullit, SAJ Musa, Superman and Rambo who were located in
other sections of the country over the radio. Koroma placed the call and instructed his
officers to work together with the RUF as a team so that they could recapture Freetown. At
this time, Gullit was in the Makeni area, while SAJ Musa and Superman were both in
Kabala. The witness testified that Gullit and Bockarie maintained a "free f1ow" of
7295 Arrpp Pyrrp, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12283.
7296 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12284 ("After Sam Bockarie had given this order to Gullit he gave
another to Superman saying that Superman and his men should stay at Yams Farm to ensure that there is a safe
corridor for those coming from Freetown, because they were now in disarray in Freetown and so we were to stay
at Yams Farm to wait on the group that was coming from Freetown").
7297 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12285.
mg Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12283-12284.
""" TFl-516, Transcript 8 Aprrr 2008, p. 6845.
7300 TFl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6846, 6848-6852, 6857; Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7512-7513.
ml TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6853-6854.

---- End of Page 1124 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dx 18 May 2012

Bq 11:1*
communications after this, but that the communication improved considerably after SA]
Musa's death.73O2
3283. TFl-516 recalled that Gullit's radio operator, Elongima, would send radio messages
to "us"7303 with a report to Bockarie telling him the position of the AFRC and the general
situation. While they were entering Freetown, Gullit and Bockarie were still
communicating.73O4
3284. TF1-516 was in Buedu during the Freetown invasion.73O5 He testified that during the
attempt to take Freetown there was little communication between SA] Musa and the
RUF.73O° However, before the entry into Freetown in January 1999 Gullit's radio operator,
Elongima, would send radio messages to Bockarie informing him of the position of Gullit's
troops. When the troops arrived in Preetown, Gullit also contacted Sam Bockarie by radio
and reported that he had captured State House. Two or three days later, Bockarie received
another call from Gullit notifying Bockarie that "the pressure on them was serious" but that
"they" had released some prisoners from Pademba prison. Bockarie ordered that all the
released prisoners be sent to Buedu. There was regular and direct radio communication
between Bockarie and Gullit. The witness knew this because he was "on set". Even when he
was not "on set" other operators would pass on information to the witness. He also had
access to the radio message book and would follow up past messages exchanged when he
was not on duty.7307
3285. On one occasion during the invasion of Freetown, Bockarie spoke to Gullit over the
radio and told him that he had just been interviewed by the BBC's West African
correspondent Mark Doyle. Bockarie told Doyle that if the pressure mounted on Gullit,
Gullit would bum down govemment buildings and the oil refinery and retreat to the
Freetown peninsula. Bockarie instructed the fiontlines to listen to his interview with the
mz TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6887-6888, 6930-6931.
7303 The Trial Chamber understands "us" to refer to the radio operators in Buedu, who included the witness.
7304 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6932-6933. The witness did not specify the date of these
communications but from the context the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the witness is referring to the December
1998/January 1999 period.
7305 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6857 (The witness was assigned to Buedu as a radio operator to Sam
Bockarie after the ECOMOG Intervention); Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860 (the witness moved to
Liberia in mid-1999).
me TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6931.
W TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6932-6933.

---- End of Page 1125 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-0l-T / 18 May 2012

SO! "2-1%
BBC for instructions.73O8 The witness overheard Bockarie speaking to Gullit on the radio
specifically instructing Gullit to burn down public structures. Bockarie stated: "lf they
mount pressure on us, burn down the fucking place".73O9 Following Bockarie's order to
Gullit to burn down public structures, Elongima sent a message to the operators in Buedu
informin them that "the men have one on a ram a e. The are killin eo le, the are
8 8 P 8 Y 8 P P Y
wounding civilians. The area has become f`earful".73m
3286. TF1-516 testified that Superman and a number of other commanders were involved
in coordinating Gullit's retreat if he was to pull out of Freetown. Superman and Colonel
Rambo were both in the Freetown axis. Bockarie communicated with these commanders
openly over the radio.73H When the forces in Freetown were on the verge of withdrawing,
Gullit sent a message to Bockarie reporting that the situation in Freetown was tense and that
his troops had run out of ammunition. Bockarie instructed Gullit to move to a location where
Rambo would reinforce him. The witness then heard communications between Rambo,
Superman and other commanders about providing Gullit with reinforcement.73 12
3287. When asked whether Bockarie sent any assistance to the commanders in Freetown
during the invasion, TFl—516 responded that all Bockarie discussed with the fighters in
Freetown was military strategy,73 13 and he issued instructions with regards to setting
ambushes, manoeuvring, on how to capture particular targets and when to withdraw.73 14
3288. TF1—5l6 also testified that during the Freetown invasion, to assist the forces in
Freetown, the RUF had a team of former SLA radio operators based in Buedu named
Gbamayagi, Atati, Ache and Sheku. They were responsible for monitoring and decoding
ECOMOG messages. This included transmitting "448 messages" to the front line that an
ECOMOG jet was in the air and the fighters should take cover. These operators were
familiar with Morse code and could therefore understand ECOMOG communications, most
of which were transmitted in Morse code.m5
7308 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6934.
7309 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6934-6935.
mo TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6936.
ml TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6935-6936.
13*2 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6931.
m3 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6943
13 M TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.
W5 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6943-6944.

---- End of Page 1126 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012

Ea uq
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
3289. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, who was in Buedu on 6 January 1999,73IG testified that
he first heard the news about the rebel invasion of` Preetown from the BBC. Later that day,
Kabbah was working in the radio room, along with other operators, Tiger, Sheku Sheriff;
Mortiga and Zedman, when King Perry communicated with the Buedu radio station directly
from Preetown. King Perry informed Kabbah that the troops had entered Preetown but "said
he was under suppression", explaining that SAJ Musa had not allowed his radio operators to
use the radio to call Bockarie, but as SAJ Musa had died and Gullit was in command of the
Preetown troops, he was permitted to communicate with Buedu.73l7 SA] Musa's group was
made up primarily of` former SLAs.73l8 There were also some members of the STF, who had
been ULIMO fightersmg
3290. Regular communication between King Perry and the operators in Buedu continued
during the course of the Preetown operation. King Perry would inform Buedu about troop
movements and the security situation in Preetown. When troops in Preetown began to face
problems from ECOMOG, Gullit spoke directly to Sam Bockarie over the radio.732O Gullit
told Bockarie that the rebel troops were being attacked in the city of` Preetown, and were
facing difficulties from enemy troops attacking from the surrounding hills. Gullit's troops
had been pushed out of` State House and the areas around it. Bockarie told Gullit to remain
on the defensive and that Bockarie would send reinforcements.732l Later, in a conversation
with Yeaten, Bockarie stated that he had given Rambo instructions to put together
reinforcements and move to assist the troops in Preetown.7322
3291. At one point, ECOMOG cut off the supply lines of the rebel troops in Waterloo. This
meant that Rambo and his reinforcements were not able to get through. When Gullit
contacted Bockarie to discuss this situation, Bockarie told Gullit to move with the prisoners
Gullit had released from Pademba Road Prison at night in order to evade ECOMOG jets.
Bockarie told Gullit specifically not to leave the released prisoners, in particular President
7316 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16166.
73 17 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16166—16167.
73 18 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16446.
73 19 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16447.
mo Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16168.
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16168—16170.
7322 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16168—l6169.

---- End of Page 1127 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / GLL 18 May 2012
x

3 5 )_D.o
Momoh, behind in Freetown,.7323 Gullit brought the persons released from Pademba Road
Prison into RUF-controlled territory, which then stretched from Lunsar to Kabala, Kailahun
and Kono.7324
3292. The following day, Gullit called Bockarie again to tell him that his troops could not
withstand "the tension" of the ECOMOG assault and had to withdraw from Freetown.
Bockarie told Gullit that as the troops retreated they should "make the area fearful". The
retreating troops were to destroy everything so that anyone passing in the area after the rebel
troops would know they had been there. Gullit told Bockarie that "he would go according to
his instruction"7325 Kabbah estimated that it was less than a week between 6 January 1999,
when Gullit initially entered Freetown, and Bockarie's instruction to Gullit to "make the
area fearful".7326
3293. Communication between the radio room in Buedu and the troops in Freetown
continued every day. As with other commanders under Bockarie's command, Gullit reported
on the situation on the frontlines to Bockarie.7327 While Gullit was in charge of the troops
attacking Freetown, Bockarie was in charge of the "entire movement".7328
3294. On cross-examination, Kabbah testified that prior to 6 January 1999, during "the
period of SAJ Musa and Gullit", Bockarie told Gullit not to enter Freetown until RUF could
send reinforcements, but SAJ Musa and Gullit refused.7329 Kabbah stated that it was only
after that group had reached State House did they contact Bockarie. In fact, the RUF first
heard that Gullit's troops were in Freetown over the BBC.733O The RUF knew that Gullit's
troops "never accepted orders and that they were heading for Freetown, so it wasn’t a
surprise to us because that was their own mission".ml Kabbah agreed that the move to
Freetown was not planned as far as Bockarie was concerned.7332
7323 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16171.
7324 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16179.
7325 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16171.
7326 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16172- 16173.
7327 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16170—16171.
mg Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16172.
mg Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16445—16446.
7330 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16647.
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16647—16448.
mz Mohamed Kabbah, 'Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16448.

---- End of Page 1128 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / (IBB 18 May 2012 g
as or

3 <·; ’2.'2— 1
3295. Once Bockarie heard over the BBC about the Freetown invasion, the RUF tried
contacting RUF radio stations closer to Freetown to get more infomation, in particular,
from Superman's radio station, which was closer to the action in Freetown. Later, King
Perry came on the air when Gullit ran into trouble and Gullit asked for reinforcements. King
Perry explained that he had not contacted Bockarie earlier because SAJ Musa had prevented
him from doing so. When Gullit first spoke to Bockarie, there was an argument between
them in which Bockarie made in clear to Gullit that he was not happy that Gullit was only
contacting him because he needed Bockarie's help. Despite the argument, Bockarie did send
reinforcements but those reinforcements only got as far as Waterloo.7333 Kabbah agreed with
the Defence proposition that Gullit only initiated contact with Bockarie when their mission
failed. However the witness insisted that Bockarie and the Accused did discuss the attack on
Freetownmil
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
3296. Witness TF]-567, who accompanied Issa Sesay's flank in the RUF attack on Kono
in December 1998, testified that after the Kono attack, Issa Sesay then went to attack
Makeni. Superman arrived from the North, and together with Boston Flomo (a.k.a. Rambo),
the RUF was able to capture Makeni. RUF were in Makeni when they overheard on the
radio that "the other SLA brothers" had entered Freetown.7335 TFl-567 testified that the
RUF captured Makeni in January 1999.7336 Once Bockarie heard that the "brothers" had
entered Freetown, he instructed Issa Sesay "to try and connect with his brothers in Freetown
whereby Gullit was the commander". Sesay in turn instructed Boston Flomo to meet the
men in Freetown.7337 Superman remained in Makeni, but later moved to Lunsar once Flomo
had reached Waterloo. Flomo sent a message to Sesay noting that he had reached Waterloo
but encountered resistance at Jui Bridge. The witness remained with Issa Sesay in
Makeni.7338
3297. TF1-567 testified that he spent "some time" in Makeni and then moved back to
Kono. Issa Sesay remained in Makeni. The day he returned to Kono, when Gullit's troops 8
7333 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16448—16449. ,
mil Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16450.
mj TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12917.
1336 TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918.
mf TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12918—12919.

---- End of Page 1129 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gu 18 May 2012

2 ey 211
had retreated to Waterloo, the witness overheard on the radio that there was infighting
between Superman and Issa Sesay.7339 When Gullit's troops were in Waterloo, the witness
travelled with Issa Sesay to Waterloo. Gullit was angry with Sesay for his failure to send
reinforcements, as Gullit had requested, forcing Gullit to retreat. Sesay explained that he had
tried to send manpower but that the troops had not managed to get past enemy forces. Sesay
then suggested that they forget about the past and instead work together to try to recapture
Freetown.734O
3298. TF1-567 stated that after this discussion, there was a joint AFRC/RUF attempt to
recapture Freetown, but it failed.7344 Sesay planned an attack on Tombo, in which Gullit's
group also took part, but the operation was unsuccessful. Gu1lit's group took part in this
attack.7342 Issa Sesay returned to Makeni some time in 1999 but the witness did not recall in
which month.7343
3299. While TF 1-567 was in Waterloo with Issa Sesay, Gibril Massaquoi was with Gullit's
group. Sesay informed Bockarie of Massaquoi's presence and Bockarie instructed Sesay to
arrest Massaquoi and send him to Buedu, explaining that Massaquoi had disobeyed him.
However, Superman and other SLAs intervened to prevent the arrest of Massaquoi. This
incident took place in 1999, but the witness was not sure which month.7344
3300. On cross-examination, TF 1-567 testified that while Bockarie was the overall
commander when the troops on the outskirts of Freetown attempted to join up with the
troops in Freetown, Bockarie did not give the order to invade Freetown.7445 ln response to
Defence counsel's proposition that the Freetown attack was not launched by the RUF, TF 1-
567 responded that the RUF always intended to go to Freetown, and when Gullit went ahead
and launched the attack, Bockarie ordered Sesay to reinforce him.7346 The witness stated that
even though Gullit made the initial attack, Gullit was part of the Junta and the AF RC and
mg TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12919.
3333 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12920.
7340 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12920-12921.
33" TF1-567, Transcript 2 Jury 2008, pp. 12921-12922.
33*3 TF1-567, Trsnscrrpt 2 July 2008, pp. 12924-12925.
7443 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12924-12925.
33** TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12923-12924.
3343 TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13153-13154.
33*3 TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, p. 13154.

---- End of Page 1130 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T XJ G`; 18 May 2012 /
\ 2

39 22.3
RUF were working together. There were members of the RUF among the forces going to
Freetown.73 41 1
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
3301. Abu Keita testified that when the attack on Freetown occurred, he and Bockarie were
in Buedu.734g He and Bockarie were listening to the programme "Focus on Africa" on the
BBC on 6 January 19997349 and heard a commander calling from Freetown announcing that
he was in control of the State House.733O Keita testified that Bockarie became angry and
called Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon, asking them how they allowed anyone other than
himself to speak to the BBC. Bockarie then called the BBC on his satellite phone and shot a
weapon, telling the BBC that he was at the State House although he was actually still in
Buedu.73 31 Bockarie was speaking to various commanders in and around Freetown,
including Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon, over the RUF radio network. Bockarie also
communicated with Benjamin Yeaten and Joseph Tuah on a satellite phone at night, and
Bockarie told the witness he was reporring to them on the status of the operation. The
witness did not hear Yeaten giving any instructions to Bockarie.7332
3302. Keita testified that during the operation, radio operators "Zedman", in Buedu, and
"Memunatu" and ‘"Sita", who were stationed in Liberia, monitored ECOMOG radio stations
based in Monrovia. lf a jet took off from Roberts lntemational Airpori, in Monrovia, these
operators would call 448 and "the radio operator would ring a bell and everybody would

Prosecution Witness TF1-174
3303. Witness TF1-174, who did relief work during the Sierra Leonean Civil War, 1354
testified that on 28 December 19987333 he was introduced to Issa Sesay in Makeni when
7347 TF1-567,Transcript8 Jury 2008, p. 13155.
7343 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020.
7349 Keita did not immediately provide the date on which he heard this broadcast. Later, Keita clarified that "`1t
was on 6 January that they called from the State House saying they were in control of the State House": Abu
Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2021.
7330 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020.
7331 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020.
7332 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2021.
7333 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2024-2025, 2069.
7354 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23664.

---- End of Page 1131 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

3°('2.'2. 9V
Sesay's vehicle pulled up close to where the witness was sitting.7356 On the same day, he
then encountered a black Mercedes Benz with about six persons dressed in black and
military attire in the centre of Makeni. They were rebels with guns, in military brown and
green shirts. They stopped the witness and one of the men pointed to a vehicle in liont of
them loaded with young men and women.7357 According to the witness, the man then stated
that "very soon we will hear what will come out of Freetown, even the vehicle ahead was
proceeding to Freetown?7358 Immediately afterwards, two other vehicles arrived from
behind. Inside the vehicles were young men and girls who said that they were heading for
Freetown. The three vehicles loaded with young men and girls were ECOMOG trucks which
had a usual capacity of about 20-30 people but were packed with up to 90 or 100 people. 7359
The witness could see that those sitting at the back door were armed. When they passed, the
witness continued on to meet his wife and children.7360
3304. For the weeks after 28 December, the witness saw the People's Army continuously
moving to Kabala, Port Loko to Lunsar, Bumbuna and Freetown. The witness knew this
because he saw the rebels loading their vehicles and they would say where they were going
or where they were coming back from.73 61
3305. In early January, 1999, the witness listened to the transistor radio everyday and heard
some announcements concerning Freetown. On 6 January 1999, he heard about an attack at
Waterloo and then that the rebels captured Freetown.7362 The civilian population of Makeni
was asked by the RUF to dance and rejoice because Freetown had been captured. The
witness danced because there were repercussions if the civilians refused to do so.7363
The Accused
3306. The Accused testified that the first he knew of the Freetown invasion was on 6
January 1999 at l0.00am, when his national security adviser, Lewis Brown, informed him of
7355 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23690 — 23692.
7356 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23692 9 23693.
7357 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23693 — 23696.
7358 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23694.
7359 TFI-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23694-23695.
7360 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23695-23696.
7361 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23707-23708.
7362 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23703 — 23705.
7363 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23705 — 23707.

---- End of Page 1132 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Z GQ 18 May 2012

ga 22S
the news. The Accused acknowledged that upon his instructions, Brown called Sam
Bockarie on the hone. Sam Bockarie stated that he did not know what was oin on in
P S S
Freetown.7364 One of the Accused's security personnel then told the Accused that he heard
Bockarie announcing over BBC radio that his men had attacked Freetown.7363 In order to
verify the situation, the Accused again instructed his security personnel to contact Bockarie.
Bockarie explained that he only said that on the radio for "morale" and to take "some claim
for itvv·7366
Defence Witness 1ssa Sesay and Defence Exhibit D-447
3307. Defence witness 1ssa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,7367 confirmed that Gullit was
a friend of his, thou h not a close friend, after the came to know each other in "the da s of
S Y Y
the AF RC".73 68 Gullit also gave Sesay a pick-up truck when he went to Freetown.73°9 Sesay
testified that he and Gullit were in detention to ether and that Gullit had told Sesa what he
S Y
was going to testify before the Special Court. Sesay told Gullit that he should testify about
what ha ened and "should not link the RUF to what RUF did not do or what RUF was not
PP
involved in" and denied having an agreement with Gullit to lie for Gullit in his (Sesay's)
RUF rr1a1.777°
3308. According to Sesay, Bockarie was willing to work with Gullit who was his friend,
unlike SAJ Musa with whom he did not see "eye to eye".7333 He stated that when he
retreated from Kono, Gullit went to sta with Bockarie in Kailahun7372 and that Bockarie
Y
was "friendly" to him.7373 Sesay recalled that they became friends "from the time they
overthrew".7374 During the Junta period, Gullit and Bockarie travelled to The Gambia and
Libya together.7373 3
7333 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26225—26227.`
7363 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26227.
7336 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26227—26228.
7767 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590—4459 1, 44596.
3363 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46737—46738.
7369 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46739.
7370 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46739—46740.
777* ipsa spray, Transcript 19 Arrgrrsr 2010, pp. 46731;,46750.
7172 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44048; Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46739.
7173 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46739.
717* 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46739.
7175 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46836.

---- End of Page 1133 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T (//Z OD, 18 May 2012

EGP?-"’
3309. Gullit also became friends with Alfred Brown through a mutual friend, Sullay,
before the retreat from Freetown.7376
3310. After Gullit arrived in Kailahun, Sesay testified that Bockarie ordered him to take
Gullit's diamonds off him, which he did near the Guinean border where Gullit had gone to
buy provisions.7377 When Sesay was confronted on cross-examination with the evidence he
had given in his own trial, where he had testified that they had found nothing on Gullit
because Gullit had already handed his diamonds over to Bockarie, Sesay re-affirmed his
testimony to this Trial Chamber, saying that he did not recall "all the things that I said were
events that occurred" or what he had testified previously. He added that the diamonds taken
from Gullit were small pieces.7378
3311. Sesay testified that Gullit then went from Kailahun to Kono in early May 1998 to
collect APRC members to go join SAJ Musa.7379 Johnny Paul Koroma appointed Bockarie
Chief of Defence Staff, but from May 1998 SAJ Musa, Brigadier Mani, Gullit and others
refused to take instructions from Bockarie.738O g
3312. In July 1998, Bockarie sent three radio operators, Alfred Brown, King Perry and
another operator whose name Sesay could not remember, to Koinadugu at a time when SAJ
Musa and Gullit were in charge of the area. Bockarie openly said he was sending them to
support the operation, but he was actually sending them to spy. The operators remained with
SAJ Musa's forces until February 1999.738l
3313. The radio operators initially had contact with Bockarie, but that contact ended in
September 1998. As a result of infighting between Superman and SAJ Musa, SAJ Musa's
group left Superman and joined Gullit in Major Eddie Town in September 1998. When SAJ
Musa arrived, he held a planning meeting for the Freetown invasion during which he gave
an order banning the radio operators from going anywhere near the radio. If they did, they
would be executed. The ban was lifted after SAJ Musa's death in December 1998 so Alfred
Brown could contact Bockarie on Gullit's behalf Gullit and Bockarie then had a
7376 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46739.
7377 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44048—44049; Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45005.
73 18 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46740—46742.
7379 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44053.
7380 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44074—44076.
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44068—44069, 44086—44087; 'Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44908-

---- End of Page 1134 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-0l-T J $0; 18 May 2012

39 22 it
discussion.7382 Allred Brown and King Perry told Sesay a&er they withdrew from Freetown
in 1999 about the ban that had been placed upon them.7383 Alfred Brown did try once to
reach Bockarie when SAJ Musa's forces attacked Masiaka. SAJ Musa found out and flogged
Brown.7384 There was therefore no communication between SAJ Musa's group and Bockarie
from September-December 1998. SAJ Musa regarded himself as head of his own
operational area and he did not see Bockarie as part of his anny.7385
3314. ln December 1998, Superman, General Bropleh and Brigadier Mani 1eR Koinadugu
and launched an unsuccessful attack on Makeni. When the attack failed, they went to
Binkolo. While there, Bockarie instructed them to join the witness's group in Makeni so
they could capture Teko Barracks. This was around 24 December 1998.7386
3315. Sesay testified that when he and his group arrived in Makeni, Bockarie instructed
Brigadier Mani, an AFRC member,7387 General Bropleh and Superman to join Sesay's group
in Makeni so they could capture Teko Barracks.7388 Sesay, Brigadier Mani, General Bropleh
and Superman then coordinated a joint attack on ECOMOG at Teko Barracks.7389 AHer the
attack, Brigadier Mani and General Bropleh stayed with Sesay in Makeni until March
1999.7390 Sesay testified that during the attack on Makeni, the RUP had no contact with SAJ
Musa. They were unaware that the attack on Freetown was imminent.739l
3316. AHer the Teko Barracks attack, Superman stayed in Makeni for a week before he
moved to Lunsar. He stayed in Lunsar until Bockarie gave orders to Superman and Rambo
to attack Port Loko.7392 The attack on Port Loko took place aHer Gullit's troops attacked
Freetown. This attack failed, and Bockarie ordered Superman and Rambo to advance
towards Waterloo, where ECOMOG had redeployed a&er the attack on Freetown. On the
44909; 18 August 2010, pp. 46631-46632. ·
7382 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44087-44090.
73*3 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44091.
7384 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44090-44091.
7385 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44091.
73*6 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44082-44083.
ml ipsa Sesay, Transcript 8 Jury 2010, pp. 43991-43994.
7388 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44082-44083.
7389 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44159-44160.
7390 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44159-44160; Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44200 (the witness
reaffirms that he stayed in Makeni throughout the invasion of Freetown up until Superman attacked him in
March 1999).
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44160.

---- End of Page 1135 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J QB 18 May 2012 "

3% 2.1%
way to Waterloo, they captured Masiaka. The RUF fought at Waterloo for two weeks before
ECOMOG withdrew. By this time, the AFRC was already leaving Freetown.7393 The RUF
forces did not get any closer to Freetown than Waterloo.7394 Rambo's forces attacked
Waterloo as part of the RUF's plan to take Freetown, as the path through Waterloo was the
only way to get to Freetown,7393 not with the intent to link up with or open a way for the
AFRC.7396
3317. According to Issa Sesay, after SAJ Musa died, Gullit called Bockarie via the radio
operator Alfred Brown. He told Bockarie about SAJ Musa's death and the plan to attack
Freetown. Bockarie told Gullit that they should wait to attack Freetown and that Bockarie
would send reinforcements to meet them at Waterloo. Gullit did not wait and attacked
Freetown one or two days later.7337 Gullit also called Bockarie after they had captured the
State House and their troops were at the Congo Cross Bridge and asked Bockarie to send
reinforcements and ammunition.7393
3318. Sesay stated that when Gullit had taken State House, he did not call Sesay's station
or radio. He confirmed that when Gullit had taken State House, Peny Kamara (a.k.a. King
Perry) was the RUF operator who facilitated the communication between Bockarie and
Gullit, pointing out that when Perry Kamara testified before this Trial Chamber, Kamara did
not ive evidence that Gullit also contacted Sesa .7399
8 Y
3319. Sesay testified that while a few members of the AFRC were involved in the attack on
Kono, the attack was dominated by the RUF. The RUF did not have control over the AFRC
at the time of the attack on Freetown and the attacks on Freetown and Kono were two
separate operations.7400 The attack on Freetown was an independent plan by the AFRC. It
had nothing to do with the RUF because the RUF was not part of the army.740l
7392 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44216-44217.
7393 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44168-44169.
7394 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44169.
7333 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45433.
73% Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45432.
7397 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44162-44163.
7398 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44162.
7393 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46754—46756.
7400 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44168.
7401 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44169.

---- End of Page 1136 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GL 18 May 2012

Za ru-<—i
3320. Sesay did not continue to Freetown because the attack on Freetown was not planned
by the RUF.44442 Further, when Gullit contacted Bockarie from the State House to request
reinforcements, Bockarie refused because Gullit had ignored Bockarie's instruction to wait
and "we" did not send reinforcements.44444 Sesay also did not send any reinforcements to
Lunsar or Waterloo.44444
3321. Issa Sesay testified that at the time of the Freetown invasion, Bockarie was in Buedu,
Superman was in Lunsar and Sesay was in Makeni. The RUF did not take part in the attack
on Preetown, and they did not send reinforcements or ammunition to the attacking forces.44445
The only RUF who were in Freetown were Alfred Brown and King Perry.4444° Sesay found
out about the attack through the media——the BBC, VOA, RFI and the SLBS radio.44444 Sesay
also testified that Rambo was never given an order to meet with Gullit's troops as they
entered Freetown, as stated in Exhibit P—149. 74448
3322. After the attack, the AF RC troops led by Gullit retreated from Freetown to
Benguema. The RUF were in Waterloo at this time. There was no unity between the AF RC
and the RUF. The AF RC blamed the RUF for their forced retreat from Freetown because the
RUF did not reinforce them.44449 As a result of the problems between the AP RC and the RUF
at Waterloo, Bockarie ordered Sesay to withdraw Rambo. Sesay did so and Rambo came to
Makeni. VVhen Rambo withdrew, ECOMOG were attacking the AF RC positions in Hastings
and advancing towards Waterloo.44444 .
3323. Sesay testified that he went to Waterloo from Makeni after the withdrawal of the
AF RC from Freetown.4444 Bockarie sent Sesay to Waterloo to instruct Gibril Massaquoi,
who had just been freed by the AF RC from Pademba Road Prison and had joined Superman
and Rambo in Waterloo,7442 to take the APC politicians who had also been freed from
44444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44168.
44444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44168; Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44187-44188.
44444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46804.
**05 rm Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 4416141416;
4404 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44161.
44447 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44162.
4404 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44190-44191.
4404 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44201-44203.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44201.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45974.
4442 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45976; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44823-44824.

---- End of Page 1137 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ® 18 May 2012

lama
Pademba Road Prison to go to Makeni to talk with Sam Bockarie.74l3 Massaquoi had
refused to come when Bockarie called him after his release from Pendemba Road and
instead told Bockarie that he was going to operate with Superrnan.74l4
3324. Sesay denied going to Waterloo to assist the AFRC in retaking Freetown.74l5 When
Sesay arrived at Waterloo, the AFRC were split into two groups. Gullit commanded one
. group in Benguema and Bazzy commanded the other in Hastings.74l6 There was no unity
between the AF RC and the RUF. Neither side would subordinate themselves to the other, so
misunderstandings arose and they used to shoot at each other. Due to problems between the
AFRC and the RUF at Waterloo, Bockarie ordered Sesay to withdraw Rambo. Sesay did so
and Rambo came to Makeni. When Rambo withdrew, ECOMOG were attacking the AF RC
positions in Hastings and advancing towards Waterloo.74l7
3325. Sesay believed that it was doubtful that Bockarie gave the order for the destruction of`
Freetown. He noted that Gullit, having being born, educated and joined the arrny in
Freetown, would not likely have committed these crimes only on the orders of someone in
Buedu. He also pointed out that Bockarie gave no equivalent order for destruction in
Makeni, which was also captured by the RUF at this time.74l8 He maintained that the men in
Freetown were not answerable to Bockarie, they had their own command structure and when
they retreated, reports were not sent to Bockarie. Gullit was not taking orders from Bockarie
at the time 7419
3326. On eross—examination, Sesay confirmed that Bockarie made threats via the media to
attack Freetown, around December 1998 or early 1999 in order to secure Sankoh's release
from Pademba Road Prison.7420 However, Sesay maintained that although Bockarie made
7413 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45974-45975.
M4 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44224.
M5 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45978.
W6 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45974.
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44201.
M8 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46109; Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46795—46796.
mq Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46111.
7420 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46175-46177.

---- End of Page 1138 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ Q4 18 May 2012

32131
threats, what happened on the ground was different.742l Further, Freetown, as the seat of
power, was always the objective of the RUF throughout the Civil War.7422
3327. Sesay stated that he heard about the death of SA] Musa in ]anuary when he was in
Makeni. Bockarie did not tell Sesay because Bockarie did not believe the news when he first
heard it,7423 and also did not immediately send reinforcements to Gullit. Bockarie told Gullit
to wait at Benguema before attacking Freetown. Gullit did not wait so Bockarie never
instructed Sesay to send reinforcements to Freetown.7424 However, Sesay noted that Gullit
did not ask for reinforcements when he delivered the news to Bockarie about SA] Musa's A
death. Bockarie told him that if that was true, Gullit should wait so that Sesay and
Superman's troops would be able to move down from Makeni and the two groups could
attack Freetown together.7425 Sesay agreed that Bockarie essentially volunteered
reinforcements when Gullit never asked for any. Sesay explained that Bockarie was willing
to work with Gullit, who was his friend, but not with SA] Musa.7426
3328. Bockarie did not send instructions to Sesay to send reinforcements to Gullit. While
Rambo did eventually go to Waterloo, this was not until late February 1999.7427 It was after
the failed attack on Port Loko that Bockarie gave instructions for Rambo to go to Waterloo.
By that time, Gullit's forces were retreating from Freetown. The intention was then to move
on to Freetown. When they got there, however, they could not get through as ECOMOG was
in Hastings and ]ui.7424
3329. Sesay also denied that the RUF attacked Port Loko in order to cut off reinforcements
to Freetown. He noted that the Freetown attack had already happened at the time of the Port
Loko attack.7429 However, he acknowledged that the road from Conakry to Freetown ran
through Port Loko as did the major road from Lungi to Freetown. In response to Prosecution
counsel's suggestion that the only fast way for ECOMOG to reinforce its troops would be by
air, landing at Lungi, or by road from Guinea, Sesay noted that ECOMOG also had an
7424 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46178.
7422 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46177. .
7423 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46734—46737.
7424 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46744, 46747.
7*25 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46748—46749, 46764-46766.
7426 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46749—46750, 46764—46766.
7427 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46767—46768.
7428 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46750—46751

---- End of Page 1139 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J QQ 18 May 2012

Eq 2.3 :2.
airfield where they landed their planes at Hastings, although this was being attacked by
Gullit's forces in January 1999.7430 Sesay was later told by Gullit's forces that from
Hastings, they moved via the ECOMOG base at Jui and crossed over the Omgu Bridge into
Freetown.743l
3330. Sesay was not aware that any RUF soldiers were jubilant about the AFRC attack on
Freetown because it was not their mission,7442 and to Sesay's knowledge, the RUF did not
force civilians to dance to celebrate the Freetown invasion.7434
3331. Exhibit D-447 is a map of Sierra Leone on which Issa Sesay indicated the route that
the Guinean ECOMOG troops at Port Loko would have taken in providing reinforcements in
Freetown in January 1999 and the position that the RUF would have taken to block them.7444
Issa Sesay testified that if the RUF had intended only to cut off reinforcements to ECOMOG
in Freetown then they would have only needed to capture Gberi Bridge, because that would
have prevented anyone coming from Port Loko to Freetown; they would not have attacked
Port Loko. Sesay explained that Gberi Bridge is located between Masiaka and Gberi
Junction over the Rokel River. It is a strategic, long, narrow (single lane/one-way) bridge
which, if captured, would cut off the supply line between Port Loko and Freetown.7445
Defence Witness John Vincent
3332. John Vincent (a.k.a. Stone One), an RUF commander,7436 testified that SAJ Musa
launched an attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999, an attack in which the RUF did not
participate. The witness was not aware of SAJ Musa's movements because the witness was
in Jojoima at the time and was not with Musa's group.7447 SAJ Musa's group had broken off
from the RUF with Superman and many ex—members of the SLA. Bockarie had declared the
7429 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46744.
7430 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46745.
4444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46745.
4432 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46757.
4443 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46760-46761.
4444 Exhibit D-447, " Map of Sierra Leone - showing the route that the Guineans at Port Loko would have taken
in providing reinforcement in Freetown in January 1999 and the position that the RUF would have taken to block
them, as indicated by DCT-172".
7435 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47303-47306.
4446 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; Transcript 30
March 2010, pp. 38226, 38239; Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38390, 38408, 38460-38461.
M" John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38129.

---- End of Page 1140 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 60 18 May 2012

32 233
area that SAJ Musa controlled as an enemy zone. lf anyone from the RUF was in that
particular zone, they were considered an enemy to the RUF.7438 At the time that SAJ Musa A
carried out his operation in Freetown in January 1999, the RUF was still occupying Makeni.
The RUF made an attempt to also reach Freetown but were unable to get further than
Masiaka.7439 Vincent was not part of the operation at Masiaka and was not aware that the
RUF went as far as Hastings.7440
3333. Vincent stated that there was no communication between the RUF in Makeni and
SAJ Musa during the attack on Freetown but King Perry, an RUF radio man who had joined
Supennan's group, attempted to pass information onto Bockarie in Buedu. King Perry was
flogged by the SLA and escaped.744l Vincent noted that some of the RUF authorities, even
the witness, believed the Freetown operation to be a joint operation between the RUF and
SAJ Musa. He testified:
it was only later that I got to know that RUF did not enter Freetown. So we were all jubilating when that
particular invasion took place, but it was only later that we were convinced that they were not part of it.7442
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
3334. Witness Sam Kolleh testified that Gullit was a friend to Bockarie but that the
incident with the diamonds in Kailahun "caused Gullit to go against Bockarie".7443
3335. Witness Sam Kolleh testified that on 6 January 1999 he was in Pendembu, and heard
about the Freetown invasion on the radio assigned to him. He heard on the radio that Johnny
Paul Koroma and Bockarie with some other loyal AFRC soldiers who were in Buedu, such
as Leather Boot and Akim, were in Kailahun lannin a eneral attack. The instructed Issa,
P S S Y
RUF Rambo, Morris Kallon and other RUF officers in Makeni to move to Freetown.7444
Kolleh understood that SAJ Musa, the SLA commander, was also on his way to Freetown.
However, Musa and his troops, which Kolleh understood to be more than 1,000, "went on
their own", meaning they were no longer part of the junta or RUF forces. His anned men
7*38 Jphrr Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38131-38132.
7439 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38132.
7440 John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38431-38434.
ml John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38132-38133.
7442 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38134.
7443 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, p. 48819.
7444 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48449-48452.

---- End of Page 1141 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QQ 18 May 2012

3 q zsgct
consisted of mainly SLA but also 20-25 RUF members. They went to Waterloo, around
Benguema.4445
3336. At this time, RUF Rambo was very close to Waterloo. SAJ Musa gave an order to
destroy the armaments captured at Benguema before others were able to use it. Kolleh heard
King Perry and Alfred Brown, radio operators who were waiting for Rambo in Benguema,
communicating with Issa and Rambo on the radio on an open channel which everybody
could listen to.4446 They reported that SAJ Musa called the RUF "the enemy". Perry and
Brown reported that SAJ Musa had drawn a line on the main road to Freetown in Benguema
and told RUF members not to cross it or they would be declared enemies.4444 King Perry
himself was beaten on account of passing information and updates on the movements of SAJ
Musa's group to Issa and Bockarie.4448
3337. After Issa reported this to Bockarie, Bockarie told Issa to tell RUF Rambo to stop his
advance and return. SAJ Musa sent his men to attack Freetown but stayed behind to get rid
of the ammunition in Benguema that "they" captured. 4449
3338. After SAJ Musa's death, Kolleh heard on the BBC radio Gullit announcing that they
had captured Freetown and taken over the State House. Bockarie also told the BBC that his
forces captured Freetown, but that was a lie. Bockarie himself was in Buedu (Kolleh knew
this since Bockarie could not have moved from Buedu without passing through Manowa
Ferry, where Kolleh was located). He heard Gullit later state to the BBC "No, we are not
fighting under the same forces", and that he was not fighting under Bocka.rie's command.4450
The reason why Bockarie told the BBC that his forces were in control of Freetown was
because he was flamboyant, "full of big show", and a boaster.4454 Kolleh testified that the
closest RUF forces got to Freetown, led by Rambo, was Waterloo and Benguema. Rambo
was instructed to stop on the highway near Waterloo to report to Bockarie.4452
4445 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48451, 48453-48454.
4*46 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48454, 48456-48459.
4444 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48455—48456, 48458.
4444 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48457-48458.
4444 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48455-48456.
4440 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48464-48465, 48468.
4454 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48468-48471.
4454 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48465-48467.

---- End of Page 1142 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ GQ 18 May 2012

3 Ci ¤.t.<.$‘
3339. On cross-examination, Kolleh maintained that SAJ Musa's troops entered Freetown
before Musa died at Benguema. He denied that immediately after SAJ Musa's death Gullit
asked Bockarie for reinforcements, stating that they were not "fiiends" at the time.7453
3340. Kolleh did not hear of the Superman-led attack on Port Loko in order to take over
Lungi. He disputed that in order to control Freetown it was important to take over Lungi
airport, as between the two locations there was "a big water", although he confirmed that
ECOMOG's helicopters landed in Lungi. He also acknowledged that there was a ferry from
Lungi to Freetown. Kolleh did not know whether ECOMOG could send reinforcements to
Freetown by flying troops into Lungi.7454
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
3341. Witness Charles Ngebeh testified that on 25 December 1998, the RUF drove
ECOMOG out of Makeni and Teko Barracks.7455 From Makeni the fighters advanced to
Lunsar, entering that city sometime during the first two weeks of January 1999. From
Lunsar the fighters proceeded to Masiaka, from where they advanced to Waterloo. Ngebeh
was with the RUF when they attacked Lunsar but remained based in Makeni. The RUF
entered Waterloo at the end of January 1999, although the witness himself rejoined the
fighters in Waterloo in the first week of February 1999.7456
3342. RUF troops also engaged with Guinean troops in Masiaka.7457 As a result of
persistent attacks led by CO Rambo, the Guineans decided to retreat further to Port Loko.
They formed a long convoy to effectuate this plan. That convoy fell into an AFRC and RUF
ambush in Lumpa, Waterloo.7458
3343. VVhen Ngebeh arrived in Waterloo he met up with AFRC fighters that had been
dislodged from Freetown by ECOMOG. Bockarie acknowledged that the returning AFRC
fighters had blundered and ordered that they be searched for government property. CO
Rambo created a gate through which soldiers returning from Freetown had to pass, and
7453 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 5 November 2010, pp. 48908-489lO.
745* Sam Kolleh, Transcript 5 November 2010, pp. 48910-48912.
7455 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37918-37919.
7456 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37920-37922.
7457 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37925-27926.
7454Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37927-37928.

---- End of Page 1143 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012

gel/2..g<¤
inspected incoming soldiers for dollars taken from ECOMOG forces.7459 Ngebeh returned to
Makeni in March 1999.7460
3344. On cross-examination, Ngebeh was questioned concerning the Freetown attack. He
testified that on 6 January 1999, the AFRC troops loyal to SAJ Musa led an attack on
Freetown. Ngebeh heard that Musa had died in an attack on Benguema before the assault on
Freetown took place, but the troops who entered Freetown were under his command
‘whether he died or was a1ive’, since it was his instructions that his men enter Freetown. The
witness was unaware who took over command over the invading force upon Musa's death
since the witness was stationed in Waterloo during this time.74(’l However, "the entire RUF"
knew that Musa was responsible for entering Freetown, not the RUF.7462 No senior
commander of the RUF and RUF soldiers were ‘involved’ in the attack on Freetown.7463
3345. Ngebeh stated that the RUF never reached closer to Freetown than Waterloo. The
RUF operated out of Waterloo, Benguema and Hastings, but only after the AFRC had
already passed through and captured these places.7464 Ngebeh affirmed that the RUF forces
successfully attacked Masiaka on 5 January 1999, after the AFRC had already entered that
town.7465 Alter entering Masiaka, Rambo commanded the troops in an operation against
RDF, a camp between Masiaka and Waterloo. The AFRC had already passed through RDF,
and the remaining enemies in that area of the RUF retreated as soon as they heard gunfire,
offering no resistance to Rambo's troops.7466
3346. In response to Prosecution counse1's suggestion that the capture of Waterloo took
place in early January, rather than late January as Ngebeh had stated in his evidence-in-
chief, Ngebeh noted that he did not record particular dates and was only certain of the month
in which the attacks occurred.7467 Ngebeh affirmed that after capturing Waterloo, Rambo's
forces deployed at Hastings and attacked the ECOMOG base at Jui. While they attempted to
7459 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37930.
7460 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37929—37930.
’4°’ charrps Ngebeh, rrapppppt l2 April 2010, pp. 38677-38679.
7462 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38678.
7** charrpp Ngebeh, rrapspppt 12 Appr 2010, p. 38679.
MM Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38680.
M5 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38680.
7*66 charrps Ngebeh, rrapppppt 12 April 2010, p. 38681.
M7 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript l2 April 2010, p. 38681.

---- End of Page 1144 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1 -T / GK 18 May 2012 %

EF1 2;<.’Q-—
join "our brothers in Freetown", they were prevented from getting past Jui.7468 The witness
was unable to recall if the RUF attack on Jui occurred as early as 9 January 1999.7469
Rambo's RUF forces twice attempted to push the ECOMOG forces out of Jui but were
rebuffed both times. At this time the witness was in Hastings assisting Rambo.747O The
witness explained that he remained based in Makeni but travelled back and forth from
Waterloo and Hastings to assist Rambo's troops.747l
3347. The witness responded to Prosecution counsel's suggestion that he had no idea of the
timing of these troop movements by pointing out that (a) the RUF was not part of the group
that entered Freetown, so he could not be expected to know the movements associated with
that action, (b) while 6 January 1999 was a date associated worldwide with the invasion of
Freetown, he could not be expected to recall accurately the dates of the other attacks as a
significant amount of time had elapsed between the events in question.7472
3348. Ngebeh regarded the portion of Exhibit P—149 describing the 9 January 1999 RUF
attacks on Jui and Kossoh Town as ‘false information’, noting that the RUF were unable to
establish a foothold in Jui and ass throu to Kossoh Town.7473 The witness was read the
P
portion of the report conceming a joint RUF and AF RC attack on J ui and Kossoh Town, and
the retreat of RUF forces from Kossoh Town. According to the witness this was further
‘false information’. The RUF did not know the radio codes used by the AFRC radio
operators in Freetown, and therefore could not have agreed to a joint operation.7474 The only
RUF authority that was in Freetown was Gibri1 Massaquoi, a prisoner at Pademba prison in
Freetown on 6 January 1999.7475
Defence Witness Martin George
3349. Witness Martin George testified that afrer the RUF captured Kono around Christmas
1998, he was assigned to capture Tongo with Akim, Base Marine and Vanicious Vamey.
During this period, he heard about the SLA attacking Freetown and the death of SAJ Musa.
7444 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38681-38682.
M9 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38682.
7470 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38683.
747* crrarrps Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38681-3 8683.
7474 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp, 38684-38685.
7474 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38688.
7474 Charles Ngebeh, rrrrrrsprrpr 12 April 2010, p. 38690.
7475 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 3868.

---- End of Page 1145 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /(/ 18 May 2012

3923%
Martin George believed that the RUF did not take part in the operation to attack Freetown
between December 1998 and January 1999. If the RUF participated, he was not aware of
it 7476
Defence Witness DCT-068
3350. Witness DCT—068 first heard about the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown from
BBC's ‘Focus’ segment while he was in Bomam. There was jubilation among the RUF at
hearing the news of the invasion.7477 DCT—068 did not remember if Bockarie sounded happy
when he was on the radio or if Bockarie identified the men who entered Freetown as his.7478
Prosecution Exhibit P—093
3351. Exhibit P—093 is a Report from Brigadier Issa Sesay to Major Sam Bockarie on the
take over of Koidu Town. It states that Sesay departed Defence Headquarters on 6
December 1998 for the mission and met Colonel Boston Flomo, commander of the Second
Brigade, at Guinea Highway. At a forum held on 11 December 1998 at Guinea Highway,
prior to the attack, Colonel Kailondo S. Banya, third Battalion Commander, was appointed
the Koidu mission commander. On 16 to 17 December 1998, the mission was carried out
and resulted in the successful capture of Koidu Town.7479 The report states that a further
ambush team captured Sewafe and Gold Town on the highway leading to Makeni on 17
December 1998. The report also notes that Masingbe was captured on 22 December 1998 by
Colonel Boston Flomo, Magburaka was captured on 23 December 1998, and Makeni was
captured on 24 December 1998.7480
Prosecution Exhibit P—149
3352. Exhibit P—149 is a memo from the Overall Intelligence Officer Commander and
Black Guard Adjutant to Brigadier Issa H. Sesay, the Battle Field Commander, dated 21
January 1999. The memo states:
7‘"° DCT-062, Transcript 23 Aprrr 2010, pp. 39783-39785
7477 Der-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, p. 37145.
7478 DCT-068, Transcript 1 1 March 2010, pp. 37146-31747.
7479 Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa
Sesay on the Take Over of Koidu, 26 January 1999", ERN 2550}-25505.
7480 Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa
Sesay on the Take Over of Koidu, 26 January 1999", ERN 25506-25507.

---- End of Page 1146 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ Ek 18 May 2012

3 ‘·1 2.33
Upon hearing the confirm [sic] report that the Strike Force Commander Brigadier Goodisl
entered Freetown with his troops, Colonel Boston Flomo (Alias Verndame) was instructed
to meet him with his troops 7484
3353. The memo reports that on 5 January 1999, the RUF launched a successful attack on
Masiaka.7482 On 6 January 1999, the troops were resting at the Waterloo Displaced and
Refugees Camp. On 7 January 1999, they attacked the ECOMOG position at a Secondary
School in Waterloo. In the afternoon, "the enemies communicated with us through letter that
they doesn’t want to figth [sic] any longer with us".7488
3354. On 8 January 1999, the troops launched a second attack on ECOMOG in Waterloo,
causing ECOMOG to evacuate to Port Loko, and that on 9 January 1999, the troops
deployed at Hastings. At Hastings, they found ECOMOG in Jui and Kosso town, but despite
daily attacks, were unable to repulse enemy attacks as ECOMOG was being continually
reinforced with arms and manpower. 1484
3355. The memo notes further that, on 15 January 1999:
It was agreed that the men in Freetown and the men at our point were to do joint operation
on Jui and Kosso town. The Freetown men schedule to attack Jui and we to attack Kosso
town, that night we attacked Kosso town clear the enemies but the Freetown men never turn
up, therefore the enemies with the support of the Alpha Jet drove us Hom Kosso town.7488
3356. The memo reports that, on 18 January 1999, Guinean troops from Port Loko attacked
Waterloo with shelling and firing. They were able to occupy Waterloo from that evening to
the morning, around 3.OOam.7488
7484 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25494.
7488 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, hom the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25494.
7488 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25494.
7484 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25494.
7488 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25495.
7488 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, Hom the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25495.

---- End of Page 1147 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / 18 May 2012

5 Cj 2.4 0
3357. The memo notes that the problems at the frontline include:
(1) We have not yet connected physically with our brothers in Freetown.
(2) Menpower indeed to be engaged on this Urban Warfare.
(3) The strategic positions of the enemies mainly Port Loko, Lungi, Jui, Kabala are
delaying our progress. 4484
3358. The memo is signed by both "Lieut Raymond Kartewu, Black Guard Adjutant" and
"Major Christ A. Mannah, Overall I.O. commander?7488
3359. Exhibit P-149 was part of a series of documents seized from an RUF Office in Kono
District in 2001 and admitted through TFl-567. Prosecution witness Tariq Malik, who was
the Chief of Evidence Unit for the OTP from April 2003 to the date of his testimony in
January 2009.7489 He testified that, based on supporting affidavits, it was clear that the 22
RUF documents were seized by the Special branch officers and CID officers from an RUF
office located in Kono District. Exhibit P-149 is one of those documents.7440
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
3360. Exhibit P-067 is a 1999 report to Foday Sankoh by the Black Guards, authored by
Junior Vandi, a Black Guard commander. 7444 Exhibit P-067 recounts the operation to capture
Kono and Makeni led by Colonel Rambo and notes that alter the fall of Makeni, Rambo
received Superman to join the operation. Rambo and Superman:
extended the operation to Port-Loko as far as Waterloo and Kambia axis.
Furthermore, Col Rambo also tried his level best to link up with the other brothers that
entered Freetown, but the Freetown operation was not coordinated as the said Commander
Black Jah was nor going by the instruction from the High Command. When they retreated
from Freetown, the BFC met them and told them to present a comprehensive report `
pertaining the whole Freetown operation, but they deliberately fail to do so. 7492

4484 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25495.
7**8 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd TNF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25495.
4489 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, p. 22920.
4440 Tariq Malik, Transcript 19 January 2009, pp. 22968-22970, 22981.
4444 TF 1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2406 (CS): Vandi authored it and he was a Black Guard
commander; TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903.
4442 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard

---- End of Page 1148 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X JQ 18 May 2012

36; *2;;,1
Defence Exhibit D-OO9
3361. Exhibit D-OO9 is a salute report to Sankoh from Bockarie, dated 26 September 1999,
in which Bockarie recounts events after Sankoh leit Sierra Leone in November 1996 to the
date of the report. lt details after the capture of Makeni in December 1998, and a successful
attack on Port Loko led by Boston Flomo (a.k.a. Rambo).7493 lt then states:
Meanwhile, the troops that entered Freetown had been cut off from the rear and were being
encircled, leaving them no way out. I was able to coordinate their operations over set and
got them to combine their forces and bulldoze from the side accessing them to the
mountains through which they took a by-pass to join our troops at Benguema and Waterloo
as JOI was occupied by ECOMOG. This is how the troops that entered Freetown were able
to retreat. Still they sustained heavy casualties including Steve Bio and SLPP chairman
Manakpaka and many others. 7444
Defence Exhibit D-084
3362. Exhibit D-084 is a Salute Report dated 27 September 1999, from Brigadier Issa H
Sesay Battleneld Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, and was tendered
into evidence through cross-examination of Prosecution Witness TF 1 -168. lt states that after
Issa Sesay, Rambo and Kallon captured Masingbi, Magburaka and Makeni:
Rambo was instructed to advance and attack Port Loko which he did, deploying his forward
defensive at the Port Loko turn-table leading to Kambia. Rambo shared the town with the
enemy for seven days. Superman pleaded that, even though Rambo had done well, he, as
battle group commander, knew the ground well and should take over the ground. He said
that he had received intelligence that the leader had been moved to Lungi and wanted to
advance as far as Lungi and rescue the leader.
At this time our forces Freetown were under enemy cut off from the rear and were in
danger of being boxed-in and either captured alive or killed.
Rambo was withdrawn from his operation in Port Loko and instructed to open a through-
way to connect with our men in Freetown. Rambo then attacked and captured Masiaka,
advanced and captured RDF, and attacked the Guineans at Waterloo, engaging them in
combat for four days and four nights.
The Guineans wrote us a letter asking for their safe passage back to Guinea, saying that
they were taking their hands out of the war. I replied, denying their request. [...]
A few days later I monitored the sound of heavy bombardment from the direction of Port
Loko. On inquiring, I was informed that our troops had dissolved the ground and that the
Commander", ERN 9679. Note that the report had previously described the BFC as Brigadier Issa Sesay (ERN
9679).
7493 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 7, ERN 9664.
7494 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", pp. 7-8, ERN 9664-9665.

---- End of Page 1149 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T %/ gr"?) 18 May 2012

ga 2;+1
enemy were advancing towards Gberi Junction. I asked for Superman and was informed
that he was in Lunsar and not on the ground that he had asked for and been given.
The Guinean convoy bulldozed all the way to Masiaka where my position was also ,
bulldozed. [U.]
Superman asked to joirr Rambo at Waterloo. He sighted the fact that as the SLA
Commanders had operated with him before he would be able to consolidate them and
exercise command and control over them. Taking into consideration his status as Battle
Group and the logic behind his explanations, I gave the OK for Superman to join Rambo in
Waterloo.
At Waterloo Superman incited SLA Commanders and soldiers against Rambo and
generally did his best to cause a break-down in command on the ground. 7495
Prosecution Exhibit P-1 1 1
3363. Exhibit P-111 is a BBC News Article, titled ‘"Africa Battle for Sierra Leone", dated
` January 6, 1999, reporting that rebels in Freetown had captured the State House government
building and a number of other installations. It also records that, in an interview with the
» BBC, rebel leader Sam "Bukari" referred to "his troops" in Freetown. The article states that
earlier, "Gibrill Massaquoi, a senior rebel leader", also telephoned the BBC to give the
rebels’ view of the conflict, stating that "rebel arms forces and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone were in complete control of the city and taking over the reins of
govemment".74%
Prosecution Exhibits P-279A and P—279B
3364. Exhibit P-279A is a clip from the radio broadcast BBC Focus on Africa, dated 6
January 1999, recording a telephone interview by BBC reporter Robin VVhite with "an RUF
rebel commander calling himself Colonel Sesay". Exhibit P—279B is a transcript of the clip.
The exhibits record Colonel Sesay claiming to be one of the people who entered Freetown in
the early hours of 6 January 1999, and stating that "we, the combined forces of the AFRC
and the RUF" had "again overthrown the SLPP government".7497 Colonel Sesay also states
that his forces had occupied the State House, from which he was speaking to the BBC, and
were controlling the entirety of Freetown. The exhibits record Colonel Sesay stating that
7*95 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, dated 27 September 1999", pp. 9-10, ERN
7764-7765.
74% Exhibit P-1 1 1, "BBC News Article, World: Africa Battle for Sierra Leone, January 6, 1999", p. l.
7497 Exhibit P-279A, "Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517"; Exhibit P-
279B, "Transcript - Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517", p. 2.

---- End of Page 1150 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/'J qw 18 May 2012

3% 243
there were 15,000 armed men involved in the Freetown attack and that they had entered
Freetown from the ‘jungle", the hills overlooking Freetown.7498 Colonel Sesay notes that the
troops met little resistance from ECOMOG on the takeover of the city. VVhen asked about
potential ECOMOG troops coming from the airport at Lungi, Colonel Sesay states that the
rebels had not yet captured Lungi, but "the motion is on the way to capture Lungi". On who
the new leader ofSierra Leone would be, Colonel Sesay states:
I cannot tell you now. I cannot tell you now, because it is a combined forces, a combined
forces. We have the RUF, you have the AF RC, the former Revolutionary council, overwg
3365. Colonel Sesay also told White that the most senior brigadier for the operation was
Brigadier TAB Yaya, a former PLO2. 7500
3366. Issa Sesay confirmed in his testimony that the "Colonel Sesay" speaking on this
recording is Colonel FAT Sesay, an SLA.750[
Prosecution Exhibit P-349A
3367. Exhibit P-349A is an audio recording of a BBC radio broadcast during the Freetown
attack on 7 January 1999. It indicates that the rebel fighters are a mixture of the RUF and the
disbanded Sierra Leonean army but that majority of the fighters at the centre of town are
from the former Sierra Leonean army. It also notes that the rebels are in control of the State
House, and that some of the prisoners released from Pademba Road are armed.7502
Deliberations A
3368. Before tuming to the substance of the parties’ submissions, the Trial Chamber sets
out some of the undisputed facts conceming the military movements of the various RUF and
AFRC contingents in December 1998 and January 1999.
mg Exhibit P-279A, "Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517"; Exhibit P-
279B, "Transcript - Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517", p. 3.
mq Exhibit P-279A, "Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517"; Exhibit P-
279B, "Transcript - Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517", p. 4.
7500 Exhibit P-279A, "Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D00005l7"; Exhibit P-
279B, "Transcript - Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517", p. 4.
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46753.
7502 Exhibit P-349A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip - D0000513, 7 January 1999"; see also Exhibit P-349B,
"Transcript, BBC Focus on Africa Clip - D0000513, 7 January 1999", p. 23608.

---- End of Page 1151 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \% GQ 18 May 2012

3**1 24%-
3369. After the Waterworks meeting, on or around 17 December 1998, RUF and AFRC
forces led by Issa Sesay, Boston Flomo and others commenced an attack on Koidu Town
and succeeded in capturing the town.75O3 Forces led by Boston Flomo from the 2"d Brigade
then moved towards the west, capturing Masingbi on 22 December 1998,7504 while forces
led by Issa Sesay captured Magburaka on 23 December 1998.7505 Troops led by Sesay,
F lomo, and others coordinated to capture Makeni on the following day.75O6 At the same time,
in late December 1998, troops under the direction of Bockarie mounted unsuccessful attacks
on the Segbwema—Dam axis, towards Kenema.75O7 The attacks were led by the lst Brigade
commander, CO Dems (a.k.a. Monkey Brown), and Karmoh Kanneh (a.k.a. Eagle).75U8
7503 Exhibit P-093, "Comprehensive Report from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay, Battle Field Commander, to Major
General Sam Bockarie, Chief of Defence Staff, 26 January 1999", p. 3, ERN 25505; Exhibit D-178, "Special
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999", para.
3; Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/ SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa Sesay
on the Take Over of Koidu, January 26 1999"; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44082—44083; Charles
Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37918-37919; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12269-12272;
Defence Final Trial Brief para. 624. (
75O4Exhibit P-093, "Comprehensive Report from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay, Battle Field Commander, to Major
General Sam Bockarie, Chief of Defence Staff 26 January l999", p. 4, ERN 25506; Defence Final Trial Brief,
para. 625; compare Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21555-21557 (the witness monitored
a radio message from Issa Sesay stating that RUF fighters were heading towards Masingbi, but he dates these
attacks as occurring between 15 and 20 December 1998).
7505 Exhibit P-093, "Comprehensive Report from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay, Battle Field Commander, to Major
General Sam Bockarie, Chief of Defence Staff, 26 January l999", p. 5, ERN 25507; Issa Sesay, Transcript 29
July 2010, p. 45051; Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46733; Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 10; Defence Final
Trial Brief para. 626.
7506 Exhibit P-093, "Comprehensive Report from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay, Battle Field Commander, to Major
General Sam Bockarie, Chief of Defence Staff, 26 January 1999", p. 5, ERN 25507; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8
July 2010, pp. 44082-44083; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37918-37919; Alice Pyne,
Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12269-12272; Defence Final Trial Brief para. 626; compare Exhibit D-178,
"Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January
l999", para. 7 (placing the capture of Makeni on 27 December 1998).
7507 Exhibit P-430C, "Excerpts from: News article, Sierra Leone Web — Sierra Leone News Archive, December
1998 (End of Pages 5 & 6 of 8)" (reporting that Bockarie claimed the AFRC/RUF had already captured Makeni and
were battling for Kenema); Exhibit P-344A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000550 30 December
1998"; Exhibit P-344B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000550 30 December 1998"
(reporting on an offensive mounted by "Sierra Leonean rebels" in Kenema and stating that on 29 December
1999, the rebels suffered heavy casualties at Tongolu village as they tried to attack ECOMOG and Kamajor
positions at Daru); Exhibit P-346A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000539, 31 December 1998";
Exhibit P-346B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000539, 31 December 1998 CMS
PGS 23602-23603" (On 30 December 1998, the RUF and AFRC attacked Segbwema town, 29 miles to Kenema.
ECOMOG and the Kamajors were able to repel the rebels, with 47 killed); Exhibit P-384, "The Inquirer, Vol.7,
No.250, Thousands Trapped In Freetown Foday Sankoh Flown to Guinea; Rebels Still Burning Buildings,
Wednesday, 13 January 1999 (CMS NOS. 22514-22515)" (The exhibit states that rebel attempts to take Kenema
suffered a setback on 12 January 1999 when they were beaten back by Kamajor forces); Isaac Mongor,
Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5824 (When asked whether he was able to accomplish his assignment, as
determined in the meeting in November 1998 in Buedu before the offensive, to attack Joru and Zimmi, Mongor
stated that he was able to occupy Joru for three days before his group was pushed out. He was not able to
advance to the next target, Zimmi).
7508 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008. pp. 20222-20224 (according to the plan, the witness was

---- End of Page 1152 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI,-03-01-T Gu 18 May 2012

Bmw->
3370. Around early or mid-December 1998, the group of predominantly AFRC fighters
based in Northem Sierra Leone, led by SAJ Musa, moved towards Freetown.75119 On 22
December 1998, this group of rebels attacked Waterloo, about 20 miles from Freetown,75111
and then attacked Benguema.7511 On 23 December 1998, SAJ Musa died at Benguema.7512
Following SAJ Musa's death, Gullit took over as commander of the fighters.7513 On 3
January 1999, the troops captured Hastings.7514
3371. ln the early hours of 6 January 1999, troops headed by Gullit advanced towards
Freetown from Allen Town, passing through Calaba Town, Brewery, and then through
Wellington Old Road and New Freetown-Waterloo road into Freetown attacking from the
east of the city penetrated the centre of Freetown, where they opened Pademba Road Prison,
freeing hundred of prisoners, including the former president J S Momoh, the former RUF
spokesman Gibril Massaquoi, and Steve Bio, the elder brother of Maada Bio, former leader
of the NPRC, and many members of the RUF and AF RC.7515 By nightfall, the area around p

to go to Baiima with Eagle, Manawai and the lst brigade commander from the RUF, CO Denis, a.k.a. Monkey
Brown. The command was to attack Bunumbu, Segbwema, Daru, T ondola, Bendu Junction, Jomukafebu,
Kumbema and all the way to Kenema); Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1 1082-1 1085 (the witness was
told that a war plan was drawn at Waterworks for a major offensive which will include the lst and 2nd brigades
to go and attack Kono and the Bunumbu-Segbwema axis, respectively); Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May
2008, pp. 9423-9424, 9426-9427 (the witness, a.k.a. Eagle, was assigned during the meeting at Waterworks to
attack Segbwema and Daru, towards Kenema, from where they were to proceed towards the southern province).
1509 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3211-3213; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April
2008, p. 8224.
75111 Exhibit D-178, "Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone, 7 January l999", para. 4; Exhibit P-308, "UNSC, Special Report Of the SG On the UNOMSIL,
S/1999/20, 7 January 1999, Paras 3-4, 6(Part),7 (Part), 8, 10, 14 (Except the First Sentence and Underlined
Portions, 18-20, 25", para. 4; Exhibit P-340A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000524, 22
December l998"; see also Exhibit P-340B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000524, 22
December 1998 CMS PG 23589".
7511 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8243-8244; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February
2008, p. 3214; Exhibit D-177, "Media Communique, A Compilation of News/Press Releases of ECOMOG, Vol.
1, No. 1, Sept~Dec 1998, Freetown, December 1998 - DCT 23", p. 30.
7512 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan; Decision on Judicial notice, 23 March 2009, Annex
A, Fact 13.
7513 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8247; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p.
3217; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 615.
7514 Exhibit D-178, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary General on the UN Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999 - DCT l00", p. 2; Exhibit P-347A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 -
D0000528, 4 January l999"; Exhibit P-347B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000528,
4 January 1999 — CMS PGS 23604-23605" (noting that there is fighting between the RUF and AFRC and
ECOMOG around Hastings); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3219 (After the conversation
between Bockarie and Gullit concerning waiting for Bockarie's reinforcements, they attacked Hastings but were
( not able to capture York); TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12604-12605 (Superman informed the
witness's group that Ba2zy's forces had attacked Hastings and were ready to enter Freetown).
7515 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43929.

---- End of Page 1153 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 6u 18 May 2012
g .-V A / 1

392qL
the State House was in control of the rebels.75l6 Meanwhile, after the capture of Makeni,
commanders under the direction of Bockarie, including Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman),
Boston F lomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo) and Komba Gbundema, left westwards towards
Freetown, attacking Lunsar,75l7 Port Loko,75l8 Masiaka,75 19 and Waterloo.752O
3372. Gullit's forces held the city centre for four days until they were forced to withdraw to
the suburbs of Freetown by counterattacks.752l The rebel forces were flushed out from the
three densely populated eastern suburbs of Kissy, Wellington and Calaba Town after three
weeks.7522 On 24 February 1999, ECOMOG succeeded in expelling the rebels from
Waterloo.7523
75 16 Exhibit D-178, "Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone, 7 January 1999", para. 10; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8270-8280; Perry
Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3224-3226.
W7 Exhibit P-345A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000549, 30 December 1998"; see also Exhibit
P-345B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000549, 30 December 1998 - CMS PGS
23600-23601"; Exhibit P-348A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 - D0000528, 4 January 1999"; Exhibit
P-348B, "Trar1script - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 - D0000528, 4 January 1999 - CMS PGS 23606-
23607" (stating that there is an ongoing offensive in areas of Lunsar); TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp.
12594-12595; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4553 (Lansana testified that he was in Lunsar
with Superman waiting for reinforcements from Kono when RUF and AFRC forces attacked Freetown on 6
January 1999).
mg Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 7; Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from
Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999 -
00007756 — 00007768", p. 9; Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44168-44169; see also Defence Final Trial
Brief, para. 628; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 11, 13.
75 19 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 00025494; TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp.
12604-12605 (When TF 1-375 had reached Masiaka, Superman was at Gberi Junction); see also Defence Final
Trial Brief, para. 632.
7520 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25494 (On 6 January 1999, the troops were resting at
Waterloo displaced and Refugees Camp. On 7 January 1999, they attacked the ECOMOG position at a
Secondary School in Waterloo); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5819-5820 (Rambo and other
fighters in advanced with Superman to Waterloo after Makeni; they then advanced towards Jui, in the Hastings
area); Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44168-44169 (RUF Rambo and Superman attacked Port Loko after
the AFRC attacked Freetown. After the attack on Port Loko failed, Bockarie ordered them to advance towards
Waterloo); see also Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 636; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 13;
752] Exhibit D-191, "Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Obseryer Mission in Sierra
Leone, 4 March 1999", para. 2.
7522 Exhibit P-328, "Human Rights Watch Report, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape,
July l999", p. 2, ERN 23000; Exhibit P-356A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 - D0000507, 22 January
1999"; see also Exhibit P-356B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 - D0000507, 22 January
1999 - CMS PGS 23627-23628" (stating that ECOMOG had control of the main road at Kissy and some parts of
Kissy, and full control of Kissy Town itself and the rebels had retreated up to the hills of the Kissy area of
Freetowrr); Exhibit P-357A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000508, 23 January 1999"; see also
Exhibit P-357B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000508, 23 January 1999 - CMS PGS

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N 391%}
(i) Evidentiary issues
3373. As a preliminary issue, the Trial Chamber notes that in support of its argument that
Bockarie "coordinated" 7524 the troops in Freetown, and that those troops took orders from
Bockarie, the Prosecution places some weight on documentary and testimonial evidence that
during and after the Freetown invasion on 6 January 1999, Bockarie spoke to the BBC and
other international media outlets and claimed that it was "his troops" who had entered
Freetown and that he had authority over these troops.7525 The Trial Chamber considers that
Bockarie's own statements to the international media is of doubtful value in determining
whether Bockarie did, in fact, have command over the troops in Freetown, or whether he
was working with Gullit. Both Abu Keita and Sam Kolleh testified that Bockarie made a call
to the BBC during the Freetown assault in which he claimed to be in Freetown during the
January 1999 attack and have control over the forces in the city, when he was in fact in
Buedu.7526 Nevertheless, the evidence does indicate Bockarie's intention to exercise
23629-23630" (The exhibits state that ECOMOG has most of Freetown under control, and the AFRC/RUF
rebels have been driven back out to the east towards Wellington and Calaba Town, where they are trapped).
7523 Exhibit D-191, "Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone, 4 March 1999", para. 3.
7524 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 518.
7525 See Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 507, 510, 554-564; TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp.
15707, 15717-15719 (On around 3 January 1999, Bockarie had used his satellite phone to inform the BBC that
his troops would be in Freetown within three days time. He was able to give this timeframe because he and
Gu11it had already spoken and Gu11it had told Bockarie his position at that time, saying that he was "entering"
Freetown. When the witness heard on FM radio that the rebels had entered Freetown, Bockarie told the BBC that
"he was a man of his word. He had given three days that his men would enter Freetown and indeed they had
entered Freetown"); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8286 (Bobson Sesay stated that after
taking control of Pademba Road prison and when he returned to the State House, he heard on international media
Bockarie announcing that his troops led by Gullit had ousted the government of Ahmed Tejah Kabbah, released
prisoners from Pademba prison and were based at the State House); Exhibit P-430C, "Excerpts from: News
article, Sierra Leone Web ~ Sierra Leone News Archive, December 1998 (End of Pages 5 & 6 of 8)" (Bockarie
threatened to attack Freetown on New Year's Day, unless the Kabbah Government agreed to negotiate with the
rebels. Bockarie claimed the AFRC/RUF had captured Waterloo and Benguema); Exhibit P-085B, "Audio CD —
Radio Broadcast of Sam Bockarie on the BBC World Service's Focus on Africa"; see also Exhibit P-085B,
"Unofticia1 Transcript - Audio CD - Radio Broadcast of Sam Bockarie on the BBC World Service's Focus on
Africa" (In an interview by Robin White with Sam Bockarie on the BBC World Service's Focus on Africa dated
8 January 1999, Bockarie states that the troops in Freetown were obeying his orders); Foday Lansana, Transcript
22 February 2008, pp. 4554-4555 (Lansana testified that on 6 January 1999, he recalled hearing Sam Bockarie
on BBC radio being interviewed by Robin White. In this interview, Bockarie said that he had received a radio
communication from his commander, Brigadier Gullit, in Freetown. Bockarie also said in the interview that he
had received information that Tongo had fallen to the RUF and Junta); Exhibit P-111, "BBC News Article,
World: Africa Battle for Sierra Leone, 6 January 1999", p. 1 (in an interview with the BBC, rebel leader Sam
"Bukari" referred to "his troops" in Freetown. The article states that earlier, "Gibri1 Massaquoi, a senior rebel
1eader", also telephoned the BBC to give the rebe1s’ view of the coniiict, stating that "rebe1 arms forces and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone were in complete control of the city and taking over the reins of
government").
7526 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020 (He and Bockarie were listening to the programme "Focus
on Africa" on the BBC on 6 January 1999 and heard a commander calling from Freetown announcing that he

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X Gu 18 May 2012 /

3 Q 2**1-%
command over the troops in Freetown and his desire to be seen as the leader of the
combined forces.
3374. Neither does the Trial Chamber consider, as the Prosecution alleges, that the call
made by AFRC member FAT Sesay to the BBC on 6 January that the attackers were a
"combined" force of RUF and AF RC indicate the dependence of the Freetown troops on the
RUF ,7527 although it does indicate the interest of the fighters in Freetown in being seen as a
combined force. It is not disputed that both RUF and AF RC elements were involved in the
January 1999 Freetown attack,7528 and the evidence unequivocally establishes that RUF
fighters were amongst the troops that entered Freetown,7529 just as there were AF RC groups
was in control of the State House. Keita testified that Bockarie became angry and called Issa Sesay and Morris
Kallon, asking them how they allowed anyone other than himself to speak to the BBC. Bockarie then called the
BBC on his satellite phone and shot a weapon, telling the BBC that he was at the State House although he was
actually still in Buedu); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48468-48471 (Bockarie also told the
BBC that his forces captured Freetown, but that was a lie. Bockarie himself was in Buedu. The reason why
Bockarie told the BBC that his forces were in control of Freetown was because he was flamboyant, "full of big
show", and a boaster); see also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26227-26228 (One of the
Accused's security personnel told the Accused that he heard on Bockarie amrouncing over BBC radio that his
men had attacked Freetown. The Accused instructed his security personnel to contact Bockarie, who explained
that he only said that on the radio for "mora1e" and to take "some claim for it").
7527 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 518; Exhibit P-279A, "Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999
(Audio File) - D0000517"; Exhibit P-279B, "Transcript - Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999
(Audio File) - D00005 17", p. 4 (The exhibits record Colonel Sesay claiming to be one of the people who entered
Freetown in the early hours of 6 January 1999, and stating that "we, the combined forces of the AFRC and the
RUF" had "again overthrown the SLPP government" On who the new leader of Sierra Leone would be, Colonel
Sesay states "I cannot tell you now. I cannot tell you now, because it is a combined forces, a combined forces.
We have the RUF, you have the AFRC, the former Revolutionary council, over").
7528 The Prosecution and Defence agreed that "[o]n about 6 January 1999, inter alia, RUF and AFRC forces
attacked Freetown" (Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact 31). The Defence has indicated that .
"[t]he admission is simply a factual recognition that there may have been RUF elements that participated in the
AFRC attack on Freetown. It says nothing about what the RUF may have done as a cohesive organization, or
about whether or not the RUF sent reinforcements to Waterloo or the Freetown environs in the days after the 6
January invasion, etc" (Defence Reply to Prosecution Response to Defence Application for Judicial Notice of
Adjudicated Facts from the AFRC Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B), 24 February 2009, para. 15).
7529 Exhibit P-364, "Restricted Revolutionary United Front - Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Nominal Roll of Trained
RUF Personne1", p. 22057 (indicating that four RUF fighters with the rank of private were captured by
ECOMOG in Freetown in January and February 1999); Exhibit P-349A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip -
D0000513, 7 January l999"; Exhibit P-349B, "Transcript, BBC Focus on Africa Clip - D0000513, 7 January
l999", p. 23608 (indicating that the rebel fighters were mixed ex-SLA and RUF but that majority of the fighters
at the centre of town were from the former Sierra Leonean army); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p.
3233 (Kamara explained that AF RC, RUF and STF troops were present in Freetown); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1
November 2010, pp. 48451, 48453-48454 (SA.1 Musa's armed men consisted of mainly SLA but also 20-25 RUF
members); Allusein Conteh, Transcript 30 January 2009, pp. 23998-23999 (Conteh, a double amputee, testified
that on 8 January 1999 combatants started harassing civilians in Kissy. He concluded that they belonged to the
RUF because they were not wearing uniforms; they came in plain clothes and had young girls with them. One of
the members of the gang was a small boy named Kelle, who told him that he had been captured eight years ago);
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8202 (Gullit established the Red Lion Battalion composed
of RUF, SLA, STF and former NPFL fighters which was part of the group which attacked Freetown). See also
Provision of Military Persomrel: Allegations Related to the Red Lion Battalion.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012

» Zeizkri
working with or under the command of Bockarie.753O The Trial Chamber notes that the
factual matter at issue which is relevant to the responsibility of the Accused is not whether
members of the RUF organisation participated in the Freetown assault but the involvement
of Bockarie in the Freetown operation after the formulation of the plan designed by Bockarie
and the Accused.
3375. For similar reasons, the Trial Chamber does not consider the presence of a group led
by O-Five, referred to by the Prosecution as the Red Lion Battalion; two RUF radio
operators, Perry Kamara and Alfred Brown; bodyguards of the RUF radio operators; RUF
fighters freed from Pademba Road Prison; and other RUF members accompanying Gullit
and SAJ Musa's forces to Freetown as conclusive proof of the RUF 's contribution to the
Freetownml Various witnesses have testified that some of these persons joined the group
led by Gullit and SAJ Musa as part of a group led by O-Five arriving in Colonel Eddie
Town around September 1998, including Perry Kamara and Alfred Brown,7532 while others
were RUF members who had gone into hiding after the ECOMOG Intervention but rejoined
SAJ Musa's group as they travelled from Koinadugu to Rosos.7533 These persons joined
Gullit and SAJ Musa's group independently of the plan designed by Bockarie and the
Accused. Similarly, while it is not contested that prisoners released from Pademba Road
7530 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3245 (The group in Waterloo, led by inter alia, Morris
Kallon, Issa Sesay and Denis Mingo, comprised AFRC, RUF and some STF troops).
7531 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 529, 532-546.
7532 Perry Kamara testified that he was sent by Bockarie in August 1998 to Koinadugu District to join SAJ Musa
and Superman, and then subsequently to join Gullit at Colonel Eddie Ground: Perry Kamara, Transcript 5
February 2008, pp. 3175-3176. Note that although Kamara testified that he and Brown were sent in accordance
with a plan developed with the Accused in mid-1998 to take Kono and Freetown, the Trial Chamber has rejected
his evidence that the Accused was involved: see Military Operations: Operation Fitti-Fatta. According to
Kamara, the group left Koinadugu for Rosos in September 1998, and they arrived in Rosos before 28 September
1998: Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3188-3190. O-Five was the head of the group that left
Koinadugu: Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3244. See also Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp.
44068-44069, 44086-44087; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44908—44909; 18 August 2010, pp. 46631-46632 (In
July 1998, Bockarie sent three radio operators, Alfred Brown, King Perry and another operator whose name
Sesay could not remember, to Koinadugu in July 1998 at a time when SAJ Musa was in charge of the area,
together with Gullit. Bockarie openly said he was sending them to support the operation, but he was actually
sending them to spy. The operators remained with SAJ Musa's forces until February 1999). See also Provision of
Military Persomrel: Allegations Related to the Red Lion Battalion.
7533 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3200 ("During the period of the intervention from Freetown to
Makeni not everybody was able to follow us to go to the jungle. For example, back in Kabala some people left
their deployment in other villages and they found it difficult to go to the towns and, therefore, they hid ·
themselves in bushes so they were staying there. Therefore, they divided themselves into groups and then when
they heard that we were going along attacking areas from Koinadugu to Rosos a good number of the RUF came
back and joined us. In fact, the number that we now reported to Gullit, we were more than 500. The number
increased to 500 and most of the men who came, they had guns, and we welcomed them to join us. So that was
how the number increased").

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Eq 25`9
became involved in the hostilities in the city,7534 these individuals included both former
SLAs and RUF members.7535 The evidence indicates that it was the intention of the forces
led by Gullit and SAJ Musa to free some prisoners, not a new idea from Bockarie.7536 While
these individuals did contribute to the Freetown attack, the Trial Chamber reiterates that the
factual matter at issue is the involvement of Bockarie in the Freetown operation after the
formulation of the plan designed by Bockarie and the Accused.
3376. Further, the Trial Chamber notes that in support of its argument concerning a
‘reuniting’ of the troops under Bockarie's command and the AFRC troops based in the north
of Sierra Leone after the death of SAJ Musa, the Prosecution cites evidence from
Prosecution and Defence witnesses that the troops under Bockarie's command received the
news that Gullit had captured the State with ‘jubilation".7537 The Trial Chamber finds that
this evidence is not probative of full coordination between Bockarie and Gullit in the initial
assault on Freetown, particularly that evidence showing that the positive reaction to the news
was induced with threats, or that it stemmed from a belief, which the witness believed to be
mistaken, that the Freetown attack was a joint operation between the RUF and SAJ
Musa.7538
7534 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, p. 5824 (Mongor testihed that when he was monitoring the radio
while the troops were in Freetown, he heard a number of exchanges between Gullit and Bockarie. He heard
Gullit tell Bockarie that his group had released various members of the RUF incarcerated at Pademba Road
Prison, including Gibril Massaquoi, and that "they all joined hands together in the fighting"); Perry Kamara,
Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3227-3228 (When the fighters who had been imprisoned in Pademba Road were
released, they were "even more angry than us" and engaged in more killing, burning, and amputation, because
"they had been jailed for life"); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8934-8935 (Bobson
Sesay testified that Gibril Massaquoi maintained command when he was released from Pademba Road; he
resumed his position as a colonel, and he was "one of the senior commanders who had manpower", and having
"some boys who had been released from Pademba Road who were with him", "he maintained his command as
colonel and he had men under his control in Freetown").
7535 See Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8280-8284; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February
2008, p. 3227.
7536 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8835, 8837 (explaining that the execution of 24 SLA
soldiers, the desire to reinstate the army, and the desire to release the RUF and AFRC political detainees at
Pademba Road Prison were all factors that led to the invasion of Freetown by SAJ Musa's troops).
7537 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 508; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5822-5823 (Mongor
testified that when he and his troops heard on the BBC on 6 January 1999 that the Gullit's troops had entered
Freetown, "we were happy and we were jubilating in all the areas"); TF 1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp.
15718-15719 (when the witness heard on FM radio that the rebels had entered Freetown, Bockarie spoke to the
BBC on a satellite phone and those around him were "dancing around"); DCT-068, 'Transcript 11 March 2010, p.
37145 (DCT-068 first heard about the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown from BBC's ‘Focus’ segment while
he was in Bomaru. There was jubilation among the RUF at hearing the news of the invasion); John Vincent,
'Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38134; see Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 143.
7538 TFl-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23705-23707 (On 6 January 1999, the civilian population of
Makeni was asked by the RUF to dance and rejoice because Freetown had been captured and there were

---- End of Page 1158 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T W 18 May 2012

3QzSI
3377. Finally, the Trial Chamber notes that it has taken judicial notice of the following
Adjudicated Fact from the AF RC trial:
Following heavy assaults from ECOMOG, the troops were forced to retreat from Freetown. This failure
marked the end of the AFRC offensive as the troops were running out of ammunition. While the AFRC
managed a controlled retreat, engaging ECOMOG and Kamajor troops who were blocking their way, RUF
reinforcements arrived in Waterloo. However, the RUF troops were either unwilling or unable to provide the
necessary support to the AFRC troops.7539
3378. The Trial Chamber recalls that each of the judicially noticed adjudicated facts from
the AF RC Trial7540 is subject to a rebuttable presumption of truth, and could be challenged
by the parties during the course of the trial.7544 The Trial Chamber considers that by
submitting that RUF reinforcements sent by Bockarie arrived in Waterloo before Gullit
retreated from Freetown and that they attempted and partially succeeded in connecting with
the troops in the city,7542 the Prosecution has sufficiently challenged the truth of the asserted
fact as to require the Trial Cha.mber's re-consideration of the matters in question.
(ii) Relationship between Bockarie and Gullit prior to the death of SAJ Musa
3379. One of the key arguments raised by the Defence in response to the Prosecution's
allegation that Gullit coordinated with and took orders from Bockarie during the Freetown
operation is that from around April 1998, when he led a break-away group of AF RC soldiers
north to Koinadugu to join SAJ Musa, Gullit did not have a good relationship with and no
longer took instructions from Bockarie,7543 having fallen out over Bockarie's treatment of
Johnny Paul Koroma and the AF RC as a whole.7544 It submits that Gullit left Kailahun under
repercussions if the civilians refused to do so); John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38134 (Vincent
noted that some of the RUF authorities, even the witness, believed the Freetown operation to be a joint operation
between the RUF and SAJ Musa. He stated "it was only later that 1 got to know that RUF did not enter Freetown.
So we were all jubilating when that particular invasion took place, but it was only later that we were convinced
that they were not part of it").
7539 Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact, Fact 15.
7540 Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009. However, the Trial Chamber dismissed Motions from both the
Prosecution and Defence for judicial notice of adjudicated facts from the RUF Trial. See Prosecutor v Taylor,
SCSL-04-01-T-987, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts from the RUF
Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B) argl Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts from
the RUF Judgement, 17 June 2010 [Taylor Decision on Judicial Notice of RUF Adjudicated Facts].
7544 Taylor Decision on Judicial Notice of AF RC Adjudicated Facts, para. 27; Prosecutor v. Popovic ct. al., IT-
05-88-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts with Annex, 26 September
2006 [Popovic Decision on Adjudicated Facts], para. 21.
7542 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 540.
75*3 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 152.
7544 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 605; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1 18.

---- End of Page 1159 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

ga :>.§2.
acrimonious circumstances after the RUF took diamonds from him, and describes a "rift"
between the men from this point on.7545
3380. The Prosecution accepts that from October 1998, when SAJ Musa fell out with
Superman and moved to Rosos until SAJ Musa's death at Benguema, SAJ Musa and his
group remained outside of Bockarie's control.7546 However, although the Prosecution
concedes that while SAJ Musa did not recognise Bockarie's leadership,7547 it contends that
Gullit himself maintained a cooperative relationship with Bockarie,7548 having been iiiends
with both Bockarie and Issa Sesay.7549 The Prosecution maintains that when Gullit was in
the Northern Jungle, he continued to communicate with RUF commanders through radio
operators,755O and through Brigadier Mani, a senior ofHcer of the SLA who had also joined
the command of SAJ Musa and Gullit in Kurubonla.755l The Prosecution alleges that Gullit
briefed Bockarie and Issa Sesay about SAJ Musa's military operations at the time of SAJ
Musa's move to Colonel Eddie Town.7552
3381. Both Prosecution and Defence witnesses agreed that during the Junta period,
Bockarie and Gullit had an amicable relationship. TF1-371 stated that, at least while Gullit
was still in Kailahun after the Intervention, Gullit and Bockarie were "very good
1iiends".7553 Even Issa Sesay confirmed that Bockarie saw Gullit as his Iiiend "Irom the time
they overthrew"7554 and was willing to work with Gullit, unlike SAJ Musa with whom he
did not see "eye to eye".7555
3382. The Trial Chamber heard consistent evidence of an incident shortly after the
Intervention when Bockarie conHscated diamonds in the possession of Gullit, and on some
7545 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 117.
7546 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 470, 476.
7547 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 497-499.
7548 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 501.
7549 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 502.
7550 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 472, 501.
7554 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 473; see also TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2385-2386 (CS)
(In early 1998, when Bockarie was appointed Chief of Defence Staff, several SLAs, including Brigadier Mani,
decided not to work with Bockarie).
7552 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 473, 501.
7553 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2365-2366 (CS),
7554 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46739.
5555 rsss Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46738, 46750.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QQ 18 May 2012
\

_; 92,5 5
accounts, sent Issa Sesay to Kailahun to forcibly effect this confiscation.755° However,
witnesses differed as to the effect of this incident on the relationship between Bockarie and
Gullit. Several witnesses testified that it led to Gullit's rejection of Bockarie's command.
Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that while Gullit initially told SAJ Musa that Bockarie had
released him from Kailahun because he had told Bockarie that he could settle some disputes
that had arisen in Kono between the RUF and AFRC,7557 later, in a closed-door meeting with
Gullit and SAJ Musa, Gullit complained to SAJ Musa about the treatment he had received in
Kailahun, and wanted SAJ Musa to "advise him on the next plan".7558 Kamara testified that
Gullit, along with other AF RC commanders, moved north because they were not happy with
the order from Johnny Paul Koroma that they take orders from Bockarie.7559 Defence
witnesses Sam Kolleh and Issa Sesa both confirmed that althou Gullit was initiall
Y Y
Bockarie's friend, the incident with the diamonds caused Gullit "to go against" Bockarie.756O
On the other hand, according to TFl-371, relations generally remained cordial and Bockarie
only disciplined Gullit by ordering that he remain in Buedu.756l
3383. lsaac Mongor testified as to an entirely different reason for Gullit leaving Kailahun,
unsupported by that of the other witnesses. Mongor testified that although he was not in
Buedu7562 while Gullit and Bockarie were both there, he heard from Gullit that he and
7556 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2364-2366 (CS) (According to TF1-371, on Johnny Paul
Koroma's advice, Bockarie did mandate Issa Sesay to proceed to Kailahun, meet with Gullit and take diamonds
from him after the Intervention and Sesay did so); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8044-
8046 (When Gullit and others arrived in Mongo Bendugu, the witness attended a closed-door meeting with inter
alia Gullit and SAJ Musa at which Gullit explained to SAJ Musa about the treatment he had received in
Kailahun, and how Mosquito had taken his diamonds); Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44048-44049;
Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45005 (After Gullit arrived in Kailahun, Sesay testified that Bockarie ordered him to
take Gullit's diamonds from him, which he did near the Guinean border where Gullit had gone to buy provisions.
Note that Sesay testified in his own trial that they had found nothing on Gullit because he had already handed his
diamonds over to Bockarie, although on his evidence on cross-examination before this Trial Chamber Sesay
affirmed the later testimony, saying that he did not recall what he had testified previously: Issa Sesay, Transcript
19 August 2010, pp. 46740-46742); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, p. 48819 (Kolleh testified that
Gullit was a friend to Mosquito but that the incident with the diamonds in Kailahun "caused Gullit to go against
Mosquito").
7557 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8023-8025, 8028.
7558 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8044-8046.
7559 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 1 1.
7560 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, p. 48819; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44074—44076
(Sesay testified that from the time that Gullit left Kailahun to join SAJ Musa, he refused to take instructions from
Bockarie).
756* TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2365-2366 (cs).
7562 The witness said that he could not give any specific time frame for when Gullit was in Buedu before he
returned to Koidu.

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x

Ba 25%
Bockarie had a cordial relationship, and that the reason why Gullit went to join SAJ Musa
was to convince Musa to come to Buedu to talk.7565
3384. The weight of the evidence suggests that Gullit did leave Kailahun at least partly
because he was unhappy with certain aspects of Bockarie's command. Dauda Amna Fornie
testified that although relations between Gullit and Bockarie at Kailahun were ‘cordial’,7564
once Gullit lefi Kailahun for Kumbonla in 1998, communications between the two men
were unpleasant; Gullit "attacked" Bockarie verbally and accused Bockarie of having
disgraced Johnny Paul Koroma.7565 5
3385. However, regardless of whether Gullit's departure was acrimonious, the Trial
Chamber heard consistent evidence that he maintained contact with Bockarie, at least until
the arrival of SAJ Musa in Colonel Eddie Town, and that in these communications Gullit
updated Bockarie and Bockarie's commanders on operational matters. Alimamy Bobson
Sesay testified that Gullit spoke to Bockarie and Issa Sesay from around J uly-August
1998,7556 informing him on operations in the North and in Gbomsamba. Bockarie promised
Gullit his "full support".7567 Bobson Sesay noted that Gullit communicated with Bockarie
before the arrival of SAJ Musa to brief him about his military operations, and he himself
was present when Gullit contacted Bockarie via radio afier the Kukuna operation. According
to Bobson Sesay, whenever they had an operation, Gullit called Bockarie before even
informing SAJ Musa.7565 Bobson Sesay testified that afier the Kukuna attack, Gullit also
contacted Issa Sesay who from their monitoring appeared to be in the Kailahun axis to
explain to him about the "activities" they had undertaken.7569 Similarly, Perry Kamara, who
testified that he was sent by Bockarie to Colonel Eddie Town in August/September 1998 to
facilitate communications between Bockarie and Gullit, stated that while he was at Colonel
Eddie Town Bockarie would inform them of his movements.7570 Both Bobson Sesay and
7563 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5817-5818.
7564 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21683.
7565 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21684-21685, 21711 ("When he went [to Kurubonla]
there was communication flowing and that was not a good one between the two men; that is Gullit and
Mosquito. Gullit attacked Mosquito verbally that Mosquito had disgraced Johnny Paul and those were the things
that he, Gullit, left the Buedu area, or the Kailahun area").
7566 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8132, 8133-8134 (Gullit was previously prevented
from doing so due to difficulties with the communications equipment).
7567 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8132, 8133-8134, 8138-8142.
7568 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8217-8218.
7565 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8218-8220; Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8304.

---- End of Page 1162 ---------------------------


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3<3·2.$§
Kamara suggested that communications were not possible for some time after Gullit moved
north from Kailahun because Gullit's group lacked the communications capability.757l
3386. Foday Lansana also testified that from his position at the signal unit in Koinadugu,
he was aware that both Bockarie and Superman would also communicate with Gullit at
Rosos.7572 TFl—5l6 stated that when Gullit was in the Makeni area, and SAJ Musa and
Superman were both in Kabala, Johnny Paul Koroma instructed Gullit and SAJ Musa over
the radio to work together with the RUF as a team so that they could recapture Freetown,
and that Gullit and Bockarie maintained a "free flow" of communications after this.7573
3387. However, the Defence alleges that any allegations of collaboration between the
AFRC and the RUF in their attempts to capture Freetown are quashed by the uncontested
evidence of the radio communication gag SAJ Musa imposed between his group and the
RUF.7574 Perry Kamara testified that this gag was imposed as soon as Musa arrived at
Colonel Eddie Town, and that Musa made clear to Gullit as well as all RUF personnel that
they should not communicate to any outsiders. Musa also ensured that no RUF operator
operated the radio.7575
3388. It is clear that the communications embargo was defied by the RUF radio operators.
Issa Sesay testified that Alfred Brown, another RUF radio operator with SAJ Musa's group,
did try once to reach Bockarie when SAJ Musa's forces attacked Masiaka. SAJ Musa found
out and flogged Brown.7576 Mongor confirmed that when Superman had captured Lunsar,
Alfred Brown contacted Mongor, telling him that they were in Masiaka, that their next target
7570 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3206.
7571 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8138 (Gu11it's group had been out of communication
for some time because their communications man had run away); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p.
3205 (Kamara explained that, up to that point, the ground at Rosos did not possess the RUF radio code. By
bringing the code, Brown and Kamara rectified the "major prob1em" with communications that had existed with
Rosos previously).
7572 rpaay Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4525-4527.
7573 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6887-6888, 6930-6931.
7574 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 913, Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 135.
7575 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3211 ("when SAJ Musa arrived he said - immediately he
arrived he went to the meeting ground and said as of today he is no longer an AF RC, neither an RUF. He had
come to Gullit for them to form their own movement, therefore Gullit should not send a message anymore to
anybody. Gullit should not communicate to anybody. He said he knew now to whom he would communicate.
Then he ensured that no RUF operator operated the radio"); Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44087-44090
(Sesay confirmed that contact between RUF radio operators with Gu11it's forces ended in September 1998, when
SAI Musa forbade, by threat of execution, the RUF radio operators from going anywhere near the radio).
7576 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44090-44091.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T % R 18 May 2012

Fsq as Q-
was Waterloo and that he would contact Mongor again when they arrived there.7577 Bobson
Sesay recalled that following an announcement by Bockarie on international radio
concerning specific attacks led by SAJ Musa's group, SAJ Musa was angry with Alfred
Brown, one of the RUF radio operators, for giving information to Bockarie.7578 Defence
witnesses Sam Kolleh and John Vincent also testified that Perry Kamara himself was beaten
on account of passing information and updates on the movements of SAJ Musa's group to
Bockarie.7579
3389. However, it is not clear that communications from RUF radio operators to Bockarie
after the imposition of the communications ban were conducted with any involvement by
Gullit. According to Issa Sesay, Bockarie had sent RUF radio operators Alfred Brown and
Perry Kamara to Koinadugu to spy on the forces led by SAJ Musa and Gullit,7580 which
would indicate that Gullit may not have known of or sanctioned their communications with
Bockarie, although Sesay testified that Gullit was friends with Alfred Brown from before the
retreat from Freetown.758l
3390. According to TFl-585, Brigadier Mani used to "mediate" between SAJ Musa's
group and Bockarie.7582 Foday Lansana also referred to Brigadier Mani as "the co-ordinator
7577 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5805, 5815-5816. The Trial Chamber notes that evidence
suggests that by the time Superman had captured Lunsar, SAJ Musa's forces were already past Masiaka and
were at Waterloo: Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000523, 22 December l998";
Exhibit P-34lB, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000523, 22 December 1998 CMS
PGS 23590-23591" (the commander of Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone confirmed that there have
been rebel attacks on Kono, Masiaka and Waterloo); TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. l2594—l2595 (TF1-
375 testified that five days after taking Makeni, an advanced team led by Komba Gbundema left Superman in
Makeni and went to Lunsar); Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12603-12604 (When TFl-375 went to Lunsar, the
troops previously commanded by SAJ Musa were in Waterloo. TFl-375 heard that these forces attacked
Masiaka, and from there Waterloo, and then Benguema Barracks); Exhibit P-345A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip
from track 1 - D0000549, 30 December l998"; Exhibit P-345B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from
track 1 - D0000549, 30 December 1998 - CMS PGS 23600-2360l" (reporting on an RUF/AFRC attack on
Lunsar).
7578 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8240-8241; Taylor Decision on Judicial Notice of
AFRC Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, Fact 12 (it is an adjudicated fact that "On one occasion during the advance,
SAJ Musa and the AFRC troops heard the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) interview Sam Bockarie over
the radio. Bockarie revealed the position of the AFRC fighting forces and explained that it was RUF troops who
were approaching Freetown. Soon after, ECOMOG bombarded the area. Musa immediately contacted Sam
Bockarie, insulted him and told him that he had no right to claim that the troops approaching Freetown were
RUF troops").
7579 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48457-48458; John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp.
38l32—38l33.
7580 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44068-44069, 44086-44087; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44908-
44909; Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46631-46632.
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46739.
75*2 TFl-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15715-15716.

---- End of Page 1164 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ·"| 18 May 2012

Bq 25:%-
who used to settle disputes between the senior military officers".7583 However, neither
witness suggested that Gullit was actually communicating with Bockarie through Brigadier
Mani after the arrival of SAJ Musa. TF1—585 specifically stated that before SAJ Musa died
there was no communication between Bockarie and either SAJ Musa or Gullit; she noted
that while SAJ Musa headed the group at Rosos, Bockarie only got information about that
group through Brigadier Mani, although direct communication resumed after the death of
SAJ Musa.7584
3391. Notably, Perry Kamara, who was one of the RUF radio operators with SAJ Musa's
group, testified that when he contacted Bockarie on behalf of Gullit after Musa's death,
Bockarie admonished Kamara for not updating him with information. Bockarie then spoke
directly to Gullit and reproached him for not informing him when "you were getting ready to
take off" even though he had radio operators.7585 Kamara's evidence suggests that, whatever
the activities of the RUF radio operators, Gullit himself never informed Bockarie of his
group's advance towards Freetown.7586 As a radio operator who parficipated in the move
from Colonel Eddie Town to Freetown, the Trial Chamber considers Kamara's evidence to
be highly probative of what occurred during that advance.
3392. The Trial Chamber notes that in contrast to Perry Kamara, Foday Lansana suggested
that Bockarie was giving instructions to the troops "from Rosos" conceming their advance
to Freetown from the point when Sankoh was sentenced in late October 1998. Lansana
testified that when Bockarie heard about Sankoh being condemned in Freetown, he
instructed the Rosos troops to move on Lunsar and advance on to Freetown, and instructed
Superman's troops to attack Makeni and join the troops from Rosos. Issa Sesay and Morris
Kallon were instructed to move on Koidu Town and then Makeni.7587 Lansana testified that
he knew where other troops were moving because the groups gave each other "situation
reporrs" on their positions and progress by radio.7588 However, the Trial Chamber notes that
75*3 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4526-4528.
75*4 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15715-15716; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp.
4525-4527 (Lansana also noted that when Gullit was in the north of Sierra Leone Mani would communicate with
Bockarie, Superman and Gullitbut did not indicate whether this occurred after the communications ban imposed
by SA.} Musa).
7585 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3218.
7586 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3383 (PS) (When Kamara contacted Bockarie, Bockarie had
no idea what Gullit's troops were doing except from what he heard from commercial radio).
75*7 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4550.
75** Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4551-4552; Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4745-4746

---- End of Page 1165 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T y 18 May 2012
r

3215%
in asserting such coordination before the RUF move to Koidu Town, that is, before the death
of SA] Musa, Lansana's account is inconsistent with that of all other witnesses. The Trial
Chamber notes that Lansana did not refer at all to SA] Musa's role in the move to Freetown,
and testified on cross-examination that the troops moving from Rosos were led by Gullit, not
SA] Musa.7589 Further, Lansana was also inconsistent on some aspects of his testimony.7590
In light of the evidence of other witnesses, the Trial Chamber considers that Lansana was
likely conflating events prior to and after SA] Musa's death and does not accept that Gullit
was taking instruction from Bockarie concerning the advance to Freetown before SA]
Musa's death.
3393. Despite the indications that Gullit was disgruntled about his treatment by Bockarie
and that Gullit did not maintain communications with Bockarie after SA] Musa's arrival at
Rosos, oral accounts suggested that at the time of SA] Musa's death the generally cordial
relationship between the two men and their willingness to work together remained largely
unaffected. TF 1-585 testified that after SA] Musa's death, Bockarie stated in her presence
and in front of other RUF members that the problem was SA] Musa and as long as SA]
Musa was dead, he and Gullit had no more problems, and also that he trusted Gullit and
knew that Gullit would make it to Freetown.759l Similarly other witnesses attested to a
positive reaction by other RUF commanders on the news of Gullit taking over the leadership
of SA] Musa's group. For example, Isaac Mongor testified that he "felt relieved" and
"happy" when he heard that SA] Musa had been killed because while there was a power
struggle between SA] Musa and Bockarie, Gullit did have a very good relationship with
Bockarie and "they were doing things together".7592 The Defence submits that this evidence
is insufficient to suggest that Gullit was amenable to subordinating himself under Bockarie's
(In a prior statement to the Prosecution, when asked whether he monitored some of the communications between
the AFRC and RUF at this time, he said "No, but I used to get information from Super because in the evening he
can brief some of his close bodyguards when they are nearby", that there was an error in the transcription of the
taped recording of the interview. According to Lansana, the Prosecutor had in fact asked him whether he had
monitored all the communications to which Lansana had responded that that was impossible and that he had
monitored some, but not all, of the communications).
7589 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4738- 4739.
7590 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 Febmary 2008, pp. 4738-4739 (Lansana first testified that Issa Sesay and
Morris Kallon arrived while they were still in Lunsar. Later he stated that they met in Waterloo); pp. 4746-4747
(Lansana also denied that he had made a prior statement that he got to know that Gullit's group from Rosos had
entered Freetown on 6th January 1999 "when we entered Pademba, and even now there are people who discuss it
on a daily basis in Pademba", Lansana said that it was false that he had heard everything he knew about the
January 1999 Freetown invasion from fellow prisoners at Pademba Road).
7591 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15717-15718.
7592 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5818.

---- End of Page 1166 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // \)& 18 May 2012

39 LS- Q
command, but the Trial Chamber considers nevertheless that the evidence establishes that
the relationship between Bockarie and Gullit had not deteriorated to the extent that the
Defence suggests. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that nothing suggests that the relationship
between Bockarie and Gullit had broken down so irretrievably that it prevented Bockarie
and Gullit from working together after the death of SA.1 Musa.
(iii) Resumption of communications after the death of SAJ Musa
3394. The evidence unequivocally shows, and the Defence concedes, that with SAJ Musa's
death in or around 23 December 1998, Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) resumed contact
with Bockarie.7593 lt is not disputed that Gullit contacted Bockarie when he was at the State
H0use to infbrm him of the capture of the city and to ask for reinforcements7594 or that
Bockarie told Gullit that he had instructed Ramb0, who was already in Waterl00, to link up
with them and provide reinforcements.7595 However, the Defence denies that this indicates
that Gullit's tr00ps were c00rdinating with Bockarie, noting that Gullit had initially defied
Bockarie's instructions to wait for reinfbrcements, and Only called Bockarie from Freetown
7593 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 615, 913; Dauda Aruna F0mie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21749
(following the death of SAJ Musa, when Gullit contacted Bockarie, "there was a free flow of communication"
between AFRC and RUF commanders); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3246 (Kamara affirmed
that on the way from R0s0s to Freetown, when SAJ Musa was still alive, he was not aware of any
communication between SAJ Musa's group and other forces moving towards Freetown. C0mmunication Only
began after SAJ Musa's death); TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12593-12594 (Gullit had a g00d
relatior1ship with Superman at this time, and began communicating after the death of SAJ Musa); Foday ,
Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4565 (Superman's b0dyguard, CY, who j0ined the R0s0s group under
the command of Gullit, informed Superman that SAJ Musa had banned them from communicating with
Superman during the time they were in R0s0s to Benguema and Waterl00 because of the misunderstandings that
0ccurred between them in Koinadugu, After the death of SAJ Musa, however, Maj0r CY and Jumb0 Blah used
to communicate on a daily basis with Superman); M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16166-
16167 (When King Perry contacted Buedu from the State H0use, he informed Kabbah that the tr00ps had
entered Freetown but "said he was under suppression", explaining that SAJ Musa had not allowed his radi0
Operators to use the radi0 to call Bockarie, but as SAJ Musa had died and Gullit was in command of the
Freetown tr00ps, he was permitted to communicate with Buedu); TFl-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp.
15709, 15715-15716 (TF 1-585 testified that before SAJ Musa died, there was no direct communication between
SAJ Musa and Gullit's group and Sam Bockarie, although Brigadier Mani mediated between SAJ Musa and
Bockarie and often relayed information concerning SAJ Musa's group to Bockarie. However, communication
resumed between Gullit and Bockarie after SAJ Musa's death).
7504 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 617, 633; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4560 (When
Gullit captured the Statehouse in Freetown and advanced on Pademba R0ad Prison he reported this to Sam
Bockarie); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8288 (Gullit also called Issa Sesay and
Superman when he captured the State H0use); Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12274-12275 (On 6
January 1999, the witness heard radi0 Operators who had gone to Freetown as part of the group that left R0s0s
announce over the radi0 network that they had entered Freetown. She also heard Gullit himself communicating
to Bockarie that they had captured Freetown)
7595 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 633,

---- End of Page 1167 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ‘Q 18 May 2012
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3% 'ZJQD
because his troops were in trouble. The Defence contends that Bockarie argued with Gullit
and was an about the lack of obedience to his instructions.7566
SYY
3395. Many Prosecution witnesses indicated that, contrary to the Defence's assertion that
Gullit contacted Bockarie only once he ran into difficulties, Gullit maintained regular
communication with Bockarie and his commanders throughout the assault on Freetown.
Perry Kamara, a radio operator who travelled with SAJ Musa and Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a.
Gullit) to Freetown and participated in the attack on 6 January 1999,7597 testified that after
SAJ Musa's death, and when Gullit's troops were in Waterloo, he facilitated radio contact
between Gullit and Bockarie in which Gullit updated Bockarie on the progress of his
troops.7596 He explained that as soon as the AFRC "authorities" became settled at the State
House, they contacted Bockarie to notify him of the capture of State House.7566 Kamara
testified that throughout his time in Freetown, he had a Yeasu radio taken from an NGO
office in Freetown which he and other RUF leaders, including Alfred Brown and Gibril
Massaquoi, would use to update Bockarie on the military situation and meetings held in
Freetown.7666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, a fighter accompanying the group led by SAJ Musa
and Gullit from Koinadugu into Freetown, also confirmed that after the death of SAJ Musa,
Gullit contacted Bockarie via radio.766l Bobson Sesay similarly noted that the first thing
, Gullit did when they entered the State House was to set up the radio set and call Bockarie to
inform him that he had entered Freetown.7662 As the only two witnesses to have participated
in the Freetown attack,7663 the Trial Chamber considers their evidence to be of articular
P
value as to what occurred during the operation. The Trial Chamber recalls that both Kamara
and Bobson Sesay are generally credible witnesses.7664
7566 Defence Final Trial Brief] para. 617.
7597 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3221; Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp.
21565-21566 (affirming that other radio operators with Gullit in Freetown included Alfred Brovm and Perry
Kamara (a.k.a. King Perry)).
7566 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3217-3218.
7599 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3229.
7666 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3228-3229, 3257-3258.
766] Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8253-8254.
7662 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8286-8287.
7666 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46845 (affirming that Perry Kamara was in Freetown); Foday
Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4564 (affirming that Perry Kamara was in Freetown); Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8275-8279 (testifying as to his own participation in the attack on 6
January 1999).
7664 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
paras 285-289.

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Si we l
3396. The testimony of Kamara and Bobson Sesay is corroborated by witnesses stationed
with Bockarie and commanders in other areas of Sierra Leone. Dauda Aruna Fornie, a radio
operator stationed with Bockarie in Buedu in January 1999, confirmed that when SAJ Musa
died, Perry Kamara sent a message to Bockarie to inform Bockarie.7665 F ornie also testified
that he saw a message in the message logbook from Gullit telling Bockarie that the
AFRC/RUF combatants had captured the State House in Freetown.7666 That Gullit reported
to Bockarie on the capture of the State House and Pademba Road Prison is confirmed by
TF 1-516.7667 Mohamed Kabbah, another radio operator stationed in Buedu in January
1999,7666 testified that on 6 January 1999, he was working in the radio room when Kamara
communicated with the Buedu radio station directly aerrr Freetown to inform Buedu that the
troops had entered Freetown.7669 Alice Pyne, who was a radio operator for Superman at
Lunsar, testified that on 7 January 1999, she heard radio operators who had gone to
Freetown as part of the group that lefr Rosos, including Perry Kamara,7616 announce over the
radio network that they had entered Freetown,7611 and after that, Gullit speaking to Bockarie
about the capture of the State House.7612 TF 1-585 testified that Gullit informed Bockarie
rior to the 3 J anua 1999 that he was "enterin Freetown",7613 and also contacted Bockarie
P YY 8
when they were being pushed out of Freetown by ECOMOG.7611
3397. The witnesses agreed that this communication continued regularly throughout the
Freetown assault and concerned the progress of the operation. Fornie described the
communication between Bockarie and Gullit during the course of the Freetown operation as
"frequent" and "constant", with communications occurring at least hourly.7615 The
communication generally concerned requests from Gullit for more materiel and
reinforcements for further advances while Bockarie sought updates from Gullit about
7665 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21609.
7606 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21564.
7667 TFl—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6932-6933.
76611 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16166.
7666 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16 166-16167.
76*0 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12257, 12261 (earlier, Pyne had named "King Perry" as one of the
radio operators who had joined SAJ Musa at Rosos).
7611 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12274.
76*7 Alice Pyrre, Transcript 19 Jurre 2008, p. 12275.
7613 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. l57l7—l5718.
76*6 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15726.
76*5 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21589 ("it did not take up to an hour when one of the
stations in Freetown did not call to Buedu directly, or Mosquito's station in Buedu did not call one of the stations
in Freetown directly to get an update from there. It was constant communication that existed").

---- End of Page 1169 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T 18 May 2012

3 Ci lb?.
progress in Freetown.76l6 Kabbah noted that communication between the radio room in
Buedu and the troops in Freetown occurred daily,76l7 and that Perry Kamara would inform
Buedu about troop movements and the security situation in Freetown.76l6 Similarly, Foday
Lansana, a radio operator stationed in Lunsar with Superman throughout the Freetown
attack,766) testified that Gullit would communicate with Bockarie on a daily basis, and that
these communications were "uncountable".7626 Isaac Mongor, a commander at the Kailahun
flank,762l testified that he was monitoring the radio while the troops were in Freetown and
that during the attack Gullit communicated with Bockarie frequently, at half—hourly
intervals.7622 According to Perry Kamara, Gullit used to transmit messages to Bockarie
concerning "whatever activities that was going on".7626
3398. Evidence also indicates that aside from Bockarie, Gullit was in communication with
Bockarie's commanders, including Boston Flomo (a.k.a. Rambo), Superman, and Issa
Sesay.7624 Fornie testified that the communications between Gullit and these commanders
was very frequent, occurring about two or three times an hour.7626 Bobson Sesay noted that
Issa Sesay, Boston F lomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo), Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and Morris
Kallon were all in "constant" communication with the forces in Freetown.7626 Lansana
testified that he monitored communications between Bockarie, Gullit, Superman, Issa Sesay,
and Boston Flomo durin the invasion.7667 Lansana ex lained that durin the Freetown
S P S
invasion, Gullit and other commanders would send a re ort re ardin which ositions were
P S S P
occupied by the Junta or the RUF troops. Superman would then communicate with his own
bodyguards who were with the troops in Freetown to confirm the information from Gullit
was correct.7626 Komba Sumana also testified that durin his time in Makeni in December
8
7616 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21565-21566.
7617 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September, pp. 16170-16171.
7616 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16168.
7616 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4569-4970. I
7626 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4560.
7621 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5822.
7622 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5825-5826.
7626 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3229.
7624 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21604-21605.
7625 Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21605—21607.
7626 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8937-8939; Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8288
(Bobson Sesay noted that Gullit informed not only Bockarie, but also Issa Sesay and Superman when he
captured the State House).
7627 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4559-4560.
7666 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4566-4567.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T y/ xm' 18 May 2012

3¢?·z.b3
1998, Five-Five made a call to Superman stating that SAJ Musa had died and they wanted
reinforcements,7629
3399, The Trial Chamber also heard a significant amount of evidence appr Dauda Aruna
Fomie,7636 Perry Kamara,763| lsaac Mongor,7632 TF l-516,7633 and Abu Keita,7634 that radio
operators in Buedu assisted the forces in Freetown by providing warnings of attacks from
ECOMOG's Alpha Jets, the so—called "448 wa.rnings",7635 The Trial Chamber has elsewhere
in the judgement addressed the role of the 448 warnings sent during the Freetown invasion
with regard to whether subordinates of the Accused in Liberia were involved in the sending
of those messages,7636 ln that context, the Trial Chamber notes that the Defence relies on the
evidence that the RUF had radio operators stationed in Buedu to monitor ECOMOG
communications to rebut the Prosecution allegation that the Accused's subordinates were
alerting RUF and AF RC fighters in Freetown to the movement of ECOMOG jets,7637 ln light
of the largely uncontested evidence that such warnings were sent appr Buedu, the Trial
Chamber accepts that during the Freetown invasion, Bockarie assisted the commanders in
Freetown by transmitting "448 messages" to the fighters in the capital,
3400, ln assessing the reliability of the evidence concerning these communications, the
Trial Chamber notes that the bulk of the supporting evidence was adduced appr radio
operators and fighters stationed with Gullit, Bockarie and commanders under Bockarie's
authorit whose role it was to monitor the relevant communications, The Trial Chamber
Y
places particular value on the evidence of Perry Kamara, who personally monitored and
facilitated conversations between Bockarie and Gullit and recorded relevant information in a
logbook,7636 Similarly, Dauda Aruna Fornie was monitoring the radio during the day of the
7629 Kpmba summa, Transcript 6 optpbpr 2008, pp. 17976-17977.
7636 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21566-21567, 21596-21597.
7637 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3231, 3236.
7632 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5826-5827.
7633 rrr-516, Transcript 8 Appr 2008, pp. 6943-6944.
7674 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2024-2025, 2069.
7635 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 530.
7636 Operational Support: Communications, "448" Warnings.
7637 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1528.
7636 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3229-3230. Other witnesses confirm that Perry Kamara
(a.k.a. King Perry) participated in the entry into Freetown with Gullit's group and facilitated contact between
Gullit and Bockarie. See Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46754—46756 (King Perry was the RUF
operator who facilitated the communication between Bockarie and Gullit); Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3
December 2008, pp. 21589-21590 (Gullit transmitted a radio message to Bockarie via King Perry that the troops
in Freetown had released the political detainees from Pademba Road prison); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15

---- End of Page 1171 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
_\..

Isa '.2.l:>\l
initial entry into Freetown and throughout the operation, transmitting received messages to
front line commanders.7639 A number of witnesses testified that they were present in the
room when communications with Gullit occurred. For example, Alimamy Bobson Sesay
testified that he was present on several occasions when Gullit contacted Bockarie via
radio.764O The Trial Chamber notes the testimony of some radio operators that where they
were not present during the relevant communications, they read those messages in radio log
books in which messages were recordedml
3401. The Trial Chamber notes that not all witnesses testified that communication between
Bockarie and Gullit commenced as early as SAJ Musa's death. While he recalled hearing the
news of SAJ Musa's death over the radio, TF 1-371 stated that the direct contact between
Gullit and Bockarie of which he was aware took place when Gullit was already in the State
House.7642 The Trial Chamber also notes that the evidence that Gullit spoke directly with
Issa Sesay is contested by Sesay himselfQ who asserted that when Gullit had taken State
House, he did not call Sesay's station or radio and noted that even Perry Kamara (a.k.a. King
Perry) did not give evidence that Gullit contacted both Sesay and Bockarie.7643 The Trial
Chamber also recalls its finding that the evidence of Issa Sesay must be approached with
caution,7644 and notes that he had an interest in minimising his own role in the events in
Freetown of January 1999. The omission of any such communications in Kamara's evidence
is not indicative that they did not occur. In light of the evidence from Fomie, Lansana and
Bobson Sesay, who also participated in the January 1999 operation, the Trial Chamber does
September 2008, pp. 16166-16167 (King Perry communicated with the Buedu radio station directly from
Freetown); Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4564 (Lansana confirmed that Alfred Brown and
Perry Kamara (a.k.a. King Perry) were RUF radio operators present in Freetown during the January 1999 attack).
7639 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21562-21563; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008,
pp. 12274-12275 (She heard Gullit himself communicating to Bockarie that they had captured Freetown and
released prisoners including Gibril Massaquoi, JS Momoh, Steve Bio, Martin Moinama and others); Foday
Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4562-4563 (Lansana recalled that he monitored one communication
in which Bockarie gave an order concerning the execution of Martin Moinina, who had been a witness against
Foday Sankoh during his trial in 1989 in Freetown).
7640 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8253-8254; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February
2008, pp. 4568-4569 (Lansana knew about the communications between Major CY and Superman because he
used to sit by the radio while Superman was communicating with Major CY and Jumbo Blah); TF 1-585,
Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15717-15718 (Gullit had told Bockarie his position at that time, saying that he
was "entering" Freetown. The witness heard this in person, but from a distance).
764* Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21609 (When SAJ Musa died, King Perry sent a
message to Bockarie to inform him. The witness did not recall if he was present when this message came but
read the message afterwards).
7642 TF1-371, rraasmpt 30 January 2008, p. 2648 (cs).
7643 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46754-46756.
764* Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T // QU, 18 May 2012 J

3-5 2.é>S`
not consider Issa Sesay's denial credible. The Trial Chamber is satisHed that Gullit
maintained frequent and daily contact with Bockarie throughout the Freetown operation to
discuss the ongoing military situation in the capital.
(iv) Gullit's failure to heed Bockarie's instruction to wait for reinforcements
3402. Concerning Gullit's initial failure to heed Bockarie's instruction to wait for
reinforcements, the Trial Chamber notes that Hve witnesses provided an account of the
conversation between Gullit and Bockarie after SAJ Musa's death and subsequent events.
3403. Bobson Sesay testified that it was Gullit who initiated the contact with Bockarie after
SAJ Musa's death to request more reinforcements.7645 Bockarie assured him that Issa Sesay
and Denis Mingo from Kono and Makeni would join them in the advance on Freetown,7°46
but that they were at the same time making targeted attacks to weaken ECOMOG and
prevent the deployment of enemy reinforcements to Freetown.7647 According to Bobson
Sesay, Gullit moved to Hastings Hill around Freetown Highway to wait for
reinforcement.7648 He contacted Issa Sesay who briefed Gullit about the movement of RUF
and the intention to enter Freetown together, at which point Gullit confirmed that he would
still wait for the reinforcement.7°49 Gullit also contacted Superman for a similar update
concerning the movements of the troops led by Superman, Brigadier Mani, and Morris
Kallon.7650 Bobson Sesay testihed that he was present during Gullit's conversations with
Bockarie and Sesay.7°5l While Bobson Sesay did not explicitly address why Gullit
ultimately entered Freetown without those reinforcements, his evidence suggests that Gullit
believed it was militarily necessary. He testified that it was only after waiting for some time,
and having contacted Issa Sesay and Superman, that Gullit instructed his troops to advance
towards Hastings, having seen ECOMOG helicopters bringing reinforcements to that
amajssz
ms Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8253-8254.
7646 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8254.
7647 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8254.
7648 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 826l-8262.
7649 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8257-8258.
7650 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8256-8258.
7651 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8253, 8257-8258.
M2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp, 826l-8262 ("After that we were at the Hastings hills.
After we had had some food we saw helicopters — combat helicopters - bringing manpower to Hastings, so Gullit

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Case No.: SCSL-O3—O1-T J gh 18 May 20l2 M

gc" Lblé
3404. Perry Kamara corroborated Bobson Sesay's evidence that it was Gullit who initiated
the contact with Bockarie after the death of SAJ Musa. Kamara testified that after Musa's
death, Gullit and other persons said that they should seek his advice and "[w]hatever he said
we would tell him to accept, so that we would work together again". When Gullit contacted
Bockarie, after reproaching Gullit for failing to inform him of the move towards
Freetown,7(’53 Bockarie asked Gullit to wait for Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Superman and
Rambo to join him before entering Freetown. These commanders at that time had passed
Lunsar and were moving to Masiaka.7654 Kamara noted that Gullit summoned a short
meeting to discuss the proposal with other AF RC officers, and at the meeting, it was decided
by a majority that they should not wait for Bockarie's reinforcements, and "whenever the
other groups came they would join us".7655
3405. Dauda Aruna F omie, stationed in Buedu, also testified in cross—examination that, in
the conversation after SAJ Musa's death, which Gullit initiated, Bockarie had told Gullit to
wait for reinforcements before entering Freetown. F omie noted that although Gullit did not
comply with Bockarie's instructions, Gullit told Bockarie that he believed his troops were in
an advantaged position in relation to ECOMOG and it was strategically necessary to
advance forward.7656 On cross—examination, F omie affirmed that coordination between
Bockarie and Gullit began before the Freetown invasion, that Gullit asked Bockarie for
reinforcements before the Freetown attack, and that the only reason that the RUF troops had
not arrived on time was because of the poor conditions of the roads.7657 The Trial Chamber
recalls that Fomie is also a credible witness.7°58
3406. Two other Prosecution witnesses also testified that Gullit did not wait for
reinforcements. According to Mohamed Kabbah, prior to 6 January 1999, during "the period
said we were to organise another advance so we should go and disorganise the evacuation that was going on in
Hastings").
7°" Perry Kamam, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3218.
7654 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3220.
7655 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3218-3219.
7656 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21727 ("I am telling you that immediately after SAJ
Musa died Gullit contacted Mosquito and informed Mosquito that [. , .] SAJ Musa was dead and that was through
King Perry that Gullit did that. From that point Mosquito told Gullit to wait for reinforcement at Benguema
before Gullit and others would enter Freetown. But Gullit sent back a message to Mosquito responding that at
that time they were in an advantaged position because ECOMOG was on the run and they should not be there
idling, so they should pursue them").
7657 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21851-21853.
7658 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fomie, paras 346-358.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ms 18 May 2012 %
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3‘i'z.l> P
of SA] Musa and Gullit", Bockarie told Gullit not to enter Freetown until RUF could send
reinforcements, but SA] Musa and Gullit refused,7669 and only after their group had reached
State House did they contact Bockarie.7666 Kabbah stated that the RUF knew that those
troops "never accepted orders and that they were heading for Freetown",766l and agreed that
the move to Freetown was not planned as far as Bockarie was concerned.7662 Isaac Mongor
stated in examination-in-chief that Gullit did not wait for reinforcements because he realised
that there would be a delay in their arrival.7666 However, on cross-examination, when
Mongor was questioned on a prior statement made to the Prosecution that he understood that
the Freetown invasion was largely an AFRC project.7664 In response to Defence counsel's
suggestion that it was SA] Musa and Gullit's idea to attack Freetown in January 1999,
Mongor explained that "if the RUF had not been attacking all the other places those men
wouldn’t have been able to get inside"; "it was not just the AFRC" and "the group that
moved for the Freetown invasion many of them were AF RC men who were soldiers. They
refused to wait for the RUF to join them. They were just doing it by themselves".7666
3407. Finally, and contrary to the evidence of Bobson Sesay, Issa Sesay testified that Gullit
did not ask for reinforcements when he delivered the news to Bockarie about SA] Musa's
death. Rather, Bockarie did not believe the news, but told Gullit that if it was true, Gullit
should wait so that Sesay and Superman's troops would be able to move down from Makeni
and the two groups could attack Freetown together.7666 Sesay agreed that Bockarie
essentially volunteered reinforcements when Gullit never asked for any.7667 Sesay stated that
Gullit did not wait and attacked Freetown one or two days 1ater.7668 Sam Kolleh also denied
that after SA] Musa's death Gullit asked Bockarie for reinforcements, stating that they were
not "fiiends" at the time.7666
7656 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16445- 16446.
7666 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16647.
7661 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16447-16448.
7662 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16448.
7663 Isaac Mongor, Tra1;1script 11 March 2008, pp. 5819-5822 ("So Sam Bockarie had wanted them to wait, but
later he realised that that was going to be a delay. So they moved, they advanced and entered Freetown").
7666 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, p. 6759.
7665 isaac Mprrgpr, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6760, 6763-6766.
7666 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46748-46749, 46764-46766.
7667 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46749-46750. 46764—46766.
7668 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44162-44163.
7666 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 5 November 2010, pp. 48908-489 10.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

33 g__E%
3408. Recalling its finding that it had no general reservations concerning the credibility of
Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Perry Kamara,7670 the Trial Chamber considers the evidence of
Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Perry Kamara, who both accompanied the group led by SA]
Musa and Gullit from Koinadugu into Freetown and provided direct and detailed evidence
of what occurred from SA] Musa's death to the group's entry into Freetown,767l to be of
si ificant wei t. The Trial Chamber notes that there are some diver ences between the
gn S
two accounts. First, Bobson Sesay did not refer to the meeting that Kamara described at
which Gullit's troops decided that they should not wait for Bockarie's reinforcements.
Further, Bobson Sesay testified that Gullit contacted Bockarie to discuss the need for
reinforcements,7672 while Kamara gave evidence that Gullit responded to Bockarie's advice
to wait for reinforcements and ammunition by saying that he did not need ammunition, and
that the AF RC officers who voted to advance forward ultimately did not consider that they
re uired reinforcements.7673 The Trial Chamber considers the discre anc concernin the
Cl P Y S
meeting minor, given that Bobson Sesay was neither asked about any such meeting nor to
explain the impetus for the decision to move onto Freetown.
3409. In relation to whether Gullit asked Bockarie for reinforcements, the Trial Chamber
notes that Kamara did not say that Gullit rejected the need for reinforcements, he rejected
the need for ammunition.7674 Further, when the meeting was held to discuss Bockarie's
ro osal, Gullit's forces did not re`ect the idea of reinforcements; rather, it was decided that
P P J
"whenever the other groups came they would join us".7675 The evidence of Bobson Sesay
and Kamara converge on the two most important aspects: first, both witnesses stated that it
was Gullit who initiated the contact with Bockarie—~Bobson Sesay testified that this was to
seek reinforcements, while Kamara testified that it was to seek advice; second, neither
7670 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
paras 285-289.
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8243-8244; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 915
(accepting that Bobson Sesay was with the AFRC group that invaded Freetown and that he rendered a firsthand
account).
7672 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8253-8254.
7673 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3218-3219.
7674 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3218-3219 ("Mosquito said Gullit should wait for Superman
and Issa Sesay and others to join him so that the manpower and the comnrand structure would be strong before
Gullit could enter. He said if that were the case it would be all right. Then Gullit said if it were for the
ammunition we have amnrunition to enter. He said, ‘No, that is not the reason. It is for the comnrand structure.
It will be strong for you.’ Then Gullit said, ‘The best thing was that I would tell my men and whatever they
agreed on I will come back and tell you.’ Then we closed the radio. Gullit called - Gullit summoned a short
meeting to inform his men what they had discussed [...]").
7675 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p, 3218-3219.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/ JN \

za wi
su ested, as the Defence sou t to ar e, that b movin forward to Freetown without
gg gu Y S
Boc1assistance. On their evidence, Gullit was receptive to the idea of reinforcements, but military
exigencies dictated a more immediate advance into Freetown. On cross-examination,
Kamara made clear that he did not believe that this was disobedience to Bockarie, rather,
Gullit exercised his discretion and judgement as to whether those reinforcements were
necessary. Kamara pointed out that, on capturing the State House, Gullit duly reported to
Bockarie.7676 Moreover, according to Kamara, before the call to Bockarie was made, Gullit's
forces decided that "[w]hatever [Bockarie] said we would tell him to accept, so that we
would work to ether a ain".7677 Kamara also believed that if Bockarie's reinforcements had
S S
met Gullit outside Freetown before 6 January 1999, they would have entered Freetown
together.7678 According to Bobson Sesay, when Gullit called Bockarie after entering the
State House, he stated that he was still waiting for Bockarie's reinforcements.7679
3410. The evidence of Dauda Aruna Fornie and Isaac Mongor's evidence on examination-
in-chief also su ort the idea that Gullit did not wait for Bockarie's reinforcements due to
PP
those reinforcements being unduly delayed, rather than as a refusal of Bockarie's support.
Dauda Aruna Fomie also confirmed that Gullit requested reinforcements from Bockarie
before the commencement of the 6 January attac1<.76’8O
341 1. The evidence of Mongor in cross-examination, Mohamed Kabbah and Issa Sesay are
somewhat inconsistent with that of Bobson Sesay, Fornie and Kamara. On Issa Sesay's
evidence, the Trial Chamber again recalls its finding that the evidence of Issa Sesay must be
7676 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3384 (PS) ("Q. [...] Gullit disobeyed Bockarie, didn’t he, by
continuing on from Waterloo into Freetown? A. Well, I cannot particularly refer to that as disobedience, but he
said because of the manpower you have and the command structure you shouldn’t enter Freetown. But the man
had the idea that he had enough manpower and forces so that he could enter Freetown and that was a discretional
job. So the man decided to enter Freetown and when he entered Freetown he duly informed Mr Bockarie that he
has entered Freetown. Q. Bockarie had given an order not to proceed into Freetown. Correct? A. Yes. The order
had a reason and that is what Fm saying. The order had a reason, because of the manpower and strength and
materials. But some other people didn’t even think that we were strong enough to enter Freetown, so therefore
they said we will enter Freetown and when we get to Freetown we will inform him and that was what happened.
When we entered Freetown theAFRC informed him that we have entered Freetown and he didn’t give any
negative comment about that").
7677 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3217.
7678 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3237.
7679 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8286-8287.
7680 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21851—21853.

---- End of Page 1177 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03 -01-T 18 May 2012

za ¤~¤ro
approached with caution,766l and notes that he had an interest in minimising his own role in
the events in Freetown of January 1999. The Trial Chamber also notes that he was not privy
to the conversation between Bockarie and Gullit, and only heard about the death of SAJ
Musa and the subsequent communication from Bockarie in January when he was in
Makeni.7682 ln relation to Sam Kolleh's evidence, the Trial Chamber considers that his
· testimony concerning what occurred in the lead-up to Freetown contained a number of
inaccuracies. Notably, Kolleh maintained that SAJ Musa's troops entered Freetown before
Musa died at Benguema.7683 Further, Kolleh had little foundational basis for his testimony
that Gullit did not ask for reinforcements; he did not claim to have heard the conversation
between Gullit and Bockarie, and he was in Pendembu at the beginning of 6 January 1999,
not with Bockarie or Gullit.7684 ln light of contradictory evidence from other witness, the
Trial Chamber does not find the evidence of Issa Sesay and Sam Kolleh that Gullit never
asked for reinforcements credible.
3412. Concerning Kabbah and Mongor's evidence, the Trial Chamber considers it is not
clear whether the two witnesses are describing events which occurred after SAJ Musa's
death. Kabbah, in particular, stated that the instruction from Bockarie to wait took place
during "the period of SAJ Musa and Gullit", and affirmed that both SAJ Musa and Gullit
refused. He was next questioned by Defence counsel on SAJ Musa's ban on his group
maintaining radio contact with Bockarie,7665 which, as noted above, was lifted after Musa's
death. Similarly, while Mongor in examination-in-chief was asked explicitly concerning the
communication between Bockarie and Gullit after SAJ Musa's death, his evidence on cross-
examination was elicited on questioning about his prior statement that the Freetown invasion
was generally an AFRC project. lt is possible that the witnesses may have conflated SAJ
Musa's initial refusal to join in Bockarie's plan to attack Freetown from the Waterworks
meeting7686 with Gullit's later failure to wait for Bockarie's reinforcements. In any case, the
Trial Chamber is not satisfied that their evidence as to the troops led by Gullit and SAJ
Musa refusing to wait for the RUF relates specifically to the period after the death of SAJ
Musa.
766I Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
7662 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46734-46737.
7666 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 5 November 2010, pp. 48908-48910.
7664 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48451, 48453-48454.
76*5 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16446.

---- End of Page 1178 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012


;·=\ QLFH
3413. Accepting the evidence of Bobson Sesay and Kamara, as corroborated by Dauda
Aruna Fomie, the Trial Chamber Ends that by advancing to Freetown from Waterloo and
Benguema without Bockarie's reinforcements, Gullit was not rejecting either Bockarie's
authority or his offer of assistance.
3414. The Prosecution goes further to contend, on the basis of Perry Kamara's evidence,
that even though Gullit made his decision to enter Freetown without waiting for
reinforcements from Bockarie, he only did so knowing that the RUF were in Makeni moving
with reinforcements towards Freetown and in a position to block further ECOMOG troops
moving towards the capital.7687 The Trial Chamber acknowledges that there is evidence that
Bockarie did discuss with Gullit targeted attacks by the RUF to prevent the deployment of
enemy reinforcements to Freetown.7688
3415. In relation to Bockarie's reaction to Gullit's failure to wait for reinforcements, the
Defence placed emphasis on evidence from Mohamed Kabbah that the first the RUF heard
of Gullit's entry into Freetown was from the BBC, that it came as a surprise to the RUF
when Gullit's group entered Freetown, having heard nothing from them until they reached
the State House, and that Kabbah believed the entry into Freetown was an independent
mission of Gullit's troops.7689 Kabbah also testified that Bockarie and Gullit argued during
this communication over Gullit's alleged disobedience to Bockarie's orders.7690 According
to the Defence, this belies the Prosecution suggestion that the RUF was involved in the
Freetown invasion.769l
3416. Certainly, the evidence from Kamara that Bockarie told Gullit to delay entering
Freetown "for the command structure" indicates Bockarie was concemed about maintaining
his authority over the troops led by Gullit.7692 That there were tensions between Bockarie
and Gullit during the hostilities in Freetown is also acknowledged by Dauda Amna Fomie,
7686 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
7687 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 506, 519-520.
7688 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8254 (Bobson Sesay noted that Bockarie assured
Gullit in the conversation after SAJ Musa's death that Issa Sesay and Denis Mingo from Kono and Makeni were
making targeted attacks to weaken ECOMOG and prevent the deployment of enemy reinforcements to Freetown.
This was "an operation that was p1anned" and "the strategy that we used").
7689 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16447.
7690 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16448-16449.
7691 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 617.
7692 Peny Kamara. Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3218-3219.

---- End of Page 1179 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 %
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Za 142
who noted that when he heard one of the troops who had entered Freetown on the BBC,
Bockarie became concerned that Gullit would take power in Freetown on his own.7693
3417. However, the evidence does not support the Defence contention that coordination
between Bockarie and Gullit broke down at this point. Perry Kamara specifically disagreed
with the suggestion of Defence counsel that Bockarie was dissatisfied with the troops
entering Freetown without waiting.76°4 The Trial Chamber notes that both Kabbah and
Fomie indicated that despite these tensions, Bockarie promised Gullit that he would send
reinforcements to Freetown.7695 The Trial Chamber also considers si ificant the evidence
an
of TF1-371, a senior member of the RUF, that while he considered that the decision of the
AFRC to enter Freetown in January 1999 without waiting for the RUF to be hasty, he did
not consider the division to be serious.7696 Similarly, Isaac Mongor conceded that throughout
the relationship between the RUF and AFRC there were problems but he believed that these
problems were manageable.7697
3-418. Further, as the Trial Chamber has found above, the radio room in Buedu and the
troops in Freetown communicated frequently during the assault on the capital concerning
strategic matters.7696 Fornie attested to direct communication between Boston Flomo (a.k.a.
RUF Rambo) and Gullit in which they spoke about how their forces would meet.7699 The
submission that coordination between Bockarie and Gullit did not progress beyond Gullit's
initial call to Bockarie is also belied by the evidence, examined by the Trial Chamber below,
that continued attempts were made to facilitate the entry into Freetown of troops under
Bockarie's command.
7693 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21578-21579.
7664 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3385 (PS).
7695 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16448-16449; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3
December 2008, pp. 21580-21581; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2426 (CS) (when Gullit contacted
Bockarie from the State House, Bockarie told Gullit that he should not be concerned and that "the RUF is
already on the way to give them support"); Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent
Officer Commander and Black Guard Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF
Brigade Headquarters - Bombali District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/ 1/l999", ERN 25494 ("Upon
hearing the confirm [sic] report that the Strike Force Commander Brigadier Goodial entered Freetown with his
troops, Colonel Boston Flomo (Alias Verndame) was instructed to meet him with his troops"); see also Defence
Final Trial Brief para. 633 ("When Gullit was at State house, he contacted Bockarie...Bockarie told Gullit that
he had instructed Rambo, who was already at Waterloo, to link up with them").
M TF1-371, Transarrpr 30 January 2008, p. 2613 (CS).
7697 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6721-5722.
7696 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September, pp. 16170-16171.
7699 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21605-21607.

---- End of Page 1180 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GX l8 May 2012

39 zftl
(v) Attempts at coordination and the entry into Freetown of Rambo Red Goat
3419. Evidence indicates that Bockarie continued to order his troops to connect with the
troops in the capital during the Freetown assault.77O0 Dauda Amna Fornie testified that he
monitored a direct conversation on 6 January 1999 between Gullit and Bockarie in which
Bockarie told Gullit to try to coordinate with Rambo and General Issa concerning
reinforcements so that Rambo would move faster and meet Gullit in Freetown.77Ol ln cross-
examination, Fomie was questioned about a prior statement in which he stated that prior to
the Freetown invasion, there was communication but no coordination between the AFRC
and RUF,7702 and that it was the AFRC who attacked Freetownjm However, Fomie
explained that when he was first interviewed, he still believed that he himself was at risk of
arrest, and therefore tried to downplay the degree of the RUF's involvement in the Freetown
invasion and later told the Prosecution that his earlier statements were incomplete.7704 Fornie
recalled that he added in a later statement that there was direct coordination between the
AFRC and RUF after the death of SAJ Musam)5 which begun in Benguema and continued
through the Freetown attacks.77O6
3420. Recalling that Fornie is a generally credible witness,77O7 the Trial Chamber accepts
his explanation of this inconsistency, and notes that his testimony is supported by a number
of other witnesses. Perry Kamara testified that in reaction to news that Gullit's forces were
experiencing difficulties in Freetown, Bockarie sent a message that the troops should move
to Waterloo and join fighters led by Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman) and Boston Flomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo) in Waterloo.77O8 Exhibit D-084, a Salute
7700 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21727 (immediately upon arriving in Freetown Gullit
contacted Bockarie to inform him of his movements. Bockarie ordered Rambo through Issa Sesay to join Gullit
and Gullit and Rambo then coordinated their movements); TF 1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2426-2427
(CS) (Bockarie ordered Boston Flomo (a.k.a. Rambo), who was in Waterloo, to link up with the AFRC troops, in
the eastern part of Freetown); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5819-5820 (after 6 January 1999,
Rambo and other fighters in Makeni continued to advance with Superman to Waterloo, fighting ECOMOG on
the way. They then advanced towards Jui, in the Hastings area).
ml Dauda Amna F ornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p, 21569.
7702 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21819-21820.
7703 Dauda Aruna F omie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21825; Transcript 8 December 2008, p. 21905.
7704 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21826-21628; Transcript 8 December 2008, pp.
21966-21968.
7705 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21819-21820.
7706 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21820-21821.
7707 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Amna Fomie, paras 346-358.
7708 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234, 3237, 3245 (in reaction to news that Gullit's forces
were experiencing difficulties in Freetown, Bockarie sent a message that the troops should move to Waterloo and

---- End of Page 1181 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T .» / qa 18 May 2012

39 2.3:+t
Report from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh dated 27 September 1999 noted that when "our
forces Freetown [sic] were under enemy cut off from the rear and were in danger of being
boxed-in", Rambo was "withdrawn from his operation in Port Loko and instructed to open a
through-way to connect with our men in Freetown".77O9 Some witnesses testified that Issa
Sesay passed the instruction from Bockarie to Boston F lomo to deploy to Freetown.77lO
3421. A further two witnesses testified that fighters led by Issa Sesay, Superman and others
in Makeni headed to Freetown. Komba Sumana testified that after the capture of Makeni in
1998,7m Issa told the fighters that they were to reinforce the forces in Freetown,77l2 and he
and other fighters travelled on a truck to Lunsar while two other trucks went on towards
Freetown. According to the witness's friend, some of the fighters were able to bypass
ECOMOG and enter Freetown.7m TF 1-174 also testified seeing Issa Sesay in Makeni on 28
December 1998 and then, shortly afterwards, RUF or AF RC fighters who informed the
witness that they were heading towards Freetown.77l4
3422. The Defence submits that the reinforcements sent by Bockarie did not get any closer
to Freetown than Waterloo,77l5 and the evidence largely supports this proposition, with most
of the attempts by the forces commanded by Boston F lomo to enter Freetown being
unsuccessful.77l6
join fighters led by Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and RUF Rambo in Waterloo,
Bockarie stated that the troops at Waterloo had come as reinforcements for Gullit's troops; their intent was to
enter Freetown).
7709 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, dated 27 September 1999", pp. 9-10, ERN
7764-7765.
mo TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12918-12919 (Once Bockarie heard that the "brothers" had entered
Freetown, he instructed Issa Sesay "to try and connect with his brothers in Freetown whereby Gullit was the
commander". Sesay in turn instructed Boston F lomo to meet the men in Freetown); TF 1-375, Transcript 24 June
2008, pp. 12604-12605, 12608 (TF 1-375 testified that on their way to Waterloo, Superman said that they should
try to open the road to Freetown, to join their "friends and brothers" in the city and at Waterloo, Superman, Issa
Sesay, Komba Gbundema and other senior officers decided that RUF Rambo should take a group to attack
Hastings and get across the bridge to go to Freetown to join their "brothers").
lm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17973-17974.
lm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17976-17978.
lm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17979.
ml TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23692-23694.
lm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 636.
W6 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38680 (Ngebeh stated that the RUF never reached closer to
Freetown than Waterloo. The RUF operated out of Waterloo, Benguema and Hastings, but only after the AF RC
had already passed through and captured these places); Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44169 (The RUF
forces did not get any closer to Freetown than Waterloo); Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall
Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL

---- End of Page 1182 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GI 18 May 2012 %
I {

3423. However, the evidence documents one partly successful attempt by Bockarie to
organise for Boston F lomo to join up with Gullit's forces. Exhibit P—149, a memo from the
Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard Adjutant to Issa Sesay, dated 21
January 1999, notes that on 15 January 1999, "it was agreed that the men in Freetown and
the men at our point were to do joint operation on Jui and Kosso town", but "the Freetown
men never tum up".m7 Exhibit P—l49 was adduced through TF1—567, who testified that
when he was stationed at Waterloo in early 1999 with Issa Sesay, he was in charge of
receiving reports from various securities,m8 and that Exhibit P—l49 was one of those
reportsmg TF 1-567 , whom the Trial Chamber has found to be generally credible,mO
affirmed that Issa Sesay instructed Boston Flomo to meet with Gullit's troops and that
F lomo's troops in Hastings attempted to join up with the troops in Freetown in the planned
operation to attack Kossoh Town, but failed to do so.7m TF 1—567's evidence is also
corroborated by Perry Kamara, who testified that in reaction to receiving news that Gullit's
troops were facing increasing pressure from ECOMOG, Bockarie sent a message that in
order to "clear the route" for the troops led by Kallon and Sesay to enter Freetown, Gullit's
men had to attack Kossoh Town with Superman's group.7722 Kamara also confirmed that
Gullit did not ultimately send troops to Kossoh Town,7723 explaining on cross—examination
that this was because Gullit was unable to assemble men to receive the reinforcements, his
forces being scattered across the city.7724
3424. However, according to Perry Kamara, the troops waiting at Waterloo did attack
Kossoh Town. Although they were unable to capture it, an AFRC "strong fighter" known as
Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat) from the group at Waterloo was able to gather a
2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/ 1999", ERN 25495 (The
memo notes that the problems at the frontline include: "( 1) We have not yet connected physically with our
brothers in Freetown (2) Menpower indeed to be engaged on this Urban Warfare (3) The strategic positions of
the enemies mainly Port Loko, Lungi, Jui, Kabala are delaying our progress").
7717 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution Intelligence Office, 21/1/1999", ERN 25495.
mg rrr-567, Transcript 2 Jury 2008,pp. 12921-12922.
me TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12938-12939.
mo Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317.
ml TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12939-12941.
mz Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234, 3237.
7723 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3237.
7724 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3388 (PS).

---- End of Page 1183 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dm 18 May 2012
r 2

3 G; ;~_q.€¤
smaller contin ent, b ass ECOMOG and `oin the troo s in Freetown at Kiss Road.7725
8 YP J P Y
Perry Kamara testified that the troops led by Rambo Red Goat and Striker were part of the
troops that remained behind in Freetown after Gullit retreated with the civilian brigade, and
Rambo Red Goat and Striker's troops carried out Gullit's orders to make the area fearful.7726
3425. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, also with the troops in Freetown, corroborated the key
aspects of Perry Kamara's testimony. Bobson Sesay stated that during the second week of
January, while the troops were still at the State House, RUF Rambo communicated to Gullit
that he was preparing reinforcements to join Gullit, stating that a former SLA member
known as Rambo Red Goat, was advancing together with Superman and others toward
Freetown.7727 RUF Rambo explained that he had received the order to send these
reinforcements from Bockarie.7728 The witness explained that in the conversation RUF
Rambo stated that he had moved with Issa Sesay and SLA Rambo as far as Hastings, but
that RUF Rambo noted that the reinforcements were still afraid as they did not believe that
SAJ Musa was dead.7729 However, Bobson Sesay noted that despite this fear, some men, led
by Rambo Red Goat, were sent to join Gullit's troops in Freetown.mO Rambo Red Goat
arrived some time before the third week of January, and Gullit appointed the witness and
Colonel Eddie to receive Red Goat from Allen townml
3426. In cross-examination, the Defence sought to challenge the credibility of Bobson
Sesay's evidence concerning the reinforcements brought by Red Goat, pointing out a prior
statement in which Bobson Sesay had stated that when the "reinforcements" arrived, they
"onl saw one Colonel Rambo also called Red Goat" and that Red Goat told them that the
Y
other men he came with remained behind fearing that SAJ Musa was still alive.7732
However, Bobson Sesay maintained that Red Goat did bring 50 fighters to Freetown but that
there were more that had not joined them and insisted that when he said "one Colonel
7725 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3237-3238.
mf Perry mmm, Transcript 6 Febmary 2008, pp. 3241-3242.
7727 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8300-8302; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8321-8323.
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8327.
mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8300-8302; Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8323.
7730 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, rrrmsmpr 23 Apai 2008, p. 8323;
ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8301-8302; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8326-8328
("this was almost during the third week of 6 January when we eritered").
7732 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8854-8855.

---- End of Page 1184 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / {{5 18 May 2012

3.4 22*1-
Rambo" he did not mean there was only one man.7743 The Trial Chamber considers this a
plausible explanation of his words, noting in particular the practice of witnesses of
introducing persons for the first time in their testimony as "one so-and-so".m4
3427. TFl-375, who was deployed with Superman's group on the outskirts of Freetown
during the attack, testified that reinforcements led by Idrissa Kamara joined Gullit's troops
in Freetown around the time that Gullit's forces took over the State House.7735 TFl-375
stated that at Waterloo, Superman, Issa Sesay, Komba Gbundema and other senior officers
decided that RUF Rambo should take a group to attack Hastings and get across the bridge to
go to Freetown to join their "brothers".m6 Issa Sesay appointed an AFRC commander
known as Rambo Red Goat to lead the group that went to Freetown because, as Sesay stated,
Rambo Red Goat was once an SLA soldier and "knew his brothers in the city well".m7
According to TFl-375, Red Goat's group was able to enter Freetown by the way of a back
road.7734 He testified that later he monitored a conversation in which Red Goat called the
troops on the outskirts of Freetown to inform them of what was happening inside the
city.7734
3428. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the evidence of TFl-375 must be
considered with caution and requires corroboration.7744) In this context, however, the Trial
Chamber considers his evidence to be amply corroborated by Perry Kamara and Bobson
Sesay, who were both inside Freetown during the January 1999 assault. The Trial Chamber
notes that Bobson Sesay was present at the conversation in which RUF Rambo
communicated to Gullit that he was sending Red Goat to join Gullit on Bockarie's
orders.774l The evidence of TFl-375, Perry Kamara and Bobson Sesay is also consistent
with TFl-37l's testimony that during the AFRC's retreat, Boston Flomo (a.k.a. "Rambo"),
7733 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8847-8850.
7744 See for example, TFl-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2610 (CS) ("There was one Eddie Murphy who
was also a radio operator later"); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10436 ("we saw one Major Johnny
Paul Koroma [...]"); Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5923 ("[...] to my surprise there was one
Peanut Butter, commonly known at Adolphus Dolo").
mj TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jupp 2008, pp. 12610-12611.
7736 rrr-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12608.
4447 TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12609.
7734 TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12610-12611.
77394TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12612.
4740 Credibility Assessment, TFl-375, paras 308-312.
744] Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8302.

---- End of Page 1185 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T XJ (P5 18 May 2012

3.¢(2.'>p$§
alread in Waterloo, was successful in linkin u with the AF RC troo s on Bockarie's
Y E P P
instructions.7742
3429. The evidence concerning Bockarie ordering Issa Sesay to reinforce the troops in
Freetown is contradicted by Issa Sesay, who testified that Bockarie never instructed him to
send reinforcements to Freetown.7744 He asserted that while Rambo did eventually go to
Waterloo, this was not until late February 1999.7744 By that time, Gullit's forces were
retreating from Freetown.7745 Sesay testified that when Gullit contacted Bockarie from the
State House to request reinforcements, Bockarie refused because Gullit had ignored
Bockarie's instruction to wait previously in Benguema and that, as a result, Bockarie did not
send troops to reinforce the AF RC in Freetown.7746 Sesay denied sending any reinforcements
to Lunsar or Waterloo.7747 Sesay also testified that he had never seen P—149 prior to his
trial7748 and that he believed the information set out in it to be false.7744 raising a range of
issues concerning the accuracy of the contents of the document.775O The Trial Chamber notes
that Defence witness Charles Ngebeh also regarded the portion of Exhibit P—149 describing
the 9 January 1999 RUF attacks on Jui and Kossoh Town as ‘false information’, stating that
the RUF did not work with the AF RC to attempt an attack on J ui and Kossoh Town.7754
7742 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2427-2428 ("A. [...] And at a point in time they have repelled
them as far as Kissy and they were entangled from the back, from the rear, and they were calling for
reinforcement and Sam Bockarie told them that he had instructed Boston Flomo who was already at Waterloo at
that point in time to open the way and to link up with them. [...] Q. Now Boston Flomo and his troops, were they
able to link up with AFRC troops'? A. Yes, they were able to link up with the AFRC troops in eastern - in the
eastern part of Freetown").
7743 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46744, 46747.
7744 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46767-46768.
7745 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46750-46751.
7746 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44168; Transcript l2 July 2010, pp. 44187-44188.
7747 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46804
7748 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44189.
7744 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44199.
7750 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44189-44190, 44197-44198 (he stated that Superman, Rambo and
Sesay all had radios at this time and communicated on a daily basis, so it would not make sense to request
reinforcements via a typed letter; the men in Waterloo did not have access to a typewriter; Ibrahim Manrrah, who
was alleged to have written the document, was with Sesay in Makeni at this time, not in Waterloo with Rambo;
Bombali District, listed on the letter as the location of the Brigade headquarters indicates that the document
originated in Makeni; Sesay was a Colonel in January 1999, not a Brigadier General; Sesay did not know the
Intelligence Officer (IO) Commander Ibrahim Manrrah by the name of Christ A. Marmah; Sesay did not know a
Brigadier Goodial).
7754 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38688.

---- End of Page 1186 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-0l-T Gu 18 May 2012 %

39147
3430. According to Issa Sesay, Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat) was part of the
AFRC group led by Brigadier Mani,7752 which had left Bockarie's command to join SAJ
Musa in the Koinadugu District in around August 1998. Sesay testified that Brigadier Mani
did not take instruction from Bockarie from February 1998 until 1999 after the Lomé
Accord.7753 According to Sesay, in late 1998, there was no communication at all between
Bockarie and Brigadier Mani's group.7754 Sesay denied ever commanding Red Goat or
instructing him to go to Freetown.7755
3431. The Prosecution submits that Issa Sesay's testimony concerning his knowledge of
Idrissa Kamara is also inconsistent. He testified firstly that he knew Idrissa Kamara as part of
the ‘"Red Goat Battalion" with Brigadier Mani at the Koinadugu flank.7756 Next, he testified
that, at the time of giving evidence, he was not aware that Rambo Red Goat's real name was
Idrissa Kamara.7757 Later, he stated that he came to know Kamara's real name during his
period of detention with Kamara's commanders.7758 On re-examination, Sesay maintained
that the first time he heard the name Idrissa Kamara was when the Defence investigators
su ested that it was the same erson as Rambo Red Goat.7759
gg P
3432. The Trial Chamber notes that Sesay's testimony concerning the relationship between
the group led by Brigadier Mani, of which Kamara was a member, and the RUF is also
inconsistent in several respects. Although Sesay testified at first that Brigadier Mani's group
did not take instructions from Bockarie from February 1998 until after the Lomé Peace
Accord,77°0 during the course of examination-in-chief Sesay admitted that he was working
with Brigadier Mani, on Bockarie's orders, for the attacks on Makeni in December 1998.
Sesay later revised his testimony to state that the period in which Brigadier Mani was not
cooperating with Bockarie and the RUF was limited to February to December 1998.7761 Indeed,
Issa Sesay stated that Brigadier Mani's group was not part of the initial attack on Freetown
by Gullit because Brigadier Mani and General Bropleh were "with" Sesay until Superman
7752 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44916.
7753 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44081 -44082.
7754 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44051-44052.
7755 rssu Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47335.
7756 rsuu Sesay, rruusprrpt 28 July 2010, p. 44916.
7757 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46801.
7758 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p, 46810.
7757 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47333-47334.
77°" rsuu spuuy, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 4408 1 -44082.

---- End of Page 1187 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
P x

33 2_and Massaquoi attacked Sesay in March 1999.7762 Further, although Sesay emphasised that
he and Brigadier Mani separately commanded the RUF and AFRC respectively,7763 he also
testified that the Red Goat "Battalion" comprised RUF Hghters,7764 but also that it was led
by an SLA fighter, ldrissa Kamara. Later on in cross-examination, he rejected his earlier
testimony that the Red Goat "Battalion" was made up of RUF soldiers, but clarihed that that
battalion was a "combined" group operating in the Koinadugu area with Brigadier Mani, and
"all of them together with Superman came to Makeni" in December 1998.7765
3433. Due to these inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber does not consider to be credible
Sesay's evidence that ldrissa Kamara could not have provided reinforcements to Gullit's
group in Freetown because he and Brigadier Mani were in Makeni or because he and the
AFRC had separate commands. Sesay's evidence to this effect is contradicted by TF1—375,
who testified that Brigadier Mani was involved with Sesay in operations on the outskirts of
Freetown while Gullit's group was in Freetown.7766 lt is also contradicted by the evidence of
Komba Sumana that aiier the capture of Makeni in 1998,7767 Issa Sesay told the fighters that
they were to reinforce the forces in Freetown.7768
3434. The Trial Chamber also does not accept the challenge by Issa Sesay and Charles
Ngebeh to the accuracy of the information contained in Exhibit P-149.7769 The Trial
Chamber recalls its Ending that the evidence of Issa Sesay must be approached with
caution.777O It further notes that Ngebeh's suggestion that the RUF did not know the radio
codes used by the AFRC radio operators in Freetown, and therefore could not have agreed to
a joint operation on Jui and Kossoh Town,777l contradicts the consistent and undisputed
evidence of Prosecution witnesses that there were RUF radio o erators with the forces in
P
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44082-44083; Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46679—46680.
7762 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44159-44160; Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44916.
7763 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47335.
77"" Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44167-44168.
7765 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46798-46799
7766 TF1 -375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12608-12609.
7767 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17973-17974.
7768 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17976-17978. Although the witness only refers to a person
named "Issa", he previously testified that "Issa" was General Issa, who is in turn described by other rebels as
their "boss" (Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17917, 17971-17972).
7769 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44189.
7770 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
777* Charles Ngsbsu, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38690.

---- End of Page 1188 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
I

Eq 2.% \
Freetown. Noting that the origin of Exhibit P—149 is confirmed by TF1—5677772 and its
account of events is corroborated by Perry Kamara, the Trial Chamber accepts that Exhibit
P—149 is a reliable record of the movements of the RUF during the January 1999 operation.
3435. On the basis of the Prosecution evidence, particularly that of Bobson Sesay, Perry
Kamara, TF1—567, TFl—375 and Exhibit P—l49, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that after
resuming communications with Gullit, Bockarie ordered his troops to advance towards
Freetown, with the aim of joining forces with Gullit in Freetown, and that Gullit, Bockarie
and Bockarie's commanders coordinated in order to achieve that aim. It is also satisfied that
a small contingent of the troops Bockarie sent as reinforcements, led by Idrissa Kamara
(a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat), was able to join Gullit's troops in Freetown some time after
Gullit's forces had captured the State House.
(vi) Whether fighters in Freetown took orders from Bockarie
3436. The Prosecution contends that from 6 January 1999, Gullit's forces not only
coordinated with Bockarie but also implemented his orders. It alleges that unlike SAJ Musa,
Gullit and his comrades were willing to subordinate themselves to Bockarie. The
Prosecution submits that during the Freetown invasion, the AFRC and RUF forces inside the
city implemented specific instructions from Bockarie, including orders that resulted in many
of the atrocities.7773 The Prosecution adduced evidence in relation to a number of specific
instructions from Bockarie which the AFRC and RUF forces inside Freetown were alleged
to have implemented, including the instruction to make the area "fearful", to send Pademba
Road prisoners to secure locations, to execute captured ECOMOG soldiers and to kill
released prisoner Martin Moinama.7774
3437. In support of its submissions concerning the general relationship between Bockarie
and Gullit, the Prosecution relies on Dauda Aruna Fornie's evidence that those RUF fighters
7772 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12922-1292}, 12938-12939 (TF1—567 testified that he worked with the
Intelligence Officer (IO) Commander, Christ A. Mannah, and his adjutant, Raymond Kartewu, and recalled
seeing at the time a report both had sent to Sesay. He verified that the signatures on the document were those of
Raymond Kartewu and Christ A. Mannah and that this was the same report to which he had previously referred
as having seen); pp.12939—12941 (TF1—567 affirmed that the "Strike Force commander Brigadier Goodial"
referred in Exhibit P—149 was Gullit and that the person who instructed Boston F lomo to meet with Gullit's
troops was Issa Sesay).
7773 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 553, 558.
777* Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 553, 558.

---- End of Page 1189 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 2/ 18 May 2012 E
I

3 ei :>~%2>~
who entered Freetown on 6 January 1999 took "direct instructions" from Sam Bockarie.7775
Fomie also testified that during the radio conversations that he monitored between Gullit
and Bockarie, Gullit referred to Bockarie as "Sir" and sometimes as "Master".7776 Isaac
Mongor testified that Gullit called Bockarie "Sir" when they communicated over the radio
during the attack because Gullit was aware of Bockarie's position as "Chief of Defence".7777
Both Bobson Sesay and Kabbah explained that while Gullit wasthe overall commander of
the troops, he reported to Bockarie, who was in charge of the "entire movement".7778
According to TF 1-516, Bockarie gave the contingents in Freetown instructions on military
strategy, particularly in regards to setting ambushes, manoeuvring, on how to capture
particular targets and when to withdraw.7779 Similarly, Perry Kamara testified that when
Bockarie communicated with Gullit's troops during the Freetown assault, Bockarie would
give the troops in Freetown instructions conceming which targets to attack and destroy, such
as the Kissy Terminal refinery, which was then burnt by the Freetown forces, and where to
set road blocks.7780 The Prosecution also cited the evidence from Foday Lansana and Exhibit
P-085A conceming Bockarie's public claims that Gullit was "his" commander in support of
the allegation that the Freetown forces implemented Bockarie's orders.
3438. The Defence submits that there is no evidence of a superior-subordinate relationship
between Bockarie and Gullit that would have led Gullit to comply with Bockarie's orders. lt
contends that neither the alleged claims by Bockarie that Gullit was his subordinate
commander nor the evidence that Gullit referred to Bockarie as "Sir" would suffice,778l and
that there is evidence in Exhibit P-067 to the contrary that Gullit was not following orders
from Bockarie during the Freetown invasion.7782 The Defence contends that the Prosecution
allegations ignore evidence suggesting that, in the period prior to SAJ Musa's death, Gullit
clearly did not consider Bockarie as his superior and was disgruntled at his treatment by the
RUF .7783 The Defence also challenged the credibility of the Prosecution evidence. For
7775 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21666.
7776 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21604.
7777 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5825-5826.
7778 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8289; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September
2008, p. 16172.
7770 TFl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.
mo Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3231-3232, 3235.
ml Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 151.
7782 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 880.
7783 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 152.

---- End of Page 1190 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T OQ 18 May 2012

gq 2.*33
example, it notes that on cross—examination, Fomie insisted that both Gullit and Five-Five
were members of the RUF, and contends that this inaccuracy is a sign of the witness's
general lack of reliability concerning the stmcture of the RUF and AF RC factions.7784 The
Defence also cited one of Fornie's responses during his examination in chief, which could
be constmed to indicate that only the RUF invaded Freetown: Fornie described a radio
recording as being made "after the Freetown invasion on January 6 by the RUF".7785 The
Prosecution did not question Fornie again on whether it was the RUF alone that invaded
Freetown.
3439. The Trial Chamber has already opined that the evidence of Bockarie's public claims I
concerning his authority over the troops in Freetown should be accorded little weight,
although they evidence his desire and intention to exercise command and control over the
joint AFRC and RUF forces. While it also considers that evidence that Gullit referred to
Bockarie as "Sir" or "Master" is not sufficient alone to substantiate any conclusions
concerning the terms on which the two individuals engaged, it is relevant to corroborating
other evidence concerning a formal or de facto superior—subordinate relationship.
3440. Concerning Dauda Amna Fornie's evidence, the Trial Chamber accepts, as the
Defence points out, that neither Gullit nor F ive—F ive were members of the RUF .7786
However, the Trial Chamber does not consider this discrepancy to cast any serious doubt on
the reliability of Fornie's evidence concerning the command relationship between the two
leaders, which, given that following the ECOMOG Intervention Bockarie was appointed as
the leader of the joint RUF/AFRC forces.7787 It also notes that Fornie had previously
indicated his awareness that both Gullit and F ive-F ive were in fact, members of the
AFRC.7788 As to his reference to "the Freetown invasion on January 6 by the RUF", the
Trial Chamber notes that not only does this testimony not exclude the possibility that both
the RUF and the AF RC participated in the Freetown invasion, but Fornie later presented a
7784 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21667.
7785 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras. 899-901. Q: Do you recall approximately when this recording occurred?
Fornie: It was around February to March 1999. That was after the Freetown invasion on January 6 by the
RU"F". Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008 p. 21500.
77*6 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 901,
77*7 Context: Civil War in Sierra Leone (1998-1999).
mg Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21422 ("And then some council members of the
AF RC, like F ive-F ive, he was doing individual mining there"); Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21564 ("Gullit
was one of the bosses in the AFRC").

---- End of Page 1191 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / Qs 18 May 2012
\

$q2$k1-
detailed account of the movements by the RUF and AFRC that culminated in the
invasion.7789
3441. The Trial Chamber also notes that on cross-examination, Fornie confirmed that he
had previously told the Prosecution that Gullit only accepted operational orders from
Bockarie because his fighters needed Bockarie's support to maintain their hold on Freetown
in January 1999.7790 However, Fornie explained that he believed this was only one of the
reasons that Gullit was willing to accept orders from Bockarie, another being that Gullit
believed he would not be able to achieve his goals as long as there was infighting between
the AFRC and the RUF. Fornie stated that "indeed when he started working with Sam
Bockarie he started seeing some improvement".779l
3442. The Defence submission is supported by Exhibit P-067, a 1999 report to Foday
Sankoh by the Black Guards, authored by Junior Vandi, a Black Guard commander.7792
Exhibit P-067 recounts the operation to capture Kono and Makeni led by Colonel Rambo
and notes that after the fall of Makeni, Rambo tried to "link up with the other brothers that
. entered Freetown", but failed because "Commander Black Jah [Gullit] was not going by the
instruction from the High Command".7793 However, recalling evidence from witnesses who
provided firsthand accounts of Gullit's command, the Trial Chamber notes that certain
decisions made by Gullit which had the appearance either of insubordination, or a rejection
of Bockarie's involvement, were explicable by military necessity. The Trial Chamber also
considers significant the testimony of TF 1-371 that accounts of serious divisions within the
AFRC/RUF command structure were often exaggerated,7794 and that generally it was not
difficult for Bockarie to control commanders on the ground, including Gullit, even if there
were isolated instances when that control was not effective.7795
7789 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008 pp. 21555 -21564, et seq.
7790 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21848—21849.
WH Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21846-21847.
7792 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2406 (CS) (Vandi authored it and he was a Black Guard
commander); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903.
7793 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9679. Note that the report had previously described the BFC as Brigadier Issa Sesay: ERN
9679; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21564 ("Black Jah" is the code name for Alex
Tamba Gullit (a.k.a. Gullit)).
ml TF1-371 , Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2868-2881 (CS).
7705 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2616-2618 (CS).

---- End of Page 1192 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

3425
3443. The Trial Chamber also notes that Issa Sesay maintained that the men in Freetown
did not take orders from Bockarie, were not answerable to Bockarie and they had their own
command stmcture.7796
3444. The Trial Chamber considers that the general evidence on Bockarie's relationship
with Gullit will need to be examined in the context of specihc orders he is alleged to have
made.
(vii) Withdrawal from Freetown and order make it "fearful"
3445. A significant amount of evidence was adduced in support of the allegation that as
Gullit was facing increasing pressure from ECOMOG, Bockarie ordered him to make the
area "fearful". Alimamy Bobson Sesay conhnned that he was present in the State House
when Bockarie contacted Gullit to give an order to start buming strategic positions in
Freetown and to capture civilians.7797 Similarly Perry Kamara testified that he first heard
Bockarie order Gullit to "make Freetown more fearful than before" after the fighters were
inside Freetown,7798 and then again when Bockarie told Gullit that he believed Gullit should
leave Freetown and that Gullit should "make the area fearful" until they came back and
reorganised themselves to "regain Freetown".7799 One of the more detailed accounts is
provided by Dauda Amna Fomie, who testified that he monitored a conversation between
Gullit and Bockarie in which Bockarie gave "direct instmctions" to Gullit for Gullit to "to
cause a lot of mayhem in the city [...] whereby the international community would show
more concern about the RUF until they released Foday Sankoh". Bockarie specifically
referred to the destmction of government buildings and the amputation of civilians,
explaining that "Gullit and others should raise alarm to the level of the international
community so that they can come in".7800
7796 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46111
7797 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328-8329.
7798 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234-3235.
7799 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241-3242.
7800 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21590 (Mosquito was giving direct instructions to
Gullit for Gullit to- for Gullit to tell the men, 1 mean the RUF and the AFRC combatants, to cause a lot of
mayhem in the city. That is like to destroy some important government buildings and to tell people to take their
hands off the war and to cause real damage whereby the international community- whereby the international
community would show more concern about the RUF until they released Foday Sankoh. He said if it is possible-
Mosquito said if it is possible to chop off anybody's arm, he said- no. He said if it is possible to give anybody
short sleeves or long sleeves, meaning to amputate anybody, he said that wouldn’t be any problem. He said that
they should raise alarm. He said Gullit and others should raise alarm to the level of the international community

---- End of Page 1193 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T gg 18 May 2012
`./ F \

3446. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination, Defence counsel questioned
Fomie on why the alleged conversation he monitored between Bockarie and Gullit in which
the former ordered Gullit to destroy government property and amputate civilians to cause
intemational alarm, was not mentioned by Fomie in any of his previous 28 witness
statements. However, Fomie maintained that he was certain that he had infonned
Prosecution investigators about this incident but that it was not recorded.78Ol
3447. The Trial Chamber recalls that Fomie is a generally credible witness78O2 and
considers that his explanation for failing to mention the conversation between Bockarie and
Gullit to be forthright and credible, and does not undermine the reliability of his account. In
any case, other witnesses provide very similar accounts. Isaac Mongor overheard Bockarie
instructing Gullit that if they were unable to hold their ground in Freetown they should start
a campaign of destruction.78O3 Specifically, Mongor stated that he heard Bockarie on the
radio ordering the Nigerian Embassy to be bumt.7804
3448. The remaining witnesses who worked as radio operators during the January 1999
attack all confinned that Bockarie told Gullit to commit acts of terror, including the
destruction of government buildings and violence towards civilians, as they retreated from
Freetown. TFI-516 overheard Bockarie speaking to Gullit on the radio stating: "If they
mount pressure on us, bum down the iircking place".7805 Similarly, TFI-585 testified that
when ECOMOG put pressure on Gullit and his fighters, Bockarie ordered Gullit to
withdraw, stating "but before they should pull out of the town they should kill many people
and bum down many houses before they should leave the town".78O6 Mohamed Kabbah also
testified that when Gullit called Bockarie to tell him that his troops would not withstand the
ECOMOG assault and were withdrawing from Freetown, Bockarie told Gullit that as the
troops retreated they should destroy everything so that anyone passing in the area after the
rebel troops would know they had been there.78O7 Further, Alice Pyne testified that Bockarie
so that they can come in. Maybe it would force government to peace talks whereby Foday Sankoh would be
released).
7801 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 221 13-22115.
7802 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Forrrie, paras 346-358.
7803 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5825.
7804 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5825-5826, 6161.
7805 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6934-6935.
7806 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15726.
7807 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16171.

---- End of Page 1194 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T / dr; 18 May 2012

told Gullit that if ECOMOG forced Gullit's troops from Freetown, "they should burn the
fucking place and [...] should not spare anything".78O8 Foday Lansana also recalled that
when Gullit reported to Bockarie that the troops in Freetown were under serious threat from
ECOMOG, Bockarie told Gullit that "if it causes you to kill all the civilians, burn all the
houses where you are, just so that you will not leave Freetown you should go ahead and
make sure that you maintain where you were".7809
3449. One of the reasons that Bockarie gave for his direction to make Freetown "fearful"
was in order to improve the RUF 's negotiating position in relation to any future peace talks
and the release of Foday Sankoh.78lO The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that when
discussing the plan to attack Kono and Freetown, the Accused told Bockarie that the
operation should be "fearful" and that the RUF should use "all means", also in order to
P
pressure the Government into negotiations for the release of Foday Sankoh.78H
3450. Witnesses confirmed that Gullit's response was one of acquiescence. Bobson Sesay
stated that Gullit responded: "Yes, sir, I will do according to your wish. Just as you have
`ven me order, I will also order the men now to start the operation to burn down and
capture people in Freetown",78l2 and in the presence of the witness and others, Gullit ordered
senior commanders to distribute firel as they burnt areas in Freetown.78l3 Perry Kamara
testified that after receiving the instruction from Bockarie to make the area fearful, Gullit in
turn passed on the order to Rambo Red Goat after leaving him in charge of Freetown.78l4
Both Pyne and Lansana testified that after Bockarie gave that order, Gullit replied "Yes,
sir",78l5 and according to Lansana, Major CY, who was part of the group that was stationed
7808 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12281-12283 (Pyne understood from Bockarie's message that he
intended the indiscriminate destruction of property and persons).
7809 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4561-4562.
mo Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21590 (Bockarie gave "direct instructions" to Gullit
for Gullit to "to cause a lot of mayhem in the city [...] whereby the international community would show more
concern about the RUF until they released Foday Sankoh".); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3236
(Bockarie told the troops to make the area fearful because "the international body would intervene and maybe
[...] start calling for peace ta1ks").
ml Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
M2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8329-8330.
W3 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8331-8332; Bobson Sesay also testified that
subsequent to that order, the troops in Freetown burnt property and maimed and killed civilians as they retreated
from Freetown; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8335-8336, 8368-8372.
78}/4 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241-3242.
mg Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12281-12282; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp.
4563-4564.

---- End of Page 1195 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T // GQ) 18 May 2012

35 2.% is
at the State House in Freetown, confimied that Bockarie's order to make themselves fearful
was passed by the top commanders down to the "least person".78*° According to Kabbah,
Gullit told Bockarie that "he would go according to his instruction"78*7
345l. While some witnesses did not give evidence as to Gullit's response, they attested as
to the implementation of Bockarie's order. TPI-516, for example, noted that following
Bockarie's order to Gullit to burn down public structures, Elongima sent a message to the
operators in Buedu informing them that "the men have gone on a ramEnd of Page. They are killing
people, they are wounding civilians. The area has become fearful".78*8 Similarly, after the
instruction from Bockarie, Fornie heard on the BBC that on their retreat from Freetown, the
RUF left behind amputees, corpses and had burnt many houses.78*9 TPI-37l also stated that
there were media reports on the BBC and the VOA at this time conceming the carnage in
Freetown as the RUF and AFRC were retreating, including the buming of houses and the
killing and amputating of civilians. TPI-37l noted that this destruction was consistent with
Sam Bockarie's description of "Operation No Living Thing".782O
3452. The Trial Chamber notes that Issa Sesay testified that he believed that it was
doubtful that Bockarie gave the order for the destruction of Freetown or that Gullit would
have obeyed it. He noted that Gullit, having being bom, educated and joined the army in
Freetown, would not likely have committed these crimes only on the orders of someone
located in Buedu.7g2* The Trial Chamber does not consider Sesay's evidence, which the
Trial Chamber notes is not direct knowledge but rather an inference drawn from his
knowledge of Bockarie and Gullit, to be plausible in light of the numerous Prosecution
witnesses who testified as to Bockarie's instruction to Gullit. ln particular, Sesay's query
conceming why Bockarie would have ordered destruction in Freetown when he had not
done so for the capture of Makeni is explicable by reference to the fact that Gullit's troops
had in fact failed to retain Freetown. As Kamara stated, Bockarie told the troops to make the
area fearful because "the international body would intervene and maybe [...] start calling for
78*6 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4567-4568.
78*7 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript I5 September 2008, p. I6 I7I.
78*8 TFI-5I6, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6936.
78*9 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 2 I599.
7820 TFI-37 I, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2428-2429.
782* Issa Sesay, Transcript I2 August 20 I0, p. 46 I09; Transcript I9 August 20 I0, pp. 46795-46796.

---- End of Page 1196 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T I8 May 20 I2

Za 2.% 9
peace talks".7822 The Trial Chamber is satisfied, on the strength of the Prosecution evidence,
that Bockarie did direct Gullit to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the
retreat from Freetown, and that Gullit complied.
(viii) To send Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu
3453. The Prosecution also alleged that Bockarie passed onto Gullit instructions he had
received from the Accused through Benjamin Yeaten that the high-profile prisoners who had
been released from Pademba Road Prison during the Freetown assault, be taken to RUF-
controlled areas.7823
3454. The Trial Chamber notes its finding that the Prosecution proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Accused did provide directions to Bockarie concerning the security of the
persons released from Pademba Road Prison.7824 Concerning whether those instructions
were then transmitted from Bockarie to Gullit, the Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution
relies on witnesses Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Perry Kamara, Dauda Aruna Fornie, TFl-5l6
and Mohamed Kabbah. The Trial Chamber recalls that it had no general reservations
concerning the evidence of these witnesses. 7825
3455. All of these witnesses confirm that Bockarie did instruct Gullit to send the politically
prominent members of the prisoners released from Pademba Road to RUF controlled-
territory. According to Perry Kamara, when Gullit told Bockarie that they had been able to
capture State House, National Stadium and Pademba Road Prison, in response, Bockarie
"urged" Gullit to "do as a military man" and provide security for the persons released from
Pademba Road.782° On the retreat of Gullit's forces to Waterloo, Gullit sent the prisoners
released from Pademba Road directly to Makeni.7827 Bobson Sesay corroborated this
account, noting that at some point after the release of the prisoners, the witness heard from
7822 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3236.
7823 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 556.
7824 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, Allegation that the Accused Directed the Freetown Invasion.
7825 Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285-289; Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara,
paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, Dauda Amna Fomie, paras 346-358; Credibility Assessment, TFl-5l6,
paras 275-284; Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338.
7826 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3229.
7827 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3253-3254 (Kamara testified that one of the prisoners, Hilton
Fyle, a radio broadcaster, Bockarie requested to be taken by Issa Sesay to Buedu).

---- End of Page 1197 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-0l-T J Gm l8 May 20l2

Eizig
Gullit that the released prisoners were taken by RUF Rambo and Issa Sesay to Makeni due
to security reasons.7'323
3456. Similarly, Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that when when Gullit transmitted a radio
message to Bockarie via Perry Kamara that the troops in Freetown had released the political
detainees,7829 Bockarie instructed Mohamed Kabbah, a radio operator, to send a radio
message to Gullit to send those big names to the rear for safety.733O The witness knew that
the message was received by Gullit because Gullit acted on Bockarie's instructions and sent
the prisoners to Makeni.7'33l While Mohamed Kabbah himself did not attest to having
personally received this instruction,7332 he affirmed that when Gullit contacted Bockarie to
discuss his increasingly insecure situation in Freetown, Bockarie told Gullit to retreat with
the prisoners Gullit had released from Pademba Road Prison, specifically telling Gullit not
to leave the prisoners he released behind in Freetown, in particular President Momoh.7333
Kabbah then testified that Gullit later brought the persons released from Pademba Road
Prison into RUF-controlled territory.7834 TF 1-516 testified that two or three days after Gullit
informed Bockarie of the capture of the State House, Bockarie received another call from
Gullit notifying him that Gullit had released some prisoners from Pademba prison and
Bockarie ordered that all the released prisoners be sent to Buedu.7333
3457. The Trial Chamber is satisfied, on the strength of the evidence of Bobson Sesay,
Kamara, Fornie and Kabbah, which the Trial Chamber considers to be credible, that
Bockarie did direct Gullit to send high-profile political detainees released from Pademba
Road Prison to RUF-controlled territory and Gullit complied with that instruction.
(ix) Other orders
3458. The Prosecution also adduced evidence as to an order given by Bockarie for the
execution of Martin Moinama, a former radio operator who had testified in Foday Sankoh's
7323 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8318.
7329 Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581, 21588.
7330 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21586-21588.
7331 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21589-21590.
7832 The Trial Chamber notes that having testified prior to Fornie, Kabbah was not questioned further on his
testimony concerning the release of the Pademba Road prisoners.
733 3 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16171.
7*34 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16179.
7333 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6932-6933.

---- End of Page 1198 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Ol; 18 May 2012

3>°1x¤; g
treason trial and had been released when the troops in Freetown overran Pademba Road
Prison, and an order for the execution of captured ECOMOG prisoners.7446
3459. Two radio operators, both stationed with Superman in Lunsar throughout the
Freetown attack, testified concerning the alleged order to execute Martin Moinama. Foday
Lansana recalled that he monitored one communication in which Bockarie gave an order
concerning the execution of Martin Moinama, who had been a witness against Foday
Sankoh during his trial in 1989 in Freetown.7837 Moinama was captured during the invasion
by Gullit's troops on 6 January 1999. When Gullit reported his capture to Bockarie,
Bockarie ordered that Moinama be executed as a traitor. Gullit "did as he was instructed".
Lansana learnt of the execution from Gibril Massaquoi when Massaquoi arrived in Lunsar
along with other combatants after the retreat from Freetown.7444 Alice Pyne also told the
Trial Chamber that she heard that Martin Moinama, one of the persons released from
Pademba Road Prison in January 1999, was killed on Bockarie's orders for testifying against
Foday Sankoh.7439
3460. In its submissions, the Defence point out that Foday Lansana was imprisoned for
seven years alongside other former RUF and AFRC fighters, and admitted that he spoke to
other RUF prisoners about events during the civil war. ln particular, in a prior statement
Lansana had been asked about Martin Moinama and did not tell the Prosecution that he had
been executed.744O Further, Lansana had told the Prosecution in a prior statement that the
man who carried out the execution of Moinama was Alhaji Conteh (a.k.a. Black Jesus),
whom Lansana affirmed was one of the inmates with him at Pademba Road.7444 The
Defence suggests that consciously or subconsciously, Lansana amended his own account to
include what he was told by those other prisoners.7442 In relation to Pyne's evidence, the
Defence pointed out that Pyne was questioned about prior statements to the Prosecution in
which she stated that she believed that Martin Moinama was killed before the Intervention of
February 1998, rather than during the Freetown invasion.7843 The Defence suggests that
7436 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 555.
7437 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4562-4563,
4434 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4562-4563.
4834 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12340-12343.
4440 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp, 4747-4751.
ml Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4747-4749, 4763-4766.
7442 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1490.
7843 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12343—l2345,

---- End of Page 1199 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T J dk 18 May 20l2

éiaaz
Pyne heard about the alleged killing from Foday Lansana, as she met with Lansana in June
2008, the same week as her departure to The Hague to testify in these proceedings.7444
346l. The Trial Chamber finds that objections raised by the Defence to the evidence of
Lansana and Pyne are insufficient to cast doubt as to the credibility of their evidence on the
execution of Moinama. The suggestion that both witnesses amended their accounts after
having spoken to others is not supported by anything other than circumstantial evidence, and
both witnesses denied that their accounts were so influenced.4445 Both also offered plausible
explanations for the alleged inconsistencies in their evidence. Lansana explained that he did
not initially tell the Prosecution about Moinama's death because he did not yet feel safe as a
witness,4444 while Alice Pyne explained that before the Intervention Moinama's wire told
Pyne that Moinama had been killed when he had in fact been taken prisoner and that she
later learnt from other prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison that Moinama had been
killed. In light of these considerations, and the Trial Chamber's previous findings that both
Lansana and Pyne are generally credible witnesses,4444 the Trial Chamber accepts their
evidence that Bockarie ordered the execution of Moinama.
3462. In relation to the alleged order to execute ECOMOG prisoners, Kamara testified that
Bockarie told Gullit that as there was no prison for ECOMOG, any captured ECOMOG
soldiers should be killed. Kamara stated that captured fighters were then executed under the
cotton tree near the State House.7444 Bobson Sesay corroborated Kamara's evidence that
when the troops in Freetown had control of the State House, Gullit ordered the execution of
captured Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers at the back of the State House,7449 although Bobson
Sesay did not attribute the order to Bockarie. The Trial Chamber considers that as one of the
radio operators located in Freetown, Kamara was privy to the communications between
Gullit and Bockarie to which Bobson Sesay, as a fighter on the ground, would not always
4444 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1493; Alice Pyne, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 1243 8-12439.
4444 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4750-4754 (denied the Defence suggestion that he heard
the entire story concerning Moinina's death at Pademba Prison); Alice Pyne, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp.
12438-12439 (stating that she never spoke to Lansana concerning his testimony before this Trial Chamber).
7*46 Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4747-4751; Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp.
12343-12345 (explaining that before the Intervention Moinama's wife told Pyne that Moinama had been killed
when he had in fact been taken prisoner. She later learnt from other prisoners released from Pademba Road
prison that Moinama had been killed).
4444 Credibility Assessment, Foday Lansana, paras 237-243; Credibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307.
4444 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3230-3231,
4444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8292.

---- End of Page 1200 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

3 °7 Z 7]
have had access. Hence, that Bobson Sesay failed to refer to Bockarie's involvement in the
order does not undermine the credibility of Kamara's evidence. Recalling its finding that
Perry Kamara is a generally credible witness,7850 the Trial Chamber accepts his evidence that
the order to execute the ECOMOG soldiers 0riginated from Bockarie.
3463. The Trial Chamber is satisfied, on the Prosecution evidence, that Bockarie gave
Gullit orders to execute Martin M0inama, and a group of captured ECOMOG soldiers near
the State H0use, and both of which orders were carried out by Gullit.
(x) Conclusion on whether fighters in Freetown took orders from Bockarie
3464. The Trial Chamber recalls that after the ECOMOG lntervention in February 1998,
Bockarie took command over both the RUF and the AFRC,785l pursuant to which he had a
formal superior-subordinate relationship with Gullit. It is clear that throughout the Freetown
Operation, Bockarie issued a number of specific instructions to Gullit, including instructions
leading to the comrnission of crimes, which were implemented by Gullit and his tr00ps. In
light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber does not consider credible Issa Sesay's testimony
that the men in Freetown did not take orders from Bockarie.7852 C0upled with the general
evidence concerning the level of deference exhibited by Gullit towards Bockarie in their
communications,7853 and that Gullit reported to Bockarie as the overall commander,7854 the
Trial Chamber accepts that the fighters in Freetown did take orders from Bockarie, through
Gullit, and that Bockarie exercised effective command and control over Gullit from the point
at which Gullit reported to Bockarie after the capture of the State H0use and Pademba R0ad
Prison.
(xi) Whether Bockarie assisted the retreat of Gullit's forces from Freetown
3465. In support of their contention that when Gullit's forces retreated from Freetown,
Bockarie instmcted his forces on the outskirts of the city to ensure a safe line of retreat for
7850 Credibility Assessment, Peny Kamara, paras 227-236.
785} Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 450; Defence Final Trial Brief] para. 603; Context: Civil War in Sierra
Leone (1998-1999).
7852 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 461 1 1
7853 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21604; Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp.
5825-5826.
7854 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8289; M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September
2008, p. 16172.

---- End of Page 1201 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T ,(/ qw"! 18 May 2012

the withdrawing troops,7855 the Prosecution relies on the evidence of Alice Pyne, TF1—375
and Exhibit D~009.
3466. Alice Pyne, a radio operator under Superman's command, testified that she was in
Yams Farm for over two weeks during the Freetown invasion. At Yams Farm, she
monitored a communication in which Bockarie give an order to Gullit to destroy people and
property in Freetown.7856 Bockarie then ordered Superman and his fighters to remain at
Yams Farm to ensure there is "a safe corridor for those coming from Freetown".7857 Pyne
testified that by "safe corridor", she meant that Superman's fighters "created a safe area, that
was Yams Farm, for ECOMOG not to be able to base there, so those who would be coming
from Freetown would come and join us safely".7858 TF1~375, who fought with Superman's
troops during the Preetown operation, also testified that when Gullit's forces retreated,
Bockarie called Superman, informing Superman that Gullit's forces would need protection
while they were retreating from ECOMOG,7859 and instructing Superman and Issa Sesay to
defend Gberi Junction, Benguema barracks and Waterloo "so as to give free passage to the
forces that were in Freetown [...] whilst they were retreating".786O He testified that the forces
retreating from Freetown took the road from Grafton, to the Peninsula, through the
mountains and then to Waterloo, and during that retreat, the witness’ group defended
Waterloo, Klay, Benguema Barracks, and Gberi Junction, preventing the Guinean contingent
at Porto Loko from taking Gberi Junction.786l Isaac Mongor also testified that when RUP
Rambo engaged the ECOMOG forces in the Hastings area, the men who retreated from
Freetown were able to use the forest and hilly area nearby to come towards the Waterloo
arpa.7862
3467. Exhibit D~0O9, a salute report to Sankoh by Bockarie dated 26 September 1999,
corroborates this version of events. It states that when the troops who entered Freetown "had
1855 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 565.
7856 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12283-12284.
7857 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12284 ("‘After Sam Bockarie had given this order to Gullit he gave
another to Superman saying that Superman and his men should stay at Yams Farm to ensure that there is a safe
corridor for those coming from Freetown, because they were now in disarray in Freetown and so we were to stay
at Yams Farm to wait on the group that was coming from Freetown").
7858 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008. p. 12285.
W rrr-275, Transcript 24 Jppp 2008, pp. 12612-12614.
7860 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12614.
78*** rrr-275, Transcript 24 Jppp 2008, pp. 1261412617
7862 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6162.

---- End of Page 1202 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gig 18 May 2012

been cut off from the rear", Bockarie was able to "coordinate their operations over set and
got them to combine their forces and bulldoze from the side accessing them to the mountains
through which they took a bypass to join our troops at Benguema and Waterloo".7863 TF l-
375 confirmed that the incident described in Exhibit D-009 referred to the Peninsula route
through the mountains which the retreating forces took from Freetown to Waterloo.7864
3468. As stated previously, the Trial Chamber considers that as one of the witnesses who
participated in the Freetown attack and withdrew with those forces from Freetown, Bobson
Sesay's evidence is of particular relevance as to what occurred during the operation. Bobson
Sesay testified that the retreat from Freetown took place in two stages. Gullit first moved
with a civilian brigade to Benguema,7865 and notified the remaining forces in Freetown that
reinforcements were advancing to assist them at Jui. When those reinforcements were not
forthcoming, the troops took a bypass from Jui to the Grafton Hastings jungle towards
Benguema.78("6 The Trial Chamber does not consider Bobson Sesay's failure to refer to any
attempt by the forces led by Superman and Issa Sesay to assist this retreat to contradict the
evidence of P ne, Exhibit D-009 and TF 1-375, iven that he was in Freetown and in the
Y 3
midst of hostilities at the time. Moreover, he corroborates the evidence of TF1-375 and
Exhibit D-009 concerning the path taken by the retreating forces to Benguema, and his
account of the promised reinforcements at J ui suggests that on the retreat, the forces in
Freetown were coordinating with those on the outskirts.
3469. Issa Sesay testified that when Gullit retreated from Freetown, the RUF were in
Waterloo. He confirmed that the forces from Freetown "took the hills to Benguema".78(’7 He
agreed that the troops in Freetown were encircled by ECOMOG, who were deployed at
Waterloo, Mile 38 and Masiaka. However, he maintained that the fact that the RUF was at
Waterloo did not assist in their withdrawal; the retreating forces would still have been able
to withdraw because they had bypassed ECOMOG troops in the same positions on the way
7863 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", pp. 7-8, ERN 9665-9666; see also TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2866-2877
(CS) (During cross-examination, TF1-371 also confirmed the statement in Exhibit D-009 which stated that
during the Freetown operation, as Gu11it's troops were cut off from the rear, Bockarie coordinated the positions
of the fighters over the radio. Bockarie ordered them to combine their forces and to join RUF troops at
Benguema and Waterloo).
7864 TF1-375, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14833-14834.
7865 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8373-8375.
7866 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8375-8377.
7867 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44201-44203

---- End of Page 1203 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3 ?2? {
into Freetown. Hence, it was not inevitable that they would have to battle with ECOMOG.
ln response to counsel's question about whether Gullit's tr00ps would have been able to set
up a base at Benguema, as they did, without the support of RUF tr00ps at Waterl00, Sesay
stated that they could have bypassed ECOMOG and surfaced behind Benguema and then
retreated.7868
3470. However, regardless of whether Bockarie's man0euvres in Waterl00, Benguema
Barracks, and Gberi Junction actually assisted Gullit's tr00ps to retreat, the Trial Chamber
considers that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Bockarie did intend, by his
instructions to his commanders, to ensure safe passageway for Gullit's retreat. The Trial
Chamber recalls its previ0us finding that Pyne is a generally reliable witness,7869 and notes
that Pyne was personally monitoring communications between Bockarie and Gullit and
other commanders.7870 Further, her evidence is corroborated by the evidence of TF 1-375 and
contemporary d0cumentary evidence in the form of Exhibit D-009.
3471. Moreover, notably, on re-examination, Issa Sesay acknowledged that any ECOMOG
reinforcements at P0rt L0k0 had to travel southwards through Gberi J unction, through Gberi
Bridge, down to Masiaka to reach Freetown.787l This evidence is consistent with TF1-375's
account that the RUF tr00ps on the outskirts of Freetown were instructed to prevent the
Guinean contingent at P0rt0 L0k0 from taking Gberi J unction in order to protect the
withdrawing forces from ECOMOG reinforcements.7872 On the Prosecution evidence, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that when Gullit's forces withdrew from Freetown, Bockarie
instructed his forces on the outskirts of the city to ensure a secure line of retreat for the
withdrawing tr00ps.
1) J 0int RUF and AF RC attempts to re-enter Freetown
3472. Conceming j0int attempts to re-enter Freetown after the retreat, Bobson Sesay and
TF 1-567 also testified there was a j0int AFRC and RUF Operation to attack T0mb0
involving groups led by Gullit and by Issa Sesay.7873 Bobson Sesay gave evidence that when
7868 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, pp. 46840-46842.
7860 Credibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307.
7870 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12283—12284.
787] Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47303—47306; Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47324.
7872 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12614—12617.
7*73 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8379-8381; TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp.
12923—12925; Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13154—13154.

---- End of Page 1204 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / ak 18 May 2012

3 7 Z 7 2
the fighters that had left Freetown reached Benguema, in the presence of Gullit, Five-Five,
Superman, RUF Rambo, Rambo Red Goat, 0-Five, Issa Sesay then planned an operation to
recapture Freetown by using Tombo axis instead of the Freetown-Waterloo highway, where
ECOMOG forces were concentrated.7874 Bobson Sesay was personally chosen to lead as an
advanced team to settle a base at Macdonald.7875 Around mid-February 1999, as instructed
by Five-Five, Superman, Bomb Blast, RUF Rambo Five-Five, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay,
Med Bajejeh, Rambo Red Goat bombarded Tombo village and were repelled by ECOMOG
‘ troops.7876 While Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and others moved to Waterloo, Five-Five, the
witness, Bomb Blast and others moved to Benguema barracks where they spent a month.7877
Bobson Sesay stated that at Benguema there was cordiality between the RUF and the AFRC
because they were able to organise to re-attack. He also noted that Issa Sesay "had command
over Gullit" but agreed that these were essentially two groups working together against a
common enemy, the Sierra Leonean government.7878
3473. TF1-567 similarly testified that when Gullit's troops were in Waterloo, the witness
travelled with Issa Sesay to Waterloo,7879 where there was a joint AFRC/RUF attempt to
recapture Freetown.788O Sesay planned an attack on Tombo, in which Gullit's group also
took part, but the operation was unsuccessfuljggl Perry Kamara also testified that the
purpose of returning to Waterloo, as instructed by Bockarie,7882 was to regroup and re-attack
Freetown.7883 After Gullit's contingent arrived at Waterloo, commanders Issa Sesay, Denis
Mingo, Morris Kallon, and RUF Rambo were also there. Kamara stated that at Waterloo
"they held a meeting and we were able to reorganise to re-attack Kossoh Town and we
attacked twice but we couldn’t make it".7884 Dauda Aruna Fornie recalled hearing during the
retreat a communication from Bockarie to Gullit in which the former instructed the latter to
7874 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8379-8380.
7775 Arruuuuy Bubuuu spsuy, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8381-8385.
7876 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8385-8389.
7877 Alirnamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8389-8391.
7878 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8860-8861.
7777 rrr-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12920- 12921.
77*70 rrr-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12921- 12922.
777* TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12924-1292s.
7882 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241-3242 (Bockarie previously told Gullit that he believed
Gullit should leave Freetown "and then we will re-organise and regain Freetown").
7883 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3245.
7884 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3245.

---- End of Page 1205 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G`h 18 May 2012

assemble around the peninsula and wait for Rambo and others to join them in order to re-
attack Freetown.7885
3474. Issa Sesay denied going to Waterloo to assist the AFRC in retaking Freetown.7886 He
testified that Bockarie sent him to Waterloo to instruct Gibril Massaquoi, who had just been
freed by the AFRC from Pademba Road Prison and had joined Supennan and Rambo in
Waterloo,7887 to take the APC politicians who had also been freed from Pademba Road
Prison to go to Makeni to talk with Sam Bockarie.7888 Massaquoi had refused to come when
Bockarie called him after his release from Pendemba Road and instead told Bockarie that he
was going to operate with Supennan.7S89 Sesay denied that he made a plan with Gullit to re-
attack Freetown after Gullit's forces left the city or that they jointly planned to attack Tombo
with a view to retake Freetown.7890 According to Issa Sesay, when the RUF was in
Waterloo, Gullit was in Benguema and Bazzy was based behind Hastings and there was a lot
of tension between the groups because the AFRC forces had not provided necessary
reinforcements.789l
3475. The Trial Chamber notes that there is support for Sesay's account that divisions
between the RUF and AFRC erupted after Gullit's retreat from Freetown. TF1-567 testified
that when he travelled with Issa Sesay to Waterloo and met Gullit, Gullit was angry with
Sesay for his failure to send reinforcements, as Gullit had requested, forcing Gullit to
retreat.78q2 There were further difficulties when Sesay attempted to arrest Gibril Massaquoi,
on Bockarie's instructions, and Superman and other SLAs intervened to prevent the arrest of
Massaquoi.78°3 Bobson Sesay testified that, as the remaining forces in Freetown retreated,
Gullit warned them that Issa Seay and Superman at Waterloo were confiscating the
valuables carried by the retreating forces.7894 TF1-371 also confinned that the part of the
7885 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21602-21604.
78**6 Issa Sesay, Transcript ii August 2010, p. 45978.
7*87 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45976; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44823-44824.
7888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45974—45975.
7889 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010. p. 44224.
7890 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 46016.
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46792-46793.
7802 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008. pp. 12920-12921.
7893 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12923-12924.
7894 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8375-8377. It is not clear whether this actually
occurred, He testified that when he actually arrived at Benguema, Five-F ive and Gullit requested the retreating
troops surrender their valuables to Gullit, which they did, although whether this was to keep the valuables from
Sesay and Superman was not clear: Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008. pp. 8377-8378.

---- End of Page 1206 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T GQ 18 May 2012

AFRC that was led by Gullit and Bazzy fell out with the RUF at Waterloo and their
relationship was not mended throughout 1999.7895 However, TF1-371 also testified that such
divisions arose out of isolated "misunderstandings" and insubordination, and did not mean
that the RUF was not a cohesive group.7898
3476. On the issue of whether cooperation took place, Sesay on cross-examination
conceded that Superman and Rambo, both on Bockarie's orders,7897 jointly launched an
attack on Tombo with Gullit in February 1999.7888 Further, while Sesay testified that the
RUF and Gullit were based in separate areas——the RUF in Waterloo, Gullit in Benguema,7899
it is significant that Sesay later stated that it was only roughly 10-15 mins walk from the
RUF base in Waterloo to Gullit's camp in Benguema.78O8 Sesay also acknowledged seeing
Perry Kamara, who was at that time part of Gullit's group,79Ol while he was in Waterloo
after the Freetown invasion.79O2
3477. The Trial Chamber considers that Issa Sesay's evidence concerning the coordination
between the RUF and AFRC troops retreating from Freetown is not credible7988 and is
outweighed by the consistent evidence of Prosecution witnesses that there was such
cooperation in which Sesay himself was involved. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that,
despite emerging tensions between the AFRC and RUF forces at this stage, the factions
made collaborative efforts to re-attack Freetown.
7895 TF1-371. Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2613-2616 (CS); see also Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2427-
2428 (CS) (there was a misunderstanding between the AFRC and the RUF that resulted in Gullit, Bazzy Kamara
and other AFRC fighters going to Okra Hill instead of joining RUF fighters in Masiaka. Rambo's troops
retreated from Waterloo to Lunsar, where Denis Mingo was stationed).
78% TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2868-2881 (CS).
7897 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46852; Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47145-47146.
7888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46851; Sesay had earlier denied this but changed his testimony
when confronted with his testimony in the RUF trial: Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46850 ("Q. Rambo and
Superman were sent to attack Tombo with Gullit, correct? A. No")
7899 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46792-46793.
7908 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, pp. 46841-46842. Sesay did not agree with Counse1's estimate that
the distance was five to ten minutes walk.
7""‘ ruru spray, rruuuprrpr 28 July 2010, p. 44908.
7°°*’ rsru spray, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp, 44908-44909.
7808 Additionally, Sesay was inconsistent on his own movements during January 1999. While first stating that he
stayed in Makeni throughout the invasion of Freetown up until Superman attacked him in March 1999 (Issa
Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44200) he later testified that when the AFRC withdrew from Freetown but
still at some point in January 1999. he travelled to Waterloo from Makeni (Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August
2010. p. 45974).

---- End of Page 1207 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

S? 30 to
Conclusion
3478. The evidence suggests that while, as TFl-371 testified, the initiative for the invasion
of Freetown was taken by the group commanded by SAJ Musa and Gullit, and the RUF
under Bockarie's command were "Johnny-come-latelies" who "effectively tagged on on the
tail end",7904 Bockarie's troops already had "their own in-house planning"7q05 and took the
opportunity presented by SAJ Musa's death and the concomitant resumption of cooperation
with his troops to attempt a coordinated effort to get to Freetown. The Trial Chamber
considers that the Defence submission that the two factions were "no more than fighting a
common enemy"79O6 fails to capture the level of coordination that took place and the control
that Bockarie exercised over Gullit.
3479. The Prosecution also went further in its submissions to submit that even though the
attempts to coordinate Bockarie and Gullit's forces largely failed, with the exception of the
entry into Freetown of Rambo Red Goat, the RUF attacks by Boston Flomo and other troops
under Bockarie's command had the effect of assisting Gullit's troops to enter Freetown and
maintain their position in Freetown.7907 The Trial Chamber does not consider it necessary to
make a determination on the effect of the RUF attacks because regardless of the impact of
Bockarie's efforts to assist the forces in Freetown, what is relevantto the responsibility of
the Accused is whether Bockarie was effectively in command of a concerted and
coordinated effort to take Freetown, with Gullit as his subordinate. The Trial Chamber is
satisfied that this was the case.
3480. The Trial Chamber notes that the plan made by Bockarie and the Accused, without
the involvement of Gullit's troops, succeeded to the extent that the attack on Kono was
successful and fighters under the leadership of Rambo Red Goat were able to enter
7904 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2643-2644 (CS); see also Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4
December 2008, pp. 21723-21724 (Fomie agreed with Defence counsel's suggestion that SAJ Musa wanted his
troops to arrive in Freetown before the RUF under Bockarie's command. Fomie agreed that even after Musa's
death, the objective of his group remained to get to Freetown ahead of the RUF); Perry Kamara, Transcript 7
February 2008, pp. 3380-3382 (PS) (On cross-examination, Kamara stated that Sam Bockarie did not order SAJ
Musa to attack Freetown, and confirmed that when SAJ Musa announced the attack on Freetown, he was acting
entirely on his own initiative); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48451, 48453-48454 (Kolleh
understood when SAJ Musa and his troops were at Benguema, that they were on their way to Freetown but that
they "went on their own", meaning they were no longer part of the junta or RUF forces).
7905 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2648-2649 (CS).
7906 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 915.
7907 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 519-527, 547-552; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief,
paras 144-146.

---- End of Page 1208 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-O3-01-T - 18 May 2012 M
/

393w/
Preetown, although the attempts to take over and capture Kenema and Freetown were
unsuccessful. However, recalling that even at Waterworks Bockarie envisaged SAJ Musa's
direct involvement in the implementation of this plan,79O8 and having regard to Isaac
Mongor's evidence that the plan made by Bockarie and Taylor did not envisage a specific
group going to Preetown,7909 the Trial Chamber considers that with SAI Musa's death in or
around 23 December 1998, when Gullit took over the leadership of the troops at Benguema
and resumed contact with Bockarie. Bockarie and Gullit coordinated in their efforts to
capture Freetown. Prom that point onwards, the Trial Chamber finds that SAI Musa's
original plan was abandoned, and Gullit's movements were incorporated into the
Bockarie/Taylor plan, as had been envisioned by Bockarie at Waterworks. ~
Findings
3481. The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Gullit resumed
communications with Bockarie on the death of SA] Musa and that Gullit maintained
frequent daily oontact with Bockarie throughout the Freetown operation to discuss the
ongoing military situation in the capital.
3482. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Bockarie ordered his troops to advance towards Preetown, with the aim of joining forces
with Gullit in Preetown, and that Gullit, Bockarie and Bockarie's commanders coordinated
in order to achieve that aim.
’ 3483. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that although the attempts at coordination were largely unsuccessful, a small contingent of
the troops Bockarie sent as reinforcements were able to join Gullit's troops in Freetown
some time after Gullit's forces had captured the State House.
3484. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that when Gullit's forces withdrew from Freetown, Bockarie instructed his forces on the
outskirts of the city to ensure a secure line of retreat for the withdrawing troops, and that
after the retreat from Preetown the RUF and AFRC made joint efforts to re-attack the city.
7908 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, the Plan.
7909 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6720-6721.

---- End of Page 1209 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % (P, 18 May 2012

3 5* 30 2.
3485. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that, throughout the Freetown operation, Bockarie issued a number of instructions to Gullit,
including an order to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the retreat from
Freetown, which were implemented by Gullit and the fighters in Freetown. Bockarie
exercised effective command and control over Gullit during the capture of the State House
and Pademba Road Prison.
3486. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that following his first conversation with Gullit after the death of SAJ Musa, Bockarie and
Gullit coordinated in their efforts to capture Freetown. From that point on, SAJ Musa's
original plan to attack Freetown was abandoned, and Gullit's movements were incorporated
into the Bockarie/Taylor plan, as had been contemplated by Bockarie and the Accused.
(c) Allegation that the Accused directed the Freetown Invasion
Submissions of the Parties
3487. The Prosecution contends that in addition to planning the multi-axis offensive
culminating in the January 1999 attack on Freetown, the Accused remained in control of the
overall implementation of the plan both directly by communicating with Bockarie and also
through his trusted subordinate, Benjamin Yeaten. The Prosecution points to several
examples of the Accused's role in directing this operation, including when the original plan
for Bockarie to obtain arms and ammunitions from Libya failed, directing Bockarie to go to
Burkina Faso instead.79lO The Prosecution alleges that Yeaten travelled to Buedu to meet
with Bockarie just before the attack on Kono in December 1998.7911
3488. The Prosecution submits that during the operation, Bockarie and Yeaten were in
contact every 3-4 hours on a daily basis, with Bockarie providing Yeaten with updates from
the front line.79l2 In particular, Bockarie spoke directly with Yeaten on the satellite phone
immediately after the capture of Koidu town to inform him of troop movements.79l3 The
Prosecution also contends that during the attacks on Koidu, Makeni and locations in
Kenema district, Marzah, Sampson and Jungle were in Buedu on multiple occasions. They
mo Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 169.
mn Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 170.
wm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 170-171.
79'3 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 171.

---- End of Page 1210 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012

3 9 303
met with Bockarie and received his briefings about the operations, then went back to inform
Yeaten.7914
3489. The Prosecution also submits that the Accused issued a number of orders during the
operation. The Accused firstly ordered the release of captured ECOMOG soldiers held in
Buedu after the capture of Koidu Town. Bockarie complied with the Accused's order and
released them to Yeaten and Tuah in F oya.7915 Second, around 7 January 1999, the Accused
sent an order to Bockarie via Yeaten for the high profile prisoners released from Pademba
Road Prison, including former President of Sierra Leone Joseph Momoh, to be sent to RUF-
controlled areas at Buedu.7916 Third, the Accused also provided instructions on military
attacks and strategy.7917 Fourth, the Accused announced a ceasefire during the fighting.7918
Finally, during the Freetown invasion, Bockarie even took a trip to Monrovia during which
the Accused had instructed him that he should maintain the RUF -controlled areas.7919
3490. The Prosecution submits that Bockarie continued to take direct instruction from the
Accused after the withdrawal from Freetown and continued to keep the Accused informed of
what was happening in Sierra Leone through Bockarie's visits to Monrovia and through
constant radio communication between his radio operators in Sierra Leone and the
Accused's subordinates in Liberia.79211
3491. The Defence denies generally that the Accused had any involvement in the Freetown
invasion in January 1999,7921 and specifically that the Accused communicated with Bockarie
either directly or through Yeaten about the progress of the Freetown invasion.7922 The
Defence alleges that the evidence concerning such interactions between Bockarie and the
Accused or between Bockarie and the Accused's subordinates is unreliable and
inconsistent.7923 Specifically, it suggests that the evidence indicating Yeaten visited Buedu
prior to the December 1998 attacks is uncorroborated and contradicted by other Prosecution
1911 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 175.
1915 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 171,
1016 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 172, 556.
1911 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 172.
1918 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 173.
1919 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 173.
19211 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 174.
1921 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 920.
mz Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1282.
1(123 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1280-1282.

---- End of Page 1211 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QLQ 18 May 2012

Z? 304
evidence;7924 that the evidence relating to the Accused's subordinates visiting Buedu is also
contradicted by other Prosecution evidence;7925 and, with respect to the orgy of violence that
followed the retreat from Freetown after the January 6 invasion there was a general
breakdown of command and control and most of` the violence was attributable to the rogue
elements within the retreating forces.7926 ln relation to the alleged order to release the
ECOMOG peacekeepers captured during the Kono operation in December 1998, the
Defence contests the allegation that the peacekeepers were released per the Accused's
‘orders’.7927
3492. Even accepting that interactions occurred between Yeaten and Bockarie, the Defence
submits that the evidence fails to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that Yeaten's alleged
communication with Bockarie carried the force of superior command, or that the alleged
communication with Yeaten was at Taylor's behest. The Defence refers to its argument that
Bockarie and Yeaten developed a close personal relationship outside the knowledge and
control of the Accused. The Defence also contends that the Prosecution evidence only
indicates interactions between Yeaten and Bockarie at the time, and not between Yeaten and
Taylor.7928 ln any case, the Defence contends that taken at face value, Prosecution evidence
suggests a relationship between Taylor and Bockarie that was largely based on the latter's
reverence to the former and cannot found superior responsibility or effective control.7929
3493. The Defence further alleges that the evidence also fails to connect the Accused to the
crimes committed in Freetown: first, because the RUF played no part in the Freetown
invasion; even assuming that the Accused had effective control over Bockarie, the
Prosecution fails to show a clear chain of command between the Accused and members of
the AFRC who carried out the Freetown invasion; and second, the evidence fails to establish
effective control on the Accused's part over the specific persons who carried out the
atrocities.793O A
7924 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 899.
7925 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 888.
79% Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 921.
7927 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1291.
7928 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1279.
7929 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. l284—1285.
7930 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1278.

---- End of Page 1212 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T % Gb 18 May 2012

3?Z0>’
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna F omie
3494. Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie testified that, prior to the December 1998 attack on
Kono,793 3 he saw Bockarie having a discussion with Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. Five—Zero) one
evening around 10.00 to 11.00pm at Bockarie's house. The witness had just received a
message from the front line and was going to take it to Bockarie. He saw two vehicles enter
and persons alight from those vehicles. When the witness approached, he saw Yeaten sitting
together with Bockarie in Bockarie's backyard. Some Liberian SSS members were also
present, wearing blue SSS uniforms. Fomie only remained there for long enough to give
Bockarie the message and then left. The two men then left to take a stroll towards Dawa
Road. Fomie did not know what the two men discussed but asserts that they met for about
an hour, and then Yeaten returned to Liberia. Other radio operators also knew about this
meeting.7932
3495. Fomie testified that an "all-out" attack by the RUF on the Kono and Kenema
districts began around 15 to 20 December 1998. When this general attack started he was in
Buedu. At Buedu, Bockarie was in constant contact with Yeaten on a daily basis and was
monitoring the frontlines. This attack led to the capture of Kono.7933 After the fall of Kono,
Bockarie contacted Yeaten and informed him of the capture of Kono. The witness was the
first person to receive the message from Issa Sesay that Kono had fallen. Sesay also stated
that some other fighters, led by Morris Kallon and Bai Bureh, were heading towards the
Masingbi area.7933 When the witness gave Bockarie this message, he called Yeaten
immediately using a satellite phone to inform him that Kono was under RUF control. The
witness was present when Bockarie contacted Yeaten. Yeaten would call Bockarie often
seeking updates fiom the frontline during the Kono operation. Bockarie would receive at
least one message every three to four hours that the witness spent with Bockarie.7933
7333 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21560.
7932 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21558~21561.
7333 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21555.
7333 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21556.
7935 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21557.

---- End of Page 1213 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T GM 18 May 2012

37366
3496. On 6 January 1999, the witness was in Buedu monitoring the radio constantly. Any
time that the RUF received a message, he would bring the messages from the monitoring
station to Bockarie's transmitting station to send to the front line commanders.7936
3497. Bockarie was in constant contact with Yeaten in Liberia during the course of the
January operation. They spoke at least two or three times a day through the satellite phone.
The witness would oHen be in the radio room with Bockarie during these conversations.7937
These communications would concern arms and ammunition, food, supplies, fuel,
operational decisions and updates. Fornie stated that sometimes Bockarie "would contact
Benjamin to consult him on some decisions before he ever took them".7938
3498. On the morning of 7 January 1999,7939 Gullit transmitted a radio message to
Bockarie via King Perry that the troops in Freetown had released the political detainees,
from Pademba Road Prison. Among those who were released included the late ex—President
Momoh, Steve Bio, Victor Foh, Osho—Williams, and other Sierra Leone politicians.7940 Less
than an hour after Bockarie received this message, he called Benjamin Yeaten on the
satellite phone to inform him of the release of the prisoners.794l Fornie was present when the
call was made.7942 A&er some time, Yeaten came back on the telephone line and gave
Bockarie instructions to ensure that the prisoners released were transferred to Buedu,
because they should not be at the frontlines.7943 Yeaten told Bockarie that this was an
instruction from Taylor. Bockarie then instructed Mohamed Kabbah, a radio operator, to
send a radio message to Gullit to send the released prisoners to the rear for their safety. The
witness knew Bockarie was speaking to Yeaten because Bockarie asked the person on the
line to confirm that it was "Five-Zero", and it was confirmed. In their conversation,
Bockarie responded to Yeaten by saying "Yes, Sir. Okay, okay, I will do that". Further,
when the conversation ended, Bockarie told Mohamed Kabbah directly that he had had
instructions from Taylor through Yeaten.7944 The witness knew that the message was
7036 Dauda Aruna Fornie, 'Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21562-21563.
7037 Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610.
7938 Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21615.
7939 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21589.
WO Dauda Aruna Fornie, 'Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581, 21588.
7941 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581-21582.
7042 Dauda Aruna Fornie, 'Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21583-21585.
79*3 Dauda Aruna Fornie, 'Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21586-21587.
7*** Dauda Aruna remie, 'Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21586-21588.

---- End of Page 1214 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OQ 18 May 2012

Wyo?
received by Gullit because Gullit acted on Bockarie's instructions and sent the prisoners to
Makeni. When these freed prisoners were transported to Makeni, Steve Bio was killed by an
enemy bomb fragment.7945
3499. There was frequent communication between Bockarie and Gullit during the course of
the Freetown operation, with communications occurring every hour or so.7946 The
communication concemed requests from Gullit to Bockarie for ammunition. As a result,
Bockarie contacted Yeaten in turn to ask for ammunition.7947 Fomie testified that as
Bockarie was too busy co-ordinating the front lines, he sent Fomie and two others to
Monrovia where they were met by Yeaten. This trip occurred two days after Gullit entered
Freetown on 6 January 1999. Yeaten took them to White Flower where they retrieved
approximately 25 boxes of ammunition and some RPGs and grenades and returned to
Buedu, all within 36 hours.7948
3500. Fomie testified that the ammunition he brought back to Buedu immediately after the
Freetown invasion was dispatched directly to Kono where Peter Vandi received it and sent it
directly on to Issa Sesay in Makeni who dispatched it to Rambo and others in the Waterloo
area. The ammunition reached Rambo approximately 3 days after Fomie came with them to
Buedu. The witness explained that he knew all this because it was written down in the
message log book.7949
Prosecution Witness TF1—567
3501. Witness TF1—567 testified that after the capture of Koidu Town in December 1998,
when the witness was on his way toward Makeni, there were communications with
Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator, Sunlight, in Monrovia. Radio operators informed
Sunlight that the RUF had captured Koidu, as well as arms and ammunition and some
Nigerian soldiers. The witness was in the radio room when these communications were
going on.7950
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
7945 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21589—21590.
7946 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21589.
7947 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21593—21594.
7048 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21522, 21594—21595.

---- End of Page 1215 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dh; 18 May 2012
l

3720K
3502. Witness Abu Keita, who took part in the RUF December 1998 offensives,7954
testified that after the RUF recapture of Kono on 25 December 1998,7452 Issa Sesay arrested
1 l Nigerian ECQMOG soldiers in Kono as prisoners of war. They were taken to Buedu and
kept in a dungeon at the military police headquarters.7453 Benjamin Yeaten and Sam
Bockarie met at Dawa. Yeaten told Bockarie that Taylor had informed him that he wanted
the ECOMOG soldiers released to him in Liberia. Bockarie did not disagree but he did not
release the soldiers that day. A "couple of days" later, Bockarie stated that he had a call from
Yeaten telling him that Charles Taylor's request was in fact an order. Following this call, the
witness, Marzah, and Sampson drove to Foya in Liberia with the ECOMOG soldiers where
they were handed over to Yeaten and Joe Tuah.7954
3503. Keita testified that during the attack on Freetown, he and Bockarie were in
Buedu.7955 When Bockarie heard on BBC radio on 6 January 1999 a commander speaking
from Freetown stating that he was in control of the State House, Bockarie became angry that
he was not the first to speak to the BBC. Bockarie then called the BBC on his satellite phone
and stated that the RUF were approaching the State House.7456 Bockarie was speaking to
various commanders in and around Freetown, including Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon, over
the RUF radio network. Bockarie also communicated with Benjamin Yeaten and Joseph
Tuah on the satellite phone at night, and Bockarie told the witness he was reporting to them
on the status of the operation. The witness did not hear Yeaten giving any instructions to
Bockarie.7957
3504. Keita also testified that during the Freetown invasion,7958 Bockarie travelled back to
Liberia. The witness accompanied Bockarie to Foya where a helicopter came to fetch
7444 Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21595-21596.
7450 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918.
7%* Apu Keita, rrarrsprrpr 23 January 2008, pp. 2007-2008
7452 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2008-2009.
7454 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2028-2029.
7454 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2028-2029.
7455 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020.
7956 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2019-2020.
7457 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022.
7458 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020 (Q. Sir, where were you when the attack on
Freetownhappened? A. When the attack on Freetown happened I was in Buedu. Q. Where was Sam
Bockarie‘?A. Sam Bockarie was in Buedu. That was the time I told you that he came with these jean trousers and
T'shirts and the car).

---- End of Page 1216 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T , (F3 l8 May 2012

Y 7 307
Bockarie.7959 Bockarie was picked up by Joe Tuah in a helicopter and flown to Monrovia.
Bockarie spent a day in Liberia,7%O and when he retumed to Foya the witness met him there.
Bockarie brought with him a Toyota Land Cruiser, which he said had been given to him by
Taylor. The vehicle also contained jeans, t—shirts, medicine and bandages.7%l Keita also saw
Bockarie depart on another trip to Monrovia from Foya via helicopter, on which Bockarie
carried a seriously wounded soldier. When Bockarie retumed on the trip during the
Freetown invasion, he told the witness that he had brought back a message from Taylor that
the RUF should maintain its controlled areas. He passed this message onto Issa Sesay and
Moriis Kallon.7962
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
3505. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, who was in Buedu on 6 January 1999,7963 testified that
one moming after Gul1it's troops entered Freetown, Benjamin Yeaten contacted Sam
Bockarie over the radio from Foya. The contact was initiated by Yeaten's radio operator.7964
The witness and other operators in Buedu heard this conversation on VHF radio as it was
quite loud. Yeaten asked Bockarie about the situation in Freetown, and Bockarie told him
that "our men in Freetown" were under enormous pressure, that they had been pushed out of
State House and that ECOMOG had cut off their supply lines. Yeaten told Bockarie to
reinforce the troops in Freetown so that they would not lose the city, and Bockarie
responded that he had given Rambo instructions to put together reinforcements and move to
assist the troops in Freetown.7965
3506. Kabbah testified that eventually ECOMOG cut off the supply lines of the rebel
troops in Waterloo, which meant that Rambo and his reinforcements were not able to get
through. When Gullit contacted Bockarie to discuss this situation, Bockarie told Gullit to
move with the prisoners Gullit had released from Pademba Road Prison at night in order to
evade ECOMOG jets. Bockarie told Gullit specifically not to leave the prisoners he- released
7959 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2011.
7960 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2023.
ml Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2011-2013.
7962 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2023-2024.
7963 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16166.
7964 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September, pp. 16168—16170.
7965 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. l6168—16169,

---- End of Page 1217 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Hu 18 May 2012

37 3/v
behind in Freetown, in particular President Momoh.7966 When Gullit withdrew, he brought
the persons released from Pademba Road Prison into RUF—controlled territory, which at that
point stretched from Lunsar to Kabala, Kailahun and Kono.7967
3507. Kabbah testified that generally when Bockarie was the leader of the RUF,7968 and
also during the period that Gullit was in Freetown,7969 Bockarie would cormnunicate with
Benjamin Yeaten. Communication between Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten during the
Freetown invasion was the continuation of a "sisterly or brotherly operation", and the two
men would share both good and bad news. Kabbah observed that Bockarie spoke to Yeaten
as if Bockarie was in the position of a subordinate receiving instruction from a superior.
Kabbah noted as an example that when Bockarie told Yeaten about the increasing
difficulties Gullit's troops were facing in Freetown, Yeaten told Bockarie to send
reinforcements to the city.797O More generally during Bocka.rie's leadership, Bockarie spoke
to Yeaten because "[i]t was a sort of a joint operation that was going on. Everybody wanted
to know the successes and the failures that each had at a particular time, so they used to talk
on those things".797l Kabbah knew that Bockarie was talking to Yeaten while the witness
was in Buedu because Yeaten's radio operator used to conduct the dialogue from Liberia.7972
3508. During the Freetown invasion, Bockarie would also cormnunicate directly with
Charles Taylor by satellite phone, and he would do so openly.7973 ln one instance, on the
very day that King Perry initially made contact with the Buedu radio station, Bockarie told
the operator on duty, Tiger, to inform Taylor's operator Sunlight that he wanted to talk to
Taylor. Bockarie then drove with the witness and others to the MP headquarters in Buedu 6
where the satellite could get reception, and Bockarie spoke with Taylor on the phone.7974
The witness heard Bockarie say that his men had entered Freetown, and had captured State
7966 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16171, 16179.
7967 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16179.
7968 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16144.
7069 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16173.
7970 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-16175; Transcript 12 September 2008, pp.
16143-16145 ("at one time when in fact the 6 January invasion took place in Freetown when ECOMOG was
pushing the men, at that time Mosquito spoke with Benjamin Yeaten and so he said, ‘The situation is becoming
bad at the front line. The enemies were pushing our men out of the town’, so Benjamin Yeaten told him why he
was not trying to reinforce the men in the city. He said, ‘You know the city is big. You need to reinforce
them"’).
wl Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16145.
7972 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16145.
7973 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173, 16175.

---- End of Page 1218 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z .... 18 May 2012

Za 3 ll
House. Bockarie was laughing when he spoke on the phone and said "Yes sir" several
times.7975 The witness understood that Bockarie was speaking with Charles Taylor because,
just prior to this conversation, Bockarie had stated that he had wanted to speak with
Taylor.7976
3509. Kabbah also testified that he did not recall Bockarie discussing any crimes over the
radio, although he noted that such matters would not be discussed over the air. Rather,
Bockarie and Yeaten would discuss developments at the frontlines, and Bockarie might
request materiel, or relate the death of a prominent member of RUF but they never discussed
civilian deaths or mistreatment of civilians.7977
3510. On cross—examination, Kabbah was questioned on a prior statement to the
Prosecution in which he had said that Yeaten never gave Bockarie advice or instructions on
military strategy. Defence counsel asked why he had testified in direct examination in
relation to the Freetown invasion that he had heard Yeaten telling Bockarie that Freetown
was a "big city" and that Bockarie should send troops to reinforce the troops that had
invaded Freetown.7978 Kabbah explained that he did not consider this to be an instruction
related to military strategy, and affirmed that Yeaten did not give directions relating to
whether the RUF should attack particular areas or set a certain ambush, but he did
occasionally offer suggestions. Kabbah confirmed another prior statement that he did not
recall hearing any orders or instructions from Charles Taylor or his subordinates regarding
the Freetown invasion.7979
3511. Kabbah testified further on cross—examination that while Yeaten was a "Special
Force", Bockarie was "a trainee from Liberia". However, although Yeaten was superior to
Bockarie, Bockarie felt that he did not want to take orders from Yeaten because Bockarie
"was commanding a whole revolution".798O Kabbah then affirmed a prior statement to the
Prosecution in which he stated that while Bockarie did not "take orders" from Yeaten
7074 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16176-16178.
7075 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16178.
7976 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16178,
7977 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16349-16350.
7978 ;\g[ohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16144; Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-
Lg; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16350-16352.
7080 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16379.

---- End of Page 1219 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % GM 18 May 2012

Z? Z/Z
because Bockarie would have seen Yeaten as "inferior" in rank, nonetheless Bockarie would
have followed instructions by Yeaten because it "had to have come from Charles
Taylor".798l Kabbah testified that even if a message from Yeaten did not specifically refer to
Taylor, it was understood in the RUF, and by Bockarie, that anything Yeaten said must have
been sanctioned by Taylor as Yeaten was the President's "right-hand man". However,
Kabbah agreed in cross-examination that there was no evidence to support the assumption
that all instructions from Yeaten stemmed from Taylor, and that it was just what people
assumed.7982
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -585
3512. Witness TF1-585 testified that just after Bockarie used his satellite phone to inform
the BBC that his troops would be in Freetown within three days time,7988 the witness heard
the radio operator on duty receive a call from Benjamin Yeaten's operator Sunlight, asking
them to find Bockarie so that he could speak with Yeaten.7984 Bockarie came to the radio,
and the witness heard Yeaten tell Bockarie that if what he heard on the BBC was true,
Bockarie should expect Yeaten to come to Buedu in two days’ time. 1-Ie told Bockarie to
switch on his satellite phone because "my father", whom the witness understood to be
Taylor, "would want to talk to you".7985 Bockarie went directly to the veranda where the
satellite phone was located and spoke on the phone. The witness was not present for this
conversation. She also testified that Yeaten came to Buedu two days later, and Bockarie
instructed her to prepare food for Yeaten.7988 This was the first time that the witness saw
Yeaten in Buedu.7987 Yeaten came with Sampson, Junior and Jungle and stayed for a night in
Buedu before going to Kono with Issa Sesay and others. The witness did not know the
purpose of their trip, or when they returned to Buedu.7988
3513. After the troops withdrew from Freetown, persons released from Pademba Road
Prison in Freetown, including Victor Foh, came to Buedu. The witness read in the radio
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381.
7982 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381.
7988 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15717-15719.
7984 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15720-15721.
7988 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15719-15722.
7888 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15722-15724.
7887 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15723.
7988 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15722-15723.

---- End of Page 1220 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /8 du 18 May 2012

logbook that Bockarie had instructed Superman to send them to Buedu. He also invited
Gibril Massaquoi, but Massaquoi did not come.7989
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
3514. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator based in Buedu during the Freetown
invasion,799O testified that when the troops arrived in Freetown, Gullit contacted Sam
Bockarie by radio and reported that he had captured State House. Two or three days later,
Bockarie received another call from Gullit notifying Bockarie that Gullit had released some
prisoners from Pademba Road Prison. Bockarie ordered that all the released prisoners be
sent to Buedu.799l The witness monitored this conversation on the radio.7992
3515. During this period Bockalie was also in "persistent" communication with Charles
Taylor, call sign "020", and Benjamin Yeaten, call sign "Base 1".7993 After Benjamin
Yeaten's radio operator, Sunlight, intercepted Bockarie's radio communications about the
release of prisoners from Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, Yeaten contacted Bockalie by
radio to congratulate him on the release of the prisoners. Sunlight had access to the RUF
radio network and knew almost all of the RUF frequencies.7994
3516. There were also communications between Bockarie and Taylor during the invasion
of Freetown via satellite phone. After conversing with Taylor, Bockarie would come to the
radio station and draft instructions for the commanders regarding military manoeuvres. After
such conversations Bockarie would instruct Gullit to set ambushes and go on attacks. The
witness overheard these satellite communications.7995
3517. The witness also recalled two particular orders issued by Bockarie during the
invasion of Freetown after discussions with Yeaten or Taylor. Following a satellite phone
conversation with "020" in Liberia, at a time when the forces in Freetown were under
increasin ressure from ECOMOG attack, Bockarie told Gullit over the radio to instruct his
g P
7989 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15730-15731.
7990 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6857 (The witness was assigned to Buedu as a radio operator to Sam
Bockarie after the ECOMOG Intervention); Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860 (the witness moved to
Liberia in mid-1999).
ml TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6932-6933.
79% TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6978.
W TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6936-6937.
7°"" TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6938-6939.
7""5 Trl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.

---- End of Page 1221 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (jk 18 May 2012

3 7 Z/7
men to burn down areas in Freetown, including government buildings, in order to attract the
attention of the international community.79% The instruction that Bockarie gave to Gullit to
send the prisoners released from Pademba R0ad Prison to Buedu was also made following a
conversation with Yeaten's radi0 station "Base 177997
3518. ln cross-examination, the witness confirmed that he had made a prior statement to
the Prosecution that he "was not aware of any directives by Charles Taylor or Benjamin
Yeaten regarding the Freetown invasion of January l999".799S TF1-516 explained that this
statement was referiing strictly to radi0 communications, and noted that there were
discussions via satellite phone, after which Bockarie would issue instructions over the
radi0.7999
3519. Brima's radi0 Operator, Elongima, informed the RUF in Buedu of reports that the
fighters in Freetown had gone on a ramEnd of Page and were cornmitting atrocities. He said that
they had captured large numbers of women and were "wounding civilians".8000 ln response
to counsel's question on whether the atrocities that were committed were reported to any
other party, TF1~516 testified that Bockarie would provide reports on the situation at the
fiontlines to Base 1 and sometimes to "020". The witness himself called "Base 1" several
times on Bockarie's behalf. Bockarie would then cornmunicate with Yeaten either by phone
0r over the radi0.S00l
3520. TF1~516 also testified initially that during the Freetown invasion Bockarie flew to
Monrovia fi0m Foya in a helicopter to see Charles Taylor and returned 72 hours later by
air.8002 However on cross-examination, TF1-516 admitted that he had made a mistake and
that the incident he described had not taken place during the Freetown invasion and,
although he could not recall exactly when it had happened, "the Operation in Freetown had
long been undertaken".8003
Prosecution Witness Pegg Kamara
79% TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6976-6977.
7907 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6977-6978.
7998 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, p. 7778.
7999 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7778-7779.
8°"° TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6978-6979.
8°°' TF1-516, Transcript 9 Appr 2008, p. 6979. V
8002 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6945-6946, 6962-6965; Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6980-6981.

---- End of Page 1222 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % gk 18 May 2012

3521. Witness Perry Kamara testihed that he was pari of the forces led by Alex Tamba
Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) who entered Freetown on 6 January 1999.8004 Before invading
Freetown, the troops were divided into groups, with one group appointed to attack areas of
Ferry Junction, Upgun and State House in Freetown, National Stadium, and another group
assigned to attack Pademba Road Prison to release Foday Sankoh and all the detainees who
were members of the AF RC/RUF or who had collaborated with them.8OO5 Kamara belonged
to the group that entered Pademba Road Prison.8OO6 Among those released were former
president J S Momoh, Gibril Massaquoi, the former RUF spokesman, and Steve Bio.8OO7
3522. When Gullit had captured the State House, he updated Bockarie about the release of
the prisoners.8O08 In response, Bockarie urged Gullit to "do as a military man" and keep the
freed prisoners secure until he could dispatch them to Kailahun.8OO9 The witness recalled that
later, pursuant to Bockarie's orders, Gullit took the released prisoners directly to Makeni.8OlO
ln relation to one of the prisoners, Hilton Fyle, Sam Bockarie requested that he be taken by
Issa Sesay to Buedu.8OH
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
3523. Witness TF1-371 testified that during the December 1998 attacks on Koidu to
Makeni, Zigzag Marzah, Sampson and Jungle were frequent visitors to Buedu. Sometimes
they met with Bockarie, and at one point Zigzag received looted materials, including
generators and TV sets, to take back to Monrovia. Bockarie often briefed them on the
operation plans. TF1-371 recalled that Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian Mosquito) came
once to Buedu with Dopoe Menkarzon and met Bockarie to discuss Bockarie travelling to
Monrovia to see Taylor and to discuss the organisation of a Hghting force to give suppori to
the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) under attack in Lofa County by LURD rebels.
However, Bockarie was awaiting the outcome of the Freetown invasion. At Hrst, Zigzag,
8003 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7820-7821. A
8004 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3221.
8005 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3224.
8006 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3225.
8007 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3226.
8008 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3229.
mg Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3229-3230.
Bm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3253.
QOH Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3253-3254.

---- End of Page 1223 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 5M 18 May 2012

Sampson and Jungle stayed in a guesthouse provided by Bockarie. Towards the latter point
of 1998, they would stay with their girlfriends in Buedu.8Ol2
3524. TF1-371 also testified that immediately after the retreat from Freetown in 1999,
discipline was not under control for the AFRC faction leaving Preetown, although
somewhere along the way the commanders took control of their men.8Ol3
3525. TP1-371 testified that after the AFRC and RUP forces retreated from Preetown, Sam
Bockarie went to Monrovia for a week to meet the Accused, accompanied by his
bodyguards and J ungle.8Ol4 TP1-371 stated that when Bockarie returned to Buedu, he
summoned the commanders for a briefing, and Jungle told them that Bockarie had been
promoted to a "two-star" lieutenant general by Taylor. TF1-371 said that Taylor promoted
Bockarie because he had accomplished the mission of capturing of Koidu and Freetown. The
witness also saw Bockarie with two sets of the SS uniform used by Taylor's securities.80l5
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
3526. Witness Varmuyan Sherif testified that before 6 January 1999,8016 he went to Foya
on a monitoring mission to ascertain that there was free movement on the border. ln Foya he
saw Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten together. On the way back, he met Zi gzag Marzah,
who told him that he had some arms and ammunitions which he was taking to Bockarie.80l7
3527. On 6 January 1999, Sherif learned of the Freetown attack from the BBC. Sherif
explained that he was with a group of Taylor's bodyguards when he heard the
armouncement. Sherif testified that he heard Bockarie over the BBC explaining that he
would not retreat except when his "father" tells him to, and that Bockarie explained that by
"father" he meant "Charles Taylor"’. Sherif said that he and the other bodyguards were
annoyed about the news because he publicly involved Taylor's name.80l8
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
8012 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2425 (CS).
gm TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2807-2808.
W4 TFI-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS).
W TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2430-2431 (cs).
8016 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 865.
8017 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 864-865.
1 gm Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 866.

---- End of Page 1224 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

Z 9 3/}
3528. Witness Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag Marzah), testified that he personally took part
in the Freetown attack and that during the attack the RUF took instructions from Charles
Taylor. He stated that "[t]here was no RUF. From Freetown to Liberia we took instructions
from one man and that was Charles Taylor".8O1(1 Marzah testified that it was in Freetown that
he received an injury to his head and that he had entered Freetown in a vehicle.8O2O
Prosecution Witness TF1—168
3529. Witness TF1·168 was imprisoned by the RUF in Buedu during the first half of 1999.
He testified that in the same camp where he was held, there were also 12 ECOMOG soldiers
captured from the Kono attack in December 1998 or January 1999 and kept as prisoners of
war.8O21 One of these ECOMOG soldiers was a Nigerian national and was killed in Buedu
because he had tuberculosis and the RUF did not want the disease to spread to the rest of the
p1isoners.111122
The Accused
3530. The Accused testified that neither he nor his govermnent was involved in the
Freetown invasion on 6 January 1999.81123 He had no prior knowledge, never instructed
anyone, nor encouraged anyone to invade Freetown.8O24 The Accused denied even knowing,
at the time, an AF RC Commander named Gullit who led troops in the invasion of
Freetown.81125
3531. The Accused testified that the first he knew of the Freetown invasion was on 6
January 1999 at 10.00am, when his national security adviser, Lewis Brown, informed him of
the news. The Accused acknowledged that upon his instructions, Brown called Sam
Bockarie on the phone. Sam Bockarie stated that he did not know what was going on in
Freetown.8O26 One of the Accused's security personnel then told the Accused that he heard
111119 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5952.
111120 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5952.
111121 TFl—l68, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23369—23370 (CS).
81122 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23369—23370 (CS).
81123 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29273—29277; Transcript 16 September 2009, p.
511211 (Clliarles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29273—29277
11025 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29266.
8016 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26225—26227.

---- End of Page 1225 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T N 18 May 2012

on Bockarie announcing over BBC radio that his men had attacked Freetown.33327 ln order to
verify the situation, the Accused again instructed his security personnel to contact Bockarie.
Bockarie explained that he only said that on the radio for "morale" and to take "some claim
for it»»~8028
3532. The Accused stated that he did not speak with Bockarie on a satellite phone on the
night before the Freetown invasion. He stated that the Freetown invasion of January 1999
. came as a surprise to those involved in the Sierra Leonean peace process, who were
preparing to implement the Abidjan peace agreement of November 1996.3029 The Accused
denied, as Mohamed Kabbah testified, that he received any information about the Freetown
invasion from Benjamin Yeaten.3O3O The Accused believed that no official in the Liberian
Government had anything to do with the Freetown invasion,3O33 or were in contact with
Bockarie via satellite phone during the Freetown invasion, because they would have no
reason to be.3O32
3533. The Accused denied Dauda Aruna Fornie's testimony that Benjamin Yeaten gave
instructions on the Accused's behalf during the Freetown invasion which were then relayed
to troops in Freetown.3O3 3 The Accused affirmed that on 6 January 1999, he did not
communicate with Bockarie or instruct Benjamin Yeaten to pass on instructions.3033 In
relation to Kabbah's testimony that he overheard conversations on the satellite phone
between the Accused and Bockarie, the Accused referred to other Prosecution witnesses
who said that whenever Sam Bockarie received a call on his satellite phone, he moved away
and spoke secretly.3O33
3534. Concerning communications between Yeaten and Bockarie through Sunlight, the
Accused did not know whether Benjamin Yeaten had a radio operator named "Sunlight" or
whether Yeaten would have received communications concerning the capture of Koidu town
3037 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26227.
3023 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26227-26228.
3029 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29106—29108; Transcript 22 September 2009, p.
29401.
3030 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29104-29105.
3033 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29104-29105.
3032 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29395-29396.
3033 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29271—29273
3033 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29273.
3033 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29106-29108.

---- End of Page 1226 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T `// db 18 May 2012
\

272/9
and the capture of Nigerian soldiers, as TF1-567 testified. However, he acknowledged that
Yeaten did have a radio operator and acknowledged the possibility that Yeaten, as the
coordinator of security, would have reason to contact Bockarie by radio.0030
3535. The Accused denied knowledge of specific instructions alleged to have come from
him. In relation to the alleged instruction to Bockarie to send reinforcements to Freetown,
the Accused believed that Bockarie, being an experienced General, would not have required
Yeaten to tell him to send reinforcements to Freetown if the troops there were under
Sicgcpsoav
3536. The Accused testified that he did not know about Bockarie's instructions to Gullit to
bum govemment buildings to raise alarm in the intemational community, and to take
released prisoners from Pademba Road Prison to Buedu, nor did he order Sam Bockarie to
do these things.0030 The Accused testified that he did not condone amputations carried out on
civilians in Sierra Leone, emphasising that he had no motive to order any kind of atrocities
in Freetown.0039
3537. The Accused denied, as Abu Keita testified, that Issa Sesay captured 11 Nigerian
ECOMOG peacekeepers after the Christmas 1998 Kono attack and released them into
Liberia on the Accused's orders. The Accused denied knowledge of any such event, stating
that the only peacekeepers released in Liberia occurred in 2000 and there were several
hundreds of them. 0040
3538. The Accused testified that he was involved in negotiations between the RUF and the
Sierra Leonean govemment during the Freetown invasion. On either 6 or 7 January 1999, he
spoke to President Kabbah as part of his role on the ECOWAS Committee of Six. There was
also a meeting between Sankoh and Kabbah on 7 January 1999 about which the Committee
was briefed.004` The Accused and the Committee continued their participation in the
0030 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28738 ("The second thing factually is that I
would not dispute the fact that the operator of Benjamin — because of Benjamin coordinating the security, it
would not be out of reason for his operator to call Sam Bockarie, okay? [...]So I wouldn't have the details, and
so I don't have a quarrel with the fact that maybe there's cormnunication").
0037 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29104—29105.
8030 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30453—30454.
0030 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29278—29280
0040 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29410-2941 1; Transcript 14 September 2009, p.
28738.
0041 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 August 2009, pp. 26270—26272.

---- End of Page 1227 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T _/~ QM 18 May 2012

3732v
negotiations until the Accused successfully secured a ceasefire between the RUF and the
Government of Sierra Leone on or around 12 January 1999.8042 On 14 January 1999, the
Accused made an announcement concerning the undertaking by the RUF to agree to a cease-
fire on behalf of the three countries charged with the responsibility of engagement with the
RUF forces, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Liberia. Liberia had been the frontline mediator but
all of the other parties had been fully briefed on this development. Tambakai J angaba, the
Liberian Deputy Minister for Foreign Af`fairs, was the senior foreign ministry official
responsible for the Sierra Leone portfolio.g043
3539. The Accused affirmed that in January 1999, there was communication between the
overnrnent of Liberia and Bockarie in order to ne otiate the cease—iire. However, there
S S
were no visits by Bockarie to Liberia in that period.gO44
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
3540. Witness Issa Sesay testified that he attacked Kono in December 1998. During the
attack, on 16 to 17 December 1998 in Koidu Town, he captured 12 Nigerian ECOMOG
soldiers.8O45 Sesay affirmed that the capture of these men is the same incident as that to
which Abu Keita testified.8O46 During the fighting, the ECOMOG soldiers raised their arms
up and surrendered.8O47
3541. Bockarie told Sesay to send the ECOMOG soldiers to him in Buedu. So with escorts,
Sesay took them to Buedu,8O48 where they were detained until the Lomé Accord, at which
time they were released to a delegation comprised of the Nigerian ambassador to Lomé, the
Nigerian ambassador to Liberia, and one other ambassador trpm Nigeria, as well as Musa
Cisse, SYB Rogers, Ornrie Golley.8O49 Sankoh ordered Bockarie to release the soldiers to the
ambassadors as a goodwill gesture, to show the RUF's commitment to the Lomé Accord.8O5O
8042 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 August 2009, pp. 26270-26272.
8043 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, pp. 26433-26436; Transcript 16 September 2009, p.
29048.
SOM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29096-29097; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp.
30452-30453.
W5 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45583- 45585.
8046 Abu Ksrts, 23 January 2008, p. 2028.
W Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45585-45586.
8048 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45586.
8049 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44154-44158; Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45587.
WO Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45587.

---- End of Page 1228 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / Orb 18 May 2012
»~/

Sesay did not hear any directive by Taylor to Bockarie to release the ECOMOG
eacekee ers, but havin seen Musa Cissé, Ta l0r's chief of r0t0c0l amon the dele ation,
P P S Y P S 3
he assumed that Taylor must have known about their re1ease.888l Sesay was not aware of the
discussion between Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten that Abu Keita described, nor did he
hear that the peacekeepers were to be released to Benjamin Yeaten.8882
3542. Sesay testified that he was in Makeni at the time of the Freetown invasion. He denied
receiving a message that AFRC/RUF combatants had captured the State H0use.8888 During
the Freetown invasion, Sesay denied knowledge of Bockarie teleph0ning Benjamin
Yeaten8888 and denied hearing that Benjamin Yeaten had given instructions to Bockarie, to
send the politicians from Pademba R0ad Prison to Buedu for safety.8888 Rather, Sesay stated
that Bockarie had sent Sesay to Waterl00 to tell Gibril Massaquoi to travel to Buedu to escort
the politicians who had been freed from Pademba R0ad Prison to go to Makeni to speak with
Bockarie. The AFRC had freed Massaquoi and other politicians held at Pademba R0ad Prison
when they entered Freetown.8888 Sesa denied an involvement b Ben`amin Yeaten 0r
Y Y Y J
Taylor in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999.8887
3543. Sesay knew Pascal to be Bockarie's Operator based in Buedu.8888 Bockarie was
Pascal's b0ss in 1998 and 1999. In December 1999 Pascal went to Liberia with Bockarie but ·
returned to Sierra Leone with Sesay in 2000. Sesay denied Pascal was assigned to Benjamin
Yeaten or based in Foya, Liberia, in 1998 and 1999.8889 Sesay denied that Bockarie gave the
order for the destruction of Freetown. It was carried out by the AFRC. Sesay did not hear of
Yeaten and Taylor directly communicating with Bockarie or instructing him during the
Freetown invasion. The tr00ps in Freetown were not answerable to Bockarie. They had their
own command structure and when they retreated, reports were not sent to Bockarie.8888
Defence Witness DCT—008
8881 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45593.
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45592
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46073—46074.
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 46077.
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 46077—46078.
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45974—45976.
8887 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 46078—46079; Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46106—46107.
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46105.
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46106-46107.
8888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46111.

---- End of Page 1229 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gb-\ 18 May 2012

37322-
3544. Witness DCT-008, a Liberian radio operator,8O6l testified that Sunlight, the primary
operator at Base 1, the radio station located at Benjamin Yeaten's home, would receive
coded messages on Base 1 and decode them for Yeaten.80°2 DCT-008 testified to an incident
in September 1998, in which Sampson Wehyee (a.k.a. Sampson), a bodyguard for Benjamin
Yeaten, arrived at Base 1 and introduced Sunlight to Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).8O63
Wehyee told Sunlight that Yeaten had ordered him to allow Tamba to use Base 1 to contact
the RUF.g064 Tamba had a piece of paper with the RUF frequency, "RUF 35B", which was
the same frequency the NPFL used in 1991 and 1992 to contact the RUF. Sunlight entered
onto the RUF frequency, and operator "Sellay" answered the call.8065
3545. In November or December 1998, Sampson and Tamba brought Memunatu Deen to
Base 1 so that she could use the radio to communicate with the RUF. 8066 DCT-008 testified
that the messages that Deen sent could not be understood because they were in code.8067
After one month, around December 1998 or January 1999, she gave the code to Sunlight so
that he could take down messages while she was away.8068
3546. DCT-008 testified that Sunlight never intercepted a message between Gullit and
Bockarie about the release of prisoners from Pademba Road, maintaining that the only
communication intercepted by Base 1 within the RUF net was between Bockarie and
Sankoh in late 1999, when they argued over the peace process.8069 DCT-008 also stated that
Yeaten could not have spoken to Bockarie on the radio, because Yeaten did not know the
RUF communication code. Further, Yeaten was afraid of being heard on the radio, so he
would not have spoken on the VHF radio, but rather only over the satellite phone.8070 DCT-
008 denies that Bockarie called to make situation reports conceming operations around
Ml DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46998-46999.
8062 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47030-47031, 47034—47035.
8063 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47034-47037, 47042-47043
*06* DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47034-47037.
gm DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47042; Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47375-47376.
wm DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47400-47408; Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47403-47404.
8067 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47405. l
M Dcr-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47406.
8069 DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 2010, pp. 47595-47596.
8070 DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 2010, pp. 47595-47596.

---- End of Page 1230 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4 dif 18 May 2012
v

393 2 3
Freetown.8O7l He testified that there was no communication between Base One and any RUF
radio or Buedu in January 1999.8072
Defence Witness Fayia Musa
3547. Witness Fayia Musa was held prisoner by the RUF in Buedu during the first half of
1999. He testified that he was incarcerated with some Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers kept as
risoners of war. One of these ECOMOG soldiers was executed after havin contracted
P 8
tuberculosis.8O73
Prosecution Exhibit P-261
3548. Exhibit P-2618074 is an audio clip of an RUF radio conversation personally recorded
by Dauda Aruna Fomie around February to March 1999, after the Freetown invasion on 6
January 1999.8075 Exhibit P-261 is one of` a number of recordings Fornie recorded on
cassette tapes, which remained in the possession of Fornie until he turned them over to
Prosecution investigators.8O76 Although the Prosecution provided to the Court a purported
transcript of the recording, it did not seek to have the transcript marked for identification or
tendered as evidence.8077 Prosecution counsel explained that the purpose of playing the
audio recording before the Trial Chamber was to elicit Fornie's evidence as to the
identification of persons on the recording.8O78
Wl DCT—008, Transcript 28 August 2010, p. 47602.
gm Der-008, Transcript 28 August 2010, p. 47606.
8073 Fayia Musa, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39511.
**07* Exhibit P-261, "Audio File — Clip One (P-261). RUF radio conversation recorded by TF1—274 after the
invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. Identifies voices of Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Sunlight and Isaac
Mongor".
8075 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21500. ("Q: Do you recall approximately when this
recording occurred? A: It was around February to March 1999. That was after the Freetown invasion on
January 6 by the RUF").
8076 Dauda Aruna F omie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21505—21506.
8077 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21499, 21501 (Prosecution counsel expressed the
belief that the transcript proffered was not "particularly reliable").
8078 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21501, 21504 (the Trial Chamber overruled an
objection by Defence counsel on the basis of a lack of an independent verification of the identity of the persons
speaking on the recording).

---- End of Page 1231 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J GA 18 May 2012

Z 732%
3549. Fornie identified on the recording the voices of Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Isaac
Mongor and Sunlight, Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator and the language in which they
were speaking as Liberian English.8O79
Prosecution Exhibit P—361
3550. Exhibit P—361 is a radio log book covering communications within the RUF for the
period 28 April 1999 to 11 September 1999. Exhibit P—361 was part of a series of documents
seized from Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road in Freetown in May 2000 admitted
through rule 92bis.8080 It records a message sent by Foday Sankoh (a.k.a. the Leader) to "all
commanders" dated 25 July 1999 instructing them "to prepare to hand over the P.O.W. s and
all political prisoners to ICRC, UNOMSIL or ECOMOG at any time they call upon you".808l
3551. It further records a message sent by Issa Sesay (a.k.a. SSS) to Foday Sankoh (a.k.a.
Smile) dated 27 July 1999 in reply to Sankoh's instruction to release prisoners of war held
by the RUF. The message states: "This headquater [sic] only have 12 Nigerian war prisoners
and one at Makeni. We are presently waiting for the ICRC to hand over them".8O82
Defence Exhibit D—189
3552. Exhibit D—189 is an official Statement released by the Government of Liberia on
measures it has taken to "Dispel Allegations Regarding Liberia's Support for the RUF/Junta
between May 1998 and February 1999". It takes the form of a chronology, and states that on
14 January 1999, "President Taylor announces an undertaking by the RUF to agree to a
cease—fire in response to a request by Liberia.8083
8079 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21505 (He identified the first voice as Foday Sankoh,
stating "I'm not getting you clearlf, the second voice as Sunlight, stating "35 Bravo, come in, Come in, 35
Bravo", and the third as Bockarie's, stating "My man, stand by". Sunlight then continued speaking, stating
something to the effect of: "You can't remember what [...] you and my father spoke just now, or what you and I
spoke‘?". Fornie identified the last speaker as Isaac Mongor.)
8080 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-747, Decision on Prosecution Motion For Admission of Documents
Seized Hom Foday Sankoh's House, 26 February 2009, para. 51; Tariq Malik, 19 January 2009, pp. 22940-
22941.
Sm Exhibit P-361, "Radio Log Book covering communication for the period - 28/04/1999 - 11/09/1999 -
00008636 - 00008726 (CMS PGS 21955—22046)", ERN 8667.
8082 Exhibit P-361, "Radio Log Book covering communication for the period - 28/04/1999 - 11/09/1999 -
00008636 - 00008726 (CMS PGS 21955-22046)", ERN 8697; Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44385-
44386 (confirming that this message referred to the release of the 12 ECOMOG prisoners captured during the
December 1998 attacks).
8083 Exhibit D-189, "Statement on Measures Taken by the Government of Liberia to Dispel Allegations

---- End of Page 1232 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Eph 18 May 2012

T 3’?Z2!
Deliberations
3553. The Trial Chamber will first consider the Prosecution allegation that, from the
commencement of the December 1998 offensives to Gullit's withdrawal from Freetown, the
Accused, either directly or through Yeaten, remained in communication with Bockarie
conceming the progress of the Freetown attack. It will then tum to examine allegations of
specific instructions or directions given by the Accused conceming the operation.
(i) Contact between Bockarie and the Accused, or the Accused's subordinates
a. Radio or Satellite phone contact between Bockarie and Yeaten, Bockarie
and the Accused during the Operation
3554. In support of its allegation that the Accused was in constant contact with Bockarie
through Yeaten during the Freetown operation, the Prosecution relied on witnesses Dauda
Aruna Fomie, TF1-585, Abu Keita, TF1-516, TF1-567 and Mohamed Kabbah.
3555. Fomie testified that from the commencement of the attacks by the RUF on the Kono
and Kenema districts on around 15 to 20 December 1998, Bockarie was in constant contact
with Yeaten, providing him with updates on progress on the frontlines.80g4 Fomie saw
Bockarie contact Yeaten using a satellite phone and inform him of the capture of Kono,8O85
and maintained this contact during the course of the January operation.8O86 Similarly, TF1-
516 testified that during this period Bockarie contacted the Accused's radio station in
Monrovia, radio call sign "020", and Benjamin Yeaten's radio station, call sign "Base 178087
Mohamed Kabbah also testified that during the period that Gullit was in Freetown, Bockarie
would communicate with Benjamin Yeaten via radio,808g and also directly with Charles
Taylor by satellite phone.8089 TF1-567 also testified that RUF radio operators informed
Sunlight that the RUF had captured Koidu, as well as arms and ammunition and some
Regarding Liberia's Support for the RUF/Junta between May 1998 and February 1999 — DCT 177", p. 3.
8084 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21555-21557, 21615.
8085 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21557.
8086 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610.
8087 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6936-6937. ·
8088 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16173.
8089 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173, 16175.

---- End of Page 1233 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

Nigerian soldiers.8°9U Abu Keita testified that Bockarie communicated with Benjamin
Yeaten and Joseph Tuah on the satellite phone, telling the witness that he was reporting to
them on the status of the operation.8O91 A number of witnesses agreed that this contact was
frequent. Fomie testified that during the Kono operation, Bockarie would receive at least
one message every three to four hours that the witness spent with Bockarie,8092 and that
during the Freetown invasion, they spoke at least two or three times a day through the
satellite phone.8O93 The evidence also suggests that such reports were promptly given as
progress on the frontline developed.8O94
3556. Sometimes these communications concerned operational decisions. TFl-5l6 stated
that after conversing with the Accused, Bockarie would come to the radio station and draft
instructions for the commanders, including Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) in Freetown,
regarding military manoeuvres, the setting of ambushes and attacks on particular targets.8O95
Kabbah noted as an example that when Bockarie told Yeaten about the increasing
difficulties Gullit's troops were facing in Freetown, Yeaten told Bockarie to send
reinforcements to the city.8096 Fomie stated that sometimes Bockarie "would contact
Benjamin to consult him on some decisions before he ever took them".8O97
3557. Kabbah attested to a complicated relationship between Yeaten and Bockarie during
the conversations concerning the Kono and Freetown operations. He stated initially that
Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as part of a "sisterly or brotherly operation", or a "joint
operation", where each party sought to be kept updated on each other's successes and
8°"° TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918.
8091 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022.
8092 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p, 21557.
8093 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610; see also TPI-516, Transcript 8 April
2008, p. 6937 (Bockarie was in "persistent" communication with Charles Taylor, call sign "020", and Benjamin
Yeaten, call sign "Base l").
8094 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. l6l76·l6l78 (Kabbah testified that Bockarie
informed the Accused that Gullit had entered Freetown and captured State House on the day that Bockarie
himself received the news); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581-21582 (Less than an
hour after Bockarie received the message concerning the release of the Pademba Road prisoners, he called
Benjamin Yeaten on the satellite phone to inform him).
’""’5 TF1-516, rrrrrrrprrpr 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.
80% Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-16175; see also Transcript 12 September 2008,
pp. 16143-16145, where the witness refers to the same incident ("at one time when in fact the 6 January invasion
took place in Freetown when ECOMOG was pushing the men, at that time Mosquito spoke with Benjamin
Yeaten and so he said, ‘The situation is becoming bad at the front line. The enemies were pushing our men out
of the town’, so Benjamin Yeaten told him why he was not trying to reinforce the men in the city. He said, ‘You
know the city is big. You need to reinforce them"’).
8097 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21615.

---- End of Page 1234 ---------------------------


Case No.Z SCSL-03-01-T mls 18 May 2012

373 Z 7
failuresgogg Kabbah also observed that Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as if Bockarie was in the
position of a subordinate receiving instruction from a superior.8O99 However, Kabbah in
cross-examination then affirmed a seemingly inconsistent prior statement in which he stated
that Bockarie did not "take orders" from Yeaten because Bockarie would have seen Yeaten
as "inferior" in rank.8lO0 Kabbah explained to the Trial Chamber that while Yeaten was
officially of a higher rank, Bockarie viewed Yeaten as inferior because Bockarie had a larger
and more important role in Sierra Leone.8lOl Kabbah testified that Bockarie nonetheless
followed instructions by Yeaten because he would have assumed such orders came from the
Accusedgm Even if a message from Yeaten did not specifically refer to the Accused, it was
understood in the RUF that Yeaten was the conduit for the Accused's instructions as he was
the Accused's "right-hand man".8l03
3558. The Defence contends that the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses is
unreliable.8l04 lt cites, as an example, Mohamed Kabba,h's evidence that he got the
information conceming the alleged radio communications between Bockarie and Yeaten
during the Freetown invasion through TF1-516 whom he alleged was Yeaten's radio
operator at the time, even though, TF1-516 testified that he was only assigned to Yeaten in
Liberia from about mid-1999.8lOS The Trial Chamber notes that Kabbah did become
confused at one stage of his testimony when discussing a communication between Yeaten
and Bockarie conceming the ECOMOG assault on the supply lines of the troops in
Freetown. He first stated that this communication was initiated by Pascal, who was stationed
in Liberia,8l0° but corrected his testimony to state that it was TF1-516 who was stationed in
Liberia and was assigned to Yeaten.8l07 However, Kabbah did indicate that TF1-516 was, at
XM Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16145.
8099 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-16175; see also Transcript 12 September 2008,
pp. 16143-16145, where the witness refers to the same incident ("at one time when in fact the 6 January invasion
took place in Freetown when ECOMOG was pushing the men, at that time Mosquito spoke with Benjamin
Yeaten and so he said, ‘The situation is becoming bad at the front line. The enemies were pushing our men out
of the town’, so Benjamin Yeaten told him why he was not trying to reinforce the men in the city. He said, ‘You
know the city is big. You need to reinforce them"’).
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381.
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16379.
8102 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381.
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1281.
W5 TF1-516, Transcript 8 Apni 2008, p. 6858.
8]% Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16168-16169.
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16170.

---- End of Page 1235 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Glk 18 May 2012

one point, assigned as an operator for Yeaten,8lO8 and recognised that there was a period
when Yeaten spoke to Bockarie before TF1-516 had been assigned to Liberia.8lO9 The Trial
Chamber considers this discrepancy minor; in light of the passage of time and the witness's
acknowledgement that TF1-516 was only stationed in Liberia for a certain period of time, it
is understandable that Kabbah may have become conli1sed about precisely when that period
Was}; 1 10
3559. The Defence also pointed to alleged inconsistencies in TF1-516's evidence regarding
alleged communications between Bockarie and Yeaten, noting that it conflicted with TF1-
516's testimony that the Liberian govermnent did not have the codes for the RUF radio net
in January 1999 and that TF1-516 later confirmed that he never heard any directive fiom
Taylor or Yeaten concerning the Freetown lnvasion.8l ll
3560. In relation to the first alleged inconsistency, the Trial Chamber notes that DCT-008
also stated that Yeaten could not have spoken to Bockarie on the radio, because Yeaten did
not know the RUF communication codes.8l 12 The Trial Chamber notes that it does not
accept the contention of the Defence that messages between Liberian radio operators and the
RUF operators could not have been relayed simply because they did not possess each others’
codes, having concluded that the RUF and NPFL radio networks were accessible by
operators from outside their respective networksgl 13 In any case, DCT-008 also testified that
in November or December 1998, Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator, began operating
out of Base 1,8114 and that around December 1998 or January 1999, she gave the RUF codes
to Sunlight so that he could take down messages while she was away.8l 15 Hence, it is clear
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16144; Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16134;
Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16170.
mg Operational Support: Communications, Use of Liberia Communications by the RUF.
WO TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2381-2382 (CS) (Memumata Deen was assigned to work at the
RUF radio station based in Monrovia in late 1998 and early 1999); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September
2008, pp. 16134-16135. (Memu Deen, Tolo's wife was in Monrovia working as a radio operator at Cissé Musa's
house when Bockarie was stationed in Buedu). Note that although DCT-008 first testified that Memunatu would
use the radio at Base One in Liberia every day in November or late December 1998, and she continued to do so
in 1999 (DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47400, 47407-411, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47403-
47404) later in his testimony he stated that there was no radio contact between the RUF and Deen in Liberia in
early January 1999 because Memunatu was in Sierra Leone (DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47420).
DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47400-47408; Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47403-47404.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1281; TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7778-7779.
SI I2 DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 2010, pp. 47595-47596.
gl I3 Operational Support: Communications, RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.
SI M DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47400-47408; Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47403-47404.
SI I5 Witness DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47406.

---- End of Page 1236 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T , 18 May 2012

3 93Zf
that at least by the time of the Freetown invasion the Liberian operators were in possession
of the relevant RUF codes. DCT-008 also testified that Yeaten was afraid of being heard on
the radio, so he would not have spoken on the VHF radio, but rather only over the satellite
hone.8l I6 However, TF1-516 testified that enerall , discussions between Yeaten and
P 3 Y
Bockarie did occur via satellite phone, after which Bockarie would issue instmctions over
the radio.8l [7
3561. 1n relation to the second alleged inconsistency, the Trial Chamber considers that the
Defence has mischaracterised TF1-516's evidence. In cross-examination, the witness
confirmed that he had said in a prior statement to the Prosecution that he "was not aware of
any directives by Charles Taylor or Benjamin Yeaten regarding the Freetown invasion of
January 1999". However, TF1-516 explained that he was referring strictly to radio
cormnunications, and emphasised that he had also noted in the prior statement that
discussions concerning military strategy were conducted via satellite phone, after which
Bockarie would issue instructions over the radio.8H8 1n light of the witness's explanation,
the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the prior statement referred to by the Defence is
inconsistent with TF1-516's testimony.
3562. Reviewing the reliability of the evidence concerning communications between
Bockarie and the Accused or Yeaten during the Kono and Freetown operations, the Trial
Chamber takes into account that much of the evidence adduced was from radio operators in
Buedu during the relevant time period, and that the witnesses were careful to substantiate the
basis on which they believed such communications took place. These radio operators were
either monitoring or facilitating such radio communications with Liberia,8H9 present in the
radio room when such cormnunications occurred,8l2O or present when Bockarie spoke on the
satellite phone with Yeaten or the Accused. gm
8**6 DCT—008, Transcript 28 August 2010, pp. 47595-47596.
***7 TF1—516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7778-7779.
BHS TF1—516, Transcript 16 ApYl12008, pp. 7778-7779,
Sm TF1—516, Transcript 9 April 2008. p. 6979 (During the Freetown invasion, the witness himself called "Base
1" several times on Bockarie's behalf); Dauda Amna Fomie. Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2l562—2l563 (On
6 January 1999. the witness was in Buedu monitoring the radio constantly); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15
September, pp. l6l68—l6l69 (one morning after Gullit's troops entered Freetown, Benjamin Yeaten contacted
Sam Bockarie over the radio from Foya. The witness and other operators in Buedu were monitoring the VHF
radio and heard this conversation as it was quite loud).
Sm TF1—567. Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918 (The witness was in the radio room when radio operators in
Buedu passed on updates to Yeaten's radi o operator, Sunlight); TF1—585. Transcript 8 September 2008, pp.

---- End of Page 1237 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Qtrg 18 May 2012

3 7 330
3563. The Accused contended that Kabbah's testimony that conversations on the satellite
phone between the Accused and Bockarie were conducted openlygm contradicts the
evidence of other Prosecution witnesses that whenever Sam Bockarie received a call on his
satellite phone, he moved away and spoke secretly.8123 The Trial Chamber notes that the
Accused did not specify with which witnesses he was contrasting Kabbah's testimony and
the evidence clearly establishes that there was no particular secrecy surrounding Bockarie's
satellite phone conversations with Yeaten at this time. TF 1-585 testified that the satellite
phone in Buedu was located on an open veranda and conversations were easily
overheard.8124 TF 1-516,8125 Abu Keita8126 and Dauda Aruna Forniegm also heard Bockarie
speak to Yeaten via satellite phone. Apart from Keita's evidence that these conversations
would take place at night, none of these witnesses testified that there were any secrecy
measures in place concerning the satellite phone communication.
3564. The Accused stated that neither he nor any official in the Liberian Government was
in contact with Bockarie via satellite phone during the Freetown invasion.8128 There are
inconsistencies in the Accused's testimony which cast doubt on his denial that he was
communicating with Bockarie directly or through Yeaten. First his insistence that no official
in the Liberian Government would have been in contact with Bockarie during the Freetown
invasion because they would have no reason to begm is undermined somewhat by his later
acknowledgement that in January 1999, there was communication between the government
of Liberia and Bockarie in order to negotiate the cease-fire for which the Liberian
15720-15721(the witness heard the radio operator on duty receive a ca11 from Benjamin Yeaten's operator
Sunlight, asking them to find Bockarie so that he could speak with Yeaten).
ml TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943 (TF1-516 testified that he overheard satellite phone
conversations between Bockarie and Taylor during the invasion of Freetown); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3
December 2008, pp. 21609-21610 (The witness would often be in the radio room with Bockarie during satellite
conversations with Yeaten); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16178 (The witness heard
Bockarie speak to the Accused on the satellite phone); TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15722-15724
(When Yeaten wished to speak to Bockarie, Bockarie went directly to the veranda where the satellite phone was 5
located and spoke on the phone).
mz Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173, 16175.
8123 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29106-29108.
gm TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp, 15722-15724,
W5 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.
SHG Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022.
Sm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610.
mg Charles Gharikay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29395-29396.
mg Charles Gharikay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29395-29396.

---- End of Page 1238 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

government took credit.8l3O Further, when asked about communications between Yeaten and
8
Bockarie through Sunlight, the Accused stated that he was not aware of such
communications, but importantly, acknowledged the possibility that Yeaten, as the
coordinator of security, would have reason to contact Bockarie by radio.8m In light of these
° inconsistencies, and against the weight of the Prosecution evidence, the Trial Chamber does
not find the Accused's denial that he was communicating with Bockarie directly or through
Yeaten during the Kono or Freetown operations credible. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that
in December 1998 and January 1999, Bockarie was in frequent contact via radio or satellite
hone with the Accused, either directl or throu Yeaten, in relation to the ro ress of the
P Y P 8
Kono and Freetown operations.
3565. The Prosecution also contends that Bockarie continued to update the Accused on the
Sierra Leone situation and take instructions from the Accused after the withdrawal fiom
Freetown. In support, the Prosecution refers to Exhibit P-261,8132 an audio clip of an RUF
radio conversation which Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that he recorded around February to
March 1999.8133 Fornie identified on the recording the voices of Foday Sankoh, Sam
Bockarie, Isaac Mongor and Sunlight, Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator and the language in
which they were speaking as Liberian English.8l34 The Defence adduced evidence fiom
DCT-008 challenging the authenticity of this Exhibit. In particular, DCT-008 testified that
he did not recognise any of the voices on Exhibit P-261 and disagreed that the second voice
on the recording, which stated "35 Bravo, come in. Come in, 35 Bravo", was the voice of
Sunlight, as Fornie had testified.8l35 DCT-008 also stated that Sunlight never used "35B" or
"35 Bravo" as the call sign for Buedu, and that although he had heard from previous
gm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29096-29097; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp.
30452-30453.
ml Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28738 ("The second thing factually is that I
would not dispute the fact that the operator of Benjamin - because of Benjamin coordinating the security, it
would not be out of reason for his operator to call Sam Bockarie, okay? [,..]So I wouldn't have the details, and
so I don't have a quarrel with the fact that maybe there's communication").
Sm Exhibit P-261, "Audio File - Clip One (P-261). RUF radio conversation recorded by TF 1-274 after the
invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. Identifies voices of Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Sunlight and Isaac
Mongor".
Bm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21500 (‘°Q; Do you recall approximately when this
recording occurred? Fomie: It was around February to March 1999. That was after the Freetown invasion on
January 6 by the RUF").
gm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21505.
mj DCT-008, Transcript 2 September 2010, pp. 47799-47801.

---- End of Page 1239 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012

3723 2
operators that the RUF code during 1991 to 1992 was "35 Bravo",8l36 from the time when
Base 1 was established, until late 1999, the call sign for Buedu was either "Planet 1" or
"Bravo zum 4".8‘"
3566. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that Dauda Aruna Fornie is a
. generally reliable witness, and that the evidence of DCT-008 must be treated with
caution.8l38 The Trial Chamber observes that the evidence of DCT-008 as to Exhibit P-261
should be treated with particular caution, noting that he had earlier testihed to an incident in
September 1998, in which, at the instruction of Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle),8l39 Sunlight
had used the RUF frequency, "RUF 35B" to contact the RUF in Buedu,8l40 directly
contradicting his evidence that "35B" or "35 Bravo" was no longer the call sign for Buedu.
3567. On the basis of Exhibit P-261 and the supporting evidence of Dauda Aruna Fornie,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that around February to March 1999, after the withdrawal of
AFRC troops from Freetown, there was contact between the RUF radio stations and
Yeaten's radio operator. However, it notes that the content of the recording, as described by
Dauda Aruna Fornie and corroborated by DCT-008, suggests no substantive discussion
between the parties to the conversation concerning the situation in Sierra Leone. As such,
the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that Exhibit P-261 indicates Bockarie was updating the
Accused on the Sierra Leone situation or taking instructions from the Accused at this time.
b. Visits by Benjamin Yeaten to Buedu in December 1998 and January
1999
3568. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from two witnesses concerning visits by
Benjamin Yeaten to Boclimmediately prior to and during the Kono and Freetown operations. Dauda Aruna Fornie
testified that, prior to the December 1998 attack on Kono,8l4l he saw Bockarie having a
discussion with Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. Five-Zero) one evening at Bocl8136 DCT-008, Transcript 2 September 2010, pp. 47799-47800.
8137 DCT-008, Transcript 2 September 2010, pp. 47799-47800.
813 8 Credibility Assessment, DCT-008, paras 373-380; Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346-
358.
8139 Witness DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47034-47037, 47042-47043.
WO Witness DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47042; 'Transcript 27 August 2010 p. 47375-47376.
gm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21560.

---- End of Page 1240 ---------------------------


Case No.I QR May

did not know what the two men discussedgm TF 1-585 also testified that two days after
Bockarie used his satellite phone to inform the BBC that his troops would be in Freetown,
Yeaten came to Buedu, and Bockarie instructed her to prepare food for the visitor.8M3
3569. The Defence contends that despite Fornie's insistence that there were other people
who witnessed this meeting, no other witness corroborates his account. The Defence also
points to evidence that Bockarie made a trip to Liberia to see Yeaten during this time, not
the other way around, and that TF 1-585 "claimed that Yeaten's first trip to Buedu was alter
the troops had entered Freetown".8M4
3570. The Trial Chamber considers both contentions to be without merit. First, it does not
consider the evidence that Bockarie made a trip to Liberia to see Yeaten during the Kono-
Freetown operation to preclude the possibility of Yeaten also visiting Buedu, and notes that
in any case, the evidence was that Bockarie's visits to Monrovia took place during January ‘
1999, while F ornie's evidence concerns a visit in December 1998.
3571. Second, the Trial Chamber notes that the Defence has mischaracterised TF 1-585's
evidence. She did not claim that Yeaten's Hrst trip to Buedu was after the AF RC troops had
entered Freetown. Rather, she testified that the visit in January 1999 was the first time that
she herself saw Yeaten in Buedu.8M5 Given that the visit Fornie described took place late at
nightgm and lasted only for about an hour before Yeaten returned to Liberia,8m it is not
A improbable that TF 1-585 would not have witnessed it.
3572. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has found TF 1-585 and Dauda Aruna F ornie to be
enerall credible witnessesgm and has no reason to doubt their testimon in relation to
S Y Y
these incidents. The Trial Chamber also considers that the testimony of Varmuyan Sherif
that before 6 January 1999,8149 he saw Bockarie and Yeaten together in Foyagm
gm Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21558-21561.
8143 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15722-15724.
W4 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 899.
W5 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15723.
W6 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21557 (the meeting took place around 10.00pm to
11.00pm).
Sm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21561.
8148 Credibility Assessment, TF1-585, paras 330-333; Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346-
358.
W9 Vannuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 865.
8150 Varinuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 864-865.

---- End of Page 1241 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / [pb 18 May 2012

corroborates the evidence of TF1-585 and Fornie that Yeaten and Bockarie met during the
Kono-Freetown operations. On the evidence of TF1-585 and Dauda Aruna Fornie, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten met at least twice in December
1998 and January 1999.
c. Trips by Bockarie and his subordinates to Monrovia during the Freetown
invasion ·
3573. The Prosecution also alleges that Bockarie took trips to Monrovia during the
Freetown operation, relying on the evidence of Abu Keita. Keita testified that during the
Freetown invasion,8l5l Bockarie travelled to Liberia. The first time, the witness accompanied
Bockarie to Foya where a helicopter came to fetch Bockariegm and the witness met
Bockarie on his return at Foya in a new ash-coloured Toyota Land Cruiser pick-up from the
Accused loaded with clothing, medicine and bandages.8l53 Keita also saw Bockarie depart
on another trip to Monrovia from Foya via helicopter, on which Bockarie carried a seriously
wounded soldier,8l54 although it is not clear from Keita's evidence whether this also took
place during the Freetown invasion. On Keita's evidence, when Bockarie returned from
Liberia on the trip during the Freetown invasion, he told the witness that he had brought
back a message from the Accused that the RUF should maintain its controlled areas.8l55
3574. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Abu Keita is a generally reliable
witness.8l56 The Prosecution cites TF1-516's account of Bockarie flying to Monrovia from
Foya in a helicopter to see the Accused during the Freetown invasion in support of Keita's
account.8l57 However, the Trial Chamber notes that TF1 -516 admitted on cross-examination
that he had made a mistake and that the incident he described had not taken place during the
Freetown invasion, but instead, long aiier the Freetown operation.8l58 The Trial Chamber
815 I Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020 ("Q. Sir, where were you when the attack on Freetown
happened? A. When the attack on Freetown happened I was in Buedu. Q. Where was Sam Bockarie‘?A. Sam
Bockarie was in Buedu. That was the time I told you that he came with these jean trousers and T'shi1ts and the
car)".
**8 Abu Kuna, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 201 1.
gm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 201 1-2013, 2023-2024.
M4 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2023-2024.
M Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2023-2024.
815 6 Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219.
Sm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6945-6946, 6962-6965; Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6980-6981.
mg TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7820-7821.

---- End of Page 1242 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T / Ju 18 May 2012

does not therefore consider that TF1-516's evidence corroborates Keita's evidence
concerning trips by Bockarie to Monrovia during January 1999.8l59 The Trial Chamber also
notes that Varmuyan Sheri? s evidence that before 6 January 1999,8l6O he saw Bockarie and
Benjamin Yeaten together in Foya supports to some extent Keita's evidence, but only
partially, indicating that Bockarie did travel to Foyagm
3575. However, two other Prosecution witnesses suggest that Bockarie was unable to travel
to Monrovia during the Kono and Freetown operations. TF1-371 testiiied that when
Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian Mosquito) and Dopoe Menkarzon came to Buedu
during the December 1998 attacks to discuss Bockarie travelling to Monrovia to see the
Accused, Bockarie did not go because he was "waiting for the success of the operation,
especially the Freetown invasion".8l62 Similarly, Dauda Aruna Fomie testiiied that Bockarie
was too busy co-ordinating the front lines to travel to Monrovia to pick up materiel alter
Gullit entered Freetown on 6 January 1999 and he sent Fomie and two others instead.8l63
3576. The Trial Chamber notes the evidence of TF1-371 that alter the AFRC and RUF
forces retreated from Freetown, in January 1999, Bockarie did travel to Monrovia for a week
to meet the Accused, who promoted Bockarie to a "two-star" lieutenant general..8l°4 It has
assessed TF1-371's evidence concerning the promotion in a separate section of the
Judgement.8l65 However, it is apparent from TF1-371's evidence that this took place alter
the Freetown operation had concluded, alter the AFRC and RUF forces retreated from
Freetown,8l66 in contrast to the evidence of Keita that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia around
the time of the Freetown attack.8l67 TF1-371's evidence that Bockarie was in Monrovia for a
week8l68 would also suggest that he is referring to a different trip to that discussed by Abu
mg Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).
xm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 865.
Bm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 864-865.
mz TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2425 (CS).
M3 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21522, 21594-21595.
M4 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS).
M5 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Sam Bockarie.
XM TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS).
Sm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020 (Q. Sir, where were you when the attack on
Freetownhappened? A. When the attack on Freetown happened 1 was in Buedu. Q. Where was Sam BoclSam Bockarie was in Buedu. That was the time 1 told you that he came with these jean trousers and T'shirts and
the car).
gm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS).

---- End of Page 1243 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / OM 18 May 2012

37 236
Keita, who told the Trial Chamber that Bockarie was gone from Buedu for only a day. TFl-
371 also does not refer to Bockarie bringing back, as Keita testified, either a vehicle
containing jeans, t-shirts, medicine and bandages or carrying with him to Monrovia a
seriously wounded soldier.gl69 According to TFl—37l , Bockarie returned with two sets of the
SS uniform used by the Accused's securities.8l70 TFl—37l also does not refer to any
instruction by the Accused that the RUF should maintain its controlled areas. For these
reasons, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the trip described by TFl—37l to Monrovia is
not the same trip described by Keita and that the trip described by TFl—37l took place later
than that referred to by Keita.
3577. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that both TFl—37l and Dauda Aruna Fomie are
generally reliable witnesses,8m and considers that their evidence supports the conclusion
that during the Kono and Freetown operations, Bockarie was too occupied with the military
front to travel to Monrovia. The Trial Chamber notes that it has previously considered and
accepted the Prosecution allegation that Dauda Aruna Fomie travelled to Monrovia during
the Freetown invasion to obtain materiel. gm
3578. In light of the lack of corroborative evidence, and the testimonies of TFl—37l and
Dauda Aruna Fornie, the Trial Chamber does not accept Abu Keita's evidence that Bockarie
travelled to Liberia during the Freetown operation to take instruction from the Accused.
(ii) Contact between Bockarie and Daniel Tamba, Joseph Marzah and Sampson
Weah during the operation
3579. The Prosecution also contends that during the December 1998 offensives, Joseph
Marzah, Sampson Weah and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) met with Bockarie in Buedu and
reported back to Yeatenxm The Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of witness
TFl—37l. The Trial Chamber notes that TFl—37l did testify that Marzah, Weah and Tamba,
M9 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 201 1-2013.
gm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2430-2431 (CS).
gm Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Dauda Amna Fomie, paras 346-
;§§.See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (February 1998-December 1999).
Sm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 175. ~

---- End of Page 1244 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T j Q1).; 18 May 2012

along with other subordinates of the Accused, Christopher Varmoh and Dopoe Menkarzon,
were frequent visitors to Buedu and Bockarie often briefed them on operation plansfm
3580. However, the Trial Chamber notes that TF1-371 did not himself say that these
persons passed the briefings given by Bockarie to Yeaten. Furthermore, according to TF1-
371, as the Defence pointed out,8l75 these individuals travelled to Buedu for a number of
different reasons. For example, TF1-371 recalled that on one occasion Marzah received
looted materials, including generators and TV sets, to take back to Monrovia, while on
another Varmoh and Menkarzon came to discuss the organisation of an RUF Hghting force
to give support to the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) under attack in Lofa County by
LURD rebels.8l76 While the Trial Chamber considers that it is likely that these individuals
did report back to the Accused on briefings they received from Bockarie, the Prosecution
has adduced no evidence to establish a basis for a finding that this did in fact occur.
(iii) Specific directions from the Accused
a. To release the captured ECOMOG soldiers
3581. Turning to specific directions alleged to have been given by the Accused to
Bockarie, the Prosecution alleges that the Accused ordered Bockarie to release ECOMOG
soldiers ca tured in the attacks on Koidu Town in December 1998.8177 lt is not contested
P
that 11 or 12 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers were captured by the RUF after this attack, and
detained in Buedugng or that they were eventually releasedgm However, the Defence
contests the allegation that the peacekeepers were released pursuant to the Accused's
‘orders ’ . 8 I 80
3582. ln support of its allegation, the Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of Abu
Keita, who testified that after a meeting between Benjamin Yeaten and Bockarie at Dawa,
Yeaten informed Bockarie that the Accused wanted the ECOMOG soldiers released to him
**74 rrr-871, rrarraprrpt 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2425 (cs).
W5 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 888.
SW6 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2425 (CS).
gm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 171.
mg Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1291; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45583- 45585; Abu Keita,
Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2028-2029; TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918.
W9 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44154-44158; Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45587.
WO Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1291.

---- End of Page 1245 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ju 18 May 2012
/ [

in Liberia. After a "couple of days", Bockarie told the witness that he had a call from Yeaten
telling him that the Accused's request was in fact an order, following which the witness,
Marzah, and Sampson drove to Foya in Liberia and handed over the soldiers to Yeaten and
Joe Tuah.8l8l While witness TF1-567 also testified that after the capture of Koidu Town in
December 1998, RUF radio operators informed Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator, Sunlight,
about the capture of Nigerian soldiers,gl82 he did not state what happened to these soldiers.
Keita is the only witness to testify as to instructions from Yeaten concerning their release.
3583. Keita's evidence is contradicted by Issa Sesay, who contends that there were 12
ECOMOG prisoners captured in the December 1998 offensive, who were held at Buedu
until Sankoh ordered Bockarie during the Lomé peace talks to release them as a show of
commitment to the peace talks.8l83 In his examination-in-chief; Sesay was questioned about
Exhibit P—361, an RUF radio log book recording a message sent by Issa Sesay to Foday
Sankoh on 27 July 1999 in response to a previous directive by Sankoh to his commanders to
turn all prisoners of war over to ICRC, UNOMSIL or ECOMOGSI84 The message from
Sesay notes the existence of 12 Nigerian "war prisoners" at Sesay's headquarters ready to be
released to the lCRC.8l85 Sesay confinned in his testimony that this message referred to the
release of the 12 ECOMOG prisoners captured during the December 1998 attacks.8l86
3584. Sesay's testimony is corroborated by TF1—168 and Fayia Musa, both of whom the
Trial Chamber has found to be credible witnesses,8l87 also held prisoner in Buedu during the
first half of 1999 and released as part of the Lomé peace talks, who testified that in the same
camp where they were held, there were also Nigerian ECOMOG prisoners of war, one of
whom was executed in February 1999 after having contracted tuberculosis.8l88 TF1—168
stated that these prisoners were captured from the Kono attack in December 1998.8189
ml Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2028-2029.
M2 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief] para. 1291.
W4 Exhibit P-361, "Radio Log Book covering communication for the period - 28/04/1999 - 11/09/1999 -
00008636 - 00008726 (CMS PGS 21955-22046)", ERN 8667.
Sm Exhibit P-361, "Radio Log Book covering communication for the period - 28/04/1999 - 11/09/1999 -
00008636 - 00008726 (CMS PGS 21955-22046)", ERN 8697; Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44385-
44386 (confirming that the message recorded the release of the 12 ECOMOG prisoners).
gm Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44385·44386.
gm Credibility Assessment, TF1-168, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2328; Credibility Assessment,
Fayia Musa, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2557.
Rm TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23369-23370; Fayia Musa, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39510; see

---- End of Page 1246 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3585. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the 12 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers referred to by
Sesay, TF 1-168 and F ayia Musa are the same Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers referred to by
Abu Keita. In light of the fact that Keita's evidence is unc01roborated, and that his testimony
is directly contradicted by Prosecution and Defence witnesses, the Trial Chamber does not
accept his evidence that, on the Accused's orders, these captured ECOMOG soldiers were
released in December 1998 to Liberia.
b. T0 send prisoners released from Pademba R0ad Prison to RUF
controlled areas
3586. The Prosecution further alleges that around 7 January 1999, the Accused ordered
Bockarie, via Yeaten, to send the high profi1e prisoners released from Pademba R0ad Prison
to RUF-controlled areas at Buedu.8l9O The Defence made no specific submission as to the
alleged instruction to release prisoners from Pademba R0ad Prison.
3587. Prosecution and Defence witnesses agree that sh0rtly after their entry into Freetown,
the tr00ps led by Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) released a number of political detainees
from Pademba R0ad Prison, including, among others, the former President of Sierra Leone
Joseph M0moh.8l9l All the witnesses, except Perry Kamara,8l92 agreed that on Bockarie's
directive, the released prisoners were sent to Buedu. Three of the five Prosecution witnesses
who testified as to this event, Kabbah,8l93 Perry Kamara,8l94 TF 1-585,8]% did not mention
any instruction by Benjamin Yeaten or the Accused relevant to the Pademba R0ad prisoners.
Issa Sesay specifically denied any involvement by Yeaten or the Accused in the invasion of
Freetown on the 6 January 1999.8l%
a1s0 Exhibit P-277, Confidentia1, p. 65, ERN 15895.
mg TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23369-23370.
8190 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 172, 556.
gm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581, 21588; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp.
6932-6933; M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16171, 16179; TF1-585, Transcript 8
September 2008, pp. 15730-15731; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3226; Issa Sesay, Transcript
11 August 2010, pp. 45974-45976.
gm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3226 (The witness recalled that pursuant to Bockarie's orders,
Gu11it took the released prisoners directly to Makeni. Only in re1ation to one of the prisoners, Hilton Fyle, did
Sam Bockarie request to be taken to Buedu).
gm M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16171, 16179.
W4 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3229-3230.
W5 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15730-15731.
81% Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 46078-46079; Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46106-46107.

---- End of Page 1247 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3-01-T / 5`Q 18 May 2012
, V

79 Z? qa
3588. However, Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that less than an hour after Bockarie received
the news from Brima concerning the release of the prisoners, he called Benjamin Yeaten on
the satellite phonegm and Yeaten told Bockarie that the Accused wanted him to ensure that
the prisoners released were transferred to Buedu for their protection.8l98 Fornie testified that
he was present when Bockarie spoke on the satellite phone to Yeaten to inform him of the
release of the prisoners,8w9 that he knew Bockarie was speaking to Yeaten because Bockarie
asked the person on the line to confirm that it was "Five-Zero", and that when the
conversation ended, he heard Bockarie telling Mohamed Kabbah that he had received
instructions from the Accused through Yeaten.820O TF1-516 testified that after Benjamin
Yeaten's radio operator, Sunlight, intercepted Bockarie's radio communication to Brima
about the release of prisoners from Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, Yeaten contacted
Bockarie by radio to congratulate him on the release of the prisoners.X2m While TF1-516 did
not specifically state that Yeaten gave Bockarie any directive concerning the Pademba Road
prisoners, he later testified that the instruction that Bockarie gave to Brima to send the
prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to Buedu was made following a conversation
with Yeaten's radio station "Base 1".8202 TF1-516 stated that he monitored the conversation
between Bockarie and Brima on the radio, but it is unclear from his evidence whether he
also heard the conversation with Base 1.8203
3589. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1-516 and Dauda Aruna Fornie are
generally credible witnesses.8204 However, it notes that their accounts differ slightly. TF1-
516 stated that the conversation preceding the instruction to send the Pademba Road
prisoners to Buedu was made with Yeaten's radio station "Base 1",8205 while according to
Fornie, Bockarie spoke to Yeaten via satellite phone.82O6 The Trial Chamber considers such
gm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581—21582.
2*22 oepae Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2158021587
mg Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21583—21585.
8200 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21587 ("And when Mosquito finished he told the
operator directly that he had instructions from Benjamin from above, that is Charles Taylor through Benjamin,
that Benjamin had told 11im that the Pa had said that they should make sure that those people who had been
released from Pademba Road should come to Buedu").
gm TF1~516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6938-6939.
*202 T1¤1-$16, Transcript 9 Appr 2008, pp. 6977-6978.
2222 TF1-5 16, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6978.
Km Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras 275-284 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346—
358.
8205 TF1—516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6977-6978.
mf) Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21583—21585.

---- End of Page 1248 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL~03—01-T 18 May 2012 Q

3 6 Bw
a discrepancy to be inconsequential, having regard to the witness's practice of using the if
Liberian radio call signs, "020" or "Base 1", even when referring to satellite phone
conversationsfm)7 The Trial Chamber also notes that while Fomie stated that Bockarie
instructed Mohamed Kabbah to send a radio message to Gullit to send the released prisoners
to the rear for their safety,8208 Mohamed Kabbah himself did not attest to having personally
received this instruction, or being told by Bockarie that it came from Yeaten or the Accused.
However, having testified prior to Fomie, Kabbah was not questioned further on his
testimony concerning the release of the Pademba Road prisoners. The Trial Chamber
considers that the failure to mention such an instruction is exp1icab1e by the passage of` time
and does not undermine F ornie's evidence.
3590. DCT—008 testified that, to his knowledge, Sunlight never intercepted a message
between Gullit and Bockarie about the release of prisoners from Pademba Road, although he
acknowledged that Base 1 did intercept messages within the RUF net at a later period
between Bockarie and Sankoh.8209 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the evidence of
DCT—008 must be treated with caution.82 [0
3591. On the evidence of Dauda Aruna Fomie, as corroborated by TF1—516, which the
Trial Chamber considers to be credible, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused
passed on instructions Bockarie to transfer the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu.
c. ln relation to military strategy/ sending reinforcements
3592. The Prosecution alleges that immediately after the retreat from Freetown and after
speaking to the Accused's radio operator, Bockarie issued a command to AF RC/RUF troops
near Freetown to set ambushes and set specific attacks.82 H The Prosecution relies primarily
on the evidence of TF1—516. TF1—516 testified that there were communications between
Bockarie and the Accused during the invasion of Freetown, after which Bockarie would
8207 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6921 ("Q. When they say go on the 21 what do they mean'? A. That is
to put the telephone on, go to the telephone. Q. Which telephone? A. The satellite telephone which Sam
Bockarie had. Q. And when he switched on the satellite phone who would he be communicating with? A.
Sometimes from Base 1 the principal of Base 1 was Benjamin Yeaten and the principal of 020 was the
president").
8208 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21586-21588.
8209 DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 2010, pp. 47595—47596.
gm Credibility Assessment, DCT-008, paras 373-380.
gm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 172.

---- End of Page 1249 ---------------------------


Case No.:SCSL-03-01-T Q/J \/ig 18 May 2012 %
\

come to the radio station and draft instructions for the commanders regarding military
manoeuvres and instruct Alex Tamba Brima in Freetown to set ambushes and go on
attacks.82l2
3593. However, the Trial Chamber notes that while TFI-516 testified that Bockarie would
instruct his commanders after communicating with the Accused via satellite phone, TFI—5 16
did not directly assert that Bockarie received any instructions from the Accused.8213 While
TFl—5l6 testified that he was in close physical proximity to Bockarie when he undertook
these satellite communications,82l4 the witness did not give evidence as to the content of
those conversations.82l5
3594. In response to the Prosecution's allegation, the Defence points to82l6 evidence from
Mohamed Kabbah that he did not recall hearing any orders or instructions from the Accused
or his subordinates re ardin the Freetown invasion82l7 and, im ortantl , that Yeaten never
S S P Y
gave Bockarie advice or instructions on military strategy. 8218 ‘
3595. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination, Kabbah acknowledged having
stated in a prior statement that Yeaten never gave Bockarie "advice or instructions" on
military strategy.g219 However, Kabbah also testified that on one occasion, when Benjamin
Yeaten contacted Sam Bockarie over the radio from Foya during the period when ECOMOG
were putting increasing pressure on the troops in Freetown,822O Kabbah stated that Yeaten
told Bockarie to reinforce the troops in Freetown so that they would not lose the city.822l
When asked about how this evidence coheres with his prior statement that Yeaten never
gave Bockarie "advice or instructions" on military strategy, Kabbah explained that he did
not consider that Yeaten telling Bockarie that he should send reinforcements to be an
Sm TFI-5 I6, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.
*213 TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.
gm TPI-5I6, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6943 ("Q. Were you present when the satellite communication was
going on, or - A. We were in the vehicle and sometimes by the vehicle, if I was not on duty and we heard the
satellite phone just in the room and we had the vehicle parked, let us say, by the window").
*2*5 rrr-5 I6, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943.
8216 Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 920.
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript I6 September 2008, pp. I6350-I6352.
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript I2 September 2008, p. I6I44; Transcript I5 September 2008, pp. I6I73-
16175.
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript I2 September 2008, p. I6I44; Transcript I5 September 2008, pp. I6I73-
16175.
8220 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript I5 September, p. I6I70.
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript I5 September, pp. I6I68-I6I69.

---- End of Page 1250 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0I-T I8 May 20I2

_ instruction related to military strategy.8222 Kabbah affirmed that while Yeaten did not give
directions relating to military strategy in the sense of whether the RUF should attack
particular areas or set a certain ambush, he did occasionally offer suggestions in response to
problems that Bockarie informed him about, such as the need for reinforcements.8223
3596. The Trial Chamber considers that although Kabbah drew a fine distinction between
military and non-military advice, and between advice and instruction, such a distinction is
not implausible or unreasonable against the texture of the evidence as to the relationship
between Bockarie and Yeaten. Hence, for example, the Trial Chamber agrees with the
Accused's suggestion that Bockarie, being an experienced General, would not likely have
needed Yeaten's specific advice on the need to send reinforcements to Freetown.8224 Even
on Kabbah's evidence, Bockarie told Yeaten when Yeaten made the comment concerning
reinforcements that he had already given instructions to RUF commanders to reinforce the
troops in Freetown.8225 However, that Yeaten offered suggestions and advice in response to
problems that Bockarie informed him about,8226 rather than instructions or directives is
consistent with Kabbah's evidence that communication between Bockarie and Benjamin
Yeaten during the Freetown invasion reflected a tense relationship in which rank and
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16351-16352. ("A. I would not accept that is a
military strategy, because it was something that had been going on within our rank and file that if there was an
operation going on and it was difficult they should send reinforcement. [...] I am not taking it to be apiece of
advice that he had been instructing that man to do it. I am not going to accept it like that. It was just a
suggestion, sort of").
8223 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16350-16352 (When asked what he meant when he
previously stated that "Yeaten would not give Bockarie any advice or instructions on military strategy", the
witness explained "Milita1y strategy which I meant, like when Yeaten would tell Sam Bockarie that they should
attack such and such an area or he would tell you to go and set an ambush on a particular area, those are the
military strategies I am talking about. When it comes to this area of giving a piece of advice, at times if they
discussed if at all anyone complained about anything he would advise him, he would just say that, ’Why
wouldn't you do this’, just like a suggestion, but it would come in the form of an advice. It is just like a
suggestion that he had been giving to him. If anything was going out of hands or if anything had been happening,
you would need a piece of advice").
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29104—29105.
8225 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September, pp. 16168-16169.
8226 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16350-16352 (When asked what he meant when he
previously stated that "Yeaten would not give Bockarie any advice or instructions on military strategy", the
witness explained "Military strategy which I meant, like when Yeaten would tell Sam Bockarie that they should
attack such and such an area or he would tell you to go and set an ambush on a particular area, those are the
military strategies I am talking about. When it comes to this area of giving a piece of advice, at times if they
discussed if at all anyone complained about anything he would advise him, he would just say that, "Why
wouldn't you do this", just like a suggestion, but it would come in the form of an advice. It is just like a
suggestion that he had been giving to him. If anything was going out of hands or if anything had been
happening, you would need a piece of advice".),

---- End of Page 1251 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T \T& 18 May 2012

5 7 W/ ’%
equality between the parties was a sensitive issue.8227 Hence, while the Trial Chamber is not
satisfied that any "suggestions" made by Yeaten pertaining to military strategy were in the
nature of instructions or directives, the evidence indicates that Bockarie frequently consulted
Yeaten on operational and military decisions. The Trial Chamber considers Fomie's
evidence that sometimes Bockarie "would contact Benjamin to consult him on some
decisions before he ever took them" to be corroborative of this view.8228
d. To bum down Freetown
3597. The Trial Chamber has also had regard to TFl-5l6's evidence that on one occasion
when the forces in Freetown were under increasing pressure from ECOMOG attack, he
overheard Bockarie speaking to Gullit on the radio specifically instructing Gullit to bum
down areas in Freetown, including govemment buildings, in order to attract the attention of
the intemational community.8229 According to TF1-516, this order followed a satellite phone
conversation with "020" in Liberia.8230
3598. The Accused testified that he did not know about or have anything to do with
Bockarie's instructions to Gullit to bum government buildings to raise alarm in the
intemational community.823l The Accused testified that he did not condone amputations
carried out on civilians in Sierra Leone, emphasising that he had no motive whatsoever to
order any kind of atrocities in Freetown.8232
3599. The Defence suggests that the violence coinciding with the AFRC retreat from
Freetown after the January 6 invasion was attributable to a general breakdown of command
and control and the rogue elements within the retreating forces, rather than any specific
order.8233 They cite the evidence of TF1-371 that immediately after the retreat from
Freetown in 1999, discipline was not under control for the AFRC faction leaving Freetown,
although somewhere along the way the commanders took control of their men.8234 However,
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16379.
Sm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21615.
mi) TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6934-6935.
Sm TF1-516, Transcript 9 Apar 2008,p. 6977.
8231 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30453-30454.
gm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29278-29280
Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 921.
8234 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2807-2808.

---- End of Page 1252 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / JQ 18 May 2012 %
\

TF 1—371 explicitly noted that the AF RC faction in Freetown "managed to remain cohesive
despite maybe insubordination from other commanders".8235
3600. The Trial Chamber recalls that a number of witnesses testified to a specific directive
from Bockarie to Alex Tamba Brima to destroy property in Freetown as Brima retreated. For
example, TF1~516 overheard Bockarie speaking to Gullit on the radio specifically
instructing Gullit "to burn down the fucking place".8236 Therefore the violence coinciding
with the AF RC retreat cannot entirely be attributable to rogue elements. However, according
to TF 1—516's evidence, Bockarie only made this directive after a conversation with the
Accused in Liberia, TF 1—516 did not testify that the Accused otherwise had anything to do
with the order or even that it was discussed in the conversation. Due to the lack of
evidentiary basis, the Trial Chamber is not able to find that the Accused, either directly or
through Yeaten, directed or advised Bockarie that the troops in Freetown should destroy
property in Freetown as they retreated after the 6 January 1999 invasion.
e. ln relation to the ceasefire announced in mid—Janug._r;y 1999
3601. Finally, the Prosecution cites the Accused's evidence that he and his government
successfully secured a ceasefire between the RUF and the Govermnent of Sierra Leone in
mid~January 19998237 as evidence of the Accused's ‘"control" over the Freetown
operation.8238 However, neither the Accused nor any other witness suggest that the Liberian
government's role in securing a cease—fire reflected any control of or involvement by the
Accused in the Freetown operation, or that it was indicative of any superior·subordinate
8235 TF1—371, 'Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2808 ("A. I mean the faction, the faction they had, they had their
own commanders and they managed to remain cohesive despite maybe irrsubordination from other commanders,
so somewhere along the way they took control of their men. Q. Somewhere along the way? A. Yes. Q. But
there was a period when it was out ofcontrol? A. Yes, immediately af`ter").
8236 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp 6934-6935; Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp.
21590-21593. (After ECOMOG had forced Gullit's troops to commence their retreat from Freetown, Fornie
monitored a live conversation in which Bockarie gave Gullit instructions to pass onto the RUF/AFRC troops in
Freetown to "cause a lot of mayhem in the city", including destroying government buildings and amputating
civilians, in order to draw attention and force the international community to intervene); Mohamed Kabbah,
Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16171 (Bockarie told Gullit that as the troops retreated they should "make the
area fearful". The retreating troops were to destroy everything so that anyone passing in the area after the rebel
troops would know they had been there); TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15725—15727 (Gullit
informed Bockarie over the radio that they were being pushed out of Freetown by ECOMOG. Bockarie ordered
Gullit to leave Freetown and kill many people and burn down many houses along the way).
gm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 August 2009, pp 26270-26272; Transcript 11 August 2009, pp.
26433-26436; Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29048.
gm Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 173.

---- End of Page 1253 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

relationship between the Accused and the AF RC/RUF . The Accused himself stated that the
cease—fire was engineered as part of the ongoing peace talks.8239 Due to the lack of any
evidentiary basis in support, the Trial Chamber considers that the Liberian government's
role in securing a cease—fire does not implicate the Accused's involvement in the Freetown
operation.
(iv) General evidence that the Accused directed the Freetown operation
3602. The Trial Chamber has also considered the evidence of Varmuyan Sherif that on 6
January 1999, he heard Bockarie over the BBC stating that he would not retreat from
Freetown except when his "father", the Accused, told him to,824O and the evidence of Joseph
Marzah that he personally took part in the Freetown attack and that during the attack the
RUF took instructions from Charles Taylor.824l
3603. In relation to Sheri? s evidence, the Trial Chamber notes that of the BBC broadcasts
in December 1998 or January 1999 admitted into the record, none support Sherif" s
testimony that Bockarie made any reference to the Accused or that he would only stop
fighting on the instruction of the Accused.8242 On the contrary, Exhibit P—350A, a clip from
BBC Focus on Africa dated 8 January 1999 indicates that instead, Bockarie said his forces
would only stop fighting if Foday Sankoh was freed from prison.8243 No other witness
corroborates Sheri? s account of Bockarie making any statement to this effect. In light of the
lack of testimonial evidence corroborating Sheri? s evidence, the lack of documentary
evidence of the BBC broadcast Sherif testified to, and considerin the content of the BBC
S
broadcast of 8 January 1999 that is in evidence, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied beyond
8239 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 August 2009, pp 26270-26272; Transcript 11 August 2009, pp.
26433-26436; Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29048.
8240 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 866.
ml Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5952.
gm See Exhibit P-340A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000524, 22 December 1998"; Exhibit P-
340B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000524, 22 December 1998 CMS PG 23589";
Exhibit P—430C, "Excerpts from: News article, Sierra Leone Web — Sierra Leone News Archive, December 1998
(End of Pages 5 & 6 of 8)"; Exhibit P-430D, "Excerpts from: News article, Sierra Leone Web — Sierra Leone News
Archive, December 1998 (End of Pages 3 & 4 of 8)"; Exhibit P-343A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 -
D0000537 27 December 1998"; Exhibit P-343B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 -
D0000537 27 December 1998 CMS PG 23596"; Exhibit P-430E, "Excerpts from: News article, Sierra Leone
Web — Sierra Leone News Archive, December 1998 (End of Page 2 of 8)".
Sm Exhibit P—350A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000554, 8 January 1999"; Exhibit P-350B,
"Transcript- BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000554, 8 January 1999 - CMS PG 23611".

---- End of Page 1254 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T J JM 18 May 2012 w

3 7 Z 4*}
reasonable doubt that Bockarie made a statement over the BBC stating that he would not
retreat from Freetown except when the Accused told him to.
3604. Concerning Marzah's evidence, the Trial Chamber recalls that Marzah's evidence
must be treated with caution and requires corroboration.8244 Significantly, no other witness
places Marzah in Freetown during the January 1999 attack. The Trial Chamber notes that
Defence counsel confronted Marzah with a statement that he made to the Prosecution on 13
March 2006, in which he said that he was in Monrovia and medically unable to join the RUF
during the Freetown attack of January 1999.8245 Marzah could not recall the year in which
the Freetown attack took place but explained that during the attack, he was injured by a
rocket and could not continue, and that he met Johnny Paul Koroma and Eddie Kanneh in
Buedu but did not know how he had gotten there.824`5 ln light of these inconsistencies, the
Trial Chamber is not able to accept Marzah's evidence that he participated in the Freetown
attack or his evidence concerning the role of the Accused in that attack.
(v) Conclusion on whether the Accused had control over the Freetown operation
3605. Although the evidence establishes that the Accused and Bockarie, whether directly or
via Yeaten, communicated regularly and frequently during December 1998 and January
1999 concerning the operations in Kono and Freetown, it is not clear that the Accused had
any level of control over the conduct of these operations. While the evidence indicates that
Bockarie consulted Benjamin Yeaten or the Accused from time to time on operational
decisions, the tone of these communications was largely in the nature of "suggestions" made
by Yeaten rather than instructions and Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as part of a "sisterly or
brotherly operation", or a "joint operation".8247 Even if, as Kabbah testified, Bockarie
followed instructions by Yeaten because he assumed such orders carrie from the
Accused,8248 there is little evidence that such orders were given. Of the instructions that the
Prosecution allege that the Accused gave to Bockarie, the Trial Chamber has found that only
one has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, that the Accused instructed Bockarie to
transfer the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu for their protection. The Trial Chamber
*244 Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263~268..
8245 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5952; Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 5990~5991.
82% Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 5991~5993.
xm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16145.
8248 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380~14381.

---- End of Page 1255 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T M 18 May 2012


considers that this is insufficient to establish, as the Prosecution has alleged, that the
Accused directed or had control over the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998
and January 1999.
Findings
3606. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused gave advice to Bockarie and received updates in relation to the progress of
the operations in Kono and Freetown in the implementation of their plan. Bockarie was in
frequent and even daily contact via radio or satellite phone with the Accused in December
1998 and January 1999, either directly or through Benjamin Yeaten. Yeaten travelled to
Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in Buedu during this period.
3607. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia during the Kono-Freetown operations to take
instruction from the Accused.
3608. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused directed Bockarie: 1) to release the ECOMOG soldiers captured in
December 1998; 2) to bum down Freetown, 3) to effect a ceasefire in mid-January 1999; 4)
to send reinforcements to Freetown; or 5) generally in relation to military strategy.
3609. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused directed Bockarie to send prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to
RUF controlled areas.
3610. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the Accused directed the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998 and
January 1999.
Summary of Findings
3611. The Trial Chamber has found that -
(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that when the
AFRC/RUF forces were pulling out of Kono during the Intervention, the radio
station of Benjamin Yeaten in Monrovia, intercepted a radio transmission

---- End of Page 1256 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ in 18 May 2012

3 72¢7
between AFRC/RUF radio stations about the withdrawal and intervened to ask
why the forces were withdrawing.
(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused told
Johmry Paul Koroma to capture Kono, and aHer a first failed attempt, the
Accused gave instructions for a second attack, which led to the ultimate
recapture of Koidu Town in Kono District by the AFRC/RUF in late
February/early March 1998.
(iii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused told
Bockarie to be sure to maintain control of Kono for the purpose of trading
diamonds with him for arms and ammunition.
(iv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
participated in the plamring of or instructed the AFRC/RUF to recapture Kono
in mid-June 1998, as the first step in a detailed plan with an overarching
mission to recapture Freetown or otherwise.
(v) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused advised
Bockarie to recapture Kono so that the diamonds there would be used to
purchase arms and ammunition. Such advice was transmitted to RUF
commanders both through Bockarie and Liberian emissaries, Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. Jungle) and/or Ibrahim Bah, and resulted in the Fitti-Fatta attack in mid-
June 1998.
(vi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in
November/December 1998 the Accused and Sam Bockarie jointly designed a
two-pronged attack on Kono, Kenema and Freetown as the ultimate
destination, the Accused emphasising the need to first attack Kono District.
(vii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused told
Bockarie to make the operation "fearful" in order to force the Government into
negotiation and free Foday Sankoh from prison and that after the Waterworks
meeting, the Accused told Bockarie to use "all means" to get to Freetown in a
satellite phone conversation. Subsequently, Bockarie named the operation

---- End of Page 1257 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~O3~O1~T // @ 18 May 2012

3 7 Z5?
"Operation No Living Thing", implying that anything that stood in their way
should be eliminated.
(viii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Gullit resumed
communications with Bockarie on the death of SAJ Musa and that Gullit
maintained frequent daily contact with Bockarie throughout the Freetown
operation to discuss the ongoing military situation in the capital.
(ix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie ordered his
troops to advance towards Freetown, with the aim of joining forces with Gullit
in Freetown, and that Gullit, Bockarie and Bockarie's commanders coordinated
in order to achieve that aim.
(x) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that although the
attempts at coordination were largely unsuccessful, a small contingent of the
troops Bockarie sent as reinforcements were able to join Gullit's troops in
Freetown some time after Gullit's forces had captured the State House.
(xi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that when Gullit's forces
withdrew from Freetown, Bockarie instructed his forces on the outskirts of the
city to ensure a secure line of retreat for the withdrawing troops, and that after
the retreat from Freetown the RUF and AF RC made joint efforts to re-attack
V the city.
(xii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that, throughout the
Freetown operation, Bockarie issued a number of instructions to Gullit,
( including an order to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the
retreat from Freetown, which were implemented by Gullit and the fighters in
Freetown. Bockarie exercised effective command and control over Gullit
during the capture of the State House and Pademba Road Prison.
(xiii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that following his first
conversation with Gullit after the death of SAJ Musa, Bockarie and Gullit
coordinated in their efforts to capture Freetown. From that point on, SAJ
Musa's original plan to attack Freetown was abandoned, and Gullit's

---- End of Page 1258 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T 1258 / 18 May 2012

3739/
movements were incorporated into the Bockarie/Taylor plan, as had been
contemplated by Bockarie and the Accused.
(xiv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused gave
advice to Bockarie and received updates in relation to the progress of the
operations in Kono and Freetown in the implementation of their plan. Bockarie
was in frequent and even daily contact via radio or satellite phone with the
Accused in December 1998 and January 1999, either directly or through
Benjamin Yeaten. Yeaten travelled to Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in
Buedu during this period.
(xv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie
travelled to Monrovia during the Kono—Freetown operations to take instruction
from the Accused.
(xvi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
directed Bockarie: 1) to release the ECOMOG soldiers captured in December
1998; 2) to bum down Freetown, 3) to effect a ceasefire in mid—January 1999,
4) to send reinforcements to Freetown, or 5) generally in relation to military
strategy.
(xvii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
directed Bockarie to send prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to
RUF controlled areas.
(xviii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the Accused directed
the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998 and January 1999.
Conclusion
3612. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces intervened in Sierra Leone and expelled the
RUF/AF RC Junta from Freetown, reinstating Tejan Kabbah's SLPP Government to power
in March 1998. Although ECOMOG initially forced RUF and AFRC forces to withdraw
from Kono, under the orders of AF RC leader Johnny Paul Koroma, these forces managed to
recapture Koidu Town in late February/early March 1998. A few weeks later, ECOMOG
forces regained control of Koidu Town. In mid—June 1998, forces under the ultimate
direction of Sam Bockarie, who had by then assumed leadership of the RUF/AF RC forces,

---- End of Page 1259 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / 18 May 2012

3 9 352.
made another attempt to take Koidu Town, code-named Operation Fitti-Fatta. The Fitti-Fatta
attack was unsuccessiiil, and in late November/early December 1998, after a trip by
Bockarie to Liberia where he met with the Accused, a meeting was held at Waterworks in
which Bockarie ordered RUF/AFRC troops under his command to carry out a two pronged
attack on Kono and Kenema, with Freetown as the ultimate target. The attacks on Kenema
and Kono were launched in mid-December 1998. While the fonner was unsuccessiiil, the
latter attack succeeded, and the RUF/AFRC troops continued towards Freetown. On 6
January 1999, a group of predominantly AFRC troops led by Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a.
Gullit) launched an assault on Freetown.
3613. The Trial Chamber has found that from the time of the Intervention, the Accused and
his subordinates communicated the imperative to maintain control over Kono, a
diamondiferous area. When the AFRC/RUF forces were pulling out of Kono during the
Intervention, the radio station of Benjamin Yeaten, Director of the Accused's Special
Security Service, intercepted a radio transmission between AFRC/RUF radio stations about
the withdrawal and intervened to ask why the forces were withdrawing. Then, in several
satellite phone conversations with Johnny Paul Koroma, who was trying to make
arrangements to get to Liberia by helicopter, the Accused instructed Koroma to capture
Kono. After a first failed attempt, the Accused gave instructions for a second attack, which
led to the ultimate recapture of Koidu Town in Kono District in late February/early March
1998. Once Kono had been recaptured, the Accused told Bockarie to be sure to maintain
control over Kono for the purpose of trading diamonds with him for arms and ammunition.
3614. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused advised Bockarie to recapture Kono
following its loss to ECOMOG, again so that the diamonds there could be used to purchase
anns and ammunition. Such advice was transmitted to RUF commanders both through
Bockarie and Liberian emissaries Daniel Tamba (a.k.a Jungle) and/or Ibrahim Bah and
resulted in the Fitti-Fatta attack on Koidu Town in mid-June 1998. Contrary to the
Prosecution's submission, the evidence did not establish thatthe Accused participated in the
fonnulation of a multi-axis operational attack plan leading to Freetown prior to the Fitti-
Fatta attack.
3615. The Fitti-Fatta attack was unsuccessful, and in November 1998/December 1998,
Sam Bockarie went with a delegation to Burkina Faso via Monrovia, meeting the Accused
on the way to Burkina Faso and on the way back to Sierra Leone. In their meetings, the

---- End of Page 1260 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T [ Lg 18 May 2012

3 73 sj
Accused jointly designed with Bockarie the two-pronged attack on Kono, Kenema and
Freetown as the ultimate destination. This plan was outlined by Bockarie to his commanders
in a meeting at Waterworks on his retum to Sierra Leone. Although the idea to advance
A towards Freetown was already in discussion when Bockarie went to Monrovia, the Accused
emphasised to Bockarie the need to first attack Kono District and told Bockarie to make the
operation "fearful" in order to pressure the Government of Sierra Leone into negotiations on
the release of Foday Sankoh from prison. Alter the Waterworks meeting, Bockarie brief the
Accused over a satellite phone conversation about the meeting. During this conversation, the
Accused told Bockarie to use "all means" to get to Freetown. Subsequently, Bockarie named
the operation "Operation No Living Thing", implying that anything that stood in their way
should be eliminated.
3616. The Trial Chamber has found that at this time there were two plans to attack
Freetown, one made by Bockarie with the Accused, and one made by breakaway AFRC
commander Solomon Anthony Joseph Musa (a.k.a. SAJ Musa), whose troops had already
started an advance towards Freetown at the end of J une/beginning of July 1998.
3617. Consistent with discussions he had made with the Accused, Bockarie invited SAJ
Musa alter the Waterworks meeting to join his efforts to attack Freetown but Musa refused.
However, with SAJ Musa's death in or around 23 December 1998, when Gullit took over
the leadership of the troops at Benguema and resumed contact with Bockarie, Bockarie and
Gullit coordinated in their efforts to capture Freetown. From that point onwards, the SAJ
Musa's original plan was abandoned, and Gullit followed the Bockarie/Taylor plan, as had
been contemplated by Bockarie and the Accused. During the operation, Bockarie exercised
effective command and control over Gullit, issuing a number of instructions to Gullit,
including the order to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the retreat from
Freetown. The Trial Chamber did not make a finding as to how SAJ Musa was killed, but
noted that his death had been mentioned by Bockarie at the time of the Waterworks meeting.
3618. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused gave advice to Bockarie and received
updates in relation to the progress of the operations in Kono and Freetown in the
implementation of their plan. Bockarie was in frequent contact via radio or satellite phone
with the Accused in December 1998 and January 1999, either directly or through Benjamin
Yeaten. Yeaten also travelled to Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in Buedu during this
period. However, it is not clear that the Accused had any level of control over the conduct of

---- End of Page 1261 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·O3·O1·T 18 May 2012

27 xm
these operations. Of the instructions allegedly given to Bockarie by the Accused during this
period, the Trial Chamber finds only one to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, that
being that the Accused instructed Bockarie to transfer the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu
for their protection. This finding is insufficient to establish, as the Prosecution has alleged,
that the Accused directed or had control over the Kono and Freetown operations in
December 1998 and January 1999.

---- End of Page 1262 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T %/ Gm 18 May 2012

D. Operational Support
1. Communications
(a) Radio Equipment and Training
Submission of the Parties
3619. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided communications equipment and
training to the RUF, the benefits of which continued throughout the conflict in Sierra
Leone.g249 For example, through radio sets provided by the Accused, the RUF was later able
to communicate with the Accused in Liberia and the RUF in Cote d’Ivoire.825O In addition,
radio operators such as Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO Nya), an NPFL member, installed
equipment in Sierra Leone and then continued to operate with the RUF in Sierra Leone
during the conflict.825l
3620. The Defence denies that the Accused provided communications equipment and
training to the RUF which benefited the RUF during the conflict in Sierra Leone. The
Defence concedes that the Accused sent an NPFL radio and NPFL radio operators to Sierra
Leone during the period of the two groups’ cooperation against ULIMO, in 1991 or
1992.8252 The Defence argues, however, that the only purpose of this was to allow the NPFL
to monitor the progress of NPFL operations in Sierra Leone.8253 The Defence claims that no
NPFL radio sets or operators were left inside Sierra Leone after the NPFL withdrew, and
that no RUF operators had been trained by the NPFL.8254
3621. The Defence also notes that the RUF was capable of training radio operators of its
own without assistance from the Accused, for Sankoh was an expert in communications, and
that the RUF used radio sets captured in combat.8255 Finally, the Defence contends there is
8249 Prosecution Closing Brief, paras 7, 49, 93-94, 308.
8250 Prosecution Closing Brief para. 308.
8251 Prosecution Closing Brief, para. 308.
8252 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 982.
8253 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, paras 982, 984.
8254 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 984.
8255 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 988.

---- End of Page 1263 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / @ 18 May 2012 1

no evidence to prove that the Accused knew that RUF fighters were being trained on the
radio by NPFL.8256
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
3622. Witness Foda Lansana testified that he was born in Liberia, and `oined the NPF L in
Y J
February or March 1990.8257 Shortly thereafter, he underwent two months of training with
the NPF L to become a radio operator, and was instructed by Emmanuel Zor and Roosevelt
Nyameleyan.8258 1n September or October 1990, James Galakpalah, the deputy overall signal
commander of` the NPFL, requested that the witness undertake an advanced training on
codes.8259
3623. While Lansana was working as a radio operator for the NPFL in Foya, Liberia,
around July or August 1991, the operators received an instruction from the overall signal
commander of the NPF L, Victor Gensei, through his deputy James Galakpalah, requesting
that some of the communications operators in Foya be a part of the communications
operations in Sierra Leone. Lansana, Nyameleyan and Moses Gargue, another operator in
Foya, then travelled to Sierra Leone.82°0
3624. They ariived in Koindu, Sierra Leone in July or August 1991.826l Sankoh instructed
Lansana and the other radio operators to install a radio at his headquarters near Koidu Town
in an area called Baidu. They installed the radio and tested it, calling various stations in
Liberia.8262 The witness testified that this was the very first radio station operated under
Sankoh in Sierra Leone, and was the onl radio station there at this time.8263
Y
8256 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 987.
8257 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4315-4320. Lansana confirmed that he also goes by the
name CO Nya. Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4703-4706.
825* Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008 pp. 4322-4327.
mq Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008 pp. 4337-4339.
3260 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008 pp. 4356-4358.
ml Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4359-4361.
*262 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4362-4364, 441 1.
*263 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4364-4367.

---- End of Page 1264 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % E 18 May 2012

3625. ln May 1992, Taylor gave an instruction for all NPF L forces to evacuate from Sierra
Leone. Lansana testified that he left Sierra Leone and went to Vahun, Liberia, bringing with
him the radio set which he had installed in Sierra Leone for Sankoh.8264
3626. Approximately two weeks later, Galakpalah sent a message to Lansana's commander
in Vahun, stating that Sierra Leone did not have any radios, and requesting that Lansana go
to Pendembu, Sierra Leone with a radio set for Sankoh.82°5 Galakpalah also communicated
that Lansana had been promoted by the NPFL8266 to be Overall Signal Commander for the
RUF in Sierra Leone.8267
3627. Lansana moved to Sierra Leone immediately, and travelled to Pendembu with the
radio set he had taken from Baidu. He installed the radio at Sankoh's residence there, and
tested it by establishing radio contact with Taylor.8268 Lansana remained in Pendembu for
the rest of 1992 and 1993, where he was asked by Sankoh to train RUF fighters on how to
conduct communications and encode and build radios.8269
3628. ln 1992, a Guinean and Nigerian contingent of government troops under the NPRC
attacked the RUF position in Bayama, Sierra Leone, and the RUF captured communications
equipment. Because of this they set up radio stations in Kailahun, Bunumbu, Gandorhun,
Koidu, and Quiva, which were installed by the operators Lansana had trained.827O A few of
the fighters whom Lansana trained included Alfred Brown, Sam Lamboi, Sahr James, and
King Perry Kamara, among others.827l
3629. Lansana continued his work as an overall commander in Kangari Hills, Sierra Leone
ppm Appr 1994 ppm 1997.8272
$264 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4378-4379.
8265 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4378-4379.
8266 The witness confirmed that the NPFL promoted him to this position, but did not indicate the specific person
who did so, only specifying that it was "Gbarnga" that did so. Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp.
4380-4381; Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4684-4685. Gbamga was the NPFL headquarters at this time.
8267 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4380-4381. Upon cross-examination the witness testified
that because of coordination between the NPFL and RUF, he was working for both parties in 1991-1992: he was
"‘on assignment with the NPFL" in Sierra Leone, but reported directly to Sankoh. Foday Lansana, Transcript 25
February 2008 pp. 4698-4699.
**26* Foday tampa, Transcript 20 Fppmary 2008, pp. 4379-4381, 4386.
8269 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4386-4387.
8270 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4388-4389, 4393.
gm Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4390.
Rm Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4406-4407.

---- End of Page 1265 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // {jk- 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
3630. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,8273 was captured by the RUF in April
1991 in Zimmi, Sierra Leone, and taken to an RUF training base in Pujehun, Sierra Leone.
Two months later Foday Sankoh came to the base and told them he needed people to be
trained in radio operations.8274 The witness and twelve others were trained by Sankoh.8275
After one month of training, Sankoh told the witness and the other trainees that he was going
to Liberia to meet with Taylor and ask for additional radios. While Sankoh was in Liberia,
Sierra Leonean government forces attacked, and so the RUF f1ed to Liberia.8276
3631. ln 1992, Kamara returned to Sierra Leone with the RUF and Sankoh requested his
fighters to continue their communications training in Pendembu, Sierra Leone.8277 Foday
Lansana, an NPFL officer from Liberia, was introduced to the fighters and told them that
Taylor sent him to provide training on the use of Liberian and Sierra Leonean code, as well
as how to send and receive messages from Liberia.8278 Lansana trained 15 men, including
the witness.8279 Kamara remained an RUF radio operator until at least 1998.8280
Prosecution Witness Dauda Anuna Fornie
3632. Witness Dauda Anuna Fornie (a.k.a. DAF)8281 a Sierra Leonean, was captured by
RUF rebels in April 1991 at the age of 16.8282 He testified that late in the rainy season of
1991, he was taken for advanced military training in Bomi Hills, Liberia.8283 At that time,
Foday Sankoh arrived in Bomi Hills and told Bockarie to assign men to various units. Fornie
joined the NPFL Signal Unit in Bomi Hills for training, which lasted until mid-1992.8284
Joseph Demmy, who was also called "Bedcat", or "Beckier", was in charge of the NPFL
Sm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
*2** Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3025-3027.
8275 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3028.
8276 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3028-3029
8277 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3037.
gm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3037.
am Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3037-3038.
8280 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3200.
ml Fomie confirmed that his nickname was "DAF". Dauda Aruna Fornie, 1 December 2008 pp. 21292-21293.
8282 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21297-21300.
8283 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 31310-21312.
8284 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21335-21338, 21348.

---- End of Page 1266 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / {I" I 18 May 2012

Si al Unit at that time.8285 The witness recalled that at this time the RUF had a radio station
BP
in the Kailahun area based in Pendembu at which F oda Lansana was the commander.8286
Y
3633. During this time, the RUF did not have its own communications system and
de ended on the NPFL's, and the two ou s shared codes.8287 ln late 1992, the witness
P SY P
moved to Pendembu, where Sankoh taught the operators British voice procedures. The RUF
operators then used different codes from the Liberian operators, more specifically, British
codes, but used Liberian codes to communicate with the NPFL.8288
3634. After the training, the witness was assigned to Kuiva and then Mendekeima, Sierra
Leone. At that time, at the end of 1992, the RUF had four radio stations in Sierra Leone
which could contact stations in Liberia.8289 Sankoh later assigned the witness to Kailahun
town, Sierra Leone, where he became a control station commander, responsible for
transmitting instructions between Sankoh and the frontlines, and between Sankoh and
Taylor.829O The witness continued his work as a radio operator until 1999.829l
Prosecution Witness TF1-585
3635. Witness TF1-585, an RUF radio operator,8292 was trained for three months in 1995
by Foday Lansana to be a radio operator in Sierra Leone. The witness was later sent to
Zogoda, where she was trained for six months by Foday Sankoh.8293 The witness worked as
a radio operator in the Western Jungle from 1995 to 1997.8294 The witness then worked as an
operator for Bockarie in 1999-2000, and for Yeaten for six months in 2001.8295
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
8285 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21337.
8286 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21349-21350.
8287 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21349-21350, 21374-21375, 21378.
Sm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21372-75.
8289 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21376.
8290 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21383-21387.
829] Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21395-21398, 21427, 21458-21469; 21476-21479.
*292 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.15589-15592 (Ps).
gm r1¤1-585, Transcript, 5 September 2008, pp. 15586-15588 (Ps).
*2** r1¤1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008,p. 15590 (Ps).
*295 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15592 (Ps).

---- End of Page 1267 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

27 369
3636. Witness Mohamed Kabbah testified that he was born in Kailahun Town, Sierra
Leone, and captured by "rebels" there in April 1991.82 99 In early 1992, Kabbah was sent to
Gohun village, in Kailahun, Sierra Leone to train as a radio operator.8297 He testified that he
was trained by CO Moses, who was from Liberia, while Foday Lansana, also from Liberia,
conducted an exercise with the trainees to check what they had learned.8298 Kabbah
completed his radio training in early 1992, and worked as a radio operator until at least
1999.9999
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
3637. Witness TF1-516 testified that in approximately 1994 he was trained to be a radio
operator by Foday Lansana at Kangari Hills, Sierra Leone.830O Foday Sankoh later requested
that all newly trained radio operators, including the witness, be transferred to his location at
Zogoda, Sierra Leone. The witness spent six more months being trained by Sankoh in radio
operations in Zogoda, and completed his training in late 1995 or early 1996.83Ol The witness
remained a radio operator until at least 1999.8302
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
3638. Witness Alice Pyne, an RUF radio operator,93O3 testified that she was captured by
NPFL fighters in April 1991.8304 In December 1993, she arrived in Ngiema, Sierra Leone
with CO Mohamed and CO Pa a, her immediate commander. Foda Sankoh thereafter
P Y
passed an order for CO Mohamed and CO Papa to recruit radio signalers. CO Mohamed
selected Pyne for training, and she was trained by Foday Lansana in radio operations.83O5 In
92% Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16087—16088.
9297 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16088—16096.
8298 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16106—16107.
9999 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16126—16127; Transcript 15 September 2008, pp.
16248—16250.
9999 TF1—5 16, Transcript 14 Apni 2008, pp. 7456-7457.
999* TF1—5 16, Trcnscnpt 8 April 2008, pp. 6828-6839, _
9999 TF1—516, Trcnscnpt 8 April 2008, p. 6857.
9999 Alice Pync, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12074.
8304 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. l2048—12049.
9305 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12066—12072; Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12105.

---- End of Page 1268 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0 1-T *4/ % 18 May 2012

late December 1994 to January 1995, Pyne was trained in advanced radio operations by
Sankoh.1131111 She worked as a radio operator until at least 1999.83117
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
3639. Witness Isaac Mongor, a Liberian trader and RUF senior commander,83118 was
ca tured b NPFL rebels in December 1989.83119 In March or A ril 1990, he was instructed
P Y P
by Taylor to help Foday Sankoh train people to fight in Sierra Leone, and the witness
thereafter trained fighters at Camp Naama.83111 Mongor testified that after they captured
Pendembu in 1991, Sankoh brought them a radio operator named Foday Lansana, who
brought a radio set with him. Sankoh said that Taylor had given him Lansana in order to
establish radio communication and operate the radio for them.8311
The Accused
3640. The Accused denied knowing Foday Lansana, saying that he first saw him on the
stand at trial, and denied sending Lansana to train RUF fighters in Sierra Leone.8312 He also
testified that Lansana was not NPFL,111113 but stole an NPFL radio and went to Sierra Leone
on his own initiative.81114 The Accused stated that he ave direct orders to cease
g
communications with the RUF after May 1992, and did not believe that Galakpalah would
have given orders to Lansana counter to this. 83 15
3641. The Accused also questioned why a young person such as Lansana, without
significant experience, and of whom the Accused had not heard, would have received a
1131111 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12081-12084.
83117 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 Iune 2008, pp. 12272-12273. ;
113118 See for example: Isaac Mongor, 'Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
*309 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008 p. 5647.
113111 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5660-5666.
8311 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008 pp. 5675-5677.
11312 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28978; Transcript 30 September 2009 pp. 30037-
38; Transcript 27 October 2009 pp. 30394-95, 30466-67, 30471.
11313 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28978-28979; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp.
30490-91; Transcript 28 October 2009 pp; 30499-30500. The Defence challenges Lansana's testimony as to the
fact that he was ordered to Sierra Leone because Sankoh had no radio by observing that Sankoh had
communication with Liberia before May 1992. This is a misinterpretation of Lansana's testimony, as Lansana
testified that he installed a radio in Sierra Leone Iuly or August 1991, Sankoh used this radio until May 1992, at
which point Taylor ordered the withdrawal of troops, and Lansana took the radio back with him to Liberia.
Lansana contends that he was ordered to return this very same radio to Sankoh two weeks later.
81111 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, p. 30490.
11315 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30487-30488.

---- End of Page 1269 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X QQ 18 May 2012

373i;
special assignment to train radio operators in Sierra Leone with Sankoh.83l6 The Accused
also suggested that Lansana could not have travelled from Liberia into Sierra Leone after
Operation Top Final in May 1992 without encountering ULlMO.83l7
3642. The Accused stated that "to the best of his knowledge", Foday Sankoh captured most
of the radios he used irom Sierra Leonean government forces.83 lg
Defence Witness Martin George
3643. Witness Martin George, (a.k.a. Mao Mao), a lieutenant, captain, major, brigade
commander, colonel, and area commander of the RUF,83 19 testified that while he was being
trained at Crab Hole, a section of Camp Naama, in Liberia, from January to March 1991, he
was trained in radio communications by Foday Sankoh.8320
3644. A few months later, when his RUF battalion was in Sierra Leone in 1991 to 1992,
they captured a long—range Thompson radio in Zimmi before they reached Pujehun. They
installed the radio station in Potom, in Sierra Leone and from then on were in
communication with Foday Sankoh and others in Kailahun so they could keep each other
updated as to their positions. When the RUF moved towards Pujehun, they left the radio in
Potom. They were able to capture other radio sets along the way and installed one in
Pujehun.832l
3645. George testified that Alfred Brown, of the RUF, trained Dauda Amna Fornie and
King Perry, and he knew this was so because "[t]here was nobody to train signal men whom
[he] knew because [Brown] was the most senior".8322
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
3646. Witness Sam Kolleh testified that Foday Sankoh was an expert on radio
communications.8323
83m Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30514-30515.
gm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30516.
gm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28964-28965.
wg Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39592; 22 April 2010, pp. 39627, 39708, 39710; 23 April 2010,
pp. 39766, 39787—39795.
8320 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39610-39614.
ml Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39666-39669.
gm Mprrrrr George, Transcript 26 April 2010, pp. 39981-39982.

---- End of Page 1270 ---------------------------


Case No.; scst-02-01-T % QR 18 May 2012

Defense Witness Issa Sesay
3647. Witness Issa Sesay, an RUF commander,8324 was recruited into the RUF in
approximately 1990 by Foday Sankoh.8325 He testified that from 1991 to 1993, the RUF
used field radios captured from government troops to communicate.8326 Sankoh was a
professional communications expert, and so he was the one who trained all of the RUF radio
operators while he was head of the RUF.8327
Defence Witness John Vincent
3648. Witness John Vincent, a Liberian Vanguard comrnander,8328 joined the RUF in
1990.8329 He testified that while training at Camp Naama, in Liberia in 1991, Foday Sankoh
taught the recruits how to use radio sets. He stated that Sankoh told them he had leamed
how to operate a radio during his time in the Sierra Leonean Am1y.833O
3649. Vincent also testified that when he was stationed in Pendembu, Sierra Leone, in 1991
Sankoh had a radio, and Sankoh's radio operator was Foday Lansana. Vincent heard that
Lansana was a former NPFL radio operator who had escaped a ULIMO attack in Liberia and
had entered Sierra Leone with his radio. He heard that Lansana met some Liberians who
took him to Sankoh, and Lansana joined the RUF. The witness believed that Lansana's radio
was the one he encountered with Sankoh in Pendembu.8?`3l The witness captured a long-
range communication radio, at Lelehan, Sierra Leone, in December 1991, when he captured
a ULIMO soldier. 8332
Defence Witness DCT-292
*323 sem Kolleh, rrerrserrpr 4 November 2010, pp. 48391—48392.
8324 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-4459], 44596.
8325 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43604.
8326 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43684.
8327 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010 pp. 44034-44036.
8328 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 38114—38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; 30 March 2010,
pp. 38226, 38239; 31 March 2010, p. 38390, 38408, 38460, 38461.
8329 John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38261-38262.
M 16116 vrrreerrr, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39613-39614.
833] John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 pp. 38044-38047.
Sm Jem Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 pp. 38043-38044.

---- End of Page 1271 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / (TI 18 May 2012
,/
J’//—
3650. Witness DCT—292 was a member of the RUF from 1990 to 1995.3333 He testified that
the NPFL did not have communication with the RUF in 1991 to 1992, as the RUF did not
have a radi0 in Koindu, Sierra Leone. The RUF Only acquired radios when Kono, Sierra
Leone was attacked around 1994.3333
Defence Witness J 0seph Dehmie
3651. Witness Joseph Dehmie, (a.k.a. Bearcat), an NPFL radi0 Operator,3333 testified that
he was b0m in Liberia and was a member of the NPFL from 1990 to 1997.3336 After one
month he was recmited by James Galakpalah to train with the Signal Unit as a radi0
Operator. 3333 Dehmie worked as a radi0 Operator known as Bearcat in B0mi Hills for two
years, from September 1990 to Oct0ber 1992.3333
3652. Dehmie knew Dauda Amna F0mie, but denied that F0mie trained as a radi0 Operator
in B0mi Hills in 1991, claiming that F0mie was his c00k.3339 It was not possible that F0mie
was an Operator without Dehmie's knowledge, because had he been an Operator there at that
time, Dehmie would have known.3330 He stated that at the time he was in B0mi Hills, n0n—
radi0 Operators were not allowed in the radi0 r00m, and F0mie never Operated NPFL
radios.3333 He further denied that the NPFL sent radi0 Operators to Sierra Leone.3332 Dehmie
also denied that Sankoh arrived at Moni Hills and instructed Bockarie to assign men to units,
stating that Sankoh did not once come to B0mi Hills from Oct0ber 1990 to September
1992.3333
3653. With regards to the evidence of Foday Lansana, Dehmie denied that Galakpalah
ordered R00sevelt Nyameleyan and Lansana to travel from Foya, Liberia to Sierra Leone to
set up radi0 communication there. First, there was no radi0 station in Foya between 1991
and 1992. Second, the witness knew Nyameleyan, and stated he was never assigned to a
3333 DCT—292, Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41673—41674 (PS).
3333 DCT—292, Transcript 2 isps 2010,p. 41894.
3333 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 21 May 2010, pp. 41467, 41494, 41523.
3333 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 18 May 2010, pp. 41133- 41135.
3337 Jcseph Dehmie, Transcript 18 May 2010, pp. 41152—47158.
3333 Jpssph Dshmis, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41223—41225.
33333 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41285—41292; Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41623—41626.
3330 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 20 May 2010, pp. 41312—41323, 41340—41343.
3333 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41292-41293, 41311-41312.
3333 Jcseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41291%-41299.
3333 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 20 May 2010, pp. 41324—41325.

---- End of Page 1272 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
\/

radio station in Foya between 1991 and 1992.4444 Finally, Dehmie stated that throughout his
entire career with the NPFL, he never heard of a person named CO Nya, Lansana's
nickname. *345
Deliberations
3654. It is undisputed that one or more NPFL radios and radio operators entered Sierra
Leone during the NPFL's cooperation with the RUF in their fight against ULIMO, from
1991 to 1992.4444 The Prosecution contends that these NPFL operators, including Foday
Lansana, trained RUF fighters in radio communication, and the RUF continued to benefit
from this training throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone.4447 The Prosecution also alleges
that the Accused provided radio sets to the RUF, which the RUF later used to communicate
with the Accused in Liberia and with the RUF in Cote d’Ivoire during the conflict in Sierra
Leone.4444
3655. The Defence contends that all equipment and operators were evacuated in 1992,4444
and denies that any of these NPFL operators, including Lansana, trained RUF fighters at this
time.4454 The Defence also argues that there is no evidence to prove that Taylor knew that
RUF fighters were being trained on the radio by NPFL.444l
3656. The Prosecution has presented substantial evidence that Foday Lansana trained RUF
fighters in Sierra Leone in radio communications from 1991 until as late as 1995. Lansana
himself testified to this fact, and it was confirmed by several witnesses, including Perry
Kamara, TF1-585, Mohamed Kabbah, TFl—5l6, Alice Pyne, and Isaac Mongor.4454
3657. The Defence contends that Lansana was not sent by the NPFL but entered Sierra
Leone independently and of his own accord, citing the evidence of Defence Witness John
4444 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 20 May 2010, pp. 41357-41359, 41358-41360
4445 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 20 May 2010, pp. 41360-41361.
4444 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 308; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 982.
4447 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 308.
4444 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 308.
4444 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 984.
4454 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 986.
4444 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 987.
4454 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3037-3038; TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.
15586-15588; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16106-16107; TF1-516, Transcript 14
April 2008, pp. 7456-7457; Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12066-12072; Transcript 18 June 2008, p.
12105; lsaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5675-5677.

---- End of Page 1273 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % JQ 18 May 2012 %

Liberia. Defence Witness Joseph Dehmie contradicted this testimony, denying that Fornie
was trained as a radio operator, and stating that Fornie was his "cook". Dehmie's testimony,
however, is uncorroborated, while Fornie provided substantial details as to his work as a
radio operator. Further, several other witnesses, including Defence witnesses, contradicted
p Dehmie and identified Fornie as a radio operator for the RUF.836l The Trial Chamber did not
find Dehmie's evidence credible. It accepts Fornie's testimony and finds that he was trained
in radio communications by the NPFL in Liberia.
3660. Several witnesses testified as to whether the RUF continued to benefit from this
trainin b the NPFL durin the conflict in Sierra Leone. Lansana stated that he remained in
Sierra Leone through at least 1997, Witness TF1-516 attested to being trained by him in
19948362 and Witness TF1-585 attested to being trained by him in 1995. Witnesses Kamara,
TF1-585, Kabbah, TF1-516, Pyne and Mongor all testified that they were trained by
Lansana. Kamara remained a radio operator with the RUF until at least 1998,8363 Kabbah,
TF1-516 and Pyne remained operators until at least 1999,8368 and TF1-585 until at least
2001.8363 Lansana himself also lists the names of other radio operators that he trained.8366
Lansana testified that following an attack in 1992, RUF fighters captured a significant
amount of communications equipment, which was installed by operators trained by
Lansana.8367 Additionally, Fornie testified that he was sent to Liberia for training with the
NPFL signal unit; he remained a radio operator with the RUF until 1999.8368
3661. Though the Defence presents credible evidence that Sankoh trained many fighters in
radio communications, and was himself an expert in communications,8369 this evidence is
**360 Credibility Assessment, Foday Lansana, paras 237-243.
836] TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2381 (CS); TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6867-6868;
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 3976; Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11333;
Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39010; Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, p. 39746; DCT-
008, Transcript 1 September 2010 p. 47767; Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 September 2010, p. 48747. These
witnesses sometimes referred to Fornie as DAF, his RUF operating code name.
8362 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4386-4387; TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7456-
7457.
*363 Perry Krtmrtrp, Transcript 6 rppmary 2008, p. 3200.
836* Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16126-16127; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p.
6857; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12272-12273.
8365 rrr-585, rrprrsprrpt 5 Sept 2008, p. 15592 (PS).
8366 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4387, 4521.
8367 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4388-4389.
8368 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21335-21338, 21395-21398, 21427, 21458-21469;
21476-21479.
8386 Periy Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3028; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp.

---- End of Page 1275 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012 [E
\.

not dispositive, for it does not exclude the possibility that Lansana, of the NPF L, also trained
operators. Similarly, the Defence argument that Lansana was only an "assistant operator"
and therefore not qualified to train RUF fighters does not negate the overwhelming evidence
that he did provide this training.837O
3662. Lansana testified that upon an instruction from James Galakpalah, he brought a radio
set for Sankoh to Sierra Leone in 1991.837l He then returned the radio to Liberia when
Taylor withdrew NPFL troops in 1992, but brought it back upon instructions from James
Galakpalah two weeks later. Mongor testified that Lansana brought a radio set with him
when he came to train RUF fighters in 1991.8372 Further, the Accused himself conceded that
he may have provided radios during the NPF L cooperation period with the RUF. As there is
no evidence that these radios were removed from Sierra Leone after 1992, the Trial
Chamber can reasonably infer that the radios remained with and were used by the RUF.
While several Defence witnesses, including the Accused, testified that they personally, or
the RUF generally, used radios that they had captured in the conflict to communicate,8373
this evidence is not dispositive of the fact that the NPF L provided radios in addition to those
that might have been captured in combat.
3663. Considering all of the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that NPF L operators,
including Lansana, trained RUF fighters in radio communication, and provided radio
equipment to the RUF, from which the RUF continued to benefit during the indictment
period.
3664. Mongor testified that Sankoh told him that Taylor had provided a radio and radio
operator, Lansana, to help set up and operate RUF communications.8374 Additionally,
21372-21375; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44035; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6828-6839;
Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12081-12084; DCT-062, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39610-39614;
Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, pp. 48391-48392; John Vincent, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39613-
39614.
8370 See Defence Closing Brief, para. 979, citing Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4658-4661.
Wl TF1-275, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4379-4381, 4386.
gm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5676-5677.
8373 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009. pp. 28964-28965; Martin George, Transcript 22
April 2010, pp. 39666-39669; Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43684; John Vincent, Transcript 25 March
2010, pp. 38043-38044; DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, p. 41894. Witness DCT-292's testimony that the
RUF had no radios before 1994, when Kono was attacked. See DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, p. 41894,
contradicts the overwhelming evidence from other witnesses that the RUF was communicating by radio before
this date.
8374 Isaac Mongor. Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5675-5676.

---- End of Page 1276 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T // GW 18 May 2012

Kamara testified that Lansana was introduced to the RUF fighters and he stated that Taylor
had sent him to provide communications training to them.8375 ln light of this evidence, the
Trial Chamber finds the proposition that the Accused would not have known that the NPFL
had provided these operators to the RUF to be incredulous. The Trial Chamber further finds
it incredulous that the Accused would not have known about the radio the NPFL provided to
the RUF, particularly considering Sankoh used this radio to communicate with the Accused
himself immediately after it was installed by Lansana.8376 The Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused knew that the NPFL
provided these radio operators and equipment to the RUF.
Findings
3665. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the NPFL provided radio operators, including Foday Lansana, and equipment to the
RUF, to train RUF fighters in radio communication. Lansana stayed in Sierra Leone
following the break with the NPFL in Operation Top Final, and the RUF continued to
benefit from the training and equipment provided by the NPFL throughout the conflict in
Sierra Leone and during the indictment period.
3666. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused knew that the NPFL provided these operators and equipment to the RUF.
(b) Satellite Phones
Submissions of the Parties
3667. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided RUF leaders, including Foday
Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, and Issa Sesay, with satellite phones which enabled the Accused to
plan, facilitate and order RUF activities during which crimes were committed.8377
3668. The Defence concedes that the Accused provided Bockarie and Sesay each with a
satellite phone, but stated that he did so in order to facilitate negotiations during the peace
8375 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3037.
8376 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4362-4364, 441 1.
8377 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 12, 17, 140, 142, 151, 168, 171, 239, 246, 307, 310, 313, 318, 323-324,
352, 356, 364, 426, 512, 612, 1208,1239,1242, 1249.

---- End of Page 1277 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T / QQ 18 May 2012
/4)

39 2 90
process between the RUF/AF RC and the Sierra Leonean government.8378 The Accused
denies that he provided Sankoh with a satellite phone. Further, the Defence contends, the
RUF received satellite phones from sources other than the Accused and thus any provision
of a phone from the Accused could not have had a substantial effect on the perpetration of
any crime. 8379
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
3669. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie was an RUF radio operator.838O Fornie testified that in
early 1998 while Fornie was working in Buedu, Johnny Paul Koroma gave Sam Bockarie
his first satellite phone.838l A second phone was given to him by Taylor, also around early
1998.8382 Fornie testified that he travelled with Bockarie to Monrovia, and on their return
Bockarie handed Fornie a bag to carry, stating that inside was a satellite phone given to him
by Taylor.8383
3670. Bockarie used his satellite phones most often for direct communication with
Benjamin Yeaten.8384 Fornie knew that Bockarie was speaking to Yeaten on the satellite
hone because he would stand close to Bockarie and hear Yeaten talkin to Bockarie.
P 8
Bockarie also asked Fornie to tell Yeaten to send phone credit to him so he could recharge
his account.8385
3671. Fornie testified that Bockarie and Yeaten were in "constant contact" between the
RUF 's attack on Kono in 1992, and when they entered Freetown, in 1997. VVhen Kono fell
to the RUF, 1ssa Sesay sent a message over the radio and Fornie transmitted this message to
Bockarie. Bockarie then called Yeaten immediately on his satellite phone to inform him that
Kono was under control.8386
8378 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 73, 97, 531, 538, 574, 699, 702, 934, 961, 998-1006, 1520.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 574, 934, 998-1006.
8380 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21376-21383.
ml Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 2151 1-21512.
8382 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21479, 21510-21512; 10 December 2008 p. 22048.
8383 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21512.
8384 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21510-21511.
W5 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 2151 1.
8386 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21555-21557.

---- End of Page 1278 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /// jk 18 May 2012 Ny)

3672. Bockarie was also in contact with Yeaten after the 6 January 1999 invasion, speaking
with him two to three times a day on his satellite phone. Bockarie would ask him for advice,
and provide reports regarding the situation on the ground.8387 On 7 January, King Perry sent
a radio message to Bockarie that RUF troops in Freetown had released political prisoners
from Pademba Road Prison. F ornie was present in the room when Bockarie called Yeaten on
his satellite phone to transmit this message and ask for more ammunition.8388 After some
time Yeaten called Bockarie back on his satellite phone and instructed him to bring the
prisoners to Buedu, saying these were instructions from Taylor.8389
3673. In cross-examination, F ornie testified that Taylor gave Bockarie more than one
satellite phone.839O Fornie also stated that the satellite phone could not have been used to
facilitate peace negotiations because Taylor gave Bockarie the satellite phone when the RUF
withdrew from Kenema after the intervention, and the RUF were very far off from the peace
accord at the timegwl
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
3674. Witness Varmuyan Sherif an RUF tighter,8392 was a member of Taylor's Special
Security Seryice (SSS) during the operative time period.8393 Sherif testiried that in early
1998, Taylor instructed him to travel to Sierra Leone and bring him Sam Bockarie, but did
not explain his reasons for doing so.8394 Sherif thereafter travelled to Sierra Leone, found
Bockarie and brought him back to Liberia to meet with Taylor.8395
3675. Following his meeting with Taylor, Bockarie thanked Sherif for making it possible
for him to meet Taylor, and said he would never forget him.8396 He told Sherif that Taylor
8387 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610, 21614-21615.
Sm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581-21586.
mg Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21584-21588; 10 December 2008, pp. 22109-22112.
8390 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 10 December 2008, p. 22048.
RW Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp, 22050-22051.
mg rrr-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.
8393 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 812.
8394 Varinuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 826, 828-829.
**95 Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 830-846.
W6 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 849-850, Transcript 1 1 January 2008, p. 1045.

---- End of Page 1279 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Jn 18 May 2012

gave him money and a satellite phone, and showed Sherif the money and the satellite phone
that Taylor had given him.4397
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
3676. Witness Mohamed Kabbah was an RUF radio operator during the operative time
eriod.4394 Kabbah testified that the first time he saw an RUF member with a satellite hone
P P
was at the end of 1995 or beginning of 1996, when he saw Foday Sankoh with one just
before Sankoh left for the Abidjan peace talks. Kabbah said that Sankoh received this phone
from Dr Addai Sebo.8394 The witness agreed that the satellite phone was given to Sankoh so
that he could contact people while he was in Abidj an.44OO
3677. Kabbah also testified that in approximately September 1999, Sam Bockarie returned
from a trip to Monrovia with a satellite phone that Kabbah did not believe he had before he
went.8401 Kabbah did not know who gave the satellite phone to Bockarie.8402
3678. During the Freetown Invasion, Bockarie would communicate with Taylor by satellite
phone, and he did so in public.84O3 In one instance, Bockarie told the operator on duty, Tiger,
to inform the o erator Sunli t that he wanted to talk to Taylor. Bockarie then drove with
P Y
the witness and others to the MP headquarters in Buedu where the satellite could get
reception, and Bockarie spoke with Taylor on the phone.44O4 The witness heard Bockarie say
that his men had entered Freetown, and were advancing.44O5
Prosecution Witness Jabaty J award
3679. Witness Jabaty Jaward testified that he was a member of the RUF, and worked in
Sam Bockarie's home in Buedu from approximately February or March 1998 to December
8447 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 849—850; Transcript 1 1 January 2008, p. 1045.
8398 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16126·16127; Transcript 15 September 2008, pp.
16248-16250.
8499 Kabbah referred to Dr Addai Sebo as "Dr Simbo", but owing to the witnesses’ description of this person the
Trial Chamber accepts that he is referring to Dr Sebo.
8440 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16285, 16353—16355.
8401 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16132, 16135; Transcript 15 September 2008, pp.
16175-16176; Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16355-16361.
8402 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16361.
8403 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16173; Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16327—
16328.
8444 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16176—16178.
4405 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16178.

---- End of Page 1280 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T f.- dwg 18 May 2012

1999.8406 At this time, he witnessed Bockarie comparing two satellite phones. Bockarie told
J award he was collected by Varmuyan Sherif and brought to Monrovia, where Taylor gave
him one of the satellite phones. Jaward did not know how Bockarie obtained the other
satellite phone.g407
3680. Because of his position in Bockarie's house, Jaward overhead many of Bockarie's
conversations on the satellite phone.8408 J award was responsible for charging the batteries to
the satellite phone. In approximately 1998 to 1999, Bockarie told J award that he had
discussed the Guineans’ attack on the RUF via satellite phone with Taylor.8409
Prosecution Witness TF 1-585
3681. Witness TF 1-585 testihed that she was a radio o erator for Sam Bockarie in Buedu
P
at the end of 1997.84*0 The witness testified that while in Buedu, she saw Bockarie with a
satellite phone, but she did not know who gave it to Bockarie.84H
3682. Benjamin Yeaten and Bockarie would often talk on the radio about Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. Jungle) bringing arms, ammunition, food, clothing and other supplies to Buedu.84l2 lf
there was anything more important than that, Yeaten would instruct Bockarie to switch on
the satellite phone.84l3 The witness knew the content of these conversations because he was
present when Bockarie would discuss them with the senior ofhcers after they happened.84l4
3683. In the beginning of 1998, the witness saw Bockarie talking on his satellite phone and
then was present when Bockarie related his phone conversation to Eddie Kanneh. Bockarie
stated that he had spoken to Yeaten, who had instructed him to bring Johnny Paul Koroma to
Beudu because "they [had] something for them". Yeaten told Bockarie that this was an
instruction from Taylor.84l5 Koroma was then brought to Buedu.84l6
8406 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13383, 13390-13397; Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13845.
8407 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13382, 13422-13423.
*408 Jabaty reward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13815-13817.
8409 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13418, 13421-13424.
WO TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15608-15610.
X4" TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15861-15862.
84*2 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15652-15654.
W3 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15652-15654, 15657.
MM TFl-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15654-15657.
M5 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15610-15615; Transcript 10 September 2008, p. 15911.

---- End of Page 1281 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T dl}. 18 May 2012

3 *7 Y
3684. Around 9 January 1999, during the attack on Freetown, Bockarie used his satellite
phone to inform the BBC that Alex Tamba Biima (a.k.a. Gullit) and his men would be in
Freetown within three days’ time.8417 Just after this announcement, the witness heard the
radio operator on duty receive a call from Yeaten's operator Sunlight, asking them to find
Bockarie so that he could speak with Yeaten.14418
3685. Bockarie came to the radio, and the witness heard Yeaten tell Bockarie that if what
he heard on the BBC was true, Bockarie should expect Yeaten to come to Buedu in two
days’ time. He told him to switch on his satellite phone because "my father", whom the
witness understood to be Taylor, "would want to talk to you". Bockarie went directly to the
veranda where the satellite phone was located and spoke on the phone. The witness was not
present for this conversation. She also testified that she was present when Yeaten came to
Buedu two days later.8419
7 Prosecution Witness Perry Kamara
3686. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator during the operative period,8420
testified that in approximately 1994 or 1995 Dr Addai Sebo brought a satellite phone to
Foday Sankoh.8421 Sankoh used this phone to communicate with Taylor, and then Sankoh
would transmit messages conceming what he discussed with Taylor to RUF commanders at
RUF field radio stations.8422
3687. Issa Sesay took over as acting leader of the RUF each time Bockarie visited Taylor
in Liberia, and also when Sankoh was arrested in Freetown in May 2000.8423 During these
times, Sesay had a satellite phone on which he would communicate with Taylor, and would
8416 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15616.
8414 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15717-15719.
8418 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15720-1572l.
8419 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15719-15724.
8420 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
4421 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054, 3057-3058. Kamara referred to Dr Addai Sebo as
"Dr Simbo", but owing to the witnesses’ description of this person the Trial Chamber accepts that he is referring
to Dr Sebo.
8422 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3082.
8424 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3083.

---- End of Page 1282 ---------------------------


Case No.:

transmit messages concerning his talks with Taylor to all RUF commanders at RUF field
stations.8424
3688. Kamara testified that Bockarie had a satellite phone in 1998 or 1999, in Buedu.8425
Around April or May 1998, Bockarie requested Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and Kamara
to travel to Buedu for a meeting. Kamara participated in a meeting at Bockarie's house along
with Mike Lamin, lsaac Mongor, Mingo and "Pa" or SYB Rogers. Bockarie showed those
present a pile of` arms and ammunition, commercial radios, and a satellite phone, and told
them that Taylor had provided these materials in return for diamonds sent to him by the
RUF. Bockarie then discussed with the men a plan to recapture Sierra Leone.842° Messages
that Bockarie received on the phone would be transmitted to all RUF stations.8427
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
3689. Witness Karmoh Kamreh was an RUF member under the direct command of Foday
Sankoh during the operative time period.8428 In early December 1996, Kamreh met at
Sankoh's house for an officers’ meeting.8429 Sankoh was present, along with Sam Bockarie,
Issa Sesay, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Abubakkarr, Francis Oscar Charles, Jackson
Swaray and the witness. Sankoh gave Bockarie a satellite phone and told them he was going
on a political tour, but they should take their orders from Bockarie.8430
3690. Kamreh also testified that in May 1997, he conducted a mission to capture Tongo
Field. When he later reported to Bockarie, Bockarie thanked him for successfully
completing the mission. Kanneh then heard Bockarie call Taylor on a satellite phone and
inform him that they had captured Tongo Field. Kamreh could hear Bockarie's side of the
8424 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3083.
8425 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3082, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3332.
8*26 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3159-3164.
8427 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3332-3333.
$*2* Kpppph Kamen, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9354-9355.
*429 The witness testifies that this meeting occurred upon Sankoh's return from signing the Abidjan Peace
Accords. Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9354, which were signed on 30 November 1996. Exhibit
D-087, "Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front"; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact O.
8430 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9356-9359.

---- End of Page 1283 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

conversation, and could hear Taylor on the other side of the phone thanking Bockarie "a
lOt>s'843l
3691. The witness also testified that around this time period, Bockarie called the witness,
Jungle and Lion to his house in Tongo and thanked them for the diamonds that they had
mined for him. Bockarie then called Taylor on a satellite phone and told him of` the work
that had been done. Kanneh could hear that Taylor thanking Bockarie, and told him to hand
the diamonds over to Jungle, who would transport them to Liberia.g432
3692. Kanneh also testified that he attended a second meeting at Bockarie's house in
December 1998, which occurred alter Bockarie travelled to Burkina Faso and returned with
materials and aims.8433 Those present included Bockarie, 1ssa Sesay, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle), Eddie Kamieh, Major Francis, Matthew Barbor, Junior Vandi, Gbessay Gbobah and
the witness.8434 At this meeting they discussed their plan to take power in Sierra Leone, by
attacking Kono and Makeni and then capturing Freetown.8435 If they met President Kabbah
at the State House, they were to kill him.8436 Alter this meeting, Bockarie and the others
briefed President Taylor by calling him on Bockarie's satellite phone. All the participants
were present as Bockarie told Taylor that he had implemented the plan Taylor had given to
him in Monrovia. Kanneh knew that Bockarie was speaking to Taylor because he announced
this to the group.8437
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
3693. Witness Abu Keita was a former ULIMO fighter who was asked by Benjamin
Yeaten to join the RUF in Sierra Leone in September 1998.8438 Keita testified that in
September 1998, he went to a meeting at Yeaten's home with Joseph Marzah (a.k.a.
Zigzag),8439 Sampson, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle,) Sam Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh, and
ml Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9369-9371.
*432 Karmoh Kaaaah, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9380-9382.
8433 Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9416-9419.
3434 Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9418-9420, 9425.
8435 Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9423-9427.
***36 Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9430-9431.
8437 Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9433-9437; Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9728.
8438 Abu Keira, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1967-1969.
8439 The witness spells Marzah's name as "Mar2har" and then refers to him as "Ma2har", but also states that he
was a special services officer and his nickname was "Zigzag". Transcript 23 Jnuary 2008, p. 1967. The Trial
Chamber is convinced that the witness was referring to Joseph Marzah.

---- End of Page 1284 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T G1 18 May 2012

others. During that meeting, the witness saw Bockarie with a satellite phone which he said
had been given to him by Yeaten.844O The satellite phone calls were paid for by Yeaten, who
would send "top up cards" to Bockarie.8Ml
3694. The witness also testified that during the attack on Freetown, the witness and
Bockarie were in Buedu. Bockarie called the BBC on his satellite phone and stated that the
RUF were approaching the State House.8442 Bockarie then called Yeaten and Joseph Tuah on
the satellite phone, and Bockarie told the witness he was reporting to them on the status of`
the operation.g/M3
3695. The witness also testified that in May 2000, "after Bockarie's regime", Sankoh
ordered that Issa Sesay should be in charge of` the RUF. Sesay travelled to Liberia and
returned with a satellite phone, which Sesay said was given to him by Taylor.84M
Prosecution Witness Dennis Koker
3696. Witness Dennis Koker, an AF RC fighter,g445 testified that he was present in Koidu in
March 1998 when it was captured by the RUF. Koker saw Issa Sesay in the centre of Koidu
near the mosque with a satellite phone. Koker heard Sesay say "Master, Kono is under our
contro1", and Koker believed that he was speaking to Sam Bockarie, because he called him
Master.8446
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
3697. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,g447 testified that in March 1997, Foday Sankoh
had two satellite phones.g44g
3698. The witness also testified that in late 1998 or early 1999, he was present at a senior
officer's meeting at Sam Bockarie's residence in Buedu attended by most of the senior
8440 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1967-1969, 1974.
ml Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2018-2019.
8442 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2019-2020.
8443 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022.
W4 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2019, 2031-2032.
W5 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1236.
W6 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1239-1240.
8447 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
8448 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2282-2284 (CS).

---- End of Page 1285 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T du 18 May 2012

3 7 S ah?
commanders of the RUF.4444 Halfway through the meeting, a few senior leaders had lunch
with Bockarie in his bedroom. Bockarie went outside and spoke on a satellite phone for ten
to fifteen minutes. When he returned, he stated that he had been on the satellite phone with
"the Pa", whom the witness understood to be Taylor. Bockarie said that Taylor had given
direct instructions for Operation No Living Thing, a mission to capture Freetown. Taylor
instructed Bockarie to execute any fighter contesting his command or authority for this
operation. In addition, no enemy forces should be captured, but only eliminated. He then
informed the rest of the attendees to the meeting about the operation.445O
3699. While the witness and Bockarie were in Beudu, Bockarie communicated with Liberia
primarily through his satellite phone, which he said Taylor had given him.4454 During the
Junta and in 1998 and 1999, Bockarie transmitted information on RUF actions to Taylor
over satellite telephone.4454 1
3700. The witness disagreed that a satellite phone was made available to Bockarie and
Sankoh for the purpose of facilitating peace negotiations. The witness testified that a satellite
phone was given by the American ambassador to Sankoh in Lome, and that with regard to
the phone Taylor gave Bockarie, Bockarie did not use it to talk to any members of the
Committee of Five on that phone, other than Taylor.4454
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
3701. Witness TF1-516 wasgan RUF radio operator from 1994 to 1999.4444 Witness TF1-
516 testified that in November or December 1996, Foday Sankoh left to attend peace talks in
Yammassoukro. Zedman returned from Yamassouko with a new satellite phone and fax
machine purchased by Sankoh.4455
3702. The witness first saw Sam Bockarie with a satellite phone in Kenema during the
Junta period in 1997. Bockarie later told the witness that he had received a phone from his
"chief" in Liberia. The one Bockarie had owned previously had been blocked because he
4449 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2410 (CS).
4450 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2412-2414 (CS).
4454 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008. pp. 2431-2432 (CS).
4454 TF1—371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2452 (CS).
3453 TF1-371. Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2788-2790 (CS).
*454 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6828-6839; Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7456-7457.
4455 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6842-6843.

---- End of Page 1286 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f 18 May 2012

was not paying his bills.4456 Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten would speak over a satellite
phone, and then Bockarie would transmit messages concerning these conversations via the
radio to the frontlines.4457 After speaking over the phone with Taylor, Bockarie would tell
those around him, including the witness, about the conversation.4454
3703. During the Freetown Invasion, Bockarie spoke with radio call sign 020, which was at
Taylor's Executive Mansion, on his satellite phone. Following this conversation, Bockarie
told Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) over the radio to instruct his men to burn down areas
in Freetown, including government buildings, in order to attract the interest of the
international community.4459
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
3704. Witness Joseph Marzah, (a.k.a. Zigzag), an SSS member,4460testified that he was at a
night club with Sam Bockarie when Bockarie received a phone call on his satellite phone
concerning an ammunitions shipment that had arrived. Marzah and Bockarie went to \Vhite
Flower, where they met with Benjamin Yeaten, Joseph Tuah and Peter Saikpedeh, who
confirmed the arrival of the ammunition.446] The witness did not specify the date of this
incident.
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -1 68
3705. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member,4462 was arrested by Sam Bockarie in March
1997.8463 The witness testified that while he was detained in Bunumbu, Bockarie came to
visit and told the detainees that Amara Essy had expressed concern about their fate.
Bockarie set up a satellite phone so that the External Delegates could speak to Essy over the
phone.4464
*456 rr1-616, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6911-6912, 6917.
*457 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6920-6924.
**5* TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6924.
4454 TF1—516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6977.
4460 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 6053-6055.
4414 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5860-5861, 5884-5886.
4464 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (CS).
44444 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23320-23322 (CS).
4444 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23362-23364 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23529-23532
(CS). Witness TF1-168 testified that Amara Essy was the foreign minister of Cote d’Ivoire. See TF1-168,
Transcript 21 January 2009 pp. 23256-23257(CS).

---- End of Page 1287 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ 0*4* 18 May 2012

Z? Y 3 0
The Accused
3706. The Accused acknowledged that he gave Sam Bockarie a satellite phone in October
1998.8465 The Accused denied, however, giving Bockarie more than one phone.84°6
3707. The Accused also acknowledged that he met with Bockarie in Liberia in September
1998, but denied that Vannuyan Sherif was present, or that he gave Bockarie a satellite
phone at this time.8467 The Accused testified that when Bockarie first came to Liberia, he
already had a satellite phone that the Accused believed Sankoh had given him.8464 It was on
Bockarie's second trip to Liberia to meet with him, in October 1998, that he gave Bockarie a
satellite phone, and only did so in order to facilitate the peace process, so that he and the
other members of the Committee of Five could contact Bockarie.4469
3708. The Accused denied that he spoke with Bockarie on a satellite phone on the night of
the Freetown Invasion. The Accused stated that in 1999, he was very busy dealing with
peace negotiations and so would not have had time to talk.847O The Accused also denied that
senior members of his regime were in contact with Bockarie via satellite phone during the
Freetown Invasion, because they would have no reason to be.447l
3709. The Accused testified that he gave Issa Sesay a satellite phone in 2000, after Sesay
. had been made acting commander of the RUF.4472 The Accused denied, however, providing
Foday Sankoh with a satellite phone, testifying that Sankoh received a satellite phone when
8445 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26663-26664; Transcript 16 September 2009 pp.
29006, 29203; Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29282-29283; Transcript 1 October 2009 p. 30143; Transcript
27 October 2009, p. 30449; Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32466; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33455-
33456; Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34294-34295.
8446 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29282-29283.
4467 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009 pp. 25807, 25812-25814; Transcript 29 October 2009,
pp. 30751-30753.
8468 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009 p. 26208.
4449 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29282-29283; Transcript 25 November 2009,
pp. 32464-66; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33452-33457.
8470 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29106-29108; Transcript 22 September 2009, p.
29401.
847} Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29395-29396.
8472 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26664; Transcript 22 September 2009, p. 29392;
Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31657; Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34293-34294; Transcript 28 January
2010, pp. 34306-34310. The Trial Chamber notes at one point in his testimony Taylor denied giving Sesay a
satellite phone, Charles Ghankay Taylor, 16 September 2009 p. 29006, but then recanted and said he had been
mistaken, and that he did give a phone to Sesay, Transcript 28 January 2010, pp. 34309-34310.

---- End of Page 1288 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Cllk 18 May 2012
x//V

he went to Abidjan.8473 Finally, the Accused denied speaking with Bockarie when the RUF
was under attack by Guinea, stating that he never spoke to Bockarie on his satellite
phone.8474
Defence Witness John Vincent
3710. Witness John Vincent, an RUF member, testified that he did not understand much
about the Lomé Peace Accords, but said that Dr Addai Sebo intervened to help bring about
peace in Sierra Leone, and at one point, Dr Sebo gave Foday Sankoh a satellite phone.8475
3711. The witness heard that Sam Bockarie first went to Monrovia in August or September
1998 and then returned on a second trip, when Taylor gave him a guesthouse and a satellite
phone.847°
Defence Witness Faga Musa
3712. Witness Fayia Musa, a member of the External Delegation and an agricultural officer
in the RUF,8477 testified that during the peace talks in Abidjan in 1996, Foday Sankoh
received a satellite phone as a gift from Omrie Golley, a Sierra Leoneon lawyer based in
London. Sankoh then sent the satellite phone with Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) to Sam
Bockaiie in Sierra Leone. As far as the witness was aware this was Bockarie's first satellite
phone.8478
3713. Musa, as a member of the External Delegation, was arrested by Sam Bockarie in
March 1997.8479 While the witness was detained in Bunumbu, some time between May
1997 and February 1998, Arnara Essy, the Foreign Minister from Cote d’Ivoire, sent
Bockarie a satellite phone. Essy explained to Bockarie that the international community
W3 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009. pp. 26663-26666; 16 September 2009, p. 29006;
Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30425-30426.
W4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30269-30271.
W5 John Vincent, Transcript 26 Mnn.11 2010 pp. 38142—38144.
W6 John Vincent, Transcript 26 Mnrnn 2010 pp is 142-38144.
8477 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38949; Transcript 19 April 2010, p. 39283.
3478 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39026-39027; Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39181; Transcript 20
April 2010, pp. 39441-39442. See also Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38965-38966 (where Musa
testifies that Omrie Golley was a Sierra Leoneon lawyer based in London).
8470 Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39117-39118.

---- End of Page 1289 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f 18 May 2012

27392
wanted him to ensure the prisoners’ security, and Bockarie put each of the prisoners on the
phone to speak with Essay.848O
Defence Witness 1ssa Sesay
3714. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,848l testified that Dr Sebo met with
Foday Sankoh in Zogoda in March or April of 1995. Dr Sebo brought with him a satellite
phone, and left the phone with Sankoh after the visit. This was the first time Sankoh had a
satellite phone.8482
3715. Sesay also testified that Bockarie first received a satellite phone in October 1998
during his second visit to Taylor in Liberia. Bockarie obtained his second satellite phone in
1999 from a Canadian businessman named Carlos. Bockarie's third satellite phone came
, from Michel and Louis, Belgian businessmen, brought by lbrahim Bah.8483
3716. Sesay received a satellite phone from Sankoh in January 2000, after Bockarie
resigned from the RUF. The Witness could only receive calls and not make them, because
the phone did not have any credit. Sankoh was the only person to call him on this phone.8484
3717. Sesay testified that he received a satellite phone from Taylor in October 2000, after
he escorted the RUF dele ation to the Abu`a eace talks. Sesa was in a meetin with five
8 J P Y S
heads of state, including Taylor, and told them that he was unable to make calls with his
satellite phone. President Obasanjo, of Nigeria, stated that if Sesay was willing to work with
them, they would provide him with a satellite phone.8485 Sesay returned to Monrovia in
October 2000. On that trip Sesay visited Taylor at White Flower and received the satellite
phone promised to him.8486
3480 Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39133. See Faya Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38953- 38954
(where Musa testifies that Amara Essy was the Foreign Minister of C6te d’1voire, involved in peace negotiations
in 1995).
**8* ipsa spsay, Transcript 26 Juiy 2010, pp. 44590-4459l, 44596.
8482 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43715-43717; Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, pp. 46472-
46473. Sesay referred to Dr Addai Sebo as "Dr Sebo", but owing to the witnesses’ description of this person the
Trial Chamber accepts that he is referring to Dr Sebo.
8483 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44038-44040.
M4 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 46054-46055; Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44485-44488;
Transcript 23 August 2010 p. 46909-46910. 2
8485 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44042-44043; Transcript 25 October 2010 p. 47172.
8486 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45094; Transcript 23 August 2010 p. 46909. The Trial Chamber notes
that Sesay first testified that his meeting with the five heads of state occurred in November 2000 and that he

---- End of Page 1290 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3718. Sesay testified that he never spoke with Taylor on either of his satellite phones.8487
When he started working with UNAMSIL, he used the phone Taylor gave him to call
"Genera1 Opande and the others" and discuss Abuja I1 meetings. He also used this phone for
personal phone calls to the RUF guesthouse in Monrovia, Gibril Massaquoi, or Ibrahim
Bah·84s8
Defence Witness Isatu Kallon
3719. Witness Isatu Kallon, a business woman who arranged supplies for the RUF,8489
testified that contrary to Periy Kamara's testimony, which indicates that Foday Sankoh
received a satellite phone from Dr Addai Sebo when he passed through RUF territory, she
took Dr Sebo into Sierra Leone but never saw him with a satellite phone.8490
Defence Exhibit D-205
3720. Defence Exhibit D-205 is a commercial invoice for a satellite phone. The document
lists the "consignee" as "Chairman Foday Sankoh" and his address as care of Paulo Bangura
at the Cape Sierra Hotel in Freetown. The date reads "10/7/l999", and there is no sender
listed.849l When shown this document, Taylor stated several times that he did not provide
Sankoh with a satellite phone, and does not know the document's origin. 8492
Defence Exhibit D-467
3721. Defence Exhibit D-467 is a letter, on RUF letterhead, from Gibril Massaquoi,8493
RUF spokesman, to President Olusegun Obasanjo, of Nigeria, dated "4/10/2000".
Massaquoi reminds President Obasanjo, "as per our last discussion in Monrovia", to send
received the satellite phone promised to him after this meeting. Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44042-
44043. He later testified that he received the satellite phone from Taylor while traveling to sell diamonds in
Liberia in October 2000. Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44575-44576; Transcript 25 August 2010 p.
47170; Transcript 26 August 2010 p. 47222-47223;
8**7 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44040-44044; Transcript 26 July 2010 p. 44605.
8488 Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010 p. 47170-47172; Transcript 26 August 2010 p. 47224.
me Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42687-42688, 42708; 17 June 2010, pp. 42733-42735, 42759-
42760, 42807.
8490 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, pp. 43095-43097. Kallon referred to Dr Addai Sebo as "Dr Simbo",
but owing to the witnesses’ description of this person the Trial Chamber accepts that she is referring to Dr Sebo.
8491 Defence Exhibit D-205 "Invoice for Purchase of Satellite Phone for Chairman Foday Sankoh, July 10 1999 -
DCT-168".
8492 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26661-26663.
8493 In Defence Exhibit D-467 his name is spelled Gibril Massakhoi.

---- End of Page 1291 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J GK 18 May 2012

him and Issa Sesay each a satellite phone to facilitate daily communication with the
President and other ECOWAS leaders. Massaquoi asks that the phones be sent to him and
Sesay through Taylor, stating that there were many issues they want to communicate to the
President directly but could not do so because they had no satellite phones.4494
Deliberations
3722. It is undisputed that the Accused gave Sam Bockarie a satellite phone in October
1998.4494 The Defence submits that this phone was for the purpose of facilitating
negotiations during the peace process. The Prosecution proffered several witnesses who
testified that Bockarie used a satellite phone to communicate with the Accused, Benjamin
Yeaten, the international press and others with regard to RUF/AFRC actions.
3723. Witness TF1-371 testified that at an RUF officers’ meeting in late 1998 or early
1999, he witnessed Bockarie speaking on a satellite phone, telling those present afterwards
that he had been speaking to the Accused, and relaying instructions from the Accused for the
Freetown Invasion.4494 Mohamed Kabbah testified that during the Freetown Invasion he
witnessed Bockarie call Taylor on a satellite phone and tell him that the RUF had advanced
to Freetown.4497 Witness TF1-516 testified that he heard Bockarie use his satellite phone to
call the Executive Mansion, at 020, during the Freetown Invasion.4494 Abu Keita similarly
testified that during the Freetown Invasion he witnessed Bockarie use his satellite phone to
4494 Defence Exhibit D—467 (Letter from Gibril Massakhoi, RUF Spokesman to His Excellency President
Olusegun Obasanjo, Federal Republic ofNigeria. October 4 2000 - (00026024 - 00026025)) CMS 30219-30220.
8*45 See Defence Closing Brief, paras 97, 574, 934, 1001, 1005, 1520. Several Prosecution and Defence
witnesses testified that Taylor provided Bockarie with a satellite phone. Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2
December 2008, pp. 21479, 21510-21512; 10 December 2008 p. 22048; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008
pp. 13382-13383, 13422-13423; Witness TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2431-2432 (CS); Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009 pp. 26663-26664; Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29006, 29203;
Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29282-29283; Transcript 1 October 2009, p. 30143; Transcript 27 October
2009, p. 30449; Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32466; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33455-33456;
Transcript 27 January 2010 pp. 34294-34295; John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38142-38144; Issa
Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 4403 8-44040. Though Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sheri? s testimony that
Bockarie received a satellite phone upon his first meeting with Taylor is contradicted by the several witnesses
who testified to this occurring on Bockarie's second visit to Liberia, Sheri? s testimony that Bockarie received a
phone from Taylor is corroborative. Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 849-850; Transcript 11
January 2008, p. 1045.
4494 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2412-2414 (CS).
8447 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16178.
4494 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008 pp. 6861, 6934-6935; Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6977-6978. Although the
Trial Chamber was not able to find that through this satellite phone conversation the Accused directed or advised
Bockarie that the troops in Freetown should destroy property in Freetown during the retreat from Freetown, the
evidence did establish that this satellite phone call was made. See Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion,
Allegation that the Accused Directed the Freetown Invasion.

---- End of Page 1292 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 2% `ng 18 Mgy 2012

inform the BBC that his men were at the State House, and to give Benjamin Yeaten and
Joseph Tuah an update on the operation.8455 The Trial Chamber recalls that it had no general
reservations concerning the testimonies of TF1-371, Mohamed Kabbah, TF1-516 or Abu
Keita.85OO
3724. Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that after the invasion of Freetown, he witnessed
Bockarie call Yeaten on his satellite phone to inform him that the RUF had released
prisoners from the Pademba Road Prison, and to ask for more ammunition. Yeaten later
called Bockarie back on the satellite phone and instructed him to bring the prisoners to
Buedu, on the orders of Taylor.55Ol Witness TF1-585 testified that on 9 January 1999, he
saw Bockarie use his satellite phone to inform both the BBC and Yeaten that his men would
be in Freetown within three days’ time.55O2 And finally, Karmoh Karmeh testified that he
attended a meeting in December 1999 at which Bockarie used his satellite phone to inform
Taylor of his plan to capture Freetown.5505 The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that
Fornie, TF1-585 and Karmoh Karmeh are all generally credible witnesses.85O4
3725. While maintaining that the Accused gave the phone to Bockarie in order to facilitate
peace negotiations, the Defence has not provided any evidence, besides the Accused's
assertions, that he used a satellite phone for this purpose. ln light of the overwhelming
evidence that Bockarie used satellite phone communications to speak with the Accused and
others in furtherance of RUF/AFRC military activities, the Defence submission is not
convincing in the view of the Trial Chamber.
3726. The Defence contends that the evidence shows that the RUF received satellite
phones from sources other than the Accused.55O5 Prosecution Witnesses Dauda Aruna
Fornie, Jabaty Jaward and TF1-168 and Defence Witnesses Fayia Musa and Issa Sesay
testified to the fact that Bockarie had more than one phone during the conflict in Sierra
5495 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022.
8500 Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338;
Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras 275-284; Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219.
55m Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581-21588; 10 December 2008, pp. 22109-22112.
5502 Witness TP1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15717-15724.
5505 Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9433-9437; Transcript 13 May 2008 p. 9728.
5504 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346-358; Credibility Assessment, TF1-585, paras 330-
333. Credibility Assessment, Karmoh Kanneh, The Role of Intermediaries, para. 2704.
5505 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 998.

---- End of Page 1293 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
L.

Leone.85O6 ln addition, Prosecution Witnesses TF1-585, Perry Kamara, TF1-516 and Abu
Keita and Defence Witness Fayia Musa testified to having seen Bockarie with a satellite
phone before he received one from the Accused in October 1998.8507 The evidence clearly
establishes that Bockarie had at least two satellite phones, and the Trial Chamber is unable
to ascertain from the evidence whether any of the calls made by Bockarie to the Accused
and others in relation to RUF/AFRC activities were made on the satellite phone that the
Accused gave Bockarie. Given the fact that Bockarie had two satellite phones, one of which
was given to him by the Accused, the Trial Chamber considers that the provision of this
satellite phone to Bockarie enhanced his communications infrastructure. The Trial Chamber
further notes the evidence that the satellite phone calls were paid for by Yeaten, who sent
"top up cards" to Bockarie, indicating ongoing support for satellite phone communications.
ln contrast, Issa Sesay testified that he was unable to make calls on the satellite phone he got
from Sankoh because the phone did not have any credit.
3727. The Prosecution's allegation that the Accused provided a satellite phone to Issa
Sesay in 2000 is also undisputed.85O8 Prosecution Witness Perry Kamara testified that Sesay
would send messages concerning his satellite phone conversations to all RUF commanders,
but he did not testify as to the content of these messages.8509 Prosecution Witness Demris
Koker testified that he saw Sesay in Koidu, reporting on a satellite phone to his "Master",
whom Koker believed to be Bockarie, that "Kono is under our control".85lO The Defence
submitted a contemporaneous memorandum that indicates the satellite phone was given to
Sesay with full knowledge of ECOWAS leaders, thereby implying it was used in the peace
85% Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21511-21512; Transcript 10 December 2008, p.
22048; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13382-13383, 13422-13423; TFl-516, Transcript 8 April
2008, pp. 6911-6912, 6917; TFl-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23362-23364 (CS); Transcript 26 January
2009, pp. 23529-23532 (CS); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26208; Fayia Musa,
Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39026 — 39027; Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, pp. 46917-46919.
8507 TFl-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15861-15862; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp.
3159-3164; TFl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008 pp. 6911-6912, 6917, 6920-6924; Transcript 9 April 2008, p.
6977; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1967-1969, 1974, 2018-2019; Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April
2010, pp. 39117-39118.
8508 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2019, 2031-2032; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44040-
44044; Charles Ghar1kay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009 p. 26664; Transcript 22 September 2009, p. 29392;
Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31657; Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34293-34294; Transcript 28 January
2010 pp. 34306-34310. Curiously, Sesay testified at one point that in May 2000, he had a satellite phone given to
him by Sankoh, and stated the phone was not from Liberia. Issa Sesay, Transcript ll August 2010, p,46054-
46055. Fayia Musa testified that "Mr Golley"gave Sankoh a satellite phone in 1996 as an incentive to join the
peace process at that time. Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39027, Transcript 20 April 2010, p. 39438.
8509 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3083.
mo Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1239-1240.

---- End of Page 1294 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

process.8511 Sesay also testified that he had more than one phone during the conflict in Sierra
Leone.8512 The Trial Chamber is unable to ascertain from the evidence whether the call
referred to by Kamara was made in furtherance of AFRC/RUF activities, or whether either
this call or the call referred to by Koker was made on the satellite phone provided to Sesay
by the Accused. Nevertheless, noting in particular his testimony that he was unable to use
the other phone he had received from Sankoh because it had no credits, the Trial Chamber
considers that the provision of this satellite phone to Sesay facilitated his communications
capability.
3728. Finally, concerning the allegation that the Accused provided Sankoh with a satellite
phone, which is contested by the Defence, the Trial Chamber notes that in its Final Trial
Brief the Prosecution alleges that Sankoh received a satellite phone both from Dr Addai
Sebo, and from the Accused.8513 Several witnesses confirmed that Sankoh received a phone
from Dr Sebo before 1996.3514 Witness TF1-371 testified that Sankoh was given a phone by
an American ambassador in Lomégm and Witness Fayia Musa testified Sankoh received a
phone from Omrie Golley.85l6 The Prosecution has failed, however, to present evidence that
Taylor was in any way connected to the provision of a satellite phone to Sankoh by these
individuals.8517 The Prosecution cites an undated commercial invoice for a satellite phone
sent to Sankoh.85l8 Upon examination of this invoice, however, the Trial Chamber notes that
there is no mention of Taylor, or any of his associates, in the document.85 19 Thus, the Trial
Sm Exhibit D—467 (Letter from RUF Spokesman to President of Nigeria). y
8512 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010 pp. 44485—44488; Transcript 26 July 2010 pp. 44575-44576; Transcript
11 August 2010 pp. 46054-46055.
8513 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 324.
8514 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16285, 16353-16355; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4
February 2008, pp. 3053-3054, 3057-3058; John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp 38142-38144; Issa
Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43715-43717; Witness TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008 pp. 2788-2790
(CS). The Trial Chamber finds that lsatu Kallon's testimony that she did not see Dr Sebo with a satellite phone
when traveling with him to Sierra Leone not dispositive of whether or not he gave Sankoh a phone. See lsatu
Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, pp. 43095-43097. Notably, TFl-516 testified that Sankoh "purchased" a
satellite phone in late 1996. TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6842-6843.
8515 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008 pp. 2788-2790 (CS).
gm Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39026-39027; Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39181; Transcript 20
April 2010, pp. 39441-39442.
8517 The Prosecution presented evidence that Dr Sebo was a former publicist or a colleague of Taylor's, See
Fayia Musa, 20 April 2010, pp. 39405-39414; Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39505-03506; lsatu Kallon,
Transcript 24 June 2010, pp. 43370- 43371, but no evidence that Taylor was in any way involved in Dr Sebo
giving the satellite phone to Sankoh.
8518 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 324, citing Exhibit D-205 (Commercial invoice for satellite phone
delivered to Foday Sankoh).
8519 Taylor denied having any knowledge of this invoice. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009,

---- End of Page 1295 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-0l—T @ 18 May 2012

g 7 Zi'?
Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Accused provided a satellite phone to Sankoh.8520
Findings
3729. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused and Sam Bockarie communicated by satellite phone in furtherance of the
Freetown lnvasion and other RUF/AFRC military activities, during which crimes were
committed.
3730. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the satellite phones the Accused provided to Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, and the "top
up cards", which the Trial Chamber finds were provided to Bockarie by Benjamin Yeaten
for phone credit, enhanced the communications capability of both Bockarie and Sesay,
which they used in furtherance of RUF and RUF/AFRC military activities.
3731. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused provided Foday Sankoh with a satellite phone.
(c) RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications
Submission of the Parties
3732. The Prosecution contends that RUF and NPFL radio operators monitored and utilised
each others’ communication networks and that they shared radio communication codes.85 21
3733. The Defence denies that the RUF and NPFL shared radio communication codes, and
alleges that the RUF and NPFL could not have communicated because they did not have
access to each others’ codes.8522
3734. The Prosecution further alleges that during the lntervention in February 1998, the
RUF received a message from Base 1, Benjamin Yeaten's radio station, asking why the
pp. 26663-26666.
8520 The Trial Chamber further notes that TFl-371 testified that Sankoh had more than one satellite phone during
the conflict in Sierra Leone. TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008 p. 2282-2284 (CS).
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 94-99, 308, 312, 314.
8522 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1281, 1497-1498, 1508-1509, 1518, 1531.

---- End of Page 1296 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QW 18 May 2012

3 7 3 K 7
RUF was pulling out of Kono.8523 The Defence challenges this allegation by claiming that
Base 1 had not been established at that time.8524
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
3735. Witness Foday Lansana, (a.k.a. Co Nya) an RUF radio operator,8525 testified that
during the early stages of the invasion of Sierra Leone, he and two other NPFL radio
operators installed the first RUF radio station operated under Sankoh in Sierra Leone.8526 He
spent from 1992 to 1996 in Sierra Leone, training RUF radio operators by teaching them
"code", which would allow their communications to remain confidential to anyone that
might be listening on the RUF network. He also taught them "nicknames", grid references
for towns and villages, frequency codes that were used in order to communicate from one
station to another and use of frequency to communicate both to RUF stations and
nationally.8527
3736. Radio operators would use codes in order to make communications secret. For
example, the code name for Freetown might be Foxtrot Tango, or "FT" for short, or
Sankoh's code would be "Smile". Grid references were code names for strategic locations,
such as town, or equipment, like weapons.g528
3737. The RUF network consisted of the national frequency and private frequencies. The
national frequency was one that every station was required to monitor in order to intercept
messages sent to the entire network. Private frequencies were used when individuals wanted
to talk: their radio operators would agree beforehand to connect on a specific frequency at a
specific time, and at the appointed time the operators would change from the national
frequency to that specific frequency so that the individuals could talk. These
8523 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 151.
8524 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1497.
*525 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
8526 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361, 4364-4367, 4371.
8527 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4386, 4389-4390, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4431.
8528 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4442-4443.

---- End of Page 1297 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T @ 18 May 2012

Z *7 3 70
communications would not be encoded.3329 In general, the RUF radio operators
communicated in English.3530
3738. In addition, any station outside of Sierra Leone that wanted to communicate with the
i RUF would call the national frequency first, and would then connect to a specific station.333 I
Lansana knew that, for example, Yeaten and Sam Bockarie were communicating because he
would hear them on the national frequency using the RUF code.3532
3739. Lansana testified that the codes were originally brought to the RUF from the NPFL,
but as time went on the RUF manipulated and changed them.3333 The code names would
change depending on the situation or the area of operation, and the radio operators’ code
book would determine what code they would use at a particular time.3334 When the codes
changed, a copy of the new codes would be sent to every substation.8333
3740. Only radio operators had access to these codes, including RUF operators Osman
Tolo and Memunatu Deen, who were at the guesthousein Monrovia, and many others who
were assigned with Benjamin Yeaten in Vahun and Foya.3536 Deen and Tolo would also
receive the new codes if they changed.8337
3741. "Back up" or "emergency" codes were those that were used by substations for a
_ short period in emergency situations, when an operator wanted to ensure the security of the
communication. This code was not accessible to any other stations that might be monitoring
communications.8338
3742. Lansana testified that only the station which was with Sankoh or, when Sankoh was
not there, with Sam Bockarie, had "every access" to communicate outside Sierra Leone.3339
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
3329 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 F cbruary 2008, pp. 4438-4440.
3330 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4437.
333] Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 F cbruary 2008, pp. 4440-4441.
*532 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4483.
3333 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 F cbruary 2008, pp. 4443-4445, 4475.
3334 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4443-4445.
8535 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4483.
3336 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4475- 4476.
*537 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4483.

---- End of Page 1298 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3743. Witness Alice Pyne, who was a radio operator at PC Ground for around Eve months
from around March 19984544, testihed that during that time, she used to hear Liberian radio
stations coming on the RUF national frequency calling Buedu station. The witness never
spoke to the radio operators in Liberia herself because she did not have permission to speak
to them; they only had dealings with Buedu. Only the Buedu station, being the overall
headquarters station, had permission to speak to the Liberian stations.4544
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
3744. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie was trained as an RUF radio operator at the NPFL
Signal Unit in Bomi Hills in 1991 to 1992.4542 At this time, the RUF members who were
around the 144 Battalion area did not have a communications °‘net" (network) of its own, but
used the NPFL net. All of` the radio stations operated on the same frequency.4544
3745. When he returned to Sierra Leone in approximately December 1992, Fornie
remained in Pendembu, where Foday Sankoh told him and the other operators that he
wanted them to establish a communications network independent from that of the NPFL.4544
They did this by creating an RUF code separate from the Liberian code they were using, and
establishing their RUF national network.4545 The RUF and NPFL could still communicate,
however, just by coming onto each other's networks and making an inquiry.4546
3746. The RUF code was prepared by Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO Nya) and sent to Gbarnga
and other radio stations in late 1992, when the RUF Hrst set up their communications
s stem.4547 Lansana also sent the RUF code to desi ated radio stations in Liberia, and the
Y gn
4544 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4479-4480.
4544 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4436.
*5*0 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12160.
4541 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12169-12171.
85*2 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21335-21338.
*5*3 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21350-21354.
4544 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21372.
4545 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21374.
4546 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21374-21375.
4544 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008 pp. 21416-21417.

---- End of Page 1299 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

27Z?2
RUF received Liberian codes as well.8548 The RUF codes were changed every two to three
months, and were delivered to each radio station by hand.8549
3747. A radio net was a group of radio stations that worked together on the same set of
frequencies, and for the RUF and NPFL this was called the national network.855O When one
person wanted to talk to another they would have their operator send a message on the
national network to the other person's operator, stating that they wanted to meet on a private
frequency. Because they knew that their enemies were monitoring the network, they had
code names for the private frequencies. By the time the enemy found the private frequency
they were using, they would be finished with their conversation. These private frequency
code names would also change.855l
3748. Commanders would also send coded messages to each other. lf one person wanted to
send a message pertaining to, for example, the reinforcement of troops, their operator would
be given a message, which the operator would write down, encode, and transmit to the
receiving station. The receiving station would then decode the message and give it to the
recipient.8552
3749. Following the ECOMOG Intervention, and as the RUF retreated from Kenema,
Fomie was personally communicating with Sunlight, the radio operator at Base 1, which
was Ben`amin Yeaten's radio station.8553 Fomie also testified that he visited Monrovia with
J
Sam Bockarie within a week of reaching Buedu, during which trip he stayed at Yeaten's
house and visited Base 1 where he met Yeaten's radio operator, Sunlight and used the
equipment at Base 1 to communicate with the front lines. He testified that Base 1 was
located "in one of the rooms at Benjamin Yeaten's back yard".8554 Fomie also testified that
there were restrictions on which operators had authority to call Base 1 directly. The witness
testified that he, Alfred Brown, the late Sellay and "every operator that was assigned to
Mosquito's radio station" had that authority.8555
8548 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21350, 21378-21379.
8549 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008 pp. 21416-21417, 21517-21518.
8550 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008 pp. 21344 -21346.
8551 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21344-21346.
8552 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21341—21344.
8553 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21436-21441, 21443.
8554 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21445; 21449-21452.
8555 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21493.

---- End of Page 1300 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z W 18 May 2012

Zqsii
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
3750. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,8556 was trained by Foday Sankoh and
Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO Nya) in Liberian and Sierra Leonean code in 1991 and 1992.8557
Lansana told the trainees that he had been sent by Taylor to be with Foday Sankoh.8558
3751. RUF radio operators worked on one net with a general frequency number, called the
"national frequency", and all operators would monitor this frequency. If one RUF member
wanted to speak to another, their radio operator would call on the national frequency and tell
the second member's operator to meet him on a particular private frequency where the two
members could talk.8559 When these private conversations occurred, however, it was
ossible for other o erators to switch onto that fre uenc and listen to the discussion; it was
P P (1 Y
difficult to have a private conversation without it being monitored by other radio
1 operators.856O Each radio station had code names, but they changed their code names and the i`
codes approximately every one or two months.856l
3752. RUF members could also send coded messages through the radio. The commander
would give his operator a message in English, the operator would encode it, and send it to
the second operator, who would decode it.8562 A record of the commanders’ messages was
recorded by the transmitting and receiving stations in log books which were kept forever.8563
3753. Kamara testified that the RUF communications system was not only located in Sierra
Leone, and the operators also communicated with Liberia and with Cote d’1voire.8564 The
operators in Liberia knew the national frequency number as well.8565 From approximately
1991 or 1992 up until disarmament, there was a direct link from the RUF's control station,
which was the main operator station, and Taylor's radio station that was effective "every
day".8566 Sometimes Foday Sankoh would talk to Taylor directly on the radio, in English
8556 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
8557 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3028, 3033, 3037-3038.
3558 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3037-3038.
8559 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3062-3063.
8560 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3141-3142
8561 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3071; Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3319.
8562 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3068-3069; Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3310-3311.
8563 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3067-3069
8564 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3071, 3073-3074.
8565 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3076.
8566 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3074-3076.

---- End of Page 1301 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / M_ 18 May 2012

3 W3? Ll-
with some coded language and on occasions in code.8567 Other times, Sankoh would write an
36666666 message and his operator would transmit it to Taylor's operator.8568 The witness
also stated that up until 1994, the RUF and the NPFL would communicate frequently,
because both groups knew each others’ codes.8569
Prosecution Witness TFl-516 V
3754. Witness TF1-516 testified that he was a radio operator for the RUF working on Sam
Bockarie's radio857O in Sierra Leone until mid-1999, when he was sent to Liberia to work as
an operator for Benjamin Yeaten.857l At the time the witness was trained to be an operator in
1994, there had already been communication between the RUF and the NPFL because there
were operators who knew and used the Liberian Code.8572 Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO Nya)
had brought the Liberian code to Sierra Leone from Liberia before the witness was trained in
1994, and this code did not change until 1998.8573
3755. The witness testified that RUF radio communications were controlled by the senior
commander of radio operations, who was based at the "control station".8574 All other stations
were called "substations".8575. At 7.30am, all stations were required to be on the air. The
control station would make what was called a "net call" on the national network, and all
substations would respond giving a "sit-rep" that was "repo1ting on the situation".8576
3756. The control and substations would establish contact with each other by making a call
on the national frequency and agreeing to meet at a pre-designated frequency, which was
assigned a code name.8577 The frequencies were not completely secure, however, so even if
two operators were on a private frequency they would use code.8578
W Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3306-3309.
8568 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3074.
8569 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3049; Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3304-3308.
8570 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6857.
8571 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858 -6859, 6862, 6889-6890, 6909-6910.
8572 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6983-6984.
8573 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6984-6986. See also TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008 pp. 7456-
7457 (stating Witness TF1-516 tramed to be an operator in 1994).
8574 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6892-6894, 6909.
8575 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6892-6894, 6909.
**576 rri-516, rrarrsprrpr 8 April 2008, p. 6904.
8577 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6891-6894, 6909.
*578 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6908, 6927-6929.

---- End of Page 1302 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3*-r;<.as‘
3757. When a commander wanted to transmit a message to a person at another radio
station, they would hand a message to the operator, who would encode the message and then
transmit it. Then the recipient operator would decode the message and give it to the
recipient.8579 Military terminology — such as attack, ambush, weapons — and persons’ names
also had codes.8580
3758. VVhenever there was a change in the code, the station commanders would report to
the control station in person as the code was "very much secretive", and would be given the
new code. They would then take the new code to their respective stations.858l The code
would change when there was a fear that it was no longer confidential, for example, when
there was an attack and an operator was forced to move without his materials, or if an
operator was captured or killed on the frontlines. 8888
3759. TF1-516 testified that the operators at Base 1, the radio station at Benjamin Yeaten's
residence in Monrovia, 020, the radio station at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia, and
Foxtrot Yankee, in Foya, knew RUF frequencies and possessed RUF codes.8583 These RUF
codes were carried from Sierra Leone to Liberia during Operation Mosquito Spray in June or
Jury of1999.8584
3760. The witness also stated that when he crossed into Liberia he was given a special
code, which was distributed to Sunlight, Sky 1 and the radio operator who was in Foya, and
this was the code that they all used to communicate. He testified that he himself gave the
code to Sunhght.8585 Only the stations named Marvel and Planet 1 had the authority from
either Sam Bockarie or Issa Sesay, to communicate with Base 1, 20 and Foxtrot Yankee in
Liberia,8586 and only operators such as Dauda Aruna Fomie, Ebony Prince, Osman Tolo,
Zedman, Perry Kamara and other senior radio operators knew the common code between the
8888 rrr -516, Transcript 8 April 2008 p. 6908.
$580 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008 pp. 6901-6903, 6925-6926. 2
888‘ TF1-516, Transcript 8 Appr 2008 pp. 6895-6896.
8888 rrr-516, Transcript 8 Appr 2008 pp. 6895-6896.
8583 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008 pp. 6889-6890, 6909-6912; 9 April 2008 pp. 6982-6983.
8888 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008 p. 6987. The Trial Chamber notes that Witness TF1-516 also calls this
incident "Operation Vulture", but owing to the context understands him to be talking about Operation Mosquito
Spray. See TF1 -516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7047-7049.
8585 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6891, 6912, 6918; Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6986-6987.
8888 TF1 -516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6910-691 1.

---- End of Page 1303 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

Zasav
RUF and the NPFL. There was also a NPFL radio operator sent to work with Bockarie,
named Sallay Duwor, who knew NPFL code.8587
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
3761. Witness Mohamed Kabbah was an RUF radio operator trained in 1992 by a Liberian
CO Moses and by CO Nya.8588 He testified that the RUF used a general frequency called a
"nationa1" frequency.8589 All radio operators would monitor the national network, listening
to all the calls.8590 When one station wanted to communicate with another, they would go on {
the national frequency and call them, and then switch to a different frequency to talk.859l The
frequencies, however, were not guaranteed to be private, because they were not owned by
one person, and anyone world-wide could monitor them; this is why they spoke in code.8592
3762. While Kabbah was the overall signal unit commander in Buedu, from the time he left
Kailahun Town until approximately December 1999, he testified that he used to
communicate with the various RUF front lines, with Base 1 and with radio operator
Sunlight.8593 He identified Sunlight as the operator at "Charles Taylor's Mansion
Ground"8594 and Base 1 as the station "where Tolo and others were... at Pa Musa's

3763. The two stations in Monrovia, Sunlight's station and Memunatu Deen's station at Pa
Musa's house were "restricted frequencies", which meant that only certain stations were
allowed to contact them. Kabbah explained that a "restricted station" was one that was
"forbidden to somebody" and that only the headquarters station or a station belonging to the
"high command" should communicate with them. The only stations that were allowed to
speak to Monrovia were Sam Bockarie's, Issa Sesay's and Foday Sankoh's stations (when
Sankoh was in Sierra Leone).8596
*587 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6912-6914, 6918-6919; Transcript 9 April 2008 pp. 6982-6983.
8588 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16248.
8589 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16251.
8590 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16251-16252.
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16251.
Sm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16252-16253.
*593 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16127.
8594 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16127.
8595 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16131-16132.
85% Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16254-16256.

---- End of Page 1304 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /% , , 18 May 2012

Bazaa-
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -585
3764. Witness TF1-585 was an RUF radio operator from 1995 until approximately
1999.85 91 The witness testified that in late 1997 through all of 1998 there were many radio
operators under the command of Sam Bockaiie.8598 During this time, there were
communications between where the witness was posted and Base 1, in Monrovia. lt was
only CO Sellay, however, who was authorised to have conversations with Base 1 over the
radio. The operators would insist on speaking with either Bockarie or Sellay before they
divulged any information.8599
3765. TF1-585 testified during the time Bockarie was based in Kenema, the calls between
Sellay and Liberia were restricted from "the other RUF fighters" and that only Sam
Bockarie, Issa Sesay and Jungle had access to them.86O0 She also testified to there being a
secret frequency between Sam Bockarie's operators and Base 1 operators.8°0l
3766. The witness testified that all RUF stations used the same code and when a new code
was created it was sent by hand with an operator who collected it in Buedu for each radio
substation.8°02 The codes were "not changed frequently", however, for example from early
1998 to December 1999, the witness believed they were changed once or twice/3603
Memunatu Deen, a radio operator stationed in Liberia, received these codes when they were
changed.8604
The Accused
3767. The Accused denied that the NPFL shared radio frequencies with the RUF, and
stated that the two could not enter onto each other's frequencies. He said there were many
frequencies that the RUF had but that they, the NPFL, did not know or could not get into
their frequencies. He conceded, however, that there was a dedicated line meaning a
8597 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15586-15587 (PS); Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15822-
15824 (PS).
8598 TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15821-15822 (PS).
8599 TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15827-15828.
8600 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15605-15606; Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15636-15637;
Transcript 9 September 2008, p. 15827.
W TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15651.
$602 TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008 pp. 15876-15877.
M3 TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008 pp. 15876-15877.
8604 TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008 pp. 15877-15878.

---- End of Page 1305 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / jim 18 May 2012

3’·T;frequency set up for exchange of security information between the NPFL and the RUF, but
only from approximately August 1991 to the end of May 1992.0000
3768. The Accused confirmed that Base 1 was the radio station at Yeaten's compound.0000
Defence Witness DCT-008
3769. Witness DCT-008 testified that he was trained as an NPFL radio operator in
1994,0007 and remained a radio operator with the NPFL until 2003.0000
3770. The Government of Liberia had a general frequency, on which every radio operator
worked. If a Liberian operator wanted to connect to another operator they would connect on
the general frequency and then switch to another frequency to communicate.0000 The witness
stated that it was possible for operators outside of Liberia to monitor the frequency on which
the Government of Liberia operated.00l0
3771. DCT-008 testified that Sunlight, the primary operator at Base 1, the radio station
located at Benjamin Yeaten's home, would receive coded messages on Base 1, decode them
for Yeaten and record them in a log book.00H These codes were created by and for the
Government of Liberia and distributed to all radio operators, but were not distributed to
anyone outside of the government.00l0
3772. DCT-008 testified to an incident in September 1998, in which Sampson Wehyee
(a.k.a. Sampson), a bodyguard for Benjamin Yeaten, arrived at Base 1 and introduced
Sunlight to Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).00l0 Wehyee told Sunlight that Yeaten had ordered
him to allow Tamba to use Base 1 to contact the RUF.00l0 Tamba had a piece of paper with
the RUF frequency, RUF 35B, which was the same frequency the NPFL used in 1991 and
1992 to contact the RUF. Sunlight entered onto the RUF frequency, operator Sellay
0000 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28566-28567.
0000 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29204.
0007 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46996-46999, 31 August 2010, p, 47556 (PS).
0000 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p, 46949 (PS).
*°°‘° Der-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47039.
B°‘° nor-008, rtsussupt 24 August 2010, p. 47039.
00H DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47030-47031, 47034-47035.
0012 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47034—47035.
0013 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47034-47037, 47042·47043 0
0010 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47034·47037.

---- End of Page 1306 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / \j 18 May 2012

3T3? 5
answered the call, and spoke to Tamba.88l8 The witness believed that Sampson and Tamba
had previously communicated with the RUF in Buedu from the Executive Mansion through
a Liberian operator Mission 5.8818 1
3773. DCT-008 testified that Sunlight met TF1-516 for the first time on Bockarie's second
trip to Monrovia in 1998.8817 The day after Sunlight met TF1-516, Tamba brought him to
Base 1 to send a coded message to Sellay in Buedu. Sunlight did not understand the message
because the operators at Base 1 did not have access to RUF code.88l8 DCT-008 denied that
Sunli t received a co of the RUF code from TF1-516 or that TF1-516 worked for
PY
Benjamin Yeaten, and stated that he would have known if either of these things had
occurred.88l8 The witness also stated that in neither 1997 nor February 1998, was there a
radio call sign named Base 1. It was not established at Benjamin Yeaten's house until after
the Camp Johnson Road incident in mid-September 1998 when Sunlight became the radio
o erator there.8828 When Sunli t did commence communications with the RUF, he was
P
instructed that communications should only be made with Sam Bockarie in Buedu.882l
3774. In November or December 1998, Sampson and Tamba brought Memunatu Deen to
Base 1 so that she could use the radio to communicate with the RUF and General Ibrahim.
8622 DCT-008 testified that the messages that Deen sent could not be understood because
they were in code.8828 After one month, around December 1998 or January 1999, she gave
the code to Sunlight so that he could take down messages while she was away.8828 Deen did
not have access to Liberian code during the time she was using Base 1, and she did not use
8818 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47043; Transcript 27 August 2010 p. 47375-47376. Perry Kamara
also testified to RUF and NPFL operators using the "35B" frequency for calls between the two groups. For
example, Kamara stated, Sierra Leonean operators would say "35B to Butterfly" in order to call Taylor's
operator, Butterfly, in Liberia; if Butterfly called "35B", the Sierra Leonean operators would know the Liberian
stations were calling the RUF. Perry Kamara 5 February 2008, pp. 3074-3075.
8818 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47046—47067.
8817 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47371- 47373.
W ner-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47385-47386.
8818 DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, pp. 47555 (PS), 47610, 47621, 47652.
8828 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47026-47030; Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47565; Transcript 31
August 2008, pp. 47600-4760l; Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47754; Transcript 2 September 2010, pp.
47809-47810.
M DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p. 47601.
8622 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47400; Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47405-47408, 47403-
47404.
M DCT-002, Trausrrrrpt-30 August 2010, p. 47405.
W ner-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47406.

---- End of Page 1307 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / nw; 18 May 2012 Q
t
1 /

any other Liberian radios to communicate with the RUF.6626 These communications from
Deen at Base 1 to the RUF were not interce ted b others, because the communications
P Y
were made in RUF code.6626 These were special codes created especially for
communications between Base 1 and Buedu, not generic RUF codes, and they did not
chan e.6627 Base 1 never had access to the eneral RUF code.6626
E E
3775. Finall , DCT-008 denied that Fomie had access to the Liberian radio codes, statin
Y S
that Fomie could call on the eneral Liberian fre uenc , which is how he contacted Base
E Q Y
I 8629
Defence Witness Joseph Dehmie
3776. Witness Jose h Dehmie, an NPFL radio o erator,6666 testified that he was trained as
P P
an NPFL radio operator in 1990.6661 When he was assigned to Bomi Hills, Dehmie had the
code name Bearcat.6662 Dehmie leamed that the "net" was the communications s stem on
Y
which the NPFL operated, and a frequency was an assigned channel on the net.6666 There
was a broad frequency that every operator used, and if one operator wanted to talk to another
operator they could meet each other on another frequency. These private frequencies were
o en, however, so other o erators could hear this conversation if the were on the same
P P Y
frequency.6664 The NPFL operators could therefore either speak in dialect or use code to
keep their communications private,6666 and frequencies also had code names, which were
distributed and then destro ed to reserve their confidentialit .666 6
Y P Y
3777. From approximately 1990 to 1994, the code that the NPFL used was not
sophisticated; the operators would speak dialect to each other in order to keep messages
6625 DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 4741 1-47412; Transcript 1 September 2010, . 47673.
P
6626 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47485.
6667 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47487; Transcript 28 August 2010, p. 47546.
6666 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47487.
W DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p. 47571.
6666 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 21 May 2010, pp. 41467, 41494, 41523.
6661 Joseph Dehrnie, Transcript, 18 May 2010, pp. 41156-47157, 41160.
6666 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript, 18 May 2010, p.41182; Transcript 19 May 2010, p. 41182.
6666 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript, 18 May 2010, pp. 41156-47157.
8634 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41175-41 178, 41244; 21 Ma 2010, pp. 41476-41478.
Y
6665 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41 179, 41244-41245.
6666 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 21 May 2010, pp. 41477-41480.

---- End of Page 1308 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
y ‘"

Ba wt
confidential.6644 In 1994 the NPFL developed a more complicated code system, which was
distributed to all NPFL radio operators by the NPFL Chief of Signal.464 4
3778. ln this new code, every word in the communication would be encoded, with letters
being represented by numbers. 6644 A commander would bring a message that he wanted to
transmit to a radio operator, who would encode that message. The operators then spoke to
each other on coded frequencies, and the operator at the other end would receive the
encoded message and decode it.4646 The witness testified that before he was stationed in
Bomi radio operators would record all messages in a book, but they stopped when they were
fighting with enemy forces for security reasons.6644
3779. Dehmie stated that NPFL radio codes were not distributed to anyone outside of
NPFL members.6642 In addition, NPFL codes were not written down, but memorised by the
operators.6644 Dehmie ceased being a member of the NPFL in 1997.6644
Defence Witness Yanks Smghe
3780. Witness Yanks Smythe worked as a radio operator and operations manager for
Taylor from 1990 until Taylor became president.4646 lf two NPFL operators wanted to speak
to each other they would meet on a private frequency that had a code, and the messages
could also be coded or be "send".4646
3781. The witness denied that the NPFL and RUF were communicating after May 1992
through 1994. Between 1990 and 1994 the RUF and the NPFL did not operate on the same
frequency, and he monitored the NPFL frequency. Thus, if they were communicating he
would have heard the radio call from the RUF.6644 The witness stated that he was "not
8637 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41179·41182, 41244-41245; Transcript 21 May 2010, p.
41500.
4644 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41181-41182, 41282; DCT-282, Transcript 21 May 2010, pp.
41477·41478; 31 May 2010, pp. 41533-41535, 41539-41541.
4649 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41533·41535.
4646 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41536-41539.
4644 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 31 May 2010, p. 41244.
4642 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 21 May 2010, pp. 41473-41474; Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41536·41539.
8643 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 21 May 2010, pp. 41475-41476.
4644 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript, 20 May 2010, pp. 41399-41400, 41411-41412.
4644 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35640-35641.
4646 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 1 March 2010, pp. 36264-36266.
*647 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010, pp. 35969-35971; Transcript 1 March 2010 pp. 36263-36264.

---- End of Page 1309 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / I8 May 2012 M

3aware" of whether the NPFL possessed RUF code from 1990 to 1994.8648 Smythe testified
that he worked with Taylor from 1990 to the end of his presidency, and he never had any
communications with Sierra Leone.8649
3782. Yanks Smythe testified that he never saw radio equipment at Benjamin Yeaten's
house between 1998 and July 2000.8650
Deliberations
3783. lt is clear from both Prosecution and Defence witnesses’ testimony that in
approximately 1991 or 1992, the NPFL assisted the RUF in establishing its own radio
communications system.865l All RUF radio operators monitored the RUF network for
messages. If one RUF member wanted to reach another RUF member, they would order
their operator to make a call on the national network requesting the second member's
operator to meet at a specific frequency to talk. The two operators would then meet on the
specific frequency, and the members would speak on this frequency.8652
3784. The frequency numbers on which operators would meet, of which there were many,
would be coded, so as to deter any other persons from being able to hear what was being
relayed.g653 These conversations would not be absolutely secure, however; if another person
knew the frequency code, or happened upon that frequency, they could hear the conversation
between the two speakers. To increase confidentiality, the two speakers could speak in code
on the private frequencies. For example, the speakers could use code names to indicate
places, names, materials, or the movement of troops.8654
8***** Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010, p. 35965.
""" Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35652-25653.
*650 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010, p. 35962.
8651 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4364, 4386, 4389-4390; Transcript 21 February 2008, pp.
4431, 4443-4445, 4475; Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21350-21354, 21372-21374;
Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21416-21417; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3028, 3037-
3038; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6983-6986.
8652 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4438-4440; Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December
2008, pp. 21344-21346; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3062-3063; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April
2008, pp. 6891-6894, 6904, 6909; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16251; Witness DCT-
282, Transcript 21 May 2010, pp. 41475-41476; 31 May 2010, pp. 41533-41536; Yanks Smythe, Transcript 1
March 2010, pp. 36264-36266.
gm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21344-21346; Yanks Smythe, Transcript 1 March
2010, pp. 36264-36266.
8654 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4386, 4389-4390; Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4431,
4442-4443, 4479-4480; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3170-3171; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April

---- End of Page 1310 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-0l-T /(/V IWQ 18 May 2012 `E

3 q nw;
3785. Members could also communicate by sending coded messages from one operator to
another. One member would relay a message in plain English to an operator, who would
translate this message into code. The sending operator would then transmit it to the receiving
operator, who would decode it for the recipient member.8655 The NPFL communications
network functioned similarly in all of these respects to the RUF network.8656
3786. The question at issue is whether the RUF could communicate in code with the NPFL
or understand its coded messages, and vice versa. The Prosecution submits that the codes
were shared and that the RUF and NPFL used each others’ networks, while the Defence
contends that the RUF and NPFL could not communicate because they did not share
codes.8657
3787. Radio operators Foday Lansana and Dauda Aruna Fornie, whom the Trial Chamber
has found to be generally credible,8658 both testified that in 1991 or 1992 the RUF did not
have their own code, but used that which was given to them by the NPFL. At a certain point,
however, the RUF code changed, and the two codes were separate and different.8659
3788. Both Prosecution and Defence witnesses testified that RUF code changed
intermittently throughout the conflict so as to guard the confidentiality of messages, ·
although witness testimony varied as to how often this would happen.8660 Several
Prosecution witnesses also testified that RUF code was shared with operators in Liberia at
various time periods.866l For example, Fomie testified that he brought RUF codes to
2008, pp. 6908, 6989, 6901-6903, 6925-6929; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16252-
16253.
8655 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21341-21344; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February
2008, p. 3063, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3068-3069; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6908.
8656 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47039; Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41175-41179,
41244-41245; 21 May 2010, pp. 41476-41480; Transcript, 31 May 2010, pp. 41533—41539; Yanks Smythe,
Transcript 1 March 2010, pp. 36264-36266.
8657 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1281, 1497-1498, 1508-1509, 1518, 1531.
8658 Credibility Assessment, Foday Lansana, paras 237-243; Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras
346-358.
8659 Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008 pp. 4443-4445, 4475; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008,
p. 21374.
8660 Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008, pp. 4443-4445, 4479-4480; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December
2008, pp. 21416—21417, 21517—21518; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3071; TF1—516, Transcript
8 April 2008 pp. 6895-6896; TF1—585, Transcript 9 September 2008 pp. 15876—l5877; Joseph Dehmie,
Transcript 21 May 2010 pp. 41477—41480.
Ml See also Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3049, 3052-3053; Transcript 7 February 2008 pp.
3304-3308 (testifying that up until 1994, the RUF and the NPFL would communicate frequently, because they
had each others’ codes).

---- End of Page 1311 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T W 18 May 2012

gqdmt
Sunlight in Monrovia in mid-1998.6666 Witness TF1-516 testified that Lansana brought
Liberian codes to Sierra Leone before 1994, and this code did not change until 1998.6666
Once the codes changed, TF1-516 stated, the new RUF codes were brought to Liberia by
himself in mid-1999,6664 and by Tiger6666 during Operation Vulture just prior to this.6666
Finally, Witnesses TF1-585 and Lansana testified that Memunatu Deen, the RUF radio
operator stationed in Liberia, received RUF codes whenever they changed.6667
3789. Defence witnesses including the Accused, Joseph Dehmie, Yanks Smythe and DCT-
008 denied that the RUF and NPFL shared codes or communications.6666 DCT-008 denied
that NPFL code was given to anyone other than NPFL operators,6666 that Base 1 had access
to the RUF code,6676 and that TF1-516 provided RUF codes to the NPFL.667l The witness
contended that when Deen and TF1-516 first came to Base 1 in 1998, they sent messages
that could not be understood because the Base 1 radio operators did not have RUF code.6676
6 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of DCT-008 must be treated with
caution and requires corroboration.6676
3790. Defence Witness Joseph Dehmie testified that NPFL radio codes were not distributed
to anyone other than NPFL members. The Trial Chamber notes that the testimony of
Prosecution witnesses cited above concerns the distribution of RUF codes to NPFL
members, not NPFL codes to RUF members. For this reason, the testimony of Dehmie is not
inconsistent with the testimony of the Prosecution witnesses and it does not corroborate the
testimony of DCT-008.
6662 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21516-21519.
6663 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6984-6985.
6666 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860, 6966-6967, 6891, 6912, 6918; TF1-516, 9 April 2008, pp.
6986-6987, 7003-7004.
6666 Upon careful examination of the record, the Trial Chamber found only one reference to radio operator
"Tiger's" given name: Sheku Sheriffi Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16167, 16170.
6666 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6987.
6667 TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15877-15878; Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008, p. 4483.
Lansana also indicated that Osman Tolo, a second RUF radio operator stationed in Liberia, also received RUF
codes when they changed. Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008, p. 4483.
6666 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28566-28567; Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 21
May 2010 p. 41473-41474; 31 May 2010, pp. 41536-41539; Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010 pp.
35969-35971; Transcript 1 March 2010 pp. 36263-36264.
6666 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47034-47035.
6676 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47487.
6676 DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 2010, p. 47555 (PS); Transcript 28 August 2010, p. 47616, 47636.
gm DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47585475%, 47405.
**73 Credibility Assessment, DCT-008, paras 373-380.

---- End of Page 1312 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / jg 18 May 2012

`.sa¤r<>$"
3791. Similarly, while Defence witness Yanks Smythe denied that the NPFL and RUF
were communicating, more specifically, he testified that the two did not operate on the same
frequency. He said he monitored the NPFL frequency and that if there were
communications he would have heard the RUF radio calls. However, the Trial Chamber
notes that the communications to which the Prosecution witnesses testified were
communications largely if not exclusively on the RUF network, not the NPFL network.
Monitoring the NPFL network, Smythe presumably would not have heard these
communications, which in no way precludes the possibility that they took place.
3792. The Trial Chamber further notes that Smythe testified that he was "not aware"of
whether the NPFL possessed RUF code during the period from 1990 to 1994, which is the
time period about which he was questioned.8674 In the Trial Chamber's view, this testimony
does not corroborate the testimony of DCT—008 that the NPFL did not have the RUF code.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that Smythe testified in cross-examination that the RUF
and NPFL were not communicating via radio between 1991 and 1992,8675 which is
inconsistent with the testimony of the Accused, who testified that there were
communications during this time period.8676
3793. The Trial Chamber notes that while DCT-008 said that Sunlight did not have the
code, TFl-516 testified that he himself gave the code to Sunlight.8°77 Mohamed Kabbah
testified that the RUF had secret frequencies that only Sunlight knew about.8°78 Moreover,
Lansana testified that he heard Benjamin Yeaten and Sam Bockarie on the national
frequency using the RUF code. ln light of the substantial evidence adduced to the contrary,
and the lack of evidence corroborating his testimony, the Trial Chamber does not find the
testimony of DCT-008, that the NPFL did not have RUF codes, to be credible.
3794. The Trial Chamber notes the denial of the Accused that the NPFL shared radio
frequencies with the RUF, and his testimony that the NPFL did not know and could not get
into these frequencies. As indicated, the testimony of both Prosecution and Defence
witnesses establishes that the radio frequencies were accessible to all. The code added a
8674 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February 2010, pp. 35640-35641.
W5 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010, pp. 35964-35966.
8676 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28566-28567.
W7 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6912.
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16464-16366.

---- End of Page 1313 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GM 18 May 2012


Baum
level of security by allowing the parties communicating to switch to a different frequency,
but it is the understanding of the Trial Chamber that no code was required to access any
particular frequency. For this reason, and in light of the substantial and credible evidence
that the RUF code was shared with the NPFL, the Trial Chamber does not find the denial of
the Accused to be credible.
3795. The Defence highlights Prosecution evidence that new RUF codes would be
delivered by hand to all operators, and questions how this delivery could have occurred
when the borders were closed at various time periods.8679 The Trial Chamber notes that it is
uncontested by the parties that Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator, was stationed at the
RUF Guest House in Monrovia.868O Deen would have needed the RUF codes in order to
effectively communicate between Liberia and Sierra Leone during the time she was at the
guest house. Therefore, the Trial Chamber considers that the RUF codes must have been
delivered to her in Liberia or she would not have been able to perform her function as a
radio operator for the RUF. Further, TF1-585 and Foday Lansana testified that Deen had
access to these codes, and Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that she brought RUF codes to
Sunlightgégl For this reason, and in light of the evidence cited above that codes were
delivered to Monrovia, the Trial Chamber does not consider this argument compelling.8682
3796. As noted above, the evidence indicates that, regardless of whether the RUF
possessed NPFL code and vice versa, these groups could communicate with each other by
radio. Prosecution and Defence witnesses confirmed that an RUF operator could enter onto
the NPFL national network, the frequency of which was open to any operator, and make a
call to an NPFL operator, and vice versa.8683 The addition of code words for frequencies,
names, and materials simply offered greater confidentiality. For this reason the Trial
Chamber does not accept the contention of the Defence that messages between the two
groups could not have been relayed because they did not possess each others’ codes. The
evidence is clear that the RUF and NPFL radio networks were able to be reached by
Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1508-1509.
gm See Operational Support, RUF Guesthouse.
8681 TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008 pp. 15877-15878; Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008 p. 4475- 4476,
4483; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21516-21519.
mz See Arms and Ammunition; Preliminary Issues, Closure of Border.
8683 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4440-4441, 4483; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1
December 2008, pp. 21374-21375; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16364-16366; DCT-
008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 4703 9-47040; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3074-3076.

---- End of Page 1314 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012


3·=r¤»¤Q~
operators from outside their respective networks, and the communications could begin from
there.
3797. Regarding the Defence contention that Base 1 had not been established by the time
of the Intervention, the Trial Chamber notes that Mohamed Kabbah, Witness TF1-585 and
Dauda Aruna Fornie all testified to the existence and operation of Base 1 at the time of the
Intervention or shortly thereafter.8684 Only DCT-008 testified that Base 1 was not yet
established, and while the Accused testified that Base 1 was the radio station at Benjamin
Yeaten's compound, he did not provide a date when it was installed.8685
3798. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that Kabbah, Witness TF1-585 and Fornie are
generally credible8686 and that DCT-008 is a witness whose testimony must be treated with
caution and requires corroboration.8°87 The Trial Chamber notes that, in her testimony, TF1-
585 generally had difficulty placing events in their correct time period.8688 Further, the
Defence notes that in a previous statement to the Prosecution, TF1-585 stated that Lima
Bravo, 35 Bravo and 35B were the call signs at Yeaten's residence. The witness explained
this inconsistency by stating that in the interim period she had second thoughts, and realised
she had mixed up RUF call signs with Base 1; she also noted that one week before trial she
corrected the first statement to read that Yeaten's call signs were Lima Bravo and Base 1.
This was the first time that she had identified Base 1 as Yeaten's radio station. 8689
3799. The Trial Chamber also notes that Kabbah incorrectly identified Base 1 as the station
"where Tolo and others were at Pa Musa's place",8690 and not the station at Yeaten's
residence. Kabbah also testified that Sunlight worked from Charles Taylor's Mansion
Ground.
868* Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16127; TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.
15604-15606; Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15827-15828; Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December
2008, pp. 21436-21441, 21443, 21445, 21449-21452.
8685 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47026-47030; Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47565; Transcript 1
September 2010, p. 47754; Transcript 2 September 2010, pp. 47809-47810. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript
17 September 2009, p. 29204.
8686 Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338; Credibility Assessment, TF1—585, paras 330-333;
Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna F ornie, paras 346-358.
8687 Credibility Assesment, DCT—008, paras 373-380.
gm Credibility Assesment, TF1-585, paras 330-333.
mq TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15858-15861.
8690 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16131.

---- End of Page 1315 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %' 18 May 2012

3·=5 Lt.08
3800. The Trial Chamber considers the discrepancies in both TF 1-585 and Kabbah's
testimonies to be minor, particularly given the passage of time, and does not therefore find
that they impact upon either witness's general credibility. In Kabbah's case, the Trial
Chamber considers that, because Kabbah did not visit Monrovia, and his knowledge of
Sunlight's location was therefore based solely on information given to him by other
operators who went to Liberia with Sam Bockarie,869l and because Kabbah did not use the
term "Executive Mansion" but rather spoke of "Charles Taylor's Mansion Ground", Kabbah
may have conflated the Defendant's White Flower residence with the Executive
Mansion.8692 In view of the issues raised, however, the Trial Chamber does not rely on their
testimonies in ascertaining the date upon which Base 1 was established.
3801. However, the testimony of Fornie, who testified that he visited Base 1 shortly after
the Intervention, supports its existence at this time. The Defence challenges Fornie's
evidence that he visited Base 1 at this time on the basis that the radio room was originally
set up inside Yeaten's house and only later moved to the outhouse where Fornie testified
that he saw it.8693 Fornie testified that Base 1 was located "in one of the rooms at Benjamin
Yeaten's backyard"8694 which, in the Trial Chamber's view, could mean that it was located
in a room inside the house overlooking the back yard, not necessarily in the yard itself.
3802. Defence Witness Yanks Smythe testified that he never saw radio equipment at
Benjamin Yeaten's house between 1998 and July 2000,8695 but this evidence contradicts that
of DCT—008 and the Accused, who both testified that Base 1 was installed at Yeaten's
residence.8696 In light of these considerations the Trial Chamber rejects the testimony of
DCT—008 and Yanks Smythe that Base 1 was not operational at the time of the Intervention.
3803. The Trial Chamber notes that there is some evidence that communications were
restricted between Liberian and Sierra Leonean radio stations at this time.8697 However, the
evidence demonstrates that this was a matter of protocol rather than a technical ba.riier.8°98
wl Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16133.
8692 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16127.
86% Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1516.
M4 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21445; 21449-21452.
8695 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010, p. 35962.
8696 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47026—47030.
8697 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16254-16255; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February
2008, p. 4436; Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12169-12171; DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p.

---- End of Page 1316 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T mg 18 May 2012

Findings
3804. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that RUF radio codes were shared with the NPFL and that the RUF and NPFL were able to
communicate via radio.
3805. The Trial Chamber also finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that Base l existed and was in operation at the time of the Intervention.
(d) Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF/AFRC
lntroduction
3806. The Prosecution submits several allegations concerning the RUF/AFRC's use of
Taylor's radio communications equipment in Liberia. The circumstances of these allegations
have been discussed in other sections of the judgement. The Trial Chamber will consider
each allegation in turn, with regard to whether Taylor provided communications capabilities
to the RUF/AFRC.
(i) Sarrkoh's Communication While Detained
3807. The Prosecution alleges that during Sarrkoh's detention in Nigeria, he used the NPFL
radio network to communicate with the RUF in Sierra Leone.8699
3808. The Defence denies that Sankoh used the NPFL radio network to communicate with
the RUF during his detention. The Defence contends that there was no need for Sankoh to
rely on the NPFL network because he had his own communications system in place at that
time. Furthermore, the Defence argues, Sankoh's messages were communicated by other
means.8700
4760l.
8698 For example, when describing "restricted stations" Mohamed Kabbah testified that they were stations that
should not be contacted and were "forbidden", not that they could not be contacted. See Mohamed Kabbah,
Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. l6254—l6255. Foday Lansana testified that only the stations with Foday
Sankoh and Sam Bockarie had "every access". See Foday Lansana, 2l February 2008 pp. 4435-4436. Alice Pyne
testified that she did not have "perrnission" to speak with stations outside Sierra Leone. See Alice Pyne,
Transcript l8 June 2008, pp. 12170-l2l7l. Dauda Aruna Fornie also testified to restrictions in the authority to
contact Base l. See Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 2 l493.
grr Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 309.
tm Defence rmi rmi Brief, paras. 993, 1484.

---- End of Page 1317 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T \l l8 May 20l2 1

3 *1 an c>
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
3809. Witness Foday Lansana testified while Foday Sankoh was detained in Nigeria, he
would transmit messages to the RUF through Taylor and his subordinates in Liberia. At the
time, Bockarie told Lansana and others in the RUF that Moinama and Massquoi visited
Sankoh in detention and received a message, and transmitted this message via telephone to
Taylor or Yeaten in Liberia. Taylor or Yeaten then sent the message on the radio to Sam
Bockarie, who issued orders to the RUF accordingly.87Ol Bockarie stated that he along with
lsaac Mongor, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay, Peter Vandi, and others, were promoted using this
message system.8702 The RUF also received the order to join the AFRC in this way.8703
3810. When Bockarie entered Freetown, Lansana added, he invited Moinama and
Massaqoui to a meeting of the High Command, at which the witness was present. Moinama
and Massaqoui "made it very clear" that the messages they had transmitted from Sankoh in
detention were from Sankoh.87O4
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
3811. Witness Augustine Mallah, an RUF security officer for Mike Lamin, testified that
after Lamin was arrested Mallah escaped to Danané, Cote d’Ivoire. Musa Cissé, Taylor's
protocol officer, lived in Danané, and had a radio operator named Action Man. The day after
Mallah arrived in Cote d’Ivoire, which was two days after Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria,
Action Man invited Mallah to Cissé's house and told him that he had contact with Sankoh in
detention in Nigeria. Sankoh told Action Man to connect him with Bockarie so he could
give him some orders.87O5
3812. The next night, Mallah, Action Man and Joseph Brown (a.l<.a. Co Brown) were at
Cissé's house. Mallah was sitting two feet away when he saw Action Man contact Bockarie
and Sankoh. Sankoh told Bockarie that he should not take any instructions from Fayah
Musa, but should take instructions directly from Taylor in Liberia. Bockarie stated that he
870* Foday Laaaaaa, Transcript 21 February 2008 pp. 4490-4494.
8702 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008 pp. 4490.
8703 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008 p. 4491-4493.
8704 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008 pp. 4490·4494.

---- End of Page 1318 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / W 18 May 2012
N

3a Lt-11
would adhere to Sankoh's instructions, and that he would support Sankoh has the leader of
the Rur.8"6
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
3813. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member, testified that after Foday Sankoh was arrested in
Nigeria in 1997, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) called on the radio and stated that Taylor had
instructed him to give a message to Bockarie from the Accused, which had been passed on
to him by Sankoh. Tamba said that Sankoh instructed Bockarie to be promoted, and that he
should take all direct orders from Taylor until Sankoh retumed from Nigeria.87O7
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
3814. Witness TF1-371 testified that in March 1997, he was in Foday Sankoh's residence
in Abidjan waiting for him to return from Nigeria when he heard on the BBC that Sankoh
had been arrested. He called Memunatu Deen, who was Sankoh's "communications lady",
and who was at Sankoh's residence in Abidjan and had Sankoh's satellite phone. He asked
Deen to put him in touch with Sankoh at his hotel in Abuja and she connected the two via
the satellite phone. Sankoh told the witness not to worry, that he was not actually arrested
but was at his hotel in Abuja, but that he would return soon.87O8
Prosecution Witness TF 1- 168
3815. Witness TF1-168 testified that after Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria, he had a satellite
phone. The Nigerian authorities confiscated it at a certain point, but, TF1-168 testified,
Sankoh found other ways to communicate with the RUF in the field. For example, Sankoh
called Mike Lamin, who was in Abidjan, and instructed him to "disarm" the witness. The
witness heard about this and sought protection from the local police.87O9 Sankoh also, while
detained in Nigeria, promoted seven RUF commanders.87lO
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
8705 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20124-20128.
8706 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20124-20128.
W rrr-338, Transcript 1 September 2008,pp. 15114-15116.
8708 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008 pp. 2282-2284.
8709 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23311-23312.
8710 TF1-168, Transcript 26 January 2009 pp. 23519-23520.

---- End of Page 1319 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / _\WQ 18 May 2012

3°`rLt tz
3816. Witness Dauda Amna Fornie testified that in mid-1997 he heard Foday Sankoh on
Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service, the Sierra Leonean radio station, instructing the RUF to
leave the bush and join the AFRC.8m
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
3817. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that following the AFRC coup, he heard _
Foday Sankoh on BBC radio ordering the commanders and members of the RUF to go
immediately to Freetown and take orders from Johnny Paul Koroma.87l2
Prosecution Witness Charles Ngebeh
3818. Witness Charles Ngebeh testified that in May 1997 he was in Giema when he heard,
on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service, a recorded message from Foday Sankoh stating
that the war was over and instructing the RUF to come out of the bush and join the AFRC in
Freetown.87l3
The Accused
3819. The Accused denied he transmitted any messages from Sankoh to Bockarie while
Sankoh was detained in Nigeria, including a message that the RUF should join the AFRC
junta or that Bockarie should take advice from Taylor while Sankoh was in prison.87l4
Taylor testified that the process by which the RUF joined the AFRC is well documented: a
recorded conversation between Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma was played on Sierra
Leonean radio and the BBC.87l5 In addition, Sankoh at that time had his own radio and
o erator in Cote d’1voire, and so did not need to transmit messa es throu Taylor.87l6 The
P 8 Y
Accused also denied the allegation that he sent a message to Sam Bockarie through Daniel
Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle). The Accused testified that he had never known Tamba, and that he
heard this name for the first time in cour"t.87l7 The Accused asserted that he was not in
gm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21400-21405.
gm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 17 April 2008 p. 7872-7873.
Sm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37858 - 37860
Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, 28 October 2009 pp. 30527-30530; 1 October 2009 p. 30086.
Sm T Charles Ghankay Taylor, 28 October 2009 pp. 30527-30529, 30534.
W6 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcipt 28 October 2009 p. 30531-30532.
gm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28717; Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30530.

---- End of Page 1320 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J 18 May 2012
K.-Y//V Q

3*% 13
communication with Sankoh or Bockarie after Sankoh's arrest in Nigeria, and that he was
not involved in any RUF promotions.87l8
Defence Witness Fayia Musa
3820. Witness Fayia Musa denied that Foday Sankoh transmitted messages through NPFL
radio networks, saying that he had others ways of communicating with RUF members. Musa
testified that when Foday Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria, he was detained in a hotel.87l9
Following Sankoh's arrest, Musa and other RUF colleagues held a press conference, in
which they revoked their support for Foday Sankoh as leader of the RUF.872O Sankoh
immediately called the witness on the telephone and told him that he was "playing with
fire". Sankoh also, the witness testified, telephoned the radio operator at his house in
Abidjan, Juliet James, and told her to order Mike Lamin, who was also in Abidjan, to beat
Philip Palmer and his wife to death. Juliet James then told Musa of this messagegm Finally,
he told the operator to give Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay a message that his arrest had been
orchestrated by the External Delegation.8722
3821. Musa also denied the veracity of Augustine Mallah's claim that he was present when
Action Man connected Sankoh and Bockarie on the radio at Cissé's house in Cote d’1voire.
First, Musa denied that Musa Cisse had a radio operator named "Action Man", stating that
instead his operator was named "Cassell".8723 Second, Musa stated that at the time of
Sankoh's arrest, he had several other ways of communicating and did not need to use
Cissé's radio. When Foday Sankoh arrived in Cote d’1voire in March 1996, he brought with
him two radios and several radio operators, including Juliet Gbessy James, Martin Moinama,
Menamutu Deen, Eddie Murphy, and Dauda Aruna Fornie (a.k.a. "DAF"). One radio was
set up at Phillip Palmer's house in Danane, and the other was in Abidjan at Sankoh's
"Cocody house".8724 The witness and other members of the External Delegation had good
8718 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30859-30860; Transcript 28 October 2009, pp.
30530-30532.
gm Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, P. 39100.
gm Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, P. 39101.
Sm Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010 pp. 39l05—39107.
. gm Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010 pp. 39105-39107; Transcript 21 April 2010 pp. 39525-39526.
*123 Fayia Musa, Transcript 21 April 2010 p. 39565.
gm Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010 pp. 39010-3901 1; Transcript 21 April 2010 pp. 39566-39567.

---- End of Page 1321 ---------------------------


Case No,. SCSI.-03-01-T /,6// W 18 May 2012

isa atl Lg.
relationships with the RUF operators in Abidjan, and none of them told him of a message
from Sankoh to Bockarie that he should take orders from Taylor.8725
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
3822. Witness Issa Sesay testiiied that when Foday Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria in
March 1997, he had two operators living at his house in Abidjan: Memunatu Deen and
another woman whose name Sesay could not recall. Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) was also
living at Sankoh's house in Abidjan. While detained, if Sankoh wanted to contact Bockarie
he would call Tamba on the telephone, who would then give the message to Memunatu
Deen, who would then code the message and send it to Bockarie. This line of
communication continued from the time Sankoh was arrested until the Nigerian authorities
cut his telephone line. The Nigerian authorities did so after Sankoh's instruction that the
RUF and Bockarie should take orders from Johnny Paul Koroma was played on Sierra
Leonean radio, and Sankoh gave an interview with the BBC urging the RUF to join the
AFRCFU6
3823. Sesay testiiied that Sankoh promoted several RUF members through a message sent
in this way: Bockarie was promoted Field Commander, Mike Lamin became a Colonel,
Denis Mingo became a Colonel, Isaac Mongor a Colonel, and Issa Sesay a Lieutenant
Colonel. Sankoh made no mention of Taylor in this message, nor did he direct that Bockarie
should take instructions from Taylor, but told Bockarie to take instructions from Johnny
Paul Koroma.8727 Sesay was inconsistent on the time period in which Sankoh made these
promotions, stating first that he sent the message after he was arrested in Nigeria, and then
that he sent the message while he was still in Abidjan, before he was arrested. 8728
3824. Sesay testified that Tamba was a close friend of his, and was not a member of
Taylor's special security forces in Liberia, nor did he work for Taylor. Tamba was a member
of the RUF, and worked at Foday Sankoh's house in Abidjan in 1996.8729 Sesay also
gm Fayia Musa, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39568.
j 8726 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010 p. 43798-43801; Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45184-45185; Transcript
17 August 2010 p. 46522.
8727 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43776-43779, 43800; Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45184-45185.
*728 Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46528-46532
8729 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010 pp. 45183-45184; 6 July 2010 p. 43801-43806, 43809.

---- End of Page 1322 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JVQ 18 May 2012 b%

Bq QJ s`
testified that following his arrest, Sankoh used to communicate with Bockarie in Abidjan
through telephone lines.873O
3825. Sesay denied Sesay denied Augustine Mallah's claim that Sankoh ordered Bockarie
to take advice from Taylor over the radio at Musa Cissé's home in Danané. Sesay contends
that in October 1996, Mallah was in Liberia with Mike Lamin, and therefore could not have
been in Danané to hear that conversation.873 I
Deliberations
3826. The Trial Chamber must determine whether, while in detention, Foday Sankoh used
the NPFL's communications network in order to transmit orders to the RUF, an allegation
the Defence denies.
3827. The Prosecution has adduced evidence that Sankoh passed messages through the
NPFL network, including one or more in which Sankoh promoted Bockarie and others, as
Lansana testified, and one in which Sankoh instructed Bockarie to take orders from the
Accused, as TF1-338 and Augustine Mallah testified. Lansana testified that Gibril
Massaqoui or Martin Moinama would carry messages away from Sankoh and telephone the
Accused or Yeaten in Liberia, who then radioed the messages to Sam Bockarie.8732 Foday
Lansana first heard that this occurred from Bockarie, but then Massaquoi and Moinama
confirmed the same; thus, it is hearsay evidence, but originating from two different sources.
3828. TF1-338 testified that Sankoh called Taylor with the message that Bockarie was
promoted and should take instruction from Taylor, which Taylor passed on to Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. Jungle), and Tamba then passed the message via radio to Bockarie.8733 It is unclear
from TF1-338's testimony whether he was in the room when the radio message between
Tamba and Bockarie transpired, and the Trial Chamber notes that his evidence that Sankoh
gave these instructions to Bockarie came from Tamba, who received it from Taylor. The
Trial Chamber finds that the contention of the Accused that he only heard of Tamba for the
first time at his trial to be lacking in credibility.
8730 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43797.
gm Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p.4613246133; Transcript 17 August 2010 p. 46524.
gm Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008 pp. 4490-4494.
gm TF1—338, Transcript 1 September 2008 pp. 15114—15117.

---- End of Page 1323 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T p / 18 May 2012

Ba wr 0
3829. Finally, Issa Sesay testified that Sankoh passed the message of Bockarie's promotion
to Tamba, who then sent the message over the radio to Bockarie. Though Sesay was, at this
particular time, stationed in Buedu with Bockarie, Sesay did not indicate the source of his
knowledge on this line of communication, or specify as to whether it was Bockarie who
informed him. Furthermore, upon cross-examination Sesay's testimony was inconsistent
concerning the date Sankoh's message promoting several RUF commanders occurred:
before or after Sankoh's arrest in Nigeria. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Sesay's
testimony must be treated with caution.8734
3830. The Trial Chamber recalls that it had no general reservations regarding the credibility
of TF 1-338, Mallah or Lansana.8735 Though these witnesses’ accounts differ in details and
are in some instances hearsay, they corroborate each other in that Sankoh used either the
Accused or Tamba to pass messages on to Bockarie. Though Lansana contends that the
communication between Sankoh in detention and the Accused in Liberia occurred through
two intermediaries, Moinama and Massaqoui, this may have been an extra detail that was
not passed on to the other witnesses through Tamba or Bockarie. ln addition, though Sesay
does not mention the involvement of the Accused, the Trial Chamber notes its finding that at
various times Tamba was an agent of the Accused.8736
3831. Regarding Sankoh's instruction to Bockarie to follow the Accused's orders,
Augustine Mallah provided a first-hand account of Sankoh using the NPFL network to
communicate with Bockarie: Mallah testified that he was present when "Action Man", a
radio operator for Musa Cissé, connected Sankoh to Bockarie over the radio.8737 The Trial
Chamber has considered this allegation elsewhere in the judgement, and accepted Mallah's
testimony.8738 The Trial Chamber notes that Musa Cissé was an NPFL representative.8739
His radio, in the Trial Chamber's view, was part of the NPF L communications network
3832. ln addition to challenging these witnesses’ testimonies directly, the Defence
contends that Sankoh did not need the NPFL radio network to communicate with the RUF
8734 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
8735 Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329; Credibility Assessment, Foday Lansana, paras 237-243;
Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2522.
W6 See The Role of Intermediaries: Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).
Sm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20124-20128.
Sm See Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AF RC, Sam Bockarie.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 991.

---- End of Page 1324 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /<;4,/ w 18 May 2012

?· mi}
during his detention because he had other ways of transmitting messages. For example,
several Defence witnesses testified that Sankoh's order for the RUF to join the AFRC was
transmitted via radio.8740 Witness TFl—37l testified that Memunatu Deen, the radio operator
who was living at Sankoh's house in Abidjan, connected him to Sankoh during his
detention.874l Witness TFl-l68 and Samuel Kargbo testified that while Sankoh was arrested
he used a telephone,8742 and Fayia Musa described several incidents when Sankoh used his
satellite phone to communicate with RUF members in Abidjan.8743 The Trial Chamber also
notes, upon careful examination of Isaac Mongor's testimony, that he does not corroborate
the Prosecution allegation that Sankoh used the NPFL network in order to promote him,
Mongor, and others, after his arrest.
3833. Sankoh's use of these alternate forms of communication, however, does not exclude A
the possibility that he also used the NPFL radio network to pass messages on to Bockarie.
The NPFL radio network may have reached longer distances than Sankoh's communications
options, or Sankoh may have believed the NPFL network was more confidential than any
other. Notably, Issa Sesay testified that the message instructing the RUF to join the AFRC
occurred both in a private message from Sankoh to Bockarie and a radio address
transmitting the news.8744
Findings
3834. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that while in detention in Nigeria, Sankoh used the NPFL communications network to
communicate to the RUF, and sent messages to Bockarie via the Accused.
(ii) Communications between Memunatu Deen and Sam Bockarie in 1997
Submissions of the Parties
*7*0 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript l December 2008, pp. 2l400-2 l405; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March
20l0, pp. 37858 — 37860; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009 pp. 30527-30529, 30534;
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008 p. 7872-7873.
X"' rrr-371, Transcript 25 January 2008 pp. 2282-2284.
8742 TFl-l68, Transcript 26 January 2009 pp. 235l9-23520.
8743 Fayia Musa, Transcript I5 April 20l0 pp. 39l05-39l07; Transcript 2l April 20l0 pp. 39525-39526.
Bm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 20l0, pp. 43800, 438l8-4382l; Transcript 8 July 20l0 pp. 4403l—44032;
Transcript 29 July 20l0 pp. 44976-44977; Transcript l8 August 20l0 pp. 46540-4654l.

---- End of Page 1325 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T l3/?‘/ mé l8 May 20l2

?> 3835. The Trial Chamber has discussed in another section of this judgement whether a
shipment of ammunition brought by Memunatu Deen and Fonti Kanu to Sierra Leone in
1997 was sent by the Accused.8745 The Prosecution alleges that Deen, an RUF radio operator
based in Liberia, used radio equipment at the home of Musa Cissé, to facilitate this arms
shipment.8746
3836. The Defence does not answer this specinc allegation concerning whether Memunatu
Deen used Liberian equipment to communicate with the RUF in Sierra Leone, but denies
that this shipment occurred and contends that Dauda Aruna Fornie is not a credible
witness.8747
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna F ornie
3837. Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie, an RUF radio operator,8748 testined that in or about
late 1997, three months afcer arriving in Kenema, he was assigned to work as a radio
operator with Sam Bockarie in Kenema Town.8749 Memunatu Deen, a radio operator who
worked in Monrovia at Musa Cisse's house, contacted the witness via radio from Monrovia
and told him that she and F onti Kanu were going to bring materials given to them by Taylor.
They then travelled to Daru, where she called to tell him that she had arrived, and F ornie and
Bockarie travelled to Daru to receive the shipment.8750
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
3838. Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,875l testined that
junior radio operators would not know of arms orders as "that area is a very sensitive
8745 Arms and Ammunition, Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, Junta Period.
87% Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 310. In their Final Trial Brief, the Prosecution cites to the testimony of
TF1-371 to support the above proposition. See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 310, citing TF1-371,
Transcript 31 January 2008 pp. 2689-2700 (CS). Upon careiixl examination of the testimony cited, however, the
Trial Chamber notes that TF1-371 does not testify that Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator, used Liberia
radio equipment to facilitate this arms deal, but only that Bockarie contacted Taylor from Kenema requesting
materiel. This testimony was given in closed session.
8747 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1508-1512.
8748 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
8749 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21428-21429.
Sm Dauda Ame Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008,pp. 21429-21433.
ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.

---- End of Page 1326 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T fp 18 May 2012
~l

ga Lt is
one".g752 However he stated that he was in Kailahun, not Kenema, during the AFRC regime,
did not operate with Sam Bockarie directly,8755 and was not always on the radio.5754 In
addition, Poday Lansana, Witness TF1-585, Dauda Amna Fomie, TP1-567, TF1-539, Alice
Pyne, Jabaty J award, and TF1-516 confirmed that Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator,
lived and worked in Monrovia.g755
The Accused
3839. The Accused denied knowing Memunatu Deen or Fonti Kanu. He stated that a man
named Musa Cisse was his Chief of Protocol, but he did not know whom Cisse hosted at his
house.8756
Deliberations
3840. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Dauda Amna Fomie, who provided the
central testimony for this allegation, is a generally credible witness.8757 The Trial Chamber
also notes that Witness TF1-516 testified that Fomie was one of the senior radio operators
authorised to contact Liberian radio stations, and several witnesses testified to Fomie being a
radio operator for Sam Bockarie during this time period.575g In addition, the fact that
Memunatu Deen was an RUF radio operator stationed in Liberia during this time period is
corroborated by several witnesses.5759
5752 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16291 -16293.
5755 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16284.
W Mohamed Kebbeh, rmmermt 16 September 2008,p. 16286.
8755 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4475-4477; TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008 pp.
15832-15833; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21434-21436; TF1-567, Transcript 4 July
2008, pp. 12990—12991 (PS); TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11463-1464; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June
2008, p. 12296; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13418-13421; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp.
7106-7108; Transcript 15 April 2008 p. 7640; 16 April 2008 p. 7743.
5756 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29171-2917 8.
5757 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras. 346-358.
5755 TF1-371, Transcript 28 June 2008, p. 2381 (CS); TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12976-12977; Issa
Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44044-44045. Note that these witnesses refer to Fornie as "DAF", which
Fomie recognised as his nickname during the conflict.
5755 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4475-4477; TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp.
l5832—15833; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp., 21434—21436; TF1—567, Transcript 4 July
2008, pp. 12990-12991; TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11463-1464; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June
2008, p. 12296; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13418-13421; TFl-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp.
7106-7108; Transcript 15 April 2008, p. 7640; Transcript16 April 2008 p. 7743.

---- End of Page 1327 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / jp 18 May 2012

Zawzo
3841. Although Mohamed Kabbah testified that junior operators would not know of arms
shipments, he also stated that he was in Kailahun, not Kenema, during the AFRC regime,
did not operate with Sam Bockarie directly876O and was not always on the radiogm Thus, the
Trial Chamber finds that Kabbah's testimony does not raise a doubt as to this allegation.
Findings
3842. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Dauda Aruna Fornie, a radio operator for Sam Bockarie, communicated by radio with
Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator based in Liberia, regarding a shipment of
ammunition that the Accused sent to Bockarie.
(iii) Communications relating to Eddie Kanneh in Liberia in 1998
Submissions of the Parties
3843. The Trial Chamber has, in another section of the judgement, considered Taylor's
involvement in the facilitation of the diamond trade between Sierra Leone and Liberia. The
Prosecution alleges that Eddie Kanneh used Liberian radio communications equipment to
conduct diamond transactions. More specifically, the Prosecution contends that radio
communications were sent from Sam Bockarie to Base 1 to report that Kanneh was
travelling to Liberia, and Kanneh would confirm his arrival in Liberia by calling Sierra
Leone from Base 1 or Base 020.8762 The Prosecution further alleges that the RUF 's mining
activity was monitored through either Base 1 or 020.8763
3844. Apart from challenges to the credibility of Witness TF 1-516,8764 and challenges to
the legal significance of the Accused's alleged provision of radio and communications
equipment,8765 the Defence does not make specific challenges to this allegation.8766
8760 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16284.
8761 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16286.
*762 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 322.
8763 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 369.
8764 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1496-1502.
8765 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 978.
8766 The Trial Chamber notes the Defence's acknowledgement of this specific allegation at paragraph 944 of its
Final Trial Brief and the cross-reference to the Aiding and Abetting section of its Final Trial Brief, where the

---- End of Page 1328 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~0l-T m 18 May 2012

Ysétnpzt
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TFl-516
3845. Witness TF1-516 testified that in late 1998, he was a radio operator in Buedu,
workin for Sam Bockarie.g767 Durin this time, the RUF brou t civilians from Kailahun
8 8
to mine diamonds for the RUF in Kono.8768 The mining commander brought diamonds from
Kono to Bockarie in Buedu. Prior to his departure, the mining commander would inform
Bockarie of his impending arrival in Buedu.8769 The witness did not see the diamonds, but
because the mining commander radioed prior to his arrival that he was bringing diamonds,
the witness deduced that when he saw the mining commander, the mining commander had
brought diamonds. Upon the arrival of the mining commander in Buedu with the diamonds,
Bockarie would inform Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. 50) at Base 1, or he would inform 020, that
Eddie Kanneh was coming with a parcel of diamonds for Taylor.877O After arriving in
Monrovia, Kanneh would call from Base 1 or 020 to inform of his arrival.877l The witness
personally transmitted and received messages regarding these movements over the radio.
These trips took place frequently, every two weeks or a month, at least until the witness left
Buedu in mid-1999.8772
3846. Once the witness relocated to Liberia in mid-1999 and was assigned to Benjamin
Yeaten, he continued to receive information about mining from Issa Sesay's operator
Elevation, who told the witness that they were mining "big, big" diamonds.8773 Sesay was in
charge of mining in Kono after Bockarie left Sierra Leone.8774 Eddie Kanneh still brought
diamonds to Monrovia during that time. The witness received radio messages informing him
that Kanneh was coming to Monrovia with parcels of diamonds for Taylor, and when he
Defence states that the allegation will be addressed. However, the specific allegation does not appear in the
Aiding and Abetting section of the Defence Final Trial Brief Defence Final Trial Brief para. 944.
8767 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6857.
Sm TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7131; Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7161-7162.
8769 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7163.
W TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7164-7165.
Wl TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7165.
W2 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7164-7168.
gm TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7164-7168. 1
W TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7169.

---- End of Page 1329 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T JQ 18 May 2012
..,//4,

Eqwzz.
arrived in Monrovia, he would instruct the witness to inform Sesay that he had arrived.8775
These messages continued until the witness left in late 2001.8776
Deliberations
3847. TF1—516 provided direct evidence of Eddie Kanneh's movements between Buedu
and Monrovia with diamonds, as he sent and received some of those messages while he was
stationed in Kono and later from Monrovia. The Trial Chamber notes that the witness's
account of mining activity is based on what he was told by Elevation, but considers that
Elevation's statements regarding mining have been corroborated by numerous witnesses
who testified about mining in Kono during that time,8777 and are conceded by the Defence.
In this context, the Trial Chamber has considered whether the conversations about mining
with Elevation from Monrovia actually occurred rather than the details of their content. ln ,
the Trial Chamber's view, TF1-516's testimony on this point was consistent and detailed.
The Trial Chamber further notes that this testimony was not effectively challenged on cross-
examination. Moreover, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1—516 is generally
credible8778 and considers his testimony in this context as credible.
Findings
3848. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that radio communications were sent back and forth from Bockarie to Base 1 or Base 020 in
Monrovia, and later from Issa Sesay, to report the movements of Eddie Kanneh between
Liberia and Sierra Leone with diamonds, and information on diamond mining in Sierra
Leone.
(iv) Communications between Dauda Aruna Fornie and Sierra Leone in 1998
Submissions of the Parties
*775 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7171-7172.
W6 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7172.
*777 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November
2008, pp. 20248-20249.
wg Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras. 275-284.

---- End of Page 1330 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 'WQ 18 May 2012

3 Q on;
3849. The Trial Chamber has considered in another section of this judgement whether Sam
Bockarie made regular trips to Liberia in 1998 for arms, ammunition, and other assistance
from the Accused. The Prosecution further alleges that on one of Bockarie's first trips to
Monrovia for this purpose, Dauda Aruna F ornie accompanied Bockarie and used Base 1, the
radio station at Benjamin Yeaten's home in Monrovia, to keep Bockarie apprised of what
was happening in Sierra Leone.8779
3850. The Defence does not directly address this allegation of Fornie using Base 1, but
submits that the Prosecution's allegation that F omie travelled with Bockarie is contradicted
by another account of Bockarie's first trip to Monrovia, testified to by Vannuyan Sherif.
The Defence also contends that though F ornie claimed to have stayed at Base 1 on this trip,
DCT—008 testified that it was not set up at this time. Finally, the Defence challenges the very
existence of this first trip in F ebmary 1998, stating that the Accused first met Bockarie in
September 1998.8780
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Dauda Amna F ornie
3851. Witness Dauda Amna Fornie, Sam Bocl1998,8781 he travelled with Bockarie to Monrovia to meet Taylor.8782 According to F ornie, he
did so in order to monitor the radio and give Bockarie updates on the front lines in Sierra
Leone. He and Bockarie arrived in Monrovia late at night, and the witness was taken to
Benjamin Yeaten's residence in Congo Town, where he stayed with Sunlight. Fornie awoke
early in the morning and went to the radio room in Yeaten's residence, called Base 1, and
used it to contact the radio stations at various front lines in Sierra Leone, including Issa
Sesay's, Denis Mingo's and Eagle's stations, among others. VVhen Bockarie came in the
morning to Yeaten's house to meet with Yeaten, Fornie gave him updates from the front
lines. Bockarie, Yeaten, Rashid and Sellay then went out and said they were going to meet
8779 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 316.
8780 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 529-530.
ml Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21436-21438, 21444.
8782 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21445-21447.

---- End of Page 1331 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03-01—T xi 18 May 2012
// .%

with Taylor, and left Fornie at Yeaten's.8783 When Bockarie returned that evening, he told
Fornie to pack up his things, and they returned to Sierra Leone.8784
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
3852. Witness Varmuyan Sherif, a former ULlMO—K fighter who became an officer in the
SSS,8785 contradicted Dauda Aruna Fornie's testimony as to Sam Bockarie's first trip to
Monrovia, stating that he was instructed by Taylor to travel to Sierra Leone to bring
Bockarie to Monrovia. Sherif did not testify to Fornie being present for Bockarie's first trip
to Monrovia.8786 The Accused testified that his first meeting with Bockarie was in
September 1998.8787 The Accused also denied that he would involve Sherif, a security
officer in the SSS, in matters relating to the RUF and ECOWAS.8788
Deliberations
3853. The Prosecution relies on the testimony of Dauda Aruna Fornie to support the
allegation that Fornie used Base 1, in Monrovia, in order to keep Sam Bockarie informed as
to the situation on the front lines in Sierra Leone while he visited Monrovia. The Accused,
however, contends that his first meeting with Bockarie was in September 1998, and that he
would not have involved Varmuyan Sherif in this matter. Further, the Defence contends that
this description of Bockarie's trip to Monrovia cannot be reconciled with the testimony of
Sherif, and that Base 1 was not in existence at this time.
3854. The Trial Chamber has considered Fornie, Sherif and the Accused's testimony
concerning this incident in other sections of the Judgement, and has accepted Fornie's
testimony as credible, finding that the first meeting between Bockarie and the Accused
occurred around February 1998.8789 The Trial Chamber has also found that the Defence
8783 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21448-21451.
*7*4 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21451.
*7*5 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript, 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; 10 January 2008, pp. 940, 986-987.
8786 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 826, 828-851; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January
2008, pp. 985-987, 1002-1005; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 11 January 2008, pp. 1032-1033.
8787 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24336-24338.
mg Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25812-25813.
mg Arms and Ammunition: Alleged Direct Supply of Materiel, February 1998 to December 1999; Diamonds:
February 1998 to July 1999; Military Operations: Alleged Message from Base 1 to Troops Retreating from
Kono.

---- End of Page 1332 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Eq gras"
contention that Base 1 was not in existence at this time is without merit.879O In considering
the above, therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that Fornie's description of this incident is
credible, and the Prosecution has proved this allegation that Fornie used Base 1 to
communicate with the RUF in Sieria Leone on this trip to Monrovia.
Findings
3855. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that on one of Sam Bockarie's first trips to Monrovia after the Intervention, radio operator
Dauda Aruna Fornie, who accompanied Bockarie on this trip, kept Bockarie appraised of
events in Sieria Leone by using Base 1, a radio station at Benjamin Yeaten's home in
Monrovia.
(v) Communications during the Freetovvn Invasion
Submissions of the Parties
3856. The Trial Chamber has considered in another section of this judgement allegations
that the Accused directed the Freetown Invasion, and more specifically, that there was
contact between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten during the Invasion. The Prosecution
more specifically alleges that the Accused and Yeaten received reports and updates on the
Freetovvn Invasion via RUF operators based in Monrovia.8791 The Defence denies generally
that the Accused had any involvement in the Freetovvn Invasion in January 1999,8792 and that
the Accused communicated with Bockarie either directly or through Yeaten concerning the
Invasion.8793
Evidence
3857. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,8794 testified that from just after
the Intervention in February 1998 until December 1999, he was a radio operator based in
8790 Operational Support: RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 317.
8192 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 920.
Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1282.
8794 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.

---- End of Page 1333 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T X 18 May 2012
I .

:s<=1~t2~<~=>
Buedu and was made overall signal commander of the RUF.8795 The witness, who was in
Buedu on January 1999,87% testified that soon after Gullit's troops entered Freetown,
Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator, TF1-516, contacted Bockarie over the radio from
FOWL8797
3858. Prosecution Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,8798 testified that he only
worked as a radio operator for Benjamin Yeaten after June or July 1999.8799 The witness
ave further evidence to the effect that he was stationed in Buedu, and not Monrovia, durin
8 8
the Invasion of Freetown in January 1999.8800
3859. Defence Witness DCT—008, a Liberian radio operator,88Ol testified that during
Bockarie's second visit to Monrovia in 1998, Sunlight met radio operator TF1-516. During
this visit, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) brought the radio operator to Base 1, located at
Yeaten's house, so that he could send a coded message to Buedu. DCT—008 testified that
Sunlight told him that TF1—516 never used the radio at Base 1 outside of this one
instance.8802 The witness denied that TF1—516 was ever a radio operator for Yeaten.8803
DCT—008 said he would have known if` this was the case.8804 However, Witnesses TF1—567,
TF1—375 and TF1—585 all testified that TF1—516 worked for Yeaten in Liberia.8805
3860. Witness DCT-008 also testified that in November or December 1998, Sampson and
Tamba brought Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator, to Base 1 so that she could use the
radio to communicate with the RUF.88O6 The witness also gave evidence to the effect that
Deen would come and send messages from Base 1 to RUF controlled tenitory on "a regular
8795 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 Sept 2008, pp. 16126-16127.
8796 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16166.
$797 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16168-16170.
*7% r1¤1-5 16, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
8799 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860, 6966-6967; Transcript 9 April 2008 pp. 7003-7004.
8800 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6931-6932; Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6979.
8801 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46948-4695l (PS).
mz DCT-008, rtsussupt 50 August 2010, p. 47518.
M DCT-008, rtsussupt 31 August 2010, p. 47528.
’"‘°" DCT-008, Transcript 31 August 2010, p. 47610, 47621, 47652.
8805 TFl-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13043-13044; TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008 pp. 12651-12652;
TFl-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15809-15910.
8806 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47400-47408; Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47403-47404.

---- End of Page 1334 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /5 A Q 18 May 2012

3<=1¤t¤—1·
basis"88O7 and that it was around mid-1999 that Memunatu Deen's visits to Base 1 became
less frequent.8808
3861. Witness DCT-008 also testified, however, that during the Freetown Invasion
Memunatu Deen did not use Base 1 to transmit messages to the RUF and that he heard that
she was not in M0movia.8809 The witness gave evidence that Memunatu Deen's Operation in
Liberia was in fact kept secret from the Liberian Government and the President.88lO
3862. Prosecution Witness TF1-371 testified that toward the end of 1998 and beginning of
1999, Sam Bockarie had a radi0 Operator named Memunatu Deen, who was located in
Monrovia and Operated the RUF radi0 there.88H In addition, Foday Lansana, Witness TF1-
585, Dauda Aruna F0mie, TF1-567, TF1-539, Jabaty Jaward, TF1-516 and TF1-371 all
testified that Deen, an RUF radi0 Operator, lived and worl3863. The Accused testified that neither he nor his government was involved in the
Freetown Invasion on 6 January 1999.8813 He had no prior 1anyone, nor encouraged anyone to invade Freetown.88l4 The Accused also denied receiving
any information about the Freetown Invasion from Benjamin Yeaten and stated that Lewis
Brown, his Security Advis0r, inf0mied him of the 0ccurrence of the event.88l5 The Accused
further denied 1Deliberations
3864. The Prosecution relies on the evidence of M0hamed Kabbah to support the allegation
that during the Freetown Invasion, the Accused and Benjamin Yeaten received reports from
8807 DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47406-47407.
8808 0017-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47408.
8*"" Der-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47420.
WO DCT-008, Transcript 1 September 2010, pp. 47674-47674.
SSH TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2381 (CS).
gm Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008 pp. 4475-4477; TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008 pp. 15832-15833;
Dauda Aruna Fornie, 2 December 2008 pp. 21434-21436; TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12990-12991
(PS); TF1-539, 10 June 2008 pp. 11463-1464; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008 pp. 13418-13421; TF1-
516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7106-7108; 15 April 2008, p. 7640; 16 April 2008 p. 7743; TF1-371,
Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2381.
8813 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29273-29277; Transcript 16 September 2009, p.
29104.
W4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29273-29277.
8815 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29104-29105.

---- End of Page 1335 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z my 18 May 2012

za 47-%
RUF operators stationed in Monrovia. Kabbah testified that on the day of the invasion,
contact was initiated by TF1-516, who was Yeaten's radio operator in Monrovia.88|7 TF1-
516 testified, however, that he was not assigned to Yeaten in Monrovia until June or July
1999, which would have been after the Freetown Invasion.
3865. Defence Witness DCT-008 offered blanket denials that TF1-516 ever worked for
Yeaten in Momovia.88l8 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of DCT-
008 must be treated with caution, and requires corroboration.88l9 Moreover, the fact that
TF1-516 worked in Monrovia for Yeaten at some point during the indictment period is
corroborated by several witnesses,882O and so DCT-008's testimony to the contrary
undermines his credibility.
3866. The Trial Chamber finds that the testimony of TF1-516, a generally credible
witness,882| that he did not arrive in Monrovia until June or July 1999, which would have
been after the Freetown Invasion, raises a doubt as to Kabbah's assertion that TF1-516
initiated contact between Sierra Leone and Liberia during the Freetown Invasion.
3867. The Trial Chamber notes that there is substantial evidence that at a certain point
another RUF operator, Memunam Deen, was stationed in Liberia. Apart from DCT-008,
who testified that Deen used Base 1 between November 1998 and mid-1999, no other
witnesses confinned that Deen was stationed in Monrovia during the Freetown Invasion.
DCT-008 also testified that Deen never used Base 1 during the Freetown Invasion.
Furthermore, all other witnesses testified that Deen was stationed at either the RUF
guesthouse or the home of Musa Cissé, and not at Benjamin Yeaten's house.8822
gm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 291 14.
gsm The Trial Chamber notes that Mohamed Kabbah was initially confused about whether Pascal or TF1-516
was Yeaten's radio operator at this time. Kabbah corrected himself to state that TF1-516 was assigned to Yeaten
and Pascal was assigned to Bockarie. The Trial Chamber has found that this discrepancy was minor and did not
affect his credibility. See Military Operations: Allegation that the Accused Directed the Freetown Invasion.
gm Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44900-44902; 11 August 2010, p. 45992; 12 August 2010, p. 46107;
25 August 2010, pp. 47016, 47110; DCT-008, 1 September 2010, pp. 47734.
gm Credibility Assessment, DCT-008, paras 373-380.
gm TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13043-13044; TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12651-12652;
TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15809-15910 (PS).
wl Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras 275-284.
gm Foday Lansana, 21 February 2008, pp. 4475-4477 (RUF guesthouse); TF1-585, Transcript 9 September
2008, pp. 15832-15833 (Deen was not stationed Yeaten's house but would sometimes go to Yeaten's house, but
was inconsistent on this point); Dauda Aruna F ornie, 2 December 2008, pp. 21434—21436 (Musa Cissé's house);
TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12990-12991 (PS) (RUF guesthouse); TF1-539, 10 June 2008, pp. 11463-

---- End of Page 1336 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3°¤··x°—‘n
3868. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that during the Freetown Invasion, Bockarie was in frequent contact with
the Accused, either directly or through Yeaten, in relation to the progress of the Freetown
operation. The evidence shows, however, that these communications were made via satellite
phone or through Sunlight, a Liberian radio operator based in Monrovia at Yeaten's
house.8823 In addition, several witnesses testified to the fact that Sunlight was Yeaten's radio
operator in Monrovia.8824
3869. In consideration of the above, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not
proved beyond reasonable doubt the allegation that an RUF operator gave updates to the
Accused and Yeaten during the Freetown Invasion.
Findings
3870. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused and Benjamin Yeaten received updates from an RUF operator
stationed in Liberia during the Freetown Invasion.
(vi) Communications during Mosquito Spray incident
Submissions of the Parties
387l. The Prosecution has considered in another section of this judgement whether the
Accused used RUF/AFRC forces to assist him in his fight against Mosquito Spray and
LURD forces. The Prosecution also alleges that around the time of the Mosquito Spray
incident, the RUF sent a radio operator to work directly with Benjamin Yeaten, in order to
coordinate and ensure smooth communications between the Goverrmient of Liberia and the
RUF/AFRC.8825 ,
l464 (Musa Cissé's house); Jabaty Jaward, Transcript l0 July 2008, pp. l34l8-l342l (did not know where Deen
was located); TFl-5l6, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7l06-7l08; l5 April 2008, p. 7640; l6 April 2008, p. 7743
(RUF guesthouse); TFl-37l, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 238l (unknown).
Sm Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, Allegation that the Accused Directed the Freetown Invasion.
*824 TFl-5l6, Transcript 8 April 2008 pp. 6890, 6938; TFI-567, 2 July 2008 p. l29l8; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript
l0 July 2008 p. I3362; TPI-585, Transcript 8 September 2008 p. l5632; Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2
December 2008 p. 2l44l; DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47024—47025;
8825 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 320.

---- End of Page 1337 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr.-03-oi-T /, QQ is May 20l2 M

33430
3872. The Defence submits that the Prosecution's evidence is highly suspect and
contested,8826 and that Witness TF1-516 was not interested in telling the truth, but in
providing an inculpatory testimony.8827
Evidence
3873. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,8828 testified that in June or July 1999, Issa
Sesay ordered him to move to Liberia to work for Benjamin Yeaten, (a.k.a.) 50 or Unit 50.
Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag) provided accommodation to the witness until Yeaten's
arrival, three days later.8829
3874. While he was working under Benjamin Yeaten, Witness TF1-516's task was to
transmit messages between RUF leaders Bockarie and Sesay and Yeaten in order to ensure
smooth operations to keep the supply route between Liberia and RUF open. Witness TF1-
516 testified that he remained in Liberia until late 2001 when the witness fled Liberia
because he had reason to believe he would be accused of collaborating with the
Kamajors.8830
3875. Witness TF1-567 an RUF member,8831 testified that upon meeting Varmuyan Sherif
in Monrovia in late 2000, Sherif told him that RUF members were working with him on the
front lines, fighting in Foya and in Guinea. Yeaten, who was based in Foya, was
coordinating the fighting with the RUF troops coming from Sierra Leone and the other
militias who combined their forces to attack Guinea. Witness TF1-567 heard also that, at
that time, an RUF radio operator was brought from Sierra Leone to ensure the
communications between RUF and Yeaten via long range radios. Witness TF1-567 met this
operator on various occasions in Monrovia.8832
8826 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1293.
8827 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1496-1502
8828 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
8829 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860; 6968.
8830 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6862-6863, 6866-6969.
ml TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS).
gm TF1-567, Transcript 7July 2008, pp. 13041-13044.

---- End of Page 1338 ---------------------------


Case No.; S SL-03-01-T 18 Ma 2012
/ Us Y Q

Eq *1-3 1
3876. Witness TF1-375, an RUF fighter,8833 testified that, in 2000, he was assigned by
Benjamin Yeaten to return to Sierra Leone in order to investigate the hostage-taking of
Zambian peace-keepers. While there, Witness TF1-3 75 saw Issa Sesay addressing the
peacekeepers. Witness TF1-3 75 testified that after this, he called an RUF radio operator to
talk to Yeaten and confirmed the capture of the peacekeepers. Yeaten answered that he
would call Sesay on his satellite phone, and asked Witness TF1-3 75 to return to Liberia.8834
3877. Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,8835 was appointed in 1999 by Sam
Bockarie as overall signal commander of the RUF in Sierra Leone.8836 Kabbah testified that
at the time Benjamin Yeaten was in Foya, the RUF sent a radio operator in order to assist
Yeaten was in radio communications.8837
3878. Witness Karmoh Kanneh, a senior commander in the RUF,8838 testified that after
fighting LURD forces in Liberia and Guinea, he reported the success of the operation by
radio to Benjamin Yeaten who was in Voinjama. Kanneh testified that at that time, he had a
radio operator who had been assigned to him for that operation.8839
Deliberations
3879. Witness TF1-516 testified that in June or July 1999, Issa Sesay ordered him to move
to Liberia in order to ensure communications between Benjamin Yeaten and the RUF during
joint operations.884O The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Witness TF1-516 is a
generally credible witness.884l Moreover, Witness TF1-516's account is corroborated by
Mohamed Kabbah, who testified that at the time Yeaten was in Foya, the RUF sent a radio
operator in order to assist Yeaten in radio communications.8842 Witnesses TF1-567 and TF1-
**33 Tri-575, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.
883* Tri-575, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp.12650-12655.
8835 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
8836 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16126-16127.
8*37 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16134.
gm Kamnoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.
8839 Kamnoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9477-9478. See also summary of Kanneh's evidence in
Relationship of the Accused with the RUF: Operations Outside Sierra Leone.
gm Tri-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860; 6968.
W Credibility Assessment, Tri-516, paras 275-284.
8842 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16134.

---- End of Page 1339 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X GUQ 18 May 2012

31 QBZL
375, who contacted Benjamin Yeaten by radio in 2000, confirmed that this same RUF
operator was assigned to Yeaten.8843
3880. The Trial Chamber notes that Joseph Marzah who, according to Witness TF1-516,
provided TF1-516 with accommodation until Yeaten's arrival,8844 did not testify about this
event. However, neither the Prosecution nor the Defence questioned him on it. Similarly,
Varmuyan Sherif was not asked to confirm Witness TF1-567's statement that Sherif told
him that a RUF radio operator was sent by RUF to ensure communication between the RUF
and Yeaten.8845
3881. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that in April 1999 and onwards, AFRC/RUF
forces fought alongside Liberian troops against LURD and their allies.8846 The Trial
Chamber also recalls its finding that during the fighting against Mosquito Spray's LURD
between April 1999 and July 2000, RUF members operated under the overall command of
Yeaten.8847
3882. In this particular context, and considering the strong corroboration of Witness TF1-
516's account, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that, around the time of the Mosquito Spray incident in August 1999, the RUF sent a
radio operator who worked directly with Yeaten, in order to coordinate communications
between Yeaten and the RUF.
Findings
3883. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that around the time of the Mosquito Spray incident in 1999, the RUF sent a radio operator
to Liberia who worked directly with Benjamin Yeaten, in order to coordinate
communications between Yeaten and the RUF.
(vii) Communications Capability to Johnny Paul Koroma
8843 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13041-13044; TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp.12650-12655.
8844 TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860; 6968.
$845 TFI-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13041-13044.
88% Relationship of the Accused with the RUF: Operations Outside Sierra Leone.
8847 Relationship of the Accused with the RUF : Operations Outside Sierra Leone.

---- End of Page 1340 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Org 18 May 2012

39 *+33
Submissions of the Parties, Evidence and Deliberation
3884. The Trial Chamber has considered in another section of this judgement the
Accused's role in facilitating a meeting between Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma in
order to facilitate the release of UN officials taken captive by the West Side Boys. The
Prosecution alleges that Taylor provided communications capability to Koroma when he
travelled to Monrovia for this meeting.8g48 The Defence concedes that the Accused provided
Koroma with a long-range radio when he travelled to Monrovia, and insists that this was
done in order for him to contact the West Side Boys and ensure them that he was free, and to
ive them instructions to release the hosta es that were detained.8849 Because the arties do
S S P
not dispute that the communications capabilities were provided to Koroma, the Trial
Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved this allegation beyond reasonable doubt.
Findings
3885. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that a Liberian radio was provided to Johnny Paul Koroma. However, this radio was
provided specifically for the purpose of enabling Koroma to communicate with the West
Side Boys about the UN peacekeepers that they had taken hostage.
(e) "448" Warnings
Submissions of the Parties
3886. The Prosecution alleges that communications between the RUF and Taylor's
subordinates in Liberia included "448 messages", used to warn the RUF when ECOMOG
jets left Monrovia to attack the AFRC/RUF forces in Sierra Leone.8850 These warnings, the
Prosecution contends, came from, among others, NPF L radio operators Sky 1 and Sunlight
in Liberia, or radio stations in Vahun and Foya, Liberia. They were then passed to Buedu,
Sierra Leone and on to AFRC/RUF units throughout the country.885l
8848 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 316.
88*9 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 644; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26678-26679;
Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31651—31652.
8850 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 315, 530-31.
3851 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 315.

---- End of Page 1341 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % GL! 18 May 2012

Ea wsu
3887. The Defence denies that Taylor's subordinates in Liberia sent ‘"448 messages" to the
RUF, and submits that the RUF had its own operators stationed in Buedu, Sierra Leone who
would monitor ECOMOG communications and alert fighters to the movement of ECOMOG
jets. The Defence further contends that it is "highly doubtful" that a person stationed in
Monrovia could ascertain the intended destination of a jet merely from observing its
departure.5552
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
3888. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,5555 was the Overall Signal
Commander for the RUF in Buedu between early 1998 and December 1999. Kabbah
testified that during this period the station in Buedu would receive radio messages from
Sunlight5554 in Monrovia, Liberia, telling the RUF when ECOMOG jets were moving from
Monrovia. Sunlight would "tell us that the Four-Four-Eight or the iron bird is moving from
Monrovia" and then the station in Buedu would pass on the message to all RUF stations on
the frontlines so that they could take cover.555 5
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -585
3889. Witness TF1-585 worked as a radio operator for the RUF from approximately 1995
until at least 2001.5555 In 1998, when the witness was an operator in Buedu, the radio station
in Buedu was used for "448 messages".5557 Whenever an ECOMOG jet took off from
Roberts International Airport in Monrovia, the NPFL operator Sky 1 in Liberia5555 would
send a message to the central RUF control station in Buedu that a "448" had left its location.
5552 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1528.
5555 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
5554 Several witnesses confirmed that "Sun1ight" operated the radio at Base 1, Yeaten's residence in Liberia,
during this time period. TF1-371, 29 January 2008 pp. 2452-53; TFl—5l6, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6860-
6861, 6889-6891, 6910; TF1-516, 9 April 2008 p. 7005, 11 April 2008 p. 7318; TF1-567, 2 July 2008 p.
129l8;TFl-585, 9 September 2008 p. 15828; Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21494;
DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46950, 47030.
5555 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16129-16130.
8*% rrr-585, Transcript 5 Sept 2008, p. 15592.
5557 TF1—585, Transcript 5 Sept 2008, pp. 15599-15600; 10 September 2008, pp. 15885.
5555 Several witnesses confirmed that "Sky 1"operated a radio for Taylor in Liberia, either at Taylor's Executive
Mansion or at Roberts International Airport. TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6890-6891; DCT-008, 31
August 2010, p. 47548.

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3%,2;*
The Buedu station would then tell the commanders in Buedu to "ring the bell", telling any
RUF in Buedu or its surroundings to go into hiding. The RUF would receive such messages
not only from Sky 1 but also from Foxtrot Yankee station, at Foya airfield in Liberia; Lima
Bravo station in Benjamin Yeaten's compound in Monrovia, Liberia; and Victor 1 station, in
Vahun, Liberia.6659
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
3890. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULIMO-K who
later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,6666 was in Buedu, Sierra Leone during the 6
January 1999 attack on Freetown.666l He testified that radio operators Zedman,6862 in Buedu,
and Memunatu6663 and Sita,6664 who were stationed in Liberia, monitored ECOMOG radio
stations based in Monrovia. If a jet took off from Roberts International Airport, in Monrovia,
these operators would call 448 and "the radio operator would ring a bell and everybody
would escape".6665
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
3891. Witness Isaac Mongor was a senior member of the RUF hierarchy.6666 Mongor
testified that as a field commander on the front lines in 1998, he would monitor the radio for
"448 messages". These warnings were sent to all stations alerting them to the movements of
ECOMOG Alpha Jets, so that those on the front lines could take cover.6667
6659 TPI-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15597-15600; 8 September 2008, pp. 15628-32; 9 September
2008, p. 15855-58; 10 September 2008, pp. 15884-88, 15890-97, 15901-06.
6666 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000; 24 January 2008,
pp. 2110, 2145.
666l Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020.
6662 Both Abu Keita and Witness TFl-516 testified that Zedman was a senior radio operator in Buedu, Sierra
Leone at this time. Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2015; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6857.
6663 Several witnesses testified that Memunatu was operating the radio at the guest house in Liberia during this
time period. Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44239-44241; TFl-371, Transcript. 28 January 2008, pp.
2434-2435 (CS); DCT-008 first testified that Memunatu would use the radio at Base One in Liberia every day in
November or late December 1998, and she continued to do so in 1999. DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp.
47400, 47407-41 1, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47403-47404. DCT-008 later contradicts himself by saying
that there was no radio contact between the RUF and Deen in Liberia in early January 1999 because Memunatu
was in Sierra Leone. DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47420.
6664 Abu Keita testified that Sita was a radio operator in Buedu, Sierra Leone at this time. Abu Keita, Transcript
23 January 2008, pp. 2016-18;
6665 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2024-2025, 2069.
6666 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5692.
***7 rpm Mppgpr, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5771-5773.

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?>°r¤rZ><-
3892. Mongor stated that 448 messages originated from operators in Buedu, and also from
operators in Liberia. Most of these operators were former operators with the SLA, who were
trained with the Nigerians and so knew the code that the Nigerian ECOMOG operators were
using. Some of the monitors in Liberia included Memunatu Deen, Osman Tolo and
Ebony.8g68 Mongor also testified that he heard "448 messages" over the radio he was
monitoring on 6 January 1999 when the RUF entered Freetown.88°9
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
3893. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC memberggm and officerggm, testified that
while in Koidu in 1998, Superman told him that Mosquito called and warned them that an
ECOMOG "jet 448" was en route to Koidu.82;72 The witness stated that "Mosquito said that
he had got information from President Taylor that the 448 had left and it was coming to
attack positions in Koidu Town".8873 Before the RUF went to Koidu Town there were no
ECOMOG air raids, after they started, however, radios were monitored, and when Superman
received word that ECOMOG jets were coming he would pass this information to all RUF
bases and everyone would take cover.8874
Prosecution Witness TF1—5 16
3894. Witness TF1—516 was an RUF radio operator from 1994 to 1999.8875 The witness
testified that during the Freetown Invasion the RUF had a team of former SLA radio
operators based in Buedu named Gbamayagi, Atati, Ache and Sheku. They were responsible
for monitoring and decoding ECOMOG messages. This included transmitting "448
messages" to the front line that an ECOMOG jet was in the air and the fighters should take
cover. These operators were familiar with Morse code and could therefore understand
ECOMOG communications, most of which were transmitted in Morse code.82;76
8868 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5772-5775.
mq Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5826.
8870 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7867, 7869; 28 April 2008, pp. 8684, 8689.
8871 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865-7866.
W2 Airmamy Bobson spsay, 18 April 2008, pp. 8017-8018.
$*73 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 18 April 2008, pp. 8018-8019.
W4 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 18 April 2008 p. 8019; 23 April 2008, pp. 8313-14.
8875 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6828-6839; Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7456-7457.
**8% TPI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6943-6944.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z OLS 18 May 2012

3em¤>Sl—
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
3895. Witness Perry Kamara was an RUF radio operator from approximately 1991 to
1998.8877 Kamara testified that in 1998, ECOMOG fighter jets from Lungi airport, in Sierra
Leone, would attack RUF positions in Kailahun, Koinadugu, and Koidu. The RUF had a
radio in Buedu, where Sam Bockarie was located, that was monitored by AFRC members
who were formerly in the SLA. These operators would monitor ECOMOG radio activities,
and then send a "448" coded message informing AFRC and RUF combatants that
ECOMOG jets were on their way to attack. Kamara would pass this information along to
other radio stations.8878
3896. Kamara also testified that while the RUF occu ied State House, ECOMOG would
P
attack from the air and he would receive a "448 message" from Buedu about every two
hours.8879
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna F omie
3897. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornje was a radio operator in Buedu at the time of the 6
January 1999 Freetown attack.888O On that day, F omie was monitoring the radio by listening
to ECOMOG communications, decoding them, and then taking them to Mosquito's
transmitting station.888l
3898. When Fomie heard air mission requests for ECOMOG Alpha Jets to bomb RUF
zones, he took these communications to the transmitting station, where they were sent to the
articular tar et station.8882 Each tar et station had a bell, and an time a station heard a
P S S Y
"448", that is, that an enemy aircraft was coming, the operator in that station would ring the
bell in order to alarm everyone.8883 One specific example of this occurred when F omie took
an intercepted message to Bravo Zulu 4, and the operator on duty transmitted the message to
Sw Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3028; Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3200.
8*78 Perry Karrrara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3223-3224.
8879 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3231, 3236.
8880 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21562.
ml Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21562-21563.
8882 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21566-215667.
888* Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 215667-215668.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (KD 18 May 2012

3q C43 8
Freetown. Two RUF stations in the area to be attacked received the message and by the time
the jets arrived the fighters had changed their location.8884
The Accused
3899. The Accused denied informing Bockarie that ECOMOG jets were en route to Koudi,
as Alimany Bobson Sesay testified. He stated that as President, it would have been
impossible for him to be on the radio or telephone in order to warn anyone of a possible
attack.8885 He also denied being familiar with the term "448" in reference to this type of
warning.8886
3900. The Accused also denied knowing that, as TF1—585 testified, an operator named Sky
1 would wam fighters when "448" jets took off from the airport in Monrovia. He testified
that there may have been a radio station at the airport, but that the RUF could not have
installed a radio inside Liberia, except for the radio that was installed at the RUF guesthouse
in Monrovia in late 1998.8887
3901. The Accused also stated that a person operating from the airport in Monrovia would
not be able to tell where a jet was flying to when it took off from the airport.8888
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
3902. Witness Issa Sesay was a high level leader in the RUF during the operative
period.8889 The witness testified that there was a strategy of monitoring ECOMOG radios,
but denied that Zedman, Memunatu and Sita were doing so. Neither Zedman nor Memunatu
knew Morse code, which was necessary in order to monitor these communications. Only the
SLA knew Morse code, and it was former SLA operators in Buedu who would monitor
ECOMOG communications. Sesay testified that Zedman was not in Buedu, and Sita was not
a radio operator. Sesay also stated that from March to December 1998, ECOMOG Alpha jets
assaulting RUF positions flew from Lungi airport, in Sierra Leone, and not from Monrovia,
8884 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21596—215997.
8885 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp 29993—29995.
8886 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 29993—29998.
8887 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30137—30139, p. 30142.
mg Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 29996.
mg Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43589.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / `T 18 May 2012

3
awiéet
in Liberia. It was from 1997 to January or February 1998 that these jets came from
Monrovia.889O
Defence Witness DCT-008
3903. Witness DCT-008 was an NFPL radio operator in Liberia in 1998. He testified that
he had never heard of the code "448", and stated that the operators never had a specific code
for the movement of ECOMOG jets.889l They had a different signal for the movement of any
enemy jet, which was 15-2.8892
Deliberations
3904. The key issue over which the Prosecution and Defence differ is whether NPFL
operators in Liberia transmitted 448 messages to RUF forces in order to wam them of
impending ECOMOG jet attacks, or whether these messages were transmitted only by RUF
and formerly SLA operators in Sierra Leone
3905. Five out of eight Prosecution witnesses gave evidence that Taylor's radio operators
in Liberia sent "448 messages" to RUF operators in Sierra Leone, which were then passed
on to RUF combatants. Mohamed Kabbah testified that operators in Buedu received this
information fiom an operator named Sunlight; Witness TF1-585 claimed that Buedu
received the messages from Sky 1; and Abu Keita testified that Buedu received these
messages from Memunatu and Sita. lsaac Mongor simply stated that these messages came
from "operators in Liberia", while Alimamy Bobson Sesay heard from Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman) that Sam Bockarie received this information from Taylor.
3906. The Defence contends that the testimony of these witnesses contradict one another.
While three of these witnesses mentioned different operators in Liberia transmitting these
messages, all five witnesses corroborated each other's testimony on the fact that the
messages were sent from positions in Liberia to Buedu, and passed on to RUF combatants.
The Trial Chamber finds the evidence of these witnesses credible and considers that "448
messages" may have come from more than one operator.
M isset Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45564-45565.
gw DCT-008, 1 September 2010, pp. 47687, 47722-47723.
*892 DCT-00s, 1 September 2010, p. 477221.

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/’ \

3 C1 *+*1%
3907. The Defence also highlights that Kabbah's testimony that "Sunlight was at the
Mansion Ground in Monrovia"8893 contradicts witnesses TFl-371,8894 Issa Sesayf;895 and
TF1-516,88% who testified that Sunlight was actually based in Benjamin Yeaten's house
behind White Flower. ln the Trial Chamber's view, because Kabbah did not visit Monrovia,
and his knowledge of Sunlight's location was therefore based solely on information given to
him by other operators who went to Liberia with Sam Bockarie,8897 and because Kabbah did
not use the term "Executive Mansion" but rather spoke of "Charles Taylor's Mansion
Ground", Kabbah may have conflated the Defendant's White Flower residence with the
Executive Mansion.8898 The Trial Chamber does not find Kabbah's testimony on this point
to be detrimental to his credibility.
3908. The Defence contends that it was former SLA operators in Buedu, Sierra Leone who
sent these "448 messages" to RUF fighters. Prosecution Witnesses TF1-516, Perry Kamara,
and Dauda Aruna Fornie, as well as Defence witness Issa Sesay, attested to this. The Trial
Chamber notes, however, that the fact that ‘448 messages’ were sent from Buedu does not
exclude the possibility that 448 messages were also sent from Liberia. None of the five
Prosecution witnesses attesting to the fact that 448 messages were sent from Sierra Leone
indicated whether or not messages were also sent from Liberia. Moreover, witnesses Abu
Keita and Isaac Mongor both testified that these messages originated in both Sierra Leone ·
and Liberia. The Trial Chamber considers that DCT-008's assertion that he had never heard
of 448 messages does not raise doubt as to the overwhelming evidence that these messages
existed and recalls its finding that his testimony must be treated with caution and requires
corroboration.
3909. The Defence also asserts that Liberian operators could not have transmitted 448
messages because they did not know Morse code, which was the format in which ECOMOG
messages were transmitted. Only former SLA operators working with the RUF who were
trained in Morse code, Issa Sesay contended, could have monitored and transmitted
ECOMOG messages. However, Sesay, who was not a radio operator, did not provide any
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16133.
8894 TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2452-2453.
8895 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45074.
88% TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6890-6891.
8897 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16133.
gm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p, 16127.

---- End of Page 1348 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // GTLS 18 May 2012
/ x

3a¤¤\
basis for his assertion that all ECOMOG messages were in Morse code, or that Liberian
operators did not know Morse code, which was the context in which he said that Zedman
and Deen did not know Morse code. Mongor testified that "most" operators were from the
SLA, and TF1—516 testified that "most" ECOMOG messages were in Morse code. In light
of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Defence arguments regarding Morse code
do not cast any doubt on the overwhelming evidence that the messages were transmitted by
N PFL operators.
3910. Considering all of the above evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that Taylor's
subordinates in Liberia sent 448 messages waming the RUF of ECOMOG attacks on RUF
positions in Sierra Leone.
3911. With regard to the Accused, Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified
that when he was in Koidu in 1998, Denis Mingo (a.k.a Superman) told him that Bockarie
had called to wam them that an ECOMOG jet was en route to Koidu and that Bockarie said
that he had received this information from President Taylor.8899 This is the only evidence
that specifically mentions the Accused as having sent a waming to Sierra Leone that an
ECOMOG jet was en route. It is uncorroborated, and it is hearsay. The Accused denied
sending a waming, saying that it would have been impossible for him, as President, to have
sent a warning on the radio or by telephone. The sense of the evidence given by Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, in the view of the Trial Chamber, was not that the Accused necessarily
transmitted a message personally but that he had caused a message to be sent to Bockaiie.
Nevertheless, it cannot find, on the basis of the evidence, that the Accused personally sent a
message to Bockarie waming him that an ECOMOG jet was en mute.
3912. However, the Trial Chamber considers that Alimany Bobson Sesay's evidence
linking Taylor to the transmission of 448 messages, corroborates the overwhelming
evidence that these 448 messages were regularly and consistently transmitted by his
subordinates, which leads the Trial Chamber to find that the Accused must have been aware
of the transmission of these wamings.
Findings
8899 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, 18 April 2008, pp. 8018-8019.

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Case No.; SCSL—03—0l—T 6-lb; 18 May 2012

T’>°r•-tw?.
3913. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that "448 messages" were sent by subordinates of the Accused in Liberia alerting the RUP
when ECOMOG jets left Monrovia to attack APRC/RUP forces in Sierra Leone. The Trial
Chamber hrrther finds that the Accused knew that his subordinates were sending these
messages.
2. Support and Training
(a) Alleged Logistical support
3914. The Trial Chamber notes the evidence in the section of the Judgement dealing with
the supply or facilitation of the supply of arms and ammunition by the Accused and of
logistical support provided by the Accused in the transportation of such materiel. The Trial
Chamber found that materiel was regularly escorted across the border by security personnel
working for the Accused, including Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Joseph Marzah (a.k.a.
Zigzag), and Sampson Weah from 1998 onwards.99999 These individuals would transport the
materiel using trucks ranging from land cruisers and pick up trt1cks999l to ten-tyre,99O2 or
eight-tyre trt1cks.99O9 Although there is no specific evidence to this effect, the Trial Chamber
considers it reasonable to infer, given that they were used by the Accused's subordinates,
that the Accused also made available the vehicles in which the materiel was transported.
Security personnel also escorted Bockarie and Issa Sesay when they picked up arms and
ammunition from Monrovia, and also when they took diamonds to the Accused.9999 Where
9990 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply of Materiel, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).
9991 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19831-19834 (The witness, accompanied by Jungle and Sampson
Weah, took ammunition to Bockarie in Buedu using a Toyota pick-up truck, including grenades, rockets, AK
rounds and RPGs);·Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1142-1144 (Sherif met Bockarie in Foya
and together they moved to the border where Sherif gave Bockarie the pick-up full of arms comprising AK-47,
RPG and other guns. The witness stated that some of the arms were in bags coated with mud).
8902 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12906.
S90} TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15136; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15207-15209 (PS).
9904 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21447 (On a trip from Sierra Leone to Monrovia,
Bockarie and his group were met in Voinjama by Jungle, who travelled onward with them to Gbarnga); Samuel
Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10544, 10546; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10797 (Kargbo testified that on
his way to Foya with other RUF members, the group encountered a white Land Cruiser, loaded with
ammunition, as well as Bockarie, Jungle and other SSS men); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2031-
2032 (ln May 2000, Issa Sesay was escorted to Liberia by Marzah and Tamba and brought back a satellite
phone as well as fifty boxes of ammunition); TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2384 (CS) (TF1-371
stated that on trips to Liberia, Bockarie would take diamonds and retum with materials including AK rounds,
RPG bombs and hand grenades. On returning to Buedu, Bockarie was always escorted by members of Taylor's
SSS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-'I` // P" 18 May 2012 l

?>"l cut;
necessary, these security escorts also facilitated the crossing of border checkpoints into or
from Liberia.89O5
3915. The Trial Chamber has found that occasionally in 1998, and regularly from mid-
1999, when insurgents began attacks on Lofa County, ammunition was flown to Foya via
helicopter and taken to Buedu by road.g906 The Trial Chamber has also accepted that from at
least 1999, the Liberian govemment had helicopters which were used by the Accused for the
purposes of delivering arms and/or ammunition to the RUF.89O7 The evidence also indicates
that the Accused also sent helicopters to transport Bockarie and Issa Sesay to Liberia on
their trips to obtain materiel.g90g
3916. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that during the Indictment period, the Accused
provided road and air transportation to the RUF and RUF/AFRC of arms and ammunition
into Sierra Leone and security personnel to escort that materiel, as well as facilitated the
travel of Bockarie and Issa Sesay to Monrovia for arms and ammunition deals. Having
regard to the fact that from August 1997, Sierra Leone was subject to a total arms embargo
imposed by ECOWAS,g9O9 and from October 1997, by the United Nations Security
8905 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19835 (The witness testified that on his trips escorting materiel
from Liberia into Sierra Leone, there was no difficulty passing through the border checkpoints because "all those
who were assigned at that checkpoint knew exactly what was going on and they knew the various cornrnanders
like Sampson and Jungle"); TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12996-13000 (TF1-567 also testified that when
delivering arms and arnrnunition to Sierra Leone during 2000 and 2001, he never faced any problems at
checkpoints because he was accompanied by Liberian Secret Service personnel.).
8906 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply of Materiel, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).
8907 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply of Materiel, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).
8908 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp 9458-9462 (when ULIMO and LURD forces invaded Lofa, the
Accused invited Bockarie and the witness to Monrovia. Benjamin Yeaten came to Foya to meet them "in [the]
same military helicopter with the combat colour". On their return to Sierra Leone, ammunition was loaded into a
vehicle and driven to the airfield for the helicopter to pick them up and take them to Foya); Augustine Mallah,
Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20209 (During 1998, Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and Gbarnga. Mallah
accompanied him to Foya in a vehicle, from where Bockarie was picked up by helicopter and transported to
Monrovia); TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12982-12983 (following Johnny Paul Koroma's and Foday
Sankoh's departure for Freetown in October 1999, Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten went to meet with the
Accused. On his return, Bockarie boarded a helicopter at Spriggs Field with Bockarie which was loaded with up
to 15 "sardine" tins of AK rounds and an "RPG bomb with the TNT".); TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008,
pp. 15165-15166 (in early 2001, Issa Sesay travelled to Monrovia, where he met with the Accused and gave the
Accused diamonds. The following day Issa Sesay flew to F oya on a helicopter with arms and ammunitions, food
and other materials, including diesel that he eventually transported to Sierra Leone).
8909 Exhibit D-135, ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, Abuja,
Nigeria, 26 August 1997, p. 3; Exhibit P-078, Sierra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians,
Amnesty International Report, p. 2; Exhibit D-340, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 33, August 1997", p. 6; Exhibit P-034, Profile: Economic Cornrnunity of West
African States (ECOWAS); Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / ·~ 18 May 2012

39 www
Council,89lO the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the facilitation of road and air transportation
of materiel, as well as security escorts, played an important role in the operations of the RUF
and the RUF/AFRC. (
Findings
3917. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that during the Indictment period, the Accused provided much needed road and air
transportation to the RUF of arms and ammunition into RUF territory, as well as security
personnel to escort materiel across military checkpoints, which played a vital role in the
operations of the RUF/AFRC during a period when an international arms embargo was in
force.
(b) Alleged Financial Support
Introduction
3918. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided financial assistance to the RUF
and later to the AFRC/RUF. In doing so, the Prosecution makes a number of discrete
allegations which the Chamber will consider consecutively.
(i) Alleged Payment to Foday Sankoh and the External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire.
Submissions of the Parties
3919. The parties do not dispute that Taylor gave 10 million CFA francs to Foday Sankoh
and the External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire. The Prosecution submits that this money from
Taylor was used for, among other things, travel to Belgium and France, countries that
supported Taylor, which gave the External Delegation the opportunity to advance diamond
sales in Europe and to arrange arms shipments on behalf of Taylor and the RUF.89H The
Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Fact AC.
8910 Exhibit P-069, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, S/RES/1 132 (1997), 8 October 1997"; see
also Exhibit P-070 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1171, 5 June 1998"; Exhibit P-311, "United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1231, S/RES/1231 (1999), 11 March 1999", paras 1-4, 7-12.
BW Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 128, 335-336.

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / dg 18 May 2012

Beau;
Defence, on the other hand, submits that this money was intended to cover the Extemal
Delegation's expenses in pursuing the peace process.89l2
Evidence
Defence Witness Faygia Musa
3920. Witness Fayia Musa, a member of the Extemal Delegation,89l3 testified that in
December 1996, Taylor was present in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire on the same day that the RUF
launched "Footpaths to Democracy" at the Ivorian Foreign Ministry.89l4 When they finished
the launch Dr Addai Sebo said he was going to inform Taylor that the Delegation was in
Abidjan launching the book, and later that day Dr Sebo returned to say that Taylor wanted to
see them.89l5
3921. The witness and Deen Jalloh met Taylor in his room at the Hotel Ivoire, where
Taylor was very busy and the room was crowded. Taylor congratulated them on achieving
the first leg of the peace process, and said that marketing themselves and making their views
and objectives known was an important start to this. Taylor told his bodyguard, General
Jackson, to give to Deen J a11oh 10 million CFA francs for their maintenance in C6te d’Ivoire
and to support them during the peace process.89l6 Every month Deen Jalloh would take
45,000 francs CFA from this money and give it to the family of each delegate.89l7
3922. The witness said that the money was also used to buy air tickets for himself and
Jonathan Kposowa to go to Belgium and The Netherlands in July 1996. They were given an
‘ordre de mission’ by Ambassador Traore of Cote d’Ivoire after the witness told him that it
was necessary that they get the backing of the European Union for their political
activities.89l8 Foday Sankoh instructed them to meet with his friend "Mr Monguya", who
lived in Belgium, so that Monguya could arrange meetings with European leaders to
Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 450.
89*3 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38949.
W4 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38994-38995, 38999-39000; Transcript 20 April 2010, p. 39439.
W5 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39000; Transcript 20 April 2010 p. 39439.
8916 Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39000-39001; Transcript 19 April 2010, p. 39307; Transcript 20
April 2010, pp. 39439-39440. The witness testified that 45,000 CFA was approximately $100 at this time. Fayia
Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39001.
*°" Fayia Musa, Transcript, 29 April 2010, p. 39467.
gm Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39043-39044; Transcript 19 April 2010, pp. 39306-39307.

---- End of Page 1353 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gm 18 May 2012
/5;/

Ba wa
establish a di lomatic front in Euro e before the eace rocess. Before the arrived,
P P P P Y
Monguya contacted businessmen because he assumed the witness and Kposowa would have
diamonds, but the businessmen ended up disappointed because they were not carrying
diarnonds.89l9
3923. Monguya took them to Ludo Martens, the fornier President of the Belgian Workers’
Party, who in turn introduced them to leaders in the European Parliament.892O Martens
introduced them to Dr De Belder, the Executive Director of an NGO called Medical Aid for
the Third World.892l Musa also travelled to France and met the Foreign Minister for African
Affairs, to Gerinany to look at a Mercedes—Benz factory to see if he could acquire buses,8922
and to Holland to meet with the Foreign Minister in charge of African Affairs, "Mr
Schaapveld".8923 The witness testified that he had asked Foday Sankoh to pay for the trip but
Sankoh said that he did not have the money.8924 The witness stayed in Europe until late
September 1996.8925
Deliberations
3924. The parties do not contest that Taylor gave 10 million CFA francs to the RUF
External Delegation when they met in Abidjan, but they disagree as to the purpose of
Taylor's gift to the RUF. The Prosecution claims that Taylor provided these funds to the
External Delegation for nefarious purposes, contending that the External Delegation used the
funds that Taylor provided to travel to Belgium and France, "a country that also provided
support for Taylor",8926 and that "these travels gave the external delegates the opportunity to
advance diamond sales in Europe and to arrange arins shipments on behalf of Taylor and the
RUF".8927 However, the Prosecution cites no evidence to support the proposition that the
8919 Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39033, 39046-39047; Transcript 20 April 2010, pp. 39438,
39467.
8920 Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39046-39048; Transcript 20 April 2010, pp. 39468-39470.
ml Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39047-39048.
***22 Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39048-39049.
8923 Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39044-39045.
W4 nor-306, Transcript 20 April 2010, pp. 39467-39468.
8925 DCT-306, Transcript 20 April 2010, p. 39464.
8926 See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 128. The Prosecution's Final Trial Brief is unclear as to whether it is
Belgium or France that "also provided support to Taylor". See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 128.
8927 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 335.

---- End of Page 1354 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Baum-
delegation's trip to Europe facilitated diamonds or weapons sales.8928 Conversely, Defence
Witness Fayia Musa provided detailed testimony on his journey to Europe and his meetings
with officials there.8929 Moreover, Musa testified that he did not carry diamonds with him, as
had been expected by businessmen in Europe.893O In the absence of evidence, the
Prosecution has not proved that Taylor's provision of these funds to the RUF was used for
the facilitation of diamonds and arms sales.
Findings
3925. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused's provision of 10 million CFA francs to the RUF in Cote d’Ivoire
funded an RUF trip to Europe that enabled them to facilitate arms and diamonds deals.
(ii) Allegation that the Accused provided funds to RUF personnel stranded in Cote
d’Ivoire after Foday Sankoh was detained in Nigeria
Submissions of the Parties
3926. The Prosecution alleges that Taylor provided funds to RUF personnel stranded in
Cote d’Ivoire after Foday Sankoh was detained in Nigeria.893l
3927. The Defence contends that the evidence will show that such incidents involved
specific amounts of money provided in discrete payments on a sporadic basis. Many of these
transactions simply asserted that money was provided with no explanation as to how it was
relevant to the war or the purpose of the gift or exchange. The Defence claims that many of
the exchanges were trivial and no context was provided for the purpose of the exchange.8932
Evidence
Rm In this same paragraph in its Final Trial Brief, the Prosecution details an incident in which Taylor provided
funds to Bockarie, but the Trial Chamber notes that Bockarie was not a part of the External Delegation.
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 335.
8929 Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39033, 39043-39048; Transcript 19 April 2010, pp. 39306-
39307; Transcript, 29 April 2010, pp. 39438, 39467-39470.
8930 Fayia Musa, Transcript, 14 April 2010, pp. 39033, 39046-39047; Transcript 20 April 2010, pp. 39438,
39467.
893 I Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, para. 335.
*932 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1169-1170.

---- End of Page 1355 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /.4/ Om 18 May 2012

Emtkw
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
3928. Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to disarmament,8933
testified that following Foday Sankoh's arrest in early 1997, he travelled from Abidjan to
Danané, Cote d’1voire and stayed there for about a week.8934 He stayed at a house just 15
yards from a house where Musa Cissé, a protocol officer for Taylor, and Cissé's radio
operator Action Man were staying.8935 The following night aRer he arrived, Action Man
invited him and CO Brown, a Liberian who was a vanguard for the RUF, to Musa Cissé's
house. Musa Cissé was there. Action Man made radio contact with Sam Bockarie (a.k.a.
Mosquito) and he heard Sankoh speaking to Bockarie. He heard Sankoh say that even before
he was arrested in Nigeria he had spoken to Taylor asking that his Sierra Leonean fighters
who had crossed into Liberia with Mike Lamin be given transport back to Sierra Leone to
continue the fight. Sankoh told Bockarie that he should therefore take advice from
Taylor.8936 A few days later, CO Brown informed the witness that Musa Cissé had given him
some money which Cissé said had been sent by Taylor to sustain those who were in Danané.
The witness saw the money. However, shortly afterwards, the witness learned from a lady
who was at the house that CO Brown had escaped with the money and gone to Liberia.
Action Man confirmed to the witness that the money had been taken.8937
The Accused
3929. The Accused denied providing money to RUF members in Cote d’1voire through
Musa Cisse aRer the arrest of Foday Sankoh. He testified that he did not know either
Augustine Mallah or CO Brown.893g
Defence Witness DCT—025
3930. Witness DCT—025, an RUF memberé;939 and a Liberian Vanguard, stated that Brown
was in Danané from 1996 or 1997 to 2000. He had been ill while in Abidjan and moved to
Bm Augustine Mallah, Transcript5 12 November 2008, pp. 20092—200923, 20102—20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209—20210.
8934 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20124.
8935 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20125.
8936 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20125-20127.
8937 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20128.
8938 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30088—30089.
8939 DCT—025, Transcript 12 March 2010, pp. 37219, 37273 (PS).

---- End of Page 1356 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T / 18 May 2012

g°lQ*~\·’;t
Danane. Brown did not know "Action Man" or Augustine Mallah, or Musa Cisse nor did
Brown meet any members of the RUF and did not try to find any.894O When Augustine
Mallah's evidence was put to DCT-025 on cross-examination, he denied that Brown
received any money from Musa Cisse.894l
Deliberations
3931. Augustine Mallah's evidence was that CO Brown told him that he had been given
money by Musa Cisse, Taylor's protocol officer, who said that the Accused had sent the
money for the stranded RUF personnel. Such explanation was plausible in the circumstances
described by the witness. Moreover, Mallah testified that he actually saw the money.
Clearly, the money did not belong to CO Brown, because Brown stole the money rather than
hand it over to the stranded RUF personnel. The money therefore had to have come from
Musa Cissé, but had it been his own money, there would have been no motivation for him to
tell CO Brown that the money had been sent by Taylor.
3932. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Augustine Mallah is a generally credible
witness.8942 DCT-025 was evasive concerning CO Brown's stay in Danané, stating several
times that Brown was with his church members and had no interest in the RUF or contacting
any of his family or of events in Liberia. He stated Brown went to Liberia when there was an
elected government there in 2000. Whilst Mallah was cross-examined about his stay and
departure from Danané, Defence Counsel did not put to Mallah that CO Brown had not met
him or any other RUF members in Danané, or that Brown did not have money intended for
the RUF.8943 The Defence instead challenged Mallah on the basis of a 2003 statement in
which he had omitted to mention the incident with CO Brown. The Trial Chamber notes that
Mallah was candid about the omission but not given an opportunity by Defence Counsel to
provide any explanation.8944 Moreover when DCT-025 gave evidence for the Defence,
Defence Counsel did not ask him any questions during his examination-in-chief regarding
Mallah's testimony and in particular did not ask if Brown had been sent money for those
8940 DCT-025, Transcript 17 March 2010 pp. 37476—37480; Transcript 18 March 2010, p. 37555
gw DCT-025, Transcript 18 March 2010, pp.37523—37525 (PS). See also DCT-025, Transcript 18 March 2010,
pp. 37515, 37555.
W2 Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre—1ndictment Period (1988-1996), para. 2522.
8943 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, pp. 20335—20337; Transcript 17 November 2008, pp.
20342-20343.

---- End of Page 1357 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—0l—T 47 L7 ,.,»’ Gu 18 May 2012
X//5**

3 7 LtSn:>
members of the RUF in Danané even though the witness was in a position to know about
that matter. In cross-examination DCT-025 denied that CO Brown received money from
Cissé. However, the Trial Chamber does not accept his testimony, noting that Mallah saw
CO Brown with the money and that another person at the house told him that CO Brown had
run away with the money.Although Mallah's evidence as to the provenance of the money is
hearsay and must be treated with caution, the Trial Chamber, having considered its context
and the circumstances under which it arose, the fact that it emanated from identified sources,
CO Brown and Musa Cissé, and Musa Cissé's undisputed connection with the Accused,
finds that such evidence is nonetheless credible.
Findings
3933. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Accused provided funds to RUF personnel stranded in Cote d’Ivoire after Sankoh
was detained in Nigeria.
(iii) Allegation that the Accused provided funds to the RUF to buy arms and
ammunition from ULIMO
Submissions of the Parties
3934. The Prosecution submits that after he became President, the Accused provided Sam
Bockarie with money to purchase materiel from former ULIMO members, and made his
subordinate commanders available to assist the AF RC/RUF to obtain the materiel from Lofa
County.8945 The Trial Chamber has considered this allegation in the context of the
Prosecution allegation that the Accused facilitated the trade of weapons between the RUF
and ULIMO.8946
Deliberations
3935. The Trial Chamber notes its finding that there were several sources for the money
used to make the purchases from ULIMO, and that one of these sources was the
W4 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20342—20343.
W5 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 7, 236-237.
8946 Amis and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Supplies from ULIMO.

---- End of Page 1358 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01·T I! Gb , 18 May 2012

Bq ws i
Accused.8947 Regarding the sum of money that was allegedly given by Taylor to Sam
Bockarie, Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that Taylor "sometimes" gave Bockarie $USD
10,000 to 20,000. However, he was not sure that Bockarie gave him accurate figures and he
did not specify how many times Taylor gave Bockarie these amounts. The Trial Chambers
considers that a conservative estimate of the amount would be in the tens of thousands of
dollars.
Findings
3936. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused provided an unspecified amount of funds to the RUF in the tens of
thousands of US dollars to buy arms and ammunition from ULIMO.
(iv) Allegation that the Accused instructed Joseph Marzah to take money to Sam
Bockarie
Submissions of the Parties
3937. The Prosecution alleges that before the Freetown Invasion, the Accused gave Joseph
Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag) money to take to Sam Bockarie.8948
3938. Although the Defence does not address this allegation specifically, the Defence
contends that Marzah's statements concerning his actions and payments made to him by
Taylor are self-serving and unreliable.8949
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
3939. Witness Varmuyan Sherif, a former ULIMO-K fighter who became an officer in the
SSS,895O testified that from approximately 1998 to 1999,895l he was on temporary assignment
W7 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Supplies from ULIMO.
Wg Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 337.
W9 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 174.
8950 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript, 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; 10 January 2008, pp. 940, 986-987.
8951 When describing this incident, Sherif testified that it occurred while he was on temporary assignment in

---- End of Page 1359 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J Gb 18 May 2012

Sq LLS 2.
in Lofa. During this time, he travelled to Foya and met with Benjamin Yeaten and Sam
Bockarie, and on his return met with Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zi gzag). Marzah told him that he
had arms, ammunition and money in his vehicle, all of which Sherif saw, and which he had
been instmcted by Taylor to bring to Bockarie.8952
The Accused
3940. The Accused denied giving money, arms or ammunition to Joseph Marzah (a.k.a.
Zigzag) in order for him to give these items to Sam Bockarie. The Accused also questioned
why Varmuyan Sherif, the assistant director of the SSS, would have to leave Monrovia in
order to meet Benja.minYeaten in Foya.8953
Deliberations
394l. Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif is the Only witness who testified to the
allegation that before the Freetown Invasion, Taylor instmcted Joseph Marzah (a.k.a.
Zigzag) to bring money to Sam Bockarie. His evidence is not first-hand evidence, but rather
second-hand evidence from Marzah. Marzah did not testify to this allegation. The Trial
Chamber has found, m0reover, that Marzah's evidence must be treated with caution and
requires corroboration.8954 The Trial will not, therefore, rely on hearsay evidence from
Marzah, and finds that the Prosecution failed to prove this allegation.
Findings
3942. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that before the Freetown Invasion, the Accused instructed Joseph Marzah to take
money to Bockarie.
(v) Allegation that the Accused gave Sam Bockarie SUSD 10,000
Lofa. Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 862-863. The witness testified that he began his
assignment in Lofa in early l998, Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 819, and left Lofa in l999.
Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 865.
8952 Varmuyan Sherif`, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 862-865.
8953 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30769-30770.
8954 Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268.

---- End of Page 1360 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T /.»··/ Ok l8 May 20l2 5
J./;·<,

Submissions of the Parties
3943. The Prosecution alleges that during a trip taken by Sam Bockarie to Monrovia, the
Accused provided him with ESUSD 10,000.89% ’
3944. The Defence states the gifts alleged by the Prosecution were "trivial", and that no
explanation was given as to how they were relevant to the war or the purpose of the gift or
exchange.8956
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
3945. Witness Karmoh Kanneh, an RUF commander,8957 testified that after ULIMO and
LURD forces invaded Lofa, he received instructions from Sam Bockarie to prepare
manpower to "clear the enemy from that place". The mission was successful, and as a result
the Accused invited Bockarie, his bodyguard Magazine, and the witness to Monrovia.8958
3946. When they arrived in Monrovia, Bockarie went with Benjamin Yeaten to meet with
Taylor. The witness did not meet Taylor during this trip but was told by Bockarie when he
returned that he had been to the Executive Mansion, and that "Pa" Taylor had told him to
wait because he would give them morale boosters and ammunition. The next day, the
witness saw ammunition, and Bockarie told him that Taylor had given him EEUSD
10,0008959
3947. They returned in the helicopter to Foya, where they met with Issa Sesay and others,
0 and they counted the money. Bockarie then loaded the money and ammunition into the same
helicopter, and travelled to Foya, where he held a meeting with Sesay, Morris Kallon and
other officers. He explained to them that Taylor had given them ammunition and $USD
8955 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 336.
*956 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1 169-1 170.
*957 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.
**58 Kapmph Kamen, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9462.
8959 Karmoh Kaimeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9462-9465.

---- End of Page 1361 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T / QN 18 May 2012

Saussr
10,000. The commanders knew that the money would not be sufficient to distribute amongst
all of them, so they decided to use the funds to buy medicine to treat wounded soldiers.8960
The Accused
3948. The Accused denied that he had a meeting with Sam Bockarie after which Bockarie
returned from Liberia with $USD 10,000 and ammunition from him (Taylor).8%l He
conceded, however, that between September 1998 and November 1999 he gave
approximately $USD 4,000 to $USD 5,000 to Bockarie, which he described as traditional
gifts from an African leader. 8962
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
3949. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF connnander,8963 and interim leader of the RUF
from 2000 until disarmament in 2002,8964 denied that he had a meeting with Sam Bockarie
when Bockarie returned from Monrovia with $USD 10,000 allegedly given to him by
Taylor.8965
Deliberations
3950. Karmoh Kanneh is the only Prosecution witness to testify as to the fact that during a
trip taken by Sam Bockarie to Monrovia, the Accused provided Bockarie with $USD
10,000. The Trial Chamber notes that Kanneh's knowledge that Taylor provided these funds
to Bockarie was based upon second-hand knowledge from Bockarie himself, but that
Kanneh was with Bockarie when he left with Benjamin Yeaten for the Executive Mansion,
and he saw the ammunition that Bockarie told him came from Taylor along with the $USD
10,000. The Trial Chamber has found, in relation to the ammunition that Taylor provided in
this incident, that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that there was a
shipment of arms and ammunitions sent by the Accused to the RUF.8966 Recalling its Ending
8960 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9465-9466.
SW Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30605—30606.
8962 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32568—32572.
8%} Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-4459l, 44596.
8964 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 4358843589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
8965 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44892-44895.
M6 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998—December 1999).

---- End of Page 1362 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / -6,*9 18 May 2012

3auSS'
I that Kannoh Kanneh is a generally credible witness,8%7 the Trial Chamber accepts his
testimony regarding the provision of $USD 10,000 by Taylor to Bockarie. The Chamber
also notes that Taylor conceded to having provided funds to Bockarie between September
1998 and November 1999. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution
has proved this allegation beyond reasonable doubt.
Findings
3951. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that after ULIMO and LURD forces invaded Lofa, Taylor provided Bockarie with $USD
10,000.
(vi) Allegation that the Accused Provided $USD 20,000 to Foday Sankoh in Lomé
before negotiations began
Submissions of the Parties
3952. The Prosecution alleges that at an unspecified time during the Lomé Peace
negotiations, the Accused sent Memunatu Deen and Ibrahim Bah with $USD 20,000 for
Foday Sanl3953. The Defence contends that this alleged transaction falls outside the scope of
assistance to facilitate a war.8969 In addition, Taylor denied sending $USD 20,000 to Foday
Sankoh during the negotiations at Lomé, stating that even if he had, it would have been for
non-criminal purposes.897O
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
3967 Credibility Assessment, Karmoh Kanneh, The Role of Intermediaries, para. 2704.
8968 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 194, 335.
8969 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1185. In its Final Trial Brief, the Defence characterises this allegation as a
contribution to "a consolidated fund for the peace process as agreed on at Lomé", but this is, in fact, a
mischaracterisation of TF l-37l's evidence, as he specifically denied that the funds provided by Taylor to
Sankoh were in conjunction with the consolidated fund. See TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008 p. 2815.
8970 Taylor previously referred to these leaders as Olusegun Obasanjo, the President of Nigeria and Gnassinge
Euadema, the President of Togo. See Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24340-24341.
,r¤

---- End of Page 1363 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6-1)) 18 May 2012

Zewss ta
3954. Witness TF1—371, an RUF member,8‘m testified that the day after he and other RUF
members arrived in Lome for peace negotiations, they met with Foday Sankoh at his hotel,
and Sankoh was briefed on what had occurred while he was detained. At this time, Ibrahim
Bah left Lome for Monrovia with the intention of asking Taylor for money for Sankoh.
When Bah retumed with Memunatu Deen and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), the witness met
him in Sankoh's suite and they presented $USD 20,000 to Sankoh. TF1—371 testified that
Sankoh was unhappy with what he called "peanuts" in the light of the volume of diamonds
Sam Bockarie had been taking to Taylor while Sankoh was in prison.8972 The witness
ortra ed the `ft as an attem t b Taylor to rekindle the relationshi between the two men
P Y 81 P Y Y P
and confirmed that this money was given before and in addition to the ‘Consolidated Fund’
agreed to at Lome. [ndeed, it was given before negotiations began.8973
The Accused
3955. The Accused denied sending $USD 20,000 to Foday Sankoh during the negotiations
at Lome. [-le said that if he had, it would have been a ‘ good gesture,’ like Presidents
Obasanjo and Eyadema8974 had previously made. ln any event, he would have sent the
money to Sankoh via the "former Foreign Minister"8975 who was on the ground in Lome
rather than waiting for [brahim Bah to pick it up from him.8°76
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
3956. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,8977 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,8978 testified that while lbrahim Bah was in Buedu, Sam
Bockarie gave Bah money to take to Sankoh in Lomé.8979
Prosecution Exhibit P-264
8971 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
8972 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2438-2439 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2442, 2510
(CS).
8973 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2509-2510 (CS); Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2815 (CS).
8974 Taylor previously referred to these leaders as Olrmegun Obasanjo, the President of Nigeria and Gnassinge
Euadema, the President of Togo. See Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24340-24341.
8975 Taylor refers to this Foreign Minister present at Lomé as "D Musuleng-Cooper". Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29615.
8976 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29610-29612, 29738-29739.
W7 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596, and
8978 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
8979 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44360-44362.

---- End of Page 1364 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T f qty; 18 May 2012 %

3 ==t~r—S?—
3957. Exhibit P-264 documents a radio message dated 17 May 1999 to "Lion" (Foday
Sankohgggo) from Concord (Sam Bockariegggl) reporting that "General lbrahim" had been
dispatched to Lion's location with $USD 20,000 for him. The message tells Sankoh that he
will send him a "sample of quality" which Issa Sesay testifies is a reference to diamonds.8982
Deliberations
3958. TF1-371 testified that during the Lomé negotiations, Taylor sent Memunatu Deen
and Ibrahim Bah to Foday Sankoh with $USD 20,000, and that the witness was present
when Bah, Deen and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) brought back and gave the $USD 20,000
from the Accused to Sankoh. The Accused denied this allegation, stating also that even if he
had provided these funds, it would have been an innocent gesture along the lines of funds
provided by other African Heads of State. Defence Witness Issa Sesay testified that Sam
Bockarie gave Ibrahim Bah $USD 20,000 to take to Sankoh during the Lomé negotiations.
3959. Exhibit P-264 is a radio message from Bockarie to Sankoh, reporting that Bah had
been sent to Sankoh with $USD 20,000 for him. The radio message from Bockarie is
consistent with Sesay's testimony that Bockarie sent $USD 20,000 to Sankoh. Sesay
indicated in his testimony that Bah came from Buedu, but TF1-371 testified that Bah went
and came back from Monrovia.
3960. The Trial Chamber considers that the evidence that Bockarie sent $USD 20,000 to
Sankoh does not contradict TF1-371's evidence that Taylor also sent $USD 20,000 to
Sankoh in Lomé, where there was presumably an ongoing need for support during the
extended period of the negotiations. Wihile the radio message from Bockarie is dated 17 May
1999, well after the Lomé negotiations had begun, TF1-371 testified that the funds from
Taylor were given at the start of the negotiations. The fact that Ibrahim Bah delivered the
funds from both Bockarie and Taylor is consistent with the finding of the Trial Chamber that
8080 The Trial Chamber has previously found that "The Lion" is a codename for Foday Sankoh. See TF1—274,
Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21619.
Wl The Trial Chamber has previously found that "Concord" is a codename used for Sam Bockarie.
8982 Exhibit P—264, "Radio Log Book — 00008636 — 00008726 of communications between Sam Bockarie and
Foday Sankoh during the Lomé peace talks (kept by TF1—274 (Dauda Aruna Fomie)", ERN 339. Issa Sesay,
Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44361—44362.

---- End of Page 1365 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T ` 18 May 2012
qu JQ

Z.¤r<»rS°Zé
Bah frequently served as an intermediary for various individuals, including Sankoh,
Bockarie and Taylor.8983
3961. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1—371 is a generally credible witness8984
and notes that his evidence was based on first—hand knowledge. The Trial Chamber finds the
denial of the Accused to be less than credible, and notes that the fact that other Heads of
State might have given similar iiinds at the same time does not negate the fact of or
responsibility for his own provision of funds. Furthermore, the Chamber finds unconvincing
Taylor's assertion that he would not give Bah funds but would do so through a "Foreign
Minister".
3962. For the above reasons, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Taylor
provided funds to Sankoh during the Lomé peace negotiations. However, the Trial Chamber
finds no conclusive evidence of the intended use for these funds. TF1-371 testified that the
money was a gift intended to rekindle the relationship between Sankoh and Taylor, without
specifying any particular use of the funds.
Findings
3963. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused sent Foday Sankoh EBUSD 20,000 in Lomé before the negotiations began.
(vii) Allegation that in August/September 1999, the Accused gave Sam Bockarie
$USD 15,000 for the RUF commanders
Submissions of the Parties
3964. The Prosecution alleges that at a meeting in Monrovia in August or September 1999
attended by Taylor, Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie, Taylor gave Bockarie EBUSD 15,000
for RUF commanders.8985
8983 The Role of lntermediaries: Ibrahim Bah,
8984 Credibility Assessment, TFl—37l, paras 220~226.
8985 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 337.

---- End of Page 1366 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T F" 18 May 2012

Eq atS"1
3965. The Defence cites this event as an example of instances in which the Prosecution has
simply asserted that money was provided with no explanation as to how it was relevant to
war or the purpose of the gift or exchange.8986
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
3966. Witness TFl-338, an RUF member,8987 testified that when Foday Sankoh travelled to
Monrovia after the Lome Peace Accords in 1999, Sam Bockarie told the witness that Sankoh
wanted him to come to Monrovia to explain the infighting that had occurred in his absence
between Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and Gibnl Massaquoi on the one hand, and
Bockarie, Issa Sesay, and Boston Flomo on the other.
3967. While in Monrovia the witness and Sankoh met with Bockarie and Taylor on the
sixth floor of the Executive Mansion, where Taylor thanked Bockarie for "maintaining the
RUF" in Sankoh's absence, and securing Foya and Voinjama against the LURD rebels.
Taylor told them not to encourage in-fighting between factions, and gave Bockarie $USD
15,000 for the "guys who had come".8988
The Accused
3968. The Accused accepted that Sam Bockarie was in Liberia with Foday Sankoh in
September 1999 but denied that the meeting in September 1999 described by TFl-338 took
place and stated that it would in any event be impossible for a person like TFl-338 to be
present in a meeting between himself Bockarie and Sankoh.8989 He testified that he met with
Sankoh about six times during this period but said the Bockarie was not at any of those
meetings. He subsequently said that Bockarie was in meetings with Sankoh and other senior
people. Further, the office in question was on the fourth, and not the sixth, floor of the
*986 Defence mai rmi Brief paras 1 169, 1 173.
8987 TFl-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (PS).
gm TFl-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15116-15118.
M9 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30860-30861.

---- End of Page 1367 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / G"; 18 May 2012

3aw9¤
Executive Mansion.8990 The Accused conceded, however, to providing Bockarie with
eppmximerery susn 4,000 to susn 5,000 between 1998 and 1999.*99*
Defence Witness 1ssa Sesay
3969. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,8992 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,8993 testified that after meeting with Foday Sankoh in
Monrovia, Sam Bockarie returned to Sierra Leone to discuss with Sesay what had occurred
while he was in Monrovia, and to give Sesay various instructions. Bockarie did not pass on
any message from Taylor that the RUF should not fight amongst themselves. Bockarie also
did not report that he had met with Taylor in the company of Sankoh, and did not tell Sesay
that he was thanked or given $USD 15,000 by Taylor. Sesay also testified that the RUF did
not fight in Foya or Voinjama in 1999, before this incident occurred.8994
Deliberations
3970. TF1—338 is the only Prosecution witness to testify to this allegation, that Taylor
congratulated Sam Bockarie on his achievements within the RUF while Foday Sankoh was
detained, and gave Bockarie $USD 15,000 for those that had come to Monrovia to meet with
him. The witness provided first—hand evidence, and the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that
TF1—338 is a generally credible witness,8995 and its findings that he was present when
various diamond transactions occurred.8996 ln light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber
. rejects the blanket denials of the Accused and Issa Sesay. The Trial Chamber notes that the
Accused changed his evidence about who was present at meetings between him and Sankoh
and that he conceded that he provided Bockarie with between $USD 4,000 and $USD 5,000
from September 1998 to November 1999. The Trial Chamber also notes that Sesay is
incorrect as to the time period when the RUF was fighting in Foya and Voinjama; the Trial
Chamber has confirmed that in April 1999, dissidents known as the LURD attacked
Voinjama, Liberia, and following this attack, Bockarie gave orders to the RUF and AFRC
8990 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30863.
8991 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32568-32572.
8992 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
8993 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
8994 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45190-45192. A
8995 Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329.
89% Diamonds.

---- End of Page 1368 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 6m 18 May 2012

Equtbi
forces to support the Liberian government forces in Liberia against the LURD.8997 As this
meeting was said to have occurred after the Lomé Peace Accords, which were signed in July
1999,8998 the meeting could have taken place after the Hghting in Foya and Voinjama. For
the above reasons, the Trial Chamber Hnds that the Prosecution has proved this allegation
beyond reasonable doubt.
Findings
3971. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that following the Lomé Accords, the Accused met with Bockarie, and gave him SUSD
15,000 for those that had met with him.
(viii) Allegation that after the Lomé Accord, the Accused provided SUSD 15,000 to
Johnny Paul Koroma.
Submissions of the Parties
3972. The Prosecution alleges that following the Lomé Agreement, the Accused gave
Johnny Paul Koroma SUSD 15,000 for his delegation. The Prosecution alleges one instance
of Taylor giving Johnny Paul Koroma SUSD 15,000, supported by the evidence of Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, and a second instance of the Accused giving Johnny Paul Koroma
SUSD 15,000, supported by the evidence of TF 1-567. 8999
3973. The Defence concedes that the Accused gave some funds to Johnny Paul Koroma for
the purchase of clothing. lt submits that the provision of these funds was not for a criminal
u ose, and that this t e of gift was not uncommon from an African leader to visitin
P YP YP g
delegates.900O
Evidence
W7 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Operations Outside Sierra
Leone.
8998 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T—370, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7
December 2007, Annex A, Fact W; Prosecutor v T uylor, SCSL—03—01—PT, Joint Filing by the Prosecution and
Defence: Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact No. 32.
8999 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 335; footnote 997 of the Prosecution Final Trial Brief
"°°° Defence rmi rmi Brief, paras 1177, 1185.

---- End of Page 1369 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / Ou 18 May 2012
or

.§¤[¤[lO2..
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
3974. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC memberml and officer,°OO2 testified that
he was present at a meeting in early August 1999 in the Accused's office in the Executive
Mansion between the Accused, Johnny Paul Koroma, "Junior Lion", Ibrahim ‘Bazzy’
Kamara and Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast) after the signing of the Lomé Accord.
Taylor gave Johnny Paul Koroma $USD 15,000 to be distributed between his men "so that
[they] could refresh [themselves] and buy things...in Monrovia" such as clothing until
Foday Sankoh arrived in Liberia from Lomé. Koroma gave the money to Kamara, who
distributed it amongst the eleven persons in the delegation.9OO3
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -567
3975. Witness TF1-567, an RUF member,90O°’ testified that he was in Monrovia when Sam
Bockarie was there waiting for Foday Sankoh to retum from Lomé. When Johnny Paul
Koroma came to Monrovia, he met the witness and Bockarie at the RUF guesthouse.
Koroma was subsequently moved to the Hotel Africa because "they" said that "they didn’t
want them to stay together"90O5 The witness saw Joe Tuah at the RUF guesthouse and give a
parcel to Koroma, and Koroma then told the witness that Taylor had sent the parcel to him,
and it contained $USD 15,000 to take care of him and his fami1y.9OO6 This evidence was not
challenged in cross-examination.
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
3976. Witness Samuel Kargbo, an AFRC Supreme Council member,90O7 testified that in
approximately August 1999 he, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, Brima Kamara, Hassan Papa
Bangura, Jumu J a11oh and Johnny Paul Koroma were present at a meeting with Taylor at the
Executive Mansion in Liberia. Taylor gave Johrmy Paul Koroma a brown envelope. The
witness did not describe its contents. He stated that Taylor also gave ‘Bazzy’ a second one
9001 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7867, 7869; 28 April 2008, pp. 8684, 8689.
9002 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865-7866.
9003 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8503-8508, 8515; Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8582-
8584.
9004 TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. l2986—l2990 (PS); Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13097.
mi TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12980.
"°°° TFl—567, Transcript 4 Jury 2008, p. 12978.
9007 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10439, 10448, 10450; Exhibit P-058, "Excerpts from the Sierra
Leone Gazette No. 52, 4 September 1997 -~ 00007703—00007704", ERN 7703-7704.

---- End of Page 1370 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l-T / qu 18 May 2012

Beiwbl
containing SSUSD 5,000 to be distributed between the group; the witness himself received
suso 700.9008
The Accused
3977. The Accused testified that in approximately August to October 1999, he met with
Johnny Paul Koroma and the West Side Boys in his office in Executive Mansion but he
cannot specifically remember the individuals with whom he met. During that meeting he
gave them an envelope with between SSUSD 5,000 and SSUSD 10,000. He thought the men
looked dishevelled so gave them the money to get something better to wear. This money
was not given to buy arms and ammunition; it was simply an African tradition and any
African leader would have done the same. He denied sending Joe Tuah to the RUF
guesthouse with SSUSD 15,0009009
Deliberations
3978. The parties do not dispute that when the Accused met with Johnny Paul Koroma in
the Executive Mansion following the Lomé Peace Accords, he gave Koroma a certain
amount of money so that they could buy clothes and other items in Momovia. The
Prosecution contends that the Accused gave Koroma SSUSD 15,000 in two instances, one in
a meeting described by Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Samuel Kargbo, and one described by
TF1-567, at the RUF guesthouse where he sent Joe Tuah on his behalf .
3979. The Trial Chamber notes that Bobson Sesay first mentioned the SSUSD 15,000 gift in
an interview with the Prosecution on 6 April 2008. When asked why he had not mentioned
this SSUSD 15,000 in any of his many prior interviews with the Prosecution, he responded
that this was the first time he had been asked about it.9OlO The Trial Chamber accepts this
explanation, noting that his testimony of the meeting is corroborated in its key elements by
0008 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10577-10581. The witness starts his description of the events in
question by stating that they began approximately one month prior to the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord
(Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10564-10568), which was signed on 7 July 1999 (Agreed Facts
and Law, Fact 32).
9009 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28756—28757; Transcript 29 September 2009, p.
30025; Transcript 21 January 2010, p. 33884. Taylor begins his description of the incidents in question by
stating that Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in Monrovia in August 1999 and left with Sankoh in October 1999.
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28753-28754.
9010 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8592, 8603.

---- End of Page 1371 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / OA 18 May 2012

zawba
Kargbo, as well as the Accused. While Bobson Sesay mentions the amount given by Taylor
to be $USD 15,000, Kargbo was less clear about the amounts, saying also that there were
two envelopes and that some of the money was distributed to the group. The Accused
testified that he gave Koroma an envelope with between $USD 5,000 and $USD 10,000.
The Trial Chamber cannot ascertain with certainty the amount of the funds given to Johnny
Paul Koroma at the meeting. However, on the basis of the evidence of Bobson Sesay and
Kargbo, as well as the Accused, the Trial Chamber can conclude that Taylor gave funds to
Koroma, in the amount of at least $USD 5,000 to $USD 10,000.
3980. Regarding the second incident, TF1—567's evidence that the Accused sent
$USD 15,000 to Koroma at the RUF guesthouse is hearsay, based on what Koroma told
TF1—567 about the envelope he received from Joe Tuah. While he conceded giving Koroma
$USD 5,000 to $USD 10,000 at the meeting, the Accused denied sending Joe Tuah to the
RUF guesthouse with $USD 15,000 for Koroma. Although the Trial Chamber has found
TF1—567 to be a generally credible witness,9OH the Trial Chamber cannot in this context
make a finding beyond reasonable doubt based on his hearsay evidence.
Findings
3981. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that following the Lomé Peace Accords the Accused gave Johnny Paul Koroma some funds,
in the amount of at least $USD 5,000 to $USD 10,000, for clothing and other personal items
at a meeting in the Executive Mansion.
3982. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused sent $USD 15,000 to Johnny Paul Koroma at the RUF guesthouse.
(ix) Allegation that the Accused gave Issa Sesay $USD 85,000
Submissions of the Parties
QOH Credibility Assessment, T F1-567, paras 313-317.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GA 18 May 2012

Baqés
3983. The Prosecution alleges that between 2000 and 2001, the Accused gave Issa Sesay
large amounts of cash, including SUSD 85,000.91112
3984. The Accused denied that this incident occurred, contending that he would never have
this large amount of money on hand.91113
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -375
3985. Witness TF 1-375, an AF RC fighter,91114 testified that during the disarmament process
and before the 2002 election in Sierra Leone, Benjamin Yeaten called him and Calvin
Yeaten (a.k.a. Bus Boy), Yeaten's younger brother, and told them to bring him to White
Flower and wait for him. Yeaten entered White Flower and came outside approximately 10
to 15 minutes later with a parcel. Yeaten told the witness and Calvin Yeaten to give the
parcel to Issa Sesay at the Royal Hotel. When they reached Sesay's hotel room and gave him
the package, he called Francis Oscar Charles (a.k.a. FOC), Eddie Kanneh and one of Sesay's
bodyguards and they opened the package and began counting the money that was inside.
The total came to SUSD 85,000. Sesay became very angry because he had been expecting
$USD 500,000 in exchange for the diamonds he had brought Taylor. Sesay was going to
send the money back, but Charles convinced him to contact Yeaten and complain, and to
keep the money.91115
The Accused
3986. The Accused did not deny that Issa Sesay might have visited White Flower, but he
denied that this incident concerning the SUSD 85,000 occurred. He stated that he was never
in touch with diamond dealers, that he never had more than SUSD 25,000 on hand, and that
a sum of money this large would have been accounted for by the Finance Ministry. Taylor
also denied knowing Calvin Yeaten.91116
(11112 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 335, footnote 998.
(11113 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 15 September 2009, pp. 28903-28910.
9014 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1236.
91115 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12686-12690.
(111111 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28903-28910.

---- End of Page 1373 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / éb 18 May 2012

Zqr.(J¤€c>
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
3987. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,9O17 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,9018 denied receiving $USD 85,000 from Taylor through
Benjamin Yeaten and ultimately TF1-375, adding that he did not know of a Royal Hotel.
Sesay testified that after 2000 he stayed at the RUF guesthouse when he visited
Monrovia.9O19 He also testified that he did not know anyone by the name of Busy Boy.9O2O
Deliberations
3988. Prosecution Witness TF1-375 is the only Prosecution witness to testify to this
allegation. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that the testimony of TF1-375
must be treated with caution and requires corroboration,9O21 which is lacking with regard to
his testimony on this incident. ln light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has not proved this allegation beyond reasonable doubt.
Findings
3989. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that between 2000 and 2001, the Accused gave $USD 85,000 to Issa Sesay.
(x) Allegation that the Accused gave Issa Sesay $USD 15,000
Submissions of the Parties
3990. The Prosecution alleges that during a meeting between Issa Sesay and the Accused,
the Accused instructed Sesay to resist disarmament, and told Sesay that if he did so he
(Taylor) would continue to assist the RUF as he had done before; he also provided Sesay
with suso 1$,000."O22
9017 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
gm Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588—43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
Omg Issa Sesay, Transcript 10 August 2010, pp. 45942-45943; Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 45945—45946.
0020 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45946.
(ml Credibility Assessment, TF1-375, paras 308-312.
9022 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 182.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QQ 18 May 2012

3==1¤»‘<=’1·~
3991. The Defence does not, in its submissions, address this incident directly, but counters
the Prosecution's allegation by claiming that the Accused played a significant role in
promoting peace in Sierra Leone. The Defence denies that the Accused was promoting peace
while at the same time prolonging the conflict by encouraging Sesay to resist
disarmament.9023
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1-338
3992. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member,9O24 testified that in July 2000 he was present at a
late-night meeting between Taylor and Issa Sesay in Monrovia, during which Taylor urged
Sesay not to listen to the Sierra Leonean Govemment; to agree to the disarmament if asked
but not to "do it in reality". For that, Taylor promised the RUF his continuing assistance and
ave Sesa $USD 15,0009025 Sesa left Taylor and two da s later retumed to Sierra Leone.
S Y Y Y Y
Sesay then convened a meeting in Koindu Town and briefed his colleagues on what Taylor
had told him conceming disarmament.9026 .
The Accused
3993. The Accused conceded that he had spoken to Issa Sesay conceming disarmament,
but did not remember who was present when he did so.9027 He also testified that he had been
active in ensuring that disarmament took place.9028
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
3994. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,9029 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,9030 testified that TF1-338's account of a late night meeting
with the Accused is false. Benjamin Yeaten never took Sesay at night to see the Accused
M Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 87-102, 967.
"°2‘ TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (Ps).
0025 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15149-15151, 15211 (PS).
9026 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15150-15151; 15211 (PS).
9027 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29636-29637 (PS).
0028 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29638-29639 (PS).
°°" ieee Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
9030 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.

---- End of Page 1375 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gm 18 May 2012

Eq Lying
and the Accused did not tell Sesay in private to agree openly to disarmament with the
ECOWAS leaders but not actually to do so, nor did Taylor give him $USD 15,0009031
Deliberations
3995. TF1—338 is the only Prosecution witness to testify concerning the allegation that at a
late—night meeting in Monrovia, Taylor gave Issa Sesay $USD 15,000. The Trial Chamber
recalls its determination that TF1-338 is a generally credible witness,9O32 and recalls its
revious determinations finding that TF1—338 was present during diamond transactions
P
made by Sesay. There is also considerable evidence that Taylor discouraged the RUF/AFRC
from disarming, despite public statements to the contrary.9O33 For this reason, the Trial
Chamber does not consider his denial credible. 1ssa Sesay also denied that this meeting
occurred and that he received $USD 15,000. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that
Sesay's evidence must be treated with caution and requires corroboration.9O34
3996. The Trial Chamber finds TF1—338's statement to be credible, and notes that he was
present and witnessed the transaction. For this reason, the Trial Chamber accepts his
testimon , and finds that the Prosecution has established, be ond reasonable doubt, that the
Y Y
Accused gave Sesay $USD 15,000 to support the RUF.
Findings
3997. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt,
that the Accused gave Issa Sesay $USD 15,000 to support the RUF.
(xi) Allegation that Issa Sesay sent Mike Lamin to Monrovia to collect money from
Taylor
Submissions of the Parties
9031 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45261.
W Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras xix-329.
0033 Peace Process: Communications with essay on Disarmament.
Om Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.

---- End of Page 1376 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 525 18 May 2012

Bet up Laj
3998. The Prosecution alleges that in 2002, Issa Sesay sent Mike Lamin to Monrovia to
collect money that the Accused had held for Sesay. The Prosecution further submits that
this money was not a part of the payment required by the Lome Agreement.0035
3999. The Defence states that the Prosecution's evidence relates only to monetary
transactions, but does not discuss the actual provision of arms, and therefore falls outside the
scope of assistance to facilitate a war.0030
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1-371
4000. Witness TF 1-371, an RUF member,0037 testified that at some point in 2001, Issa
Sesay informed Mike Lamin of an amount of money that he was expecting from Taylor,
because he had been depositing diamonds with Taylor while he and Lamin were detained.
Lamin accompanied Sesay on a trip to Monrovia to collect these funds. They went on board
Taylor's military helicopter from Foya to Monrovia, and Lamin, Sesay and Morris Kallon
met with Taylor at midnight at White Flower. Taylor asked Sesay about the disarmament
process, to which Sesay responded that approximately 40 percent of the RUF had
disarmed.9030 Taylor asked Sesay whether he trusted the UN disarmament process, and asked
Lamin whether he had seen Foday Sankoh while he was detained.9030
4001. Sesay then told Taylor that he needed $USD 100,000 for food and supplies for his
men, and Taylor told Yeaten to give Sesay $USD 50,0009040 The next moming, Yeaten
gave Sesay the SUSD 50,000, and they were escorted to the airport and retumed to Foya in
Taylor's helicopter, and on to Sierra Leone. Sesay told Lamin that he was disillusioned with
Taylor and that this was the last time he would go to see him.004l
4002. In 2002, Sesay told Lamin that the RUF still had iiinds deposited with Taylor and
they needed these funds for the coming election. When Lamin went to Senegal to meet with
0035 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 337.
90% Defence Final Trial Briar, paras 1172, 1185.
"°" TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (cs).
0030 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2453-2454 (CS).
0030 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2455 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2773-2774 (CS).
"°‘° TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2454 (cs).

---- End of Page 1377 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / G" 18 May 2012

SGM}0
President Abdulai Wade, he stopped in Monrovia to see Taylor in order to ask him for their
remaining $USD 50,000. VVhen Lamin arrived in Monrovia he went to see Yeaten, and
happened to see Francis Oscar Charles (a.k.a. FOC) and so Lamin asked Yeaten why
Charles was in Monrovia. Yeaten told Lamin that Charles was there on Sesay's instruction,
in order to ask Taylor for funds. Lamin tried to meet with Taylor but he was very busy, and
he knew that the RUF delegation was still in Monrovia so he left the next day.4042
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -338
4003. Witness TF 1-338, an RUF member,4044 testified that in April 2002 Francis Oscar
Charles was instructed by Sesay to take a letter to Taylor. He was not told the purpose of the
letter but knew from Sesay's briefing of senior officers that the letter asked for money.4O44
The Accused
4004. The Accused conceded to speaking with Issa Sesay about disarmament, but denied
that Mike Lamin was present when he did so. He denied having any knowledge of a meeting
at midnight at the Executive Mansion between himself, Lamin and Sesay in which he spoke
to Sesay about disarmament. The Accused also denied that Sesay had requested $USD
100,000 and stated that he never provided these funds. Finally, he contended that he was
active in trying to ensure that disarmament took place.4045
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4005. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander4046 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,4047 denied that Mike Lamin met with him, Morris Kallon
and Taylor at White Flower in 2001, because Sesay and Kallon did not travel to Monrovia
together in 2001. The last time that Sesay and Kallon went to Monrovia was in October
2000, when Lamin was detained. Sesay also denied having a discussion in Lamin's presence
concerning disarmament, and denied asking Taylor for $USD 100,000 for food for the RUF,
°°"‘ Tri-371, Transcript 29 January 2008,p. 2457 (cs).
4042 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2458-2460 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2773-2774 (CS).
4044 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (PS).
4044 TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15240 (PS).
4445 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29636-29639 (PS).
W6 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-4459 1, 44596, and
4047 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.

---- End of Page 1378 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~/ 6%. 18 May 2012

Za Mr IH
following which Taylor gave him $USD 50,000. He also denied sending Francis Oscar
Charles to collect $USD 50,000 from Taylor or to go anywhere.9048
4006. Sesay further denied that he instructed Lamin to travel to Monrovia in 2002 to ask
Taylor for $USD 50,000 from Taylor, stating that he was not aware of Lamin going to
Monrovia.9049
Deliberations
4007. Witness TF 1-371 is the only Prosecution witness proffered to support the allegation
that in 2002, Issa Sesay sent Mike Lamin to Monrovia to get money that Taylor had held for
Sesay. TF 1-371 testified to more than the allegation that Sesay sent Lamin to collect money
from Taylor in 2002, TF 1-371 also testified that Taylor gave Sesay $USD 50,000 in 2001,
and Lamin was sent back to Liberia to collect another $USD 50,000 in 2002.
4008. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF 1-371 is a generally credible
witness.9O50 Although the Accused and Issa Sesay denied that these events occurred, the
Trial Chamber finds their denials to be self—serving. ln that regard, the Trial Chamber recalls
its finding that Issa Sesay's evidence should be considered with caution.905l TF 1-371
provided detailed and coherent testimony on these events, and the Trial Chamber finds his
testimony credible. The Trial Chamber notes that the $USD 50,000 from Taylor, as
described by TF 1-371 in his testimony, was money related to diamonds that was held by
Taylor for the RUF.
Findings
4009. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused gave $USD 50,000 to Issa Sesay in 2001, and that Sesay sent Mike Lamin
in 2002 to retrieve a further $USD 50,000 that Taylor held for the RUF.
(xii) Allegation that Issa Sesay sent a "second delegation" to Monrovia to collect
money from Taylor
9048 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45075·45077 (PS); Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45114 (PS),
(mq Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 451 13-45114 (PS).

---- End of Page 1379 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01 -T / '__ 18 May 2012

iquq-2
Submissions of the Parties
4010. The Prosecution alleges that Issa Sesay sent a "second delegation" to Monrovia to
receive money from the Accused, but they were imprisoned on the Accused's orders.9O52
4011. The Defence did not address the allegation that Issa Sesay sent a delegation to
Monrovia to receive money from the Accused, but denies that the Accused received money
from Sesay for safe keeping.9O53
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -338
4012. Witness TF1-338 an RUF member,9O54 testified that in 2001, Francis Oscar Charles
(a.k.a. FOC) and Issa Sesay travelled from Koindu Town to Foya where they met Benjamin
Yeaten, and they all travelled on to Monrovia. Alpha Bravo met them at the RUF
guesthouse,9O55 and they handed him a packet of diamonds. In the presence of Charles,
Alpha Bravo gave Sesay ESUSD 300,000. Sesay divided this amount into two: he gave ESUSD
150,000 to Taylor for safe keeping, and he took the remaining SSUSD 150,000 back to Sierra
Leone.9O56
4013. In early 2002, Sesay sent Charles and Fatmata Sankoh, one of Sankoh's wives, to
Monrovia to give a letter concerning the collection of this $USD 150,000 to Taylor.9O57
Charles went first to meet with Yeaten so that he would take him to Taylor, but he was told
at White Flower that Yeaten was at the front lines. Sesay then communicated with Dopoe
Menkarzon, who took Charles, Rashid Foday and Fatmata Sankoh to Taylor.9O58 While they
were waiting to see Taylor at White Flower Yeaten's bodyguard, Salami, arrested them,
°°5° crearbrrrry Assessment, TF 1 -371, paras 220-226.
9051 Credibility Assessment, 1ssa Sesay, paras 359-372.
0052 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 337.
9053 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 183.
W4 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (PS).
9055 TFl—338 indicates that this guesthouse "be1onged to Monie Captan". Yanks Smythe confirmed that the RUF
guesthouse in Monrovia supplied by Taylor was owned by Monie Captan but leased by the Liberian
Government. Yanke Smythe, Transcript 25 February 2010, pp. 36004—36005.
W6 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15171—15172, 15226 (PS).
[xm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15226-15227 (PS); Transcript 4 September 2008 pp. 15503-
15504, 15516 (PS).
*)**5** rrr-228, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15227-15231 (Ps).

---- End of Page 1380 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T \/ @1L 18 May 2012

$¤rLFtE
saying that this was done on orders from Yeaten, although Charles did not know why he was
arrested. At the police station, Charles said that he worked with Sankoh, and was in Liberia
to see Taylor. They spent two nights in detention at Saw Beach, after which a woman
working at the Executive Mansion came and took them to White Flower to speak with
Taylor.9659 Salami took his documents and the letter intended for Taylor.9666
4014. Charles told Taylor that Sesay had sent him to collect the $USD 150,000 that Taylor
had kept for the RUF, but Taylor responded to Charles that he would help the RUF during
elections but he had told Sesay not to disarm and did not have the money for him. Taylor
threatened to arrest and execute Sesay if he came to Liberia, and allowed them to leave.
Charles spent one more night in Monrovia, after which Yeaten gave him $USD 200 and told
them to retum to Sierra Leone.966l ,
The Accused
4015. The Accused denied having any knowledge of the $USD 150,000 that Prosecution
Witness TF 1-338 testified was left by Sesay with him for safe keeping.9662
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4016. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,9666 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,9664 denied selling $USD 300,000 worth of diamonds to
"Alpha Bravo", and giving $USD 150,000 to Taylor for safe keeping. Sesay had never heard
of Alpha Bravo.9666 Sesay also denied that he sent Francis Oscar Charles (a.k.a. FOC) to
Monrovia, stating that after disarmament in November 2001 Charles remained in Makeni
and did not go to Monrovia.9666
Deliberations
9659 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15233-15234 (PS); Transcript 4 September 2008 p. 15504-
15506, 15508-15511 (PS).
6666 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15236 (PS);
9661 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15233-15237 (PS); Transcript 4 September 2008 p. 15511-15512
(PS).
6662 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2008, pp. 30886—30888.
"°‘" ipsa sasay, Transcript 26 Jury 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
6664 Issa Sesay, `Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
06651ssa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45311-45113; Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45356 (PS).
66661ssa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45113-45114 (PS).

---- End of Page 1381 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T % T 18 May 2012

3‘r¤l~`-{Ln;
4017. TF 1-338 is the only Prosecution Witness to testify to the details of this allegation,
that Issa Sesay sent a "second delegation" to Monrovia, including Francis Oscar Charles, to
get money that Taylor had held in safe keeping, but that they were imprisoned on Taylor's
orders. TF 1-371 testified that Mike Lamin saw Francis Oscar Charles in Monrovia and was
told that he was there to collect funds from Taylor. The Trial Chamber considers that this
testimony corroborates the testimony of TF 1-338 that Charles travelled to Monrovia to
collect funds from Taylor. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that both TF 1-371 and
TF 1-338 are generally credible witnesses.9O67
4018. The Defence highlighted in cross-examination several inconsistencies between TF 1-
338's prior statements and his testimony. For example, in his previous statement the witness
told investigators that Francis Oscar Charles was taken to see the Accused when he first
arrived, at which point the Accused arrested him; in his trial testimony, the witness stated
that Charles only met Taylor after he was arrested. The witness also in his previous
statement did not refer to Sankoh's wife or Rashid Foday accompanying Charles to meet
Taylor, and in a prior statement said that after Charles was released from detention he was
brought to the RUF guesthouse, but not back to a jail cell, as TF 1-338 testified at trial.9O68
TF 1-338 explained these inconsistencies as a misunderstanding of chronology and an
administrative error of the Prosecution, respectively.9069 ln his prior statement, TF 1-338 also
said that Mike Lamin travelled to Monrovia from Senegal and pleaded for Charles’ release,
which TF 1-338 did not mention in his testimony at trial.9O7O TF1-338 testified at trial,
however, that he had said this in his interview with investigators, but they had not written
this down.9O7l The Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-371 testified that Mike Lamin saw Charles
in Monrovia at this time but did not mention Charles's imprisonment.9072 The Trial
Chamber accepts the explanations of TF 1-338 with regard to his prior statement and does
not consider his failure to mention Mike Lamin in his testimony to be significant.
9067 Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329.
mg TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008 pp. l55l4—l5519.
9069 TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008 pp. 15514-15526.
9070 TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008 pp. 15519-15521.
(ml TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008 p. 15519-15521.
9072 See TF1-371, 'Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2459-2460.

---- End of Page 1382 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ou 18 May 2012

Z°l *Fl·S
4019. The Trial Chamber does not accept Issa Sesay's assertion that Charles was based in
Makeni, and therefbre did not travel to Monrovia; the fact that Charles may have been based
in Makeni does not exclude the possibility that he travelled to Monrovia.
4020. ln light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Sesay sent a "second
delegation" to Monrovia to collect money from the Accused. The Trial Chamber notes,
however, that the money from the Accused, as described by TF1—338 in his testimony, was
money held by the Accused, relating to diamonds. According to the evidence, no funds were
given to Francis Oscar Charles, except for $USD 200 from Yeaten to return to Sierra Leone.
Findings
4021. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
T that Issa Sesay sent a "second delegation" to Monrovia to get money from the Accused, and
they were imprisoned on his orders, but no funds were given by the Accused to Sesay.
Conclusion
4022. The Trial Chamber has found that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that Taylor provided financial support to the RUF/AFRC, in the following amounts:
(i) 10 million CFA francs to the RUF in Cote d’Ivoire, however the Prosecution
failed to prove that the funds were used to facilitate arms and diamond deals
for the RUF.
(ii) an unspecified amount of funds to RUF personnel stranded in Cote d’Ivoire ,
(iii) an unspecified amount of funds to the RUF, in the tens of thousands of dollars,
to buy arms and ammunition from ULIMO;
(iv) $USD 10,000 to Sam Bockarie afrer ULIMO and LURD invaded Lofa,
(v) EBUSD 20,000 to Foday Sankoh in Lome before the negotiations began;
(vi) $USD 15,000 to Sam Bockarie following the Lome Accords.
(vii) $USD 5,000 to 10,000 to Johnny Paul Koroma following the Lome Accords,

---- End of Page 1383 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T / (JIM 18 May 2012

3(viii) $USD 15,000 to Issa Sesay to support the RUF; and
(ix) $USD 50,000 to Issa Sesay in 2001.
4023. The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused conceded to having provided some of
these funds, including the 10 million CFA francs given to the RUF in the C0te d’lv0ire, and
the money given to Johnny Paul Koroma following the Lomé Accords. The Accused also
testified that he provided $USD 4,000 to 5,000 to Sam Bockarie between September 1998 to
November 1999. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that with the exception of its finding
that the Accused provided funds to Bockarie in order to buy arms and ammunition from
ULIMO and the 10 million CFA francs given to the RUF in C0te d’lv0ire, the use of these
funds was unspecified or for personal use. ln several instances, the Prosecution alleges that
these funds were used for cl0thes or travel for RUF members. For example, Taylor provided
$USD 20,000 to Foday Sanl<0h before the Lomé neg0tiations began for Sankoh's "personal
use" and he provided $USD 15,000 to Johnny Paul Koroma for his delegation to buy
personal items in Monrovia. The $USD 15,000 provided to Bockarie by the Accused for
commanders who had travelled to Monrovia was for unspecified use. In addition, the
unspecified amount of money given to RUF members in C0te d’1v0ire after Sankoh was
arrested was to "sustain them" in Danané. Moreover, the Prosecution failed to prove that the
10 million CFA francs given by the Accused to the RUF in C0te d’1v0ire was used to
facilitate arms and diamond deals.
4024. The Trial Chamber notes the Defence contention that the RUF received financial
SUppOI`1Z from s0urces other than Taylor. For example, TF1—168 testified that in February
1996, Sankoh told him that he had received $USD 50,000 from Nigerian President Sani
Abacha, although Sankoh did not tell the witness the purpose of this gift.9073 TF1—168 and
Fayia Musa testified that in May 1996, $USD 500,000 was provided to Foday Sankoh by
Libya, which is corroborated by a contemporane0us d0cument indicating that the funds were
specifically for the purchase of arms and ammunition.9074 Finally, Issa Sesay testified that in
November 1998, $USD 50,000 was provided to Bockarie, Bah, R0gers and Kanneh by
9073 See Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 449, citing TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23277 (CS).
W4 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23283-23284, 23288-23289 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, pp.
23454-23458 (CS); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39019-39020, 39022-39023; Exhibit D-015,
"RUF - F0110w up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother M0hamed Talibi, Libyan Arab
Pe0p1e's Jamahiriyya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996".

---- End of Page 1384 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (ih 18 May 2012

.31 LGR-
Gaddafi in Libya, which Bockarie used partially to buy ammunition and medicine.9O75 The
Trial Chamber considers that there is no evidence that these payments are in any way linked
or relevant to the payments by the Accused.
4025. ln light of the relatively few and small amounts of firnding provided to the RUF or
AFRC by the Accused, and considering that most of this funding was for personal or
unspecified uses, the Trial Chamber is unable to find that the financial support provided by
the Accused, in itself had a direct impact on the operations of the AFRC/RUF.
(c) Alleged Medical and Other Support
Submissions of the Parties
4026. The Prosecution alleges that throughout the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, the
Accused provided medicine, medical treatment, as well as food, military uniforms, fuel,
vehicles, and "morale boosters", such as cigarettes, drugs and alcohol to the RUF, Junta and
AFRC/RUF."‘"6
4027. The Defence concedes that there is "a considerable amount of evidence citing Taylor
as the provider of a variety of goods and money for the RUF effort" but submits this
evidence involves "often low ranking" subordinates who witness events in Sierra Leone, not
in Liberia or anywhere in the proximity of the Accused.9077 The Accused also conceded that
he gave some support to the RUF for humanitarian reasons or gifts not related to the war
effortgmg The Defence denies, however, that the Accused provided a majority of these
supplies or services, and contends that transactions involving this support were legal, and
occurred on the open market in Liberia.9O79
Evidence
9075 See Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 10, 619, 1075, citing Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44125-
44129.
9076 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 338-340.
9077 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 168.
W Defence rmi Trial Brief, pm. 1177, 1181, 1186.
9079 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1168, 1175-1176, 1178-1179, 1182.

---- End of Page 1385 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T /,/’ 18 May 2012 Q

3 r~t=··;··a
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
4028. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,9080 testified that he saw
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) "who we called Colonel Jung1e" in RUF territory and that he
heard from members of the RUF high command about trips that Tamba would make to RUF
territory in 1997. Tamba did not come there in secret, and everyone knew that he travelled
frequently between Sam Bockarie and Taylor. Tamba would bring arms, ammunition, food
and medicine to Bockarie at headquarters, and the radio operators at headquarters would
send messages to the front lines reporting on what Tamba had delivered. Whenever Tamba
came, RUF members felt relieved because they believed he was someone who brought
materiel for the RUF.908l
4029. The first time that Saidu met Tamba in person was in 1998, when Bockarie asked
him to deliver a letter to Tamba in Foya Tenga, Liberia stating that the RUF had a shortage
of materials. Bockarie told Saidu to take the letter quickly because they needed materials to
come quickly. When Saidu arrived, Tamba said he had been expecting someone because he
had already spoken to Bockarie. Tamba read Bockarie's letter and said to Saidu that he
would go to Monrovia to meet Taylor, so Saidu returned to Sierra Leone.9082 A few days
after Saidu arrived to Koindu after delivering the letter, the RUF in Koindu received some
materials from Buedu "because we had written .... [w]e received materials".9083
4030. VVhen Bockarie was based in Buedu, Saidu would visit as his wife was based
there.9084 In April 1998, Bockarie visited Koindu, where Saidu was based. The senior
officers were called and Saidu walked into a room where Bockarie was speaking on his
satellite phone. Bockarie's security guard Mohamed Banya (a.k.a. Sabado) was present.
Banya told Saidu that he and Bockarie were on the way to collect arms and ammunition
from Taylor, and Bockarie was on the phone asking for clearance from Foday to travel to
(,080 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
qw Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11027-11029; Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11046-11051.
Om Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11023-1 1029.
9083 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 11029.
9084 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 1 1019; Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1069.

---- End of Page 1386 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

?>au»"(~=r
Monrovia.9O85 Banya told the witness he had made two trips to Liberia with Bockarie and
had brought back ammunition, arms and food.9O86
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
4031. Witness Perry Kamara was a high-level radio officer in the RUF in 1998.9087 Kamara
testified that during the Fitti-Fatta mission, Sam Bockarie and Taylor arranged for wounded
RUF fighters to be taken to Monrovia for medical care. Bockarie told Denis Mingo (a.k.a. F
Superman) to take the wounded to Buedu, where they would be loaded onto helicopters to
Foya and then would travel on to Monrovia.9088
4032. The witness testified that this was not the first time that this happened, but that "any
time" they had wounded fighters they would be taken by helicopter to Monrovia. For
example, in 2000, when Mingo had a serious accident during the RUF attack on the UN in
Makeni, Taylor requested that he be taken by helicopter to Liberia for treatment.9089
4033. Kamara also testified that after the RUF entered Kono district in 1998, Bockarie
would send messages to those in Kono frequently "emphasising on mining, mining", saying
that they should be sure to hold "fast" on to Kono, because the mining there was crucial for
the RUF to obtain arms, ammunition, food and drugs from Taylor.9O9O
4034. Kamara also stated that from May 2000 to disarmament in 2001, Issa Sesay would
bring diamonds to Taylor in Liberia for safe keeping. Sesay would call from Liberia and
re ort on what Taylor had donated to the RUF, and would brin back to Sierra Leone
P Y S
documents which catalogued the number of diamonds that Taylor kept, as well as the diesel,
petrol, engine oil and food that Taylor would give the RUF.9O91
""" Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 Jtme 2008, pp. 11008-11016.
0086 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11018-11022.
9087 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3089 (Kamara was the overall signal commander in Makeni);
Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3200 (Kamara was the most senior radio officer, besides Alfred Brown, at
Rosos).
Om TF1-360, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3171; Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3181-3182.
0089 TF1-360, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3181-3182. 1
0090 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3135-3136.
(ml Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3267-3269.

---- End of Page 1387 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T X] QW! 18 May 2012 j

Ease o
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
4035. Witness Varmuyan Sherif, a former ULIMO-K Hghter who became an officer in the
SSS,0002 testified that while the RUF was fighting in Lofa County in 1999, RUF fighters
were taken to a hospital in Monrovia. The press and politicians saw Sierra Leonean citizens
in the hospital and stated on the radio that this proved that there was no war in Liberia, but
that Taylor was sending Liberians to fight the war in Sierra Leone.0003
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
4036. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULIMO-K who
later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,0004 testified that during the recapture of Kono
and Makeni in late 1998, he travelled with Bockarie to Poya, where Joe Tuah came in a
helicopter to bring Bockarie to Liberia.0095 Bockarie did not stay long in Liberia, and when
he retumed to Foya the witness met him there. Bockarie brought with him a Toyota Land
Cruiser pick-up, which he said had been given to him by Taylor. The vehicle also contained
jeans, t-shirts, medicine and bandages.0000
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
4037. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander,0007 testiried that in November
1998 he received a radio message from Sam Bockarie ordering him to travel to Buedu.
When Mongor arrived at Bockarie's house in Buedu, Bockarie was happy and said that he
had gone to Liberia and received ammunition, food and medicine from the Pa, Taylor. The
ammunition "was packed up to the ceiling" in a store room next to Bockarie's bedroom.0000
0002 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 940,
986-987.
0003 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 898-900.
0004 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000;
Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.
0005 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2011.
0000 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 201 1-2013.
0007 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
0000 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5789-5793.

---- End of Page 1388 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X qw 18 May 2012

Bawar
Prosecution Witness TFl—5l6
4038. Witness TFl—516, an RUF member,9099 testified that in 1998 aiier the ECOMOG
Intervention Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Dopoe Menkarzon and Joseph Marzah (a.k.a.
Zigzag) "started coming back" bringing materials from Foya. Sam Bockarie told "us" that
his chief infonned him (Bockarie) via radio message that "certain people" were coming.
Bockarie sent coded radio messages requesting materials, ammunition. The witness also
testified that in 2000, when Issa Sesay was the RUF commander in Buedu, various persons
would collect supplies and take them from Liberia to Sierra Leone, including Bockarie,
Tamba, Dopoe, Marzah, Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Supennan), Roland Duah (a.k.a. Amphibian
Father) and Black Liberian Mosquito. Amis, ammunition, petrol, medicine, food and combat
fatigues would arrive in Foya in Liberia, and then be taken to Buedu by vehicle. VVhen
fighting was taking place in Foya these materials were flown in. The vehicles were
sometimes provided by Bockarie and were sometimes from Liberia and driven by Liberian
soldiers. When the supplies reached Buedu, Bockarie would sign documents indicating that
he had received the shipments. The flow of materials "was frequent"9l0f)
4039. TFl—5l6 also testified that Colonel Sherrif Parker (not Base Marine, who was also
called Sherrif Parker) was flown to Monrovia after being wounded and remained in
Monrovia for some months. The witness did not specify when this occurred but noted that
Parker area rrr 2001.9101
Prosecution Witness TF 1-338
4040. Witness TF 1-338, an RUF member,9lO2 testified that at the end of 2000, Issa Sesay
travelled to Monrovia with diamonds to give Taylor. He was received by Benjamin Yeaten
and was taken to the guesthouse and, at night, taken to Taylor. When Sesay saw Taylor at
the Executive Mansion, Taylor took the diamonds and said he would help them with
whatever they needed for the revolution in Sierra Leone, but would hold the diamonds for
"safe keeping" until Foday Sankoh returned. Sesay told Taylor that the RUF lacked
materials and their enemies were threatening their positions, and so Taylor said that he
9099 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
M0 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6953-6959.
ml TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7423-7424.
0102 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (PS).

---- End of Page 1389 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // q\\,. 18 May 2012

Sci W32
would talk to Yeatengm After this meeting, Yeaten took Sesay to the Schefflein Camp,
where Sesay collected arms, ammunition, boots and uniforms "in large quantities" and took
them back to Koidu.9lO4 These materials were stored in Sierra Leone, and then used by the
RUF against the Kamajors and UNAMSIL as they pushed towards Makeni.9l05
4041. In early 2001, Sesay travelled again to Monrovia with diamonds for Taylor, and met
Taylor at the Executive Mansion at night. Taylor asked him what he had done regarding
UNAMSIL, and Sesay replied that he had managed to get the situation under control, but the
Kamajors were still a threat. The following day, Sesay boarded a helicopter for Sierra
Leone, taking with him arms, ammunition, bags of rice and diesel. The diesel was for use in
the Caterpillar which was mining diamonds and for vehicles.9lO6
4042. ln March, April or May 2001, Sesay met Yeaten in Foya and travelled with him in an
ATU helicopter to Monrovia to meet Taylor at night. Sesay handed diamonds to Taylor at
the Executive Mansion and Taylor told Sesay to stop bringing him diamonds because the
international community would link him to the RUF. Taylor told Sesay he would try to find
someone who would exchange diamonds for money so that Sesay could purchase supplies
for the front line in Sierra Leone. The next day Yeaten introduced Sesay to two white men
who were diamond dealers from Belgium. Later, Sesay returned to Sierra Leone with diesel,
rice, and medicine.9lO7
4043. Later in 2001, Francis Oscar Charles and Issa Sesay travelled with a packet of
diamonds to meet Yeaten in Foya, and they all travelled to Monrovia. Sesay met Alpha
Bravo at the RUF guesthouse and handed him the diamonds. Alpha Bravo gave Sesay $USD
300,000, and Sesay divided this amount into two: he gave $USD 150,000 to Taylor for safe
keeping, and took $USD 150,000 back to Sierra Leone. Sesay returned to Foya with Yeaten
and loaded his vehicle with beer, liquor, shoes, clothing and drugs, which he took to Koidu
Town. During 2001 Sesay continued to make trips to Monrovia. 9108
9103 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156—15157, 15161.
0104 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. l5l61—15164.
9105 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15164.
9106 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15164—15l66.
9107 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15167-1517l. .
(MOS TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15171—15173.

---- End of Page 1390 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T J QL 18 May 2012

3 94%;
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
4044. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,9lO9 testified that during the time he was in Buedu in 1998, Sam Bockarie used
to go to Monrovia and Gbarnga. The witness accompanied Bockarie on a trip to Foya, where
a helicopter took Bockarie to Monrovia. Mallah then returned to Buedu. Bockarie told
Mallah that he was going to Monrovia to meet with Taylor to get arms, ammunition and
medicine. Bockarie did not tell Mallah how he paid for these items, but the bodyguards with
p whom Bockarie travelled told Mallah that Bockarie traded diamonds for ammunition and
US dollars. Bockarie would send people with this money to buy food and clothing at the
Guinean border.9l 10
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
4045. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie, an RUF radio operator,9m testified that when he was
assigned as a radio operator in Buedu from early 1998 until April 1999, the radio station at
Sam Bockarie's house had many communications with Base 1, the station in Liberia.
Bockarie would tell the radio operators in Buedu to contact Benjamin Yeaten through
Sunlight in Liberia and say that they needed ammunition. Yeaten would consult with Taylor,
and then tell Bockarie to travel to Liberia or send someone there, and Bockarie would send
RUF commanders to Liberia to get ammunition and other materials.9l 12 Sometimes
Benjamin Yeaten would send Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) or Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag)
or a Liberian called Mosquito. Marzah was one of Yeaten's security men who would travel
to Sierra Leone with ammunition, fuel, diesel, and sometimes food. Tamba frequently
escorted ammunition to Sierra Leone, there were only a few trips where materials were
brought that Tamba was not involved in.9l 13
Om Augustine Mallah, Transcript5 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209-20210.
Ol IO Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20209-20212.
(ml Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
91 12 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21488-21492.
Ol 13 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21491-21492.

---- End of Page 1391 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-O1-T / OTT 18 May 2012

zawg E+
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
4046. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,9H4 testihed that in 1998, Sam Bockarie made a
series of trips to Monrovia to take diamonds to Taylor. On his second trip to Monrovia the
witness saw diamonds brought by CO Med, the RUF mining commander to Bockarie.
Bockarie gave these diamonds of various sizes to Taylor. Bockarie called on the radio to Issa
Sesay in Sierra Leone saying that he had arrived and was with Benjamin Yeaten, and spent
approximately one week in Monrovia. When he returned to Buedu, he was accompanied by
Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag) and "Sampson", two members of Taylor's security detail,
who brought 15-20 boxes of AK47 ammunition, a few RPG bombs, salt, Maggi, rice, and
ci garettes.Ql I5
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
4047. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,9H6 testihed that when he was
assigned as a radio operator in Buedu from early 1998 until late 1999,9m Sam Bockarie
made frequent trips to Monrovia, "he was welcome there" and did not need a passportgllg
When the RUF needed ammunition, Bockarie would give the radio operators a message, and
they would communicate with Sunlight in Liberia in order to tell this to Taylor. Bockarie
would go to Monrovia and return to Sierra Leone with ammunition, food, used clothing and
other items. In one instance, Bockarie brought diamonds from Kono to Monrovia, and
returned with a large ten tyre truck Hlled with ammunition, "rubbers", wine, rice, Maggi, salt
and other condiments. Jungle too used to bring ammunition. At times if Bockarie did not go
to Liberia Jungle would come.9l lg
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -585
4048. Witness TF1-585, an RUF radio operator,9l2O testified that while she was stationed in
Buedu, there was frequent communication between the radios in Buedu and Base 1 in
"**‘ rri-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (cs).
""5 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2375-2380 (cs).
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
W7 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16126; Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16413
(witness moved to Buedu approximately three weeks after killings in Kailahun that he states occurred in
February or March 1998, and left in late 1999).
91 lg Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16136—16137.
Om Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16138-16140.
9120 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.15589-15592 (PS).

---- End of Page 1392 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

sa ~a—%S‘
Monroviagm This communication occurred during 1998 and later. lf something was
important Benjamin Yeaten would speak to Sam Bockarie on Bockarie's satellite phone.
After these conversations, the witness would hear Bockarie speak openly to other ofhcers
about what was discussed, mainly Bockarie's trips to Monrovia, or Daniel Tamba's (a.k.a.
Jungle) trips to Buedu. Bockarie was not a man who kept secrets.9l22
4049. Tamba would bring supplies such as arms, ammunition, food, clothing, shoes and
many things to Buedu any time the RUF was in needgm Materials were stored in two
warehouses, one of which was next to Bockarie's house. Tamba's driver, "Alpha Jalloh",
told the witness that they would pick up the supplies from \Nhite Flower, Taylor's home in
Monrovia, at night and bring them to Yeaten's house. They then loaded them onto a truck
for Buedu and would return to Sierra Leone at night.9l24
Prosecution Witness TF 1-567 r
4050. Witness TF 1-567, an RUF member,9l25 testified that at the time he was based in
Balahun, from February 1998 to September 1998, he would travel to Buedu frequently. The
witness was told that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and Sampson would come to Buedu with
arms, ammunition, food and other supplies. Tamba and others said that it was Taylor who
would provide these arms and ammunition.9l26
4051. TF 1-567 also testified that "while [he was] in Monrovia",9m he would buy medicine
. and send it to Sierra Leone. In order to get rice to send to Sierra Leone, Benjamin Yeaten
would give him instructions from Taylor to go to "Freeport K&K", where a Lebanese man
ml TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15650-15651.
Om TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15651-15653.
gm TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15650-15654.
Om TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15657-15663.
M5 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 1298642988 (PS).
W rrr-567, rrarrsprrpr 2 Jrriy 2008, pp. 12905—12906.
Om TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12893—12895 (witness was in Balahun from Operation Pay Yourself
until September 1998). The witness only stated that this occurred "while he was in Monrovia", and did not
specify to what years he was referring, but his testimony indicates that he was assigned to work at the RUF
guesthouse from 1999-2001, for Eddie Kanneh in 2001, and then for Benjamin Yeaten until 2003, all in
Monrovia. TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12988-12990, 13003-13004 (PS); Transcript 8 July 2008, pp.
13175-13176.

---- End of Page 1393 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z CW 18 May 2012 /

Bquxta
named K&K owned a store where he would collect the rice. Taylor would buy the rice that
he sent to Sierra Leoneqlzg
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
4052. Witness J abaty J award was a store keeper for the RUF between early 1998 and late
1999.9l29 He testified that while he was in Buedu in mid—1998, Sam Bockarie travelled to
Liberia and said he was going to see "the old man", whom the witness testified was Taylor.
When he returned, Bockarie told the witness that they should be expecting supplies to ariive,
and Bockarie's bodyguard "Foday", told the witness that they went to Monrovia to see
Taylor. They then received a large consignment of food, fuel, gasoline, engine oil and other
supplies the soldiers needed.9l3O
The Accused
4053. The Accused testified that "during the very tough period" he permitted RUF
members who were injured to get treatment in Liberia, but stated that this was humanitarian
assistance and there was nothing wrong with him doing so.9m
4054. The Accused denied that he provided the RUF with food, and more specifically with
rice. He contended that Foday Sankoh bought rice when he came to Liberia, and Bockarie
"did a lot of shopping" and would also buy things such as food, clothes, shoes and medicine
in Liberia and carry them to Sierra Leone. Further, he stated that in the time that he was
mediating the conflict on behalf of ECOWAS it would have been within his rights to
provide the RUF with rice, and that would have been a good thing to do.9m Finally, the
Accused conceded that two drums of fuel may have passed fiom Liberia to Sierra Leone
during Issa Sesay's regime, but insisted that the RUF bought this fuel, and that it was only
for use in hospitals.9l33
4055. The Accused also denied that, as Abu Keita testified, he provided Bockarie with a
Toyota Land Cruiser that contained clothes and medicine. Taylor noted that the witness
M TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13175—13176.
9129 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13306, 13332; Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13383.
9130 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13412-13415.
9131 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29013.
9132 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29012-29014.
9133 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29041-29043.

---- End of Page 1394 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /% fil}? 18 May 2012

3 n 4%*4.
testified the incident ha ened `ust before Christmas, but Bockarie was not in Liberia at an
PP J Y
time before Christmas, except when he passed through in early December.9l34
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4056. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,9l35 and interim leader of the RUF
from 2000 until disarmament in 2002,9136 testified that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) moved
to Cote d’Ivoire in 1996, and stayed there until 1998. He then left the RUF with Bockarie in
1999. ln approximately 1998, Tamba was used as a buying officer for the RUF, and would
travel to Liberia to buy whatever they needed, such as petroleum, food, medicine and other
suppliesgm Bockarie would send Tamba to Monrovia to buy medicine and provisions from
Lebanese businessmen named "Mohammed" and "Fayard". Tamba was a runner for
Bockarie and not for Taylor, so he did not run between Bockarie and Taylor.9l38
4057. Sesay also testified that the money that was looted from the bank in Koidu town in
April 1998 was used to buy ammunition from ULIMO, and also food and medicine for RUF
combatants.9l3°
Deliberations
4058. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused contributed to the RUF and the war in
Sierra Leone by providing medical and other assistance to the RUF during the Indictment
eriod.9l4O The Defence concedes that the Accused ave some su oit to the RUF for
P 8 PP
humanitarian reasons, but contends that most support was procured by the RUF through
legal means, on the open market in Liberia.9l4l
4059. The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence includes references to deliveries of aims
to the RUF and diamonds to the Accused. These aspects of the evidence are addressed
9134 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29398-29401.
°*" isss sssuy, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
9136 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
9*1* issu spsuy, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47388-47391.
mg Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43803-43805; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45072-45074 (PS);
Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45405.
"*" 1ssu Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45026-45027 (Ps).
9*40 Prosecution rruui Trial Brief, paras 338-340.
Om Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1168, 1175-1179, 1181-1182, 1186.

---- End of Page 1395 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jug 18 May 2012

3cr 488
elsewhere in the context of the Trial Chamber's consideration of arms and diamond
deliveries.9l42
4060. The Prosecution has presented a considerable amount of evidence that the Accused
provided the RUF with various goods and services that benefited the RUF war effort.
Concerning the provision of medical care, the Accused does not necessarily deny that he did
so, stating that during "the very rough period", he permitted RUF injured fighters to get
treatment in Liberia.ql43 The Accused does not, however, specify in which periods in the
conflict he provided this care.
4061. Perry Kamara testified that "any time" there were wounded fighters, including during
the Fitti-Fatta mission, Taylor arranged for them to be taken to Monrovia for medical
care.9l44 When asked by the Prosecution how he knew that RUF fighters were treated in
Monrovia, Kamara gave the example of Denis Mingo being taken by helicopter for
treatment from Makeni in 2000.9145 Moreover, his testimony is corroborated in general terms
by the evidence of Varmuyan Sherifi who testified that Taylor provided medical treatment
for RUF fighters when the RUF was engaged in combat in Lofa County. Sherif stated that
the press and politicians noted on the radio that Sierra Leonean fighters were treated in
Liberian hospitals, although no further evidence has been adduced by the Prosecution
relating to this claim. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that both Kamara and Sherif are
generally credible witnesses.9l46
4062. Although the evidence of the two Prosecution witnesses is not very specific, the Trial
Chamber notes that the Accused has conceded to providing some medical treatment for RUF
fighters. In light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused provided medical
treatment to RUF fighters at some point in the Indictment period. It is not clear, however,
how continuous or substantial the provision of medical care was throughout the Indictment
period.
9142 Arms and Ammunition; Diamonds.
W3 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29013.
W4 TFl—360, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3171; Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3181-3182.
9'45 TFl—360, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3181-3182.
W6 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, Varmuyan Sherif, Arms and
Ammunition, para. 5324.

---- End of Page 1396 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03-01-T /' 18 May 2012 A
/ im Mg


Kawai
4063. Several Prosecution Witnesses testified to the Accused's involvement in providing
roods such as food, clothin , ci arettes, alcohol and other su lies to the RUF. Prosecution
B 8 8 PP
Witnesses TFl-338 and TFl-567 testified to having first-hand knowledge of the Accused
providing these supplies, TFl-338 when the Accused told Sesay that he would talk to
Yeaten regarding the RUF's lack of materials and when Yeaten then provided these
materials for Sesay in "large quantities".9m TFl-567 stated that when he lived in Liberia he
would buy rice on behalf of the Accused and send it to the RUF in Sierra Leone.9l48
4064. Eight Prosecution Witnesses testified to hearing that the Accused provided supplies
to the RUF. Perry Kamara, Abu Keita, Isaac Mongor, Augustine Mallah and Jabaty J award
heard directly appr Bockarie that the Accused gave supplies to the RUF.9149 Witness TFl-
567 heard from Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and others that the Accused provided supplies
for the RUF.9l5O Albert Saidu stated that "everyone knew" that Tamba brought supplies to
the RUF.9151 Saidu also delivered a letter concerning the RUF's shortage of materials to
Tamba, at which point Tamba said he would meet with the Accused. Three days later,
supplies anived in Sierra Leone.9l52 Finally, Witness TFl-585 heard from Tamba's driver
who accompanied Tamba to Liberia that he received supplies from VVhite Flower, the
Accused's home in Monrovia, and then loaded the supplies onto trucks that travelled to
Sierra Leone.9l53
4065. The Defence concedes that the Accused may have provided a limited amount of
su lies for humanitarian reasons.9154 The Defence also contends, however, that the ma`orit
PP J Y
of the Prosecution's evidence is given by individuals who assume that assistance came rrpm
the Accused because it arrived from Liberia. There is some Prosecution evidence which
falls into this category. Prosecution Witnesses TFl-5l6, TFl-338, TFl-371, Mohamed
9147 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15157, 15161-15164.
(M8 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12988-12990, 12893-12895, 13003-13004 (PS); Transcript 8 July
2008, pp. 13175-13176.
W9 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3135-3136; Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3267-3269; Abu
Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2011-2013; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5789-5793;
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20209-20212; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp.
l34l2-13415.
°'5° rrr-567, Transcript 2 Jury 2008, pp. 12905-12906.
(Ml Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 110273-11029; Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11046-11051.
9152 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 1 1023-1 1029.
9153 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15657-15663.
9154 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1177, 1181, 1186. See also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16
September 2009, pp. 29012-29014 (stating that at the time Taylor was mediating the conflict on behalf of

---- End of Page 1397 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jg 18 May 2012

ia wie
Kabbah, and Albert Saidu all testified that RUF members came from Liberia with supplies,
but offered no evidence that these supplies were provided by the Accused.9l55 The Accused
testified that Sankoh and Bockarie would buy these supplies when they came to Liberia.9l56
Defence Witnesses Issa Sesay confirmed that Tamba bought supplies in Liberia to bring
back to Sierra Leone, and claimed that these transactions had no connection to the
Accusedqm TFl-338 testified that after the Accused asked Sesay to stop bringing him
diamonds because of international pressure, he found Belgian men who would trade
diamonds for cash, and Sesay bought supplies with these funds.9l58 In addition, Augustine
Mallah testified that Bockarie's bodyguards told him that Bockarie would trade diamonds
for cash in Liberia, and buy supplies with this cash.9l59 This supports the Defence contention
that RUF members bought supplies with cash.
4066. The Trial Chamber notes, however, the substantial evidence that the Accused himself
provided supplies to the RUF, and is of the view that the Accused's provision of supplies
did not preclude others from also buying supplies on the open market in Liberia. For this
reason, the Trial Chamber does not consider the evidence of independent cash transactions
not attributed to the Accused inconsistent with the evidence of transactions in which the
Accused was involved. These are not alleged to be the same transactions. Having considered
all the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused provided supplies to the RUF during the Indictment period, although
the evidence is insufficient to enable the Trial Chamber to judge the quantity of supplies
provided. V
Findings
4067. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused provided medical care to RUF/AFRC members. However, it is not clear
ECOWAS, it would have been proper for him to provide the RUF with rice).
M5 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6957-6959; TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15164-15166;
TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2375-2380 (CS); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008,
pp. 16138-16140.
M6 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29012-29014.
gm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43803-43805; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45072—45074 (PS);
Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45405; Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47388-47391.
"‘" TF1-338, rrarrrerrpr 2 September 2008, pp. 15167-15171.
"‘" Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20209-20212.

---- End of Page 1398 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M/ J *0 18 May 2012
W/4

Zadag
how continuous or substantial the provision of medical care was throughout the Indictment
period. The Prosecution has also proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused provided
medicine, food, clothing, cigarettes, alcohol and other supplies to the RUF during the
indictment period. However, the evidence is insufficient to enable the Trial Chamber to
judge the quantity of supplies provided. Moreover, other supplies for the RUF came from
Liberia through other channels unrelated to the Accused.
(d) Alleged Provision of Herbalists
Submissions of the Parties
4068. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused sent herbalists who put "protection marks"
on fighters in order to bolster their courage for the mission to recapture Kono, also called
Operation Fitti·Fatta.9l60
4069. The Defence concedes that there is evidence that herbalists came from Liberia to
prepare fighters for the Fitti·Fatta missionglél However, it characterises the inculpatory
accounts of the Accused's involvement as entirely hearsay and highlights evidence that the
RUF used herbalists and juju men before the Accused allegedly sent the herbalists from
Liberia which, the Defence submits, means that there would have been no need for the
Accused's involvement.9l°2 The Defence also cites evidence from the Accused that he did
not believe in juju in any event.W’3
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
4070. Witness Alice Pyne, an RUF radio operator,9l64 testified that she encountered
herbalists in the zoebush in Buedu, when she was there with Superman for the meeting at
which the Fitti·Fatta mission was planned.9l65 Pyne testified that when she arrived in Buedu
Sebatu, Sam Bockarie's radio operator, came and told her that Bockarie was going to Foya
MO Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 157, 254, 283, 306.
WA Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 924.
Om Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1 193-1 194.
9163 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1 194.
0164 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12074.
(M65 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12233-12234, 12236, 12239-12240.

---- End of Page 1399 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T gf QR 18 May 2012

39 *69 2
in Liberia. Following this, the witness saw Bockarie and his bodyguards leave in their
vehicles from her house, which was not far from Bockarie's. Later the same afternoon,
Bockarie retumed. Wm
4071. Bockarie took Pyne, Superman and other RUF fighters into the zoebush outside
Buedu where there were up to seven herbalists leading other herbalists and juju men. They
used juju practice and marked the RUF fighters to make them bulletproof at the "war front"
gm so bullets would not pierce their bodies.9l(’8 Pyne testified that she also saw Colonel
Jungle in the zoebush at this time.W’9 Pyne explained that she knew the herbalists were irom
Liberia, both from the language they spoke and because that was what Bockarie told
Superman when he was handing the herbalists over to him. Pyne also testified that an elderly
Gbandi woman had told her that the herbalists’ boss was a Loma tribesman and they had
been sent to Bockarie by Taylor to help protect the RUF fighters, particularly those who
would o to reca ture Koidu Town from ECOMOGPHO Bockarie told Su erman that these
8 P P
people were "his strangers" and Superman should take them to his base so that other
commanders irom Yomandu, Gandohun, Tombudu and Tefeya in Kono could bring their
men to be marked in preparation for the Fitti—Fatta mission. They then travelled back to
Kono together with the herbalists. Pyne stayed in Buedu for three days and thereafter, about
200-300 people including herself, Superman, armed men and the herbalists travelled to
Superman Ground. They brought arms and ammunitions to Superman Groundfml
4072. The next moming, as instructed by Superman, Pyne sent a radio coded message to
Komba, Bai Bureh, Rambo and Rocky CO requesting them to send manpower that was
supposed to participate in the Fitti—Fatta operation to go to Superman Ground and have their
bodies marked by the herbalists.9l72 Pyne estimated that 500 men arrived at Superman
Ground and the next morning, the herbalists created a special place with a circle in which
the fighters could enter and have their bodies marked. Pyne spoke Gbandi and for that
reason, she interpreted as the herbalists were marking the fighters.9l73 Pyne stated that the
9I°° Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12236-12237.
Om Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12236-12238.
gm Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12237.
M9 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12236, 12310-12313.
WO Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 April 2008, p. 12238.
Om Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12240.
Om Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12241-12242,
°‘" Aupp Pyne, Transcript 19 Jupp 2008, pp. 12242~12243.

---- End of Page 1400 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 4/ A 18 May 2012

37492
herbalists used a blade to put 168 markings on each of their bodies and imposed "laws"
forbidding sex, bathing and eating slimy food for seven days.9l74 After they completed the
markings, Komba and Bai Bureh returned to their locations with their men.
Prosecution Witness Pegg Kamara
4073. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,9l75 testified that around April or May
1998 at the commanders’ meeting in Buedu at which Bockarie ordered the Fitti-Fatta attack,
Bockarie introduced one herbalist saying that he had been sent by the Accused. Kamara said
that the herbalist was meant to "inspire" them so that they would have no fear about
attacking Kono and "the various areas [Kamara had] named".9l76 Bockarie said that Taylor
had told him that herbalists had been helping him in Liberia so he was sending them to
Sierra Leone to come and work for the rebels there. The herbalist carved and rubbed
‘concoctions’ on the bodies of the fighters, including the witness, so that they would not fear
guns. Kamara was marked by piercing with a razor blade 21 times on his left and right arms
and 21 times on each side of his back, then "something black" was rubbed in. If anyone
refused to be carved, Bockarie ordered them to be killed. Kamara explained that those who
were in Buedu were dealt with there and that "they" (the herbalists) were then sent to
Superman Ground in Kono where fighters there were carved, and more fighters were then
called in turn from their bases to be marked: "nobody escaped the markings".9m Kamara
testified that the reason so many of the fighters died or were wounded during Fitti-Fatta was
"because they met the man Sam Bockarie said Taylor sent" and they believed that the
medicines would work the way the herbalists told them they wouldgm
Prosecution Witness TF1-3 75
4074. Witness TF1-375, an RUF fighter,9l79 testified that about three weeks after they
retreated from Koidu Town, Sam Bockarie contacted Superman via radio to advise that he
om Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12244. Witness stated that a total of 168 markings were made on her
Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
9176 It was Kamara's testimony that the Accused and Bockarie planned attacks on not only Kono but also the
entire campaign to Freetown at this meeting. See Military Operations: Operation Fitti-Fatta. Kamara also
testified that "we received plenty ammunition, food, drugs" and "morale boosters", drink for the fighters, Perry
Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3169.
W7 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3160-3161, 3164-3166.
9178 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3171.
W9 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
JP

was sending "guests" from Liberia. Superman sent people to receive them at the Moa River,
and they returned accompanied by up to eight Liberians. The men had Liberian accents and
brought arms and ammunition, as well as two medicine men who marked the fighters to
protect them. At an open forum for senior officers the Liberians told Superman and the
officers that they wanted the officers to retake Kono. Superman forced all the fighters to
"take the mark",despite the witness not believing "in that". The medicine men told the
fighters that they had done the same to fighters during "the NPFL time under Taylor". The
herbalist made "a total of 168 marks" on the back, arms and chest of the witness by piercing
with "one razor blade". More than 200 — 300 fighters were marked in this way.9l8O TF1-375
testified that one of the Liberians was an SSS officer named Osebo Demy (a.k.a. 59), whom
he came to know subsequently in Liberia as one of Yeaten's subordinates in the SSS.9l8l
4075. After the markings, the fighters were ordered to re-attack Kono and, among the RUF,
the witness had never seen such numbers die.9l82
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
4076. Witness Samuel Kargbo, an AFRC Supreme Council member,9l83 testified that while
in Buedu°l84 he underwent marking by Liberiangm priests, (also referred to as herbalists9l86)
called Zopopeh in Liberian dialect, for the purpose of warding off bullets. The Zopopeh then
went to do the same to fighters in Kono. Kargbo told the court that Bockarie leh one evening
to travel towards the Liberian border area and returned with the men the following evening,
"within 48 hours". Kargbo was marked on his shoulders, both sides of his chest and the back
by cutting with a razor blade, then a medicine, "a black thing", was rubbed into the cuts. The
Zopopeh also imposed "laws" on those marked that they must not have sex or eat certain
9180 TF1—375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12523—l2529.
ml TF1—375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12527—12530.
W rrr-275, Transcript 23 June 2008,p. 12527.
Om Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10439, 10448, 10450; Exhibit P—58, "Excerpts from the Sierra
Leone Gazette No. 52, 4 September 1997 — 00007703—00007704", ERN 7703-7704.
9184 The Trial Chamber considers from Kargbo's testimony that this occurred some weeks after the dispute with
Koroma over diamonds and that he was therefore referring to the marking ceremonies prior to Fitti—Fatta. See
Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10558, where the witness explained that this happened some weeks
"after they had taken our diamonds Hom us".
9185 The witness stated that the men were speaking with Liberian dialects but that he did not "get too much
conversation with them".
0186 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. l0819—10820.

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Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T J QM 18 May 2012

5 Q 4< 95
foods for seven daysgm He testified that after the herbalists had performed their rites,
bullets were fired at the fighters but did not touch them and the weapon was damaged.9l88
The herbalists then went to Kono and did the same there.9l89
Prosecution Witness Komba Sumana
4077. Witness Komba Sumana, a former RUF child soldier,9l9O testified to seeing a
traditional priest, otherwise called a medicine man or juju man, called Pa Demba, a member
of the RUF, in Magburaka during the infighting between 1ssa Sesay and Superman after the
Freetown Invasion. Demba had been brought to mediate between Superinan and Sesay and
"they came together again".9l9l He had also seen a medicine man previously in Kono. The
men used to mark people by making cuts on their upper amis, chests and backs to protect
them against bullets. Sumana refused to undergo the cutting because he saw blood oozing on
those who had been cut and was afraid.9l92
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
4078. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that during an attack on a village in
Koinadugu District in June or July or July to August 1998, they captured a juju man called
Tamba Sewa who promised to help the troops by making charms that "will disable the
enem from attackin ¤ us" if Gullit did not kill him. He re ared charms for the troo s to
Y Ea P P P
wrap around their arms.9l93
The Accused
A 4079. The Accused denied sending herbalists "any place to go and do anything". He
testified that he did not believe in juju, nor was he exploiting existing superstitions in Sierra
Leone by sending herbalists to protect fighters. If he had, he stated, he would have used
herbalists on his own men during the NPFL days, which he did not. He confirmed that, to
his knowledge, the Gbandis, Kissis, Lomas, Mendes and Temnes were superstitious and
9187 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10557-1056l; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10820.
9188 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10561; Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10819-10820.
mg Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10561.
9*99 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17192.
Om Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17981.
9*99 Komba surparra, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17981-17983.
9*99 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8075-8076.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-0l·T / 18 May 2012

used herbalists, suggesting that someone may have brought someone. Furthermore, he
expressed doubt regarding Alice Pyne's testimony on the basis that women were not
typically allowed to attend ceremonies in the zoebush.9l94
Defence Witness John Vincent
4080. Witness John Vincent, an RUF member,9l95 testified that he was based in Kono at
the time Superman led an unsuccessful attack there.9l96 When Alice Pyne's testimony was
put to Vincent, he confirmed that the RUF used herbalists at times during the conflict, but he
said he had never heard ofTaylor sending herbalists to the RUF to protect their fighters. He
could not, however, speak of the particular group of herbalists from Liberia described by
Pyne, except to say that he did not know about them and had not heard about them.9l97 On
cross-examination, the witness described the testimonies of Alice Pyne, Perry Kamara,
Komba Sumana and Charles Ngebeh about Liberian herbalists and/or juju men marking
fighters before the attack on Kono as "lies" and stated that he did not see a medicine man or
ajuju man sent by Taylor.9198
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4081. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,9l99 denied that Taylor sent herbalists
to Sierra Leone before the Fitti-Fatta mission. The herbalists (two men and a woman) who
marked the fighters’ bodies and rubbed in a "poultice" for the Fitti-Fatta mission came to
Buedu at Sam Bockarie's request with a Liberian ULIMO man from Loma named Titus, a
friend of Bockarie's and a relation ofAugustine Mulbah, one of the vanguards. When they
had protected the people in Buedu, Bockarie sent them with Superman to go to the attack in
9194 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29027-29028; Transcript 30 September 2009,
pp. 29979, 29982-29984.
9195 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; 30 March 2010,
pp. 38226, 38239; 31 March 2010, p. 38390, 38408, 38460, 38461.
9196 John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38383. Although the witness testified that, since Fitti-Fatta
meant "we would have taken... got everything at our disposa1" he did think this was the "Fitti-Fatta" mission, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the event he describes, an unsuccessful attack on Kono in 1998 before Superman
moved to Kabala, is the same event that other witnesses have described as "Fitti-Fatta".
9197 John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38227-38231; Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38340-38346.
91% John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38340-38346. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that the
witness also testified that by ‘1ies’ he meant "I don’t know about it". John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010,
pp. 38340, 38346. The Trial Chamber notes that Vincent became agitated and vehement during this part of his
testimony.
°""’ ipsa Sesay, Transcript 26 Jury 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3¢¢77
Kono.92O0 Sesay acknowledged that the RUF had never experienced the "kind" of casualties
that they suffered in the Fitti-Fatta mission but attributed this to the fact that there was not
sufficient ammunition for the attack, it was not organised properly.92Ol
Defence Witness Charles N gebeh
4082. Witness Charles N gebeh, an RUF armourer,92O2 testified that in the initial stages of
the war, for example in Baiima, Kailahun in 1991, family members used to protect fighters
against bullets by marking the body or embalming or "smoking". Furthermore, he stated that
in 1998, another group was brought by Sam Bockarie "from Liberia, from the ULIMO side"
to protect the troops against bullets. They marked the witness on his chest, arms and back
using a razor blade, making many marks. Ngebeh called this process "embalming". The
witness explained that some fighters believed in the protection, although he personally did
not. Moreover, he said he saw bullets fired at those who had been "embalmed" but they were
not protected.9203
Deliberations
4083. lt is undisputed by the parties92O4 that in preparation for the Fitti-Fatta mission in
mid-1998, ‘herbalists’ marked fighters in Buedu and then Kono in order to ‘protect’ them
against bullets, to which most of the Prosecution and Defence witnesses cited above
testified. Although Witnesses Komba Sumana and Charles N gebeh testified to the presence
of herbalists in 1998, the Trial Chamber did not find their testimonies detailed enough to
determine conclusively that they were referring to the herbalists sent before the Fitti-Fatta
mission. Although Defence Witness John Vincent testified that the RUF used herbalists at
times during the conflict, he said he had not heard about the particular group of herbalists
from Liberia who came to mark the fighters prior to Fitti-Fatta.92O5 On cross-examination,
Vincent described the testimony of the Prosecution witnesses about these herbalists as
"lies",9206 but the Trial Chamber notes that his evidence is contradicted by the testimony of
9200 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44065—44067; Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46059; Transcript 12 I
August 2010, pp. 46118—46120.
9201 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44065—44067.
9202 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37847.
9203 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, pp. 37766—37770.
9204 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 157, 254, 283, 306; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 924.
9205 John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38231.
9206 John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38340—38346. _

---- End of Page 1405 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012
2* ff %

S? M g
Defence Witness Issa Sesay who testified that herbalists came from Liberia to mark the Fitti-
Fatta fighters.92O7 The Trial Chamber considers that Vincent's demeanour while giving this
evidence undermined his credibility on that issue. Moreover, the Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that the testimony of John Vincent must be treated with caution and corroborated.9208
The Trial Chamber finds that the herbalists came from Liberia and marked the fighters to
protect them in Operation Fitti-Fatta. At issue is what, if any, involvement the Accused had
in the provision of these herbalists.
4084. The Defence highlights the predominance of hearsay evidence supporring the
Prosecution's allegation that the herbalists were sent by the Accused. The Trial Chamber
recognises that the evidence relied on by the Prosecution is hearsay but considers that this is
explicable by the fact that the witnesses who testified were members of the RUF/AFRC
present in Buedu and/or Kono when the herbalists arrived. They would not conceivably have
been present when the Accused would allegedly have made the requisite arrangements. The
Trial Chamber considers the lack of direct evidence to be a natural consequence of these
circumstances and does not preclude a finding on the basis of hearsay evidence that is
substantially corroborated. The Trial Chamber places weight on the fact that each of the
witnesses who testified was told about the Accused's involvement from different sources.
4085. Two witnesses relied on by the Prosecution, Alice Pyne and Perry Kamara, testified
that they had heard from Sam Bockarie (in Kamara's case) or from a Liberian woman who
accompanied the herbalists (in Pyne's case) that herbalist(s) used in Buedu and Superman
Ground in Kono had been sent by the Accused. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that
Perry Kamara92O9 and Alice Pyne92lO are generally credible witnesses. Prosecution Witnesses
Samuel Kargbo and TF1-375 did not confirm or deny any association of the Accused with
the herbalists, although aspects of their testimony corroborate the testimony of the other
Prosecution witnesses on the time, place, and procedures adopted by the herbalists. TF1-375
testified that the herbalists said that they had done the same during "the NPFL time under
ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44065-44067; Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46059; Transcript 12
August 2010, pp. 46118-46120.
mg Credibility Assessment, John Vincent, Provision of Military Personnel, paras 4463-4464.
mq Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.
gm Credibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f QW 18 May 2012

Taylor",92H and that the witness subsequently came to know one of the eight men as one of
Yeaten's SSS subordinates,92l2 therefore someone who worked for the Accused.
4086. The Defence challenges Alice Pyne's testimony on the basis that in her prior
statements she had not mentioned the Accused as having sent the herbalists to Bockarie,
saying they had been hired by Bockarie.92l3 The Trial Chamber has reviewed Pyne's
testimony and notes that she told the Prosecution in her fourth interview, which was three
months, not 10 days as alleged by the Defence, before her testimony that the Accused had
sent the herbalists.92l4 In her first interview, she stated that "the traditional herbalists were
hired by Sam Bockarie".92l5 Pyne testified that "hired" was the investigator's wording and
that she had only told him that Bockarie had introduced the herbalists to Superinan.92l6 The
Trial Chamber accepts Pyne's explanation that she omitted to mention the Accused in the
absence of any direct questions from investigators as to who sent the herbalists92l7 and is of
the view that in the absence of any mention of the Accused on Pyne's part at her first
interview, it is reasonable that the investigator misconstrued her statement..
4087. The Defence relies on the evidence of 1ssa Sesay and John Vincent to rebut the
testimony of the Prosecution witnessesfmg In view of John Vincent's denial of any
knowledge that Liberian herbalists were present in Kono before the Fitti—Fatta mission, the
Trial Chamber considers his denial of the Accused's involvement to be of little value.
Moreover, his evidence that he never heard about the Accused providing herbalists is not in
itself dispositive or preclusive of such involvement. The clear agitation shown by the
witness during his cross—examination on the subject also undermined his credibility on this
issue. Moreover, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Vincent's evidence must be
considered with caution.92l9 Issa Sesay denied that the Accused sent the herbalists, saying
that Bockarie hired the herbalists through a friend named Titus, who was also a relative of
"2" T1¤1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12528.
"2‘2 T1¤1-375, Transcript 23 Jnnc 2008, pp. 12526-12527.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1193.
(mil Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 April 2008, pp. 12313-12315.
""5 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 April 2008, p. 12315.
W6 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 April 2008, p. 12316.
gm Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 April 2008, p. 12316.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 194.
mg Credibility Assessment, John Vincent, Provision of Military Personnel, paras 4463 ·4464.

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Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T 4%/ 18 May 2012

5Q§0o
one of the RUF vanguards, Major Augustine Mulbah.9220 In view of its earlier finding that
Sesay's evidence should be treated with caution, the Trial Chamber does not accept this
uncorroborated testimonyfml
4088. The Accused denied sending herbalists "any place to go and do anything",9222 citing
the prevalence of such superstitions in a number of areas of Liberia, presumably suggesting
that Liberian herbalists were widely available and need not therefore have been provided by
him. The Trial Chamber notes that his evidence of the prevalence of people practised in such
rites does not impact upon whether he made the alleged arrangements. The Accused
challenged Pyne's evidence through his assertion that women were not allowed at
ceremonies in the zoebush. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that Defence witness Issa
Sesay testified that one of the three herbalists who came to mark the fighters in Buedu was a
woman.9223 Sesay also testified that women, such as fighters’ wives, would indeed be found
in the zoebush re ion.9224 The Trial Chamber therefore finds the Accused's challen e to
8 8
Pyne's evidence to be without foundation.
4089. The Trial Chamber does not find the Accused's disbelief in the powers of herbalists
and juju men to be relevant in determining whether he sent these herbalists to perform rites
on fighters in preparation for the attack. Several witnesses have testified that the RUF used
such individuals throughout the conflict9225 on the basis that the fighters believed in their
owers.9226 The Accused need not have believed in the effectiveness or otherwise of the
P
herbalists’ rites to exploit beliefs held by the fighters.
4090. The Defence also submits that the fact that the RUF used herbalists and juju men
before the Accused allegedly sent the herbalists from Liberia means that there would have
been no need for the Accused's involvement.9227 As referred to in the preceding paragraph,
the Trial Chamber recognises that the RUF had used herbalists and juju men to ‘protect’ or
9220 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44065-44067; Transcript ll August 2010, p. 46059; Transcript 12
August 2010, pp. 46118-46120.
ml Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
Om Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 29984.
9223 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010. p. 44066; Transcript 12 August 2010. p. 46119.
9224 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010. pp. 47247-47249.
mj Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8075-8076; TF 1-263, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp.
17982-17983; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010. pp. 37766-37770.
9226 See Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010. p. 37770; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008. p.
10561; Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10819-10820.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /’ JQ 18 May 2012

595b/
at least encourage fighters before their alleged use in the Fitti-Fatta operation. The Trial
Chamber considers, however, that such prior use does not preclude and is not inconsistent
with assistance by the Accused in the provision of this support.
4091. With regard to the impact of the rites perfonned by the herbalists, the Prosecution
does not assert that the markings provided real protection against bullets during the Fitti-
Fatta attack but that it was intended to "bolster the courage of AFRC/RUF fighters before
the Fitti-Fatta mission".9m The Trial Chamber has heard evidence from Perry Kamara and
Charles Ngebeh that some fighters believed in the herbalists’ powersimg and Samuel Kargbo
himself testified that he saw their protective effects at first hand.923O While it is difficult to
measure the impact of these rituals on the fighters whom they were intended to support, this
evidence does establish, in the view of the Trial Chamber, that the provision of the herbalists
and the rites they perfonned did bolster some fighters’ confidence, as intended. Prosecution
Witness Kamara and Defence Witness Sesay both testified to the heavy losses that the RUF
incurred in the Fitti-Fatta operation and the belief of many fighters that they were invincible.
4092. The Accused testified that he was aware of the existence of such rituals and practices
and of the widely held belief that herbalists or juju men had power to render people immune
from danger. Whilst there may have been herbalists and juju men coming to the RUF from
time to time, the Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses that the
herbalists who came to Buedu and Kono before Operation Fitti-Fatta were sent by the
Accused. .
Findings
4093. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused sent ‘herbalists’ who marked fighters in Buedu and in Kono in preparation
for the Fitti-Fatta mission in mid-1998, to bolster their confidence for the mission to
recapture Kono.
W7 Defence Fmer Trial Brief, para. 1194.
(mg Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 306.
9229 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 22 March 2010, p. 37770; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3171.
9230 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10820.

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
.9/ 9**

375‘0 2
(e) Bunumbu Training Camp
Submissions of the Parties
4094. The Prosecution alleges that in mid-1998, the Accused instructed Bockarie to open a
training base called "Camp Lion" in Bunumbu, Kailahun District and instructed that 62
fonner SLA soldiers were to be trained there. In support of this allegation, the Prosecution
relies on the evidence of TF1-362.923]
4095. The Defence challenges the credibility of Witness TF1-362 and submits that her
_ account defies logic. The Defence maintains that the Accused had no involvement in the
creation of the RUF base. The Defence also points out contradictions between Witness TF1-
362's hearsay evidence and the testimonies of TF1-516 and Issa Sesay. 9232
Evidence P
Prosecution Witness TF1-362
4096. Witness TF1-362, an RUF member,9233 testified that after the attack on Freetown in
1998, Monica Pearson was instructed by Issa Sesay to report to Sam Bockarie who was
based in Buedu. There, Bockarie informed Pearson, in the presence of the witness, that
Taylor had instructed the RUF to set up a training base at Bunumbu, in Kailahun district.
Following these instructions, the training base at Bunumbu was opened. This base was also
named Camp Lion. (,234
4097. Witness TF1-362 testified that military training was provided at the base to between
100 and 200 civilians captured on the way from Freetown.9235 The "recruits" were divided
into five platoons: SBU, SGU, adult, old age, and WACs. Women were forced to undergo
military training and were subsequently sent to the front lines to provide sexual services to
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 250, 326-327, 879, 916, 979-983.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1 100, 1286-1289.
W TF1—362, Transcript 27 rpbmary 2008, pp. 4826-4827 (cs).
W TF1-362, Transcript 27 Fprmmy 2008, pp. 4866-4868.
W5 TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4895-4899.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J JQ 18 May 2012 / /

376 O 5
the men.9236 Military training of civilian captives would last from two to three weeks up to
six months after which they were sent to the front line.9237
4098. Witness TFl—362 stated that, in addition to civilians, Monica Pearson was instructed
by Issa Sesay to train 62 SLAs. Sesay said that Sam Bockarie had told him that Taylor
requested the RUF to train the SLAs in order to open a road to the border between Sierra
Leone and Gbamga. At the time, only helicopters could reach Sierra Leone from Liberia.
Witness TFl—362 said the SLAs were trained for one to two weeks after which Issa Sesay
arrived at Bunumbu with a group of Liberian ATU bodyguards, a special unit allegedly
under Taylor, which brought rice and cooking equipment for the RUF troops. Sesay also
gave Monica Pearson some rice and ammunition and informed her that Taylor had thanked
her for her work. 9238 ·
4099. Witness TFl—362 described the command structure in Bunumbu as essentially the
same as it had been at Matru Jong.9239 David Kanneh was the Blackguard assigned by Sam
Bockarie to Bunumbu base. Bockarie also appointed the training instructors.924O The
Blackguard at Bunumbu reported directly to Sam Bockarie while Monica Pearson reported
to Issa Sesay.°24l
4l00. While the witness was based at Bunumbu, they received weapons and ammunition
from an ammunition dump that was located at Sam Bockarie's house in Buedu. Bockarie
told her that he received these arms and ammunition from Taylor.9242
Prosecution Witness TFl -5 l 6
4l0l. Witness TFl—5l6, an RUF radio operator,9243 testified that after the Freetown attack,
when the AFRC/RUF retreated from Freetown in l999, many of AFRC/RUF fighters
crossed the border to take refuge in Liberia, creating a shortage of manpower for the RUF.
Bockarie travelled to Liberia and discussed with Benjamin Yeaten the possibility of
9236 TFl—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4899-4901.
W TFl—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4911.
mt r1¤1~362, Transcript 27 rpbmmy 2008, pp. 4895-4897.
"""’ TF1-862, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 486948723.
°’"° TF1-862, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 48784874, 4878.
°2"' TFl—362, Transcript 27 rpbmr-y 2008, p. 4894.
9242 TFl-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4909.
W rrr-516, Transcript 8 Appr 2008, p. 6845.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-0l-T %/ gl N 18 May 20l2

tightening up the borders to prevent armed AFRC/RUF men from entering Liberia. Yeaten
commanded Bockarie to open a training base to recruits civilians. Following this request,
Bockarie set up a training base at Bunumbu.9244
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4102. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,9245 and interim leader of the RUF
from 2000 until disarmament in 2002,9246 testified that in March 1998, Bockarie called
Monica Pearson to Kailahun and he appointed her deputy training commandant at the
training base called Camp Lion in Bunumbu under the command of Jah Glory. In April
1998, Jah Glory was shot dead and Pearson was appointed as training commandant of the
base until February 1999 when the base was transferred to Kono. 9247 As such, Pearson was
reporting directly to Sam Bockarie.9248
4103. According to Issa Sesay, Witness TF1-3 62 lied when she said that Taylor ordered the
opening of Bunumbu. Bockarie instructed him to send 15 to 20 SLAs, who had fled to
Liberia after the ECOMOG attack on Daru, to Bunumbu training base in order to be trained
for two weeks. These SLAs soldiers had not been engaged in combat for a long time and
Bockarie wanted them to be trained again before being sent to the front line.924°
Deliberations
4104. lt is undisputed that in 1998 an RUF training base called "Camp Lion" was set up in
Bunumbu.925O The Prosecution, relying on the testimony of Witness TF1-362, alleges that
the Accused instructed Sam Bockarie to open the training base Camp Lion in Bunumbu and
instructed him to train 62 former SLA soldiers there.9254 The Defence contends that the
Accused had no involvement in the creation of the RUF base and submits that Witness TF1-
362's testimony lacks credibility.9252
4244 TF1—5 16, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6941-6942.
9245 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-4459l, 44596.
9246 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588—43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
92471ssa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 4491 1-44912; Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45164, 45168 (PS).
924* ipsa spppy, Transcript 30 Jpiy 2010, pp. 45167-45169 (Ps).
"2"" ipsa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 4517045173 (Ps).
9250 See also TF1—371, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 2949—2950 (CS).
4251 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 326—327.
W oprpppp Final Trial Bmpr, paras 1100, 1286—1289.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T JM 18 May 2012
/

575 O 5*
4105. Witness TF1—362 is the sole witness who testified regarding the Accused's direct
involvement in the creation of the Bunumbu training camp in 1998 and the training of 62
SLAs, and her testimony is hearsay, based on Bockarie's statement that the Accused asked
the RUF to train the SLAs and based on a message of thanks to Monica Pearson from the
Accused, transmitted by Issa Sesay. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that TF1—
362 is a generally credible witness.9253 Sesay denied that the Accused ordered the opening of
the training camp, and the Defence also cites the evidence of Witness TFl—516 as "directly
contradict[ing]" the evidence of TF1—3 62.
4106. The Trial Chamber notes that Witness TF1—516 testified that Bockarie was
commanded to open the base in Bunumbu by Yeaten in order to tighten up the borders to
prevent armed AFRC/RUF men from entering Liberia. This evidence is not very detailed
and erroneously places the opening of the Bunumbu base in 1999. Nevertheless, the Trial
Chamber considers that TF1—516's testimony of Yeaten's command corroborates the
testimony of TF1—362 with regard to the involvement of the Accused. Yeaten was Director
of the SSS, working for the Accused, transmitting and carrying out orders on his behalf.
Rather than contradicting the evidence of TF1—362, the Trial Chamber finds that this
evidence is consistent with the evidence of TF1—362 that the training camp was opened on
the order of the Accused.
4107. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of Issa Sesay must be treated
with caution and corroborated.9254 His denial of the involvement of the Accused is not
corroborated by other evidence, and the Trial Chamber does not accept it as credible.
Findings
4108. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused instructed Sam Bockarie to open a training base in Bunumbu, Kailahun
District.
(f) Alleged Training in the Use of Missile Gun
Submissions of the Parties
gm Credibility Assessment, TF1-362, paras 244-253.
Gm Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.

---- End of Page 1413 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // gw 18 May 2012

5 9506
4109. The Prosecution alleges that at the end of December 1998, at Sam Bockarie's
request, Taylor sent Martina Johnson, a former NPFL artillery commander, to Buedu to
conduct training to use a 40-barrel missile captured by Issa Sesay.9255
4110. The Defence submits that assistance in using a weapon in attacks against a lawful
army cannot be considered as a crime.925°
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
4111. Witness TF1-371, an RUF officer, testified that in December 1998, Taylor's former
NPFL artillery commander, Martina Johnson, came to Buedu at Sam Bockarie's request to
train the RUF fighters in the use of a 40-barrel missile gun which had been captured by Issa
Sesay in Kono District. According to Witness TF1-371, the RUF never used the gun because
it was technically very difficult to operate.9257
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
4112. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,9258 testified that Gibril
Massaquoi and others captured a 40 barrel missile gun from Guinean troops along the
Kambia border in late 1996 or early 1997, prior to the AFRC coup. The RUF concealed the
missile gun in a truck in the jungle alongside the river bank at Manowa crossing point until
after the Intervention. 9259
4113. After the Intervention in 1998, several engineers came from Liberia to repair the
missile gun so that it could be utilised by the RUF. Saidu was told by the RUF artillery unit
that the RUF was planning to use the missile against the government of Sierra Leone but
that none of the RUF fighters was trained in order to use of using the missile. The unit
explained that a woman named Martina, from Taylor's government, would come to use the
weapon once it was repaired.9260
9255 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 328.
9256 Defence Final rms Brief, para. 1 188.
‘"" TF1-371, Transcript 4 Febmary 2008, p. 2950 (cs).
W Albert sarau, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
9259 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 10988~10990; Transcript 9 June 2008, pp. 11308~1 1309.
9260 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 10990-10994; Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1 1031-1 1032; Transcript

---- End of Page 1414 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T / 18 May 2012

4114. Saidu stated that before the repairs were completed, a helicopter gunship came from
the government and bombarded the area. The missile gun was seriously damaged and the
weapon repair was abandoned. Saidu observed the damaged missile when passing by the
riverbank after the helicopter attacl<.92°l
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
4115. Witness Moses Blah, Inspector General of the NPP L from 1990 to 1997,9262 Liberian
Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000,9263 and Vice-
President of Liberia from 2000 to 2003,9264 testified that Martina Johnson was an NPFL
commander of the artillery unit who was heading the missiles group.9265
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
4116. Witness Varmuyan Sherif, a former ULIMO-K fighter who became an officer in the
$55,9266 testified that Martina Johnson, a junior commando of the NPFL, was a terrorist who
headed the artillery unit.9267
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
4117. Witness Charles Ngebeh, an RUF armourer,9268 testified that the RUF captured a 40-
barrel missile gun from Guinean troops around Waterloo in January 1999. Sam Bockarie
ordered that the gun be brought to him in Kailahun. Ngebeh was able to bring the missile
gun as far as the Manowa Ferry, but the ferry was in such poor condition that the gun could
not be moved across the river. Eventually, an ECOMOG jet bombed the gun and destroyed
its barrels, and the Guineans returned to take the gun away.9269
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
9 June 2008, p. 11309.
926] Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 10991-10992; Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11309.
Om Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9943-9945.
W Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884.
0264 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884; Blah became President of Liberia for 60 days from 1 1
August to 11 October 2003: Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10065.
"2"5 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, p. 9906.
9266 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript, 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; 10 January 2008, pp. 940, 986-987.
9267 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 866-869.
9268 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37847.
W Charles Ngabah, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37929.

---- End of Page 1415 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr.-03-01-T / Qu? 18 May 2012 f

f"
3?>¤2
4118. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commanderi)270 and interim leader of the RUF
from 2000 until disarmament in 2002,9271 testified that in 1998 the Guineans crossed over
into Yenga and Mofindor in the Kailahun District and they crossed into Kono at
Kombeyendeh, but the RUF repelled them. During these attacks, Rambo managed to go
into Guinea and captured a 40-barrel missile gun. However, in late 2000, early 2001 the
Guineans began shelling at the border and attacking RUF positions. 9272
Exhibit D-084
4119. Exhibit D-084 is a salute report from Issa Sesay, dated 27 September 1999. In this
report, Sesay explained that his bodyguard commander led a squad of men in an ambush
against the Guinean troops. During this ambush, the squad captured a 40-barrel missile that
Sankoh escorted to the RUF rear.9273
Exhibit P-379
4120. Exhibit P-379 is a report on the visit of Foday Sankoh to Makeni in November 1999.
The report mentions the disarmament on 18 November 1999 of a 40 barrel missile gun
which was captured by the RUF from the Guinean ECOMOG around the Kambia Axis.9274
Deliberations
4121. The evidence clearly establishes that around 1998 or 1999, the RUF captured a 40-
barrel missile gun from the Guinean ECOMOG troops along the Kambia border.9275
9270 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
9271 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
Om Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45602; Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47095.
9273 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999 — 00007756 — 00007768",
pp. 9-10.
9274 Exhibit P-379, "Sierra Leone People's Army, Amry Headquarters, Makeni, Northern Region, Makeni,
Visitation Of the Leader Cpl. Foday Sankoh, Representative of the International Cimmunities and ECOMOG
Securities, From the O/All [.D.U Commander. 22 November 1999", p. 4.
0275 TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2950 (CS); Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 10988~10990;
Transcript 9 June 2008, pp. 11308-11309j Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37929; Issa Sesay,
Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45602. See also Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute
Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27
September 1999 - 00007756 ~- 00007768", pp. 9-10; Exhibit P-379, "Sierra Leone Peop1e's Army, Amry
Headquarters, Makeni, Northern Region, Makeni, Visitation Of the Leader Cpl. Foday Sankoh, Representative
of the International Cimmunities and ECOMOG Securities, From the O/All [.D.U Commander. 22 November
1999", p. 4.

---- End of Page 1416 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 I
/ M f

4122. Prosecution Witness TF1-371 testified that at the end of December 1998, at Sam
Bockarie's request, the Accused sent Martina Johnson to conduct training to use a 40-barrel
missile captured by Issa Sesayf)276 Albert Saidu also heard that a woman named Martina,
from Taylor's government, would come to use the weapon once it was repaired but testified
that the missile was never repaired because a bombardment seriously damaged the
missile.9277 Charles Ngebeh also testified that an ECOMOG jet bombed the gun and
destroyed its barrels.9278 Several witnesses testified as to Martina Jo1mson's role in the
NPFL but made no reference to the allegation that she came to train the RUF to use a 40-
barrel missile.
4123. Witness TF1-371's evidence about the training was brief, totalling ten lines of
transcript within eight days of testimony. Furthermore, while he testified that Taylor sent
Martina Jolmson, it is not clear from his evidence what the source of his information was.
His testimony is inconsistent with the testimony of Saidu that a woman named Martina was
to come when the missile was repaired but that the missile was never repaired. Saidu
testified that several engineers came from Liberia to repair the missile, which TF1-371 did
not mention in his testimony.
4124. In light of these inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber finds the evidence insufficient to
support a finding beyond reasonable doubt that, at the end of December 1998, at Bockarie's
request, the Accused sent Martina Jolmson in order to conduct training to use a 40-barrel
missile gun captured by Issa Sesay.
Findings
4125. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that at the end of December 1998, the Accused sent Martina Jolmson, a former NPFL
artillery commander, to Buedu to train RUF fighters to use a 40-barrel missile gun.
(g) Alleged Order to Build an Airfield in Buedu
Submissions of the Parties
gm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 328; see TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2950 (CS).
9277 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 10990-10994; Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11031-11032;
Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 1 1309.
(fm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37929.

---- End of Page 1417 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f/*’ 18 May 2012

4126. The Prosecution alleges that in 1996, before signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord,
the Accused sent a message to Foday Sankoh telling him to choose a particular area where
they should construct an airstrip. After Sankoh received that message, he appointed Peter B.
Vandi to be in charge of constructing the airfield in a village close to Buedu. I-Ie told Vandi
to use civilians and to work day and night to complete the construction. Civilians did work
there day and night.9279
4127. The Prosecution alleges that after the Intervention, the Accused reiterated to Sam
Bockarie the need for a functional airstrip in AFRC/RUF territory. At a meeting convened
by Bockarie, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and General Ibrahim Bah spoke on behalf of the
Accused. Jungle said that the AFRC/RUF should try to construct the airstrip at Buedu as
fast as possible. Bockarie then transmitted a message that the Accused said the AF RC/RUF
should try and reorganize and re-prepare the airfield at Buedu.9280
4128. The Defence submits that the Prosecution allegation is confused. Furthermore, it
challenges Perry Kamara's credibility and submits that his uncorroborated testimony is
discredited by another Prosecution witness. The Defence maintains that the Accused was not
involved in the construction of the airstrip in any way.928l
4129. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution's allegation regarding the construction
of an airfield in Buedu in 1996 is confused with its allegation regarding the construction of
an airfield in Buedu in 1998. The Prosecution cites the testimony of Abu Keita, Isaac
Mongor and Witnesses TF 1-585 and TF 1-371 in support of its 1996 allegation.9282
Similarly, the Defence submits in its closing brief that the evidence of Mohamed Kabbah
discredits the Prosecution allegation.9283 I·Iowever, a careful reading of their evidence
indicates that these five witnesses were testifying about the re-construction of the Buedu
airfield in late 19989284 and not about the initial building of the airfield around 1996.9285
9279 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 134.
9280 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 149.
ml Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 825; Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 15-17.
Om Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 134, footnote 452.
9283 Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 16: "The allegation in paragraph 134 of the PFB
is discredited by another Prosecution witness. TF1-568 provided evidence to the extent that Bockarie had told
Mohamed Kabbah that the airfield at Buedu was created in order to import arms directly from Libya. Thus,
Taylor was not involved in the construction of the airstrip in any way".
9284 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1987-1988; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2099 (Keita saw the
airstrip in construction after September 1998); TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2504-2506 (CS) (TFI-

---- End of Page 1418 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / jk 18 May 2012 kw

rr
37;; 1 1
l Evidence
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
4130. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,9286 testified that following the capture
of Sierra Rutile, Foday Sankoh received a written message from Taylor saying that the RUF
should make arrangements to construct an airfield where planes could land. Sankoh sent the
message to Kailahun and appointed`Peter B. Vandi to work with civilians day and night in
order to construct the airfield at a village close to Buedu.9287
4131. Kamara later testified that after the attack on Koidu Town, following the
lntervention, Sam Bockarie transmitted a message. According to the witness, "He said Mr
Taylor has told him that they should try and reorganise and re—prepare the airfield at Buedu,
so in there they would need civilians to do the work on the field". The RUF then sent over
200 to 300 civilians to do forced labour, to work on the field day and night with security
escorts.9288
Prosecution Witness TF 1 — 1 68
4132. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member,9289 testified that, around November 1996 while
he was visiting Cote d’1voire, Sankoh wrote a letter in which he ordered Sam Bockarie to
prepare an airstrip in Buedu for delivery of goods. Witness TF1—168 testified that he
personally saw the airstrip constructed.929O
371 saw the civilians working on the airport of Buedu while he was there, between March 1998 and April 1999);
TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15662; Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16293-16294 (TF1-585
testified that he saw the airstrip being constructed around 1998-1999); Isaac Mongor, Trancript 31 March 2008,
pp. 6203-6204 (it is clear that Mongor's testimony is about the period while he was Commander in Buedu in
1998).
ms Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37856-37857 (the airfield was built in 1996). See also
Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306, S/2000/1195, adopted on 20
December 2000" ("Most Sierra Leonean landing strips in the areas under RUF control were destroyed or have
not been maintained because of the war. The landing strip at Yengema is probably not operational, and although
the airstrip at Magburaka was rebuilt during the AFRC period in 1997 and is now in rebel territory, there are few
reports of fixed-wing aircraft landing there or elsewhere in RUF-held territory"). But see Issa Sesay, Transcript 7
July 2010, pp. 43905-43906 (the construction of the airstrip in Buedu was not completed in 1996). See generally
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 134, 149.
9286 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
9287 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3058-3059.
9288 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3105.
9289 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (CS).
"2"° TF1-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23467-23470 (cs).

---- End of Page 1419 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gm 18 May 2012

5 7 S / 2
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
4133. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,929l was in Buedu, Kailahun District from March
1998 until April 1999. He testified that civilians there were harassed by RUF soldiers, were
forced to work for the RUF and were used to carry food, arms and ammunition for RUF
combatants. Witness TF1-371 also testified that civilians were used to construct an airfield
in Buedu.9292
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
4134. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,9293 testified that in late
19989294 he attended a secret meeting convened by Sam Bockarie, which took place between
Buedu and Dawa. CO Jungle and General lbrahim, two representatives of Taylor's
Government participated in the meeting. Superman, CO Augustine Gbao and Issa Sesay also
attended the meeting. Saidu testified that the agenda of the meeting was to address the
pressure of ECOMOG and CDF on the AFRC/RUF forces, and the loss by Sesay of the
diamonds that Bockarie gave him for Taylor and the consequences of his loss on the RUF's
ability to purchase arms and ammunition.9295 After Bockarie's introduction, CO Jungle took
the floor explaining that Taylor recognized the RUF/AFRC relationship and supported it.
Jungle also said he encouraged the RUF to recapture Kono, the diamond mining area, to
exchange diamonds for weapons. Finally, they discussed the maintenance of an airstrip they
were trying to construct behind Buedu. Jungle said they should try to construct the airstrip as
soon as possible for emergency landing of aircraft to deliver the materials.9296
Prosecution Witness TF1 -585
4135. Witness TF1-585, an RUF radio operator,9297 testified that while Bockarie was
absent from Buedu, Bockarie's wife told TF1-585 that he was at Taylor's farm to discuss the
9291 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
9292 TF1 -371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2504-2505 (CS).
9293 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
9294 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11066 ("by that time we were approaching the end of 1998 [...]
October/November, around November, early November"). But see Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11353 ("the
meeting took place after my birthday [...] in April 1998").
0295 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11054-1 1056.
92% Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11056-1 1057.
9297 TF1 -585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15589-15592 (PS).

---- End of Page 1420 ---------------------------


Case No.:

3 as / 2
construction of an airfield, because the transportation of arms and ammunition through
Monrovia and overland to Buedu was time-consuming.9298
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
4136. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULIMO-K who
later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,9299 testified that after his arrest and his
detention around September 1998,9300 he was released and sent by Benjamin Yeaten to
Sierra Leonefml There, Keita travelled to Foya, where he met with Issa Sesay. Keita
subsequently moved to Buedu together with Sesay.93O2 While in Buedu, Sesay showed the
witness a site where the RUF was constructing an airstrip in order to receive supplies by
air.93O3 Keita testified that because jets used to bomb the site during the day, the RUF had to
construct the strip at night. The RUF used unpaid civilian workers to build the airstrip.9304
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
4137. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF officer,9305 testified that about a month after he
arrived in Buedu, he attended a meeting at which Sam Bockarie discussed the construction
of an airstrip near Buedu.93O6 The meeting was attended by hundreds of people including
1ssa Sesay, Denis Mingo, Eagle, King Perry, Zedman and AFRC members. During the
meeting Bockarie emphasized the importance of building the airstrip close to Buedu in order
to allow the RUF to receive its ammunition directly from Libya, rather than it being landed
in Monrovia and brought overland to Buedu, as was the case. Kabbah stated that the airstrip
was constructed by civilians but never used by any plane.9307
W TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15662.
9299 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000; 24 January 2008,
pp. 2110, 2145.
9300 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2099.
‘"°' Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1967-1969.
W Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1985-1986.
"’°3 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1987-1988.
9304 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1987-1988.
9305 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
93% Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16147-16148.
9307 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16147-16148; Transcript 16 September 2008, p.
16294.

---- End of Page 1421 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
4138. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF front line commander,9308 testified that the RUF used
civilians to work in mines, in farms or to carry ammunitions. They were forced to work and
were not paid in exchange. Isaac Mongor himself used these civilians to build him a hut.
Isaac Mongor further testified that Sam Bockarie used these civilians in order to prepare an
airfield in Buedu. The civilians working there did not receive any payment.9309
The Accused
4139. The Accused testified that he had no contacts with Foday Sankoh after Operation
Top Final in around May 1992.9310 He denied having given any advice to Sankoh. More
specifically, the Accused denied having advised Sankoh to construct any airfield arguing
that since he had no planes in Liberia he had absolutely no reason to advise Sankoh to do
50.9311
4140. The Accused denied having sent Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) or General Ibrahim
Bah to the RUF, and denied advising the RUF to build an airstrip.93 12
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4141. Witness Issa Sesay, an RUF commander,93 13 testified that he was in Zogoda when
he heard from the RUF Commander in Buedu, Big Daddy, and from Peter Vandi, that in
May 1996, while in Burkina Faso, Foday Sankoh sent Peter Vandi back to Buedu in order to
start the construction of an airstrip. Sesay further heard that around June or July 1996,
Sankoh sent two Belgian nationals with Steve Kamanda, a radio operator, to inspect the
airfield. However, the airstrip was not completed since they told Vandi to stop the
construction.9314
9308 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
9309 TF1-532, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6203-6204.
WO Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24824-24825; Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25460;
Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28669-28670; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28710-28711.
Q3 H Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009 p. 29001.
93 I2 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30233-30235.
W ipsa Sesay, rrarrpprrpt 26 Jrriy 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
(ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43905-43909.

---- End of Page 1422 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/

39.5/ 5
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
4142. Witness Charles Ngebeh, an RUP recmit,93`5 testified that at Buedu there was an
airstrip. The airstrip had been constmcted between 1995 and 1996 at the request of Sam
Bockarie, who announced that he had a contract to receive arms and ammunition from
Libya. The airstrip was never used to bring in any materials from Libya.93]6
Deliberations
4143. lt is undisputed that an airfield was constmcted in Buedu, and both Prosecution and
Defence witnesses testified that it was never used. The testimony falls into two time
periods, 1996 and 1998.
4144. With regard to events in 1996, the Trial Chamber notes that Perry Kamara is the only
witness who testified that the Accused told Foday Sankoh to construct an airfield. His
testimony about the Accused's message was brief and unclear. Kamara did not indicate how
he knew about the written message or whether or not he saw it. Witness TP1-168, an RUF
officer who visited Cote d’1voire at the time, testified that Sarrkoh was in Abidjan when he
ordered Sam Bockarie to build the airstrip in Buedu.93`7 Issa Sesay also heard that Sarrkoh
was with the External Delegation when he ordered Vandi to build the airstrip.93 `8 The Trial
Chamber considers it is therefore very unlikely that Kamara, who was not in Cote d’1voire
with Sankoh, was present when Sarrkoh would have received this written message and
unlikely for the same reason that Kamara himself saw the message. Witness TF1-168, who
was in Cote d’Ivoire with Sankoh,93l9 did not mention the Accused's involvement when he
testified about the construction of this airstrip.
4145. Without knowing the basis for Kamara's statement that Sankoh received a written
message from the Accused, and the likelihood based on the circumstances that Kamara
would not have seen this written message, while the evidence indicates that Sankoh ordered
the building of the airstrip, the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude that the Accused told
him to do so.
(mj Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37847.
gm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37856—37857.
gm TF1-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23467-23470 (CS).
(mg Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43905-43906.
(mq TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009 pp. 23274-23275 (CS).

---- End of Page 1423 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 {
/ j

4146. The Prosecution also cites the testimony of Abu Keita, Isaac Mongor and Witnesses
TF1-585 and TF1-371 in support of this 1996 a11egation.932O Similarly, the Defence submits
in its closing brief that the evidence of Mohamed Kabbah discredited this Prosecution
allegationfml However, a careful reading of their evidence indicates that these five
witnesses were testifying about the re-construction of the Buedu airfield in late 19989322 and
not about the initial building of the airfield around 1996.9323 The Trial Chamber has
therefore considered this evidence in the context of the allegations made in relation to 1998,
for which the witnesses are again cited by the Prosecution.9324 The Trial Chamber notes the
evidence of Issa Sesay that the airfield was not completed in 1996.9325
4147. With regard to the allegation that after the Intervention in 1998, the Accused
reiterated to Bockarie the need for a functional airstrip in AFRC/RUF territory, the
Prosecution relies on the evidence of Albert Saidu, Perry Kamara and TF1-585. Saidu
testified that at a meeting convened by Bockarie, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) spoke on
behalf of Taylor and said that the AFRC/RUF should try to construct the airstrip at Buedu as
fast as possible to be able to deliver arms and ammunition for the RUF.9326 Kamara testified
that Bockarie transmitted a message that Taylor had told him they should try to reorganize
9320 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 134, footnote 452.
ml Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 16: "The allegation in paragraph 134 of the PFB
is discredited by another Prosecution witness. TF1-568 provided evidence to the extent that Bockarie had told
Mohamed Kabbah that the airfield at Buedu was created in order to import arms directly from Libya. Thus,
Taylor was not involved in the construction of the airstrip in any way".
9322 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1987-1988; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2099 (Keita saw the
airstrip in construction after September 1998); TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2504-2506 (CS) (TF1-
371 saw the civilians working on the airport of Buedu while he was there, between March 1998 and April 1999);
TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15662; Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16293-16294 (TF1-585
testified that he saw the airstrip being constructed around 1998-1999); Isaac Mongor, Trancript 31 March 2008,
pp. 6203-6204 (it is clear that Mongor's testimony is about the period while he was Commander in Buedu in
1998).
9323 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37856-37857 (the airfield was built in 1996). See also
Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on 20
December 2000" ("Most Sierra Leonean landing strips in the areas under RUF control were destroyed or have
not been maintained because of the war. The landing strip at Yengema is probably not operational, and although
the airstrip at Magburaka was rebuilt during the AF RC period in 1997 and is now in rebel territory, there are few
reports of fixed-wing aircraft landing there or elsewhere in RUF-held territory"). But see Issa Sesay, Transcript 7
July 2010, pp. 43905~43906 (the construction of the airstrip in Buedu was not completed in 1996). See generally
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 134, 149.
9324 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 149, footnotes 484- 485.
9325 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43905~43909.
9326 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11056-11057.

---- End of Page 1424 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/, 18 May 2012

3 95/ 7
and re-prepare the airfield at Buedu.9327 TF1-585 testified that Bockarie's wife told her that
Bockarie was at Taylor's farm to discuss the construction of an airfield.9328
4148. Based on the testimony of these three Prosecution witnesses, all of whom the Trial
Chamber has found to be generally credible`)329, the Trial Chamber finds the denial of the
Accused lacking in credibility. The testimony of the other Defence witnesses is not
inconsistent with the evidence of the three Prosecution witnesses. The Defence contends that
the evidence of Mohamed Kabbah discredits the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses.
Kabbah cited Bockarie as saying the the airstrip would allow the RUF to receive
ammunition directly from Libya. The Trial Chamber also notes the testimony of Charles
N gebeh that an airfield was constructed between 1995 and 1996 at the request of Bockarie,
who said he had a contract to receive arms and ammunition from Libya. Based on this
evidence, there may have been an intent to use the airfield for arms and ammunition to come
directly from Libya, but in the view of the Trial Chamber an anticipated use of the airfield to
receive arms and ammunition from Libya is not inconsistent with a need perceived by the
Accused for an airfield to receive arms and ammunition from Liberia.
4149. Both Saidu and Kamara testified that the Accused told Bockarie that the RUF should
try to build an airfield. Kamara testified that he transmitted Bockarie's message in which
Taylor told Bockarie that they should try to reorganise and re-prepare the airfield at Buedu,
but it is unclear from his evidence whether it was Taylor or Bockarie who said that civilians
would be needed to work on the field.933O In his account of the meeting, Saidu made no
reference in Jungle's message on behalf of the Accused to the use of civilians for forced
labour to construct the airfield.93 31 Moreover, in Kamara's testimony on the 1996 allegation,
it is clear that the order to use civilians was not mentioned by Taylor but came from Sankoh.
For these reasons, while finding that the Accused told Bockarie that the RUF should
9327 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 149.
mg TFl-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15662.
9329 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, TF 1-585, paras 330-333.
Credibility Assessment, Albert Saidu, see Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2384.
9330 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3105 ("He said Mr Taylor has told him that they should try
airzildrgorgamse and re-prepare the airfield at Buedu, so in there they would need civilians to do the work on the
(ml Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11056 ("Then he also discussed the maintenance of an airstrip.
There was an airstrip that we were trying to construct behind Buedu and he said we should also try, as fast as
possible, to construct that airstrip, because in case of any emergency landing of materials, the aircraft will have
to land there").

---- End of Page 1425 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jp 18 May 2012
4/

construct an airfield, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the Accused told Bockarie to use
forced labour for this construction.
Findings
4150. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that in 1996 the Accused sent a message to Sankoh telling him to make arrangements
to choose a place to construct an airheld.
4151. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in 1998 the Accused told Bockarie that the RUF should construct or re-prepare the
airfield in Buedu.
3. Alleged Provision of Safe Haven
(a) Retreat from Zogoda
Submissions of the Parties
4152. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused nurtured, directed and protected the RUF in
a myriad of vital ways including by providing safe haven to RUF/AFRC members. More
specifically, after the RUF retreat from Zogoda, RUF fighters were forced to cross into
Liberia. The Accused then ensured that Mike Lamin obtained Liberian travel documents and
money to facilitate Lamin's travel across Liberia to the Cote d’Ivoire to be reunited with
Sankoh.9332
4153. The Defence submits that the evidence cited by the Prosecution alleging that after the
retreat from Zogoda, when RUF fighters and Mike Lamin were pushed into Liberia, the
Accused ensured the provision of Lamin's travel documents in Monrovia is not credible.9333
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
9332 Prosecution Final Trial Briefj paras 1 15, 330.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 975-976, 1007-1009; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief,
para. 65.

---- End of Page 1426 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M M 18 May 2012

375 x 7
4154. Witness TFl-371, an RUF member,q334 testified that when the Sierra Leonean
Government forces attacked Zogoda, while peace talks were ongoing in approximately
November or December 1996, Foday Sankoh sent a message by satellite phone to Mohamed
Tarawalli telling him to retreat from Zogoda.9335 Tarawalli was to take the fighters to
Kailahun District to meet up with Sam Bockarie, and Mike Lamin was to take the rest of the
fighters, approximately 2,000 of them, to Pujehun District. When Lamin arrived in Pujehun
District, around Zimmi, he met with Michael Rogers, the commander of Pujehun, who told
him that Pujehun was also under attack, that they were having problems getting ammunition,
and that they were exhausted.9336
4155. Mike Lamin called Sankoh on the radio, who said to tell the commanders there to be
patient because he had sent his adjutant Kposowa and Alfred Brown with $USD 42,000 to
meet with Mr Taylor to see how the NPFL, then a political entity, could help with arins and
ammunition. The group waited, but nothing was forthcoming. There was a large attack and
they could not resist because they had run out of ammunition. Their only option, the witness
testified, was to cross over into Liberia, and approximately 2,000 combatants and thousands
of civilians crossed the border in the area near Kongo.9337
4156. After the combatants crossed over, the ULJMO rebel faction that was occupying the
area was instructed by their commander to ensure that the RUF disarmed, and so they
collected all of the RUF combatants’ arms. The combatants were then moved to Bopolu and
the witness stayed there for some time.9338
4157. ln Bopolu, Mike Lamin met Abu Keita, the ULIMO commander in charge, who
allowed him to use his radio to speak to Sankoh, who was in Abidjan.9339 Lamin told Sankoh
that he and the combatants were forced to cross into Liberia because they had no
ammunition and none had arrived, and they were now disanned and receiving assistance
9334 TFl-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
9335 TFl-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2268-2269, 2276 (CS).
9336 TFl-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2276-2277 (CS).
0337 TFl-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2276-2278 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2462-2463 (CS).
0338 TFl-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2277-2279 (CS).
(mq TF]-371, Transcript 25 January 2008 pp. 2279-2280 (CS).

---- End of Page 1427 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T 18 May 2012

39 S2 ca
from the International Committee for the Red Cross. Sankoh instructed Lamin to try and
meet him (srmkoh) in Ab1dja¤.""°
Prosecution Witness TF1-362
4158. Witness TF1-362, an RUF member,934l testified that she was in Kenema District,
re ortin to Mohamed Tarawalli. After Foda Sankoh left for Abid`an, the Kamaors
P 8 Y J J
attacked. The witness was present when Sankoh sent an order by radio saying that "his
brother", whom the witness testified was Taylor, said they should go to Liberia, "where they
have the force for the people". Mohamed Tarawalli fled to the western jungle, and Mike
Lamin went to the Pujehun area. VVhen the witness, along with more than a thousand
combatants, passed through the Liberian border, they arrived in the buffer zone, which was
"not particular" to any fighting faction and was empty. ULIMO disarmed the combatants,
and ECOMOG were within the area.9342 The witness could not recall the names of all of the
areas they passed through.9343 She stated that she was pregnant at the time and exhausted.9344
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
4159. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security ofHcer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,9345 testiHed that after Zogoda was overrun by the Sierra Leonean Government
forces and the Kamajors, the RUF did not have enough ammunition to Hght. CO Mohamed
Zino contacted Foday Sankoh on the radio, and he ordered that the combatants in Zogoda be
divided into two. CO Mohamed would take one group to Kailahun District, and the other
ou would be taken to Pu`ehun Distict. Mallah was with the ou of a roximatel 800-
EY P J EY P PP Y
900 combatants sent to Pujehun District with Mike Lamin.9346
4160. VVhen they arrived in Pujehun, they met with the RUF soldiers stationed there under
the command of Michael Rogers (a.k.a. Captain Bond&y), who had also come under attack
WO TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008 pp. 2280-2281 (CS).
934] TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4826-4827 (CS).
9342 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4855-4858 (CS); Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5080-5089, 5096
(CS). See also TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4853-4854 (CS) (Camp Lion was located in Kenema
District).
"’" TF1-362, Transcript 27 rebmary 2008, p. 5108 (CS).
93** TF1-362, Transcript 27 rebmary 2008, p. 5118 (cs).
9345 Augustine Mallah, Transcript, 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209-20210.
QW) Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20111-20112.

---- End of Page 1428 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/2/

by the Kamajors and the Sierra Leonean Government forces. Mallah stated that he was
standing next to Mike Lamin as he was talking on his radio to Sankoh, who was in Cote
d’1voire. Sankoh told Lamin that he had sent Major Kpowosa to Taylor in Gbarnga to ask if
he could provide ammunition.9347 They did not receive this ammunition and were
continually attacked, and the only thing they could do was go to the border with Liberia and
contact ULiMo.‘"‘*8
4161. Lamin told Mallah and another commander to go to the border and contact the
ULIMO commander so that the combatants, and the civilians with them, could cross into
Liberia. He wanted ULIMO to rescue them, so that they could find a way to return.9349
ULIMO disarmed all of the RUF fighters and civilians and took them to Bopolu, in Liberia,
to stay there.9350
4162. Once they got to Bopulo, the ULIMO commander, General Charles Julu, gave Lamin
access to his radio so that he could speak to Sankoh in Cote d’1voire.935l Lamin brought
Mallah and a radio operator into the ULIMO communications room, where Sankoh told
Lamin to find a way to get to Monrovia so that he could meet him in Cote d’1voire. Lamin
asked Mallah to accompany him to Monrovia.9352
4163. When they arrived at Dualla, Lamin told Mallah he was going to Congo Town to
meet Taylor, because they did not have anywhere to get money and Taylor knew him. They
drove to Taylor's office in Congo Town. Mallah stayed on the veranda with the security
guards while Lamin entered the office. Approximately one hour later Lamin emerged with
$USD 100 dollars, and said that he had spoken to Taylor. Lamin said that Taylor's Special
Forces had given them a place to stay, at Jacob Tarawulu's (a.k.a. Pa Jacob) home, where
they stayed for two days.9353
9347 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20110-20113; Transcript 14 November 2008, p.
20294.
9348 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 201 14.
[mq Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20114-201 15.
9350 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 201 15-201 16.
935] Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 201 16.
(B52 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 201 17-20118.
9353 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20118-20119; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20321-20322.

---- End of Page 1429 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JH 18 May 2012

4164. Jacob Tarawulu was the Deputy Education Minister in the interim government, and
the next day Lamin, his wife Jessica Robertson, and Mallah went to his office at the
Education Ministry, and then to the Foreign Ministry. The three of them took photos, and
retumed to Tarawulu's home. The next day, they received Liberian laissez—passer. The day
after this, Lamin hired a car to drive them from Monrovia to the Cote d’Ivoire border, at
Loguatuo, and the three of them then went on to Danané and then Abidjan. They met with
Sankoh for one week in Abidjan.9554
The Accused
4165. The Accused denied being in contact with Sankoh after the RUF retreated from
Zogoda and denied using Musa Cissé as a conduit to keep in touch with Sankoh in Cote
d’Ivoire.5555 He conceded, however, that in 1996 Mike Lamin and the RUF ended up in
Liberia and that the RUF was disamied by ECOMOG and tumed over to the International
Committee for the Red Cross.5556 The Accused also noted that at this time, he did not live in
Congo Town but opposite the United States Embassy in Monrovia at Mamba Point.5557
When the testimony of Augustine Mallah was put to him, he did not comment on the
evidence relating to the crossing into Liberia after the fall of Zagoda and was not
specifically questioned on Mallah's account of these events.9558
Deliberations
4166. The Defence concedes that after the retreat from Zogoda, RUF fighters and Mike
Lamin crossed into Liberia. Prosecution Witness TF1—362 testified that she was present
when Foday Sankoh sent an order through the radio that Taylor said the combatants should
go to Liberia.5559 TF1—362 is the only witness who testified that this order to retreat to
9554 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20120-20122; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20321-20323.
0555 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30059-30061, 30066, 30072.
5556 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l October 2009, pp. 30060-30061, 30086.
9557 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, p. 30078 (PS).
5555 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30080-30081, 30086.
9555 TFl-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4855-4858 (CS); Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5080-5086, 5096
(CS). See also TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4853-4854 (CS) (Camp Lion was located in Kenema
District).

---- End of Page 1430 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J JM 18 May 2012

Liberia was given by the Accused. The Trial Chamber recalls that it had no general
reservations conceming the credibility of TF1 -362.9360
4167. TF1-362's testimony on this point, however, was inconsistent. The witness first
testified that the retreat occurred when Sankoh went to the Abidjan Peace Accords "in
l994".°3°l When confronted with the judicially noted fact that Sankoh participated in the
Abidjan Accords in 1996, not 1994, the witness stated that she could not be sure of the facts
because it had "been a very long time now". She then said that Mohamed Tarawalli told her
that Sankoh went to a peace accord, but she could not recall a year.9362 The witness also
stated that the lntemational Committee for the Red Cross was not present when the RUF
crossed into Liberia or could not recall them,9363 in contrast to TF1-371 and the Accused,
who testified that they were present.9364 The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-362 was
"exhausted" during this time and accepts that she may not have taken note of events clearly
as a result.
4168. In addition, TF1-362's testimony is unclear as to whether the Accused actually
directed the RUF to retreat to Liberia or simply suggested this or allowed the RUF to cross
the Liberian border. The witness first testified that Sankoh told her that Taylor said the RUF
"should go to Liberia".93°5 When asked upon cross-examination whether the RUF retreated
because of an order from Taylor the witness first responded "Yes", and then stated that it
was "not directly because of [Taylor's] order", but because they were under attack and had
no place to remain, and thus "the Pa allowed us to go through Liberia".936° The witness then
reiterated that Sankoh said that because there was nowhere for the RUF to base, "My brother
has allowed you to go to Liberia and base there until the area is cleared up". 9367
""" Credibility Assessment, TF1—362, paras 244-253.
936* TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4855-4858 (CS); Transcript 3 March 2008 pp. 5080-5086, 5096
(CS). See also TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4853-4854 (CS) (Camp Lion was located in Kenema
District).
W TF1—362, Transcript 3 Meseh 2008, pp. 5081-5084 (cs).
9363 TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5099-5100 (CS).
9364 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30060-30061, 30086; TF1-371, Transcript
25 January 2008, pp. 2280-2281 (CS).
9365 TF1—362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4855-4858 (CS).
"’°6 TF1—362, Transcript 3 Msseh 2008, pp. 5084-5085 (cs).
0367 TF 1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, p. 5086 (CS) (emphasis added).

---- End of Page 1431 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T / w, 18 May 2012

37;, J2 L;.
4169. Witness TF1-371 testified that Mike Lamin told Sankoh that he and the combatants
retreated to Liberia only after they had crossed the border.9368 TF1-371 testified that the
RUF crossed into Liberia not on Taylor's orders, but only after they had no other choice.9369
The Trial Chamber recalls that TF1-371 is a generally credible witnessfmo
4170. In light of the evidence of Witness TF1-371, which is inconsistent with the vague
and unclear evidence of Witness TF1-362, the Trial Chamber cannot say that the
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused ordered the RUF to
retreat to Liberia, although it is clear that he did provide them safe haven by allowing them
into Liberia. The Trial Chamber notes that Taylor has conceded, and several witnesses
confirmed, that once the RUF combatants crossed into Liberia they were disarmed by
ULIMO, and subsequently serviced by the International Committee for the Red Cross.937l
4171. With regard to the allegation that the Accused facilitated the provision of Mike
Lamin's travel documents in Monrovia, Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah is the only
witness whose testimony supports this allegation. Mallah testified that when he and Lamin
arrived in Monrovia, Lamin told Mallah that he was going to meet Taylor because they did
not have money. Mallah stated that they visited Taylor's office in Congo Town, although he
did not go in with Lamin and he did not see Taylor himself.9372 In a prior statement Mallah
said that he saw Taylor from the veranda as he waited for Lamin.9373 When confronted with
this statement on cross-examination, Mallah conceded that the statement was inconsistent
with his testimony and suggested that this was an interpreter's mistake. He also said that in
2003 his questioning was focused on the AFRC and RUF trials, and not on Taylor.9374 The
Trial Chamber accepts Mallah's affirmation of his testimony and the possibility that there
was a mistake in interpretation, and finds that his prior statement does not undermine the
credibility of his testimony.
9368 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2280-2281 (CS).
M9 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2276-2278 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008 pp. 2462-2463 (CS);
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20114.
(mo Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226.
(ml Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30060-30061, 30086; TF1-371, Transcript 25
January 2008, pp. 2280-2281 (CS); TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4855-4858 (CS); Transcript 3
March 2008, pp. 5080-5086, 5096 (CS); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20115-20116.
Om Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20118-20119; Transcript 14 November 2008, p.
20321-20322.
9373 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, pp. 20323-2025.
9374 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, pp. 20324—20325.

---- End of Page 1432 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

5752 5
A 4172. Mallah testified that Lamin exited Taylor's office with SUSD 100. He could not
confirm first—hand that it was Taylor who provided these funds, but he said that Lamin told
him he had spoken to Taylor and he clearly inferred that the funds came from Taylor.9375
The Trial Chamber finds this to be a reasonable inference. Mallah also stated that Taylor's
Special Forces provided him and Lamin with a place to stay,9376 which the Trial Chamber
considers can also be attributed to the Accused's facilitation. The Trial Chamber notes the
Accused's testimony that at this time his residence was not in Congo Town, but finds this
fact is not dispositive because Mallah testified that they went to Taylor's office in Congo
Town, not Taylor's residence.9377
4173. Finally, Mallah stated that he and Lamin visited the Liberian Education and Foreign
Ministries and Lamin later received a laissez-passer, but he did not clearly state Taylor's
involvement in securing this documentation.9378 Upon cross-examination, Mallah conceded
that Taylor was not yet the President of Liberia at the time he visited Monrovia with
Lamin.9379 The Prosecution has not provided evidence linking the laissez-passer for Mike
Lamin, which he got from the Foreign Ministry, to the Accused, who had not yet assumed
office and was therefore not in control of this or any government ministry. ln light of these
circumstances, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to establish that the
Accused facilitated Lamin's travel to the Cote d’Ivoire to meet with Sankoh.
Findings
4174. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused provided safe haven to RUF combatants who fled to Liberia from Zogoda.
However, the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
ordered the RUF combatants to cross into Liberia.
4175. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused provided $USD 100 to Mike Lamin, but failed to prove beyond reasonable
9375 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20118—20119; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20321-20322.
W6 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20118—20119; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20321-20322.
W7 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20118-20119; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20321-20322.
gm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20120-20122; Transcript 14 November 2008, pp.
20321-20322.

---- End of Page 1433 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / UL 18 May 2012

doubt that the Accused facilitated the provision of Liberian travel documents to Mike
Lamin, so that Lamin could visit Sankoh in Cote d’Ivoire.
(b) Retreat of Junta Personnel to Monrovia
Submissions of the Parties
4176. The Prosecution alleges that in mid—February 1998, a group of AFRC officials fled
from Freetown to Monrovia, knowing that the Accused would give them safe haven. This
retreat to the Accused, whose country did not extradite individuals to Sierra Leone, was with
the Accused's knowledge and consent. Having these experienced aviators and fighters and
their aircraft would benefit the Accused in Liberia as well as give him the option of later
returning them to action with the AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone. The Accused attempted to
give them safe haven but "(his) men were intercepted by ECOMOG and thus unable to
receive the fleein Junta ersonnel".9380 The Accused then attem ted to et the men and
S P P 8
helicopter(s) turned over to him, trying unsuccessfully to personally intervene. The arrested
personnel were taken to Nigeria despite the Accused's protests. The Prosecution claims that,
contrary to the Accused's testimony, the Nigerians, not the Accused, later handed those
arrested over to the government of Sierra Leone.938l
4177. The Defence submits that this incident is improperly characterized by the
Prosecution as an example of the Accused providing safe haven to the Junta. The Accused
sought assurance that the officials would be given a fair trial if they returned to Sierra Leone
to prevent them from being summarily executed by the Sierra Leonean Government. He
denies that in doing so he was guilty of aiding and abetting the Junta in the commission of
crimes.9382
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Vaimuyan Sherif
(mg Augustine Mallah, Transcript 14 November 2008, p. 20321.
9380 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 331.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 331.
gm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 502; Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 66. See
also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009 pp. 22597-22598, 25574-25577, 25589-25590; Transcript
5 August 2009 pp. 26051-26054; Transcript 20 January 2010 pp. 33718-33723.

---- End of Page 1434 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·0l·T / Ok 18 May 2012

j@SZ7
4178. Witness Varmuyan Sherif testified that during the time when ECOMOG was fighting
against the AF RC in Freetown, in late 1998 or early 1999, Taylor called Sherif and told him
that an AFRC delegation was travelling by helicopter from Freetown to Monrovia. Taylor
instructed Sherif to receive the delegation at the airfield in Monrovia and take them to
Taylor's office.9383 When Sherif arrived to meet them at the airport, ECOMOG surrounded
the area and would not allow Sherif to receive or go close to the delegation. Sherif called the
SSS director who told Sherif to leave.93g4 Two days later, Taylor announced that ECOMOG
must leave Liberia, because Liberia was "a government of [its] own".9385
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
4179. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,9386 testified that when the AF RC was pushed out
of Freetown by ECOMOG, Victor King, commander of the air wing of the Sierra Leonean
Army, took a military helicopter with other senior officers and businessmen and travelled to
Monrovia without the knowledge of Johrmy Paul Koroma. The witness was told about this
incident when, while meeting with Johnny Paul Koroma, Koroma complained about King
evacuating persons from Freetown to Liberia without telling him and leaving him (Koroma)
there with his family. The witness heard that King and the others were arrested by
ECOMOG in Monrovia and tumed over to the Sierra Leonean government, and were later
executed by firing squad in October 1998.9387
( The Accused
4180. The Accused testified that when ECOMOG forces took control over Freetown during
the Intervention, two military helicopters landed at Spriggs Payne Airport in Monrovia, and
Victor King, a member of the AFRC Junta, was one of the passengers. ECOMOG was there
and seized "the plane" and the occupants. He called the ECOMOG force commander, who
reported to him on the situation and occupants of the helicopter. The Accused responded that
he would send his Defence Minister to meet with the force commander so that Liberia could
take charge of the occupants until the matter was resolved, and the force commander stated
that he would inform his superiors and "let (Taylor) know". Later on, the Accused was
9383 Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 825; Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 889.
9384 Varmuyan Sherif: Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 826; Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 889.
9385 Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 826, 828.
9386 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).

---- End of Page 1435 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T / GL) l8 May 2012

3 75 2 g
informed that the force commander would keep control over the helicopter and the
occupants, and so he (the Accused) called President Abacha and stated that he would "not
stand for [this]" and that the sovereignty of Liberia was at issue. A compromise "was
worked out" and the Accused returned the planes and the people after a couple of weeks but
after a "long discussion".
4181. The Accused contended that he had "raised the issue" of having the passengers stay
in Liberia, and told President Kabbah that he would only allow them to be taken back to
Sierra Leone "on the assurance that nothing would happen to them" and, if they were
charged or tried, that their rights would be protected. The Accused contended that he was
worried that the occupants would be summarily executed, similar to what occurred several
years before, when General Lansana, one of the leaders of an attempted coup in Sierra
Leone, was returned to Sierra Leone from Liberia with promises he would not be executed.
The Accused did not know that, in fact, the delegation had been taken to Nigeria until he
read this in Prosecution documents. President Abacha told the Accused that they would be
kept in custody in Nigeria because Liberia did not have a place to hold them, but that they
would not be sent back to Sierra Leone without his consent. ECOMOG and President
Kabbah were pressing for them to be extradited to Sierra Leone, and had assured him that
they would not be executed. After approximately two months, the Accused agreed they
could be returned to Sierra Leone. The passengers were later taken to Sierra Leone and
executed after which, the Accused testified, he expressed his outrage to President
Kabbah.9388 The Accused denied that he had any contact with AFRC officials during this
time.9389
Prosecution Exhibit P- 132
4182. Prosecution Exhibit P-132 consists of an Integrated Regional Information Network
(IRIN) news update dated 16 February 1998, produced by the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The update states that Taylor demanded that
ECOMOG hand over AFRC officials who were arrested when two helicopters they were
using to escape from Freetown were forced to land in Monrovia by an ECOMOG jet. In a
0387 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2328 (CS).
0388 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, pp. 25574-25577, 25589-25590; Transcript 5 August
2009, pp. 26051-26054; Transcript 20 January 2010, pp. 33718-33723; Transcript 29 September 2009, pp.
29754-29755.

---- End of Page 1436 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3 is".? 7
radio broadcast Taylor stated that Liberia was a sovereign state, and should take charge of
the AFRC officials.939O
4183. An ECOMOG force commander, however, stated that he had arrested the AFRC
officials for breaking a UN ban on travel by AFRC members, and that they did not need
permission from the Government of Liberia to enforce this embargofml
Defence Exhibit D-141
4184. Defence Exhibit D-141 is a collection of Taylor's speeches and statements published
by the Department of Public Affairs and Press Secretary to President Taylor.9392 The
Defence points specifically to a nation-wide address concerning "the crisis between
ECOMOG and the Government of Liberia over the helicopter gun-ship incident", delivered
by Taylor on 14 February 1998.
4185. In this speech, Taylor states that when two helicopters landed at Spriggs Payne
Airport in Monrovia on 13 February 1998, Taylor's security services attempted to intervene
but armed ECOMOG personnel carriers arrived and told them to leave. Taylor instructed the
Minister of National Defence to request that the individuals in the helicopters be turned over
to the Liberian Government, and he received a letter from the ECOMOG Force Commander
stating that upon completion of an investigation this would be done. After some time, Taylor
he realized that ECOMOG would "do it their way", and so attempted "dip1omatic
manoeuvres" and "expressions of the [sic] grave concern". After all else failed, he states,
they "decided to take it a little further".
4186. The primary issue, Taylor claims, was whether Liberia had the right to safeguard its
territorial integrity, contending that ECOWAS, the OAU, the UN and the international
community agree that any aircraft that lands on the territory of Liberia becomes the
responsibility of its government. Finally, Taylor states that he was demanding that the
aircraft be turned over to the Government, and that he had already spoken with UN
9389 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, pp. 25530-25531.
(mo Exhibit P-132, "IRlN - West Africa Update 146, 98.2.16, University of Pennsyvarria - African Studies
r Center, 14 - 16 February 1998 - 00100146 — 00100148", ERN 00100147.
(ml Exhibit P-132, "lRIN - West Africa Update 146, 98.2.16, University of Pennsyvania - African Studies
Center, 14 - 16 February 1998 - 00100146 — 00100148", ERN 00100147.
Om The Trial Chamber notes that the publication date for this collection is unknown.

---- End of Page 1437 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // gk 18 May 2012


3 Q.; 3 0
Secretary-General Kofi Annan and had lodged formal complaints with ECOWAS, OAU and
the LlN.9393
Deliberations
4187. The parties agree that the Accused attempted to provide a safe haven in Monrovia for
AFRC ofhcials following their flight from Freetown in February 1998. The Prosecution
seeks to impute a nefarious meaning to this incident, claiming that the Accused wanted the
option of retuming the aviators and Hghters to action with the AFRC/RUF in Sierra
Leonefml The Defence, however, offers an altemative explanation to this incident, stating
that the Accused offered to host the AFRC ofhcials because he feared they would be
summarily executed without tria1.q395
4188. The Prosecution relies exclusively on the testimony of Varmuyan Sherif and one
piece of documentary evidence to support this allegation.9396 Sherif’ s testimony gives some
indication that the Accused knew that the AFRC delegation was arriving in Monrovia before
they landed there, with Sherif stating that Taylor called and told him to meet the group at the
airport and bring them to his office.9397 Sherif offered no testimony, however, conceming the
Accused's motivations for his instructions to Sherif or the Accused's reasons for providing
A safe haven to the AFRC members. The Trial Chamber also notes that Sherif was unsure as to
the date this incident occurred, and admitted that it happened a long time ago and certain
things "move off my head".9398
4189. The documentary evidence cited by the Prosecution does not offer any further proof
of the Accused's motive: this contemporaneous IRIN news update describes the incident and
9393 Exhibit D-141 Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of Activities of the Chief
Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997 ~ 3 lDecember 1998 pp. 238-441 ERN 539.
0304 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 331.
9395 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 502; Defence Response to the Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 66.
93% The Trial Chamber notes that in their Final Trial Brief the Prosecution also cites to TF 1-597, but his
testimony only corroborates Varmuyan Sherif’ s testimony that the helicopter's flight from Freetown to Liberia
occurred, a fact that is not in dispute. See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 331, citing TF1-597, Transcript 21
May 2008, pp. 10489-10490.
9397 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp, 825-827; Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 889.
9398 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 826.

---- End of Page 1438 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z gt 18 May 2012

the Accused's demand to take charge of the AF RC officials, facts which are not contested by
the parties.9399
4190. The Accused testified that he was worried the occupants would be summarily
executed, as was another attempted coup leader who had been returned to Sierra Leone.
Indeed, Prosecution and Defence witnesses, including the Accused, concur that Victor King
was executed following his return to Sierra Leone.940O The documentary evidence provided
by the Accused, namely the transcript of a contemporaneous speech by the Accused, though
undated and unattributed, corroborates much of the Accused's in-court testimonyfml In
addition, the Accused denied that he had any contact with AFRC officials during this
time.94O2
4191. It is clear, even from the Accused's own evidence, that he attempted to provide safe
haven for the AF RC officials who arrived in Liberia. However, he was unable to provide a
safe haven, and the evidence is insufficient to establish his motive for trying to do so.
Findings
4192. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused attempted to provide a safe haven in Liberia for AF RC officials who fled
Freetown in mid-February 1998. However, he was unable to provide a safe haven, and the
evidence is insufficient to establish his motive for trying to do so.
9399 Prosecution Exhibit P-132, IRIN - West Africa Update 146, 98.2.16, University Of Pemrsylvania, African
Studies Center, 14-16 February 1998, p. 100147 ERN 181.
9400 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2328 (CS); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, pp.
22597-22598, 25574-25577, 25589-25590; Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26051-26054; Transcript 20 January
2010, pp. 33718-33723. See also Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46682; Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8829-8830, 8834 (testifying that Victor King was executed by the Sierra Leonean
Government).
gm Defence Exhibit D-141 Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997 — 31 December 1998 pp. 238-441 ERN 539.
**02 crmrps ohapkay rayrpr, Transcript 29 Jury 2009, pp. 22597-22598.

---- End of Page 1439 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ O" 18 May 2012 \ /i

v·•
37szg
4. Provision of RUF Guesthouse in Monrovia
Submissions of the Parties
4193. lt is undisputed that in approximately 1998, the Accused provided a guesthouse to
the RUF in Monrovia.44O3 Several other facts regarding this guesthouse are also uncontested.
For example, the Accused provided long-range radio equipment and telephone capability,
and RUF radio operators including Osman Tolo and Memunatu Deen were stationed
there.94O4 The guesthouse was protected by the SSS, which was headed by Benjamin Yeaten,
and the Accused provided other personnel such as cooks, security guards and a caretaker.94O5
The parties agree that the guesthouse was closed in early 2001.4406
4194. The Prosecution alleges that the provision of this guesthouse "facilitated Taylor's
criminal participation, involvement, and concerted action with the AFRC/RUF" from 1998
to 2002. ln particular, the Prosecution alleges that the guesthouse was established to
facilitate the movement of diamonds to the Accused and of arms, ammunition and other
supplies to the RUF in Sierra Leone.94O7
4195. The Defence submits that the Accused provided the guesthouse as part of his efforts
to facilitate peace negotiations with the RUF in the lead up to the Lomé Peace Accords in
1999. The Accused's actions were "at all times genuine and aboveboard" and the UN,
ECOWAS and President Kabbah were aware of the provision of this guesthouse.94O8
4403Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 17, 333, 1249; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 99, 543-545; Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26005, 26012-26013; Transcript 11 November 2009, pp. 31606-
31607; Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 26530.
9404 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 333; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 544, 935, 1013, 1025.
4405 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 333; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 94, 544, 1013, 1020.
9406 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 333; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1028. Taylor first denied that the
guesthouse was closed in early 2001 and suggested that it was closed down around early 2002, Charles Ghankay
Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28808, but then later testified that the guesthouse was closed between
2000 and 2001. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34288—34289. The Defence Final Trial
Brief, however, states it was closed in 2001.
4407 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 333.
W Defence rmi rmi Brief, paras 94,448, 543-545, 652, 1010-1029.

---- End of Page 1440 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X ·-e 18 May 2012

395 3.3
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1 -567
4196. Witness TF1—567,94O9 an RUF member, testified that in 1999, he was present when
Foday Sankoh called Sam Bockarie over the radio and asked him to organise approximately
15 to 17 people to meet him in Lome, including the witness.94m The delegation travelled
from Buedu and stopped in the RUF guesthouse in Monrovia for one meal en route to
Lome.94H
4197. After two weeks in Lome, Sankoh told the witness and others to go back to Sierra
Leone to brief Bockarie on the peace process.94l2 The witness and others, including a "Dr
Williams", whom the witness identified as "medical personnel for the RUF", flew to
Monrovia on the way to Buedu, and stayed at the guesthouse. At the guesthouse, the witness
saw Benjamin Yeaten give a parcel to Dr Williams that he said was from Taylor, but he did
not know what was in the parcel. Yeaten said Taylor knew that they had arrived. Later, Dr
Williams gave the witness $USD 200, which he said was from Taylor, to "buy some items".
The witness then flew to Buedu and reported to Bockarie on Lome.94l3
4198. After approximately one month, Bockarie summoned the witness to Buedu and told
him to accompany him to Lome. Bockarie, the witness and others travelled to Monrovia
first, and were taken to the same guesthouse.94l4 Bockarie then told the witness that he had
decided not to travel to Lomé because he knew the UN was going to arrest him, and so the
delegation did not go. They decided to wait in Monrovia at the guesthouse until Sankoh's
arrival after the Lome negotiations.94l5
4199. While in Monrovia waiting for Sankoh to arrive, Sankoh told Bockarie to send a
message to Johnny Paul Koroma to meet him in Monrovia. Koroma arrived in Monrovia and
9409 TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986—12988 (PS).
9410 Witness TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12929—12930. See also TF1—567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp.
13193 (delegation went to Lomé in the rainy season of 1999, but witness does not remember what month).
(MH TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12966—12967. ,
94*2 TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12972.
Om TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12972—12973.
(M4 TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12974—12975; Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13142—13144.
9415 TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12975—12976.

---- End of Page 1441 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T // GL 18 May 2012

met Bockarie's delegation at the guesthouse.94l6 The witness saw Joe Tuah give a parcel to
Koroma which Koroma said contained $USD 15,000 and was sent by Taylor to take care of
Koroma and his family.94l7
4200. After the Lomé Peace Accord was signed, Sankoh came to Monrovia to meet
Koroma and stayed at the guesthouse, and Koroma was taken from the guesthouse to Hotel
Africa.94l8 The witness said he was present when Sankoh and Koroma met Taylor at the
Executive Mansion, and Sankoh told him that they discussed how Koroma and Sankoh were
to work together and with others.94l9 During Sankoh's stay at the guesthouse, Sankoh's
friends, with whom he and Taylor had trained in Libya, visited. The witness saw Yeaten,
Francis Mewon (an NPFL Special Forces Commander) and "someone like Joe Tuah" visit
Sankoh at the guesthouse.942O
4201. The witness met with Sankoh and Yeaten before Sankoh left for Freetown, and
Sankoh informed the witness that he would be assigning a caretaker to work at the
esthouse. Sankoh told the witness that Taylor said the esthouse was a lace for the RUF
SU Y SU P
to use if they came to meet with him in Monrovia and that Sankoh should leave an honest
person at the guesthouse. Sankoh appointed a caretaker and told him that Yeaten would act
as the "mediator" between the RUF and Taylor, but would not have any direct contact with
Taylor, as Taylor was too busy. Sankoh told the caretaker that Yeaten was to be his
immediate boss, and instructed him to keep records of everything that was going onfml
4202. Yeaten later gave the guesthouse caretaker a strict waming that he was not to keep
documents pertaining to any transactions taking place between Taylor and the RUF. ln
approximately 2000, Yeaten discovered that the caretaker had been keeping records of the
happenings at the guesthouse, such as arms and ammunition that were taken, and he _
removed the caretaker from the guesthouse and sent him to the front lines, but later brought
him back to the guesthouse to work. Cooks and SS security were assigned to the guesthouse.
9416 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12980.
9417 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12979.
9418 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12980.
9419 TF1-567, Transc1ipt4 July 2008, p. 12980.
9420 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12826-12837; Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12972-12974, 12981-12983.
ml TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12990 (PS), 13008 (PS); Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13097.

---- End of Page 1442 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T //’ GK 18 May 2012

.-•· 7**
2 9.; 3 .5
Benjamin Yeaten assigned a radio to it which was installed by Sunlight and operated by
Memunatu Deenf}422
4203. In 2000, Sankoh came to Monrovia again and stayed at the RUF guesthouse. While
in Monrovia, Sankoh told the witness that he wanted to give some diamonds to Taylor, one
of which was 45 carats and three of which were 25 carats. Later, Yeaten came to the
guesthouse to pick up Sankoh and took him, as well as the caretaker, to White Flower,
where Sankoh gave Taylor diamonds.9423
4204. In 2000, after Issa Sesay became head of the RUF, TF1-567 received a message from
Sesay for Yeaten about Sesay's trips to Liberia, to be passed on to Taylor.9424 In addition, if
Sesay needed arms and ammunition he would send a coded message to the guesthouse and
the radio operators would translate this into English for the caretaker to understand. The
witness would then take these messages from the caretaker at the guesthouse to Yeaten, who
would later say that he sent them to his "dad", meaning Taylor. Yeaten would later tell the
witness that Taylor said he would "solve the problem" and Yeaten would give the
materials.9425 In some instances Sesay himself would come for the ammunition, and "many
times" the witness would collect the ammunition for Sesay and give it to him.9426
4205. From 1999 to 2001, Gibril Massaquoi, Abdul Razak, J emba Ngobeh, Kenneth
Macauley and Superman visited the guesthouse. Sesay came many times when Taylor
wanted him, from the time he became leader of the RUF up until 2001.9427
4206. Also after Sesay took over as leader of the RUF, Eddie Kanneh went twice to the
guesthouse and brought diamonds, and Gibril Massaqoui was there once with diamonds.9428
Any time Kanneh brought diamonds they would meet Ibrahim Bah at the Hotel Boulevard,
and Bah and Kanneh would then take the diamonds to Taylor.?429
mz TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986—12990 (PS); Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13097.
gm rrr-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13012-13014 (PS).
°"2" TP1-567, rrarrsprrpr 4 Jury 2008, p. 12991(Ps).
9425 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12991-12992 (PS).
9426 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12992-12999, 13004 (PS).
9*27 rrr-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13001-13002 (PS).
gm TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13002-13003 (PS).
0429 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13005-13007 (PS).

---- End of Page 1443 ---------------------------


Case Nor: SCSL-03-01-T OJ; 18 May 2012

3953é
4207. In 2001, the witness and Sesay took diamonds from the guesthouse to Ibrahim Bah
at the Hotel Boulevard and Sesay told Bah that he wanted to sell the diamonds to Taylor so
that they could purchase "other items" they needed. Sesay and Bah met with Yeaten, who
took them to Taylor. Sesay told the witness after this meeting that they took out the
diamonds in tront of Taylor, who told them he would keep them safe. Bah then told Sesay
that he would contact his business partners to try and get satellite phones and computers for
the RUF. Bah later came to the guesthouse with a satellite phone, computers and money
amounting to srrso $0,000.9430
4208. The witness saw Massaquoi came at the guesthouse in late 2000 and Massaquoi told
him that Issa Sesay had sent him to Monrovia to handle diplomatic issues pertaining to the
RUF 9431
4209. The witness said the caretaker remained working at the guesthouse until early 2001,
when Momoh Gibba said that the whole world was blaming Taylor for supporting the RUF,
and it had become too big of a concern, and so Taylor ordered that the caretaker be removed
trom there.Q432
Prosecution Witness TF1 -338
4210. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member,4433 testified that in 2000 Issa Sesay made five
trips to the guesthouse in Monrovia. In May 2000, when he was based on Koindu, Sesay told
the witness that Taylor had called and asked him to find a person who had been present in
Freetown when Sankoh was arrested and bring him to Monrovia.9434 When the delegation
arrived in Monrovia, they were taken to the RUF guesthouse.9435
4211. At around 10.00 to 11.00pm, Benjamin Yeaten drove Sesay and the delegation trom
the guesthouse to the Executive Mansion Ground to meet Taylor. Taylor asked why "his
brother that was" Sankoh had been arrested. One of the delegation members explained that
**30 rrr-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pn. 13004-13006 (PS).
944* TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13001 (PS).
**32 rPr-s67, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13003 (PS).
9433 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (PS).
9434 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15128-15129. See also TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008 p.
15141 (trip occurred in May).
4435 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15129.

---- End of Page 1444 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / G" 18 May 2012

57.9 2 7
Sankoh was arrested because of the capture of the UN peacekeepers.943° Taylor then spoke
of a British military adviser that had been captured and released and said that the RUF had
made a big mistake in not using him as "a bargaining chip", collateral, to negotiate for the
release of Sankoh.9437
4212. Sesay told Taylor that pro-government forces were still attacking the RUF and they
had no materiel, and so Taylor told Sesay to appoint one person to go with Joe Tuah to Belle
Fassama forest to get materiel for the RUF.4438 This was complied with and materiel was
collected. Once they returned to Monrovia with the materiel, the person whom Sesay
appointed to accompany Tuah was left at the guesthouse while Tuah drove to the Executive
Mansion Ground with the truck carrying the materiel.9439
4213. At the end of May 2000, Sesay travelled to Monrovia for the second time that year.
Sesay told the witness that Taylor invited him to discuss the release of UN peacekeepers.
Upon Sesay's arrival in Monrovia, Yeaten picked him up and took him to the guesthouse.
From there, at around 10.00 to 1 1.00pm, Yeaten took Sesay to meet Taylor at the Executive
Mansion. Taylor told Sesay that the United Nations was after him concerning the
peacekeepers and that he would "help [him] in the struggle with anything that he asked for"
if Sesay released the UN peacekeepers. After the meeting, Sesay returned back to the
guesthouse and used the radio there to contact "the base".4440
4214. On 26 July 2000, Sesay travelled to Monrovia for the third time with a delegation on
Taylor's invitation and were taken to the sixth floor of the Executive Mansion.944l Taylor
introduced the delegation to four heads of state who, the witness testified, spoke to the RUF
delegation. The witness testified that President Obasanjo, of Nigeria, told them that they
should continue their good relationship with Taylor because he was a "good leader",9442 and
Yayha Jammeh, the President of the The Gambia, encouraged the RUF to appoint new
leadership so that they could carry on the peace process. Finally Taylor spoke, saying that a
4436 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15130-1513 1.
9437 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15131-15132.
9438 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15132-15134. See also TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008 p.
4444414131-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15135-15136.
9440 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15141-15144.
944l TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15145-15146.
9442 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15146-15147.

---- End of Page 1445 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Ok 18 May 2012

59 $3
change in leadership was necessary because Sankoh was too old, stubbom and lazy, was
"always being arrested".9443
4215. The delegation returned to the RUF guesthouse where, at approximately 11.00 or
12.00pm, Yeaten took Sesay, Augustine Gbao and Francis Oscar Charles from the
guesthouse to a meeting with Taylor at the Executive Mansion. Taylor told Sesay that he
(Sesay) should remember that the presidents he met were British elected presidents and he
should not listen to the Sierra Leone Government. He gave Sesay $USD 15,000, promised
them further assistance and requested that Sesay disobey the Sierra Leonean Government's
request to disarm. Sesay and the witness spent the night at the guesthouse and Sesay flew
back to Foya the next day.9444
4216. Two or three days later, Sesay returned to Monrovia, where he met at Roberts
lntemational Airport with Taylor, and Presidents Obasanjo and Konaré. President Obasanjo
gave Taylor a letter that he had brought from Sankoh in Sierra Leone, telling him that he had
appointed Sesay as the new leader of the RUF, and that he should take all instructions from
Taylor. After the meeting, Sesay went to the guesthouse in Yeaten's vehicle and passed the
night there.9445
4217. At the end of 2000, Sesay and the witness travelled to the RUF guesthouse in
Monrovia carrying diamonds for Taylor. When Sesay arrived in Monrovia, he was received
by Yeaten and taken to the guesthouse. That night, they were taken to see Taylor at the
Executive Mansion Ground where the witness was present when Sesay presented Taylor
with "many diamonds". Sesay stated that they lacked materiel and enemies were threatening
their positions, after which Taylor replied that he would talk to Yeaten. After the meeting,
Sesay drove back to the guesthouse. From the guesthouse, Sesay and the witness travelled
with Yeaten and obtained large quantities of boots and uniforms, as well as arms and
ammunition.°446
4218. TF1—338 also testiiied that in 2001, Issa Sesay and Francis Oscar Charles travelled
from Koidu Town to Foya with a packet of diamonds and met Benjamin Yeaten, and then
9443 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15146-15148.
(M4 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15148-15151, 15211 (PS).
9445 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15152-15154.
W6 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15164 (Open Session), 15213 (PS).

---- End of Page 1446 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OQ) 18 May 2012

they travelled on to Monrovia. Sesay and Yeaten were taken to the RUF guesthouse, where
Alpha Bravo came to meet them. They weighed the diamonds that Sesay and brought and
Alpha Bravo gave Sesay approximately $USD 300,000. Sesay divided the money into two
parts: he took $USD l50,000 to Taylor for "safe keeping", and took the second $USD
150,000 back to Sierra Leone.9447
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
4219. Witness TF1—371 an RUF member,9448 testified that the RUF had a radio base in a
guesthouse on 16th Street in Monrovia, and that from late 1998 to early 1999
communications were sent there from Buedu on a daily basis.9449 The witness disagreed that
the guesthouse was established to facilitate the involvement of RUF members in the peace
process, as it had been set up before that period. The witness agreed, however, that they
were able to use the facility as part of their involvement in the peace process.945O
4220. In April 1999 the witness and an RUF delegation travelled to Lome through Liberia.
After landing in Monrovia, a car belonging to Taylor's security took the witness and others
to the guesthouse. Memunatu Deen, Osman Tolo and two securities were there and he also
met a Gambian security commander at the guesthouse.945l Yeaten met the witness at the
guesthouse and gave each of the delegates $USD 300, telling the witness that the money was
from Taylor. The witness spent two days at the guesthouse before being transported to
Lome.9452 The witness also met Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) at the guesthouse when
Mingo was leaving for Lome to meet San14221. Afterwards, when the witness came back from Lome, he met Bockarie at the
guesthouse. Bockarie told the witness that he was against disarmament and tried to persuade
the witness to boycott the peace process. The witness testified that he tried to reason with
9447 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15171-15172. In speaking of this incident, TF1-338 indicates
that this "guesthouse" "belonged to Monie Captan". Yanks Smythe confirmed that the RUF guesthouse in
Monrovia supplied by Taylor was owned by Monie Captan but leased by the Liberian Government. Yanks
Smythe, Transcript 25 February 2010 pp. 36004-36005.
9448 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
"""’ TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2382-2383 (Ps).
""" TF1-371, Transcript 1 Febmary 2008, pp. 2796- 2798 (Ps).
""' Tri-271, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2434-2436 (Ps).
9452 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2434-2436 (PS).
W TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2976 (PS).

---- End of Page 1447 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 /

5 95 GL O
Bockarie, telling him that the UN and others had spent enormous resources on the peace
process and it could not be undermined by Bockarie, but Bockarie was not convinced.4454
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
4222. Witness Foday Lansana, (a.k.a. Co Nya) an RUF radio operator,9455 testified that on
22 December 1999 he travelled to Monrovia to see his family, and to meet with Taylor
conceming the conflict between Sam Bockarie and Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman). Lansana
arrived in Monrovia and was taken to a house in Congo Town where Memunatu Deen and
other RUF personnel were based. He met Ibrahim Bah for the first time at the Hotel
Boulevard in Monrovia and then later at the RUF guesthouse, where Bah gave Lansana
$USD 500 "for shopping". Bah told Lansana that Sankoh had given him instructions to give
the money to Lansana.9454 Also on this trip, Foday Sankoh, who was in Monrovia at this
time, introduced Lansana to Benjamin Yeaten so that he could meet Taylor. Lansana did not,
however, meet Taylor on this trip.4457 Lansana testified that he was in Liberia for four
months, from December to April of 2000, including one month in Monrovia and that Yeaten
would meet him at the guesthouse frequently to discuss the conflict between Bockarie and
Mingo. 4458
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
4223. Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie, an RUF radio operator,4459 testified that en route to the
Lomé Peace Accords, he and the other delegates stayed at the RUF guesthouse in Monrovia
for a few hours, and then went on to Lomé. Furfher, in late October or early November
1999, Foday Sankoh, Ibrahim Bah and the witness stayed at the RUF guesthouse in
4454 TF] -371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2448-2450 (PS).
4455 Foday Lansana, T. 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
4456 TF1-275, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4472-4474; Transcript 25 February 2008, 4718-4720.
9457 Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4719-4723. The Defence noted upon cross-examination
that in a previous statement made on 1 February 2007, Lansana did not inform Prosecutors that Sankoh
introduced him to Yeaten. Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4722-4727. Lansana agreed that this
was not consistent with his trial testimony. Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4722-4723. On re-
examination, the Prosecution noted that Lansana had said in another previous statement on 15 February 2007
that Sankoh introduced him to Yeaten. Foday Lansana, Transcript 26 February 2008, pp. 4768-4769. The Trial
Chamber thus fmds that Lansana's clearly gave this information to the Prosecution and the date when he gave it
does not undermine his credibility.
9458 Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4724. See also Foday Lansana, Transcript
22 February 2008 pp. 4571-4574 (concerning Lansana's meetings with Yeaten).
4459 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript l December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.

---- End of Page 1448 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /’/’ 64*5 18 May 2012
. rx

Monrovia for a number of days on their return from Lomé to Sierra Leone af°ter the signing
of the Accords.6466
The Accused
4224. The Accused testified that the RUF guesthouse was established in early October
1998 as a place for RUF members to stay when they came to Monrovia to meet him for
ofHcial purposes.6461 The guesthouse was opened with the knowledge and consent of
ECOWAS members, including the Committee of Five.4462 Members of the ECOWAS
diplomatic delegation visited Bockarie at the guesthouse, and President Kabbah knew of its
existence.6466
4225. In establishing the guesthouse, the Accused testified, he wanted to centralise all RUF
activity in Liberia by providing, as had been done for the RUF previously in the Cote
d’1voire, a building in which RUF members could eat, sleep, and maintain communication
with the RUF in Sierra Leone.6464 In 1998, there was a radio placed at the guesthouse so that
the RUF could communicate with stations in Sierra Lone.4466
4226. The Accused described how the guesthouse was used by the RUF at several points in
his testimony. For example, he testified that Bockarie stayed at the guesthouse in October
1998, on his second visit to Liberia,6466 and that RUF representatives bound for Lomé were
lodged at the guesthouse,6467 and that Foday Sankoh stayed at the guesthouse arier the
signing of the Lomé Accords.9466 Further, when Sankoh arrived in Monrovia on 28
September 1999 in order to speak with Johnny Paul Koroma, Sankoh stayed at the
6466 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21624-21625.
6461 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009. pp. 26005-26010; Transcript 13 Aug. 2009, pp. 26796-
26797; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28772-28773; Transcript 11 November 2009, pp. 31606-31607.
6462 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 2009, 26006-26007.
4466 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26006-26007, 26036; Transcript
14 September 2009, p. 28772.
6464 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26006, 26009-26011. See also Charles Ghankay
Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009 pp. 32480.
6465 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28780-28781.
6466 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009. pp. 29336-29338; Transcript 11 November 2009,
pp 31606—31607.
6464 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29605.
646* Charles Ghankay Taylor. Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28760.

---- End of Page 1449 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // Ob 18 May 2012

guesthouse.9469 He also said that Issa Sesay stayed at the guesthouse in August 2000, at the
time he was appointed leader of the RUF.9479
4227. The Accused testified that he never visited the guesthouse himself, nor did any of the
staff at the guesthouse contact Taylor.947l When he wanted Bockarie to come to him, he
would send for him. He believed that Yeaten visited the guesthouse and that Yeaten and
Bockarie developed a close relationship.9472
4228. The Accused affirmed that from around July 2000, Gibril Massaquoi was posted at
the guesthouse as the RUF spokesman, and made public statements on the RUF's behal£9479
He denied, however, that he stationed Massaqoui at the guesthouse to act as his conduit to
Sesay in order to facilitate the diamond trade.9474 He also denied that the guesthouse itself
was used to cover business activities related to diamonds, stating that had he known this, he
would have closed it down.9479
4229. The Accused denied that the guesthouse was closed in early 2001 and suggested that
it was closed down around early 2002.9476 Subsequently, Taylor testified that the guesthouse
was closed down between 2000 and 2001.9477
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4230. Witness Issa Sesay, an RUF cormnander,9478 confirmed that he met with ECOWAS
leaders in Monrovia in July 2000, but denied that he and the RUF delegation met with
Taylor privately at night, and denied that Taylor encouraged them not to disarm.9479
9469 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26795·26797 (The purpose of the visit was to
conclude outstanding matters on what to do with the SLA under Johnny Paul Koroma and to solve internal
matters before returning to Freetown); Exhibit D-217, Itinerary for the Visit of Hon. Foday Sankoh and
Delegation Visit to Liberia, 8 September 1999, 301999 p. 1 ERN 615.
9479 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28804 (PS).
947l Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32481-32482.
9472 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26011-26012.
9473 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 August 2009, pp. 27307-27309; Transcript 25 August 2009, pp.
27658-27659; 27 January 2010, pp. 34288-34289.
9474 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 January 2010, pp. 34310-34314.
9475 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27565-27566.
9476 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28808 (PS).
9477 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34288·34289.
9478 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
9479 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45258—45262.

---- End of Page 1450 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 6}, 18 May 2012

4231. Sesay also testified that in 2000, Bockarie visited him and Augustine Gbao at the
guesthouse.448O They discussed the problems between them over Bockarie's unwillingness to
disarm. It was the first time Sesay had seen him since December 1999.4481
4232. Sesay denied receiving materials from Taylor, and stated that he made only one trip
to Monrovia in May 2000. After having a meeting with Taylor at the Executive Mansion,
where Taylor gave Sesay $USD 5,000 for fuel, Sesay was sent back to the guesthouse to
prepare for travel the next day in order to release the UNAMSIL personnel in Kono.4482
A 4233. Around July 2000, acting on behalf of ECOWAS, Taylor sent Tuah to Deen at the
guesthouse, to send a message to Sesay asking him to travel to Monrovia for a meeting with
ECOWAS leaders. The RUF delegation to Monrovia spent the night at the RUF
guesthousef)483 After that meeting Sesay returned to Sierra Leone. From Kono, after
consulting with RUF commanders regarding the change of leadership, Sesay travelled back
to Monrovia and stayed at the guesthouse. Memunatu Deen, Osman Tolo and others were
permanently at the guesthouse during this time.Q484
Defence Witness DCT-008
4234. Witness DCT—008, a Liberian radio operator,9485 testified that he first went to the
RUF guesthouse which was located along Tubman Boulevard in Monrovia, in 1999. The
witness had not heard of the RUF guesthouse prior to 1999, but Yeaten's guards spoke
freely of it, suggesting that it was not a secret.9484 The witness visited Sankoh at the
guesthouse about a week after the RUF peace talks in Lomé.9487 During this second visit,
Dauda Aruna Fomie, Bockarie and Pa Rogers were at the guesthouse. The witness believes
that Eddie Kanneh was there as well.9488 The witness did not meet Sesay at the
9489
guesthouse. A
4480 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45070-45071.
948l Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45261-45262; 45257.
4482 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45232-45234; Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44515—44522.
9483 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July, p. 44600; Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44548-44552.
°‘"*" Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44553-44556.
4485 DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46948-46951 (PS).
4486 DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47477—47480.
W nor-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47483.
"""‘ Dcr-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47481—47482.
W nor-008, Transcript 6 September 2010, p. 48019.

---- End of Page 1451 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T lark 18 May 2012

4235. DCT—008 testified that Sunlight had leamed that the Government of Liberia gave the
VHF radio at the guesthouse.949O The radio operators at Base 1 were "very mindful" of
communicating with the radio at the RUF guesthouse because they believed the RUF radio
was being monitored by the Government of Liberia. These communications between the
guesthouse and Base 1 were secret, and so operators were warned by Benjamin Yeaten not
to do anything to expose the connection. The witness himself monitored corrnnunications
from the guesthouse radio.949I
Defence Witness Yanks Smythe
4236. Witness Yanks Smythe, (a.k.a. Yankuba Samateh or Butterfly B), Assistant Director
of Operations for the sss,9492 testified that in 1999 he met the RUF delegation travelling to
Lomé when they passed through Monrovia and stayed at the RUF guesthouse. Yanks
Smythe designated persons to provide security for the delegation in Monrovia.94Q3
Deliberations
4237. lt is undisputed that in approximately 1998, the Accused provided a guesthouse to
the RUF in Monrovia which housed a long—range radio and telephone, radio operators
Osman Tolo and Memunatu Deen, SSS security supervised by Benjamin Yeaten, cooks and
a caretaker. The guesthouse was closed in 2001.9494 The issue before the Trial Chamber is
the purpose and use of the guesthouse.
4238. At the outset, the Trial Chamber notes that the guesthouse was established in
October 1998, prior to the Lome Peace Accords,Q495 and that in October 1998 a radio was
placed at the guesthouse by the Government of Liberia. lt was used by the RUF to
communicate with stations in Sierra Leone and to facilitate communication with Bockarie in
°"°° Der-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47483-47484.
W DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47483-47487.
9492 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 23 February 2010, pp. 35730, 35747; 24 February 2010, pp. 3586635869; 25
February 2010, pp. 36003, 36014, 36019, 36023, 36031; 26 February 2010, pp. 36199, 36202, 36206, 36208.
9*93 Yanks sutytus, Transcript 25 February 2010, pp. 36005-36006.
9494 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 17, 272, 333, 1249; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 94, 99, 544, 550,
935, 1013, 1025, 1028; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26005, 26012—26013; Transcript
11 November 2009, pp. 31606-31607; Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 26530.
9495 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 333; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 543 (Bockarie stayed at the
guesthouse when he met with Taylor in October 1998), para. 935 (from October 1998, there was a radio at the
guesthouse used to communicate with Bockarie).

---- End of Page 1452 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T /6 / (jig 18 May 2012
./1 i

59.5 4.5
Sierra Leone.9496 However, the Trial Chamber concurs with the Defence observation that
"there is little evidence about how the guesthouse was used by the RUF prior to the signing
of the Lomé Peace Accord".9497 The evidence adduced by the Prosecution on the use of the
guesthouse pertains to events in the period after January 1999.9498
4239. Several Prosecution and Defence witnesses testified to the guesthouse being used by
RUF members going to and from peace negotiations, or for conversations with the Accused
concernin the eace rocess. For exam le TF1-567, TF1-371, Dauda Aruna Fornie and the
8 P P P
Accused testified that the RUF delegation stayed in the guesthouse on the way to the Lomé
eace ne otiations.9499 TF1-567 also testified that Sarrkoh sta ed at the esthouse after the
P 8 Y gu
Lomé accords, when he met with Johnny Paul Koroma at the Executive Mansion with
Taylor.95OO TFl-567 also met Gibril Massaquoi at the guesthouse in late 2000, who told the
witness that Sarrkoh had sent him to Monrovia in order to handle diplomatic issues
pertaining to the RUF.950l The Accused coniinned that Massaquoi was posted at the
uesthouse to make ublic statements on the RUF's behalf95O2 Issa Sesa testified that he
8 P Y
stayed at the guesthouse when called to Monrovia by Taylor for a meeting with ECOWAS
leaders.95O3 Finally the Accused testified that Sam Bockarie stayed at the guesthouse on his
way to Burkina Faso to meet with the Chainnan of the OAU.95O4
4240. The Prosecution, however, has presented substantial evidence that the RUF
guesthouse was also used from 1999 for purposes other than to promote peace. ln some
_ cases the use of the guesthouse was related to peace, and yet the message from the Accused
to the RUF was not in support of the peace process. For example, Issa Sesay stayed at the
guesthouse in May 2000, when Taylor called him to Monrovia to discuss the release of the
94% Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 935. See also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp.
28780-28781 (PS); DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47483-47484.
0497 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1017.
9498 See Prosecution evidence Hom TFl-567, TFl-33 8, TFl-371, Foday Lansana, and Dauda Aruna Fornie; See
also Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 333.
9499 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12966-12967, 12974-12975; Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13142-13144.
Bockarie ultimately decided against attending the Lomé peace negotiations. TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp.
l2975—12976; TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2434-2436; Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 3
December 2008, p. 2 1 624-2 1625; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29605.
W Tri-567, Transcript 4 Jrriy 2008,p. 12980.
°5"‘ TFl-567, Transcript 4 Jrriy 2008,p. 13001.
9502 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 August 2009, pp. 27307-27309; Transcript 25 August 2009, pp.
27658-27659; Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34288-34289.
9503 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July, p. 44600; Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44548-44552.
9504 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28660-28662.

---- End of Page 1453 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ,/4/ 85 18 May 2012 \

UNAMSIL Peacekeepers.5505 In his meeting with Sesay, however, Taylor told those present
that the RUF had made a big mistake in not using the peacekeepers as collateral for
Sankoh's release.55O5 Further, in July 2000 an RUF delegation stayed at the guesthouse in
order to meet with Taylor, and Taylor requested that Sesay disobey the government's order
to disann.55O7
4241. Several witnesses testified to the guesthouse being used to facilitate the transfer of
anns and funds for the RUF, and the delivery of diamonds to the Accused. For example,
Witness TF1-567 testified that the caretaker of the guesthouse received messages from
Sesay to Yeaten requesting anns and ammunition, which were to be passed on to Taylor,
and he received ammunition from Yeaten for the RUF many times. The caretaker attempted
to keep records of these transactions but Yeaten discovered this and removed him from the
guesthouse.55O8 TF1-338 testified that the guesthouse was used to house an RUF member in
transit when Sesay received arms and materiel from Belle Fassama forest.55O5
4242. TF1-567 testified that Foday Sankoh, Issa Sesay, and Eddie Kanneh stayed at the
esthouse on their wa to 've diamonds to Taylor.55 10 Sesa was at the esthouse, twice
gu Y S1 Y Y gu
when delivering diamonds to Taylor.95H TF1-567 testified that $USD 15,000 was sent by
Taylor to the guesthouse for Koroma and $USD 50,000 was sent by Taylor to the
guesthouse for Issa Sesay.55 12
4243. The Defence contends that nothing secret could have transpired at the guesthouse
because the international community was aware of the Accused's dealings with the RUF in
furtherance of the A peace process,55l5 and cites the Accused's testimony and some
5505 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15143; TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13039; Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27044; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44519-44522;
Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000).
5505 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15131-15132. Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL '
Peacekeepers (2000).
9507 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15148-15151, 15211. Peace Process: Communications with
Sesay on Disarmament.
5508 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12996; Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13097.
9505 TF1—338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15135-15136. Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct
Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's Leadership (December 1999-January 2002).
9550 TF1—567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13012-13014 (PS) (Sankoh); TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp.
13004—13006 (PS) (Sesay); TF}-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13007 (PS) (Kanneh). Diamonds.
55'H TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15164, 15213; Transcript 2 September 2008 p. 15171-
15172. Diamonds.
W TFl—567, Transcript 4 Juiy 2008, pp. 12978-12979, 13004 (Ps).
9515 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26036; Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26006-26007;

---- End of Page 1454 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-()3-01-T // 655 18 May 2012
. 5//

documentary evidence to support this contention.95l4 Only two of the exhibits cited,
however, in any way mention the RUF guesthouse: one UN code cable referring to the
delegates’ lunch at a Government of Liberia "safe guest house",95l5 and one itinerary,
authorship unknown, for the RUF delegation's trip to Liberia on the way to Lome,
indicating their stay at the "OfHcial Guest House" in Monrovia.95l6 The Trial Chamber finds
this evidence inadequate to support the Defence proposition that the guesthouse was used
only in furtherance of peace. The Trial Chamber accepts the Defence evidence that the
existence of the guesthouse was, as DCT-008 testified, "not a secret".95l7 The Trial
Chamber notes, however, that public recognition of the guesthouse in the international
community does not preclude the possibility of clandestine activities occurring there.
4244. The Trial Chamber notes that even though the Accused testified to being entirely
unaware of matters that occurred at the guesthouse,95lg most of the evidence relating to the
transfer of arms and ammunition, the provision of funds, and the delivery of diamonds
directly involved the Accused, with witnesses testifying as to meetings with him at the
Executive Mansion, or at White Flower.95l9 RUF members who stayed at the guesthouse
went to deliver diamonds directly to Taylor.9520
4245. Having considered all the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that while the
esthouse was used to house RUF dele ates takin art in and travellin to and from
gu S S P S
activities related to the peace process, it was also used as a layover point for individuals
carrying diamonds to the Accused and for individuals who came to arrange and receive
arms, ammunition and other supplies on behalf of the RUF from the Accused.
Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29605.
9514 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 94.
9515 Exhibit D-193 (J), Outgoing Code Cable, To Pendergast/Miyet/fall UNations. NY, From Downes-Thomas,
Rsg, UNOL RUF: Flight Clearance and Related Border Activities, 24 April 1999, ERN 591 J. The Trial
Chamber notes that Exhibits D-193 (A-1) and (K) and Exhibits D-355 (B) and (C), which the Defence cites in
support of this proposition, do not indicate any official knowledge of the RUF guesthouse.
95 16 Exhibit D-217, Itinerary for the Visit of Hon. Foday Sankoh and Delegation Visit to Liberia, 8-30 September
1999, ERN 615.
W ner-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, pp. 47477-47420.
Om Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26009-26015; Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26036;
Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29605-29606.
9519 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12972-12973, 12978-12979; Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13012-13014
(PS), 13097-13098; TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15164, 15171-15172, 15213.
9520 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13004-13007; Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13012-13014; TFl-338,
Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15164, 15213.

---- End of Page 1455 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ok 18 May 2012

Findings
4246. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused provided the RUF with a guesthouse in Monrovia, equipped with a long-
range radio and telephone, RUF radio operators, SSS security supervised by Benjamin
Yeaten, cooks and a caretaker. Although the guesthouse was used by RUF members partly
for matters relevant to the peace process or for diplomatic purposes, it was also used to
facilitate the transfer of arms, ammunition and funds directly from the Accused to the RUF,
and the delivery of diamonds from the RUF directly to the Accused, thus providing a base
for the RUF in Monrovia. These transactions between the RUF and the Accused played a
vital role in the military operations of the RUF in which crimes were committed.
Summgry of the Findings
4247. The Trial Chamber has found that: V
(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the NPFL
provided radio operators, including Foday Lansana, and equipment to the
RUF, to train RUF fighters in radio communication. Lansana stayed in
Sierra Leone following the break with the NPFL in Operation Top Final,
and the RUF continued to benefit from the training and equipment provided
by the NPFL throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone and during the
indictment period.
(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Taylor knew that
the NPFL provided these operators and equipment to the RUF.
(iii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused and
Sam Bockarie communicated by satellite phone in furtherance of the
Freetown Invasion and other RUF/AFRC military activities, during which
crimes were committed.
(iv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the satellite
phones the Accused provided to Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, and the "top
up cards", which the Trial Chamber finds were provided to Bockarie by
Benjamin Yeaten for phone credit, enhanced the communications capability

---- End of Page 1456 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3-O1-T / Om 18 May 2012

of both Bockarie and Sesay, which they used in furtherance of RUF and
RUF/AF RC military activities.
(v) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided Foday Sankoh with a satellite phone.
(vi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that RUF radio codes
were shared with the NPFL and that the RUF and NPFL were able to
communicate via radio.
(vii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Base l existed
and was in operation at the time of the Intervention.
(viii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that while in detention
in Nigeria, Sankoh used the NPFL communications network to
communicate to the RUF, and sent messages to Bockarie via the Accused.
(ix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Dauda Aruna
Fomie, a radio operator for Sam Bockarie, communicated by radio with
Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator based in Liberia, regarding a
shipment of ammunition that the Accused sent to Bockarie.
(x) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that radio
communications were sent back and forth from Bockarie to Base l or Base
O20 in Monrovia, and later from Issa Sesay, to report the movements of
Eddie Kanneh between Liberia and Sierra Leone with diamonds, and
information on diamond mining in Sierra Leone.
(xi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on one of Sam
Bockarie's first trips to Monrovia after the Intervention, radio operator
Dauda Aruna Fomie, who accompanied Bockarie on this trip, kept Bockarie
appraised of events in Sierra Leone by using Base l, a radio station at
Benjamin Yeaten's home in Monrovia.
(xii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
and Benjamin Yeaten received updates from an RUF operator stationed in
Liberia during the Freetown Invasion.

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Case No.: SCSL~O3-Ol~T K GA IS May 20l2

3 7550
(xiii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that around the time
of the Mosquito Spray incident in 1999, the RUF sent a radio operator to
Liberia who worked directly with Benjamin Yeaten, in order to coordinate
communications between Yeaten and the RUF.
(xiv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that a Liberian radio
wes provided to Johnny Paul Koroma. However, this radio was provided
specifically for the purpose of enabling Koroma to communicate with the
West Side Boys about the UN peacekeepers that they had taken hostage.
(xv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that "448 messages"
were sent by subordinates of the Accused in Liberia alerting the RUF when
ECOMOG jets left Monrovia to attack AFRC/RUF forces in Sierra Leone.
The Trial Chamber further finds that the Accused knew that his subordinates
were sending these messages.
(xvi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that during the
Indictment period, the Accused provided much needed road and air
transportation to the RUF of arms and ammunition into RUF territory, as
well as security personnel to escort materiel across military checkpoints,
which played a vital role in the operations of the RUF/AFRC during a
period when an international arms embargo was in force.
(xvii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused's
provision of 10 million CFA francs to the RUF in Cote d’Ivoire funded an
RUF trip to Europe that enabled them to facilitate arms and diamonds deals.
(xviii) The Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided funds to RUF personnel stranded in Cote d’Ivoire after Sankoh
was detained in Nigeria.
4 (xix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided an unspecified amount of funds to the RUF in the tens of
thousands of US dollars to buy arms and ammunition from ULIMO.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T GL l8 May 20l2

3 9; 5 z
(xx) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that before the
Freetown Invasion, the Accused instructed Joseph Marzah to take money to
Bockarie.
(xxi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that after ULIMO and
LURD forces invaded Lofa, Taylor provided Bockarie with $USD 10,000.
(xxii) The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused sent Foday Sankoh $USD 20,000 in Lome before the
negotiations began.
(xxiii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that following the
Lome Accords, the Accused met with Bockarie, and gave him $USD 15,000
for those that had met with him.
(xxiv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that following the
Lome Peace Accords the Accused gave Johnny Paul Koroma some funds, in
the amount of at least $USD 5,000 to $USD 10,000, for clothing and other
personal items at a meeting in the Executive Mansion.
(xxv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
sent $USD 15,000 to Johnny Paul Koroma at the RUF guesthouse.
(xxvi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that between 2000
and 2001, the Accused gave $USD 85,000 to Issa Sesay.
(xxvii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt, that the Accused gave
Issa Sesay $USD 15,000 to support the RUF.
(xxviii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused gave
$USD 50,000 to Issa Sesay in 2001, and that Sesay sent Mike Lamin in
2002 to retrieve a further $1USD 50,000 that Taylor held for the RUF.
(xxix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Issa Sesay sent a
"second delegation" to Monrovia to get money from the Accused, and they
were imprisoned on his orders, but no funds were given by the Accused to
Sesay.

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Case No.; SCSL—03-01-T // OM) 18 May 2012

5 955 2
(xxx) In light of the relatively raw and small amounts of` funding provided to the
RUF or AFRC by the Accused, and considering that most of` this funding
was for personal or unspecified uses, the Trial Chamber has found that the
financial support provided by the Accused cannot be said, in itself, to have
had a direct impact on the commission of` any crimes.
(xxxi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided medical care to RUF/AFRC members. However, it is not clear
how continuous or substantial the provision of` medical care was throughout
the Indictment period. The Prosecution has also proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused provided medicine, f`ood, clothing, cigarettes,
alcohol and other supplies to the RUF during the indictment period.
However, the evidence is insufficient to enable the Trial Chamber to judge
the quantity of` supplies provided. Moreover, other supplies f`or the RUF
came f`rom Liberia through other channels unrelated to the Accused.
(xxxii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused sent
‘herbalists’ who marked fighters in Buedu and in Kono in preparation f`or
the Fitti—Fatta mission in mid—1998, to bolster their confidence for the
mission to recapture Kono.
(xxxiii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
instructed Sam Bockarie to open a training base in Bunumbu, Kailahun
District.
(xxxiv) The Prosecution f`ailed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that at the end of`
December 1998, the Accused sent Martina Johnson, a former NPFL artillery
commander, to Buedu to train RUF fighters to use a 40—barrel missile gun.
(xxxv) The Prosecution f`ailed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in 1996 the
Accused sent a message to Sankoh telling him to make arrangements to
choose a place to construct an airfield.
(xxxvi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in 1998 the
Accused told Bockarie that the RUF should construct or re—prepare the
airfield in Buedu.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T 18 May 2012

3 9.;;.92
(xxxvii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided safe haven to RUP combatants who fled to Liberia from Zogoda.
However, the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the Accused ordered the RUP combatants to cross into Liberia.
(xxxviii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided $USD 100 to Mike Lamin, but failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused facilitated the provision of Liberian travel
documents to Mike Lamin, so that Lamin could visit Sankoh in Cote
d’Ivoire.
(xxxix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
attempted to provide a safe haven in Liberia for APRC officials who fled
Preetown in mid-February 1998. However, he was unable to provide a safe
haven, and the evidence is insufficient to establish his motive for trying to
do so.
(xl) The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused provided the RUP with a guesthouse in Monrovia,
equipped with a long-range radio and telephone, RUP radio operators, SSS
security supervised by Benjamin Yeaten, cooks and a caretaker. Although
the guesthouse was used by RUP members partly for matters relevant to the
peace process or for diplomatic purposes, it was also used to facilitate the
transfer of arms, ammunition and funds directly from the Accused to the
RUP, and the delivery of diamonds from the RUP directly to the Accused,
thus providing a base for the RUP in Monrovia. These transactions between
the RUP and the Accused played a vital role in the military operations of the
RUP in which crimes were committed.
Conclusion
4248. The Accused provided to the RUP, RUP/APRC alliance communications support,
logistical support, financial support, technical support and other operational support.
4249. Concerning communications assistance, following the invasion of Sierra Leone in
1991, the NPP L provided radio equipment and operators to Sierra Leone with the

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Case No.:SCSL—03-01·T QW 18 May 2012
4-0
/

3 Li ss 4
knowledge of the Accused. NPFL radio operators, including Foday Lansana, were sent to
Sierra Leone and trained RUF fighters in radio communication. Foday Lansana stayed in
Sierra Leone following the break with the NPFL in Operation Top Final, and the RUF
continued to benefit from the training provided by the NPFL throughout the conflict in
Sierra Leone and during the Indictment period.
4250. Among the RUF operators trained by Foday Lansana were Perry Kamara, Mohamed
Kabbah, Alice Pyne, Witness TF1-516, and Witness TFl-585. In addition, RUF operator
Dauda Aruna Fomie was trained by the NPFL signal unit in Liberia. The Accused
acknowledged that he provided radio equipment to the RUF during the period prior to
Operation Top Final, and Lansana himself brought a radio set to Sierra Leone. This
equipment remained in Sierra Leone and was used by the RUF for communications from
which it continued to benefit during the Indictment period. The NPFL provided these radio
operators and equipment to the RUF with the knowledge of the Accused.
4251. It is not disputed that the Accused gave Sam Bockarie a satellite phone in October
1998. The Trial Chamber has found that Bockarie used a satellite phone to speak with the
Accused and his subordinates to give them updates regarding the attack on Freetown and to
request ammunition from them. The Defence contention that the satellite phone given to
Bockarie by the Accused was for the purpose of facilitating negotiations during the peace
process was not supported by the evidence. While Bockarie had at least two satellite phones,
the phone from the Accused enhanced Bockarie's communications capability, as did the
"top up cards" for phone credit that he received from Benjamin Yeaten, Director of Special
Security Services for the Accused, and this enhanced capability was used in furtherance of
RUF/AFRC military activities. The Accused also gave a satellite phone to Issa Sesay in
2000, albeit with the full knowledge of the ECOWAS leaders. Nevertheless, this satellite
phone enhanced Sesay's communications capability and thereby his capacity to further
RUF/AFRC military activities. For example, Sesay used a satellite phone to report to
Bockarie that Kono was under RUF control. Sesay had another satellite phone he had gotten
from Foday Sankoh, but he was unable to use it as it had no credit. While Foday Sankoh
was also given a satellite phone, the Prosecution failed to prove that the phone came from
the Accused.
4252. The Trial Chamber has found the Defence contention that the Accused and the
RUF/AFRC were not able to communicate because of differences in codes and frequencies

---- End of Page 1462 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL 03 01 T / (Pb 18 May 2012

jqsff
to be without merit. Although the RUF and the NPFL or Liberian Government's radio
networks used different frequencies, RUF frequencies were accessible to operators in
Liberia, and vice—versa. Codes and private frequencies were used by both Liberian and
RUF/AFRC officials in order to secure radio communications. Following the invasion of
g Sierra Leone, when the RUF did not have their own code, they used the code given to them
by the NPFL. Subsequently, the RUF code changed, and the two code systems were
different. RUF codes were changed intermittently throughout the conflict to guard the
confidentiality of messages. The RUF and NPFL radio networks used different frequencies,
but these frequencies were accessible to all. The RUF codes, which were used to encrypt
messages and to identify private frequencies, were shared with subordinates of the Accused.
However, these codes were not required for the relay of messages; they simply offered
greater security. There were some restrictions on communications between Liberian and
Sierra Leonean radio stations, but this was a matter of protocol rather than a technical
barrier.
4253. ln addition to providing communications training and equipment to the RUF, the
Accused and his subordinates facilitated communications for the RUF through their own
communications network. The RUF/AFRC was provided access to radio communications
equipment in Liberia by the Accused or his subordinates. This equipment was used by RUF
radio operators to communicate with the RUF, in one instance concerning supplies of
military equipment,, in another to update Bockarie on events in Sierra Leone when he was in
Liberia, and in others to report on the movement of Eddie Kanneh between Liberia and
Sierra Leone with diamonds and information on diamond mining in Sierra Leone. A radio
was provided by the Accused to Johnny Paul Koroma. However, this radio was used
specifically for the purpose of enabling Koroma to communicate with the West Side Boys
about the UN peacekeepers that they had taken hostage. The evidence did not establish that
the Accused and Yeaten received updates during the Freetown Invasion from an RUF
operator stationed in Liberia.
4254. NPFL operators in Liberia also transmitted "448 messages" alerting the RUF to
imminent ECOMOG jet attacks. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused knew that
his subordinates were sending these messages.
4255. The Accused provided much needed road and air transportation to the RUF of arms
and ammunition into RUF territory. Materiel was also escorted across military checkpoints

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T / 017** l8 May 20l2

5 9 S 5 é
by security personnel working for the Accused, including Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle),
Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), and Sampson Weah. This facilitation of road and air
transportation of materiel, as well as security escorts, played a vital role in the operations of
the RUF/AFRC during a period when an international arms embargo was in force.
4256. The Accused also provided financial support to the RUF/AFRC, some of which he V
acknowledged. In most instances, however, the funds given by the Accused to various
individuals was for unspecified or personal use. For example, he provided $USD 20,000 to
Foday Sankoh before the Lomé negotiations began for Sankoh's "personal use", $USD
15,000 to Johnny Paul Koroma for his delegation to buy personal items in Monrovia, and
$USD 15,000 to Bockarie for commanders who had travelled to Monrovia, without any use
of these funds specified. The Prosecution failed to prove that the 10 million CFA francs
given by the Accused to the RUF in Cote d’Ivoire, or the $USD 15,000 given by him to
Sesay to support the RUF, were used to facilitate arms and diamond deals. The Accused did
give funds to Bockarie, in the tens of thousands of US dollars, to buy arms and ammunition
from ULIMO. The RUF received financial support for arms and ammunition from other
sources than the Accused as well.
4257. The Accused provided other fonns of support to the RUF, including medical support,
and he acknowledged that he permitted injured RUF fighters to get treatment in Liberia. It is
not clear, however, how continuous or substantial the provision of medical care was
throughout the lndictment period. In preparation for the Fitti-Fatta mission in mid-1998, the
Accused sent ‘herbalists’ who marked fighters in Buedu and in Kono in order to bolster
their confidence for the mission to recapture Kono. Other support included the provision of
goods such as food, clothing, cigarettes, alcohol and other supplies to the RUF by the
Accused. However, the evidence is insufficient to enable the Trial Chamber to judge the
quantity of supplies provided. Other supplies for the RUF came from Liberia through other
channels unrelated to the Accused.
4258. With regard to military training and technical support, the Accused instructed
Bockarie in 1998 to open a training base in Bunumbu, Kailahun District, and told him also
in 1998 that the RUF should construct or re-prepare an airfield in Buedu. However, the
Prosecution failed to prove that the Accused sent Martina Johnson, a former NPFL artillery
commander, to Buedu to train RUF fighters to use a 40-barrel missile gun.

---- End of Page 1464 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T g / 6% 18 May 2012
..4 %

59 55 7
4259. The Accused provided safe haven to RUF fighters, and Mike Lamin, when they
crossed into Liberia after the retreat from Zogoda in 1996, but the Accused was not found to
have ordered the RUF combatants to cross into Liberia. He facilitated arrangements to
provide Lamin with a place to stay, and gave him $USD 100. He had not yet taken office as
President, however, and the Prosecution failed to prove that he facilitated documentation to
enable Lamin to travel to Cote d’1voire. In February 1998, the Accused attempted to provide
a safe haven in Monrovia for AFRC officials following their flight from Freetown.
However, his efforts were unsuccessful, and the evidence is insufficient to establish his
motive for trying to do so.
4260. From 1998 to 2001 the Accused provided a guesthouse to the RUF in Monrovia,
which housed a long—range radio and telephone, RUF radio operators, SSS security
supervised by Benjamin Yeaten, cooks and a caretaker. The guesthouse was used by RUF
members going to and from peace negotiations, and for conversations with the Accused
concerning the peace process. The RUF delegation stayed in the guesthouse on the way to
the Lomé peace negotiations, and Foday Sankoh stayed at the guesthouse after the Lomé
accord was signed. In late 2000 Gibril Massaquoi was posted by Sankoh to the guesthouse
to handle diplomatic issues pertaining to the RUF and to make public statements on the
RUF's behalf. Issa Sesay stayed at the guesthouse when called to Monrovia by Taylor for a
meeting with ECOWAS leaders and Bockarie stayed at the guesthouse on his way to
Burkina Faso to meet with the Chairman of the OAU. However, the RUF guesthouse in
Monrovia was also used for purposes other than to promote peace. It was used to facilitate
the transfer of arms and funds directly from the Accused to the RUF, and the delivery of
diamonds from the RUF directly to the Accused, belying his testimony that he was entirely
unaware of what occurred at the guesthouse. The RUF guesthouse provided a base for the
RUF in Monrovia, which faciliatetd the regular transfers of arms and ammunition from the
Accused to the RUF, as well as diamonds from the RUF to the Accused, transactions which
played a vital role in the military operations of the RUF/AFRC In Sierra Leone in which
crimes were committed.
4261. Of these various modes of operational support, in particular, the support provided by
the Accused to the RUF in the context of communications and logistics was sustained and
significant. Although the establishment of the infrastructure and the training of RUF radio
operators occurred prior to the lndictment period, the benefits of this support continued into

---- End of Page 1465 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T E? gk 18 May 2012

.5 9558
the Indictment period. Moreover, the Accused and his subordinates provided ongoing
support to the RUF during the Indictment period through the provision of satellite phones,
the use of the NPFL communications infrastructure, and the transmission of "448" messages
alerting the RUF to imminent ECOMOG attack, which enhanced the communications
capacity of the RUF, and its capacity to carry out military operations in which crimes were
committed As noted above, logistical support played a vital role in the operations of the
RUF/AFRC by facilitating the transport of` arms and ammunition to Sierra Leone. Similarly,
the RUF guesthouse provided a base for the RUF in Monrovia, which was used, in addition
to the activities for which it was purportedly established, to relay arms and ammunitions
from the Accused to the RUF, as well as diamonds from the RUF to the Accused, providing
sustained and significant support. These transactions played a vital role in the military
operations of the RUF in which crimes were committed.

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Case No.; scsi.-03-01-T Z, gm 18 May 2012

E. Provision of Military Personnel
General Submissions
4262. The Prosecution submits that the Accused provided personnel to the AFRC/RUF
during the lndictment period from the NPFL, other organized groups in Liberia, Sierra
Leonean refugees and civilians living in Liberia, and after he became President from the
AFL, SSS, ATU and LNP.9521 According to the Prosecution, the Accused smoothed the flow
of personnel across the Sierra Leone—Liberian border in early 1998, when he ordered
Varmuyan Sherif to open a corridor in Lofa County so that fighters on either side could
cross over to buy or sell arms or join the AFRC/RUF cause. As a result of Sherif s actions
both sides of the border were filled with current and former fighters from both countries as
well as Liberian Security personnel, and all of them operated openly and without
restriction.9522
4263. The Prosecution also made submissions with regard to the role of liaisons and
facihtators.9523 The Trial Chamber has dealt with these allegations in other sections of the
Judgement.
4264. The Defence disputes the notion that the Accused sent manpower to the RUF or to
the AFRC/RUF during the lndictment period, with the intention that they contribute in a
substantial way to the commission of crimes. The Defence submits that throughout this
section the Prosecution essentially begs the Trial Chamber to infer that if an action was
taken by Liberian security personnel or Liberian forces along the Sierra Leonean border, and
resulted in the supply of manpower during the lndictment period, it was done with the
Accused's knowledge and that he had intended those actions to be taken, while such "grand
inferences" are not supported by the facts.9524
1. Allegations Related to the Red Lion Battalion
Submissions of the Parties
9521 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 282.
9522 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 284.
(im Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 283, 300—305.
9524 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 48.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T 4/ mk 18 May 2012

575ev
4265. The Prosecution submits that after the Pitti-Patta attack on Koidu Town, Bockarie
sent Senegalese with a group of Liberian fighters to reinforce Superman's forces who had
joined up with SAJ Musa in Koinadugu. The combined force, including Taylor's Liberian
reinforcements, attacked ECOMOG in Mongor Bendugu and Kabala.9525 These Liberian
reinforcements, along with APRC, RUP and STP personnel, were formed into a unit called
the Red Lion Battalion. The Prosecution alleges that along the way from Koinadugu to
Colonel Eddie Town, the Red Lion Battalion participated in attacks against civilians in
Kukuna and Mange Bureh, as well as in the campaign towards Preetown, committing
atrocities against civilians in Koinadugu, Bombali and Port Loko Districts.9526 Once inside
Preetown, the Red Lion Battalion was part of the group which opened Pademba Road Prison
and participated in the attack on Kingtom, killing civilians and buming houses with people
alive inside. During the withdrawal from Preetown, the Red Lion Battalion bumed houses
and killed civilians in Pourah Bay and Upgun.9527 The Prosecution relies on the testimonies
of Alice Pyne, TP1—375, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Perry Kamara, Poday Lansana, TP1-585,
TP1—143 and TP1—028.
4266. The Defence submits that after APRC, RUP and STP forces under the command of
Superman and SAJ Musa attacked Mongor Bendugu and Kabala and captured ammunition
from Kabala. Musa and Superman refused to hand over this ammunition to Bockarie, so
Bockarie sent Senegalese to recover it, but Superman still refused to hand it over. After July
or August 1998, SAJ Musa informed Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) that his forces had
been joined by Superman, and that in about September/October 1998, when Gullit's forces
were stationed in Colonel Eddie Town, SAJ Musa informed Gullit that he had sent a group
led by O—Pive to reinforce them in preparation for the advance towards Preetown. The
Defence submits that the group led by O—Pive was composed of APRC, RUP and STP
fighters, and had Liberians among its numbers.9528 According to the Defence, the STP,
Special Task Porce, was formed in 1995 to fight alongside soldiers of the Sierra Leonean
government against the RUP, and was comprised of Liberians, almost entirely former
members of ULIMO. The Defence contends that these Liberian fighters were part of the
armed forces of Sierra Leone who joined the APRC when it attacked Preetown, and that it is
9525 Prosecution Pinal Trial Brief, para. 294.
9526 Prosecution Pinal Trial Brief, paras 295-296.
9527 Prosecution Pinal Trial Brief, paras 297, 497, 535-536.
0528 Defence Pinal Trial Brief, paras 610-612, 897, 1102, 1495; Defence Response to Prosecution Pinal Trial

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (xxx 18 May 2012
/»

37.%/
therefore possible that witnesses who referred to hearing Liberian accents or English being
spoken may have been referring to STF members.9529 The Defence challenges Alice Pyne's
evidence that Senegalese told her that he had been sent by Taylor to Bockarie. The Defence
contends that as a member of the STF, Senegalese would have been in Sierra Leone for a
long time and therefore the Accused could not have sent him to Sierra Leone.953O The
Defence also challenges the testimonies of Alimamy Bobson Sesaygw and Perry
Kamara 9532
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyge
4267. Witness Alice Pyne, one of Supennan's radio operators,9533 testiHed that following
the Fitti—Fatta attack9534 she was told by Supennan that Sam Bockarie ordered him to attack
SAJ Musa's forces in Kurubonla. The witness heard Bockarie inquiring over the radio
whether Supennan had left. Three days after Supennan's departure from Supennan Ground,
Supennan told the witness and his bodyguards to join him at Yomandu.9535 Upon her arrival
in Yomandu, the witness communicated with Supennan, as he had already left Yomandu for
Kurubonla. Supennan told the witness that Short Bai Bureh should send some of his men,
along with the convoy who came from Supemian Ground, to Kurubonla.9536
4268. In Yomandu, the witness met a man named Senegalesegm who told her that he had
come from Liberia and was sent by Charles Taylor "with others" to Bockarie, and that
Brief, paras 137-138, 147.
9529 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 439-442.
9530 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1495.
ml Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 916; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 54.
9532 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 147-150.
9533 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12074.
9534 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12247-12248. The witness describes the unsuccessful night
operation in which Superinan's forces attacked Koidu Town. The witness stated that the mission was less than
two weeks before Sani Abacha's death (Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12246).
"5" Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12248-12251.
9536 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12249, 12251-12252, 12254 (Superinan did not carry out
Bockarie's order to attack SAJ Musa's troops, but rather decided to join SA] Musa instead).
9537 The witness did not know Senegalese's real name. See Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12382.

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / 18 May 2012

3-75; Z
Bockarie had sent him to join Superman with reinforcement of 30 men to launch an attack
which Bockarie had sent Superman to carry out.9939
4269. On the other hand, the witness knew that Senegalese was Liberian, as he spoke only
Liberian English and could not speak "a single" Krio at all. The witness knew the STF to be
a force which fought along with the Sierra Leonean Army and was comprised of ex—ULlMO
fighters. At this point, in 1998, the STF was still in existence and was commanded by
General Bropleh.9939 The 30 men accompanying Senegalese told the witness that they
belonged to the STF but she did not believe this because they did not speak Krio but "pure
Liberian tongue".9949 The witness said that these 30 men were all armed and were all
Liberians. They did not speak Krio and their commander, Senegalese, told the witness that
they had all come from Liberia. These men spoke a dialect which the witness did not
recognise as coming from Sierra Leonea, but she did recognize that some of the Liberians
spoke Kepelle when they were talking to STF members and Liberians who were in the
RUR9541
4270. The witness left Yomandu with Senegalese, Superman's bodyguards and Short Bai
Bureh's men for Kurubonla, and proceeded to Koinadugu. About two miles from Koinadugu
they met General Bropleh with STF forces and other men who had came to escort the
convoy and together they entered Koinadugu in August 1998, approximately one week after
the witness left Superman Ground.9942 The forces in Koinadugu included SLA fighters
headed by SAJ Musa, STF and RUF fighters, as well as "fighting groups", the Strike Force
and the Red Lion battalion, which was headed by SLA Rambo Red Goat, and was
comprised mainly of SLAs.9943
9999 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12250, 12252-12253, 12258-12259 (the witness did not know from
where in Liberia Senegalese had come from); Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12287-12289 (Senegalese passed
through Superman Ground and since Superman was not there he proceeded to Yomandu, where the witness frst
met him). The witness had stated in a prior statement to the Prosecution that the Liberian fighters were part of
Charles Taylor's forces that were sent by Charles Taylor (Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12388).
9539 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12249-12254; Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12382-12384 (while the
witness agreed that ULIMO was fighting against the NPFL in Liberia in 1993, she stated that she does not know
whether the members of the STF were the same ULIMO members who fought against the NPFL, although she
reiterated that STP comprised of former ULIMO members).
9949 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 123 82-12385.
9944 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12253-12254.
9942 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12254-12255, 12259.
9949 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12256, 12259-12260; Transcript 20·June 2008, pp. 12385-12387,
12389-12391, 12394-12398 (the witness frst heard the name Red Lion Battalion in Koinadugu. She stated that

---- End of Page 1470 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-Ol-T Ou 18 May 2012

395éB
4271. The day after the witness arrived in Koinadugu, the "new" Red Lion Battalion was
formed by Superman to go and join the SLA forces that had been cut off at Rosos.9544 The
Red Lion Battalion was commanded by Colonel O-Five and Major CY who was Superman's
bodyguard. lt comprised 300 men and included Superman's forces, Komba Gbundema's
bodyguards, STF, AFRC and RUF members.9545 Komba Gbundema's unit was commanded
by Striker, and Superman's unit, which was also named the Cobra Unit, was a unit within
the Red Lion Battalion.9546 The Red Lion Battalion radio operators included King Perry,
Alfred Brown and Elongima.9547 Alter the Red Lion battalion lelt Koinadugu it remained
loyal to Superman.9548 On the Red Lion Battalion's arrival in Rosos, O-Five communicated
to Superman by radio.9549
4272. On 7 January Pyne heard on the BBC news that rebels who had come from Rosos
had entered Freetown and had captured the State House. Pyne then switched on the radio set
and heard radio operators who were in Freetown communicating with Bockarie over the
radio. These operators were with the group which lelt Rosos and entered Freetown, which
included the Red Lion Battalion which lelt from Koinadugu, the men they had met in Rosos,
and SAJ Musa's men.9550 Over the radio, Pyne heard Gullit speaking with Bockarie and with
the radio operators who were in Freetown including King Perry, while O-Five spoke with
Superman. The information they gave was that they had captured the State House and had
freed prisoners who were held at Pademba Road, including Gibril and other AFRC men. O-
Five also informed Superman that they had lost SAJ Musa on their way to Freetown.955 I
while the old Red Lion Battalion was comprised of mainly SLAs, she did not know whether they were solely
SAJ Musa's bodyguards, but they were not Superman's bodyguards).
9544 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12261; Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12391.
W5 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12259-12260; Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12391—12392, 12398.
9546 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12403, 12406.
9547 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12261.
9548 Alice Pyne, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12434-12435.
9549 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12261-12262.
9550 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12274. 1
OSS} Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12275-12277 (O-Five also informed Superman about the capture of
the State House and the release of the prisoners through a letter. In that letter he also informed Superman about
the death of SAJ Musa).

---- End of Page 1471 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—O3-O1-T (nt 18 May 2012 bw

37st%
4273. On cross—examination the witness stated that she did not know whether Senegalese
was in Freetown, but that she did see him in Pumpkin Ground where she was with
Superman's forces.9552
4274. On re—examination the witness stated that she heard from King Perry and
Superman's bodyguards that the Red Lion battalion killed civilians, burnt houses, and looted
civilian property in Freetown.9553
Prosecution Witness TF1—3 75
4275. Prosecution witness TF1-375, one of Superman's bodyguards,9554 testified that two
days after the Fitti—Fatta mission he and others were ordered by Superman join Komba
Gbundema's forces in Wordu in Kono District, to hand over ammunition to join Gbundema
and to then proceed with Gbundema to Kurubonla in Koinadugu District to meet SAJ Musa
and "work with him" to attack Mongor Bendugu. The witness then carried out these orders
and arrived in Kurubonlaf)555 In Kurubonla a commanders’ forum was convened which was
attended by SAJ Musa, Komba Gbundema, Brigader Mani, General Bropleh, other senior
RUF officials and the witness as Superman's "eye".9556 General Bropleh, a Liberian, was the
head of ULIMO, also called STF, at the time. The witness believed that Bropleh was a
former army commander in Liberia.9557
4276. Following the attack on Mongor Bendugu, Superman arrived in Kurubonla and a
commanders’ forum was convened, which the witness attended. In the meeting, Superman
explained to SAJ Musa that Bockarie had told him to join forces with the AFRC so that they
could get back to Freetown. An offensive was planned to attack Kabala, then advance to
Makeni and from there to Freetown.9558
9552 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12387.
W3 Alice Pyne, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12457-12458.
9554 TF1 -375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.
9555 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12544.
9556 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12546-12547.
9557 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12547.
9558 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557 (during the meeting they discussed the plan to attack
Kabala, from there proceed to Makeni and from Makeni to Freetown).

---- End of Page 1472 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gm 18 May 2012
r
/

3 Ci 54 5
4277. After an unsuccessful attack on Kabala the forces retreated to Koinadugu Town.9559
Bockarie then spoke with SAJ Musa and Superman by radio communication and asked that
the ammunition captured at Kabala be sent to him. Following discussions, SAJ Musa and
Superman contacted Bockarie and told him that they would like to keep the ammunition to
attack Makeni. Bockarie protested and said that he would send "some people" to collect the
ammunition.q56O 1
4278. The group of men sent by Bockarie arrived in Koinadugu Town about three weeks
aiier this communication, about a month aiier the attack on Kabala, and during the rainy
season in 1998.9561 The group was headed by Senegalese and included about 60 men, mainly
Liberians and a few Sierra Leoneans.9562 Senegalese was a Liberian whom the witness rirst
met in Kenema with Jungle "when we were in Freetown" (the witness is referring to the
Junta period here).9563 This Senegalese was in President Taylor's Special Forces in
Liberia.9564 Most of the Liberians who came with Senegalese said they were former NPFL
righters.9565 Among the Liberians was CO Vensen, (a.k.a. Vensy),95°6 who at that time was
in the SSS in Liberia.9567
4279. A forum was convened by Superman and SAJ Musa for all senior ofricers including
Senegalese and CO Vensen, which the witness attended. Superman welcomed the group and
said that although the group had come to recover the arms and ammunition and take them to
Kailahun, at present they, SAJ Musa and Superman, were unable to hand over the materiel.
Superman said that they would call Bockarie and ask that the group be used to work with
them to move to Freetown.9568
4280. Subsequently, Superman suggested forming a battalion in order to rind Gullit's
forces as Gullit was in the jungle and no one knew his whereabouts.9569 Each commander
9559 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12563.
9560 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12563-12566.
gm TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12566.
9562 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12566-12567.
9563 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12567-12568.
9564 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12568.
9565 rrr-575, Transcript 24 rrrrre 2008, p. 12572.
(566 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12570-12571.
W rrr-575, Transcript 24 rum 2008,p. 12572.
M rrr-575, Transcript 24 June 2008,p. 12568.
W rrr-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12569.

---- End of Page 1473 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / @5 18 May 2012

r-
5 7 s é é
was then tasked with allocating men in order to form the battalion.957O The Red Lion
Battalion was formed, and O-Five from the AFRC was appointed as its commander.957l The
witness did not knowthe number of men in the battalion, but stated that a battalion usually
comprised of 62 men but could go up to 200 members.9572
4281. The Red Lion Battalion comprised RUF members, 10 STF members and SLA
members, though the witness could not recall their number. The RUF group included 60
members and comprised bodyguards to SAJ Musa, Superman and Komba Gbundema, and
30 of the Liberians who came with Senegalese, including CO Vensen but not including
Senegalese himself The witness stated that Superman had the highest number of
bodyguards in the battalion, five to seven, who were mainly Liberians who were present in
Koinadugu before the arrival of Senegalese. The remaining 10 Liberians who came with
Senegalese stayed with Superman in Koinadugu.9573 The Red Lion Battalion was then sent
to search for Gullit.9574
4282. After the battalion found Gullit and joined them, Alfred Brown, a Liberian and
former NPFL fighter who was incorporated into the RUF and was working as a radio
operator, contacted Superman and SAJ Musa in Koinadugu to inform them of the battalion's
safe arrival. Superman then informed Bockarie of the battalion's safe arrival and that they
were now with Gullit's forces.9575
4283. In Koinadugu, Senegalese was assigned to head the training base in Koinadugu
Town in which adults, children and females who were abducted in Kabala and its
surroundings were trained.9576 Fighting broke out between SAJ Musa and Superman over a
dispute whether to court-martial Senegalese, who had beaten a trainee to death; Superman
refused to do so without the permission of Bockarie, given that Senegalese was in the SSS,
while SAJ Musa wanted to court-martial him and refused to take orders from Bockarie.9577
""° rrr-375, Transcript 24 Jupp 2008, pp. 12572-1257s.
957* Tri-375, Transcript 24 Jump 2008,p. 12573.
9572 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12573; Transcript 27 June 2008, p. 14783 (the total that the witness
gave was 60 RUF fighters and 10 men from the STF).
9573 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12573—12575; Transcript 27 August 2008, pp. 14780-1478 1.
(W4 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12574; Transcript 27 August 2008, pp. 14781—14784.
W5 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12574—12575.
W6 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12569—12570.
9577 TF1~375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12578-12580 (On Superman's side were the RUF, the STF led by

---- End of Page 1474 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T GTB 18 May 2012

.§9§é7
Prosecution Witness TF1—585
4284. Witness TF1-585, an RUF member,9578 testified that she had seen Senegalese in
Kenema with Jungle before they retreated to Buedu.9579 In Buedu around November 1998,
she saw him and 40 to 50 Liberian soldiers. The witness identified the men as Liberian
soldiers although they wore civilian clothes since they were under the command of Abu
Keita and had crossed over from Liberia, they were well anned. They spoke Liberian
English and most of them spoke Mandingo. During the time they were in Buedu, the men
answered to Abu Keita as well as Sam Bockarie.9580
4285. At a meeting in Bockarie's house, in which a move towards Freetown was discussed
between Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh, attendees included CO Isaac, Morris Kallon, Issa
Sesay, Abu Keita, and the Liberian soldier named Senegalese.958l After the meeting
Bockarie called a fonnation and addressed the Liberian soldiers in Liberian English as well
as Krio. Bockarie su lied the men with arms and ammunition and said the were to o to
PP Y 8
Kono to join Supennan to attack Koindu and from there proceed to a combined mission in
Kabala and from there to Freetown.9582
4286. A convoy including Issa, Rambo and the 40 to 50 fighters who were led by
Senegalese left for Kono.9583 They joined Supennan and succeeded in capturing Kono. The
witness then stated that Supennan said that his forces did not succeed in capturing Kono but
succeeded in capturing anns and ammunition from Kono. They then proceeded with others
to Waterloo.9584 Alice Pyne told the witness that Supennan's group, including the 40 to 50
men, reached Waterloo, but the witness did not know whether they entered Freetown.9585
General Bropleh, and former SLA soldiers Brigadier Mani and Colonel T. On SAJ Musa's side were the AFRC
and former SLA soldiers).
9578 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15589-15592 (PS).
9579 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15700-15703.
9580 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15703-15706; Transcript 11 September 2008, p. 15982. On
cross examination the witness stated that there are Mandingos in Sierra Leone and that she did not know whether
the 40 to 50 men lived in Sierra Leone prior to the meeting in Buedu (TF1-585, Transcript 1 1 September 2008,
pp. 15982-15984).
9581 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15700-15703, 15707; Transcript 11 September 2008, p. 15974
(the witness did not know which faction Senegalese fought with in Liberia).
9582 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15706; Transcript 11 September 2008, pp. 15982-15983 (the 40 to
50 men could understand some Krio).
9583 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15706, 15712.
9584 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15706-15707.
W TF1-585, Transcript 1 1 September 2008, pp. 15993-15994.

---- End of Page 1475 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f " 18 May 2012

5954 9
4287. On cross-examination the witness could not recall which of the three meetings she
had described was attended by Keita and Senegalese, although she remembered that they did
attend the last meeting. She subsequently recalled that the invasion of Freetown was
discussed during the last meeting but said that she could not recall whether this meeting was
attended by both Keita and Senegalese.9586
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
4288. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC member,9587 testified that when he was
in Rosos with Gullit, he was present when Gullit informed SAJ Musa in around July/August
1998 of the operation he had led "now that he had based in Rosos".9588 Two weeks later,
Musa told Gullit that Superman's troops and Komba Gbundema's troops had joined him in
Koinadugu. Musa stated that Superman had come from Kailahun to reinforce him, and that
they had carried out a joint attack, along with Komba Gbundema's troops, in which they
succeeded in capturing Mongor Bendugu and were then heading towards Kabala. During
this conversation, Superman confirmed the information provided by Musa.9589
4289. While Gullit's forces were in Rosos, they attacked and captured the town of Gbinti.
During the attack they looted and burned houses, and on houses they did not burn they wrote
"Five-Five heading for Freetown", "RUF, SLA, NPFL heading for Freetown" in order to
instil fear in the population and ECOMOG that these forces, including the NPFL, were
preparing to go to Freetown, although at this point in time there were no NPFL troops with
them ‘"until later we got reinforcements from Koinadugu".959O Following ECOMOG attacks,
the troops retreated from Rosos, in around September/October 1998.9591 The troops then
based in a location between Tonko Limba Chiefdom and Sanda Magbolontor in Kambia
District, naming it first Major Eddie Town, and then Colonel Eddie Town, as Eddie was
promoted.9592
9586 TF1-585, Transcript 11 September 2008, pp. 15980-15982.
0587 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7867, 7869; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8684,
gggilimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 Apri12008, pp. 8141-8142, 8146-8147.
9589 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8151-8153.
9590 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8156-8159 (the reason they used the NPFL name was
because people, including ECOMOG, were afraid of the NPP L and the RUF due to their conduct in 1991-1992).
9591 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8162-8163.
0592 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8163-8165 (the witness, Bazzy, Junior Lion, Hassan
Papa Bangura stayed in Rosos to ensure all the troops had left, then set Rosos on fire and joined the rest of the

---- End of Page 1476 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1476 % 18 May 2012
/Z

3 7 5; q
4290. While in Colonel Eddie Town, the witness listened to radio communication between
Gullit and SAJ Musa, during which Musa told Gullit that a group of men led by O-Five, an
SLA, will be sent from Koinadugu to them as reinforcement for the Freetown Invasion and
that the group included "some SLA mixed force".9593 Given that it was a radio conversation,
Musa did not disclose everything, but said that they should be ready for O-Five's group
which included Liberians, and that O-F ive would muster his men and provide a report to the
commander once he arrived in Colonel Eddie Town.9594 Later on, they received a
communication from SAJ Musa and Superman that O-Five and his men were preparing to
leave. Gullit responded that he would send troops to receive O-F ive and named Gbndembu
as a meeting point.9595 The witness and a group led by Major King left for Gbendembu.
Along the way to Gbendembu they heard Eldred Collins announcing Operation Spare No
Soul over the international media.9596
4291. When they met O-F ive and his group in Gbendembu, O-F ive had a large group with
him, including some SBUs. O-F ive told them that his troops had attacked Kamalo, that they
had captured civilians and children, burned houses and vehicles and killed people, in
accordance with Operation Spare No Soul. Bobson Sesay saw and spoke to the civilians who
were captured from Kamalo and who were carrying looted items that the forces brought
from Kamalo.9597
4292. O-Five's group comprised 200 fighters apart from civilians. After the troops arrived,
O-F ive orchestrated a muster parade in which he introduced the troops within his force to
Gullit. O-F ive introduced SLA, 30 RUF members and 50 Liberians - 30 STF members and
20 former NPF L fighters who were integrated into the AFL. O-F ive confirmed the rumours
that Superman went to Kailahun to get reinforcements in order to form a brigade that would
advance towards Freetown, and that Bockarie provided Superman with Liberians who came
from Liberia in order to reinforce the troops in Koinadugu and attack Mongor Bendugu and
Kabala, and to prepare a brigade for the advance towards Freetown. O-F ive stated that these
troops in Colonel Eddie Town).
0593 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8165-8166.
9594 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8166-8167; Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8198-8199.
9595 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8170.
(5% Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8171-8172, 8175-8176 (they heard a second
announcement on the international media m which the government confrrmed that people in Kamalo m Bombah
District were attacked and killed, houses were burnt and some vehicles were destroyed by AFRC/RUF forces.
According to the report, all the civilians ran away from the Kamalo and Kamakwie area).

---- End of Page 1477 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1477/ 18 May 2012

<""
57.2 7 0
troops participated in the attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala, proved "well", and were
therefore sent to reinforce the troops that prepared for the Freetown Invasion.9998 O—Five's
ou included Ca tain Sta er from the RUF and others from the RUF the witness could
gf P P gg
not recall, Foyoh, Bobby Sherrifr King Perry, Med Bajehjeh, who was an SLA, and STF
Liberian fighters named Washington and Dukulay.9999 Bobson Sesay could not name
members of the former NPFL fighters, stating that he was not too familiar with them.9699
4293. The STF, Special Task Force, was headed by Liberian General Bropleh and was
comprised of Liberians who were part of ULIMO—K. During the early 1990s these Liberians,
a small number, were integrated into the Sierra Leonean Army, and worked against the
RUF. Following the AFRC coup, the STF joined the RUF and the AFRC, and General
Bropleh became "part and parcel" of the AFRC government under Johnny Paul Koroma.
These STF fighters later joined the SLAs in "the bush". The STF group was different from
the group of former NPFL fighters who had integrated into the AFL.969l
4294. Within O-Five's group there was a unit called the Red Lion which comprised of 50
men ~ 20 former NPFL fighters and 30 STF members. Immediately after the muster parade,
Gullit took men from the Red Lion group and established a battalion, naming it the Red Lion
Battalion. The Red Lion Battalion included 200 men and was headed by SLA's Med
Bajehjeh. The Red Lion Battalion included 70 SLA members, 20 to 30 RUF members, 30
STF members and 20 former NPFL fighters, and the rest were SBUs. While Gullit
distributed the RUF and SLA members from O—Five's group into different battalions, the
STF and former NPFL fighters were not divided and were appointed to the Red Lion
Battalion.9692 The ex-NPFL fighters and the STF members referred to themselves as RUF
since they came to reinforce the forces in Kailahun. 9699
9997 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8174, 8176-8177.
9598 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193-8198, 8200-8201; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp.
8674, 8747, 8769-8771.
9599 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8178-8180; Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193, 8201-
8202.
9600 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8201.
99m Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8177-8178; Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8199-8200;
Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8748-8750, 8754, 8756-8757.
9602 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8202-8203; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8315-8318;
Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8758-8765.
9699 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8918-8919.

---- End of Page 1478 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V/( QL} l8 May 2012

5 75* 7 x
4295. While in Colonel Eddie Town, forces commanded by Bazzy, which included Five-
Five, Bomb—Blast, O-F ive and the Red Lion Battalion, attacked Kukuna in
October/November 1998. After succeeding in pushing some of the ECOMOG forces from
Kukuna, Bazzy's forces set the town on fire, killed civilians and looted civilian property.%04
4296. Following the attack on Kukuna, Gullit organized a team headed by Ibrahim Bioh
Sesay, O-Five, Abdul Sesay and some other commanders. This force, which included a
small number of members of the Red Lion Battalion, among whom were SLA members, a
few from the STF and NPFL/AFL fighters, launched an attack on Mange Bureh in Port
Loko District. The witness participated in the attack in which they fought against a mixed
force of Guineans and Nigerians, bumt houses and looted anything of value. They then
retumed to the camp.%O5 Thereafter, Gullit contacted Bockarie and informed him about the
operations in Kukuna and Mange Bureh.%O6
4297. Bobson Sesay also testified that SAJ Musa contacted Gullit to inform him that he
was heading to Colonel Eddie Town due to a falling out he had with Superman.96O7 When
Musa anived, he briefed the men on his fight with Superman, and explained that despite
what happened between Superman and himself, they were brothers and it should not
interfere with the operation.9608 He told the troops to prepare to go to Freetown, and
explained to them that they should strictly obey the humanitarian laws that govemed
them.%O9 A
4298. Around mid-December 1998, after SAJ Musa anived, about 1,000 fighters%lO left
Colonel Eddie Town and crossed the river towards Mange Bureh. At that point in time, the
5th battalion, headed by Saidu Kambolai (a.k.a. Basky), the RDF battalion, headed by
Terminator, and the Red Lion Battalion headed by Med Bajehjeh, were ahead in the advance
towards Mange Bureh.96H At the point in which the troops left Colonel Eddie Town, there
9604 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8205-8207.
(M5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8208-8210.
9606 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8217.
(W7 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8217.
9608 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8222.
0609 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8222-8223.
WO Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8251-8252.
(ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8224-8226.

---- End of Page 1479 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QN 18 May 2012
x/

were the lst battalion, 2nd battalion, 3rd battalion, 4th battalion, Sth battalion, the RDF
battalion, and the Red Lion battalion.%l2
4299. After they attacked Mange Bureh they continued on to Maraykula in the Port Loko
area, where upon Five—Five's order they set houses on r‘ire.%l3 From Maraykula the troops
moved to Mamusa where they established a temporary base. Upon SAJ Musa's instructions,
a force headed by CO Terminator attacked ECOMOG forces in Lunsar, during which they ,
captured ammunition from the ECOMOG forces and returned to Mamusa.%l4 From Mamusa
the troops moved towards Gberi Junction, between Bombali and Port Loko Districts. From
there the troops moved to Gberi bridge96l5 and towards the Masiaka, Masumana axis. A
force headed by Papa 17 attacked Masiaka and burned the town.%l6 Upon SAJ Musa's
order, men headed by Colonel Terminator then attacked and burnt two ECOMOG vehicles
and returned to Mansumana.%l7 Troops headed by Terminator then attacked ECOMOG
troops who were based in Mile 38, also known as Magbuntoso, in early December 1998.
After Terminator was injured, the troops retreated to the temporary base. From there the
whole brigade moved to Mamamah in Koya rural district in the Westerm Area.%l8 From
Mamamah the troops moved to and captured Newton in the Koyal rural district, close to
Waterloo. Before heading towards Waterloo, SAJ Musa declared Operation Born Naked in
which the troops removed their uniform shirts and tied them around their waists in order to
identify themselves.96l9 The troops, including the Red Lion Battalion, then moved and
captured Waterloo on 23 December 1998. In Waterloo they engaged in looting food and
other products from civilians.9620 SAJ Musa then instructed Foday Bai Marah to form a force
that would attack Benguema. The force, including the witness, encountered heavy firing
from ECOMOG. They therefore asked SAJ Musa for reinforcements. SAJ Musa arrived and
W2 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8225, 8227 (before they attacked Mange Bureh, the
witness was demoted by SAJ Musa along with other second lieutenants to the rank of sergeant).
Om Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8226.
W4 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8226-8227.
W5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8227-8228, 8233.
96[6 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8233-8236.
W7 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8236-8237.
M8 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8237-8239.
W9 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8241-8242.
9620 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8242-8244.

---- End of Page 1480 ---------------------------


Case No.: S

they succeeded in capturing Benguema, where they engaged in looting and capturing
ammunition.%2l On 24 December, SAJ Musa was killed when a bomb exploded.9622
4300. Following the death of SAJ Musa, Gullit took command of the troops and made
promotions and appointments. The battalions remained the same, and within them the SBUs
remained as they were, including in the Red Lion Battalion.9623 The troops moved to Hasting
Hills, around the Freetown Highway, and from there went for a food finding mission in
Waterloo, where they looted food from civilians.9624 After they returned to Hastings Hills,
fighters including from the Red Lion Battalion participated in an attack on ECOMOG forces
in Hastings on 3 January 1999. During the attack the forces executed three ECOMOG
soldiers the had ca tured and bumt Hastin s airfield and aircrafts.9625 After ca turin
Y P g P g
Hastin s and Jui, the entire bri ade, includin the Red Lion Battalion, based in Allen Town
g g g
on 4 Janua 1999.9626 At this oint the troo s did not move as battalions but were rather
W P P
mixed in the brigade led by Gullit, including men from the Red Lion Battalion.9627
4301. On the night of 5 January Gullit convened a commanders’ meeting in which he
ordered that once the troops entered Freetown they should burn police stations and free
risoners, kill those who o osed the AFRC/RUF, loot from civilians and kill those who
P PP
refuse to hand over their property. Gullit also said that they should capture civilians in order
to "gain recognition".%28 In Freetown they were to attack ECOMOG, government forces,
Kamajors, and SLA members who fought with the government.9629 At this point the troops
included over 1,000 men.9630
4302. Four battalions, including the Red Lion battalion, moved from Allen Town to Calaba
Town and Brewery. From there the troops entered Freetown from two locations; one force
went throu the new Freetown-Wellin on Road, while the other force includin the Red
7 g
"62' Arrmamy Bpbspp sappy, Transcript 22 Appr 2008, pp. 8243-8244.
9622 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8244-8248.
9623 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8248-8250.
9624 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8246-8257.
9625 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8261-8265, 8267-8268.
9626 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8265-8267.
9627 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8268-8269.
Om Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8268-8271.
(mg Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8271-8272.
9630 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8272.

---- End of Page 1481 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T cg, G5 18 May 2012 I

57 s 7 <¢
Lion Battalion and the witness, entered Freetown through Wellington Old Road.666l The
troops who went through the old road captured the police station in Kissy Mes Mes in the
eastern pan; of Freetown. They then captured Shell Old Road and moved to Saroulla.6662 The
troops then captured Fisher Lane where they burnt 50 vehicles of civilians.6663 On their
advance on 6 January 1999, the troops reached the Eastern Police, where Junior Lion
executed two police officers whom they had captured.6664
4303. In the morning of 6 January 1999 the troops captured State House, the President's
residence. Some members of the Red Lion Battalion stayed there, while other Red Lion
Battalion members, including the fonner NPFL fighters, and other troops moved to
Pademba Road Prison in order to release the prisoners. Along the way, they burnt the
Criminal Investigation Department headquarters. They reached Pademba Road and released
3,500 prisoners, many of whom were AFRC members and some of whom were RUF
members. There were also prominent lawyers and criminals.9635 Troops including the
"mixed STF" force burned down the Central Police Station.6666
4304. ln the second week of January, 150 fighters went to attack ECOMOG forces in
Kingtom, where they killed civilians and burned houses with people inside. These forces
included the former NPFL fighters who were wearing red headbands with ‘NPFL’ and
‘RUF’ written on them. Others in the Red Lion Battalion wore white headbands and wrote
‘RUF’ on them.6667
4305. ln the third week of January, as the rebels withdrew from the ECOMOG attack on
the State House,9666 Gullit, Five-Five and Bazzy met with the witness's group at Savage
Square. They informed the fighters that one SLA soldier had been killed in Fourah Bay, and
that the civilians were challenging the rebels. Thus, Gullit said that they should go down to
Fourah Bay.9666 Subsequently, a group comprised of RUF, SLA, STF, RDF and Red Lion
Battalion members in addition to Gullit, Five-Five, Bazzy and the witness attacked Fourah
666l Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8272-8274.
6662 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8274-8275.
6636 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8275-8276; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8314-8315.
6634 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8279.
6635 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8280-8283.
6666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8293-8294.
9637 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8294-8296, 8298.
6666 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328, 8331.

---- End of Page 1482 ---------------------------


Case No..SCSL 03 01 T M dir; 18 May2012

Bay. The group forced civilians out of their houses and killed them. Some civilians stayed
inside their homes and died as the houses burned down.%40
4306. Following the operation in Fourah Bay, the fighting force, which included Med
Bajehjeh, withdrew to Upgun where they mounted a defensive.%4l Upon Five-Five's
instruction, Five-Five, Kabila and Major Mines amputated civilians. Five-Five first gave a
demonstration by amputating the arms of three captured civilians. After that, Major Mines
and Kabila started capturing people and amputating their arms.%42
4307. The Red Lion Battalion performed very well during its attacks; when they burned
they did it "to extremes". Troops were happy when the Red Lion Battalion arrived, saying
"danger is here", "danger men have come", as its members were "fierce" and dangerous to
ECOMOG and civilians. Most of them didn’t have family members in Freetown, and as the
witness observed, they were dangerous to anyone they saw, not like the other fighters who
were careful of whom they attacked.9643
4308. Bobson Sesay also testified that after the invasion of Freetown as they retreated they
created a blocking force at Newton, where an RUF commander named Senegalese and other
RUF commanders were.9644
4309. On cross-examination the witness stated that he knew that Foday Lansana and
Superman were Liberia.ns.%45
4310. On re-examination the witness was shown Exhibit P-111, a BBC report which quotes
Bockarie as saying that his troops numbered 5,000.%% Bobson Sesay said that was Bockarie
was referrin to the `oint forces of AFRC and RUF who took over Freetown under the
S J
command of Gullit.9647
0639 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8332-8333.
9640 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8332-8334.
0641 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8334-8335.
9642 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8337-8339.
9643 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8319-8321.
9644 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8399.
9645 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8794.
9646 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8915-8916.
9647 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8917.

---- End of Page 1483 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T AJ Oh 18 May 2012

3 if 7 é
4311. On re-examination, the witness was presented with Exhibit D-028, a Sierra Leone
News Archive dated December 1998 in which President Charles Taylor is recorded as
denying any Liberian government involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict but
acknowledging that there were Liberian mercenaries involved; he is quoted as stating "But
they are there on their own". Bobson Sesay testified that he disagreed with pari of Taylor's
statement that Liberian mercenaries in Sierra Leone were there on their own since men such
as Isaac Mongor, Denis Superman and Foday Lansana (a.k.a. Nya) had confirmed that they
were sent to Sierra Leone by Charles Taylor.4648
Prosecution Witness Pegg Kamara
4312. Witness Perry Kamara (a.k.a. King Perry), an RUF radio operator,4644 testified that
following the Fitti-Fatta operation, at the end of May, Superman prepared himself and a
large group of fighters to join SAJ Musa in Koinadugu.9°50 Approximately two months
afterwards the witness left Superman Ground upon Morris Kallon's instructions. Kamara
left with a convoy which included Alfred Brown, another radio operator under the command
of Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO Nya) and others who included the wives of Gullit and Five-
Five. Kamara and Alfred Brown were to collect equipment from SAJ Musa in Koinadugu to
prepare for going to go to Rosos (Colonel Eddie Town) to help set up effective radio
communication there.4°5l
4313. During Kamara's stay in Koinadugu for less than a week, they were provided with
arms and ammunition, fighters and a commander who led them to Colonel Eddie Town.4°52
While in Koinadugu, the witness observed that the relationship between SAJ Musa and
Denis Superman was cordial.9655
4314. The group of men sent from Koinadugu to Rosos was commanded by AFRC's O-
Five of the AFRC and was comprised of 60 RUF, 250 AFRC, and a number of STF
members. The STF members were Liberian ULIMO fighters. The number of the group
increased as they were joined by others along the way. The group included a
4644 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8930-8932.
5549 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
4550 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3172.
°°5l Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3175-3176; Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3183-3185 (the
witness stated that his move to Koinadugu was part of the plan discussed iii Buedu).
4552 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3185.

---- End of Page 1484 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 56 18 May 2012

communications unit, a medical unit, and groups who were responsible for taking care of the
arms and ammunition. The RUF group comprised two units: the Cobra Unit, which was a
small group composed of Superman's bodyguards, and the Red Lion Battalion, which
dominated the RUF group and comprised Komba Gbundema's bodyguards.9654 The Red
Lion Battalion was commanded by Striker.9655
4315. Before they left Koinadugu, Superman and SAJ Musa ordered O—Five to make the
area "fearful", to capture civilians, take the civilians to them or kill them, amputate hands
and bum all the villa es the assed throu h,%5(’ sa `n the order had come from
8 Y P 8 Y1 8
Bockarie.9657
4316. In September 1998, the group left Koinadugu for Rosos, and they arrived in Rosos
before 28 September 1998, a date on which the witness was injured. On their way to Rosos
they passed through Karina, Gbendembu, Mateboi, and other towns.9658 During their
'oume , Kamara witnessed killin s, bumin s, ca ture of civilians to ca loads, killin of
J Y 8 8 P YYY 8
those who were tired and could not carry loads, capture of children into SBUs and SGUs,
capture of women and looting.9659
4317. While in Rosos, the troops went on a food finding mission in Kukuna on 28
September. ln Kukuna, the troops captured civilians to carry loads, killed most of the
civilians they encountered along the way and bumt down part of the town.9660
4318. Subsequently, SAJ Musa arrived in Rosos with over 1,000 men from Koinadugu.
Musa announced their mission to go to Freetown, stating that they no longer belonged to the
RUF or the AFRC.%6l ln early December, the troops moved to Freetown. Along the way
they crossed Little Scarcies River, attacked villages around Madina and Kambia, and
attacked Lunsar and Masiaka. From Masiaka they covered villages along the Masiaka-
9653 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3186.
"°5" Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3185-3188, 3233.
9655 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3239.
9656 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3190.
9657 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3191.
M Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3188-3190.
9659 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3190-3194 (in one of the villages, several civilians had been
assembled by Father Mario who was caring for them. They were al1, including pregnant women, executed upon
O-Five's order. Father Mario was captured by SAJ Musa and was not there at the time).
0660 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3200-3202.
%°l Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3211-3212.

---- End of Page 1485 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T '" 18 May 2012
J GF!


3FS7z
Freetown highway, while moving to and from the main highway and into "the bush" in
order to confuse the enemy. They did so until they arrived in Four Mile, Six Mile, Lumpa,
Waterloo and Benguema, in late December.9662 En route from Rosos to Freetown, Kamara
witnessed the troops committing numerous atrocities; they attacked Government troops and
ECOMOG positions, killed civilians, burnt houses, amputated civilians, and abducted
civilians who were then forced to carry loads for the troops.9663
4319. Once in Freetown, Kamara was part of the group which entered Pademba Road
Prison, while another group went to State House, and a different group went to the National
Stadium. The rest stayed in Ferry Junction.9664 In Pademba Road they attacked and drove
away all the security personnel and forced the Prison Officers to open the gates. Those
Prison Officers who delayed were beaten. This group thus succeeded in their mission to
release the prisoners who were accused of collaborating with the Junta. Among the released
prisoners were former President JS Momoh, a journalist named Hilton Fyle, businessman
Steve Bio, and the former RUF spokesman, Gibril Massaquoi.9665 The prisoners were then
taken to State House.6666 The forces occupied State House for about one to two days before
they began to retreat, fearing ECOMOG attacks due to the killing on Bockarie's orders of
ECOMOG troops at Cotton Tree.9667
4320. The thousands of AFRC, RUF and STF fighters who entered Freetown treated
civilians "pathetically;" civilians suffered rape, hard labour, executions, amputations,
burning of property and looting. These acts were carried out in almost all of the areas, which
they occupied from the day they entered until the day they left Freetown, although the worst
situation occurred in eastern Freetown. The RUF group that participated in the attack on
Freetown included the Cobra Unit, comprised of Superman's bodyguards including CY, and
the Red Lion Battalion headed by Striker. While in Freetown, CY communicated with
9662 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3212-3214.
6663 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3213-3214 (the forces, including the Red Lion Battalion,
agreed to "move like guerillas [sic]" leaving Rosos for Freetown in early December, attacking along the way
from Madina to Benguema, burning down houses, abducting civilians to carry loads, and cutting hands).
6664 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3224-3225.
6665 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3225-3227.
9666 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3230.
6667 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3230-3231.

---- End of Page 1486 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 »


395 M
Superman and informed him about the military situation in Freetown and the casualties their
unit incurred.9668
4321. Forces which included the witness and O—Five retreated from Freetown to Waterloo,
while the Red Lion Battalion under the command of Striker stayed in Freetown with Rambo
Red Goat.9669 Kamara saw smoke coming from Freetown while he was in Waterloo, and
received information from the media in Freetown that the rebels in Freetown were
amputating civilians, raping, burning houses, killing, abducting civilians and forming
roadblocks.%7O On the radio, the witness heard that the forces that stayed in Freetown,
headed by Rambo Red Goat and Striker, eventually left Freetown and joined the forces on
the main highway towards Waterloo to Masiaka, but the witness did not see them again.%7l
P Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
4322. Witness Foday Lansana, an RUF radio operator,%72 testified that he arrived with
Superman in Koinadugu. Upon their arrival, Gullit requested reinforcements, a strong
battalion, for fighting which took place at Camp Rosos. Upon this request, Superman, SAJ
Musa, Brigader Mani, who was the most senior SLA in Koinadugu at the time, General
Bropleh and Colonel Tamba Yamba formed a battalion and provided it with ammunition.
The witness was present during the preparations to send the battalion to Rosos and saw the
battalion being assembled in Koinadugu prior to its departure.9673 The battalion included
1,000 men and its overall commander was O-Five. Members of the battalion's signal unit
were Alfred Brown and King Perry Kamara.9674 The battalion included the Red Lion
Battalion. The Red Lion Battalion was "strictly under the command/control and was
considered as the bodyguard unit of Superman and SAJ Musa". CY and Jumbo Blah were
members of the Red Lion Battalion.9675
4323. During the Freetown invasion and following the death of SAJ Musa, while Superman
was in Lunsar, he was in constant communication with CY and Jumbo Blah. CY told
9668 Perry Karnara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3231-3233, 3258-3261.
9669 Perry Karnara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3242-3244.
9670 Perry Karnara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3243-3244, 3251.
967] Perry Karnara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3251-3252.
W2 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
Om Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4526-4528.
W4 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4529.
W5 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4528-4529.

---- End of Page 1487 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /6// 18 May 2012

39520
Superman that they did not communicate with him beforehand because Musa had banned
them from doin so.%76 The contacted Su erman rior to their de arture from Ben ema
3 Y P P P gu
and informed him of O—Five's instruction to spare no civilians on the way from Benguema
to Freetown. During their operation in Freetown, O—Five, Jumbo Blah and CY constantly
communicated with Superman and confirmed to him reports which were transmitted by
Gullit and other commanders about their offensive and the areas that they had captured. CY
stated that he was part of the group which was assigned to State House in Freetown.9677
4324. Lansana also stated that following the departure of the 1,000 men from Koinadugu, a
"serious misunderstanding erupted" when Bockarie accused Superman of failing to carry out
his mission to kill SAJ Musa.9678
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -1 43
4325. Witness TF1—143 was abducted at the age of 12 around September 1998 from
Konkoba in Koindugu District, after hearing that rebels were pushed out of Kabala. After his
capture, the witness was assigned to a man named Kabila,%79 an RUF member.968O The
group went to Koinadugu Town where O—Five, Five—Five, Komba and others introduced all
the boys who were captured to their boss, SAJ Musa.%8l Kabila told the witness that there
were two groups in Koinadugu Town: Superman's group and SAJ Musa's group, to which
the witness belonged. SAJ Musa's group was comprised of RUF and AFRC members.9682
4326. The witness was told by Kabila that they were to be in the advance team to
Freetown.%83 The advance team consisted of about 200 men, among them were Five—Five,
O—Five, Mohamed, Kabila and other fighters. The group was comprised of predominantly
AFRC members but was mixed with RUF members. Some wore black and some wore red
headbands.9684
9676 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4530.
(xm Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4565-4567.
9678 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4530.
9679 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8970-8972, 8979.
"‘>*° TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008,p. 8993.
""*' TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8982-8983.
gm TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8985.
""" TFl—l43, Transcript 5 May 2008,p. 8986.
W TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8988-8989.

---- End of Page 1488 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012

4327. The group left Koinadugu and was headed by Five-Five and O-Five. On their way,
the witness observed O-Five severing a man's head with a power saw. The troops entered
Karina while the boys, girls and women amongst them, and those carrying ammunition,
followed them into the town. ln Karina, the witness saw three corpses of civilians, some
soldiers who had been shot and houses on fire.9°85
4328. From Karina the troops continued to a village where they trained captured boys.
Afterwards, the witness swallowed two blue tablets given to him by Kabila which made him
feel bold and made his eyes red.%86 Before they left that town they met Komba and a large
group which included armed men and civilians. Komba was one of the leaders of the group
which captured the witness in Konkoba, and according to Kabila was from the RUF group
who had mixed with the AFRC. Kabila told the witness that the armed men were Liberian
soldiers Komba had brought as reinforcements to go to Freetown.9°87 Komba's bodyguards
included John, Ballah, Bajehjeh and Bahzoh.9688
4329. The troops then moved to another town in which Five-Five ordered them to loot, kill
and burn. ln that town, upon Kabila's order the witness killed a man, a woman and her two
children, and burnt the family's house.9689 From there the troops went to Kamalo and
proceeded to Kukuna where there was heavy firing and the troops captured a white priest.
Upon Kabila's orders, the witness hid in the bush while canying Kabila's ammunition. From
Kukuna, the`troops proceeded on the way to Colonel Eddie Town.9690 Along the way they
stopped, upon Komba's orders. Bajehjeh and Bahzoh captured a small girl at gunpoint and
took her to a house where Komba raped her.96°1
4330. When the forces arrived in Colonel Eddie Town they met SAJ Musa, Junior Lion,
whose boss was Gullit, one of Gullit's boys called Foday Pump Lock, Alhaji and other
fighters.9692 Junior Lion, Gullit and Foday Pump Lock were in a group called Red Lion.9693
"°"5 r1¤1-143,rraaaa1~1pt5 May 2008, pp. 8989-8991. ,
W TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8991-8992.
9687 r1¤1-143,rraaaa1~1pt5 May 2008, pp. 8992-8995, 8997.
**8 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8994.
W TF1- 143, rrapampt 5 May 2008, pp. 8997-9000.
Q690 TF 1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9000-9005 (the witness arrived in Kukuna after the advance team had
been there).
""°‘ TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9008-9011.
9692 TFI-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9007, 9009.
"°°’ TFl~143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9048-9049.

---- End of Page 1489 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T ,/ 18 May 2012
gw

V" .¢·
3 9 rs 8 A
The Red Lion group was an RUF group whose members had red headbands. Most of its
members did not speak Krio, and Kabila told the witness that those who did not speak Krio
were Liberians.9694
4331. ln Colonel Eddie Town, Kabila told the witness that SAJ Musa, their boss, gave
them an order to go to Freetown to overthrow the government and told them that they should
not kill civilians, not burn houses, not loot and not amputate. Kabila dismissed this order
saying that they will continue with O-Five's order with which they came to Colonel Eddie
Town- the order for Operation Spare No Soul, which meant that humans, ants, goats — all
should be 1ri11cr1.%°5
4332. Subsequently, a group including SAJ Musa, O-Five, Junior Lion, Gullit and others
left Colonel Eddie Town.9696 At that point in time, there was a group called the Red Lion
group, which Junior Lion and others were in. The witness himself was in SAJ Musa's group
which was mixed with both RUF and AFRC members.9697
4333. The troo s assed throu h a villa e where there were no eo le and burned it down
P P S S P P
on SAJ Musa's order.9698 They continued to Benguema,9699 where SAJ Musa's group and
the Red Lion group, the advance team which included O-Five, Five-Five, Komba, Med and
other fighters, entered the military barracks and looted ammunition. The witness, together
with the women, small bo s and irls, and the ou followin behind, sta ed outside
Y 8 SY P S Y
because advance team had set fire to the remainin ammunition and there were ex losions in
8 P
the barracks.97O0 After the death of SAJ Musa, Gullit and O-Five took control of the
group.970l According to Kabila, Gullit and O-Five ordered that a sacrifice of a fair-
complexioned lady be made so that their mission to attack Freetown would be successful, so
they tied a woman's legs up and buried her alive alongside SAJ Musa's corpseem
"°"‘* T1¤1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9053-9054.
W TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9013-9018.
W T1¤1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9019.
"°‘" TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9019-9021.
°°°*‘ TFl-l43, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9018-9021.
°°°° TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9021-9022.
‘"°" Tri-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9022-9023.
‘"0' TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9026.
W TFl-l43, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9025.

---- End of Page 1490 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-0l-T LX 18 May 2012

4334. The witness stated that after SAJ Musa had been buried, the group, led by Gullit and
O-Five, headed for Freetown, burning houses and looting shops along the way. The group
that entered Freetown included the Red Lion group, which included Gullit, Junior Lion,
Foday Pump Lock and others.97O3 The Liberian soldiers who came for reinforcement were
art of the RUF ou .9704
P 8`Y P
4335. On cross-examination, the witness stated that he had only been asked about the
group he was attached to and the names of commanders. He had not been asked the names
of other groups and he forgot to mention the existence of the Red Lion group in his prior
statements. He recalled some but not all of the things that had happened to him long ago.97O5
The witness knew about the Red Lion group because a boy whose boss was Junior Lion told
him that the group he was in was called Red Lion.97O°
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -028
4336. Witness TF1-028 testified that she was captured in Karina by a group headed by
Five-Five, which included SLA members and Liberians.97O7 She was with the group that
moved from Rosos to Colonel Eddie Town, which used to be called ‘"Tufayim".97O8 While in
Colonel Eddie Town two ‘"junta boys"97O9 who had a communication set and could hear
communications between commanders told her that Superman was sending reinforcements
from Kurubonla. The news that Superman was sending reinforcements and ammunition
brought jubilation among the forces, who said that they would then go to Freetown.97lO A
group of fighters headed by Ahchebe left Colonel Eddie Town to meet the RUF
W rrr-145, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9026-9027.
‘"°" rrr-145, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 9027.
‘"°5 rrr-145, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9049-9051, 9055-9057.
9706 TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9051, 9053, 9056.
9707 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9235-9236, 9255-9256; Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9307-9308.
‘""* rrr-028, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9260.
mq TFl-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9234-9235, 9242 (the witness refers to the group which captured her as
‘juntas", which comprised of former SLA soldiers and a few RUF members).
(mo TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9205-9207, 9213-9214 (other groups in Colonel Eddie Town included
Tito's group who were "the juntas", Alabama's junta, and RUF Mohamed, "that was the third group for
Superman". The commanders in Colonel Eddie Town were Colonel Eddie, Five-Five, Gullit, Woyoh, FAT,
Leather Boot. The witness knew their names since they were in the same group and the man she was with
showed her who were the commanders).

---- End of Page 1491 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / - 18 May 2012

reinforcements in Gbendembu and came back.9m The forces were happy with the arrival of
the reinforcements, saying that they now had enough ammunition to go to Freetowngm
4337. The group of reinforcements was called "Red Lion" and was commanded by
Mohamed Bajehj eh. The group included more than 100 men, both Sierra Leonean "Mendes"
and Liberians, all wearing red headbandsgm Among the RUF group who arrived in Colonel
Eddie Town were 70 Liberian fighters and 30 Sierra Leoneans, mainly Mendes, some of
whom were fighters and some were civilians.97l4
4338. A week after the Red Lion group arrived in Colonel Eddie Town the forces,
including the witness, left for Freetown.97l5 The forces included the Red Lion group headed
by Med Bajehjeh, the SLA group under SAJ Musa, Tito's group, and Five—Five's group,
which had captured the witness in Karina, and which was different from SA] Musa's
grOup~971c»
4339. The forces passed through Port Loko road together with the civilians. The troops,
including the Red Lion group, arrived in Waterloo where they bumed houses and killed. The
witness saw corpses of men, women and children in civilian clothes.97l7 From Waterloo the
- forces continued to Benguema, where SAJ Musa died.97l8 In Benguema, the witness saw
three Nigerian soldiers who were captured by AFRC men being beatenfmg From Benguema,
the troops which included the RUF and the AFRC, together with the civilians, went to
Tombo, Grafton and reached Calaba Town in Freetown. From there the group entered
Freetown on 16 January.972O The witness stopped at Ferry Junction in Freetown while the
(ml TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9207-9209, 9212-9214, 9254-9255 (the witness heard the names being
called during a meeting held at a house close to hers).
Om TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9209-9210, 9218.
W3 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9210, 9215-9218, 9220 (the witness was familiar with the Liberian
language since her sister's "co-wife" was Liberian who spoke the Liberian language during the 6 years before
the witness was captured).
W4 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9239-9240; Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9304-9307, 9262-9264.
W TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9220.
W6 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9235-9236, 9255-9256.
W TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9223-9224.
W TF1-028, rrarraarrpr 7 May 2008, pp. 9224-9225. T
W9 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9225 (the witness was distraught by seeing the men being beaten and
ran up the hill).
°"° TF1-028, rrarraarrpr 7 May 2008, pp. 9225-9226.

---- End of Page 1492 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % - 18 May 2012

RUF group and the "juntas" proceeded, From that point, the witness did not know where the
Red Lion group went since "they were scattered all over the town".972l
4340, On cross—examination the witness confirmed that from Colonel Eddie Town the
forces went to Port Loko Highway, close to Mange Bureh, and proceeded to a village called
Four Mile,9722 The forces were also in Mamusa in the vicinity of Lunsar, and on their way to
Freetown passed through Mile 38 and Mamamah,9723
4341. Also on cross—examination, the witness stated that she knew Superman was
Liberian,9724 and that she was familiar with the STF because during the attack on Karina in
which the witness was abducted, she heard the forces saying "STF advance",9725 She also
heard "SLA—NPFLA advance, advance",9726
Prosecution Witness Komba Sumana
4342, Witness Komba Sumana, a child soldier under Supennan's command, who was
abducted in around April/May 1998,9727 testified that he was captured by three former
ULlMO—K fighters who were incorporated into the STF and joined the Sierra Leonean
militaq/,9728 After he was captured, Sumana was taken to Kissi Town to the "boss" of those
who captured him, named Major Wallace, Wallace was a former ULlMO Liberian fighter
under Alhaji Kromah,9729 Wallace told the witness that Senegalese was once a member of
ULlMO with Wallace, before fighting erupted and they went their separate ways,973O There
were more than 100 former ULIMO fighters under the command of Supeimangm
4343, Sumana also testified that following a second attack on Kabala, civilians captured in
Kabala were taken to Koinadugu and trained by a rebel called Alabama, At one point,
°"‘ TF1—028, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9226-9228, 9268-9269.
mz TF1—028, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9277-9278.
W TF1—028, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9278-9280. ‘
W TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, p. 9248,
9725 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9249-9250.
9726 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp, 9253-9254. In re—examination the witness stated that she did not know
what the "NPFLA" was (TF1—028, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9307).
9727 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes, Count 9 (Child Soldiers), Conscription and Use of Child
Soldiers in Kailahun District.
gm Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp, 18078—18080,
9729 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp, l79l0—l79l2.
9730 Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18080-1808l.
{ml Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, p. 18080.

---- End of Page 1493 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / dbx 18 May 2012

"Superman's boy" shot a man at the military training barracks. SAJ Musa then went to the
military barracks and also killed a man. The witness was at his house when he heard
gunshots and infighting between Superman and SAJ Musa. A week later, SAJ Musa »
announced that he was going to Freetown. The commanders who remained in Koinadugu
after SAJ Musa left were Superman and Bropleh.9732
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
4344. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,9733 testified that Senegalese was once a
member of ULIMO. According to a report gathered when the RUF had joined forces with
the AFRC, Senegalese was one of the soldiers who were fighting alongside the government
forces, the "SLAs". After the ECOMOG Intervention., Senegalese retreated to Buedu and
became an RUF member. Bockarie then commanded Senegalese to move to Kono for an
assignment. The witness believes he met Senegalese in Sengema on his way on to Kono.9734
Prosecution Witness Auggstine Mallah
4345. Witness Augustine Mallah testified that in 1997, during the Junta period, Senegalese
spent a night in Kenema. Senegalese was a former ULIMO fighter who came to Sierra
Leone because of Mike Lamin, and was not too familiar with Sam Bockarie.9735 The reason
they named him Senegalese was because he was tall.9736
Prosecution Witness TF1-367
4346. Witness TF1-367, an RUF member,9737 testified that Senegalese was in Buedu with
Bockarie in 1997, Senegalese was a soldier coming from Liberia, "a tall guy" but the
witness did not know whether he was from ULIMO or the NPFL.9738
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
gm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17966- 17968.
W Tri-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
973* Tri-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7185.
(mj Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20452-20453.
9736 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 18 November 2008, p. 20555.
W TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
W TF1—367, Transcript 29 August 2008, p. 14976.

---- End of Page 1494 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 `

4347. Witness Samuel Kargbo testified that CO Senegalese was an RUF high commander
who was involved in the Magburaka shipment.4744 Senegalese was a Liberian who was
present in Freetown during the Junta period and stayed with the RUF high command leaders,
such as Issa Sesay.4740
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
4348. Witness Isaac Mon or testified that followin Su erman's de arture to Koinadu ,
S S P P Su
Superman and SAJ Musa had a falling out which involved armed attacks between their
forces and led to the separation between the men. Bockarie then sent CO Rocky and
Senegalese with ammunition to kill Superman, but instead of killing Superman Rocky joined
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award p
4349. Witness Jabat Jaward testified that he knew Sene alese to be a Liberian who
Y S
worked for President Taylor, in SOD uniform, the Special Operational Division, which was
one of President Taylor's security groups. Senegalese had been an escort with those who
brought supplies to Buedu such as Jungle and Sampson. The witness estimated that these
trips occurred after February/March 1998.9742
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
4350. Witness Varmuyan Sherif testified that "Senegalese was a trustworthy bodyguard to
Mr Taylor at last".4743
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
4351. Witness Abu Keita testified that a cou le of weeks after he arrived in Buedu, in
P
December 1998,9744 he travelled with Issa Sesay to Foya to meet Bockarie, who was on his
way back to Sierra Leone.9745 In Foya, they met Bockarie who came with two trucks the
4444 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10712.
4440 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10746.
4444 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5767-5768.
4442 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13386-13388.
4443 Vamruyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 920.
4444 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2130-2131.
4445 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1988, 1993.

---- End of Page 1495 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / dv 18 May 2012 /

37585
Libyan government gave Taylor and one °‘picl<-up". Bockarie came with 300 boxes of
ammunition,9746 and 150 men, both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, whom Keita was told
were taken fiom Camp Naama. The convoy also included a Liberian police driver
nicknamed Senegalese and Keita's wife.9747
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
4352. Witness Mohamed Kabbah testified that when Bockarie returned to Buedu from
Monrovia with a large consignment of ammunition, Zigzag Marzah, Liberian Mosquito,
Sheku, Senegalese, a Guinean man named Sidibay, Jungle and Abu Keita all came to Buedu
with him.‘""‘
Prosecution Witness TF1 -150
4353. Witness TFl-150 testified on cross-examination that he heard Eldred Collins, an
RUF commander, announcing the launching of Operation Spare No Soul on the BBC radio
in August 1998.‘""9
The Accused l
4354. The Accused said that he did know anyone by the name of Senegalese, nor did he not
knowingly send any Liberian combatants to Sierra Leone after May 1992, nor did he send a
man named Senegalese to Bockarie in Sierra Leone. He suggested that Senegalese was
probably a former ULIMO-K member.975O
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4355. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,9751 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disannament in 2002,9752 testified that Senegalese was not sent by Taylor to
command a Liberian troop to assist the RUF in the attack on Kono. Sesay stated that
Senegalese was a former ULIMO-K fighter who came to Sierra Leone with Mike Lamin in
9746 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1993-1994.
gm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1994-1996.
9748 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16142, 16155-16156.
9749 TF1-150, Transcript 18 February 2008, pp. 4037-4038 (CS); Exhibit P-077 (confidential), para. 31.
9750 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28853; Transcript 30 September 2009, pp.
29984-29985, 29999; Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30146-30147.
(ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.

---- End of Page 1496 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T aj /’ 6% 18 May 2012

3 9 Qs? 7
1997, along with two other fomier ULIMO Hghters, ULIMO Jungle (not Daniel Tamba) and
Colonel Musa. Senegalese stayed in Kenema with Bockarie during the Junta period, and
A retreated from Kenema with Bockarie to Kailahun following the Intervention. Sesay stated
that Senegalese was among the group sent by Bockarie to Supemian to retrieve ammunition
captured during the Fitti-Fatta attack, and Supemian did not allow them to return.9753
Prosecution Exhibit P-306
4356. Exhibit P-306 is a report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the
Security Council on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 16 October
1998. According to the report, on 17 August 1998 the RUF announced a terror campaign
against civilians, CDF and ECOMOG.9754
Prosecution Exhibit P-602
4357. Exhibit P-602 is a summary of a meeting held in the RUF headquarters in Buedu on
17 August 1998 "to discuss issues concerning our movement at the moment". The meeting
was attended by "senior authorities" but "became more or less an open and general meeting"
and focused on the release of Foday Sankoh. In the meeting, a Public Relations Organ
headed by Eldred Collins was created.9755
Defence Exhibit D-028
4358. Exhibit D-028 is a news article from December 1998, which states that Liberian
President Charles Taylor denied any Liberian government involvement in the Sierra Leone
conflict. Taylor is quoted as saying that "it is very clear and factual that there are Liberians
in Sierra Leone fighting", "Liberians have been used as mercenaries in Sierra Leone for a
long time by all governments of Sierra Leone;’, "they have always been there — about 3,000
of them. But they are there on their own".9756
9752 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
9753 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44166-44167; Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45576; Transcript 11
August 2010, pp. 45953-45954; Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46632—46633.
9754 Exhibit P—306, "UN Security Council, Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/960, 16 October 1998", para. 4.
9755 Exhibit P—602, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Brigade Headquarters — Buedu, Meeting/Forum
held in Buedu to Discuss Issues Concerning Our Movement at the Moment", August 17 1998.
9756 Exhibit D—028, "Sierra Leone News Archives, 31 December 1998, Sierra Leone Web". pp. 2-3.

---- End of Page 1497 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T "‘ 18 May 2012

Z? §? 0
Defence Exhibit D-026
4359. Exhibit D-026 is the testimony of President Tejan Kabbah in the Sierra Leonean
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In his statement, Kabbah says that he first learned
, about the existence of the Special Task Force, STF, in 1997 when the STF joined forces
with the AFRC after the coup. Kabbah said that the army used the STF regularly and
depended on it considerably. The STF was a group of Liberians from Samuel Doe's Armed
Forces of Liberia (AFL) who fled from Liberia to Sierra Leone with the common objective
to regroup and return to Liberia and continue their resistance against Charles Taylor's
NPF L. They were eventually named ULIMO. After fighting broke out between the Khrans
and the Mandingos ULIMO split into ULIMO-J headed by Roosevelt Johnson and ULIMO-
K headed by Alhaji Kromah.9757 According to Kabbah, the Sierra Leonean NPRC
government dropped the "J" and "K" from the names of the two factions and collectively
renamed them "Special Task Force" (STF). The STF was then almost incorporated into the
Sierra Leone Army, and they received salaries, allowances and their supplies were regularly
replenished.9758 Kabbah stated that on the day of the AFRC coup, 25 May 1997, he heard the
then Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone military ordering the Special Task Force to
fight against the disloyal troops and foil the incipient coup. Instead of doing so, the STF,
headed by General Bropleh, joined forces with the AFRC Junta. Kabbah added that General
Bropleh and his STF followers fled together with AFRC personnel following the ECOMOG
Intervention in February 1998 and fought in places such as Koidu, Makeni, Kamakwie and
Lunsar, and supported the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown.9759
Defence Exhibit D-454
4360. Exhibit D-454 is a list of 29 STF members, Liberians, who had been dropped from
the Sierra Leone Army since 12 November 2000. The list includes the surnames, initials,
ranks and army numbers of the 29 members.976O
9757 Exhibit D-026, "Appendix 2, Submissions to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
Statement; His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 5 August 2003", paras 52-56.
9758 Exhibit D-026, "Appendix 2, Submissions to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
Statement; His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 5 August 2003", paras 57-58.
9759 Exhibit D-026, "Appendix 2, Submissions to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
Statement: His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 5 August 2003", paras 61-62.
9760 Exhibit D-454, "Comprehensive Nominal Roll of STF (Liberian) Dropped from the Sierra Leone Army
Since 12 November 2000 and due for One—Off Ex-Gratia Cash Payment", ERN 30079.

---- End of Page 1498 ---------------------------


Case No.:
Defence Confidential Exhibit D-455
4361. Confidential Exhibit D-455 shows that David Livingstone Mah Bropleh was in
Sierra Leone in 1997. It also indicates that Bropleh, a Liberian, was a founding member of
ULIMO and within ULIMO fulfilled high ranking roles from 1991 until 1994. Bropleh was
also the commanding general of the Special Task Force Amied Forces of the Republic of
Sierra Leone (AFRSL) from 1995 to 2000.9761
Defence Exhibit D-465
4362. Exhibit D-465 is a letter to the National Provisional Ruling Council signed and
approved by Major General David L. Bropleh, "Ex-ULIMO Combatants Leader". The letter
congratulates the addressee for the third amriversary of the NPRC.9762
Defence Exhibit D-469
4363. Exhibit D-469 is a request from Brigadier General David LM Bropleh, for redress on
26 Liberians who were rejected at "BTC BSTTT 4 Training Programme" on constitutional
grounds. The letter was sent from the Special Task Force HQ in Freetown, and is dated 30
November 2000. In the letter, Bropleh states that in April 1995 he was charged with the
responsibility to mobilize these men and served as the forerunner of the negotiations
between the men and the government. He stated that before the men were originally
recruited there were seven conditions set by the government of Sierra Leone, which included »
denouncing ULIMO, and being prepared to be absorbed into the Sierra Leonean Army under
a special unit. ln the letter, Bropleh mentions past activities in the various battles "especially
when the RUF was about to launch a final attack on Freetown in 1995 after capturing
Lumpa, the opening of Masika-Bo Highway af`ter three months of closure and the repelling
of RUF attack on the city of Bo on the election day".9763
Deliberations i
°7°’ Exhibit 15-455 (coiinaeiiiiai).
0762 Exhibit D-465, "Thjrd End of Page of a Letter to the National Provisional Ruling Council, Signed by Major General
David L Bropleh, Ex-ULIMO Combatants Leader".
9763 Exhibit D-469, "Letter from Brigadier General, David L M Bropleh, to Acting CDS, DHQ, Request for
Redress on the Twenty-Six (26) Liberians Rejected at BTC BSTTT 4 Training Programme on Constitutional
Grounds, November 30 2000", pp. 1-3, ERN 30225-30227.

---- End of Page 1499 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6`R 18 May 2012

.3 are 2
4364. lt is undisputed that a group called the Red Lion Battalion participated in the attack
on Freetown and included Liberian fighters among its members.9764 What is disputed is
whether those Liberian fighters within the Red Lion Battalion were sent to Sierra Leone by
the Accused. In support of its allegation that Liberian fighters sent by the Accused were
incorporated in the Red Lion Battalion, the Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of
Alice Pyne, who testified that she was told by a Liberian fighter that he was sent by the
Accused, and on the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay that the Red Lion Battalion
included former NPFL fighters who were incorporated into the AFL. The Trial Chamber
recalls its findings that Alice Pyne97°5 and Alimamy Bobson Sesay are generally credible
witnesses.9766 .
4365. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of many witnesses who testified
about a complex sequence of events and the composition of merging and separating forces,
in the context of a military operation. In order to determine whether or not the Accused sent
the Liberian fighters who participated in the Red Lion Battalion, the Trial Chamber must
first detennine who was in the Red Lion Battalion that participated in the Freetown
Invasion, and who led the Red Lion Battalion.
4366. The Prosecution submits that the group headed by O-Five and sent by SAJ Musa and
Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) to join Alex Tarnba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) in Rosos was
called the Red Lion Battalion, and it included AFRC, RUF and STF members, as well as
Liberian reinforcements sent by the Accused. The Defence acknowledges that there were
Liberians in the group headed by O-Five but denies that they were sent by the Accused. The
Defence submits that the Liberians in this group were STF fighters who had already been in
Sierra Leone and that Prosecution witnesses, when referring to Liberian fighters, were
referring to these STF fighters.
4367. The Trial Chamber notes that the STF was formed in Sierra Leone and comprised of
Liberians who were former ULIMO fighters. The STF initially fought alongside the Sierra
Leonean government against the RUF, but some of its members joined the Junta forces
gm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 294-297, Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 54,
`i;gCredibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307.
9766 Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285-289.

---- End of Page 1500 ---------------------------


Case No.:
following the AFRC coup in May 1997 and were integrated into the AFRC/RUF forces
subsequently.9767
4368. TF1-375 testified that among the Liberian fighters who arrived in Koinadugu with
Senegalese were former NPFL fighters, 30 of whom were then incorporated into the Red
Lion Battalion headed by O-Five.9768 The witness not only distinguished Liberian STF
fighters, but also distinguished Mingo's Liberian bodyguards from the Liberians who came
with Senegalese, whom he identified as former NPFL fighters. He said he knew that they
were former NPFL fighters because they had told him so. The Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that TF1-375's evidence should be treated with caution and requires
corroboration.9769 The Trial Chamber finds that his testimony is corroborated by Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, who testified that O-Five arrived in Colonel Eddie Town with about 20
former NPFL fighters who had been integrated into the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and
came from Liberia to Bockariefmo A
4369. The Defence submits that Bobson Sesay's evidence is unreliable and unclear,
arguing that his testimony was not consistent with some of his prior statements. Moreover,
the Defence says that while Bobson Sesay claimed that the Red Lion Battalion was formed
in Colonel Eddie Town, he later conceded that it was a bodyguard unit of Superman, and
was therefore in existence before Colonel Eddie Townfml However, Bobson Sesay did not
concede in his testimony that the Red Lion Battalion was a bodyguard unit. On the contrary,
he was consistent during his testimony that with O-Five's group were former NPFL fighters,
9767 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12249-12250, 12252; Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12382-12384;
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8177-8178; Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8199-8200;
Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8748-8750, 8754, 8756-8757; Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8788, 8820; TF1-375,
Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12547; Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17910-17912; Transcript 7
October 2008, pp. 18078-18081; Exhibit D-028, "Sierra Leone News Archives, 31 December 1998, Sierra Leone
Web", pp. 2-3; Exhibit D-026, "Appendix 2, Submissions to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), Statement: His Excellency the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 5 August 2003",
paras 52-58, 61-62; Exhibit D—454, "Comprehensive Nominal Roll of STF (Liberian) Dropped from the Sierra
Leone Army Since 12 November 2000 and due for One-Off Ex-Gratia Cash Payment", ERN 30079; Exhibit D-
455 (confidential); Exhibit D-465, "Third End of Page of a Letter to the National Provisional Ruling Council, Signed by
Major General David L Bropleh, Ex-ULIMO Combatants Leader;" Exhibit D-469, "Letter from Brigadier
General, David L M Bropleh, to Acting CDS, DHQ, Request for Redress on the Twenty-Six (26) Liberians
Rejected at BTC BS 1 1 I 4 Training Programme on Constitutional Grounds, November 30 2000", pp. 1-3, ERN
30225-30227.
9768 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12566-12567, 12569, 12572-12573; Transcript 27 August 2008, pp.
14780-14781.
9769 Credibility Assessment, TF1-375, paras 308-312.
9770 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193-8198, 8200-8201; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp.
8674, 8747, 8769-8771.

---- End of Page 1501 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z Qu 18 May 2012

as O-Five introduced the Liberian fighters - 30 STF fighters and 20 foriner NPFL fighters
who had been integrated into the AFL - during a muster parade in Colonel Eddie Town.9772
The Trial Chamber notes that Bobson Sesay could not recall the names of the fonner NPFL
fighters, although he did recall names of STF, fonner ULIMO, fighters.9773 When confronted
on cross-examination with a prior statement in which he only mentioned STF fighters and
not fonner NPFL fighters among O-Five's group, Bobson Sesay explained that the Liberian
fighters were not divided into sub-groups and were all referred to as STF. He stated "the
thing was broad,...this was the name they mostly used" and O-Five had introduced some of
the STF members as fonner NPFL fighters.9774 The Trial Chamber finds that this is
consistent with Bobson Sesay's prior statement that the STF included fonner NPFL
fighters.9775 He believed that the STF included former NPFL fighters because O-Five
introduced them as being in the same group. When confronted with the statement made by
the Accused, and uoted in Exhibit D-028, that "Liberians have been used as mercenaries in
(1
Sierra Leone for a long time by all governments of Sierra Leone", "they have always been
there — about 3,000 of them. But they are there on their own",9776 Bobson Sesay said he
disagreed with the statement, although he did not specifically mention these NPFL
fighters.9777 Recalling its finding that Bobson Sesay is generally credible,9778 the Trial
Chamber finds his testimony in this regard to be consistent and reliable.
4370. The Prosecution relies on the testimony of Alimamy Bobson Sesay and TFl-028 to
prove that along the way troops called "SLA-NPFLA advance" and wrote "NPFL" on
houses during their advance. However, Bobson Sesay testified that they wrote NPFL on
houses when NPFL fighters were not among his troops, and before Gullit's forces arrived in
Colonel Eddie Town. He explained that they used "NPFL" in order to instil fear in the
population since the population was afraid by the NPFL and RUF due to the attacks in the
(ml Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 916; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 54.
9772 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8178-8280; Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193-8196,
8201; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8747, 8772-8774, 8779-8781; Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8785-8790,
8793-8794.
9773 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8178-8180; Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8193, 8201;
Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8801-8802.
9774 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8781; Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8785-8790.
9775 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8776-8778; Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8788.
9776 Exhibit D-028, "Sierra Leone News Archives, 31 December 1998, Sierra Leone Web", pp. 2-3.
9777 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8930-8932.
9778 Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285-289.

---- End of Page 1502 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-O3-O1-T // 0.* 18 May 2012

early 1990'sf)779 With regard to TF1-028, the Trial Chamber notes that her testimony also
refers to a time before the reinforcements were sent by Superman to Colonel Eddie
Town.9780 Moreover, the Trial Chamber finds that her credibility was tainted by her
consistent denial of parts of her testimony in the RUF trial, especially in relation to the
Liberian fightersfml For these reasons, the Trial Chamber has not considered this testimony
in support of the allegation that the group sent by Superman {ppm Koinadugu included
former NPFL fighters.
4371. The Trial Chamber notes that Perry Kamara, who was in O-Five's group,9782 and
Foday Lansana, who was in Koinadugu when O-Five's group was formed,9783 did not
mention in their testimony that former NPFL fighters were among O-Five's group.
However, Kamara stated that the STF were part of the group9784 and the Trial Chamber notes
Bobson Sesay's evidence that the term "STF" was used broadly to refer to the Liberian
group. The Trial Chamber finds that their failure to mention the NPFL fighters does not
negate the evidence of their presence in O-Five's group. Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes
that both Kamara and Lansana were radio operators, not fighters, and would therefore have
been dealing more with commanders than the soldiers on the battlefront. ln contrast,
Bobson Sesay was a fighter and would have been in the midst of the fighting forces.
4372. The Trial Chamber finds Bobson Sesay's evidence to be credible and accepts the
explanation he gave for the omission in his prior statement. His evidence corroborates the
evidence of TF1-375, and they mention roughly the same number of men — 20 and 30 men,
respectively — as comprising the group of former NPFL fighters {ppm Liberia. ln light of the
foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that there were NPFL fighters from Liberia in the group
led by O-Five, together with RUF, AFRC and STF forces.
4373. The Trial Chamber notes that Prosecution witnesses gave different accounts as to
who formed the Red Lion Battalion and where it was formed. Alice Pyne and TF1-375, who
were in Koinadugu when O-Five's group was formed, identified that group, which leii
(mq Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8156-8159.
"""’ TF1-028, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9307-9308.
ml TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9237-9239, 9250-9252, 9266-9271; Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9282-
9284, 9308-9309.
W Arma Pypa, Transcript 19 Jima 2008, p. 12261.
9783 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4526-4529.
0784 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3185.

---- End of Page 1503 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GM 18 May 2012

Koinadugu and was headed by O-Five, as the Red Lion Battalion stating that it was formed
in Koinadugu by Superman.9785 Two radio operators, Perry Kamara, who was in O-Five's
group,9786 and Foday Lansana, who was in Koinadugu when O-Five's group was formed,9787
identified the Red Lion Battalion as a unit within O-Five's group. Kamara testified that the
unit was comprised of the bodyguards of Komba Gbundema, while Lansana called it a
bodyguard unit that was under the command and control of Superman and SAJ Musa.9788 As
both witnesses testified that the unit was within O-Five's group, the Trial Chamber
considers that their evidence is consistent and that Lansana was referring to the overall
command, as O-Five served under Superman and SAJ Musa.
4374. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, who was in Colonel Eddie Town, the destination of the
group led by O-F ive from Koinadugu, testified that within O-Five's group there was a group
called Red Lion which included 30 STF and 20 former NPFL fighters,9789 and that aiier they
arrived in Colonel Eddie Town, Gullit formed the Red Lion Battalion and appointed
AFRC's Med Bajehjeh as its commander.9790 TF 1-028, who was also in Colonel Eddie
Town, testified that the group of reinforcements sent by Superman was called "Red Lion"
and was commanded by Med Baj ehjehfml
4375. The Trial Chamber notes that some of the witnesses were in Koinadugu, where the
group headed by O-Five was formed, while others were in Colonel Eddie Town, which is
where it was sent to from Koinadugu. All of the witnesses testified that this group was led
by O-Five. Several of them testified that there was a unit within the group and it was that
unit that was the Red Lion Battalion, although Lansana and Kamara identified this group as
a group of bodyguards, while Bobson Sesay, who also said that the Red Lion group was a
sub-group within the larger group under O-Five, said this subgroup included the former
9785 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12259-12261; Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12385-12386, 12389-
12391.
9186 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4529; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12261;
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8201-8202.
0787 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4526-4528; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp.
12255-12256.
9788 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4528-4529; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp.
3185-3188.
9789 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8316-8317.
9700 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8758-8760.
ml TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9205-9216, 9220.

---- End of Page 1504 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // Um 18 May 2012

B 7 5 7%
NPFL fighters. Both Pyne and TF1-375 testified that the entire group was called the Red
Lion Battalion.
4376. The Trial Chamber notes that, regardless of the name of the group or sub-group led
by O-Five, in Colonel Eddie Town, changes were made to the composition of the group,
according to Bobson Sesay's testimony, which is supported by the testimony of TF1-028,
who was also in Colonel Eddie Town. With the exception of Perry Kamara, none of the
other witnesses who testified about the formation of the group in Koinadugu, were in
Colonel Eddie Town when these changes would have been made, or in Freetown when the
Red Lion Battalion arrived there. For this reason, the Trial Chamber considers that their
testimony on this point is not reliable.
4377. Kamara did not mention in his testimony any changes to the Red Lion Battalion in
Colonel Eddie Town. Bobson Sesay testified that in Colonel Eddie Town Gullit reassigned
members of the group led by O-Five, sending the RUF members and AFRC members to
different battalions and units. He said the STF "mixed group", referring to the STP and the
former NPFL forces who had been integrated into the AFL, kept the name Red Lion
Battalion, which was put under the command of Med Bajehjeh, from the AFRC. Perry
Kamara, the other witness in Colonel Eddie Town at this time, had identified Striker as the
commander of the bodyguard unit he labelled the Red Lion Battalion in his testimony.
Kamara maintained that this unit remained under Striker's command and went with other
forces to Freetown. The Trial Chamber considers that Bobson Sesay, as noted, fought
alongside the Red Lion Battalion. His account, which is different from Kamara's account, is
corroborated by TF1-028. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Perry Kamara is
generally credible.9792 However, in light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber accepts Bobson
Sesay's testimony that the Red Lion Battalion which entered Freetown included the former .
NPFL forces who had been integrated into the AFL and was commanded by Med Bajehjeh.
4378. Having found that the Red Lion Battalion included AFL members, the Trial
Chamber will address the question of whether these AFL members were sent by the Accused
to Sierra Leone as alleged by the Prosecution. The Prosecution relies on the testimony of
Alice Pyne to support this allegation. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Alice Pyne
gm Credibility Assessment, Periy Kamara, paras 227-236.

---- End of Page 1505 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T // 18 May 2012

is generally credible.9793 Pyne testified that a group of 30 Liberian men arrived in Koinadugu
in August 1998.9799 These men were headed by Senegalese who told the witness that he and
"others’9 had been sent to Bockarie by the Accused.9799 Although in a prior statement Pyne
identified Senegalese as an STF fighter,9796 she had subsequently corrected her statement to
say that the Liberian fighters she met were "Charles Taylor's forces" who had been sent
from Liberia to Bockarie.9797 Pyne's testimony as to a group of Liberian men arriving in
Koinadugu after the F itti-F atta attack with Senegalese is corroborated by TF 1-3 75 .9798
4379. The Trial Chamber accepts Pyne's explanation that she did not believe Bai Bureh,
who had told her that Senegalese was from the STF because the STF members she knew
spoke Krio fluently while Senegalese only spoke Liberian English9799 and Bobson Sesay's
explanation that STF was used as a generic term for the Liberian group.9899 However,
evidence on the role of Senegalese is unclear, although all witnesses identified him as
Liberian. Some witnesses testified that Senegalese was working in Charles Taylor's Special
Forces in Liberia,9g9l while several other witnesses testified that Senegalese was a former
ULIMO fighter who had been in Sierra Leone since 1997 and was incorporated into the
' RUF 9802
43 80. The Trial Chamber notes that even if Senegalese did come from Liberia, rather than
having been already in Sierra Leone, Prosecution witnesses differed significantly on the
9793 Credibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307.
9994 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12259.
9795 Aiipp Pypp, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12258-12259.
9796 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12286-12287.
9797 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12287-12289.
‘""*" Tri-375, Transcript 24 Jupp 2008, pp. 12563-12567.
9799 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12250, 12253-12254; Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12384.
9800 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8781.
9991 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12567-12568; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 Januaxy 2008, p. 920;
Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13386-13388.
9892 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7185 (Senegalese was once a member who used to fight alongside the
SLA and retreated with Bockarie to Buedu following the ECOMOG Intervention); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2
June 2008, pp. 10712, 10746 (Senegalese was an RUF commander who was in Freetown during the Junta
period); TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, p. 14976 (Senegalese was in Buedu with Bockarie in 1997 but he
did not know whether he was a former ULIMO or NPF L fighter); Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008,
pp. 18080-18081 (Wallace, a former ULIMO-K fighter in Superman's group told the witness that Senegalese
was once a member of ULIMO before fighting erupted and they parted ways); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17
November 2008, pp. 20452-20453; Transcript 18 November 2008 p. 20555 (Senegalese was a former ULIMO
fighter who came to Sierra Leone with Mike Lamin); Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44166-44167;
Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45576; Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45953-45954 (Senegalese was a former
ULIMO fighter who came to Sierra Leone with Mike Lamin in 1997 and stayed in Kenema with Bockarie during
the Junta period and withdrew with Bockarie to Kailahun following the ECOMOG Intervention).

---- End of Page 1506 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T / 18 May 2012

timing of his arrival in Sierra Leone. Some Prosecution witnesses testified that Senegalese
came with the contingent of men allegedly under Abu Keita's command and was in Buedu
in November 1998.9803 However, according to Alice Pyne, Senegalese was already in Sierra
Leone in August 1998.9804 Witnesses J abaty J award, and TF 1-585 confirm that Senegalese
came with Jungle bringing supplies to Buedu at various unspecified times. The Trial
Chamber accepts that evidence of the occasions of Senegalese's presence in Sierra Leone
has been conflated but in relation to his role with bringing Liberian men from Buedu to
Koinadugu it is clear that he was in Sierra Leone.
4381. The evidence shows that following the F itti-F atta operation, which occurred in mid-
June 1998,9805 Superman moved to Koinadugu and joined forces with SAJ Musa.9806 The
contingent of men headed by O-Five then left Koinadugu and headed to Colonel Eddie
Town where they joined forces with Gu1lit.9807 Alice Pyne testified that the battalion headed
by O-Five was formed a day after she arrived in Koinadugu in August 1998.9808 Perry
Kamara, who was in the group led by O-F ive which left Koinadugu,9809 said that the group
left Koinadugu in September 1998 and arrived in Rosos before 28 September 1998.9810 The
Trial Chamber considers his testimony on timing to be reliable as he recalled the specific
date due to his injury on 28 September 1998 after they had reached Colonel Eddie Town.
Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that he was in a group coming to meet O-Five's group in
Gbendembu, and that on their way to Gbendembu the troops heard Eldred Collins
announcing Operation Spare No Soul over the international media,98H which took place on
17 August 1998.9812 ln light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the group of men
9803 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1995 (the men came with Bockarie upon his return from Burkina
Faso which the Trial Chamber recalls was in late November/early December 1998); Mohamed Kabbah,
Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16142, 16155-16156; TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15704-
15706.
9804 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12254-12255, 12259.
9805 Military Operations: Operation F itti-Fatta. A
9806 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 394; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 610; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June
2008, pp. 12247-12248, 12251-12252, 12254-12255; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp.
8151-8153; TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543-12544, 12563-12566; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5
February 2008, p. 3172; TFl-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8982-8983, 8985; Foday Lansana, Transcript 22
Feb. 2008, pp. 4526-4528.
9807 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12259- 1226 1; Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12391.
9808 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12254-12255, 12259.
9809 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3185-3188.
Om Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3188-3190.
98]] Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8170-8172.
W2 TFl-150, Transcript 18 February 2008, pp. 4037-4038 (CS); Exhibit P-306, "UN Security Council, Second
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/960,

---- End of Page 1507 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jg 18 May 2012

3 7 6 00
led by O-Five left Koinadugu sometime in August 1998 and arrived in Colonel Eddie Town
sometime in September 1998.
43 82. ln light of the evidence, it is clear that the contingent of men who allegedly came to
Sierra Leone under Abu Keita's command and were in Buedu in November 1998 was not
the same contingent of men who were part of the group led by O-Five, who left Koinadugu
in August 1998.
43 83. However the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the evidence show a pattern of visits by A
Senegalese to Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber accepts Alice Pyne's consistent both in prior
statements to the Prosecution and in sworn testimony that was not challenged in cross-
examination that Senegalese was sent by the Accused to be part of the reinforcements
supplied to Bockarie.
43 84. The Trial Chamber notes that it is not contested that Senegalese was sent by
Bockarie with a group of men to Koinadugu after the Fitti-Fatta attack. The Prosecution
alleges that Senegalese and the men accompanying him were sent to reinforce Superman's
forces, but not all of the Prosecution witnesses supported this allegation in their testimony.
Bobson Sesay testified that O-Five said that the former NPFL fighters came in Superman's
group to reinforce SAJ Musa, and they participated in the attacks on Mongor Bendugu and
Kabala.98l3 TF1-375, who was in Koinadugu when Senegalese and the former NPFL fighters
arrived there, testified that they came after Superman arrived in Koinadugu and after the
attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala occurred.98l4 Alice Pyne testified that Senegalese
told her that Bockarie sent him to reinforce Superman's troops on a mission Bockarie had
given to Superman,98l5 and she said that Superman told her that Bockarie had sent him to
kill SAJ Musa. She also testified that Senegalese's group arrived in Koinadugu after
Superrnar1.98l° Foday Lansana also testified A that Bockarie sent Superman to kill SAJ
Musa.98l7 TF1-516 testified that Senegalese was sent on a mission in Kono,98l8 while TF1-
16 October 1998", para. 4; Exhibit P-602, "Revo1utionary United Front of Sierra Leone Brigade Headquarters —
Buedu, Meeting/Forum held in Buedu to Discuss Issues Concerning Our Movement at the Moment, August 17
iigaillimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193-8197.
W4 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557, 12563-12567.
9815 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12250, 12252-12253.
W6 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12248-12251.
9 817 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4530.
Om TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7185.

---- End of Page 1508 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z M 18 May 2012

375 and Issa Sesay testified that Bockarie sent Senegalese with the men to Koinadugu to
retrieve ammunition.9gl9 Isaac Mongor testified that Senegalese was sent with CO Rocky to
kill Supennan.982O Based on this evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Senegalese and
the men accompanying him were sent by Bockarie to Superman in Koinadugu, but does not
find that Senegalese was sent by Bockarie as reinforcement to Koinadugu.
4385. With regard to the attacks in which the AFL fighters participated and during the
course of which crimes were committed, the Prosecution relies on the evidence of TF 1-3 75
to prove that the AF L fighters participated in attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala while
in Koinadugu and before O-Five's group left to Rosos.9821 However, TF 1-375 testified that
the group of former NPP L fighters arrived in Koinadugu after the attacks on Mongor
Bendugu and Kabala, stating that the reason the group was sent by Bockarie was to retrieve
ammunition Superman's and SAJ Musa's forces captured during their attack on Kabala.9822
F or this reason, the Trial Chamber does not accept the Prosecution's submission.
4386. A number of witnesses testified with regard to the crimes committed by the group
headed by O-Five as it advanced from Koinadugu to Colonel Eddie Town. The Trial
Chamber notes that one of these witnesses, TF 1-143, placed Five-Five in O-Five's group,
although Five-Five left Koinadugu before Superman arrived in Koinadugu,9823 and O-Five's
group was sent by Superman and SAJ Musa from Koinadugu, therefore after Five-Five had
left. Given that TF 1-143 arrived in Koinadugu at a time Superman was already in
Koinadugu,9824 after Five-Five's group had left Koinadugu, the Trial Chamber finds that
TF 1-143 was in O-Five's group and that he was mistaken in saying that F ive-F ive was also
in this group. The Trial Chamber considers that his confusion can be explained by his young
age at the times the events occurred, and notes his testimony that he was drugged by his
captors during this time.9825 F or this reason the Trial Chamber has treated his evidence with
9819 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12563-12567; Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44167;
Transcript 18 August July 2010, pp. 46632-46633.
9820 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5767-5768.
ml Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 294, 497.
9822 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557; Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557, 12563-
12566. _
9823 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8156-8159 (the witness testified that the group led by
Gullit who left Koinadugu to Rosos before Superman had arrived in Koinadugu wrote on houses they did not
burn "Five-Five heading for Freetown").
9824 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8985.
**25 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8991-8992.

---- End of Page 1509 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ Tm 18 May 2012

caution. With regard to the crimes committed by the Red Lion Battalion after it left Colonel
Eddie Town, the Trial Chamber has relied on the testimony of Alimamy Bobson Sesay for
the reasons set forth above.
4387. The group that left Koinadugu with O—Five included several hundred people, among
which were about 200 fighters,9826 among which were about 20 former NPFL fighters who
were integrated into the AFL.9$27 The group attacked and committed crimes in Karinaimg
and Kamalo9829 in Bombali District on their way to Colonel Eddie Town.
4388. The contingent of 1,000 men who left Colonel Eddie Town and advanced towards
Freetowni)830 included the Red Lion Battalion which was com rised of` 200 men, amon
P E
which were the 20 former NPFL fi ters who were inte ated into the AFL.983l Alon the
gf E
way troops including between 200 and 1,000 fighters, participated in attacks and committed
crimes in Kukunagfm in Port Loko District, and in Fisher Lane,9833 Hastings,9834 Eastern
Police,9835 Pademba Road Prison,9836 Central Police Station,9837 and Fourah Ba 9838 in
Y
Freetown and the Western Area.
4389. The 1,000 men who entered Freetown,9839 includin the 20 former NPFL fi ters
B
who were integrated into AFL fighters, participated in attacks in which crimes were
9826 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8177-8178; Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193-8198,
8200-8201; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8674, 8747, 8759, 8769-8771; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p.
12260; Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12391-12392, 12398; TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, . 12573;
P
Transcript 27 June 2008, p. 14783; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3185, 3187-3188; TF1-028,
Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9210, 9215-9216, 9220; TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8988.
9827 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8193-8198, 8200-8201; Transcript 28 A ril 2008, pp.
P
8674, 8747, 8769-8771.
9828 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8989-8991; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3188-3194.
9829 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8174, 8176-8177; TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008,
pp. 9001-9004.
9830 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8251-8252, 8272; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6
February 2008, p. 3233.
9831 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8202-8203; Transcript 23 A ril 2008, . 8315-8318;
P PP
Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8758-8765.
9832 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8205-8207; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February
2008, pp. 3200-3202.
9833 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8275-8276; Transcript 23 April 2008, . 8314-8315.
PP
GBM Alimamy Bobson Sesa , Transcript 22 April 2008, p . 8261-8265, 8267-8268.
Y P
9835 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8279.
9836 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8280-8283.
9837 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8293-8294.
9*38 Alimamy Bobson Sesa , Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8333-8334.
Y
9839 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8251-8252, 8272; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6
February 2008, p. 3233.

---- End of Page 1510 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JQ 18 May 2012

committed in Maraykula9840 in Port Loko District and Waterloogw in Freetown and the
Western Area.
4390. 150 fighters, including from the Red Lion Battalion, participated in an attack in
which crimes were committed in Kingtom9842 in Freetown and the Western Area.
4391. An unknown number of fighters, including from the Red Lion Battalion, participated
in attacks where crimes were committed in Mange Bureh9843 in Port Loko District, and in
Upgun9844 in Freetown and the Western Area.
4392. There is no direct evidence showing that the former NPFL fighters from the AFL
ersonally committed crimes, or that the crimes committed were committed s ecificall by
P P Y
members of the Red Lion Battalion, which was part of a larger group that committed the
crimes. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber notes that the Red Lion Battalion was considered
"dangerous" to ECOMOG and civilians, and was described as "fierce" during their
attack.9845 The Trial Chamber recalls that the Red Lion Battalion numbered approximately
200 fighters, approximately 20 of whom were former NPFL fighters from the AFL.
Findings
4393. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that approximately 20 former NPFL fighters who had been integrated into the Armed Forces
of Liberia formed part of a group of approximately 200 fighters led by O-Five that attacked
and committed crimes in Karina and Kamalo in Bombali District on or about
August/September 1998.
4394. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that this group of 20 was incorporated into the Red Lion Battalion, which was comprised of
200 fighters and was part of a larger group of up to approximately 1,000 fighters who
attacked and committed crimes in Waterloo, Fisher Lane, Hastings, Freetown Eastern
9840 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8224-8226.
984] Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8242-8244; TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp.
9223-9224.
9842 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8294-8296, 8298.
9843 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8208-8210; TF1-028, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp.
9278-9280.
0844 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8334-8335, 8337-8339.
9845 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8319-8321.

---- End of Page 1511 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / jug 18 May 2012 /

3 6/60 4
Police, Pademba Road Prison, Kingtom, Fourah Bay and Upgun in Freetown and the
Western Area on or about December1998/January 1999.
4395. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that these 20 fighters were sent by the Accused from Liberia to Siena Leone where they
joined the RUF/AFRC forces in Siena Leone.
2. Scorpion Unit
Submissions of the Parties
4396. In alleging that the Accused sent fighters as reinforcements for the Kono and
Freetown operations, the Prosecution submits that following the Camp Johnson Road
incident in Liberia in September 1998, the Accused sent former ULIMO fighters to Siena
Leone in order to both strengthen the rebel forces and decrease the likelihood that ULIMO
fighters would turn against his regime in Liberia. According to the Prosecution, upon the
Accused's instructions to former ULlMO—K commander Varmuyan Sherif to "look for one
of the most senior officers" of the former ULIMO—K to work alongside Sam Bockarie in
Siena Leone, Sherif approached Abu Keita and brought him to meet Benjamin Yeaten.
Keita accepted Yeaten's proposal, which was planned with the Accused, to command a
troop called the "Scorpion Unit" which would serve as a standby force in Buedu alongside
Bockarie's forces. Keita then travelled to Siena Leone, canying a newly issued AK—47, a
pistol and 10 boxes of amnrunition, all of which were given to him by Yeaten. He was
escorted by Zi gzag Marzah, Sampson and Jungle, and by three NPFL bodyguards. A couple
of weeks after Keita arrived in Siena Leone, Bockarie returned with 150 men brought from
Camp Naama in Liberia. Bockarie informed Keita that he did not agree to have a dual
command structure and integrated the men into other RUF units, while Keita was given his
own assignments. Bockarie sent Keita and Taylor's Liberian reinforcement personnel, and
AFRC/RUF fighters, to attack and capture Kenema via Bunumbu, Segbwema, Daru, and
other locations along that axis, during which the combined force killed civilians and burned
down villages. The Prosecution relies on the testimonies of Abu Keita, Varmuyan Sherif and
Augustine Mallah.9846 The Trial Chamber also heard evidence on the arrival of Keita in
°*""’ Prosecution Firrar Trial Brief, paras 291-293.

---- End of Page 1512 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-O1-T / jig 18 May 2012
}%.,._i,

3 76 05
Sierra Leone and his subsequent role in the RUF from TF1-371, Mohamed Kabbah, Albert
Saido, Isaac Mongor, J abaty J award, Foday Lansana, TF1-516, and TF1-367.
4397. The Defence does not dispute that Keita came to Buedu and fought alongside the
RUF, but submits that the Accused played no role in this and that no credible evidence was
introduced to show that the Accused was aware of the Scorpion Unit. The Defence
challenges the credibility of Abu Keita and Varmuyan Sherif and submits that their
testimonies contradict rather than corroborate one another, and that Keita appears to have
been influenced by substantial payments and promised relocation as an incentive for
testifieying. The Defence further submits that it is more plausible that due to their "pre-
existing contacts with the RUF, Sherif and Keita were involved in activities on behalf of
Benjamin Yeaten", not the Accused.9847 2
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
4398. Witness Varmuyan Sherif a former ULIMO general who served in Taylor's SSS,
testified that Taylor called him to White Flower and instructed him to look for one of the
most senior officers of fomier ULIMO-K to work alongside Sam Bockarie. Sherif explained
that the Accused wished to send a senior ULIMO-K member to work alongside Sam
Bockarie in Sierra Leone so that other fomier ULIMO-K fighters would "feel free" to do so
as well.2848 Sherif then contacted Abu Keita, who was the fomier deputy chief of staff of
ULIMO-K and held the rank of Major General, making him one of the most senior officers
the witness knew of at that time in ULIMO-K.9849 At first, Keita told Sherif he was
suspicious since the RUF had previously fought against ULIMO-Kem
4399. After this conversation, fighting broke out in September in Camp Johnson Road in
Monrovia, when Roosevelt Johnson resisted his arrest. Following this incident, Sherif again
spoke with Keita who then accepted the offer.985]
9847 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1269-1270, 1399-1404; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief,
paras 50-53.
2848 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 856-8 57 . The witness did not provide a date for this event.
2**2 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 857.
2850 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 857-858.
qw Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 858-859.

---- End of Page 1513 ---------------------------


Case No.:

4400. Upon Musa Cissé's instructions, Sherif took Keita to Benjamin Yeaten's residence,
located at the back of White Flower, to meet Bockarie who was waiting for Keita.9852 ln
addition to Bockarie and Yeaten, also present at Yeaten's house were Joe Tuah, Dopoe
Menkarzon, a four star general in Taylor's Special Forces, and "Sekou", who "was supposed
to be used as the rebel leader for Guinea". During the meeting, the discussion focused on
how to carry out various attacks. Sekou was there in case an attack came from Guinea.
Yeaten instructed Bockarie to organise a group who would attack Guinea from Sierra Leone.
Sherif did not remain more than five minutes at the meeting as the meeting was not for him.
He only tried to make sure that Abu Keita was in good hands before he left.9853
4401. After Sherif left the meeting, he did not have contact with Keita again until 2000,9854
when Keita sent Sherif a message through a letter stating that his Scorpion Unit was sent on
Benjamin Yeaten's instruction to by Bockarie to go to fight in Liberia and assist the Liberian
government in attacking LURD in Guinea.9855 Sherif denied that Keita worked for
LURD.9856
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
4402. Witness Abu Keita, a former ULIMO-K commander who joined the AF L,9857
described fighting breaking out at Camp Johnson Road during an attempted arrest of
Roosevelt Johnson. Keita was not involved in the fighting, but was arrested for refusing to
fight against Roosevelt Johnson and was blamed for meeting with Johnson prior to the
incident, although the reason he met Johnson was because Johnson wanted the two former
ULIMO factions, ULlMO—J and ULIMO-K, which Keita was a part of, to meet in order to
mark the end of their rival1y.9g58
9852 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 859.
9853 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 859-861; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 916-917.
9854 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1191-1192. The witness confirmed a prior statement in
which he said that in 2000 Taylor gave the RUF bases in Foya and Kolahun to attack Guinea through
Gueckedou.
9855 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 861-862; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 898, 917;
Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1 188. Sherif was shown Prosecution Exhibit P-028, "Operation Order-20 January
2001", ERN 12758. The document contains the following sentence: "Revo1utionary Brothers behind enemies
line [sic], forces name SCORPION UNIT is here commanded by Maj. Gen. Keita".
9856 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1 188.
9857 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000;
Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.
9858 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1962-1964; Transcript 24 January 2008. pp. 2104-2105.

---- End of Page 1514 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %$ 18 May 2012

4403. Keita was held in detention for a week when Varmuyan Sherif] a former ULIMO-K
member as well, came to release him from prison and asked Keita to cooperate with Taylor's
government.9859 From rison, Sherif took Keita to Musa Cisse's house at Con o Town. At
B P B
the house Musa Cisse, Taylor's protocol officer, Benjamin Yeaten, the SS Director, Sherif
Papa Kuyateh, a police director, and Pa Morrie, a police officer who was Cissé's brother
were present. Cisse and Yeaten urged Keita to cooperate with Taylor's government. Keita
agreed and was then taken to Yeaten's house.°86O That was the first time the witness met
Yeaten.9861 r
4404. Around one week later, Jungle, Sampson and Zigzag Mazhar,9862 members of the SS,
came to Keita's residence and escorted Keita to Musa Cisse's house. From there they went
to Yeaten's residence, which was located at the back of President Taylor's house.9863 There,
Y
Keita met with Yeaten, Sam Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh who was with the Sierra Leone
Anny,9864 SB Rogers who was the "War Council leader of the RUF", Rashid who was the
"adjutant of the RUF", Varmuyan Sherif and Montgomery.9865 This was the first time Keita
met Bockarie.9866
4405. At the meeting, Yeaten asked Keita to join the RUF in Sierra Leone, explaining that
he wanted Keita to be a commander of a standby force called the Scorpion Unit which
would be based in Buedu, Kailahun District with Sam Bockarie.9867 Yeaten said that he had
lanned this new unit with the President, and that the President had instructed him to send
P
Keita to Sierra Leone.9868
9859 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1964-1965; Transcript 24 January 2008. pp. 2106-2107. ln a
prior statement the witness said that it was Papay Kuyateh who released him from prison and took him to Sherif
The witness denied saying this.
9860 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1964-1966.
9861 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2108.
9862 The Trial Chamber notes that the witness referred to Zigzag Mazhar, rather than Marzah.
9863 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1966-1968. Keita stated that the SS was the special close
protection unit of the President.
9864 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1971-1972. The witness stated that following the ECOMOG
Intervention and the overthrow of the AFRC, the RUF and SLA formed a combined force called the "People's
Army".
"*°5 Abu Keira, rrrrrispripr 23 Jrrrirrrrry 2008, pp. 1968-1969.
9*66 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110-21 1 1.
0867 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1968-1971.
9868 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970-1971.

---- End of Page 1515 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

5 6/ 6 O 8
4406. At the meeting, Yeaten did not indicate whether any particular operations or attacks
were envisaged for the new unit to carry out.98°9 On cross—examination, Keita confirmed that 1
the reason for having the Scorpion Unit as a standby force was because "they wanted a force
outside of Liberia that could come in from behind an enemy should Liberia be attacked",
while also confirming that he was told at the meeting that Bockarie would take care of him
since what Keita would be doing would be in the interests of the West Aiiican sub-
region.987O Keita also confirmed on cross—examination that Yeaten had promised him that he
would send 300 men to Buedu who would be under Keita's commandfml
4407. Keita said that at that same meeting, Bockarie stated that Eddie Kanneh would be the
liaison officer between Sierra Leone and Liberia for the diamond business. Bockarie, who
was the RUF 's commander, also complained that Superman was insubordinate and Yeaten
undertook to speak to him.9872
4408. After the meeting at Yeaten's house, Keita went with Bockarie to the Boulevard
Hotel in Monrovia. At the hotel, they met with General 1brahim Bah, a former NPF L
member. This was the first time Keita met Bah. In addition to Bockarie, Bah and Keita, also
present were Yeaten, Kanneh, SB Rogers, Rashid and one of Bah's bodyguards known as
General CR.9873 The discussion focused on how General Bah could find a buyer for RUF
diamonds and assist the RUF to obtain "radio cornmunication" to use for propaganda.9874
Keita testified that he saw Bockarie showing Bah over ten diamonds, but he did not see
Bockarie hand the diamonds over to Bah.9875 Following this meeting, Keita returned with
Bockarie to the Kadija Hotel where Bockarie was staying. Keita stayed there with the
delegation until the afternoon and returned to his home.9876
4409. The same night, Keita went with Yeaten, Bockarie, Musa Cissé, SB Rogers and
Eddie Kanneh to VVhite Flower. The men entered Taylor's house and Yeaten instructed them
to wait in the parlour. After Taylor appeared, Bockarie told Taylor that he had come to pay
9869 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970-1971.
9870 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2110.
987] Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2130, 2137.
9872 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1972-1973.
9873 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1974-1975; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 211 1.
9874 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1975.
9875 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008. pp. 1975-1976; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 21 12.
9376 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1976.

---- End of Page 1516 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ W 18 May 2012

his respects. Taylor then told Bockarie to "maintain", take care of the RUF in the absence of
Foday Sankoh. Bockarie replied that he would do everything possible. Taylor then told
Bockarie that Yeaten and Cissé should be immediately contacted in case problems emerge.
That was the Hrst time Keita had met Taylor in person.9877
4410. The men left Taylor's residence and went down the hill to Yeaten's residence, where
they encountered Bockarie's bodyguards. From there, Bockarie and his bodyguards departed
and the witness returned to his home in Monrovia to prepare for his assignment.9878
4411. Afterwards, in late September 1998,9879 Mazhar, Sampson and Jungle came to
Keita's house and told him that Yeaten had said that he should depart for Sierra Leone.
Keita was then given by Yeaten, at Yeaten's house, one AK-47, one "silent weapon pistol"
which contained eight rounds of ammunition, ten boxes of ammunition, a Yaesu radio and
three former Liberian NPFL fighters as bodyguards, each armed with a rifle.9880
4412. Keita and his three bodyguards were then escorted by Mazhar, Sampson, Jungle,
Mike Lama, and a driver named "Yellowman" in an SS pick-up vehicle to Voinjama. In
Voinjama, they were informed by the local police commander, Colonel Toma, that Bockarie
was on his way and that they should await him.988l Upon Bockarie's arrival in Voinjama, the
two groups exchanged vehicles: Keita transferred his ammunition and other supplies to
Bockarie's vehicle to travel on to Sierra Leone with a police escort to meet the battalion
commander in Foya, Colonel Stanley. Bockarie took the SS pick up to travel on to
Monrovia, as Bockarie told Keita that he was going to see Taylor.9882 Mazhar, Jungle,
Sampson and Mike Lama returned to Monrovia with Bockarie.9883
4413. Toma gave Keita and his bodyguards a police escort to travel to Foya and meet
Foya's battalion commander, Colonel Stanley. In Foya, Issa Sesay was waiting for Keita.9884
9877 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1976-1977; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 21 12.
9878 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1978-1979, 1983-1984.
°‘"" Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2117.
°**° Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1979-1982.
ml Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1982-1984. Toma told the witness that he knew of Bockarie's
movements from a radio communication.
9882 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1984.
W Abu Keita, rranaunpr 23 January 2008, p. 1986.
9884 Abu Keira, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1984-1985.

---- End of Page 1517 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsL·03-01-T / jx) 18 May 2012

Keita then travelled with Sesay to Buedu.9999 Upon arriving in Buedu, Sesay instructed an
RUF commander named Kaisok0 to allocate an apartment for Keita which would be close to
Sesay and Bockarie.9986 When Keita arrived in Buedu he saw an airstrip being
constructed.9997
4414. "A coup1e of weeks" after Keita's arrival in Buedu, in December 1998,9999 Sesay and
Keita travelled to Foya to meet Bockarie, who was on his way back to Sierra Leone.9999 ln
Foya, they met Bockarie who came with two trucks the Libyan govemment gave Taylor and
one "pick-up". Bockarie came with 300 boxes of ammunition,9890 and 150 men, both Sierra
Leoneans and Liberians, whom Keita was told were taken from Camp Naama. The witness
thought that these were the men Yeaten said would be sent to be under Keita's command,
but the men were taken to be trained at Camp Bunumbu, the RUF training camp, where
Monica Pearson and Colone1 Mong0r were the training commanders. The convoy a1s0
included a Liberian police driver nicknamed Senegalese and Keita's wife.989l
4415. Upon their return to Buedu, Bockarie explained to Keita the "RUF laws" — fighters
were not allowed to have foreign currency, a passport or diamonds in their possession.9892
Bockarie told Keita that after they had last met in Monrovia, he had travelled to Burkina
Fas0 and showed Keita a picture of the place Bockarie stayed at and a1s0 depicting Sheku
Suwape Koroma, "a Guinean who was in Liberia with Benjamin Yeaten". The first time
Keita met Sheku was in Monrovia with Yeaten before Keita left for his assignment, a1though
Sheku did not attend the meetings Keita described. The next time Keita saw Sheku was
when Sheku came to Buedu with Bockarie.9899
4416. Bockarie told Keita that there was Only one command in Buedu and that the men he
brought shou1d be under his, Bockarie's, command. Jungle, Sampson and Mazhar were
present for this discussion, and they told Keita that "there is no big deal in that. We just have
9999 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1985-1986.
98*6 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1986-1987.
9997 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1987-1988.
9999 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2130-2131.
9999 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1988, 1993.
9990 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1993-1994.
9991 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1994-1996.
9999 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1996.
9993 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1997-1999. On cmss-examination Keita agreed that Sheku
Suwape Koroma attended the meeting at Yeaten's house. See Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2122.

---- End of Page 1518 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 —

5 76 7/
to cooperate".9894 Bockarie took Keita's bodyguards and the Yaesu radio and gave Keita
three of his own bodyguards.9895
4417. Bockarie gave Keita a piece of paper which was his letter of assignment to the RUF,
signed by President Taylor in blue pen. Keita asked Yeaten for the letter before he left
Liberia. Keita lost this letter subsequently in Liberia when his mother's house burned
down.9896 After receiving this letter in Buedu, Keita spoke with Yeaten, who was in
Monrovia, through the Yaesu radio at Bockarie's residence. Yeaten told the witness to
safeguard the letter of assignment since it had been signed by the President.9897
4418. A second group of around 150 Liberian men arrived in Sierra Leone after the
invasion of Kono and Freetown in January 1999, with the escort of Mazhar and Sampson.
These men were dispatched into "another group of the RUF", and were not under Keita's
command.9898
4419. On cross-examination Keita agreed that Bockarie's refusal to have a double
command structure and him taking the men who were supposed to be under Keita's
command was contrary to what Keita was told in Monrovia, and that in effect Bockarie
disregarded the cornrnands or directives of Benjamin Yeaten, which in tum came from
Charles Taylor.9899 Keita also agreed that while he received the rank of general in the RUF,
he had no troops under his direct command.9900
4420. Abu Keita also testified that there was an offensive on Kono and Makeni and then an
operation from Bunumbu to Segbwema, to Jumo Kafebu, Gbava and Bendu Junction.
Officially, the taking of Kono Town was announced on Christmas Day, 1998. Keita played a
part in the offensive; not in Kono but in Segbwema, Juma Kafebu, Gbava and Bunumbu.
During the offensive which included Kono, other districts such as Makeni, Masingbi and
Magburaka were involved. Sam Bockarie ordered that if any air raids took place or if there
was any resistance in a place, then that place should be burned down. Keita himself took part
9894 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1999; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2132.
9895 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2005; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2132.
98% Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1999-2001.
9897 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2001.
9898 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2025; Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2139-2131.
qw) Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2136-2137.
0900 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2138.

---- End of Page 1519 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GM 18 May 2012

5 W 6 /2
in burning down houses in Bunumbu, Sebguema, Jumo Kafebud and Gbava "into Kolahun
and Kenema District". He stated that "some places we burned down ten houses, some areas ’
seven, some areas eight".q9Ol During the attack on Freetown, Keita was assigned to
Segbwema, Bunumbu, to take wounded soldiers to the rear in Buedu where they could be
treated. For example, Keita made civilians construct a hammock for Mano in order for them
to take him to Buedu.99°2 During these attacks, Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and left Mike
Lamin in charge of Buedu.9903
4421. Keita remained in Sierra Leone with the RUF until 2002.9904 His functions from late
1998 onwards included ensuring that wounded soldiers were brought to Buedu and assisting
in mining activities.99O5
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
4422. Witness Augustine Mallah, an RUF junior commando and security officer, testified
that he attended a meeting in late 1998/beginning of 1999 in which Sam Bockarie said that
he wanted to leave Kailahun and was going to Liberia to seek advice from Charles Taylor.
Subsequently, the witness heard that Bockarie went to Liberia, sometime in 1999.9906 After
Bockarie returned from Liberia he sent messages to all the deployment areas around
Kailahun that they should send two to three representatives to Buedu for a meeting. The
witness went from Baiima to Buedu with Major Lamin, an AFRC soldier, and Major
Kailondo to attend the meeting.9907 ·
4423. The meeting in Buedu took place at around November 1998,9908 and was attended by
representatives from other deployment areas controlled by the RUF. About 60 to 80 persons
attended the meeting from the AFRC, RUF, and Liberian forces that had come as
reinforcements, as well as civilians. Bockarie said that he had come from Charles Taylor in
Liberia, and that he had received arms and ammunition. Bockarie also said that he brought
reinforcements "that had been given to him for a particular mission that he wanted to
ml Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2008-2011; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2139.
9902 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2022-2023; Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2037-2038.
9903 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 201 1-2012.
9904 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 21 17.
9905 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2137-2138.
9906 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20217-20218.
9907 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20218-20219.
9008 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20227.

---- End of Page 1520 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QQ 18 May 2012

undertake". The reinforcements he brought were all Liberians, and their commander was
Abu Keita. Bockarie announced Operation Free Sankoh at this meeting in the presence of
"all the civilians, everybody".99O9
4424. Following this meeting, Bockarie convened a meeting for 30 to 40 senior officers out
of Buedu at Waterworks. Bockarie said that he had planned Operation Spare No Soul, that
this operation was to be taken seriously and that every commander should do exactly what
he said. He stated that what he wanted was the land, and that they should destroy any town
they "feel" is occupied by ECOMOG, kill civilians and burn the towns in order to raise
international concern and as means to negotiate the freeing of Foday Sankoh with the
"international committee".99lO
4425. According to this plan, the witness was to go to Baiima with Eagle, Manawai and the
brigade commander, CO Denis, a.k.a. Monkey Brown. The command was to attack
Bunumbu, Segbwema, Daru, Tondola, Bendu Junction, Jomukafebu, Kumbema and all the
way to Kenema. That was the witness's "own part" of the operation.99H When they returned
to Buedu, Bockarie provided the commanders who were to go on the mission, which
included the witness, Manawai, Eagle and CO Denis, with Abu Keita "and his
reinforcements" to attack the various areas. Bockarie also provided the commanders with
arms, ammunition and medicines.99l2
4426. After they had received the reinforcements and the arms and ammunition, they
carried out their mission and succeeded in capturing Kenema. During the attack, they
followed Bockarie's instructions of Operation Spare No Soul; they killed civilians and burnt
down villages that they had captured.99l3 From Kenema, the witness went to Segbwema,
where he heard over the BBC that the Junta had re—entered Freetown, in 1999.9914
Prosecution Witness TF l-371
9909 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20219-20220.
Wm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20220-20222. Military Operations: The Freetown
Invasion, The Plan.
(NH Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20222-20223.
gm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20222-20223. The witness also saw Bockarie
providing arms, ammunition and medicines to Issa Sesay, who was told by Bockarie to go to Kono with AFRC's
Akim and Soriba, and others, to join Superman and CO Rambo to Attack Kono, and from there Akim should
attack Tongo while Issa and Morris Kallon would advance to Makeni.
Om Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20224.
W4 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20224-20225.

---- End of Page 1521 ---------------------------


Case No.;
4427. Witness TF1—371 testified that before Bockarie departed for Monrovia in November
or December 1998 to secure ammunition for the Kono attack, the RUF received in Buedu a
small contingent of fighters from Liberia, led by a Guinean dissident called Sheku and his
deputy, Abu Keita with "the so-called Scorpion Unit". The witness stated that he had
previously met Keita "with the ULIMO forces and later when I went to Monrovia he was
now part of Mr Taylor's security outfit".99l5
4428. The witness spoke with Sheku and Keita who told him that they had an operation in
Guinea, in Conakry. Sheku said that he was the head of the armed group for a detained
opposition leader in Guinea named Alpha Condeh. Sheku stated that he had come to
commence an operation in Guinea against the Government of President Conte, and that he
came with two other men and Abu Keita. Sheku said that they had been sent to Buedu by
Taylor and that Yeaten gave them a security escort to travel to Buedu.99l6
4429. Following discussions on a simultaneous attack on Kono and Kenema, Bockarie
gave instructions for the distribution of materiel and assigned the Scorpion Unit "that was
there with Abu Keita and some other men that were brought by Sekou" to assist in capturing
Kenema.99l7
4430. TF1-371 also testified that during the simultaneous attack on Kono, Makeni and
Kenema, Mike Lamin was in Buedu with Sam Bockarie, and spent most of his days with
Bockarie in the radio room monitoring activities on the front lines.99l8
4431. The flank that was to go through Kenema met strong resistance from ECOMOG, the
Sierra Leonean army and the militias and went as far as Mano Junction and Segbwema. The
manpower and supplies were concentrated at the Koidu axis. The flank that went through
Koidu succeeded in capturing Koindu and by 25 December they had already captured
Makeni.99l9
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
(M5 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2402 (CS); Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2502 (CS).
"’° TF1—37 1, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2465 (CS).
9917 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2414 (CS).
[mg TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2417-2418 (CS).
"’°‘° TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2417-2418 (CS).

---- End of Page 1522 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012 M

4432. Witness Mohamed Kabbah testified that at the time Bockarie returned to Buedu with
a large consignment of ammunition from Monrovia, Zigzag Marzah, Liberian Mosquito
from the NPFL, Sheku who "they said was going to take the war to Guinea", Senegalese, a
Guinean man named Sidibay, Jungle and Abu Keita all came to Buedu with him. Bockarie
said that these men were the ones "who took the war to Guinea", and stated that these men
came "for the Guinea mission". Abu Keita was a ULIMO general in Liberia who later joined
the NPFL. Keita, Sheku and Sidibay were present when the Guinean operation was
discussed.992O Kabbah also testified that during the period from 1991 to 1997, Keita was one
of the ULIMO Generals from whom the RUF purchased ammunition.992l
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
4433. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant, testified that when Bockarie and Eddie
Karmeh returned with "a lot" of ammunition from Bockarie's trip to Liberia and Burkina
Faso in late 1998/early 1999, a meeting was held at Waterworks in Buedu. The witness
could not attend the meeting as he was fighting in Kono. A day alter the meeting, the
witness came to Buedu where he was briefed about the meeting by two of Bockarie's
bodyguards, Shabado and Ray. They told the witness that frontline commanders and senior
Vanguards attended the meeting, including Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh, CO Jungle, General
Ibrahim, SYB Rogers, Abu Keita and "some Liberians". They had drawn a war plan to go
and attack Kono and the Bunumbu—Segbwema axis simultaneously. Shabado and others told
the witness that Keita, a Liberian, came from Liberia along with Colonel Jungle and General
Ibrahim to participate in the fighting, and that he was assigned to the lst brigade in the
Bunumbu—Segbwema axis.9922
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
4434. In a prior statement, Witness Isaac Mongor, a senior commander of the RUF, said
that Abu Keita was a ULIMO Liberian rebel who went to fight alongside the RUF but was
not sent by Charles Taylor. This statement was put to the witness in cross—examination
9920 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16142, 16155~16156; Transcript 17 September 2008,
p. 16445.
(ml Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16277-16278.
Om Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11080-1 1087.

---- End of Page 1523 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

together with a following sentence that Keita had been working with the Prosecution, and
Mongor was asked to confirm the statement, which he did.9923
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
4435. Witness Jabaty Jaward testified that he saw Pa Sheku, Colonel Jungle, Zigzag
Marzah and Abu Keita in late 1998 at the time a large consignment of ammunition arrived in
Buedu for "the Kono operation", although he could not recall who the escorts of that
shipment were.9924
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
4436. Witness Foday Lansana, an RUF radio commander, testified that he heard that when
Superman was in Buedu, prior to the Fitti-Fatta operation, Issa Sesay had lost diamonds
which were meant to be used to purchase arms and ammunition, but Fonti Kanu was able to
obtain arms and ammunition from Monrovia. Lansana also came to know that ULIMO-K or
LURD rebels in Lofa County, specifically General Abu Keita, came with arms and
ammunition to Sam Bockarie in Buedu.9925
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
4437. Witness TF1-516 testiiied that Abu Keita, a ULIMO fighter, became an RUF
combatant at "some point in time", after the "ECOMOG disarmament in Liberia", around
1996/1997. At first he was "moving with" Sam Bockarie, and after Bockarie left Keita was
one of the officers sent to fight in Liberia by Issa Sesay. The witness saw Keita in Kenema
during 1997, at a time Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. 50) invited Bockarie to celebrate the
inauguration of the President.9926
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -367
4438. Witness TF1-367, an RUF commander, testified that Abu Keita was a ULIMO
fighter who came from Liberia to the RUF "as a friend". The first time the witness saw Keita
9923 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6542-6543.
9924 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13424.
9925 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4516-4518.
9926 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7101-7102.

---- End of Page 1524 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T // /}`Q 18 May 2012
C J

36/ 6 / ?
was in Kono with 1ssa Sesay. Keita was in Kailahun up to Kono. Since Keita used to be a
ULIMO fighter, he went to the front lines with the RUF.9927
The Accused
4439. The Accused denied that he would appoint a fomrer ULIMO fighter to head a unit,
especially Abu Keita who was imprisoned for participating in joining the Roosevelt Johnson
uprising on 18 September, when Johnson, the head of UL1MO—J, attempted to overthrow his
government and was joined by several UL1MO—K members, such as Abu Keita. The
Accused said that Keita, as a military man, not a politician, should not have gone to meet
with Johnson as he knew there was tension in Monrovia. Keita was detained until the end of
September when the Accused agreed to release him upon the request of Musa Cissé and
Vamruyan Sherif for the purposes of reconciliation.9928
4440. The Accused explained that for reconciliatory purposes, he integrated senior
UL1MO—K fighters into his regime. These included Vamruyan Sherif who worked as senior
director of the SSS of the motorcade, and Musa Cissé, a Mandingo, who was a senior
protocol officer of the president. Cissé, Sherif and other Mandingos were therefore
"shocked" when they saw that Keita fought with Roosevelt Johnson against the Accused and
asked him to order the Ministry of Defence to release Keita. The Accused accepted the
request, for reconciliatory purposes, and asked the Defence Minister to release the
Mandingos outof prison so that they would meet with senior Mandingo commanders and
other elders in the country in order to continue the process of reconciliation. This was done
with the knowledge and the consent of the Accused.9929
4441. The Accused denied that he ordered Yeaten to recruit Keita to his government, and
questioned why he would ask a fomrer ULIMO member who had demonstrated his
disloyalty on a "major mission", out of the thousands of fomrer NPFL and ULIMO fighters
at his disposal. The Accused contended that the meeting at Musa Cissé's house was a
0927 TF1—367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14974—14975.
Om Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26215—26218; Transcript 22 September 2009, pp.
29311—29312, 29327. Taylor stated that Keita was looking for mercenary work, which he eventually found in
Cote d’1voire.
W9 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29325—29327.

---- End of Page 1525 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T J _T__ 18 May 2012
c {M

meeting of senior Mandingos meant for reconciliatory purposes, "chastising him (Keita) for
the nonsense that he had done", not to recruit him.°q30
4442. The Accused said that he knew nothing about the Scorpion Unit, and denied
instructing Yeaten to send Keita to Sierra Leone to command a standby unit called the
Scorpion Unitfml The only Scorpion Unit Taylor had heard of was part of LURD and
fighting against him. He said that this Scorpion Unit must have been what Keita and others
started putting together.9932
4443. The Accused denied sending men in late 1998 to Sierra Leone, and questioned why
he would have sent men to Sierra Leone to fight who needed military training out of the
30,000 NPFL disarmed men that he could have sent.9933 He suggested that Keita collected
some ex—ULlMO fighters on his way to Sierra Leone, as Keita went through Lofa along the
way.9934 The Accused also denied sending another 150 men to Sierra Leone after the Kono
and Freetown attacks.9935
4444. Finally, the Accused denied writing a letter of appointment for Keita, saying that the
President of Liberia does not, could not and would not sign even a military assignment in or
out of Liberia. The only authority he had was to sign appointments of military commissions
or personnel. He stated that he only signed in green pen, as did all the Presidents of Liberia
before him, for historical reasons.9936
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4445. Witness Issa Sesay testified that he never heard of the name Scorpion Unit for a unit
within the RUF until he heard it in Court.9937 He further testified that Abu Keita and
Varmuyan Sherii two ULIMO generals, met Bockarie in Foya in December 1996 and sold
arms and ammunition from ULIMO to the RUF.9938 Sesay said that from December 1996
until May 1997, Keita was in contact with Bockarie when Bockarie and other RUF members
0930 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29329-29331.
(ml Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29340, 29347.
9932 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29344-29345.
9933 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29382-29385.
9934 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29385-29386.
(mj Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, p. 29406.
9036 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29368-29371.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45060.

---- End of Page 1526 ---------------------------


Case No.

went to F oya. Sesay first met Keita in 1997 when Keita arrived in Koindu with Varmuyan
Sherif On this occasion, Keita brought ammunition from Voinjama, the ULIMO
headquarters.9939
4446. The contact resumed in December 1998 when Keita arrived in Buedu a day after
Bockarie returned from his trip to Burkina Faso. Keita brought with him 20 to 25 "of his
Mandingo people". Keita and his men came without uniforms and were not armed. Keita
told Bockarie and Sesay that he was afraid for his life as he was under threat from Liberian
"securities" and came to stay with Bockarie and the RUF for safety. From December 1998
and until 2001, Keita was a guest of the RUF but was not a member of the RUF, nor was he
recognized as an RUF commander.9940
4447. Sesay was never told that Keita was sent to Sierra Leone by Taylor, or that Yeaten
sent Keita to command the Scorpion Unit in Sierra Leone. Sesay said that the 20 to 25 men
brought by Keita were not called the Scorpion Unit, and there was no Scorpion Unit within
the RUF."°"‘
4448. Sesay denied that he went to meet Keita in Foya, that he instructed someone to
provide Keita with an apartment,9942 that he travelled with Keita to receive Bockarie in Lofa
County, that he went with Keita to Lofa County where they met two trucks loaded with 300
boxes of ammunition,9943 or that 150 men came from Liberia to RUF -held territories.9944
4449. While staying with the RUF, Keita participated in a military operation with Mike
Lamin in Bunumbu-Segbwema in January 1999. During this attack, the 20 to 25 men Keita
brought with him went to the battlefront while commanded by Lamin who also provided
them with arms. At the time of the attack on Kono, Lamin was still in Buedu. It was only in
gm Issa Sesay, Transcript, 6 July 2010, pp. 43781-43787.
9939 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43787-43788; Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45521. In his examination
in chief Sesay also said that he himself met Sherif around April 1997 during the RUF's purchases of ammunition
from ULIMO, but only first met Keita in December 1998. See Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43790-
43791.
9940 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45062; Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45521-45523, 45528, 45530-
45531, 45535, 45542-45543. Keita did not tell Sesay, and Sesay was not aware, that Keita was imprisoned
following the Camp Johnson Road incident.
(ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45060; Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45530-45533.
9942 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45535, 45537-45538.
9943 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45545-45546. Sesay stated that the largest shipment they received
was 100 boxes of ammunition in around 1991. They did capture a large consignment of over 300 boxes of
ammunition in Kono.

---- End of Page 1527 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /_/ 5% 18 May 2012

January that the attack on Kenema occurred, after Sesay managed to capture Kono, since
that was when ECOMOG forces retreated from Bandajuma Yaweh, Bunumbu, Manowa,
causing Bockarie to send Lamin to attack Segbwema. Sesay insisted that Keita did not go to
the battleiiont, although Keita was there with Lamin who commanded the operation.9945
Defence Witness John Vincent
4450. Witness John Vincent testiiied that he met Abu Keita in Buedu at the time of the
Waterworks meeting, which Keita and the witness attended. Bockarie told the witness that
Keita had escaped from Liberia with 20 to 40 other Mandingos and arms and ammunition,
because Charles Taylor's men were after him and sought to kill him. He therefore did not
communicate with Taylor's authorities. The witness did not see the 20 to 40 men, but said
that Keita and the men joined the RUF,9946 and that while Keita brought these men they were
deployed by Bockarie.9947
Deliberations
4451. lt is undisputed that Abu Keita went to Sierra Leone after the Camp Johnson Road
incident. The Trial Chamber notes that the Camp Johnson Road incident was an attack on
the Accused's Government led by former ULIMO-J fighters loyal to their leader Roosevelt
Johnson, which culminated on 18 September 1998 with a heavy exchange of gunfire on and
around the United States Embassy premises in central Monrovia, leading to the death of 52
people and serious injury to two Embassy persormel.9948 At the time, Keita was a Major in
the AFL, having been integrated into the armed forces following the election of the Accused
in August 1997.9949
0944 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45062-45063; Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45547-45548.
W5 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45061; Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45523-45524, 45542, 45556-
45558. K
9946 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38105-381 10.
"°"’ Jprrrr vrrrcprrr, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38111-38112.
gm Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Polices, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the Chief
Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997-31 December 1998", pp. 63-65; Exhibit D-162, "Ofiicial Report of the
Government of the Republic of Liberia on the Camp Johnson Road Conspiracy, 24 September 1998;" Exhibit D-
163, "Code Cable to Predergast/Miyet United Nations New York, from Downes Thomas, RSG, UNOL,
Monrovia, The Camp Johnson Road Incidents of 18 September 1998 and Subsequent Developments, 20
September 1998;" Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25742.
°°"" Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2094.

---- End of Page 1528 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
`

4452. The Prosecution submits that the Accused sent Keita to Sierra Leone with Liberian
fighters as reinforcements for the Kono and Freetown operations, and that subsequently
these forces fought in the attack on Kenema in which crimes were committed. ln support of
its submission the Prosecution primarily relies on the testimonies of Varmuyan Sherif who
purportedly selected Keita to head the Scorpion Unit after the Accused requested him to
recommend a senior officer from ULIMO-K for the task, and Abu Keita, who was allegedly
sent to command the Scorpion Unit in Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding
that Abu Keita and Sherif are generally credible witnesses.995O
4453. The Defence disputes that the Accused sent Keita to Sierra Leone and submits that
the accounts of Sherif and Keita contradict rather than corroborate each other.995l The Trial
Chamber observes that there are some discrepancies between the accounts of Keita and
Sherif While Sherif testified that Keita accepted the offer to cooperate with Taylor's
government after the Camp Johnson Road incident,9952 he did not mention that Keita was
imprisoned due to that incident, as acknowledged by Keita himself who also testified that
Sherif was the one who released him from prison.9953 Moreover, Sherif testified that he
invited Keita to cooperate with Taylor's government prior to the incident,9954 a detail which
was not mentioned by Keita.
4454. Furthermore, Keita testified that Sherif took him from prison to Musa Cissé's house,
and a week later he was taken to a meeting at Yeaten house,9955 while Sherif testified that he
took Keita to Yeaten's house upon Cissé's instructions.9956 Sherif also said that he escorted
Keita to Yeaten's house,9957 while Keita said that Sherif escorted him to Cissé's house9958
and that to the meeting at Yeaten's house he was escorted by Jungle, Sampson, and Zigzag
Marzah, only mentioning that Sherif attended the meeting at Yeaten's house.9959
9950 Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219; Credibility Assessment, Varmuyan Sherif, Arms and
Ammunition, para. 5324.
(ml Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 51-52.
0952 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 858-859.
9953 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1962-1965; Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2104-2107.
9954 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 857-858.
°°" Abu Kpuu, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1964-1968.
9956 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 859.
9957 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 859.
9958 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1964-1966.
""5" Abu Kpuu, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1966-1969.

---- End of Page 1529 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6-U) 18 May 2012

3%.2;;
4455. The two witnesses also differed as to the attendees at the meeting at Yeaten's house.
Sherif stated that the meeting was attended by Bockarie, Yeaten, Joe Tuah, Dopoe
Menkarzon, and "Sekou".°%O while Keita stated that the meeting was attended by Sherif,
Bockarie, Yeaten, Eddie Kanneh, SB Rogers, Rashid and Montgomery.9%l
4456. The Defence also highlights an alleged discrepency between Sherif’ s account, that
Keita was initially suspicious about cooperating with the RUF, and Keita's account that he
was willing to do so.9962 However, the Trial Chamber notes that both witnesses are
consistent in their testimony that Keita accepted the offer.9963
4457. While noting that the two accounts differ in details, the Trial Chamber finds these
details to be minor, given the consistent account of the two witnesses according to which
following the Camp Johnson Road incident in Monrovia, Abu Keita was brought to a
meeting at Yeaten's house, which included Bockarie, and that during the meeting Yeaten
assigned Keita with a mission to go to Sierra Leone.9964 Both witnesses implicated the
Accused as being involved in the decision to send Keita to Sierra Leone. Sherif stated that
the Accused ordered him to seek a senior ULIMO commander for the mission,9965 and
according to Keita, Yeaten said at the meeting that he had devised the plan with the
Accused.9966 Furthermore, according to Keita, after he arrived in Buedu, Bockarie showed
him his letter of assignment signed by the Accused. This letter was presumably given to
Bockarie by Yeaten, as Keita indicated that he asked Yeaten to provide him with a letter of
assignment.9967 After Bockarie showed the letter to Keita, Yeaten told Keita over the radio to
safeguard the letter of assignment since it had been signed by the Accused.9968 Keita testified
that the letter had been burnt during a fire at his mother's residence.
9960 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 859-861; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 916-917.
ml Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1968-1969.
9962 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 52.
9963 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 857-859; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1964-
g9%ifarmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 858-861; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1962-
giggifarmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 856-857.
9966 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1971.
M7 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1999-2001.
9968 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2001.

---- End of Page 1530 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSI. 03 01 T mb 18 May ..012

B 9 6 .,2 3
4458. Keita's account of being sent to Sierra Leone by the Accused and given a security
escort of SSS members, namely Zigzag Marzah, Jungle and Sampson,9969 is corroborated by
the testimony of TF 1-371, who testified that he was told by a man named Sheku that he,
Keita and two other men were sent by the Accused to Buedu, and that Yeaten, who was the
SSS director, provided them with a security escort to travel to Buedu.9970
4459. The Defence challenges the credibility of Abu Keita on several grounds.997l Keita's
testimony was inconsistent in a number of ways with his prior statements to the Prosecution.
First, in a prior statement the witness had described substantially different attendees at the
meeting at Yeaten's residence in Monrovia where he allegedly first met Bockarie. In his
prior statement Keita had not mentioned the RUF and other attendees to whom he testified
in court, specifically Eddie Kanneh, SYB Rogers, Montgomery and Rashid. Secondly, Keita
testified that 300 men were brought in two stages, with a first group arriving with Bockarie
on his retum from Burkina Faso in December 1998 and a second group arriving around
January 1999 with Marzah and Sampson. However, in a prior statement the witness stated
that 350 men from Liberia arrived together around a week after Keita arrived in Buedu.
Thirdly, in his first three statements to the Prosecution Keita did not mention that he met the
Accused when he met Yeaten and Bockarie. Keita maintained that he told this to the
Prosecution on each occasion.9972 He ascribed the other inconsistencies to errors of the
Prosecution.9973
, 4460. The Defence suggests that it is implausible that in a single day Keita met, for the first
time, Yeaten, Bockarie, Bah and the Accused.9974 The Trial Chamber disagrees and
considers that having asked Sherif to find someone to undertake the mission, it is plausible
that the Accused would want to meet the person chosen for the mission when Keita came to
meet the other key RUF leaders.
4461. Several witnesses disputed that the Accused sent Abu Keita to Sierra Leone. Defence
witnesses Issa Sesay and John Vincent testified that Abu Keita came to Sierra Leone on his
9969 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1979-1982.
9970 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2465 (CS).
99 71 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1399-1403.
W2 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2114-2117.
9973 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2123-2124, 2126, 2128-2129.
9974 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2112-2113.

---- End of Page 1531 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

own.9998 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Issa Sesay's testimony should be treated
with caution and requires corroboration.9978 Moreover, Sesay gave two different accounts
during his examination in chief as to the first time he met Sherif and Keita; he first said that
he met Sherif in around April 1997 during the RUF's purchases of ammunition from
ULIMO, but only met Keita in December 1998,9977 while later he said that he iirst met Keita
in 1997 when Keita arrived in Koindu with Varmuyan Sherif when they brought
ammunition from Voinjama, ULIMO's headquarters.9978
4462. Before evaluating the merits of John Vincent's testimony, the Chamber will consider
his general credibility.
4463. Defence Witness John Vincent was an RUF member between 1990 and 2000,9999
where he served as overall training commander9989 and attained the rank of Colonel.998l
Vincent then became a member of the AFL in 20019982 before being recruited to the SSS in
2002.9988 The Trial Chamber observed that Vincent exhibited a calm demeanour and
provided clear and detailed testimony throughout his examination—in—chief, admitting when
he did not know the answer to a question.9984 The Trial Chamber also notes that the witness
was willing to give inculpatory evidence.9989 However, Vincent became noticeably agitated
and evasive when challenged during cross-examination.
4464. Although Vincent was not present during some of the major events of the Sierra
Leonean civil war,9988 which may explain some of the gaps in his knowledge, the Trial
9978 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45060, 45062; Transcript, 5 August 2010, pp. 45521-45523, 45528,
45530-45535, 45542-45543; Jolm Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38105-38110.
9978 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
9977 Issa Sesay, Transcript, 6 July 2010, pp. 43790-43791.
9978 Issa Sesay, Transcript, 6 July 2010, pp. 43787-43788; Transcript, 5 August 2010, p. 45521.
9979 Jolm Vincent, Transcript 24 March 2010, pp. 37962-37963; Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38259. Vincent
testified that he briefly served with the NPFL before joining the RUF (Jolm Vincent, Transcript 24 March 2010,
p. 37962; Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38261)
9980 Jolm Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 38049-38050; Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38391-38392.
9981 Jolm Vincent, Transcript 24 March 2010, p. 37963; Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38441-38443.
9989 Jolm Vincent, Transcript 24 March 2010, p. 37962; Transcript 30 March 2010, p. 38259.
"°" Jolm vmpppr, Transcript 24 March 2010, pp. 37962-37964.
9989 For example when asked about how the mined diamonds were spent (John Vincent, Transcript 26 March
2010, p. 38126).
9988 Jolm Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38161-38162; Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38259-38261.
9988 For example, during late 1998 and the Freetown invasion Vincent was undergoing "punishment" in Jojoima
for wanting to join Supennan and testified that he received very little infonnation there (John Vincent, Transcript
26 March 2010, pp. 38129-38130; Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38231, 38326-38327).

---- End of Page 1532 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18May 2012

Chamber found his awareness of well-known events throughout the conflict incongwously
lacking.9987 The Trial Chamber also notes that at times Vincent's evidence was patently
implausible and denied events to which even other Defence witnesses attested. For example,
he strenuously denied RUF violence against civiliansgggg Given the 10 years Vincent served
with the RUF, the rank he attained and the locations in which he served, the Trial Chamber
considers that it is incredible that he would have neither witnessed nor heard about such
crimes against civilians. Furthermore, he provided some inconsistent testimony without any
reasonable explanation.9989 In view of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that Vincent's
evidence must generally be considered with caution and carmot be relied upon without
corroboration. The Trial Chamber will consider further issues relating to Vincent's
credibility in context as they may arise.
4465. In view of the inconsistencies in Sesay's evidence in this instance and its findings
that neither Sesay nor Vincent are generally credible witnesses, the Trial Chamber does not
consider that their evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to the possibility that Taylor sent
Keita to Sierra Leone.
4466. The Trial Chamber notes that Isaac Mongor confirmed his prior statement in his
cross-examination that Keita was not sent to Sierra Leone by the Accused,999O but that he did
so in response to questioning about the other half of the statement put to him, relating to
whether Keita was working for the Prosecution. He was more specifically asked about that
part of the statement, which was the focus of inquiry by counsel. The Trial Chamber does
9987 For example, Vincent testiHed that he had never heard of Superman Ground in Kono (John Vincent,
Transcript 30 March 2010 p. 38237) and did not know an operation named Fitti-Fatta which took place in mid-
1998 (John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38236-38237; Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38343) despite
being based in Kono between the ECOMOG Intervention and August! September 1998 (John Vincent, Transcript
31 March 2010, pp. 38376-38383).
99*8 Vincent testified that he did not hear about any civilian being amputated or in any way harmed by the RUF
during Operation Stop Election 1996 (John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 pp. 38055-38057; Transcript 30
March 2010, pp. 38331-38332, 38334), that the AFRC initiated the campaign to amputate civilians and that he
never saw any RUF member doing so throughout the conflict (John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp.
38063-38066), that he did not hear about civilians being killed in Kenema, Kailahun or Makeni after the
Intervention (John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 2010 pp. 38330-38331) and that the RUF never allowed
children into combat before the age of 18 (John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37999-38000).
9989 For example, Vincent first testified that he knew Dopoe Menkarzon "very well" (John Vincent, Transcript 26
March 2010, p. 38078). On cross-examination, he denied knowing him well stating "When you talk about
knowing him well, that means maybe he and I have some things in common. No. Except maybe I say hi to him,
then I pass by" (John Vincent, Transcript 1 April 2010, p. 38476). Although Vincent testihed that he had never
heard about human sacrifices in the RUF (John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38363), he admitted that
hehad heard about the sacrifice of Alice Pyne's baby (John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38363).
9990 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6542-6543.

---- End of Page 1533 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

2 762 6
not, for this reason, consider his response to have evidentiary weight, particularly as he was
not further examined on this issue or was questioned as to how he received this information.
Prosecution witness TF 1-367 testified that Keita was a ULIMO fighter who came from
Liberia to the RUF "as a fiiend", stating that Keita fought in the front lines with the RUF .99%
The Trial Chamber does not find that this negates the possibility that the Accused sent Keita
to Sierra Leone.
4467. ln his testimony, the Accused challenged the proposition that he would entrust the
function of heading a covert combat unit in a neighbouring country to a former enemy
whom he had recently imprisoned in relation to the Camp Johnson Road Incident on
suspicion of treasonous activity. Instead, the Accused described Keita as a mercenary,
pointing to evidence that Keita subsequently went on to fight in Cote d’Ivoire.9992
4468. With regard to the Accused's challenge, the Trial Chamber observes that when
confronted on cross-examination with the contention that he was arrested on suspicion that
he had plotted a coup with Johnson, Keita first denied but then conceded that one of the
reasons for his arrest was that he refused to fight against Johnson's men.9993 Sherif provided
an explanation as to why the Accused wished to send a former ULIMO-K fighter to fight
alongside Sam Bockarie in Sierra Leone, stating that it would have encouraged other former
ULIMO-K fighters to "feel free" to do so as well.9994 However, the Trial Chamber observes
that this appears to have been speculation on Sherif` s part as he did not testify that the
Accused had explained any motive to him.
4469. The Defence proposes in its submissions that a plausible reading of the evidence is
that due to pre-existing contacts with the RUF, Sherif and Keita were involved in activities
on behalf of Yeaten and not the Accused.9995 The Trial Chamber notes that Yeaten was a
subordinate under the Accused's authority.9996 Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that both
Varmuyan Sherif and Abu Keita testified to the direct involvement of the Accused, Sherif in
having been instructed by Taylor to find a ULIMO-K officer, with corroboration by TF1-
371, who testified that the Accused sent Keita to Sierra Leone with a security escort
(xm TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14974-14975.
9992 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26215-26218.
9993 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2105.
9994 Vamiuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 856-857.
0095 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1404; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 52.

---- End of Page 1534 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T {ke 18 May 2012

provided by Yeaten, clearly indicating the involvement of the Accused. The Trial Chamber
has no reason to believe that Yeaten would have acted independently in sending Keita to
Sierra Leone.
4470. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber has considered evidence cited by the Defence to
prove Keita's pre-existing ties with the RUF. The Trial Chamber notes that Keita did not
testify about his relationship with the RUF prior to his arrival in Sierra Leone in late 1998,
although he did say that the first time he met Bockarie was at the meeting at Yeaten's house
where Keita was given his assignment.Qq97
4471. TF1-371 testified that before Keita arrived in Sierra Leone, he had previously met
Keita in association with ULIMO forces,9998 and testified that in 1997 the RUF purchased
arms and ammunition from ULIMO through Varmuyan Sherif while Abu Keita was also
"involved".9q99 On cross-examination the witness said that before Keita arrived in Buedu he
and Bockarie were enemies, but became close after Keita's arrival in Sierra Leone. TF1-371
acknowledged that Keita's girlfriend's father, Mr Kallon, was Foday Sankoh's senior
advisor, but denied that this constituted a personal connection to the RUF, or that this was
Keita's entry point into the RUF. 1110011
4472. Foday Lansana testified that he heard that Keita had brought arms and ammunition to
Bockarie in Buedu prior to the Fitti-Fatta operation,111001 which occurred in mid-June
1998.10002 Mohamed Kabbah testified that during the period from 1991 to 1997, Keita was
one of the ULIMO generals from whom the RUF purchased anmiunition.10003
4473. TF1-516 testified that he saw Keita in Kenema during 1997, when Yeaten invited
Bockarie to celebrate the inauguration of the President,101104 which occurred in August
1997.10005 TF1-516 also stated that Keita joined the RUF after the "ECOMOG disarmament"
99% The Role of lntermediaries: Benjamin Yeaten.
9997 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110-2111.
""°" TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2402 (CS).
9999 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2696-2697 (CS).
10000 TFI-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2805-2807 (CS).
10001 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4516-4518.
1011112 Military Operations: Operation Fitti-Fatta.
10003 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16277-16278.
""*"‘* TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7101-7102.
1110115 Agreed Facts and Law, Fact 1(d).

---- End of Page 1535 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Q1! 18 May 2012

5 7 6 .2 E?
in 1996/1997, referring to the disarmament of ULIMO in Liberia at the time. Given that
TF1-516 is the only witness to say that Keita joined the RUF prior to 1998, the Trial
Chamber believes that the witness was confused with regard to times, but accepts his
testimony that Keita was in Kenema in 1997, given the specific detail the witness provided,
that it was at the time of the inauguration of the President.
4474. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous findings that TF1-371, Mohamed Kabbah and
TF1-516 are reliable witnesses.mOO6 In the Trial Chamber's view, the pre-existing ties of
Keita to the RUF, as provided by several Prosecution witness, would have made him a likely
candidate for a mission involving working along with the RUF in Sierra Leone. In light of
the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused sent Abu Keita to Sierra Leone on a
mission.
4475. With regard to the reason Keita was sent to Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber notes
that in his examination in chief Keita said that during the meeting at Yeaten's house Yeaten
tasked him with commanding a standby force that would be called the Scorpion Unit and
would be based with the RUF in Buedu. He also said that Yeaten did not indicate any
particular operations or attacks that the unit should carry out.mOO7 On cross-examination
Keita confirmed that the Scorpion Unit was to be "a force outside of Liberia that could come
in from behind an enemy should Liberia be attacked", while also confirming that he was told
Bockarie would take care of him since what Keita would be doing would be in the interests
of the West African sub-region.l0OO8
4476. The Trial Chamber has considered other evidence concerning the purpose of Keita's
mission to Sierra Leone. While in his examination in chief Keita said that Sheku Suwape
Koroma did not attend any of the meetings he described prior to his departure to Sierra
Leone, saying that he met Sheku in Monrovia before he left,lO009 in his cross-examination
Keita acknowledged that Sheku was present at the meeting at Yeaten's house.lOOlO Sherif
testified that during the meeting at Yeaten's house, Yeaten instructed Bockarie to organize a
WOO6 Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-
338; Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras 275-284.
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1968-1971.
Img Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970-1971; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2110.
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1997-1999.
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2122-2123.

---- End of Page 1536 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T mb 18 May 2012

group that would attack Guinea from Sierra Leone, and that "Sekou", whom Sherif decribed
as "a rebel leader for Guinea", was there "in case an attack came from Guinea".1O1111
4477. TF1~371 testified that before Bockarie left for Monrovia to secure ammunition for
the attack on Kono, in November or December 1998, the RUF received in Buedu a small
contingent of Hghters from Liberia, led by a Guinean dissident called Sheku and his deputy
Abu Keita with "the so-called Scorpion Unit".1111112 TF1-371 stated that Sheku told him that
he, Keita and two other men were sent to Sierra Leone by the Accused, and that he had come
to Sierra Leone to commence an operation in Guinea against the Government of President
Conte, stating that Yeaten provided the convoy with a security escort to travel to Buedu.101113
The Trial Chamber notes that in his eross~examination TF1-371 was unclear as to whether
Keita and Sheku had arrived in Sierra Leone together.1111114
4478. Mohamed Kabbah testihed that at the time Bockarie had returned with a large
consignment of ammunition from Monrovia, he saw Keita, Sheku, Senegalese, a Guinean
named Sidibay, Zigzag Marzah, Jungle and Liberian Mosquito in Buedu, that Bockarie said
that these men came "for the Guinea mission", and that Keita, Sheku and Sidibay were
present during discussions about "the Guinean operation".1O015 The Trial Chamber also notes
that in 2001, Keita participated in the operation against LURD in Guinea. 10016
4479. The Trial Chamber considers, based on the evidence, that Keita was sent by the
Accused to command a standby force in Sierra Leone, on call to help defend Liberia. While
he was there, Keita was deployed by Bockarie and participated in the attack on Kenema. The
evidence of other witnesses, including Prosecution witnesses, is that the Accused sent Keita
to serve as a standby force for attacks on Liberia. As Keita himself conhrmed, "they wanted
111011 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 859-861; Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 916-917.
111012 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2402 (CS); Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2502 (CS).
10013 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2465 (CS).
111014 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2762 (CS): "And furthermore Sam Bockarie came with not only -
in fact with this consignment [of ammunition], not only with this consignment, he came with that Guinean
dissident 1 told you about who was already based in Monrovia, called Sheku. You know, he was already based
there. He came along with other men. Abu Keita was - 1 mean was like a few days before they came in and he
was already in, Sheku". 1
10015 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16142, 16155-16156; Transcript 17 September 2008,
p. 16445.
101116 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 861-862. See Leadership and Command Structure:
Operations Outside Sierra Leone.

---- End of Page 1537 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T wr @" 18 May 2012

a force outside of Liberia that could come in from behind an enemy should Liberia be
attacked". 100 I 7 V
4480. With regard to the men sent to serve as reinforcements under Keita's command, the
Trial Chamber accepts Keita's testimony that Bockarie rejected the idea of having a dual
command structure on the ground, and that Bockaiie integrated the men sent to Keita as
reinforcements into the RUF, who were then sent to fight in Kenema. According to Keita,
Jungle, Sampson and Zigzag Marzah, members of Taylor's sss,*00*0 were present during
this conversation and told Keita that he should cooperate with this a1Tangement.lOOl9 On
cross-examination Keita confirmed that he had no troops under his direct connnand,mO20
contrary to the promise given to him by Yeaten that 300 men would be sent to serve under
his command.l002l The Trial Chamber notes that no evidence was adduced as to how Yeaten
or the Accused responded to Bockarie's dismissal of their purported order. However, the
Trial Chamber notes that Jungle and Marzah, members of the SSS under the command of
Yeaten, told Keita to comply with Bockarie's demands. Having found that Jungle was a
subordinate of the Accused durin this time eriod,l0022 and iven that Jun le told Keita to
comply with Bockarie's demand to incorporate both Keita and the men sent to be under
Keita's command into the RUF, the Trial Chamber finds that Jungle's instruction to Keita
was done on behalf of the Accused.
4481. The Prosecution submits that upon Bockarie's orders Keita and the Liberian
reinforcements who were inte ated into the RUF artici ated in the attack on Kenema in
which crimes were committed.l0U23 The Defence points to Keita's testimony that the
Liberian reinforcements were taken to be trained at Bunumbu and were not sent on a
mission by Bockarie, as claimed by the Prosecution. 10024
4482. Keita did not indicate whether the men, who according to him were taken to be
trained at Bunumbu, artici ated in this attack. Au stine Mallah testified that followin a
P P gu g
*00*0 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2130, 2137.
*00*0 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1966-1968.
mw Abu Keira, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1999; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2132.
*0000 Abu Kcita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2138.
*000* Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2129-2130.
*0022 The Role of Intermediaries: Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle)
*0023 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para, 293.
mm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Biief, para. 53.

---- End of Page 1538 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03~01~T Oka 18 May 2012

Z 763/
meeting at Waterworks in November 1998, Bockarie provided the commanders who were to
go fight in Kenema with Liberian reinforcements Bockarie had brought from Liberia after he
had met with the Accused}0025 According to Mallah, Keita was the commander of the
reinforcements.lOO26 The Trial Chamber notes that Mallah was one of the commanders
tasked with attacking Bunumbu, Segbwema, Daru, Tondola, Bendu Junction, Jomukafebu,
Kumbema and Kenema,lOO27 some of which were indicated by Keita as places he was
assigned to. The Trial Chamber notes that when questioned on cross—examination, Mallah
was very candid about having listened to the testimony of Abu Keita via radio broadcastml)28
and does not find that this influenced his testimony.
4483. Mallah's testimony is supported by the evidence of TFl—37l who testified that
following a discussion on a simultaneous attack on Kono and Kenema, Bockarie gave
instructions for the distribution of materiel and assigned the Scorpion Unit "that was there
with Abu Keita and some other men that were brought by Sekou" to assist in capturing
Kenema.lOO29 Albert Saidu also supports this evidence as he testified that he was told by two
of Bockarie's bodyguards after a meeting at Waterworks in Buedu that the meeting was
attended by frontline commanders and senior vanguards, including Abu Keita and "some
Liberians", in which a simultaneous attack on Kono and the Segbwema—Bunumbu axis was
discussed, and that Keita was assigned to the lst brigade in the Bunumbu—Segbwema
aXiS.1003O
4484. The Defence highlights the testimony of Abu Keita as inconsistent with the
testimony of Augustine Mallah in that Abu Keita stated that the men brought were both
Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, while Mallah testified that they were all Liberians. However,
Mallah testified that Bockarie said that the fighters were Liberians whilst Mallah himself
testified that the manpower "comprised of fighters from Liberia".mO3l The Trial Chamber
recalls that all of the fighters came from Liberia with Bockarie, and does not therefore find
Keita's testimony inconsistent.
wm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20219-20220, 20222-20223.
10026 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20219-20220; Transcript 17 November 2008, p.
0
;$);3f(;ilgllS[iI1€ Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20222-20223.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20374.
Wm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2414 (CS).
wm Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11080-11087.
Hm I Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20430.

---- End of Page 1539 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GM 18 May 2012

3 76 31
4485. The Trial Chamber recalls that all of the fighters came from Liberia with Bockarie
and notes that Mallah did not say why he thought all the fighters were Liberians. The Trial
Chamber does not find this inconsistency significant. Mallah would likely have assumed that
the men were all Liberians since they had come from Liberia.
4486. The Trial Chamber notes that Abu Keita in his testimony did not say where the men
Bockarie sent to be trained at Bunumbu were subsequently deployed. Presumably as
reinforcements, they were sent to the frontlines to participate in the attack, and Keita did not
say that they were not at Kenema. The focus of his testimony was that these troops were
taken from his command. ln light of the testimony of Augustine Mallah, which is supported
by the testimony of TF1-371 and Albert Saidu, that the contingent of men brought from
Liberia participated in the attack on Kenema, the Trial Chamber finds that Liberian
reinforcements participated in the attack on Kenema, as did Keita.
4487. Keita testified that he fought in the Bunumbu-Segbwema axis, including in Jumo
Kafebu, Gbava and Bendu junction, during the time of the attack on Kono on Christmas Day
in 1998, and that he participated in the buming of houses. Later in his examination in chief,
and also in his cross-examination, Keita was asked what was his assigmnent during the
fighting in Freetown in January, and answered "l told you that I was assigned to Segbwema,
Bunumbu" stating that his assignment was to take wounded soldiers to the rear in Buedu
where they could be treated.1OO3 2 The Trial Chamber believes that Keita participated in the
buming of houses, as he testified, which does not preclude his having also taken wounded
soldiers for treatment, as he added. Based on the testimony of Keita that he participated in
the buming of houses during the attack on Kenema, and the testimony of Augustine Mallah
that during the attack on Kenema the forces bumed houses and killed civilians, the Trial
Chamber finds that Keita participated in the commission of crimes during the attack on
Kenema.
4488. The Trial Chamber notes that no Prosecution witness provided a number for the men
who fought in Kenema, nor did Prosecution witnesses provide the number of men brought as
reinforcements who participated in the attack on Kenema. Defence witness Issa Sesay stated
that 20 to 25 Liberian men whom Keita brought to Sierra Leone were sent to the front lines
10032 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2008-2011, 2022-2023; Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2037-
2038; 2139.

---- End of Page 1540 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 615 18 May 2012 m

during the attack on Kenema, although he stated that Mike Lamin was in charge of the
attack,lOO33 while both Abu Keita and TF1-371 testified that during the attacks on Kenema
and Kono Mike Lamin was stationed in Buedu.lOO34 Sesay's testimony therefore can110t be
relied upon. Defence witness J 0hn Vincent testified that he was told that Keita brought with
him 20 to 40 Manding0s to Sierra Leone,lOO35 but Only stated that these men were depl0yed
by Bockarie,lOO36 without saying where.
4489. While the evidence indicates that at least some of the reinforcements from Liberia
were sent to participate in the attack on Kenema, the Trial Chamber is unable to determine
how many and in what proportion they were to the RUF forces as a whole in Kenema.
While it is possible and even probable that the men committed crimes during these attacks,
and provided support to others who committed crimes in these attacks, the Trial Chamber
notes that as is unable to determine the relative impact the reinforcements sent by the
Accused to Sierra Leone had on the commission of crimes in Kenema.
Findings
4490. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Abu Keita and 150 men to be under his con1mand were sent by the Accused to Sierra
Leone.
4491. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Abu Keita and the reinforcements were sent by the Accused for the purpose of
fighting in the Kono and Freetown military Operations, which included Kenema. However,
the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), on behalf of the Accused, approved Bockarie's decision to
integrate the Scorpion Unit to be under Bockarie's command.
4492. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Abu Keita and some of the reinforcements sent by the Accused participated in the attack
0n Kenema and that Abu Keita participated in the commission of crimes during this attack.
mlm Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45061; Transcript, 5 August 2010, pp. 45523-45524, 45542, 45556-
45558.
IOO34 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2011-2012; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2417-
2418 (CS).
""’" 101111 v111p€111, rm11Sp11p126 March 2010 pp. 38105-38110.

---- End of Page 1541 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ow 18 May 2012
xw

4493. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Daniel Tamba approved Bockarie's decision to integrate the Scorpion Unit to be
under Bockarie's command on behalf of the Accused. A
4494. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Abu Keita and some of the reinforcements sent by the Accused participated in the attack
on Kenema and that Abu Keita participated in crimes during this attack.
3. Repatriation of Sierra Leoneans
Submissions of the Parties
4495. The Prosecution submits that the Accused sent 62 "(former) SLA soldiers" to be
trained at Camp Bunumbu in order for them to "clear the road" used to transport arms and
armrnunition between Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Prosecution also submits that after the
Intervention the Accused implemented a policy of encouraging, facilitating and actively
sending SLA members who retreated to Liberia back to Sierra Leone. The Prosecution
contends that the Accused organized, armed and sent a large group of experienced SLA
soldiers to Bockarie to support the operation to take Kono and the advance towards
Freetown. The Prosecution further contends that Bockarie made efforts across the border
and appointed SLA members such as Foday Kallon to cross into Liberia and persuade other
SLA members to return to Sierra Leone to fig1rt.lOO37
4496. The Prosecution also submits that Taylor's subordinates arrested, detained and
forced Sierra Leoneans residing in Liberia, including refugees, to return to Sierra Leone to
fight. According to the Prosecution, RUF members openly recruited people in Voinjama
using financial incentives or arresting both men and women and forcing them to go to Sierra
Leone to fight. "Civilians who refused to go were subjected to constant intimidation which
included looting, beatings, and arrests".lOO38
4497. The Prosecution submits further that after fighting broke out in Voinjama, Liberia, in
April 1999 the pressure for Sierra Leonean manpower escalated, resulting in the killing
and/or torturing of Sierra Leonean civilians who refused to return to Voinjama or
[0036 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38111-38112.
"’°" Prosecution moi Trial Brief, paras 3, 190, 286, 327.
*003* Prosecution moi moi Boor, paras 287-288.

---- End of Page 1542 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Grhts 18 May 2012

5 % 2 5
"volunteer" to fight, after Chucky Taylor accused them of being Kamajors. The Prosecution
submits that three of those civilians were taken to meet the Accused who asked them if they
were refusing to go to their country to fight when they were most needed, and when he
received no answer the Accused asked the civilians if they were Kamajors sent to overthrow
his government. The Accused threatened the civilians that if they did not tell the truth they
would be taken to the beach and beheaded.lOO39
4498. To prove its submissions the Prosecution relies on the testimonies of TFl-362
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TFl-539, TFl—590 and Issa Sesay.
4499. The Defence denies that the Accused sent manpower to the RUF or AFRC/RUF
during the Indictment period. The Defence contends that the testimony of TFl-362 is
contradictory and "defies logic". The Defence submits that the inferences the Prosecution
asks the Trial Chamber to make — that if Liberian security personnel or Liberian forces along
the Sierra Leonean border acted in a manner which resulted in the supply of manpower
during the Indictment period, it was done with the Accused's knowledge and intent - are not
supported by the facts. The Defence further argues that the Prosecution asks the Trial
Chamber to find that since the Accused did not arrest fighters who retreated to Liberia and
keep them in Liberia, he is guilty for any of the criminal activities which these individuals
undertook upon their return to Sierra Leone. Finally, the Defence submits that the testimony
of TFl-590 is uncorroborated and is focused primarily on the actions of Chucky Taylor
rather than the Accused.lOO4O
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TFl-362
4500. Witness TFl-362, an RUF member, testified that after the establishment of Bunumbu
training camp in 1998, "during the time the RUF retreated from Freetown", Issa Sesay
instructed Monica Pearson to train "62 SLAs" at Bunumbu training camp in order for them
to fight "in Liberia" to open the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Issa Sesay told
Pearson that "Bockarie said that Charles Taylor said we should train the 62 SLA men to go
*0000 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 289-290.
lgm Defence Final Trial Brief paras ll00, 1287; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 48-

---- End of Page 1543 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—0l—T 59 18 May 2012 M

and open the border between us and Gbamga".l0O4l On cross-examination the witness
confirmed a prior statement which states that the men were trained in order to help fight
ULIMO forces that had captured the area between Lofa and Voinjama given that this was an
important area since its closing limited the access between Taylor and the RUF.l0042
4501. The witness said that the SLAs underwent guerrilla-fighting training for one to two
weeks, as the had never fou t in "the bush".l0043 After the com leted their trainin , Issa
Y Y P S
Sesay came to Bunumbu to get the 62 "SLAs". The witness believed that the 62 SLAs went
"to open the road" since that was what Issa Sesay told Pearson}0044 Sesay came with
Liberian ATU bodyguards, a special unit "behind Charles Taylor", and they stayed at
Bunumbu training base for "hours".m045 Sesay told Pearson that "Bra", referring to
Bockarie, said that Charles Taylor thanked her and said that she should continue with her
cc€ffOI,tss
4502. TF1-362 stated that Sam Bockarie also met Pearson in Bunumbu and informed her
that he had sent Sesay with the 62 men and that it was Taylor who sent the 62 men to
Bockarie so that they would be trained to "go and clear the road".lO047
4503. On cross-examination the witness confirmed prior statements, according to which the
border between Liberia and Sierra Leone was closed as of 1992, but the witness could not
recall for how long. The witness explained that the border area referred to as being closed as
of 1992 was around Bomi Hills at the Bo Waterside area which is different from the border
area in Gbarnga, around the "Buedu area", which the 62 men were sent to open in 199840048
4504. The witness was confronted on cross—examination with another prior statement in
which it was said that after the retreat from Freetown, Pearson received a direct order from
Mosquito to establish a training camp at Bunumbu, and that she believed that the order had
come from Taylor and that Taylor knew that Monica Pearson was in charge of the training
IOW TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4895-4896 (CS).
M42 TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5091-5092 (CS).
mm TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4895-4896 (CS).
WOM TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4899 (CS).
WMS TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4896-4897 (CS) (one of the ATU bodyguards that arrived at the
camp was Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian Mosquito));
NW6 TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4896-4897 (CS).
mm TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4898 (CS).
mm TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5090-5092 (CS).

---- End of Page 1544 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T OJ, 18 May 2012

3 C/6 3 7
camp and was training the fighters, because two days after the training camp was established
Mosquito told Pearson "specifically" that Charles Taylor said the 62 SLA soldiers were to
be trained at Bunumbu training camp in order for them to go and "clear the forces who were
blocking the access route between Charles Taylor and the RUF", which was used to
transport arms and ammunition between Liberia and Sierra Leone. The witness was
confronted with the difference between the testimony that it was Sesay who instructed
Pearson to train the 62 men, and that Sesay had received the instruction from Bockarie. The
witness, who was present, explained that Pearson met both Sesay and Bockarie "face-to-
face" when Pearson received the order to train the 62 men. Issa Sesay was with Bockarie at
the same time when Pearson was told about the 62 SLAs, in Buedu. Sesay was the one who
gave Pearson the message about the 62 men. They then "walked along directly" to Bockarie
(a.k.a. Mosquito), who addressed the matter.lOO49
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
4505. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC memberlOO5O and officerm)5 1, testified
that during the February 1998 Intervention AFRC personnel retreated from Freetown
towards Kabala. When the witness was in Kabala, he saw KBC, an AFRC member, crossing
over to Guinea with other former SLA members, as most SLAs did.l0°52
4506. In March/April 1999,10053 KBC arrived in Newton, where AFRC forces and the
witness were, with a group comprised of four "SLAs", including KBC, two RUF members,
and two 10 year-old SBUs who KBC took from the RUF side in the Kono area and who
were carrying "AKs". The group came together with Captain Hindolo Trye and was well
armed.lOO54 KBC explained to the ARFC forces in Newton that he had fled from Guinea to
Liberia since the Guinean authorities arrested senior Sierra Leonean commanders - "if you
were an SLA you would be arrested". KBC said that in Liberia, Charles Taylor called the
former SLA members, organized, armed and sent them to Mosquito in Kailahun to reinforce
mw TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5091-5094 (CS).
mom Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7867, 7869; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp.
8684, 8689.
Wm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865-7866.
*0052 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8401.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8404.
my Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8403-8404.

---- End of Page 1545 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol-T (PA 18 May 2012

the Junta troops in Freetown. KBC said that the group of SLAs sent by Taylor from Liberia
included "many",{0000 and was "a strong manpower"{0000.
4507. According to KBC, his group came during the preparations to advance to Kono,
participated in the successful attack to capture Kono, and then attempted to get to Freetown
and reinforce the forces there. However, KBC explained that his group, including the four
SLAs, was unable to get to Freetown and did not participate in the Freetown lnvasion as
they were "delayed;" during their advancement towards Freetown, they attacked areas in
which ECOMOG forces were deployed. Therefore, some of the men were deployed in
targeted areas, such as Kono, Makeni, Magburaka and Matotoka, for any counter attacks by
ECOMOG forces. KBC said that he arrived in Newton due to his determination, as he
wanted the forces to know that he did not run away and could not come to reinforce them in
Freetown due to these "delays".{0007
4508. KBC's group stayed with the witness's forces until the ceasefire in 2000, when the
West Side Boys were arrested in Freetown. During that period the forces based in Newton,
including KBC's group, organized patrols as that was the time of the peace negotiations.{0000
4509. Bobson Sesay also testified that he met the Accused in early August 1999, after the
signing of the Lomé Peace Accord, in the President's office in Monrovia. The meeting was
also attended by Johnny Paul Koroma, Bazzy, Junior Lion, Major Gbonkelenkeh and Hassan
Papa Bangura (a.k.a Bomb Blast),{0009 Liberia's Defence Minister, Daniel Chea, and Momoh
Gibba who was Taylor's "aide-de-camp".{0000 During the meeting Taylor expressed his
concem over the division between the RUF and the APRC. Taylor said that he has been
giving assistance to the AFRC/RUF in order for them to remove Kabbah's government. He
stated that he had been mobilizing "most of the SLAs" who came to Liberia and sent them to
reinforce "you there".{000{ Taylor said that he gave safe passage to "SLAs" who came from
{0055 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8400-8404; Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8795;
Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8402-8405; Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8436-8437.
{0050 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8797-8800.
{0057 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8400-8402, 8404; Transcript 29 April 2008, pp.
8795-8800.
{0050 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008. pp. 8402-8405; Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8436-
8437.
{0059 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008. p. 8494.
{0000 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008. pp. 8496, 8503-8504.
{000{ Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8503-8506 (Taylor also said that he had supplied the
forces with arms and ammunition and food).

---- End of Page 1546 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gu /0/ 18 May 2012

3 76 39
Guinea, made sure that they were not arrested, ordered that they be reorganized and sent
them to Mosquito in Kailahun so that they could join the troops that advanced towards
Freetown. Taylor also said that he had been co—ordinating the supplies — arms, ammunition
and "even food" so they could remove the Government of Tejan Kabbah in Freetown.
Taylor said that he wanted these men to join "the troops coming forwards" Freetown and
overthrow the Government. That invasion eventually occurred on January 6.lOO62
4510. On cross—examination the witness agreed that the meeting with the Accused was an
official matter, coordinated by the governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia. He confirmed
his prior statement that the "SLAs" who travelled to Liberia for this meeting sought
assurances from the Liberian government as it had influence over the RUF. The witness
explained that the assurances they were seeking were due to fear of the RUF which had
"strong comrections in Liberia". The witness also confirmed his prior statement that during
the meeting Taylor said he hoped peace between the RUF and the AFRC could be achieved.
The witness agreed that Taylor was facilitating peace between the RUF and the AFRC, but
explained that if the meeting was meant to be with a peace mediator other countries could
have invited the delegation. The reason they met with Taylor was because he "had direct
influence on the AFRC and the RUF".lOO°3
Prosecution Witness TF1—539
4511. Witness TF1—539 testified that he left Sierra Leone and entered Lofa in Liberia three
months after the Intervention. Three months later, the witness went to reside in Duala,
around Monrovia.lOO64 The witness stayed in Duala until 6 January 1999,mO65 and then
moved to Congo Town.1OO66 While in Congo Town, the witness was arrested by Joseph
Marzah, who had suspected the witness of being a spy sent by Kabbah's government in
Sierra Leone to find out whether Taylor's government was supporting the RUF/ SLA. After
the witness denied the allegation, Marzah told the witness that he was in charge of the
IOM Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8509-8515 (The witness knew the Accused referred
to the January 6 invasion since Bockarie told them that reinforcement was coming and Taylor confirmed that he
sent to Mosquito in Kailahun the "SLAs" who had surrendered to support the advance towards Freetown).
mm Alimamy Bobson sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8593-8596.
"""4 TFl-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11400-11401.
*0065 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11403-11405.
‘°""6 TFl-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11407.

---- End of Page 1547 ---------------------------


Case No.; sCsL-03-01-T ’ 18 May 2012
4 / %

"Death Squad" and that if he found that the witness was in fact a spy he would kill him.[[[[[[’7
The witness later on met the Accused at his mansion in Monrovia.[O[[68
4512. The witness testified that after he left the mansion with Joseph Marzah he ran into
Foday Kallon, who was a lieutenant in the Sierra Leonean Army before they "fled". The
witness told Kallon that the man accompanying him, Marzah, was a powerful man whom
the witness had come to fear. The witness informed Kallon that Marzah was in charge of the
"Death Squad" and that Marzah had killed Moses Kabia (a.k.a. Rambo). The witness then
asked Kallon to "save" him by informing ECOMOG or the American embassy so that the
witness could go there "for rescue". Marzah then approached the witness and Kallon and
told the witness that they should go. The witness and Marzah then left. [[[[[69
4513. Foday Kallon told the witness that Mosquito had appointed him, Captain Bakarr and
Captain Hindolo to mobilize men, "strong fighters who were interested", to go and join
forces with ‘"the other men there to fight and be able to gain more grounds from ECOMOG
and the government". Kallon said he went to the refugee camp.[[[[[7[[ The witness then
described going on a trip to Burkina Faso[[[[[7[ in March 1999.[[[[m
4514. On cross-examination the witness said that the trip to Burkina Faso took place at the
end of l998.[0[m ln a prior statement the witness stated that the trip took place in around
May 1998. The witness stated that he recalled that the trip took place in 1998 but denied
giving his investigators a specific date. [0074
4515. On re-examination the witness stated that the flight to Burkina Faso took place in
1999.[[[[[75 The witness also acknowledged that while he can recall important events, he
cannot recall specific dates. [0076
[0067 TF1—539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11412-1 1413.
*0000 TF1—539, Transcript 10 Jupp 2008, p. 11469.
*0000 TF1—539, Transcript 10 Jppp 2008, pp. 114'/2-11473.
[0070 TF1—539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11473.
*00** TF1—539, Transcript 10 Jupp 2008, p. 11478.
*00*0 TF1—539, Transcript 11 Jump 2008, p. 11509.
[0073 TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11690.
*00** TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008,p. 11697.
*00*0 TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11720.
*00*0 TF1—539, Transcript 12 Jppp 2008, p. 11722.

---- End of Page 1548 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T @,5 // 18 May 2012 _

5 6/64/
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -590
4516. Witness TF1-590 testified that he fled from Kenema when he was 26 in fear of
Kamajors and Nigerian-led forces who were on their way, according to mmours.lO077 He fled
along with his pregnant wife and three of his brothers.lO078 VVhen they got to Bomaru, at the
border of Sierra Leone, there were thousands of refugees from Kenema and the surrounding
area trying to cross the Sierra Leone-Liberian border. There were also hundreds of RUF
rebels and AFRC soldiers. The refugees were detained, searched and some had property
taken away. Sometimes people had to give money before they could cross,l0079 including the
witness and his family. mom
4517. After the witness and his family crossed the border, they encountered a checkpoint
on the Liberian side. There, the Liberian security forces took property from the refugees and
demanded money before they could cross. The witness "used" his wife's pregnancy and
crossed with the help of the ICRC. They then got to Vahun. They were in Vahun for a week,
during which security forces harassed and intimidated civilians. Civilians were arrested,
especially men and young boys and girls, in order to force them to go back to Sierra Leone
and fight or be used in any other form that could benefit the security forces. The security
forces included the RUF, AFRC, Special Operation Division of the Liberian police (SOD)
and other security forces from the Liberian police. 10081
4518. The witness himself was arrested and detained for the same purpose by SODs, RUF
and Liberian security forces. He was.taken to the police station in the centre of the town and
was held for about an hour. The witness and the other detained persons were then told to go
to a meeting. The witness was not told the reason for the meeting. The witness was released
from detention but refused to attend the meeting. He and his family left for Kolahun the next
day, realizing Vahun was not a safe place. H)082
4519. VVhen they reached Kolahun they saw thousands of refugees and were discouraged
since the refugees in Kolahun told them that there was harassment and violence there. Since
Wm TF1-590, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11732-11734; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11907-11908.
mm TF1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11951.
mw TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11748-11749.
10080 TF1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11952-11953.
mg} TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11749-11751.
mm TF1-590. Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11750-11751; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11921-11923.

---- End of Page 1549 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ··{l§ 18 May 2012

jp 7 642
that was what the witness and his family were running from, they decided immediately to go
to Voinjama, and left for Voinj ama the same day. Nm}
4520. The witness and his family arrived in Voinjama on 27 February 199840084 There
were NGO's and other Sierra Leonean refugees. The witness's family was helped by a
Liberian woman who hosted them. They then moved to a house on the other side of
Voinjama, in the Mandingo quarter. There were two parts in Voinjama which had both
cultural and political differences: on the one side there was the Loma etlmic goup, which
was comprised of Christians and was mainly in support of the NPFL and the Taylor
administration. On the other side there was the Mandingo etlmic goup, a Muslim goup,
which was in support of the former ULIMO and Alhaji Kromah. IOOSS
4521. Around two months after he arrived in Voinjama, the witness opened a small kiosk
in Voinjama. His business thrived and everybody in the community used it: refugees,
civilians, travellers, security forces including the RUF, police, SOD, SSS, ATUs,
immigation and custom officers, Liberians. The ATU was a Liberian security force
commanded by Chucky Taylor, Charles Taylor's son. The witness was able to distinguish
between these goups as they had clear distinct identification features: the SODs wore black
overalls, the SSS wore a blue camouflage—like uniform, the "ATUs" wore American-like
camouflage, and the immigation and custom officers wore civilian dress. The RUF
r personnel wore half camouflage, half civilian dress, and would be easily identifiable as they
spoke Sierra Leonean tribal languages, such as Mende and Temne. 10086 These security forces
would come to the witness’ kiosk and discuss the situation in Sierra Leone. The witness
would either hear them talking amongst themselves or they would discuss it with him and
with other people in the kiosk.
4522. At one point in time an RUF commander named CO Victor, a Sierra Leonean, told
the witness that he was there to recruit people to go and train in Gbarnga in Liberia for four
weeks and thereafter go to Sierra Leone to fight. Those who signed the contract for this
particular mission received $USD 500 to EBUS 1,000. Half of the sum was given to them
before they went for training and the rest of the amount was to be given to them after they
{0083 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11752-11753.
{0084 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11758.
[0085 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11753-11754; Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11834.
{0086 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11754—11759; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11953-11956.

---- End of Page 1550 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T qt 18 May 2012

561 6 43
have finished the training. Victor told the witness that before they could sign this particular
contract they had to meet with Chucky Taylor. At this time, CO Victor was with another
Sierra Leonean RUF officer called CO Vandi, and some ATU and SOD members. CO
Victor's primary responsibility was to recruit people. The recruitment was done either by
encouragement or forcefully. When it was done forcefully, the SOD, the Liberian Police
soldiers and the RUF would arrest people and take them to Sierra Leone to fight.101187
4523. The witness personally knew people who signed the contract CO Victor had told him
about. After these people signed the contract they had money and would come to the
witness's kiosk to purchase drinks and cigarettes and would leave some money with their
relatives before they would go. After they would leave, the witness never saw them
again.1111188 The witness knew about people being forced to go to Sierra Leone from people
who visited his kiosk. When people were arrested the word spread to others who were then
able to hide until the tension cooled down. Those who refused to go to Sierra Leone were
subjected to molestation, looting, beatings, detention. The witness himself was a victim of
that "situation" and was subjected to daily intimidation and threats of arrest. This was
threatening as arrested people would sometimes never come back. The witness therefore
needed to go into hiding at times.1111189
4524. There were a lot of RUF men in Voinjama. In September 1998, the witness saw
General Mosquito, the leader of the RUF at the time, coming to Voinjama. Mosquito came
from Sierra Leone and went through Voinjama on his way to Monrovia. Two weeks later,
Mosquito returned to Voinjama with a convoy. The convoy included Chucky Taylor and an
aide to President Charles Taylor, who was a special protocol officer named Campare, a
Gambiarr.111111)11 The convoy also included two Arab men and some ATU, SSS, some members
of the AFRC and the RUF.1111191 These security men were in Voinjama mainly in order to
recruit people to undergo commando training in Gbarnga and then go to Sierra Leone. RUF
members in Voinjama were in "good numbers". They had big guns on their vehicles and
carried small rifles.1111192 The witness saw Mosquito, Chucky Taylor, Campare and others on
1111187 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11759-11763; 11766-11768.
101188 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11766-11768.
11111119 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11768-11771; 11775-11776.
1011911 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11789.
101191 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11763-11766.
111092 TF1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11833.

---- End of Page 1551 ---------------------------


Case No.: . - - - 1

25 46 44
their last day in Voinjama after they had spent one to two weeks there. They were walking
down the road, close to the witness’ kiosk. Mosquit0 talked with some Sierra Leonean
people. The convoy then drove towards Sierra Leone. 10093
4525. In February 1999, security forces came to the witness’ kiosk to arrest the witness, but
he was not there. His kiosk was then looted and the witness’ brother who was in the kiosk
was arrested by "the regular police in Liberia". The brother was taken to the police station.
The witness’ wife came to where the witness was staying, told him that his brother was
arrested and that he should not go h0me or to his kiosk as there were "securities" there. The
witness and his wife then asked the help of the w0man who hosted them in the beginning in
Voinjama. She contacted her uncle and they went to the police station. They neg0tiated with
the police officer to release the witness’ brother, but the police would not release the brother
unless the witness surrendered himself. The witness knew he could not surrender himself as
he would be forced to go and fight in Sierra Leone. They managed to release the witness’
brother by paying the police off His brother then left for Monrovia while the witness left
Voinjama and went to the refugee camp in Kolahun which was safer. They were in refugee
Camp 2 in Kolahun, and the witness was registered as a refugee with the UNHCR. The
refugee camp was safer since, as the witness understood, it was "established" to the
"Liberian security" that the refugee camp should be respected. The "Liberian security"
therefore never went to the refugee camp to arrest people 0penly. 10094
4526. In April 1999, fighting broke out in Voinjama while the witness was in Kolahun. The
witness did not know who the attackers were. The attack was repelled by security forces in
Liberia with "some RUF". The witness knew RUF forces were involved because he was told
as much by his wife when he met up with his family after the attack. He saw RUF soldiers at
the checkpoints alongside the security forces.lOO95 The witness then went to Voinjama since
his wire was there. They then decided to flee for Monrovia. There were thousands of people
fleeing from Voinjama. The following morning, they headed to the Monrovia Highway
towards Gbarnga. They reached a checkpoint at St Paul River Bridge on 18 April 1999. At
the checkpoint, the men were separated from women, children under the age of 10 and
elderly people. S0me of the men who were detained at the checkpoint were taken behind the
mlm TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11768.
mlm TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11776-11779; Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 11884.
IOM TF1—590, Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11833; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11941-11942.

---- End of Page 1552 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T GQ; / 18 May 2012

37 6 45
Military Police office. The security forces then asked the men to be a part of the fight they
were engaged in. Refusing would be the equivalent of opposing. Those who refused to
retum to Voinjama were set aside. H)096
4527. The witness was in the group of men who refused to take part in the fighting, along
with more than 50 other men. After some time, three range rovers and one SUV jeep arrived
with Chucky Taylor and the Demon Forces. Chucky Taylor was angry. He stood in front of
the group and said that he had heard that there were "rebels and Kamajors" in the group.
Chucky Taylor said that those who were rebels or Kamajors should come forward. There
was no movement in the group. Chucky then pointed at 4 people, shot each of them in the
head and killed them all. Chucky's men took the bodies to the St Paul River and beheaded
them. The heads were hung on the checkpoints. One of the heads was placed on one of the
Cars. 10097
4528. The witness was then taken to Gbatala base in Monrovia where he was severely
tortured for 5 days by ATU members commanded by Chucky Taylor. The group including
the witness initially comprised of 10 to 15 men, but decreased as several men were brutally
ki11€d.'°""8
4529. After his second attempt to escape, the witness was caught by a group of ATU
members. The witness and another man were brought back to the camp where Chucky and
Campare were. Campare wanted to kill the witness and the other man. The two were then
heavily tortured.lO099 There was another soldier present who had received a message from
the Papay, Charles Taylor. The soldier said that Charles Taylor wanted to see the men. A
third man was then brought and the three men were tortured again. The three men were then
tied up in a painful manner called "tie-bay", blindfolded with a hood and loaded onto
j€€pS'i0100
IOOQ6 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11780-11782; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11962-11963.
mw TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11782-11785; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11962-11963.
mm TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11785-11787; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11963-11966;
Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 11984-11987.
mow TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11809-11810.
WOO TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11813-11814; Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11836-11839.

---- End of Page 1553 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GB 18 May 2012

4530. The "ATUs" took the three men to Monrovia in the evening and they arrived in
Monrovia around midnight.lOlOl They were taken directly to Charles Taylor's compound in
Congo Town.mlO2 By this time, the witness's hood had fallen off and he was able to see his
surroundings. After some time, Charles Taylor emerged with 4 to 5 officials.lOlO3 Charles
Taylor was dressed casually when the witness first saw him, in "like pyjamas or something
not officially dressed". The witness and the two other men were naked. mm
4531. When Charles Taylor came, he told an ATU member to remove the sellotape from
1 the mouths of the three men. Charles Taylor asked if these were the guys "who refused to go
to their country and fight when they were most needed". The prisoners said nothing. Charles
Taylor then asked if they were Karnajors sent to overthrow his government. The witness
tried to reply that he was not but was beaten by a bodyguard when trying to speak. All three
said they were Sierra Leonean registered refugees and they did not know anything about
what Charles Taylor was asking.lOlO5 The witness explained that Kamajors were members of
a militia group in Sierra Leone and were not in Liberia. The accusation of being a rebel or a
Karnajor was used to justify arrest and punishment for refusing to comply with security
forces’ orders.lOm6
4532. Charles Taylor then said that if they refused to tell the truth they would be taken to
the beach and beheaded. Then Daniel Chea, the Liberian Defence Minister, said that the
risoners should not be killed but should rather be used to et information from them. The
P 8
Defence Minister said that if the prisoners were to be killed, they should have been killed
where they came from.lOm7 The witness and the two other prisoners were taken to Barclay
Training Centre (BTC), the APL's headquarters, a military barracks in Monrovia.lOlO8 The
three men were eventually released by the UNHCR from the BTC on 20 May 1999. The
witness has still not fully recovered from his injuries.lOlO9
*0*0* T1¤1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11819-11820.
mm The witness only leamed that this was Taylor"s compound later when he was at Barclay Training Centre,
the headquarters of the AF L, a military barracks/ garrison in Monrovia.
*0*00 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11814-11815.
*0*00 T1¤1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11839-11840.
MOS TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11815-1 1816; Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11838.
*0*00 T1¤1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11836-11838, 11840.
*0*0* TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11816-11817.
mm TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11817; Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 11987.-11991.
IOW) TF1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11841-11846, 11857—11862, 11864-11865. The witness produced

---- End of Page 1554 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

4533. The witness stated that he was targeted because he repeatedly refused the order to go
to be trained in Gbamga in the past.l0l 10
4534. On cross-examination the witness acknowledged that he had spoken to United States
prosecutors for proceedings against Chucky Taylor in Miamiwl ll
4535. On cross-examination the witness was asked to describe Charles Taylor's compound.
The witness stated that the house was fenced and there were "securities" all around, but he
could not describe the building or a fountain which was located in the compound. The
witness explained that while sitting in the jeep within the compound he was being beaten
and was not observing his surroundingswl I2
4536. On re-examination the witness explained that while he was in Charles Taylor's
com ound in Monrovia he concentrated on whether or not he would live. When Charles
P
Taylor came, the witness was directed to look at Taylor. They were looking at him when he
was speaking.l0l I3
The Accused
4537. In relation to the testimony of TFI-362, the Accused testified that there was no
fighting on the border between Gbamga and Sierra Leone in I998 and therefore this
evidence is a fab1·ication.lOH4 The Accused denied that he sent the 62 SLA men to be trained
and questioned why trained men from the Sierra Leonean army would need to be
trained.lOll5
4538. The Accused said he was not aware that members of the SLA were entering Liberia
from Guinea following the ECOMOG Intervention in February I998. He argued that people
came in and out of Liberia all the time. He argued that if they came from Guinea they were
a photograph taken at a refugee camp following his release showing markings to his arms (Exhibit P—l4l
(confidential)).
""'" ri¤1-590,rrrrrrS6rrpr I6 June 2008,p. 11967.
mm TFI-590, Transcript I6 June 2008, p. II866—I I907, II933—I I937; Transcript I7 June 2008, pp. ll997—
I200I.
""'2 TFI-590, Transcript I7 June 2008, pp. 11980-1 I984.
'°'" TFI—590, Transcript I7 June 2008, pp. I2028—I2030.
ml M Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 262I9,
[OHS Charles Ghankay Taylor, T ramcript I6 September 2009, pp. 29064—29065.

---- End of Page 1555 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0]-T V! I8 May 20I2

a 4 6 4f?
not armed, and as ordinary civilians Liberian security personnel would not stop them.11)116
The Accused further stated that he did not know that the Guineans were arresting SLA and
that it was not public knowledge. 101 17
4539. The Accused denied that he organized, armed and sent SLAs to Mosquito, or that he
sent men to Sierra Leone prior to the attack on Kono. He denied using SLAs as mercenaries,
saying that he did not even know that SLAs were in Liberia.11)118
4540. The Accused agreed that a meeting took place in August 1999 at the Executive
Mansion with members of the AFRC, his Defence Minister and his aide—de—camp, Momo
Dgiba. He could not recall, but did not dispute, that Alimamy Bobson Sesay attended the
meeting.11)119 The Accused questioned why would he tell a delegation a week af`ter he met
Johnny Paul Koroma that he had helped the AFRC, as Johnny Paul Koroma would have
known of any assistance given to the AF RC by the Accused and would have thanked him.
The Accused said at this point in time the AF RC and the RUF were not working together
and that he asked the delegation how the dispute between the AF RC and the RUF could be
resolved. The Accused stated that this was an ofHcial meeting for which the delegation was
flown to Liberia by ECOMOG and the UN on a plane which included Tejan Kabbah's
protocol officer. He argued that he would not have said that he helped the AFRC in an
official meeting. All he said was that the RUF and the AF RC needed to stay together. The
Accused asserted that at this meeting he offered to help the AF RC in the political process.
That is why he was able to negotiate a position for Koroma and a position for the SLA. The
Accused further asserted that he did not do it alone, that Kabbah and Eyadema, ECOWAS’
chairman, were involved, and that it was done with the knowledge of the United Nations. He
re—asserted that it was a known "situation"— freeing the UN personnel, removing Koroma
"from the bush", bringing him to Monrovia, bringing "these boys" from Okra Hills to
Monrovia, setting the peace so by the time Foday Sankoh got to Monrovia in September,
Taylor had brought them together, and got them all back into Freetown in order to
implement the Lomé peace agreement. There was nothing unofficial. 10120
10116 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 30002-30003.
111111 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 30004.
101111 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 30002, 30004-30006.
111110 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 30026.
10120 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 30017-30020, 30022-30025.

---- End of Page 1556 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ok 18 May 2012

2 as 49
4541. In regard to the testimony of TF1—590, the Accused denied sending a message asking
to see the witness, and stated that he never knew whether an individual was arrested unless it
was a national security issuelom
4542. The Accused denied that TF1—590 and the two captured men were brought to see him
and denied saying that they should be killed, stating that had he given such an order those
men would have been killed and his order would not have been overridden by an "ordinary"
security man. mm The Accused stated that it was incomprehensible that a prisoner would be
beaten in front of him, and said that he is cultured enough not to come outside in his
pyjamaslom The Accused also noted TFl—590's inability to describe his house where the
meeting allegedly occurred. IO lm
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4543. Witness Issa Sesay testified that during the ECOMOG and Kamajor attack on Daru
most of the SLAs crossed over to Liberia. They started crossing over even after the start of
the Intervention in Kenema, but the last group crossed over after the fall of Daru, around
February/March 1998. Around September 1998, Sam Bockarie sent a radio message to
Bomaru asking that Foday Kallon report to Buedu. Kallon passed through Pendembu where
Sesay was based and told Sesay that Bockarie had invited him. Kallon went to Buedu, where
Bockarie sent him to go to Liberia and invite SLAs who were based in Vahun, Kolahun and
Foya to return to Sierra Leone. Kallon brought 15 to 20 SLAs from Vahun to Nomaru and
they met Sesay in Pendembu. After Sesay infomred Bockarie that the men had arrived,
Bockarie instructed Sesay to send the 15 to 20 SLAs to two weeks of training at Bunumbu.
After their training, the men came back to Pendembu. Two of the men stayed in Pendembu,
while Sesay deployed the others in Kuiva, Mobai and Baiima. M25
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 November 2009, pp. 30959-30961.
'("22 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 3 November 2009, pp. 30961-30963.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 November 2009, pp. 30964-30965.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 November 2009, p. 30962.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45170-45172 (PS); Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp.
46685-46686.

---- End of Page 1557 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ Ol" 18 May 2012 %

3765 O
4544. According to Sesay, Bockarie ordered that the men be trained since they were in
Liberia from March until September while not taking part in combat. They therefore needed
to first be trained before being sent to the front lines.lOl26 A
4545. Sesay called TF1—362's account that he told Pearson that Bockarie said Taylor told
him to train the 62 SLAs to open the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia "a black lie",
as far as what he heard. There was no war in Liberia in 1998. There was therefore no need to
fight in Liberia in order to open the border. Sesay himself went to Monrovia in April 1998
with a civilian vehicle.l0m
4546. When describing what led to the death of Colonel Foday Kallon, a former SLA,
Sesay stated that around mid—1998, Bockarie invited Kallon to Buedu. Kallon passed
through Pendembu where he met Sesay and told Sesay he was going to meet Sam Bockarie,
after he received a message that Bockarie wanted to see him. Kallon then continued on to
Buedu and met Bockarie. Bockarie told Kallon to go to Liberia, to Kolahun, Vahun and the
surrounding areas, and try to assemble the SLAs who had crossed to Liberia in
February/March 1998 "for them to come back". Kallon crossed to Liberia and went to
Kolahun and Vahun. He brought with him 15 SLAs or more and came to Pendembu. Kallon
told Sesay to inform Bockarie that he had fulfilled the mission Bockarie had given him.
Sesay then sent a message to Bockarie who instructed Sesay to send the soldiers to the
training base, "to go and exercise" before being sent to the front lines. Bockarie then called
Kallon to come to Buedu. Kallon went to Buedu and returned to Baiwala through
Pendembu, where he met Sesay around September. Around November, before Bockarie
"went on a trip" Bockarie called Kallon again. Kallon went through Pendembu, where Sesay
saw him, and continued to Buedu. Bockarie told Kallon to go to Liberia again, and so Kallon
went. Bockarie then went on a trip to Monrovia. While in Monrovia on the way to Burkina
Faso, in early December, Bockarie sent Sesay a message that Kallon should be arrested
when he returned to Sierra Leone until Bockarie retumed. When Kallon came, he said he
was unable to "get men this time". VVhen Sesay told Kallon that he had received orders to
arrest him and asked Kallon what he had done, Kallon said that he did not know. Sesay did
not arrest Kallon as Kallon was Sesay's wife's uncle, but he told him to stay in Buedu until
Bockarie returned, and Kallon agreed. Kallon stayed in Buedu for about a week until
W6 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45171—45172 (PS).
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45173—45174 (PS).

---- End of Page 1558 ---------------------------


Case No.

5 67 6 5 f
Bockarie retumed. When Bockarie retumed he said that bodyguards such as Junior Vandi
and one of Bockarie's bodyguards had told him, Bockarie, that Kallon had gone to the Sierra
Leonean embassymm which meant that Kallon was collaborating with the SLPP. Bockarie
then took his pistol and shot Kallon to death.lOl29 Sesay did not know why Junior Vandi was
at the Sierra Leonean embassy, but surmised they were there as civilians rather than RUF
members to avoid detection. They may have been visiting some fellow Mende tribesmen who
were working there. Sesay did not know whether the infomation that Kallon was seen at the
embassy was given to Bockarie by Liberian intelligence.l0l30
4547. On cross—examination Sesay said that Kallon, a Sierra Leonean, was successful in
recruiting SLAs who were in Vahun and a few who were in Foya, in Liberia, to retum to
Sierra Leone. Kallon went to Liberia two times. The first time he brought 15 to 20 SLAs.
Sesay did not know how Kallon convinced them to retum to Sierra Leone. Sesay did not
hear about Liberian securities arresting them or Kallon. Sesay could not recall whether
Kallon brought men with him during the second time, when Bockarie instructed Sesay to
arrest Kallon. Kallon was not sent to Monrovia but Sesay later leamed from Bockarie that
Kallon had gone to Monrovia and that someone saw Kallon at the Sierra Leonean
embassy.l0m ln the RUF trial, Sesay had said that on the second occasion Kallon brought 7
men with him.lOl32
4548. Bockarie did not "do anything" to Junior Vandi. Junior Vandi was Sankoh's
bodyguard, who was with Bockarie. Junior Vandi and another of Bockarie's bodyguards
saw Kallon at the embassy. Bockarie did not do anything to them since they were the ones
who gave Bockarie the information.l0m'
4549. Sesay confirmed that Captain Bakarr was an SLA officer who was brought back by
Kallon. He stated that he left Bakarr in Buedu when he went to Kono. Bakarr was at Daru
Barracks throughout the war. Sesay was asked where Bakarr was in 1998 and 1999. He
replied that he left him in Pendembu when he went to Kono. Sesay escaped the attack on
Img The witness initially testified that it was the American Embassy but corrected himself (Issa Sesay,
Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45633-45634).
mm Issa Sesay, 'Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45631-4563}
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46688—46690.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46685—46686.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46691—46692.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46690—46691. p

---- End of Page 1559 ---------------------------


Case No.:SCSL—03-01-T % 18 May 2012

Makeni in April, and on his return from Makeni Bakarr was in Segbwema. Sometime in
1999, Bakarr went to Freetown. mm
4550. Sesay understood that the soldiers Kallon brought back to Sierra Leone wanted to
return but asked for a "word of confidence" which Kallon gave them. Sesay's friend,
Kantus,lOl35 told Sesay after he returned that "business was difficult" in Vahun. IOH6
4551. ln re-examination, Sesay explained that Vahun in Liberia is nine miles away from
Bomaru in Sierra Leone, that Kolahun is 17 miles from the Sierra Leonean border and that
Foya is seven miles from the border. Other than SLAs who fled to Liberia, thousands of
Sierra Leoneam civilian refugees lived in Vahun, while hundreds of thousands of Sierra
Leonean civilian refugees were in Kolahun. Civilians fled to Liberia through Kailahun and
Bomam during the Intervention. Civilians fled from Kenema, "from around Tongo",
Segbwema, Mano Junction, "up to Daru" and its surroundings. Those thousands of people
were allowed access to Liberia as refugees. Refugee camps were set up in Vahun and
Kolahun. Sesay stated that after the Lomé Accord "the Liberians" allowed the refugees to
return to Sierra Leone. Sesay then agreed that the Sierra Leonean refugees along the Sierra
Leone·Liberian border could go easily in and out of Sierra Leone. There was a trade taking
place at the border where civilians met the refugees and traded with them. mm
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
4552. Witness Sam Kolleh confirmed that Captain Bakarr was one of the SLAs brought
back from Liberia to rejoin the AFRC/RUF forces but could not recall who brought him
back. He only knew that Bakarr tried to bring people into Sierra Leone. IOM
Deliberations
4553. The Prosecution submits that the Accused reorganised, anned and sent former SLA
soldiers who fled to Liberia back to Sierra Leone to fight, as well as forcing Sierra Leonean
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46693.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46686.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46693.
mm rugs Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47255—47258.
mm Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, pp. 48792-48793.

---- End of Page 1560 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

5 Q 6 53
civilians residing in Liberia, including refugees, to return to Sierra Leone to fight.l0l39 The
Trial Chamber will first address the allegation as it relates to SLA soldiers.
4554. The prosecution primarily relies on the testimonies of TF 1-362 and Alimamy
Bobson Sesay. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that TF 1-362 and Alimamy Bobson
Sesay are generally credible witnesses.l0l40
4555. Prosecution witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay gave evidence that when he met with
the Accused in around August 1999 the Accused told him that he had given safe passage to
SLA members after the Intervention, ordered that they be reorganized, and armed and sent
them to Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) in Kailahun in order to support the advance towards
Freetown. mm Bobson Sesay did not mention in one of his prior statements that the Accused
sent the former SLA soldiers back to Sierra Leone, or that they were sent to support the
advance towards Freetown, but the Trial Chamber accepts his explanation that he answered
questions as they were posed and that the investigator did not ask him to elaborate on this
matter at the time of that statement. The Trial Chamber notes that he did mention his
meeting with the Accused. mm
4556. In addition to this evidence that the Accused later told him he had sent SLA soldiers
back to Sierra Leone to fight, Bobson Sesay also testified that after the Freetown invasion he
met one of these soldiers, who was part of the group of men sent by Taylor. The former SLA
soldier named KBC arrived with a group of 8 men in Newton in March/April 1999: four
"SLAs" including himself, two RUF SBUs, and two RUF members. KBC told Bobson
Sesay that the group had fled to Liberia after the ECOMOG Intervention, and that Charles
Taylor had called them, organized, armed and sent them to Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) in
Kailahun to reinforce the advance towards Freetown.l0l43 They arrived before the attack on
Kono.
'°'3° Prosecution Final Trial Brici paras 3, 190, 286, 327.
{0140 Credibility Assessment, TF1-362, paras 244-253; Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras
agi 28ri1imamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8496, 8503-8504, 8509-8515.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8586-8589, 8596-8597, 8601.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8404.

---- End of Page 1561 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QM 18 May 2012

3 96 54
4557. The Accused denied that he regrouped, armed and sent former SLA members back to
Sierra Leone to fight.l0M4 He maintained that he would not have admitted to doing so in an
official meeting known to the international community.lO 145 Bobson Sesay acknowledged
that the meeting was an official meeting, coordinated by the governments of Sierra Leone
and Liberia, and that during the meeting Taylor said he hoped peace between the RUF and
the AFRC could be achieved.lOl46 The Trial Chamber does not find this argument of the
Accused convincing. The fact that it was an official meeting is not dispositive of whether or
not Taylor mentioned in the meeting his sending former SLA soldiers to fight in Sierra
Leone. The Trial Chamber considers that it is not only plausible but even likely that while
trying to mend the rift between the AFRC and the RUF in a meeting with an AFRC
delegation, the Accused would have recalled to the delegation that he had supported their
attempt to overthrow the Government of Tej an Kabbah in Freetown.
4558. Bobson Sesay testified that the group sent by the Accused came together with
Captain Hindolo Trye.l0l47 This evidence is supported by the testimony of Prosecution
witness TF1-539, who testified that after he met the Accused at the Accused's residence, the
witness ran into Foday Kallon in Monrovia. Kallon told the witness that Bockarie (a.k.a.
Mosquito) had appointed him, Captain Bakarr and Captain Hindolo to mobilize men who
were interested to go and fight in Sierra Leone.lOl48 The Trial Chamber also notes that
Bakarr, mentioned by TF1-539, was also named by Defence witness Sam Kolleh, who
confirmed in his testimony that Bakarr was responsible for bringing men back to Sierra
Leone.lm49
4559. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-539 recalls its finding that TF1-539's evidence
requires corroboration,lOl50 and notes that he was confused with regard to the timing of when
he met Foday Kallon in Monrovia. He stated that he met Kallon before going on a trip to
Burkina Faso, and gave different time periods for the trip to Burkina Faso in his direct,l0l5l
IOM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 30002, 30004-30006.
WMS Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 30022-30025.
IOM Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8593-8596.
10147 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8402-8405; Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8436-
TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11473.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010. p. 46693; Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, pp. 48792-
i§;)93·Credibi1ity Assessment, TF1-539 paras 296-303.
mm TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11403-11405; Transcript 11 June 2008, p. 11509.

---- End of Page 1562 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
as Jg

3 7 6 55
cross,lOl52 and re-examination.lOl53 The Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-539 conceded that he
had a problem with remembering dates,l0l54 but the witness's testimony that he met Foday
Kallon in Monrovia in late 1998 is consistent with the testimonies of Alimamy Bobson
Sesay and Issa Sesay.
4560. TF 1-539 testiiied that when he met Foday Kallon in Monrovia, he asked Kallon to
go to the American embassy or ECOMOG and inquire whether the witness could seek
refuge there, as Joseph Marzah, who was accompanying him, was a dangerous man and
suspected the witness of being a spy.lOl55 The Trial Chamber notes that this testimony is
consistent and accords with the testimony of Defence witness Issa Sesay, who described the
killing of Foday Kallon upon Kallon's retum to Sierra Leone from the assignment given to
him by Bockarie to bring back men to Sierra Leone from Liberia as related to the fact that,
according to Sesay, Bockarie killed Kallon after he was told by bodyguards that Kallon was
seen at the Sierra Leonean embassy in Monrovia, and Bockarie therefore suspected him of
being a traitor. According to TF 1-539, Marzah suspected him of being a spy, and he had
asked Kallon to help him find refuge. Subsequently, according to Issa Sesay, Kallon was
suspected of being a spy and killed for this reason.
4561. Issa Sesay stated that Bockarie retumed from his trip a week after Foday Kallon
retumed from Liberia. 10156 The Trial Chamber has found that Bockarie retumed from
Burkina F aso at the end of November/early December 1998.mm This evidence supports the
account of Alimamy Bobson Sesay that the group of SLA men sent by the Accused for the
advance towards Freetown arrived in Kailahun during the preparations to attack Kono,
which occurred in or around mid-December 1998.
4562. Based on the direct evidence of Bobson Sesay that the Accused sent former SLA
soldiers to support the advance towards Freetown, his evidence from one of these soldiers
that the group of men arrived with Hindolo Trye in Kailahun prior to the attack on Kono
which occurred in or around mid-December 1998, the evidence of TF1-539 that Foday
Kallon was in Monrovia with Captain Hindolo to mobilize men back to Sierra Leone, and
mm TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp, 11690, 11697.
mm TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11720, 11722.
mm TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11555-11556.
M55 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11472-11473.
IOISG Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46690-46691.

---- End of Page 1563 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J GL 18 May 2012

the evidence of 1ssa Sesay that Foday Kallon was seen in Monrovia in around late
November/early December 1998, the Trial Chamber finds that the men brought by Foday
Kallon were sent by the Accused, and arrived in Kailahun in or around late November 1998.
4563. Bobson Sesay testified that KBC said that the group of SLA men sent by Taylor
included "many",l0l58 and was "a strong manpower".ml59 He told Bobson Sesay that the
group of men was unable to reach Freetown and did not participate in the Freetown attack
since they were "delayed" during the advance towards Freetown by ECOMOG attacks. KBC
told the witness that they participated in the attack on Kono, and that some of the men were
then deployed in Kono and Makeni for any counter attack by ECOMOG forces.lOl°O
4564. While the Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of Alimamy Bobson Sesay that the
SLA men sent by Taylor participated in the attacks on Kono, the Trial Chamber is unable to
consider the impact this group of men had on the commission of crimes since the testimony
of Bobson Sesay is vague with regard to the number of men sent by the Accused, and no
evidence was introduced to show that the men sent by the Accused committed crimes.
4565. The Prosecution also submits that the Accused sent 62 former SLA soldiers to be
trained at Camp Bunumbu. Prosecution witness TF 1-362 testified that following the retreat
from Freetown in 1998, Monica Pearson received 62 SLA members from 1ssa Sesay to be
trained at Bunumbu training camp in order for them to fight "in Liberia" to open the border
between Sierra Leone and Liberia. First, Pearson was told by 1ssa Sesay that Bockarie told
him that the Accused told Bockarie that the men should be trained in order to "open the
border between Gbamga and Sierra Leone".lm6l Later on, Bockarie himself told Pearson
that Taylor sent the 62 men to Bockarie so that they would be trained to "go and clear the
road".lOl62 The Trial Chamber heard evidence showing that a platoon is comprised of 62
soldiers.lOl63 A
mm Amis and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso Shipment.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8400-8404; Transcript 29 April 2008, p. 8795;
Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8402-8405; Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8436-8437.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8797-8800.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 29 April 2008, pp. 8796-8797.
'°">' TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4895-4896 (cs).
mm TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4898 (CS).
mm TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5091-5094 (CS).
mm TF1-375 Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12573; TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2192, 2195 (CS);

---- End of Page 1564 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % GH 18 May 2012

4566. ln a prior statement TFl-362 stated that it was Bockarie who told Pearson that
Taylor said the 62 SLAs should be trained at Bunumbu training camp, not Sesay. The Trial
Chamber accepts the explanation of the witness with regard to the circumstances in which
the conversation took place, with the result that Pearson ultimately received the infonnation
from both Sesay and Bockarie.
4567. The Accused denied sending the men to be trained in order to open the border
between Gbamga and Sierra Leone,lOl64 and questioned why trained men from the Sierra
Leonean army would need to be trained. IO mj The Trial Chamber notes that TFl-3 62 testified
that the men needed to undertake guerrilla-fighting training as they had never fought in "the
bush",lOl6° and accepts this explanation.
4568. Issa Sesay testified that Bockarie told him to send l5 to 20 SLA members who were
brought from Liberia by Foday Kallon to be trained at Bunumbu training camp but denied
that Bockarie told him that the men had been sent by Taylor.lOl67 The Trial Chamber notes
that Sesay gave three accounts as to the timing of this event in his testimony. During his
examination in chief Sesay first said that Foday Kallon brought 15 to 20 SLA members who
fled to Liberia in September 1998, and that these men were sent to be trained at Bunumbu.
Sesay then said that "(a)round September 1998 starting from March to September"
Bockarie sent Foday Kallon to Liberia to bring back AFRC members and that Kallon then
brought 15 to 20 men from Liberia who were sent to be trained at Bunumbu.lOl68 Later on in
his examination in chief, Sesay said that Bockarie sent Foday Kallon in mid-l998 to Liberia
to bring back former SLA members and that Kallon came back with 15 men whom he sent
on Bockarie's orders to be trained before sending them to the front lines.
4569. ln this last account, Sesay noted that around September, Foday Kallon went to
Baiwala and was there until November when Bockarie sent Kallon again to Liberia to recruit
SLA men there. When Kallon retumed from this second mission he told Sesay that he was
TP1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2253 (CS); Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10952; TF1-338,
Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15096; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20081; Martin
George, Transcript 18 April 2010, p. 40226;
[Om Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26219.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29064-29065.
*0*66 TP1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4895-4896 (CS).
"’"" rm sappy, Transcript 30 Jury 2010, pp. 45173-45174 (Ps).
mm 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45171-45172 (PS).

---- End of Page 1565 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~·» L/ 18 May 2012
Gl., v

.3*7653*
unable to recruit men at this time.l0l°9 On cross-examination Sesay agreed that Bockarie
wanted to bring back SLA members who fled to Liberia in late 1998 and sent Foday Kallon
to bring them back to Sierra Leone and that Kallon then brought 15 to 20 men with him.
Sesay then said on cross-examination that Kallon went to Liberia twice to recruit SLA men,
that he succeeded in bringing men back to Sierra Leone from his first trip, and that he could
not recall whether he succeeded in bringing men back irom Liberia the second time.ml70 In
his testimony in the RUF case Sesay had stated that Kallon brought 7 men with him the
second time. IO] 7l
4570. The Trial Chamber notes that Sesay confirmed in his testimony that a number of men
were brought by Foday Kallon to Bunumbu sometime between March and September 1998
on the first of two trips from Liberia, the second of which was confirmed by several
Prosecution witnesses as set forth above. The Trial Chamber accepts the testimony ofTF1-
362 that 62 men were brought to Bunumbu and notes that the number 62 may not have been
an exact number but rather TF1-362's way of referring to a platoon.
4571. Issa Sesay testified that after their training, he deployed the SLA men who had been
trained at Bunumbu in Pendembu, Kuiva, Mobai and Baiimadom He denied that the men
were sent to fight in order to open the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia, stating that
3 there was no need as the border was open in 1998.lOm The Trial Chamber notes that TFl-
362 testified that the men were to fight "in Liberia" against ULIMO forces that had captured
the area between Lofa and Voinjamadom However, no evidence was introduced to show
that there was fighting in Liberia in 1998. There is also no evidence that the route of supply
from the Accused to the RUF was blocked in 1998, as the Trial Chamber found that there
was a flow of supply from the Accused to the AFRC/RUF from around February 1998.lOl75
4572. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of TF1-362 that a
number of SLA soldiers were sent by Taylor back to Sierra Leone for training at Bunumbu
IOW) Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45631-45633.
10170 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46683-46685.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46691-46692.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45170-45172 (PS).
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45173-45174 (PS).
mm TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008, pp. 5090-5092 (CS).
mm Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).

---- End of Page 1566 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 6% \/ 18 May 2012

3 7 65 7
and does not find the denials of the Accused and Issa Sesay credible. However, the Trial
Chamber notes that the testimony of TF 1-362 that the men were sent to fight in Liberia is
not supported by the evidence on record and would not in any event establish any link to
crimes committed in Sierra Leone.
4573. With regard to the submission of the Prosecution on the forcible return of civilians,
including refugees, to Sierra Leone, Witness TF1-539 mentioned in his testimony that when
he met Foday Kallon in Monrovia, Kallon told him that he had gone to "the" refugee camp
and was mobilizing men.lOl76 The Prosecution relies on TF 1-590, who described in his
testimony a prolonged period of time in which civilian refugees in Vahun, Voinjama and
Kolahun in Liberia were either encouraged or forced by RUF and AFRC men who were in
Liberia to go to Sierra Leone and fight. The witness testified that Liberian authorities also
helped in the mission of recruiting men, including the Special Operation Division of the
Liberian police (SOD), SSS, ATU headed by Chucky Taylor, and immigration and custom
officers. TF1-590's account is based on the information provided to him by men from these
forces and by men who agreed to go and be trained before going to fight in Sierra Leone.
These men were customers at his kiosk in Voinjama and he identified the Liberian officials
and military by their various uniforms. He also described his own experience of being
arrested and detained in Vahun and told to go to a meeting in which he was to be forced to
go and fight in Sierra Leone, although he escaped and did not attend the meeting, which
apparently led to the arrest of his brother and efforts to arrest him.
4574. TF 1-590 gave a detailed account of subsequently being tortured in Liberia by ATU
members headed by Chucky Taylor when he refused to fight in Voinjama and was taken to
meet the Accused at his compound, where the Accused confronted the men for refusing to
go and fight in their country and threatened them with beheading.
4575. The Defence cross examined the witness on whether he could describe the area in
which Taylor lived, but the witness could not recall details. The Trial Chamber accepts the
l witness’ explanation that when he was brought to the Accused's compound he was not in a
condition to observe his surroundings as he was naked, handcuffed and severely beaten,
therefore concentrating on whether or not he would live.l0l77 The Trial also notes that this
mm TF1—539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11473.
mm TF1-590, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 11980-11984, 12028—12030.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-0l-T 05 18 May 2012
o/

5 9 6 60
incident occurred at about midnight. In cross-examination TF 1-590 also admitted to being a
witness in the trial of Chucky Taylor in the United Statesmng The Trial Chamber does not
find that either his failure to recall the details of Taylor's compound or his status as a
witness in the trial of Chucky Taylor undermines his credibility. The Trial Chamber found
him to be candid, consistent and detailed in his testimony, which the Trial Chamber found
credible.
4576. TF 1-590 claimed that he was targeted due to his constant refusal to go and be trained
to fight in Sierra Leone.lm79 The Trial Chamber notes that he was tortured after he refused
to go and fight in Voinjama in Liberia, some time after the pressure he was put under to go
fight in Sierra Leone.ml8O Moreover, he himself observed that the accusation of being a
rebel or a Kamajor was used to justify arrest and punishment for refusing to do as ordered by
security forcesdmgl In light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber cannot find with clarity
exactly why he was tortured but accepts his testimony that Liberian government authorities
arrested, detained and forced Sierra Leoneans residing in Liberia to return to Sierra Leone to
fight.
4577. The Trial Chamber notes that no evidence was introduced to show how many
refugees actually went back as a result of the pressures put on them by Liberian officials,
whether they participated in any attacks, and if so when and where.
Findings
4578. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused sent former SLA soldiers to the Bunumbu training camp soon after the
Intervention.
4579. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that following their training these former SLA soldiers were used to "open the road"
of arms and ammunition between Liberia and Sierra Leone.
'°"8 TFl—590, Transcript 16 June 2008, p. ll866—1l907, 1193}-11937; TF1—590, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp.
11997-12001.
'°"° TF1—590, Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11967.
'°'8° TPI-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11782-11785; TFI-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11962-11963.
'°'*' TF1—590, Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11840.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T gy 18 May 2012 %

4580. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused reorganized, armed and sent a group of at least four former SLA soldiers
who had fled to Liberia back to Sierra Leone to support the attack on Freetown, and that the
men arrived in Kailahun on or around late November 1998.
4581. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that at least four former SLA soldiers sent by the Accused participated in the attack on Kono
in December 1998 during which crimes listed in the Indictment were committed.
4582. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Liberian government authorities and RUF/AFRC members recruited and forced civilian
refugees residing in Liberia to return to Sierra Leone to tight. However, the evidence did not
establish that these civilian refugees participated in attacks in Sierra Leone.
4. Alleged Cooperation in the Return of Deserters to Sierra Leone
0 Submissions of the Parties
4583. The Prosecution submits that the Accused assisted the AFRC/RUF by having his
Liberian police capture AFRC/RUF deserters and return them to Sierra Leone. The
Prosecution provides two examples with regard to the arrest and detention of Fonti Kanu
and Dauda Aruna Fomie. The Prosecution relies on the testimonies of TF1-371, Samuel
Kargbo, Augustine Mallah, Dauda Aruna Fomie and Mohamed Kabbah.lO182
4584. The Defence submits that the Prosecution asks the Trial Chamber to infer that if an
action was taken by Liberian security personnel or Liberian forces along the Sierra Leonean
border it was done with Taylor's knowledge and that he had intended those actions to be
taken. According to the Defence, "such grand inferences are not supportable on the
facts".mm With regard to the killing of Fonti Kanu the Defence relies on the testimony of
Issa Sesay, according to which Kanu was arrested in Sierra Leone and was killed by Mike
Lamm 10184
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 285.
mm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 48.
mm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 49.

---- End of Page 1569 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03-01-T 6% 18 May 2012

3 ‘/ 66 2
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1-371
4585. Witness TF 1-371, an RUF commander, testified that Colonel Fonti Kanu and other
SLA officers defected to Foya and Vahun in Liberia after the fall of Daru to ECOMOG in
1998, but retumed to Pendembu due to the "refugee situation" in Foya and Vahun. After
Kanu retumed to Pendembu he was mostly with Issa Sesay.l0lg5
4586. Fonti Kanu became dissatisfied with the slow pace of combat activities. He escaped
from Pendembu unbeknownst to Issa Sesay and returned to Liberia. After it was reported to
Sesay that Fonti Kanu had escaped to a refugee camp in Liberia, Sesay decided to pursue
Kanu, arrest him and bring him to Pendembu. This was because Kanu was a security risk as
he knew too much about the strength of the RUF. Sesay told Mike Lamin to go along with
him to Vahun.l0l86
4587. En route to Vahun, Mike Lamin accidentally shot and injured Issa Sesay's driver
when trying to seek shelter from Alpha jets. Sesay became "annoyed" with Lamin, and
ordered the RUF military police to detain Lamin until Sesay returned from Vahun. Sesay
then continued to Vahun.lOl87 Sesay went to Vahun through Bomaru, where there was a
market at the border which most RUF commanders used. The route was open and the access
was easy.m 188
4588. Later on that day, Sesay summoned Lamin to come to his house. When Lamin
arrived at the house Kanu was lying on the ground naked in a state of unconsciousness and
bruised, as he had been heavily beaten on the way from Vahun to Pendembu by RUF
"securities" who accompanied Sesay. Sesay explained to the commanders who were at the
house that Liberian "securities" at the border apprehended Fonti Kanu and tumed him over
to the Liberian armed forces’ captain who was assigned to the border. The captain, who was
a friend of Issa Sesay, detained Kanu until Sesay anivedimgg
IMS TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2395-2397 (CS).
mm) TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2397 (CS).
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2397-2398 (CS).
IMS TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2400 (CS).
Img TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2398-2400 (CS).

---- End of Page 1570 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Oh 18 May 2012

E5 7 6 6 3
4589. Issa Sesay ordered "his boys" to continue beating Fonti Kanu. Sesay sat on his
veranda intoxicated. At one point Sesay started shooting his AK-47 all around, trying to
shoot the unconscious Fonti Kanu, which brought some of the commanders to try to disann
Sesay. Sesay fought them and in the end shot F onti Kanu in his left foot, but F onti Kanu was
already dead. IOW)
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
4590. Witness Samuel Kargbo, a member of the AFRC,lOl9l testified that Lieutenant
Colonel Fonti Kanu, who used to be his commander, came with Issa Sesay to Pendembu,
where Kargbo was a deputy brigade commander. Sesay told the witness that F onti Kanu was
his uncle. They then returned to Buedu. After some time, Sesay visited Buedu and said that
he, Sesay, was going to stay in Pendembu. By then Sesay had given Kanu an "XL
motorbike" that he was using. mm
4591. Around July/August 1998 the witness was at his house when Sesay's and Mike
Lamin's bodyguards came and rushed him to go to see Sesay who had summoned him. They
went to where Sesay was lodged in Pendembu. There the witness met Sesay, Mike Lamin
and some RUF commanders. F onti Kanu was seated on the ground. Sesay explained to the
witness that the Liberian police in Vahun had called him via radio communication to infonn
him that they had arrested Kanu while Kanu was attempting to surrender himself to UN
agencies in Vahun. The Liberian police called Sesay because Sesay used to go "there" with
Kanudom Sesay questioned why SLA commanders, in particular Kanu who had received
"privileges" from Sesay, would surrender themselves to the UN. Sesay told the witness that
the Liberian police handed Kanu over to him, and thereafter Sesay brought Kanu to the
brigade headquarters in Pendembu. IOM
4592. Sesay asked the witness what he should do with Kanu. Mike Lamin then said that
there was nothing else to do other than kill Kanu. Immediately after, Lamin shot Kanu in
one of his legs. Sesay then shot Kanu in his other leg. The other soldiers shot Kanu in both
10190 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2399-2400 (CS).
10191 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10439, 10448, 10450; Exhibit P-58, "Excerpts from the Sierra
Leone Gazette No. 52, 4 September 1997 — 00007703-00007704", ERN 7703-7704.
mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10551-10552.
mm The Trial Chamber understands this to mean that Sesay used to go to Liberia with Fonti Kanu.
10194 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 Mat 2008, pp. 10552-10555, 10608.

---- End of Page 1571 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 01,5 18 May 2012

0f his arms. Kanu was now helpless and was crying. "They"ml95 ordered the b0dyguards to
drag Kanu and "finish with him". They dragged Kanu and sh0t him while he was on the
ground. Kanu then went c01d. "He"l0l96 then to1d the b0dyguards to go and "discharge"
Kanu somewhere. The b0dyguards went and threw Kanu's b0dy into a water—we11 on the
road to Pendembu, c10se to the Barri. Sesay then said that if "y0u see me do this to my own
family member, my own tribesman, a Temne man, I warn y0u if anyb0dy dare try it y0u will
not et sc0t—free". The witness then went h0me thinkin that the had 10st "one strong
8 8 Y
m3n»_10197
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
4593. Witness Augustine Mallah testified that he heard that F0nti Kanu wanted to escape to
Liberia, but Issa Sesay sent men to arrest him. They later heard that Sesay ki11ed Kanu. mm
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
4594. Witness Dauda Amna Fornie, an RUF radi0 Operator,l0l99 testified that after the
Lomé Peace Accord, he wr0te a letter together with Junior Vandi who was "Lion's
b0dyguard". Vandi gave the letter to Ka1ik0, one of Sankoh's b0dyguards, asking him to
take the letter to Freetown and give it directly to Foday Sankoh. Ka1ik0 showed the letter to
different pe0p1e in Kailahun Town. 1nformation about the letter leaked to some of
Mosquit0's b0dyguards. The b0dyguards immediately arrested Ka1ik0 and took him with the
letter to Mosquit0. The b0dyguards met .lunior Vandi, Satellite and others "0n the ground"
and arrested them as we11. During the night of these arrests Fornie was at his house when he
heard rum0rs that Mosquit0 took the letter which Fornie and Vandi had intended to be sent
to Freetown. Fornie therefore escaped that night from Buedu together with T—Boy. The two
went through the Liberian border and reached Vahun in Liberia. Fornie did not go to
*0*95 The Trial Chamber understands that the witness referred to Mike Lamin and 1ssa Sesay.
IOM "They ordered the b0dyguards to drag him and to take him somewhere and finish with him and they drag
him. The b0dyguards 0pened fire at him whilst he was on the ground and then he went c0ld. And then he said
they should go and discharge of him somewhere". The Trial Chamber is therefore unable to infer who the
witness refers to when he states the word "He".
wm Samuel Kargb0, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10553-10554.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20380.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.

---- End of Page 1572 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / §` 18 May 2012

3 7 6 65
Pendembu or Kailahun and went straight to Vahun thinking he would feel safe there where
Bockarie could not "use his vet0" on him.lO20O
4595. When Fornie g0t to Vahun he sent a message from Vahun's radi0 station to Sankoh
who was in Freetown about the type of "attitude" Bockarie had devel0ped, and that he had
even arrested J unior Vandi and others. Thereafter, Fornie was arrested in Vahun and put in a
pit. Mosquit0 sent an instruction to Vahun's AFL commander, Captain Tengbeh. Captain
Tengbeh then arrested Fornie and provided two armed men who escorted Fornie back to
Sierra Leone. A vehicle picked Fornie up from the border and he was taken to Buedu.
Bockarie then tortured F0mie and put him in jail, in a dunge0n. Bockarie left F0mie in the
dunge0n when he crossed with his forces into Liberia. F0mie left Buedu before Christmas of
1999, before the year 2000 had ariived.lO2Ol
4596. On cross—examination Fornie explained that Bockarie imprisoned him in a dunge0n
because he had written a letter to Sankoh suggesting that the best way to convince Bockarie
to disarm and leave Buedu was through Charles Taylor, as Taylor had direct influence over
Bockarie. mm
Prosecution Witness M0hamed Kabbah
4597. Witness M0hamed Kabbah, an RUF radi0 Operator,lO2O3 testified on cross-
examination that he was arrested in late 1998, put in "a hole" for a week and tortured. The
reason the witness did not escape from the RUF was that being in the RUF had become "a
stigma".l0204 The witness explained that if he had gone "t0 the govermnent side" he would
have been accused of being a rebel and they would have killed him. If he had fled to Liberia
he would have been "hunted and brought back", and perhaps would have been killed. lf he
had gone to Guinea he would not have been safe. He therefore could not have even
attempted to escape. MOS
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21629-21630.
mm Dauda Aruna F0mie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21630—21632; Transcript 10 December 2008, pp.
22125—22126.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, p. 21987; Transcript 11 December 2008, p. 22257.
mm M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
mm M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16241—16242.
mm M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16242-1624}

---- End of Page 1573 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 M 2012
_/ GB ay ~ %

3 7 6 6 6
4598. On re-examination the witness explained that if he had gone to Liberia, Sam
Bockarie would have either sent a message to the NPFL commanders at the border, to Foya
where there was a radio station, saying that a person "has hidden", or he would have sent
"our own brothers" to Liberia so that they would "hunt" Kabbah and bring him back to
Koidu, as the commander in Foya might not have recognized him. The RUF and the NPFL
worked hand in hand. Therefore, if Kabbah had tried to hide from the RUF by going to the
NPFL it would have meant that he had not hidden at all. Kabbah believed this would have
happened since as a radio operator he knew "a lot of secrets" and if he would have chosen to
hide from the RUF, RUF members would have suspected that he would reveal the secrets he
knew about the RUF. 10200
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4599. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF cormnander,10207 and interim leader of the RUF
from 2000 until disarmament in 2002,10200 testified that Fonti Kanu was the commander in
Daru before the AFRC and the RUF were pushed out of Daru. Afterwards, Kanu stayed in
Kailahun Town, while Sesay, Mike Lamin, and Sam Bockarie were in Buedu. At one point,
Kanu was arrested at Nyandehun, Sierra Leone, while trying to escape to Liberia for the first
time. He was brought to Kailahun and Bockarie was informed via the radio by Vandi Kosia,
the commander in Kailahun. Bockarie then ordered that Kanu be detained. During a visit to
Kailahun Town by Sesay, Bockarie and Mike Lamin, Bockarie ordered that Kanu be
brought to him. When Kanu was brought to Bockarie, Bockarie expressed his anger that
Kanu knew RUF secrets from Burkina Faso and was now trying to escape and inform the
SLPP govemment about RUF activities. Sesay and Colonel Paul pleaded with Bockarie to
"forget and forgive" Kanu. Bockarie agreed and released Kanu from custody. Kanu then
stayed in Kailahun Town .10200
4600. In April 1998, Sesay was posted to Pendembu after losing diamonds.10210 Kanu
asked Sesay to join him in Pendembu and Sesay agreed. In Pendembu Kanu and Sesay had a
close relationship. They were from the same tribe and the same district. One night, in
October 1998, Kanu left Pendembu and went towards the border without Sesay's
10200 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16456-16458.
10207 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
10200 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 4358843589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
10200 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45032-45034; Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46298—46299.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ dk 18 May 2012

37 66 76
knowledge. In the moriring, the RUP Military Police (MP) at Bomaru in Sierra Leone
arrested Kanu. MP Amara sent Sesay a radio message to Pendembu that Kanu was in their
custody after they arrested him very early in the moriring as he was attempting to cross the
border to Liberia. Sam Bockarie's radio operator monitored the message and conveyed it to
Bockarie. Bockarie then told Mike Lamin to go to Pendembu and then go to Bomaru to take
Kanu from custody. Lamin passed through Pendembu while Sesay was on patrol and went to
Bomaru to collect Kanu. Lamin then brought Kanu to Pendembu.111211
4601. Sesay returned to Pendembu from his patrol and saw Kanu tied up against a car in
front of Sesay's house. Sesay met Lamin who informed him that Bockarie sent him (Lamin).
As they were speaking, Bockarie's radio operator contacted Lamin and informed him that
Bockarie wished to speak with him. Lamin went to speak with Bockarie, and when he
returned to Sesay, he informed him that Bockarie had ordered Lamin to execute Kanu.
Lamin then asked his bodyguard for his AK and shot Kanu four times to death.111212 Bockarie
wanted Kanu dead because Kanu knew about the link the RUP had with Burkina Paso,
which was top secret, and he was therefore a security threat. Bockarie also had a grudge
against Kanu as Kanu was the SLA commander who attacked the RUP in Kailahun before
the Arno coup i996.‘°2‘3
4602. Sesay stated that he had no authority to arrest Lamin and denied that he was drunk
during the incident, arguing instead that it was Lamin who everybody in the RUP knew was
a "drurr14603. Sesay stated that during this time it was not easy to cross over to Liberia as MPs and
guards were deployed there. A person who wanted to cross over to Liberia needed a pass
from Sesay or Bockarie. On the Liberian side the Liberian border guards interrogated
anyone who wanted to cross over.111215
1112111 Diamonds: Loss of Diamonds by Sesay.
111211 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45035-45038; Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46298-
46299, 46303.
10212 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45037-4503 8; Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, p. 46299. On
cross examination Sesay said Fonti Kanu was in the vehicle with his hands tied behind his back.
111213 Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp, 46299-46300.
111214 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45037-45038 (PS).
111215 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45039 (PS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ju, 18 May 2012

3 7 6 6 6
4604. On cross-examination Sesay disagreed with the proposition that Kanu crossed over
to Liberia and was arrested there, asserting that Kanu was arrested in Bomaru in Sierra
Leone by the RUF. Sesay explained that Kanu was arrested because he tried crossing the
border during the night. During the day civilians used to trade at the border in Bomaru and
Vahun, around the border in Folima.m2l6
4605. Sesay denied taking part in the torture and killing of Kanu, asserting it was Mike
Lamin who shot Kanu and killed him.lO2l7
Deliberations
4606. The Prosecution submits that security forces subordinate to Taylor assisted the
AFRC/RUF by capturing personnel who were trying to escape from the movement. The
Prosecution provided two examples to support its submission; the arrest of Fonti Kanu in
Liberia by Liberian authorities who turned him over to Issa Sesay, and the arrest and
surrender of Dauda Aruna Fomie.lO2l8 Mohamed Kabbah, also cited by the Prosecution in
support of its submission, testified about his own detention in Sierra Leone and what he
thought might have happened if he had tried to escape to Liberia.
4607. lt is not disputed that Fonti Kanu was captured and then killed in Sierra Leone. The
issue disputed is whether he was captured in Liberia and handed over to the RUF by
Liberian authorities. Prosecution witness Samuel Kargbo testified that in July/August 1998
he was told by Issa Sesay that the Liberian police in Vahun called Sesay via radio
communication and informed Sesay that they had arrested Fonti Kanu as he was attempting
to surrender himself to UN agencies in Vahun. Sesay also told Kargbo that the Liberian
police handed Kanu over to him.l02l9 This evidence is corroborated by Prosecution witness
TF1-371 who testified that he was told by Issa Sesay that Liberian securities at the border
apprehended Fonti Kanu who escaped from Pendembu to Liberia and turned him over to the
Liberian armed forces’ captain, who detained Kanu until Sesay ariived.lO22O Prosecution
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46303—46304.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, p. 46304.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 285.
mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. l0552—lO555, 10608.
mm TFl—37l, 'Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2398-2400 (CS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % jk 18 May 2012 M

3 aa 6 7
witness Augustine Mallah further corroborates this evidence, stating that he heard that Fonti
Kanu tried to escape to Liberia and that Issa Sesay then sent men to arrest Kanu. mm
4608. The Defence relies on the testimony of Defence witness Issa Sesay to refute the
allegation that Kanu was arrested in Liberia.lO222 Issa Sesay testified that Fonti Kanu was
arrested in Bomaru in Sierra Leone by the RUF military police in October 1998 while trying
to cross over to Liberia, not in Liberia by the Liberian police. NH23 Sesay also testified that he
only saw Kanu after he returned to Pendembu from his day—patrols, and that in Pendembu
Kanu was already handcuffed, having been collected from detention by Mike Lamin,lO224
implying that Sesay himself was not involved in Kanu's arrest and detention. However, two
Prosecution witnesses, Samuel Kargbo and TF1—371, testified that Sesay told them that he
was the one who received Kanu from detention. While Prosecution witness Augustine
Mallah testified that he heard that Sesay sent men to arrest Kanu, without mentioning that it
was Sesay who went to apprehend Kanu, his testimony does not support Sesay's account
that he himself was not involved in Kanu's arrest.
4609. The Trial Chamber notes that Issa Sesay gave a contradictory and implausible
explanation as to why Kanu was arrested before crossing over to Liberia. During his
examination in chief Sesay stated that a person who wanted to cross over to Liberia needed
a pass from Sesay or Bockarie.m225 On cross-examination, when asked why Fonti Kanu was
arrested, Sesay answered that Kanu was arrested because he tried crossing the border during
the night, as opposed to during the day when there was a trading area around the border. N)226
Sesay was questioned in cross—exa1nination on his testimony that persons who wanted to
cross the border to Liberia needed a pass from Sesay or Bockarie to do so. Sesay then stated
that there was a trading area around the border, and that a pass was not needed during the
daytime. The Trial Chamber does not find Sesay's account credible and recalls its finding
that his testimony must be treated with caution and requires corroboration. my
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20380.
mm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 49.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45035—45038 (PS); Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46298—46299,
Ytgiolisa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46299—46300.
wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010. p. 45039 (PS).
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 16 August 2010, pp. 46303—46304.
mm Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.

---- End of Page 1577 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T JQ 18 May 2012
Z \%

3 76 rw
4610. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that TF 1-371, Samuel Kargbo and Augustine
Mallah are generally credible witnesses.*0228 Their accounts of what happened largely
conform to each other, with a few differences in details that do not, in the view of the Trial
Chamber, undermine their credibility. ln light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that
F onti Kanu was arrested and returned to Sierra Leone by Liberian authorities.
4611. Prosecution witness Dauda Amna Fornie testified that he was arrested in Vahun,
Liberia after the Lome Peace Accord, while trying to escape from Bockarie because of a
letter he had written to Foday Sankoh about Bockarie, which had been intercepted by
Bockarie. F ornie testified that Captain Tengbeh, the AFL commander in Vahun in Liberia,
arrested him upon Bocltortured F ornie and locked him in a dungeon,*(*229 leaving him there when he left for
Liberia,*O230 which the Trial Chamber has found was in December 1999.*023*
4612. When confronted on cross-examination with the fact that the letter and its reference
to the Accused were not mentioned in a prior statement, F ornie testified that he must have
told his investigators about it since everybody from the RUF and the AF RC knew about the
letter and his arrest. He also stated that he could not recall every detail that had taken place a
decade ago.*0232
4613. The Trial Chamber notes that the account by Dauda Amna F ornie of his arrest falls
in line with the testimony of Mohamed Kabbah, who gave several reasons to explain why he
believed that he could not have left the RUF. Among them, he said that if he had gone to
Liberia, Bockarie would have sent a message to the NPF L commanders at the border in F oya
to arrest and surrender him.*0233 Kabbah also stated that Bockarie might have sent "our own
brothers", which the Trial Chamber understands to mean RUF members, to bring him back
to Koidu.
mm Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Samuel Kargbo, paras 290-295;
Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre-lndiotment period (1988-1996), para. 2522.
*0229 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21629-21632.
*0230 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 22125-22126.
*1*23* Leadership and Command Struomre: Aooused Relationship with the RUF/AF RC, Sam Bookarie.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 8 December 2008, pp. 21987-21989.
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16456—16458.

---- End of Page 1578 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % Qih 18 May 2012

4614. Recalling that Fomie is a generally reliable witness,lO234 the Trial Chamber accepts
Fomie's testimony that he was arrested by an AFL commander in Liberia at Bockarie's
request and handed over the Bockarie. Kabbah's testimony supports this finding in general
terms and indicates the understanding Kabbah had, which he describes in effect as common
knowledge, that Liberian authorities cooperated with the RUF on the return of wanted Sierra
Leoneans who escaped to Liberia.
Findings
4615. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Liberian police authorities detained two AFRC/RUF members, Fonti Kanu and Dauda
Aruna Fomie, and handed them over to RUF personnel in late 1998 and late 1999,
respectively.
4616. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Liberian police authorities detained AF RC/RUF deserter Fonti Kanu, and Dauda Aruna
Fomie, and handed them over to RUF personnel in late 1998 and late 1999, respectively.
Summary of Findings
4617. The Trial Chamber has found that —
(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that approximately
20 former NPFL fighters who had been integrated into the Armed Forces
of Liberia formed part of a group of approximately 200 fighters led by O-
Five that attacked and committed crimes in Karina and Kamalo in Bombali
District on or about August! September 1998.
(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that this group of 20
was incorporated into the Red Lion Battalion, which was comprised of 200
fighters and was part of a larger group of up to approximately 1,000
fighters who attacked and committed crimes in Waterloo, Fisher Lane,
Hastings, Freetown Eastem Police, Pademba Road Prison, Kingtom,
10234 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fomie, paras 346—358.

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Case No.: SCSL—03~01—T %·/ Ob 18 May 2012 xg

3 96 922
Fourah Bay and Upgun in Freetown and the Westem Area on or about
December1998/January 1999.
(iii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that these 20 fighters
were sent by the Accused from Liberia to Sierra Leone where they joined
the RUF /AF RC forces in Sierra Leone.
(iv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Abu Keita and A
150 men to be under his command were sent by the Accused to Sierra
Leone. The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abu
Keita and the reinforcements were sent by the Accused for the purpose of
fighting in the Kono and Freetown military operations, which included
Kenema. However, the Trial Chamber has found that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.eJungle), on
behalf of the Accused, approved Bockarie's decision to integrate the
Scorpion Unit to be under Bockarie's command.
(v) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Abu Keita and
some of the reinforcements sent by the Accused participated in the attack
’ on Kenema and that Abu Keita participated in the commission of crimes
during this attack.
(vi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
sent former SLA soldiers to the Bunumbu training camp soon after the
Intervention.
(vii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that following
their training these former SLA soldiers were used to "open the road" of
arms and ammunition between Liberia and Sierra Leone.
(viii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
reorganized, armed and sent a group of at least four former SLA soldiers
who had fled to Liberia back to Sierra Leone to support the attack on
Freetown, and that the men arrived in Kailahun on or around late
November 1998.

---- End of Page 1580 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3 96 7— 5
(ix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that at least four
former SLA soldiers sent by the Accused participated in the attack on
Kono in December 1998 during which crimes listed in the Indictment were
committed.
(x) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Liberian
government authorities and RUF/AFRC members recruited and forced
civilian refugees residing in Liberia to return to Sierra Leone to fight.
However, the evidence did not establish that these civilian refugees
participated in attacks in Sierra Leone.
(xi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Liberian police
authorities detained two AFRC/RUF members, Fonti Kanu and Dauda
Amna Fornie, and handed them over to RUF personnel in late 1998 and
late 1999, respectively.
Conclusion
4618. The Trial Chamber has found that approximately 20 former NPF L fighters who had
been integrated into the Armed Forces of Liberia formed part of a group of approximately
200 fighters led by O·Five who attacked and committed crimes in Karina and Kamalo in
Bombali District on or about August/September 1998. Subsequently, this group of 20
fighters was incorporated into the Red Lion Battalion, which was comprised of 200 fighters
and was part of a larger group of up to approximately 1,000 fighters who attacked and
committed crimes in Waterloo, Fisher Lane, Hastings, Freetown Eastern Police, Pademba
Road Prison, Kingtom, Fourah Bay and Upgun, on or about December1998/January 1999.
These 20 fighters were sent by the Accused from Liberia to Sierra Leone where they joined
the RUF/AFRC forces in Sierra Leone and participated in attacks in which crimes were
committed.
4619. The Trial Chamber has found that Abu Keita and the reinforcements known as the
Scorpion Unit were sent by the Accused to Sierra Leone and participated in the attack on
Kenema, in which Abu Keita committed crimes. Although the evidence does not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the Scorpion Unit was sent for the purpose of fighting in the
Kono and Freetown military operations, which included the attack on Kenema, Daniel

---- End of Page 1581 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T //681 18 May 2012

5 7 6 Wl
Tamba, on behalf of the Accused, approved Bockarie's decision to integrate the Scorpion
Unit under his command.
4620. The Accused sent former SLA soldiers to the Bunumbu training camp soon after the
Intervention, although their subsequent deployment was not established. The Accused later
sent a group of at least four former SLA soldiers from Liberia back to Sierra Leone to
support the attack on Freetown. These men arrived in Kailahun in or around late November
1998, and they participated in the attack on Kono in December 1998, although they were
unable to reach Freetown and did not participate in the Freetown attack. .
4621. Liberian government authorities and RUF/AFRC members recruited and forced
Sierra Leoneans residing in Liberia to retum to Sierra Leone to tight. However, the evidence
did not establish that these civilian refugees participated in attacks in Sierra Leone.
4622. The Trial Chamber considered the allegation by the Prosecution that the Accused
assisted the AFRC/RUF by capturing and retuming AFRC/RUF deserters to Sierra Leone.
The Trial Chamber has found that Liberian police authorities detained two RUF/AFRC
members Fonti Kanu, and Dauda Aruna Fomie, and handed them over to RUF personnel in
late 1998 and late 1999, respectively. In evidence about his own arrest and torture in Sierra
Leone, Mohamed Kabbah described as common knowledge the cooperation of Liberian
authorities and the RUF on the return of wanted Sierra Leoneans who escaped to Liberia.

---- End of Page 1582 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T X82 Gln 18 May 2012

F. Arms and Ammunition
General Submissions bythe Parties
4623. The Prosecution submits that the Accused, both personally and through his
subordinates, directly supplied and facilitated the supply of essential materiel that made
possible the RUF 's attacks and control of territory throughout the Indictment Period.m235 At
various times during the Indictment Period, the Prosecution alleges that the Accused ensured
a "steady stream" of materiel to the RUF and AF RC by:m236
(i) delivering arms and ammunition to the RUF and the AFRC via alleged
subordinates or providing arms and ammunition to Bockarie, Sesay or
their subordinates when they came to Liberia;l0237
(ii) facilitating the purchase of arms and ammunition by the RUF and AF RC
from former ULIMO-K fighters in Lofa Countygumg and arranging for
several of the largest shipments of arms/ammunition relied on by the RUF
and AF RC, including:
(iii) a shipment arriving in Magburaka in or around October 1997 (the
"Magburaka Shipment"),lO239 and
(iv) a shipment arriving in Liberia and originating from Burkina Faso in late
1998 (the "Burkina Faso Shipment").lO240
4624. According to the Prosecution, the materiel that the Accused supplied, or facilitated
the supply of "ensured the very survival of the rebels as a viable armed group at several
crucial times" and contributed significantly to the crimes committed in Sierra Leone by the
RUF, AF RC and/or the Accused's Liberian fighters.l024l In particular, the Prosecution
submits that the Accused provided the ammunition and arms which the RUF used to carry
out the F itti-F atta mission in mid-1998, as well as the operations in the north of Sierra Leone
10235 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 2.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 206.
1023 7 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 4, 6.
10238 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 7.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 206.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 8.

---- End of Page 1583 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T dh 18 May 2012

in the lead up to the 1999 Freetown invasion,lO242 and that the Accused played a key role in
facilitating the shipment of arms and ammunition supplies relied on by the RUF for the
Freetown invasion itself 10243
4625. The Defence rebuttal to the Prosecution case is three—pronged. First, it refutes the
allegation that the Accused was either involved in or informed of the supply of military
equipment to the RUF and AFRC during the Indictment Peri0d.lO244 The Defence largely
. rejects Prosecution evidence that the Accused was implicated in the supply of arms and
ammunition to the RUF and AFRC during the Indictment Peri0d as weak or unreliable}0245
The Defence contends that the Liberian government was not in a position to supply any
military equipment to Sierra Leone because:
(i) it was itself sh0rt of arms and ammunition due to the process of
disarmament in Liberia which had taken place prior to 1998;lO246
(ii) the Accused himself made sure that the border between Liberia and Sierra
Leone was at relevant times monitored by ECOMOG; IO247
4626. Second, the Defence submits that any materiel the RUF or the AFRC s0urced from
Liberia was without the knowledge of the Accused, being conducted, facilitated or arranged
by persons acting through un0ff1cial channels. 10248
4627. Third, the Defence contends that any assistance provided by s0urces in Liberia made
n0 substantial contribution to the commission of the crimes pleaded in the Indictment. The
Defence alleges that the RUF and AFRC's primary s0urces of military equipment were not
from Liberia, but from: weapons captured from ECOMOG; from government stores when
the groups acted as the Junta government; and from arms trading with Guinea and former
ULIMO combatants.l0249 The Defence submits that where the RUF or the AFRC did s0urce
Nm. Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 206.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras l56—l57.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 169.
M4 Defence Final Trial Bmr, pam. 1034.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1035 et seq.
'°2*‘* Defence Final Trial Brief pm. 1032.
‘°2" Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1148.
‘""3 ncmm Final Trial Brief para. 1034.
‘°2"° Defence Final Trial Brief, mms 1033-1034, 1131.

---- End of Page 1584 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T .// W 18 May 2012

39622
materiel from Liberia, the amount of materiel it obtained was small and not sufficient to
enable the RUP or APRC to launch major operations.lO25O
1. Preliming Issues
4628. Before turning to the Prosecution's allegations, the Trial Chamber will consider two
preliminary issues raised by the parties in relation to the Accused's ability to transport
materiel across the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border during the Indictment period and the
Accused's capacity to supply the RUF or AFRC given the arms embargo imposed on
Liberia during the Indictment period. ‘
(a) Closure of the Border/Arms Embargo
Submissions of the parties
4629. The Defence contends that the Accused was unable to transport materiel from Liberia
to Sierra Leone because for much of the Indictment period, the border between Liberia and
Sierra Leone was closed or the presence of ECOMOG prevented the movement of materiel
across the border.l025l It submits that when the Accused became President in July 1997,
ECOMOG was in reality the only effective force in the country and patrolled the border
between Sierra Leone and Liberia.l0252 According to the Defence, the Accused and the
Liberian government took steps to prevent arms and ammunition being taken to Sierra
Leone, in particular, making an offer to President Kabbah to post observers on the border to
monitor the situation with regards to arms crossing into Sierra Leone and making repeated
requests for the UN or ECOMOG to deploy obsewers to monitor the border. In late October
199710253 and late December 1998,lO254 the Liberian government closed the border with
Sierra Leone in collaboration with ECOMOG. The Defence submits that the border
remained closed from this time until alter the Lome Peace Accord was signed in July
1999.10255 The Defence adduced evidence from Issa Sesay, John Vincent, DCT—190, DCT-
292, as well as Exhibits D—385, D—136, D-341, D-l27, D—O62, D—157, D—169, D—177, D—175,
'°25° Defence Final Trial Bried para. 1131.
W"' Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 557.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 469.
'°2" Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 493.
'°"" Defence Final rm Brief, paras 557, 1148.
"’2" Defence Final Trial Brief paras 493, 557.

---- End of Page 1585 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL~O3—O 1~ r / 18 May 2012

5 61 6 $5
D-189, D-141, D-179, D-178, D-031, D-181, D-182, D-191, D-185, D-188, D-347, D-232,
D-23 5, D-239C, D-003, D-263, D-264, D-268, D-03 7, and D-348.
4630. The Prosecution contends that ECOMOG and UNOMIL forces never had sufficient
resources to prevent the movement of materiel across the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, and
that the lack of proper coordination between ECOMOG and the UN observers hindered their
effectiveness, as did movement of the majority of ECOMOG personnel to Sierra Leone
following the Presidential elections in Liberia. lt was therefore easy for the Accused to
circumvent these border patrols}0256 The Prosecution points to the Accused's evidence that
he bought ammunition from ECOMOG in Liberia as an indication that ECOMOG did not
effectively enforce the arms embargoes}0257 The Prosecution contends that the Accused's
testimony that he would have been unable to send materiel into Sierra Leone is contradicted
by oral and documentary evidence of movements of arms and ammunitions across
borders. 10258
4631. The Prosecution argues that Liberian support for the border closure from December
1998 hid the reality that the border was only closed to those forces the Accused did not
support, and that by stationing his subordinates at the border the Accused was able to ensure
that it remained open for the RUF/AFRC}0259 The Prosecution submits that the Defence
contention that the Accused was not able to control the border is at odds with the testimony
of Issa Sesay, who stated that when Taylor granted refuge to Bockarie and his soldiers in
1999, he closed the border to all RUF except for Ibrahim Bah. The Prosecution argues that
this acknowledgment of the Accused's ability to seal the border confirms that cross-border
transactions of materiel would not have escaped the attention of the Accused.lO260 The
Prosecution adduced evidence from Moses Blah, Augustine Mallah, Albert Saidu, Joseph
Marzah, Abu Keita, TF1-367, TF1-516, TF1-371, TF1-567, and TF1-579, as well as
Exhibits P-466, P-467, P-468, P-469, P-470, P-472, P-473, P-474, P-475, P-130, and P-080.
Evidence
IO256 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 213-214, 1261.
my Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1262.
I0258 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 214.
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 209, 1200.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1264.

---- End of Page 1586 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l~T 158% QQ 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
4632. Moses Blah was Inspector General of the NPFL from 1990 to 1997, Liberian
Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000, and Vice-President
of Liberia from 2000 to 2003.l026l Blah testified that the border between Sierra Leone and
Liberia was effectively controlled by ULIMO from 1992 until the elections in June
1997 10262
4633. Blah agreed with the suggestion of Defence counsel that when Charles Taylor
became president, ECOMOG was in reality the only effective force in the country and
numbered around 10,500 troops. He also agreed that they were primarily responsible for
policing within Liberia, and that although there were several instances of ECOMOG soldiers
abusing their power, they were able to exercise control in most regions throughout Liberia,
including establishing firm buffer zones between the various pre-election factions. mw
4634. According to Blah, Taylor again closed the border with Sierra Leone as part of the
peace process from December 1998 to 2 October 1999 in order to put pressure on the RUF
to begin discussions that would lead to peace.lO264 On re-examination, Blah explained that
his knowledge of the border closure came from an announcement on the radio and he did not
have direct knowledge of the state of the border. 10265
4635. However, according to Blah, the borders between Liberia and Sierra Leone, like the
borders between Liberia and C6te d’1voire and Liberia and Guinea, are artificial as ethnic
groups span both countries. Blah agreed with the suggestion by Defence counsel in cross-
examination that there was historically a great deal of fluidity of movement across these
borders, and it was virtually impossible for any nation to police ingress and egress. M)266
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
mm Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884. Blah also became President of Liberia for 60 days
from 1 1 August to 1 1 October 2003. Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10065.
mm Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, p. 10193.
mm Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10241.
*0200 Mpaaa Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10314.
*0005 Mpaaa Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10362-10363.
ll)266 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10151-10152.

---- End of Page 1587 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Our 18 May 2012

36/ 68 O
4636. Augustine Mallah testified that the only time the border between Liberia and Sierra
Leone was effectively closed was in 1992, when ULIMO occupation succeeded in cutting
off the RUF supply line from Liberia.1112117 Although he was aware that the border between
Liberia and Sierra Leone was officially closed from 1998 to 1999, Mallah testified that it
was porous as between the former NPFL and the RUF. Mallah saw members of the RUF and
Taylor's men cross the border without hindrance. 10268
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
4637. Albert Saidu testified that he was not aware that President Taylor closed the
Liberian/Sierra Leonean border from December 1998 to 2 October 1999. According to
Saidu, the only time that the RUF supply route was effectively blocked was from the end of
1992 up to 1996, when ULIMO permanently occupied the border.111269 Saidu believed that
the announcement by the Liberian government that they had closed the border in December
1998 was merely to satisfy the international community and "movement between the RUF
and the Charles Taylor government still continued from 1998 up to 2OO1".1027O
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
4638. Joseph Marzah testified that ECOMOG troops deployed in Liberia maintained
checkpoints on all major and minor roads throughout the country throughout the period 1996
and 1997. Some checkpoints were mamred by ECOMOG while others were manned by
Liberians. Generally at those checkpoints, all persons and vehicles were searched.111271
However, Charles Taylor had close contacts with ECOMOG through Victor, the ECOMOG
commander assigned to Taylor at White Flower, and was able to transport materiel across
borders through bribery of ECOMOG officials. At times, the materiel would be transported
in an ECOMOG jeep, and officials at the checkpoints would not check these vehicles. The
witness used ECOMOG vehicles when he was transporting arms from Roberts International
Airport to White Flower in Monrovia. In 1996, when ULIMO captured Lofa, ECOMOG
troops escorted him to Yekepa on Taylor's instructions to pass through to Sierra Leone.111272
111267 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20085-20086.
1112118 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20437-20440.
111269 Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 1 1205-1 1206.
1112711 Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, p. 1 1224.
111271 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, p. 6097.
111272 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6098-6099.

---- End of Page 1588 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Cnji 18 May 2012

"opened up" because ECOMOG prevented ULIMO from harassing RUF troops attempting
to cross the border. At this time, the witness would travel back and forth from Sierra Leone
to Liberia. 10279 The witness noted that when ECOMOG entered Lofa, they set up road blocks
towards the border areas at Mendekoma Highway in Foya and at Vahun, although not at
Voinjama and it was possible to cross from Sierra Leone into Liberia via Voinjama without
meeting any ECOMOG checkpoints.11128O
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
4643. TF1-516, a radio operator stationed in Buedu from the time of the ECOMOG
Intervention to mid-1999, testified that during his time in Buedu, there was little hindrance
to the flow of RUF personnel across the border to Liberia and the movement of personnel
was frequent.1O281
Prosecution Witness TF1 -371
4644. TF1-371 testified that when Taylor became President in August 1997, ECOMOG
was in control of the country and were stationed on the border.11)282 During 1998, the
Liberian-Sierra Leonean border was open and many RUF commanders would go to Vahun,
in Liberia, to buy goods. 10283
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -567
4645. TF1-567 testified that during the 1ssa Sesay administration, he travelled to Charles
Taylor's farm at Malkei, near Gbarriga to get ammunition. He was accompanied by two g
Liberian SS men, which meant the witness never faced any problems at checkpoints, which
were manned by the NPFL.11)284
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -579
"’m Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1985-1986.
10279 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14309-143 10; Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14965.
‘°2*‘° TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14965-14970.
"’"‘ TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6957.
mm TFl—37l, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2698-2700.
'°"’ TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2400.
‘"34 TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12996—13000,

---- End of Page 1590 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % dh 18 May 2012

4646. TF1-579 testified that he took materiel to Bockarie in Buedu twice in 199830285 TF1-
579 stated that on one of his trips, the group passed a checkpoint just before the border with
Sierra Leone, at Foya. AFL soldiers were based on the Liberian side and there was a r0pe
" ate". U on crossin the r0 e, the rou was on RUF teriitory.l0286
8 P 8 P 8 P
4647. The witness testified that on these tri s, there was no difficult assin throu the
P Y P 8
border check 0ints because "all those who were assi ed at that check 0int knew exactl
P sn P Y
what was going on and they knew the vari0us commanders like Sampson and Jungle and
they had the order there that any time that car ariived there they should allow it to pass
thfoughaa 10287
4648. TF1-579 testified that while in 1997 and 1998 ECOMOG had checkpoints in
Monrovia and other areas of Liberia, when he was delivering ammunition from Monrovia to
Buedu he never had to ass throu an ECOMOG check 0int. K)288
P P
The Accused
4649. The Accused testified that, from the middle of 1996 to the end of 1997, ECOMOG
tr00ps were fully depl0yed throughout the country, with as many as 18,000 to 20,000 tr00ps
0n the ground.lO289 During this peri0d, ECOMOG were effectively "in charge" of Liberian
teriitory and controlled the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. ECOMOG had such
control that it was threatening the sovereignty of the Liberian government. On 24 Oct0ber
1997, the Accused also wr0te a letter to President Sani Abacha of Nigeria, complaining that
ECOMOG were allowin Kama°0rs to use border areas of Liberia as a base from which to
8 J
launch attacks on Sierra Leone.lO29O From 1997 into 1998, ECOMOG continued to 0 erate
P
alon the border in an effort to revent an movement of arms and ers0miel across the
8 P Y P
border. IOM
mm TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19830-19831.
{M6 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19834.
*0287 rrr-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19835.
mm rrr-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21108-21110.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31751- 31756.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 July 2009, pp. 25274-25275.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25351-25352; Transcript 10 August 2009, pp. 26329-
26333.

---- End of Page 1591 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dm 18 May 2012

4650. The Accused testified that the size of ECOMOG troops deployed in Liberia steadily
decreased from 1997.10292 He stated that after the election, Ghana and Nigeria repatriated a
few of their battalions from Liberia while the Cote d’1voire withdrew completely. Burkina
Faso and Niger left a few forces behind.l0203 In March 1997 there were 10,000 ECOMOG
troops in Liberia. 10204 By October 1998, the ECOMOG headquarters had moved to Freetown
and by November 1998 approximately 800 ECOMOG troops remained in Liberia and were
em lo ed for ca acit buildin , the ma`orit havin one to Sierra Leone. B the be innin
P Y P Y 8 J Y 8 8 Y 8 8
of 1999, only about 400 to 500 ECOMOG troops remained in Liberia.l0205 The Accused also
affirmed that the presence of UNOMIL in Liberia ended on 30 September 1997.10290
4651. The Accused stated that during the time ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia, to the
best of his knowledge they were able to carry out their mission successfully. However, the
Accused was aware that ECOMOG publicly complained of insufficient financial support as
well as insufficient logistical resources.l0207 The Accused confirmed that there was a
disagreement between himself and the ECOMOG Force Commander General Malu which
had culminated in General Malu being replaced as Force Commander of ECOMOG but
denied allegations that this related to his plans to put ECOMOG under his own
command.l0200 The Accused also testified that he bought ammunition from ECOMOG
officers during the war. 10200
4652. According to the Accused, the Liberian government officially closed the border with
Sierra Leone on several occasions. During a meeting of the Committee of Five held on 22 to
23 October 1997, reviewing the situation in Sierra Leone, the Liberian government closed its
borders with Sierra Leone in order to further the implementation of the peace process. A
combination of Liberian security personnel and ECOMOG enforced this closure, while
UNOMIL were present as observers. The border remained closed until July 1999 after the
[0202 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31751- 31756.
[0203 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 21 January 2010, pp. 33868-33873.
[0204 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 November 2009, p. 31927.
[0205 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 November 2009, pp. 31959-31962.
[0200 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 November 2009, p. 31947.
‘°2‘" Charles Glrarrlray Taylor, Transcript 21 January 2010, pp. $$806-33807.
[0200 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 21 January 2010, pp. 33873-33877.
[0200 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25785; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32628-
32629.

---- End of Page 1592 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ` 18 May 2012

Lome agreement was signed.1O3OO Prior to this closure, the border was open for "normal
movement" but not for "military activities".1O3O1
4653. The Accused also testified that around 29-31 October 1998, at the ECOWAS summit
meeting at Abuja, he met with other heads of state including President Tejan Kabbah of`
Sierra Leone, and Secretary-General Kofi Annan.1113112 President Tejan Kabbah informed the
Accused that he had received reports that arms were being sent from Liberia to the Sierra
Leonean rebels, which the Accused denied. The Accused told Kabbah that he had repeatedly
requested the Security Council to post troops on the border to prevent such transactions. 10303
4654. The Accused affirmed that on 22 December 1998, shortly after returning from the
inauguration of` President Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso, he made a statement in which
he announced the intention of the Liberian government to close its borders with Sierra Leone
due to insurgents of both Sierra Leonean and Liberian provenance crossing the border of
Sierra Leone into Liberia. Once it was announced, the border closed.1O3O4 The closure of the
border was achieved with the cooperation of President Tejan Kabbah.111305 The Accused
explained that the border was closed and re—opened several times, and that December 1998
was not the first time that it had closed.11131)6 The border remained closed from December
1998 until 1999, afrer the signing of the Lome Peace Accord.1O3O7
4655. Accordin to the Accused, on 25 Au ust 1999, the ECOWAS heads of state decided
S S
to extend ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone, char "n it with the task of monitorin arms
gl 8 S
movements,1113O8 the protection of UNAMSIL and persons working under DDR, and
monitoring the cease fire. The Accused explained that ECOMOG had power to establish
roadblocks, checkpoints and monitor the movement of` arms and ammunitions throughout
103110 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, pp. 25472-25474; Transcript 7 September 2009, p.
28234.
10301 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25447.
10302 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26016-26017.
111303 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 26027, 26029.
10304 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 'Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 261 14.
10305 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 261 18-26119.
10306 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 1 August 2009, p. 26436.
10307 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, p. 26804.
10108 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28307.

---- End of Page 1593 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 0'lb 18 May 2012

. 5% 86
Sierra Leone.l0309 This made it virtually impossible for the Accused to provide arms and
ammunitions to Sierra Leone. mm
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4656. Issa Sesay testified that the Liberian/Sierra Leonean border closed immediately after
Bockarie moved permanently to Liberia and did not reopen until May 2000. During this
time, only Ibrahim Bah was able to cross the border. HBH Sesay stated that he was aware of
the border closure when, afterwards, Momoh Rogers, an RUF member, went to the border to
urge those individuals that had accompanied Bockarie into Liberia to return to Sierra Leone
but was prevented from crossing the border. The Liberian border guards arrested Rogers and
then seriously beat him. Rogers had to go to Freetown to receive treatment. HB I2
4657. Issa Sesay also stated that a few days after Bockarie left for Monrovia, Sankoh also
moved from Freetown to Monrovia in mid-December. While Sankoh was in Liberia, he met
Ibrahim Bah and two white men from Belgium—Michel and Louis, who then travelled with
Akim Turay to Pendembu in a truck with heavy duty mining equipment in it.lO3l3 Sankoh
told Sesay that these men were going to be in Kono to be doing some mining and they
would be buying diamonds. Michel and Louis returned to Liberia when Sankoh left Kono, in
late January 2000. They left the mining equipment behind. [O3 [4
4658. The commander in Buedu, Copor Meh, also used to report to Sesay via radio that the
border was closed. When Sesay arrived in Buedu on his way to Monrovia in May 2000, the
civilians told him that he was the first person since Bah to use a vehicle on that road to the
border. When Sesay crossed over into Liberia, he spoke with Sierra Leonean refugees who
told him the closed border had prevented them from returning home. MI5
Defence Witness John Vincent
mw) Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28308-283 10.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28312.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44465.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44463—44464.
*03 B Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44476—44478.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44482·44483.
IOM Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44484—44485, 44489-4449l.

---- End of Page 1594 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l-T i/( dt} 18 May 2012

4659. John Vincent, an RUF fighter, testified that around 22 December 1998, the border
between Sierra Leone and Liberia closed. He did not know the reason for the border closure,
but he understood that it meant the RUF "were now supposed to struggle on our own" and
could only obtain ammunition through capturing supplies from ECOMOG and the SLA and
trade with Guinea. NB I6
Defence Witness DCT-190
4660. DCT-190, a former ULlMO fighter who was part of the Special Forces assisting the
CDF in 1997 and l998,lO3 W testified that approximately one month afier the Camp Johnson
Road incident, which the witness places in September 1997,l03 18 he took part in a mission
with the CDF, which began in Liberia at the Gendema crossing point. ECOMOG was
deployed at the Klay Junction and took the witness's forces over to Gendema.lO3l9 The
witness was part of a reconnaissance team that crossed the border to Sierra Leone to gather
military information ahead of the operation. lo} 20 The witness stated that since the border
between Liberia and Sierra Leone is long and porous, with 18 to 20 crossing points, they
used eight crossing points at midnight and crossed by canoe. IO 3 21
Defence Witness DCT-292
4661. DCT-292, an RUF member,lO322 testified that in 1996 all Liberian checkpoints were
under the supervision of the NPFL and that it was possible to pass unhindered through the
checkpoint if accompanied by an NPFL commander or ECOMOG officer. 10323
Prosecution Exhibits P-466, P-467, P-468, P-469, P-470, P-472, P-473, P-474, P-475
4662. Exhibit P-466 is the Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 14 February 1994. The report records the ongoing
progress of establishing a buffer zone along Liberia's borders, noting that along the border
with Sierra Leone, UNOMIL was consulting with ULlMO on the establishment of three
IMG John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38121—38123.
10317 DCT—190, Transcript 07 June 2010, pp 42232, 4235, 42236.
mm DCT-190, Transcript 07 June 2010, p. 42241.
10319 DCT—190, Transcript 07 June 2010, p. 42239.
mm DCT—190, Transcript 07 June 2010, p. 42239.
‘""‘ DCT-190, Transcript 07 June 2010, p. 42239.
mm DCT-292, Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41673-41674 (Ps).

---- End of Page 1595 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-O1-T 624 18 May 2012

checkpoints on the border towns of Bo, Kongo and Vahun}0324 The report also notes that a
proposed expansion of ECOMOG forces in Liberia also meant ECOMOG faced added
logistical and financial difficulties. ln particular, the additional ECOMOG troops had not
received the logistical support required for their deployment, and secondly, troop-
contributing countries or donors were not able to cover the cost for stipends to the additional
troops, a major factor in troop morale. The existing ECOMOG troops also faced logistical
difficulties due to the length of their mission in Liberia. M25
4663. Exhibit P-467 is the Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Liberia, 26 August 1994. According to the Report, ECOMOG
continued to be faced with resource and logistical problems, delaying full deployment
throughout the country. The Secretary-General notes that he has consistently emphasised
ECOMOG's critical need for resources to carry out its mandate, although "[t]o date [...] the
response has been disappointing". lfmb
4664. Exhibit P-468 is the Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Liberia dated 13 September 1995. ln the Report, the Secretary-General
reiterates that ECOMOG has been hampered in the supervision of the peace agreements in
Liberia by a lack of financial and logistic resources.m327
4665. Exhibit P-469 is the Thirteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 23 October 1995. On the resource
requirements of ECOMOG, the Secretary-General records that ECOMOG's strength as at
October 1995 was 7,269 but that it estimated that some 12,000 troops would be required to
carry out its concept of operations in Liberia. The report also notes that ECOMOG faced a
number of logistical difficulties, in particular, ECOMOG's deployment capability was
limited and substantial additional logistic assistance was required to enable it to carry out its
mm Der-292, rmnsmpr 2 June 2010, p. 42051.
10324 Exhibit P—466, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1994/ 168, Second Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 14 February 1994", para. 18.
mm Exhibit P-466, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1994/ 168, Second Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 14 February 1994", paras 26-29.
mm Exhibit P-467, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1994/ 1006, Sixth Progress Report of the
Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 26 August 1994", paras 15-16.
mm Exhibit P—468, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1995/781, Twelfth Progress Report of
the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 13 September 1995", para. 43.

---- End of Page 1596 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % dh 18 May 2012

responsibilities under the Abuja agreement, with priority needs being vehicles,
communications, spare parts and fuel. 10333
4666. Exhibit P-470 is the Sixteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 1 April 1996. The report states that
ECOMOG received an additional infantry battalion from Nigeria, increasing its total
strength up from approximately 7,000 to 7,500 troops, as well as 3 helicopters and 20 trucks
as part of the logistical assistance pledged by the United States of America.113333 It notes that
ECOMOG was deployed at Monrovia, Gbamga, Buchanan, Greenville, Kakata, Suehn and
Konola.1133313
4667. Exhibit P-471 is the Seventeenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 21 May 1996. It notes that because of
hostilities erupting in April, ECOMOG had to withdraw from Gbamga, Bo Tienne and
Sinjie and reduce its strength in Buchanan and Kakata.113331
4668. Exhibit P-472 is the Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 17 October 1996. It estimates the force
strength of ECOMOG as at October 1996 at some 7,500, deployed in Monrovia, Kakata,
Buchanan and the Po River. 113332
4669. Exhibit P-473 is the Twenty-First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 29 January 1997. The Report states that
as at 29 January 1997, ECOMOG troops numbered 7,500 in Liberia and had been further
deployed into the interior of Liberia in support of the disarmament process. The report also
records that ECOMOG had successfull established buffer zones between ULIMO-J and
Y
ULIMO-K in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties although the creation of a similar
113333 Exhibit P-469, Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1995/881, Thirteenth Progress Report of
the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 23 October 1995", paras 35-37.
111339 Exhibit P 470, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1996/232, Sixteenth Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 1 April 1996", para. 24.
113330 Exhibit P-470, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1996/232, Sixteenth Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 1 April 1996", para. 25.
10331 Exhibit P-471, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1996/362, Seventeenth Progress Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 21 May 1996", paras. 21-22.
113333 Exhibit P-472, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1996/858, Nineteenth Progress Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 17 October 1996", paras. 19, 21.

---- End of Page 1597 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dk 18 May 2012 m
\

buffer between the NPFL in Bong and Lofa counties required additional troops and
logistical support. 10333
4670. Exhibit P-474 is the Twenty-Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 19 March 1997. The Report states that as
at March 1997, ECOMOG troops numbered 10,000 in Liberia and was currently deployed
throughout the country except in Grand Km and River Cess counties.l0334
4671. Exhibit P-475 is the Twenty Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, dated 19 June 1997. The Report states that as at
June 1997, ECOMOG troops numbered 11,000 in Liberia.llm5
Defence Exhibit D-3 85
4672. Exhibit D-385 is a Special Supplement of the Ofricial Joumal of ECOWAS, Volume
22, 1997, setting out extracts from major documents on the Liberian crisis, including the
Final Report of the Fifth meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECOWAS
Committee of Nine on the Liberian crisis on 15-16 May 1995. The Committee of Nine
Report indicates that the ECOMOG Field Commander, Major-General J. M. Inienger
presented a report accounting for ECOMOG activities in Liberia since August 1994 to the
date of the meeting. lnienger's report "drew attention to the worsening logistics positions of
ECOMOG and the reduction of its troops from 10,000 to 8,443". It noted that that despite
the optimum force level required for ECOMOG operations in Liberia being 18,000, he was
pleading for a force strength of only 12,000, being the required minimum number of
ECOMOG troops, and called for reinforcement and other resources "in order to fulril
creditably the remaining part of the ECOMOG mandate". 10336
Defence Exhibit D-136
10333 Exhibit P-473, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1997/90, Twenty—First Progress Report
of the Secretary—General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 29 January 1997", p. 3.
10334 Exhibit P—474, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1997/237, Twenty—Second Progress
Report of the Secretary—General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 19 March 1997", paras 15,
17.
10335 Exhibit P—475, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1997/478, Twenty Third Progress
Report of the Secretary—General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, S/ 1997/478, 19 June 1997",
p. 5.
10336 Exhibit D—385, "Ofiicial Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Volume
22, Special Edition, 1997- DCT 184 (194 End of Pages)", p. 56, para. 23.

---- End of Page 1598 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T GN 18 May 2012

4673. Exhibit D-136 is the Final Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of
State, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 26-27 August 1997.10337 During a closed session in which
only military personnel could attend,m338 ECOMOG Force Commander Major General
Victor Malu, provided a progress report on the Liberian peace process. Malu reported that
ECOMOG increased to 11,000 troops towards the Liberian elections. Malu also reported
that "ECOMOG personnel were redeployed in adequate numbers around the country and
alon the Liberia! Sierra Leone border to revent an s ill over effect". mw
g P Y P
Defence Exhibit D-341
4674. Exhibit D-341 is an article published on the Sierra Leone News Website, dated 22
October 1997. lt states that Liberia "closed its border with Sierra Leone on Wednesday and
said it would strictly limit the use of its territory for military action to restore the
government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah". [0340
Defence Exhibit D-127
4675. Exhibit D-127 is an article published in the New Aiiican, in December 1997, entitled
"Taylor's Triumph Liberia's 100 Days". lt includes an interview with Charles Taylor
concerning his election victory in August 1997 and his intentions for his administration as
President. A postscript to the interview states:
"Straight from this interview, President Taylor went into a long cabinet meeting with his
colleagues at the end of which the govemment announced the closure of the border with
Sierra Leone to avoid cross-border incursions by the fighting forces in Sierra Leone. Two
days after this announcement, ECOWAS achieved a breakthrough at its meeting in
Conakry, Guinea, where the military regime in Freetown headed by Major Paul Koroma
agreed to hand over power in April l998 to President Tejan Kabbah who will run a power
sharing government as enunciated under the Abidjan Accord of November l995 which led
to the elections in Sierra Leone in March l996.m34l
Defence Exhibit D-062
my Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26-27 August l997 - DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)", p.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25343.
mm Exhibit D-I36, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26-27 August l997 - DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)", p. l l.
M40 Exhibit D-34 l , "Article, Sierra Leone News Website, October 22 1997 - DCT 277 (l End of Page)", p. 1.
mm Exhibit D-l27, "New African, No. 358, Taylor's Triumph Liberia's l00 Days, December 1997 - DCT l7l
(14 End of Pages)", p. 9.

---- End of Page 1599 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T fi GK l8 May 20l2 yl
\ /)

4676. Exhibit D-062 is a Chronology of the Sierra Leonean Civil War set out as part of a
s ecial re ort on website "Africa Confidential", dated A ril 1998. 1t notes that after the
P P P
Liberian elections, 4000 ECOMOG troops were moved from Liberia to Freetown.lO342
Prosecution Exhibit P-130
4677. Exhibit P-130 is the Fifth Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the
Security Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone, dated 9 June 1998. ln the report, the
Secretary-General notes that although ECOMOG has continued to make progress following
the expulsion of the RUF/AFRC Junta from the capital, Freetown, in mid-Febmary, "it is
severely overextended and its advance has been beset by logistical constraints, as well as by
fierce resistance from elements of the AFRC and the RUF".lO343 1t further states that, while
ECOMOG has deployed a total of 12,000 personnel in Sierra Leone, it has also appealed for
a further 6,000 to enable it to carry out its functions more effectively.l0344
4678. The Secretary-General further reports that:
On 5 May 1998, President Taylor wrote to me deprecating the "disturbing a11egation" that the
Government of Liberia was involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone and stressing his
commitment to the maintenance of peace in the region. President Taylor informed me that he
had proposed to the Chairman of ECOWAS that ECOMOG "cordon off’ the border between
the two countries, and said he would welcome the concurrence of the United Nations with his
suggestion that United Nations monitors be deployed in the border area.
On 7 May 1998, the Liberian Government issued a policy statement reaffirming that it would
not permit its territory to be used to destabilize any neighbouring country and stating that
President Taylor had approved the deployment of an ECOMOG observer unit at the border
between Liberia and Sierra Leone in Lofa County, Liberia.
The Government of Sierra Leone has welcomed the issuance of the policy statement [. . @10345
Defence Exhibit D-158
. 4679. Exhibit D-158 is a report by Minister Counsellor Christian M Wisseh, member of the
ermanent mission of the Re ublic of Liberia to the United Nations on a meetin on 15 June
P P g
mm Exhibit D-062, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Diamonds,
Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 6.
mm Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217", paras 13-14, ERN. 4203.
10344 Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217", para. 18, ERN. 4204.
10345 Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217", paras 30-32, ERN. 4206.

---- End of Page 1600 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ·/ Gb 18 May 2012

Z? 6 9 3
1998 with Ambassador Antonio Monteiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal and the
President of the Security Council. lt records that at the meeting, the Ambassador and
President of the Security Council informed Wisseh of concerns expressed by the Security
Council that there were reports that many of the fighters supporting the former Junta in the
East of Sierra Leone were Liberian nationals. According to the report, Wisseh stressed the
Liberian Government's policy not to allow its territory to be used to destablise neighbouring
countries and that President Taylor had previously appealed to the Secretary-General for the
deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the situation at the Liberian and Sierra
Leonean border. IO346
Prosecution Exhibit P-080
4680. Exhibit P-080 is the First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 12 August 1998. Reporting on the activities of
ECOMOG and the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General
notes that while ECOMOG has deployed an additional brigade in Sierra Leone, allowing it
to mount more aggressive patrols, its estimated 10,000 troops in theatre are "still
overstretched and in need of significant additional logistical support, in order to contain the
rebels and restore and maintain order in the eastern and northern parts of the country". mm
Defence Exhibit D-169
4681. Exhibit D-169 is the Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 16 October 1998. The Report notes difficulties in
the relationship between President Kabbah of Sierra Leone and President Taylor of Liberia
after information received by Kabbah of alleged preparations by Liberia for the despatch of
fighters for an incursion into Sierra Leone. The Secretary-General states that in an effort to
improve relations between the two countries and show their commitment to subregional
peace and security, "should both parties agree, the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the
‘""° Exhibit D-158, "Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations, Report on the Meeting
between Ambassador Antonio Monteiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal and President of the Security
Council, and Minister Counsellor Christian M Wisseh", p. 2.
10347 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council ~ First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 ~ 00012386 00012400", para. 15, ERN. 12389.

---- End of Page 1601 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1601 / Ou 18 May 2012

border, subsequently accompanied by United Nations military observers, could help to
stabilise the situation and restore mutual confidence". mm
Defence Exhibit D-177
4682. Exhibit D-177 is a compilation of media releases published by the ECOMOG Press
Information Office, covering the period September to December 1998. A press statement
dated 9 December 1998, titled "Enforce embargo on Liberia to block arms flow to rebels —
Gen Shelpidi", records Major General Timothy Shelpidi, the ECOMOG Force Commander
as calling publicly on the United Nations to ensure a stricter enforcement of the existing
arms embargo and possibly impose fresh sanctions on Liberia as a way of stopping the flow
of arms to the rebel forces in Sierra Leone. Commenting that the only possible supply route
and source of all illegal arms in Sierra Leone is Liberia, General Shelpidi further states:
Gen Shelpidi said it has been proved beyond all doubts in several instances that Liberia
remains the only possible supply route and source of all illegal arms in Sierra Leone, urging
the United Nations not to take President Charles Taylor's denials seriously. [...]
On the possibility of deploying ECOMOG troops for direct policing of Liberia/Sierra
Leone boarder [sic], General Shelpidi said the human and material resources required for
realistic and effective monitoring could be very enormous, moreso in view of the porousity
of borders in Aiirica. He said the International community could still do a lot to help the
situation by prevailing on Liberian authorities. IO349
4683. According to the press release, Shelpidi's view was that the major problem now
facing ECOMOG was the issue of insufficient troops as "many countries that promised
contributing forces are yet to fulfil despite repeated assurances. This situation is being
compounded by the inadequacy of logistics". 10350
Defence Exhibit D-175
4684. Exhibit D-175 is the Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone dated 16 December 1998. The report notes that a Liberian
delegation led by the Minister of` National Security undertook a two-day visit to Sierra
wm Exhibit D-169, "UN Security Council, Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/960, 16 October 1998 — DCT 170", paras 6-7, 61, ERN.
12373, 12383.
mm Exhibit D-177, "Media Communique, A Compilation of News/Press Releases of ECOMOG, Vol. 1, No. 1,
Sept—Dec 1998, Freetown, December 1998 — DCT 23", p. 24.
mw Exhibit D-177, "Media Communique, A Compilation of News/Press Releases of ECOMOG, Vol. 1, No. 1,
Sept—Dec 1998, Freetown, December 1998 — DCT 23", p. 25.

---- End of Page 1602 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T [ GM, 18 May 2012

3 % 75
Leone on 9 December 1998 after which the Liberian government announced that President
Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for joint patrols on the border of Sierra
Leone and Liberia. M5 I
Defence Exhibit D-189
4685. Exhibit D-189 is a statement issued by the government of Liberia setting out a
chronology of the steps it has taken to dispel allegations regarding Liberia's support for the
RUF/Junta between May 1998 and February 1999. Included as one of these measures is the
issuance of a Special Statement on 19 December 1998 concerning the closure of the Liberian
border with Sierra Leone and the deployment of units of the Armed Forces of Liberia to
border areas. [0352
Defence Exhibit D-141
4686. Exhibit D-141 is a collection of the Accused's policies, statements, speeches and
other Presidential Papers from 2 August 1997 to 31 December 1998, published by the
Department of Public Affairs and Presidential Press Secretary in around 1999.lOm The
collection documents the activities of the Accused and important events during his
presidency. [0354
4687. It includes a copy of a public statement made by President Taylor at the Executive
Mansion in Monrovia, on 22 December 1998 "on the occasion of his safe return home from
attending the inauguration of the President of Burkina Faso".l0355 In that statement, Taylor
referred to recent radio announcements concerning the closure of the border with Sierra
Leone and explained that the closure was prompted by signals received by the Liberian
A government that the escalating nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone might lead to a spill
over into Liberian territory, and intelligence reports that elements loyal to ULIMO were
planning to infiltrate insurgents across the border. According to the statement, the Liberian
Hm] Exhibit D-175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the SecretaryAGenera1 on the United
Nations Obsewer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/1 176, 16 December 1998 A DCT 102", para. 14.
mm Exhibit D-189, "Statement on Measures Taken by the Government of Liberia to Dispel Allegations
Regarding Liberia's Support for the RUF/Junta between May 1998 and February 1999 A DCT 177 (4 End of Pages)", p.
fee Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25206,
my Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25205-25206.
10355 Exhibit D-141, "Presidentia1 Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997A 31 December 1998 A DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", pp. 289-291.

---- End of Page 1603 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T XZ 18 May 2012

3% 96
government immediately convened a National Security Council meeting to discuss the
issues. Based on the recommendation of the Council, the Government noted its intention to
collaborate with ECOMOG to enforce the closure, and to deploy security and paramilitary
units along the border. 10356
4688. A policy statement by the Government of the Republic of Liberia on allegations
against Liberia for involvement in the Sierra Leonean crisis, made in Monrovia on 29
December 1998, recalled its decision to permit joint Liberian and ECOMOG patrols of the
border with Sierra Leone, and the subsequent deployment of these forces, and its previous
requests to the UN Secretary-General for the deployment of UN observers along the
border. 10357
4689. Exhibit D-141 also includes a copy of the joint communiqué of the meeting between
the President of Sierra Leone and the President of Liberia on 2 July 1998 in Abuja. The
meeting was jointly hosted by the Chairman of ECOWAS and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. The communiqué records that as part of the discussions on ways in which
security and cooperation between the neighbouring states could be further improved, both
the heads of State of Liberia and Sierra Leone "would welcome and support the deployment
of United Nations and ECOMOG observers along their border".10358
Defence Exhibit D-179
4690. Exhibit D-179 is a letter from Charles Taylor to the President of the Security Council
dated 6 January 1999. The letter details Taylor's concern about theiaccusation leveled
against the Government of Liberia that it was augmenting violence in Sierra Leone. Taylor
refutes the allegations as inconsistent and without substantial proof. In the letter, Taylor also
emphasises that the Liberian government has requested ECOWAS and the United Nations to
deploy observers at the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border and offered to conduct joint border
security activities with the Government of Sierra Leone.111359 Taylor notes that while "the
111356 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997— 31 December 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 290; see also p. 56.
10357 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997— 31 December 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 292.
111358 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997— 31 December 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 298; Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25803.
111359 Exhibit D-179, "Letter to the President of the Security Council, from the President of Liberia, S/ 1999/ 17, 6

---- End of Page 1604 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GTA 18 May 2012

Secretary—General indicated his intention to discuss the matter further with the Government
with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the Security Council for the
deployment of observers on the border", "to date nothing has been done by the Security
Council to this effect".1113611
Defence Exhibit D—178
4691. Exhibit D-178 is a Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 7 January 1999, conceming military and other developments
in Sierra Leone to date. The report states that on 20 December 1998, President Charles
Taylor had announced the closure of the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia and that
he had ordered Amied Forces of Liberia personnel to station themselves at the border.
President Taylor informed the representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia, Felix
Downes-Thomas, that he had received intelligence reports conceming an impending attack
against the territory of Liberia to take place. Additionally, the report states that Taylor also
proposed ECOMOG troops in Liberia should mount joint patrols with Liberian personnel
along the border. 10361
Defence Exhibit D-034
4692. Exhibit D—()34 is a document published by the Liberian Ministry of Information,
Cultural Affairs and Tourism, dated 26 January 1999, setting out the Liberian govermnent's
response to allegations of its involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war. ln a section entitled
"Practical steps by Liberia to bring peace to Sierra Leone", it states:
On the military front, the Liberian border with Sierra Leone has been well-fortified so as to
prevent any situation where retreating AFRC/RUF rebels could contemplate the use of the
Liberian side of the border to launch hit-and-run military operations into Sierra Leone.
Because of this preventive measure, the Liberian side of the border has remained absolutely
calm from any military activity.
And finally, in an attempt to ensure international verification of Liberia's neutrality in the
Sierra Leonean crisis, the Liberian govermnent has invited the United Nations, the OAU
and ECOWAS to send a joint observer mission at the border that would monitor the
January 1999 — DCT 33", p. 2.
1031111 Exhibit D-179, "Letter to the President of the Security Council, from the President of Liberia, S/ 1999/ 17, 6
January 1999 — DCT 33", p. 2.
111361 Exhibit D-178, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary General on the UN Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999 — DCT 100", para. 11.

---- End of Page 1605 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Glk 18 May 2012
Aév

movement of forces both on the Liberian and Sierra Leonean sides of the border. To this
date such verification team is yet to be put in place.m3°2
Defence Exhibit D-181
4693. Exhibit D-181 is a Code Cable from Felix Downes-Thomas, Special Representative
of the Secretary-General in Monrovia, to Prendergast, the Undersecretary-General for
Political Affairs at the United Nations,IO363 on the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops from
Liberia, dated 30 January 1999. It comments on a PANA news article of 15 January 1999
which reported the withdrawal of the Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG from Monrovia.
Downes-Thomas notes that ECOMOG had deployed its personnel primarily in Monrovia
and more visibly at checkpoints in and along roadways leading to Monrovia. While Liberian
security officers have successfully taken over the manning of those checkpoints, he records
that concerns have been raised regarding the ability of government forces to contain
organised violence anywhere in the country. In particular, the Liberian population harboured
concerns regarding the conduct of Liberian security agents, and were "particularly
apprehensive about the overall conduct of members of the Special Security Services
(SSS)".m364 He also noted that despite the often tense relationship between the NPFL-led
government and ECOMOG, the government would have preferred a scaled-down ECOMOG
presence "as opposed to its sudden and massive withdrawal". IO365
4694. On the allegations in the PANA article concerning Liberian complicity in fueling the
conflict in Sierra Leone, Downes-Thomas notes that there is a reluctance from those making
such accusations to furnish incontrovertible evidence, but "[i]f allegations about Liberian
supply of fighters and war material to RUF are true, then one must conclude that either such
supply ante-date the recent events in Sierra Leone or that the joint ECOMOG/Liberia
monitoring of the closed Liberia! Sierra Leone border has been thoroughly ineffective". 10366
mm Exhibit D-034, "Liberia's Response to Allegations of Her Involvement in the Sierra Leone Civil War,
Ministry of Information, Cultural Affairs and Tourism Monrovia, Liberia, 26 January 1999, 00028759-
00028766", pp. 8-9, ERN. 28764.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l 1 August 2009, p. 26480.
mm Exhibit D-181, "Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York from Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Reported Withdrawal of ECOMOG Troops from Liberia — 30 January 1999 — DCT
48", paras 4-5.
mm Exhibit D-181, ‘"Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York from Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Reported Withdrawal of ECOMOG Troops from Liberia — 30 January 1999 — DCT
48", paras 7, 19.
10366 Exhibit D-181, "Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York from Downes-Thomas,

---- End of Page 1606 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Ob 18 May 2012

Defence Exhibit D-182
4695. Exhibit D-182 is a code cable from the United Nations to UNOMSIL in Conakry
dated 5 February 1999 commenting on a "five-point plan" proposed by UNOMSIL as to
furthering stability in the region. The code cable sets out a number of points that UNOMSIL
should take on its visits to Monrovia and Ouagadougou, including that the United Nations
"would [...] welcome the exercise of any influence President Taylor could bring to bear on
the rebels to reach an accommodation with the GOSL7111367 The cable also notes:
In his 9 June 1998 report (S/ 1958/486), the Secretary·General responded positively in
principle to calls by GOL to deploy United Nations personnel at the border between Liberia
and Sierra Leone. In practice, however, this has proved impossible in view of the absence
of any ECOMOG deployment to provide security.1111611
Defence Exhibit D-191
4696. Exhibit D-191 is the Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations
Obseryer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 4 March 1999. The Secretary-General notes the
Government of Liberia's request to deploy United Nations monitors along with ECOMOG
forces at the Liberia/Sierra Leone border in light of repeated allegations of illegal shipments
of arms to the rebels, and remarks that although he intends to pursue options further with
President Taylor, "practical obstacles to the proposal to deploy United Nations monitors at
the border [...] remain, as deployment of the ECOMOG forces required to protect them is
unlikely".111369
Defence Exhibit D-185
4697. Exhibit D-185 is an official statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Liberia
on the Sierra Leonean conflict. It set out a number of undertakings "in furtherance of the
efforts of the Government of Liberia to discourage Liberian citizens from complicating the
crisis in Sierra Leone", including renewing its request to the Government of Sierra Leone to
accept the joint patrol and monitoring of the Liberian/Sierra Leonean border, renewing its
RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Reported Withdrawal of ECOMOG Troops from Liberia — 30 January 1999 — DCT
48", paras 2·4.
1113117 Exhibit D·l82, "Outoing Code Cable to Okelo, UNOMSIL, Conakry from Miyet, United Nations, New
York, Your Five—Point Plan and Next Steps, 5 February 1999 — DCT l32", p. 2.
111368 Exhibit D·l82, "Outoing Code Cable to Okelo, UNOMSIL, Conakry from Miyet, United Nations, New
York, Your Five—Point Plan and Next Steps, 5 February 1999 — DCT l32", p. 2.
111369 Exhibit D·l9l, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations

---- End of Page 1607 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·0l·T r"· 18 May 2012
Z 01*5

59700
request to the United Nations Security Council to approve deployment of United Nations
and ECOMOG forces at the border, and reinforcing directives to security forces to ensure
that no cross border movement or transshipment of arms and ammunition takes place. 10370
Defence Exhibit D-188
4698. Exhibit D-188 is a letter from President Taylor to the United Nations Secretary-
General dated 23 February 1999, renewing his requests for the United Nations to consider
the deployment of` observers or monitors at the Liberia-Sierra Leonean border. It further
states that the government of Liberia has called upon its citizens to disengage its
participation from the conflict in Sierra Leone.lO37l
Defence Exhibit D-347
4699. Exhibit D-347 is an extract from the Official Journal of the Economic Community of
West African States recording the decision of the Heads of State and Government of
ECOWAS on 25 August 1999 to redefine the mandate of` ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Article
1(l) defines the new ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone to include both the maintenance of
peace and security of Sierra Leone and the protection of UNOMSIL and other DDR
personnel. Article 1(2)(d) and (e) instructs ECOMOG to "[...] establish road blocks and
check points to check movement of arms and ammunition and assist in directing refugees
and displaced persons" and "man entry points (land, sea and air) in order to prevent illegal
movement of arms and ammunition into or out of the country".m372
3 Defence Exhibits D-232, D-235, and D-239C
4700. Exhibit D-232 is a code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas, Special Representative of
the Secretary-General in Monrovia, to Prendergast, the Undersecretary-General for Political
Affairs at the United Nations,lOm reporting on a conversation with President Taylor on 26
January 2000. Downes-Thomas reports that Taylor requested that he convey to the
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999 — CMS pgs. 21594~21607 — DCT 142", para. 50.
10370 Exhibit D—185, "Repub1ic of Liberia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monrovia, Official Statement of the
Government of Liberia on the Sierra Leone Crisis, 19 February 1999 — DCT l69", pp. 3-4.
‘°"‘ Exhibit D-188, ‘*Letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, from the President of
Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 February 1999 — DCT 59", p. 2.
mm Exhibit D-347, "Officia1 Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 36,
August 1999 — DCT 281 (4 pp.)", p. 3.
103 73 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 1 August 2009, p. 26480.

---- End of Page 1608 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 615 18 May 2012

Secretary-General that Taylor was agreeable to the deployment inside Liberia and along the
Sierra Leone-Liberia border of UN observers and monitors who could among other things,
deter or report on any cross-border traffic of diamonds, arms or security persormel}0374
4701. Exhibit D-235 is a code cable to Downes-Thomas from Prendergast dated 10
February 2000, acknowledging Taylor's request for UN observers and suggesting that the
Govemment of Liberia should set out its request in writing, setting out, inter alia, the
proposed deployment locations, numbers of observers, whether it envisaged the deployment
of armed troops and the level of support to be provided by the Liberian govemrnent.l0375
4702. Exhibit D-239C is a code cable from Downes-Thomas to Prendergast, dated 14 April
2000, explaining that he had met with the Foreign Minister, who had clarified that the
Liberian govemrnent was not "desperately inviting UN monitors [...] to Liberia", and the
request was made rather to defend its innocence against the background of the allegations
that Liberia was fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone. The cable reports that the Minister
concluded that it was up to the UN to decide whether it was necessary for it to accept the
request. Downes-Thomas states that his own view was that the issues could be
comprehensively addressed by a "UN technical survey team" and sought advice on whether
such a measure would be necessary.l0376
Defence Exhibit D-003
4703. Exhibit D-003 is a Radio Log Book recording radio messages between RUF
commanders from 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000. Exhibit D-003 was adduced
through Prosecution witness Perry Kamara, who testified that it was one of the logbooks
relating to Buedu, Sam Bockarie's radio station.l03 77
4704. One of the recorded messages rrpm C/S Rock (Buedu) Operator to Foday Sankoh
(a.k.a. "Smile") dated 6 February 2000, states:
mm Exhibit D-232, "Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas, RSG,
UNOL, Monrovia, Conversation with President Taylor, 27 January 2000 — DCT 38", para. 6.
10375 Exhibit D-235, "Code Cable to Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, from Prendergast, United Nations, New
York, Recent Cables, 10 February 2000 — DCT 166", p. 1.
fom Exhibit D-239C, "Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, Proposed Deployment of UN Observers on Liberia/Sierra Leone Border, 14 April 2000 — DCT
136 ", p. 1
*7777 Perry xamm, rmpsmpt 7 Fpbmary 2008, pp. 3334-3335.

---- End of Page 1609 ---------------------------


Case No.:

Sir, be informed that since you talked with the brothers on the other side (Liberia) in order
for us to work hand in hand, up till now the border is closed between us by them. People are
very eager to return home upon your instruction but they give no chance for them to come.
About 50 (fifty) civilians came to Worsorga but the Liberia securities raised them and send
them back from where they came from. The harassment on the border is too great sir. All
this confusion is mostly caused by the brothers at Foya. mm
4705. Another message from Col Momoh Rogers to Issa Sesay (a.k.a. "Survival") dated 22
March 2000, states: "Despite the closure of the border line on Sierra Leone and Liberia side
brothers from across yesterday bitterly beat two of our civilians who were willingly
returning home. lt's serious". mw)
4706. A further radio message from the Fourth battalion commander, Major Fayia Sahr at
Koindu to the First Bri ade Commander, dated 7 A ril 2000, states:
g P p
the constant harassment of peaceful Sierra Leonean returnees by the Liberian security on
the borderline is the order of the day this has continued for quite a long time now. They
(Liberian securities) are always impeding the movement of our people to and fro as they
claimed the border being closed". mm
Defence Exhibits D-263 and D-264 A
4707. Exhibit D—263 is a letter from Monie Captan, the Liberian Foreign Minister, to
Thomas P Pickering, the United States Under-Secretary of State dated 17 August 2000,
discussing the ongoing attacks launched from the Guinea-Sierra Leone borders on Liberia. lt
draws the Under-Secretary's attention to the "highly porous nature of our borders" and
formally requests the United States to "(a) facilitate international monitors to be stationed at
Liberian borders; and (b) provide technical assistance to improve monitoring capacity at all
ports of entry". mm
4708. Exhibit D-264 is a letter from President Taylor to President Bill Clinton of the
United States, dated 23 August 2000, discussing the continuing attacks against Liberia
emanating from the Sierra-Leone/Guinea border region, stressing that the "inviolability of
the borders between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone remains a crucial issue" and
wm Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000",
ERN. 8790.
mw Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000",
ERN. 8806.
mm) Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000",
ERN. 8819.
mm Exhibit D-263, "Letter to Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,
from Charles Taylor, dated 17 August 2000 — DCT 1 14", p. 3.

---- End of Page 1610 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
/)/A `f

requesting US support in Liberian calls for, among other things, a UN monitoring presence
along Liberian borders, 10382
Defence Exhibit D-268
4709, Exhibit D-268 is a letter from President Taylor to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, dated 28 August 2000, referring to recent attacks on Liberia by armed insurgents
from the area of the Guinea-Sierra Leone borders and calling again for a monitoring
J presence of the United Nations at these borders. lt also suggests the utilisation of an airborne
multi-spectral service in detection of any unusual movements along the entire border, 10383
Defence Exhibit D-037
4710, Exhibit D-037 is a letter dated 5 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of
Liberia to the UN Secretary-General, Annexed to this letter is a document in which the
Government of Liberia states that it remains completely and totally disengaged with the
RUF and that the Sierra Leone-Liberia border remained closed since March 2001 and is
patrolled daily by security personnel for effective monitoring,lO384
Defence Exhibit D-348
4711. Exhibit D-348 is an excerpt from the Official Journal of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol, 38, dated December 2000, recording the decision
of the Heads of State and Government on 15-16 December 2000 to deploy ECOMOG along
the border between Guinea and Liberia, 10385
Deliberations
(i) ECOMOG presence at the border
10382 Exhibit D-264, "Letter to the President of the United States, H.E William Jefferson Clinton, from the
President of Liberia, Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 August 2000 — DCT 250", p. 2.
mm Exhibit D-268, "UN Security Council, Letter dated 28 August 2000, from the President of Liberia,
addressed to the Secretary General, $/2000/ 844, 1 September 2000 — DCT 129", pp. 1-2,
10384 Exhibit D-037, "Unjted Nations Security Council, Letter dated 5 July 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of Liberia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2001/675, 9 July 2001 -
0010001 1-00100017", para 1.1. Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp, 10323-10325,
10385 Exhibit D-348, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 38,
December 2000 — DCT 282 (2 End of Pages)", p. 7.

---- End of Page 1611 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T A 18 May 2012

4712. The Defence submits that ECOMOG presence in Liberia effectively prevented the
Accused from engaging in cross-border arms trade with the rebels in Sierra Leone. 111386 The
evidence unequivocally demonstrates that there was an ECOMOG presence in Liberia from
around August 1990111387 to at least January 1999.10388 Its task was to oversee the
implementation of successive peace agreements in Liberia, a key component of which was
the establishment of a buffer zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leonean border.1O389 It is clear
that prior to 1997, ECOMOG never successfully achieved this. Although some efforts were
made to negotiate the establishment of checkpoints at the border with Sierra Leone,11)3911 due
to continuing hostilities, ECOMOG deployment in Liberian teriitory remained for the most
art restricted to Monrovia and a few stron olds scattered near the southern coastline.111391
P
It is evident that at least until 1996 or 1997 ECOMOG suffered from resource deficiencies
which delayed full deployment throughout the country. 10392
111386 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 469. 0
1113117 Exhibit D-141, "Presidentia1 Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997- December 31 1998 - DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 69; Exhibit D-120,
"Ana1ytica1 Chronology of the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia: Banjul to Akosombo and Beyond- DCT43 (93
End of Pages)", para. 12; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 July 2009, pp. 24729-24732.
111388 Exhibit D-181, "Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York from Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Reported Withdrawal of ECOMOG Troops from Liberia — 30 January 1999 - DCT
48", paras 7, 19.
111389 Exhibit D-385, "Officia1 Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Volume
22, Special Edition, 1997- DCT 184 (194 End of Pages)", p. 7, para. 10 (on the Yamossoukro Accords in 1991); Exhibit
D-141, "Presidentia1 Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the Chief Executive
of Liberia, 2 August 1997- December 31 1998 - DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 73 (on the Contonou Agreement in
1993); Exhibit P-469, Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1995/881, Thirteenth Progress Report
of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 23 October 1995 (P-469)", para. 24
(on the 1995 Abuja Agreement).
111390 Exhibit P-466, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1994/168, Second Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 14 February 1994", para. 18
(UNOMIL consulted with ULIMO on the establishment of three checkpoints to be manned by ECOMOG on the
border towns of Bo, Kongo and Vahun).
111391 Exhibit P-471, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1996/362, Seventeenth Progress Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 21 May 1996", paras 21-22
(because of hostilities erupting in April, ECOMOG had to withdraw from Gbarnga, Bo Tienne and Sinjie and
reduce its strength in Buchanan and Kakata).
111392 Exhibit P-466, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1994/168, Second Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 14 February 1994", paras 26-29, This
situation did not change despite repeated requests to contributor countries, and the continuing lack of resources
hampered the conduct of their task in supervising the successive peace agreements in Liberia: Exhibit P-467,
"Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/ 1994/ 1006, Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary General
on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 26 August 1994", paras 15-16; Exhibit P-468, "Excerpts
from: United Nations Security Council, S/1995/781, Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 13 September 1995", para. 43; Exhibit P-469, Excerpts from:
United Nations Security Council, S/ 1995/881, Thirteenth Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 23 October 1995 (P-469)" paras 35-37 (Substantial additional logistic
assistance was required to enable ECOMOG to carry out its responsibilities under the Abuja agreement and

---- End of Page 1612 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T 18 May 2012

4713. According to the Accused, from mid-1996 until the end of 1997, ECOMOG troops
were iirll de lo ed throu out the countr [0393 and were effectivel "in char e" of Liberian
Y P Y Y Y S
territory, including controlling the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia.lO394 However,
documentary evidence indicates that only with a substantial injection of troops in early 1997
was ECOMOG able to deploy throughout the country. NB95 By late August 1997, ECOMOG
personnel were deployed along the Liberia/Sierra Leone border.lO3% Prosecution witnesses
Moses Blah,lO397 TF1—371,l0398 and TF1—367,lO399 also indicate that ECOMOG was able to
maintain a presence at the border when the Accused was elected as President.
4714. The Prosecution contends that even if ECOMOG maintained a presence on the
border, due to continuing resource deficiencies ECOMOG was never able to assert ejféctive
control of the border. The Trial Chamber notes that from early on in the Indictment period,
ECOMOG began phasing out its presence in Liberia.m4OO Although in June 1997, ECOMOG
troops numbered 11,000 in Liberia,lO4Ol in August of that year, ECOWAS extended the
mandate of ECOMOG into the territo of Sierra Leonel04O2 and diverted 4000 troo s from
YY P
Liberia to Freetown. 10403 According to the Accused, the total number of ECOMOG troops
recalling that "a severe shortage of logistic support was a main reason for the inability of ECOMOG to carry out
its tasks under the Cotonou Agreement"); see also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 21 January 2010, pp.
33806-33807 (the Accused was aware that ECOMOG publicly complained of insufficient financial support as
well as insufficient logistical resources); see also Exhibit D-385, "Officia1 Journal of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), Volume 22, Special Edition, 1997- DCT 184 (194 End of Pages)", p. 56, para. 23
(drawing attention to the worsening logistics positions of ECOMOG and the reduction of its troops from 10,000
to 8,443).
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31751- 31756.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 July 2009, pp. 25274-25275.
I0395 Exhibit P-473, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1997/90, Twenty-First Progress Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 29 January 1997", p. 3.
103 %Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26—27 August 1997 — DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)", p. 11.
10397 Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10241 (ECOMOG was in reality the only effective force in the
country. ECOMOG forces numbered around 10,500 troops and were primarily responsible for policing within
Liberia).
mm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2698-2700 (CS) (when the Accused became President in August
1997, ECOMOG was in control of the country and were stationed on the border).
10399 TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp, 14977- 14950 (when ECOMOG intervened in Lofa County in
1996 and 1997, they set up checkpoints at the border).
10400 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31751- 31756.
mm Exhibit P-475, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, S/1997/478, Twenty Third Progress
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, S/1997/478, 19 June 1997",
p. 5.
10402 Exhibit D-340, "Officia1 Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 33,
August 1997 — DCT 279 (8 End of Pages)", pp. 13-14.
10403 Exhibit D-062, "1-low Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, Chronology of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Diamonds,
Africa Confidential, April 1998", p. 6; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 November 2009, p. 31960.

---- End of Page 1613 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / M 18 May 2012

dropped to 800 by November 1998, and by the beginning of 1999, only about half that
number remained in Liberia,1O4O4 marking the commencement of the withdrawal of
ECOMOG troops}0405
4715. The extent to which these shortages had an effect on the ability of ECOMOG to
adequately police the border is unclear. However, a number of witnesses testified to crossing
the border from Sierra Leone to Liberia and back at this time. TF1—367, a former RUF
member, testified that although when ECOMOG deployed at Lofa County they set up road
blocks towards the border areas, they were unable to monitor all the major border crossing
points.l°4O6 As the Trial Chamber has previously found, the occupation of the border areas of
Liberia by ULIMO from 1993 to the commencement of the disarmament programme
obstructed access by the RUF to Liberia during that period.lO4O7 However, according to TF1-
367, the road effectively "opened up" once ECOMOG deployed in Lofa County because
ECOMOG prevented ULIMO from harassing Sierra Leoneans attempting to cross the
border.1O4O8 Both Augustine Mallah and Albert Saidu affirmed that the only time the border
between Liberia and Sierra Leone was closed in practice was when ULIMO occupied the
border areas from around 1993 to 1996 or 1997, and testified that the border was porous at
all other times. 10409
4716. Joseph Marzah also suggested that the corruption of ECOMOG officials meant that it
was easy to evade border controls at this time. He testified that ECOMOG commanders
provided Taylor with ECOMOG branded vehicles, sold Taylor arms and ammunition, and
escorted Marzah to the border while he transported materiel to Sierra Leone.1041O According
10404 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 November 2009, pp. 31959-31962.
MD5 Exhibit D-181, "Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York from Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Reported Withdrawal of ECOMOG Troops from Liberia 4 30 January 1999 4 DCT
. 48".
*0*00 TFl-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14965- 14970.
IOW Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged RUF Assistance Fighting ULIMO in Liberia. See also Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28709-28710 (the border was entirely cut off when ULIMO
occupied the area until January 1997 following the disarmament programme); Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May
2008, p. 10193 (the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia was effectively controlled by ULIMO from 1992
until the elections in June 1997); Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9676-9678 (the border was
sealed off from middle of 1992 till 1997 when the disarmament process was underway); Abu Keita, Transcript
24 January 2008, pp. 2150-2151. (ULIMO's control of the border area continued until 1997 when Charles Taylor
was elected President).
*0000 TFl-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14309-14310; Transcript 29 August 2008, p. 14965
IOW) Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20085-20086; Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008,
pp. 11205-11206.
mm Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6098-6099.

---- End of Page 1614 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

to Defence witness DCT—292, in 1996, when the presence of ECOMOG in Liberia was
significant, it was possible to pass unhindered through border checkpoints if accompanied
by an NPFL commander.l04ll While the Accused did not agree that ECOMOG assisted with
the movement of arms across the border, he agreed that he did purchase arms and
ammunition from corrupt ECOMOG cormnanders.m4l2 The Trial Chamber recalls its
previous finding that the evidence of Joseph Marzah must be treated with caution,l04l3 but
notes that in this instance, his evidence is corroborated by TFl—367, who testified as to the
ability to cross the Sierra Leonean—Liberia border while ECOMOG was stationed there in
1997.
4717. lt was also the Accused's evidence that once ECOMOG troops moved into Sierra
Leone, their mandate extended to monitoring the movement of arms and ammunition into
and out of Sierra Leone. Exhibit D—347 affirms that at least from August 1999, the
ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone was defined to include "man[ning] entry points (land,
sea and air) in order to prevent illegal movement of arms and ammunition into or out of the
country".l04l4 Nonetheless, evidence suggests that logistical and other resource shortages
persisted,l04l5 hampering ECOMOG's ability to police the border from the Sierra Leonean
side. In a press statement dated 9 December 1998, Major General Timothy Shelpidi, the
ECOMOG Force Commander, noted that while, in his opinion, cross—border arms supply
from Liberia was the only possible supply route for the entry of illegal arms into Sierra
Leone, insufficient troops and inadequate logistical support prevented ECOMOG from
directly policing the border. IOM6 Similarly, Exhibits D—l82, D—l9l and P—l30 indicate that
while the United Nations welcomed in principle the Government of Liberia's proposal to
deploy United Nations monitors at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, up to
*°‘*" DCT-292, Transcript 3 Jrrrrr 2010, p. 42051.
[W2 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25785; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32628-
32629.
mm Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268.
[M14 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28308-28310; Exhibit D-347, "Ofticial Journal
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 36, August 1999 ~ DCT 281 (4 pp.)"
(defining the ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone to include establishing "road blocks and check points to check
movement of arms and ammunition and assist in directing refugees and displaced persons" and "man[ning] entry
points (land, sea and air) in order to prevent illegal movement of arms and ammunition into or out of the
country").
[W5 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council ~ First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 ~ 00012386 ~ 00012400", para. 15, ERN. 12389 (ECOMOG's
estimated 10,000 troops are "still overstretched and in need of significant additional logistical support").
[W6 Exhibit D-177, "Media Communique. A Compilation of News/Press Releases of ECOMOG, Vol. 1, No. 1,
Sept~Dec 1998, Freetown, December 1998 ~ DCT 23", pp. 24-25.

---- End of Page 1615 ---------------------------


Case No; SCSL—03—01—T (I1; 18 May 2012 l ;

March 1999, this proved impossible due to the absence of any ECOMOG deployment to
provide security.*04*7
4718. ln view of this evidence, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the deployment of
ECOMOG in Liberia or Sierra Leone was sufficient to prevent the cross-border movement
of arms and ammunitions.
(ii) Closure of the border bythe Liberian government
4719. The Defence further submits that the Liberian government itself closed the border in
1997 and 1998, reinforcing the ECOMOG troops at the border with Liberian forces. The
Accused testified to several occasions on which the Liberian government officially closed
the border with Sierra Leone.*04*4 He then testified that during a meeting of the Committee
of Five held on 22 to 23 October 1997 the Liberian government closed the border.*04*9 Later,
the Accused affirmed that on 22 December 1998, he announced the closure of the border,
due to reports of the escalation of the conflict in Sierra Leone and intelligence that the
defunct ULIMO were planning to infiltrate insurgents across the border.*O420
4720. The Trial Chamber notes that the announcement by the Liberian government that it
closed the border with Sierra Leone in October 1997 is corroborated by Exhibit D-341*042*
and Exhibit D-127,*0422 both media articles covering the announcement of the closure. That
the Liberian government also closed the border with Sierra Leone in December 1998 is
corroborated by Exhibits D-141,*0424 Exhibit D-189,*0424 both publications issued by the
*04*4 Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217", paras 30-32, ERN. 4206; Exhibit D-182,
"Outgoing Code Cable to Okelo, UNOMSIL, Conakry from Miyet, United Nations, New York, Your Five—Point
Plan and Next Steps, 5 February 1999 — DCT 132", p. 2; Exhibit D-182, "Outgoing Code Cable to Okelo,
UNOMSIL, Conakry from Miyet, United Nations, New York, Your Five—Point Plan and Next Steps, 5 February
1999 — DCT 132", p. 2; Exhibit D-191, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999 — CMS pgs. 21594—21607 — DCT
142", para. 50.
*04*8 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, p. 26436 (The Accused explained that the border was
closed several times).
*04*4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, p. 25472-25474; Transcript 7 September 2009, p. 28234.
*0420 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26114.
*042* Exhibit D-341, "Article, Sierra Leone News Website, October 22 1997 — DCT 277 (1 End of Page)", p. 1.
*0422 Exhibit D-127, "New African, No. 358, Taylor's Triumph: Liberia's 100 Days, December 1997 — DCT 171
(14 End of Pages)", p. 9.
*0423 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
ChiefExecutive of Liberia, 2 August 1997— December 31 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 290; see also p. 56.
*0424 Exhibit D-189, "Statement on Measures Taken by the Government of Liberia to Dispel Allegations

---- End of Page 1616 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // CPL 18 May 2012

J1
Liberian government, Exhibit D—178,lO425 the Secretary—General's progress report,
Prosecution witness Moses Blah}0426 and Defence witness John Vincent. mlm The Trial
Chamber accepts that on both occasions the Liberian government announced the official
closure of the border and their intention to enforce that closure in collaboration with
ECOMOG30428 The Accused gave a number of other dates for the closure of the border,lO429
but due to a lack of corroborative evidence the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the
Liberian government also announced a closure of the border at those times.
4721. Evidence indicates that after the official closure of the border in December 1998, a
joint force of ECOMOG and Armed Forces of Liberia personnel was present at the border.
In Exhibit D-178, the Secretary—General in his progress report on the situation in Sierra
Leone noted that along with the announcement of the border closure, the Accused also
ordered Armed Forces of Liberia personnel to station themselves at the border. HMO The
existence of a joint ECOMOG/Liberia monitoring of the closed Liberia/Sierra Leone border
in January 1999 is also affirmed by Felix Downes-Thomas, Special Representative of the
Secretary—General in Monrovia, in Exhibit D—181.w43l
Regarding Liberia's Support for the RUF/Junta between May 1998 and February 1999 — DCT 177 (4 End of Pages)", p.
2 (Included as one of these measures is the issuance of a Special Statement on 19 December 1998 concerning the
closure of the Liberian border with Sierra Leone and the deployment of units of the Armed Forces of Liberia to
border areas).
10425 Exhibit D-178, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary General on the UN Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999 — DCT 100", Para. 11
10426 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997— December 31 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", pp. 56, 289-291;
Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10314 (the Trial Chamber notes that Blah recalled this event only after
prompting from Defence counsel during cross-examination).
‘°‘" John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 20 l0 pp. 38121-38123.
10428 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 July 2009, p. 25473; Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies,
Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997— December
31 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 290.
10429 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24332 (stating that he closed the border with Sierra
Leone in August 1998); Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29047 (stating that the Liberian government closed the
border with Sierra Leone in October 1998).
10430 Exhibit D-178, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary General on the UN Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999 — DCT 100", para. 1 1.
10431 Exhibit D-181, "Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York from Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Reported Withdrawal of ECOMOG Troops from Liberia — 30 January 1999 — DCT
48", paras 2-4; see also Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the
Activities of the Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997— December 31 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 292
(recalling the government's decision to permit joint Liberian and ECOMOG patrols of the border with Sierra
Leone, and the subsequent deployment of these forces); Exhibit D-189, "Statement on Measures Taken by the
Government of Liberia to Dispel Allegations Regarding Liberia's Support for the RUF/Junta between May 1998
and February 1999 — DCT 177 (4 End of Pages)", p. 2 (referring to the closure of the Liberian border with Sierra Leone
on 19 December 1998 and the deployment of units of the Armed Forces of Liberia to border areas).

---- End of Page 1617 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

39 7 / 0
4722. However, whether the Liberian forces were any more effective at policing the border
is questionable. A number of witnesses testified to first-hand experiences of crossing the
border from 1998 to 1999. Both TF1-579 and Abu Keita, who claimed to have been
involved in the delivery of materiel across borders during this time, suggested that they had
no difficulty getting through the border checkpoints, even though AFL soldiers were
stationed there.111432 Abu Keita noted that the RUF commanders issued entry "passes" for
border crossings which were recognised on both sides of the border, including by the AFL
and Liberian police.111433 TF1-579 testified it was a simple matter to bypass ECOMOG
checkpoints on the way from Monrovia to Buedu.111434
4723. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that the evidence of TF1-579 must be
treated with caution.111435 However, his evidence as to the porous nature of the border as
between the Accused's subordinates and the RUF is corroborated by witnesses about whose
testimony the Trial Chamber had no reservations. 1n addition to Abu Keita, Augustine
Mallah, Albert Saidu and TF1-516 also testified that from 1998 to 1999, there was little
hindrance to the flow of RUF personnel and Taylor's subordinates across the border.14436
Saidu believed that the announcement by the Liberian government that they had closed the
border in December 1998 was merely to satisfy the intemational community and did nothing
to prevent the movement of RUF members. 14437
4724. In rebuttal to this evidence, the Defence cites correspondence documenting the
Accused's requests to the United Nations for the deployment of United Nations observers or
monitors at the Liberia-Sierra Leonean border, dating from mid-1998, as contemporary
evidence of the unlikelihood of the Accused being responsible for arms and ammunition
being taken to Sierra Leone.
4725. The Trial Chamber notes that although it was repeatedly mooted in discussions
between the Accused's government and the United Nations,14434 evidence suggests no such
14432 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2045; TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p, 1983.
14434 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2045.
111434 TF1-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21108-21110.
111445 Credibility Assessment, TF1-579, paras 339-345.
10436 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20437-20440; Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008,
p. 11224; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6957.
‘°*" Albert satdu, rmSmp16 June 2008,p. 11224.
144314 Exhibit P-130, "Unjted Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217". paras 30-31, ERN. 4206 (On 7 May 1998, the

---- End of Page 1618 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 Ma 2012
X GIA y M

5 9 7 /7
monitoring programme was ultimately put into place. H)439 Exhibits D-235 and D-239C,
Liberian Government issued a policy statement "stating that President Taylor had approved the deployment of an
ECOMOG observer unit at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone in Lofa County, Liberia"); Exhibit D-
158, "Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations, Report on the Meeting between
Ambassador Antonio Monteiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal and President of the Security Council, and
Minister Counsellor Christian M Wisseh", p. 2 (recalling that President Taylor had previously appealed to the
Secretary General for the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the situation at the Liberian and
Sierra Leonean border); Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the
Activities of the Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997- December 31 1998 ~ DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 298
(a joint communiqué of the meeting between the President of Sierra Leone and the President of Liberia on 2 July
1998 in which both the heads of State of Liberia and Sierra Leone stated they "would welcome and support the
deployment of United Nations and ECOMOG observers along their border"); Exhibit D-141, "Presidential
Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August
1997~ December 31 1998 ~ DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 292 (a policy statement by the Liberian govemment on 29
December 1998 recalling its previous requests to the UN Secretary General for the deployment of UN observers
along the border); Exhibit D-178, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary General on the UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999 ~ DCT 100", para. 11 (stating that in addition to announcing
the closure of the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia in December 1998, Taylor also proposed ECOMOG
troops in Liberia should mount joint patrols with Liberian personnel along the border); Exhibit D-179, "Letter to
the President of the Security Council, from the President of Liberia, S/1999/17, 6 January 1999 ~ DCT 33", p. 2
(letter emphasising that the Liberian government has requested ECOWAS and the United Nations to deploy
observers at the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border); Exhibit D-034, "Liberia's Response to Allegations of Her
Involvement in the Sierra Leone Civil War, Ministry of Information, Cultural Affairs and Tourism Monrovia,
Liberia, 26 January 1999, 00028759-00028766", pp. 8-9, ERN. 28764; Exhibit D-185, "Republic of Liberia,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monrovia, Official Statement of the Government of Liberia on the Sierra Leone
Crisis, 19 February 1999 ~ DCT 169", pp. 3-4 (set out a number of undertakings "in furtherance of the efforts of
the Government of Liberia to discourage Liberian citizens from complicating the crisis in Sierra Leone",
including renewing its request to the United Nations Security Council to approve deployment of United Nations
and ECOMOG forces at the border, and reinforcing directives to security forces to ensure that no cross border
movement or transshipment of arms and ammunition takes place); Exhibit D-188, "Letter to the Secretary
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, from the President of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 February
1999 ~ DCT 59", p. 2 (renewing Taylor's request for the United Nations to consider the deployment of observers
or monitors at the Liberia-Sierra Leonean border. It further states that the government of Liberia has called upon
its citizens to disengage its participation from the conflict in Sierra Leone); Exhibit D-232, "Code Cable to
Prendergast, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Conversation with
President Taylor, 27 January 2000 ~ DCT 38", para. 6 (Downes-Thomas reports that Taylor requested that he
convey to the Secretary-General that Taylor was agreeable to the deployment inside Liberia and along the Sierra
Leone-Liberia border of UN observers and monitors who could, among other things, deter or report on any
cross-border traffic of diamonds, arms or security personnel); Exhibit D-235, "Code Cable to Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, from Prendergast, United Nations, New York, Recent Cables, 10 February 2000 ~ DCT 166", p. 1
(acknowledging Taylor's request for UN observers and suggesting that the government of Liberia should set out
its request in writing, setting out, inter alia, the proposed deployment locations, numbers of observers, whether it
envisaged the deployment of armed troops and the level of support to be provided by the Liberian government).
Wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25803; Exhibit D-182, Outgoing Code Cable to
Okelo, UNOMSIL, Conakry from Miyet, United Nations, New York, Your Five~Point Plan and Next Steps, 5
February 1999 ~ DCT 132", p. 2 ("In his 9 June 1998 report (S/1958/486), the Secretary-General responded
positively in principle to calls by GOL to deploy United Nations personnel at the border between Liberia and
Sierra Leone. In practice, however, this has proved impossible in view of the absence of any ECOMOG
deployment to provide security"). The Trial Chamber notes that in late 2000, the Liberian government renewed
its request for an ECOMOG or United Nations monitoring presence at the Sierra Leonean and Guinean borders
due to recent attacks on Liberia by armed insurgents. Exhibit D- 263, "Letter to Thomas Pickering, Under
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, from Charles Taylor, dated 17 August 2000 ~ DCT 114 (D-
263)", p. 3; Exhibit D-264, "Letter to the President of the United States, H.E William Jefferson Clinton, from the
President of Liberia, Dr Charles Ghankay, 23 August 2000 ~ DCT 250 (D-264)", p. 2; Exhibit D- 268, "UN
Security Council, Letter dated 28 August 2000, from the President of Liberia, addressed to the Secretary
General, S/2000/844, 1 September 2000 ~ DCT 129 (D-268)", pp. 1-2. This request appears to have been
answered. Exhibit D-348, "Official Joumal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

---- End of Page 1619 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // Uk 18 May 2012

establish that although in February 2000, the United Nations suggested that the Government
of Liberia should set out its request for UN observers in writing,l044O the Liberian
government did not do so, explaining that it was not "desperate1y inviting UN monitors [...]
to Liberia", and the request was made rather to defend its innocence against allegations that
Liberia was fuelling the contlict in Sierra Leone.lO44l Citing this evidence, the Prosecution
contends that the United Nations "called Taylor's bluff’ when it requested the Liberian
government to provide details of the requested monitoring mission, and hence could not be
used as evidence of the Accused's good faith.lO442
4726. The Trial Chamber notes that this is not the only reasonable inference from the
Liberian government's failure to provide the written request, given that its response did not
depart from the context and language of its previous requests, which had emphasised the
need for Liberia to clear its name. However, the Trial Chamber considers it significant that
in August 2000, the Liberian government again sought the deployment of international
monitors at Liberian borders, this time in response to attacks launched by insurgents from
Guinea.lO443 That in December 2000 it succeeded in obtaining ECOWAS approval for the
deployment of ECOMOG along the border between Liberia and Guineall)444 indicates that if
the Liberian government had wanted to do so, it could have sought greater policing of the
Sierra Leonean border.
4727. The Defence also invoked the Accused's proposal to President Kabbah to implement
joint Liberian—Sierra Leonean patrols on the border. There is some reason to doubt whether
the joint border patrols were ever seriously considered by either side. Although according to
Vol. 38, December 2000 — DCT 282 (2 End of Pages)".
10440 Exhibit D-235, "Code Cable to Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, from Prendergast, United Nations, New
York, Recent Cables, 10 February 2000 — DCT 166", p. 1.
lO44I Exhibit D-239C, "Outgoing Code Cable to Prendergast, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas,
RSG, UNOL, Proposed Deployment of UN Observers on Liberia/Sierra Leone Border, 14 April 2000 — DCT
136 (D-239C)", p. 1
IOM Exhibit D-235, "Code Cable to Downes-Thomas, RSG. UNOL, from Prendergast, United Nations, New
York, Recent Cables, 10 February 2000 — DCT 166", p. 1; Exhibit D- 239-A, "Outgoing Code Cable to Downes-
Thomas, RSG, UNOL from Prendergast, United Nations, New York, Proposed Deployment of UN Observers of
Liberia/Sierra Leone Border, 12 April 2000 — DCT 136 (D-239A)", p. 1.
10443 Exhibit D- 263, "Letter to Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,
from Charles Taylor, dated 17 August 2000 — DCT l 14 (D-263)", p. 3; Exhibit D-264, "Letter to the President of
the United States, H.E William Jefferson Clinton, from the President of Liberia, Dr Charles Ghankay, 23 August
2000 — DCT 250 (D-264)", p. 2; Exhibit D- 268, "UN Security Council, Letter dated 28 August 2000, from the
President of Liberia, addressed to the Secretary General, S/2000/844, 1 September 2000 — DCT 129 (D-268)",
pp. 1-2.
IO444 Exhibit D-348, "Ofticial Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 38,

---- End of Page 1620 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Exhibit D-175, in early December 1998 the Liberian government announced that President
Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's proposal,44445 yet in public statements in January
and February 1999, it sought to renew the request to President Kabbah.44446 There is no
evidence to show that such joint patrols were ever implemented.
4728. ln any case, the Trial Chamber considers what is relevant is not the official position
of the Liberian government but the practical reality of what was occurring at the border.
Evidence from witnesses with firsthand experience of crossing the border during this period
suggests that although the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone was officially closed
from 1998 to mid-1999, that closure was largely ineffective.
(iii) The Accused's ability to control the border and the closure of the border from
December 1999
4729. The Prosecution submits that the Accused had the ability to control, allow or prevent
cross-border transactions of materiel and that this is confirmed by evidence that the border
was closed after Bockarie's departure from Sierra Leone in December 1999.40444
4730. Some evidence suggests that Liberian forces did exert a degree of control over the
Liberian! Sierra Leonean border in 2000. Exhibit D-003 contains a number of radio messages
between RUF commanders recording incidents from February to March 2000 when Liberian
forces stationed at the border forcibly prevented Sierra Leonean refugees returning
home.40444 Issa Sesay also testified that the Accused closed the border immediately after
December 2000 · DCT 282 (2 End of Pages)", p. 7.
44445 Exhibit D-175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary·General on the United
Nations Obseryer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/1176, 16 December 1998 · DCT 102 (D-175)", para. 14
(after a two-day visit by a Liberian delegation to Sierra Leone on 9 December 1998 the Liberian government
announced that President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for joint patrols on the border of
Sierra Leone and Liberia).
404444 Exhibit D-179, "Letter to the President of the Security Council, from the President of Liberia, S/ 1999/ 17, 6
January 1999 · DCT 33", p. 2 (Letter notes that the Liberian government has offered to conduct joint border
security activities with the Government of Sierra Leone); Exhibit D-185, "Republic of Liberia, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Monrovia, Official Statement of the Government of Liberia on the Sierra Leone Crisis, 19
February 1999 · DCT 169", pp. 3-4 (set out a number of undertakings "in furtherance of the efforts of the
Government of Liberia to discourage Liberian citizens from complicating the crisis in Sierra Leone", including J
renewing its request to the Government of Sierra Leone to accept the joint patrol and monitoring of the
Liberian/ Sierra Leonean border).
44447 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1264.
40444 Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000",
ERN. 8790, 8806, 8819. P

---- End of Page 1621 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gk 18 May 2012

5 9 7 / el
Bockarie moved permanently to Liberia,l04`w and that this had prevented civilians from
returning to Sierra Leone.m45O Further, Exhibit D—037 records the Liberian government as
stating that since March 2001 the Sierra Leonean—Liberia border had been closed and was
patrolled daily by security personnel.l045l
4731. However, evidence suggests that the border was not closed to all individuals.
According to Issa Sesay, certain persons remained capable of crossing the border, in
particular, lbrahim Bah and persons in his company. He stated that a few days after Bockarie
leii for Monrovia in December 1999, Sankoh also moved from Freetown to Monrovia and
on Sankoh's return, lbrahim Bah and two white men from Belgium, also crossed the border
with a truck carrying mining equipment.l0452 TF1—567 also testified that when delivering
arins and ammunition to Sierra Leone during 2000 and 2001, he never faced any problems at
checkpoints because he was accompanied by Liberian Secret Service persormel.l0453 The
Trial Chamber considers that the ability of select persons to cross the Sierra Leonean border
during this period indicates that even if the border was officially closed, the Accused was
able to authorise particular movements between Liberia and Sierra Leone of which he
approved.
4732. The Trial Chamber is mindful that it is not necessary to establish that the Accused
had the ability to control the border, only that there were insufficient border controls to
prevent the existence of a cross-border arins trade. ln this regard, the Trial Chamber
considers significant Moses Blah's evidence that the border between Liberia and Sierra
Leone was largely artificial and was virtually impossible for any nation to police.l0454
However, in light of the evidence of Issa Sesay and TF1—567, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
1 that although from December 1999 to 2001, the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia
was to some degree closed to civilians, this was not sufficient to prevent the cross-border
movement of arins and ammunition.
Findings
`O449 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44465.
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44484—44485, 44489-4449l.
mm Exhibit D—037, "United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 5 July 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of Liberia to the UNited Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2001/675, 9 July 2001 -
00100011—00100017", para 1.1. Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10323—10325.
wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44476-4447S.

---- End of Page 1622 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T CM 18 May 2012

5 7 7 /.5
4733. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that at no relevant time in the
Indictment period was the ECOMOG presence on the Liberia/Sierra Leone border, or the
official closure of the border by the Liberian Government, sufficient to prevent the cross-
border movement of arms and ammunition.
(b) Shortage of Materiel in Liberia
Submissions of the Parties
4734. The Defence argues that the Accused was not in a position to supply arms and
ammunitions to the Sierra Leonean rebels because the disarmament process in Liberia, left
the Liberian government with no arms and/or ammunition to give.444455 The Defence submits
that disarmament in Liberia had been completed in December 1996, prior to the electoral
process and none of the collected materiel was given to the Accused when he became
president.44456 According to the Defence, a persistent reality of the Accused's presidency
was the severe lack of arms for use by his domestic security forces due in part to the arms
embargo imposed on Liberia by the Security Council.4O457 lt was only when confronted with
repeated incursions that Liberia violated the embargo to acquire war materiel from Serbia in
early 2002 in order to legitimately defend itself, by which time the war in Sierra Leone had
ended.4444544 The Defence relies primarily on the evidence of the Accused, and additionally
adduced evidence from Issa Sesay, Yanks Smythe, John Vincent, DCT-008, Exhibits D-136,
D-201, D-204, D-230, D-286A, D-286B, D-297A, D-297B, D-297C, D-337, D-349, D-351,
D-361, D-362, D-364, D-369, and D-394.
4735. The Prosecution refutes this argument on several grounds. First, it contends that the
Accused is not telling the truth when he claims not to have had arms and ammunition during
his Presidency prior to 2001 and is contradicted by aspects of his own testimony.444459 The
Prosecution contends that the disarmament in Liberia never truly occurred, and the NPF L
and other factions hid their caches of arms and ammunition.4444444 lt submits that the evidence
444454 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12996-13000.
444454 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10151-10152.
444455 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 533, 1032; Defence Opening Statement, Transcript 13 July 2009, p. 24313.
444456 Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 463.
444454 Defence Final Trial Brief] paras 706-707.
40458 Defence Final Trial Brief; paras 707-709.
*0459 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1255, 1258-1259.
4444440 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 210.

---- End of Page 1623 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T 0% 18 May 2012

also establishes that the Accused was continuing to arrange clandestine arms deals long
before the arms shipment in 2002, circumventing the UN arms embargo imposed on Sierra
Leone by paying bribes to foreign officials.lO4°l The Prosecution also relies on a number of
Prosecution and Defence witnesses who acknowledged that the RUF did get ammunition
from Liberia during the period that Liberia was subject to the arms embargo.lO462 The
Prosecution adduced evidence from Moses Blah, TF1-371, Joseph Marzah, Dauda Aruna
Fornie, Varmuyan Sherif lan Smillie, Stephen Ellis, and Exhibits P-018, P-032, P-453, P-
482.
4736. Further, the Prosecution submits that the Accused's claim that the Liberian
government had no access to arms and ammunitions is implausible or incompatible with the
Defence claim that the Sierra Leonean rebel forces did obtain ammunition and arms from
Liberian government personnel, only that they were acting independently from the
Accused. H)463
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
4737. Moses Blah was Inspector General of the NPFL from 1990 to 1997,l0464 Liberian
Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000,lO4(’5 and Vice-
President of Liberia from 2000 to 2003.lO466 Blah testified that the disarmament process in
Liberia was completed by the middle of 1996. Of the weapons collected, some went to the
police, some to the army, some for training and some were burnt during the disarmament
process in Liberia. However, while some factions disarmed, others did not do so properly,
for example, by disarming only their old weapons or by burying their weapons. Blah 1
described the process as "a game". IOM7
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 213, 1255-1257.
[M2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1252.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1254.
‘°"6" Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp, 9943-9945.
‘°"°5 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884.
W'66 Moses Blah. Transcript 14 May 2008. pp. 9882-9884. Blah became President of Liberia for 60 days from 11
August to 11 October 2003. Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008. p. 10065.
KW7 Moses Blah. Transcript 19 May 2008. pp. 10207-10208.

---- End of Page 1624 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 0% 18 May 2012

397/7
4738. Blah described several arms shipments that came into Liberia during his time
working with Charles Taylor. He knew of four such shipments. The first occurred in
December 1989, when Blah picked up a consignment of arms and ammunition in Abidjan,
provided by the Minister of Defence during Houphouet Boigny's administration in the Cote
d’ Ivoire. mlm "
4739. The second arms shipment occurred when he was Liberian ambassador and travelled
with Joe Tuah to Ouagadougou to talk to President Blaise Compaoré about Compaoré's
relationship with Taylor, which had become strained. Compaoré complained he had been
"risking his life for Taylor". Blah stated that fiom what he saw and fiom his analysis,
Compaoré had been shipping consignments of arms and ammunition and news fiom Gaddafi
to Taylor.l04°9 While there Blah saw Musa Cissé and Grace Minor, the latter a friend of
Taylor's and a Liberian Senator}0470 who had "come on a mission .... also to see Blaise
Compaoré". Blah, Tuah and Cissé then retumed to Liberia on a plane loaded with arms and
ammunition. 10471 These were unloaded by NPFL soldiers into waiting trucks. He did not see
where the cargo was taken but "usually" "it goes straight to Mr Taylor's house and at the
back of his house there was a place underground where the weapons were kept all the
time".m472 This was the "old building" called White Flower. Taylor's new residence was
"also called Vfhite F1ower".l0473
4740. The third shipment to reach Monrovia arrived towards the end of the witness's time
as Vice-President and just before Taylor resigned. It was seized by UNOMIL forces at
Roberts Intemational Airfield. Blah did not state where this shipment came fiom}0474
4741. Blah also knew of another arms shipment, earlier in his vice—presidency, which was
transported by a plane that crashed as it approached Roberts International Airport. Blah
drove to the scene and saw the crash but did not investigate it. At the scene Blah saw two
white men fiom the plane, who had Ukrainian passports, being taken to hospital}0475
IOM Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9820-9822; Transcript 20 May 2008, pp 10277-10278.
Img Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, p. 9894.
HMO Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008. pp. 9894, 9904-9905.
IW] Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9886-9889, Transcript 15 May 2008, p 9895.
NW2 Moses Blah. Transcript 15 May 2008, p. 9897.
Wim Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, p. 9898
mm Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10277-10278.
HWS Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008. pp. 9901-9902; Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10277.

---- End of Page 1625 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GA 18 May 2012

5 9 7 /2
4742. Despite these shipments, Blah also testified that throughout his time and involvement
with the NPFL and the Taylor government, arms were in short supply for the fighting forces
and for the Liberian police. This was always a major concern for the government,
particularly after the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo. IO476
4743. Blah testified that there was an area underneath Taylor's residence where weapons
were stored. Weapons from this storage area could be sent to the frontlines. It was a highly
restricted area but the witness knew about it due to his rank as the Inspector General of the
NPFL, and later Ambassador and Vice-President. He would also see trucks backing up to
this storage area and being loaded.lO477
Prosecution Witness TP 1 -371
4744. TF1-371 testified that he was aware of first the Magburaka shipment and two other
subsequent major shipments of materiel which were imported into Liberia and then
transported into Sierra Leone. The first of the subsequent shipments came by plane from
Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso to Roberts International Airport in Liberia with Mr Cissé,
Taylor's protocol officer and taken to White Flower in November or December 1998.
Supplies from this shipment were trucked into to Buedu. The second shipment was in early
1999 when Sam Bockarie left for Monrovia and came back with a consignment of materiel
to Buedu}0478 Between these shipments Bockarie took regular trips to Monrovia and brought
( arms but "not really large, in huge quantities as those three shipments". mlm
4745. In response to a suggestion by Defence Counsel in cross-examination that the
Liberian government was still subject to an arms embargo when it was sending two large
shipments of arms to Sierra Leone, the witness explained that the arms embargo was not an
effective measure to prevent materiel coming into Liberia. Those on whom the embargo was
placed breached the arms embargo in order to ensure that they survived. HMSO
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
mlm Moses Blah. Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10279-10280.
10477 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9973-9974. The Accused denied the existence of this structure.
Charles Ghankay Taylor. Transcript 4 November 2009. p. 31132.
mlm TF1-371. Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2702-2703 (CS).
mw) TF1-371. Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2700 (CS).
MSO TF1-371. Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2740 (CS).

---- End of Page 1626 ---------------------------


Case No,: SCSL-03-01-T Gm 18 May 2012

37 7/ 7
4746. Joseph Marzah testified that not all of the arms collected during the disarmament
process in Liberia were destroyed by ECOMOG, only the "ugly" ineffective weapons were
destroyed. The ECOMOG commander assigned to Taylor at White Flower,lO48l Victor,
allowed the factions to hide their arms, either by burying them at the Camp Schefflein
Highway or by taking them to Gbamga. Taylor's men therefore still had possession of the
effective weapons.lO4g2 Marzah testified that arms and ammunition were transported on
Ecomog vehicles from the airport to White Elowerloim and that ECOMOG personnel also
used to sell weapons to Charles Taylor. Marzah was instructed by Taylor to approach Victor
with US dollars, and Victor would in tum provide the witness with arms and ammunition
from the ECOMOG base.lO4g4
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Eomie
4747. Dauda Aruna Eomie testified that on returning from a trip to Monrovia shortly after
the ECOMOG Intervention, when Bockarie had obtained a supply of arms and ammunition
such as AK rounds, GPMG, RPG and RPG rockets, Bockarie remarked that Taylor had told
him that while Taylor did not have much ammunition, he was ready to support the RUF "to
the best Or his ability".l°485
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
4748. Varmuyan Sherif testified that LURD made major incursions into Liberia "at the end
of 1998 going into 1999". He stated that at this time, the Liberian Government was not well
equipped and short of the arms to defend itself because the country had been disarmed and
the weapons burned by ECOMOG. HMS6 0
Prosecution Exhibit P-032 and Prosecution Witness Stephen Ellis
4749. Exhibit P-032 is the first report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
, Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001) concerning the compliance by the Government of
Liberia with its arms embargo and links between Liberia and the conflict in Sierra
mm Joseph D. Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6091, 6103-6104.
Wm Joseph D. Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6102-6103.
mm Joseph D. Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, p. 6099.
mlm Joseph D. Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6090-6094.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 214543—214545.
MSG Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 1006-1007.

---- End of Page 1627 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dx 18 May 2012

Leone}0487 Describing sources of revenue for the breach of the arms embargo, the report
states that the Panel obtained bank transfer details for two transfers of funds from the
Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry ("LISCR") to San Air General Trading
in the United Arab Emirates on 21 June 2000 and 7 July 2000, for $USD 525,000 and $USD
400,000 respectively. The report asserts "[t]hese two payments were for arms and
transportation in violation of Security Council resolutions".[0488 "San Air's bank accounts
were used for many payments for arms deliveries to Liberia and the money trail is described
in the section on government expendimres".[0489
4750. According to the Panel's report, the LISCR admitted that it made these payments
following written requests from the Corrnnissioner of Maritime Affairs, Benoni Urey,
through his Deputy Connnissioner of Financial Affairs (DCFA), instructing LISCR to
redirect a pending distribution of the Government's share of the Registry collection to a non-
governmental account. LISCR became increasingly uncomfortable at the growing regularity
of requests for divergence from standard procedure in late 2000 and informed the
Commissioner of Maritime Affairs that it would no longer honour such requests. [0490
4751. The report then notes:
Having found resistance from LISCR, Cormnissioner Urey then changed his strategy, writing to his Deputy
Commissioner for Financial Affairs on l3 September to authorize one payment of US$ 200,000 on 13
September 2000, one payment of US$ 174,000 on 20 September 2000 and one payment of US$ 174,000 on 27
September 2000. According to a copy of Urey's letter in the Panel's possession, these amounts were to be
transferred to the Maritime Affairs Account at the Ecobank in Monrovia for onward transmission to the San
Air General Trading Account in Sharjah, "via: the account of S. Ruprah" (annex 9).
These transfers from the Maritime Account correspond with the issuing of a US$ 200,000 cheque (No.
0019119) from the BMA Ecobank account in Monrovia (Account 10610001812018). This cheque was written
out to "Sanjivan Ruprah", dated "13 September 2000" and signed by Commissioner of Maritime Affairs
Benoni Urey. mg]
4752. The Panel documented a number of case studies in which it believed the Liberian
goverrnnent to have violated UN—imposed sanctions. ln relation to one of these case studies,
H)487 See Exhibit P-022, "United Nations Security Resolution 1343 (2001) Adopted on 7 March 2001", paras 19-
20, ERN 100009.
Img Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para.
412, ERN 4521.
msg Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (200l)", para.
412, ERN 4521.
HMO Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para.
415, ERN 4521.
mm Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", paras

---- End of Page 1628 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ESS 18 May 2012
, K 4,/ (

the Panel reported that Liberia set up a ghost airline, known as "West Africa Air Services",
to transport arms cargoes in July and August 2000 using a forged End—User Certificate for a
company in Guinea. According to the Panel, the plane shuttled between Monrovia and
Abidjan to bring over 100 tons of ammunition to Liberia.l0492 The Panel interviewed
Sanjivan Ruprah in relation to West African Air Services documents that he signed for
flights from Abidjan to Monrovia during July and early August 2000. Ruprah affirmed that
these trips were for transportation of ammunition. The Panel also referred to Ruprah as "the
same person the Panel on Sierra Leone identified as an arms dealer involved in the Liberian
procurement process".l0493 lt also stated that Ruprah was an associate of Victor Bout,
another arms dealer. 10494
4753. According to the Panel's report, the corporate relationships of the companies San
Air, West Africa Air Services and others revolved around a network of arms dealers
including Victor Bout and Sanjivan Ruprah. The Panel found that the main company behind
many of the shipments was San Air.l0495
4754. The Panel also interviewed General Robert Guei who, after the elections in Cote
d’Ivoire, acknowledged that he had signed an End—User Certificate for a flight of cargo of
ammunition from Ukraine to Abidjan in July 2000 which was then transferred to Liberia. He
explained that when he took office, after a coup d’etat in 1999, he wanted to replenish
depleted lvorian army stocks. When he asked the Heads of State of other African countries
to assist, the Liberian President supplied some arms and even sent an emissary to help the
General out. This emissary was the Liberian Ambassador—at—large Mohamed Salame, a
resident of Abidjan, and owner of a timber business in Liberia. Salame offered his services
and asked General Guei to sign the End—User Certificate and offered to split the consignment
416-417, ERN 4521-4522.
H)492 Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para.
17, ERN 4445.
mm Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", paras
207-208, ERN 4479.
H)494 Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para.
23, ERN 4445.
10495 Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para,
22, ERN 4445.

---- End of Page 1629 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
J qw w

between Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia. The General acknowledged that some of the ammunition
had remained in Cote d’Ivoire but most of it had been for Liberia.10496
4755. The composition of the UN Panel of Experts for Liberia is almost identical to the
Panel for Sierra Leone, with the exception that Ian Smillie was replaced as a member of the
panel by Alex Vines.111447 Exhibit P-032 was admitted through Prosecution witness Stephen
Ellis, who provided the Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Court with a report on the
connection between the RUP and Liberia.10494 His report cited Exhibit P-032 in support of
its conclusion that there was continuing connection between the accused and the RUP in the
deals in diamonds and arms.141449
Prosecution Exhibit P-018 and Prosecution Witness Ian Smillie
4756. Exhibit P-018 is a report of the UN Panel of Experts dated December 2000 appointed
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra
Leone. The report identities Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan national, as a "well-known"
weapons dealer playing a "key role in Liberia's airline registry and in the arms trade".11151111
According to Exhibit P-018, in 1999, Ruprah was appointed by the Liberian Minister of
Transport to act as the "Global Civil Aviation agent worldwide". Ruprah would travel using
a Liberian diplomatic passport in the name of Samir M. Nasr, which identified him as 1
Liberia's Deputy Commissioner for Maritime Affairs, and carried additional authorisation
from the Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry.1115111
4757. Ian Smillie, a co-author of Exhibit P-018,111502 affirmed that Ruprah was a senior
official in the aircraft registry of Liberia and that he was travelling using a Liberian passport
10496 Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para.
216, ERN 4481.
111497 Compare Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343
(2001)", ERN. 4435A and Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 —
S/2000/1195, adopted on 20 December 2000", p. 3, ERN 4373.
10448 Exhibit P-019, "Expert Report "Diamonds, the RUF and Liberian connection — A Report for the Office of
the Prosecutor The Special Court for Sierra Leone", lan Smillie, April 21 2007".
111494 Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1446-1447,
1115011 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 26, 224, ERN. 4380, 4408.
105111 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 26, 225-226, ERN. 4408.
111502 See Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted
on 20 December 2000", p. 3, ERN 4373, which cites lan Smillie as one of the co-authors of the Expert Panel
Report.

---- End of Page 1630 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T T 18 May 2012

under an assumed name.{O5O3 He noted that the connections documented in Exhibit P-018
between Ruprah, known arms dealer Victor Bout, and Liberia were partly anecdotal and
partly came from intelligence sources and from people in the aircraft business.{O5O4
According to Smillie, the Panel saw a picture of` Sanjivan Ruprah's Liberian passport and a
passport in the name of` Samir Nasr.{05O5 Smillie stated that when the UN Panel of` Experts
asked the Charles Taylor about Ruprah and his work, Taylor denied that he knew
Rupmhiosoc
Prosecution Exhibit P-482
4758. Exhibit P-482 is Annex XII from the report of` the Panel of` Experts on Liberia
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), a letter from the Ministry
of` Finance, Republic of` Liberia, dated 20 August 1999, to the General Manager of` the
Oriental Timber corporation. The subject of` the letter is "GOL tax payment transf`er", and
authorises the transf`er of` $USD 500,000 against forestry related taxes to Sanjivan Ruprah. It
is signed by Juanita E Neal, Deputy Minister of` Revenue. {05 07
Prosecution Exhibit P-453
4759. Exhibit P-453 is an article from an online news service, www.pbs.org, reporting on
an interview with Daniel Chea in May 2005 concerning Chea's work as Liberian Minister of`
Def`ence under the government of` Charles Taylor. In the interview, Chea describes the
disarmament of` 1995 as a "fiasco. There was no disarmament...It was a haphazard
attcmptarrosos
The Accused
{0503 Ian Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, p. 571.
{0504 Ian Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, p, 560.
*0505 Ian smi111a,rraaampt8 January 2008,p. 658.
{0506 Ian Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, pp. 571-572.
{0507 Exhibit P-482, "Am1ex XII, Letter from the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Liberia, GOL tax payment
transfer, 20 August 1999". Defence counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit P—482 for the reason that it
contained evidence that was probative to the guilt of the Accused and hence had to satisfy the requirements of
the Trial Chamber's decision in Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion in Relation
to the Applicable Legal Standards Goveming the Use And Admission of Documents by the Prosecution during
Cross-Examination, 30 November 2009. The Trial Chamber has overruled that objection: Charles Ghankay
Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, p. 34245.
{0508 Exhibit P-453, "Excerpts from; News article, Frontline World, Liberia 4 No More War, A Political
Survivor: Interview with Daniel Chea, May 2005", p.4.

---- End of Page 1631 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / __ 18 May 2012

4760. The Accused testified that Liberia had no arms and ammunitions during his
presidency prior to 2001 to send outside the country, and if there were such arms and
ammunitions, denied that he had any access to them.11)5119 The Accused testified that when he
was elected as President of Liberia in July 1997 the Liberian economy and infrastructure had
been destroyed and there was no national armed force as they had factionalised during the
war.1115111 The Liberian government issued a general order for all NPFL soldiers to disarm to
the peacekeepers after the Civil War,111511 and this began in late 1996 to 1997.10512 The
materiel collected was kept by ECOMOG and the UN and stored at the ECOMOG
headquarters.111513 Although the Accused asked for use of some of the material, his requests
were denied.111514 During and after the process of disarmament, only the ECOMOG soldiers
assigned to the Accused, as a newly elected President, and the Accused's security protection
and the Secret Service were armed; they had "some handguns",111515 although he later stated
that even his own "securities" were not a1med.1051° P
4761. The Accused testified that the United States, "our good friends" insisted on the
destruction of all the arms as a signal that Liberia wanted to put the war behind it. While it
was not a popular idea, and the Accused was concerned about Liberia's inability to defend
itself from external threats, Liberia finally agreed to do it and the materiel collected as a
result of the disarmament process ~was destroyed in about February 1999.1115 17 The official
destruction of arm and amrnunitions in Liberia concluded on 18 October 1999,1115 18 when it
was announced by the UN in an official statement attributable to the spokesman of the
Secretary-General.111519 Every weapon turned over was ultimately destroyed.1115211 During re-
10509 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30524; see also Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25436;
Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25823; Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26901-26903; Transcript 10 September
2009, pp. 28612-28613; Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30279-30280.
1115111 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25195-25198.
111511 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25347.
10512 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, p. 26444.
10513 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25195—21597; Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26901-
26903; Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28612-28613; Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 29992; Transcript 26
October 2009, pp. 30279-30280.
111514 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25195-25197.
10515 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25195-21597.
10516 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 29992.
10517 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, pp. 26444-26447.
105111 Charles Ghankay Taylor Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26901-26903; Transcript 9 September 2009, pp.
28444-28445.
105 19 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 9 September 2009, pp. 28444-2 8445.
111520 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25195-25197.

---- End of Page 1632 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ’/ GQ 18 May 2012

examination, the Accused testified that the NPFL did not completely disarm and stated
"based on the bar set at that particular time one can say total, but in looking at the real
anal sis of what would be called total disarmament,that's virtuall im ossible to be total.
Y Y P
But I mean according to the bar set I would say it was satisfactory" He stated that the NPF L
gave up only about 80 to 90 percent of the arms in their possession by the end of the
disarmament process and acknowledged that UN observers estimated that 50% of the NPF L
disarmed, but given his explanation that it was impossible to have "total disarmament" he
considered disarmament levels of 80 to 90 percent to be "satisfactory".l052l The Accused
estimated that the level of disarmament for ULIMO was only 40 to 45 percent.lO522 On the
whole, he estimated the disarmament process in Liberia to be only 70 percent successful and
acknowledged that there was a significant amount of arms unaccounted for.m523 The
Accused was aware that former ULIMO personnel hid some of their weapons and that they
were selling ammunition to Sierra Leone and the RUF ,lO524 some of these hidden weapons
having been brought to him at his residence in Monrovia by Varmuyan Sherif. This was to
demonstrate Sherif s loyalty to the Taylor government. 10525 He denied any knowledge of an
interlinked network of traders and insurgents that fuelled cross-border trade in arms, but
subsequently agreed that "the borders are porous" and acknowledged that people were
selling arms but were doing so without his consentlO526
4762. With the arms destroyed and ECOMOG leaving, Liberia had virtually no capacity to
defend itself.lO527 Accused testified that incursions into Liberia by LURD through Guinea
began in late 1998, and there were also attacks in 1999 and 2000.10528 Having destroyed the
arms and with ECOMOG drawing down, the Accused had virtually no capacity to defend
Liberia from the LURD incursion. For this reason, as well as the fact that the Government of
Liberia had no official army but was relying on diverse groups loyal to the government,
LURD made a rapid advance.lO529
*052* Charles olraalray Taylor, Transcript 18 ralaraary 2010, pp. 35402-3540;.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30737—30740.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 August 2009, pp. 27788—27793.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 February 2010, p. 35404.
H)525 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30737—30740.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 August 2009, pp. 27788—27793.
H)527 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26553—26555. »
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 28044-28045.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp 26553—26555.

---- End of Page 1633 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T L! 18 May 2012

4763. The Accused testified concerning one incident during September 1998 when
Liberian government forces engaged in heavy fighting with the forces of Roosevelt Johnson,
a former minister in the Accused's governmentlO53O who led a rebellionllml against the
Taylor administration and set up a city—state in Camp Johnson Road, Monrovia.m532 With
some assistance from ECOMOG, the Liberian Government defeated J ohnson's group}0533
4764. The Accused stated that to the best of his knowledge the Security Council in
Resolution 788, dated 19 November 1992, calling for states to implement a complete arms
embargo on deliveries of weapons to Liberia was still in place in relation to Liberia}0534 In
1997 ECOWAS lifted the arms embargo it had imposed on Liberia but was unable to
ersuade the UN Securi Council to do the same}0535 In 2000 or 2001 the Accused wrote a
P
letter to the UN Security Council informing them that, the Government of Liberia was
invokin the ri t to self—defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter and would im ort arms
8 P
from Serbia in order to defend itself against the LURD incursion.lO536 The Accused testified
that prior to the writing of that letter no arms were imported into Liberia in breach of the
arms embargo and that he was unaware that Liberia was used as a conduit for arms going
into Sierra Leone. He stated that "if arms were going through Liberia when he need(ed) arms
to fight.". "the logical thing to do" (was) "to take them".l0537 The Accused denied
allegations that he had any access to new weapons in 1998.105 38 Benoni Urey only began
organising arms purchases from Serbia in 2000 on Taylor's authority and with his implied
authority.Although the accounts were set up for payments in late 1999,10539 and the first
shi ment of arms after disarmament came from Serbia in 2001 or 2002.10540 Sometimes a
P
bribe would have to be paid to transport arms through a country to Liberia, although Taylor
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 July 2009, p. 25701.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25741.
10532 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25742.
10533 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 July 2009, p. 25719.
10534 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 7 September 2009, pp. 28214-28216.
10535 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25414-25415.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 Aug 2009, pp. 27838-27839; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp.
32513-32515. The Accused was unable to find the letter, although it was mentioned in UN papers. Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, p. 28072. The letter included all the information as to the source of
the arms, the type and the amount which would be imported. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 September
2009, pp. 29869—29871; 26 November 2009, pp. 32516-32518.
'°5" Charles oiiairicay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, p. 28074.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26191-26194.
W9 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34224-34231.
10540 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, p. 28074, 34230-34228.

---- End of Page 1634 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2// ds I8 May 2012

Z9 7 2 7
does not know which countries these were.4O544 Taylor's Chief of Protocol, Musa Cisse, was
one of those responsible for arranging the bribes. 40542
4765. The Accused testified that he also bought ammunition from ECOMOG officers
during the the fighting with ECOMOG. 40543 ·
4766. During cross-examination, in response to the statement by General Robert Guei
recorded in Exhibit P-032, the Accused agreed that when General Guei took power on in
1999 he asked Liberia for assistance. The Accused admitted that he sent Guei trained lvorian
SSS personnel to serve as Guei's bodyguards and stated that they carried with them small
quantities of ammunitions and light weapons. Taylor denied giving instruction to Mohamed
Salame to get General Guei to sign an End User certificate. 40544
4767. In response to the statement in Exhibit P-032 that the Liberian lntemational Ship
and Corporate Registry made two transfers of funds from to San Air General Trading in the
United Arab Emirates in 2000, the Accused testified that he did not know what these
transfers were for but if there were documents showing that the transfers were for the
purchase of arms by a relevant government authority they would have been approved by him
as President of Liberia. Benoni Urey, the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, in approving
the transfers was acting with Taylor's (implied) authority. 40545
4768. In response to Exhibit P-482, the Accused stated that he was unaware of instructions
by the Liberian Ministry of Finance to the Oriental Timber Company to make a forestry-
related tax payment of $USD 500,000 to a Swiss bank account in the name of ,"Sanjivan
Ruprah". However, he acknowledged that even though he did not remember the transaction
itself, any letter from the Ministry of Finance to Ruprah would have first gone through
clearance from the President.m546 The Accused stated the money transfers were not his
responsibility unless a controversy arose and an investigation was required but reiterated that
10541 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32526-32529; Transcript 2 December 2009, p.
fsogzlgharles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 December 2009, p. 32910,
wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25785; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32628-
32629. The Accused was not precise as to "the fighting" he is referring to or when it occurred.
U)544 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34261—34268.
M45 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34224, 34231.
m54° Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34241-34246.

---- End of Page 1635 ---------------------------


Case No.

a half a million dollar transfer would not have been made without the approval of the
govemment. 111547
4769. The Accused at first denied knowing Sanjivan Ruprah.1115411 He explained that
diplomatic passports were given to non nationals as a courtesy for short periods of time
accompanied by a sealed document from Ministry of Foreign Affairs when they were
representing Liberia's interests such as investors or non—Liberians granted consular
services. 111549 However, the Accused stated in cross—examination that he knew of Ruprah but
was not personally acquainted with him. The Accused believed Ruprah worked in a public
relations ambassadorial role for the Maritime agency but could not be certain.1115511 Finally,
the Accused affirmed that he approved Sanjivan Ruprah as an Ambassador—at—Large for
Liberia, based on recommendations, and approved the issue of his diplomatic passport. 111551
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4770. Issa Sesay testified that he heard, from Foday Sankoh, among others, that ECOMOG
sold ammunition. On one occasion, Foday Sankoh sent someone to purchase ammunition
ppm Eco1v1oo. *5552
4771. In cross—examination Sesay agreed that without the ammunition brought by
Bockarie from Liberia in December 1998, the attack on Koidu would never have taken
place. He stated that if he had not received ammunition to attack Kono he would not have
launched these initial operations,111553 and without taking Kono and capturing the
ammunition there, the RUF would not have had the materiel necessa to attack other
W
areas.111554 He denied his revious testimon iven in 2007 that the ammunition came from
P Y 8
Burkina Faso, statin that he realised after readin the transcri ts that had not `ven the ri t
8 8 P 81
account.111555
‘°55’ Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34247-34250.
1115411 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27685; Transcript 26 August 2009 p. 27800.
111549 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 August 2009, pp. 27800-27803.
1115511 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 January 2010. pp. 33737-33739.
111551 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34247-34250.
111552 Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46520.
111553 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46169- 46171, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46661-46662.
10554 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46661-46662.
111555 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46171. The testimony was given in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon
and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T.

---- End of Page 1636 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / QU 18 May 2012 `E

Defence Witness Yanks Smythe
4772. Yanks Sm he, who was Assistant Director for O erations for the SSS between 1998
P
and July 2000,lO556 testified that Charles Taylor's securities were armed to protect Taylor as
he was President.l0557 Smythe also testified that there was a warehouse for the SSS in a
building next to White Flower which contained supplies including supplies of arms and
ammunition, including light weapons, AK—47s and ammunition and RPGs for the sss.*0550
The SSS had another small warehouse at the Executive Mansion containing "small light
weapons". The arms and ammunition of the Armed Forces of Liberia were kept separately
from the SSS warehouses and were held at the Barclay Centre.lO559
Defence Witness John Vincent
4773. John Vincent, a Liberian member of the RUF from September 1990 to 2000 before
leaving to join the Armed Forces of Liberia in 2001, testified that he met Jungle on the way
to the Waterworks meeting of 199840560 Jungle informed Vincent that he was making
re ular tri s to Buedu and rovidin Bockarie with ammunition.l056l Vincent did not know
3 P P 3
from where in Liberia Jungle obtained supplies but he never heard that these supplies came
from Taylor.lO562
Defence Witness DCT-008
4774. DCT-008, a radio operator in Gbarnga and Monrovia Liberia, from August 1994 to
2003,l0563 testified that Yeaten, without Taylor's knowledge purchased ammunition from
disarmed factions in Liberial0564 which he then onsold to Bockarie in Sierra Leone,
beginning late 1998. M65
Defence Exhibit D-136
*0550 Yanks syrrttrts, rrarrsarrpt 24 February 2010 pp. 35865-35867, 25952
*055* Yanks srrtytits, Transcript 1 March 2010, pp. 36285-36286.
*0550 Yanks smytits, rraascrrpt 24 February 2010 pp. 35933-35935.
*0550 Yanks smyths, rrartsarrpt 24 February 2010 pp. 35936-35938
IMO John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38109-381 13, Transcript 30 March 2010 p.38259.
lm'] Jolm Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38110-38111.
wm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 p. 381 12; Transcript 30 March 2010 p. 38260.
*0500 Der-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 46949 (Ps).
IOW DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47389, 47393; Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48086-48087,
48104-48105.

---- End of Page 1637 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

4775. Exhibit D-136 is a report of a meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State in Nigeria on 26
to 27 August 1997, discussing ECOMOG's actions taken in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The
report discusses the completion of the disarmament process and details ECOMOG's
contribution to disarmament: since its commencement, ECOMOG had recovered 35, 000
weapons and 4 million assorted small ammunition.111566
Defence Exhibit D-201
4776. Exhibit D-201 is a letter dated 14 July 1999 from President Obasanjo to Charles
Taylor. The letter thanks Taylor for his invitation to the symbolic burning of arms and
ammunition surrendered to the UN and ECOWAS by former military factions in Liberia, to
mark the 1521111 anniversary of Liberian independence.111561
Defence Exhibit D-204
4777. Exhibit D-204 is an article from the BBC News website dated 28 July 1999 referring
to the arms destruction ceremony in Liberia as "one of the largest weapons destruction
programmes the world has seen in recent years". However, it reports Nigerian General Felix
Mukakperou, who headed the ECOMOG units in West Africa and was charged with the
safeguard of the captured weapons, as stating that the weapons destruction programme was
"a mess" and several weeks behind schedule. He warned that unarmed UN monitors were
incapable of protecting those weapons not yet destroyed from possible seizure by armed
groups which might want them after ECOMOG troops withdraw from Liberia.1115611
Defence Exhibit D-230
4778. Exhibit D-230 is a note dated 5 January 2000 from the Office of the Representative
of the Secretary-General to Liberian Minster of Foreign Affairs Moni Captan. The note
annexes a report on the destruction of arms and ammunition by the UN, ECOWAS and the
Government of Liberia between July and October 1999. It estimates that the total number of
10565 DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47391-47392; Transcript 7 September 2010, p. 48182.
111566 Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26-27 August 1997 — DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)", p. 10; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25346-
25347.
1115117 Exhibit D-201, "Outgoing Code Cable to Downes-Thomas (Only), RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Liberia, from
Prendergast, United Nations, New York, 7 May 1999 — DCT 65".
111568 Exhibit D-204, "BBC News, World: Taylor: A New Era for Liberia, 26 July 1999 — DCT 220", 28 July
1999, p. 2.

---- End of Page 1638 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ @.5 18 May 2012

weapons of all sizes destroyed between 25 July and 20 September 1999 to be 19,297 and the
total rounds of ammunition destroyed to be 3,164,849. The report also notes that the
destruction of weapons and ammunition of all sizes was completed on 18 October 1999.10569
Defence Exhibits D-286A, D-286B, D-297A, D-297B and D-297C
4779. Exhibits D-286A, D-286B, D-297A, D-297B and D-297C are photographs which
show President Taylor, Tejan Kabbah, Olusegun Obasanjo and Alpha Konare at Barclay
training Centre in 1999 on the occasion of the buming of arrns.1115711
Defence Exhibit D-337
4780. Exhibit D-337 is UN Security Council Resolution 788 (1992), dated 19 November
1992, on the situation in Liberia. Paragraph 8 of the resolution calls for states to implement a
"general and complete embargo" on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to
Liberia until the Security Council decides otherwise.10571
Defence Exhibit D-349
4781. Exhibit D-349 is a letter from Charles Taylor to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
dated 22 January 1999. The letter expresses concem about the safelceeping of confiscated
arms after withdrawal of ECOMOG and states that the Liberian Government would not
accept removal of the arms from Liberian territory and that the UN must ensure the arms
remained in its custody.111572 It also states that while the Liberian government "is amenable
to the possible destruction of unserviceable arms", it wished the remaining arms to "remain
in the custody of the United Nations for the future utilization by the Liberian Army".10573
10569 Exhibit D-230, "United Nations, Office of the Representative of the Secretary General, Note to Monie
Captan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liberia, from Ambassador Bariyu Adeyemi, Office in Charge, UNOL, 5
January 2000 — DCT 16".
10570 Exhibit D-286A, "Photographs at the Barclay Training Centre on the day that weapons were destroyed";
Exhibit D-286B, "Photographs at the Barclay Training Centre on the day that weapons were destroyed"; Exhibit
D-297A, "Photograph — DP-120, each showing President Taylor, Tejan Kabbah, Olusegun Obasanjo and Alpha
Konare at Barclay training Centre in l999"; Exhibit D-297B, "Photograph — DP-121"; Exhibit D-297C,
"Photograph — DP-122".
10571 Exhibit D-337, "UN Security Council Resolution 788 (1992), S/RES/788, 19 November 1992 — DCT 260 (3
End of Pages)", para. 8.
10572 Exhibit D-349, "Letter ro the Secretary General of the United Nations, H.E Kofi Annan, from the President
of Liberia, Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 January 1999 — DCT 286", p. 1.
10573 Exhibit D-349, "Letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, H.E Kofi Annan, from the President
of Liberia, Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 January 1999 — DCT 286", p. 2.

---- End of Page 1639 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T GM,. 18 May 2012

Defence Exhibit D-351
4782. Exhibit D-351 is a letter from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to Charles Taylor,
dated 5 March 1999 in response to Taylor's letter of 22 January 1999 conceming the 1
disposal of weapons collected by ECOMOG during the disarmament. The Secretary-
General's letter welcomes the Liberian Govemment's willingness to destroy unserviceable
weapons and as regards any weapons or ammunition which would be found to be
serviceable, states that the Secretary-General assumed further consultations on their
disposition between the Liberian Government, ECOMOG and the UN would be
necessary. 10574
Defence Exhibit D-361
4783. Exhibit D-361 is a letter dated 17 June 1999 from the UN Secretary-General to
Liberian Minster of Foreign Affairs Moni Captan, welcoming the Liberian government's’
decision to destroy arms and ammunition}0575
Defence Exhibit D-3 62
4784. Exhibit D-362 is a joint communique issued by Presidents Obasanjo and Charles
Taylor dated 25 June 1999, following the visit of President Obasanjo to Liberia. In the
communiqué, the Nigerian President commends the decision of the Government of Liberia
to destroy the arms and ammunition collected from disarmament in Liberia and notes that
technical discussions have commenced concerning the process of destruction. 10576
Defence Exhibit D-3 64
mm Exhibit D-351, "Code cable to Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Liberia from Miyet, United
Nations, New York, Letter from Secretary General, 5 March 1999, in response to letter from Taylor of 22 Jan",
p. 2.
mm Exhibit D-361, "Letter from Sec-Gen UN to the Liberian Foreign Minister, recording the decision of the
Government of Liberia to destroy arms and ammunition collected during the disarmament process, dated 17 June
l999".
10576 Exhibit D-362, "Joint Communique following the visit of President Obasanjo to Liberia, dated 25 June
1999", para 1.3.

---- End of Page 1640 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI,-O3-O1-T dbh 18 May 2()12

4785. Exhibit D-364 is a letter dated 27 July 1999, addressed to Charles Taylor from UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The letter congratulates Taylor on the destruction of arms
and ammunition underway in Monrovia. 111577
Defence Exhibit D-369
4786. Exhibit D-369 is a statement attributable to the spokesman of the UN Secretary-
General dated 18 October 1999. The Secretary-General welcomes the completion of the
weapons destruction programme in Liberia. 105715
Defence Exhibit D-394
4787. Exhibit D-394 is a BBC news article, dated 4 February 2002. In the article, Liberia's
defence Minsiter, Daniel Chea, states his forces are unable to get new military supplies
because of the arins embargo imposed on Liberia. Chea states that if the embargo was lifted
, the Liberian forces could defeat LURD within a month.115579
Deliberations
4788. The Accused's claim that he had insufficient military supplies to send to Sierra
Leone or to defend Liberia from internal and external threats rests on two contentions: first,
that the country had disamred such that no amrs were available in Liberia, and second that
the arms embargo imposed in Liberia by the UN Security Council from 1992 onwards meant
that he could not and did not import materiel from external sources.
4789. The parties do not dispute that there was a process of disarmament within Liberia
although the dates given by various witnesses differ.11551515 The Accused testified that
disarmament began in late 1996 to 1997, while Exhibit P-453 records Daniel Chea, the
Liberian Minister of Defence, describing disarmament as occuring as early as 1995.10581
10577 Exhibit D-364, "Letter to the President of Liberia, from the United Nations Secretary—General, Kofi Annan,
27 July 1999 4 DCT 327".
111575 Exhibit D-369, "Statement Attributable to the Spokesman of the Secretary—General: Weapons Disposal in
Liberia, New York, 18 October 1999 4 DCT 338 (2 End of Pages)", p.1.
10575 Exhibit D-394, "BBC News Article: Liberia istfllggllllg to Defeat’ Rebels, 4 February 2002 — DCT 354 (3
End of Pages)", pp. 1-2.
105511 Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26427 August 1997 — DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)", p. 10; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25346-
25347.
10551 Exhibit P-453, "Excerpts from: News article, Frontline World, Liberia —- No More War, A Political

---- End of Page 1641 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GA 18 May 2012

Moses Blah testified that disarmament was completed by mid-1996.10002 Undisputed
evidence shows that anns and ammunition collected as a result of disannament were
publicly destroyed between 25 July 1999 and 18 October 1999.10003
4790. The Defence cites the evidence concerning the destruction of arms in support of its
argument that post—e1ection, the Accused no longer had anns in Liberia.10004 While this
evidence supports the conclusion that the disannament process resulted in the destruction of
a significant amount of anns and ammunition,10000 other evidence clearly establishes that
complete disarmament did not occur. Even the Accused himself testified that the NPLF gave
up only about 80 to 90 percent of the anns in their possession by the end of the disannament
process and placed the level of disarmament for ULIMO as being far lower, at only 40 to 45
percent.10000 Moses Blah testified that not all of the factions disarmed and some did not do
so properly.10007 The Accused, as did Blah10000 and Joseph Marzah,10000 admitted that various
factions hid their arms rather than disanning.10000 There is also evidence in the record
Survivor: Interview with Daniel Chea, May 2005", p.4.
10000 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10207-10208.
10500 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26901-26903; Transcript 9 September 2009, pp.
28444-28445; Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28612-28613; Exhibit D-201, "Outgoing Code Cable to
Downes-Thomas (Only). RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Liberia, from Prendergast, United Nations, New York, 7 May
1999 — DCT 65"; Exhibit D-361, "Letter from Sec-Gen UN to the Liberian Foreign Minister, recording the
1 decision of the Government of Liberia to destroy arms and ammunition collected during the disarmament
process, dated 17 June 1999"; Exhibit D-362, "Joint Communique following the visit of President Obasanjo to
Liberia, dated 25 June 1999"; Exhibit D-286A, "Photographs at the Barclay Training Centre on the day that
weapons were destroyed"; Exhibit D-286B, "Photographs at the Barclay Training Centre on the day that
weapons were destroyed"; Exhibit D-297A, "Photograph — DP-120, each showing President Taylor, Tejan
Kabbah, Olusegun Obasanjo and Alpha Konare at Barclay training Centre in 1999"; Exhibit D-297B,
"Photograph — DP-121"; Exhibit D-297C, "Photograph — DP-122"; Exhibit D-364, "Letter to the President of
Liberia, from the United Nations Secretary—General, Kofi Annan, 27 July 1999 — DCT 327"; Exhibit D-369,
"Statement Attributable to the Spokesman of the Secretary—General: Weapons Disposal in Liberia, New York,
18 October 1999 — DCT 338 (2 End of Pages)", p.1 (welcoming the completion of the weapons destruction programme
in Liberia which conmienced on 25 July 1999).
10004 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1032, footnote 2970.
10000 Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26—27 August 1997 — DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)", p. 10 (During the period of disarmament, ECOMOG had recovered
35,000 weapons and 4 million assorted small a1nrnunition); Exhibit D-230, "United Nations, Office of the
Representative of the Secretary General, Note to Monie Captan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liberia, from
Ambassador Bariyu Adeyemi, Office in Charge, UNOL, 5 January 2000 — DCT 16" (estimating that the total
number of weapons of all sizes destroyed between 25 July and 20 September 1999 to be 19,297 and the total
rounds of anmiunition destroyed to be 3,164,849); Exhibit D-204, "BBC News, World: Taylor: A New Era for
Liberia, 26 July 1999 — DCT 220", 28 July 1999, p. 2 (The destruction of weapons in Liberia "is one of the
largest weapons destruction progranmies the world has seen in recent years").
10000 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30737-30740.
10007 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10207-10208.
10000 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10207-10208.
10000 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6147-6152.
10000 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 February 2010, p. 35404.

---- End of Page 1642 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / M 18 May 2012

suggesting the possibility that only unserviceable anns were destroyed, rather than all
arins.m59l Those closest to the disarmament programme considered it to be less than
exemplary. Liberian Minister ofDefence Daniel Chea described it as a "fiasco",lO592 General
Felix Mukakperou, who headed the ECOMOG army in West Africa and was charged with
the safeguard of the captured weapons, described the process as "a mess",lO593 and Moses
Blah called it "a game".m594 ln this context, the Trial Chamber does not consider the
evidence concerning disarmament and the destruction of arms probative of the assertion that
the Accused did not have sufficient arms to send to Sierra Leone.
4791. In relation to the arms embargo, there is undisputed evidence that in November 1992
the UN Security Council imposed a "general and complete embargo" on all deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Liberia that remained in place throughout the Indictment
period.m595 The Accused testified that until he notified the Security Council of his intention
to purchase weapons from Serbia, the Liberian Government did not import arms and
ammunition from external sources,lO5% although the Accused was inconsistent on the date
when he notified the Security Council and when the first shipment from Serbia arrived. The
Accused first stated that he sent the letter to the Security Council in January or February
2001. Later in direct examination the Accused stated this occurred in late 2001 or early
2002, and in re-examination pushed the date back to 2000.lO597 Similarly, while the Accused
mlm Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6102-6103 (Not all of the arms collected during the
disarmament process in Liberia were destroyed by ECOMOG, only the "ug1y" ineffective weapons were
destroyed); Exhibit D-349, "Letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, H.E Kofi Annan, from the
President of Liberia, Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 January 1999 — DCT 286" (stating that while
the Liberian government "is amenable to the possible destruction of unserviceable arms", it wished the
remaining arms to "remain in the custody of the United Nations for the future utilization by the Liberian
Army").; Exhibit D-351, "Code Cable to Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Liberia from Miyet, United
Nations, New York, Letter from Secretary General, 5 March 1999, in response to letter from Taylor of 22 Jan",
p. 2 (The Secretary General welcomes the Liberian Government's willingness to destroy unserviceable weapons
and assumed further consultations on the disposition of any weapons or ammunition found to be serviceable).
mm Exhibit P-453, "Excerpts from: News article, Frontline World, Liberia — No More War, A Political
Survivor: Interview with Daniel Chea, May 2005", p.4.
mm Exhibit D-204, "BBC News, World: Taylor: A New Era for Liberia, 26 July 1999 — DCT 220", 28 July
1999, p. 2.
mm Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10207-10208.
mm Exhibit D-337, "UN Security Council Resolution 788 (1992), S/RES/788, 19 November 1992 — DCT 260 (3
End of Pages)", para. 8; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 7 September 2009, pp. 28214-28216.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 Aug 09, pp. 27838-27839; Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 28072,
28074; Transcript 29 September 2009, pp. 29869-29871; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32513-32518,
32520-32522, 32531-32535; Transcript 18 February 2010, pp. 35414-35422.
mgm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 August 2009, pp. 27838-27839; Transcript 31 August 2009, pp.
28072; Transcript 29 September 2009, pp. 29869-29871; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32513-32515;
Transcript 18 February 2010, pp. 35417-35422.

---- End of Page 1643 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ‘G> 18 May 2012


first stated that the Serbian importation occurred in early 2002,m598 in cross—examination he
stated the first shi ment arrived in the middle of 2001,lO599 and in his re-examination the
P
Accused laced this event as early as 2000.l0600 In li t of these inconsistencies, the Trial
P
Chamber does not consider the Accused's evidence as to when he first imported arms into
Liberia in contravention of the arms embar o credible, nor does the Trial Chamber consider
S
his evidence to support the Defence contention that the Liberian government only began
urchasin arms from external sources after the end of the Sierra Leonean Civil War.
P S
4792. The Prosecution led evidence that the Accused arran ed clandestine arms deals lon
S S
before the weapons from Serbia began arriving in 2002, relying on the findings in Exhibit P-
032, the first report of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia,w6Ol and in particular on evidence
set out in that Exhibit of transfers in June to September 2000 from the LISCR to a company
in the United Arab Emirates, which were traceable to the account of Sanjivan Ruprah.lO°O2
Accordin to Exhibit P-032, Ru rah admitted that he was involved in arran in fli ts
S P S S
trans ortin car oes of ammunition from Abidan to Monrovia durin Jul and earl Au st
P S S J S Y Y gu
2000, around the same time as the transactions from the LISCR took place.m6O3
Corroborating the assertions in Exhibit P-032 is Exhibit P-482, a letter from the Liberian
Minist of Finance and si ed b the De ut Minister of Revenue, dated 20 Au st 1999,
YY gn Y P Y gu
to the General Manager of the Oriental Timber corporation authorising the transfer of $USD
500,000 against forestry related taxes to Sanjivan Ruprah.l0°O4 Ian Smillie, and Exhibits P-
018 and P-032 identify Ruprah as an international arms dealer. [0605
4793. The Trial Chamber observes that the findings made by Exhibit P-032 are based on a
variety of sources, most importantly oral interviews with key individuals and contemporary
documentary evidence, including documents evidencing transfers of funds. The Trial
[9598 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, p. 28074.
[0599 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32516-32518.
[0600 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 February 2010, pp. 35414-35417.
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1256-1257.
[0602 Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para.
412, ERN 4521.
[0603 Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", paras
208, 436, ERN. 00004479, 00004526.
[0604 Exhibit P-482, "Annex XII, Letter from the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Liberia, GOL tax payment
transfer, 20 August 1999".
[0605 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1 195, adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 26, 224, ERN. 00004380, 00004408; Exhibit P-032, "Exhibit P-032, "Report of the
Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)", para. 207, ERN. 00004479

---- End of Page 1644 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 6;% 18 May 2012

Chamber notes that although Exhibit P-032 was adduced through witness Stephen Ellis, who
cited the document in his expert report for the Office of the Prosecutor,11)6116 Ellis himself
was unable to provide much background information to the exhibit. However, the Trial
Chamber finds that in relation to this particular incident, the factual claims made in Exhibit
P-032 are well-documented and has no reason to doubt their reliability. The Trial Chamber
also considers relevant to assessing the weight and reliability of Exhibit P-032 that Ian
Smillie, one of the authors of Exhibit P-018, which had reached similar conclusions
concerning the role of Ruprah, affirmed those conclusions and explained the evidentiary
basis on which they were reached.
4794. Further, the Trial Chamber considers it notable that in response to the evidence in
Exhibit P-032 concerning two transfers of funds from the LISCR in 2000, the Accused
testified that he did not know of these particular transfers but if they were for the purchase of
arms they would have been approved by him as President of Liberia. He also acknowledged
that if Benoni Urey, the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, approved the transfers, he was
acting with Taylor's implied authority.1O°O7 He also stated that while he was unaware of
instructions set out in Exhibit P-482, any letter from the Ministry of Finance to Ruprah
would have first been submitted for clearance from the President. Significantly, the Trial
Chamber notes that he took responsibility for the transfer.11161)8 Although the Accused i
initially denied knowing Sanjivan Ruprah,1O°O9 he later stated that he knew of Ruprah but
was not personally acquainted with hin1,1O°1O and finally, conceded that he approved
Sanjivan Ruprah as an Ambassador-at-Large for Liberia and approved the issue of his
diplomatic passport.1O°11 Given the Accused's own acknowledgement that the large transfers
of funds to Ruprah must have been authorised through official channels, it is a reasonable
inference that the military shipments that Ruprah admitted to have facilitated around the
same time had the imprimatur of the Liberian govemment.
111606 Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, pp. 1445-1446.
1116117 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34226, 34231.
106118 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, p. 34246 ("I have no recollection of the specific
purpose, as much as I can, because of the amount, it had to get some clearance from the mansion and I take
responsibility. I would not say that I would remember all of the - $500,000, while it's a big amount, but it's not
something that I would sit here today and remember").
1116119 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27685.
1011111 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 January 2010, pp. 33737-33739.
10°11 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34247-34250.

---- End of Page 1645 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T ’/ Gb, 18 May 2012 %
I

4795. That the Accused was obtaining arms and ammunitions in breach of the arms
embargo from prior to 2001 and 2002 is also supported by Moses Blah. Blah described a
number of occasions in which Taylor obtained materiel shipments through other West
African States, notably Cote d’1voire and Burkina Faso. ln particular, Moses Blah described
one incident from 1997 to 2000 when he travelled to Burkina Faso and met a separate
delegation from Liberia which had arranged to bring back to Liberia a plane loaded with
arms and ammunition. According to Blah, Blaise Compaoré's behaviour suggested the
existence of a longer-term supply relationship with Burkina Faso than the single incident
that Blah had witnessed.l06l2 TF 1-371 also testified that he was aware of major shipments of
materiel which were imported into Liberia and then transported into Sierra Leone when the
arms embargo was in place in late 1998 and early 1999,10613 affirming that the arms embargo
was not an effective measure to prevent materiel coming into Liberia.l06l4 The Trial
Chamber recalls its previous finding that the evidence of TF1-371 and Moses Blah is
generall reliable.l06l5 Even Defence witness John Vincent testified that he heard of re lar
Y gu
supplies of military supplies being transported from Liberia to the RUF headquarters in
Bupau rp 1998.l06l6
4796. In light of the evidence from Exhibits P-032, P-018, P-482, Moses Blah, TF1-371,
and John Vincent the Trial Chamber finds the Accused's denial of importation of arms into
Liberia prior to 2002 not credible.
4797. There is some evidence to support the Accused's assertion that Liberia was short of
materiel at relevant times during the Indictment period. Moses Blahl06l7 and Varmuyan
Sheriff 0618 both agreed with the Accused that arms were in short supply under the Accused's
regime, particularly during the period of LURD attacks on Liberia during and after
{Om Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, p. 9894.
mm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2702-2703 (CS).
MM TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2740 (CS).
MI5 Credibility Assessment, Moses Blah, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2222; Credibility
Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226. Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies,
Burkina Faso Shipment; Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam
Bockarie's Leadership (February 1998-December 1999).
*%*6 Jphp vmppm, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38110-38111.
mm Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10279-10280; DCT-190, Transcript 8 June 2010, pp. 42336-
42337.
mw; Varmuyan Sheriff; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 1006-1007.

---- End of Page 1646 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 65 18 May 2012 2
K

1999.10619 However, aspects of the Accused's evidence belie the claim that the Liberian
government had no supplies of arms and ammunitions at its disposal. The Accused himself
admitted that he bought weapons from ECOMOG during the Liberian civil conflict.1111111 He
also testified that his security protection and the Secret Service were armed, although he
later contradicted himself. 111621 Yanks Smythe explained that the Secret Service had access to
at least two warehouses of arms and ammunition, and importantly, that the Armed Forces of
Liberia also had its own separate store of materiel.111(122 Moses Blah also testified that there
was a storage area for military requipment below the Accused's residence from which trucks
were loaded and frontlines were supplied.1O°21 That he was able defeat the rebellion led by
the forces of Roosevelt Johnson in September 1998, after "heavy fighting", albeit with the
assistance of ECOMOG, indicates that the Liberian government had resources available to
put down internal threats. 10624
4798. The aspect of the Accused's testimony which most significantly undercuts the claim
that he had no arms to give to Sierra Leonean rebels, is his admission that he sent men with
arms and ammunition to assist General Guei in Cote d’Ivoire when Guei took power in a
coup in 1999, during the time when, under attack from LURD, the Liberian government
most needed its military supplies. 111625
4799. Finally, even if Liberia confronted a shortage of supplies, this does not preclude a
finding that the Accused supplied the RUF and the AFRC. As Dauda Aruna Fornie's
evidence suggests, even though the Accused may not have had much ammunition, it did not
prevent him from "doing what he can" to support the RUF.1O62° The Trial Chamber notes
that of the shipments to the RUF and AFRC alleged to be linked to the Accused during the
111611 See also Exhibit D-394, "BBC News Article: Liberia ‘Strugg1ing to Defeat’ Rebels, 4 February 2002 ~ DCT
354 (3 End of Pages)" (Daniel Chea states that his forces were unable to get new military supplies to fight rebels in
Northern Liberia because of the arms embargo, and were relying on captured materiel).
101110 Prosecution Final Trial Briei para 1255; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp.
32628-32629; Joseph Marzah also testified that ECOMOG would sell their weapons to the Accused. Joseph
Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6090-6094; see also Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46520
(Sesay heard ECOMOG sold ammunition).
101121 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25195-21597; Transcript 30 September 2009, p.
29992 ("My securities are not even armed. So where am 1 going to get these arms from to send‘?").
10622 Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010 pp. 35936-35938.
10613 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, p. 9974.
101121 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 July 2009, p. 25719.
1111121 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 January 2010, pp. 34261-34268.
111626 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21454-21455.

---- End of Page 1647 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012

Indictment period, the largest arrived not from Liberia, but through Liberia from third party
states, primarily Burkina Faso, and was alleged to have been facilitated by the Accused.
4800. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Liberia had the capacity to
supply arms and ammunitions to the rebel groups in Sierra Leone from its own supplies, and
to facilitate larger arms shipments through third countries.
Findings
4801. The Trial Chamber finds the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the Accused was able to obtain arms and had the capacity to supply arms and ammunition to
the rebel groups in Sierra Leone, and had the capacity to facilitate larger arms shipments
through third countries.
2. Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused
(a) During the Junta period
(i) Alleged Ammunition Supply from Daniel Tamba
Submissions of the Parties
4802. The Prosecution submits that Bockarie contacted Taylor in 1997 requesting arms and
ammunition and that Taylor complied with the request. One shipment of ammunition that
Taylor sent got stuck near Buedu before reaching Bockarie in Kenema. Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle), a member of Taylor's SSS, conveyed this information to Bockarie. Bockarie then
sent his subordinates to Pendumbu to meet Jungle and another of Taylor's Liberian
subordinates called Senegalese. Civilians were used to transfer the ammunition from the
larger vehicle on to other vehicles. The ammunition —~ boxes of GPMG rounds, AK-47
rounds and RPG rockets —~ was then taken on to Bockarie in Kenema. The Prosecution
contends that Bockarie sent some of this ammunition to Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) in
Freetown to be used in an anticipated ECOMOG attack against Freetown.m°27 The
Prosecution adduced evidence from J abaty J award, TF1-375, lsaac Mongor, TF1-585, TF1-
371, Karmoh Kanneh, Albert Saidu, Augustine Mallah, Dauda Amna Fomie, TF1-168 and
Mustapha M. Mansaray.
10627 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 224.

---- End of Page 1648 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T .»--* { dk 18 May 2012
l’‘i

39 7 w
4803. The Defence challenges the claim that Tamba delivered arms and ammunition to
Bockarie and that Tamba was sent by the Accused. The Defence also submits that the
evidence does not show what the materiel was used for and for how long it lasted, and
therefore it cannot have had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes during this
period.lO628 The Defence adduced evidence from the Accused, Issa Sesay and Exhibit D-009.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
4804. Witness J abaty J award testihed that a person named Daniel Falla, whom he knew as
"Jungle", came to Bockarie's house in Kenema in early 1998. Jungle was a member of
Charles Taylor's Special Security Service ("SSS") in Liberia, "but he had been with the
RUF since 1994", as he was part of the NPFL group which was "cut off" by ULIMO and
was forced to join the RUF. Jungle stayed in Sierra Leone for a year and later on crossed
over to Guinea and entered Liberia, although Jaward could not recall the specihc date on
which Jungle returned to Liberia. The next time J award saw Jungle was in 1998.10629
4805. J award was present when Jungle told Bockarie that he came to inform him that he
brought ammunition which got stuck close to Buedu. Jungle did not say where he came from
with the ammunition or who provided him with it, but J award believed Jungle came from
Liberia since he was in Taylor's SSS, and that Jungle could not have obtained ammunition
in Liberia other than getting it "through the orders" of Charles Taylor.lO63O The witness also
explained in cross—examination that at that time Jungle was the "coordinator" between
Bockarie and Taylor, "especially" for arms deals.lO63 I
4806. J award was in Daru, before the ECOMOG interyention, when he heard that
Bockarie's convoy had passed through Daru and went on in the direction of Buedu. The
L witness believed that the convoy was going to collect the ammunition Jungle had informed
Bockarie about. 10632
*0628 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1060-1062.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. l3353—13354.
mw) Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13354-13355.
mw Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13830-13831.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13355, 13358.

---- End of Page 1649 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /;»/' Gl-·$ 18 May 2012 g

37 7 9* 2
4807. The day after Jungle arrived in Kenema, Jaward saw Bockarie giving Jungle "a
parcel". The witness knew the parcel contained diamonds as at that time diamonds were
always referred to as "a parcel". When Bockarie handed the parcel to Jungle, he told Jungle
that this is what he has now for "the old man", referring to Charles Taylor. At that time
Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor were referred to as "Papay" or "old man".m633
4808. On cross—examination, Jaward was confronted with a prior statement in which he
said that he saw Jungle coming to meet Bockarie in Kenema but did not know whether
Bockarie had given diamonds to Jungle or whether Jungle had brought arms and
ammunition to Bockarie. J award explained that this was because the Prosecution
investigators had not accurately recorded what he had told them.1O634 On re—examination it
was shown that six months after the initial statement and 12 months prior to giving
evidence, J award had corrected his statement to the Prosecution. In the corrected statement,
he said that Bockarie gave diamonds to Jungle to take to Taylor, and that J award was present
i when Jungle informed Bockarie that a truck of ammunition was stuck next to Buedu. J award
also affirmed another prior statement to the Prosecution in which he stated that when Jungle
came to visit Bockarie in Kenema during the Junta period, Jungle told J award that Bockarie
had given him some "parcels" of diamonds for "the old man"’, which the witness understood
to refer to Taylor. 10635
Prosecution Witness TF1—3 75
4809. Witness TF1—375, an RUF member, testified that in 1997 Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman), who was in Freetown, gave the witness and other men an assignment to go to
Kenema to collect ammunition from Bockarie. When they got to Kenema, Bockarie told
them that Jungle had brought ammunition but that the car he used broke down, and that they
therefore needed to go to Pendembu to meet Jungle and collect the ammunition. They went
with two Land Cruiser pick—ups. When they arrived they met Jungle and Senegalese. The
witness stated that "Jungle was in the SSS in Liberia. He was a bodyguard to President
Taylor, close protection unit"lO636 and that Senegalese was a member of President Taylor's
Special Forces. The ammunition, comprised of GMG rounds in boxes, AK—47 rounds and
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13356-13357.
IO634 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13830-13833, 13838-13839.
*0635 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 18 July 2008, pp. 14037-14042.
‘O°3°TF1-375, Transcript, 23 June 2008, p. 12490.

---- End of Page 1650 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J3 18 May 2012

37 7 ¢» .3
RPG rockets, was in Jungle's truck. Upon Jungle's instructions, they gathered civilians who
then transferred the ammunition from the truck to the two land—cruiser pick—ups. The convoy
then went with Jungle to Kenema, where Bockarie told them to immediately take some of
the ammunition to Mingo in Freetown because they heard that ECOMOG would soon be
attacking them there. They then went to Freetown and gave the ammunition to Mingo. Wm
4810. When asked about where this shipment of ammunition came from, the witness
testified that he did not know at the time, but when he later became Jungle's close friend,
Jungle told the witness that he was the liaison between Sam Bockarie and President Taylor.
Jungle would bring diamonds to Taylor and in return Taylor would give him ammunition,
sometimes from White Flower, the Executive Mansion in Liberia, to take to Bockarie.m638
TF1-3 75 then stated that "that was not his first time to cross over with ammunition". mw
4811. On cross-examination the witness was questioned about why he had not mentioned
in prior statements that he had met Jungle on one of his arms trips in 1997. The witness
asserted that he had told the Prosecution that he met Jungle in 1997 in Pendembu, and
insisted that this should be recorded in other prior statements he gave to the Prosecution.lO64O
In another prior statement, the witness had also said that he was introduced to Jungle in
1998. When asked why he would need an introduction in 1998 if he had already met Jungle
in 1997, the witness explained that he had not been officially introduced to Jungle in 1997
because when Jungle returned with the witness and the convoy to Kenema, Bockarie urged
the men to take the ammunition to Freetown quickly. In 1998, there was a meeting attended
by Jungle and the witness's "bosses", in which the witness was officially introduced to
Jungle. IOM
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
4812. Witness Isaac Mongor confirmed, on cross-examination, a prior statement in which
he stated that before the AFRC coup in 1997 Bockarie told him that Tamba (a.k.a.
‘°"" T1?1-375, Transcript, 23 Jnnc 2008, pp. 12487-12492, l2495—l2496.
*0638 T1?1-375, Transcript, 23 June 2008, pp. 12490-1249l.
""°" TFl—375, Transcript, 23 June 2008, p. 12491.
IOW TFl—375, Transcript, 27 August 2008, pp. l4743—l4748. The witness was also first denied saying that he
tcld the prosecution that Tamba was his best friend, but then stated that he confirmed to the prcsecuticn that
Tamba was his best friend.
IOM TFl—375, Transcript, 27 August 2008, pp. l4748—l475l.

---- End of Page 1651 ---------------------------


Case No.. SCSL 03 01 T 18 May 2012 %

Jungle)lO642 went to see Charles Taylor to request ammunition. Mong0r also confirmed his
statement that in 1997, when Mong0r was with the AF RC in Freetown, Bockarie told him
that Jungle had come back to Buedu with some 50 boxes of ammunition for AKs, RPGs and
GMGs. Mong0r confirmed that he believed Jungle was in Monrovia when the AF RC took
over, and that Jungle brought the ammunition to Buedu when the RUF had already j0ined
the AF RC in Freetown, at a time Mong0r himself was in Freetown.lO643 Mong0r stated that
Bockarie did not send the ammunition to Freetown and confirmed saying that the RUF 's top
command did not inform the AF RC about this shipment.lO644
Prosecution Witness Mustapha Mansaray
4813. Witness Mustapha Mansaray testified that he visited Bockarie in Kenema in August
1997 several times. Mansaray stated that at Bockarie's house were also residing Junior
Vandi/JR, junior fighters and Daniel Tamba, an NPF L member.lO645 Mansaray first met
Tamba in 1995 in Z0g0da when Tamba was with F 0day Sanl<0h. Mansaray understood that
at that time Sanl<0h would send Tamba to Liberia to get arms and ammunition or to Guinea
to get f00d for the RUF. Mansaray did not know from where Tamba would 0btain the arms
and ammunition since he did not travel with him.lO64°
Prosecution Witness TF 1-585
4814. Witness TF 1-585, an RUF radi0 Operator, was questioned about a prior statement in
which the witness told the Prosecution about frequent visits to Kenema by Jungle. In that
statement, she had said that she did not know the purpose of Tamba's visits to Kenema. The
witness explained that at the time of the visits she did not know but later on found out that
40642 Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5683; Transcript 2 April 2008, pp. 6504-6506; Transcript 3
April 2008, pp. 6507-6508. The witness did not know Tamba's first name, Daniel, but was familiar with his
nickname, Jungle.
IOG43 Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6727-6728.
10644 Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6728-6732. The witness was questioned why earlier in his
testimony he said that there was no mistrust between the RUF and the AFRC, if the RUF's top command, which
included Mong0r, decided not to ir1forin the AFRC about this shipment. The witness explained that while he was
in the top command, it was Bockarie who was in charge of amrnunition, and he was the one who mistrusted the
AFRC while the witness did not feel that there was mistrust.
M45 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5296-5297.
m°4° Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5296-5298.

---- End of Page 1652 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T `'44 JQ 18 May 2012

Z? 7 4/ s
Tamba came to Kenema upon Benjamin Yeaten's (aka "50") orders. The witness did not see
Tamba bringing arms and ammunition to Kenema.10647
4815. Prosecution Witness TF1-371
4816. Witness TF1-371 affirmed a prior statement in which he stated that in 1997 Bockarie
contacted Taylor from Kenema requesting material support. This was told to him by
Bockarie.10648 TF1-371 also testified that he came to know "Dennis Tamba" (a.k.a. Jungle)
when Tamba came from Kenema to meet Issa Sesay in Freetown in 1997. According to
TPI-371, at that time, and during "most of the time", Jungle acted as a liaison between the
RUF and the NPFL and later between the RUF and Musa Cissé and Taylor.1O649 Issa Sesay
initially told the witness that Jungle played such a role, but the witness himself came to
know it also later on, in 1998.10650
4817. On re-examination, the witness confirmed his prior statement in which he stated that
before the 1997 coup, Denis Tamba made trips to Guinea for arms for the RUF. He
explained in his testimony that after he met Tamba in Freetown and Buedu, Tamba told the
witness that he managed to get in touch with the RUF before the coup and would come to
meet the RUF high command, 1ssa Sesay and Foday Sankoh, in Kailahun.1065 1
Prosecution witness Karmoh Kanneh
4818. Witness Karmoh Kanneh testified that when Foday Sankoh returned from signing the
Abidjan Peace Accord, Sankoh held a meeting of senior RUF commanders at which he
explained that he was going on a political tour to Libya and other areas and that they should
take orders from Bockarie, who in turn should take orders from the NPFL leader, Charles
Ghankay Taylor. Sankoh gave his satellite phone to Bockarie so that they would have
"links"10652. Sankoh told the meeting that he wanted to introduce Jungle to them. He said
that Jungle was "the Pa's" representative, that is, Charles Ghankay Taylor's representative.
*0***7 TF1—585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15842-15845.
mm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2692-2693 (CS).
[0649 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2372-2373 (CS).
{Om TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2373 (CS).
[Ow TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 2965-2966.
‘°°" Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9358.

---- End of Page 1653 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 1653% jg 18 May 2012 M

Jungle buttressed what "the Pa" had said, stating that he will do the level best of his
ability. 10653 The witness did not know J ungle's real name. 111654
4819. Kanneh testified that, during the Junta period, he would take diamonds mined at
Tongo Fields to Sam Bockarie. On two occasions he witnessed Bockarie calling Taylor to
inform him of the total number of diamonds mined when Jungle was present. On both
occasions, Jungle confirmed the number of diamonds on the phone to Taylor and Taylor
instructed Bockarie to hand the diamonds over to Jungle. Bockarie did so and Jungle took
them via helicopter from Foya to Monrovia. 111655
4820. On cross—examination, the witness stated that before the meeting in which Jungle
was introduced as TaylorTs representative, at the end of 1996, Jungle, as an NPFL member,
"came with the war". Until that meeting, Taylor did not have a representative. The witness
did not know why at this point Taylor needed a representative, explaining that all Sankoh
’ said is that Jungle is "Taylor's eye".1O656
Prosecution witness Albert Saidu
4821. Witness Albert Saidu testified that he first met Jungle when in 1998 at Buedu, alter
the ECOMOG Intervention, Sam Bockarie gave Albert Saidu a letter to deliver to Colonel
Jungle in Foya Tenga, Liberia.111657 However, the witness was aware that previously Jungle
had come to RUF territories. When Jungle came previously, it was common knowledge that
he brought materiel and that he was working directly with Charles Taylor. Securities close to
Bockarie would inform the witness any time Jungle entered RUF territory. 10658
Prosecution witness Augustine Mallah
4822. Witness Augustine Mallah testified that while he was in Kenema during the Junta
period, he met Colonel Jungle one time at Bockarie's residence. He, Bockarie and Jungle sat
down together. Bockarie told Mallah that Colonel Jungle had been sent by Charles Taylor
111653 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9358-9359.
1111154 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9356-9359.
15555 Karmoh Karrrrpir, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9380-9385.
111656 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9671-9673.
10657 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11041-11042.
1111158 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11027-1 1028.

---- End of Page 1654 ---------------------------


Case No.: scsr.-02-01-T /4/ Ji-? 18 May 2012 \%

for some parcels of diamonds. Mallah remained in Kenema while Bockarie, Colonel Jungle
and others went to Tongo.lO659
Prosecution witness Dauda Amna Fornie
4823. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie testilied that in or about late 1997, three months alter
arriving in Kenema, he was assigned to work as a radio operator with Bockarie in Kenema
Town. Fornie was in communication with almost every AFRC/RUF station, including the
radio station in Liberia where Charles Taylor was based.lO660 The communications
concerned the movement of troops, co—ordination of mining, and requests for arms and
ammunition.lO66l
Prosecution Witness TF1—168
4824. Witness TF1—168 testilied that in 1994 an RUF group on a food—linding mission
discovered a group of NPFL lighters along the Sierra Leone—Liberian border, including
Daniel Tamba.m662 This NPFL group was cut off from Liberia because of ULIMO which
was at the border. At that point, Tamba and his group were effectively incorporated into the
RUF. Over time, Tamba became a trusted member of the RUF. In 1996, Bockarie sent
Tamba to Sankoh who was in Abidjan alter telling Sankoh he needed money to purchase
materiel from ULIMO. Sankoh sent Tamba with $USD 7,000 to give to Bockarie. Bockarie
then sent Tamba to Danané}0663
Prosecution Wtness Mustapha M. Mansaray
4825. Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray testilied that he visited Bockarie in Kenema in
August 1997 several times. Mansaray stated that at Bockarie's house also resided Junior
Vandi/JR, junior lighters and Daniel Tamba, an NPFL member. Mansaray lirst met Tamba
in 1995 in Zogoda when Tamba was with Foday Sankoh. Mansaray understood that at that
time Sankoh would send Tamba to Liberia to get arms and ammunition or to Guinea to get
Img Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20148-20149.
IMO Dauda Amna Fomje, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21429.
mm Dauda Arirna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21429.
lO°°2 TF1—168, Transcript 16 January 2009, p, 23535.
'°"‘" TF1—168, Transcript 16 January 2009, pp. 22524-25527.

---- End of Page 1655 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012
28

food for the RUF. Mansaray did not know from where Tamba would obtain the arins and
ammunition since he did not travel with him.111664
The Accused
4826. The Accused denied providing ammunition to Daniel Tamba to bring to Bockarie in
1997. He denied knowing Senegalese and asserted that no person named "Jungle" or a
person named Daniel Tamba was in the SSS close protection unit. The Accused also denied
that Tamba was a liaison between him and Bockarie, or that he received diamonds from him.
The Accused suggested that some witnesses assumed that Tamba was meeting with him
when travelling to Liberia when in fact Tamba did not report to him and the Accused did not
use Tamba as a "coordinator" between Sam Bockarie and himself10665 The Accused testified
that he did not even know Jungle.10666
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
4827. Witness Issa Sesay denied that when Senegalese and "Jungle" came in 1997 to join
Bockarie in Kenema they brought a truck with ammunition with them. Sesay explained that
while he did see Senegalese and Mike Lamin coming to Kenema in 1997 with a man named
"Jungle" to rejoin the RUF after the AFRC coup, that individual was a foriner ULIMO
member, known as "ULlMO Jungle", not Daniel Tamba. ULIMO Jungle did not bring
ammunition on that trip, and Sesay never heard that they brought ammunition on that
trip.111667 Sesay also testified that Daniel Tamba could not have delivered ammunition to the
RUF during this period because in 1997, when Sesay was in Freetown and Bockarie in
Kenema, he was in Abidjan. Tamba went to Cote d’Ivoire in 1996 and stayed there until
1998.10668 In 1997, Sesay was stationed in Freetown but he used to go to Kenema, and
Bockarie used to come from Kenema to Freetown. Therefore, if ammunition had arrived in
Kenema, Sesay would have known.1O669
111664 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5296-5298.
10665 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28853-28861; Transcript 24 October 2009, p.
30414; Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30230-30232, 30267-30268.
111666 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28859.
111667 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 45953-45957. Lamin and Senegalese told Sesay the route which
they took from Monrovia to Pendembu and onto to Kenema. See Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp.
45959-45961.
111668 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43803—43805.
111669 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45956.

---- End of Page 1656 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ JQ 18 May 2012

4828. Sesay further testified that he never heard that the AFRC received ammunition from
Taylor in 1997.10671) He maintained that during the Junta regime, the RUF did not get
ammunition from any source other than the AFRC or riem Burkina Faso as part of the
Magburaka shipment. 111671
Defence Exhibit D-009
4829. Exhibit D-009 is a salute report to Sankoh by Bockarie, dated 26 September l999, in
which Bockarie recounts events after Sankoh left Sierra Leone in November 1996 to the date
of the report. The report states that during Sanlmany contacts were made to sympathizers to promote the image of the movement, details `
of which will be presented to you in a manner so as not to cause any breach of security. Out
of these contacts I was able to get the basic needs and facilitate our military move to Kono
and onwards past Machine [sic] 10672
Deliberations
4830. In support of its allegation that during the Junta period the Accused sent Daniel
Tamba with ammunition to Bockarie, the Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of
TF1-375, who testified that on Bockarie's instructions, he personally collected a shipment
brought by Tamba and transported it to Kenema.
4831. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1-375's evidence should be treated with
caution and requires corroboration.111673 It also notes that in relation to this particular
shipment, TF1-375 failed to explain on cross-examination why he had not mentioned in
prior statements that he had met Jungle on one of his arms trips in 1997.10674 However, the
Trial Chamber notes that his account of the arrival of the shipment is corroborated by J abaty
J award, who also referred to a man known as "Jungle" informing him that he had brought
ammunition which became stuck close to Buedu. While J award believed Jungle's real name
to be Daniel Falla, the Trial Chamber considers that the account he provided of Falla bears
sufficient similarity to the person identified by other witnesses as Daniel Tamba as to leave
10670 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 45957-45958.
10671 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 45956·45957.
10672 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9663.
*0673 Credibility Assessment, TFl—375, puius 308-312.
"""4 TFl-375, Transcript, 27 August 2008,pp. 14743-14748.

---- End of Page 1657 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-Ol-T { Ji 18 May 2012
./1

no doubt that they are the same person.m675 Although Jaward had, in a prior statement,
stated that he had not known whether Tamba had brought arms and ammunition to Bockarie,
in light of the evidence that J award had ensured that his statement was corrected prior to his
testimony, and recalling its finding that J award is a generally credible witness,lO676 the Trial
Chamber accepts his explanation that this was because the Prosecution investigators had not
correctly recorded his evidence. IO677
4832. From the unique detail of the truck being "stuck", the Trial Chamber can draw the
inference that Jaward and TF1-375 testihed as to the same occurrence.lO678 Isaac Mongor
also testified that Tamba delivered ammunition to the RUF in 1997, after the AFRC coup,
although it may not have been the same shipment as that described by Jaward and TF1-
4833. The Defence submits that it is signihcant that neither Exhibit D-009, Bockarie's
salute repo1"r,lO68O nor Exhibit P-067, the RUF's situation reporfloégl make any reference to
Tamba supplying the RUF with arms and ammunition.m682 The Defence also relies on Issa
Sesay's testimony that although he was not stationed in Kenema at the time the ammunition
allegedly came to Kenema in 1997, he used to go to Kenema and if Jungle did deliver
materiel, Sesay would have been told by Bockarie. 10683
HWS Jaward described Jungle as a member of the Liberian SSS, who had joined the RUF in Sierra Leone but later
left for Liberia, and frequently delivered military and other supplies to the RUF from Liberia: Jabaty Jaward,
Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13386-13388; Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13353-13354; Transcript 10 July 2008,
pp. 13425-13426. This is also corroborated by, for example: TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2372-
2374; Transcript 28 February 2008, pp. 4485-4487; TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19830-19832,
19847; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16165-16166; TF1-168, Transcript 16 January
2009,1919. 23534-23537.
W6 The Role of lntermediaries: Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle)
IOG77 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13830-13839; Transcript 18 July 2008, pp. 14037-14041.
HWS The Trial Chamber consider it significant that both Jaward and Mongor testified that the ammunitions were
stuck close to or delivered to Buedu, not Pendembu, as TF1-375 testified. The Trial Chamber notes that
Pendembu is not far from Buedu, and lies in the same direction as Pendembu from Daru, where Jaward was
stationed: See Exhibit P-052, "Map of Sierra Leone — AFRC/RUF primary radio locations — mid 1998, as
indicated by TF1—360 — 00100182".
mw) lsaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6728-6732,
IMO Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 96589671.
mw Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army — Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN. 9672-9681.
*%*2 Defence rmi Trier Brief, para 1060.
M83 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45956

---- End of Page 1658 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jig 18 May 2012
Xi V;

4834. The Trial Chamber considers that neither TF1-585's failure to personally see Jungle
bring ammunition during 1997 nor the lack of reference in Exhibits D-009 or P-067 to
Tamba supplying the RUF is conclusive of the non-occurrence of this event. TF1-585
acknowledged that Jungle did visit Kenema frequently during 1997, but that at the time, she
was not privy to the purpose of his visits. She also testified that she was not in Kenema
during the entire duration that Bockarie was stationed there.{6664 lt is likely that at this time
when Jungle was not frequently delivering materiel to the RUF,{6666 the witness would have
been unaware of the transportation of a single consignment of materiel. On similar grounds,
the Trial Chamber does not consider Bockarie's failure to tell Sesay about a delivery of
supplies to Kenema dispositive of whether it did or did not occur. ln relation to the salute
reports, the Trial Chamber notes that in Exhibit D-009, Bockarie's indication that he would
not disclose his sources of supplies in the salute report for security reasons,{6666 provides an
explanation for why accounts of Jungle delivering materiel would not appear in that report.
4835. The Trial Chamber has considered Issa Sesay's evidence as to the whereabouts of
Daniel Tamba at this time. According to Sesay, Tamba did not deliver ammunition to the
RUF during this period because in 1997, when Sesay was in Freetown and Bockarie in
Kenema, Tamba was in Abidjan, having gone to Cote d’1voire with Sankoh in May/June
199666667 However, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay later contradicted himself, stating
that during 1997 Jungle travelled back to Buedu to answer a summons from Bockarie and
spent a week in Sierra Leone in August 199766666 The Trial Chamber does not therefore
accept Sesay's evidence that Tamba could not have delivered ammunition to Bockarie in
Kenema because he was in Abidjan. ln any case, his evidence is contradicted by Mustapha
Mansaray, who testified that in August 1997 he visited Kenema and saw that Tamba was
residing in Bockarie's house.{6666
{6664 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15601-15603 (the witness visited Tongo for 2-3 days when she
was based in Kenema).
{6665 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).
{6666 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9663.(Bockarie states that during Sankoh's absence "many contacts were made to
sympathizers to promote the image of the movement, details of which will be presented to you in a manner so as
not to cause any breach of security. Out of these contacts 1 was able to get the basic needs and facilitate our
military move to Kono [...]".)
{66671ssa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45957
{6666 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44096-44103; Transcript 27 July 2010, pp. 44797-44799.
{6669 Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5295-5298.

---- End of Page 1659 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / /M 18 May 2012
z'//V J

Ervsz
4836. The Defence further contends that even if Tamba did bring ammunition to Bockarie
he acted independently as a member of the RUF, and outside of the Accused's knowledge or
effective control. The Defence submits that an alternative explanation for the source of the
ammunition brought by Tamba is that he received money from Sankoh to purchase arms and
ammunition from ULIMO.l069O The Defence cites in support of this theory the evidence of
Mustapha Mansaray, who testified that in 1995 Sankoh sent Tamba to Liberia to collect
arms, ammunition and food for the RUF, and the evidence of TF1-168, who testified that in
1996 Sankoh provided Tamba with money so that amis and ammunition could be purchased
from ULIMO.lO69l The Trial Chamber has also had regard to TF1-371's testimony that
before the 1997 coup, Tamba made trips to Guinea for arms for the RUF.lO692
4837. The Trial Chamber finds that the Defence's submissions that Ibrahim Bah and
Daniel Tamba were acting on behalf of Foday Sankoh and the RUF should be accorded little
weight in determining any relationship that Tamba may have had with the Accused. The
Trial Chamber accepts the testimonies of TF1-168, Issay Sesay, TF1-371 and Mustapha
Mansaray that Tamba was working for Sankoh and the RUF, but notes that no evidence was
adduced to suggest that these relationships were exclusive. Further, the Trial Chamber notes
that this evidence relates to Tamba's activities in 1995 and 1996, during which the border
between Liberia and Sierra Leone was occupied by ULIMO and supply routes from
Monrovia to the RUF were cut offl0693 Even if Tamba was engaged in purchasing materiel
from ULIMO and Guinea during earlier periods, it is of little value in determining the
provenance of shipments brought during the Junta period, when the supply routes to
Monrovia had been re-opened.lO694
4838. The Trial Chamber considers relevant the evidence of a number of witnesses who
testified that during the Junta period, Tamba was working as a liaison between the Accused
and the RUF. TF1-371 testified that he came to know "Dennis Tamba" (a.k.a. Jungle) in
1997, at which time, and during "most of the time", Jungle acted as a liaison between the
RUF and the Accused. M)695 Prosecution witness Karmoh Kanneh also testified that at the end
IOM Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1061.
ww] TF1-168, Transcript 16 January 2009, pp. 23534-23537.
mw; TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 2965-2966.
10693 See supra, Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged RUF Assistance Fighting ULIMO in Liberia
IMM See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Preliminary Issues, Closure of Border/Arms Embargo.
IOM TF1-371. Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2372-2373 (CS).

---- End of Page 1660 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 M

§77>5
of 1996, Foday Sankoh introduced Jungle at a meeting of senior RUF commanders as the
Accused's representative.l0°% Albert Saidu also testified that although he first met Jungle in
1998 at Buedu, after the ECOMOG lntervention,m697 he was aware that previously Jungle
had come to RUF territories and at those previous times it was common knowledge that
Jungle worked directly with Charles Taylor.lO698 Both Karmoh Kannehmwg and Augustine
Mallahmmo testified that, during the Junta period, Jungle took parcels of diamonds from
Bockarie to Taylor in Monrovia.lO70l
4839. Although the evidence that Tamba was working as a liaison between the Accused
and the RUF during the Junta period does not rule out the possibility that he was obtaining
materiel supplies for the RUF from other sources, such as ULIMO and Guinea, there is
evidence which indicates that materiel supplies were obtained from the Accused. When
asked about the source of the shipment of ammunition which became stuck at Pendembu,
TF1—375 testified that he heard from Tamba that Tamba would obtain materiel for these
transactions on the Accused's orders from the Executive Mansion.lO7O2 lt is clear from TF1—
375's testimony that Tamba was acting as the liaison between the Accused and Bockarie for
this particular shipment}0703
4840. Jaward also testified that he believed that the ammunition which became stuck near
Buedu was from Charles Taylor and that at the time of the shipment, he knew Jungle was
the "coordinator" between Bockarie and Taylor, "especially" for arms dea1s.l0704 Jaward's
response as to why he held this belief was somewhat speculative: he held this opinion
because, as Tamba was a member of the SSS, he could not have had any source of
ammunition except for the Accused.lO705 However, the Trial Chamber notes that J award also
m°% Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9356-9359.
mfm Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11041-11042.
mgg Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11027-11028.
H)699 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9380-9385.
WOO Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20149.
mm See supra, Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, Junta Period.
‘°7°2 rrr-375, Transcript, 23 June 2008, pp. 12490-12495.
mm TF1-375, Transcript, 23 June 2008, p. 12491 ("Q. Do you know where Jungle had got the ammunition
which you then transferred to Sam Bockarie in Kenema? A. The first time I met him we did not discuss that
much, but when I got to know him later he explained to me [...] sometimes the President used to send him to get
the ammunition from White Flower, the Executive Mansion, to take it to Sam Bockarie and that was not his first
time to cross over with ammunition" [emphasis added]).
""°" Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13830-13831.
mos Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13355 ("l knew that [Jungle] wouldn't have had ammunitions all
by himself in Liberia rather than getting it through the orders of Charles Taylor.")

---- End of Page 1661 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /,/J 18 May 2012

37 7.54
had a much stronger basis for his belief J award testified that the day after Jungle arrived in
Kenema to inform him that he brought ammunition which got stuck close to Buedu, J award
saw Bockarie give Tamba a parcel of diamonds, telling him that "this is what I now have for
the old man"lO7O6 which the witness understood to mean that the diamonds were to be taken
to the Accused in Liberia.lO7O7 The Trial Chamber considers that it is a reasonable inference
that the diamonds were provided in payment for the arms just delivered.
4841. Finally, Isaac Mongor testified that Bockarie informed him that prior to the AFRC
coup, Bockarie sent Tamba to collect ammunition from the Accused, and that Tamba
returned after the coup with a shipment of ammunition to Buedu.lO7O8 The Trial Chamber
recalls its previous finding that it had no general reservations concerning the credibility of
MongorlO7O9 but notes that his evidence as to this shipment was not elicited during
examination-in-chief Rather, Defence counsel drew attention to his account of the shipment
in a prior statement because counsel sought to challenge another aspect of the witness's
evidence-in-chiefmw Critically, Mongor was not challenged on the part of his statement
which is of core relevance to this allegation, the attribution of the ammunition to the
Accused. In light of this, the Trial Chamber has no reason to doubt his account that on
Bockarie's instructions Tamba brought a supply of ammunition from the Accused during the
Junta period.
4842. Further, there is evidence that Bockarie was communicating with the Accused in
relation to arms and ammunitions requests during this period. TF1-371 testiHed that
Bockarie told him that he had sought materiel assistance from the Accused in 1997 when he
was at Kenema.lO7H Dauda Aruna Fornie also testihed that in or about late 1997, when he
worked as a radio operator with Bockarie in Kenema Town, some communications with the
Accused's radio station in Liberia concemed requests for arms and ammunitiondom
Another radio operator, Mohamed Kabbah, testihed that juniors would not know of arms
orders as "that area is a very sensitive one".lO7l3 However he stated that he was in Kailahun,
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13352-13355.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13352-13355.
mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6727-6728.
WG9 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274.
mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6693-6697.
mm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2692-2693 (CS).
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21429.
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16291-16293.

---- End of Page 1662 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012
I

3775s
not Kenema, during the AFRC regime and did not operate with Sam Bockarie directlylO7l4
and was not always on the radiolO7l5. Further, TF1—371, who was in a position to know about
such requests, corroborates Fornie's testimony.
4843. On the basis of the evidence of Mongor, TF1—375, and Jaward, as corroborated by
TF1-371 and Dauda Aruna Fornie, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that materiel brought by
Tamba to the RUF in Sierra Leone during the Junta period was sourced from the Accused.
Findings
4844. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that during the Junta period the Accused sent ammunition to Bockarie in Sierra Leone via
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).
(ii) Alleged Ammunition Supply by Memunatu Deen and Fonti Kanu
Submissions of the Parties
4845. The Prosecution submits that later in 1997 Taylor sent the Junta another shipment by
road, which was paid for with diamonds. Memuna Deen, an RUF radio operator based in
Monrovia, and Fonti Kanu, the Battalion commander for Daru, travelled from Monrovia to
Daru with ammunition provided by the Accused for "AKs, GMGs and RPGs". According to
the Prosecution, Bockarie picked up the ammunition from Daru and brought the materiel to
Kenema.lO7l6 ln support of this allegation, the Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence
of Dauda Aruna Fornie.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
4846. Prosecution witness Dauda Aruna Fornie, an RUF radio operator, testified that in late
1997 when the RUF were in Kenema, Memunatul(m7 Deen, a field radio operator for the
RUF based in Monrovia at that time, and Fonti Kanu, Battalion commander for Daru,
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16284.
***7*5 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008. p. 16286.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 225.
mm The witness also refers to Deen as "Memuna" Deen. See Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008,
pp. 21432-21433.

---- End of Page 1663 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
r/ ‘f'i

Z? 7 :> é
travelled to Liberia to get ammunition. After Deen and Kanu returned to Dam they
contacted Mosquit0 and informed him that they had returned with ammunition.lO7l8
4847. The witness knew about the shipment because Deen contacted the witness from
Monrovia "before they left" and told him that she and Kanu were travelling to bring "some
materials" that were given to them by Charles Taylor. Deen contacted the witness once they
had arrived in Dam. F0mie and Bockarie then travelled to Daru to c0llect the shipment and
returned to Kenema with some of the materiel. Deen and Bockarie told the witness that the
materiel included mk rounds", ‘·G1>MG" and "RPG".m7l9
4848. Deen went to Monrovia after Foday Sankoh was arrested following the Abidjan
peace neg0tiations. She lived in Monrovia with Musa Zesay, a Gambian who was a member
0f the Special Forces, one of Taylor's "securities". In late 1997, Deen and Musa Zesay were
the liaisons through which the RUF c00rdinated m0st of their affairs. Musa Zesay was the
RUF's direct link to Taylor. Zesay fulfilled that role until the ECOMOG 1ntervention, when
Benjamin Yeaten took over that position.lO720
4849. F0mie was questioned on cross-examination about a prior statement to the
Prosecution, a month before he testified, in which he described the shipment brought by
F0nti Kanu and Memunatu Deen in 1997 after the Accused was elected. He did not mention
the Accused as the s0urce for the ammunition in that interview, nor in any other interview
with the Prosecution. In a second prior statement, the witness stated that F0nti Kanu was
involved in 0btaining ammunition for the AFRC and RUF during the Junta peri0d from
Liberia, without mentioning the Accused.lO72l The witness suggested that if it was not
recorded in the statements taken by the Prosecution, he was either not asked where the
ammunition had come from when he was interviewed, or that he forg0t to mention it, but he
maintained that the ammunition came directly from the Accused. my
The Accused
10718 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21432-21433; Transcript 5 December 2008, p.
21788.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21433-21434.
10720 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21434-21436.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 22020-22021.
mm Dauda Aruna remie. Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 22021-22025.

---- End of Page 1664 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z e J 18 May 2012

Z9 7 5 7
4850. The Accused denied knowing Memunatu Deen or Fonti Kanu. He stated that a man
named Musa Cissé was his Chief of Protocol, but Cisse was a Liberian, not a Gambian. He
did not know who Cisse hosted at his house.lOm The Accused denied that Musa Cisse was
his liaison with the RUF, explaining that Benjamin Yeaten and Musa Cisse had roughly the
same rank and were unlikely to have replaced one another. mm
Deliberations
4851. ln support of its allegation that Memunatu Deen and Fonti Kanu brought ammunition
from the Accused to Daru in late 1997, the Prosecution relies solely on the evidence of
Dauda Aruna Fomie. Fomie testified that in late 1997 Memunatu Deen told him that she
went to Monrovia with Fonti Kanu to bring ammunition from the Accused.
4852. The Trial Chamber notes that while Fomie testified that he himself went with
Bockarie to Daru to pick up the shipment of supplies brought by Deen and Kanu, and
testified to transporting those supplies to Kenema, he stated that he did not go into the
"ammo dump" in Daru, and that he was told by Deen and Bockarie what the supplies
consisted of. Further, the critical part of his evidence that this materiel was supplied by the
Accused is uncorroborated hearsay. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that it
had no general reservations concerning Dauda Aruna Fornie's testimony.lO725 However,
there are reasons to treat Fornie's evidence in relation to this particular incident with
caution. The Trial Chamber notes that in none of his prior statements, and specifically in two
prior statements in which Fomie described a shipment brought by Fonti Kanu and
Memunatu Deen in 1997 and Fonti Kanu generally being involved in obtaining ammunition
for the AFRC and RUF, did Fomie refer to a link to the Accused. Fomie gave several
possible explanations for the lack of any mention in his prior statement a month before the
witness was due to testify that the ammunition had come from the Accused. While the
witness may have forgotten to mention it, or the Prosecution may not have asked about it,
because it is uncorroborated hearsay rather than direct evidence, the Trial Chamber cannot
rely solely on Fornie's testimony under these circumstances.
Findings
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29171-2917 8.
10724 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29179-29181.
mm Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna F ornie, paras 346-358.

---- End of Page 1665 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3 4; 7 srs
4853. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the shipment of ammunition brought by Memunatu Deen and Fonti Kanu to
Sierra Leone in 1997 was sent by the Accused.
(b) During Sam Bockarie's Leadership {February 1998-December 1999)
(i) Alleged deliveries of materiel from the Accused to Sierra Leone
Submissions of the Parties
4854. The Prosecution submits that, from the ECOMOG lntervention in February 1998 to
Bockarie's departure from Sierra Leone in December 1999, the Accused regularly instructed
subordinates, including Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Sampson Weahl(a.k.a. Sampson) and
Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah, to deliver materiel to the RUF/AFRC forces on request by
Bockarie. 10726 In support of its allegations, the Prosecution relies on evidence from witnesses
TF1-585, Dauda Aruna Fornie, TF1-567, Abu Keita, TF1-516, Augustine Mallah, Dennis
Koker, Perry Kamara, Mohamed Kabbah, TF1-371, Jabaty Jaward, Isaac Mongor, Joseph
Marzah, TF1-579, Varmuyan Sherif, Albert Saidu, TF1-362, Komba Sumana, TF1-590,
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1-375, and Exhibits P-066 and P-067.
4855. The Defence acknowledges that the "evidence favours the conclusion" that supplies
arrived in Buedu via Tamba, Marzah and others.l0m However, the Defence submits that
these individuals were supplying the RUF of their own accord, in a "private enterprise that
was mutually beneficial to themselves, but unknown to President Taylor".l0728 The Defence
contends that witnesses who attributed such supplies to the Accused are unreliable and have
little basis for their testimony that materials were provided by or on behalf of the
Accused. 10729
4856. The Defence also points to evidence that the quantity of supplies brought from
Liberia were relatively small, comprised ammunition and not arms, and "certainly not
enough to satisfy the RUF's needs or substantially support any offensives". 1073 0 The Defence
10726 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 239; see also para. 1117 ("1n 1999, the trips made by Tamba, Marzah
and others, with the assistance of Yeaten, continued").
10727 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 103.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1091.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1080.
""’° Derenee Final Trial Baer; paras 1 101-1 103.

---- End of Page 1666 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /.1 18 May 2012 g gi

contends that until late 1998, when the major shipment from Burkina Faso arrived, the RUF
"struggled to obtain sufficient arms and ammunition".l073 I q
4857. The Defence relies on the testimony of TF 1-371, DCT-008, Issa Sesay, the Accused
and Moses Blah to support its contentions.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1-585
4858. Witness TF 1-585, a radio operator who retreated with Bockarie after the Intervention
to Buedu,IO732 testified that Jungle frequently brought supplies to Buedu, including arms and
ammunition, food and clothing.I0m She estimated that Jungle came every two or three
weeks throughout 1998 into mid-1999, whenever Bockarie requested military
equipment,IO734 and that J ungle's movements were not a secret in Buedu. mm
4859. Jungle's driver, Alpha Jalloh, told her that he and Jungle picked up the arms and
ammunition from White Flower at night and took them to Yeaten's house, and then they
were loaded into trucks for Buedu. mm The escorts travelled at night, using the road through
Foya airfield.lOm Jungle was typically accompanied by other SSS personnel, specifically
Junior and Sampson. mm TF 1-585 testified that Sampson, Junior and Jungle were constantly
together (in the witness's words, "always in company"). The three men wore uniforms
which were dark coloured and had "SSS" written on the back. {Om
4860. TF 1-585 also testified that at one point in late 1999, Bockarie told her that Jungle
would arrive in Buedu with five trucks with food and materiel. All of the trucks came from
Monrovia and were destined for Buedu. TF 1-585 saw the trucks arrive at Foya and boarded
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1063.
mm TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15608—15610.
mm TF1-585, Transcript 8 Septenrber 2008, pp. 15652, 15655.
WM TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15682.
""" TF1-585, Transcript 9 Septenrber 2008, p. 1579445795 (cs).
mm TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15658; Transcript 9 September 2008, p. 15794 (CS).
mm TF1-585, Transcript 8 Septenrber 2008, p. 15660.
mm TF1-585, Transcript 8 Septenrber 2008, pp. 15659, 15664.
uml) TF1-585, Transcript 8 Septenrber 2008, pp. 15638—15639.

---- End of Page 1667 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012


one on its return to Monrovia. The trucks contained f00d, used cl0thing, arms and
ammunition.101111
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna F 0rnie
4861. Dauda Aruna Fornie, a radi0 Operator, worked in Buedu from early 1998 until late
April 1999 when he left to attend the peace talks in Lome.1111i11 Fornie testified that
throughout this peri0d, Bockarie, through his radi0 Operators, would contact Benjamin
Yeaten or Taylor to request military supplies.10112 Yeaten's radi0 Operator, Sunlight, would
then respond that Bockarie should wait while Yeaten consulted with "Zer0-F0ur-Seven",
which Fornie understood to refer to Taylor.10143 Sunlight would then call back and tell
Bockarie that he could come to Monrovia or Bockarie should send a team to receive the
supplies.10144 Other times, Sunlight would inform Bockarie that Yeaten would despatch
Jungle, Zigzag Marzah or Liberian Mosquit0 with materials to Sie1Ta Leone,111145 and these
men would bring amrnunition, fuel or f00d.101116 F 0rnie knew these individuals to be working
under Yeaten in the SSS.10141 Fornie testified that visits from Jungle and Zigzag Marzah in
1998 were very frequent.101411
Prosecution Witness TF 1-567
4862. Witness TF 1-567, an RUF member, testified that when he was based in Balahun
(from after the 1ntervention to around September 1998),10149 on one 0ccasion he travelled to
Buedu, where he encountered Bockarie, Jungle, Zigzag Marzah, J unior Vandi and
others.10150 Bockarie intr0duced these men as "the Liberian brothers sent by Charles
Taylor".1O151 TF 1-567 testified that the men were wearing "blue/black" overalls with the
1111111 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15663, 15778-15782; Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15778-
15782.
111111 Dauda Aruna Fcmie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21457-21458, 21615.
111112 Dauda Aruna F0mie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21479.
111113 The Accused has testified that "Zer0-F0ur-Seven" or "047" was one of the c0de names used for him by
radi0 Operators. Accused, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 28992.
111744 Dauda Aruna Fcmie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21527, 21489-21492.
10115 Dauda Aruna Fcmie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21489-21492.
11171111 Dauda Aruna Fcmie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21492.
111117 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21491.
1111111 Dauda Aruna F0mie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21492.
*‘""° TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12894-12895.
*1*150 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903.
*075* TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903.

---- End of Page 1668 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T [ jk; 18 May 2012

words "SOD police" written near the pocket. He was subsequently told by Jungle that
‘°SOD" referred to the Special Operations Division, and that this Division was a police
branch that served directly under Taylor. my
4863. The witness heard Bockarie order men under his command to unload ammunition
from the vehicle in which the Liberians had arrived. mm TF1-567 observed "RPG boxes and
AK rounds" in the truck. Bockarie advised the Liberians to return that same night so as to
avoid civilians becoming aware of their presence. my
4864. TF1—567 testified that this incident occurred at the same time that Bockarie returned
from Monrovia after he had been given Koroma's diamonds by Sesay.lO755 However, the
witness did not explicitly link Bockarie's trip with the arrival of the ammunition.
4865. TF1-567 testified that on subsequent trips to Buedu, he saw Sampson, Jungle and
others. These men told him that they came to Buedu bringing arms, ammunition, food and
other items and that the goods had been provided by Taylor.lO75° On one occasion witness
TF1—567 saw the truck used to transport the goods and it was a "ten—tyred", "military"
tmck·10vsv
4866. TF1-567 further testified that while he was stationed in Buedu before the Lome
peace talks in July 1999, he used to see Mike Lama, Zigzag Marzah and Jungle bringing
weapons to Buedu. He explained that when Jungle and others came with this ammunition
"they used to say that it was the Pa, Charles Taylor, who sent the ammunition, he said
because when it is time for peace he should prepare for war". He explained that meant that,
as the peace talks were going on, the ammunition should be kept underground.lO758
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
10752 TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. l2904—12905.
10753 TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 1290}-12904.
"’"" TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903.
""" TF1—567, Tra11scr1pr2 July 2008, p. 12905.
mm TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12906.
WSJ TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12906.
"’"* TF1—567, Tra11scr1pr4 July 2008, p. 12966.

---- End of Page 1669 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 0/ 18 May 2012
,/ if

4867. Abu Keita, a former member of ULJMO-K assigned by Yeaten to Sierra Leone,111759
testified that when he first moved to Buedu, some time in September or October 1998,10760
Yeaten provided him with an AK-47, a pistol, ten boxes of ammunition, a Yaesu radio, and
three former NPFL111761 Liberian bodyguards armed with rifles, all of which he took with
him to Buedu.111762
4868. Keita testified that Charles Taylor sent him to Buedu, and that Taylor was in charge
of the RUF. However, Keita further testified that when he arrived in Buedu, Bockarie told
him that there would be only one commander, and that this was not consistent with what
Keita had been told in Monrovia. ln addition, the men Keita believed would be under his
command were taken from him. Thus the witness agreed that it would be fair to say that
Bockarie disregarded the commands or directives of Benjamin Yeaten and that those
commands and directives were ultimately those of Charles Taylor. 111763
4869. Keita was able to identify Marzah and Jungle from a photograph111764 and testified
that he saw the two men return and bring further supplies of ammunition, fuel and
medicines11171°5 "often" during his time with the RUF in Sierra Leone, "when there was any
problem".11171’6 He never saw them in uniform on their visits to Sierra Leone.111767 Keita
testified that these men were sent to Sierra Leone by Benjamin Yeaten. 1117118
Prosecution Witness TFl -516
‘°"" Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1970.
1117611 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2117. lt is not clear when Keita left Buedu. The witness testified
that he was in Buedu during January 1999, but on cross examination said that he was travelling back and forth
between Buedu and Makeni at that time: Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020; Transcript 24 January 2008, pp.
2140-2142. He was not in Buedu by August 1999, as he was taking part in Operation Mosquito Spray in August
1999. Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2048.
111761 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1982.
111762 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1982-1984.
111763 Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2136-2137.
111764 Exhibit P-045A, "Photograph - 00038533", p. 38533; Exhibit P-045B, "Photograph - 00038519", p. 38519;
Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1989.
111765 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1991-1992.
""" Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1992.
111767 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1991-1992.
1117611 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1991. Keita also testified that within the first few weeks of his
arrival in Buedu, Marzah, Sampson and Jungle arrived with fuel, medicine and ammunition, which they gave to
Sesay, and after this, Bockarie returned to Buedu, arriving with two trucks, 300 boxes of ammunition, and 150
men who were both Liberian and Sierra Leonean: Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1988, 1993-1995.
The Trial Chamber considers that the timing of this shipment may coincide with and refer to the Burkina Faso
shipment, and has considered it in that context.

---- End of Page 1670 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T "/ im 18 May 2012

4870. Witness TF1-516, a radio operator stationed in Buedu from the ECOMOG
Intervention to mid-l999,l07°9 testified that Zigzag Marzah, Jungle and Dopoe Menkarzon
commenced bringing arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone shortly after the Intervention
in 1998 to Bockarie in Buedu. According to the witness, until then, ULIMO-K had blocked
the supply line between the RUF and Liberia}0770 The witness was not able to be precise
about how often these men brought materiel, he testified that it happened regularly and when
materiel was needed for operations.l077l He testified that requests for ammunition from
Liberia were never denied, but that on some occasions Bockarie was told to wait}0772
4871. According to TF1-516, Bockarie would make a request for ammunition via radio,
usually to "Base One". Base One would then respond "[t]he iron bird will come with your
food", which the witness understood to mean that a helicopter would bring a shipment of
ammunition}0773 The request would then be transmitted to 020, the radio at the Executive
Mansion, which would then notify Buedu when the helicopter would be ariiving at Foya and
instruct Bockarie to collect it from there}0774 Sometimes, the instruction would be to expect
either Zigzag and Colonel Jungle, or General Dopoe who were en route with materiel to his
location in Buedu}0775 The communications of requests for materiel and notification of its
ariival were recorded in encoded form. IO776
4872. According to the witness, Bockarie went to Monrovia "quite oiten" and returned
with ammunitions. He had a ten-tyred truck he used for this purpose}0777 Other times
Jungle, Dopoe and Zigzag or other Liberians would deliver supplies to Buedu}0778 The
Liberian escorts would not remain in Sierra Leone after delivering the materials, and even
while they were there, their movement was "restricted". mm
*0769 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860 (The witness stated that in the rainy season of 1999
(roughly June and July) Issa Sesay ordered the witness to move to Liberia to work for Benjamin Yeaten).
'°"" TF1-516, rprpscppr 8 April 2008, pp. 6952-6953.
"‘"‘ TF1-516, rprpspppr 8 April 2008, pp. 6954, 6965.
mm rrr-516, rprpspppr 8 April 2008, p. 6965.
mm TF1-516,Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6949.
'°"" TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6949-6951.
‘°"5 TF1-516,Transcript9 April 2008, p. 6951.
mm TF1—5 16, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6954.
'O"7 TF1-516,Transcript8 April 2008, p. 6955.
'°"* TFl-516, rrppspppr 8 April 2008, p. 6957.
10779 TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6958.

---- End of Page 1671 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Z

4873. On cross-examination, TFl-516 explained that he was able to deduce when
instructions were coming from Yeaten when they originated from the call sign "Base One",
located at Yeaten's residence in Monrovia, and when instructions were coming from "the
President" because they originated from the call sign "020", located at the Executive
Mansion in Monrovia.I078O Further, although he knew that some of the men bringing
supplies, such as Dopoe, took orders from Yeaten, he understood that Yeaten, whom he
referred to as "50",lO78l took orders from Taylor because Yeaten had previously made
reference in the context of the military operation in Voinjama that the President was his
Chief 10782
4874. TF1-516 testified that the flying of ammunition to Foya via helicopter only
commenced in 1999 when insurgents began attacks on Lofa County. Prior to this, materials
were transported by land.m783 He also stated that the RUF had a "special group of armed
men" assigned in Foya to keep security at the airfield,lO784 and that Foya was a strategic
point wherein to coordinate meetings with those who were sent from Monrovia and those to
be taken to Monrovia from Sierra Leone.'O785 Regardless of how material arrived in Foya,
they would be taken into Buedu by road and then turned over to the G-4 Commander.
Bockarie would sign documents acknowledging receipt of the shipments. 10786
4875. TF1-516 was insistent that the radio requests for materiel were only for
ammunitions, not arms.IO787
4876. TF1-516 also attested to being personally involved in arms and ammumtions
shipments during the period June 1999 to December 2001 when he was assigned to work for
Benjamin Yeaten. On cross-examination, TF1-516 was asked how many times he crossed
between Liberia and Sierra Leone during this period. The witness stated that there were "so
many instances, so many times I crossed back into Sierra Leone and some of the times they
mm TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7001; Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6860-6861, 6921; Transcript 9
April 2008, p, 7021. ,
*07** TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860.
*0782 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7001-7002.
wm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6955.
mm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6955; corroborated by TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp.
15552-15553.
W5 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6956.
W6 TPI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6957-6958.
mm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6949, 6965.

---- End of Page 1672 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

V"
37 7 4 as
were moving with materials"l0788 but gave no specific information of dates, quantities, types
of weapons and ammunition and persons involved in the transfer. The witness mentioned
that on one unspecified occasion, when he was under attack in Foya from LURD insurgents,
he went to the ferry crossing point with Benjamin Yeaten where they met Issa Sesay. The
witness testified that Yeaten left Sesay with some boxes of ammunition which were
"drowned" in the river. mw
Prosecution Witness Auggstine Mallah
4877. Augustine Mallah, an RUF security officer, testified that he saw Jungle in Buedu up
to three times in 199840790 Mallah travelled to Buedu during the retreat from Freetown after
the Intervention and stayed there for two months before being stationed at Baiima. mm In his
examination-in-chief; he testified that the first two occasions were prior to his assignment to
Baiima. mw Mallah testified that on the first occasion, Jungle brought arms and ammunition.
He told the witness these supplies came from Gbarnga and that he had been instructed by
Taylor to bring them.lO793 On the second occasion, Jungle came in a Hilux vehicle. Mallah
was present when boxes of ammunition, including "RPG boxes, AK boxes" and "GPMG
rounds" and AK-47s were unloaded from under a tarpaulin in the vehicle and placed in
Bockarie's storeroom.l0794 The third occasion was later in the year. Jungle told the witness
that he had brought ammunition but Mallah did not see it}0795 However, on
cross-examination, Mallah stated that he "was actually more sure" of seeing Jungle on the
second and third occasion.lO796
4878. Although the witness referred to seeing Jungle in 1999 in examination-in-chief; in
cross-examination, he acknowledged that he did not know the movements of Jungle in 1999
because he was not frequently in Buedu during that year. mw
""" TF1-516, Transcript 10 Ap1112008,p. 7271.
M9 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7270-7271.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20214.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20176-20177, 20203-20204, 20208-20209.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20214-20215.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20215.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20215-20216; Transcript 17 November 2008,
pp. 20424-20425.
lows Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20216.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20433, see also pp. 20423, 20428, 20430.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20430.

---- End of Page 1673 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T "'ii I 18 May 2012
ff 1%

4879. Mallah testified that it was only some time in 1999 or 2000 that he first heard about
"Zigzag" Marzah. He noted that at the time Marzah made trips to Sierra Leone, not all RUF
fighters knew of him or saw him, as Marzah was "only concemed about the High Command
like Mosquito, his securities or the radio operators who were with them".lO798 Mallah also
stated that Bockarie would not discuss his sources of ammunition openly with the fighters
because an enemy might catch a fighter and discover from him where the RUF sourced its
Supplyirovss
Prosecution Witness Dennis Koker
4880. Witness Dennis Koker, who was stationed in Buedu during 1998 as a member of the
RUF Military Police,lO8OO testified that during the rainy season in 1998, there were several
incidents in which he saw persons speaking Liberian dialect bringing ammunition to
Bockarie in Buedu. When describing the first incident which took place in July 1998, he
stated that these men were wearing camouflage fatigue, black caps, and some wore yellow
polo shirts with the words "NPF L Navy Rangers". mgm According to Koker, there were more
than seven people who arrived, and they arrived in a truck, a car and a jeep. moz
4881. When they opened the truck, Koker was able to observe what was inside; he
recorded the contents and then they put the boxes into the ammunition dump, in an ‘"under-
cellar" house on Goduku Road.lO8O3 The container of the truck was roughly 20 feet by 7 feet,
without the driver's cabin.lO8O4 Koker recalls that off-loaded were propelled grenades, jet-
tracer (anti-aircraft) guns, mines the size of a dinner plate which would bum a tank, many
sardine cans of .50 calibre AA ammunition for shooting jets, rocket propelled bombs and
TNT, a type of bomb which could be fixed free-style on the nozzle of the AK.lO8O5
4882. Koker recalled three other occasions when visitors came to Buedu bringing materiel,
although on two of these occasions Koker did not directly witness the visits himself. Rather,
he knew that people had arrived because he was working at the Military Police ("MP")
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20449-20450.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20450.
mgm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1260.
"’**°‘ Dennis Kpkpr, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1280-1281.
mm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1282.
mm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1283.
IOW Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1282.
mm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1284-1286.

---- End of Page 1674 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T 2/ 18 May 2012

Office and the guard posts brought documents to the office which detailed the visitors’
arrival. The MP Office acted like "immigration" and provided for clearance for persons
continuing onto Buedu. IOSOG
4883. In the second delivery of materiel that Koker witnessed, also in July 1998, Bockarie
himself arrived at night with the materiel, accompanied by Liberians led by General Fayia,
commander at Fo a.l0807 The witness s oke with Fa ia, who told him his name.l08O8 He saw
Y P Y
8 them arrive with two large trucks, two minivans and a Range Rover jeep. When the trucks
arrived, others spent about four hours off-loading the trucks while Koker listed the
items.l080q Koker remembers seeing and listing the following materiel: many sardine tins of
AK ammunitions, G3 guns and ammunitions, many RPGs and mortar bombs, heavy
machine guns and ammunition, as well as many mines.l08l0
4884. The witness stated that he believed the arms and ammunitions from these shipments
came from Charles Taylor.lO8H His explanation for this belief was that he was told by his
"men" that the "arms came from Charles Taylor's men,"lO8l2 the Liberians told him that the
materiel delivered was from Charles Taylorglom and that the Liberians "came from his
country to our country, and [Taylor] was the head of that country and so nothing could come
from that country without his knowledge because he had securities too". IOW
Prosecution Witness Peg Kamara
4885. Perry Kamara, a senior radio operator working for Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) at
Superman Groundlom during 1998,lO8l6 testified that he was aware through the
communications network that Bockarie received ammunition. Bockarie would send
messages by radio that Jungle was bringing arms and ammunitions from Monrovia to Foya
mm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1286-1287, 1293-1294.
IOW Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1287, 1365-1367.
*0*08 Dennis Karan Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1288.
[Omg Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1288-1289.
mm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1290-1291.
[OSH Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1374.
wm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1374.
*0**3 Dennis Karan Transcript 15 January 2008,p. 1375.
mm Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1374.
wm Perry Kamara testified that Superman Ground was on the highway from Koidu Town to Guinea: Transcript
5 February 2008, p. 3112.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3115.

---- End of Page 1675 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / QQ 18 May 2012 gf

in Liberia by helicopter.101117 Bockarie would then send vehicles to c0llect the supplies and
bring them to Buedu.10818 Bockarie would message his commanders, including Superman,
stating "that he had brought am1nunitions from Mr Charles Taylor" and ask his commanders
to send men to c0llect the arms and ammunitions. Superman sent men to receive the
ammunitions.1O819
Prosecution Witness M0hamed Kabbah
4886. M0hamed Kabbah testified that in the peri0d after the 1ntervention until the attack 0n
Kono in December 1998, the RUF survived on "bits and pieces" of ammunition which
Jungle brought in a pick up truck.108211 Jungle came frequently to Buedu, to0 frequently to
estimate.101121
4887. Under sustained questioning from the Defence, Kabbah consistently maintained that
he was told by Jungle that the ammunition came from Taylor.101122 Kabbah testified that he
was personally present when Jungle reported to Bockarie that he came from the mansion in
Monrovia and in conversations between Bockarie and Jungle where Bockarie would say that
he was sending Jungle to Taylor.10823 Kabbah stated that Jungle "was always with us",101124
but denied that he was an RUF member because "[h]e was not trained by the RUF".10825 He
testified that Jungle was well known as one of Taylor's "strong men".
4888. Kabbah explained that he was able to distinguish ammunition brought by Jungle
from ammunition purchased from ULIMO (which had been buried and needed to be cleaned
in diesel) or ammunition traded through Guinea. Ammunition brought by Jungle was in
boxes.1082°
*08*7 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 31 18-31 19.
111818 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 31 19.
‘°8‘° Perry Krrrrrrrrrr, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 31 17-31 18.
1 10820 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16422-16424.
10821 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16140-16142.
111822 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16428-1643 1.
111823 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16165; Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16428-
16431; see also p. 16452.
111824 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16165; Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16381-
16382.
111825 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16428.
10826 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16425.

---- End of Page 1676 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

4889. Kabbah testified at some length as to the quantity of ammunition received from
Jungle. Kabbah stated that Jungle "never used to bring enough ammunition" and he typically
came with between three and five boxes.111827 Kabbah testified that in 1998, until the time
they recaptured Kono, the RUF was in a "stiff" situation with respect to ammunition, and all
they accessed was the "one or two boxes from Jungle that he used to bring".111828 Kabbah
also repeatedly affirmed that the supplies which the RUF received from Liberia in this
period comprised ammunition and not arins; he testified that the RUF had sufficient arins in
1998 to 1999.10829
4890. According to Kabbah, Bockarie announced that the operations to retake Kono were
necessary because "the struggle had reached a point when these bits and pieces of
ammunition that we were getting from Liberia was dwindling".1083O Kabbah explained that
the RUF needed to begin mining diamonds since the support it had been receiving from
Taylor was insufficient:
[W]hat I mean is that you want — you wanted a hundred boxes [of ammunition] and when you go there
somebody gives you ten, you will take it because you had no option. So the hundred that we wanted, if we had
our diamonds, when we take them we will get our hundred. 1111131
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
4891. Witness TF1-371 testified that the RUF received materiel delivered by escorts
including Zigzag Marzah, Jungle and Sampson. Each of these men had their own house in
Buedu and Marzah also had a girlfriend there. 111832
4892. As to the quantity of materiel supplied, in cross-examination the witness agreed that
from mid—1997 when Bockarie became leader of the RUF, he complained about a lack of
assistance from Liberia.111833 Defence counsel raised with him a prior statement in which he
had agreed that Bockarie was complaining because the assistance from Taylor was
1111127 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16141.
10828 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16396. Kabbah also testified that by "bits and
pieces", he meant two or three boxes of ammunition. Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16423.
‘°*" Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16417-16418.
11111311 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16149.
101131 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16150.
111812 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2379-2380 (CS). That the men had separate houses in Buedu is
also corroborated by Jabaty Jaward. Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13392.
mw TF1—371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2669 (cs).

---- End of Page 1677 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / JM 18 May 2012

"somewhat less than substantial" and where the witness had described it as comprising a
"small quantity" prior to November 1998. my
4893. The witness disagreed with the proposition put to him that Taylor did not really
provide any assistance to the RUF from 1993 until November or December 1998, with the
shipment from Burkina Faso. He stated that Taylor's lack of assistance was remedied after
Bockarie made a trip to Liberia in 1998.l0835 He testified that:
There were a series of trips made [to Monrovia]...and initially in June material came in small quantity
and...the supplies increased gradually up to the end of that year 1998.lO836
4894. However, he agreed that the "major substantial amount" came around November or
December 1998. mw According to the witness, between the three large shipments he recalled
in October 1997 (the Magburaka Shipment), November/December 1998 (the Burkina Faso
shipment) and March 1999, "Bockarie took regular trips to Monrovia, arms were coming,
but they were not really as large, in huge quantities as those three shipments [...]".l°838
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
4895. Jabaty Jaward testified that from early March 1998, he was Bockarie's "store
keeper" with responsibility for RUF supplies, including arms and ammunition and food and
fuel supplies.lO83° J award testified that he believed the supplies in the RUF store came from
Liberia.l084O The basis for J award's belief was that the supplies were escorted by men with
names such as Colonel Jungle, Sampson, Mike, Senegalese, Junior, Zigzag Marzah and Pa
Sheku.l084l Jaward was also aware that these men were Liberian, with the exception of Pa
Sheku, who was from Guinea.lO842 Jaward also learnt from these escorts the route they
typically used to enter Sierra Leone. They used to complain about the condition of the roads,
and at times vehicles would break down and Jaward would send transport to pick up the
*0880 TF1-371, rrarrnnnpr 30 January 2008, p. 2670 (cs).
*0888 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008,p. 2669 (cs).
*0880 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2670-2671 (cs).
*0888 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2671 (cs).
*0888 TF1—371, Transcript 31 January 2008,p. 2700 (cs).
mw Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13378-13383. Jaward was in Daru at the time of the
Intervention and arrived in Buedu several weeks thereafter, at the end of February or beginning of March in
1998.
*0880 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 133 84.
IOW Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13386.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13388.

---- End of Page 1678 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

supplies.1O843 The escorts mentioned towns in Liberia through which they passed, including
Monrovia. 111814
4896. According to Jaward, the Liberian escorts worked for Taylor.1111145 He knew this
because: first, Jungle was well—known as one of Taylor's SSS; second, Sampson and Junior
were also SSS men (a fact the witness came to know subsequently while in Liberia); third,
Senegalese dressed in a uniform of Taylor's Special Operational Division, and fourth, the
escorts also told the witness that they worked for Taylor.1111146 However, J award testified that
the escorts told him that their instructions in relation to the transport of arms and
ammunition into Sierra Leone came from Benjamin Yeaten.10847
4897. J award stated that the supplies received from the Liberian escorts included
"ammunition of AK and these anti—aircraft weapon ammunition [...] RPG rockets, the
weapons themselves".1111148
4898. Jaward remained storekeeper for Bockarie until Bockarie departed the RUF in
December l999.1111149 He testified that during this period, these supplies arrived from Liberia
"once in a while" and that they were "not that much frequent" and it was "not something
re lar".111g51) The witness testified that there was "no s ecific schedule" for the arrival of
gu P
supplies, at times he was informed by Bockarie that Bockarie had made a request "to
Monrovia" for supplies on account of pressing needs on the ground.1111151
4899. Jaward testified in respect of one particular incident in "late l998" when the RUF
was engaged in combat with Guinean troops who were crossing into Sierra Leone near
Koindu. When RUF commanders came to Buedu for supplies, the store was empty.
According to the witness, Bockarie stated that he had called to "the Papay in Liberia" and
that he expected men to arrive shortly with arms and ammunition.1111152 By "the Papay in
1111143 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13385.
1111144 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13385.
"’*‘" Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13387.
1111146 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13387-13388.
1111147 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13389-13390.
"’*‘"‘ Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13392.
'°*"*" Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13390.
'°"° Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13390.
1111151 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript l0 July 2008, pp. 13390-13391.
101152 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript l0 July 2008, pp. 13391-13392.

---- End of Page 1679 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / —r»*’1" 18 May 2012

Liberia", the witness understood Bockarie to refer to Taylor.m853 Jaward testified that
subsequently, Sampson, Jungle, Mike and Senegalese arrived with aims and
ammunition. `O854
4900. Jaward would make an inventory of received items and distribute them to the front
lines according to Bockarie's instructions, with quantities being distributed according to the
military needs of the commanders.`O855
5 Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
490l. Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander, also testified that while in Kono under the
command of Superman,`0856 he was under orders from Bockarie not to let go of Kono
because that was where they got their diamonds from. There was no ammunition in Kono so
Mongor requested ammunition from Buedu. Bockarie told him to be patient because Jungle
had gone to Liberia to Taylor to get some.`O857
4902. Mongor testified that he later received ammunition from Bockarie which was part of
a delivery made by Jungle to Buedu. Bockarie sent men to Mongor with ten boxes of AK
rounds, but because the men fought the Kamajors along the way, only half that amount
reached Mongor.`O858 According to Mongor, each box contained two "sardine tins", each of
which contained 35 packets of ammunition of 20 rounds each, totalling l400 rounds per
bOX·108s9
4903. Mongor also testified that after the meeting in Buedu at which the Fitti-Fatta
operation was ordered, Superman came to Gandorhun with a quantity of ammunition for the
attack. Mongor subsequently spoke with Bockarie who confirmed that Taylor had sent
*0555 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13391.
IOW Jabaty Jaward, Transcript I0 July 2008, p. 13392.
***555 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13392-13393.
IOM Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5742-5744.
*5555 Isaac Mcrrgcr, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5744-5745.
. [0858 Mongor testifies that this was shortly after the Intervention. Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp.
5745-5746.
mw Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5746-5747. The term "sardine tins" was commonly used by
witnesses to refer to the metal boxes in which ammunition was stored, which apparently had a lid that rolled
back similar to a tin of sardines: see explanation of Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 441 10.

---- End of Page 1680 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T rm 18 May 2012
/

Jungle with a "small quantity" of ammunition which Bockarie had given to Superman for
the Fitti-Fatta operation. 1118611
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
4904. Marzah stated that when ULIMO was disarmed, during "the time Mosquito was
there up to Issa Sesay's administration", he made 20 to 40 trips to Sierra Leone transporting
arms, ammunitions and artillery pieces. Marzah testified that these supplies were brought by
Taylor's friend, a white man, and were kept at Taylor's residence at White Flower.10861
Marzah stated that he undertook these trips "on the direct instructions of Charles Taylor"
and that "...it was a government that had a constitution that governed the country led by
him, Charles Taylor. So, anything we did was by his orders". Marzah testified that while he
would at times transport materiel offloaded from the airport to White Flower, he was
sometimes ordered by Taylor to transport it directly to Sierra Leone. 10862
Prosecution Witness TFl-579
4905. Witness TF1-579 testified to taking materiel to Bockarie in Buedu twice in 1998.
The first time was in September around the time of the Roosevelt Johnson incident.111863 The
witness, accompanied by Jungle and Sampson Weah, took ammunition to Bockarie in
Buedu using a Toyota pick-up truck, including grenades, rockets, AK rounds and RPGs.1O864
4906. The witness testified that although he would ordinarily wear his SSS uniform in
Monrovia, none of the three men were wearing uniforms on the trip to Buedu.111865 He
explained this as follows:
Q. From what you've told us, when people were involved in shipping ammunition to Sierra Leone they
wouldn't wear their uniforms, would they?A. Yes, you wouldn't wear your uniform to go to Sierra Leone to
prevent people from knowing that Mr Taylor was involved with the RUF movement.1O866
10860 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5748. The Prosecution brief also cites Isaac Mongor's
testimony at Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5781-5783, but the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Mongor is
there testifying about the lead up to the December 1998 offensives.
10861 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5875.
'M Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5876-5877.
*0*6** TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19830-1983l.
111864 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19831-19834.
111865 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19834-19835.
'°*°" TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 21122, 19834-19835.

---- End of Page 1681 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

.37 7 7 4
4907. Although the men were not wearing their uniforms, there was no difficulty passing
through the checkpoints at the border because "all those who were assigned at that
checkpoint knew exactly what was going on and they knew the various commanders like
Sampson and Jungle and they had the order there that any time that car arrived there they
should allow it to pass tl1rough".m887
4908. At Buedu, the witness, Sampson and Jungle offloaded the ammunition into a store
room in Bockarie's house. Bockarie told the witness that he was pleased with the delivery as
he was "under serious attack". The witness spent two days in Buedu on this occasion. IO888
4909. The witness's second trip to Buedu took place approximately two months after the
first, with Zi gzag Marzah, Sampson Weah and Jungle. Yeaten provided the ammunition they
took to Buedu from a warehouse on the left side of Taylor's house. According to the
witness, Yeaten had a list of items which he presented to the G4 Commander Moses Duoh at
that warehouse.m889 When the group arrived in Buedu, Bockarie met them and said that he
was under "very serious attack" and was "already out of ammunition. The witness spent
almost a week in Buedu on this occasion.lO870
4910. TFl—579 also stated that he saw Sampson, Jungle and Marzah at other times leaving
to take supplies to Buedu, although he was not present on those joumeys.lO87l He knew this
because Sampson was his "best friend" and they, together with Jungle and Zigzag Marzah,
all lived at the YWCA, so he was aware when they were leaving for Buedu in Sierra Leone.
Also, sometimes before such trips, the witness, Sampson and Marzah would go to a club for
a drink, and Sampson and Marzah would take along to the club a pick—up truck loaded
already with the ammunition. mm
4911. TFl—579 stated that as far as he was aware, only ammunition was carried on these
trips, not arms. IOS78 He testified that generally, the group travelled in pick—up trucks in which
the ammunition was carried. Sometimes the intennediaries would travel in an individual
10887 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19835.
10888 TF1—579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19836-19837.
lO889 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19837-19839.
lO87O TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19839-19842.
mw TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19847-19848.
mm TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19847-19848.
18878 TF1-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, p. 21142.

---- End of Page 1682 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

"car" and sometimes in a convoy. The largest convoy TF1-579 witnessed leaving consisted
of two pick-up trucks. IOS74
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
4912. Varmuyan Sherif testified that during 1998, Taylor had given him a temporary
assi ent to o to Lofa Count and collect arms and ammunitions hidden b former
gum g Y Y
ULIMO-K fighters who resisted disarmament.m875 Sherif was shown where these arms were
hidden by the former fighters. Sherif saw about four pickup-truckloads of arms and
ammunition in good condition.l0876 Sherif took three of these truckloads back to Monrovia
before Taylor informed him that he should supply the last load directly to Bockarie.lO877
4913. Sherif met Bockarie in Foya and together they moved to the border where Sherif
ave Bockarie the ick-u full of arms com risin AK-47, RPG and other ns. The witness
g P P P S gu
stated that some of the arms were in bags coated with mud.lO878
4914. Sherif testified that he had to change out of his uniform when travelling to the Sierra
Leonean border, explaining:
4915. In case the civilians around see the uniform, you can see the badges here that identify
it as executive management. So, I had to change into another clothing so on my way back to
Monrovia I had my uniform on again‘lO879
Prosecution Witness Albert; Saidu
4916. Albert; Saidu explains that whenever Jungle came to the RUF territory, there was a
eneral understandin amon st the RUF that he brou t "materials", arms, ammunitions,
S g S
food and drugs to the RUF fighters which they used to fight and that those "materials" were
sent by Charles Taylor.lO88O
Prosecution Witness TF1-362
'°8"‘ rrr-$79, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21138—21141.
mw Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 820.
mm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 821.
{0877 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 851-852.
mm varrrrrryrrrr Sherif, Transcript 14 Jrrrrrrery 2008, pp. 1 142-1 144.
mm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 856; See also Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008,

---- End of Page 1683 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /// JQ 18 May 2012
‘\/

4917. Witness TF1-362 stated that at some point in 1998 or l999,lO88l she received
weapons and ammunition from the ammunition dump that was located at Sam Bockarie's
house in Buedu. She testified that Bockarie "used to collect arms and ammunition from
Charles Taylor". mm
Prosecution Witness Komba Sumana
4918. Komba Sumana testified that in 1998 three soldiers with red hats delivered arms at
pass out parade. H)883 He was told by a fellow member of the rebel forces that these men, who
spoke Liberian English, were "Charles Taylor's so1diers".lO884 Sumana iirrther added that
after the weapons were distributed, Bockarie stated that they were going to "clear" Kono.
The troops, including the witness, left the next day. En route, General Issa told the troops
that as part of ‘Operation No Living Thing,’ they would attack Koidu Town. The attack was
not successful. HMS The witness did not ultimately participate in the attack.lO886
Prosecution Witness TF1 -590
4919. Witness TF1-590, a Sierra Leonean reiirgee who fled to Liberia after the ECOMOG
Intervention, testified that in 1998, shipments of arms and ammunitions and other supplies
would arrive via a plane at an airfield at Voinjama. Members of the Liberian security and the
RUF would take the supplies from this airfield.lO887 On one occasion, the witness saw
persons with trucks unloading ammunition boxes from an airplane into RUF vehicles and
then drive those vehicles towards Sierra Leone.m888 lt was not a secret when planes arrived
p. 1143. ,
*%*1* Albert saian, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11027-11029.
*%** TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4868, 4916 (cs).
mm TF1-362, Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4909. The exact wording used by the witness in response to the
question of whether Bockarie told her about the source of supplies: "He was not specific. He said he can collect
— he used to collect arms and ammunition from Charles Taylor".
mm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17937-17939; Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18031-
18033.
mgm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17938; Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18041-18042.
*%**5 Kcrnba snrnana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17940-17942.
*%*6 Kcrnba snrnana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17941-17942.
*%*7 Tri-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11771.
*%% TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11772.

---- End of Page 1684 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T { X 18 May 2012

59777
and the witness knew of these shipments because those transporting the supplies would
frequent his kiosk and talk about the shipments.111111111
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
4920. Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified that in early August 1999, a group of AFRC men,
including Johnny Paul Koroma, "Bazzy", Junior Lion, Bomblast, Major Bonkolonkeh, and
the witness himself met with Taylor, Momoh Gibbah and Defence Minister Daniel Chea at
the President's Mansion in Monrovia.11111911 At the meeting, Taylor urged the AFRC and RUF
to cooperate, and threatened arrest for failure to do so. Taylor confirmed to them that he
supplied food, arms and ammunitions to AFRC/RUF troops so they could overthrow the
government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and that he arranged Johnny Paul Koroma's
departure from Kailahun to Liberia and also arranged for the delegation to meet him in
Liberia. 111891 Taylor also gave Johnny Paul SUSD 15,000 to spend in Monrovia. 1111192
Prosecution Witness TF1-3 75
4921. Witness TF1-375, an RUF fighter,1111193 testified that about three weeks after they
retreated from Koidu Town, Bockarie contacted Superman via radio to advise that he was
sending "guests" from Buedu who had come from Liberia. Superman sent people to receive
them at the Moa River, and they returned accompanied by up to eight Liberians. The men
had Liberian accents and brought arms and ammunition. TF1-375 testified that one of the
Liberians was an SSS officer named "Osebo Demy", whom he came to know subsequently
in Liberia as one of Yeaten's subordinates in the SSS. 111894
4922. TF1-375 also testified that during the rainy season of 1998, after Superman and SAJ
Musa attacked Kabala, Bockarie called and said that he wanted them to send some of the
ammunition and arms that they had captured from Kabala to him so he could send it to the
front lines. After this communication, Superman and SAJ Musa and other commanders
called a meeting to discuss the request. The distance was too far to send the ammunition to
Kailahun, so they wanted to call Sam Bockarie and tell him that they would like to use the
10889 TF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11772-11774.
1011911 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8501-8504.
111891 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8504-8506, 8509.
111892 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8506.
10893 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.

---- End of Page 1685 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jg 18 May 2012

ammunition to attack Makeni. Superman and SAJ Musa called Bockarie who reasseited that
he needed the ammunition and that he would send some people to collect it, which he
did}0895 Superman told these men that he and SAJ Musa were unable to turn over the arms
and ammunition to them}0896
The Accused
4923. The Accused denied the allegation of sending arms and ammunitions to the
RUF/AF RC via Marzah, Jungle and others}0897 He contended that he could not have been in
control of` everything in the SSS, and there were elements within the organisation, including ,
Benjamin Yeaten, which were acting autonomously. He stated that he was busy dealing with
diplomatic and political matters, and persons such as Tamba, Sherif and Weah who were
bringing arms to Sierra Leone were acting without his knowledge or consent.log98
4924. The Accused also testified that during this period Liberia did not import any
weapons and had no finances to purchase any, and hence had no arms to send to Sierra
Leone; the disarmament in Liberia took place in 1996, thereafter the arms were held by
ECOMOG and the UN. The Accused denied he had any access to arrns.lO899 He pointed to
the fact that ECOWAS had requested that the Security Council lift its anns embargo on
Liberia, but was unable to persuade the Security Council to do so}0900
4925. The Accused told the Trial Chamber that around June to August 1998,mgm there was
a formal investigation carried out conceming allegations that his government was involved
‘°""‘* TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12523-12528.
‘°8‘" TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008,pp. 12563-12566.
"’8"" TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12568-12569.
10897 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26209; Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28727,
28729-28730 (in response to TF1-567's evidence, specifically denying that he sent a ten-tyred tmck hill of arms
and ammunitions); Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30100-30103 (in response to Ma11ah's evidence), 30172-
30273 (in response to the evidence of TFl-585); Transcript 27 October 2009, p. 30414 (in response to Isaac
Mongor's evidence); Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30769-30770 (in response to Sherif" s evidence); Transcript
2 November 2009, pp. 30897-30898 (in response to Dennis Koker's evidence, stating that he was not aware of
any uniform worn by the Navy Rangers and denying that yellow was a colour used by his fighters); see also
Transcript 2 February 2010, pp. 34625-34626 (identifying as Navy Rangers persons depicted in Exhibits P-493B
and P-493E, which depicts armed personnel wearing yellow t-shirts with "Navy Rangers" written on them);
Exhibit P·493B, "Photograph — P0000866"; Exhibit P-493E, "Photograph — P0000869".
‘°"‘"" Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 August 2009, pp. 26333-26335.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26191-26192; Transcript 17 August 2009, pp.
2690 1 -26903.
10900 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25414-25415.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, p. 32180.

---- End of Page 1686 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ 18 May 2012

in the training of Sierra Leoneans, diamond trafficking and the movement of arms across the
border.1O9O2 That investigation was an internal Liberian investigation,1O9O3 but it was carried
out by a delegation which included the Representative of the UN Secretary—General
Downes—Thomas, ECOMOG officers, his Foreign Minister and a US military attache by the
name of Colonel Dempsey.1O9O4 According to the Accused's recollections, a report of their
investigation, primarily authored by Dempsey, concluded that there were indications that a
small amount of arms was going across the Liberian border into Sierra Leone, but the source
of these arms was unclear.1119115 The Accused's recollection of the report was that Colonel
Dempsey stated that the low—level arms supply did not appear to be occurring at any official
level 10906
4926. Describing the mode in which arms and ammunitions could be accessed by security
personnel, the Accused confirmed that formal requests had to be made by SSS personnel for
arms and ammunition. Records were kept of arms and ammunition assigned to personnel,
and any Secret Service personnel in possession of arms and ammunition had to account for
them at every inspection. According to the Accused, the SSS had their own distinct weapons
stored at a separate storage facility within their own custody. The primary SSS armoury was
at the Executive Mansion. While the Accused could not recall who had day to day control of
the armoury, the Director of the SSS had ultimate powers to remove materiel from the
armoury or authorise its removal.109O7
4927. The Accused denied that there was a warehouse attached to his residence in
Monrovia,109O8 but admitted that there was an SSS warehouse located next door to White
10902 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26140-26142; Transcript 19 November 2009, pp.
32180—32183; See also Exhibit D-141, "Presidentia1 Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of
Activities of the Chief Executive of Liberia, August 2 1997 — December 31 l998", p. 293: "The Liberian
Government wishes to draw attention to the statement of the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Africa, Amb Vicki Huddleston, that there is no evidence that the Liberian Government is involved in aiding
the war in Sierra Leone. The Government wishes to also point to the results of an independent investigation
conducted by Col. Dempsey, Military Attache at the US Embassy in Monrovia, which found no evidence of the
alleged involvement of the Liberian Government in the Sierra Leonean conflict".
10903 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, pp. 32183- 32186.
109114 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26140-26142; Transcript 19 November 2009, pp.
32180-32183.
10905 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26147; Transcript 18 November 2009, p. 32183.
10906 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 November 2009, p. 32183.
109117 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 28007-28009.
10qOg Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30629; see also Transcript 31 August 2009, p.
28009 (stating that a certain amount of arms and ammunition was kept at White Flower for the President's
security. The Director of the SSS would also have ultimate authority for these supplies).

---- End of Page 1687 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-0I-T // JB 18 May 2012

Flower. According to the Accused, the warehouse was under Benjamin Yeaten's command
and he did not have access to the warehouse. 10909
Defence Witness DCT-008 A
4928. Witness DCT-008 served as a radio operator from August 1997 to 2003.10910 He
testified that Yeaten and Bockarie were involved in "secret deals" in which Yeaten sold
ammunition to Bockarie.lO9H The ammunition deals between Bockarie and Yeaten
commenced in late 1998, after Bockarie's first visit to Monrovia,lO9l2 which DCT-008
placed in September 1998.10913 Yeaten secured the ammunition by sending people to
purchase it from persons in the south—east of Liberia, which had previously been controlled
by the Liberian Peace Council, and also from ULIMO-K in LOFA County.l09l4 Yeaten used
Jungle, Sampson or Zigzag Marzah to transport ammunition at night, either from his
residence or that of Cisse.lO9l5
4929. DCT-008 testified that Yeaten's relationship with Bockarie was hidden from
Taylor.lO9l6 Yeaten was able to keep the transportation and trade in ammunitions a secret
because the persons involved were "high-ranking government off1cials". The witness noted
that Yeaten was the chief of security to the President, "and even his bodyguards, when his
bodyguards are driving around, no other security would search their car". Further, Musa
Cisse was the chief of protocol to the President, and "[w]henever they saw his vehicle,
nobod at an check oint would check his car".lO9l7 He testified that deals such as this b
Y Y P Y
overmnent officials without the knowled e of Taylor were common, since salaries were
g g Y
low and corruption was rife.m9l8 According to DCT-008, Yeaten told his "close
NW9 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30629-30631.
"’9‘° Dcr-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 46949 (Ps).
Wm DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47388; Transcript 3 September 2010 p. 47935.
mgm DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47391; Transcript 3 September 2010 p. 47934
mm DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47050—47052.
ROOM DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47389, 47393; Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48086-48087,
48104-48105.
mlm DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47391-47392; Transcript 7 September 2010, p. 48182.
mgm DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47386; Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48103-48104, 48184-
48186, 48216.
‘°°" Der-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47390.
‘°"'" Der-008, rrsasmpt 27 August 2010, p. 47389.

---- End of Page 1688 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / in 18 May 2012

bodyguards" that they should keep the arms deals a secret because he feared being arrested
if the President heard about it.l09l9 A
4930. DCT-008 stated that he was not aware of any trip by Sampson or Jungle to Sierra
Leone with arms and ammunition in 1998 to early 1999, with the exception of one trip
shortly after Bockarie's first visit (which he places in September 1998).10920
4931. DCT-008 testified that the clandestine transactions between Yeaten, Cissé, Jungle
and Bockarie (and Sampson and Marzah) ceased in December 1999 when Bockarie came to
seek refuge in Liberia.l092l
Defence Witness Issa Sesay ’
4932. Issa Sesay testified that the only ammunition that came into Sierra Leone in 1998
was ammunition bought or exchanged from ex-ULIMO fighters and from Guinea.l0922
According to Sesay, during this period the RUF did not receive arms and ammunition from
Charles Taylor in Liberia. Sesay said that, being in Kailahun throughout this time, he was in
a position to kr1ow.l0923
4933. Sesay denied that Jungle, Marzah and Sampson were runners between the Liberian
government and the RUF.lO924 Sesay did not see Sampson in RUF territory and met him only
in 2000. Sesay only got to know Marzah in 1999 when Marzah was security accompanying
the Liberian Lomé Peace Accord delegation.l0925 Sesay testified that he was good friends
with Jungle and was not aware of Jungle being an agent of Charles Taylor.l092° According to
Sesay, Jungle did not bring ammunition from Liberia and Sesay would have known if Jungle
had done so}0927
Defence Witness Yanks Smgghe
'°""’ DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47389.
'°"2° Dcr-008, Transcript 30 August 2010, p. 47420.
"""' DCT—008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47395-47396.
'°"" Issa susuy, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 4430044302.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44626—44628.
"’°"‘ Issa susuy, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 4507245074
"’°’5 Issa susuy, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 4507345074.
'°"2° Issa spsuy, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43804, 43806-43808.
IO927 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45405.

---- End of Page 1689 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

4934. Yanks Smythe, who was appointed Assistant Director for Operations for the SSS by
Taylor in 1998,10928 testified that an arms and ammunitions warehouse for the SSS existed in
a building next to White Flower. There was a protocol to obtain supplies from the
warehouse in which the Director of the SSS would make a request to the President, it would
be approved and the Director would get the supplies.1O929 The warehouse was staffed 24
hours a day. The superintendents of the warehouse were Moses Duoh and Aloysius Kai.m93O
However, Smythe conceded that if the director "wanted to obtain a single uniform from the
warehouse", he would not need Presidential approval. Smythe agreed with the proposition
from Defence counsel that it was possible that Yeaten could obtain supplies from the White
Flower warehouse without informing the President. Wm
4935. According to Smythe, the arms and ammunition of the Armed Forces of Liberia were
kept separately from this warehouse and were held at the Barclay Centre. However, the SSS
had another small warehouse at the Executive Mansion containing "small light weapons" to
which access was given by the Director. The SS Director could authorise removal of
supplies and it was not necessary to notify the President. During the time that he was
Assistant Director, the witness was not aware of any supplies being taken from the
warehouse at the Executive Mansion and sent to Sierra Leone}0932
Defence Witness John Vincent
4936. John Vincent, a Liberian member of the RUF from September 1990 to 2000 before
leaving to join the Armed Forces of Liberia in 200l, testified that he met Jungle on the way
to the Waterworks meeting of 1998, which Vincent placed in July, August or
September.1O933 Jungle informed Vincent that he was making regular trips to Buedu and
providing Bockarie with ammunition since he was able to easily travel from Sierra Leone to
Liberia due to his dual Sierra Leonean and Liberian citi2enship.lO934 Vincent did not know
Wm DCT-179, Transcript 24 February 2010 pp. 35865-35867.
mm Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010 pp. 35933-35934.
"’°"’ Yanks srnyrna, Transcript 24 February 2010 pp. 35935-35936.
'°"" Yanks srnyrnn, rrannnnpr 24 rpbnrary 2010 pp. 35934-35935.
'°"" Yanks srnyrna, Transcript 24 February 2010 pp. 35936-35938.
mm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38109-381 1 1.
'°°"" John Vincent, rrannnnpr 26 March 2010 pp. 381 10-381 11.

---- End of Page 1690 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J ilgg 18 May 2012

from where in Liberia Jungle obtained supplies but he never heard that these supplies came
from Taylor. 10935
4937. Vincent stated that he first met Zigzag Marzah in Liberia at the end of 2000 or 2001
and never saw Marzah bringing arms and ammunition in 1998 or 1999 to Sam Bockarie.111936
Defence Witness Martin George
4938. Martin George, an RUF Commander involved in the capture of Kono in 1998, and
Brigade Commander in Kono in 1999,10937 stated that he had not heard of the RUF receiving
any ammunition from Taylor or the NPFL, nor did he himself receive anything from
Taylor. 111938
Prosecution Exhibit P-066
4939. Exhibit P-066 is an unsigned letter, dated 24 June 1998, from "Brigadier Sam
Bockarie — CDS RUFSL" to Charles Taylor through his "Chief of Protocall" Alhaji Musa
Sesay. The letter begins by describing the RUF's supply shortages, stating that in the face of
ECOMOG led attacks on RUF positions in Koidu and Kailahun, "we do not have rockets or
bombs which are badly needed to handle the situation" and that the RUF was "merely
managing the small ammunition we have at hand as at now".111939
4940. The letter requests that Musa Sesay meet with "The President" to explain these
issues in detail, and states:
We appreciate the assistance we have been receiving and we want you to believe that we
have no where else to cry to for help besides you and his Excellency.
We usually receive materials without bombs and not even up to twenty (20) boxes which
makes the operation, to capture and defend any strategic point difficult.
[...] we are appealing that you please discuss the matter with His Excellency for his timely
intervention of the situation on the ground. 109411
10935 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 p. 381 12.
'°°" John vrnnnnt, rrnnsnnpt 26 Mnnnn 2010, pp. 38113-38114.
10937 DCT-062, Transcript 23 April 2010 pp. 39779-39782, 39794-39797.
*0%* DCT-062, rrnnsnnpt 23 Apnr 2010, pp. 39848-39852.
10939 Exhibit P-066, "Confidentia1 — RUF Brigade Headquarter — Buedu, ‘1nformation and Request’, Report from
Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, 24 June 1998", ERN. 7833.
111940 Exhibit P-066, "Contidentia1 — RUF Brigade Headquarter — Buedu, ‘Inforn1ation and Request’, Report from
Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, 24 June 1998", ERN. 7833.

---- End of Page 1691 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / jg 18 May 2012

Prosecution Exhibit P-067
4941. Exhibit P-067 is a 1999 report to Foday Sankoh by the Black Guards, authored by
Junior Vandi, a Black Guard commander,lO94l which indicates in general terms that
throughout 1998 Taylor provided material support to the RUF. After recounting that
Bockarie was called to Monrovia by Taylor shortly after the lntervention, Exhibit P-067
states that:
From that point, the President gave huge quantity of logistics (Ammunition) to the
High—Command for us to start repelling the ECOMOG advancement or to contain
situation. 10942
4942. Exhibit P-067 indicates that such support continued. After recounting the episode in
which Sesay lost a parcel of diamonds in Monrovia, and prior to discussing the Fitti-Fatta
mission, the Black Guards state:
Moreso, President Taylor continues to give helping hands with logistics which involves
foodstuff and materials. 10943
Deliberations
4943. The evidence adduced by the Prosecution consistently establishes, and the Defence
concedes, that throughout 1998 and 1999 supplies of military equipment arrived in Buedu
that were brought by Liberians.lO944 Twenty Prosecution witnesses testified to supplies of
materiel being brought by intermediaries and their accounts are complementary in most
respects. According to these witnesses, Bockarie would radio requests through to Liberia
when he was short of materiel.lO945 Usually one or a combination of Daniel Tamba,
Sampson Weah, Joseph Marzah and Dopoe Menkarzon would bring the supplies,lO946 either
10941 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2406 (CS): Vandi authored it and he was a Black Guard
commander. TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903.
10942 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army~ Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN. 9674-9675.
10943 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army~ Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN. 9676.
10944 See Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1091 ("There is also a significant body of evidence that intermediaries
such as Daniel Tamba (Jungle), Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), Sampson Wehyee and others delivered arms and
ammunition to the RUF throughout 1998 and perhaps into 1999. ...The Defence submits that essentially these
individuals, in conjunction with others, operated a private enterprise that was mutually beneficial to
themselves..."), 1 103 ("The evidence favours the conclusion that while Tamba and others did make trips from
Liberia to Sierra Leone, that they transported ammunition rather than arms. . ,").
10945 TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15682; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p.
21479; TF1—5l6, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6949.
10946 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15652, 15655 (stating that Jungle brought supplies); Dauda

---- End of Page 1692 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T J 18 May 2012

37 7 X5
from the Accused's farm in Gbarnga,l0947 or from White Flower in Monrovia.m944 Evidence
indicates that Tamba,l0949 Marzahmm and Weahl095 I were employed as the Accused's
security personnel. These persons would travel by road during l998,l0452 and from mid-
1999, when insurgents began attacks on Lofa County, ammunition was flown to Foya via
helicopter and taken to Buedu by road.lO953 Sometimes the intermediaries would take the
supplies as far as Foya and Bockarie would send vehicles to collect them. IOQS4
4944. Four Prosecution witnesses (Joseph Marzah, TFl-579, Varmuyan Sherif and Abu
Keita) testified to being directly involved in transporting military equipment from Liberia to
the RUF/AFRC in Buedu. Sherif and Marzah stated that they took direct instructions from
Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21489-21492 (Sunlight would inform Bockarie that Yeaten
would dispatch Jungle, Zigzag Marzah or Liberian Mosquito with materials to Sierra Leone); TF1-567,
Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903 (encountering Bockarie, Jungle, Zigzag Marzah, Junior Vandi and others
unloading ammunition); TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6952-6953 (testifying that Zigzag Marzah, Jungle
and Dopoe Menkarzon brought arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone shortly after the Intervention in 1998);
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20214 (testifying that he saw Jungle in Buedu up to three
times in 1998); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16140-16142 (the RUF survived on "bits
and pieces" of ammunition which Jungle brought in a pick up truck); TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp.
2379-2380 (CS) (the RUF received materiel delivered by escorts including Zigzag Marzah, Jungle and
Sampson).
I0447 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15661-15662; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November
2008, p. 20215.
I0448 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19839-19842; TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15658;
Transcript 9 September 2008, p. 15794 (CS); Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5875.
40944 The Trial Chamber has previously found that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) worked for the SSS as a
subordinate of Benjamin Yeaten and the Accused throughout the Indictment period. See supra, The Role of
Intermediaries: Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).
10950 The Trial Chamber has previously expressed doubts concerning Joseph Marzah's claim in his testimony
that he was SSS Chief of Operations at the Accused's Executive Mansion. See supra, Credibility Assessment,
Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268. However, it accepts on the evidence of a number of Prosecution witnesses that
Marzah did work for the Accused. TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903 (Bockarie introduced Zigzag
Marzah and others as "the Liberian brothers sent by Charles Taylor"); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2
December 2008, pp. 21489-21492 (Sunlight would inform Bockarie that Yeaten would despatch Jungle, Zigzag
Marzah or Liberian Mosquito with materials to Sierra Leone); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1991
(Keita testified that Marzah and Jungle were sent to Sierra Leone by Benjamin Yeaten).
10951 Evidence indicates that Sampson Weah was a member of the SSS working under the direction of
Benjamin Yeaten. TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6991 ("Sampson Weah was a brother to Benjamin D
Yeaten, but he was assigned to him as well"); TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12535 ("The cars were
driven by Jungle and Sampson Weah. They were both from the SSS"); TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008,
p, 19831 ("Sampson Weah was a brother to Benjamin Yeaten and he was also an SSS personnel").
40452 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15660; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6955; Jabaty
Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13385.
mm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6955-6958; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3118-
3119.
40454 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3119; Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 14 January 2008, pp.
1142-1144 (Sheri? s account of meeting Bockarie at Foya and moving to Buedu together); TF1-516, Transcript 8
April 2008, p. 6956 (Foya was a strategic point wherein to coordinate meetings with those who were sent from
Monrovia and those to be taken to Monrovia from Sierra Leone).

---- End of Page 1693 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J 18 May 2012 ‘

the Accused when they transported those supplies to the RUF.10955 TF1-579 did not directly
state that he believed the Accused to be involved in or sanctioned the delivery of supplies to
Buedu in 1998. However, he noted that secrecy measures were required on the trips "to
prevent people from knowing that Mr Taylor was involved with the RUF movement".1O956
He also testified that the G4 Commander at the arms and ammunitions warehouse next to the
Accused's house was aware that supplies of ammunition listed by Benjamin Yeaten were
being issued to the witness, Zigzag, Sampson and Jungle}0957 TF1-579 stated that the
intermediaries delivering supplies had no difficulty getting through the border checkpoints,
even though AFL soldiers were stationed there.10958 Keita stated that the Accused sent him
to Buedu but that Yeaten provided him one AK-47, a pistol, ten boxes of ammunition, and
three former NPFLH)959 Liberian bodyguards armed with rifles to take with him.10960
4945. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that the testimonies of Marzah and TFl-579
must be considered with caution.10961 Further, the Defence contended that with regard to
several trips TF1-579 allegedly participated in from Monrovia to Buedu, in which material
was delivered to Bockarie, the witness's accounts were inconsistent regarding the dates of
these shipments, the materiel included in them, and the number of vehicles participating in
these shipments.10962 When confronted with the inconsistencies regarding the dates of these
shipments, the witness explained that he remembered it was during the rainy season and that
10955 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5876-5877 (Marzah stated that he undertook these trips "on
the direct instructions of Charles Taylor" and that "...it was a government that had a constitution that governed
the country led by him, Charles Taylor. So, anything we did was by his orders".); Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9
January 2008, pp. 851-852 ("[Taylor] called me back and instructed me that whatever arms and ammunition that
I am bringing to Monrovia I shouldn't bring them to Monrovia again. I should take them and turn everything
over to Sam Bockarie that I had").
10956 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 21122, 19834-19835 (TF1-579 explained that he would not
wear his uniform on trips to Sierra Leone "to prevent people from knowing that Mr Taylor was involved with the
RUF movement").
'°"" r1=1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19837-19839.
10958 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19835. See also Arms and Ammunition: Preliminary Issues,
Closure of Border/Arms Embargo. p
‘°"" Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1982.
’"""’ Abu Kena, rranaenpr 23 January 2008, pp. 1982-1984.
10061 Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268; Credibility Assessment, TF1-579, paras 339-345.
10962 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1464-1468; TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19831, 19837-
19846; Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21081, 21083-21087; Transcript 26 November 2008, pp. 21184-
21197 (PS).

---- End of Page 1694 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T _T{Q 18 MKY 2012

these events occurred "during action time and we are human beings. lt is possible anybody
can make mistakes over years". IOW
4946. However, thirteen other Prosecution witnesses corroborate the account of TFl-579
and Marzah that the Accused was the source of the materiel supplied by inter alia Daniel
Tamba, Joseph Marzah and Sampson Weah.m9°4 The Defence submits that these witnesses
tended to conflate the fact that materiel came across the border from Liberia with the
assumption that such materials were necessarily provided by or on behalf of the
Accused.]0965 The Defence also contends that the witnesses who testified that the Accused
was the source of such shipments only through hearsay camrot be relied upon as
corroborative evidence. 10966
4947. The Trial Chamber finds the first contention of the Defence unconvincing. The Trial
Chamber notes that two of the Prosecution witnesses appeared to rely for their belief that the
Accused was the source of materiel supplies on a general belief of indeterminate source.
However, these witnesses are supported by the majority of witnesses, who provided a
concrete foundation for their belief Of these witnesses, seven testified that they were
*0*3 rrr-579, Transcript 25 Neverrrber 2008, pp. 21085-21087.
[0964 TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903 (Bockarie introduced Zigzag Marzah and others as "the Liberian
brothers sent by Charles Taylor"); Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12966 (when Jungle and others came with this
arnrnunition "they used to say that it was the Pa, Charles Taylor, who sent the ammunition, he said because when
it is time for peace he should prepare for war"); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21479
(Bockarie, through his radio operators, would contact Benjamin Yeaten or Taylor to request military supplies);
TFl-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7001-7002 (when instructions concerning ammunition came from Base 1,
the witness deduced the fact that it came from Benjamin Yeaten and when those instructions came from call sign
020 he deduced that it was coming from Taylor); Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1374 (Dennis
Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1374 (Koker was told by his men that the arms came from "Charles
Taylor's men"); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 31 17-31 18 ("when this ammunition would come
we would get information from Sam Bockarie that he had brought ammunitions from Mr Charles Taylor");
Y
Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16428-16431; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p.
13387 (the Liberian men bringing arms "also used to express most of their relationships with Charles Taylor's
government in Liberia when they come"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5744-5745; Albert
Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11027-11029 (whenever Jungle came to the RUF tenitory, there was a
general understanding amongst the RUF that he brought "materials", arms, arnrnunitions, food and drugs to the
RUF fighters which they used to fight and that those "materials" were sent by Charles Taylor); TFl-362,
Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4909 (In response to the question of whether Bockarie told her about the source
of supplies, the witness stated: "He was not specific. He said he can collect - he used to collect arms and
ammunition from Charles Taylor"); Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18041- 1 8042 (three soldiers
with red hats delivered arms at pass out parade, and his friend informed him that the men with red hats were
Taylor's soldiers); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8504-8506, 8509; Varmuyan Sherif,
Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 851-852 (Sherif was shown where these arms were hidden by the former fighters.
Sherif saw about four pickup-truckloads of arms and ammunition in good condition. Sherif took three of these
truckloads back to Monrovia before Taylor informed him that he should supply the last load directly to
Bockarie).
IOW Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1080.

---- End of Page 1695 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ 18 May 2012

explicitly told that the materiel was supplied from the Accused, either from the
intermediaries who delivered those supplies or from Bockarie himselfll)967 Other witnesses
testified that the intermediaries who delivered the supplies were the Accused's
subordinates. *0968
4948. In relation to the second Defence contention, the Trial Chamber recognises that an
important part of the Prosecution's evidence as to the Accused's involvement is hearsay.
However, it notes that the hearsay evidence of Prosecution witnesses is corroborated by
other evidence from the remaining Prosecution witnesses which also points to the Accused
as the source of the supplies. The Trial Chamber places particular weight on TF 1—516's
evidence that he was privy to radio conversations in which instructions were given from the
radio station at the Executive Mansion for the delivery of materiel.lO%9 Further, Fornie
testified that he was told Yeaten sought instructions from the Accused in relation to
Bockarie's request for arms and ammunitions.lO97O
4949. The conclusion that materiel assistance was provided by the Accused is also
bolstered by contemporary documentary evidence in the form of Exhibit P—067 and P—066.
There is no indication in P-067 as to how its authors knew that the Accused was sending
109% Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 1147.
mm TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12906 ("Jung1e and others were saying that it was the Papay, Charles
Taylor, who used to give the arms and ammunition"); Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1374 (Koker
was told by his men that the arms came from "Char1es Taylor's men"); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February J
2008, p. 3118 ("when this ammunition would come we would get information from Sam Bockarie that he had
brought ammunitions from Mr Charles Taylor"); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16429
("And always when Jungle came he said he came from Charles Taylor from the mansion and when Mosquito
sent him he would send him to Charles Taylor"); Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13387 ("ln addition
to that, they also used to express most of their relationships with Charles Taylor's government in Liberia when
they come"), pp. 13391-13392 (ln late 1998, Bockarie stated that he had called to "the Papay in Liberia" and that
he expected men to arrive shortly with arms and ammunition); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5745
("l sent to Buedu for them to send me some ammunition and Mosquito told me to exercise some patience [...]
and he told me that Colonel Jungle had gone to Liberia, to Mr Taylor, to get some ammunition, [...] indeed when
they brought the ammunition, he sent some ammunition for me in Kono"; TF 1-362, Transcript 27 February
2008, p. 4909 (In response to the question of whether Bockarie told her about the source of supplies, the witness
stated: "He was not specific. He said he can collect - he used to collect arms and ammunition from Charles
t Taylor"). The Trial Chamber has not relied on the evidence of Augustine Mallah that Jungle had attributed the
source of materiel to the Accused as Mallah later stated that he was not sure of seeing Jungle on that occasion:
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20433; Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20215.
10968 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12523-12528 (TF1-375 testified that about three weeks after they
retreated from Koidu Town, up to eight Liberians brought arms and ammunition to Superman. TF 1-375 testified
that one of the Liberians was an SSS officer named "Osebo Demy", whom he came to know subsequently in
Liberia as one of Yeaten's subordinates in the SSS).
ww TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7001 ("So instructions coming from Base 1 - instruction coming from
Base 1 - we deduce the fact that it came from Benjamin D. Yeaten and instruction from call sign 020 we deduce
the fact that it was coming from the President").

---- End of Page 1696 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / du 18 May 2012

377%
supplies to the RUF. However, the Trial Chamber notes that the Black Guards were
intelligence officers who had access to senior commanders. The Trial Chamber is satisfied
that Exhibit P—067 is a credible source to support the allegation that the Accused was
sending supplies to the RUF. Exhibit P—066 suggests that prior to June 1998 the RUF had
been receiving, albeit in a relatively small quantity, materiel from the Accused. The Defence
has relied on this document in substantiating its submissions concerning the RUF's shortage
ofmateriel during this time.11)971
4950. The Defence suggests that Prosecution witnesses have been induced, by staff of the
Office of the Prosecutor, to link the Accused with arms shipments, citing specifically TF1—
585 and Edna Bangura as examples.11)972 The Trial Chamber has not relied on the evidence
of Edna Bangura in determining whether arms shipments to Sierra Leone have been linked
to the Accused. 10973 ln relation to the evidence of TF1—585, the Defence submits that because
TF1—585 had testified that a former RUF operator had spoken to her in Sierra Leone about
the Special Court for Sierra Leone seeking witnesses to testify regarding "the things that
went on between Liberia and Sierra Leone", "the arms and ammunition that were brought
over" and "Taylor's involvement in the Sierra Leone war", she had been encouraged to give
testimony concerning arms and ammunition originating from the Accused. 111974
4951. The Trial Chamber considers that the fact that the witness was told, in general terms,
that the Court was seeking witnesses to give evidence on issues relevant to the trial of the
Accused, does not undermine her general credibility, and is not outside the ordinary process
of evidence gathering by the parties. The Trial Chamber considers TF1—585 to be a credible
and reliable witness in relation to Daniel Tamba's visits, given her contact with, and the
information she was provided by, Tamba's driver Alpha Jalloh.111975
4952. Tuming to the Defence submission that in supplying arms and ammunitions to
Bockarie during 1998 the individuals involved were operating a private enterprise
independent of the Accused,11)976 the Trial Chamber has previously discussed its concerns
10970 Dauda Aruna Forrrie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21527, 2l489—2l492.
*097* Defence Final Trial Brief, footnote 2181, p. 272.
*0972 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1142.
10973 TFl—3 14, Transcript 20 October 2008, pp. l8754—l8755.
10974 TFl—585, Transcript 10 September 2008, pp. 15940-1594l.
111975 TFl—585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp, 15791-15792 (PS).
10976 Defence F irial Trial Brief para. 1091.

---- End of Page 1697 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /( 3-Q 18 May 2012

re ardin the eneral credibilit of DCT—008 and the roblematic nature of his evidence
E E g Y P
concerning a "secret" arrangement between Yeaten and Bockarie for Yeaten to sell materiel
to Bockarie.10977
4953. The Trial Chamber has considered the Defence theory that Yeaten was acting
independently of the Accused in a private enterprise. The Trial Chamber considers that this
theory is difficult to accept in light of Defence evidence concerning the ability of Yeaten to
obtain supplies without the Accused's knowledge. The Trial Chamber recalls Yanks
Smythe's testimony that at the arms and ammunitions warehouse next to White Flower, it
was not possible for the Director of the SSS to obtain any significant amount of supplies
without the approval of the President, and it was staffed 24 hours a day by sss
ersonnel.10978 While Vincent testified that the SSS had another small warehouse at the
P
Executive Mansion which could be accessed without Presidential approval,1O979 a number of
the Prosecution witnesses testified specifically that the arms and ammunitions delivered to
Buedu originated from the warehouse next to or near White Flower.1098O The Accused also
testified that formal requests had to be made by SSS persomiel for arms and ammunition and
strict records were kept of arms and ammunition rounds assigned, making the clandestine
removal of materiel difficult.10981 The Accused's insistence that he did not have access to the
warehouse at White Flower, which was under Benjamin Yeaten's command, lacks
credibility given his evidence that the warehouse was located next door to his residence and
that the arms kept there were for the purpose of the President's own security, 10982
4954. The Trial Chamber further considers the Defence contention that the individuals
transporting arms were involved in a private enterprise which they wished to keep secret
incompatible with the consistent evidence by Prosecution witnesses that it was open
knowledge amongst the Sierra Leonean rebels that these individuals were bringing arms and
ammunitions on behalf of the Accused.10983 That persons such as Tamba would openly
10977 Credibility Assessment, DCT-008, paras 373-380.
'°°7* Yanks snayrnp, rranssnpr 24 rpbnrary 2010, pp. 35933—35934.
10cm Yanks Smythe, Transcript 24 February 2010, pp. 35936-35938.
1119811 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15658; Transcript 9 September 2008, p. 15794 (CS); Joseph
Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5875; TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19837-19839.
10Q81 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, pp. 28007-28009.
10982 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 31 August 2009, p. 28009.
111983 See Arms and Ammunitions: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused. But see Augustine Mallah,
Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20450 ("It was not something that all the RUF needed to know about, that
Zigzag Marzah was bringing ammunition, because enemies sometimes might capture any RUF fighter on the

---- End of Page 1698 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

implicate the Accused as the source of supplies is not consistent with the notion that they
wished their activities to be kept hidden from the Accused. While the evidence does disclose
indications of secrecy measures surrounding the delivery of arms and ammunitions to the
RUF by inter alia Daniel Tamba, Joseph Marzah and Sampson Weah,l0984 it also suggests
that such measures were intended to mask the Accused's involvement from civilians rather
than to hide the transactions from the Accused.
4955. The Trial Chamber also recalls its earlier finding that Issa Sesay's evidence on
matters beyond the basic facts and sequence of events in the Sierra Leonean civil war must
generally be considered with caution.lO985 Despite his claim that he was a close fiiend of
Tamba's, his evidence that during this period Jungle did not bring materiel from Liberia is
contradicted even by one of the Defence witnesses, John Vincent, who states that he was
aware that Tamba was making regular trips between Buedu and Liberia to transport
ammunition in l998.l0986 In light of the overwhelming evidence by Prosecution witnesses,
the Trial Chamber finds that Sesay's denial that Daniel Tamba, Marzah and Sampson were
not bringing materiel supplies to the RUF from the Accused is not credible.
4956. The Defence also refers to the lack of a "general picture of arms and ammunitions
shipments going from or through Liberia to Sierra Leone at this time" from any of the
witnesses, suggesting that the transportation of arms across borders was conducted in a
"rather haphazard manner" rather than an "organised, presidentially-directed one".lO987 The
Defence cites in particular the fact that Marzah did not know Sherif to be involved in the
transportation of arms and ammunition to the RUF, despite the fact that both witnesses were
senior figures in the SSS}0988 The Trial Chamber does not consider the lack of co-operation
amongst the intermediaries engaged in supply to be dispositive of the Accused's non-
involvement or non-awareness.
front line and they would want to know where you are getting your ammunition from or from whom, so the high
command did not actually expose some of those things to fighters that n1uch").
10984 For example, TFl-567 noted that Bockarie advised the Liberians to avoid civilians becoming aware of their
presence: TFl-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. l2903. TFl-579 also stated that the intermediaries did not wear
their SSS uniforms on trips to Sierra Leone, in order "to prevent people from knowing that Mr Taylor was
involved with the RUF movement": TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 2l l22, 19834-l9835. This was
also a practice shared by Varmuyan Sherif: Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 856; see also
Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. l l43.
10985 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
‘°"*6 John Vincent, Transcript 26 Match 20 l0 pp. 38 l09-38l l2.
*09*7 Defence Final Trial Brief; paras 1 l36-l l37.
10988 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. l 136.

---- End of Page 1699 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T du l8 May 20l2

37792
4957. Finally, the Trial Chamber notes that Bobson Sesay's evidence that the Accused
confirmed at a meeting with AF RC leaders in August 1999 that he had supplied food, arms
and ammunitions to the Sierra Leonean rebel troopsmggg also corroborates the various
witnesses who testified that they were told the supplies came from the Accused. The Trial
Chamber notes that on cross-examination Bobson Sesay was questioned about why it was
only in 2007 that he first mentioned to the Prosecution the Accused's comments about
providing logistical support, although in various interviews from 2003 he had been asked
about support provided by the Accused to the RUF /AF RC. The witness explained that it was
not until 2007 that investigators asked him to provide further detail on his knowledge of the
provision of anns and ammunition.lO990 He also noted that for a long time he was afraid of
repercussions from the Accused, and did not volunteer answers unless he was specifically
asked about them.l099l Recalling that Bobson Sesay is a generally credible witness,lO992 the
Trial Chamber considers this a plausible explanation of the omission.
4958. On the strength of the Prosecution case, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that supplies
of arms and ammunitions were sent to the RUF /AF RC in Buedu between February 1998 and
December 1999 by the Accused, through, inter alia, Daniel Tamba, Sampson Weah and
Joseph Marzah.
Quantity of materiel supplied
4959. The Trial Chamber has heard conflicting evidence from Prosecution witnesses in
relation to the quantity of ammunitions or anns supplied. A number of witnesses claimed
that the amount of supplies delivered by the intermediaries was significant, amounting to,
for example, "ten-tyred" military trucks full of anns and anununition}0993 Such evidence is
supported by Exhibit P-067, which recorded that the quantity of ammunition given to the
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8506
IOW) Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8597-8598.
IOW Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp, 8597, 8599.
Wm Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285-289.
IOM Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, pp. 1288-1289; TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12906; TF1-
516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6955.

---- End of Page 1700 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J dig 18 May 2012

"I~Iigh-Command" by the "President" was "huge".10994Other witnesses testified that the
deliveries were not large and generally brought in pick up trucks. 10999
4960. The Trial Chamber heard consistent evidence that the RUF was short of ammunition
after the ECOMOG Intervention through 1998 until the December 1998 shipment. In
addition to TF1-37l's testimony,10990 TF1-579 testified that the RUF had its own weapons
but was short of ammunition.10997 Isaac Mongor stated that while in Kono in 1998, the RUF
had no ammunition.10999 Karmoh Kanneh recalls discussing in the context of one of the
meetings at Waterworks during 1998 the shortage of ammunition in his own area.10999
Defence witness John Vincent testified that before the Waterworks meeting, the RUF was
out of ammunition.11000 Mohamed Kabbah also testified that Tamba "never used to bring
enough amrnunition".11001 There is also evidence from TF1-375 that when Superman and
SAJ Musa refused to hand over the ammunition captured from Kabala to Bockarie, Bockarie
told them that he was in need of ammunition and sent someone to recover it.11002 Exhibit P-
066 indicates that the RUF were short of ammunition by June 1998 to repel ECOMOG
attacks and that the Accused was not sending supplies of a sufficient quantity to enable the
RUF to defend strategic positions.11009
4961. The Trial Chamber considers that the weight of the evidence indicates that large
amounts of materiel were not delivered to the RUF/AFRC during 1998 and 1999 by, inter
10999 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN. 9674-9675.
*0995 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2670 (CS); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp.
16422-16424; TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19830-19834; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January
2008, p. 855; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20215-20216; Transcript 17 November
2008, pp. 20424-20425. ‘
10990 TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2670-2671 (CS).
10997 TF1-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21138-21141.
10990 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5744-5745.
10909 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9416; see also Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council — First
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone", 12 August 1998, ERN.
12388: "Reported shortages of food and ammunition among the rebels have increased the risk that they could
attack ECOMOG convoys and isolated settlements in order to resupply themselves. ..."; Samuel Kargbo,
Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10515: Kargbo testified that after the ECOMOG Intervention, the AFRC and RUF
had to abandon the heavy artillery and weapons in Freetown and there was no way for the AFRC to replace the
arms that were lost.
11000 John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38418-38419.
11001 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16141.
"°°2 Tri-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12567-12569.
11009 Exhibit P-066, "Confidential — RUF Brigade Headquarter — Buedu, information and Request’, Report from
Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, 24 June 1998", ERN. 7833.

---- End of Page 1701 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03-01-T / (114 18 May 2012

alia, Tamba, Marzah and Weah.H0O4 The Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of witness
TF1—371 that between the three large shipments he recalled in October 1997 (the Magburaka
Shipment), November/December 1998 (the Burkina Faso shipment) and in March 1999,
su lies of materiel obtained b the RUF were not lar e.HOO5 The Trial Chamber considers
PP Y 8
that the Accused's evidence that during this period Liberia also faced a shortage of arms] 1006
is not inconsistent with the evidence of the majority of the witnesses that arms and
ammunitions delivered from Liberia by, inter alia, Tamba, Marzah and Weah were few.
4962. The Defence also questioned whether these alleged intermediaries transported arms
and ammunition or merely ammunition.] mm The Trial Chamber notes that Mohamed
Kabbah repeatedly affirmed that the supplies which the RUF received from Liberia in this
period comprised ammunition and not arms, he testified that the RUF had sufficient arms in
1998 and 1999.11008 TF1-579 also stated that as far as he was aware, only ammunition was
carried on these trips, not arms.] 1009
4963. However, the Trial Chamber considers that Kabbah, a radio operator, was unlikely to
have a comprehensive overview of what was brought into Sierra Leone from Liberia. Other
witnesses in a better position to be aware of supplies received, including RUF commander
Dennis Koker and stores operator J abaty J award, testified to arms also being delivered by
Tamba, Sampson and Marzah.HOlO Further, according to Joseph Marzah, when he made
transported materiel supplies to Sierra Leone, he carried both arms and ammunitions.] 1011
4964. The weight of the evidence suggests that the military equipment delivered by, inter
alia, Tamba, Weah and Marzah consisted of both arms and ammunition.
Findings
H004 For example, TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15663, 15778-15782; Transcript 9 September
2008, pp. 15778-15782 (testifying that five trucks came from Monrovia to Buedu in late 1999).
"°°5 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2700 (cs).
11006 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26191-26192; Transcript 17 August 2009, pp.
26901-26903.
11007 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1101.
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16417-16418.
H009 TF1-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, p. 21142; TFl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6949, 6965
(testifying that radio requests for materiel were only for ammunitions, not arms).
Hm See for example, TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15652; Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January
2008, pp. 1284-1286; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13392.
""" Jnnapn Manaan, Transcript 12 March 2008,p. 5875.

---- End of Page 1702 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

36} $95
4965. The Trial Chamber finds that Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
supplies of arms and ammunition were sent to the RUF/AFRC in Buedu between February
1998 and December 1999 by the Accused, through, inter alia, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle),
Sampson Weah and Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah. However, there is insufficient evidence
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that, except for the Burkina Faso shipment of
November/December 1998, the amounts of materiel provided by the Accused in 1998 and
1999 through, inter alia, Daniel Tamba, Sampson Weah and Joseph Marzah were large.
(ii) Alleged trips by Bockarie to Liberia in 1998
Submissions of the Parties
4966. The Prosecution contends that Bockarie made regular trips to Liberia in 1998,1 11112 as
a result of which, Bockarie received substantial amounts of arms, ammunition and other
assistance from the Accused which were then distributed to front-line commanders.111113 The
Prosecution submits that in retum for this materiel, Bockarie delivered diamonds to the
Accused. 1 1014
4967. The Prosecution concedes that the evidentiary record conceming how many such
trips were allegedly made in 1998 and on which dates is imprecise, and attributes this to the
recollection of witnesses some ten years on, explaining that "[d]etails regarding the exact
number and specific timing of these trips may have been impacted by the passing of
time".11015 The Prosecution nonetheless submits that "there can be no reasonable doubt that
these multiple trips occurred".111116 In support of its allegations, the Prosecution adduced
evidence from witnesses Dauda Aruna Fornie, Karmoh Kanneh, TF1-585, Albert Saidu,
Alice Pyne, Jabaty J award, Augustine Mallah, TF1-371, Mohamed Kabbah, Samuel Kargbo,
Perry Kamara, TF1-516 and TF1-367.
111112 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 238-242.
111113 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 238-242.
111114 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 242.
11015 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 242.
111116 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 242.

---- End of Page 1703 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-O3-Ol-T 1703 Ozb 18 May 2012

4968. The Defence submissions in relation to this allegation centre on the primarily hearsay
nature of the evidence and the reliability of the witnesses.111117 The Defence also adduced
evidence from the Accused and Issa Sesay.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
4969. Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that in the period before the Freetown attack of 6
January 1999, he made six trips to Monrovia.1111111 This section sets out below his evidence as
to the three trips prior to the Burkina Faso shipment which, according to Fornie, resulted in
Bockarie or other members of the RUF returning with a consignment of arms and
ammunitions back to Sierra Leone.111119
4970. Fornie testified that his first trip to Monrovia took place shortly alter the
Intervention. Fornie was based in Kenema in the final two months of the Junta period,
assi ed to Bockarie as a radio o erator. He testified that RUF forces remained in Kenema
sn P
"keeping the defensive" for roughly a week alter the Intervention before retreating to
Buedu.1111211 While at Pendembu during the retreat, Bockarie instructed him to contact "the
other side", which the witness understood to refer to Liberia, and to inform "Papay Musa
and Benjamin" that the situation in Sierra Leone was out of control and that the RUF needed
ammunition to stop the ECOMOG advance.11021
4971. Upon Bockarie's instructions, Fornie contacted a radio station in Monrovia known as
"Base 1"111122 and passed Bockarie's message to Sunlight, Yeaten's radio operator.111123 The
next day, before the RUF fighters arrived at Buedu,1111211 Sunlight contacted Fornie with a
111117 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1105.
1111111 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21513.
111119 Although Fomie testified that he made six trips to Monrovia, he accounts for only five of those trips. Three
of these trips are set out below. One of the five trips relates to the Burkina Faso Shipment, which is dealt with in
that section: See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso
Shipment.Another trip in mid—1998 did not involve the collection of arms and ammunitions. See Dauda Aruna
Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21516, 21519.
1111211 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21436-21440, 21445.
111121 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21441-21442.
111122 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21441-21442.
111123 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21442.
111121 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21444.

---- End of Page 1704 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01~T J O1) 18 May 2012

message fiom Yeaten that Bockarie was to travel to Monrovia on the orders of Taylor.llO25
Fornie testified that the day after arriving at Buedu,llO26 Bockarie departed for Monrovia,
accompanied by a group of ten to fifteen people, including the witness.llO27
4972. According to Fornie, Bockarie and his group were met in Voinjama by Jungle, who
travelled onward with them to Gbarnga. Between Gbarnga and Kakata, the group also met
Yeaten, whom Jungle identified to the witness as Taylor's SS director.llO28 Upon arrival in
Monrovia, the witness was taken to Yeaten's residence in Congo Town.llO29
4973. Fornie testified that the following morning Bockarie told him that he was going to
meet with Taylor.llO3O After Bockarie returned, the group left Monrovia that same evening.
On the highway on the outskirts of Monrovia going towards Kakata the group met Jungle
and Bockarie's bodyguards with a small "Benz" truck loaded with ammunition, including
"AK rounds...grenades, GPMG, RPG, G3 rounds, [and] RPG rockets".llO3l Prom there the
group returned to Buedu along with the loaded truck.llO32
4974. Fornie stated that during the course of the return trip, Bockarie remarked that Taylor
had told him that while Taylor did not have much ammunition, he was ready to support the
RUF "to the best of his abi1rity".llO33 Upon their return to Buedu, the bulk of the ammunition
was distributed to the "various front 1ines" within Kailahun and Kono Districts. According
to the witness, "that was the ammunition we used to stop the ECOMOG advance into our
temtoryavl l 1034
4975. Fornie testified that his second trip to Monrovia occurred around mid—1998.llO35 He
stated that upon arrival in Monrovia, he remained in the radio room with Sunlight at
Yeaten's house while Bockarie, Yeaten and Rashid went to meet with Taylor.llO36 In the
H025 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21442-21443.
*1026 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21444-21445.
**02* Dauda Ampe rcrrrre, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21445—21446.
Hm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21447.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21449—21450.
H030 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21451.
NO3 I Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21454.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21452-21454.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21454—21455.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21455-21456.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21519.
H036 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21520-21521.

---- End of Page 1705 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL 18 May 2012

evening Bockarie and Yeaten returned with two vehicles loaded with ammunition and the
ou travelled back to Buedu. The witness did not know "where the exactl .loaded those
EY P Y Y
ammunitions in the vehicle". Having said that, the witness confirmed that there were two
vehicles loaded with ammunition. 11037
4976. On the third occasion, also in mid-1998, Fomie travelled to Monrovia in a Hilux van
with Victor, Jungle and "Yellow Man". Bockarie did not come on this trip on account of a
meeting he convened with commanders from his various front lines.111138 Fomie was
included on this trip for the purpose of communicating with Bockarie if the need arose.11034
Fomie testified that his group went to White Flower where Yeaten and other Liberian men
loaded ammunition, including "AK rounds" and RPG rockets, into the van.110411
4977. The witness explained that Bockarie instructed him to go on these trips since he was
familiar with the Liberian cornrnunications network11041 and Fomie knew the purpose of
Bockarie's visits because Bockarie told his radio operators. 1 1042
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
4978. Karmoh Kanneh, a senior RUF Commander,11043 testified that in 1998 "some
months" before the death of Sani Abacha,111444 Bockarie contacted him from Buedu and
instructed Kanneh to assist in collecting some ammunition which "Pa Taylor" was sending
to Foya for the RUF.11045 Kanneh met with Bockarie and they travelled to Foya in three
jeeps along with several of Bockarie's securities and his radio man Elevation.111146 Kanneh
11037 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21521.
11038 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21523-21524; Transcript 3 December 2008, pp.
21535-21537.
11034 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21538.
110411 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21535-21537.
11041 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21513-21514. Fornie testified that in late 1991, he
was assigned to join the NPFL Signal Unit training in Bomi Hills. Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December
2008, pp. 21335-21338.
11042 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21515.
111143 Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9390-9391.
111144 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9452-9463. Sani Abacha died in June 1998, Admitted fact 11.
11045 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9448.
11046 Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9448-9449.

---- End of Page 1706 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

e Cr GZ 77
was selected because he was a commander in the Kailahun area and because he had a
vehicle, a land rover.l IO47
4979. At Foya, a helicopter ariived and five people alighted, unloaded materiel and brought
them into Bockarie's vehicles. Bockarie introduced the witness to a man who Bockarie said
was Taylor's chief bodyguard, named Benjamin Yeaten. The helicopter had flown in fiom
Monrovia.H040 The materiel included 40 boxes of AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets, a
few RPG tubes.H040 In the evening, they left Foya and went to Buedu. At Buedu, the
materials were put in the ammunition dump, by Foya Road, near Sam Bockarie's house.
Kanneh was given some materials for his own use by Bockarie, which Karrneh took to his
base at Baiima.H050
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -585
4980. Witness TF1-585, testified that in early 1998, before Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in
Buedu, Bockarie travelled to Liberia and was promoted by Taylor to the rank of General. On
his retum, Bockarie brought with him, among other things, a tactical jeep and some new
arms. The arms included brand new AK-47s with new AK rounds (which were in something
like sardine tins with rockets). I l05l
4981. TF1-585 testified that while Bockarie travelled to Monrovia "once in a while" in
1998, his trips became more frequent in 1999 (via helicopter from Foya airfield),l 0052 when
Bockarie would travel to Monrovia as diamonds were brought to him from Kono. I Hm
4982. TF1-585 stated that she was told on another occasion by Bockarie that he had gone
to Taylor's farm in Gbamga, where he arranged for material to be transferred to VVhite
Flower. From there it was transferred to Yeaten's house and then escorted overland to
Buedu.ll054
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
11047 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9447-9449.
11000 Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9453-9455.
11040 Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9456-9457.
11050 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9457-9458.
11051 TF1—585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15616-15622; Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15648.
11052 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15683.

---- End of Page 1707 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dvi 18 May 2012

4983. Albert Saidu testified that Bockarie's bod uard Shabado, who was a close friend of
YS
Saidu's, told him of two occasions in the second half of 1998 on which he had travelled to
Liberia with Bockarie.111155 ln 23 April 1998, when Saidu was summoned to meet with
Bockarie and his bodyguards Shabado and Ray in Koindu Town, Bockarie was
communicating on his satellite phone.111156 During Bockarie's conversation on the satellite
hone, Shabado told Saidu that the were headin to Liberia to collect "materials" from
P Y 8
Taylor, which the witness understood to refer to arms and ammunitions.111157 Some time after
Shabado retumed from Liberia, "not long after" fighting commenced against the Guineans
in June 1998, he informed the witness that he had brought materiel from Taylor.111158 Saidu
had a further conversation with Shabado around a month after Shabado's retum in which
Shabado informed him that he had made another trip to Liberia for the same purpose of
collecting materiel.111159 Shabado would also sometimes inform Saidu that Bockarie "had put
in for some materials and that materials were on their way".1111611
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
4984. Alice Pyne, a radio operator, testified that she travelled to Buedu with Superman and
more than 150 others to attend a meeting convened by Bockarie prior to the Fitti-Fatta
mission.111161 Being a radio operator, Pyne did not attend the meeting of commanders.111162
She testified that following the meeting, she observed Bockarie and his bodyguards
1 departing in vehicles. One of the other radio operators, Sebatu, told her that Bockarie was
departing for Foya.111163 Pyne saw the group retum several hours later, with Colonel Jungle,
and unload goods at Bockarie's house. She was not able to see the items themselves, but
11053 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15683-15684.
**555 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15661-15662.
***555 Albert samp, Transcript 4 June 2008. pp. 11020-11022.
11056 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11038-11041.
****55 Albert sertiu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11008-11016.
****55 Albert sertiu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 11021.
11059 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11021-11023.
****55 Albert sertiu, rrrrrreerrpt 4 Jprre 2008, pp. 11020. I
11061 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12191-12193, 12209-12211; Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12233;
Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12356-12357.
**555 Alice Pyrre, Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12357.
110113 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12235-12236.

---- End of Page 1708 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /6 6% 18 May 2012

later they gave Superman arms, ammunition and alcoholic drinks known as "morale
boosters" which they said they had brought from Foya.111164
Prosecution Witness Jabaty J award
4985. J award testified that during the time he was in Buedu, from early March 1998 until
December 1999, he recalled an occasion in mid-1998 on which Bockarie travelled to
Liberia. On Bockarie's return, Bockarie explained to the witness that he had met Taylor in
Liberia. Shortly afterwards, the RUF received a large supply of arms, ammunitions, food,
fuel and gasoline in Buedu.111165 J award told the Trial Chamber that "whenever Sam
Bockarie went to Monrovia we would expect those supplies from Charles Taylor".111166
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
4986. Augustine Mallah was assigned as an RUP Hghter to Baiima from around June to
_ December 1998, but he travelled regularly to Buedu.111167 He testified that during 1998,
Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and Gbamga.111168 On one occasion Mallah accompanied him
to Poya in a vehicle, from where Bockarie was picked up by helicopter and transported to
Monrovia.111169 Bockarie told him that the purpose of these trips was to secure supplies,
includin arms, ammunition and medicines, from Taylor.1111711
S Y
4987. While Bockarie did not directly tell Mallah whether any payment was made for the
supplies obtained on these trips, Bockarie's bodyguards told Mallah that on occasion they
would travel with diamonds that had been mined in Kono.111171 The bodyguards told Mallah
that typically they would return from Monrovia with ammunition or US dollars.111172
Prosecution Witness TF1 -371
11064 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12236-12237.
111165 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13412-13415.
**666 Jrrbrrry Jaward, Transcript 10 Jury 2008, p. 13415.
111167 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20208-20209; Transcript 17 November 2008,
pp. 20421-20423.
1111611 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20209.
111169 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20209.
1111711 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20210-20211.
111171 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20210.
111172 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20210, 20218.

---- End of Page 1709 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 616 18 May 2012

4988. Witness TF1-371, who was in Buedu between March 1998 and April 1999,IIO73
testified that Bockarie made "a series of trips" to Monrovia throughout "the latter part of
1998",I IOM "after June, July, August",I IO75 "fiom 1998 ending to early 1999".I IO76 While he
specifically recalled three trips that were essential, there were other trips, the precise number
of which he could not recal1.I III77
4989. TF 1-371 stated that on these trips Bockarie would take diamonds that had been
brought by RUF fighters to Buedu from Kono and Tongo Field, where mining had
intensified. Bockarie would return with materials including AK rounds, RPG bombs and
hand grenades.IIO78 On returning to Buedu, Bockarie was always escorted by members of
Taylor's SSS. In particular, TF 1-371 recalled one occasion towards the end of 1998 on
which Bockarie was escorted by Dopoe Menkarzon.IIO79 TF 1-371 knew about these visits
since each time Bockarie returned from Monrovia, he would brief his close associates in
Buedu on the visit. I IOSO
4990. The first trip that Bockarie took to Monrovia occurred at some point after an incident
in which Sesay stripped Johnny Paul Koroma of nine plastic bags of diamonds at Buedu.I IOSI
Bockarie told the witness that he was going to take the diamonds to Monrovia to Taylor to
get arms and ammunition. Bockarie left for Monrovia, but he later told the witness that he
was unable meet the Accused because of an ECOMOG patrol team in Monrovia.I *082
4991. One or two weeks later, Bockarie carried some 20 to 30 diamond pieces of various
sizes mined from the Kono District and Tongo to Monrovia. Bockarie spent almost a week
in Monrovia. I IIIS3 When Bockarie returned to Buedu, he was accompanied by Zigzag Marzah
and Sampson, two of Taylor's security detail. They brought 15 to 20 boxes of AK—47
‘"’" TF1—371, Transcript 28 rciiruary 2008,p. 2389 (cs).
"O74 TF1—371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2825 (cs).
"°" TF1—371, Transcript 1 February 2008,p. 2826 (cs).
II076 TF1—371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2382 (CS) ("[...] from 1998 ending to early 1999 there were a lot
of activities, people coming into RUF controlled territories and Mosquito Erequenting Monrovia").
"°" TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2382-2383 (cs).
"°" TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2383-2384 (cs).
"°7" TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2384 (cs).
"°*° TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2384 (cs).
IIOSI TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2370 (CS).
"°*" TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2375 (cs).
"°’" TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2375-2377 (cs).

---- End of Page 1710 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / dlk 18 May 2012

ammunition, RPG bombs, condiments (salt and maghi), rice and cigarettes.H084 Bockarie
briefed Issa Sesay when he returned to Buedu and stated that Taylor had instructed Yeaten
to give Bockarie the ammunition.l IOSS
4992. TF1-371 stated that on one occasion when Bockarie returned he was "really very
excited" about having met Taylor and confirmed that "the diamonds that he took from
Johnny Paul Koroma were actually in the possession of Mr Taylor".H08° He called his
commanders to a meeting, where he reported that Taylor had instructed them to retain Kono 1
and intensify the mining operation there "so as to enable to pay for those materials".l 1087
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
4993. Mohamed Kabbah testified that Bockarie travelled regularly to Monrovia in
1998.H088 The witness was not able to estimate how many times such trips occurred. He
informed the Trial Chamber that sometimes Bockarie would go once or twice in a month,
and sometimes he would not go for one or two months.l 1089 According to Kabbah, each time
the RUF was short of arms and ammunition, RUF would contact Monrovia, and either
Bockarie would travel to Monrovia and return with ammunition, food and clothing or Jungle
would arrive with materiel.l mm 8
4994. The witness explained that Bockarie never required travel documents or exemptions
from the travel ban to cross the border into Liberia: "[t]he way was open for him".l ml
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
4995. Samuel Kargbo, an AFRC insider, testified that at some point in March 1998, he
accompanied Issa Sesay, Mike Lamin, CO Lion (a Liberian), an RUF Commander named
"Eddie" and others on a trip to Foya. The group remained in Foya until the evening, visiting
the residence of a Liberian female police commander and also a bar owned by her.HO92 In
Hm TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2378 (CS).
"°" TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2378-2379 (CS).
HO86 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2384-2385 (CS).
HOW TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2385 (CS).
""" Mohamed Kabbah, rrapeerrpr 12 September 2008,p. 16137.
HO89 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16347.
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16138-16139.
HW Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16137, see also p. 16136.
mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10543-10544, 10546; Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10795-

---- End of Page 1711 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // dll; 18 May 2012 \j

cross—examination the witness stated that the ou travelled, "choked" to ether, in one
EY P 8
Land Cruiser, with men hanging from the sides.llO93
4996. On their return, the group stopped along the road to Dawa when they encountered a
white Land Cruiser, loaded with ammunition. The witness saw eight men in the Land
Cruiser, including Bockarie and Jungle and other SSS men.llO94 The group travelled on to
Buedu, where Kargbo assisted in unloading the ammunition from the Land Cruiser. He told
the court that he saw RPG bombs, AK rounds, mortar bombs and G3 roundsl 1095 and that the
quantity of ammunition was sufficient to fill a whole storeroom.l 10% Kargbo testified that he
knew the ammunition came lrom Liberia because Bockarie had said that "Charles Taylor
had sent the vehicles to collect us", and because of the uniforms Jungle and the other SSS
men were wearing.l 1097 According to Kargbo, this was the first consignment that the AFRC
had received after the Intervention. I 1098
4997. Kargbo testified that within one to two weeks after this first incident, around the end
of March 1998, nearing April, he travelled to Foya with Bockarie and others.llO99 Mike
Lamin and Collins accompanied them and the men travelled in two to three vehicles.mO0
They visited the residence of a Liberian female police commander for food and drink.mOl
On their return, they met Jungle with a vehicle at the side of the road in the bush. The
witness was unable to recall whether the vehicle was in Liberia or Sierra Leone.m02 On
Bockarie's instructions, Kargbo and others unloaded "materials" from Jungle's vehicle,
transferred them to their own vehicle and returned to Buedu.mO3 The materials were similar
in type and quantity to those received on the first trip.l I 104
10796.
"°‘" sarnncr Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10794-10795.
mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10544, 10546; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10797.
HO95 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10545-10546.
**0% Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10547; Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10799—10800.
mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10545; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10798.
**098 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10798.
HO99 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10547-10548, 10550. The witness testified in his
examination-in-chief that the group travelled to Dawa, but on cross-examination corrected this to Foya:
Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10805.
mw Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10804-10805.
mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10548; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10805.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10807-10811.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10548-10549.
"""‘ Samuel Kargbc, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10809- 108 10.

---- End of Page 1712 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // QL 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness Pegry Kamara
4998. Perry Kamara testified that the first time the RUF entered Kono after the ECOMOG
Intervention they had a message from Bockarie in Buedu, to Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman)
concerning mining in Koidu Town. The message stated that Taylor had instructed Bockarie
not to lose Kono as the diamonds mined from there were to be given to Taylor in return for
ammunition. After travelling to Monrovia and returning with ammunition, Bockarie
reinforced this message of the importance of holding onto Kono.m05
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
4999. Varmuyan Sherif testified that soon after the helicopter incident in Monrovia,mO6
Taylor instructed him to collect Sam Bockarie from Sierra Leone.m07 On the same day,
Sherif travelled from Monrovia to Sierra Leone.m08 Sherif met with Bockarie in Buedullm
and travelled back with Bockarie to Monrovia.mlO After meeting with Taylor, Bockarie
showed Sherif money in US dollars and a satellite phone which Taylor had given him so that
Bockarie could communicate with Taylor at anytime} 1 1 ll
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
5000. Witness TF1-516 testified to Bockarie returning from a trip to Liberia with a truck
full of ammunition not long before the November-December 1998 operation in Kono.1m2 1
Prosecution Witness TF1-367
5001. Witness TF1-367 testified that he travelled with Bockarie to Monrovia and returned
to Buedu with a truck carrying ammunition which was used for the successful attacks on
Kono and Koidu.l lm
The Accused
Hm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3142.
NW6 Varmuyan Sherif] Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 826-828.
Hm Varmuyan Sherifi Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 829-830.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 830.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif] Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 835-836.
mm Varmuyan Sherif; Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 847.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif] Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 849-850.
""2 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6961.

---- End of Page 1713 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012

5002. The Accused denied the allegation that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia to collect
ammunition.IIII4 The Accused testified that during this period he did not have access to a
supply of` ammunition in Liberia because much of` these military supplies were taken away
during disarmament and destroyed.IIII5 The Accused denied that Bockarie was a regular
visitor to Monrovia, stating that he made three trips between August and December 1998
and came again during the Lomé discussions in 1999, and again in September, November
and December 1999.IIII`l’
5003. In response to Fornie's evidence that in mid-1998, Bockarie and Yeaten went to
Monrovia ttpm Buedu in the morning and returned in the evening with two vehicles loaded
with ammunition, the Accused stated that in mid-1998, during the rainy season, it was not
possible to drive to Monrovia and return to Sierra Leone on the same day. I II I7
5004. The Accused also contested Karmoh Kanneh's account that a military helicopter
carrying supplies and five people, including two pilots, landed at Foya Airfield in broad
daylight. The Accused stated that he had no helicopter at this time and the first helicopter
they got in Liberia in 1999 was an Mi-2 which was not large enough to carry five men and a
cargo of` materiel. I I I Ig
5005. In response to TF1-585's evidence, the Accused denied that he supplied Bockarie
with arms and ammunitions in early 1998 and that arms were ever taken ttpm Gbamga and
White Flower to Buedu. I I I I9
5006. In response to TF1-371's evidence of` a trip taken by Bockarie in early 1998 in which
Bockarie was unable to meet with the Accused due to an ECOMOG patrol, the Accused
""3 TF1—367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 1423]-14235.
IIII4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29l97—29l98 (in response to Fomie's
evidence); 1 October 2009, pp. 30106—30107 (in response to Mallah's evidence); Transcript 26 October 2009,
pp. 30283-30287 (in response to Jaward's evidence); Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29089 (in response to
Kabbah's evidence); Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 3084030842 (in response to Kargbo's evidence).
IIII5 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29197—29198, 29200.
IIII° Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29093—29097.
IIII7 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29229-2923l.
IIII3 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30594—30598.
IIII9 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30168—30172.

---- End of Page 1714 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Z GIS 18 May 2012

stated that ECOMOG patrols had nothing to do with the people that he received and needed
to see, and would not have prevented Bockarie from meeting with the Accused.11121)
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5007. Issa Sesay denied that Bockarie went to Monrovia in the early part of 1998, as
Kanneh and Fornie testified.11121 According to Sesay, Bockarie's first contact with Charles
Taylor was in September 1998. Bockarie received a message in mid-September 1998 from
General Dopoe Menkarzon stating that Bockarie should meet Menkarzon at the border and
Menkarzon would take him to see Charles Taylor. Bockarie spent three or four days in
Liberia before returning to Buedu.11122 Sesay acknowledges that Bockarie made trips to
Monrovia in September, October and November 199811123 but states that only on one of
those trips, the November 1998 trip, did Bockarie return with arms and ammunition, which
were appr Burkina Faso and unconnected to Taylor.11124
Deliberations
5008. The Trial Chamber notes that Augustine Mallah, TF1-371 and Mohamed Kabbah
testified in general terms as to Bockarie making regular trips to Liberia in 1998 and
returnin with materiel. TF1-585, Dauda Aruna Fornie, TFl-371, Karmoh Kanneh Samuel
8
Kargbo, Alice Pyne, Albert Saidu and Jabaty Jaward testified as to specific trips taken by
Bockarie from early 1998 to mid 1998.
5009. The Prosecution cites the testimony of Sherif as to Bockarie's alleged initial visit to
Monrovia in February 1998 to support its allegations that Bockarie obtained arms and
ammunition appr the Accused on his visits to Monrovia.11125 The Prosecution appears to
suggest that this trip is the same as that described by Fornie as taking place shortly afrer the
11 120 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29552-29556.
11121 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44839-44840; Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46069-46070.
" *22 ipsa sappy, Transcript 9 Juiy 2010, pp. 44122-44124.
11123 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44120-44122 (as to the September 1998 trip by Bockarie to
Monrovia); Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44310-44312 (as to the October 1998 trip by Bockarie to Monrovia to
visit Charles Taylor); Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46640 (as to all three trips).
11124 Issa Sesay, Transcript 10 August 2010, p. 45900.
11125 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 243-247, see Vannuyan Sherif] Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 844-848.
Note that Sherif testified that he escorted Bockarie from Koindu to Monrovia to meet the Accused "at the same
time — ending of 1998-1999" when LURD invaded Liberia. However, despite his repeated reference to this time
frame, his evidence of other events happening at the same time suggests that he is in fact talking about early
1998.

---- End of Page 1715 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T %/ dk 18 May 2012

5 42*02
1nteryention.III26 The Trial Chamber notes that in any event, Sherif’ s testimony involved no
factual assertion of supply of military equipment occurring on that visit.III27 The Trial
Chamber does not consider Sherif’ s evidence as to the February 1998 trip assists in
determining the specific question of whether the Accused supplied Bockarie with materiel
on the latter's trips to Liberia during 1998.
5010. The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution has also relied on the evidence of TF1—
516 and TF1—367 as to trips made by Bockarie to Monrovia before the successful attacks in
Kono in November—December 1998. The Trial Chamber considers that the timing and size
of these shipments coincide with and refer to the Burkina Faso shipment, and has considered
such evidence in that context. I I I28
5011. The Defence submits that during Bockarie's trips to Liberia, none of the witnesses
saw the Accused give or promise to give arms or ammunition to Bockarie and that those
witnesses giving hearsay evidence that the Accused provided arms and ammunition to
Bockarie are generally unreliable.III29 The Defence also points to the lack of evidence,
particularly from the Prosecution witnesses closest to the Accused, Moses Blah and
Varmuyan Sherii that during Bockarie's trips to Liberia they saw the Accused give or
promise to give arms or ammunition to Bockarie.I I BO
5012. Regarding the Defence's contention as to the predominance of hearsay evidence, the
Trial Chamber recognises that much of the evidence relied on by the Prosecution to support
its allegation that Bockarie received arms or ammunition from the Accused while in Liberia
is hearsay and circumstantial. This is explicable by the fact that many of the witnesses who
testified were not personally present at meetings between the Accused and Bockarie and
therefore could not have observed their interaction. However, the Trial Chamber considers
that direct evidence that the Accused personally provided Bockarie with arms or ammunition
is not necessary to establish his involvement in the supply of materiel to Bockarie.
III26 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 248.
III27 Sherif testified that after meeting with Taylor, Bockarie only showed Sherif US dollars and a satellite phone
which Taylor had given him so that Bockarie could communicate with Taylor at anytime. Varrnuyan Sherif,
Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 849-850.
III28 See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso
Shipment.
IIIZQ Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 105.
III3° Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 105.

---- End of Page 1716 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GIA 18 May 2012

5013. On the question of credibility, the Trial Chamber has found Mohamed Kabbah, TF1-
585, Dauda Aruna Fornie, Samuel Kargbo, and Alice Pyne to be generally credibleIII3I but
will consider further issues of credibility that arise in this context.
5014. TF1-585's account of the promotion of Bockarie by the Accused, which allegedly
occurred shortly after the ECOMOG Intervention, has been analysed in another section of
the judgement. I I I32 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that it had no general reservations
concerning the evidence of TF1 -585 in relation to that trip. Similarly, the Trial Chamber has
accepted Dauda Aruna Fornie's account of establishing contact with Sierra Leone using
"Base 1", Yeaten's radio station, on his first trip to Monrovia with Bockarie.I I I33
5015. TF1-371 testified that Bockarie made two trips to Monrovia after Johnny Paul
Koroma was stripped of his diamonds. It is not clear from TF1-371's testimony when this
event took place. However, the Trial Chamber has heard consistent evidence from other
witnesses that the incident in which Koroma was stripped of his diamonds took place shortly
after he arrived in Buedu, sometime in February to April 1998,III34 and is satisfied that it
occurred in early 1998.
5016. In response to TF1-371's evidence, the Accused contended that it was unlikely that
an ECOMOG patrol prevented Bockarie from meeting with the Accused in Monrovia as `
they had nothing to do with the people that he received.III35 The Trial Chamber recalls that
TF1 -371 's evidence was hearsay and he was simply reporting what he was told by Bockarie.
ln these circumstances, the failure of TF1-371 to explain the precise detail of what occurred
on the trip does not undermine the general credibility of his account that Bockarie travelled
to Monrovia and brought back a supply of materiel.
IIIBI Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338; Credibility Assessment, TF 1-585, paras 330-
333; Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346-358; Credibility Assessment, Samuel Kargbo,
paras 290-295; Credibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307.
III32 See infra, Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AF RC, Foday Sankoh.
III33 See supra, Operational Support; Communications, RUF and NPF L Radio Codes and Communications.
III34 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44409 (describing the incident as taking place in March 1998);
Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16296-16297 (describing the incident as taking place in
March or April 1998); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3147 (describing the incident as taking
place shortly after Koroma's arrival in Buedu); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20195-
20196 (describing the incident as taking place in February 1998).
III35 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29552-29556.

---- End of Page 1717 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Cy.} 18 May 2012

5017. In relation to Samuel Kargbo's account of his second trip with Bockarie, there were
inconsistencies in Kargbo's evidence as to whether he first saw Jungle in Liberia or in Sierra
Leone.m36 Further, in a prior statement to the Prosecution, Kargbo said that he took one trip
with Mike Lamin to collect ammunition, but did not describe a second trip. Instead, he
referred to an incident in which he had been instructed by Issa Sesay to remain in Buedu
until Bockarie returned with arms and ammunition. Kargbo maintained that he had told the
Prosecution of both tripsllm The Trial Chamber notes that TF1—371, who was aware of
Mike Lamin's movements at the time, testified that Lamin never accompanied Bockarie on
the latter's trips to Liberia in 1998.m38
5018. Turning to Alice Pyne's account, the Trial Chamber is concerned that while she
testified that she saw Bockarie leaving from and returning to Buedu, in prior statements she
had not mentioned her own direct observations of Bockarie's departure and arrival from
Buedu. Pyne said firstly that she understood the goods given to Superman had come from
Liberia on account of radio conversations she had heard and conversations she had with
radio operator Sellay and only later added her presence in Buedu.H H9 She explained that she
had no opportunity to correct any mistakes, although Defence counsel pointed out that
amendments had been made in other parts of her prior statements.m4O The Trial Chamber
notes that when Pyne was presented with a photograph of Bockarie, she was not able to
identify him. Pyne testified that she had seen Bockarie on several occasions but explained
that she was "not that used to him" to be able to recognise him.m4l
5019. In relation to Jaward's evidence, the Trial Chamber obsewes that aspects of his
testimony raised some questions about his role as storekeeper for RUF stores in Buedu.
J award conceded that the role of storekeeper, which was officially known within the RUF as
the "G4" position, was formally assigned to another person at the time: CO Brown, with his
deputy Hassan Kamara.m42 According to Jaward, neither CO Brown norhis deputy was
HUG Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10548-10549; Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10808-10810.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10812-10817.
HBS TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2384 (CS).
Hm Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12318-12322; see also Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12326-12327
(inconsistency as to where Pyne met Jungle).
""‘° Aripp Pyne, rmpsmpt 19 Jump 2008, pp. 12322-12324.
Hm Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12361-12362; see D-051, "Photograph-P-0000641" and same
photo Exhibit P-030, "Photograph-P0001l41"; Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12442-12444.
MM2 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13394.

---- End of Page 1718 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J Ju 18 May 2012

5 Cf! ff
involved with the supplies arriving from Liberia, although the witness did not understand
why.m43 In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes the testimony of TF1—516 that materials
transported overland from Foya to Buedu were given to the G4 connnander.m44 However,
J award explained that there were two stores in Buedu, one attached to Bockarie's house, and
a larger one a few yards away from Bockarie's house which was established later, in
addition to the G4 stores themselves, which were located in Kudorwahun, a village
approximately two miles from Buedu.m45 The Trial Chamber considers that Jaward's
position at the stores attached to or near Bockarie's house in Buedu, rather than the main G4
stores, constitutes a plausible explanation of why Jaward was not aware of the G4
commander receiving materials from Liberia.
5020. The Accused challenged the reliability of Karmoh Kanneh's account on the basis that
he had no helicopter in Liberia in 1998 with which to send military supplies. However, the
Trial Chamber notes, and has addressed elsewhere, the conflicting testimony given by the
Accused as to the date on which the Liberian government acquired its own helicopters.l I 146
The Trial Chamber further notes that Augustine Mallah stated that the Accused sent a
helicopter to transport Bockarie from Foya to Monrovia in 1998.l I 147 In light of the
inconsistencies in the Accused's testimony and the corroborative evidence of Mallah that the
Accused did use helicopters in 1998 in his interactions with Bockarie, the Trial Chamber has
no reason to doubt Kanneh's account that Bockarie picked up materiel delivered by
helicopter at Foya in 1998.
5021. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Trial Chamber will treat the testimony of
Samuel Kargbo and Alice Pyne with caution in relation to Bockarie's trips to Liberia. The
Trial Chamber notes, however that their evidence as to Bockarie making a series of trips to
Liberia in 1998 from which he returned with materiel is consistently corroborated by many
Prosecution witnesses, including Karmoh Kanneh, Albert Saidu, Jabaty Jaward, Augustine
Mallah, TF1—371, Mohamed Kabbah, TF1—585, Perry Kamara and Dauda Aruna Fomie. The
testimony of Kargbo and Pyne that the Accused was involved in this supply of materiel is
Hm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13394.
Hm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6957-6958.
M45 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13395.
HM See infra, Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (December 1999-January 2002).
Hm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20209.

---- End of Page 1719 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T %{ G5 18 May 2012

also corroborated. Mallah was told by Bockarie that the purpose of his trips to Liberia was to
secure supplies from the Accused.11148 Kanneh testified that Bockarie told him "Pa Taylor"
was sending ammunition to Foya for the RUF.11149 Saidu's testimony was that Bockarie's
bodyguard had informed him that the materiel from Liberia was sourced from the
Accused. 1 1 150 Finally, TFl-371 stated on one occasion when Bockarie returned from Liberia
with materiel he spoke to his commanders about meeting the Accused and being instructed
by the Accused to maintain Kono "to pay for those materials".11151 While Jaward did not
specifically state that Bockarie said these supplies were sourced from Taylor, Jaward told
the Trial Chamber that "whenever Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia we would expect those
supplies from Charles Taylor".11152 Perry Kamara testified that prior to going to Monrovia,
Bockarie sent a message relaying his instructions from the Accused for the RUF to hold onto
Kono in early 1998 in order to provide the Accused with diamonds in exchange for arms and
ammunition.11153
5022. Evidence given by other witnesses is circumstantial but indicates that the Accused
knew of and sanctioned the supply of military equipment. TFl-371 testified that on his
retum from such trips, Bockarie was always escorted by members of the Accused's sss.* 1 154
Kabbah noted that Bockarie never required travel documents or exemptions from the travel
ban to cross the border.11155 Further, the Trial Chamber recalls its findings conceming the
role of Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) in the Accused's relationship with the RUF
organisation.11156 The consistent evidence that Tamba was involved in these trips supports
the conclusion that the Accused had knowledge of and sanctioned the delivery to Bockarie
of materiel to take back to Sierra Leone from Liberia.11157
11148 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20210-2021 1.
11149 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9448.
***5** Arnarr Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 1 1021.
***5* TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2385 (cs).
11152 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13415.
11153 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3142.
***5" TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2384 (CS).
11155 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16136-16137.
1115° See The Role of Intermediaries: Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).
11157 Dauda Arirna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21447; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp.
10544, 10546; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10797; TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14303-14305; Alice
Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12235-12237.

---- End of Page 1720 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /6// dp? 18 May 2012

5023. The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused himself stated that Bockarie could not
travel to Liberia, and specifically to Monrovia, without the Accused being aware of it. I I ISS ln
light of the evidence that Bockarie did not require travel documents or exemptions from the
travel ban to cross the border,I I I59 the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused's assertion that
he did not know about these trips and his denial of involvement in the supply of materiel to
Bockarie, are not credible.
5024. The Accused also maintained that Bockarie did not travel to Monrovia until the latter
half of 1998. Issa Sesay also testified that Bockarie did not meet the Accused until
September l998.I I I6O The veracity of this claim has been analysed elsewhere in the
Judgement, and the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Accused's denial that he met
Bockarie in Monrovia in early 1998 lacks credibility.III6I
5025. The Trial Chamber recalls its earlier finding that Issa Sesay's evidence must
generally be considered with caution. I I I62 The Trial Chamber notes that the basis for Sesay's
knowledge about Bockarie's trips is what Bockarie told himI I I6} and Sesay was not based in
Buedu for a substantial portion of 1998.III64 It is conceivable that Sesay was not privy to
information concerning other trips that Bockarie may have taken to Monrovia during the
course of 1998. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that Issa Sesay's testimony as to
whether Bockarie obtained arnrs or ammunitions from the Accused during his trips to
Liberia is not credible.
5026. While the the evidence does not establish the details of each specific trip to which
the above witnesses testified, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, based
on the evidence of all ten Prosecution witnesses, that Bockarie made a series of trips to
Liberia throughout 1998 from which he returned with materiel. The Trial Chamber is also
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, in light of the consistent evidence from these witnesses
III58 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 2601 1-26013, 26030.
III59 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16137, see also p. 16136.
IIIGO See Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AF RC .
III(’I See Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AF RC.
III`32 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
***6* rssa Sesay, rrarrsrrrpr 18 Arrgrrsr 2010, pp. 46641—46644.
III64 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44028 (Issa Sesay living near Bockarie in Buedu in March/April
1998); but see, Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43995-43997 (Sesay in Makeni after ECOMOG
intervention); Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44046—44048 (Sesay left Buedu for Pendembu in late April and
remained there until November 1998), 44082-44083 (Sesay in Makeni during December 1998 offensives).

---- End of Page 1721 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /5/ dx 18 May 2012

linking the source of the materiel that Bockarie brought back from Liberia to the Accused,
that the Accused was involved in the supply of military equipment to Bockarie on
Bockarie's trips to Liberia in 1998.
Quantity of materiel supplied
5027. The Trial Chamber has heard varying evidence from Prosecution witnesses in
relation to the quantity of ammunition or arms supplied. Karmoh Kanneh testified that when
he travelled with Bockarie to Foya, the materiel they picked up included 40 boxes of AK
rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets, a few RPG tubes.I I I65 Jaward stated that the supply
received after Bockarie met the Accused in Liberia in mid—1998 was "large". I I I°6 A number
of the Prosecution witnesses testified to receiving arms as well as ammunition.I I I67
5028. Although Fomie initially testified that the materiel could be transported in one small
"Benz" truck,I I I68 in cross—examination Fomie stated that on his retum to Sierra Leone from
Monrovia with Mosquito they were actually accompanied by three trucks full of
ammunition, including a Toyota Hilux and a Land Cruiser jeep, carrying around 80
containers of ammunition.I I Iw The witness confirmed the number of containers of
ammunition afier he was presented with a prior statement in which he had described a
"Liberian military truck" carrying 80 containers of ammunition.III7O The witness admitted
that he had not made clear how much ammunition there was in examination—in-chief but
that the questioning in cross-examination had refreshed his memory.III7I Although the Trial
Chamber considers that the witness may not have an accurate recollection of the precise
III65 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9456-9457.
III6° Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13413-13414 ("We received a large consignment of arms,
ammunition, including food supplies, fuel, gasoline, engine oil and other commodities").
III°7 TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15618 ("Bockarie, said there were documents to the effect, but
what he showed us was the combat suit, the tactical jeep, green coloured, and we saw him come with some new
arms"); Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13412-13415 ("We received a large consignment of arms,
ammunition, including food supplies, fuel, gasoline, engine oil and other commodities"); Augustine Mallah,
Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20210-20211 ("We11, most of what [Bockarie] told me, and what I saw
m self, that is to say he went to Monrovia to Charles Taylor for us to be supplied our needs, that is ammunition,
Y
arms, medicines"); Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12237 ("But when I was to return to Superman's
ground, the things that they gave to Superman included arms, ammunition, alcoholic drinks which we referred to
as morale booster").
III68 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21454.
III°° Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 22031-22036. The Trial Chamber also notes that
according to Fornie, Bockarie had stated the ammunition provided by the Accused was not "much" because the
Accused was short on supplies: Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, p. 21454.
III70 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, pp. 22037-22047.
III7I Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, p. 22033.

---- End of Page 1722 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % j"- 18 May 2012
1

number of containers of ammunition, the Trial Chamber accepts his later evidence, and his
explanation for the inconsistency with his evidence—in—chief, that the shipment of
ammunition was large. Samuel Kargbo also testified to a large amount of materiel being
brought back on one of his trips to Liberia. l l 172
5029. The Trial Chamber accepts TF1—371's testimony that in between the Magburaka
shipment in October 1997, the Burkina Faso shipment in November/December 1998 and a
third shipment in March 1999, Bockarie's trips to Monrovia were regular but the shipments
he brought back were not as large as those three major shipments.m73 In the light of
consistent evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the materiel supplied by the Accused to
Bockarie on Bockarie's trips to Monrovia during early to mid—1998 were sizeable, although
not large in comparison to the Magburaka, Burkina Faso or the March 1999 shipment.
Findings
5030. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Bockarie made trips to Liberia in 1998 during which he obtained materiel from the
Accused.
5031. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
beyond reasonable doubt that the RUF/AFRC received sizeable amounts of materiel from
the Accused in 1998 although not comparable in quantity to the Magburaka shipment, the
4 Burkina Faso shipment and the March 1999 shipment.
(iii) Alleged trip by Bockarie in January 1999
Submissions of the Parties
5032. The Prosecution alleges that during the Freetown operation Bockarie travelled to
Monrovia on Taylor's instruction to brief and take instruction from Taylor. Bockarie
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10547, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10799-10800 (testifying
that the quantity of ammunition was sufficient to fill a whole storeroom).
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2700 (CS); see also p. 2690 (CS) ("There were three shipments I
can recall 1997 to 1999 of arms and ammunition to the RUF and the AFRC from Mr Taylor, three large
shipments. I mean major shipments. And of course there were other minor trips of arms, but those were the
major’").

---- End of Page 1723 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

retumed from that trip with ammunition.m74 The Prosecution adduced evidence from TF1-
516 and Abu Keita in relation to this allegation.
5033. The Defence contends that the arms and ammunition used by the AFRC in the
Freetown invasion came exclusively from those captured along the way.lm5
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
5034. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator based in Buedu,m76 testified that during
the Freetown invasion Bockarie flew to Monrovia from Foya in a helicopter and retumed 72
hours later by air with ammunition. The witness explained that Bockarie told him that he
had been called and given instructions by "his chief", Charles Taylor, through a message
sent from Base 1 and reinforced by 020. Those who remained in Buedu were then informed
through Base 1 and 020 that Bockarie was retuming to Foya by helicopter so they took a
communications vehicle and met Bockarie in Foya. They saw what appeared to be bales of
`eans bein unloaded from the helico ter but became aware when the arrived in Fo a that
J 8 P Y Y
the bales in fact contained ammunitions.m77
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
5035. Abu Keita, who was in Buedu during the Freetown offensive,l lm testified that
during that time he travelled with Bockarie to Foya where Bockarie was picked up by Joe
Tuah in a helicopter and flown to Monrovia. He spent a day there. The witness stated that he
met Bockarie again at Foya; he retumed with a new ash-coloured Toyota Land Cruiser pick-
up from Charles Taylor which was loaded with some jeans, T-shirts, medicine and
bandages. I I H9
The Accused
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 173, 267.
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1112.
Hm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860 (The witness stated that in the rainy season of 1999
(roughly June and July) Issa Sesay ordered the witness to move to Liberia to work for Benjamin Yeaten).
Hm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6945-6946, 6962-6965; Transcript 9 April 2008, 6980-6981.
""*‘ Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020.
Hm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2011-2013, 2023-2024.

---- End of Page 1724 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X GK 18 May 2012

5 98 / ?·
5036. In response to TFl—516's testimony, the Accused denied that he was in
communication with or visited by Bockarie in January 1999, that he gave him ammunition
for the Freetown invasion or that he possessed a helicopter at that time. I I ISI)
Deliberations
5037. As a preliminary matter, the Trial Chamber notes that an issue arises in the evidence
given by TFl—516 and Abu Keita as to the timing of the alleged visit by Bockarie to
Monrovia. TFl—5l6 expressed uncertainty about the timing of Bockarie's trip on each of the
three occasions on which he referred to the trip in his testimony. On the first, he said "really
these things happened for quite so long really to have to think to recollect"III8I and on the
second, that "I was not sure really whether it was during the time of the Freetown
operation".III82 Under cross—examination, he then admitted that he had made a mistake and
that the incident he described had not taken place during the Freetown invasion and,
although he could not recall exactly when it had happened, "the operation in Freetown had
long been undertaken".III83 There are similarly doubts about Abu Keita's evidence that the
trip he described took place during the invasion. When first testifying about the trip, he
described it as having taken place during the "offensive involving Kono", specifically
referring to the attacks on Kono, Makeni, Masingbi and Magburaka, not Freetown. Indeed,
these attacks were the specific topic of`Counsel's questions to the witness.I I I84 Only later did
he assert that "during the Freetown invasion he went to Monrovia with that helicopter. He
spent a day there. That was the time he came with the Toyota Land Cruiser that I told you
3bOut,,_11185
5038. The Trial Chamber considers that the evidence given by the two witnesses strongly
suggests that they were not testifying about the same event. As noted above, TFl—5l6
ultimately placed the event long after the Freetown invasion whereas Abu Keita's testimony
was that the event took place before or during the attack. Furthermore, Keita testified only to
the arrival of jeans, T—shirts, medicine and bandages, not military equipment. For this
reason, the Trial Chamber considers that the evidence of Keita does not corroborate the
III80 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30451-30454.
IIIIII TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6945.
III82 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6962.
III83 TF1-516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7820-7821.
III84 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 201 1-2013.

---- End of Page 1725 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

testimony of TFl—516, nor does it support the allegation of the Prosecution that Bockarie
imported ammunition to Buedu in January 1999.
5039. Nonetheless, in the Trial Chamber's view, TFl-516 gave a credible and consistent
account of the event to which he testified. It also recalls its finding that TF1—5l6 is a
generally credible witness.m86 The candid way in which he repeatedly expressed his doubts
as to the timing of the event while maintaining complete consistency as to the event itself are
to his credit. The Trial Chamber notes that while the witness saw Bockarie depart from and
return to Foya with arms, his testimony as to the Accused's involvement in this shipment is
hearsay, based on what he was told by Bockarie. However, the evidence of TFl—5l6 is also
supported by general evidence that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia in 1999 during which the
Accused supplied him with materiel.m87 TF1—37l, who was in Buedu between March 1998
and April l999,m88 testified that Bockarie made "a series of trips" to Monrovia "from 1998
ending to early l999"m89 from which Bockarie would return with materiel from the
Accused.m90 TFl—585 testified that while Bockarie travelled to Monrovia "once in a while"
in 1998, his trips became more frequent in 1999, via helicopter from Foya airfield,m91 and
that on these trips Bockarie brought back materiel from the Accused's property to
Bnedu.11192
5040. The Trial Chamber considers TFl—5l6's account to be reliable, supported by the
evidence that Sam Bockarie made trips to Monrovia during 1999 from which he returned
with ammunition. For this reason, the Trial Chamber accepts TFl—516's evidence that
Bockarie made a trip to Monrovia at an undefined time after the Freetown invasion from
which he returned with a supply of ammunition from the Accused.
Quantity of materiel supplied
MISS Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2023-2024.
"'*° Credibility Assessment, TF1—516, pmss 275-284.
Hm See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (February l998—December 1999).
'*'** TF1—371, Tmnsenpt 28 rebmsty 2008, p. 2389 (cs).
Hm TF1—371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2382 (CS) ("[...] from 1998 ending to early 1999 there were a lot
of activities, people coming into RUF controlled territories and Mosquito frequenting Monrovia").
"'9° TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2383-2384 (cs).
""" TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15683.
Hm TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15661—15662.

---- End of Page 1726 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Ong 18 May 2012

5041. In relation to the quantity of materiel, the Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-516 gave n0
evidence on the amount of ammunition Bockarie brought back.
5042. In light of the paucity of evidence, the Trial Chamber is unable to draw any
conclusions as to the quantity of materiel supplied on this trip.
Findings
5043. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie made a trip to
Liberia at an undeHned time after the Freetown invasion during which he 0btained arms and
ammunitions supplied by the Accused.
(iv) Alleged trip by Bockarie in March 1999
Submissions of the Parties
5044. The Prosecution alleges that in about March 1999, Bockarie went to Monrovia and
received a maj0r shipment of materiel from the Accused which was transported from White
F lower to Buedu by Zigzag Marzah, Jungle and Mike Lama, who said the materiel was from
Charles Taylor.m93
5045. The Prosecution submits that "there can be little doubt" that this materiel given to
Bockarie in about March 1999 was part of shipment which the Accused 0btained through his
friend Blaise C0mpa0re, President of Burkina F as0. lt specifically alleges that the shipment
was flown into Liberia via Burkina F as0, where the head of C0mpa0ré's Presidential Guard,
Diendere, signed the end-user certiHcate certifying that the materiel was for the sole use of
the Burkina F as0 Ministry of Defence.m94
5046. The Defence states that "in 1999 the trips by Tamba, Marzah and others, with the
assistance of Yeaten, continued" HWS but submits that the within the context of Yeaten's
"wide ranging military p0wers and control" the evidence that ammunition came from Taylor
is "circumspect".m96 The Defence further submits that the Prosecution allegations
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 268.
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 269.
HWS Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1117
1}}% Defence Final Trial Brief paras l 1 18-1 l 19.

---- End of Page 1727 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GK / 18 May 2012
/w/’

conceming this shipment are based on a spurious assumption that because the Accused was
importing arms, he must have given them to the RU F/AFRC.11197
5047. In support of its allegations, the Prosecution adduced evidence from TF1-371,
Karmoh Kanneh, Stephen Ellis, TF1-585, TF1-539 and TF1-567 as well as Exhibits P-018,
P-021A-D, P-031, P-032 and P-035.11198 The Defence adduced evidence from the Accused,
and Exhibit D-448.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -3 71
5048. Witness TF1-371, who was in Buedu between March 1998 and April 1999,11199
testified that between February and March 1999, before the Lome negotiations began, Sam
Bockarie received a "major" shipment of weapons from Monrovia around the time the
fighting with LURD intensified. He described it as one of three "major shipments" received
by the RUF, along with the Magburaka shipment in October 1997 and Burkina Faso
shipment in November/December 1998. Specifically, the witness stated that some time just
after the Freetown invasion, Bockarie left Freetown for Monrovia, retuming a "week or so
later" to Buedu with the consignment in pick-ups and t1ucks.112OO On cross-examination,
TF1-371 stated that he did not know where this arms shipment originated,1121)1 but that it
came directly from White Flower.1121)2 He also noted that the consignment came after "Mr
Taylor asked Sam Bockarie to beef up their troops in Foya and he went to Monrovia and he
came with that third consignment".112O3 TF1-371 also stated that the second and third
shipments, of the three major shipments he referred to, were paid for by several
consignments of diamonds taken by Bockarie to Taylor.112114
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
11107 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 42.
"""’ TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2363, 2380, 2433 (cs).
11200 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700-2703 (CS).
11201 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2739-2740, 2751 (CS).
11202 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2740 (CS),
112011 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2751 (CS).
**20* TF1-371, rranapnpr 31 January 2008, pp. 2704-2705 (cs).

---- End of Page 1728 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GN /4/ 18 May 2012

3 Ci 82 f
5049. Karmoh Kanneh testified that when ULIMO and LURD forces invaded Lofa, he
received instructions from Bockarie to prepare manpower to go and "clear the enemy from
that place". The mission was successful and as a result the Accused invited Bockarie, his
bodyguard, Magazine and the witness to Monrovia. Benjamin Yeaten came to Foya to meet
them "in [the] same military helicopter with the combat colour".11205 They spent three days
staying at Benjamin Yeaten's house "at White Flower".11200 Bockarie went with Yeaten to
meet with Taylor. The witness testified that Bockarie said Taylor had given him $USD
10,000 which the witness saw when it was counted at Foya.The witness did not meet
President Taylor during this trip but was told by Bockarie when he retumed that he had been
to Mansion Ground where the "Pa" Taylor had told him to wait and promised to give them
morale boosters and some ammunition. The witness then saw this ammunition, AK rounds
and RPG rockets, "very close to Benjamin Yeaten's residence where he used to sleep" at the
back of "Pa Taylor's house", Vxfhite Flower. The witness could not recall the quantity of
ammunition they received, explaining that they did not go to Monrovia for the purpose of
obtaining weapons, although he later described them as "few materials". He testified that the
ammunition was then loaded into a vehicle and driven to the airHeld for the helicopter to
pick them up and take them to Foya.11207
Prosecution Witness TF1—585
5050. Witness TF1—585 testified that less than two weeks after the troops retreated from
Freetown in 1999, Bockarie told Eddie Kanneh that he was going to Monrovia for
ammunition at Charles Taylor's invitation. Bockarie returned from Liberia within two days
and on the third day Jungle came to Buedu with ammunition.11200
Prosecution Witness TF1—567
5051. Witness TF1—567 testified that while he and others were waiting in Buedu to go to
the peace talks in Lome he used to see Zigzag Marzah, Jungle, and Mike Lama bring
ammunition there. He said "when Jungle and others came with this ammunition they used to
say that it was the Pa, Charles Taylor, who sent the ammunition, he said because when it is
11205 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp 9458-9462.
11200 Given the proximity of Yeaten's residence to White Flower, the Trial Chamber understands this witness to
mean his residence ng White Flower.
11207 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459, 9462-9466.
11200 TF]-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15731-15732.

---- End of Page 1729 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ·-gh % 18 May 2012

time for peace he should prepare for war. So being that the peace talk was going on, he said
they should bring the ammunition to be kept underground". I mq
5 Prosecution Witness TFl—539
5052. Witness TFl—539 testified that some time after hearing of the 6 January 1999
invasion of Freetown, when the witness was in Liberia, Colonel Marzah told the witness to
speak with Benjamin Yeaten at Yeaten's house. Yeaten said to the witness "You said you
are an artillery officer" and that he had received a message from Sam Bockarie that the
SLA/RUF had captured two Panhard APC tanks, which were anti-personnel carriers, from
the Nigerians and a 40 barrel gun from the Guinean contingent in Sierra Leone. Yeaten
stated that he had previously seen documents with the witness verifying that he was indeed
an artillery officer and told the witness that he believed the witness "would be very, very
much useful". I mo After Yeaten described the weapons captured, he asked the witness
whether he would be able to identify those weapons and ammunition that could be used in
them. The witness responded he was able to identify the correct ammunition and thus enable
the weapons to be used. The witness also told Yeaten that he could be helpful as an artillery
man. Yeaten said that the witness should wait for the arrival of Bockarie from Buedu to
prepare for a trip to Burkina Faso to obtain weapons, which would then be used to dislodge
ECOMOG from the areas in Sierra Leone still under its controllml These events occurred
some time after the January 1999 attack on Freetown and before the Lome negotiations.l mz
5053. Bockarie then arrived two days later. The witness was asked by Marzah to identify
Bockarie from a group of four men at Benjamin Yeaten's house, and did so. Bockarie also
said that he recognised the witness, although he did not know the witness well. Bockarie and
his bodyguards arrived at Yeaten's house in three Leyland trucks captured from ECOMOG
and a black Land Cruiser jeep. A Lebanese man called Mohamed Saleh, a diamond
businessman, came with two other Arab nationals that the witness did not recognise.lm3
Hm TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12965-12966. The witness did not clarify who he was referring to as
"he" but given the context it is apparent he is referring to Charles Taylor. In its Final Trial Brief, the Prosecution
also referred the Trial Chamber to evidence given by TF1-567 on 2 July 2008 in support of its submissions, but
having reviewed this evidence, it is clear to the Trial Chamber that it related to 1998, not March 1999 and the
Trial Chamber has therefore had no regard to this evidence in making its findings.
mm TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11439-11440.
**2** rrr-539, Transcript 10 June 2008,pp. 11444-11445.
**2*2 TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jupp 2008, p. 11446.
**2*2 Tri-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11447-11449.

---- End of Page 1730 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T AEA 18 May 2012

Bockaric conductcd a diamond transaction with the Lcbancsc mcn.H2l4 Bockaric lcft to go
back to Bucdu the samc night. Ammunition from a storc at the back of Ycatcn's housc was
also loadcd into the trucks accompanying Bockaric.l 1215
5054. At an undciincd point aftcr this, the witncss staycd at Marzah's housc at YMCA with
Marzah for thrcc days. Bockaric camc to Monrovia a sccond timc and staycd in Marzah's
housc for the samc thrcc days.H2l° At onc point, Marzah and the witncss wcnt back to
Ycatcn's housc whcrc Ycatcn told thcm that an arrangcmcnt had bccn madc "for all the arms
wc nccdcd" in ordcr to "go ahcad with the mission wc had at hand", rcfcrring to thc
dislodging of ECOMOG that Ycatcn had prcviously discusscd. Marzah thcn took thc
witncss to the housc of Musa Cissé, the Protocol Ofticcr to Prcsidcnt Taylor, and introduccd
thc witncss to Cissé. Thc witncss rcmaincd at this housc for somc timc. 1 1217
5055. In prcparation for the trip, Cissé prcparcd Liberian passports for thosc pcoplc
travclling to Burkina Faso including the witncss, Bockaric, Eddic Karmch and Coloncl
Abdul Razak. Thc passport issucd to the witncss was in a Liberian namc but had thc
witncss's photograph in it, and the witncss rcccivcd it aftcr Bockaric again arrivcd in
Monrovia. I mg
5056. Bcforc hc lcft on the Burkina Faso trip, the witncss also mct the Accused at thc
Exccutivc Mansion with inter alia Zigzag Marzah and Bcnjamin Ycatcndmg Thc Accused
wclcomcd TFl-539 to Liberia and told him that hc would rcccivc furthcr instructions from
Musa Cissé. Taylor gavc Cissé an cnvclopc which Cissé gavc to TFI-53 9. It containcd up to
SUSD 1,50011220 Aftcr lcaving the Exccutivc Mansion, the witncss ran into Foday Kallon,
who was a formcr SLA Licutcnant.H22l
5057. Thc ncxt timc the witncss saw Bockaric was whcn thcy madc the trip to Burkina
Faso, with Coloncl Razak, Cissé Musa, Eddic Karmch and Gcncral Ibrahim.H222 Thc group
"2'4 TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jupp 2008, pp. 11450-11454.
Hm TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11475-14477.
mm TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11456, 11458-114659; scc also Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11477.
"2'7 TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jrrpp 2008, pp. 11461-11462.
"2'8 TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jrrpp 2008, pp. 11466
"2"’ TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11467-11469.
"’·2" TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jrrpp 2008, pp. 11469-11470.
lm! TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11472-11473.
Hm TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jrmp 2008, p. 11478.

---- End of Page 1731 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 6% / 18 May 2012
/ 1/

3 9824
travelled to Ouagadougou via Roberts Airfield where they were permitted to pass without
any immigration checks. The two pilots of their airplane were both Russians; there were no
other crew. The witness explained that he knew they were speaking Russian because he had
been trained by Russians while he was working for the Sierra Leonean Army under
Strasser.ll223 He confirmed that he does not speak Russian himself.l I224 The witness testified
that it was a passenger airplane with yellow, blue and red lines and that it had "something
like a baseball logo at the tail".l M5 When the plane landed in Ouagadougou, two vehicles
approached it and the passengers were received by General Sania Samba and another two
men in Burkinabe army uniforms. They were taken to the residence of the Liberian
Ambassador, a house, which had Liberian speaking staff. Eddie Kanneh and Sam Bockarie
left "that very day", and Kanneh said they were supposed to travel to France. They retumed
three days later.l @6
5058. The witness explained that on the fourth day in Ouagadougou, he went to a military
warehouse with inter alia Sam Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh, Colonel Razak, General Ibrahim
and two Burkinabe military personnel and chose ammunition and weapons from there,
including some "to use on that Panhard and 40 barrel", RPG7s and 7.62 millimetre NATO
and Warsaw type. They loaded everything onto at least five military trucks which were
driven to the airport, while the witness went to the airport via the residence. When the
witness arrived at the airport, the trucks were at the plane and the plane was loaded with the
ammunition and weapons taken from the warehouse in the "places meant for cargo" and on
the passenger seats fastened by the seatbelts.H227 The witness embarked with Bockarie and
the rest of Bockarie's Sierra Leonean entourage to retum to Liberia. Six persons went on the
trip to Burkina Faso and came back to Liberiailm
5059. The witness was presented with Exhibits P—02lA, B and D, extemal and intemal
photographs of an airplane with a red/orange logo on the tail comprising a basketball and the
letter "S". Unidentifiable boxes and bags are tied into the passenger seats. TF1—539 testified
that he recognised the plane as the one that the group used to travel from Liberia to Burkina
""3 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11478—11482, 11488.
Hm TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11700.
H225 TF1—539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11483; Transcript 11 June 2008, p. 11503.
'mb TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11493, 11504
Hm TF1—539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11483; Transcript 11 June 2008, p. 11503.
"m TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11493—11499, 11503—11504.

---- End of Page 1732 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T ylpp 18 May 2012

3 782 5
Faso. He also testified to recognising the individuals in Exhibit P-138 as the two Russian
pilots of that airplane.ll229
5060. TF1—539 testified that while they were in Burkina Faso, General Ibrahim had
introduced General Sania Samba to the witness as "his boss" at Ouagadougou Airport. Sam
Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh, who used to interpret for Bockarie, told TFl-539 that he was
going to meet President Blaise Compaore. Eddie Kanneh later told him that the meeting had
taken place but the witness was not present so does not know what was said.l mo
5061. When the airplane arrived at Roberts Airfield "they" sat for a long time. The witness
noted that ECOMOG were at the airport and coming close to the plane. Then Liberian
Security personnel, outnumbering ECOMOG arrived. They were the SSS, including Zigzag
Marzah and Charles Taylor's son Chucky. The passengers then came out of the plane and
were driven directly to Musa Cisse's office at the President's mansion. Sam Bockarie, Musa
Cisse, Eddie Kanneh and General Ibrahim then said that they were going to see the President
but the witness did not accompany them.ll23l Musa Cisse gave the witness $USD 2,000.1 m2
The witness subsequently learned from Musa Cisse that the cargo had been successfully
off1oaded.l1233
5062. A few days later, Bockarie and others loaded three Leyland trucks and a black Land
Cruiser with arms and ammunition from the store at Yeaten's house at the back of White
Flower and eventually transferred it all to Buedu along with gymnastic equipment and
drums of petrol, diesel and engine oil. The witness's testimony is not clear as to whether
these additional items also came from Burkina Faso. They were accompanied on the journey
to Sierra Leone by Colonel Jungle and Colonel Sampson.ll234 En route Bockarie threatened
to kill the witness alleging "you, the SLA guys, you are trying to sabotage the operation".
The witness denied Bockarie's allegation. Upon arriving in Buedu, the witness testified that
he was immediately put into a dungeon, a hole underground, with others including Fayia
Musa, Palmer and Dr J alloh so he did not know what happened to the ammunition. Although
he later testified that after Mosquito Spray had been cleared and while there was a ceasefire
Img TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11-183-11486.
11230 TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11499—11502.
lm] TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11504-11507, 11509-11510.
Hm TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11510.
Hm TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11511-11512.

---- End of Page 1733 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GS 18 May 2012

with ECOMOG, Issa Sesay took some RPGs and twin barrel ammunition, as well as
ammunition for the tank in Kono and 7.62 millimetre NATO and "Warsaw type". Sesay also
took the twin barrel that Bockarie was using to defend his headquarters from the Alpha
Jet 11235
5063, The witness testified that the trip to Burkina Faso took place around March
1999.11236 He described hearing over the radio as they returned to Sierra Leone from this trip
that Foday Sankoh had just been released for peace talks.l 1237
Prosecution Witness lan Smillie
5064, Ian Smillie, a member of the panel of experts appointed by the Secretary General of
the United Nations to investigate and report on the arms trade in Sierra Leone and a co-
author of Exhibit P-018,11238 testified that the Expert Panel had been made aware of, an
aircraft a BACIII owned by Mr Leonid Minin. The Experts were unable to access flight
records in Liberia but an expert panel member investigated the planes flight records in Spain
and talked to a crew member. According to Ian Smillie, these records showed:
"On 16 March the plane was loaded with weapons and flew back to Liberia. On the 17th, it returned to
Ouagadougou [...] It flew again from Ouagadougou to Liberia with weapons on the 19th". That is two flights.
[...] "On the 25th the plane flew again from Liberia to Ouagadougou and returned on the same day with
weapons. On the 27th the plane flew again to Ouagadougou and from there to Bobo Dioulasso for the weapons
that had been trucked there. The aircraft made three flights over the next three days between Bobo Dioulasso
and Liberia. On 31 March the plane flew back to Spain".'m°
5065, The witness considered these totalled six flights, The crew member told the Panel
that the cargo was ammunition and weapons,] 1240 The witness produced photographs of the
plane taken by one of its crew members at Bobo Diaulasso airport which were given to the
Hm TF1—539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11516-11520, 11522-11523; Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11706.
"235 TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp, 11523, 11535, 11543.
"236 TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, p. 11509.
Hm TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11521-11522. This occurred in mid April 1999: Exhibit P-313,
"United Nations Security Council, Sixth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/645, 4 June 1999", p. 2.
Hm See Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted
on 20 December 2000", p. 3, ERN. 4373, which cites Ian Smillie as one of the co-authors of the Expert Panel
Report.
Hm Ian Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, pp. 549-552.
"2"’ ian siniuic, Transcript 7 January 2008, p. 556.

---- End of Page 1734 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Nm / 18 May 2012
»~t/

panel. These showed the marking "VPCLM" and a symbol on the tail which the witness
stated was from the Seattle Supersonics, a baseball team.I IMI 9
5066. Taylor told the panel that Minin had come to Liberia wanting to sell the plane as a
presidential jet but the price was too high. Taylor had taken a few trips on it. Minin took it
back. The witness stated that the BAC111 is an executive jet and could not be used for
weapon transfers because of its lack of weight capacity which was why so many trips were
required. I I242
5067. The panel had been made aware of the aircraft by "the Angola Expert Panel" which
"had recorded the fact that a large shipment of anns had gone to Burkina Faso"II243. He
stated that members of the Panel also travelled to Ukraine to verify what had been reported
by the Angola panel and received information from the Ukrainian Government that there
had been a shipment of 68 tonnes of weapons, the dates and route of the shipment, and
verification that the end-user certificate was for Burkina Faso. I I244 Infomiation on the flights
was in part obtained from the flight logs of the aircraft in Spain and from airports, Bobo
Dioulasso and Ouagadougou but no flight records were made available to the panel in
Libe1ia.II245 Smillie stated that the panel members also spoke to one of the crew
members. * *246
The Accused
5068. The Accused said that he did not know about the anns and ammunition brought on
the plane and denied "in the most emphatic way" the existence of the March 1999 anns
shipmentI I247 or his involvement in such a shipment.I I248 According to him, at that time he
was busy dealing with preparations for Lomé. I I249 The Accused conceded that the BAC-111
plane mentioned in Exhibit P—018II25O was indeed in his possession for an unspecified
***4* lem sm1111e, rmmeript 7 January 2008, p. 554.
**24* lem Smillie, rmmenpt 7 January 2008, p. 556.
Im} Ian Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, p. 550.
**2** lem Srnillie, rmmenpt 7 Januaiy 2008, p, 558.
**2*5 nm Smillie, rmmenpt 7 January 2008, p. 550.
**2"°1em sm1111e, rmmenpt 7 January 2008, p. 550.
II247 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28955—28958.
II248 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27673—27674.
Img Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28956—28957.
IIZSO Exhibit P—018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 203—21 1, ERN. 4405—4406.

---- End of Page 1735 ---------------------------


Case No,: SCSL—03—01~T 01% 18 May 2012

period between 1998 and 1999, but was used only as a presidential jet and not for the
purpose of transporting arms. However, he stated that "we" could not afford it and did not
retain it.1 125 1
Prosecution Exhibit P-018
5069. Exhibit P-018 is the report of the Panel of Experts established by Security Council
Resolution 1306-S/2000/1195, dated 20 December 2000 on the link between trade in
diamonds and trade in arms in Sierra Leone. The panel noted that the RUF had no access to
the sea so weapons and materiel could only be imported by air and road, most of the landing
strips in areas under RUF control were not operational and there was a "total lack of
governmental oversight in Sierra Leone airspace"H252 Virtually all of the weapons shipped
into RUF territory are trans-shipped through at least two other countries between their point
of origin and RUF territory in Sierra Leone. In virtually all cases, the last transit point before
shipment into Sierra Leone was Liberia.11253 Relevantly, the Report states that a shipment of
68 tons of weapons ariived at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on 13 March 1999 and was then
transported within a matter of days to Liberia.H254 The weapons included 715 boxes of
weapons and cartridges, 408 boxes of cartridge powder, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air
missiles, and RPGs and RPG launchers.H255 The weapons supplier was a Ukrainian state-
owned company called Ukrspetsexport.H256 The weapons were sold to a Gibraltar-based
company representing the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso. The end-user certificate
dated 10 February 1999 and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert Diendéré (Head of the
Presidential Guard of Burkina Faso) came from the Burkina Faso Ministry and authorised
the Gibraltar-based company to purchase the weapons for the sole use of the Ministry of
M25] Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27672-27673.
Hm Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para 198-201, ERN. 4405
Hm See Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted
on 20 December 2000", para 202 ERN. 4405
H254 The panel states that this shipment has been "well documented" See Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of
Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on 20 December 2000", para 204, ERN. 4405
M55 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para. 203, ERN. 4405.
Hm Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para. 204, ERN. 4405.

---- End of Page 1736 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T { GQ 18 May 2012

Defence of Burkina Faso and certified that Burkina Faso would be the final destination of
the cargo and the end-user of the weaponryl 1257
5070. The report states that "[t]he weapons in question, however, were not retained in
Burkina Faso. They were temporarily off-loaded in Ouagadougou and some were trucked to
Bobo Dioulasso. The bulk of them were then trans-shipped within a matter days to
Liberia".ll258 The report also states that "[t]he authorities of Burkina Paso, in
correspondence with the United Nations Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone, denied
allegations that the weapons had been re-exported to a third country, Liberia, and during a
visit to Burkina Faso the Panel was shown weapons that were purportedly in that
shipment". I mg
5071. Nevertheless, the Report states that "most" of the weapons were flown to Liberia
aboard a BAC-111 plane in a series of flights between 15 March and 31 March 1999. The
report details the aircraft's flights from Ibiza in Spain to Liberia on 8 March 1999 and
subsequent trips to Ouagadougou, and its return to Liberia with weapons between 15 and 31
March 1999. It states that the aircraft was owned by the Israeli businessman of Ukrainian
origin, Leonid Minin, "a business partner and confidant of Liberian President Charles
Taylor" who is "identified in the police records of several countries and has a history of
involvement in criminal activities".H2°O According to the Report, Minin offered the aircraft
mentioned above for sale to Charles Taylor as a Presidential jet, and for a period between
1998 and 1999, it was used for this purpose as well as to transport arms. Finally, the Report
claims that a second plane, an Antonov operated by the Liberian company named Weasua,
had been reported by eye witnesses to have flown part of the cargo to Liberia from Bobo
Dioulasso.l lm
Prosecution Exhibit Exhibits P-021A-D
Hm Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 ~ S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 204-205, ERN. 4405-4406.
Hm Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 ~ S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para. 207, ERN. 4406.
11259 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 ~ S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para. 206, ERN. 4406.
11260 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 208-209, ERN. 4406.
HM Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 ~ S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para. 210, ERN. 4406.

---- End of Page 1737 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T Cl; 18 May 2012

as 230
5072. Exhibits P-021A-D are photographs of the interior and exterior of aircraft. P-
021AH262 shows the interior of an aircraft loaded with boxes strapped to seats and in the
spaces in front of the seats. There are no markings on the boxes indicating the content of
the boxes. P-021DH263 is similar except that the photographer is facing the front rather than
back of an aircraft. Similar boxes and plastic bags on seats are visible. P-021BH264 shows
the exterior of an airplane with red, orange and black stripes along the visible side, a logo
comprising an "S" shape and basketball on the tail and the letters "VPCLM" on the engine.
Finally, P-021Cl M5 is a picture of a building with the words Bobo-Dioulasso written on the
front elevation. Only one wing of an airplane is visible in this photograph.
5073. Exhibits P-02lA-D were admitted into evidence through Ian Smillie, who brought
them to The Hague at the time of his testimony. He stated that panel members had received
the photographs from one of the crew members of the plane described in P-018 in October
or November 2000, but he refused to give the name of the individual in order to maintain
his/her protection. The information on the date of the photographs came from his colleagues
on the Panel. The Trial Chamber notes that there is no indication on the photographs
themselves when they were taken. Smillie stated that it was he who wrote "March 1999" on
the back of the photographs.H266 P-021B shows the registration VPCLM, which, Smillie
testified, is registered in the Cayman Islands to Leonard Minin. Smillie testified that Taylor
had told him that Minin had come to Liberia with the aircraft wanting to sell it as a
Presidential jet but that Taylor had told Minin that it was too expensive for Liberia. Taylor
had taken a few trips on it, but Minin had taken it back.H267
Prosecution Exhibit P-032
5074. Exhibit P-032 is a report dated 17 October 2001 of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001) concerning the compliance by the
Government of Liberia with its arms embargo and links between Liberia and the conflict in
Sierra Leone.H268 The report describes the involvement of arms dealer Leonid Efimovic
Hm Exhibit P-021A, "Photograph P-0001171".
Hm Exhibit P—021D, "Photograpl1 P-0001174".
N64 Exhibit P-021B, "Photograph P-0001172".
**265 Exhibit P-021C, "Photograph P-0001173".
HM lan Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, p. 554; Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 655-657.
Hm lan Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, p. 555.
Hm See Exhibit P-022, "United Nations Security Resolution 1343 (2001) Adopted on 7 March 2001", paras 19-

---- End of Page 1738 ---------------------------


Case No.;

Minin in facilitating a number of anns shipments entering Liberia during the period when
Liberia was under an anns embargo. The report states that Minin's private jet made several
trips between the airports of Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso and Monrovia to transport a
total of 68 tons of small anns from Burkina Faso to Monrovia in March 1999.l mw
Prosecution Exhibits P-031, P-035 and Stephen Ellis
5075. Exhibit P-035 is an IRIN news update dated 8 April 1999 adduced through witness
Stephen Ellis concerning the involvement of Liberia and Burkina Faso in an arms shipment
to the RUF. It states that ECOMOG's force commander in Sierra Leone, General Felix
Mujakpemo, has issued a press statement describing events leading up to an alleged delivery
of anns to the RUF. Exhibit P-035 notes:
According to the statement, faxed to IRIN by ECOMOG, a Ukrainian registered cargo aircraft, Antonov 124,
carrying 68 tons of arms arrived in Ouagadougou on 14 March 1999, and was parked at the presidential wing
of the airport. The pilot was told to continue on to Monrovia to deliver the cargo but he refused to do this on
the grounds that it was not the initial arrangement, Mujakpemo said.
On 15 March, a smaller aircraft with Ukrainian crew members landed at Robertsville International airport in
Liberia, accompanied by a Liberia Special Security Services Director, the statement said. Its cargo, it added,
was taken to Gbanga [sic] and then to the Sierra Leone border for delivery to the RUF and to the Guinea border
for rebels in Guinea. I mo
5076. According to Exhibit P-035, the ECOMOG press statement reported that this process
continued with additional aircraft and Bockarie "has indicated receipt of the anns from
Liberia in recent conversations with some of his comrnanders". I ml
5077. Exhibit P-031 is an expert report dated 5 October 2006 prepared by and adduced
through witness Stephen Ellis. It cites Exhibit P-035 for its statement that General Felix
Mujakperou in April 1999, "publicly accused President Taylor of supplying anns to the
RUF by means of Ukranian-registered aircraft and crews".l m2 Ellis affinned this statement
in his testimony.l m3
Defence Exhibit D-448
20, ERN. 100009.
Hm Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)",Para
19, Concerning Liberia para. 212, ERN. 4480.
Hm Exhibit P-035. "IRIN update 438 ofevents in West Africa, 8 April 1999", ERN. 21259.
Hm Exhibit P-035, "IRIN update 438 of events in West Africa, 8 April 1999", ERN. 21259.
Hm Exhibit P-031, " Report for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ‘Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra

---- End of Page 1739 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QL 18 May 2012
./*"`·./

3 Cf 8 31
5078. Exhibit D-448 is a situation report dated 14 April 1999 from Felix Downes-Thomas
to Prendergast at United Nations, New York covering the period 13 to 14 April 1999. lt
reports that Liberian Defence Minister Daniel Chea ‘"has announced the deployment of
additional troops on Liberia's border with Sierra Leone in response to a recent threat by
ECOMOG's [...] Maj. Gen. Felix Mujakpero to attack RUF rebels’ supply routes in
Liberia". lt further reports Chea's request for disciplinary action against Mujakpero by
ECOMOG by way of an apology for the commander's threats and for the UN to deploy
military observers on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border to investigate allegations that Liberia
was supplying arms to the RUF rebels.* *274
Deliberations
5079. The central contention of the Prosecution is that the shipment or part thereof from
· Ouagadougou, referred to in Exhibit P-018 as arriving in Liberia a few days after 13 March
1999, was transported to Sierra Leone and provided to the RUF. The Trial Chamber notes
that while the evidence of TF1-539 and the report of the ECOMOG press statement in
Exhibit P-035 support the allegation that this March 1999 Burkina Faso shipment was the
same shipment that made its way to Sierra Leone, Exhibit P-018, P-032 and lan Smillie do
not state that the shipment referred to in Exhibit P-018 was transferred to Sierra Leone.
5080. With regard to the testimony of TF1-539, the Trial Chamber recalls its previous
finding that his evidence must be viewed with caution.**275 The Trial Chamber noted in
particular the implausibility of his account that days after being accused of espionage,
Marzah took the witness to the Executive Mansion to meet the Accused, where the Accused
offered the witness encouraging words, and passed on a gift of $USD 1,500 to him. The
Defence also makes a number of specific challenges to the credibility of TF1-539's account
of the alleged shipment in March 1999. Specifically, it points out that (1) TF1-539 had no
good answer as to why he would be brought along to Burkina Faso to identify ammunition
when General Ibrahim was an expert at such identification and was also present on the
Leone’, Report of Stephen Ellis arid Corrigoridai ERN. 22613.
**273 Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, p. 1472; Transcript 17 January 2008, p. 1474.
**27* Exhibit D—448, "RSG/MVA/CLN-127, Outgoing Coda Cable: Daily Sirkop — Covering Period from 1401li
13 April 1999 ro 1400lr 14 April 1999, From Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia ro Prendergast, United
Nariorrs, New York, April 14 1999", para. 1, ERN. 29703.
**275 Credibility Assessment, TF1-539 paras 296-303.

---- End of Page 1740 ---------------------------


Case No.;

journey and (2) he gave inconsistent testimony about the consignment papers for the
ammunition and whose signature was on those papers. I 1276
5081. In relation to the first of the challenges raised by the Defence, the Trial Chamber
notes that the witness did not say he was brought for the specific purpose of identifying
ammunition; he said that before being asked to go on the mission, Yeaten questioned him
about his knowledge of the ammunition needed for named weapons. I 1277 Further the
Defence is, in effect, asking the witness to speculate on how those planning the trip made
their decisions about who or what they needed. I mg
5082. Concerning the second issue raised by the Defence, the witness testified under cross-
examination that he was given several ‘documents’ to hold for the consigmnent. The witness
testified that he saw one document, the one on top that was signed by Musa Cissé which
referred to a consignment of gym equipment. I mg Prior statements relating to Yeaten and the
Accused's signatures were put to him in cross—examination in which he had said that the
signatures of Charles Taylor and Benjamin Yeaten were on the papers he was given to hold
and also that he had not seen any signatures on the consignment papers. However it was
a arent in the course of his testimon that the witness had corrected that statement and
PP Y
made clear that Taylor's signature was not on the document. The witness emphasised that he
had not said that he saw Yeaten's, only Cisse's signature. I 1280 The Trial Chamber is satisfied
that there was more than one interview and that the witness did correct earlier statements;
while there was an inconsistency concerning whether Yeaten's signature was on the
consignment notes the Trial Chamber notes the logic of TF1— 539's sworn testimony that he
saw the top document only and accepts his evidence that Cissé's signature alone was on it.
5083. The Trial Chamber notes that aspects of TF1-539's account to this Chamber, in
particular the description of the passenger plane with "something like a baseball logo at the
11276 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras. 1457, 1458, citing TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11690-1 1691.
uw TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p, 11444 ("Q. Sir, after Benjamin described to you the weapons that
were captured, told you the weapons that were captured, what else was said? A. He asked me whether 1 will be
able to identify those weapons and the ammunition that could be used in them and then after the 40 barrel he also
asked me about the Panhard and then l told him, yes, l will be able to identify them and l believe that if they
were there and l was able to identify them we will be able to use the weapons"),
Hm TF1-539 himself stated "1f they did not need me, they wou1dn’t have used me to be part of that trip". TF1-
539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11691.
****9 TF1-539, Transcript 12 June 2008 p. 11706. g
**2**** TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11706-1 1711.

---- End of Page 1741 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03-01-T T 18 May 2012

tai1"**28* is commensurate with the plane depicted in Exhibit P-02lB,**282 which according
to Smillie was a photograph of the flight described in P-018.* *283 However, in the interview
a month before his testimony before the Trial Chamber, the witness stated that "[t]he flight
was a cargo flight with the entrance at the tail end". TFl-539 explained that he said during
interviews that the plane carried cargo but had passenger seats, which is consistent with
Exhibit P-018 and his evidence-in-chief. He also testified that he mentioned the colours and
a logo on the plane prior to being shown the photograph but that was not recorded.**284 The
Trial Chamber is satisfied that the evidence of TFl-539 concerning the loading of arms and
ammunition collected in Burkina Faso and transported by plane to Monrovia is amply
corroborated by the evidence in Exhibit P-018 and has not been undermined by the issues
raised by the Defence.
5084. lt is apparent from Exhibits P-018 and P-032 that the cargo of materiel was too large
to be taken directly to Monrovia and had to be flown in a series of flights over the course of
the last two weeks of March 1999 in aircraft owned by the lsraeli businessman of Ukrainian
origin, Leonid Minin.**285 TFl-539 described the flight that was taking cargo directly from
Ouagadougou to Monrovia. He did not say that he accompanied any other flights nor did he
purport to have knowledge of other flights* *286 The Trial Chamber considers Exhibits P-018,
P-032, and P-02lA-D are based on relevant, reliable and independent documentation and
statements and finds that tons of weapons and ammunition originating in Ukraine were
shipped to Burkina Faso from where most, but not necessarily all, were transferred in six
flights in a BAC-1 ll aircraft owned by Leonid Minin. The Trial Chamber further finds on
the evidence of the Accused and P-018 that the same BAC-lll aeroplane was within the
control of the Accused in 1998-1999.
5085. According to TFl-539, from the time between the arrival of the plane in Monrovia to
Burkina Faso and their return to Sierra Leone, there was only a lapse of several days.*l287
**28* TFl-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11483; Transcript ll June 2008, p. 11503. 1
**222 Exhibit P-02112, ··1>1ipipgiap1i P-0001 l72".
**283 Ian Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, p. 554; Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 655-657.
**2*** TFl-539, Transcript 12 Jiiiip 2008, pp. 11704-11705.
**285 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 » S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 208-209, ERN. 4406; Exhibit P-032, "Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1343 (200l)" para. 212, ERN. 4480.
**286 TFl-539, Transcript ll June 2008, pp. 11493-11499, 11503-11504.
**287 TFl-539, Transcript ll June 2008, pp. 11516-11520, 11522-11523; Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11706.

---- End of Page 1742 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M GK 18 May 2012

The Trial Chamber notes that in his testimony, TF1—539 gives two different time frames for
when this shipment occurred. In examination—in—chief, TF1—539 testified that it took place
around March l999,l mg after the Freetown Invasion.ll289 On cross—examination, the witness
testified that the trip to Burkina Faso took place towards the end of 1998, two weeks after he
had been arrested by Zigzag Marzah,l mo although the witness had previously testified to the
arrest occurring after he learnt of the Freetown invasion} ml In a prior statement, which he
subsequently disavowed, he had stated that it took place in May 1998.H292 During re-
examination, he reverted to l999,l mg} and acknowledged that his memory for dates is
poor.H294 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that it has considered in another context
TF1—539's evidence concerning his encounter with Foday Kallon in Monrovia during his
preparations for the mission to Burkina Faso as corroborative of events occurring in late
1998.ll295 The Trial Chamber considers that a witness who had an admitted difficulty with
dates and whose testimony concerning the events surrounding the shipment has been found
to describe events occurring in late 1998 may have confused an alleged March 1999
shipment from Burkina Faso with the well—established occurrence of the
November/December 1998 shipment from Burkina Faso. In this regard, the Trial Chamber
notes that TF1—539's account of the trip to Burkina Faso, including the presence of "General
Ibrahim", Musa Cisse and Eddie Kanneh on the trip, and the transport of the materiel from
White Flower to Buedu by inter alia, Jungle and Sampson, correspond to the details of the
November/December 1998 shipment.l ING In light of this, the Trial Chamber is unable to find
that TF1—539's evidence substantiates a separate shipment from Burkina Faso in March
1999.
***29 TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, p. 11509.
**299 TF1—539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11506-11508.
***99 TFl-539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11690.
{ml TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11403-11404, 11697 (where the witness describes learning of the
Freetown Invasion from the BBC before his arrest), 11423-11429 (where the witness describes his arrest).
***92 TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11697.
***9* TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11720.
***9* TF1—539, Transcript 12 June 2008, p. 11722.
HM See supra, Provision of Military Personnel: Repatriation of Sierra Leoneans (finding the witness's
testimony that he met Foday Kallon in Monrovia in late 1998 after the meeting at the Executive Mansion in
preparation for the Burkina Faso shipment. is consistent with the testimonies of Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Issa
Sesay on events in late 1998).
Hm See supra, Anns and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso
Shipment

---- End of Page 1743 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T Gbb 18 May 2012

5086. Tuming to Exhibit P-035, the Trial Chamber recalls that when Exhibit P-035 was
admitted into evidence, Defence counsel submitted that as simply a "press release", P-035
had limited probative value.11291 The Trial Chamber notes firstly that the Exhibit is not itself
a "press release", but a report from a news service of a press statement allegedly made by
ECOMOG C0mmander General Mujakperou. The Trial Chamber also notes that Stephen
Ellis did not confinn any m0re than what was stated in his expert report, that General
Mujakperou had, in April 1999, publicly accused the Accused of supplying arms to the RUF
by means of Ukranian-registered aircraft and crews.11298 Further, the Trial Chamber notes
that the description of the flight in P-035 differs from that of TF1-539 and P-018 and was
attributed to General Mujakperou sh0rtly after the flights 0ccurred without the benefit of
evidence or detailed research by him. In light of these considerations, the Trial Chamber is
0f the 0pinion that Exhibit P-035 is, by itself or in conjunction with the evidence of Stephen
Ellis, of limited weight in establishing the truth of the facts asserted conceming the transfer
0f a shipment of materiel from Ouagad0ug0u to Monrovia and to Sierra Leone.
5087. The Prosecution also relies on Exhibit D-448 in April 1999 contending that the
reference in the UN cable by the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone to attacking RUF
supply routes in Liberia was "n0 doubt in reference to Taylor's March shipment to the
rebels".11299 The Trial Chamber rejects this argument, considering that the reference to a
"recent threat" to attack undefined supply lines lacks the necessary precision to draw any
reliable inferences.
5088. The Trial Chamber then turns to consider the evidence of the remaining witnesses
who testified as to the arrival of a shipment of materiel in Sierra Leone in the first half of
1999. The Trial Chamber notes that none of these witnesses testified that the 0rigins of
materiel brought was Burkina Fas0, although they agreed that it came from Monrovia.113OO
11291 Defence Objections to tender of the d0cument, Transcript 18 January 2008, p. 1636.
11298 Exhibit P-03 1, "Expert Rep01t, ‘Char1es Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone’, Rep01t of Stephen Ellis and
Conigenda", ERN. 22613; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 16 January 2008, ERN. 1472. See also Stephen Ellis,
Transcript 17 January 2008, p. 1474.
11299 Prosecution Final Trial Biief, para. 269.
11300 TF1·371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2751 (CS) (TF1-371 consistent1y stated that he did not know where
the March 1999 aims shipment 0riginated, although he said it was transpmted from Monrovia); TF1-585,
Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 1573l~l5732 (TF1-585 referred to the shipment as 0riginating from
Monrovia).

---- End of Page 1744 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V du 18 May 2012

5 98 3 7-
5089. TFl-371 testified that between February and March 1999, before the Lomé
negotiations began, Bockarie received a "major" shipment of weapons from Monrovia,113111
which came directly from White Flower.113112 While TF1-371 described it as one of three
"major shipments" received by the RUF, along with the Magburaka shipment in October
1997 and Burkina Faso shipment in November/December 1998, the Trial Chamber notes
that his testimony conceming the March 1999 shipment was not as detailed as that relating
to the other shipments. TF1-371 failed to mention the alleged March 1999 shipment in an
earlier interview in February 2006 and could not explain his failure to do so except for
stating that it was "human nature" to forget events that had not occurred "for years". In
another prior interview on November 2005 the witness had testified to there being three
major shipments, including one in April 1998 and the Magburaka Shipment but did not
mention the alleged March 1999 shipment explicitly. The witness also acknowledged that he
had forgotten the March 1999 shipment in these interviews.113113 However, the Trial
Chamber accepts his swom evidence that there was a major shipment before the Lomé peace
talks and that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and returned "ai°ter a week or so" with a
consignment in trucks and pick-ups.113114 The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-371 was in a
position to know of the arrival of arms and ammunitions shipments and recalls its finding
that TF1-371 is a generally credible witness.113115
5090. Karmoh Kanneh also describes a shipment as originating from Monrovia.113116 The
Trial Chamber notes that while Kanneh testified that this event took place between March
and April 1998, the context of his account suggests that he is mistaken and the events he
described relate to a time in early 1999. He stated that the shipment arrived when LURD
forces invaded Lofa, which occurred in the first half of 1999. Further, the witness stated that
this was the second arms shipment into Sierra Leone from Liberia that he witnessed, the first
one having occurred in the first half of 1998. He also states that the materiel was transported
by air to Foya. Kanneh attributed the shipment to the Accused, who gave Bockarie and the
11301 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700-2703 (CS).
11302 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2740 (CS).
113113 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2705-2709 (CS).
11304 TF1—371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700-2703 (CS).
11305 Credibility Assessment, TF1—371, paras 220-226.
11306 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459, 9462-9466.

---- End of Page 1745 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Ou 18 May 2012

witness the ammunition after Bockarie assisted the Accused in "clearing the enemy" from
Lofa county. I BOI
5091. TF1-567's testimony does not actually cite a specific shipment. Rather, the way TF1-
567 phrased his evidence —— "l used to see them bring ammunition"I Im —- suggests he was
referring to multiple occasions over the period of time he was stationed in Buedu. He stated
that when they delivered this ammunition, Marzah, Jungle, and Mike Lama told him that it
was the Accused who sent it.II3II9 However, the Trial Chamber considers that TF1-567's
testimony generally supports the arrival of a shipment of arms and ammunitions sent by the
Accused to the RUF around this time.
5092. The Trial Chamber notes the different accounts of the timing of the shipments
described by these witnesses.II3 IO However, given that these witnesses identify the time of
the arrival of the shipment in Buedu with known events viz after the Freetown invasion and
the LURD attacks in Lofa county, and that they were living in a remote area coupled with
the lapse of time the Trial Chamber finds that their evidence corroborate TF1-371's
evidence that these events occurred around March 1999.
5093. TF1-567 and Kanneh indicated that the shipment originated from the Accused.
Although TF1-371 did not state explicitly that the shipment was sent by the Accused, he
noted that the consignment came after "Mr Taylor asked Sam Bockarie to beef up their
troops in Foya and he went to Monrovia and [...] came with that third consignment".II3II
TF1-371 also stated that this shipment was paid for by several consignments of diamonds
taken by Bockarie to Taylor.II3 I2 Similarly, TF1-585 testified that Bockarie went to
Monrovia for ammunition at Charles Taylor's invitation.II3 I3 The Trial Chamber accepts that
the evidence of both these witnesses indicated that the shipment originated from the
**3**3 Karmoh Kaaaah, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459, 9462-9466.
Img TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12966 ("whilst we were in Buedu I used to see Zigzag Marzah,
Jungle, Mike Lama. I used to see them bring ammunition there").
**3**3 TF1-567, Transcript 4 Jury 2008, p. 12966.
II3IO TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700, 2703 (CS) (between February and March 1999); TF1-585,
Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15731-15732 (within two weeks of the retreat from Freetown); Karmoh
Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459 (when ULIMO and LURD forces invaded Lofa).
**3** TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2751 (cs).
**3*3 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2704-2705 (cs).
**3*3 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15731-15732 (CS).

---- End of Page 1746 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Accused. The Trial Chamber also recalls that it had no general reservations conceming the
evidence ofTF1-371, TF1-567, TP1-585 and Karmoh Kanneh.lm4
5094. On the evidence of TF1-371, TF1-567, TF1-585 and Karmoh Kamieh, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that on Bockarie's trip to Monrovia around March 1999, he brought
back a shipment of materiel supplied by the Accused.
5095. In relation to the quantity of the shipment, TP1-371 testified that the shipment was
"large" and "major" and was physically transported to Buedu by "pick-ups and trucks".lm5
The Trial Chamber notes that while Karmoh Kamieh described the materiel that Bockarie as
‘"few", he initially could not recall the quantity of ammunition they receivedm 16 In these
circumstances, the Trial Chamber accepts TF1 -371 's testimony that the shipment was large.
Findings
5096. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that on Bockarie's trip to Monrovia around March 1999, he brought back a large shipment of
materiel supplied by the Accused.
(v) Alleged trip by Bockarie in Auggst to October 1999
Submissions of the Parties
5097. The Prosecution submits that when Bockarie travelled to Monrovia as part of the
Lome delegation, at some point in August to October 1999, he retumed to Sierra Leone with
a helicopter of materiel supplied by the Accused.lm7 The Prosecution relies on the evidence
of TF1-567 in respect ofits allegationlmg
5098. The Defence makes no specific submissions in relation to the allegation that
Bockarie brought materiel from Liberia to Sierra Leone in August to October 1999. The
Defence adduced evidence from the Accused and Exhibit D-302.
Hm Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, TFl-567, paras 313-317;
Credibility Assessment, TFl-585, paras 330-333; Credibility Assessment, Karmoh Karmeh, The Role of
intermediaries, para. 2704.
**3*5 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700, 2703 (CS).
****6 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459,,9462-9466.
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 272.
H3 18 The Prosecution also cites evidence from the Accused and Issa Sesay but these relate to the presence of

---- End of Page 1747 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gb 18 May 2012

Evidence L
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
5099. Witness TF1-567, who went with Sam Bockarie to Monrovia during the Lomé peace
talks,m 19 testified that following Johnny Paul Koroma's and Foday Sankoh's departure for
Freetown in October 1999, Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten went to meet with the Accused.
After the meeting Bockarie relayed to the witness that the Accused had told him that he
should try to return to Sierra Leone. The next day Bockarie, TF1-567 and Benjamin Yeaten
went to Spriggs Field, where the witness boarded a helicopter with Bockarie which was
loaded with up to 15 "sardine" tins of AK rounds and an "RPG bomb with the TNT".m2O
Yeaten explained to Bockarie that this materiel was given to him "by my dad, Charles
Taylor" to take to Buedu for the purpose of "keeping security" while Sankoh was in
Freetownlml The helicopter was painted in camouflage colour like military uniforms — a
green, black and dark brown mix — and belonged to the Accused.l *222
The Accused
5100. The Accused denied that the trip described by TF1-567 in 1999 occurred.
Specifically, he asserted that only white UN helicopters were being used to ferry RUF
members back to Sierra Leone. Furthermore, he stated that the Liberian Goverrnnent did not
own a camouflage helicopter in October 1999, saying that it only acquired one in 2000. The
Accused also specifically denied providing any anns or ammunition to the RUF at this stage,
which would have contravened the peace agreement} lm
Exhibit D-302
5101. Exhibit D-302 is the Liberian government's reaction to the UN Panel of Experts
Report, dated January 2001, and was adduced through the Accused. In response to
Bockarie in Monrovia rather than to the specific allegation regarding amrnunitions.
**2*2 TF1~567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12974~12976.
**22** rm-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. l2982~12983.
**22* TF1~567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12983.
**222 r1¤1~567,’rrrrpspr·rpr4 July 2008, pp. 12983~12984.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28764~28767.

---- End of Page 1748 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T / du, 18 May 2012

allegations in the Panel of Experts Report that the Liberian government was delivering arms
to the RUF in Sierra Leone via Mi-2 and Mi-17 helicopters, Exhibit D-302 states:11323
The Government admits that it does have two (2) Mi 2 civilian helicopters, which were
acquired almost a year ago, and two (2) Mi 8 civilian transport helicopters purchased
locally five months ago. [...]
The Mi2's are used exclusively for civilian purposes. [...] Paragraph 202 states that the
RUF has "been supplied with weapons by helicopter on a sporadic basis before 1997 and on
a regular basis since then". It is a fact easily verifiable - that until a year ago there were no
Government owned or operated helicopter-s in Liberia. The only helicopters in Liberia
were operated by the United Nations.
Deliberations
5102. It is not disputed that Sam Bockarie was in Monrovia in September 199911323 as part
of the delegation to Lomé. According to TF1-567, Bockarie did not return to Sierra Leone
until after Foday Sankoh's departure for Freetown in October 1999.11323 According to Issa
Sesay, Bockarie was still in Monrovia on 26 September 1999.11327 The Trial Chamber
accepts that Bockarie did not return to Sierra Leone until late September or October 1999.
The issue is whether in Bockarie's return journey to Sierra Leone he took with him materiel
supplied by the Accused.
5103. The Trial Chamber first recalls its finding that TF1-567 is a credible witness.113213
When TF1-567's evidence as to this alleged supply of materiel was put to the Accused, the
Accused maintained that it would not have been possible for him to have transported
materiel in a camouflage coloured helicopter, as the Liberian Government did not own a
camouflage helicopter in October 1999, and only acquired one in 2000.11323
5104. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-567 is not the only witness to testify to
camouflage-coloured helicopters being used to transport materiel to the RUF during 1999.
113 23 Exhibit D-302, "Prelirninary Reaction of the Government of Liberia to the report of the Panel of Experts
appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) paragraph 19 in relation to Sierra Leone,
Monrovia, Liberia, 10 January 2001- DCT 1 (64 End of Pages)", paras 95-96.
113 25 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2008, p. 32441 (Bockarie in Liberia in September 1999);
Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44255-44256 (Bockarie still in Monrovia on 26 September 1999).
11323 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008. pp. 12982-12983. Foday Sankoh left Monrovia for Freetown in October
1999. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 26818; Exhibit D-222, "Code Cable to
Prendergast, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL , Sankoh and Koroma's Departure
from Monrovia and Return to Freetown, 3 October 1999", para. 1.
11327 Issa Sesay, Transcript l2 July 2010, pp. 44255-44256.
11333 Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317.
11329 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28764-28767.

---- End of Page 1749 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T gm 18 May 2012
,/ X \

Karmoh Kanneh testified about returning from Monrovia to Foya with Bockarie in a
"combat colour" helicopter when ULIMO and LURD forces invaded Lofa.l mo
5105. The Trial Chamber also notes that the Accused gave conflicting testimony as to the
date at which the Liberian government acquired its own helicopters. First he stated that the
Liberian authorities first obtained helicopters in 2000.1133l According to the Accused, the
first helicopters acquired were Mi-2s,lm2 military, camouflage-colouredll333 helicopters
used by the ATU,H334 and in 2000, he used them to transport Issa Sesay from Lofa to
Monrovia for the purpose of peace negotiations.H335 However, later in his testimony, the
Accused stated that the Liberian government was in possession of Mi-2 helicopters from the
beginning of` 1999,11336 and confirmed that when Johnny Paul Koroma travelled to Monrovia
in August 1999, he was transported by a Liberian, government owned, Mi-2 helicopter.ll337
He then affirmed on cross-examination that the Liberian government had one Mi-2
helicopter as of 1999, and two Mi-2 helicopters as of the end of 1999.11338
5106. The Accused's testimony is partly contradicted by Exhibit D-302, the Liberian
government's reaction to the UN Panel of Expert Report published in January 2001. Exhibit
D-302 asserts that the Liberian government only had two Mi-2 civilian helicopters from
January 2000 which it used exclusively for civilian purposes,l mg in contrast to the
Accused's testimony that the government-owned Mi-2s in 2000 were military helicopters
used by the ATU.
5107. The Trial Chamber further notes the evidence of TF1-516 that the Accused was
using ATU and SSS helicopters in 1999. TF1-516 testified that the SSS helicopters were
""° Karrnoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9461-9463.
lm I Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27664.
"332 Charles Ghankay rayiur, Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27667.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28803(PS); Transcript 19 August 2009, p.
27121.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, p. 27655.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28803 (PS); Transcript 19 August 2009, p.
27121.
m3° Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30605; see also Transcript 16 September 2009, p.
29032 ("We don't get a helicopter until about 1999").
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30847.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 January 2010, pp. 33723-33724.
Hm Exhibit D-302, "Pre1iminary Reaction of the Government of Liberia to the report of the Panel of Experts
appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) paragraph 19 in relation to Sierra Leone,
Monrovia, Liberia, 10 January 2001— DCT 1 (64 End of Pages)", paras 95-96.

---- End of Page 1750 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

primarily transport helicopters while the ATU helicopters were used to bomb enemy
targets.113411 In light of the evidence of Karmoh Kanneh, TF1—516 and TF1—567, together
with the conflicting testimony of the Accused, the Trial Chamber considers that the V
Accused's claim that he did not have a camouflage helicopter in September or October 1999
is not credible.
5108. The Trial Chamber finds that TF1—567's account is reliable, supported by the
‘ evidence that Sam Bockarie made trips to Monrovia during 1999 from which he returned
with ammunition. For this reason, the Trial Chamber accepts TF1—567's evidence that
Bockarie did make a trip to Monrovia at an undefined time after the Freetown invasion from
which he returned with a supply of ammunition.
5109. In relation to the quantity of materiel, the Trial Chamber notes TF1—567 testified that
the helicopter transporting the materiel was loaded with up to 15 "sardine" tins of AK
rounds and an "RPG bomb with the TNT".11341
Findings
5110. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Bockarie made a trip to Monrovia as part of the Lome delegation and returned to Sierra
Leone in or around late September to October 1999 with a helicopter ofmateriel supplied by
the Accused.
(vi) Alleged shipment from Niger on 22 December 1998 and brought back by
Fornie
Submissions of the Parties
5111. The Prosecution contends that in addition to the Burkina Faso Shipment, on 22
December 1998 the Accused received a large shipment of arms and ammunition from
Niger.11342 The Prosecution alleges that this shipment was sent by the Accused to Bockarie
while the rebel forces were still in Freetown, following a request from Gullit (a.k.a. Alex
Tamba Brima). Specifically, it submits that Bockarie sent Fornie and other securities to
11340 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6970.
11341 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12982-12983.
11342 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 265.

---- End of Page 1751 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GQ 18 May 2012
.../

3 9844
Monrovia where they obtained ammunition from the Accused's White Flower residential
complex that was brought back to Sierra Leone and sent on to the RUF troops at Waterloo
fighting to enter the city.ll343 The Prosecution adduced evidence from Fomie and Exhibit P-
018 to support its allegations. The Prosecution further cites in support of this allegation the
evidence of the Accused that Niger was a transshipment point for weapons that he had
4 purchased in violation of sanctions against Liberia. 1 1344
5112. The Defence cites Exhibit P—018 as an example of a conclusory determination that
weapons shipments to Liberia necessarily were connected to the Accused and to the
hostilities in Sierra Leone.11345 The Defence also submits that Fomie is lying, premised on
what it suggests is the illogicality that at the time of the alleged trip, the RUF had already
obtained a significant amount of ammunition during its December offensive against
ECOMOG which, it submits, dwarfed the amounts collected from White Flower. In these
circumstances, it argues that Bockarie would not need 25 boxes from Liberia to send to
Gullit, if he already had over 100 boxes of ammunition captured from ECOMOG. The V
Defence posits that, if Bockarie did resupply Gullit, he did so from his own supply.11346 The
Defence also contends more generally that the arms and ammunition used by the AFRC in
the Freetown invasion came exclusively from those captured along the way.11347 To support
this contention, it cites evidence from Issa Sesay and the Accused.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
5113. Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that two days after the 6 January attack on Freetown,
Gullit was requesting ammunition from Sam Bockarie so Bockarie contacted Benjamin
Yeaten requesting ammunition. Bockarie was too busy co—ordinating the front lines and so
he sent Fomie and two others to Monrovia where they were met by Yeaten. Yeaten took
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 12, 266.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 January 2010, pp. 34431-34433.
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1080, footnote 3104.
HW) Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 11 15.
HW Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1112.

---- End of Page 1752 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f 18 May 2012

them to White Flower where they retrieved approximately 25 boxes of ammunition and
some RPGs and grenades and returned to Buedu, all within 36 hours.I I3/18
51 14. Fomie testified that the ammunition he brought back to Buedu immediately after the
Freetown invasion was despatched directly to Kono where Peter Vandi received it and sent it
directly on to Issa Sesay in Makeni who despatched it to Rambo and others in the Waterloo
area. The ammunition reached Rambo approximately 3 days after Fomie came with them to
Buedu. The witness explained that he knew all this because it was written down in the
message log book. I I349
Prosecution Exhibit P—01 8
5115. Exhibit P-018 is the report by the Panel of Experts established by Security Council
Resolution 1306-S/2000/1 195, dated 20 December 2000. The Report documented a
shipment of weapons and related equipment in December 1998 which moved from Niamey
Airport in Niger to Liberia in two separate trips on a BAC—1 1 1 airplane owned by an Israeli
businessman of Ukrainian origin named Leonid Menin. On the second trip the panel found
that the plane carried "a consignment of weapons, probably from existing stocks of the
armed forces of Niger", and were loaded onto Liberian military vehicles. The Report noted
that a "few days after these events, the RUF rebels started a major offensive that eventually
resulted in the destructive January 1999 raid on Freetown". I I3 50
51 16. The Prosecution tendered Exhibit P-18 through Ian Smillie who, as an expert witness
on the diamond trade and West Afiica, was appointed to the panel of experts who created
the report. I I35I
The Accused
51 17. The Accused denied the allegations that he or Sam Bockarie brought back arms from
Burkina Faso on the 22 December 1998 for the January 6 invasion.II352 The Accused
admitted that in 2001 his government bribed officials fiom other countries in order to
Img Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21522, 21594-21595.
**349 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21595-21596.
M50 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-S/2000/1195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", paras 208, 211, ERN. 4406.
II35I lan Smillie, Transcript 7 January 2008, pp. 505-508.
II352 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 February 2010, pp. 35406-35415.

---- End of Page 1753 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

5%.46
transport arms and ammunition through that country.m53 Niger was one of the transhipment
points for weapons that he had purchased in violation of sanctions. However, the Accused
denied that the weapons he obtained from such shipments were used to reinforce the RUF
and its allies in December 1998 or January 199941354
5118. The Accused also stated that he did not send ammunition to Freetown in January
1999; at that time he was in the Hnal stages of the programme of buming amis, which ended
in July 1999, and had no arms to supply.m55
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5119. Issa Sesay testihed that he was in Makeni at the time of the Freetown invasion in
January l999.ll356 During the Freetown invasion, Gullit called Bockarie after they had
captured the State House and their troops were at the Congo Cross Bridge. Gullit asked
Bockarie to send reinforcements and ammunition.ll357
5120. During the Freetown invasion, Sesay denied knowledge of Bockarie telephoning
Benjamin Yeaten.ll358 Sesay denied hearing that Benjamin Yeaten had given instructions to
Bockarie, via satellite phone, for Gullit to send the politicians from Pademba Road Prison to
Buedu for safety. Sesay repeated his earlier account where he went to Waterloo to collect
Gibril Massaquoi and the politicians.H359 Sesay denied any involvement by Benjamin
Yeaten or Taylor in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999.l UGO
Deliberations
5121. The Trial Chamber understands the Prosecution's case to be that the Accused
supplied Bockarie with ammunition during the Freetown invasion with materiel from the
Niger shipment. However, the Trial Chamber notes that Fomie made no reference in his
evidence to a shipment arriving from Niger, and Exhibit P-018 connects these events only
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32496-32498; Transcript 26 November 2009,
pp. 32528-32529; Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33353-33355.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 January 2010, pp. 34433-34434.
H355 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29270-29271; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp.
30452-30453.
H356 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46073-46074.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44162.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 46077.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46077—46078.

---- End of Page 1754 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gu 18 May 2012

by temporal proximity. Further, the two accounts are not commensurate: Exhibit P—18
implies that the Niger shipment precipitated the commencement of the Freetown invasion,
while Fornie's account is that they received ammunition from the Accused two days after
that invasion began. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber considers that the Prosecution has
not established that the Niger shipment was taken to Sierra Leone.
5122. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber will examine whether Dauda Aruna Fornie's
evidence can sustain an independent allegation that a shipment from the Accused to
Bockarie was brought from Liberia to Sierra Leone while rebel forces were still in Freetown
in January 1999.
5123. Concerning Fornie's evidence that Gullit communicated to Bockarie during the
Freetown invasion that he was short of ammunition, it is an adjudicated fact that at some
point during the operation, following heavy assaults from ECOMOG, Gullit's troops were
running out of ammunition, forcing them to retreat from Freetown. I 1361 It is not disputed that
Gullit contacted Bockarie when he was at the State House to inform him of the capture of
the city and to ask for reinforcements.H362 lt is likely that at that point, facing shortages of
ammunition, he would have also asked for further supplies.
5124. The Defence contends that even if Gullit requested ammunition, as the RUF had
already obtained a signihcant amount of ammunition during its December offensive against
ECOMOG, it is implausible that Bockarie would have sent Fornie to bring back 25 boxes of
materiel rather than supplying Gullit's forces from the large stockpiles of captured
materiel. I 1363
5125. The Trial Chamber notes the evidence concerning the capture of signiHcant amounts
of materiel during the December 1998 offensives.U364 However, the Trial Chamber
**160 ruup Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, pp. 46078~46079.
Hm Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact, Fact 15.
MM Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 617, 633, TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2427 (CS) (Gullit's
forces called for reinforcements from the State House); Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, p. 4560
(When Gullit captured the Statehouse in Freetown and advanced on Pademba Road Prison he reported this to
Sam Bockarie); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, p. 8288 (Gullit also called Issa Sesay and
Superman when he captured the State House); Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. l2274—l2275 (On 6
January 1999, the witness heard radio operators who had gone to Freetown as part of the group that left Rosos
announce over the radio network that they had entered Freetown. She also heard Gullit himself communicating
to Bockarie that they had captured Freetown)
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 1 15.
Hm See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel, Captured Materiel.

---- End of Page 1755 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Gm *7 18 May 2012

considers that the fact that Bockarie had captured a large amount of materiel during
December 1998 does not preclude the necessity of further supplies, especially considering
that during the Freetown invasion, Bockarie's commanders continued to launch offensives
on the Segbwema-Daru axis, towards Kenema, as well as on the Makeni-Freetown axis. I M65
5126. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Dauda Aruna Fornie is a generally credible
witness.l B66 The Trial Chamber also recalls its previous findings in that during the Freetown
operation, Bockarie was in regular communication with Yeaten and the Accused concerning
operational issues relating to the Kono-Freetown attack in late December 1998 to January
1999. The Trial Chamber there accepted Dauda Aruna Fornie's evidence that he was often
in the radio room with Bockarie during the conversations with Yeaten.H367 The Trial
Chamber also notes that Fornie gave first hand evidence of going to Monrovia and retrieving
ammunition from White Flower,i assisted by Benjamin Yeaten,H368 and has no reason to
doubt his evidence as to the trip. While Fornie did not directly testify as to the ammunition
originating from the Accused, the Trial Chamber considers that his evidence that it came
from White Flower and was facilitated by Benjamin Yeaten, the Accused's subordinate,l M9
to be sufficient to establish that the Accused either sanctioned or was aware of the supply to
Fornie.
5127. The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused also stated that he did not send
ammunition to Freetown in January 1999, at that time he was in the final stages of the
ro amme of burnin arms, which ended in Jul 1999, and had no arms to su l Amo
P gf 8 Y PP Y
However, the Trial Chamber recalls that the Accused had previously testified that the
ro amme of the destruction of arms in Liberia ended in October 1999,lml and this is
P gf
su orted b documentar evidence. H372 The Trial Chamber also recalls its revious
PP Y Y P
conclusion that in spite of the disarmament process, Liberia had the capacity to supply arms
M65 See supra, Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
H366 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346-358.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609—21610; See supra, Military Operations: The
Freetown Invasion, Allegation that the Accused Directed the Freetown Invasion.
img Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21522;,21594-21595.
Hm See supra, The Role of Intermediaries: Benjamin Yeaten.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29270-29271; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp.
30452-3045}
HW Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26902—26903.
Hm Exhibit D—369, "Statement Attributable to the Spokesman of the Secretary~Genera1: Weapons Disposal in
Liberia, New York, 18 October 1999 — DCT 338 (2 End of Pages)", p.1 (welcoming the completion of the weapons

---- End of Page 1756 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL / 18 May 2012
///// V

and ammunitions to the rebel groups in Sierra Leone from its own supplies, and to facilitate
larger arms shipments through third countries. H373
5128. In light of the direct evidence of Dauda Aruna Fomie, which the Trial Chamber
considers to be credible, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that during the Freetown invasion,
Fomie travelled to Liberia to bring back ammunition and arms supplied by the Accused
during the Freetown invasion.
5129. Conceming the destination of the shipment, the Trial Chamber also accepts Fomie's
testimony that ammunition he brought back to Buedu was ultimately despatched to Rambo
and others in the Waterloo area, noting that Fomie testified that he knew the destination of
the ammunition he brought back to Buedu because it was written down in the message log
book.l mil The Trial Chamber will further assess the use of this shipment in the section of the
Judgement dealing with the use of materiel supplied or facilitated by the Accused.
Findings
5130. The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that during the Freetown
invasion in January 1999, Dauda Amna Fomie and others transported materiel provided by
the Accused from Liberia to Sierra Leone.
(c) During Issa Sesay's Leadership (December 1999—January 2002)
(i) Alleged deliveries from the Accused
Submissions of the Parties
5131. The Prosecution submits that during Issa Sesay's reign as Interim Leader, the
Accused continued to send arms and ammunition to the RUF on request by Sesay,lm5 via
the Accused's subordinates, including Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle), Sampson Weah, Dopoe Menkarzon, Roland Duoh (a.k.a. Amphibian Father) and
Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian Mosquito).lm6 The Prosecution cites the evidence of
destruction programme in Liberia which commenced on 25 July 1999).
um See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Preliminary Issues, Shortage of Materiel in Liberia.
Hm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2l595—2l596.
um Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 274.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 276.

---- End of Page 1757 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T `vg 18 May 2012

TF1-516 to support its contention that the transport of arms and ammunition from the
Accused to the RUF continued beyond Bockarie's departure from the RUF in December
1999. It has also adduced relevant evidence from Varmuyan Sherif Joseph Marzah, TF1-
567 and Exhibits P-099A and P-099B.
5132. The Defence submits that due to a lack of military operations in 2000 and 2001, and
"evidence of few atrocities against civilians", the RUF had no need to obtain large quantities
of arms and ammunition. The arms and ammunitions it did obtain were captured from
ECOMOG soldiers, or taken from UN peacekeepers in May 2000.11377
5133. The Defence also submits that by December 1999, Daniel Tamba had left Sierra
Leone and the RUF, with Bockarie, and that once back in Liberia, he went on to Hght under
Benjamin Yeaten against the LURD insurgencylmg It relies on the evidence of Jabaty
J award, Issa Sesay, DCT-008 and the Accused.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
5134. According to Witness TF1-516, the practice of making requests via radio to Yeaten
for materiel remained the same when Issa Sesay took over command of the RUF, although
Sesay was now in Kono rather than Buedulmg TF1-516 testihed that the same persons
involved in the transport of materiel when Bockarie was leader, including Zigzag, Jungle,
Sampson Weah, and Dopoe, were also involved in transport of materiel to Sesay, with the
addition of Roland Duoh and Liberian Mosquito.l 1380
5135. The witness stated that in early 2001, Momoh Gibba brought a supply of rifles to
Benjamin Yeaten's house. Alter some time, the rifles were flown to Foya. Issa Sesay
himself took part of the materiel to Kono. The remainder was distributed to RUF combatants
who were to participate in an operation in Guineamgl The witness saw the arrival of the
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1128-1130.
Img Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1117.
Img TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7010-7011.
{USO TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6956-6958, 7011.
**3*** TF1-516, Transcript 8 Aprri 2008, p. 6959.

---- End of Page 1758 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GUS 18 May 2012

3 98 5/
rifles at Yeaten's house when he was at the radio station "Base One", and he travelled with
the rifles to Foya.ll382
5136. TF1-516 stated that Roland Duoh (a.k.a. Amphibian Father)l 983 came to be based in
Buedu in 2001 when Foya fell to the LURD. During the period when troops based in Buedu
were fighting the LURD in Liberia, ammunition and supplies first arrived by helicopter to a
village called Tuba in Liberia. At some point, this was no longer possible due to attacks by
LURD, and Roland Duoh began to transport ammunition by truck from Vahun to
Buedu.ll384
5137. The witness stated that the supplies were used by Liberian soldiers and RUF in
Buedu in efforts to regain control of Foya.ll385 At one point, the witness was assigned by
Yeaten to support Duoh, and the witness travelled with Duoh from Vahun to Buedu,
transporting ammunition. At the time it was difficult to make the trip with materiel because
UN peacekeepers were monitoring the border to prevent such movements as disarmament in
Sierra Leone had already begun. I 1386
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
5138. Varmuyan Sherif testified that together with RUF, he fought against LURD. The
RUF contingent operated in Foya, Kolahun and Voinjama and reported directly to Benjamin
Yeaten.H387 At this time, Taylor provided arms to Benjamin Yeaten and in return Yeaten
distributed them among the groups that fought in Lofa Countydlm Taylor would call the
chiefs of staff directly to White Flower and give them the ammunition which was then
transported in cars to the chiefs’ respective locations.l 1389
5139. According to Sheriri Roland Duoh was a commander for the navy and was the
Security Director at the OTC, the Oriental Logging Company at Buchanan which Taylor had
Hm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6997.
11383 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6996.
11384 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6994-6995, 7088-7089.
11385 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6994~6995.
11386 TF 1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7094-7095.
11387 Varmuyan Slrerif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 898.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 899.
11389 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 906-908.

---- End of Page 1759 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (il/ilk 1759 18 May 2012
/2%

exclusive rights over.II390 He had also been a junior commando.II3qI Roland Duoh himself
would transport the ammunition to Foya from James Spring Field. I m2 Sherif transported the
arms to White Flower at Congo Town and sometimes stored them at the back of his house
ready to be taken to the front line.II393 He received arms and ammunition totalling not less
than 250 bags of AK 47, 50 RPG bomb and he sometimes received 300 arms for the army
division from Taylor himself at his residence. I I394
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
5140. Joseph Marzah testified that he was only involved in the transportation of arms from
the point when UL1MO disarmed, during "the time Mosquito was there up to 1ssa Sesay's
administration".II3q5 He also stated, in response to a question as to whether he took any
orders from Taylor concerning 1ssa Sesay, "[w]hen 1ssa Sesay was there 1 received orders to
ammos for him [sic]".II3% Marzah also stated that Taylor ordered him to execute 1ssa Sesay
because Sesay had "connived" with UN personnel to disarm.I I397 Taylor told Marzah that he
had sent for 1ssa Sesay to receive ammunition at Buedu.II398 Marzah then crossed over from
Kono to Mile Five River and crossed by ferry to Pedembu, Kailahun District where he spent
almost two weeks waiting to execute 1ssa Sesay. Taylor then called him stating that 1ssa
Sesay "had already connived" and would no longer receive supplies from Taylor.II39q
According to Marzah, this occurred around the end of 2002, after the process of RUF
disarmament had begun, although he was not quite sure of the date. I IMIO
Prosecution Witness TF 1-567
5141. Witness TF 1-567 testified that when LURD was in control of Lofa County in 2000,
Taylor would use helicopters to transport arms and ammunition to Foya, which would then
be trucked into Sierra Leone. He noted that if Benjamin Yeaten was not at Foya, "if there
II390 Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 877; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 894-895.
II3°I Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 877. ’
""’2 Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 907.
II393 Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 905-906.
IIW4 Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 908.
IIM Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5875.
IIM Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5895.
II397 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5897.
Hm Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5896.
II399 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5896-5898.
II400 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5899.

---- End of Page 1760 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T }// -»»‘‘'"'-' * " 18 May 2012

was another commander there like a commander who was called Amphibian Father, he will
be there to organise to see that the ammunition moves across to meet Issa Sesay in Sierra

Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
5142. According to J abaty J award, in December 1999, Jungle and others accompanied
Bockarie when he left Buedu for Monrovia.11402 Jungle said to the witness that he and the
other members of Bockarie's company were going to stay in Liberia for the meantime, as
Bockarie had been removed from membership of the RUF. Jungle also told the witness that
Bockarie warned those that would stay with him in Monrovia not to return to Sierra Leone
as Issa Sesay would do harm to them because they were Bockarie loyalists. 1 14113
The Accused
5143. In response to TF1-516's evidence, the Accused denied that Dopoe Menkarzon,
p Christopher Varmoh and Roland Duoh ever transported ammunition from Liberia to Sierra
Leone. The Accused stated that Duoh, Menkarzon and Varmoh were senior personnel who
would never carry supplies of ammunition across the border.114114 ln particular, Duoh was
one of the most senior generals in the Liberian forces, the chief of staff of the Navy division,
a colleague of Benjamin Yeaten and served as Assistant Secretary of Defence to the
govemment of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.114115 The Accused acknowledged that when LURD
began their attacks, he appointed Roland Duoh to lead units against LURD.114116
5144. The Accused also acknowledged that Christopher "‘Vambos", whom he referred to as
the "Mosquito" in Liberia, knew Bockarie during the period when the NPFL had cooperated
with the RUF and had assisted the Accused in contacting Bockarie in early 1998.11407
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
""°’ TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13109.
11402 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, pp. 13569-13570.
114114 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, p. 13445.
11404 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30454-30455.
114115 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30454-30455.
1141114 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 November 2009, pp. 32045-32046.
114117 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24337-24338.

---- End of Page 1761 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JQ 18 May 2012

5145. According to 1ssa Sesay, in 2001 it was not necessary for the RUF to trade diamonds
for arms and ammunition. They had a supply of arms and ammunition captured from
ECOMOG and government sources in December 1998.mOg The RUF still had arms and
ammunition in 2000 to 2001 left from what they had captured from previous1y.H4O9 Further,
Sesay testified that during 2001, the RUF had already disarmed in some areas: Kambia
District, Lunsar and Tonkolili and they were disarming in Konodmo
5146. Sesay also testified that from December 1999, when Bockarie withdrew from the
RUF, Jungle did not come back to Sierra Leone until the end of disarmament by the
RUF 11411
Defence Witness DCT-008
5147. Witness DCT-008 testified that he did not hear about Yeaten sending Sampson,
Jungle, Dopoe or Zigzag Marzah into Sierra Leone after Bockarie's departure in late 1999.
He likewise never saw any of those, or anyone else, depart for Sierra Leone.l M12
Prosecution Exhibits P-099A and P-099B
5148. Exhibit P-099A is a redacted version of a composition book of handwritten radio
communication between Benjamin Yeaten and 1ssa Sesay. Exhibit P-099B is a redacted
copy of Exhibit P-099A. 1t records a message from "Gen 50 (SSS Director, Lib)" to 1ssa
Sesay on 30 September 2001. In the message, Gen 50 informs Sesay that pursuant to a
telephone conversation the day before, he has despatched:
10 boxes of AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets (All with TNTs) for smooth operation. Colonel Gbovay is en
route together with one of your men (Major Takpor) assigned at Foya Airfie1d.lm3
5149. On the next End of Page, the Exhibit records a message from General "1ssah" Sesay from
"Gen 50" dated 22 October 2001 stating:
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44809-44810, 47195.
"""’ ruuu spsuy, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47193-47195.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47193-47195.
Wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45078 (PS); Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47229.
Hm DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 2010, p. 47624.
Wm Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Communication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Pub1ic", ERN 19181.

---- End of Page 1762 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T F / 18 May 2012

Be info that your men headed by Col [illegible] have retreated from Guinea leaving no security at the border.
This man appear not to be under control. 1 have leamt that there has been a serious fighting going on in Foya
Airfield between Col [illegible] and some APL commanders.I MM
5150. Exhibit P—099A was adduced through radio operator TF1—516, who testified that his
task from mid—1999 was to receive messages from, and transmit messages to, RUF leaders
in Sierra Leone, specifically Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, on behalf of Benjamin
Yeaten.H4l5 He affirmed that the Exhibit belonged to him.ll4l° TF1—516 testified that "50"
was a code name for Benjamin Yeaten.ll4l7 TF1—516 testified that the messages dated 30
September 2001 and 22 October 2001 was received from Base 1, and was to be relayed to
Issa Sesay's radio station in Buedu.ll4l8 He explained that this was the period when "we
were in Buedu and the forces, Amphibian Father and others, fought hard to retake Foya, so
they were still in Foya together with the RUF fighters who were there". He testified that the
message was received in code, transcribed and remained in the book until handed over to the
OTP 11419
5151. The Defence challenged the reliability of the Exhibit at Trial, noting that although
labelled as a 96—End of Page exercise book, it contained only 44 End of Pages.H420 The witness explained
that the two radio messages recorded had long been written on two End of Pages in an older
com osition book. He then tore out of that book a number of a es. The book was then
P P S
reproduced into a new composition book, what is now Exhibits P—99A and P—99B, by
Rebecca, a girl staying with the witness who wanted to be trained in signal communication,
in 2001 .1 ml The witness himself added some notes to the new notebook.ll422
Deliberations
5152. The Trial Chamber recalls that the majority of the witnesses who testified to seeing,
inter alia, Tamba, Marzah and Weah deliver supplies to the RUF largely limit their evidence
Him Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Communication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Public", ERN 19182.
**4*5 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6862.
**4*6 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6864-6865.
**4*7 T1=1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6858-6860.
**4** TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7109-7111.
**"*" TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7112-7113.
***2° TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7218.
**42* T1¤1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7218-7221.
***22 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7261-7262.

---- End of Page 1763 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (Rf ,.;*4 18 May 2012
...-
//4 |

to the years 1998 to 1999. Only Joseph Marzah and TF1-516 directly testified as to the
continuation of the delivery of supplies by these persons after Bockarie left the RUF in
December 1999.11423
5153. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that the testimony of Joseph Marzah should be
treated with caution.l 1424 The Trial Chamber also has doubts conceming his evidence as to
delivering materiel during Issa Sesay's reign as leader. \Vhile Marzah indicates that he
received instructions to deliver arms and ammunitions "[w]hen Issa Sesay was there",ll425
he does not give evidence of any particular instance in which he successfully carried out
these orders. Marzah only testified to Taylor sending for Sesay under the pretense of
supplying materiel as a ruse for Marzah to carry out the execution of Sesay around the end
of 2002. Marzah's account of this incident is confusing and unclear and he was not cross-
examined on his testimony as to the event.
5154. To the extent of Marzah's continued involvement in the supply of materiel to the
RUF in 2000 to 2001, Marzah's account is corroborated by TF1-516. The Trial Chamber
had no general reservation about the credibility of TF1-516.11426 ln the Trial Chamber's
view, TF1-516 gave a credible and consistent account. As the basis for his knowledge, TF1-
516 testifies that as radio operator, he facilitated direct conversations between Sesay and
Yeaten in which Sesay requested materiel. TF1-516 testified that from mid-199911427 to
January 2001,11428 he had been assigned by Sesay to Monrovia to work for Yeaten as a radio
operator.H429 The Trial Chamber considers that TF1-516's assignment by 1ssa Sesay as
Yeaten's radio operator during this time, and living in Benjamin Yeaten's compound,ll43O
makes him a reliable witness as to whether requests for materiel were made and satisfied,
how they were satisfied and Yeaten's daily activities in general. Hence, while the Trial
Chamber is sceptical as to Marzah's account of being ordered to execute Issa Sesay, it
Hm However, some witnesses testify as to the continued involvement of Jungle and Marzah in facilitating Issa
Sesay's trips to Liberia. see Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-2032; TF1-371, Transcript 29
January 2008, p. 2458 (CS).
Him Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268.
M25 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5895.
Him Credibility Assessment, TF1-516, paras 275-284.
"427 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7168-7169.
***28 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7066.
H429 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7009 (The witness describes his duties while working for Benjamin
Yeaten).
"""’ TF1-516, Transcript 15 April 2008, p. 7638.

---- End of Page 1764 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T i 18 May 2012
/YiV

59 8 5 if
accepts his evidence, which is corroborated by TF1-516, as to being involved in the
transportation of materiel after December 1999.
5155. For their submission that Tamba had by this time permanently left the RUF, the
Defence relies primarily on the evidence of DCT-008 and J abaty J award. The Trial Chamber
is not satisfied that the evidence of these two witnesses is probative of this assertion. DCT-
008 merely states that he did not hear about Jungle returning to Sierra Leone after
Bockarie's departure in late 1999, which is not inconsistent with the possibility that Jungle
did resume his role, absent the knowledge of DCT-008. Similarly Jaward's evidence that
Jungle decided to stay with Bockarie in Liberia does not preclude the possibility that he
undertook further assignments to deliver materiel. I ml
5156. Two witnesses, Varmuyan Sherif and TF1-567, corroborated TF1-516's account that
Roland Duoh (a.k.a. Amphibian Father) was involved in the delivery of arms and
ammunitions to the RUF on the instructions of the Accused. According to TF1-567, the
Accused sent materiel to the RUF because the RUF was assisting Liberia in repelling the
LURD forces. Duoh, along with Benjamin Yeaten and other Liberian commanders, would
ensure that the ammunition moved across the border. I M2 Varmuyan Sherif also testified that
Duoh was involved in the transport of ammunition to repel the LURD insurgents, but his
evidence did not specify whether Duoh was transporting ammunition to the Liberian groups
fighting in Lofa County or to the RUF contingents supporting them.ll433 Nonetheless, in
light of the three witnesses who testified as to Roland Duoh's involvement in ensuring the
transportation of arms and ammunition to repel the LURD during this period, the Trial
Chamber does not consider credible the Accused's assertion, uncorroborated by other
evidence, that Duoh was too senior to be involved in such tasks.
5157. Similarly, the Trial Chamber does not consider credible the Accused's assertion that
Christopher Varmoh was too senior to be involved in such tasks. The Trial Chamber notes
also that although there is no specific corroboration of TF1-516's evidence that Varmoh was
involved in supply of materiel in 2000 and 2001, according to TF1-371, Varmoh was one of
the Liberians accompanying Bockarie when he returned with the supply of arms and
H4} I See supra, The Role of Intermediariest Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).
Hm TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13109.
M3 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 906-908.

---- End of Page 1765 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jh /6 18 May 2012

ammunitions from the Burkina Faso shipment in November/December 1998, along with
Marzah, Weah and Tamba.l 1434
5158. The Trial Chamber has also had regard to Exhibit P-099A, documenting a radio
message from Benjamin Yeaten to Issa Sesay in September 2001 stating that he had
despatched ammunition, via Colonel Gbovay and one of Sesay's men.H435 The radio
messages indicate that Sesay's forces were at this time cooperating with Yeaten in relation
to operations in Liberia and Guinea.ll436 In a separate part of the Judgement, the Trial
Chamber has satisfied itself of the reliability of Exhibit P-099A.H437 The Trial Chamber
considers this contemporary documentary evidence to be particularly valuable corroboration
of the oral evidence conceming continued delivery of materiel during Sesay's administration
as leader.
5159. On the basis of TF1-516's and Joseph Marzah's testimony, and the contemporary
documentary evidence in Exhibit P-99A as to the supply of materiel by the Accused and the
Accused's subordinates to Sesay for the purpose of operations outside of Sierra Leone,ll438
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that that the Accused did send supplies to the RUF via persons
such as Benjamin Yeaten and Roland Duoh during 2000 to 2001.
Quantity of materiel supplied
5160. As to the quantity of materiel, the Trial Chamber notes that TF1-516, Joseph Marzah
and TF1-567 did not give any evidence as to the amount of ammunition sent or the
frequency with which it was sent. According to Varmuyan Sherif, while fighting the LURD
with the RUF, he received arms and ammunitions totalling not less than 250 bags of AK 47,
Hm TPI-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2404-2405 (CS).
Hm Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Communication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Public", ERN 19181.
{1436 Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Communication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Public", ERN 19182.
Hm See supra, Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Operations
Outside of Sierra Leone.
Hm ln addition to the testimony of TPI-567 and Varmuyan Sherif, see also TFl-338, Transcript 2 September
2008, pp. 15163-15164, 15218 (CS).

---- End of Page 1766 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4*, A 18 May 2012 A

1 50 RPG bomb and sometimes received 300 arms for army division from the Accused
himself at his residence.] 1439
5161. However, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that from 2000 to 2001, there were
few military engagements by the RUF in Sierra Leone itself and also that there was little
evidence of crimes within the scope of the Indictment committed during this period.lM40
Notably, even TF1—516 does not give evidence that any of the ammunition transported by
alleged intermediaries during this period was used in Sierra Leone. According to all three
witnesses, the supplies were used by Liberian soldiers and RUF in Buedu in efforts to regain
control of Foya.H44l TF1—516 testified that some materiel was also supplied to the RUF by
Yeaten to be used in an operation in Guinea.l *444
5162. The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that large amounts of materiel were delivered to
the RUF during 2000 and 2001.
Findings
5163. The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused continued to
deliver arms and ammunition to the RUF in 2000 and 2001 via, inter alia, Joseph (a.k.a.
Zigzag) Marzah, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Sampson Weah, Dopoe Menkarzon, Roland
Duoh (a.k.a. Amphibian Father) and Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian
Mosquito).However, There is insufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the amounts of materiel delivered were large.
(ii) Alleged trip by Issa Sesay to Liberia in May 2000
Submissions of the Parties
5164. The Prosecution contends that the Accused began provisioning Issa Sesay before
Sesay became interim leader of the RUF, when the Accused called him to Monrovia to
explain the arrest of Sankoh in May 2000.11443 The Prosecution submits that at this meeting
11439 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 908.
11440 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes.
11441 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6994~6995; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 899;
TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13109.
**444 rrr-516, rmnsmpt 8 April 2008, p. 6959.
**443 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 274-275.

---- End of Page 1767 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M /_ .,.r~ of 18 May 2012

39860
in Monrovia Sesay complained to the Accused that the UNAMSIL and pro-Govemrnent
forces were still attacking the RUF. The Accused instructed Sesay to appoint a person to go
to Belle Fasama, Liberia11444 with the Accused's subordinate, Assistant Director of the SSS
for intelligence Joe Tuah, to retrieve materiel that the Accused had hidden there. Some of
the materiel was later transported from Foya to Sesay's base in Koidu, Sierra Leone. The
remainder of the retrieved materiel was stored in Foya where the RUF would return for
refill.11445 The Prosecution adduced evidence in relation to this allegation from witnesses
TF1-338, Abu Keita, TF1-567 and Perry Kamara.
5165. The Defence makes no specific submission as to the alleged May 2000 shipment but
challenges the credibility of a number of the witnesses who testify to a shipment at this time.
It also adduced evidence from witnesses Issa Sesay, the Accused and Exhibit D-302.
Evidence »
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -338
5166. TF1-338, an RUF member, testified regarding several trips taken by Issa Sesay to
meet with Taylor, after which Taylor provided Sesay with a supply of arms and ammunition.
5167. The first trip took place in May 2000.11446 TF1-338 testified that Issa Sesay told the
witness that he had been summoned to Monrovia to brief Taylor on Foday Sankoh's
arrest. 1 1441 Sesay travelled with a "delegation" of RUF members to Liberia. They took a UN
vehicle from Koidu Town to Foya and were flown by a "Weasua" branded helicopter to
Monrovia. On arrival, Sesay stayed at the RUF guesthouse at Congo town and he was driven
by Benjamin Yeaten to the Executive Mansion to meet Taylor.11448 Aiier Sesay complained
to Taylor at the meeting that UNAMSIL and pro-Government forces were still attacking the
RUF, Taylor instructed Joe Tuah to retrieve materiel from Belle Fasama, Liberia.11449 This
materiel, which included AK-47 rounds, G3 rounds, RPG rockets and some rifles,114511 was
11444 Charles Taylor confirmed that there is a location called Belle Fasama in Lofa county, Liberia: Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30871.
11445 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 274-275.
11446 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15128.
11441 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15128-15129.
114411 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15130.
11449 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15133-15134; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15206-15207
114§1?1TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15135-15136; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15207-15208

---- End of Page 1768 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JQ / 18 May 2012

36/ 8 6 f
transported back to the Executive Mansion in an eight-tyre truck and then flown to
Foya.H45l Some of that materiel was later transported from Foya to Sesay's base in Kono,
Koidu Town, while the remainder was stored in Foya. I MS2
5168. TF1-338 also testified that Issa Sesay took a second trip to Monrovia, at the end of
May 2000, to discuss with Taylor the release of the UN Peacekeepers. I 1453
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
5169. Abu Keita testified that in May 2000, following the arrest of the peacekeepers,
Marzah and Jungle arrived in Makeni and took Issa Sesay to Liberia. When Sesay returned
to Sierra Leone, he had a satellite phone and fifty boxes of ammunition, which he said had
been issued to him by Charles Taylor. Sesay called a meeting at the Makeni police
headquarters, and announced to his commanders that "Charles Taylor said we should release
the peacekeepers over to him in Liberia". The peacekeepers were driven to the border and
handed over to Benjamin Yeaten and then Joe Tuah in Foya.H454
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -567
5170. Witness TF1-567 testified that while in Liberia, he heard that the RUF had captured
a large number of UN peacekeepers. On learning of the capture of the soldiers, the Accused
summoned Issa Sesay to Monrovia. ln Monrovia, Taylor met with Sesay and Bockarie in an
unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the two men. Taylor requested Issa Sesay to release the
captured peacekeepers, because it would be a great help to Taylor.H455 VVhen Sesay returned
to Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers were brought to Foya and from Foya, airlifted to Spriggs
Payne Field.lI456 Sesay left Monrovia on Taylor's helicopter, which also contained a supply
of ammunition provided by the Accused. The witness stated that he accompanied Sesay
during Sesay's time in Monrovia, travelled with him to Spriggs Payne field and saw the
(PS). K
my TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15136; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15207-15209 (PS).
MS2 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15136.
Hm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15142.
my Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2031-2032.
M55 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13037-13040.
H456 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13040.

---- End of Page 1769 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T jug W 18 May 2012 M

materiel himself in the helicopter. It is not clear whether the witness accompanied Sesay
back to Sierra Leone. I I457
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
5171. Perry Kamara testified that Taylor negotiated the release of the peacekeepers arrested
by Issa Sesay in May 2000 in return for a supply of ammunition. Kamara stated that Taylor
requested Sesay to bring the detained personnel to LiberiaI Im and sent a helicopter, loaded
with ammunition, to Foya to collect them.II459 Kamara testified that, according to Issa
Sesay, Taylor said the RUF should expect further military action as a result of having
"molested" UN personnel and should keep the ammunition from the helicopter to defend
themselves. I I460
5172. Kamara testified that the helicopter sent to pick up these individuals in Foya was
Taylor's helicopter rather than a UN helicopter. He was also in Makeni, not in Foya when
these peacekeepers were picked up and did not personally witness the helicopter coming to
Foya. However, there was a message to the effect that the helicopter had come to Foya to
receive the UN personne1.I I4°I
The Accused
5173. The Accused admitted that he met with Issa Sesay in May 2000, in regards to the P
release of the hostage peacekeepers, on 26 July 2000, on 21 August 2000, and in later
months a few times before the end of the year. According to the Accused, Sesay came in
times of crisis.II462 The Accused denied that he ever gave Sesay any materiel during his
trips to and from Monrovia, refuting in particular TF 1-338's evidence that he met with Issa
Sesay at 10.00pm to11.00pm as he did not meet with leaders at that time. I I463
""" Tri-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13040.
II458 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269.
II459 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270; Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3395.
IMO Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3271.
IMI Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3395-3396.
II462 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, p. 27172; Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28783
(stating that from August to December 2000, Issa Sesay visited Monrovia once or twice as everybody was busy
with disamiament).
II463 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27173-27176; see also Transcript 28 October
2009, pp. 30607-30608 (in response to Karinoh Kanneh's evidence); Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29420-
29422 (in response to Abu Keita's evidence); Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28838 (in response to TF1-567's

---- End of Page 1770 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

5174. The Accused noted in particular with respect to the evidence that he had provided
1ssa Sesay with ammunition before or after the release of the peacekeepers, that it would
make no sense that he would give Sesay ammunition in the midst of an international crisis in
which Liberia and Sierra Leone were being intemationally monitored and in which there
was a large UN and intemational press presence.11464 Taylor further stated in relation to
witnesses who testified that Sesay flew back and forth between Poya and Spriggs Payne
Airport, that at that time the airport was crowded with international diplomats, UN military
ersonnel and media, makin it ver difHcult for him to have loaded a helico ter with
P 8 Y P
ammunition unobserved.1 1465
5175. In response to TP1-567's evidence that Issa Sesay left the meeting with the Accused
in May 2000 with a helicopter load of materiel, the Accused noted that the type of helicopter
used in Liberia in around this time was an Mi-2 helicopter. According to the Accused, Mi-2
aircraft are very small military helicopters and it was not feasible to use these helicopters to
carry passengers as well as a cargo of ammunition. 1 1466
5176. However, later in his testimony, the Accused stated that the Liberian government
was in possession of Mi-2 helicopters from the beginning of 1999,11467 and acquired a larger
model of aircraft known as Mi-8 in 2000 when the Liberian civil war intensified.11468
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5177. Issa Sesay acknowledged that he did go to Monrovia in late May 2000 to discuss the
UN hostage incident11469 but denied retuming with supplies of materiel. According to Sesay,
this was the first time he spoke to Taylor. 1 14711 ~
5178. ln response to TP1-338's evidence, Issa Sesay denied ever receiving instructions
from Taylor to brief him regarding Sankoh's arrest.11471 Further, Sesay denied travelling
evidence); Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29045-29047 (in response to Perry Kamara's evidence).
11164 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, p. 27120.
11465 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29420-29422.
11466 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27119-27120; see also Transcript 14 September
2009, pp. 28803-28804 (PS); Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30596-30597.
11467 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30605.
11468 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30606.
"‘6" ruuu Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46026.
""° ruuu Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43594.
11471 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45212.

---- End of Page 1771 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jg / 18 May 2012

a 42 64
from Foya to Monrovia in a Weasua helicopter and stated that for all the meetings, he was
collected in an ATU helicopter from Foya. 1 1472
5179. Sesay also maintained that he only made one trip to Monrovia to visit Taylor in May
2000 and that was to arrange the release of the UNAMSIL personnel in Kono.H473
5180. ln response to Abu Keita's evidence, Sesay denied that Marzah and Jungle came for
A him in Makeni to go to Liberia. Sesay testified that instead Benjamin Yeaten arrived by
helicopter in Pendembu asking the commander, Dennis Lansana, for Sesay. Yeaten said to
pass a message to Sesay that President Taylor wanted to see him urgently.! W4 Sesay drove
through Kono to Kailahun and crossed the border to Foya, where a helicopter was
despatched to pick him up. According to Sesay, Abu Keita did not come along with Sesay
but instead stayed in Makeni.H475 Sesay denied receiving 50 boxes of ammunition from
Taylor, stating that he was only given $USD 5,000 to cover the costs of transportation of the
captured UNAMSIL personnel. I W6
5181. ln relation to TF1-567's evidence, Sesay denied Taylor asked for the release of the
UN peacekeepers to increase Taylor's international standing. Sesay understood the release
of the UN persomiel to be in the interest of ECOWAS as guarantors of the Lomé Accord and
neither Taylor nor Benjamin Yeaten gave him ammunition on the trip.H477
Prosecution Exhibit P-0457
5182. Exhibit P-0457 is an undated print-out from a website entitled "Asia Trading Post
Online: Russian Helicopter Sales" advertising used and new Russian helicopters. lt
describes and provides specifications for a number of helicopter models. ln relation to the
Mi-2, it states: "The standard passenger version of Mi-2 helicopter has seating for 1 pilot
and 8 passengers. The interior can be quickly converted for transport of 700kg of
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 4521}-45214.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45232-45234.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45599.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45600.
11476 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45601.
uw Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46030-4603l.

---- End of Page 1772 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 177% 18 May 2012

cargo".ll478 Exhibit P-0457 was adduced by the Prosecution through cross-examination of
the Accused.
Defence Exhibit D-3 02
5183. Exhibit D-302 is the Liberian government's reaction to the UN Panel of Experts
Report, dated January 2001, and was adduced through the Accused. In response to
allegations in the Panel of Experts Report that the Liberian government was delivering arms
to the RUF in Sierra Leone via Mi-2 and Mi-17 helicopters, Exhibit D-3 02 states: I 1479
The Government admits that it does have two (2) Mi 2 civilian helicopters, which were acquired almost a year
ago, and two (2) Mi 8 civilian transport helicopters purchased locally five months ago. [...]
The Mi2s are used exclusively for civilian purposes. Govermnent's purchase of the Mi-8s was necessitated by
the intensification in the fighting occasioned by the third invasion of insurgents from Guinea. They were used
to transport supplies and to bring wounded and displaced civilians to Monrovia who had been caught up in the
fighting. [H.}
And it is equally important to note that although the Mi-2's were acquired about a year ago, they do not have
the range or capacity to fly armaments or related material from Monrovia to the Sierra Leonean border; only
the Mi-8's have this capability and they were only acquired a few months ago.
Deliberations
5184. TF1-338, Abu Keita, TF1-567 and Perry Kamara testified to a trip by Issa Sesay to
Liberia in or around May 2000, after which Sesay returned with supplies of materiel,
purportedly from the Accused. The Trial Chamber has previously found that it had no
general reservation about the evidence of these witnesses.l MSO The Trial Chamber notes that
it has addressed the issue of whether the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to release the
UNAMSIL peacekeepers in another section of the Judgement.l MSI
5185. TF1-338's evidence is the most detailed account of what occurred during the alleged
May 2000 trip. Contrary to Issa Sesay's own testimony before this Trial Chamber, TF1-338
stated that Sesay took two trips in May 2000 to Monrovia, with the first occurring some time
after Sankoh's arrest, and the second just before the release by the RUF of the UN
H478 Exhibit P-457, "Excerpts from: Asia Trading Post Online, Russian Helicopter Sa1es", p. 2.
11479 Exhibit D-302, "Pre1iminary Reaction of the Government of Liberia to the report of the Panel of Experts
appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) paragraph 19 in relation to Sierra Leone,
Monrovia, Liberia, 10 January 2001- DCT 1 (64 End of Pages)", paras 95-97.
MSO Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329; Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219;
Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317.
Hm See supra, Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000).

---- End of Page 1773 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T lm / 18 May 2012

peacekeepers. The Trial Chamber has previously discussed its concerns regarding the
eneral credibilit of 1ssa Sesa and considers that his evidence re uires corroboration.H482
8 Y Y Cl
The Trial Chamber notes that Sesay himself provided contradictory accounts about his travel
to Monrovia in May 2000. At his own trial, Sesay said that he travelled to Monrovia twice in
May 2000,H483 while in the proceedings before this Trial Chamber, Sesay testified he went
only once because while he did go to Liberia a second time in May, he did not travel further
than Foya, where he released the hostages.H484 The Trial Chamber considers that Sesay's
explanation of this inconsistency is not credible in light of the detail with which he testified
to his two trips to Monrovia in his own trial.
5186. However, two inconsistencies emerge in TF1-338's account of the two trips in May
2000. TF1 -338 stated that at Issa Sesay's first meeting with the Accused, the Accused
criticised the RUF for releasing a British member of the military observer mission to the
1ndian contingent of UNAMSIL, stating that the RUF could have used the man as a
"bargaining chip",H485 yet according to TF1-338 it was not until after Sesay's second trip to
Monrovia in May 2000 that the peacekeepers were ultimately released.H486 The witness was
not questioned again on the release of the British military observer referred to in the first
trip. However, the Trial Chamber observes that other witnesses have testified to the separate
arrest by the RUF of a smaller Indian contingent of peacekeepers and military observers in
addition to the 500 Zambian peacekeepers at Makeni.H487 The Trial Chamber considers that
the release of the British military observer referred to in the witness's account of the first trip
may be explained by the existence of two contingents of peacekeepers that were captured by
the RUF, members of one of which were released prior to the other.H488
5187. Additionally, the Defence highlights TF1-338's contradiction where he told the
Prosecution in prior statements that he first met the Accused in November, but then testified
Hm Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
Him Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, pp. 46895-46896 (Defence counsel reads from Issa Sesay's
testimony in the RUF Trial on 25 May 2007, pp. 87-88).
11484 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45232-45234; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46897.
***85 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15131.
*****6 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15142.
Him DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41970-41972; Martin George also testified that he affected the arrest
of a group of "MILOBs", military observers separately to the 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers, Transcript 28 April
2010, pp. 40192-40194.
***8** TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008. p. 15142.

---- End of Page 1774 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

3 678 6 $6
that he htat mat him in May 2000."‘"*° rrr-2.2.8 taatrhaa that he ahgrhaiiy tara the
Prosecution that he first met the Accused in May, but that they incorrectly recorded it as
November.4444O On cross-examination, the Defence pointed out that when given an
opportunity to correct the date later, the witness did not correct it, although he made a
number of other corrections to the same interview record. 4 4444
5188. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-338 testified with direct knowledge and in
significant detail about the trip in a manner which lent his account credibility. 1-Ie testified
concerning statements made by Taylor concerning Sankoh's arrest, his criticisms of the RUF
officers for releasing a British member of the military observer mission whom Taylor felt
the RUF could have used as a "bargaining chip" for Sankoh's release,44442 the route and
various modes of transportation of the materiel brought by Tuah.44443 ln light of these
considerations, the Trial Chamber considers that TFl-338 gave a credible and consistent
account of the events to which he testified and accepts his explanation as to the incorrect
recording in prior statements of the date of his first meeting with the Accused in May 2000.
5189. The Trial Chamber observes that the accounts by other witnesses as to this May 2000
trip diverge in some respects from TF1-338 and from each other. According to TF1-567,
Sesay was provided with a helicopter loaded with ammunition when he returned from
Monrovia to Foya after the meeting with Taylor to discuss the peacekeepers.4 4494 According
to Abu Keita, Sesay was escorted to Liberia by Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah and Daniel
Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), and brought back a satellite phone as well as fifry boxes of
ammunition, two elements which do not appear in the other three accounts. Abu Keita made
no mention of a helicopter. Perry Kamara also testified that the Accused sent a helicopter,
loaded with ammunition, to Foya,44445 but, unlike other witnesses, Kamara omitted any
account of a trip by Sesay to see the Accused to discuss the release of the peacekeepers4 44%
444449 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1223 citing TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15476 (PS).
4444444 TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15476 (PS).
44444 TFl-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15477-15486 (PS).
44442 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15130-15132.
44444 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15128-15132.
444444 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13040.
44445 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270; Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3395.
444% Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270.

---- End of Page 1775 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4475 / 18 May 2012

and was the only witness to have described materiel from the Accused arriving in the same
helicopter that had come to Foya to pick up the released UN personnel.ll497
5190. The Defence contends that Kamara should not be believed because he claimed that
the helicopter sent to pick up the peacekeepers was the Accused's rather than a UN
helicopter.l M98 The Trial Chamber does not consider this to undermine Kamara's account. lt
notes that even Issa Sesay did not state that the helicopter that transported the peacekeepers
was a UN helicopter. Sesay testified that it was owned by the Liberian government. I iw)
5191. However, that the Accused supplied Sesay with a helicopter loaded with materiel
before the release of the peacekeepers is on the whole consistent amongst all the accounts.
The Trial Chamber notes that Keita testified to being in Makeni when Issa Sesay arrived
with ammunition. ln these circumstances, the failure of Keita to make mention of a
helicopter delivery at Foya is explicable by reference to Keita only witnessing the event
from Sesay's arrival at Makeni. The Trial Chamber accepts that TF1-338, TF1-567, Perry
Kamara and Keita's accounts are sufficiently similar to be corroborative.
5192. As to the Accused's argument that he would have been unable to send materiel via
helicopter to the RUF undetected at this time, the Trial Chamber notes that there is no
specific corroborating evidence that Spriggs Payne airfield was at this time filled with
international persomrel. TF1-597 testified that he knew of an ECOMOG presence at Spriggs
Payne but does not provide a time period for this presence.ll500 However, the testimony of
TF1-338 and TF1-567 is that materiel was flown to Foya in Liberia, not into Sierra Leone,
and internal flights would likely not have attracted the attention that cross-border flights
would have. Further, the Accused himself testified that in 2000 to 2001, LURD was .
attacking Liberia in Lofa County.ll50l As other witnesses testified, materiel was regularly
flown to Foya at this time to supply contingents resisting the LURD.] 1502 ln those
H497 See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's Leadearship
(December 1999-January 2002).
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 898, 1127.
""9"1r.sa Sesay, Transcript 26 Jury 2010, pp. 44538-44539.
"5°" TF1-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp. 21108-21110.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28803.
"502 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7025 (TF1-516 testified that on one occasion, he saw Momoh Gibba
and Benjamin Yeaten load rifles onto an aircraft at James Spriggs Airport which was flown to Foya); Varinuyan
Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 907 (Roland Duoh would transport the ammunition to Foya from James
Spring Field to fight the LURD insurgents); TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13109 (when LURD was in
control of Lofa County in 2000, Taylor would use helicopters to transport arms and ammunitions to Foya, which
/

---- End of Page 1776 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1 18 May 2012

circumstances, the Trial Chamber considers it was possible for the Accused to send materiel
to Foya without arousing suspicions that he was dealing with the RUF. In light of these
considerations, the Trial Chamber does not accept the Accused's evidence that he could not
have sent the RUF materiel at this time.
5193. As to the Accused's argument that the Liberian government in May 2000 had no
helicopters which were capable of carrying a cargo of ammunition and passengers, the Trial
Chamber recalls its previous concerns regarding the inconsistencies in the Accused's
testimony as to the dates at which the Liberian government first acquired particular types of
helicopters. The Accused's evidence was first that in 2000, the Liberian government only
had available Mi-2 helicopters, which did not have the range or capacity to fly armaments or
other materiel from Monrovia to the Sierra Leonean border.H503 However, later in his
testimony, the Accused stated that the Liberian government acquired larger sized Mi-8
helicopters in 2000.H504 ln light of the conflicting testimony of the Accused, the Trial
Chamber considers that the Accused's claim that he did not have a larger-sized helicopter in
May 2000 is not credible.
5194. Based on TF1-338's account, which the Trial Chamber finds to be credible, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that the Accused provided Issa Sesay with a helicopter loaded with
materiel when Sesay travelled to Liberia in May 2000.
Findings
5195. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Issa Sesay made a trip to
Liberia in May 2000 in which he obtained arms and ammunitions from the Accused.
(iii) Alleged trips by Issa Sesay in second half of 2000 to 2001
Submissions of the Parties
5196. The Prosecution alleges that Sesay continued to travel to Monrovia to meet with and
obtain materiel supply from the Accused in exchange for diamonds up to December
would then be tmcked into Sierra Leone).
11503 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 August 2009, p. 27808; Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30596-
30597.
HSM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30606.

---- End of Page 1777 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T _ 18 May 2012

2001.1 ISGS The Prosecution submits that at the end of 2000, Sesay travelled to Monrovia and
provided diamonds to Taylor, whereupon Yeaten and Sesay went to Camp Schefilein to
obtain large quantities of materiel, boots and uniforms which were transported by helicopter
to Foya.H5O6 It further submits that Sesay also travelled to Monrovia to meet with the
Accused in early 2001, and at the end of 2001, when, in retum for diamonds, the Accused
provided Sesay with arms and ammunition.l 1507 The Prosecution adduced evidence in
relation to this allegation from witnesses TF1-338, Karmoh Karmeh and TF1-371.
5197. The Defence submits that due to a lack of military operations in 2000 and 2001, and
"evidence of few atrocities against civilians", the RUF had no need to obtain large quantities
of arms and ammunitions. The arms and ammunitions it did obtain were captured from
ECOMOG soldiers, or taken from UN peacekeepers in May 2000.1 ISGS
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -338
5198. Witness TF1-338 testified that at the end of 2000,11509 Issa Sesay went again to see
Taylor at the Executive Mansion, delivering a parcel of diamonds.ll5l0 The witness stated
that Sesay "expected that the diamonds presented to Mr Taylor were for arms and
ammunition and food",ll5ll and told Taylor that the RUF lacked "materials" and "enemies
were threatening their positions".l mz Taylor told Sesay that the diamonds were to remain in
Taylor's safekeeping until Foday Sankoh's retum, but he would speak to Benjamin Yeaten
conceming the shortage of materiel.H5l3 After the meeting, Sesay travelled with Yeaten to
Camp Schefilein, a barracks in Monrovia, where they collected uniforms, boots, AK 47
rounds in large quantities, G3 rounds and RPG rockets, some of which were loaded on the
ATU helicopter and transported to Foya and to Sierra Leone.H5l4 Issa Sesay took some of
11505 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 278-279.
11506 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 278.
11507 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 279.
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 279.
**5°° TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15156.
**5*** TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15158.
**5** TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15157.
Hm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15161.
**5*3 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15162.
**5*** TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15162-15163.

---- End of Page 1778 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

these supplies to Koidu Town. Some of this materiel was used in the mission in Guinea, and
some remained in Liberia for RUF forces assisting in the fight against LURD rebels. Some
was used in Sierra Leone to fight against the Kamajors and UNAMS1L.l *5*5
5199. Another trip took place in early 2001.H5l6 After Issa Sesay handed Taylor another
arcel of diamonds,ll5 N Sesa briefed Taylor concemin the remainin threat posed b
P Y Y 8 8 Y
Kamajors. The next day, Issa Sesay boarded an ATU helicopter loaded with arms and
ammunition (AK rifles, G3 rifles, G3 rounds and RPG rockets, diesel, bags of rice) to Foya
and then retumed to Sierra Leone by road. These ammunitions and arms were used to attack
Kamajors and UNAMSIL peacekeepers and the remainder were stored in Koidu town.l I5 lg
5200. TF1-338 also testifred to a trip by Issa Sesay to Monrovia in 2001 at Benjamin
Yeaten's invitation. On this trip, Benjamin Yeaten told Sesay that Charles Taylor wanted
Sesay to use the materiel Taylor had given him to attack Guinea.H5 19 Issa Sesay then
planned attacks at Pamelap and Kissidougou. The attacks were carried out successfully at
the end pt 2001 . ‘ *520
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
5201. Karmoh Kanneh testified that in the second half of 2000,H52l he met Issa Sesay in
Monrovia and they returned to Sierra Leone together with a supply of arms and ammunition.
He travelled to Monrovia after a successful mission as Brigade commander in Kolahun as a
result of which RUF and Liberian forces captured Voinjama from the LURDH522 Kamieh
reported the success of the mission to Benjamin Yeaten, who took him to Monrovia to meet
Taylor because Yeaten was so happy with the outcome. They took vehicles to Foya and then
flew by helicopter from Foya to Monrovia. Kanneh and Yeaten then went to White Flower.
MI5 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15163-15164; Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15218 (CS).
"5‘° TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15164.
"5" TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008,p. 15165.
Hm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15166-15167.
Hm TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15177; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15217-15218 (CS).
Hm TF1-33 8, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15179; Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15218 (CS).
""‘ kermeb Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9509-9511.
Hm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9473-9477.

---- End of Page 1779 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % W 18 May 2012

They were met at Benjamin Yeaten's place at the back of the President's house by Issa
S€S&y·11$23
5202. Kanneh was in Monrovia for about four to five days but his meeting with the
President was ultimately cancelled.H524 Kanneh was staying at Benjamin Yeaten's house,
and would hear Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay say they were going to meet Taylor at the
mansion. They met with Taylor twice. Kanneh did not find out what was discussed in those
meetings. 1 B25
5203. Kanneh saw military equipment at the back of Taylor's house, including AK rounds,
RPG rockets, new AK machine guns, RPG tubes and grenades. I 1526 Kanneh saw the materiel
at the back of White Flower being loaded into two vehicles — a van and a jeep — by "ATU
boys", Zigzag Marzah and the Director's bodyguards. Once the van and jeep were loaded, a
second jeep arrived and Kanneh, Issa Sesay and Benjamin Yeaten and his securities
travelled in this second jeep to the centre of town, to the same iield where the helicopter
would land. I 1527
5204. Upon arrival at the field, the materiel was transferred to the helicopter. Kanneh was
concerned about this amount of weapons going to Siena Leone because there was a
ceasefire, but he did not ask because he was just a junior man.H528 Issa Sesay, and some
soldiers, as well as the witness, boarded the helicopter and flew to Foya. Benjamin Yeaten
stayed behind.l up Upon landing in Poya, they met vehicles which had come from Kailahun
and loaded the materiel into the vehicles. They waited until evening to travel because Issa
Sesay was afraid that they would be seen by UNAMSIL travelling with arms} mo
5205. That night, they moved to Pendembu where Kanneh stayed. The others continued on
their journey. Kanneh did not ask why that materiel was brought to Sierra Leone but later
Hm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9482-9486.
11524 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9478·9482.
Hm 1**526 111527 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9503-9504.
**528 111529 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, p. 9505.
11530 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9505-9506.

---- End of Page 1780 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J ® 18 May 2012

on, Issa Sesay visited Kanneh on his base in Pendembu and told Kanneh that Taylor had
given the materiel for the RUF to attack Guinea from Sierra Leone.11531
5206. According to Kanneh, the operation to attack Guinea took place some time in 2001.
Kanneh did not participate because he was in Pendembu. He did not personally see the
materiel brought from Monrovia being used in the operation. 1 1532
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
5207. Witness TF1-371 testified that at some point in 2001, Issa Sesay told Mike Lamin
about money expected from the Accused in exchange for diamonds. Jungle and Lamin
travelled to Monrovia. 1 1533 Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Mike Lamin met with the Accused
at midnight at his White Flower residence. The Accused inquired about the disarmament
process, and Issa Sesay said they had disarmed about 40 percent. Issa Sesay told the
Accused that they needed about SUSD 100,000 for the men, and the Accused instructed
Benjamin Yeaten to give the RUF members EBUSD 50,000 to pay for the items that Issa
requested. 1 1534
5208. According to TF1-371, Sesay told him that he was sending most of the diamonds
mined by the RUF to buy food and pay for arms because there was still fighting against
UNAMSIL.11535 One time Benjamin Yeaten gave the RUF ammunition to attack the
govemment of President Lansana Conte in Guinea.11536
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5209. Issa Sesay testified that as interim leader, he made five to six trips to Liberia but
maintained that he never brought ammunition back with him to the RUF. 1 1537 He denied ever
receiving instructions from Taylor to brief him regarding Sankoh's arrest.11S38 Further, Sesay
denied ever travelling from Foya to Monrovia in a Weasua helicopter and stated that for all
11531 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9506-9507.
11532 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9516-9517.
11533 TFl—371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2458 (CS).
**534 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2453-2454 (cs).
11535 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2926-2927 (CS).
**536 rrr-371, Transcript 29 January 2008,pp. 2457-2458 (CS).
11537 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46002.
11538 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p, 45212.

---- End of Page 1781 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M? 18 May 2012

the meetings, he was collected in an ATU helicopter from Foya.44539 Issa Sesay's testimony
1 also challenged that of TF1-338 concerning these trips.
5210. ln response to Karmoh Karmeh's evidence that on one trip to Liberia to collect arms
in the second half of 2000, he and Sesay waited until evening to travel with ammunitions
from Monrovia because UNAMSIL was patrolling the area,44540 Sesay maintained that from
September to December 2000 there were no UNAMSIL personnel in Kailahun.
5211. ln response to the evidence of TFl-371, Sesay denied that he told TFl-371 about
trips that he had made to Monrovia with diamonds.4 4544
Deliberations
5212. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings as to the credibility of the witnesses relied on
by the Prosecution and Defence.44542 While the Trial Chamber had no general reservation
about TF1-371, TF1-338 and Karmoh Kanneh's evidence, the Trial Chamber has previously
discussed its concerns regarding the general credibility of Issa Sesay and considers that his
evidence must not be relied upon without corroboration.
5213. TF1-338 and Karrnoh Karmeh both testified in relation to specific trips in the second
half of 2000. According to TF1-338, Sesay went to see Taylor again at the end of 2000,44543
and in early 2001,44544 during which he obtained materiel. While TF1-338 also testified as to
a fourth trip by Sesay to Liberia to see Benjamin Yeaten some time close to the end of
2001,44545 he said that no materiel was obtained during this trip. Karmoh Karmeh also
testified that in the second half of 2000,44546 he met Issa Sesay in Monrovia and they
returned to Sierra Leone together with a supply of arms and ammunition.
5214. Karmeh's and TF1-338's accounts of the trip in late 2000 are too divergent to be .
accounts of the same trip. ln both accounts Sesay met with Taylor and flew from Monrovia
**"" rsss Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45213-45214.
44540 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9505-9506.
**5** rsss Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45098-45099.
44542 Credibility Assessment, TF 1-338, paras 318-329; Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226;
Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372; Credibility Assessment, Karmoh Kanneh, The Role of
lntermediaries, para, 2704.
44544 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15156.
44544 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15164.
44545 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15177; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15217-15218 (CS).

---- End of Page 1782 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T l% 18 May 2012

to Foya with a helicopter loaded with arms and ammunition. However, according to TF1—
338, Sesay and Yeaten together went to Camp Schefflein to pick up a large supply of arms
and ammunition,H547 while in Ka1meh's account, the military equipment that was loaded
into the helicopter came from the back of Taylor's house.l lm
5215. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross—examination, Kanneh admitted that this trip in
the second half of 2000 took place when disarmament was underway and Kanneh was
involved in monitoring the ceasefire and disarmament process. When asked why he would
be involved in the collection of arms and ammunitions at this point, Kanneh consistently
maintained that he did not travel to Monrovia intending to pick up materiel and was
surprised when Sesay brought back a supply with him on their way back to Sierra
Leone.ll549 This explanation comports with Kanneh's testimony that Issa Sesay instructed
the RUF to delay disarmament in Kailahun in order to carry out operations in Guinea,H55O
and the Trial Chamber does not consider that this is a discrepancy in the witness's account.
5216. On cross—examination, the Defence pointed out a number of other inconsistencies
between TF1—338's evidence as to Issa Sesay's trips to Monrovia and his prior statements to
the Prosecution,H55l but were not able to seriously challenge his account of the May 2000
trip. The Trial Chamber considers that the level of detail that the witness was able to provide
conceming the meetings between Issa Sesay and the Accused lends his account credibility.
The Trial Chamber notes that aspects of his evidence are also corroborated by TF1—516.H552
5217. The Trial Chamber accepts that Kanneh's and TF1—338's accounts of Sesay's
joumeys to Liberia consistently establish that Sesay travelled by helicopter from Foya to
Monrovia and flew back with supplies of ammunition loaded onto the helicopter. Their
testimony that Sesay obtained materiel from Liberia during this period, sometimes in
exchange for diamonds, is also supported by the evidence of TF1—371 that Sesay had been
"5"° Kalman K3HH€h, rlallaanlpl 12 May 2008, pp. 9509-9511.
11547 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15162—15163.
M8 Kalman Kalman, rlallaanlpl 12 May 2008, pp. 9498-9500.
""° Kalman Kalman, rlallaanlpl 12 May 2008, pp. 9608-9612.
""° Kalman Kalman, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9511-9513, 9547-9548.
my TF1—338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15388-1539O (PS) (The Defence pointed out that before this
Chamber, TF1—338 stated that Issa Sesay did not take diamonds to the Accused until some time in late 2000 or
early 2001 although, in a prior statement, he told the Prosecution that Sesay had taken diamonds to see the
Accused when they met concerning Foday Sankoh's arrest in June 2000. TF1—338 maintained that he had not
told the Prosecution about any exchange of diamonds on this trip, or that the trip was in June).
**52 TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6947-6951.

---- End of Page 1783 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % \§_Q 18 May 2012

56] 8 7%
given materiel by Benjamin Yeaten to carry out Operations in Guinea.l 1553 The Trial
Chamber notes that while none of these witnesses directly mentioned that Taylor supplied
arms and ammunitions to Issa Sesay, their accounts strongly implicate his involvement.
TF1-338 testified that on Sesay's trip at the end of 2000 Taylor told Sesay he would speak to
Yeaten concerning Sesay's need for materiel, and Sesay then travelled with Yeaten to c0llect
materiel from Camp Scheff`lein.H554 Similarly, Kanneh testified that Yeaten and Issa Sesay
met with Taylor twiceH555 before picking up military equipment at the back of Taylor's
house.l 1556
5218. TF1-371 testified Only as to Yeaten's involvement in supplying ammunition. The
Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Defence arguments and the evidence of DCT-008
d0 not in themselves establish that Yeaten was engaged in the trade of arms and ammunition
for the RUF independently and without the knowledge of the Accused.H557 ln this instance,
the Defence has not pointed to any evidence indicating that Yeaten was acting outside the
scope of his auth0rity as the Accused's subordinate. Given the general evidence that he was
subject to Taylor's auth0rity, and that many of Yeaten's dealings with the RUF were
conducted with the involvement of the Accusedl 1558 the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that in
the specific instance described by TF1-371, Yeaten was acting without the approval 0r
knowledge of the Accused.
5219. Based on Kanneh and TF1-338's account, which the Trial Chamber finds to be
credible, as well as the corroborative value of TF1-371 's evidence and the Trial Chamber's
previ0us findings concerning the relationship between Benjamin Yeaten and the Accused,
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused supplied Issa Sesay with military equipment
when he travelled to Liberia in the second half of 2000 and early 2001.
Quantity of materiel supplied
5220. The Trial Chamber notes that nearly all of the witnesses who testified that Sesay
brought materiel back from Liberia to Sierra Leone agreed that the materiel was transported
H553 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2457-2458 (CS).
H554 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15162.
M55 Kami0h Karmeh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9497-9498.
H556 Kami0h Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9498-9500.
H557 See supra, The R01e of Intemiediaries: Benjamin Yeaten.
H558 See supra, The R01e of Intemiediaries: Benjamin Yeaten.

---- End of Page 1784 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1784 ,_/ 18 May 2012

by helicopter irom Monrovia to Foya before being taken across the border.ll559 This is
consistent with the testimony of other witnesses that ammunition supplies were flown to
Foya via helicopter from 1999 when insurgent attacks on Lofa County made the roads
impassable.H56O The witnesses’ evidence as to the quantity of materiel brought to Sierra
Leone varies. TFl-338 states that in May 2000, the materiel was transported in an eight-tyre
truck. Kanneh states that in 2000, two vehicles — a van and a jeep · were required to
transport the materiel to the airport on that trip.l ISM However, according to Abu Keita, the
materiel brought back by Sesay totalled only 50 boxes of ammunition.H562 None of the
witnesses testified that the helicopters made repeat flights solely to pick up military
equipment.
522l. Some evidence was adduced before the Trial Chamber as to the size of the
helicopters involved in the transport of materiel. The Accused stated that the type of
helicopter used in Liberia around this time was too small to carry passengers as well as a
cargo of ammunition.ll563 The Prosecution put to the Accused during cross-examination the
possibility that even if a Mi-2 was carrying passengers it would still have weight capacity to
carry cargo. lt sought to rely on the statement in Exhibit P-0457 that the interior of a Mi-2
could "be quickly converted for transport of 700 kilos of cargo". The Trial Chamber
considers, and as it also noted during the trial,l 1564 that it is not evident lrom the statement
in Exhibit P-0457 that once converted to transport cargo a Mi-2 helicopter was still capable
of carrying the same number of passengers, or indeed any number of passengers. However,
H559 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15136; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15207-15209 (PS)
(materiel was transported back to the Executive Mansion in an eight-tyre truck and then flown to Foya on the
chopper); Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15162-15163; TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13040; Perry
Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270; Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3395; Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript
12 May 2008, pp. 9504-9505; but see Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2031-2032, who did not see
the materiel arrive in Foya.
HSGO TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6955; TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13109 ("lf the road was not
clear, that was the reason why Charles Taylor had helicopters. We would load the arms and ammunition there
and then they will fly it straight to Foya").
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9503-9504.
**562 Abu Keira, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2031-2032.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27119-27120; Transcript 26 August 2009, pp.
27806-27808 (The Accused explains that Liberian Government received two Mi-2 civilian helicopters in 2000
which could not carry more than 10 people, and could not have been used to transport arms).
HSM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 January 2010, pp. 33723-33730.

---- End of Page 1785 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z WQ 18 May 2012

as the Trial Chamber has found, the contradictory testimony of the Accused undermines his
claim that he did not have a larger—sized helicopter in 2000.l M65
5222. The only other witness to testify to the size of helicopters was TF1—516, who noted
that of the three types of helicopters used to transport materiel in Liberia during 1999 to
2000, SSS helicopters were of` a smaller size than the ATU helicopters, and could only
transport, at most, five personsl IS66
5223. In light of the lack of evidence, the Trial Chamber is unable to draw any conclusions
as to the quantity of any of the supplies of` arms or ammunition brought back by Issa Sesay
on his trips to Liberia.
Findings
5224. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that Issa Sesay made at least two
trips to Liberia in the second half of 2000 and in early 2001 during which he obtained anns
and ammunition supplied by the Accused. However, there is insufficient evidence to
establish the quantity of materiel received by Sesay from the Accused on his trips to Liberia
during 2000 and 2001.
(iv) Alleged trips by Issa Sesay's subordinates
Submissions of the Parties
5225. The Prosecution submits that during Issa Sesay's reign as Interim Leader, his
subordinates also transported materiel provided by the Accused from Liberia to Sierra
Leone.H5(’7 The Prosecution relies on the account of Albert Saidu that Issa Sesay in 2000
sent him to deliver a letter to Yeaten in Vahun requesting ammunition and medicine, which
was immediately provided, and also on the evidence of TF1—3 75 and TFl—567 that they were
personally involved in the transportation of arms and ammunition during this period.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
M65 See supra,"Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's
Leadership (December 1999—January 2002).

---- End of Page 1786 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T M QQ 18 May 2012

5226. Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant,H568 testified that at one point in 2000, Sesay asked
him to deliver a letter to Benjamin Yeaten, whom the witness referred to as "General 50", in
Vahun. This 0ccurred sh0rtly after Sesay was notified of CDF attacks against the RUF at
Segbwema.ll5°9 Saidu travelled by motorcycle with another member of the RUF, Prince
K0sia, to Vahun, met with Yeaten and gave him the letter. The following m0rning, Yeaten
rovided him with two vehicles a Land Rover and a Hilux ick-u truck l0aded with
P P P
ammunition and fuel, and referred to these supplies as "the things y0u have come for".
Yeaten's men drove the vehicles to B0maru where the ammunition was off-l0aded and taken
to Pendembu and Kono.l mo Later, Saidu was asked by Issa Sesay to meet the first brigadier
commander Dennis at Pendembu, who distributed to Saidu and another C0mmand0 at
Segbwema fifty AK-47 rifles that they brought back to Segbwema and kept until the final
disarmament in 2001.115 H According to Saidu, they experienced no further attacks by the
CDF and did not use the rif1es.ll572
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -567
5227. Witness TF1-567 testified that while he was in Monrovia during 2000, he began
P transporting weapons over a peri0d of about a yearllm lf Issa Sesay wanted arms and
ammunition, he would pass on the message to Benjamin Yeaten who would then pass it 0n
to Taylor. According to TF1-567, Yeaten would tell him that "his dad had said he would
solve the problem", and then Yeaten would give ammunition to the witness. S0metimes
TFl-567 would bring the ammunition to Sesay while at other times, Sesay would come pick
it up in Monrovia. The witness c0llected the ammunition "many times".ll574 The witness
would pick up the ammunition from a weapons depot near the Executive Mansion where the
ATU were based, named Pr0ton, sometimes from a house at the side of White Flowerll575
***°° TF1-516, Tpannpnpt 8 April 2008, pp. 6968-6970.
H567 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 276-277, 279.
H568 Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10887-10888; Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
***°° Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11105-11106.
H570 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11107-11110.
HSM Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11110-11111.
****2 Aman Saidu,Tra11script5 Jnna 2008, pp. 11111-1 1 112. .
**5** TF1-567, rrrannpnpt 7 July 2008, pp. 13110-13112.
**5** TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12991-12992. _
****5 TF1-567, 'rranapnpt 4 July 2008, p. 12995.

---- End of Page 1787 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T % gg 18 May 2012

3 Ci 8 KO
and sometimes from Taylor's farm, which was located in a village on the way to
Gbarnga. I I576 The witness stated that he always travelled to Proton at night.I I577
5228. Similarly, the witness would travel to White Flower at night. Yeaten would often go
with the witness to White Flower to get anmiunition. If Yeaten was not there, the witness
would get ammunition from G4 Moses or Kai. The witness did not know how many times
he went to White Flower. I I578
5229. The witness did not recall how many times he went to Taylor's farm, but said he did
go there several times. The witness had a pickup truck given to him by Issa Sesay and from
the farm he would take the materiel straight to Issa Sesay in Sierra Leone. He would be
accompanied by two Liberian SS men. The witness drove to Sierra Leone with annnunition
in the pickup truck throughout 2000 and 2001, when Issa Sesay was head of the RUF. II579
5230. On two occasions, TF 1-567 went to Roberts Intemational Airport in the early hours
of the morning and witnessed arms shipments arriving in Monrovia by air. The witness
states that the first consignment went to White Flower in mid-2000 and the second went to
an ATU warehouse.II580 The witness believed that the particular consignment which was
taken to White Flower ended up in Sierra Leone because before that consignment arrived,
the warehouse at White Flower was quite empty; about one month after the consignment
arrived, Issa Sesay requested annnunition which Yeaten supplied from the White Flower
warehouse. I I58I
5231. TF 1-567 testified that after the LURD forces gained control of Lofa County in 2000,
arms and ammunition shipments were either transported by road, or if Yeaten was at F oya,
flown to F oya and then taken across the border by road. He explained that these shipments
were transportable by road because the RUF and Taylor's troops cleared the road of LURD
forces between Voinjama, Kolahun and F oya. I I582
II576 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12996.
II577 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12993-12994.
Img TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12995-12996.
II579 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12996-13000.
IISSO TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13112—13113.
II5$I TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13114-13116.
II582 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13108-13109.

---- End of Page 1788 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % JM) 18 May 2012

5232. From 1999 to 2001, TF 1-567 witnessed "a large amount" of arms and ammunition
transported from Liberia to Sierra Leone. While it was not a scheduled occurrence, any time
Issa Sesay needed ammunition he sent a message to the witness who in tum passed it onto
Taylor. Sometimes this could happen four times a month.] 1583
5233. On cross-examination, the witness acknowledged that he never heard Taylor directly
instructing any person to take materiel from Sierra Leone and his attribution of those arms
and ammunition to Taylor was based on information from third parties. However, he insisted
that he knew that all weapons coming from Yeaten ultimately had approval of Taylor
because that was what Yeaten told him.] 1584
Prosecution Witness TF 1-375
5234. Witness TF 1-375 testified that he was involved in transporting arms and ammunition
to Sierra Leone from Liberia on four occasions.ll585 The first time, in 2000, the witness
carried ammunition (including AK rounds, RPG rockets, and GMG rounds) from White
Flower to Koindu on the instructions of Benjamin Yeaten. The ammunition was loaded into
a Land Cruiser pick-up and the witness turned this materiel over to Issa Sesay's bodyguard,
Bob George, when he arrived at Koindu.l H86
5235. Also in 2000, the witness took ammunition from White Flower to Foya, and then to
Buedu where he gave the ammunition to a man named "CO Fembeh". The ammunition
included AK rounds, GMG and RPG rockets.] IS87
5236. The third time was in early 2001. On the instructions of Yeaten, the witness collected
ammunition from White Flower, with some ATU officers, in an ATU Land Rover Defender
and took it to Issa Sesay in Kono.l *888
5237. The fourth time, in 2001, TF 1-375 was instructed by Yeaten to go to Monrovia to
collect ammunition from the armoury dump and from White Flower. The witness turned
over the ammunition to Issa Sesay's bodyguard, Boise, at Mende Buima. I mg
**888 TF1-567, Transcript 7 Juiy 2008, pp. 13109-13110.
**888 TF1-567, Transcript 7Ju1y 2008, pp. 13097-13098.
**888 TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jump 2008, p. 12659.
Hm TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12659-12660.
Hm TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12660-12662.
**888 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12662-12663.

---- End of Page 1789 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // JM 18 May 2012

The Accused
5238. The Accused testified that he did not provide arms to Issa Sesay during 2000 to
2001. The Accused denied any knowledge of the four alleged arms movements described in
the evidence of TF 1-375.1 15911 He also denied that materiel was ever picked up rrpm White
Flower, as TF 1-375 claimed, distinguishing between the building referred to as White
Flower, which was his residence, and the area surrounding White Flower on which there
were other buildings from which materiel could have been picked up without his
knowledge.11591
5239. In response to the evidence of TF 1-567, he denied providing materiel to the RUF on
the basis that he had no access to materiel to give, these supplies having been destroyed at
the end of 1999 during the disarmament process.11592 He also denied receiving messages
rrpm Issa Sesay through TF 1-567, as TF 1-567 claimed, saying he did not contact or know of
Sesay until May 2000.11593 He also categorically denied that arms and ammunitions were
kept at the Executive Mansion, although the ATU stored materiel at the barracks at the
Executive Mansion Ground.11594 The Accused also denied that arms and ammunitions were
stored at his farm near Gbarnga, as his farm "was not a military post".11595
5240. In response to the evidence of Albert Saidu, the Accused denied any knowledge of
the vehicles, ammunition and fuel given by Yeaten to Saidu.11596
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5241. Issa Sesay denied dealing with Benjamin Yeaten regarding the supply of ammunition
as during the time he met with Benjamin Yeaten the war in Sierra Leone had ceased so there
was no need for ammunition.11597 He denied that any of his subordinates, including TF 1-375
and TF 1-567, brought any supplies of arms or ammunition rrpm Liberia to Sierra Leone.11598
**5*9 rrr-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12663-12664.
115911 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28886-28887.
11591 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28884.
11592 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28786.
11593 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28781—28782.
11594 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28789.
11595 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28799-28800.
115% Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30238-30239.
11597 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46001.
115911 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 46002.

---- End of Page 1790 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /‘/ Jig 18 May 2012

5 Q 88 3
While Sesay confimied that "Boy Creorge" and "Boys" were his bodyguards and "CO
Fembeh" was an RUF member, he stated that none of them were in the locations where and
at the time at which TF1-3 75 claimed to have handed them supplies of materiel. 1 1599 1-Ie also
stated that TF1-567 did not procure or keep custody of ammunition while in Monrovia, nor
_ did TFl-567 have contact with Benjamin Yeaten.11°1111
Deliberations
5242. Conceming TF1-375's evidence on his personal involvement in anns and
ammunition transportation, the Trial Chamber recalls its previous conclusion that TF1-375's
evidence should not be relied upon without corroboration, considering in particular the
witness's tendency to exaggerate his own importance within the RUF and SSS.1161)1 Given
the lack of any supporting evidence for TF1-375's account, the Trial Chamber considers that
TF1-375's evidence as to his role in materiel transportation is another example of such
exaggeration in a manner which is not confimied or corroborated. The Trial Chamber is not
satisfied that he transported arms and ammunitions from White Flower to Sierra Leone on
the instructions of Yeaten.
5243. The Trial Chamber notes that the testimonies of TF1-567 and Albert Saidu are
unusual in that they testify as to transportation of materiel by road during this period, when
other witnesses have testified that, during this period, materiel was largely flown from
Monrovia to Foya due to LURD attacks.11°112 The Trial Chamber notes that while Saidu
testified on direct examination that from 1999, LURD rebels fought in Lofa County
attempting to cut off the RUF supply route,116113 in cross-examination, Saidu insisted that
LURD rebels made no attempt to affect cross-border supply.116114 Saidu was not asked, and
did not explain how Yeaten's men were able to drive two vehicles full of supplies from
Monrovia to Bomaru in Sierra Leone unimpeded, nor did he refer to any difficulty in
transporting these supplies.116115 1-Iowever, TF1-567 explained that he was able to transport
supplies by road during 2000 and 2001 while LURD was in occupation of Lofa County
11599 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46002, 46004, 46005.
111100 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46033-46034.
111111 Credibility Assessment, TFl-375, paras 308-312.
116112 TF1-5 16, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6955.
116113 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1199.
111104 Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 11221-11222.
116115 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. ll 107-1 1 1 10.

---- End of Page 1791 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1791/ j1Q 18 May 2012

because RUF and Liberian troops cleared the road of LURD forces between Voinjama,
Kolahun and Foya.11°116 The Trial Chamber considers that this is a plausible explanation of
how cross-border arms and ammunitions shipments were sustained while LURD was in
occupation of Lofa County, not contradicted by other witnesses. The Trial Chamber accepts
TF1-567's evidence, which corroborates Saidu's testimony that supplies could be taken by
road at this time.
5244. The Trial Chamber considers that Saidu's testimony as to the receipt of ammunition
and medicines from Benjamin Yeaten following a request from Sesay to be clear and
consistent. Further, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Albert Saidu is a generally
credible witness.116117 In cross-examination Saidu was questioned concerning a number of
inconsistencies and omissions,11608 but he did not depart in any significant way from his
account given on direct examination or in his prior statements to the Prosecution. The Trial
Chamber notes that Issa Sesay himself was not questioned on Saidu's evidence.116119
5245. In light of the Trial Chamber's satisfaction as to the credibility of his account and the
corroborative value of TF1-567's evidence as to the transportation of materiel by road, the
Trial Chamber finds that Albert Saidu did bring back ammunition and medicine from Yeaten
in 2000 in response to a request from Issa Sesay.
5246. Similarly, concerning TFl-567, the Trial Chamber notes that no other witness
corroborates his involvement in the transport of materiel. However, the Trial Chamber
recalls that it had no general reservation about the credibility of TF1-56711610 and has no
particular reservation concerning TF1-567's account as to the transportation of materiel. The
witness maintained his position on cross-examination and was able to provide explanations
for apparent inconsistencies, such as the ability to transport materiel across Lofa County
11606 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13108-13109.
11607 Credibility Assessment, Albert Saidu, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2384.
11608 Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, pp. 11265-11269, 11275-11277 (The witness was questioned as to
why one of his prior statements referred to arms and ammunitions being provided by Yeaten while another
statement referred to ammunitions and medicine. The witness maintained that only ammunitions and medicine
were provided); Transcript 9 June 2008, pp. 11265-11269 (The witness admitted that he had not ever served
directly under Issa Sesay, but that he had been ordered to deliver the letter to Liberia by another member of the
RUF, Gbessey Ngobeh. When asked why he was selected to deliver such an important letter, he explained that
he did not know and any other member of the RUF could have been selected. The Defence pointed out that in a
prior statement to the Prosecution he had not referred to travelling with "Prince Kosia" on the trip but he
explained that this was because he was not asked).
11°O9 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 1 1107-11 110.
""‘° Credibility Assessment, rrr-567, psms 313-317.

---- End of Page 1792 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /% 18 May 2012 g

when it was occupied by LURD forces. The witness's careful explanation of how he knew
details such as whether the particular consignment coming into Monrovia by air was taken to
Sierra Leone also lends his account credibility.11611
5247. In light of the Trial Chamber's satisfaction as to the credibility of his account, the
Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that TF1—567 was, on Yeaten's instmctions, involved in
the transportation of materiel to Issa Sesay in Sierra Leone.
Quantity of materiel supplied
5248. In relation to quantity of materiel brought by Saidu and TF1—567, Saidu testified that
he returned with two vehicles (a Land Rover and a Hilux pick-up tmck) loaded with
ammunitions and fuel on his trip to Liberia. He also testified that later he received 50 AK-47
rifles,11612 although it is not clear whether these rifles came from the same shipment that he
retumed with from Liberia. In any event according to Saidu, they did not use the rifles as
there was little further fighting.11616
5249. TF1-567 did not state the amount of materiel he transported during 2000 and 2001.
The Trial Chamber notes that he testified to transporting the materiel in a pickup tmck,11614
that he was involved in transporting weapons over a period of about a year11616 and collected
ammunition "many times".1 *6*6
Findings
5250. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that during Issa Sesay's reign as Interim Leader of the RUF, TF1-567 was involved in the
transportation of materiel frequently over the course of one year and that materiel was
provided by the Accused from Liberia to the RUF in Sierra Leone.
**6** TFl-567, rrrrrrsprrpr 7 July 2008, pp. 13312-13116.
**6*6 Aibprr srrrdu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11110-1 1 1 1 1.
**6*6 Aibprr srrrarr, rrrrrrrprrpr 5 Jppp 2008, pp. 11111-1 1112.
**6*6 TFl-567, rrrrrrsprrpr 4 Jrriy 2008. pp. 12996-13000.
11615 TFl-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13110-13112.
**6*6 T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 Jpiy 2008, pp. 12991-12992.

---- End of Page 1793 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T __kO 18 May 2012 9
\

5251. The Trial Chamber finds that the Peosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in 2000, Albert Saidu brought back two vehicles of ammunition and medicine from
Yeaten in response to a request from Issa Sesay.
5252. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that during Issa Sesay's reign as Interim Leader of the RUF, TF1-375 was involved in
the transportation of materiel to Sierra Leone from Liberia on four occasions.
3. Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies
(a) Supplies from ULIMO
(i) Alleged Facilitation after the Abidjan Peace Accords
Submissions of the Parties
5253. The Prosecution alleges that the evidence "strongly suggests" that Taylor provided
money and guidance to Foday Sankoh in 1996 to obtain materiel from ULIMO. The
Prosecution suggests that in order to provide materiel to the RUF and AFRC/RUF during the
time the border was not easily accessible to him, one of Taylor's options was "no doubt"
obtaining that materiel from ULIMO/ex-ULIMO fighters. Therefore, the Prosecution
submits, Taylor "would have included that option in the meetings he had with members of
the RUF extemal delegation, and one can reasonably conclude, with Sankoh".H6l7
5254. The Prosecution claims that during SanlSankoh gave Bockarie instructions to obtain materiel from ULIMO, and that Bockarie
reported that he used $USD 7,000, "presumably given to him by Sankoh on that trip", to
purchase that materiel. The Prosecution submits that "it is no coincidence" that the money
and the instructions came to Bockarie well after Tayor's contacts with the RUF in Cote
d’1voire, including his meeting with them in Abidjan in about December 1995, when he
gave them some 10 million CFA francs. The Prosecution argues that securing materiel from
ex-ULIMO fighters provided a two-pronged benefit to Taylor - "disarm ex-ULIMO fighters
who could be potential enemies and/or send them to fight alongside the AFRC/RUF and
11617 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 220.

---- End of Page 1794 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

5 7 887
supply his Liberian forces and his proxy Sierra Leone forces, the AFRC/RUF, with that
materiel, thus conserving some of his own stores".l lm
5255. The Prosecution further alleges that the Accused was in a long-term cooperative
relationship with Alhaji Kromah, who became the leader of ULIMO-K, and that they were
working together on various matters from as early as 1993. The Prosecution submits that a
Memorandum of Understanding entered into by Taylor and Kromah in November 1995 led
to Taylor once again having access to the border with Sierra Leone.ll6l9
5256. The Defence denies the Prosecution's allegation and submits that there is no
evidence suggesting that the Accused was involved in the arms trade between the RUF and
ULIMO in Liberia.H620 The Defence accepts that Sankoh gave Bockarie SUSD 7000 to buy
ammunition from ULIMO, but submits that this is not linked to Taylor in any way other than
by the suggestion that it was Jungle who carried the money from Sankoh to Bockarie. In this
regard, the Defence submits that Jungle was not with the RUF on Taylor's behalfmm The
Defence also challenges the Prosecution's allegation that the Accused and Alhaji Kromah
were in a long-term cooperative relationship and submits that this is simply a Prosecution
assumption, since there is no evidence on this point.H°22
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1- 168
5257. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member, testified that when Foday Sankoh was in the
Cote d’Ivoire for the peace negotiations he received SUSD 500,000 in May 1996 from the
Libyan ambassador to Ghana, Mohamed Talibi. This assistance came after Sankoh went to
Libya to ask for it in order to transform his movement into a political party. After Sam
Bockarie told Sankoh that he could get ammunition from ULIMO fighters along the Sierra
Leone-Liberian border and that he needed money in order to do that, Sankoh sent $USD
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 220.
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 221-222.
M20 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1040-1041; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 40-41.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief] para. 1039.
Hm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 40-43.

---- End of Page 1795 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

7,000 with Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) to Bockarie. Out of that amount, $USD 2,000 was
for f00d and $USD 5,000 was for ammunition.l lm
Prosecution Witness TF1 -338
5258. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member, testified that in 1997 after Foday Sankoh
returned from Abidjan he gave "some money" to Bockarie when they were in Giema.
Sanl<0h told Bockarie to use the money to purchase arms and ammunition from ULIMO
since he had heard that ULIMO were disarming and had a large cache of arms with them.
The witness went to Foya with Bockarie, Kennedy, Lion, Sam Kolleh and others to
neg0tiate for arms and ammunition from ULIMO. The materiel was b0ught from Farrah
Aidid and Musa Sidibay, called Jungle. The witness stated that this happened in 1997 but
could not recall the particular time.l 1624
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
5259. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member, testified that in 1997 the RUF purchased arms
and ammunition from ULIMO through Varmuyan Sherif Abu Keita was also "involved".
The first sum of money came from San1<0h who sent Boc1g0t 40,000 Liberian d0llars although the witness did not 1Hom 11625
Prosecution Witness TF1-367
5260. Witness TF1-367, an RUF member, testified that the RUF purchased ammunition
from ULIMO in 1997 until "Johrmy Paul called us", referring to when Johr1ny Paul
Korom0a invited the RUF to Freetown.H°26 The witness stated that the first purchase was
made with $USD 7,000 Bockarie had provided. Bockarie said that the money was given to
him by Sankoh "t0 maintain the ground". Sankoh had given the $USD 7,000 to Bockarie
upon his return to Buedu from the peace talks in the C0te d’Iv0ire.H627 Bockarie would
change the currency and provide funds for the ammunition purchases out of the $USD 7,000
Hm TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23283-23285 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23537-23540
(CS).
"°2" TP1-338, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15275-15277.
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2696-2697 (CS).
H62° TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14964-14966, 14967-14969.
"°" rrr-867, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14156-14158.

---- End of Page 1796 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr-08-01-T jg) X! 18 May 2012

lump sum. The witness could not recall how much out of that sum was actually used to
purchase the ammunition.11626
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
5261. Witness Mohamed Kabbah testified that prior to the Junta taking power, in 1996, the
RUF was trading for ammuniton with ULIMO at the border.11629
The Accused
5262. The Accused denied that he had anything to do with providing Bockarie with the
$7000 he used to buy amis and ammunition from ULIMO, asserting that there is no
evidence whatsoever of his involvement.11636
5263. The Accused acknowledged that the NPFL and ULIMO worked together to resolve a
dispute regarding governmental posts after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement on 25 July
1993. It was eventually agreed that the NPFL would receive the posts of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Justice while ULIMO would get the post of Finance. 1163 1
5264. The Accused also acknowledged that he himself signed the Akosombo Agreement
on 12 September 1994, signed also by Alhaji Kromah for ULIMO. That agreement
established the Council of Five, in which one member of the NPFL, ULIMO and AFL were
to be appointed while one other member was to be chosen by the Liberian National
Conference, and another one to be jointly appointed by the NPFL and ULIMO. The Accused
also agreed that ULIMO and the NPFL jointly appointed the Honourable Tamba Tailor as a
representative in the Council of Five.11632 _
5265. The Accused recalled that Mr George Boley of ECOWAS mediated between the
NPFL and ULIMO—K of Alhaji Kromah. He acknowledged that the NPFL and ULIMO—K
signed a memorandum of understanding on 30 November 1995 to cease all hostilities. They
116211 See TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15013-15019.
11629 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16425.
11636 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25139-25140.
11631 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33316-33317.
11632 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33317-33321.

---- End of Page 1797 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JQ // 18 May 2012

5 Cf 8%
then cooperated to ensure free movement of civilians and commercial activity in their
respective controlled territories.1 1633
5266. The Accused denied acting in concert with ULIMO-K in 1996 against Roosevelt
Johnson of ULIMO-J. He asserted that it was the Liberian government who arrested
Johnson, which included the NPFL, ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J which at that time was headed
by Kai Karyee,. Taylor asserted he was not involved in UL1MO's internal fights and stated
that it was the government who temporarily recognized Karyee as the head of ULIMO-J so
that his faction could implement the peace plan.11634
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
5267. Witness Charles Ngebeh testified that before the RUF retreated from Zogoda in
1996, Bockarie established a relationship with ULIMO in Foya, who by then were disarming
in 1996, 1997. Bockarie would go with other officers to negotiate for ammunition with the
ULIMO commander in Foya. Bockarie and the other officers who would then travel with the
ammunition back to Buedu. The witness stated that this was in 1996/1997. According to the
witness, the ammunition was mainly bartered for "single barrels" and goods, although
sometimes it was done with money. The witness went with Bockarie on one occasion to
purchase ammunition and arms from ULIMO. On that occasion they went with single
barrels to make the exchange for ammunition. Bockarie also had US dollars with him.11635
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5268. Witness Issa Sesay testified that in late November, before signing the peace accord in
Abidjan, Sankoh gave Sam Bockarie $USD 7,000 in the presence of Issa Sesay, Peter Vandi
and Lawrence Womandia in Buedu. Sankoh told Bockarie to try very hard to establish a
relationship with ULIMO in order to buy ammunition to defend Kailahun.111’36 After Sankoh
returned to Abidjan, Bockarie sent him a message that he had met ULIMO members and that
"it had gone through".111’37
11633 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33321—33324.
11634 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33324-33328; Transcript 17 November 2009, pp.
31877-31880.
11635 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37848-37852.
11636 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43769-43770, 43774-43775.
111’31Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010. p. 43796.

---- End of Page 1798 ---------------------------


Case No.: S L- 3- -T JQ / 18 May 2012

3 98 7 /
5269. The day Sankoh left for Abidjan, Issa Sesay, Matthew Sesay, Peter Vandi, Lawrence
Womandia and Sam Bockarie went back to Giema. Two days later, in late November,
Bockarie said he was going to the border, to Foya, to meet with ULIMO. Bockarie then went
to Foya with his bodyguards, Matthew Sesay (a.k.a. Kennedy), a Vanguard named Big
Daddy and CO Sellay. Bockarie was there for about a week. I mx Upon their return they told
Issa Sesay that ULIMO thought Bockarie had come to surrender. ULlMO's commander in
Foya contacted ULlMO's headquarters in Voinjama. ULIMO generals, Abu Keita and
Sherilt, then came to Foya with their bodyguards. The ULIMO commanders sent 20 to 25
ULIMO men to accompany Bockarie and his delegation back to Giema. They said it was for
the men to see the RUF-controlled—territory in order to "feel safe with the RUF ". Bockarie
returned with the delegation to Giema in December.ll639 Issa Sesay was there during the 5
days the ULIMO members stayed in Giema and were establishing a relationship with the
RUF'11640
5270. Then, in late December, the ULIMO members returned to Foya with Bockarie,
Matthew Sesay and Bockarie's bodyguards. Bockarie stayed in Foya for 3 days. He then
explained to the men that he was interested in buying ammunition and they were willing to
sell their ammunition to Bockarie. Abu Keita and Sherif then brought ammunition which
was bought by Bockarie. Bockarie returned to Kailahun with ammunition which included 45
RPG rockets, 15 "sardine tins" of AK rounds and there were "open ones" which were in rice
bags, about ten sardine tins of G3 rounds, and eight to ten sardine tins of GMG rounds.l ml
5271. When Keita and Sherif brought the ammunition from Voinjama, the commander on
the ground told Mosquito that he too had some ammunition that he would like to sell
separately, without the other commanders knowing. Bockarie told the commander to wait
and that he would come to buy it later from Koindu. Bockarie then introduced Kennedy to
Sherilt, Keita, the commander in Foya and all the other men, telling them that if they wanted
to sell their consignments they should bring them to Koindu, and if they meet Kennedy
there, Kemiedy would send a message to him, to Bockarie. I M42
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43779-43781, 43786-43787.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43781-43783, 43787.
HMO Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43783-43784.
HM} Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43784-43785, 43787.
MM2 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43785-43786.

---- End of Page 1799 ---------------------------


Case No.: ..- - - 1 ay 01
C N SCSI 0301 T 1-HQ 1799% 8M 2 2

5272. Kerrrredy was then posted by Bockarie to Koindu, as Koindu was close to the border,
for Kennedy to be able to receive the men and pay them for the ammunition When the
ammunition was st0cked and accumulated they would transport it to Buedu. Kennedy was
based in Koindu for this purpose from December 1996 until the AFRC overthrow in May
5273. Keita, Sherif and others came to Koindu with ammunition in their pick-ups on two to
three 0ccasions. S0me ULIMO members from Foya Tinkia towards Masabulahun would
themselves bring ammunition to Buedu and Bockarie would buy it from them.ll°44 The
ULIMO fighters and their commanders would sell the ammunition to the RUF and get what
they requested for it. These transactions were not controlled by Keita or Sherif Keita and
others used to sell their ammunition from the headquarters, and soldiers irom lower ranks
would sell their own ammunition.l mj
5274. Because of the frequent attacks by govemment tr00ps and the Kamaj0rs on RUF
positions, the money given by Sankoh for materiel was not sufficient. Therefore, these
purchases fi0m ULIMO were also financed by selling civilians’ harvest. I IG46 Bockarie would
send Peter Vandi to sell the civilians’ products in the trading areas. Peter Vandi would bring
the money to Bockarie, who would then send it to Kennedy in Koindu. Kennedy would
purchase ammunition irom the Mandek0ma border area. S0me money would stay with
Bockarie as he would buy materiel irom Dawa customs area.H647 ULIMO men would also
ask for different comrn0dities in exchange for the ammunition, including single barrel guns,
generators, tape recorders. There came a time when it became rampant. I mg
5275. The trade with ULIMO began in late December 1996 and continued until the AFRC
coup, and after the AFRC took p0wer and continued up to 1998.ll649 Between December
1996 and May 1997 ECOMOG was depl0yed in Liberia in order to cariy out the
*****3 ipsa Sesay, Transcript 6 Jury 2010, pp. 43787—43788.
{M4 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43788.
HMS Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43793-43794.
11646 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43788-437889. The civilians agreed to give their harvest to the RUP
in exchange for the RUF defending them, instead of having to become refugees in Liberia.
H647 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43792-43793.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43793—43795.
11649 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43787.

---- End of Page 1800 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \/YQ % 18 May 2012
1

jégf 3
disarmament process. 1 16511 lt was impossible to have contact with Charles Taylor at this time,
as ULIMO was controlling the entire Lofa County.111"51
Defence Witness Fayia Musa
5276. Witness Fayia Musa testified that when Sankoh was in Abidjan, he started getting
support from leaders in Africa. The first came from the Libyan government. Mohammed
Talibi, who worked at the Libyan embassy in Ghana, gave Sankoh $USD 500,000 in
Abidjan. The money was given in a carton. A letter in the carton stated that this money was
meant for Sankoh to help civilians living in RUF-held—tenitory and to buy food, medicines
and "other important things for your civilians back home". The letter also congratulated
Sankoh for allowing the peace negotiations to get started.11652 Out of the $USD 500,000,
Sankoh sent SUSD 7,000 to Mosquito to buy arms and ammunition from ULIMO at the
border. By then, they had succeeded in breaking "the barricade" between them and the
ULIMO members at the border in Lofa County.11653 The witness thought that the SUSD
7,000 was delivered to Bockarie through one of the radio operators,11654 then recalled that it
was Colonel Jungle who transferred the $USD 7,000 to Bockarie along with a radio operator
who brought Bockarie a satellite phone.11655 The information that $USD 7,000 was given to
purchase war materiel was conveyed to RUF members by the RUF external delegation in
Abidjan, as the delegation was angry that money given for humanitarian purposes had been
used either for arms or was expropriated by Sankoh for himself. 1 1656 They never saw the rest
of the money. Sankoh used it and the 10 million CFA francs given to the delegation by
Charles Taylor in December 1995 to buy flight tickets, and "squandered" the rest of the
money. By July 1996 Sankoh told Musa that he had no money.11657
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
5277. Defence witness Sam Kolleh testified that at the end of 1996 Mosquito went with
Kennedy, Lion and others to Foya in Liberia to get arms but mainly ammunition from
11650 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43792.
11651 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43795.
11652 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39019-39020. 39022-39023.
11653 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39020-39021.
11654 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39023.
111155 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39026—39027.
11656 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39023-39024.
11157 Fayia Muse, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39033-39034.

---- End of Page 1801 ---------------------------


Case No.: ` L-0 -01-T 1 May 012
C SCS 3 1801 8 2

ULIMO. Bockarie told ULIMO, his former enemies, that he did not come to attack but
rather to establish relations with them. ULIMO agreed to establish a relationship and then
rovided the RUF with a sufficient amount of ammunition and a few arms.l 1658 Kolleh was
P
in charge of transporting the materiel to Sierra Leone.H659
5278. On their way by from the mission, Bockarie told the group who went with him to
pick up the materiel that it was Sankoh who told him to ask for ULlMO's assistance since he
had a dream to comiect with ULIMO. Bockarie himself was fearful of going to ULIMO
since they were former enemies.H66O Kolleh did not know how Sankoh knew that it was
safe for Bockarie to approach ULlMO.l mm
5279. From this operation they brought "plenty" of ammunition in sardine pans, boxes and
1 rice bags. Bockarie purchased the ammunition with US dollars taken in ambushes, some
diamonds, gold watches and clothing, and a single barrel shotgun. Mr Kolleh did not see the
transfer of money. I 1662
5280. After this occasion, some ULIMO fighters brought ammunition individually to
Mosquito, saying that they were not part of the arrangement between Bockarie and their
commanders. I I663
Prosecution Exhibit P-425
5281. The Prosecution cites Prosecution Exhibit P—425, a report made by the United
Nations Secretary General to the Security Council about the situation in Liberia, dated 18
December 1995. According to this report, the NPFL headed by Taylor and UL1MO—K
headed by Alhaji Kromah signed a Memorandum of Understanding to end all hostilities
which resulted in opening the roads to Lofa County through Bong County. lt further states
****58 sem 1H659 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 4841 1-48413, 48427. Kolleh gathered over 100 people, both
civilians and armed men, to transport the materiel overnight from Nyandehun in Liberia to Sierra Leone.
HMO Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48410—48412.
HW Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010, p. 48762.
**°°* sem 1****63 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48424-48425.

---- End of Page 1802 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

.392 75
that the factions have increased delivery of humanitarian assistance to the newly accessible
erees."""‘*
Prosecution Exhibit P-61 1
5282. Prosecution Exhibit P-611, "1nterview of Sam Koroma, November 18 2003", is Sam
Kolleh's interview with the Prosecution in 2003.II665 The interview includes a statement by
Kolleh that after the retreat from Zogoda in 1996, Bockarie went to Foya to establish
relations with uLrMo-K. ‘ ‘6"6
Defence Exhibit D-009
5283. Defence Exhibit D-009 is a salute report from Sam Bockarie to "the Leader of the
Revolution", i.e. Foday Sankoh, authored on 26 September 1999. ln his report, Bockarie
writes that after Sankoh left for Abidjan in 1996 he, Bockarie, had made contacts with
ULIMO upon Sankoh's instructions. Bockarie stated that he was first arrested by ULIMO
but then convinced them to release him and was able to establish a relationship with them.
He had used the $USD 7,000 Sankoh had given him to purchase "vitally needed materials
that gave us the stance to fight and challenge the SLPP govemment until they were ousted
by the AFRC coup. The efforts of the civilians most [sic] be highlighted as they provided
Agricultural Produce which l traded for materials during the same period". I I667
Defence Exhibit D-015
5284. Defence Exhibit D-015 is a letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi, Libyan
Arab People's Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana, dated 26 June 1996. Sankoh thanks Talibi for
$USD 500,000 given to him to purchase materiel to pursue "the military mission", but asks
for an additional $USD 1,500,000 as requested by his "business partners". I I668
II6°4 Exhibit P-425, "14III Progress Reporr of the Secretary General on UNOMIL, 18 December 1995,
S/1995/1042, paras 6-7.
II°65 The witness identified himself at the time as "Sam Koroma". See Sam Kolleh, Transcript 4 November 2010,
pp. 48701-48706.
M6 Exhibit P-611, "Inter"view of sem Kereme, November is 20032 pp. 95-99.
II667 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarrers, Salute reporr to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF/SL, from
Major General Sam Bockarie", p. 1, ERN 9658.
Img Exhibit D-015, RUF — Follow up request from Foday Sarrkoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother Mohamed Talibi,
Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996.

---- End of Page 1803 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JQ [ 18 May 2012

Defence Exhibit D-084l mw
5285. Defence Exhibit D-084 is a Salute Report from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh, dated 27
September 1999. ln his report, Sesay states that after Sankoh left for Abidjan to sign the
peace accord, Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) was able to establish relations with ULIMO. With
the $USD 7,000 Sankoh had given them they purchased materials from ULIMO which
helped them resist enemy advances in the Kailahun District.l M0
Defence Exhibit D-3 85
5286. The Prosecution cites Defence Exhibit D-385. This Exhibit is an ECOWAS journal
which documents agreements, decisions and resolutions made in relation to the Liberian
crisis under the aus ices of ECOWAS. It includes the Cotonou A eement between the
P ST
Interim Government of National Unity, the NPF L and ULlMO,l Wl the Akosombo
Agreement between the AFL, NPFL and uL1Mo,‘ ***72 and tne Ecoivioo Held
commander's report on the attack of "govemment forces", NPF L and ULIMO fighters, on
the premises of General Johnson in 1996. I W3
Defence Exhibit D-470
5287. Defence Exhibit D-470 is a photograph of Sam Bockarie and other men. Sam Kolleh
testified that he took this picture in December 1996 at Dawa crossing after the night
operation in which they brought materiel from ULIMO. I W4 Kolleh recognized in the picture
Sam Bockarie,H675 Simeon who was a medic, Hai and Devu ama who were bod ards,
, J Y Ygu
and Stewart who was an officer.H676
Deliberations
Hm Authenticity Assessment of Specific Documents; Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras. 359-372.
IMO Exhibit D-084, RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, dated 27 September 1999, p. 00007757.
"‘"' Exhibit D-385, "ECOWAS Official Journal, Vol. 22 (Special Edition)", pp. 27-34.
Hm Exhibit D-385, "ECOWAS Official Journal, Vol. 22 (Special Edition)", pp. 58-64.
Hm Exhibit D-385, "ECOWAS Official Journal, Vol. 22 (Special Edition)", pp. 88-89, paras 40-43. The fighting
resulted in severe and widespread devastation and looting in Monrovia.
HGH Exhibit D-470; Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48413-48415, 48423-48424. The picture
includes some bodyguards and some officers. These men are only part of the group who went to collect materiel.
H675 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48418-48420.
NW6 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48421-48423.

---- End of Page 1804 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Jp ij 18 May 2012
4/

37 8 ‘7 7
5288. Evidence not contested by the parties shows that Sankoh either gave or sent Bockarie
$USD 7,000 to purchase materiel from ULIMO, and that this money was used to purchase
ammunition and amis from ULIMO members from around November 1996 until the AFRC
coup in May 1997.
5289. The Prosecution contends that "it is no coincidence" that Sankoh's instructions to
Bockarie to purchase materiel from ULIMO and the SSUSD 7,000 given to Bockarie came
after the Accused met the RUF external delegation in Abidjan in about December 1995, at
which time Taylor gave them 10 million CFA francs.
5290. However, the only Prosecution witness who testified about the origin of this money,
TF 1-168, testified that it came from EBUSD 500,000 given to Sankoh in Abidjan by the
Libyan Ambassador to Ghana, Mr Mohammed Talibi. Similarly, Defence witness Fayia
Musa testified that Mohammed Talibi, an employee at the Libyan Embassy in Ghana, gave
EBUSD 500,000 to Sankoh in Abidjan, and that out of that sum Sankoh sent Bockarie EBUSD
7,000 to purchase military materiel from ULIMO. Exhibit D-015, written by Sankoh,
corroborates that he received SSUSD 500,000 from Mohammed Talibi for materiel purchases.
No evidence was introduced to establish that the SSUSD 7,000 came from Taylor or that it
was Taylor who told Sankoh or Bockarie to purchase materiel from ULIMO. The Trial
Chamber recalls that it had no general reservations regarding the credibility of either TF 1-
168 or Fayia Musa. I 1677
5291. Prosecution witnesses TF 1-338 and TF 1-367 and Defence witness Issa Sesay
testified that Sankoh gave Bockarie the US dollars in Sierra Leone, before returning to
Abidjan for the peace negotiations. However, Prosecution witness TF 1-168 and Defence
witness Fayia Musa testified that Sankoh sent the EBUSD 7,000 to Bockarie through Daniel
Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle). TF 1-371 testified that Sankoh sent the money to Bockarie, but he did
not name Tamba as the one who transferred it. Even if Tamba was involved in the
transaction, as stated by some witnesses, the Trial Chamber notes that it was in the role of a
courier to transfer the money from Sankoh to Bockarie.
5292. The Prosecution submits that the Accused had good relations with Alhaji Kromah of
ULIMO-K. However, no evidence was introduced to suggest that the Accused was involved
H677 Credibility Assessment, TFl-168, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2328; Credibility Assessment,
Fayia Musa, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2557.

---- End of Page 1805 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1805 18 May 2012
X

in facilitating the relationship between the RUF and ULIMO prior to his inauguration, or
that it was the Accused who facilitated a relationship between Sankoh or Bockarie and
Kromah. The evidence rather shows that it was Bockarie who facilitated the relationship
between the RUF and UL1MO.l 1678
Findings
5293. The Trial Chamber finds that Sankoh gave Bockarie $USD 7,000 which was used to
. purchase arms and ammunition from ULIMO from around late 1996. The Prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was involved in the arms and
ammunition transactions between the RUF and ULIMO between November 1996 and May
1997.
(ii) Alleged Facilitation through Varmuyan Sherif
Submissions of the Parties
5294. The Prosecution submits that aiier he became President, the Accused tasked
Varmuyan Sherif at the end of 1997/early 1998 with encouraging former ULIMO fighters to
sell weapons directly to the RUF and with opening "a coriidor" between Lofa County and
RUF held territories in Sierra Leone so that the RUF could purchase arms and ammunition
from former ULIMO fighters. According to the Prosecution, the Accused devised this plan
in order to provide materiel for the RUF and in order to diminish the possibility that such
materiel would be used by potential Liberian dissidents against Taylor's rule. The
Prosecution contends that to further advance his plan, the Accused provided Sam Bockarie
with money to purchase materiel from former ULIMO members, and made his subordinate
commanders available to assist the AFRC/RUF to obtain the materiel from Lofa County.l 1679
Hm TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23283-23285 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23537-
23540: Bockarie told Sankoh that he could get ammunition from ULIMO fighters along the Sierra Leone-
Liberian border; DCT-146, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37848-37853: before the RUF retreated from Zogoda
in 1996, Bockarie established a relationship with ULIMO in Foya; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43769-
43770, 43774-43775: Bockarie went to Foya to facilitate a relationship with ULIMO and was almost arrested;
Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48412-48413; Bockarie went to Foya to establish a relationship
with ULIMO; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from
Major General Sam Bockarie", p.1: Bockarie wrote to Sankoh that after Sankoh left for Abidjan in 1996 he,
Bockarie, had made contacts with ULIMO upon Sankoh's instructions.
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 7, 236-237.

---- End of Page 1806 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T mb f 18 May 2012

5 7 K7`?
5295. The Defence does not dispute that the RUF continued transacting with ULIMO
during the Junta period and after the Intervention. However, the Defence submits that the
only witness to implicate the Accused in these transactions is Varmuyan Sherif Moreover,
the Defence argues that since there is evidence that the transactions between the RUF and
ULIMO had been going on for years prior to the Accused's alleged instruction to Varmuyan
Sherif, it is unclear why the Accused would need to "kick-start" an already established
relationship. The Defence submits that Sherif himself had been a part of the trade between
the RUF and ULIMO, doing so independently of the Accused, and it is therefore unlikely
that the Accused sent him to engage in a trade which he had been doing independently. I 1680
Evidence I
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
5296. Witness Varmuyan Sherif testified that after the Intervention,H68l Taylor instructed
him to open a corridor between Lofa County and RUF held territories, so that former
ULIMO fighters would feel free to provide arms and ammunition to the RUF. Sherif then
went to Lofa County, to Voinjama, Kolahun and Foya districts, and met with the former
fighters there. Sherif let them understand that they were free to sell arms and ammunition to
the RUF if they wanted to, and that the RUF should have free access to F oya, Kolahun and
Voinjama. I 1682
5297. Sherif stated that he was then tasked with ensuring that RUF members were moving
freely and that former ULIMO-K fighters who wanted to go to Sierra Leone felt free to do
so. He therefore went on a monitoring mission to Foya.H683 Sherif observed that former
ULIMO fighters were taking hidden arms to Sam Bockarie in RUF held territories, and that
Bockarie sent Superman, one of his senior commanders at the time, to travel to Voinjama
and the surrounding area to buy arms and ammunition and bring them to Sierra Leone.H(’84
Sherif stated that after he fulfilled the mission he received from the Accused, former
combatants were selling their arms and ammunition individually. At first, after the
IMO Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1056, 1089.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 825-826. Sherif describes a helicopter incident following
the Intervention, after which he escorted Bockarie on a trip to Monrovia. After his trip with bockarie, Sherif was
tasked with opening a corridor.
HG82 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 852-853.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 864.

---- End of Page 1807 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ® 18 May 2012
Z E

3 WO 0
ECOMOG lntervention in 1998, weapons were being taken to Sierra Leone on a weekly
basis, but afterwards Bockarie "took control" over the entire Lofa area. The fighters carried
weapons in bags or in any way they could. Sherif was told that fighters were being paid
SUSD 200-300 per weapon. Some weapons were exchanged for looted goods.l M5
5298. Sherif further testified that Taylor told him that he gave "some money" to Sam
Bockarie and that Bockarie would obtain arms and ammunition from Lofa County through
his commanders or by himself.l 1686
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
5299. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that in mid-1998 he travelled to Voinjama to
collect ammunition from Liberian ex-fighters who had buried their arms in the ground. After
the commander responsible for that area assembled the ammunition, he would contact
Mosquito. Mosquito would then send people to go and collect it. Such transactions started in
early 1998 and occurred in Voinjama, Vahun and Foya, along the border area. Bockarie
would send people, such as Kennedy and Sellay to make the transactions.H687 Mosquito
would mainly send Sellay for these transactions.ll68g Bockarie would give them "money like
US dollars", which he obtained from Taylor during his trips to Monrovia. Mosquito told the
witness that Taylor would give Mosquito SUSD 10,000-20,000. Bockarie would say that
"the Pa" had given him "something here", and would sometimes give the witness SUSD 50
or SUSD 100 out of what Taylor had given him.H689 The money for the purchases was not
given directly to Fornie. Mosquito would give the money to the person who went to make
the purchase. Fornie was on the ground at one point when Mosquito gave Sellay up to SUSD
8,000 and told him to "go and hustle" for annnunition.H69O The witness then said that he saw
Mosquito giving Kennedy money to go and meet Sellay. Sellay was a Liberian who was
H684 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 891-892.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1 136-1 137.
HCM Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 1016-1017; Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1137. Sherif
stated that no money was given to him by Taylor to make the purchases from ULIMO for Taylor.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21524—21526, 21529; Transcript 3 December 2008,
pp. 21538-21539.
Hm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21529; Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21539-
?';‘§°41(5auda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21526—21527.
N90 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21527-21528.

---- End of Page 1808 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

from the Voinjama area and used to be an NPFL commander. That is why Mosquito made
Sellay "the 1eader"I I69I or "the foreman". I I692
5300. On cross-examination the witness explained that he only went to collect materials
from Sellay, that he was not engaged in making the transaction, and that Sellay was the one
who bought the materiel from the ex-combatants. Fomie stated that he never knew the
people with whom the transactions were being made as he was not the one who made the
transactions.II693 The witness further stated on cross-examination that he was present when
Bockarie gave money to the group who went to go and buy materiel, that he did not receive
the money himself and that he did not make the purchase himself, as he collected the
materiel from Sellay and not from the ex-combatants. I I694
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -3 71
5301. Witness TF1-371 testified that around 1997 the RUF purchased arms and
ammunition from ULIMO. Initially the money came from Foday Sankoh. Bockarie also
received 40,000 Liberian dollars but the witness did not know from where. Sam Bockarie
told the witness that he transacted directly with Varmuyan Sherif The witness himself was
involved in two such purchases; one in 1997 and another one in 1998. The witness explained
that the transactions with ULIMO were a "minor enterprise". I I695
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -367
5302. Witness TF1-367 testified that upon Bockarie's orders, he received from Superman
56 million Leones which was stolen from a bank in Koidu Town. I I696 The witness then went
to Buedu and handed the money over to Bockarie. He also gave Bockarie another 200
IIIIQI Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21446; Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21539-
21541. The witness was asked whether he had seen the cash transaction during the one trip he attended and
answered that he had not. He only had cash for his lunch meal.
II692 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21539
**693 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 4 December 2008, pp. 21771-21772; Transcript 5 December 2008, pp.
21776-21777. The witness insisted that he did not know from whom the weapons were bought, although in a
prior statement it is recorded that he named "former NPF L and ULIMO-K fighters" as the ones from who they
were buying ammunition from. See Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 2 1780-2 1781.
II694 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21776-21777, 21783-21784.
IIIIQS TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2696-2700.
III’9I° TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14141-14145, 14151.

---- End of Page 1809 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (lm % 18 May 2012
A

35902
million Leones, which was given to him by the AFRC prior to the retreat from Freetown to
give to the RUF in 1997, and a 12 carat diamond.l Hm
5303. Approximately two months after the bank robbery, and after the RUF retreated from
Freetown, Bockarie took 25 million Leones out of that money and travelled with the witness
and his bodyguards to Foya in Liberia. There they met an NPFL police ofHcer called Ma
Mary who took them to the Guinean border to exchange the currency into Guinean francs.
From there the witness, Bockarie and Bockarie's bodyguards travelled to Voinjama. From
there, Bockarie and his bodyguards proceeded to Monrovia, while the witness stayed in
Voinjama to purchase ammunition from former ULIMO soldiers, upon Bockarie's orders.
Although ULIMO was supposed to be disarrned, some ULIMO soldiers did not hand over
their materiel and hid it in the bush.l mg
5304. ln Voinjama, the witness was assisted by Colonel Kundi and an NPFL police
commander to track former ULIMO fighters. VVhen the witness would get a sufficient
amount of materiel, he would contact the headquarters in Buedu with radio equipment which
the NPFL police officer gave him. He would then inform the commanders in Buedu, usually
Bockarie but Issa Sesay or Kallon in Bockarie's absence, and they would send a vehicle to
pick him up from the border. The witness and the police commander's bodyguard, Captain
Junior, would then go to load the police officer's car, a police jeep, with materiel the witness
had purchased and assembled in one place. The two would then go back to Voinjama. They
would then load the materiel onto the vehicle which was sent from Buedu and go back to
Sierra Leone.] mg
5305. The witness took these trips after they retreated from Freetown and before Sam
Bockarie had travelled to Monrovia to meet Charles Taylor. All in all, the witness attended
two to four trips to Lofa County to purchase ammunition. Bockarie escorted the witness
during his first trip to meet Ma Mary, and for the other trips the witness went on his own.
"°97 TFl—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14145-14147.
Hm TFl—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. l4l48—l4l5l; Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14965-14966,
14968-14969. The witness distinguishes between his trips to Voinjama to purchase materials, which occurred
after they retreated from Freetown, from his purchases from ULIMO before the AFRC called the RUF to join
them in Freetown which he made from Foya at the border. The witness stated that the first group he met was
"Kundi at the border line in Foya".
""°° TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. l4l52—l4l56.

---- End of Page 1810 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-0l-T JA / l8 May 2012 M

5 9703
The witness would usually stay there for about two weeks, locating the hidden materiel and
cajoling the ex—fighters in order to convince them to sell their materiel. I WOO
5306. Other than funding the purchases from ULIMO with the stolen money from Koidu
Town and the money given to the witness in Freetown, the RUF also used money they
received from selling goods and agricultural products to the Guineans at the border. I Wm
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
5307. Witness J abaty J award was confronted on cross—examination with a prior statement
in which it is recorded that he had told his investigators that he knew Varmuyan Sheiif in
1996 "when he was fighting for the ULlMO~K". Jaward explained that he knew about
Varmuyan Sherif in 1996, during the time the RUF was making contacts for arms and
ammunition with ULlMO—K fighters along the Liberian border. This was during the
disarmament process in Liberia. The witness stated that he never knew of Sherif making a
direct transaction at the time nor saw Sheiif with weapons to sell, but his name was
mentioned among the various commanders within ULIMO at that time along the border.mO2
The Accused
5308. The Accused denied that he ordered, "in effect", a free zone in Lofa in order enable
trade of arms and ammunition at the border. He denied knowing that such a trade occurred,
calling the ULIMO men "crooked". The Accused questioned why he would tell ULIMO to
sell their weapons when his own security and police forces had no arms at the time. He
stated that when he found out after he was elected that ULIMO had hidden arms, in August
1997, he called Sherif who was "more senior there". Taylor then asked Sheiif what he can
do about it, and Sherif answered that to prove his loyalty to Taylor's govermnent he will go
to Lofa and bring "whatever" he could find.mO3
Hm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14155-14156.
mm TFl-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14961-14964.
Hm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 15 July 2008. pp. 13762-13765.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30754-30758, 30760-30761.

---- End of Page 1811 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ 18 May 2012

5 7 7 0 QL
5309. The Accused also stated that in late 1998, although he was the President of Liberia,
people like Sherif, a former general of ULIMO-K, had "real control" and influence over
former ULIMO-K members in Lofa.117114
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5310. Witness Issa Sesay testified that after the RUF retreated from Freetown, in February
1998 and until the Freetown invasion in January 1999, Bockarie sent an RUF member to
Kolahun to buy buried ammunition from UL1MO.117115 Sesay also testified that he first met
Sherif around April 1997, when Sherif sold ammunition to Bockarie. At that time Sherif was
acting as a ULIMO general. He was not working for the Liberian government, as this was
before the Liberian elections.11706 After those two times, Sesay saw Sherif in 2000 going to
Monrovia. Sesay heard in 1998 that Sherif was working with 'l`aylor's government. 1 *7**7
Defence Exhibit D-009
5311. Defence Exhibit D-009 is a salute report from Sam Bockarie to "the Leader of the
Revolution", i.e. Foday Sankoh, authored on 26 September 1999. ln his report, Bockarie
writes that he established a "Defence Headquarters" in Kailahun immediately after Freetown
fell. Bockarie then writes that "back at the headquarters I renewed my contact with ULIMO
and tried to secure materials from them. lt was out of these materials that 1 gave Superman a
good quantity to attack and capture Kono".117118
Deliberations
5312. The Prosecution contends that the Accused instructed Varmuyan Sherif to encourage
ULIMO fighters along the Sierra Leone-Liberian border to sell arms and ammunition to the
RUF, that Sherif fulfilled his assignment, and that as result of that a large number of former
ULIMO fighters sold their arms and ammunition to the RUF.117119 Furthermore, the
**704 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30758-30760.
**705 Issa saaay, Transcript 20 July 2010, pp. 44626—44627.
11706 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43790-43791.
**7**7 ipsa spaay, Transcript 6 Jury 2010, pp. 43791-43792.
1171111 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF/ SL, from
Major General Sam Bockarie", pp. 4-5, ERN 9661-9662.
117119 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 236.

---- End of Page 1812 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J 18 May 2012

.5w05‘
Prosecution submits that the Accused provided money to the RUF in order to purchase the
arms and ammunition from ULIMO.lm0
5313. The Prosecution relies on the testimony of Varmuyan Sherif that after the ECOMOG
Intervention the Accused instructed him to "open a corridor" between ex-ULIMO fighters in
Lofa County and RUF-held-teriitoriesiml After he fulfilled his mission, Sherif observed
that ex-ULIMO fighters were selling their arms and ammunition individually.lm2
5314. The Trial Chamber finds that the Defence's characterization of Sherif’ s actions is
inaccurate. The Defence argues that it is unclear why the Accused would send Sherif to
"kick-start" an already established relationship, as the RUF was already making purchases
from ULIMO prior to Sherif’ s alleged assigmnent.lm3 The Trial Chamber agrees, as it has
found,lm4 that the RUF was trading with ULIMO from around November 1996 and until
May 1997, when the AFRC took power over Sierra Leone.
5315. However, the extent of the trade between the RUF and ULIMO before the Junta
period was minor, compared to the trade which occurred after the fall of the Junta in
February 1998. Prosecution witness TF1-367, who was involved in the transactions with
ULIMO stated that the trade before "Johnny Paul called" the RUF, meaning before the Junta
period, was at the border from Foya. The witness distinguished the trading with ULIMO
after the fall of the Junta, which occurred in February 1998, stating that during that period
the RUF/AFRC would go into Liberia, to Voinjama. TF1-367 described how he would stay
for about two weeks in Voinjama making these purchases, as he had to "cajole" the ex-
ULIMO fighters.lm5 The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-367 was confused in regards to
dates, as he, for example, placed the retreat from Freetown in 1997,11716 instead of` 1998.
5316. Moreover, the evidence shows that during the Junta period, between May 1997 and
February 1998, there was almost no trade between the Junta and ULIMO, and that the trade
was renewed after the ECOMOG lntervention. Prosecution witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Briefi para. 237.
Hm Varmuyan Sherifi Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 852-853.
Hm Varmuyan Sherifi Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1136-1137.
Hm Defence Final Trial BriefQ paras 1056, 1089.
‘""’ Arms and Ammunition; Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Supplies from ULIMO.
Hm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14148-14151; TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14965-
14966, 14968—14969.
mm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14145-14147.

---- End of Page 1813 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

gqqoé
testihed that the transactions with the ex-Liberian fighters in areas in Lofa County in Liberia
started in early 1998.11717 Prosecution witness TF1-367 described two time periods for the
transactions with ULIMO, the first being before the Junta period and the second after the
RUF retreated from Freetownlmg In Exhibit D-009, Bockarie describes how he renewed his
contacts with ULIMO after Freetown fell.l mg Defence witness Issa Sesay testified that after
the RUF retreated from Freetown, in February 1998 and until the Freetown invasion in
January 1999, Bockarie sent an RUF member to Kolahun to buy buried ammunition from
UL1MO.m20
5317. The break in the trade between the RUF and ULIMO, and the reason for the Accused
to send Sherif in order to renew the trade, can be explained by the two major political events
which transpired during these time periods, the Junta coup which brought the relocation of
the RUF headquarters from Kailahun District to Kenema District and Freetown, and the re-
establishment of the headquarters in Kailahun District close to the border after the
ECOMOG Intervention, and the inauguration of the Accused as the president of Liberia in
August 1997.
5318. The Accused denied that he ordered Sherif to facilitate a Hee-zone in Lofa County in
order to enable the trade of arms and ammunition at the border. The Accused asserted
instead that his own police and security forces had no arms of their own, and that he would
have requested the arms for his own forceslml However, the Trial Chamber has found that
the Accused ordered Sherif to bring arms and ammunition Hom ex-ULIMO Hghters to
Monrovia, that the Hrst three shipments were brought to Monrovia, but that the Accused told
Sherif to give the fourth shipment of materiel Hom ULIMO to Bockarie, and that Sherif did
so.m22 The Accused then ordered Sherif to open the "cor1idor" to make sure that a trade
between the RUF/AFRC and ULIMO takes place without the need of the Accused
interfering as an intermediary.
Hm Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21524-21526, 21529; Dauda Amna Fornie,
Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21538-21539.
Img TF1-367, Transcript 29 August 2008, pp. 14965-14966, 14968-14969.
Img Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF/SL, from
Major General Sam Bockarie", pp. 4-5, ERN 9661-9662..
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 20 July 2010, pp. 44626-44627.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30754-30758, 30760-30761.
11722 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership
(February 1998-December 1999).

---- End of Page 1814 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \ /% 18 May 2012

gqc; 0 7
5319. The Accused also stated that in late 1998 Sherii a former general of ULIMO-K, had
"real control" and influence over former ULIMO-K members in Lofa, as opposed to the
Accused who was in charge of Lofa County only as the Liberian president.m23 lndeed,
Sherif himself agreed that after his election the Accused had "very little influence" in the
Lofa County area until towards the end of 1998, when he began to deploy armed forces
there,lm4 and that in 1998 former combatants were selling arms and ammunition to the RUF
because they had no other form of income.lm5 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the
Accused did not have influence over former ULIMO combatants in Lofa County. ln the
Trial Chamber's opinion, that is the reason the Accused sent Varmuyan Sherif to Lofa
County, as Sherif did have influence over the ex-ULIMO combatants, and was therefore in a
position to ensure that the trade between the RUF and ULIMO continued freely.
5320. The Defence submits that Sherif himself had been a part of the trade between the
RUF and ULIMO, doing so independently of the Accused, and that it is therefore unlikely
that the Accused sent Sherif to engage in a trade which he had been doing
independently.m26 Moreover, the Defence submits that Varmuyan Sherif is an accomplice
witness who sought to mask his longstanding involvement in selling arms and ammunition
to the RUF as a member of ULIMO by attributing his activities to the Accused,m27 that he
tailored his evidence to support the Prosecution's case, and that his testimony should be
treated with caution. I mg
5321. lndeed, Prosecution witness TF1-371 testified that Bockarie told him that he
transacted directly with Varmuyan Sherii and that the trade with ULIMO took place in
1997.11729 This evidence is supported by the testimony of Defence witness Issa Sesay who
testified that the RUF was transacting with Varmuyan Sherif and Abu Keita as part of the
trade with ULIMO before the Junta period.lm0 Prosecution witness Jabaty Jaward testified
on cross-examination that he heard Sherif" s name in connection with these transactions, as a
ULIMO commander during that time, although he said he did not know of direct
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 October 2009, pp. 30758-30760.
Hm Varinuyan Sherif`, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1 138-1 139.
Hm Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 1 1 January 2008, p. 1083.
lmé Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1056, 1089.
my Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1089, 1137, 1383-1384.
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1089-1090.
Img TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2696-2700. .
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43784-43787.

---- End of Page 1815 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3 96 0 g
transactions made by Sheriflml Sherif himself stated that the trade between the RUF and
ULIMO began in 1997,11732 but did not say that, and was not asked whether, he himself was
involved in the trade.
5322. The Trial Chamber accepts that Sherif himself was involved in the transactions
between the RUF and ULIMO before the Accused ordered him to "open a corridor" between
Lofa County and RUF—held—territories. However, the Trial Chamber does not find this
inconsistent with the premise that after he was elected as president, the Accused wanted to
ensure the continuing existence of a trade between the RUF/AFRC and ex-ULIMO fighters,
and therefore tasked Sherif with ensuring it on the Accused's behalf.
5323. The Defence argues that it is only Sherif who implicates the Accused in the
transactions between the RUF/AFRC and ULIMO, but the Trial Chamber considers that as
the order was given from the Accused to Sherif this is not surprising and does not
undermine his credibility.
5324. With regard to other matters relating to the credibility of Sherif the Trial Chamber
notes that Sherif acknowledged that he and his family disliked the Accused due to the deaths
of his family members, but accepts his explanation that he told his family that he was
working for the Accused out of respect for the electoral wishes of the Liberian peoplellm
Moreover, while Sherif testified that he was imprisoned for six months by the Accused, he
also testified that the Accused was the one who released him from prison, apologized to him
and promoted him to Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army Division.lm4 Sherif was surprised
when he was told on cross—examination that payments he received from the Prosecution
totalled $USD 2,575,117% and stated that he did not need financial support since the Accused
had given him $USD 10,000.117% The Trial Chamber does not find the amount given to
Sherif by the Prosecution to be excessive, in particular given that he did not need financial
support. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence led evidence suggesting that Sherif had
developed a mental illness in late 1998/early 1999, but the two witnesses who testified to
Hm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 15 July 2008, pp. 13762-13765.
W32 Varrnuyan Sherii Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 1018.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 956; Transcript 11 January 2008, pp. 1047-1049.
Hm Varrnuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 895-896.
Hm Varrnuyan Sherii Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1121-1126, 1146-1147.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 11 January 2008, p. 1068.

---- End of Page 1816 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

39 7 97
this had heard it from others and did not provide details.] 173 7 Sherif himself admitted that he
"acted crazy" in order to avoid being involved in attacks in Sierra Leone and Guinea, where
his ancestors had come from.l 173 8 The Trial Chamber therefore does not find this suggestion
to be substantiated. In light of these considerations, the Trial Chamber finds Sherif to be
generally credible.
5325. With regard to the source of funding for these transactions, Prosecution Witness
Dauda Anina Fomie testified that starting in early 1998, Bockarie would give US dollars to
the persons he sent to make the transactions at "the border". He also testified that Bockarie
would bring $USD 10,000 to $USD 20,000 from the Accused, following his trips to
Monrovia. Fomie testified that he only went on one of these trips, and when asked
repeatedly who the materiel was purchased from, he was unable to say, mentioning only
1 Liberian ex—fighters without reference to ULIMO. He explained that he was not the one
making the transactions and was therefore not able to say with whom they were made.l 173 9
When asked whether he had seen the money for these purchases, Fomie stated that he once
saw Bockarie hand SSUSD 8,000 to Sellay telling him to buy ammunition.l lm Subsequently
Fornie said that what he saw was Bockarie giving money to Mathew Sesay (a.k.a. Kennedy)
for him to take to Sel1ay.m4l On cross-examination he stated that he was present when
Bockarie gave money to the group who went to go and buy materiel.ll742 Varmuyan Sherif
also testified that the Accused told him that he gave money to Bockarie in order to purchase
arms and ammunition from ULIMOU743
5326. Prosecution witness TF1-367 testified that the RUP used money stolen from a bank
in Koidu Town and money given to the witness from the AFRC to help the RUF make the
purchases from ULIMO after the Intervention, as well as money they got from selling goods
and agricultural products at the Guinean border. I lm
'"37 Yanks Sniythe, Transcript 24 February 2010, pp. 35910, 35916-3517; DCT-008, Transcript 31 August
2010, p. 47530.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1192-1193.
"7" Dauda Aruna Fernie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21776—21777.
Hm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21524-21530.
Hm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21539-21541.
Hm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008, pp. 21783-21784.
Hm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 1016-1017; Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1137
MM TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14141-14151; Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14961-14964.

---- End of Page 1817 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T du 1817 % 18 May 2012

.5 ? 7/O
5327. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-367 did not mention the Accused as a source of`
funding for these transactions in his testimony, while Fornie did not mention the sources of
funding mentioned by TF1-367. The Trial Chamber is of the view that there were several
sources for the money used to make the purchases from ULIMO, and that one of` these
sources was the Accused. The Trial Chamber has discussed the financial support given by
the Accused to the RUF or RUF/AFRC, including financial support for arms and
ammunition, in a different section of the Judgement.* *745
5328. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-367 described in his testimony the assistance of
an NPFL police commander to track fonner ULIMO fighters, as well as his assistance with
radio communications to infonn headquarters in Buedu to send a vehicle when he had
acquired a sufficient amount of materiel.* *746
Findings
5329. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused sent Vannuyan Sherif to open a corridor to facilitate the existing trade of
the purchase and sale of anns and ammunition between the RUF and ULIMO between Lofa
County and RUF-held-territories after 14 February 1998, that Sherif fulfilled his assignment,
as result of which members of ULIMO who were supposed to disanns and surrender their
anns to the UN, instead sold or bartered them to the RUF.
5330. The Trial Chamber also finds that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused provided financial support to the RUF/AFRC in order to facilitate
their purchases of arms and ammunition from ex—UL1MO combatants.
(b) Supplies from ECOMOG
Submissions of the Parties
5331. The Prosecution submits that in late 1996, the Accused attempted to obtain a large
supply of materiel from ECOMOG to re-provision a large group of RUF who were trapped
near the Pujehun District/Liberia border and were out of ammunition. Taylor was not
convinced that Foday Sankoh could be trusted to use money given directly to him to
**745 Operational Support: Support and Training, Financial Support.
**7% TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14152-14155.

---- End of Page 1818 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4/ 18 May 2012

3 Cf 7 //
purchase this materiel so he devised a means of supplying these RUF which allowed him to
keep Sankoh only peripherally involved in the arrangement. Taylor used his connections
with ECOMOG and one of his senior NPF L Special Forces commanders, Saye Boayou, to
strike a deal for this materiel. Taylor sent Boayou to Cote d’Ivoire to meet with Sankoh.
Sankoh then sent DCT-292, a member of the RUF extemal delegation, with Boayou to meet
a senior ECOMOG official whom Boayou knew and who would supply the ammunition.
During the travel from the Cote d’Ivoire border to Monrovia, Boayou and DCT-292 passed
easily through the NPF L checkpoints. Saye Boayou was in charge of this transaction, from
setting up the meetings with the ECOMOG official, to handing over the money and
arranging the transfer of the ammunition to the RUF at the border. However, the attempt was
unsuccessful and the RUF forces in Pujehun were forced to cross over into Liberia.11747
5332. The Defence argues that there is no evidence to support the Prosecution's assertion
that the Accused was involved in the alleged transaction.11748
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1-371
5333. Witness TF 1-371 testified that after the retreat from Zogoda in Kailahun District in
1996, the RUF forces in Pujehun were under attack and were having problems acquiring
ammunition. The witness heard a radio conversation between Foday Sankoh, who was in
Abidjan, and Mike Lamin, one of the commanders on the ground, Sankoh told Lamin to tell
the commanders there to be patient since he had sent Jonathan Kposowa and Joseph Brown
with $USD 42,000 to Liberia to try to meet with Taylor to explore whether the NPF L could
help the RUF get ammunition. The RUF forces in Pujehun waited but the ammunition never
arrived. They therefore had to retreat to Liberia. 1 1749
5334. After Lamin retreated to Liberia, the witness heard him inform Sankoh via radio
communication that the ammunition had not arrived and that they had to retreat. Sankoh
invited him to come meet him in Abidjan. When the two met in Abidjan, Sankoh infomied
him that Jonathan Kposowa could not have met Taylor since Kposowa had been arrested by
11747 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 219.
11748 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 43.
11749 TF1—371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2276-2278 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2462 (CS).

---- End of Page 1819 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012 %

some of Taylor's S ecial Forces and these S ecial Forces had taken the mone . Afterwards,
Y P P Y
Jonathan Kposowa stayed in Monrovia because he was afraid to meet Sankoh.m5O
Prosecution Witness Auggstine Mallah
5335. Witness Augustine Mallah testified that after the Kamajors and the SLA mounted an
assault on Zogoda in 1996, a group of RUF rebels led by Mike Lamin withdrew to the
Pujehun District of Sierra Leone and joined another RUF group stationed there. The SLA
and the Kamajors advanced to Pujehun and maintained continuous pressure on the RUF.
Mallah testified that, in Pujehun, he heard Mike Lamin communicating with Foday Sankoh
I over the radio. Foday Sankoh informed Lamin that he had sent his secretary Kposowa to the
Accused in Gbarnga to ask for his help in obtaining arms and ammunition. However, they
never received this ammunition.l 175 I
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5336. Witness Isaac Mongor testified that when Sankoh returned from Abidjan, Sankoh
told him and the rest of the RUF commanders that he had sent Jonathan Kposowa to convert
money, which Mongor believed was from someone in Ghana, and with that money purchase
ammunition. Sankoh explained that the ammunition was not purchased since Kposowa had
used the money for himselfl 1752
The Accused
5337. Taylor testified that during the fighting in Liberia the NPFL had bought weapons
from ECOMOG}1753
5338. However, he stated that he never received Jonathan Kposowa or Joseph Brown, and
that Sankoh never gave him, Taylor, money for materiel.m54
Defence Witness DCT-292
‘"5° TF1—371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2278-2281 (cs).
11751 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20111-201 14.
Hm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6625; Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6636-6640.
11753 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25784—25785.
11754 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29532—29533 (PS).

---- End of Page 1820 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012

5339. Witness DCT-292, a senior member of the RUF, testified that in Cote d’Ivoire, in
around November 1996, Foday Sankoh gave Jonathan Kposowa $USD 20,000 and
instructed him to go to Liberia to purchase arms and ammunition from an ECOMOG
commander and then to deliver the purchased materiel to Mike Lamin.{{755 Kposowa was to
go with Saye Boayou, a member of the NPFL Special Forces, who was supposed to hand
over the money to the ECOMOG commander. When Kposowa reached Duala, he met the
contact person, who was the ECOMOG commander's chief security officer. He told
Kposowa that the amount of money that they had brought was too little to arrange the
transaction. Kposowa went to Foday Sankoh in C6te d’Ivoire, who gave him an additional
$USD 10,000. Kposowa then retumed to Liberia, this time with Joseph Brown, and handed
the money over to the ECOMOG official via Boayou, who had remained in Liberia.
Kposowa waited a month in Liberia to receive the arms and ammunition, but did not receive
anything. After he infonned Sankoh, Sankoh accused him of embezzling the money.{ {756
Defence Witness John Vincent
5340. Witness John Vincent, a Liberian Vanguard, testified that in 1990, Saye Boayue was
deployed as the commander of the NPF L in Bong Mines.{{757
Defence Witness J oseph Dehmie
5341. Witness Joseph Dehmie, an NPF L senior radio operator, testified that in March-April
1990, Saye Bonayue was the NPF L commander in Bong Mines.{{758
Defence witness DCT-025
5342. Witness DCT-025 testified that Joseph Brown and Jonathan Kposowa were part of
the group that accompanied Sankoh to Abidjan. At the time this attempted purchase took
place, Joseph Brown was in the hospital, and therefore could not have participated in it.{{759
Defence witness Issa Sesay
**755 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41755-41767.
{{756 DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41767-41771, 41773—41774; Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41994-
41995; Transcript 3 June 2010, pp. 42045-4205l.
{{757 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37983-37984.
{{758 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, p. 41167.
{{759 DCT-025, Transcript 16 March 2010, pp. 37363-37370 (PS).

---- End of Page 1821 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ._ 18 May 2012
L.
1

5343. Witness Issa Sesay testified that in 1996 the RUF group in Pujehun needed
ammunition. When Sankoh came back to Kailahun District in November 1996, he told
Sesay, Sam Bockarie and the others that he had sent Jonathan Kposowa to make contact
with ECOMOG in Monrovia to buy ammunition.l 1760
Deliberations
5344. The Prosecution contends that the Accused sent Saye Boayou to Sankoh to help the
RUF get arms and ammunition from ECOMOG, but acknowledges that this attempt failed
and the RUF forces in Pujehun were forced to cross over into Liberia.1 1761
5345. Several witnesses testified that Foday Sankoh sent Jonathan Kposowa to obtain
ammunition, and that the attempt to purchase ammunition had failed.m62 However, no
Prosecution witness testified that the purchase was to be made with ECOMOG, or that Saye
Boayou was involved in the attempted purchase. Prosecution Witness TF1-371 testified that
he heard Sankoh tell Lamin that he sent Jonathan Kposowa and Joseph Brown with money
to meet Taylor but that he later leamed from Sankoh that the meeting did not occur and the
money was taken by Taylor's Special Forces.l 1763 Prosecution Witnesses Isaac Mongor and
Augustine Mallah only testified that Sankoh sent Jonathan Kposowa to obtain ammunition
and that the ammunition never arrived.m64 Neither of them indicated that the ammunition
was to be purchased from ECOMOG, or that Saye Boayou was involved in the attempted
purchase.
5346. In support of its submission, the Prosecution relies on Defence witness DCT-292's
account, which differs greatly rrum the account of its own witnesses. According to DCT-
292, Saye Boayou, a member of the NPFL Special Forces, was sent by Sankoh together with
Kposowa to make contacts with ECOMOG in order to purchase materiel. Two Defence
witnesses testified that Boayou was the NPFL commander in Bong Mines in 1990,m65 but
‘""° rssu Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, pp. 46516-46522.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 219.
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2276-2281 (CS); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November
2008, pp. 20112-20114; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008, p. 6625; Transcript. 4 April 2008, pp. 6636-
6640; DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41757-41774; Transcript 3 June 2010, pp. 42045-42052; Issa Sesay,
Transcript 17 August 2010, pp. 46516—46522.
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2276-2281 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2462 (CS).
N64 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 201 12-201 14; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 April 2008,
p. 6625; Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6636-6640.
Hm John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37983-37984; Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, p.

---- End of Page 1822 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T du % 18 May 2012
n

no evidence was introduced to indicate the role or position of Boayou in 1996, or his
relationship with the Accused at that time. While Defence witness DCT—292 testified that
Boayou was involved in the failed transaction, he testified that it was Sankoh who sent him
on the mission to ECOMOG, without reference to the Accused.
5347. The Prosecution's theory that the Accused devised this transaction in a manner so as
to keep Sankoh peripherally involved, since he did not trust Sankoh with money, is
incompatible with the evidence given by both Prosecution and Defence witnesses that it was
Sankoh who gave the money to Kposowa for the transaction.
Findings
5348. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused used one of his superior commanders, Saye Boayou, in an attempt to
help the RUF purchase arms and ammunition from ECOMOG in November 1996.
(c) Magburaka shipment
Submissions of the Parties P
5349. The Prosecution submits as follows. After the breakdown of negotiations between
the AFRC/RUF Junta and ECOWAS, the former was desperate for anus as they not only
faced the threat of military action to force it from power but also suffered from an arms
embargo imposed on Sierra Leone by UN Resolution 1132. Taylor met that desperate need
by supplying the Junta with arms and ammunition in various shipments that enabled them to
hold on to key areas in Sierra Leone for several additional months.11766 ln August 1997
Johnny Paul Koroma sent a delegation to Monrovia with a written request to the Accused for
materiel and his assistance in gaining recognition from the ECOWAS States. The delegation
met with officials of Taylor's Government,11767 and were told that their letter was
transmitted to the Accused and that Taylor was willing to work with the ECOWAS
Committee to recognise the Junta. In addition, Koroma's delegation was assured that Taylor
was in touch with their leader; was safely escorted by Taylor's security to the airport, and
had their expenses in Monrovia paid for by the Taylor govemment. On their retum to
41167.
11766 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 223-225.
11767 The Prosecution refers to John T. Richardson and Monie Captan the Foreign Minister.

---- End of Page 1823 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T M / 18 May 2012
•

5 99/A
Freetown the delegation briefed Koroma who confirmed that Taylor had spoken with him
and assured him of cooperation to ensure the recognition of the Junta Government. **768
5350. ln Freetown, Taylor's representative, Ibrahim Bah was already there and had met
with Bockarie and Koroma. Bah informed Bockarie that he had been given adirective from
the Accused to help the Junta get arms and ammunition and asked about mining operations
in Kono and whether they had diamonds to pay for the shipment. After he met Bockarie,
Bah met with Koroma and said that on the instructions of the Accused 90 carats of diamonds
would be needed for the arms shipment and $USD 90,000 for the flight.**769 Two or three
days later Koroma briefed the Junta Supreme Council that he was in the process of arranging
the shipment, and it was agreed to obtain the diamonds and money. Gullit brought the
diamonds from Kono. The rough diamonds and $USD 90,000 were given to Bah who took
the cash and diamonds to Monrovia.**77*7
5351. The Prosecution further submits that in September 1997 the Accused took the
diamonds and used the opportunity under diplomatic cover of a trip to South Afiica, Burkina
Faso, Libya, and Niger to arrange the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Junta.**77* ln
South Afiica the Accused presented some of the Junta diamonds as a gift to supermodel
Naomi Campbell.**772 The "huge" shipment which arrived at Magburaka in October 1997,
included arms, ammunition and weapons to bring down aircraft, was distributed between the
AFRC and RUF forces and was "central to prolonging the life of the Junta".* *777
5352. The Defence points out a number of inconsistencies and contradictions in the
Prosecution's evidence on the Magburaka arms shipment, characterizing it as "a jigsaw
where the pieces just do not fit" and invites the Trial Chamber to reject the Prosecution
evidence as unreliable.**777 The Defence submits that there are inconsistencies over where
the shipment came from, how the shipment was paid for, who facilitated the shipment, when
**768 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para, 226.
**769 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 227.
**77" Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 228.
**77* Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 229, 230, 233.
**777 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 230.
**777 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 234.
**777* Defence Final Trial Brief para. 589.

---- End of Page 1824 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 W

3 991 7
the shipment took place and who picked it up, what were the contents of the shipment and
where the shipment was delivered.m75 ’
5353. The Trial Chamber examined the following evidence related to the so-called
"Magburaka arms shipment".
Evidence I
Prosecution Witness TF1 -371
5354. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member, testified that in August 1997,m7° Johnny Paul
Koroma asked him to be part of a delegationmw that carried a letter to President Charles
Taylor requesting the latter to assist the Junta Government to gain recognition amongst the
ECOWAS Stateslmg On ariival in Monrovia, the delegation was not able to meet President
Taylor and instead met with officials of the Liberian Government including one John T.
Richardson and Monie Captan, the Foreign Minister. Captan, who received the letter from
the delegation, told them that he had passed it on to Taylor who had expressed a willingness
to work with the ECOWAS Committee for recognition of the Junta Govermnent and who
was already in contact with Johnny Paul Koromalmg
5355. On returning to Freetown the delegation went to brief Johnny Paul Koroma who
confirmed that President Taylor had already communicated with him and promised support
in securing recognition by ECOWASH780 TF1-371 also attended a meeting in the Cape
Sierra Hotel between Sam Bockarie and General Ibrahim Bah at which Bockarie expressed
concern at the constant military attacks on the AFRC by the Nigerian ECOMOG troops and
the AFRC Junta's lack of arms and ammunition. Bah responded that Charles Taylor had
specifically sent him to negotiate terms with Johnny Paul Koroma that would assist the
AFRC to secure arms and ammunitionmgl Bah suggested that given the quantity of
materiel required, 90 carats of diamonds would be required to pay for the arms and
11775 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 591-596.
11776 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2301 (CS).
11777 The delegation was headed by one Frank Karifa Smart and other members included Mike Lamin and
Milicent Kamara.
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2299-2300 (CS).
mw TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2304-2307 (CS).
11780 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2307 (CS).
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2308-2309 (CS).

---- End of Page 1825 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0 - GIA 18 May 2012

54 ws
ammunition and SBUSD 90,000 to transport them by air, and that he had already made this
proposal to Koroma. I 1782
5356. Two or three days later TFl-37l attended an emergency meeting of the AFRC/RUF
Supreme Council, also attended by Abu Sankoh, SAJ Musa, Gibril Massaquoi, Morris
Kallon, Bazzy Kamara, Eldred Collins, Brigadier Mani and Issay Sesay, at which the
imminent threat of an ECOMOG attack was discussed.ll783 Johnny Paul Koroma, who
chaired the meeting, announced that he had made arrangements to secure a supply of arms
and ammunition that would cost the Junta Govermnent 90 carats of diamonds and EBUSD
90,000 for shipment.ll784 Koroma then instructed Cobra, the mining commander in charge
of Kono, and Gullit, the Principal Liaison Officer, to bring the requisite amount of diamonds
to his residence. The meeting also endorsed SAJ Musa's proposal that $USD 90,000
required for the air freight be obtained from the Central Bank of Sierra Leone.m85
Sometime later TFl-371 was at Johnny Paul Koroma's residence when he saw Koroma hand
over the requisite diamonds and EBUSD 90,000 to Bockarie who in turn handed the diamonds
and cash to Ibrahim Bah, after which Bah and Bockarie left Freetownl 1786 TFl-371 denied
having seen the letter (Exhibit D-004) before but stated that he was familiar with its contents
as they were discussed in the said emergency meeting. I N87
5357. TFl-37l testified that towards the end of October l997,m88 while at Cockerill
Military Headquarters, he saw a report from Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and the Military
Intelligence Branch officer that Ibrahim Bah had delivered a shipment of arms and
ammunition by plane to the Magburaka airfieldmgg TPI-371 was further informed that a
second arms shipment accompanied by Issa Sesay and Fonti Kanu, a senior SLA officer,
was scheduled to arrive later that day, but the delivery was not made because Nigerian
ECOMOG jets bombed the runway before the plane could land.m90 TFl-371 testified that
'"82 TFI-371, Transcript, 28 January 2008, p. 2309 (CS).
**783 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2310-2311 (CS).
**784 TF1-37 1, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 23 l2 (CS).
**785 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2310-2313 (CS).
¥¥?ZYiE1i§Zi’¥§ZEZ§‘"I§§ §Z2EZ"’ EEE? ‘°‘°;§i§Z£§§"’ ‘""i
TFl-371; Transcrigt 31 Janua; 2008; gp. 2744-2748 (cs).
¥£l-iZl§ TIZEZZEEI 32 JZEEEEEEEI Efiiiiiiia as

---- End of Page 1826 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T 5* 1826//{ 18 May 2012 M


he did not know from where the flight had departed**79* but that he understood from "the
organisers of the shipment"**792 that the flight came from Ouagadougou, Burkina F aso.**793
The weapons were distributed to the Cockerill Military Headquarters, Koroma's residence
and Issa Sesay's base in Kenema District.**794 The witness could not recall the exact
quantity* *795 of arms and ammunition purchased but stated that the shipment was "huge" and
that approximately 200 AK-47 rifles, one of two 75 calibre machine guns, rocket propelled
grenades and 80 boxes of AK-47 ammunition were allocated to the RUF a1one.**7%
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5358. Witness Isaac Mongor, a senior RUF member, testified that he was present at a
meeting at Sam Bockarie's residence at I-Iill Station, Freetown, attended by senior RUF
members including Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO Nya), Gibril
Massaquoi and others, at which Ibrahim Bah delivered a message from Charles Taylor
urging the RUF "to work together with the AF RC".**797 After the said meeting, Ibrahim Bah
was taken to the residence of Johnny Paul Koroma on Spur Road to deliver the same
message to the AF RC. Mongor was present at the meeting attended by senior AF RC
members including Johnny Paul Koroma, SO Williams, Gullit and Bazzy and "a11 the other
authorities" of the AFRC, at which Bah repeated the message from Charles Taylor that the
RUF and AFRC should "work hand in hand", a message that was "we11 received" by both
the RUF and AF RC.**798 The witness testified that the main topic discussed at the second
meeting was the need for ammunition and that the meeting was happy because Bah "wou1d
be able to help them get ammunition".**799 The witness further stated that after this meeting
Koroma and Bah held "a closed-door meeting", but the contents of these discussions were
not disclosed to Mongor.**800 Koroma later told Mongor that he had been in contact with
'"9‘ rri-271, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700-2701 (CS).
**792 The witness stated that he was informed by Bah and Issa Sesay that the plane flew from Burkina Faso.
**793 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2701-2702, 2732-2736 (CS).
"’°‘ tri-271, rranaarrpr 28 January 2008, pp. 2316-2317 (CS).
**795 In cross examination, the witness stated that the sum total of arms and ammunition paid for with the 90
carats of diamonds and $USD 90,000 comprised two plane loads, although only one plane load was actually
delivered at Magburaka. Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2726.
**7% Tri-271, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2316-2317 (CS).
**707 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5712.
**798Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5712-5714.
**799 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5714.
**80** Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5713-5715; Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6658-6659.

---- End of Page 1827 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T Gtk / 18 May 2012

3 6/720
Taylor and that Taylor had said that he was going to "send something" for the Junta
Government. I ISOI
5359. Mongor testified that in 1998 shortly before the ECOMOG interyention,I Im a "small
amount of ammunition" was delivered at the Magburaka airstrip and that Koroma sent
Mongor, Fonti Kanu, Mike Lamin and other people to collect the delivery. I Im The delivery
consisted of two anti-aircraft guns and some ammunition for the AA gun and GMG
rounds.IIIIO4 The witness stated that one of the two anti-aircrai°t guns was allocated to the
AFRC and mounted at Koroma's residence in Freetown, while the other was allocated to the
RUF and taken by Mike Lamin to Bockarie in Kenema.II8O5 I-Ie said that an Alpha jet
bombarded the place ai°ter they had already collected these items.II8II6 In cross-examination
Isaac Mongor testified that he learnt from Johnny Paul Koroma that the Magburaka arms
shipment originated from Libya in 1998 and passed through Liberia, through arrangements
made by Taylor with the AFRC, and an·ived in Magburaka shortly before the ECOMOG
interyention.II8II7 Mongor confirmed his statement to the investigators that previously the
RUF had made arrangements with Ibrahim Bah to ship arms in from Burkina Faso but when
the `oined the AFRC Johnn Paul Koroma renewed the arms contract b talkin directl
Y J Y Y 8 Y
with Bah. I Img
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
5360. Witness Samuel Kargbo, a former SLA and member of the AFRC Supreme
Counci1,I IW) testified that one to two weeks ai°ter the 25 May 1997 coup, he overheard a
telephone conversation between Johnny Paul Koroma and Charles Taylor pertaining to an
arms shipment. In the telephone conversation, Koroma reportedly told Taylor that he was
sending him a delegation led by Mike Lamin and that Ibrahim Bah had been recommended
by Sam Bockarie to assist the delegation with the procurement of the arms and
IISOI Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5724.
II8O2 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6646-6651.
Im} Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5724.
II804 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5724, 5726-5728; Transcript 4 April 2008, p. 6644.
II805 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5733-5734.
II8II° Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5724.
IIW Isaac Mongor, Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6644-6652.
II808 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6659-6661.
IISOQ Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10421-10423, 10433-10440; Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10717.

---- End of Page 1828 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI-—03—01—T du % 18 May 2012

ammunition} 1810 Kargbo stated that he was aware of other telephone calls made by Koroma
to other African leaders at various times thereafter, including Presidents Mainassara of
Niger, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, and that the
delegation in fact travelled to Liberia, Niger, Burkina Faso and Libya. mm Later Kargbo
attended a Supreme Council meeting in which Koroma explained that a delegation headed
by SYB Rogers was going to take a letter to Charles Taylor asking for political recognition
of the AF RC Junta and other things.H8l2
5361. Alter the first delegation went to Liberia, Koroma told another Supreme` Council
meeting that Kargbo attended, that he was sending a second delegation to Liberia led by
Mike Lamin of the RUF, Lieutenant—Colonel Fonti Kanu of the AFRC and General Ibrahim
Bah to purchase aims and ammunition for the Junta. Koroma recommended Lieutenant-
Colonel Fonti Kanu to be on the delegation because he was familiar with the military
equipment needed by the Junta,H8l3 while General Ibrahim Bah was recommended by Sam
Bockarie to facilitate the movement of the aims into Sierra Leone.] 1814 In the meetin , it
g
was agreed that the arms and ammunition would be paid for with "a parcel", which the
witness understood to mean diamonds.H8l5 Between 48 and 78 hours later,H8l6 a delegation
headed by Mike Lamin and including Fonti Kanu, and General Ibrahimmm travelled to
Liberialmg and between one and two weeks later an anns shipment anived by plane at
Magburaka.H8l9 Kargbo estimated that the shipment was delivered about one month before
the Conakry Accord (hence on or about 23 September 1997). I 1820
5362. Samuel Kargbo testified that he and others, including Issa Sesay, CO Lion and
"Senegalese" were present when the Magburaka shipment ar1ived.H82 I When the plane
landed at night between 7.00pm and 9.00pm, it was already dark and vehicle headlights
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10455.
HBH Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10445—10446, 10456—10457.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10453—10454.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10477.
HSM Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10455—10459, 10477.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10458.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10458.
HSN Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10457.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10478.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10458—10459; Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10710.
"82° Samuel Kargbo, Transcript. 21 May 2008,pp. 10457—10459.
mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10712.

---- End of Page 1829 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T (Q / 18 May 2012

were used to illuminate the airstrip.11822 According to the witness, a "large quantity" of
ammunition comprising AK rounds, G3 rounds, mortar bombs, RPG bombs and stinger
missile bombs, was dropped by net from the plane, but the shipment did not include
arms.11823 The shipment was accompanied by Lieutenant—Colonel Fonti Kanu, Mike Lamin
and a soldier called Musa wearing a Burkina Faso uniform with an insignia on it.11824 The
ammunition was hurriedly put in vehicles and delivered to Johrmy Paul Koroma's residence
in Freetown, from where it was distributed to the AFRC and RUF commarrders.11825 In
cross-examination, the witness admitted that he did not know from where the arms shipment
originated but concluded based on the presence on the plane of Musa who was wearing a
Burkinabe uniform, that the shipment "may have passed through Burkina Faso".11826
5363. Witness Sam Kargbo also testified that airer the ECOMOG intervention and the loss
of Freetown, the AF RC were unable to bring their heavy artillery with them as they retreated
as Waterloo was blocked and there was no way for the heavy artillery to cross over. They
left the weapons at Tombo.11827
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
5364. Witness Augustine Mallah, a former RUF member,11828 testified that at a meeting
held at the Officer's Mess at the Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown, the Chief of Army Staff
told the meeting that Koroma should tell the officers that they were expecting the first
consignment of arms, ammunition and medicines since the AF RC coup, due to arrive at the
Magburaka Airfield, and that one Major Dumbuya should go there to receive the
shipment.11829 The Chief of Army Staff also told the meeting that the Junta had money in the
bank and diamonds from Kono and Tongo to pay for the shipment.11830 ln cross-
examination, the witness testified that this meeting occurred "close to October l997" and
11822 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10459; Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10709, 10747.
**222 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10479—l0482; Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10718.
118211 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10479; Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10710.
***225 samuer Kargbe, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10479-10482.
**226 samuer Kargbe, Transcript 2 Juue 2008, pp. 10715-10719.
11827 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10514.
11828 Augustine Mallah, Transcript l2 November 2008, p. 20073. Mallah was an RUF Junior Commando from
1991 until the disarmament.
**229 Augustine Mariah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20152—20154.
118311 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20152—20154.

---- End of Page 1830 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T Q10 % 18 May 2012
./

that he did not know if Ibrahim Bah made the arrangements for the shipment or from where
the shipment originated. 1 1831
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
5365. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay testified about the Magburaka arms shipment in
cross-examination. In 1997, about 2 months after the AFRC coup, Hassan Papa Bangura
(a.k.a. Bomb Blast) told the witness that the Junta were expecting a consignment of arms
and ammunition to arrive at the Magburaka arifield.11832 The witness and Colonel SO
Williams went to Magburaka airfield to collect arms and ammunition. Many other RUF
fighters and SLA members, including Denis Mingo and Akim Turay, were present and were
deployed in the bushes around the airstrip. Fonti Kanu and Colonel Yapo coordinated the
arrival of the shipment. 11833 When the witness arrived at Magburaka, the plane carrying the
arms shipment had already landed and the ammunition loaded on trucks.11834 The witness
initially testified that the shipment took place around two months after the AFRC coup
(therefore around July 1997)11835 but later said it was "during the AFRC, but at least they
had been in power for some time".1183° According to the witness, there were discussions
amongst some of the soldiers that the shipment came from Ukraine, while others said that it
was from Liberia.11837 In a previous witness statement, Bobson Sesay told investigators that
he was not aware where the shipment came from but other soldiers told him that it originated
from Ukraine. The shipment contained sub machine guns (SMGs) and SMG rounds, AK
rounds, and an anti-aircraft gun with lasers. VVhen tested at Johrmy Paul Koroma's house on
Spur Road, the anti-aircraft lasers were found not to be working.11838 The witness told the
Trial Chamber that the arms were distributed among RUF and SLA members11839 and that
some other arms and ammunition were used to reinforce the fight against ECOMOG
forces. 1 1840
11831 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20379-20380.
**832 Aumamy B66S6¤ sr-Say, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8686.
111133 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8686-8691.
11834 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8693.
11835 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8686.
1111311 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8687, 8701.
11337 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8687, 8701.
111138 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8701-8703.
11839 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8702-8704.
11840 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8688.

---- End of Page 1831 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T A l8 May 2012

Prosecution Witness Pegg Kamara
5366. Witness Perry Kamara a former RUF Junior Conirnandomm testified that during the
AFRC/RUF Junta regime, an airstrip was constructed about 2 to 3 miles from Magburaka.
The Junta often used the airstrip for receiving shipment of arms and ammunition by plane
which usually landed at night.ll842 On one such occasion "around the end of 1997",l lm Issa
Sesay instructed him and an RUF Administrator called Alpha, to go and collect their share
of ammunition at the Magburaka airstrip.ll844 On arrival at around 5.00am or 6.00am, the
witness found that the plane had already delivered the arms and ammunition at night and
left. He saw vehicles belonging to the RUF, AFRC, "Bo Brigade" and other groups from
Freetown and Kenema, all of whom had come to collect their share.ll845 The witness saw
arms and ammunition in boxes being distributed "by groups" between the RUF and
AFRC} lm He did not know where the shipment came from.ll847
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
5367. Witness TF1-338, a former RUF member,ll848 testified that during the AFRC/RUF
Junta regime, an airstrip was constructed at Mayoroh near Magburaka where the Ukrainians
used to deliver arms and ammunition by plane, including G3 rounds, AK—47 rounds and
stick grenades. The airplane would not land for fear of the ECOMOG raids and simply
dropped off the supplies at the airstrip.ll84° The witness attended a meetinglmo at the State
House towards the end of 1997, at which Johnny Paul Koroma announced that the
Ukrainians were helping the Junta to ship arms and ammunition by air through Mayoroh
airstrip, near Magburaka.ll85l Koroma further explained that the Ukrainians first tried to
send the materiel by sea but were disturbed by ECOMOG jets so decided later to bring it by
**84* Perry mmm, Transcript 4 rpbmry 2008, pp. 3024-3027.
Hm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3091.
Hm Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3353.
H844 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3091; Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3352-3353.
H845 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3092.
HM Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3091.
HW Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3353.
Hm TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15084 -15088.
"*"" Tri-332, Transcript 3 September 2008, p. 152x2-15283.
H850 TF1-338 also stated at pp. 15284-15285 that this meeting was attended by AFRC members including Gullit,
Five-Five and Abu Sankoh (a.k.a. Zagalo), as well as RUF members including Eldred Collins, Sam Bockarie,
Issa Sesay, Moiris Kallon, Mike Lamin and Denis Mingo.
HSS} TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15283-15285.

---- End of Page 1832 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GW 18 May 2012

air to an airstrip at Mayoroh. A month after this announcement, the arms and ammunition
shipment arrived by plane at Mayoroh.ll852 The witness went at night between 8.00pm and
9.00pm with Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon and their bodyguards to the Magburaka airstrip to
collect their share of the delivery.ll853 As the plane had not arrived they left and returned
later only to find that the plane had dropped off the delivery at night.ll854 Mike Lamin was
present at the airstrip when the witness first arrived but the witness did not know whether
Lamin was there when he returned the second time.l 1855 They arrived after the plane had left
but saw the materiel it had dropped on the field, which was AK rounds, G3 rounds, stick
grenades and GMG rounds. These were distributed to AFRC/RUF forces in Freetown,
Makeni and Magburaka and later used to repel ECOMOG from Freetown. I ISS6
Prosecution Witness Naomi Campbell
5368. Witness Naomi Campbell testified that in September 1997, she attended a dinner
hosted by Mr and Mrs. Nelson Mandela at their Presidential House in Pretoria. The dinner
was attended by other prominent personalities including Charles Taylor.H857 At the table,
Taylor had a general conversation with the other guests telling them who he was and where
he was from.ll858 After dinner Ms. Campbell retired to her room upstairs in the Presidential
Guesthouse but was awoken by two strange black men who upon knocking on her door gave
her a pouch saying "a gift for you".H859 She did not open the pouch until the next morning
when she saw in it a few "small dirty looking stones". I lm) Campbell did not know who these
men were or where they came from and it was only after discussing the incident with Mia
Farrow and Carole VVhite at breakfast that she concluded that the stones were diamonds and
must have been sent by Charles Taylor. As she did not want the stones, she gave them to
Hm TF1—338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15282—15287.
**555 TF1—338, rrumerrpt 3 September 2008, p. 15285.
**555 TF1—338, rrmreerrpt 5 September 2008, p. 15285.
Hm TF1—338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15282—15287.
**555 TF1—338, rrrmserrpt 5 September 2008, pp. 15557—15558.
Hm Naomi Campbell, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45464. The dinner was related to the fund—raising activities
of the Mandela Children's Charity of which Ms. Campbell is an Ambassador. According to the "B1ue train
Summary of Programme" (Exhibit D—428) the dinner took place on Thursday 25 September 1997 at the
Presidential Guest house in Pretoria and was attended by other celebrities.
**555 NQOHI1 Campbell, Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45466—43468.
Hm Naomi Campbell, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45468.
Hm Naomi Campbell, Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45468—45470.

---- End of Page 1833 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T %/ GL 18 May 2012

Jeremy Ratcliffe, the head of the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, "to do something with
them" that would benefit the disadvantaged children.11861
Prosecution Witness Carole White
5369. Witness Carole White, who attended the same fund—raising function and dinner as
Ms. Campbell and spent the night in the same guest house at the Mandela residence on 25
September 1997,11862 told the Trial Chamber that there were 8 or possibly about 10 people at
the dinner that evening.11863 White testified that she saw Campbell and Taylor laughing and
nodding, being charming to each other and "mildly flir"ring" with each other at the dimier
table.118°4 Campbell excitedly told White that Taylor was going to give her diamonds and
Taylor responded by smiling and nodding in agreement.11865 In cross—examination White
affirmed that she never actually heard Taylor make any promise to give Campbell diamonds
but that he nodded in agreement.11866 The witness further testified that at the conclusion of
the dinner, she was present during a conversation between a Liberian Minister and Campbell
concerning the delivery of the diamonds and that she thought Taylor may also have been
briefly present.118°7 During the conversation, White learned that the arrangement was for two
men to collect the diamonds from Johannesburg and deliver them to the guesthouse.11868
White told the Trial Chamber that she and Campbell stayed in the lounge area of the guest
house from "around 10 o’clock at night" waiting for the men to arrive. After checking
outside she and Campbell went to bed.118°9 At about 1.00am in the morning, two men threw
pebbles at the window of \Vhite's room to get her attention and shouted that "they had
something for Campbell".1187O White then alerted Campbell and the two women met the two
men in the lobby, where the men gave Campbell a "quite scruffy paper"11871 containing five
or six uncut diamonds.11872 That morning Ms. Campbell put the diamonds in a small
**88* Naomi Campbell, rrarrsarrpt 5 August 2010, pp. 4546845475
11862 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45755-45760. See also Exhibit D-428.
11863 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45809-458 10; Transcript 10 August 2010, p. 45852.
11864 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, p. 45764; Transcript 10 August 2010, p. 45818.
**888 Carole White, rrarrscrrpt 9 August 2010, p. 45764.
**888 Carole White, rrarrsarrpt 10 August 2010, pp. 45819-45822.
**887 Carole White, rrarrscrrpt 9 August 2010, p. 45766.
11868 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, p. 45767; Transcript 10 August 2010, pp. 45823-45826.
**888 Carole wlrrta, rrarrsarrpt 9 August 2010, p. 45768.
**878 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45769—45768 In cross-examination, White stated on 10 August
pp. 45835-45842 that the men said "they have a gift for Ms. Campbell".
**87* Carole wlrrts, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45857, 45866.
**878 Carole White, rrarrsarrpt 9 August 2010, p. 45771-45772.

---- End of Page 1834 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T (pa / 18 May 2012

jewellery pouch.11878 The following moming White advised Campbell against taking the
diamonds out of South Aiiica as that would be illegal and suggested instead, that the
diamonds be donated to the Nelson Mandela Children's Charity. White was present when
Campbell handed the diamonds in a pouch to Jeremy Ratcliffe, Chairman of the Nelson
Mandela Children's Charity.11874 White admitted in cross-examination that she is involved
in a multi-million dollar suit against Campbell whom she sued for breach of contract, but
denied that the suit had any impact on her testimony in Court.11875
Prosecution Witness Mia Farrow
5370. Witness Mia Farrow testified that she too was invited by Nelson Mandela to attend
the Blue Train fund-raising event and, like Campbell, she and the other guests attended the
dinner and spent the night at the Presidential Guesthouse.11876 Farrow told the Trial Chamber
that the following moming at breakfast, Campbell excitedly talked of an event the night
before in which some men sent by Taylor had knocked on her door and given her a huge
diamond, which Campbell said she intended to give to the Nelson Mandela Children's
Charity.11877 Campbell did not show Farrow the gift she had received.11878 Farrow testified
that it was Campbell who suggested that the gift was from Charles Taylor.11879 She said she
did not recall Carole White.1 18811 In cross-examination, the witness again said that she did not
see the diamond or know where the diamond came from, and that she did not know the
reason behind the gift.11881 Ms Farrow admitted in cross-examination that as a "Goodwill
Ambassador" for UNICEF her work focuses mainly on children impacted by armed conflict
in Afiica11882 but maintained that her testimony is not impacted by her views or work on the
subject.11888
Defence Exhibit D-424
11878 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, p. 45868; Transcript 10 August 2010, pp. 45866, 45868.
11874 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, p. 45773.
11875 Carole White, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45790—45795; Transcript 10 August 2010, pp. 45850, 45863.
**876 Mia Farrow, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45650—45653.
11877 Mia Farrow, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45654—45662.
WS Mru ruuuw, rtuusutrpt 9 August 2010, p. 45654.
11879 Mia Farrow, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45659—45660.
118811 Mia Farrow, Transcript 9 August 2010, p. 45659. I
11881 Mia Farrow, Transcript 9 August 2010, p. 45664.
11882 Farrow mentioned working with children in conflict in Sudan, Chad, Congo, Central African Republic and
Uganda.
11888 Mia Farrow, Transcript 9 August 2010, pp. 45716—45743.

---- End of Page 1835 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T dk J 18 May 2()12

5371. Exhibit D—424 is a photograph of some of the guests that attended the dinner at the
Presidential Guesthouse in Pretoria on 25 September 1997. Exhibit D—428 is the "Blue Train
Summary of Programme" indicating that a private dinner was hosted by President Mandela
at the Presidential Guesthouse, Pretoria on Thursday 25 September 1997.
The Accused
5372. The Accused denied having any contact or dealings with the AFRC/RUF Junta or
receiving a delegation sent by Johnny Paul Koroma in July 1997 as alleged by the
Prosecution, as he was inaugurated President of Liberia on 2 August 1997 and not
before.ll884 Taylor acknowledged that in early October 1997, a delegation sent by Johnny
Paul Koroma carrying a letter (Exhibit D—004) was received by his Foreign Minister. Taylor
did not meet the said delegation, nor respond to the request for arms and ammunition in
Exhibit D-004. He maintained that Liberia was not in a position to send arms or ammunition
to Sierra Leone as requested in Exhibit D—004 because (rz) Liberia had totally disarmed and
all arms were in UN custodygl M5 (Z2) Liberia did not recognise the Junta regime in
Freetown; (c) ECOWAS States had just delivered an ultimatum to the Junta regime to
reinstate President Kabbah or face forceful removal by ECOMOG;ll886 (rz') there was a
decision (A/DEC/7/8/97) of ECOWAS Member States instituting sanctions and an arms
embargo on the Junta regimegllgm and (e) ECOMOG forces were deployed throughout
Liberia including at all major airports to enforce security in the sub—region.H888 A second
delegation from Johnny Paul Koroma was sent to Monrovia after 3 October 1997 but Taylor
declined to meet them too as he did not wish to lend credence to the illegal Junta regime.l M9
Taylor denies ever supplying arms to the rebels in Sierra Leone in exchange for diamonds as
alleged by the Prosecution.l N90 Taylor denied any involvement in the alleged shipment of
arms and ammunition to the AFRC/ RUF Junta through Magburaka,l ml and denied speaking
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25431, 25442. Ruth Sandor Perry was President of
Liberia before Taylor.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25436, 25443.
HSM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25438. q
HW Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25452.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25443-25445.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25440-25441; Transcript 23 September 2009, p.
29541.
N90 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25849.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l4 January 2010, pp. 33356-33360; Transcript 27 October 2009, p.
30440; Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29539-29542; Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25442.

---- End of Page 1836 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Q / l8 May 2012

to Johnny Paul Koroma on the phone before the said shipment. 111192 Taylor also denied
receiving any money and/or diamonds from Ibrahim Bah on behalf of the Junta in Sierra
Leone as payment for arms and ammunition.111193 He said he was made aware of the
shi ment in his ca acit as a member of the Committee of Five111194 but denied orderin the
P P Y 8
RUF to construct an airfield near Magburaka or at Buedu, or having an aircraft capable of
carrying arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone. 111195
5373. The Accused testified that he had nothing to do with the Magburaka arms shipment
and was not aware of Ibrahim Bah's presence in Monrovia in relation to such a shipment.
He said the shi ment could not have ori inated from Liberia because at that time ECOMOG
P 8
was in position and the Accused had no weapons and no aircraft.111196 The Accused denied
purchasing arms and ammunition during his multi-State trip in September 1997111197 and
instead testified that the purpose of this trip was so he could receive medical treatment and
meet with Nelson Mandela.111198 The Accused confirmed attendin a dinner at Nelson
8
Mandela's residence, at which Naomi Cam bell and Mia Farrow were also in
P
attendance111199 but denied carrying diamonds with him during his trip or sending a diamond
to Campbell.1191111 Official records entered into evidence indicate that on 20 September 1997,
Taylor commenced a multi-State trip that took him to South Africa, Burkina Faso, Libya,
Tunisia and Niger, returning to Liberia on 3 October 1997.1 19111
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5374. Witness Issa Sesay testified that in late June/early July 1997,11902 Gibril Massaquoi
travelled from Ni eria and delivered several letters from Foda Sankoh. Massa uoi
8 Y (1
delivered two of the letters to Ibrahim Bah and General Diendere, the Chief of Staff of the
111192 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29546-29549.
118113 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 29 September 2009, p. 29788.
111194 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 July 2009, pp. 25610-25612.
111195 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 February 2010, pp. 351 12-351 13.
118% Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29539-29542.
111197 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33332-33338, 33349, Transcript 16 February
2010, pp. 35110-35111; Transcript 17 February 2010, pp. 35219-35223.
111198 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 February 2010, pp. 351112-35113.
111199 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 February 2010, pp. 351 112-35113.
11901*1 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33339-333340, 33369-33371.
11901 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of Activities of the Chief
Executive of Liberia, August 2 1997 — December 31 1998", Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January
2010.

---- End of Page 1837 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
[ 4/

Burkinabe Army, respectively, in Ouagadougu, while the other two were delivered to
Johnny Paul Koroma and Sam Bockarie in Sierra Leone.N903 In the letter to Bockarie,N9O4
Sankoh urged Bockarie to work with Koroma and Ibrahim Bah to ensure that the
ammunition Sankoh had purchased and stored in Burkina Faso was delivered to Freetown so
that "the AFRC and RUF would be able to defend themselves".ll905 Sesay explained that
Foday Sankoh had purchased the arms and ammunition from Burkina Faso in early 1997
before he was arrested in Nigeria N906 and left them with General Diendere for safe-
keeping.N907 According to Sesay the arms and ammunition were purchased with funds
donated to the RUF by Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya.N908 Sesay denied that the
RUF ever gave Charles Taylor or Ibrahim Bah diamonds in exchange for arms and
ammunition,N909 explaining that at that time "1\/Ir Taylor and Mr Sankoh had no
business".l mm In July 1997, Johnny Paul Koroma invited Ibrahim Bah, through Sam
Bockarie and Gibril Massaquoi, to make arrangements to hire a plane for the purpose of
transporting the arms and ammunition from Burkina Faso. I WN Ibrahim Bah met Johnny Paul
Koroma in Freetown, who gave him $USD 90,000 from the Bank of Sierra Leone in July or
August 1997 for hiring a plane. I W2 Bah arranged for the arms shipment which arrived by air
at Mayagba airfield near Magburaka between November and December 1997.NQN Sesay
disputed the fact that the AFRC/RUF Supreme Council ever held an emergency meeting at
which the issue of paying Ibrahim Bah 90 carats of diamonds for the purchase of arms and
""°2 rusa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43862.
Nm Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43855.
N904 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46560-46561 (where Sesay states that Bockarie read the letter
out to him.)
N905 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43856—43873; 29 July 2010, p. 44988; Transcript 18 August 2010, p,
46558.
N9O° Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43872-43873,
N907 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43810; Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43857, 43874.
"°°" rssa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43857, 43874.
N909 Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44670; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 44985, 44996.
NW) Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43871.
""" rm Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43810.
Nm Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43860. Sesay explained at p. 43862 that while Foday Sankoh the RUF
leader owned the amrs and ammunition, Johnny Paul Koroma was to provide $USD 90,000, the cost of
transporting them, as his contribution to the war effort.
Nm Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43860-43863. Elsewhere in his testimony, Sesay refers to the airstrip
as "Magburaka airfield".

---- End of Page 1838 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / 18 May 2012 % ‘
r

ammunition was discussed.II9I4 He also disputed the fact that Johnny Paul Koroma sent a
delegation to Liberia in late 1997. I IQIS
5375. When the aims shipment arrived at Magburaka "around November or December
1997",II9I6 Johnny Paul Koroma sent Sesay and other representatives of the APRC and
RUFIIQIY to collect their share of the arms and ammunition which arrived on the plane
accompanied by Fonti Kanu, Ibrahim Bah and a crew that looked like Russians.II9I8 Sesay
and SO Williams went by helicopter to Magburaka and spent the night in Makeni.
According to Sesay, the plane arrived at Magburaka the next day between 3.00pm and
4.00pm and when it landed Sesay and the others unloaded all the materials from it.II9I9
Sesa stated that the lane flew from Burkina Paso directl to Ma buraka.II920 Immediatel
Y P Y E Y
after the lane left, the ECOMOG Alfa `ets bombarded the runwa but missed the car o that
P J Y E
had just been offloaded. After the jet left, Sesay and others were able to load the cargo into
their t1ucks.II92I The plane was supposed to deliver the arms and ammunition in three trips
but as a result of the bombardment, onl one fli ht arrived.II922 Sesa stated that he did not
Y E Y
see Samuel Kar bo at Ma buraka.II923 The shi ment consisted of two BZT wea ons, five
E E P P
"SAM-7s" with their ammunition, AA rounds, GPMG rounds and some G3 rounds but no
AK-47 guns or ammunition. I I924 Sesay estimated the quantity of ammunition he collected as
two truckloads.II925 The aims and ammunition were delivered to the residence of Johnn
Y
Paul Koroma in Freetown.II926 Sesay stated that Johnny Paul Koroma distributed the
materiel from the Magburaka shipment in 1997. Koroma gave some of the materiel to RY
Koroma, who was in charge of distribution of ammunition at Cockerill, and some to Mike
IIQI4 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43857.
IIQIS Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45130.
IIqI° Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43863.
IIQI7 Sesay named SO Williams, Emjlin Dumbuya (a.k.a. Savimbi), Lieutenant AK .Jalloh and Akim Turay,
Varnicious Vandi (a.k.a. Kailondo) and Daniel Wankay (a.k.a. Rambo), as some of the senior AFRC and RUF
officials that went to collect the materiel. Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45130.
IIQIB Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43866.
IIOIQ Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45130.
IIQ20 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 .July 2010, p. 43875.
IIOZI Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 .July 2010, p. 43867.
II922 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 .July 2010, pp. 43867·43875. In cross—examination, Sesay states that the plane was
supposed to make two trips, not three. Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46628·46629.
M3 im scsay, Transcript 30 July 2010, p. 45132 (cs).
II924 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43863; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45002-45003.
IIOZS Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43863.
II026 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 .July 2010, p. 43867.
?'

---- End of Page 1839 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T j 18 May 2012

Lamin to take to Bockarie. However, when ECOMOG interyened in February 1998, the
materiel was left at Johnny Pau1's house and captured by ECOMOG forces.11921
Defence Exhibit D-015
5376. Exhibit D-015 is a letter, dated 26 June 1996, from Foday Sankoh to Mohammed
Talibi, the Libyan Ambassador to Ghana, acknowledging receipt of SSUSD 500,000 provided
by Libya for purchase of "needed material to pursue the military mission" and requesting a
further SUSD 1.5 million for the procurement and airlreight of more arms and
ammunitions.1 1928
Prosecution Exhibit P-272
5377. Exhibit P-272 is a letter, dated 4 December 1996, irom Foday Sankoh to Mohammed
Talibi, the Libyan Ambassador to Ghana, in which he explains that he has paid $USD
300,000 to his "business pa1tners" for procurement of materiel but needs $USD 700,000
more to cover the balance. ln this letter Sankoh laments the fact that there is some money
with the Burkinabe Government for the provision of war materiel but that the said
Government "have not shown any keen interest in assisting the RUF as a movement,
notwithstanding a recent conversation that Sankoh had with cormnandant Diendere".11929
Defence Exhibit D-004
15378. Exhibit D-004 is a letter, dated 3 October 1997, from Johnny Paul Koroma to
Charles Taylor, thanking him for his supportive position at the UN General Assembly. The
letter ends with a request that he supply the Junta with arms and ammunition, with an
itemised list of the quantity and description of the arms and ammunition requested.119311
Deliberations
111121 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 439l5~43916.
11928 Exhibit D—0l5, "RUF — Follow up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother Mohamed
Talibi, Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriyya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996".
119211 Exhibit P-272, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl. Foday S
Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi, Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya,
Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996 - 00007797 — 000077987
110311 Exhibit D—004, "Letter from Johrmy Paul Koroma to Charles Taylor asking for help in the Defence of the
Country against ECOMOG, 3 October 1997".

---- End of Page 1840 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 4// 18 May 2012

gqq33
a. Origin of the arms shipment;
5379. Having carefully considered the above evidence, the Trial Chamber makes the
following observations. lt is not in dispute that a few months before the Magburaka arms
shipment arrived in Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, the head of the AFRC/RUF Junta in
Sierra Leone, sent a delegation to Monrovia, Liberia with a letter to then President Charles
Taylor for assistance in gaining recognition amongst the ECOWAS Member States. The
exact date of the delegation's visit is in dispute, with `Witness TF 1-371 who was part of the
said delegation, stating that it was in August and the Accused stating that it was in October
1997. lt is not in dispute that on arrival in Monrovia, the said delegation was unable to meet
Charles Taylor and instead met two of his Government officials, namely John T. Richardson
and Monie Captan, to whom the delegation delivered the letter for onward transmission to
Taylor. Recalling its finding as to their general credibility,H93l the Trial Chamber believes
the testimony of Witnesses Samuel Kargbo and TF 1-371 and finds that the mission of this
delegation was a purely diplomatic one seeking political/diplomatic recognition of the Junta
regime, and did not involve asking for arms or ammunition from Taylor. The Trial Chamber
also believes TF 1-371 that the letter Exhibit D—004, dated 3 October 1997, which contains
references to arms and ammunition was not the letter carried by this delegation. For these
reasons, the Trial Chamber does not consider the visit of this delegation to Monrovia to be
relevant to the Magburaka arms transaction.
5380. One witness spoke vaguely of` a second delegation sent by Johnny Paul Koroma
around September/October 1997 to the Accused, specifically to solicit arms and
ammunition. Samuel Kargbo heard Johnny Paul Koroma state at a meeting of the Supreme
Council that he was going to send a second delegation to Liberia led by Mike Lamin of the
RUF and Lieutenant—Colonel Fonti Kanu of the AF RC to purchase arms and ammunition for
the Junta to be facilitated by one General lbrahim who had been recommended by Sam
Bockarie.H932 According to Kargbo, a couple of days later these three individuals travelled
to Liberia around the begimiing of September 1997 and the Magburaka arms shipment
arrived one or two weeks after, around 23 September 1997. Kargbo, however, admitted that
he did not know exactly where the arms shipment originated but surmised that it may have
lm I Credibility Assessment, Samuel Kargbo, paras 290-295; Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226.
Him Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10455-10459.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M 18 May 2012

JZ C7 92 if
passed through Burkina Faso.H933 The Accused himself spoke of a second delegation sent
by Johnny Paul Koroma to Monrovia after 3 October 1997 but maintains that he declined to
meet them.H934 The Trial Chamber finds Kargbo's testimony in this regard to be of little
probative value in establishing a link between this second delegation and the arms shipment
as it not only is circumstantial but is contradicted by another Prosecution witness TF1-371,
who insisted that Mike Lamin was never on the delegation that went to Liberia to solicit for
arms or ammunition. For those reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that there is insufficient
evidence linking the visit of a second delegation to Liberia to the Magburaka arms
transaction.
5381. With regard to the Prosecution contention that in September 1997 the Accused took
the diamonds and used the opportunity under diplomatic cover of a trip to South Afiica,
Burkina Faso, Libya and Niger to arrange the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Junta
and that while in South Afiica the Accused presented some of the Junta diamonds as a gift to
supermodel Naomi Campbell, the Trial Chamber makes the following observations
regarding the evidence of the three witnesses called by the Prosecution. lt is not in dispute
that Witnesses Naomi Campbell, Carole White, Mia Farrow and the Accused all attended a
private dinner hosted by Nelson Mandela at his Presidential House in Pretoria, South Afiica
on 25 September 1997. It is what transpired at the dinner and afterwards that is in dispute.
Not only did the Accused deny sending Ms. Campbell any diamonds but the evidence of the
three Prosecution witnesses as to what transpired at and after the dinner also contains
contradictions. White insisted that Campbell and Taylor were "mildly flirtatious" at the
dinner table, an assertion refuted by Campbell. White maintained that Campbell told her
during the dinner that Taylor was going to give her a diamond and that Taylor nodded
affirmatively, an account refuted by Campbell, who insisted that she only had a general
conversation with Mr Taylor at the table. White maintained that after the dinner, she
overheard a Liberian Minister making arrangements with Campbell for two men to deliver
the diamonds from Johannesburg to her room, a conversation denied by Campbell. White
further maintained that she and Campbell stayed up late waiting for the diamond couriers
who arrived at the Guesthouse after 1.00am. Campbell refuted White's version stating that
when the men did arrive she was fast asleep in her bed and was not expecting them. White
Him Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. l07l5—l07l9.
gggiliharles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25440-2544l; Transcript 23 September 2009, p.


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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T Z 18 May 2012

3 79 xs
told the Court that she was present when the two men delivered the uncut diamonds to
Campbell in the lobby of the guesthouse but Campbell insisted the men came to her room
and handed her a pouch and that she was alone when that happened. Both White and Farrow
maintained that it was Campbell who told them that the diamonds were a gift from Taylor
but Campbell refuted their version, claiming that it was White's and Farrow's suggestion
that the diamonds must have come from Taylor.
5382. The Trial Chamber found both White and Farrow to be frank and truthful witnesses,
not prone to exaggeration and consistent in saying that they did not recall certain details
clearly. They were also consistent with respect to the details that they did recall. White was
subjected to detailed cross-examination on her direct evidence and on extraneous matters,
but she affirmed her testimony and her recall of events remained clear and unembellished.
The Trial Chamber notes that Campbell, on the other hand, was a reluctant witness who
openly expressed fear of testifying against the Accused.H935 The Trial Chamber is of the
view that Ms. Campbell deliberately omitted certain details out of fear of the Accused. There
are differences in the details described by these three witnesses, but the Trial Chamber
considers, particularly given the lapse of thirteen years between the events and their recall of
these events, that these differences are not significant. All three witnesses testified that the
diamonds given to Campbell came from Taylor — White on the basis of what she heard and
saw both at the dinner and when the diamonds were delivered, Farrow on the basis of what
Campbell told her, and Campbell herself, who said she came to the realization that the
diamonds were sent by Taylor. I 1936
5383. In the light of this evidence from all three witnesses, the Trial Chamber does not find
the denial of the Accused credible. The evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
two men sent by the Accused delivered uncut diamonds to Naomi Campbell on his behalf
following a dinner they both attended on 26 September 1997 at the Presidential House of
Nelson Mandela in Pretoria, South Africa. Be that as it may, however, the Trial Chamber
notes that no evidence has been adduced by the Prosecution with regard to the origin of the
diamonds given to Naomi Campbell by the Accused, or to support its allegation that the
Accused arranged the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Junta during the course of his
H935The witness described her coming to Court as "a big irrcoriveriierice" and expressed concern about
"endangering her family" by agreeing to testify. See Naomi Campbell, Transcript 5 August 2010, pp. 45478,
45483, 45506-45507.
H936 Naomi Campbell, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45472.

---- End of Page 1843 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dk 18 May 2012

trip to South Africa, Burkina Faso, Libya and Niger. In the absence of such evidence the
Trial Chamber cannot conclude with any degree of certainty that the Magburaka arms
shipment originated from South Africa.
5384. Several other witnesses who gave evidence about the Magburaka arms shipment
sim l did not know exactl where the shi ment ori `nated or merel s eculated. These
P Y Y P 81 Y P
include Augustine Mallah,H937 Alimamy Bobson Sesay,ll938 Samuel Kargbo, who saw a
soldier wearing a Burkinabe uniform on board the plane and speculated that it came from
Burkina Faso,ll939 TF1—371,H940 Alimamy Bobson Sesay who said that some soldiers
thought the shipment came from Ukraine while others said it came from Liberia, and TF1-
338 who heard it said in a meeting that the Ukrainians provided the arms and
ammunition.H94l Isaac Mongor testified that a shipment came to Magburaka in 1998 from
Libya, which passed through Liberia and was arranged by the Accused. The Defence
challenged his testimony, submitting that Mongor was trying to "disown his previous
statement" made to the Prosecution by alleging the arms and ammunition that he previously
referred to "were a different shipment from the Magburaka shipment" from Burkina Faso,
arranged by Bah with Koroma.H942 Mongor said he did not remember any arms or
ammunition coming from Burkina Faso and denied saying so to investigators, although he
was unable to explain why he did not correct his statement. The Trial Chamber has also
considered the evidence of Issa Sesay to the effect that the arms shipment was in fact
urchased b Foda Sankoh in earl 1997 and left with General Diendere, the Chief of Staff
P Y Y Y
of the Burkinabe Army, in Ouagadougu, Burkina Faso.ll943 Sesay claims that he came to
know this information via a letter carried by Gibril Massaquoi to Sam Bockarie.H944 The
Trial Chamber has earlier expressed its reservations about the general credibility of Issa
Sesay.ll945 In this particular case the Trial Chamber has also taken into account the fact that
no other witness spoke of an arrangement whereby Foday Sankoh had an arms cache
Wm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20379-20380.
Hm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8687, 8701.
mw Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10715-10719.
M40 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700-2701 (CS), The witness stated that he personally did not
know where the shipment came from but was informed by Ibrahim Bah and Issa Sesay that the plane carrying
the arms shipment came from Ouagadougu, Burkina Faso.
"°" rrr-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15282-15285.
H942 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 865.
wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43810; Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43857, 43874.
HW Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46560-46561.
M45 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.

---- End of Page 1844 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012

$9427
standing by in Burkina Faso, awaiting transportation to Sierra Leone, notwithstanding that
some of the witnesses were senior RUF officials at the time and would have known of the
arrangement if it did exist. Furthermore, in his "Salute Report as Battle Field Commander to
the Leader of the Revolution, dated 27 September 1999", at End of Page 3 where Sesay speaks
about "a document" that Gibril Massaquoi carried from Sankoh in Nigeria and handed to
Johnny Paul Koroma, Sesay makes no mention whatsoever of the alleged arms cache lying
in Burkina Faso or the need for the RUF and AFRC to secure its transportation to Sierra
Leone. H946 Lastly, the Trial Chamber notes from the evidence of Samuel Kargbo that
Lieutenant-Colonel Fonti Kanu was specifically included on the delegation that went to
bring the arms shipment because "he was familiar with the military needs of the J unta". This
presupposes that the military equipment was not yet purchased and that Fonti would be
instrumental in identifying which equipment to purchase. For the above reasons, the Trial
Chamber does not believe Sesay's testimony regarding the pre-purchase of the Magburaka
arms shipment by Foday Sankoh.
5385. ln view of the lack of credible evidence regarding this aspect of the shipment, the
Trial Chamber is unable to make a specific finding as to the origin of the Magburaka arms
shipment.
b. How was the shipment paid for?
5386. With regard to payment for the shipment, the Trial Chamber has considered the
evidence of several witnesses all of whom spoke of a Supreme Council meeting where it
was agreed that 90 carats of diamonds would be paid as purchase price and $USD 90,000 for
transportation of the arms shipment. Witness TF 1-371 attended an emergency meeting of the
AFRC/RUF Supreme Council in September 1997 at which Johnny Paul Koroma, the
Chairman, announced that the Junta needed 90 carats of diamonds and $USD 90,000 to pay
for the arms shipment. ln that same meeting, Koroma instructed the AFRC mining
commander and the Principal Liaison Officer to provide the requisite diamonds, and the
Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone to provide the US dollars. A few days later, TF 1-371
was present at Koroma's residence when the latter handed over a parcel of diamonds and
$USD 90,000 to Sam Bockarie who in turn handed the cash and diamonds to Ibrahim Bah.
H946 Exhibit D—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999 - 00007756 — 00007768".

---- End of Page 1845 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

3 793 at
In late October, the shipment arrived at Magburalattended a Supreme Council meeting at which, inter alia, it was agreed that the arms and
ammunition to be purchased by the Junta would be paid for with "a parcel", which Kargbo
understood to mean diamonds.H948 Augustine Mallah attended a meeting of senior military
officers "close to October 1997" during which the Chief of Army Staff told the gathering
that the Junta would pay for the arms shipment with "money in the bank and diamonds from
Kono and Tongo".l [949 The Trial Chamber does not have any general reservations regarding
the credibility of Witnesses TF1—371, Kargbo and Mallah.H950 Defence witness Issa Sesay
confirmed that $USD 90,000 from the Bank of Sierra Leone was used to pay for
transportation of the arms shipment although he maintained that the arms were pre—paid for
by Foday Sankoh using a donation from the Libyan People's Jamahiriya, a version rejected
by the Trial Chamber.
5387. The Defence also refers to Exhibits D—015 and P-272 to support its contention that
the arms delivered to Magburaka were paid for by Sankoh with money from Libya.H95l The
two letters sent by Sankoh to Libyan Ambassador Talibi in 1996 are a request for money for
procurement of arms and ammunitions and an acknowledgement of receipt of money, with a
request for more money. There is no evidence that these monies were actually expended on
arms and ammunition. The Trial Chamber notes that Defence Witness Fayia Musa gave
evidence that Sankoh misused the money he received from Libya in 1996 for the RUF on
expensive clothes, women and stereo equipment.H952 Witness TF1—168 also testified that
Sankoh spent the money he received on fine clothes and women.H953 The Trial Chamber
considers that the letters cited by the Defence are not probative with regard to the source of
funding for the Magburaka shipment
5388. In light of the above evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the AFRC/RUF Junta
spent 90 carats of diamonds on the purchase of the Magburaka arms shipment and $USD
90,000 on air freighting it from its origin to Magburaka airfield in Sierra Leone.
H947 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008.
Hm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10458.
11049 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20152-20154.
Hm Credibility Assessment, TF1—371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Samuel Kargbo, paras 290-295.
Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2522.
1195 I Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 862-864.
lm] Fayia Musa, Transcript 16 April 2010, pp. 39203-39204.
11953 TF1-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, p. 23417.

---- End of Page 1846 ---------------------------


Case No.: ` ` L—0 - - 18 May2012

c. Who facilitated the arms shipment?
5389. With regard to making arrangements for the purchase and shipment of the arms, a
number of witnesses testified that Ibrahim Bah visited the Junta in Freetown in September
1997 for this purpose. Witness TF 1-371 attended a meeting with Bockarie and Bah at the
Cape Sierra Hotel, at which Bah explained that Charles Taylor had specifically sent him to
negotiate terms with Johnny Paul Koroma that would assist the AFRC secure arms and
aminunition,H954 and that he had already discussed the costs involved with Johnny Paul
Koromal NSS Later, TF 1-371 was present at a meeting in Koroma's residence where Koroma
handed a parcel of diamonds and $USD 90,000 to Bockarie who in turn handed the cash and
diamonds to Bah, after which Bah and Bockarie left Freetown.H956 Isaac Mongor attended a
meeting at the residence of Jolmny Paul Koroma at which the main topic discussed was the
need foriammunition. Mongor stated that the meeting was happy because Bah, who was
present at this meeting, "would be able to help them get ammunition".H957 After this
meeting Koroma and Bah held "a closed-door meeting", but the contents of these
discussions were not disclosed to Mongor.ll958 Samuel Kargbo attended a Supreme Council
meeting at which he explained that Sam Bockarie had recommended Ibrahim Bah as the
erson who would facilitate and assist the Junta to urchase arms and ammunition.H959
P P
Kargbo stated that days later a special delegation that included Ibrahim Bah left for Liberia,
and the arms shipment arrived one to two weeks later.H96O Defence Witness Issa Sesay also
testified that Ibrahim Bah came to Freetown to meet J olmny Paul Koroma, but he said that it
was to arrange for the transport of arms and ammunition that had already been purchased by
Foday Sankoh and left in Burkina Faso for safe-keeping. Numerous witnesses, including
Defence Witness Issa Sesay, testified that Fonti Kanu and Ibrahim Bah were on the plane
that delivered the Magburaka shipment of arms and aminunition.H96l In light of the above
evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Ibrahim Bah was the key person who facilitated
Him TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2308-2309 (CS).
"955 TP1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2309 (cs). 2
WSG TP1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2313-2314, 2374-23755 (CS).
Him Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5714.
Img Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5713-5715; Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6658-6659.
Him Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10455-10459.
IMO Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10458-10459; Transcript 2 June 2008, p .10710.
HW Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p, 43866; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2314 (CS); Samuel
Kargbo, Transcript. 21 May 2008, p. 10479; Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10710; Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8686-8691,

---- End of Page 1847 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f 18 May 2012

3 9 94 0
the purchase and transportation of arms shipment from its place of origin to Magburaka in
Sierra Leone.
d. Alleged involvement of the Accused in the supply of the arms
shipment:
5390. A number of Prosecution witnesses implicated the Accused in the supply of the
Magburaka arms shipment, at the request of Johnny Paul Koroma. Witness TF1—37l stated
that while in Monrovia, his delegation had spoken to officials of the Liberian Government
who assured them that President Taylor was already in contact with Johnny Paul
Koroma.ll962 Upon his retum from Monrovia TF1—371 went to brief Johnny Paul Koroma
who confirmed that President Taylor had already communicated with him and promised
support in securing recognition by ECOWAS.ll%3 Subsequently, TF1—371 was at a meeting
with Bockarie and Ibrahim Bah at the Cape Sierra Hotel. After Bockarie expressed concern
at the constant military attacks on the AFRC by the Nigerian ECOMOG troops and the
AFRC Junta's lack of arms and ammunition, Bah responded that Charles Taylor had
specifically sent him to negotiate terms with Johnny Paul Koroma that would assist the
AFRC secure arms and ammunition.ll964 Isaac Mongor was present at a meeting between
Ibrahim Bah and senior RUF officials at Sam Bockarie's residence in Freetown when Bah
delivered a message from Charles Taylor urging the RUF "to work together with the
AFRC".ll965 Mongor attended a subsequent meeting of senior AFRC officials at the
residence of Johnny Paul Koroma on Spur Road at which Ibrahim Bah repeated the message
from Charles Taylor that the RUF and AFRC should "work hand in hand", a message that
was "well received" by both the RUF and AFRC.ll%6 The main topic discussed at this
second meeting was the need for ammunition and that the meeting was happy because Bah
"would be able to help them get ammunition".ll%7 Later Koroma told Mongor that he had
been in contact with Taylor and that Taylor had said that he was going to "send something"
for the Junta Government.ll%8 Samuel Kargbo overheard a telephone conversation between
Him TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2304-2307 (CS).
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2307 (CS).
Him TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2308-2309 (CS).
M65 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5712.
H%° Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5712-5714.
Wm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5714.
H968 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5724.

---- End of Page 1848 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gu 18 May 2012

Sari!
Johnny Paul Koroma and Charles Taylor during which Koroma reportedly told Taylor that
he was sending him a delegation led by Mike Lamin and that Ibrahim Bah had been
recommended by Sam Bockarie to assist the delegation with the procurement of the arms
and ammunition. **969 Subsequently, Kargbo attended a Supreme Council meeting at which
Koroma stated that he was sending a delegation to Liberia led by Mike Lamin of the RUF,
Lieutenant-Colonel Fonti Kanu of the AF RC and General Ibrahim Bah to purchase arms and
ammunition for the Junta.11971) This delegation left for Liberia within hours of the meeting.
The Prosecution did not adduce evidence regarding the procurement of the arms and
ammunition, nor of Taylor's direct involvement in making these arrangements.
5391. In light of the above evidence, the Trial Chamber has carefully considered the
Defence evidence and arguments exonerating the Accused, and makes the following
observations. Regarding Taylor's denial of contact or dealings with the AFRC/RUF Junta
before his inauguration as President of Liberia on 2 August 1997,11971 the Trial Chamber
notes that none of the Prosecution witnesses above alluded to contact between Taylor and
the Junta before August l997. Regarding Taylor's testimony that Liberia was not in a
position to send arms or ammunition to Sierra Leone as requested in Exhibit D—004 because
(a) Liberia had totally disamied and all arms were in UN custody,11972 (b) Liberia did not
recognise the Junta regime in Freetown, (c) ECOWAS States had just delivered an
ultimatum to the Junta regime to reinstate President Kabbah or face forceful removal by
ECOMOG,11973 (d) there was a decision (A/DEC/7/8/97) of ECOWAS Member States
instituting sanctions and an arms embargo on the Junta regime,11974 and (e) ECOMOG
forces were deployed throughout Liberia including at all major airports to enforce security in
the sub—region,11975 the Trial Chamber is of the view that there was nothing to prevent the
Accused, using an agent or intermediary like Ibrahim Bah, to covertly or clandestinely assist
the Junta to acquire the necessary arms and ammunition. Indeed the covert nature of the
arms purchase explains why so few witnesses actually knew of the origin of this shipment.
11969 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10455.
11971) Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10455—10459, 10477.
_ 11971 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25431, 25442. Ruth Sandor Perry was President of
Liberia before Taylor.
11972 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25436, 25443.
111173 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25438.
11(W Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, p. 25452.
11975 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25443—25445. »

---- End of Page 1849 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0 1-T dm 18 May 2012

5 4 4 4 2
5392. The Defence further submits that, even if the Trial Chamber were to accept the
testimonies of TF 1-371 and Samuel Kargbo, the evidence implicating the Accused is
circumstantial, and that no link has been established between the testimony relating to the
Accused and the shipment to Magburaka.H97°
5393. The Trial Chamber does not consider the evidence implicating the Accused to be
solely circumstantial. TF 1-371 had direct knowledge of the transaction. He testified with
clarity that the Magburaka shipment was organised by Ibrahim Bah, who had been sent by
the Accused to Freetown, where he was given money and diamonds to arrange the shipment,
in the presence of the witness, and that the shipment to Magburaka resulted from this
transaction. 1 1977 TF 1-371 's testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Isaac Mongor and
Samuel Kargbo, both of whom testified that Hnrahim Bah came to Freetown on behalf of the
Accused and both of them linked the arms transaction to Magburaka as well as to the
Accused. While these witnesses recount different meetings, the content of what they heard
in these meetings consistently indicates that Ibrahim Bah was acting on behalf of the
Accused in arranging the arms deal. TF 1-371 testified that following these meetings Bah left
Freetown with Bockarie, and Kargbo testified that Bah went from Freetown to Liberia.l 1978
5394. In light of these considerations, the Trial Chamber rejects the evidence of Issa Sesay
and accepts the evidence of TF 1-371, Mongor and Kargbo that the Accused sent Ibrahim
Bah on his behalf to make an arrangement for provision of arms and ammunition, in
exchange for 90 carats of diamonds and $USD 90,000, which was given to Bah by Bockarie
and Koroma.
e. Date of delivery of the shipment
5395. With regard to the date of the Magburaka shipment, there are inconsistencies in the
testimony of several witnesses. Alimamy Bobson Sesay initially testified that the shipment
took place around about two months after the AF RC coup, which would therefore be July
1997, but later said it was after they had been in power for some time. TF 1-371 testified it
was in October 1997 and Issa Sesay testified that the flight arrived around November or
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1050.
Him TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2701.
"978 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2313-2314, 2374-23755 (CS); Samuel Kargbc, Transcript 21
May 2008, p. 10478.

---- End of Page 1850 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Orb 18 May 2012

544rB
December 1997.11979 Samuel Kargbo testified that the shipment was delivered in late
September 1997. Perry Kamara and TF1-338 testified that the shipment took place "around
the end of 1997711980 Isaac Mongor stated that the delivery arrived in early 1998 shortly
before the ECOMOG intervention.] wg]
5396. The Trial Chamber accepts that a witness recalling events which happened over ten
years earlier when there is no evidence that any of them kept precise or formal records can
lead to variations in recollections and estimations. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that
the Magburaka arms shipment took place sometime between September 1997 and December
1997.
f Size and contents of the Magburaka shipment
5397. With regard to the size and content of the Magburaka shipment, the Trial Chamber
heard varying testimony. TF1-371 was not present for the delivery of the shipment but
relied upon a report from Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon who went to Magburaka to collect
the RUF share.H982 He described the RUF share of the delivery as "huge", including 200
AK-47 rifles, two 75 calibre machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and 80 boxes of AK-
47 ammunition. The quantity of arms and ammunition described by the witness did not
include those allocated to other factions.H983 Isaac Mongor who also went to collect the
RUF share stated that the delivery consisted of two anti-aircraft guns and some ammunition
for the AA gun and GMG rounds.] 1984 Samuel Kargbo who went to collect the AFRC share
testified that there was a "large quantity" of ammunition comprising AK rounds, G3 rounds,
mortar bombs, RPG bombs and stinger missile bombs, but the shipment did not include
arms.ll985 Alimamy Bobson Sesay who arrived at Magburaka after the materials had been
loaded into trucks testified that the shipment included contained sub machine guns (SMGs)
and SMG rounds, AK rounds, an anti-aircraft gun with lasers. VVhen tested at Johnny Paul
Hm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 594.
**980 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3092; TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15282-
fgglggaac Mongor, Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6646-6651.
Wm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2314 (CS).
Hm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2316-2317 (CS).
H984 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5724, 5726-5728; Transcript 4 April 2008, p. 6644.
MSS Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10479-10482; 2 June 2008, p. 10718.

---- End of Page 1851 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dub 18 May 2012

Z 7 7 QL 4L
Koroma's house on Spur Road, the anti-aircraft lasers were found not to be working.H986
Witness TF1-338 who went with senior RUF officials to collect their share arrived after the
plane had left but saw the materiel it had dropped on the field, which was AK rounds, G3
rounds, stick grenades and GMG rounds. l 1987
5398. Issa Sesay who went to collect the RUF share of the delivery stated that the shipment
consisted of two BZT weapons, five "SAM-7s" with their ammunition, AA rounds, GPMG
rounds and some G3 rounds but no AK-47 guns or ammunitionllggg Sesay estimated the
quantity of ammunition he collected as two truckloads.H989 The Trial Chamber however,
doubted Sesay's testimony that the plane landed at 3.00pm to 4.00pm during daylight, or
that Sesay and his colleagues had time to offload the cargo, in view of evidence suggesting
to the contrary, that the plane hurriedly dropped the cargo mid-air at night for fear of
ECOMOG bombardment. Furthermore, Sesay prevaricated when asked to quantify the size
of the shipment and denied TF1-37l's testimony that the delivery included 200 AK-47 rifles
and 80 boxes of ammunitionlwgo stating that there were only a few boxes. In cross-
examination, however, Sesay indicated that the airplane had a very large capacity and said it
was half full. He was evasive when asked why two trucks were required and another plane
load expected.H99l The Trial Chamber finds that the testimony of Issa Sesay was not
credible on this issue and that he tried to downplay the quantity of the shipment, while TF1-
37l's testimony received some corroboration from Samuel Kargbo's testimony that the
shipment contained a "large quantity" of ammunition. Isaac Mongor, testified that only a
"small amount" of ammunition was delivered, Perry Kamara saw arms and ammunition
boxes being distributed by groups, Alimamy Bobson Sesay also testified that a large number
of RUF and AFRC received arms and ammunition from the shipment. The evidence of
Kargbo, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, and Kamara, who were present, all show that a large group
of fighters and a large number of vehicles, including two trucks, awaited the shipment. After
it was off-loaded the consignment was distributed quickly among those present before they
dispersed.
H986 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8701-8703.
Wm TF1-338, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15557-15558.
Hm Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43863; Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45002—45003.
Wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43863.
HW) Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45002—45003.
Wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47357-47358.

---- End of Page 1852 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % db) 18 May 2012

Z9 Q 4 5
5399. There is no evidence that a manifest was produced, signed and recorded or any
evidence to suggest that any member of the Junta took an inventory of the contents of the
shipment on the airplane or an inventory of what was loaded onto each vehicle. Given that
the delivery was made during the night with little lighting and hurriedly loaded on to trucks;
and given further that each faction was concerned with collecting their own share of the
arms and ammunition, the Trial Chamber accepts that the variation in description of the
quantity and content of the shipment is inevitable. ln the circumstances there can be no
finding of the exact quantity or nature of the materials in the shipment. The Trial Chamber
finds however, based on the evidence of witnesses TFl—371, Mongor, Bobson Sesay and
Issa Sesay that the shipment was large and contained both arms and ammunition.
g. Distribution of the Magburaka arms and ammunition
5400. Accounts of who was present at Magburaka to pick up the shipment are numerous
and varied. From the evidence it is clear that the plane dropped off the cargo under cover of
darkness, and that the cargo was hurriedly collected and taken away for fear of an
ECOMOG bombardment. Witnesses arrived at different times and some arrived after the
plane had left. Furthermore, RUF and AFRC personnel from different locations were
positioned at different places around the airstrip, including in the bushes, as they waited to
collect their share of the delivery. Samuel Kargbo testified that vehicle lights had to be used
to illuminate the runway for the plane, which arrived between 7.00pm and 9.00 pmwm
Witnesses TFl—338 and Perry Kamara also stated that the plane dropped off the delivery at
night.H993 lt is therefore not surprising that the witnesses expressed a fair amount of
uncertainty as to who was present and who was not. Given this situation the Trial Chamber
accepts that it is inevitable that different witnesses may have seen certain persons at the
location and not seen others who were in fact present or that they were mistaken in their
identification.l [994 The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution makes no submissions as to
who was present for the delivery, stating only that "Fonti Kanu was on the plane that
brought the shipment to Magburaka". I [995
Him Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10459; Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10709, 10747.
Hm TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, p. 15285.
NW1 R. v. Turnbull (1976) 3 A/IER"64.
H995 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 233.

---- End of Page 1853 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / 5,3 18 May 2012

5401. The Trial Chamber accepts the testimony of the witnesses who said they themselves
were present for the arrival of the shipment at Magburaka and considers that the
inconsistencies in their testimony as to others who were present result from the
circumstances described above. The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
members of both the AFRC and RUF were present at Magburaka for the delivery of the
shipment or after it was made. It therefore finds that members of the AF RC/RUF Junta were
present for the delivery.
5402. Regarding the distribution or allocation of the arms and ammunition, no
documentary record was tendered in evidence. The Trial Chamber considered the evidence
of Isaac Mongor, Samuel Kargbo, TF 1-338, TF 1-371 and Issa Sesay, which witnesses all
gave varying accounts. Witness TF 1-371 stated that the weapons from the shipment were
distributed to the Cockerill Military Headquarters, Koroma's residence and Issa Sesay's base
in Kenema District11996 and that approximately 200 AK-47 rifles, one 75 calibre machine
gun, rocket propelled grenades and 80 boxes of AK-47 ammunition were allocated to the
RUF alone.11997 TF 1-371 also testified that the AK-47s were distributed amongst the armed
guards stationed at the mining operations at Tongo Fields, in addition to the weapons which
the guards already had when they joined the Junta.1199g According to TF 1-371, these guards
included members of the "Small Boys Units" ("SBUs"), some of whom were as young as 13
years old.11999 Mongor testified that one of the two anti-aircraft guns was allocated to the
AF RC and mounted at Koroma's residence in Freetown, while the other was allocated to the
RUF and taken by Mike Lamin to Bockarie in Kenema.121)1111 Samuel Kargbo stated that the
ammunition was hurriedly put in vehicles and delivered to Johnny Paul Koroma's residence
in Freetown, from where it was distributed to the AF RC and RUF commanders.12111)1
5403. Alimamy Bobson Sesay stated that the arms were distributed among RUF and SLA
members12OO2 and that some other arms and ammunition were used to reinforce the fight
against ECOMOG forces.12OO3 Perry Kamara stated that on arrival he saw vehicles belonging
119% TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2316-2317 (CS).
11997 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2316-2317 (CS).
"°"* rrr-371, Transcript 29 January 2008,p. 2463 (cs).
11999 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2337 (CS).
120110 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5733-5734.
12001 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10479-10482.
12002 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8702-8704.
12003 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8688.

---- End of Page 1854 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ’%/ Og 18 May 2012

399¢7
to the RUF, AFRC, "Bo Brigade" and other groups from Freetown and Kenema, all of
whom had come to collect their share.l2OO4 The witness saw arms and ammunition in boxes
being distributed "by groups" between the RUF and AFRC.l2005 Witness TF1-338 stated that
the arms and ammunition were distributed to AFRC/RUF forces in Freetown, Makeni and
Magburaka and later used to repel ECOMOG from Freetown.l2OO6 Issa Sesay stated that the
arms and ammunition were delivered at the residence of Johnny Paul Koroma in
Freetownm)07 and that Johnny Paul Koroma distributed some of the materiel to RY Koroma,
who was in charge of distribution of ammunition at Cockerill, and some to Mike Laniin to
take to Bockarie. However, when ECOMOG intervened in February 1998, the materiel was
left at Johnny Paul's house and captured by ECOMOG and SLPP forcesmog
5404. The Trial Chamber considers that in fact there is a degree of consistency in the
evidence as to where the materiel went following its arrival at Magburaka. A number of
witnesses, including TF1 -371 , TF1-338, Samuel Kargbo, Isaac Mongor and Defence witness
Issa Sesay, all indicated in their testimony that at least some of the materiel was taken to
Koroma's residence. Some witnesses also indicated other destinations, but the evidence
converges to establish that Koroma's residence was a destination for the shipment. The Trial
Chamber also finds, based on the testimonies of TF1-338 and TF1-371, that other parts of
the shipment were delivered to Cockerill Military Headquarters, Makeni, Magburaka and
Kenema. This is consistent with the evidence that shares in the shipment were driven away
from Magburaka after the airplane arrived.
5405. The Trial Chamber will assess the use of the Magburaka shipment in the section of
the Judgement below dealing with the use of materiel supplied or facilitated by the
Accused. WG9
Findings
5406. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused sent Ibrahim Bah on his behalf to Freetown to meet with Sam Bockarie and
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3092.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3091.
12006 TF1-338, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15557—15558.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43867. `
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43915—43916.
Img See Arms and Ammunition: Use ofMaterie1 Supplied or F acilitated by the Accused.

---- End of Page 1855 ---------------------------


Case No.:

Johnny Paul Koroma to make arrangements for the procurement of arms and ammunition.
Bah was given 90 carats of diamonds and $USD 90,000 to pay for the shipment.
5407. The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused travelled to a number of Afiican countries,
including South Afiica, from September to 3 October 1997. On September 25 September
1997 he attended a dinner at the Presidential House of Nelson Mandela, which was also
attended by Naomi Campbell. Following the dinner two men sent by the Accused delivered
diamonds to Naomi Campbell. However, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the
Accused made arrangements during the course of these travels for the purchase of arms and
ammunition to be shipped to Sierra Leone.
5408. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the shipment of materiel negotiated with Bockarie and Koroma by Ibrahim Bah in
Freetown on behalf of the Accused was delivered by plane to Magburaka in Sierra Leone
sometime between September and December 1997, and that members of the AFRC/RUF
Junta were present for the delivery. There is insufficient evidence to determine where the
flight to Magburaka originated.
5409. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the shipment of materiel
delivered to Magburaka included arms and ammunition, which were distributed among the
AFRC/RUF Junta, and that this shipment was very large.
(d) Alleged facilitation of Burkina Faso shipment
Submission of the Parties
5410. The Prosecution submits that one of the largest and most significant shipments of arms
and ammunition provided to the AFRC/RUF was that which arrived just prior to the multi-
axis operation culminating in the attack on Freetown in January 1999, the operation which
inflicted so many crimes and such great suffering on the civilian population of Sierra Leone.
Taylor was instrumental in procuring and organising this shipment.120m Around
October/November 1998, upon Taylor's orders, Bockarie travelled with a delegation,
including his security personnel, Rashid, SYB Rogers, Eddie Kanneh, radio operator Dauda
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 257.

---- End of Page 1856 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T (Ph _/ 18 May 2012

399 ¢< 7
Aruna Fornie ("DAF") and others to Monrovia, where Bockarie met with Taylor, and then
onward to Burkina F aso.l20H
5411. It was originally plarmed that Bockarie would go to Libya to get "materiel". However,
in Monrovia the plan was changed at Taylor's instruction and Taylor sent Bockarie to Burkina
Faso instead, as the materiel had been taken there.l20l2 From Monrovia, Taylor then sent
Bockarie, Karmeh, Rogers and Womandia on to Burkina Faso to receive the materiel. DAF
remained in Monrovia and whilst in Burkina Faso, Bockarie contacted DAF several times to
get updates on the frontlines in Sierra Leone. Bockarie and his delegation, accompanied by
Taylor's subordinate Musa Cisse, brought a large quantity or arms and ammunition back with
them to Roberts International Airport.l20l3
5412. The Prosecution submits that in late November or early December 1998, AF RC/RUF
military commander Sam Bockarie returned from Liberia with unprecedented quantities of
ammunition, which had been flown from Burkina Faso to Roberts International Airport in
Liberia where Bockarie was waiting. It was unloaded by Taylor's persormel and then
Bockarie took it by truck from Liberia to the rebel's stronghold in Kailahun, Sierra Leone.
Taylor was instrumental in this deal by putting the AF RC/ RUF in contact with the Burkinabe
authorities, sending Musa Cisse to accompany Bockarie, and arranging the travel and delivery
of the weapons through Liberia's principal airport to AFRC/RUF territory. When Bockarie
returned to Sierra Leone from this trip, he informed his top commanders that the ammunition
would be used in an offensive plarmed with Taylor with the goal of taking Freetown and
freeing Foday Sankoh.l20l4 The Prosecution further submits that within days of this delivery,
RUF rebels using the said weaponry were able to launch a major attack on a number of
locations in Sierra Leone including Koidu Town (under the command of Issa Sesay) and
Makeni (where the RUF were joined by SLA and STF forces) and eventually Freetown,
attacks that were planned, facilitated and ordered by the Accused. 12015
5413. The Prosecution further contends that upon Bockarie's return to Monrovia from
Burkina Faso, the arms and/or ammunition were taken to White Flower, where Taylor kept p
some of this materiel and sent Jungle, Marzah and others with the remainder on to the
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 258.
*20*2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 259, see also para. 169.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 259.
UOM Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 9.

---- End of Page 1857 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3~O1~T {LA f 18 May 2012

3%; <>
AFRC/RUF through Bong and Lofa Counties to Buedu.12O11° The materiel brought from
Monrovia included AK-47s, G3s, RPG ammunitions, rockets and bombs, ammunition
including GMG ammunition, AK-47 rounds, bombs, grenades and mines.12O17 The materiel
supplied by Taylor was critical to the success of the multi-axis nationwide operation, and was
used to capture Koidu Town and environs and other locations from which the attacking forces
were able to supplement their supplies by capturing more materiel. This in turn enabled them
to move to other targets and capture them, all along the Freetown axis and the Kenema axis.
Some of the materiel was used by Rambo Red Goat's fighters that attacked Freetown.12O18 The
Prosecution relies on evidence from witnesses TF1-371, Dauda Aruna Fornie, Issac Mongor,
Joseph Marzah, Albert Saidu, Augustine Mallah, Varmuyan Sherif, TF1-516, TF1-567, TFI-
338, Karmoh Kanneh, TF1-367, Mohamed Kabbah, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, J abaty J award
and Abu Keita and Exhibits P-046, P-063, P-067, P-093, P-370, P-371, P-372, and P-373.
5414. The Defence does not dispute the "abundance of evidence that Bockarie and other key
figures in the RUF travelled to Burkina Faso in about November 1998 and that following the
trip, the RUF obtained a significant quantity of arms and ammunition". The Defence submits,
however, that "there is not enough corroborative or credible evidence here to conclude that
Taylor facilitated or assisted its acquisition".12O19 The Defence submits further that in
November or December 1998, Ibrahim Bah hosted Sam Bockarie when he travelled to
Ouagadougou to meet with OAU Chairman Compaoré12O2O and that Bockarie may also have
arranged an arms deal there. The Defence submits that the primary and official purpose of this
. mission was to discuss the peace process in Sierra Leone with President Blaise Compaoré,
then chairman of the OAU. From Burkina Faso, Bockarie, Bah and other RUF delegates
travelled on to Libya12O21 to request military assistance from Col. Gaddafi.12O22 In Libya,
Bockarie met with Gadaffi, who provided USDEE 50,000 in assistance to the RUF and on
returning from Libya, Bockarie passed through Burkina Faso and Monrovia. In early
121115 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 10-17.
121116 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 260-261, see also para. 169.
111117 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 261.
121118 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 264.
120*9 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1074.
121120 The Defence argues in para. 1073 that an earlier plan by the RUF in April 1998 to secure arms and
ammunition from Burkinabe General Diendere with the help of Ibrahim Bah, failed when Issa Sesay lost the
collateral diamonds that were to be used to pay for the shipment.
12021 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 619, 1075.
121122 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1073.

---- End of Page 1858 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 615 18 May 2012

1 39951
December, Bockarie arrived back in Buedu with arms and ammunition and the materiel was
put into the store near his house.
5415. The Defence further submits that while Bockarie's trip may have taken him through
Liberia, Burkina Faso and Libya and while he obtained arms and/or ammunitions on that trip,
the evidence is "not at all clear as to where exactly, and from which source, he obtained those
arms and/or ammunition", and that it is possible the supplies came from multiple sources,
including from Libya, Burkina Faso and/or individuals in Liberia.*2023 Furthermore, the
evidence regarding the quantity of the arms and ammunition obtained by Bockarie is
uncertain.*2O24 Lastly, while conceding that materiel obtained from Bockarie's trip to Burkina
Faso was used during the attack on Koidu Town in December 1998 and during the attack on
Kenema, the Defence submit that none of the materiel was distributed to the AFRC or RUF
forces in Koinadugu District.*2U25 The Defence further submits that notwithstanding the
RUF's importation of arms and ammunition during the period November to December 1998,
the most significant source of arms and ammunition for the RUF during this period was from
sources within Sierra Leone, in particular from capturing weapons from ECOMOG at
locations such as Koidu Town, Kimberlite, Sewafe, Masingbi and Teko Barracks.*2O26 The
materiel captured by the RUF in its December 1998 offensive was used to secure further
targets during that period and not to aid or abet the commission of crimes.*2O27 The Defence
relies on evidence of the Accused, Issa Sesay, Sam Kolleh, John Vincent, Fayia Musa, TF1-
168, TF1-338, Isaac Mongor, Abu Keita, Jabaty Jaward, Karmoh Kanneh, Albert Saidu,
Dennis Koker, and Exhibits D-084, D-393 and P-067.*2028
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -371
5416. Witness TF1-371 testified that Sam Bockarie made a major trip to Monrovia in
November or December.1998.*2O29 The witness stated that before the said trip, he attended a
*2023 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1076. A
*2024 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1077.
*2025 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1078.
*2026 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1068—1071.
*2027 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1071.
*2028 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1076.
*2029 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2402 (CS).

---- End of Page 1859 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 5% 18 May 2012

g cy q 5 Z
meetin at which Bockarie met with the witness, Issa Sesa , and Kallonmm and ex ressed
8 Y P
that he was concerned with expanding the fighting to Kono especially after they suffered the
casualty after the aborted attempt of the Fitti-Fatta operation.l2O3l Bockarie told the meeting
that he was planning to travel to Monrovia with Ibrahim Bah, Eddie Kanneh, SYB Rogers and
Lawrence Womandia to meet Taylor's chief of protocol, Musa Cisse and Mr Taylor. Bockarie
told the meeting that from Monrovia, the group was to proceed to Ouagadougou in Burkina
Faso where Ibrahim Bah was to assist them to get a shipment of ammunition for a major
attack.l2O32 The witness testified that Bockarie and his entourage retumed to Buedu two weeks
later, accompanied by Charles Taylor's securities (SSS), namely Zigzag Marzah, Jungle,
Sampson and Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian Mosquito). my
5417. Bockarie took Eddie Kanneh, SYB Rogers (a.k.a. Pa Rogers), and Lawrence
Womandia with him to Monrovia,l2O34 where they met with Musa Cisse who had organized a
flight for them to travel together with himself and Ibrahim Bah to Ouagadougou}2035 They
returned with a major consignment of arms,l2O36 which was transported by plane from
Ougadougou to Roberts lntemational Airport in Monrovia, from where it was deposited at
White Flower. Thereafter, the Accused ordered his bodyguard Yeaten to take "their supplies"
before the RUF was given its own supply, which was then escorted in long-eight-tyre trucks
from White Flower to Buedumm by "Charles Taylor's securities" (SSS), namely Marzah,
Tamba, Sampson and Varmoh.l2O38
5418. The witness testified that Bockarie and his entourage returned to Buedu two weeks
later,l2O39 "with truck loads of arms and ammunition" and a brown coloured new pick-up
Toyota Land Cruiser that Bockarie said the Accused had given to him.l2O4O They came back
with "plenty of boxes of AK-47 rounds and boxes of hand grenades, RPG bombs and machine
IMO TFI-371 does not specify which Kallon but from the context the Trial Chamber considers he is referring to
Morris Kallon.
‘2°3‘ TF1-371, rranuprrpr 28 January 2008,p. 2402 (cs).
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2402-2403 (cs).
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2405 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2750 (CS).
12034 TF1-371, Transcript 28-January 2008, p. 2403 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2750 (CS).
12035 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2403 (CS); Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2643 (CS); Transcript
31 January 2008, pp. 2702, 2726~2727, 2750, 2762 (CS).
12036 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2703, 2750 (CS). The witness describes this as the second major
shipment that happened in November/December 1998.
mm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2702-2703; Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2750, 2762 (CS).
Img TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2405 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2750 (CS).
*20** TF1-371, rranupnpr 28 January 2008, p. 2403 (cs).

---- End of Page 1860 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J! (Lx 18 May 2012

guns, general machine guns, 50 calibre machine guns ammunitions" which were all offloaded
and stored in Bockarie's warehouse in Buedu.*2**4* Sam Bockarie also returned to Buedu with
$USD 17,000 which Bockarie said President Compaore gave to him "as a kind gesture... to
buy medication for the combatant".*2O42
5419. On returning to Buedu, Bockarie convened a forum at Waterworks attended by the
witness, at which Bockarie and his entourage briefed the meeting about their mission. The
witness conhrmed that Exhibit P-063 is a record of the minutes taken at this forum.*2O43 TF1-
371 testified that immediately after the forum documented in Exhibit P-063, Bockarie
convened another meeting of senior RUF and AFRC ofhcers at which he launched ‘Operation
No Living Thing’, and distributed the materiel he had brought from Burkina Faso.*2O44 The
meeting was attended by senior RUF commanders including Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Peter
Vandi, Isaac Mongor, TF1-371 and AFRC commanders including Akim Turay, Gullit,
Leather Boot, Adams and others.12045 Bockarie told the meeting that he now had sufhcient
ammunition for the attack on Kenema Town, Koidu Town and Freetown to be known as
‘Operation No living Thing’ which operation was intended to capture Freetown and to force
the government to negotiate with the rebels.*2O46 Bockarie also brought a map and explained
to the commanders the two pronged approach they were to take in order to capture Freetown.
Issa Sesay and Kallon who were to lead the Hrst flank were given the mission to attack Koidu,
Makeni, Lunsar and to meet the second flank at Masiaka. Akim Turay and Momoh Rogers
who were to lead the second flank, were to attack Kenema, Bo and then move to Masiaka.
After capturing Masiaka, the combined forces were to attack Waterloo and then enter
Freetown. *2047
5420. Halfway through this meeting, several commanders went to have lunch in Bockarie's
bedroom at which point Bockarie went outside to talk on his satellite phone for 10 to 15
minutes. Bockarie entered his bedroom in excitement and told the attendees that he had been
*2040 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2404-2405 (CS). The witness described the trucks that carried the
shipment as "long, long, eight tyred trucks". TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2702 (CS).
*204* TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2404-2405, 2415 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2761 (CS).
The witness also testified that the major substantial amount of support from the Accused came around
November to December 1998. TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2671 (CS).
*2***2 TF1-371, rranspnpt 31 January 2008, pp. 2761-2762 (cs).
*2***3 TF1-371, rranspnpt 28 January 2008, pp. 2405-2410 (cs).
*20** TF1-371, rranapnpt 28 January 2008, pp. 2410-2414 (cs).
*2°" TF1-371, rranspnpt 28 January 2008, pp. 2405, 2410-2411 (cs).
*2°"° TF1-371, rranannpt 28 January 2008, p. 2411 (cs).
*2°""’ TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2411.

---- End of Page 1861 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T M {V; 18 May 2012

3 C1 C19?
talking to the Pa, Mr Taylor, who had instructed him to inform his commanders to undertake
"Operation No Living Thing" and by all means capture Freetown so as to force the
Government into negotiations, and that any commander who disobeyed that instruction was to
be executed. Bockarie also stated that "he didn’t want anyone to misuse those materials that
he had... brought because it was extremely difficult for him to get and he had to give
account".12O48
5421. After the meeting, Bockarie ordered the S4 to distribute the materiel that he had
brought back from Monrovia amongst the various RUF commanders.12O49 Commander Akim
Turay from Tongo Field was given some materiel and was asked to link up with Momoh
Rogers to attack Kenema and also asked the Scorpion Unit led by Abu Keita and other men
led by Sekou to link up with the group in Segbwema and capture Kenema.12O5O The next day
when Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon left for Koidu, Bockarie gave them the bulk of materiel
brought from Monrovia to be used to capture Koidu.12O51 First the arms and ammunition were
transported by trucks, and when they came to the Moa River, Augustine Gbao instructed the
G5 Commander to order civilians living in Kailahun Town and the surrounding villages to
carry it the rest of the way on their heads in tins. The witness escorted the arms and
ammunition as far as the Moa River.12O52 The witness testified that there were 30 boxes of
materiel, weighing 200-250kg each.12O53
5422. TF1-371 stated in cross-examination that the arms and ammunition that Bockarie
brought from Burkina Faso through Liberia in November/December 1998 were the arms that
were used to launch an attack on Kono in December 1998,l2O54 and on Freetown in January
1999 12055
12048 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2413-2414 (CS). The witness explained the words "anyone
standing in the way" to include civilians, fighters, enemy forces.
*2000 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2413 -2414 (CS).
*2050 TF1-371, rranuprrpr 28 January 2008, pp. 2414-2415 (CS).
*205* TF1-371, rranuprrpr 28 January 2008, p. 2416 (CS).
*2052 TF1-371, rranuprrpr 31 January 2008, pp. 2416-2417 (CS).
*2055 TF1-371, rranupnpr 31 January 2008, pp. 2418-2419 (CS).
*2055 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2753 (CS)
12055 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2761-2762 (CS). In cross-examination, the witness stated that
Sam Bockarie brought back from Burkina Faso a consignment of arms and $17,000. That trip was facilitated
from Monrovia by Mr Taylor's protocol Musa Cisse who was on board the flight. The materiel was deposited
first at the White Flower before Sam Bockarie was escorted by Taylor's securities to bring the consignment of
the RUF.

---- End of Page 1862 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / du 18 May 2012

39 qs?
5423. TF1 -371 testified that Bockarie paid Taylor for the shipment with parcels of diamonds
that Bockarie brought to Taylor over the course of multiple trips to Monrovia}2056 The
Defence repeatedly confronted the witness as to whether this shipment was paid for as part of
the Magburaka deal struck by the Junta government in around October 1997. However, the
witness repeatedly insisted that it was not.l2O57
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
5424. Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie, an RUF radio operator, testified that on 19 December
1998 he accompanied Bockarie, Rashid, SYB Rogers, Eddie Kanneh, Shabado and other
people whom he was unable to recall on a trip to Monrovia.l2O58
5425. Prior to their departure from Buedu, Bockarie told the witness that he had held
discussions with Benjamin Yeaten, in which it was intended that Bockarie would travel to
Libya to secure ammunition}2059 However, upon their arrival in Monrovia, the plan changed
and the trip was instead diverted to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, for reasons unknown to the
witness.l2O6O Bockarie told the witness after their arrival in Monrovia that the the Pa a /CIC
Taylor had said that the ammunition had been brought to Burkina Faso where Bockarie was to
go and receive it. mm
5426. Fomie stated that Bockarie and his groupm)62 remained in Monrovia for up to 72 hours
rior to de artin for Burkina Faso. Durin this time, Bockarie left for lon eriods, includin
P P 8 8 8 P 8
ovemight, with Yeaten.l2O63 Sometimes when they would retum, Bockarie would tell the
witness that they had briefly met with "the Papay". mm
5427. Fomie testified that he was taken on this trip to act as a radio operator for Bockarie in
Monrovia while he was abroad. When Bockarie, Kanneh and SYB Rogers travelled to
Burkina Faso, Fomie remained at Base 1, the radio station at Yeaten's residence in
*2050 rm-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2728-2731 (cs).
*2052 r1¤1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2728-2772 (cs).
msg Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21530; Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21542,
21545.
msg Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21542—21544.
IMO Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21545.
mm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21542—21543; Transcript 10 December 2008, pp.
22078—22079.
*2002 The group included the witness, Rashid, Shabado and some of Bockarie's bodyguards with whom he
travelled.
mm Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21545.

---- End of Page 1863 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T du / 18 May 2012 %

Monrovia.121165 While there, he collected information from the various RUF front lines and
passed this information to Bockarie via telephone.121)66 The witness testified that when
Bockarie arrived in Ouaugadougou he called on the telephone and spoke with Sunlight,
Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator, and Sunlight called the witness to the phone so that
Bockarie could s eak to him directl .121167 Fornie further testified that he ersonall s oke
P Y P Y P
with Bockarie about three times on the telephone while he was there.121168 Bockarie told the
witness over the telephone that they had met with President Compaore.12069
5428. Fornie testified that Bockarie and his group returned to Monrovia from Ouagadougou
at night about one week later.12070 The next day in the evening, Bockarie came with Eddie
Kanneh and General 1brahim121171 to Base 1, Yeaten's radio station, where they met the
witness.12072 At Base 1, Bockarie called Issa Sesay on the radio and then instructed the
witness to send a message to the front-line to "some of the commanders" to come and meet
him in Buedu.121173 While in the radio room, the witness heard Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh and
Benjamin Yeaten discussing that Kono and Tongo were the first targets to be hit with the
armnunition that Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) had brought back from Burkina Faso. 12074
5429. On the same day, at around 7:30 to 8pm, Fornie, Bockarie, Rashid and SYB Rogers
departed in two jeeps irom Yeaten's residence to return to Sierra Leone.12075 On the outskirts
of Monrovia, towards Kakata, the convoy was joined by two large trucks loaded with
"ammunition of different types", morale boosters, fuel, rice and other condiments. Zigzag
Marzah, Jun le and Bockarie's securit ards were with the trucks.12076 Bockarie told the
8 Y gu
12064 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21545.
12065 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21545.
12066 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21544, 21546—21547.
12067 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21441; Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21544-
21545.
12068 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21546.
12069 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 10 December 2008, p. 22077.
121170 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21547.
12071 The witness described General Ibrahim as a Gambian who used to help Foday Sankoh coordinate the RUF
affairs outside of Sierra Leone since 1996 before the Abidjan Accord. General Ibrahim also used to talk to
Mosquito sometime on the satellite phone, he used to coordinate things for the RUF, sometimes with Charles
Taylor, sometimes in Burkina Faso or Libya.
121172 Dauda Aruna F ornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21547.
12073 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21547.
12074 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21549.
12075 Dauda Aruna F ornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21549-21550.
12076 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21550—21551.

---- End of Page 1864 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012 Vg

witness that the trucks had been loaded at Roberts Intemational Airport.l2O77 The jeeps and the
trucks then moved in a convoy directly to Buedu. mm
5430. Fomie further testified that upon arrival at Buedu, Bockarie met with various
commanders he had sent for, including Isaac Mongor, Saddam, Eagle, Akim Turay and Issa
Sesay to strategize how they could successfully and without delay attack Kono and Tongo.
Fomie was not present during these discussions and said that his knowledge of the meeting
was based on a message that he had read from a book found in Bravo Zulu 4, Bockarie's radio
station, calling the commanders to "hasten and come for the meeting". mm
5431. After the meeting, Bockarie distributed the ammunition among the various front—line
commanders. Some of the ammunition he sent toward a target in Njama, which is in Kenema,
some of it went "to Eagle and others in their defensive area", but most of it was sent with Issa
Sesay towards Kono and Tongo.l2O80 Bockarie also distributed supplies, "morale boosters"
including alcohol, rice, fuel and condiments, which they had also brought back with them and
marijuana. mm The Commanders then left for their respective areas of responsibility with Issa
organizing his men to launch an immediate attack on Kono, Akim and others heading toward
Tongo, Isaac Monger toward the Njama area. The witness was in Buedu where there was a
general all—out attack on the frontlines in the Kono and Kenema Districts that commenced on
about 15 to 20 December 1998.l2O82 Fomie explained that this was the attack that led to the
capture of Kono and Makeni and during which Gullit and others went ahead to Waterloo and
finally up to Freetown on 6 January 1999.l2O83 Fomie also testified that when Kono fell to the
RUF, Bockarie called Yeaten (a.k.a. 50) on his satellite phone to give him the good news. @84
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2155l—21552.
mr Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2l551—2l552. The witness stated that initially, from
Benjamin Yeaten's house, the witness was in the same jeep as‘Sam Bockarie but when they met the
trucks at the outskirts of Monrovia, the witness was transferred to the truck and Zigzag Marzah drove in
the same jeep as Sam Bockarie as they moved to Buedu.
HOT) Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2l552—21554.
mw Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21552-21553.
lm} Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2l554—21555.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21554-2 1555.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21555.
@84 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21556.

---- End of Page 1865 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03—0l—T J 6`(L 18 May 2012

gqqs@
5432. Witness Isaac Mongor testified that in November 1998,l2085 Sam Bockarie summoned
him to Buedu to discuss a disagreement between Bockarie and Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman). While he was there, Bockarie expressed concem that the RUF was running out of
ammunition to go on offensive or even defend themselves and summoned all the commanders
that were in Buedu, including the witness, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Colonel Jungle),l2O86 an SLA
named Sambebe and SYB Rogers (a.k.a. Pa Rogers), to a meeting at Waterworks to discuss
the issue and come up with a solution.l2O87 The meeting requested the Adjutant Rashid Sandy
to write a letter on their behalf to the Accused requesting him to assist them get ammunition
because they "did not have enough ammunition to again to continue our offensive, or to fight,
A or to even defend our areas...". Sandy wrote the letter and read it out to the meeting. The
meeting then asked Colonel Jungle to take the letter to Mr Taylor.l2O88 Jungle took the letter to
the Accused, and three days later Bockarie told the witness that he had received a call from
Taylor asking him to go to Monrovia himself and that during his absence he was leaving Issa
Sesay in charge of Buedu and the witness in charge of Pendembu.l2O89 Bockarie also told the
witness that he was not going alone to Monrovia and that Rashid Sandy, SYB Rogers,
Lawrence Womandia, and Eddie Kanneh were to accompany him on the j oumey.l2O9O Mongor
testified that Bockarie took some diamonds to Liberia which he used to pay for the
ammunition and which he left with Mr Taylor.l2O9l When Bockarie retumed from Monrovia
in November 1998, he summoned all the commanders including Mongor to Buedu.l2O92 On
arrival, Mongor met Bockarie in a room in his house and an excited Bockarie explained that
as a result of the invitation from Mr Taylor, he had brought a lot of ammunition, food and
medicine. Bockarie showed Mongor the boxes of ammunition which had been stacked from
the floor up to the ceiling in stacks that were about 2.5 to 3 meters high, and were stored in a
room inside Bockarie's house and told him that there were more than 100 boxes of different
@85 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5783.
*2086 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5783-5786. Mongor stated that ‘]ung1e’, a member of the
Executive Mansion Guard or SSS in Liberia, was also based in Buedu and was acting as a liaison between the
RUF and the NPFL, responsible for ferrying arms and arrmiunition from Taylor to the RUF.
mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5782.
Img Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5776-5781.
Img Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5782.
moo Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5781-5783.
mq] Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5793-5794.
mgm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5789-5790.

---- End of Page 1866 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GK 18 May 2012

kinds of ammunition and included AK, RPG, and GMG rounds. 12993 Prior to this, Mongor had
not seen "any ammunition that could be up to that quantity".12994
5433. Bockarie also told Mongor that Mr Taylor had connected them with the President of
Burkina Faso and that as a result, Bockarie had gone with SYB Rogers to Burkina Faso where
they had made arrangements to buy ammunition from there.12995 Bockarie also showed
Mongor the photographs which he had taken with SYB Rogers at a hotel they lodged in
Burkina Faso.1299°
5434. After Bockarie showed the ammunition to Mongor, he told Mongor that he sat with
Mr Taylor in Monrovia and looked at a map to see which locations the RUF and SLAs
occupied, and then together they planned an operation to capture Kono and Makeni and
advance to Freetown. They were also planning to attack Joru and Kenema. Bockarie and
Taylor wanted either Mongor or Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) to attack Joru, because they
were both former NPP L fighters. Because Superman was located far away from Buedu in the
Koinadugu District, they decided that Mongor would attack Joru and then advance on Zimmi,
where he would receive NPP L fighters coming from Liberia to reinforce the operation.12997
Bockarie told Mongor that the ultimate objective of the operation was to capture Freetown in
order to release Foday Sankoh and the others from prison and ultimately to seize power.121198
Bockarie told the witness that Taylor advised that during the attack they should not waste
ammunition and that they should "make the operation be more fearful than in all the other
operations" the had undertaken so that the take Freetown and hold on to ower.12999
P Y Y P
5435. The next morning, Bockarie held a meeting in Buedu of senior RUF and AFRC121011
commanders, including Mongor, SYB Rogers, Mike Lamin, Eddie Kanneh, Leather Boot,
Akim Turay, ‘Monkey Brown’, Issa Sesay, Augustine Gbao, Morris Kallon and other
commanders from other places, during which Bockarie briefed them about his trip, showed
them the ammunition he had brought from his mission to Liberia and Burkina Faso and told
12993 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5790-5791.
12994 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5789-5795. I
12995 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp, 5793-5794. I
12996 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5794.
12997 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5795-5796.
121198 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5796.
12999 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5795-5798.
12199 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5797-5798. Mongor explained that Eddie Kanneh, Leather
Boot and Akim Turay were former SLA or AF RC members.

---- End of Page 1867 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T \/Z GL 18 May 2012

3 9 Ci é 0
them about the operation they were supposed to use it for.121111 Mongor explained that
Commanders Superman and SAJ Musa whose forces were in Koinadugu District in the
northern jungle, neither attended the meeting nor received any share of the ammunition as
they were strategically ‘cut off" from the others by the ECOMOG and Kamajor forces based
in Koidu Town. However, at this meeting it was agreed that Bockarie would communicate
with them by radio and involve them in the operation.121112
5436. After the meeting, Bockarie distributed the ammunition amongst the various
commanders and sent them to carry out the operation. Mongor received 15 boxes of AK
rounds, six boxes of RPG and five boxes of GMG rounds which he used to attack and capture
Joru. He testified that while waiting for the NPFL reinforcement at Joru, ECOMOG forces
pushed him out of J oru.121113
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah ga.k.a. Zigzagt
5437. Witness Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), a former NPFL member and a member of the
Special Security Service (SSS) at the Executive Mansion in Liberia, testified that he was
accustomed to carrying diamonds from the RUF in Sierra Leone to Charles Taylor in
exchange for arnrnunition and that he did so over 10 to 15 times.121114 Marzah testified that on
one occasion on a date he does not remember,121115 he presented Taylor with a jar of diamonds
he brought from Issa Sesay. Taylor, who was overjoyed with the diamonds, called Musa
Cisse, his chief of protocol and said "the boys were doing extremely well", "it will be better if
I do a recommendation for him and you go to Burkina Faso and sign for ammunition for
himself".121O6 Marzah stated that later, Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh, Mike Lamin, and Musa Cisse
left and came back 12 days later with pictures of where they slept. Marzah was later at a club
with them when Bockarie received a call on his Thuraya satellite phone to return to White
Flower. When they arrived there Bockarie was told that his "materials" and "ammo" had
arrived. They went to Roberts Airport to receive the Russian cargo plane which was so iirll of
12101 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5797-5798.
121112 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5799-5801.
121113 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5801-5804. Each box of AK rounds contained "two pans and
packets inside the pans".
121114 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5878.
12105 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5893.
121116 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5884.

---- End of Page 1868 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GA 18 May 2012 %

r

Braéx
ammunition that they could not take everything to Monrovia that night. The Accused assigned
trucks to transport the ammunition from the airportmm
5438. Marzah testified he thought that after the ammunition arrived, after two days in the
city, he, Eddie Kanneh, Bockarie, Mike Lamin and their bodyguards took off from White
Flower the following night and drove to Buedu with one shipment of the arms and
ammunition they had unloaded from the plane. After the first trip, Marzah made about four or
five additional trips taking the rest of the ammunition to Sierra Leone.l2lO8
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
5439. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF member, testified that around early November 1998, he
attended a meeting for front line commanders, adjutants and clerks, including CO Eagle,
Superman, Hi—Rash, Augustine Gbao and front-line commanders from the various areas.
Bockarie told them that the reports from the front lines like Koidu were serious, they could
not attack Kono because they had run out of ammunition and that "it look[ed] like he himself
should go and meet Charles Taylor to explain to him that that was the situation on the
ground" and to "explain to him what the pressure was".l2lO9
5440. Saidu further testified that in 1998 before the major attack on Kono,l2llO prior to
Bockarie's trip, the witness visited Sam Bockarie at Bockarie's house in Buedu and told
Bockarie how the RUF was struggling to defeat the Guinean forces in Koidu. Bockarie
showed the witness diamonds wrapped in a "white paper" and told him to be patient because
very soon he, Bockarie, was going to take those diamonds to ‘the Father’ (meaning Charles
Taylor) in order to secure materials (i.e. arms and ammunition) for the RUF to launch a major
offensive on ECOMOG and to capture Konom ll
5441. Saidu was promoted around November 1998, when Sam Bockarie travelled to Liberia,
leaving Issa Sesay in command.l2ll2 When Bockarie retumed, Saidu was fighting in Koidu
when Bockarie convened another forum at Waterworks in Buedu. Saidu could not attend the
mm Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5878-5885; Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6109-6111,
mO8Jos§e;ili7lmw Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11064, 11066-10068.
I2! IO Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11075.
mn Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11071-11072, 11075.
m I2 Albert Saidu, Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 11205-11207.

---- End of Page 1869 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / @5 18 May 2012 %

meeting due to pressure from the enemies in Koidum 13 However, Saidu travelled to Buedu a
day later and spoke with Bockarie's bodyguards, Ray, Shabado and others who told him that
Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh had returned from Liberia with a lot of ammunition and that all
of the front line commanders and senior Vanguards including Bockarie, Eddie Kamieh, CO
Jungle, Ibrahim Bah, Abu Keita, SYB Rogers, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay and "some other
Liberians" had attended the Waterworks meetingm I4 The witness was told that Bockarie and
Eddie Kanneh went to see the Accused in Liberia and had later crossed to Burkina Faso, then
returned to Sierra Leone through Liberia.ml5 Saidu was further told that a war plan was
drawn during the meeting to attack Kono, and the Bunumbu—Segbwema axis
simu1taneously.ml6 According to the war plan, the first brigade led by Tamba and Abu Keita
was to attack Bunumbu—Segbwema, located in Kenema. The second brigade led by Issa
Sesay, Denis Mingo and PB Vandy was to attack Koidu Town, the main town of Kono
Districtm U
Prosecution Witness TFI—567
5442. Witness TF1—567, an RUF member,ml8 testified that in September 1998 he was
assigned to work under Issa Sesay in the 2"d Brigade at ‘Superman Ground’ in
Koinadugum 19 While there, in October/November 1998, the witness accompanied Issa Sesay
from Koinadugu to Buedu to meet Bockarie who told them that he was travelling to Liberia to
meet Charles Taylor and ask for his assistance to recapture Koidu Town, and was leaving
Sesay in charge of the RUF.m20 In December 1998, Bockarie returned to Buedulgm with a
pick—up truck carrying "lots of am1T1unition", RPG bombs, AK rounds, GPMG rounds, guns,
camoufla e "meanin combat clothes", and other thin s that the witness could not recall.
8 8 8
Bockarie said that Charles Taylor had told him that they should capture Kono and the other
mining areas so that they would be able to get diamonds and hence more arms and
3,Il'1II1L1H1t1OH.l2l22 Bockarie handed over the arms and ammunition to Issa Sesay and tasked
*2* *2 Albert sairrn, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11083.
ml I4 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp, 11081—11085.
m I5 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11082—11083.
m I6 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11081-11085.
m I7 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11085—11087, 11091.
*2* *2 TF1—567, Transcript 2 Jnry 2008, p. 12833 (Ps).
*2* *" TF1—567, Transcript 2 Jnry 2008, p. 12908.
mm TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12912-12913,
*2*2* TF1-567, Transcript 2 Jnry 2008, p. 12915.
mm TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12912—12913, 12915.

---- End of Page 1870 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T GLB / 18 May 2012

him with organizing commanders to fight and capture Kono and other areas.m23 Bockarie
captured civilians from around Buedu who carried the arms and armnunition back to
Superman Ground. mm
5443. At Superman Ground, the witness attended a meeting convened by 1ssa Sesay and
attended by RUF and AFRC commanders including Morris Kallon, Akim Turay, Banya,
Boston Flomo (a.k.a. Rambo), Gassam Mansaray and others, at which Sesay explained that
Bockarie had brought back a lot of arms and ammunition from Liberia for them to capture
Koidu Town and other mining areas and that Charles Taylor told Bockarie that he would no
longer supply them with arms and ammunition if the RUF/AFRC did not recapture the mining
areas.m25 Sesay organized the commanders and assigned them areas to attack. Boston Flomo
was to lead the attack on Koidu Town and in particular Five-Five spot where ECOMOG was
based, Akim Turay was to attack Tongo field, while Morris Kallon was to attack
Goltown.m26 After the meeting, Sesay distributed the arms and ammunition. In December
1998, the 2"d Brigade forces under Sesay's command successfiilly overran Koidu Town
capturing many arms and armnunition and ECOMOG soldiers who were then taken to
Buedu.m27
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
5444. Witness Augustine Mallah, an RUF member, testified that in late 1998, he attended a
routine meeting of senior officers and men at Sam Bockarie's residence in Buedu, at which
Bockarie said that he was tired of all of them being confined to Kailahun District and that he
would go to Liberia from the Accused and to see whether they could get their needs met.m28
Mallah estimated that Bockarie left for Liberia in 1999,m29 and said that when Bockarie
returned he summoned representatives from all deployment areas around Kailahun and Kono
Districts for a meeting in Buedu.m30 The witness, who was stationed in Baiima, represented
M3 TF1-567, Transcript 2 Jiiiy 2008, p. 12913.
mt TF1—567, Transcript 2 Jtiiy 2008, p. 12913.
mz? T1¤1~567, Transcript 2 Jtiiy 2008, p. 12913.
mw TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12914—12916.
M7 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008,p. 12917.
mg Aiigiistinc Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20217.
Img Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20218.
mw Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20218.

---- End of Page 1871 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T CL) / 18 May 2012

his area along with Major Kailondo and Major Laminmm at the meeting which was attended
by over 60 to 80 RUF/AFRC delegates including civilians and Liberian fighters.m32
5445. Bockarie told the meeting that he had returned from Liberia where Charles Taylor had
given him arms, ammunition and that he brought Liberian reinforcements led by Abu
Keita,l2l33 so that they could fight ECOMOG in an operation called ‘Operation Free
Sankoh’.l2l34 After that meeting, the witness attended a second meeting for 35 to 40 senior
officers at Waterworks where Bockarie told them that they now had everything that they
required to fight.m35 Bockarie also announced that he himself had planned and called
‘Operation Spare No Soul’, which meant that the fighters were to kill anyone they saw in
order to attract the attention of the international "committee"l2l36 and demand that Foday
Sankoh be freed.l2m
5446. After the meeting, Bockarie distributed the arms, ammunition, medicine and Liberian
reinforcements to the various commanders to whom he also assigned areas of attack. The lm
brigade including Mallah, Manawai, ‘Eag1e’ and CO Denis (a.k.a. Monkey Brown), the lst
Brigade commander, were to attack Bunumbu, Segbwema, Dam, Tondola, Bendu Junction,
J omukafebu, Kumbema up to Kenema. Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon were to attack Kono and
then advance to Makeni. AFRC members Akim Turay, Soriba and others were to join
Superman and attack Tongo.l2l38 Mallah participated in "Operation Spare No Soul" where the
RUF/AFRC killed civilians and bumt villages in accordance with Bockarie's orders.m39
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
5447. Witness Varmuyan Sherif testified that sometime in late 1998 and prior to the
Freetown attack in January 1999, he saw Sam Bockarie at Roberts International Airport in
lm I Major Lamin was an AFRC soldier (Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20218).
um Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20217-20218. The witness explained that the Liberian
reinforcements sent with Abu Keita also attended this meeting
mm Abu Keita was a former ULIMO commander from Liberia (Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November
2008, p. 20219).
um Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20219.
um Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20217·20220.
IMG The witness used the term ""committee" throughout this portion of his evidence. He explained he meant
ECOMOG who kept the peace and international observers. Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008,
pp. 20227-20228.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20220-20221.
img Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20220-20224.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20224.

---- End of Page 1872 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 0*,-°’ / 18 May 2012

3 4 QA 5
Mar ibi Count Liberia, which is located far awa from Monroviamilo On this occasion, Mr
E Y Y
Taylor had instructed Sherif, then working as Assistant Director for Operations, Special
Security Service (SSS) at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia,m41 and Paul Molrbah, the
olice director who was res onsible for receivin all arms and ammunition, to o to Roberts
P P E 8
International Airport to receive the arms and ammunition that were expected to arrive by
air}2142 On arrival at RIA, Sherif saw Bockarie, Musa Cisse,m43 and Joe Tuah,m44 seated at
Martina Johnson's restaurantmils discussing what "quantities" of ammunition they would
each receive. Morlbah told them that his instructions were not to distribute any ammunition at
the airport but rather to first take all the ammunition to White Flower from where it would be
distributed by Mr Taylor himself.m46 Sherif did not know the quantity of arms and
ammunition delivered but he drove behind Paul Morlbah as they escorted the cargo to White
Flowerlzm Sherif also testified that once the arms and ammunition were stored at White
Flower, Charles Taylor himself was in charge of the warehouse and strictly controlled who
had access to the arms and ammunition in the warehouse and in what amounts.12148
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -338
5448. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member, testified that in December 1998 he attended a
meeting convened by Sam Bockarie at Waterworks in Buedu and that this was the last
meetin Bockarie convened before the RUF ca tured Kono.m49 At the meetin , the witness
E P E
saw General Ibrahim Bahmiso and heard Bockarie state that it was General Ibrahim Bah who
had helped to connect Bockarie to Charles Taylor who in turn connected him with Blaise
Compaoré in Burkina Faso to be able to obtain arms and ammunition.m5l
mm Varinuyan Sherif; Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 825-826, 867, 870.
mill Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript, 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 940,
986-987.
*2*42 Varinuyan Sherif; Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 868.
mil} Although the transcript lists "Musa Sesay", the witness explained that he was Taylor's Chief of Protocol.
The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the witness referred to Musa Cissé.
mm The witness explained that Joe Tuah was Assistant Director of Intelligence in Taylor's Security Services.
*2*42 The witness explained that Martina Johnson was a Security Director at Roberts Intemational Airport, who
also owned a restaurant behind the airport.
*2*46 Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 868-869.
mu Varinuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 869.
mm Varinuyan Sherif; Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 869. Sherif explained that Taylor's staff at the warehouse
would only hand out materials in accordance with Taylor's instructions.
*2*42 TF1-338, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15295.
mw The witness explained that General Ibrahim Bah was a Gambian arins dealer that regularly assisted the RUF
to obtain arms and ammunition during the conflict (TF1-338, Transcript 3 September 2008, p. 15298).
*2*5* TF1~338, Transcript 5 September 2008,p. 15295.

---- End of Page 1873 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 Kg

37 ‘/é é
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
5449. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator, testified that in around
November/December 1998, just prior to the Kono operation, Sam Bockarie returned from
Liberia to Buedu with a ‘ten-tyre truck’ loaded with ammunition, specifically AK rounds,
RPG bombs, and GMG rounds.12152
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
5450. Witness Karmoh Karmeh (a.k.a. Eagle), a senior RUF commander,12153 testified that
Sam Bockarie sent a message on the radio calling for frontline commanders including the
witness to a meeting at which he told them that he was travelling to Burkina Faso. Bockarie
spent about a month away before he returned to Buedu in mid-December 1998. Bockarie
brought back a lot of ‘materials’ including AK-47s, AK-47 rounds, G3s, hand grenades,
mines, RPG rockets and tubes, G3 rounds, bombs, hand grenades, mines, combat fatigues,
boots and other items, all of which were stored in an "ammo dump" close to his house on
Buedu Road.12154 Kanneh was not present when Bockarie returned from Burkina Faso and as
such could not estimate the quantity of arms that Bockarie had brought to Buedu.12155
5451. Around mid-December 1998, the witness attended a second meeting convened by
Bockarie at his home in Buedu at 9.00pm. This meeting was attended by 12 persons including
Issa Sesay, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a Jungle), Eddie Kanneh, Major Francis (a Gambian who
trained with Foday Sankoh), Matthew Barbor, Junior Vandi, Gbessay Gbobah (a.k.a.
Chucky), Morris Kallon, Mike Lamin and lasted three hours.12156 Bockarie told them that he
had travelled to Burkina Faso with Ibrahim Bah, where they had met with the President of
Burkina Faso.12157
5452. Bockarie explained that he had brought ammunition and enough logistics for them "to
run any kind of mission" and that they should plan how they were going to capture Kono,
Makeni, Segbwema, Daru, Kenema and finally Freetown.12158 Bockarie told the attendees that
he and Charles Taylor devised this plan in Liberia and that he was merely briefing them to
12152 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6960-6961.
12153 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.
12154 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9416-9418, 9438.
12155 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9417.
121% Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9418-9424, 9433.
12157 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9418-9419, 9429-9430; Transcript 13 May 2008, p. 9703.

---- End of Page 1874 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (J\ % 18 May 2012 `%

implement it.l2l59 Bockarie further explained that the 0bjective of the plan was firstly to
capture Freetown and to release Foday Sankoh from Pademba Prison, secondly to capture
State H0use and overthrow or kill President Tej an Kabbah and thirdly to take over p0wer.l2l°O
Bockarie then assigned each of the commanders the areas they were to attack. Issa Sesay,
Morris Kallon and Superman were to attack Kono and Makeni,l2l6l while Kanneh was to
attack Dam and Segbwema.l2l62
5453. Jungle sp0ke and told the meeting about the materials that Bockarie had brought back
and said that they should not fear this time around and that there was no force that could
withstand them. Jungle also stated that when he was in Monrovia Taylor had told him that
their first target should be Kono.l2l63
5454. Towards the end of the meeting, Kanneh heard Bockarie and Jungle speaking on the
satellite phone to Charles Taylor, briefing him about what had transpired in the meeting and
assuring him that the senior of`ficers had agreed to go ahead with the plan.l2l64 The witness did
not hear Taylor's side of the conversation but it was made clear to those at the meeting that it
was Taylor who was speaking to Bockarie and Jungle.m65
5455. The next day Bockarie invited the witness to his amm0 dump to see the materiel and
logistics that he had brought from Burkina Fas0. The witness saw "a l0t of logistics including
AK rifles and rounds, G3 rounds, grenades, mines, RPG rockets and tubes, and combat
uniforms.l2l°° The witness, a member of the lst Brigade, was given his orders and he left to
meet Dennis Lansana, one of the brigade commanders, and begin getting the men together to
carry out their mission to capture Segbwema, Daru, and if possible beyond.l2l67 The brigade
cleared the enemy forces from Segbwema but they were unsuccessful in their attack at the
Dam Barracks, where they were st0pped by ECOMOG forces.l2l68
Prosecution Witness M0hamed Kabbah
Img Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9424.
mw Karrn0h Kamreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9424.
mw Karrn0h Kamreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9430-9431.
mm Karmoh Kamreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9425.
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9426-9427.
mw Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 943l-9433.
****4 Karmoh Kamreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9434-9437.
*****5 Karrrrpir Kamreh, rrarraprrpr 9 May 2008, pp. 9434-9437.
m°6 Karmoh Kamreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9437-9438.
***6* Karrrrprr Kamreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9438-9440.
mm Karrn0h Kamreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9438-9440.

---- End of Page 1875 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T / W l8 May 2012 ®

5456. Witness Mohamed Kabbah (a.k.a. Tourist), an RUF radio operator, 12169 testified that in
late 1998, prior to the attack on Kono, Bockarie took some diamonds to Monrovia and on his
return he came with a ‘ten-tyre tmck’ loaded with ammunition, rice and condiments. The
witness stated that this was the biggest consignment of ammunition, food and used clothing
which the RUF had ever received.121711 The witness stated that the ammunition was used to
"attack Kono, as far as Makeni and other areas".12171
5457. Prosecution Witness TF l-367
5458. Witness TF l —367 testified that he was a ointed to be the minin commander of Kono
PP 8
at a date he did not recall after the ECOMOG lntervention12172. He was stationed in Guinea
Highway, three miles from Koidu Town.12173 During this time Colonel Boston F lomo (a.k.a.
Rambo)12174 told him that Sam Bockarie had travelled to Monrovia for arms and ammunition
from Charles Taylor whom "we used to call Father", and that when he returned Issa Sesay,
who at that time was a Battle Front lnspector,12175 would come to Kono "for us to attack
Koidu Town".12176
5459. About two weeks after TF l-367 arrived in Guinea Highway; Sesay arrived with
ammunition, his bodyguards, officers and "many manpower". They carried the ammunition
there on their heads because they did not use the highway. At that time they "did not have
anywhere else to get ammunition from except Liberia from Charles Taylor". Sam Bockarie
went to Liberia, leaving Sesay in charge as commander in Buedu. When Bockarie returned to
Buedu he gave the ammunition to Sesay, who then took the ammunition to Kono for their
attack on Koidu Town.12177 The ammunition that they were given to use in the attack was
new, meaning that the boxes it was in were unopened.12178 The witness testified that the RUF
assigned people to keep records of ammunition that was delivered to the commanders.12179
12169 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
12170 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16140.
12171 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16432.
12172 The ECOMOG Intervention occurred on 14 February 1998. Prosecutor v Tay/or, SCSL-03—1—T—370,
Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Fact AD.
'2"3 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14158-1416].
12174 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14169-14170.
'2"5 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14176.
12116 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14162, 14182.
12177 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14162, 14181-14182.
'2"8 TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14183.
12179 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14169, 14173-14174.

---- End of Page 1876 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

3 9 7 é C?
5460. Sesay sent a message to the senior officers to report for a meeting at headquarters. At
the meeting they planned attacks on the roads leading to Koidu Town. The 0bjective of the
attack, which was named Operation Free Foday Sankoh, was to attack Kono in order to
suppress the govern1nent and force the release of Foday Sankoh. They planned to start at
Koidu Town and go all the way to Freetown, and they were advised to make the Operation
"fearful".m80 Specific places that they were assigned to attack included Guinea Highway,
Tank0r0 and F ive-F ive and Leban0n, where ECOMOG had heavy weapons.m8l The fighters
attacking Kono were part of the 2nd brigade. I2 [82
5461. They were ultimately successful in their attacks against ECOMOG in the Kono
District and in Koidu Town, and they captured arms, ammunition and vehicles from them.m83
Akim Turay moved on to attack T0ng0 and B0ston Fl0m0 (a.k.a. Ramb0) moved on to attack
Makeni.m84
5462. Immediately aPter the RUF recaptured Kono, Akim captured T0ng0. Ramb0 (B0ston
Fl0m0) and Superman then captured Makeni. nm
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
5463. Abu Keita testified that he was in Foya when Issa Sesay received a radi0 call from
Sam Bockarie that they were to go to a meeting. Bockarie arrived at the meeting with a pick-
up truck and two beige "six style" trucks that the Libyan government had given to Taylor, and
he brought with him 300 boxes of ammunition from Monrovia and a mixture of about 150
Sierra Leonean and Liberian men who were taken from Camp Naama. Bockarie told the
witness that the ammunition was from Monrovia. A Liberian police driver named Senegalese
and the witness’ wife also came with the trucks. Bockarie said it was the first time he had
been given such a huge quantity of amrnunition, and he was so happy about it that he sh0t into
the air. The trucks continued to Buedu and the men were taken to Bunumbu, the RUF training
Campizrxs
IMO TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14165
mg} TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14162-14165.
mw TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14169.
mm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14181,14184—14185.
mm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14186.
IMS TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14185-14187.
mlm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1993-1996.

---- End of Page 1877 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /4/ gl" 18 May 2012

3€€7o
5464. After Bockarie had despatched the men to Bunumbu, he met with the witness.
Bockarie told the witness that since he had last seen him he had been in Burkina Faso and
gave him a picture of the guesthouse that he had stayed in there. ln the picture there were six
people including a Guinean named Sheku Suwape Koroma whom the witness had seen at
Benjamin Yeaten's home in Monrovia, Eddie Kanneh, Sam Bockarie, and "SB" Rogers. 12187
5465. When Sam Bockarie arrived with the 300 boxes of ammunition in Buedu, the RUF
men stationed there were very happy. Bockarie immediately called a meeting of the
commanders in his home including Issa Sesay, Lawrence Wohmandia, SB Rogers, Akim, and
Leatherboot, where Bockarie said that they should use the ammunition to take over Makeni
and Kono and terrorise the highway. Kono was targeted because they needed to generate
funds for the RUF and the only place they could do this was through mining in Kono. After
this meeting Bockarie met with the vangmards in his bedroom, which was followed by a
muster parade where all of the soldiers assembled at the military groundsmgg
5466. At the muster parade Bockarie ordered Issa Sesay to take over Kono and Makeni, and
reported that the President Taylor had said "they should be very vigilant and maintain the
ground of the RUF". They then dispersed to carry out the operation in Kono, Makeni,
Masingbi, and Magburaka and the operation from Bunumbu to Segbwema to Jumo Kafebu,
Gbava, and Bendu Junction. Keita was part of the Bunumbu operation. Koidu Town was
taken over on Christmas Day 1998.12189
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
5467. Jabaty J award testified that in 1998 Sam Bockarie assigned him to be the store keeper
in charge of ammunitions, arms, food supply, fuel oils, gasoline, kerosene etcmgo that came
from Liberia. The supplies were brought from Liberia by "escorts" who worked for
Taylor.m9l Originally the supplies were kept in a room attached to Sam Bockarie's home,
but when the supplies increased another store was established a few yards away from his
compound. When the supplies would arrive, Bockarie would instruct Jaward to take an
inventory of them and prepare a distribution list before they were sent to the targets. During
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1997-1999, Exh. P-046B
*2*88 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2005-2007.
mw Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2007-2010.
mw Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13383.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13385-13388.

---- End of Page 1878 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6% 18 May 2012

5 CM 7/
the time that he was the store keeper he distributed arms and ammunition to Koidu, Kono,
Segbwema, and Kuiva. Jaward held this position until Sam Bockarie left the RUF in
December l999.m92
5468. Jabarty testified that in December 1998 a large consignment of AK ammunition, G3
rounds, RPG rounds, rockets, GPMG rounds, bazooka rockets, mortar bombs, drums of
petrol, diesel, engine oil, bags of rice, salt, Maggi, and batteries came to Buedu. A large part
of this supply went to the Kono operation and smaller quantities were allocated to other
defensive positions. He could not recall the specific escorts, but he saw Sheku (a.k.a. Pa
Sheku), Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Colonel Jungle), Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), and Abu Keita
and others when the consignment came. Sam Bockarie arranged for the supplies for the Kono
operation to be given to Brigadier Issa Sesay the overall commander for the front lines,
through Jaward's ofiice.l2l93 Jaward testified that while he was store keeper and supplied
arms to the RUF, Sengema was a main target because "it was one of the main routes that the
RUF soldiers used to go to the Kono defensive". IZIQ4
5469. One week later Jaward heard on the radio, and from captured ECOMOG fighters
brought to Buedu, that Koidu Town had been recaptured and that RUF troops were advancing
toward Makeni, capturing other towns and weapons and ammunition from enemy forces,
including an armoured ECOMOG tank. Other commanders in Kono at that time included
Peter Vandi, Boston F lomo (a.k.a. Rambo), and Amara Peleto. l2l95
Prosecution Witness Dennis Koker
5470. Dennis Koker testified that on one occasion he determined that arms coming into
Buedu were from Liberia because those who brought them spoke Liberian English, they were
wearing Liberian military uniforms and it was during a time when Taylor was President of
L1b€iia.‘2'9°
The Accused
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13380-13384, 13390-13393; Transcript 16 July 1998, pp.
13844-13845.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13424-13426.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13411-13412.
mms Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13426-13429.
12}% Dennis Koker, Transcript 16 January 2008. pp. 1367-1368.

---- End of Page 1879 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ 51 18 May 2012

Srrrz
5471. The Accused testified that in December 1998 he had returned to Liberia after a trip to
Burkina Faso to attend the inauguration of President Blaise Compaoré as Chairman of the
OAU. In late 1998 the Accused was aware that Sam Bockarie was passing through Liberia on
his way to Burkina Faso to visit President Compaoré in the latter's capacity as Chairman of
the OAU. Bockarie told the Accused that the purpose of his visit was to speak to the
Chairman of the OAU in furtherance of the peace process in Sierra Leone. President
Compaoré also informed the Accused of Bockarie's visit and that many members of
ECOWAS and the international community knew that Bockarie was travelling through
Liberia to go to Burkina Faso. The Accused said he was not aware of any arms deal being
made between Burkina Faso and the RUF around that time in 1998 and did not know what
transpired between Bockarie and Compaoré during Bockarie's trip.12197
5472. The Accused testified that the reason that Sam Bockarie made trips to Monrovia after
Taylor had first made contact with him in September 1998 was because the Accused was
"pursuing him to agree to a ceasefire and the implementation of the 1996 Abidjan agreement.
That was all. All of the trips he makes, this is what it is all about. It's about the peace process
that Sam Bockarie is being urged very much. I·Ie's also told that by the chairman of the OAU.
I·Ie's under a lot of pressure to agree to accept peace. This is all the reason why he's
travelling. No other reason".12198
5473. The Accused testified that Sam Bockarie came to Liberia in late November 199812199,
passing through on his way to Burkina Faso. Bockarie travelled to Monrovia by road and, to
the best of the Accused's knowledge, he did not spend the night in Monrovia. "A plane came
and picked him up and took him to Roberts" [International Airport] and he travelled on to
p Burkina F aso.1221111 The Accused said that Bockarie organised the trip himself and that he, the
Accused, did not purchase any airline tickets for him and did not arrange for an aircraft to
collect him. Bockarie travelled with Eddie Kanneh,122111 with a shortish older man with grey
hair who could have been Mr Rogers,122112 and with several other people from Sierra Leone
whom the Accused did not remember.122113 Bockarie also travelled with Musa Cissé, the
12197 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26129; Transcript l0 August 2009, pp. 26391—26392.
12198 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, p. 29225.
12109 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, p. 29247.
122011 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, p. 29248.
12201 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, p. 29248.
12202 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, p. 29254.
12203 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, p. 29249.

---- End of Page 1880 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T GLB 18 May 2012

57 9 7 3
Accused's protocol officer, who spoke French and English and was to serve as an interpreter
for President Compaoré. The Accused permitted Musa Cissé to travel with Bockarie only
because Bockarie was going to Burkina Faso on a peace mission to meet the Chairman of the
OAU. mm Taylor did not know how long Bockarie stayed in Ouagadougou, but he was away
from Liberia for two weeks. @05
5474. The Accused disputed evidence given by Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
that Bockarie spent 72 hours in Monrovia before he took off for Ouagadougou. The Accused
said that Bockarie arrived at night and the Accused saw him briefly the next morning before
he took off @06
5475. When Musa Cisse returned from Burkina Faso the Accused asked him why the trip
had taken so long. Cissé informed him that Bockarie had left them to travel to Libya and back
before they returned to Monrovia.l22O7 When Bockarie returned to Liberia, the Accused was
located on the outskirts of Monrovia where he was very busy with a "polio campaign".
Bockarie went to meet the Accused before returning to Sierra Leone to thank him for sending
Cisse and "helping in arranging this trip...to make it possible with the chairman of the OAU"
and to tell him "that they had had a very fruitful discussion". The Accused did not ask
Bockarie for a debrief because if the Accused wanted to know anything he would have found
it out from Cissé or from the Chairman himself Bockarie left the same day for Sierra
Leone. @08
5476. The Accused understood that President Compaore, Chairman of the OAU, had sent a
small airplane for Sam Bockarie, and that this trip was arranged by Sam Bockarie and some of
the people he travelled with. However, the Accused ultimately stated that "I have no idea of
how Sam Bockarie arranged that trip". @09
5477. The Accused further testified that according to a UN document presented to the Trial
Chamber,l22lO Bockarie and other Junta people were approved for "travelling out for peace".
The Accused stated that there were several people related to the Junta who were named in that
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, pp. 29248, 29249.
@05 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, pp. 29249, 29261,
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, p. 29260. The Accused had said earlier in his
evidence that Bockarie did not spend the night in Morovia — see para XXX above.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, pp. 29249—29250; 29259—29260.
Img Charles Ghankay Taylor, 17 September 2009, pp. 29250, 29261.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, 17 September 2009, pp. 29253-2925S.

---- End of Page 1881 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 5\ / 18 May 2012

document who were given permission to travel, because at that time they would otherwise not
have been allowed. According to the Accused, "Sam Bockarie would not have come and he
would not have been permitted to travel through Liberia to go to Burkina Faso to see the
chairman of the OAU unless the chairman knew, I knew, and others knew, including United
Nations and other people. Everyone knew of Sam Bockarie's trip...Kabbah agreed that some
of these junta people could travel. The UN agreed". mu
5478. The Accused, disputing evidence given by Dauda Aruna Fornie, questioned whether
Sam Bockarie would have shared his reason for travelling to Monrovia with a radio operator.
The Accused stated: "You don’t talk important things with messengers and little radio
operators".l22l2 He suggested that Fornie did not know why Bockarie was coming to
Monrovia. The Accused stated that:
if this Court believes that I had material between disarmament up until I would say 2001
and 2002 where I wrote the United Nations and told the Security Council that I would bring
ammunition for legitimate self-defence, if this Court believes that I had material at the
quantity that these people are talking about, then I’1n already guilty. There was no such
thing in that country with the Accused having material; but the whole case is built on: ‘He's
having material. He's distributing it.’ It's not t.rue.l2m
5479. The Accused testified that he was not aware that Ibrahim Bah had played the role of
helping Foday Sankoh in coordinating RUF affairs outside of Sierra Leone since before the
Abidjan Accord. However, the Accused said that this would not be strange because Bah left
NPF L controlled area back in 1993-1994 and he never heard from him again. The Accused _
said that some of the evidence he had heard in Court and some of the documentation from the
OTP that he had read, gave him no reason to doubt that Bah could play such a role with Foday
Sankoh. However, the Accused insisted that evidence given by Dauda Aruna Fornie that
Ibrahim Bah sometimes coordinated things for the RUF with the Accused in other areas such
as Burkina Faso and Libya was "totally false". The Accused said that he was not aware that
lbahim Bah was playing such a role in Burkina Faso or Libya. mm
5480. The Accused also disputed the testimony of Prosecution Witness Abu Keita that he,
the Accused, had provided Bockarie with two trucks, 150 Liberian and Sierra Leonean men
from Camp Naama, and 300 boxes of ammunition from Monrovia sometime in late autumn
mw It is unclear to the Trial Chamber which document Taylor was referring to in this testimony.
mu Charles Ghankay Taylor, 17 September 2009, pp. 29253-29255.
mm Charles Ghankay 'Taylor, 17 September 2009, p. 29226.
ml} Charles Ghankay Taylor, l7 September 2009, pp. 29226-29227.

---- End of Page 1882 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QL / 18 May 2012

E? 7 7.7
prior to the attack on Kono on Christmas Day 1998, which culminated in the attack on
Freetown.l22l5 The Accused testified that at that point in time Camp Naama had been
deserted for a long time, a fact that he stated in a speech that he made in December 1998. @16
5481. Further disputing the testimony of Abu Keita, the Accused testified that since Liberia
was disanned at that time, he did not even have material to give to Liberian security
personnel, and therefore would not have had 300 boxes of ammunition to give to fighters in
Sierra Leone.l22l7 Also, since Liberia had disarmed, there were not 150 men available to
send.l22l8 The Accused further pointed out that Abu Keita claimed in a statement that the
alleged driver, Senegalese was a police driver, but that other Prosecution evidence described
him as a soldier.l22 19 The Accused also denied Keita's evidence that he, the Accused, gave
Sam Bockarie an ash coloured Toyota Land Cruiser. @20
Defence Witness Fayia Musa
5482. Fayia Musa testified that in April 1996 he travelled with Foday Sankoh, Deen—Jalloh,
Daniel Kallon, Peter Vandi, Fullah Mon Ami and Palmer for a tour of the sub—region. The
purpose of the tour was to meet with regional leaders to both raise funds and ask for political
support for the RUF. In Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, Sankoh held separate meetings with
Major Dinjeri (a.k.a. Commander Diendere) and Blaise Compaore. Sankoh also met with
Ibrahim Bah. The witness understood that Compaore later sent them $40,000 in July 1996, but
he also testified that gifts such as these from West Afiican leaders were nor1nal.l222l
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5483. Issa Sesay testified that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia with SYB Rogers, the War
Council Chairman, Eddie Kanneh, Lawrence Womandia, Rashid Sandy, Junior Vandi, and
Shabado in late November or December 1998. While Bockarie was gone he called Sesay
away from Pendembu to be in Buedu with Mike Lamin. After they arrived in Monrovia, they
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, 17 September 2009, pp. 29262—29264.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 September 2009, pp. 29379—29383.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 September 2009, p. 29383.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 September 2009, p. 29385.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 September 2009, p. 29385.
'""’ Charles Ghankay rayier, 22 September 2009,p. 29384.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, 22 September 2009, p. 29391.
my Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39034—39036, 39043; Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39082;
Transcript 16 April 2010, p. 39183; Transcript 20 April 2010, p. 39462.

---- End of Page 1883 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T gx / 18 May 2012

37 ? 7é
travelled to Ouagad0ug0u, Burkina Fas0, in order to meet with the OA Chairman regarding
the Abidjan Accord. While there they met up with Ibrahim Bah who sp0ke with Bockarie
about going to see Gaddafi for assistance for the RUF. Bockarie, Bah, R0gers, and Kanneh
travelled to Libya for an unspecified number of days, and Bockarie and R0gers were the ones
who met with Gaddafi while they were there. Gaddafi gave them money, which the witness
thought was $50,000 USD. After leaving Libya, Bockarie went back to Burkina Fas0 and then
returned to Monrovia, where Bockarie used some of the money to buy medicine in Monrovia,
and ammunition in L0fa C0unty, before returning to Sierra Leone.12222
5484. Bockarie said that he b0ught some of the ammunition from the Liberian Army (AF L)
battalion commander at L0fa but subsequently stated that it was b0ught in in Voinjama.
S0me ammunition was b0ught from from Benjamin Yeaten in Kolahun. Bockarie did not say
whether the ammunition purchases were made with the knowledge or permission of Taylor.
Bockarie purchased up to 40 boxes of AK rounds, up to 15 boxes of G3 rounds, and about 10
boxes of HMG rounds. The ammunition was transported to Sierra Leone in a big civilian ten-
wheel tmck, and arrived the same day that Sam Bockarie returned to Buedu around 11 or 12
December 1998. Bockarie kept the ammunition in a store by his bedr00m. 12223
5485. The day after Bockarie and the delegation returned, a meeting was held at
Waterworks, which was attended by the witness, R0gers, Lamin, Kanneh, Rashid Sandy, and
W0mandia. Bockarie briefed them on his trip and ordered Sesay, who was a Colonel at the
time, to attack ECOMOG positions in Koidu Town in Kono. Bockarie gave Sesay 20 boxes of
AK rounds, eight boxes of G3 rounds, and five or six boxes of GPMG rounds, as well as
medicines, five jerry cans of diesel, five jerry cans of petrol, cigarettes, cartons of Maggi, acid
for the Operator's battery, stationary, and engine oil to clean the arms. Sesay successfully
carried out the attack, after which he captured a l0t of arms and ammunition including tanks,
armoured tanks, and many armoured tank rockets, because they captured the entire ECOMOG
ammunition dump. 12224
Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
12222 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44125—44128.
12223 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44127—44129.
12224 Issa Sesay, Transcript 10 July 2010, pp. 44129, 44136—441342, 44148—44149.

---- End of Page 1884 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—"[` 18 May 2012

Err? 7
5486. Sam Kolleh testified that Sam Bockarie went to Burkina Faso sometime from July to
August 1998, after the Peace Accord was signed on 7 July 1999, to meet with Compaoré. He
subsequently stated Bockarie went in July 1999. Kolleh later stated he was not aware of any
other trip that Bockarie took to Burkina Faso. Bockarie told Junior Vandi that they had
travelled through Monrovia to Burkina Faso. Two or three days after Bockarie arrived back in
Buedu in 1999, he called a meeting near Buedu at Waterworks, in order for all of the front
line commanders, officers and civilian leaders to provide a salute report to him from their
various assignment areas, as well as their proposals. About 40 to 60 people attended this
meeting, including SYB Rogers, Gbessay Ngobeh, a tall slim Liberian called Jungle, Martin
Koker, Eagle, Jalloh (a.k.a the Fulla), Tom Sandy, Rashid Sandy, Junior Vandi, and Major
Francis. Mike Lamin, CO Lion, Deputy Commander Gadaffi a.k.a. Foday were not there. The
witness could not recall whether 1ssa Sesay was present. Bockarie did not explain why he had
gone to Burkina Faso in this meeting. After this meeting Kono was attacked. The witness
placed the time of the attack on Kono in 1998[2225
5487. During the witnesses’ testimony he repeatedly changed dates or provided dates that
were clearly inaccurate, for example, testifying that events took place in 2008 when he meant
1998. He testified that he was wounded late in March 1998 and was in hospital for nearly a
year but also stated he left hospital in November 1998[2226. The Presiding Judge noted that the
witness appeared tired; however, the witness insisted he was able to carry on.[2227
Defence Witness DCT-008
5488. DCT-008 testified that Sunlight, Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator, began dealing
with Dauda Aruna F omie in late 1998, but subsequently corrected himself and stated Sunlight
never dealt with DAF in 1998[2228 and "dealt a 1ot"[2229 with Fomie in 1999 after the death of
Sellay Duwor, the overall signal commander for the RUF/SL which was "prior to the peace
talks". DCT-008 also specified that Sunlight's first meeting with Fomie was when Fomie had
retumed from Togo and the Lome Peace Talks, where Fomie said, he was part of the RUF
[2225 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48501-48509.
‘m° Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, p. 48442.
[2227 Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48506—48509.
@*1 DCT—0O8, Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47668.
[m°DCT~008, Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47663.

---- End of Page 1885 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T OA [885 18 May 2012

jvqra
delegation.l223O DCT-008 also testified that the Accused was not residing in White Flower as A
ofearly 1998.l223l
Prosecution Exhibit P-046
5489. Exhibit P-046 is two copies of the same photograph, one in colour and one in black
and white, allegedly taken during Sam Bockarie's trip to Burkina Faso in November or
December 1998. The Prosecution tendered the exhibit through Abu Keita, who identified the
six persons standing in the picture, beginning from the left as: 1) an unknown person, 2)
Eddie Kanneh, 3) Sam Bockarie, 4) SYB Rogers of the war council of the RUF, 5) unknown,
and 6) Sheku Suwape Koroma.l2232 Keita testified that Koroma was a Guinean who was in
Liberia with Benjamin Yeaten, whom he had seen in Monrovia at Yeaten's house and with
Bockarie in Buedu.
Prosecution Exhibit P-063
5490. Exhibit P-063 is entitled "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led
by the RUF Defence Staff, 2"d December l998". It is a report on the meeting that Sam
Bockarie convened in order to report on the external mission to Burkina Faso. It was held on
2 December 1998 at "water-works" at 1323 hours GMT. The attendees were listed as: 1)
Brigadier Sam Bockarie, Mr S.Y.B. Rogers, Col. Edward Kanneh, Maj. Lawrence Womandia,
Major Junior Vandi, Major Mohamed S. Banya, "Lieutenant Colonel Rashid Sandi — External
delegates", Colonel 1.H. Sesay BFC, and "members of various other units". my
5491. The report states that Bockarie appointed SYB Rogers to give a salute report about the
mission. Rogers stated that "the mission to seek our welfare at the "international front" had
been a very big success and "very great interms [sic] of what they were able to receive". He
thanked and credited Bockarie with his role in the "external mission", describing his role as
"very excellent". Rogers also "noted with profound gratitude the effort applied by our host
govt. on the other side for granting us the in-let and exit facilities even with escort".l2234
mw DCT—008, Transcript 1 September 2010, pp. 47661—47663, 47715, 47761 . 47766—47773.
mm DCT—008, Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47770. j
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1997-1998.
12233 Exhibit P—063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff 2"d
December 1998", p. 1, ERN 15487
my Exhibit P—063. "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff 2"d
December 1998", pp. 1-2, ERN 15487—15488..

---- End of Page 1886 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T (3+0 18 May 2012

3% 7 7
5492. Rogers is reported as stating that he and Bockarie both paid a "courtesy call on his
Excellency C.G.T" and that the mission extended to Burkinafasso [sic] where they (delegates)
were warmly received and attended to. All discussions with the Burkinabey [sic] authorities
were highly fruitful .... [Bockarie] behaved excellently and maturedly to the admiration of his
excellency, Campore [added in handwriting]. The Brigadier has done a very historic job for
the RUF SL movement. He has signed a rich contract for us and with our support, given to him
and the movement, we shall do every thing possible to promote this struggle".l2235
5493. Eddie Kamaeh spoke next stating that "the trip was very successful" and commending
Bockarie, SYB Rogers and "Col. Issah Sesay" for "keeping the ground under control" in
Bockarie's absence.
5494. Sam Bockarie spoke, and among other things stated that he brought Major Lawrance
Womandia because he could speak French and it was the delegates’ intention to visit "France
~ Countries and even Libya" and that Pa Rogers and Col. Eddie also went. Bockarie
"congratulated Col. Jungle and General Abraham for their sincerity and honesty in delivering
the parcels that were given to them for our father across. The C.D.S. said the father showed
him the parcels and said he was keeping the parcels until we cater [sic] and get more so as to
be able to purchase reasonable quantity of whatever we want". @36 He described the missions
as a success and stated that he had been able to "formally hand over our struggle and petition
about our Leader to the President of Burkina Faso...so that as O.A.U. Chairman, he will stip
[sic] in and mediate Peace between us and the SLPP govt". Bockarie also "placed a curse on
any one who would plan to mismanage the small logistics they had laid down their lives for in
the interest of the struggle. [Bockarie] inferred re that he went with a two and half carats (2.5
carats) diamond and some other items (handwritten) which he gave as present to a senior
security ~ Benjamin inorder [sic] to facilitate easy access to all chances for the undelayed
success of our mission". mu
'2235 Exhibit P—063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2"d
December 1998", p. 2, ERN 15488.
'2236 Exhibit P~063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2"d
December 1998", p. 4, ERN 15489. .
my Exhibit P-063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2"d
December 1998", p. 4, ERN 15489.

---- End of Page 1887 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03—O1-T GL / 18 May 2012

5495. Col. Issa Sesay, the Battlefield Commander and Col. Isaac Morogo [sic] are also
recorded as speaking and thanking the delegates. 12238
5496. Colonel Mike Lamin also spoke and thanked Bockarie and the delegates who went
with him on the mission, and is quoted as saying that "We as RUFSL must consider this
gesture as a brilliant challenge and we must do some things impressively in retum of the
challenge". According to the report, "Lamin then wamed that we must not talk on how the
material was channelled to our base for security reason [sic]". 12239
5497. Major E. Collins stated that Bockarie "has killed two birds with one stone i.e. solved
political and military problems"(handwritten). Several other people are recorded as speaking
before Bockarie announced a senior ofHcers’ meeting to arrange "full scale operations".m4O
Bockarie then called a meeting for the senior officers wherein arrangements were made for a
full scale operation.l22M
5498. The authenticity of this document was challenged by the Defence. The Trial Chamber
has already addressed this challenge. IZ242
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
5499. Exhibit P-067 is entitled "RUF People's Arm [sic] — Situation Report to Foday Sankoh
from the Black Guard Commander". lt is addressed to "The Leader" from "The Black
Revolutionary Guards" regarding the subject "Situation Report". lt records a history of events
since Sankoh's de arture in 1996 and in articular in reference to the Burkina Faso shi ment,
P P P
it states that in Octoberm43 Taylor "again called the "High Command (a reference to
Bockariemlil) to report"m45 and "we therefore went along with him to Monrovia". The
Img Exhibit P—063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2"d
December 1998", p. 5, ERN 15490.
Img Exhibit P—063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2"d
December 1998", p. 4, ERN 15489.
'2240 Exhibit P—063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2"d
December 1998", p. 5, ERN 15491.
Im] Exhibit P—063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff 2"d
December 1998", p. 5, ERN 15490.
mm See supra, Evaluation of Evidence: Authenticity of Documents.
'2243 As the preceding paragraph of Exh.P—067 refers to incidents in September 1998 the Trial Chamber infers
from this and other matters referred to that this incident occurred in October 1998.
@44 Issa Sesay, Testimony 12 July 2010, p. 44300.
'2245 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9672. Exhibit P—067 states that Bockarie had also been called after "Freetown and
provincial HQ fell in hands of ECOMOG" [sic] to report to the President of Liberia, ERN 9674.
/‘

---- End of Page 1888 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

39 Q 2 /
Accused instructed the "High C0mmand" to go to Burkina Fas0 to meet with President Blaise
C0mpa0ré and the "High C0mmand" travelled there with the war council chairman and Col.
Eddy Kanneh as a S.L.A. Representative, and remained there for two weeks. They met with
President C0mpa0re who welcomed them and assured them that he would not let Foday
Sankoh down and encouraged them to uphold the movement until Sankoh returned.
C0mpa0ré also instructed them to for"ward the "R.U.F. 1ssue" to the O.A.U. as he was its
current Chairman. On their return they were given "huge quantity of materials for seri0us
0ffensive to start a campaign for the release of 0ur leader".12246
5500. The delegation returned to Monrovia in November and then back to the base where a
fori1m was immediately held "for a seri0us offensive to commence". The fighters were happy
and agreed to start an Operation to capture Kono. A "huge quantity" of materiel was given to
B.F.C Issa Sesay who immediately left for Kono.m47 After they captured the entire Kono
district they also captured some artillery weapons and a huge quantity of arms and
ammunition. Colonel Ramb0 then took over the whole Operation and continued to T0nk0lili,
Makeni, and P0rt L0k0.12248
Prosecution Exhibit P—093
5501. Exhibit P—093 is entitled "Restricted RUF/SL C0mprehensive Report to Maj0r Sam
Bockarie from Brigadier 1ssa Sesay on the Take Over of Koidu, January 26 1999". The
Prosecution tendered the exhibit through Isaac Mong0r.12249 It is purportedly a list of
materials taken on 6 December 1998 by Issa Sesay to Kono and Sengwema.1225O According to
this list, prior to leaving "Defence 1·Ieadquarters" for the attack on Koidu, Sesay and the
second brigade were given, among other things, 30 boxes of AK rounds, 16 boxes of G3
rounds, 2.5 boxes of RPG rounds, 50 calibre rounds (25 belt feds), 20 boxes of GPMG
rounds, one BMG round, f00d and cigarettes. The report also lists the materials that were
captured in Koidu, Kimberlite, Sewafe and Masingbi after they were taken under their control
between 17 December 1998 and 22 December 1998. The captured materials included 39
W6 Exhibit P—067, "RUF Peopie's Arrny— Situation Repoit to Foday Saiikoh from the Black Guard
C0rnmander", ERN. 9672, 9679.
12247 Exhibit P—067, "RUF Pe0p1e's Arrny— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
C0rnmander", ERN. 9679-9680.
Img Exhibit P—067, "RUF Pe0p1e's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
C0mmander", ERN. 9680.
12240 Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5808.
12250 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 263, fn. 780.

---- End of Page 1889 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012

3 992 2
mortar bombs, 1 RPG tube with two rockets, 73 boxes of American AA rounds, 16 boxes of
mortar bombs, 31 commando mortar bombs with fuses, one sardine tin of GPMG rounds, one
box of Chinese calibre rounds, one box of hand grenades, 3 armoured tanks, drugs and
diesel.*225*
5502. For the attack on Sengwema, the materials he was given included 2 boxes of AK
Rounds, 1 box of G3 rounds, one half box of RPG bombs, and 2 boxes of GMPG rounds.
They were brought to Sengwema and handed over to the commander in charge on 7
December 1998.*2252
Prosecution Exhibit P-371
5503. Exhibit P-371 is entitled "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 2**52 Brigade,
Headquarters, Kono District, Report of Materials Issued Out, From the 2**** Brigade G-4
Commander to the Second Brigade Commander, 12 December 1998". This report states that
Colonel Morison [sic] Kallon was issued four boxes of AK rounds, two boxes of G-3 rounds,
four boxes of GMG rounds, two RPG rockets and two TNTs; Major Ibrahim Dugbah was _
issued three boxes of AK rounds, one box of G-3 rounds, two GMG rounds, two RPG rockets
and two TNTs; and Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel KS Banya was issued 10
packets of AK rounds and 5 packets of G3 rounds.*2222 It is signed by the 2"d Brigade
Commander, Boston F1omo and the G.4 Mohamed Christopha.
Prosecution Exhibit P-3 72
5504. Exhibit P-372 is entitled "Restricted Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,
Materials Issued to the 2"d Brigade Commander on the 13 December, 1998 As Seen Below" is
dated 14 December 1998. This report states that materials issued to the 2"d brigade
commander on December 13 1998 included: 13 boxes and 1 tin of AK rounds; 8.5 boxes of
G-3 rounds; 8 RPG rockets and 8 TNTs, 7 boxes and tin [sic] GMG rounds. These materials,
and foodstuffs and cigarettes were distributed to Lieutenant Colonel Akim, Colonel Boston
Flomo, S/Capt Junior, an unnamed artillery commander and Major Victor. This list was
*225* Exhibit P—093. "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa
sesay on the Take Over ofKoidu, January 26 1999’*, pp. 1-4, ERN 25503—25506.
*2252 Exhibit P—093. "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier 1ssa
Sesay on the Take Over ofKoidu, January 26 l999", p. 2, ERN 25504.

---- End of Page 1890 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

signed by 2nd Brigade G—4 Commander Major Christopha M. and approved by 2"d Brigade
Commander Lieutenant Colonel Boston Flomo. WM
Prosecution Exhibit P—3 73
5505. Exhibit P—373 is entitled "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone — RUF/SL 2nd
INF Brigade Headquarters Makeni Bombali District The Office of the G—4 Unit, Report, From
the 2"d Brigade G—4 Commander to the 2"d Brigade Adjutant". It is a report dated 22 January
1999 tram 2"d Brigade G—4 commander noting that materials transported to Koidu on 15
January l999 arrived safely on 16 January 1999. The materials were listed as 94 boxes of
American AA rounds, one box of 60 mm mortar bombs, two boxes of 120 mm mortar bombs,
one box of 81mm mortar bombs, one 8lmm mortar stand; four boxes of armoured tank
bombs; one 1 barrel gun, and three boxes of 82mm mortar bombs. The one barrel gun was
asked for by BFC Brigadier Issa. 12255
5506. Documents P—371, P—372 and P—373 were seized from the RUF Kono ofiice.`2256
Defence Exhibit D—084
5507. Exhibit D—084 is entitled "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report,
From Brigadier Issa H Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, To The Leader of the
Revolution, 27 September 1999". The Defence tendered the exhibit through its cross-
examination of Witness TF1—168. In the report, Sesay informed Sankoh that "General
Mosquito left on a trip to secure materials for the Movement and on his return I was issued a
liberal quantity of ammunition and instructed to cross the Moa River and recapture the
enemy? 12257
Deliberations
mw Exhibit P—371, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 2"d Brigade, Headquarters, Kono District,
Report of Materials Issued Out, From the 2"d Brigade G—4 Commander to the Second Brigade
Commander, 12 December 1998", ERN 25706.
my Exhibit P—372, '"Restricted Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 2"d Brigade Commander on the 13
December, 1998 As Seen Below, 14 December 1998", ERN 25700.
12255 Exhibit P—373, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone — RUF/SL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters
Makeni Bombali District The Office of the G—4 Unit, Report, From the 2nd Brigade G—4 Commander, to
the 2"d Brigade Adjutant", ERN 26072.
my) Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL—03—1—T—749, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents
Seized from RUF Kono Office, Kono District, 27 February 2009.

---- End of Page 1891 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

5508. Having carefully examined the above evidence, the Trial Chamber makes the
following observations. lt is undisputed by the parties that in around November 1998,
Bockarie left Sierra Leone lor Burkina Faso with a delegation that included Eddie Kanneh,
SYB Rogers and Lawrence Womandia. On their way to Burkina Faso, the RUF delegation
stopped in Monroviamsg It is also not disputed that the delegation wasjoined in Monrovia by
Ibrahim Bah and Musa Cissé who accompanied them to Burkina Fasomig The parties further
agree, as supported by the evidence,l226O that Bockarie and his delegation returned to Buedu,
Sierra Leone, around the end ofNovember/early December 1998 with a large quantity of arms
and ammunition.l226l This materiel was subsequently provided to Sesay for a major offensive
in Kono District.l2262
5509. In this context, the Prosecution argues that the Accused was instrumental in procuring
and organising the shipment of arms and ammunitions from Burkina Faso used in the
AFRC/RUF multi-axis operation culminating in the attack on Freetown in January 1999.l2263
The Prosecution alleges that it was originally planned that Bockarie would go to Libya to get
the materiel but that, in Monrovia, Taylor changed the plan and sent Bockarie and his
delegation to Burkina Faso, accompanied by "I`aylor's subordinate Musa Cisse. Bockarie, his
delegation and Musa Cisse brought a large quantity of arms and ammunition back with them
to Roberts International Airport in Monrovia.l2264
5510. The Defence contends that the Accused played no role in this shipment and submits
that while Bockarie's trip may have taken him through Liberia, Burkina Faso and Libya, and
on that trip he obtained arms and/or ammunition, the primary and official purpose of the
mm Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, dated 27 September 1999", p. 7, ERN
7762.
*2228 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 258 ("Around October/November 1998... Bockarie travelled with a
delegation to Monrovia and then onward to Burkina Faso. Bockarie's delegation to Monrovia included
his security personnel, Rashid, SYB Rogers, Eddie Kanneh, radio operator Dauda Aruna Fornie aka DAF
and others"); Defence Final Trial Brief paras 619 ("In late November 1998, Bockarie left Buedu and
passed through Monrovia on his way to Burkina Faso. Bockarie travelled with Eddie Kanneh, Lawrence
Womandia and SYB Rogers, among others"), 1073 (There has been an abundance of evidence that
Bockarie and other key figures in the RUF travelled to Burkina Faso in about November 1998, and that
following the trip, the RUF obtained significant quantity of` arms and ammunition).
msg Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 259; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 619.
mw Exhibit P-63, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence
Staff handwritten title ‘Battlefield Commander RUF-SL`, 2nd December, 1998", ERN 15487.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 9; Defence Final Trial Brief paras 620-621.
*2262 see cetttext; AFRC/RUF Jttttte Period (199 7-1998).
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 257, see also paras 9, 258-264.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Briefpara. 259.

---- End of Page 1892 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T { 18 May 2012

mission was to discuss the peace process in Sierra Leone with President Blaise Compaoré,
who was the chairman of the OAU at the time}2265 The Defence further contends that the
RUF delegation obtained supplies from multiple sources, including from Libya, Burkina Faso
and individuals in Liberia operating independently of the Accused. @66
5511. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that Witnesses TF1-371, Fornie, Mongor,
Kanneh and Saidu are generally reliablemm whilst the testimonies of Marzah and Sesay must
be considered with caution and require corroboration.l2268
5512. The Defence argues that the Prosecution witnesses’ accounts "do not complement
each other". Specifically, the Defence contends that the evidence of Prosecution witnesses
Mongor, Saidu, TF1-371 and Kanneh differs regarding how the RUF contacted the Accused
in order to obtain weapons.l22°9 The Trial Chamber disagrees. Mongor testified that in early
November 1998, the commanders in Buedu met in Waterworks with Bockarie, Jungle, SYB
Rogers, Rashid Sandy and others, and decided to send a letter to Taylor requesting
ammunition via Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. J ungle).l227O Saidu testified to a meeting in early
November at which Bockarie said that he would have to go to Liberia himself to explain to
the Accused the pressure faced on the ground by the RUF. mn Such a meeting is corroborated
by Augustine Mallah who testified that Bockarie told a senior officers’ meeting that he was
"fed up" of staying in Kailahun District and would try to visit Taylor for advice and see
whether they "could get [their] needs met".l2272 Neither TF1-371 nor Kanneh testified, nor
were they questioned, as to how the Accused was initially contacted and their evidence is
therefore not inconsistent with the other Prosecution witnesses. More fundamentally, the Trial
Chamber notes that both TF1-371 and Kanneh testified to the Accused's involvement in the
facilitation of the ammunition from Burkina Faso}2273 The Defence seeks to distinguish
Saidu's testimony from Mongor's on the basis that Saidu testified that it was Bockarie who
mcs Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1073.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1073-1076.
mw Credibility Assessment, TF 1-371, paras 220-226; Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna F orrrie, paras 346-
358; Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274; Credibility Assessment, Albert Saidu, Pre-
lndictment period (1988-1996), para. 2384; Credibility Assessment, Karmoh Kanneh, The Role of
lntermediaries, para. 2704.
Img Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372; Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268.
'"°" Defence rmi rmi Brief para. 1074.
mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5779-5783.
mm Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11064, 11066-11068.
12272 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20217.
ma TF 1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2405-2417 (CS); Karmoh Kamreh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp.
9394, 9396-9398; Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9416-9418.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 6*,% 18 May 2012 ,

met the Accused to inform him that the RUF required ammunition rather than, as Mongor
testified, Tamba who delivered a letter from the RUF that had been drafted at a meeting in
Buedu.12274 Whilst neither Mallah nor Saidu testified to the letter described by Mongor, their
evidence is not inconsistent with his since Mongor also testified that the Accused called
Bockarie to Monrovia three days later.12275 Moreover, there is a wealth of evidence that
Bockarie left Buedu with the specific intention of collecting ammunition. 12276
5513. The Defence further submits that TF1—371's account that the weapons and
ammunitions were stored in White Flower before being transported to Sierra Leone is not
supported by any other witness. 12277 The Trial Chamber notes that Varmuyan Sherif who was
in Liberia and, according to his testimony, an eyewitness to these events also stated that the
ammunition was taken to the Accused at White Flower where it was distributed by the
Accused himself12278 Joseph Marzah also testified that the shipment was brought to White
Flower. 12279
5514. The Trial Chamber notes that a significant part of the Prosecution's evidence
regarding the events in Liberia and Burkina Faso is hearsay. In particular, Witness TF1—371,
Mongor, Saidu, and Kanneh did not participate in the RUF mission to Liberia and Burkina
Faso. Their account is based on what they observed while in Sierra Leone before the
departure and after the return of the RUF delegation, including Bockarie's statement during
12274 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1074.
*2275 isaac Manger, 11 March 2008,p. 5782.
12276 TF1—37l, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2402-2403 (the witness testified that Bockarie told him prior to
leaving that the purpose of his trip was to meet with the Accused and Musa Cissé in Monrovia and that
afterwards Ibrahim Bah was to escort Bockarie to Burkina Faso to get a shipment of ammunition for a
major attack); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2l542~2l544 (the witness testified
that prior to their departure from Buedu, Bockarie told the witness that he had held discussions with
Yeaten in which it was intended that Bockarie would travel to Libya to secure ammunition); Albert Saidu,
Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11071-1 1072, 11075 (Before he left, he showed the witness "a white paper"
which contained diamonds that he said he was taking to the Accused to secure materials for the RUF to
launch a major offensive to recapture Kono); Karmoh Kanrreh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9416 (Bockarie
told the witness before he left that he was going to travel to Burkina Faso); Exhibit P—063, "RUF
Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 21111 December 1998", p.
4, ERN 15489 (Bockarie and the delegation had travelled with Lawrence Womandia because he could
speak French and it was the de1egates’ intention to visit "France—countries and even Libya" and Exhibit
D—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, dated 27 September 1999", p. 7, ERN
7762 (Sesay reported to Sankoh that "Genera1 Mosquito left on a trip to secure materials for the
Movement...).
12277 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1074 citing Witness TFl~37l, Transcript 31 January 2008 pp. 2726-2728,
2750.
12278 Vamruyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 869.
12279 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5888—5890.

---- End of Page 1894 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T 6,3 18 May 2012 Q)

the debriefing in Buedu in early December 1998. In these circumstances, the fact that their
accounts do not coincide exactly on every particular point of the mission in Liberia and
Burkina Faso does not affect their credibility. Nonetheless, the fact that most of the evidence
of the witnesses is second hand has been iiilly considered when assessing the weight of their
evidence.
5515. In the Trial Chamber's view however, Prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, including
those who were allegedly present in Liberia when the shipment was received, effectively
complement each other on each critical element of the allegation. Parts of these testimonies
are also corroborated by reliable contemporary documentary evidence. The Prosecution
witnesses agreed that the RUF senior officers initiated a request to the Accused to obtain arms
and ammunition.l2280 The evidence also shows that while in Liberia, Bockarie met the
Accused, which is acknowledged by the Accusedmgl The Accused asked Musa Cisse to
accompany Bockarie and his delegation to Burkina Faso. 12282 While the Accused testified that
Musa Cisse went in the role of translator, the evidence indicates that Lawrence Womandia, a
member of the delegation, spoke French and was brought on the mission by Bockarie for
precisely this reason. Issa Sesay testified that Eddie Kanneh spoke very good French. 12283 For
imo Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5776-5781 (The RUF Senior officers decided to write a letter
to the Accused requesting ammunition); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12912-12913, 12915
(Bockarie asked the assistance of the Accused to recapture Koidu Town); TF 1-371, Transcript 28 January
2008, p. 2403 (Bockarie told Witness TF 1-371 that the purpose of the trip was to meet the Accused and
Musa Cissé in Monrovia to get a shipment of ammunition for a major attack); Augustine Mallah,
Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20217-20218 (RUF senior oiiicers in Buedu, decided to go to see the
Accused for advice and to see whether they could get their needs met).
my Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21545 (Bockarie told Fornie that he had briefly met
with the Accused); Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11083, 11085 (At the meeting in Buedu,
Bockarie said that he, Eddie Kanneh, and others had met the Accused in Liberia); Charles Ghankay
Taylor, 17 September 2009, pp. 29250, 29261 (Bockarie met the Accused before returning to Sierra
Leone).
mm TFI-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2403; TFI-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2643; Transcript 31
January 2008, pp. 2702, 2750, 2762 (The delegation met with Musa Cissé who had organised a flight for
it to travel together with himself and Ibrahim Bah to Ouagadougou); Joseph Marzah. Transcript 12 March
2008, p. 5884 (Musa Cissé went with the RUF delegation to Burkina Faso in order to get weapons);
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, pp. 29219, 29248-29249, 29254, 29261,
(Taylor permitted his protocol officer, Musa Cissé, to travel with Bockarie in Burkina Faso but only
because he was on a mission of peace); Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript, 17 September 2009, pp.
29249-29250; 29259-29260 (Taylor asked Cisse for a briefing when he returned to find out why the trip
took so long. Cisse informed the Accused that Bockarie had left them to travel to Libya and back before
they returned to Monrovia).
Im} See Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010 p. 44122 (Issa Sesay testified that Eddie Kanneh spoke very good
French); See also Exhibit P-063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF
Defence Staff] 2"d December 1998", ERN 15490 (Bockarie explained that he brought Major Lawrance
Womandia because he can speak French).

---- End of Page 1895 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T EF 18 May 2012
I

3 M gg
this reason, the Trial Chamber does not find the testimony of the Accused credible with
regard to Musa Cisse's role in the delegation to Burkina Faso.
5516. Prosecution witnesses, including Fornie, Marzah, and Sherif, testified that after being
arranged in Burkina Faso, the shipment was brought back by plane from Ougadougou to
Roberts International Airport in Liberia.l2284 From there, the shipment was transported and
stocked for a short time at White Flower.l2285 The next day, the materiel was transported by
trucks provided by the Accused to Buedu, Sierra Leone. In Buedu, after a meeting with RUF
and AFRC commanders, the shipment was distributed to the commanders. 12286 TF1-371,
Mongor, Marzah, Saidu and Perry Kamara all testified that the Accused received diamonds in
exchange for his help in obtaining these materials. 12287 The Trial Chamber accepts the
mm TF 1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2758-2764 (The shipment came from Burkina Faso through
Liberia. The Defence suggests that it came directly from Burkina Faso, but the Witness disagreed); Dauda
Artrna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21551-21552 (Bockarie told Fornie that the trucks had
been loaded at Roberts International Airport); Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5884-5887
(The shipment arrived in Roberts International Airport in Monrovia); Varrnuyan Sherif, Transcript 9
January 2008, p. 870 (Sherif saw Bockarie at Roberts International Airport in Monrovia, with Issa Cissé
and Tuah; They were discussing the quantity of arms and ammunition which was ariiving);
@85 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2702-2703; Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2750, 2762 (The
shipment was deposited at White Flower where it was split between the NPF L and RUF); Joseph Marzah,
Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5888-5890 (Marzah and Bockarie brought the shipment to Taylor's
residence at White Flower in Monrovia); Varrnuyan Sherifi Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 869 (Sherif
testified that the ammunition was taken to the Accused at White Flower where it was distributed by the
Accused).
@86 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2750-2751 (The arms were deposited at White Flower, Sam
Bockarie was given his consignment and was escorted by the Accused's Special Security Service to
Buedu). TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2405; Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2750 (Charles
Taylor's securities namely Marzah, Tamba, Sampson and Varrnoh escorted the convoy to Buedu in Sierra
Leone); TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2404-2405; Transcript 31 January 2008 p. 2702
(Bockarie told Witness TF1-371 that the Accused had given the trucks which cariied the shipment);
Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, pp. 5885-90 (The convoy carrying the shipment passed
through Bong County, Lofa, through to Voijama, Kolahun, Foya and entered Buedu. Marzah was at the
front of the convoy in a jeep with no ammo as an escort. "...when they see me, they will know
straightaway that I was the one traveling with those trucks and there would be no embarrassment through
Charles Taylor's directive").
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2728-2731 (Bockarie paid the Accused for the shipment with
parcels of diamonds that Bockarie brought to the Accused over the course of multiple trips to Monrovia);
Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March pp. 5789-5795 (Bockarie told Mongor that he had given diamonds to
the Accused in exchange for ammunition and rockets, medicines and food which he brought back from
Liberia); Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, p. 6100 (Bockarie gave a passport sized diamond to
Taylor in exchange of ammunitions); Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11071-11072, 11075
(Bockarie showed Saidu a white paper which contained diamonds that he said he was taking to the
Accused to secure materials for the RUF to launch a major offensive to recapture Kono); Albert Saidu,
Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11071-11072, 11075 (Saidu testified that during a meeting he had with
Bockarie prior to his trip, Bockarie showed him a "white paper" which contained diamonds that he said
he was taking to the Accused to secure materials); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3159-
3167 (Bockarie summoned his commanders to a meeting in Buedu where he showed them a large
quantity of arms and ammunition that the Accused had provided in return for diamonds); See also Exhibit
P-063, "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2nd
December 1998", ERN 15490. (Bockarie went with a two and half carats diamond and some other items

---- End of Page 1896 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Gb 18 May 2012

37/@7
evidence of these witnesses. Their evidence regarding this particular event is consistent with
their previous statements, they corroborate each other and are corroborated by documentary
evidence, and they were not effectively challenged in cross-examination. The Defence argues
that the Accused did not move into VVhite Flower until January 1999 and that it would not
make sense for Bockarie to have deposited arms there only to immediately remove and
transport them to Sierra Leone.I2288 The Trial Chamber notes that the building was owned by
the Accused and under construction,I2289 which would not preclude its use as a storage area
for materiel. Moreover, the evidence indicates that it was not all removed and transported as
the Accused retained some of the materiel that arrived.I2290
5517. The Accused himself acknowledged that he met Bockarie in Monrovia before he went
to Burkina Faso and that he met him again on his way back to Sierra Leone.I229I He further
acknowledged that he sent Musa Cissé with the RUF delegation and testified that, aRer the
mission in Burkina Faso, Musa Cissé briefed him and that he also spoke to Bockarie who
thanked him, Taylor, for his help. I2292 As noted, the Trial Chamber does not find the
Accused's testimony that Cissé went with the delegation to provide French translation
credible. Similarly, in the Trial Chamber's view, Taylor's statement that he was not aware of
what transpired between Bockarie and Compaoré during Bockarie's tripI2293 is not credible.
The presence of Cissé during the mission would have placed Taylor via debriefings, in a
position to know the content of the discussions between Bockarie and Compaoré.
5518. The Defence contends that the RUF had other sources of supply for the materiel at
issue but does not specify a particular alternative for this shipment and even acknowledges
that Bockarie may have arranged an arms deal in Burkina Faso when he was there.I2294 Issa
Sesay testified that the RUF delegation travelled to Libya from Burkina Faso, where they
received USD $50,000 from Colonel Gaddafi that Bockarie used for the purchase of arms and
ammunition in Liberia.I2295 The Prosecution alleges, and Fornie testified, that Libya was the
which he gave as a present to a senior security — Benjamin — in order to facilitate easy access to all chances
for the undelayed success of the mission).
I mg Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1084.
I mg Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26045.
I2290 See TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2702; Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 868—
IDQI Chiiis Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29250, 29261.
nm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29248—29250, 29259—29261
I 2293 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009 p. 26129; Transcript 10 August 2009 pp. 26391—26392.
'""‘* Defence mei Trier Brief, paras 619, 1073, 1075.
I2295 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 619, 1073, 1075.

---- End of Page 1897 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T 5% 18 May 2012

ori inal intended destination of` Bockarie, but that lans were chan ed b the Accused when
8 P 8 Y
they arrived in Monrovia. TF1-371 testified that Burkina Faso was the intended destination.
However, he was not a member of the delegation. The only witness who travelled with the
delegation, to Monrovia, is Fomie. Although Fornie did not travel with the delegation to
Burkina Faso, he was in regular contact with Bockarie while he was there, which was
acknowledged by the Accused as having been "possible".l2296 The Trial Chamber considers
that, as a radio operator, Fomie would have known if Bockarie and the delegation travelled to
Libya.
5519. Sesay and the Accused are the only witnesses who testified that the delegation went to
Libya. Taylor heard from Cissé that Bockarie had travelled from Burkina Faso to Libya.l2297
Sesay testified that in Libya, Gaddafi gave Bockarie USD $50,000, from which he purchased
medicines in Monrovia and ammunition from the AFL battalion commander in Voinjama and
from Yeaten in Kolahun. mgg
5520. The Trial Chamber recalls that based on its concerns regarding the general credibility
of 1ssa Sesay, his evidence must be viewed with caution. Regarding his testimony in this
articular context, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesa testified in his own trial, on 22 June
P Y
2007, that Bockarie brought a large shipment of ammunition from Burkina Faso to Sierra
Leone passing through Liberia. Confronted in cross-examination with this contradiction,
Sesay explained that he did not recall the truth at that time.l2299 Sesay's initial testimony, four
years closer to the events in question, corioborates the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses
including TF1-371, TF1-3 88, Fomie and Kanneh, who testified that the materiel was
purchased in Burkina Faso. moo Moreover, contemporary documentary evidence also indicates
that the arms and ammunition came from Burkina Faso, without mention of Libyamm
@96 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29261
mw Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29249-29250; Transcript 25 November 2009,
p. 32493.
mos Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44125-44128.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, pp. 46154-46163.
mol) TF 1-371, 'Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2759-2761 (TF 1-371 testified that the materials with which the
delegation returned to Buedu were given to them by President Compaoré, who also gave them USD
$17,000); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21542-21543; Transcript 10 December
2008, pp. 22078-22079 (Taylor sent Bockarie, Kamreh and SYB Rogers to Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, to
collect the ammunition there instead of Libya); Karmoh Kamreh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9639-9640
(Bockarie told him that the arms had come from Burkina Faso and through Liberia to Sierra Leone); TF 1-
338, Transcript 3 September 2008 p. 15295 ("1brahim Bah helped Bockarie to pass through Charles
Taylor to obtain materials from Blaise Compaoré and to bring them back"); See also Exhibit P-063, "RUF

---- End of Page 1898 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % G; 18 May 2012

5521. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence has challenged the authenticity of Exhibit
P—063. The Trial Chamber has considered the authenticity of this document and rejected the
challenges raised. 12302
5522. Under these circumstances, and in light of the overwhelming evidence of Prosecution
witnesses and documentary exhibits that arms were shipped from Burkina Faso to Monrovia
q and particularly noting his initial testimony corroborating this evidence, the Trial Chamber
does not find Sesay's testimony that the arms were procured elsewhere to be credible.
5523. The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence of the Accused is second-hand and self-
serving. He testified that Cissé told him the delegation travelled to Libya, when he asked why
the trip to Burkina Faso was so long. He claimed to have little information on what transpired
in Burkina Faso and did not say anything about what might have transpired in Libya. The
Trial Chamber notes that the testimony of the Accused, and the contention of the Defence,
that the purpose of the visit was to discuss the peace process in Sierra Leone with then OAU
Chairman President Compaorémm does not preclude the possibility that, while in Burkina
Faso, the RUF arranged the shipment of arms and ammunition that they brought back to
Sierra Leone through Liberia with the help of the Accused. With regard to Taylor's emphatic
assertion that he had no materiel to give to Bockarie, the Trial Chamber notes that the
allegation is not that he gave materiel that he had to Bockarie, but rather that he arranged for
Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, handwritten
title ‘Batt1efie1d Commander RUF-SL’, 2nd December, l998", pp. 1-4, ERN 15487-15490.
*2301 Exhibit P-063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence
Staff, handwritten title ‘Batt1efie1d Commander RUF-SL’, 2nd December, l998", p. 4, ERN 15490.
(Description of the mission as a success; See also Bockarie's warning to the fighters not to "mismanage
the small logistics [which the delegation] had laid down their lives for in the interests of the struggle");
Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peop1e's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN 9672, 9678 ("The High Command, the War Council Chairman and one SLA representative
Col. Eddy Kanneh took the trip to Burkina Faso. They met president Blaise Campoare [sic], and they
were highly welcome. They took two weeks in Burkina Faso. They were given worls [sic] of confidence
and assurance by president Blaise that he will not let Cpl Foday Sankoh down at all. The president told
the High Command to be very hard in [i11egib1e]to uphold the movement until the arrival of the Leader. In
fact he instructed the High Command to forward the RUF issue to the OAU as he is the current OAU
Chairman. On their return they were given huge quantity of materials for serious offensive to start a
campaign for the release of our leader. The delegation return [sic] back to Monrovia in November. The
delegation return back [illegible] and held an immediate forum for a serious offensive to commense [sic].
All the combatants were happy and agree to start the operation in capturing Kono"). See also Exhibit P-
063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff,
handwritten title ‘Batt1efie1d Commander RUF-SL’, 2nd December, 1998", p. 4, ERN 15490 (Mike
Lamin's stated that "we must not talk on how the material was channelled to our base for security reason
[sic]").
mm See supra, Evaluation of Evidence: Authenticity of Documents.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1073.

---- End of Page 1899 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 7 GA 18 May 2012

S7? ? Z
Bockarie to secure arms and ammunition elsewhere, in Burkina Faso, and that Taylor kept
some of this materiel for his own use, which is consistent with his testimony that he needed
the materiel. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that the testimony of the Accused
does not raise reasonable doubt regarding the origin of the shipment, or the evidence that he
played a role in organizing it.
5524. The Defence argues that the evidence of Fayia Musa, that in April 1996 he travelled
with Sankoh and others to meet regional leaders to raise funds and seek political support for
the RUF, supports the proposition that "Liberia was simply a transit point for arms and
ammunition supplies originating elsewhere", that the RUF 's contact in Burkina Faso was
General Diendere, and that the Accused had been negotiating with him for arms and
ammunition during the time of the Abijan Peace Process.mO4 The Trial Chamber rejects this
argument. The fact that Sankoh met with Diendere in Burkina Faso several years beforehand
and on that occasion was given funds by Compaoré in no way precludes the possibility that
the Accused made arrangements for this particular arms transaction. Similarly, the Trial
Chamber does not find the Defence citation of Koker's testimony that on one occasion,
unrelated to this shipment, he determined that arms were from Liberia because those who
brought them spoke Liberian English and were wearing Liberian uniforms at a time when
Taylor was President as probative of the argument that "witnesses are keen to conflate the fact
that any materials coming across the border from Liberia were necessarily provided by and
with the knowledge of Taylor". mw
5525. There is substantial credible evidence that the Accused was paid for the shipment with
diamonds, that he sent Musa Cissé with the delegation, that he directed the distribution of the
shipment, and that he kept some of it for his own purposes, In the light of the foregoing the
Chamber finds that the shipment of arms and ammunitions brought to Sierra Leone in
December 1998 came from Burkina Faso through Liberia, and that the Accused played a
significant role in this transaction.
5526. Turning to the content of the shipment, the Trial Chamber notes that the testimonies
vary regarding the exact content and volume of the shipment.l23O6 Nonetheless the evidence
12304 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1085-1086.
*2305 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1080.
A mlm TF]-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2404-2405 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2761. (The
shipment contained "plenty of boxes of AK-47 rounds and boxes of hand grenades, RPG bombs and

---- End of Page 1900 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T §_ 18 May 2012

unequivocally demonstrates that the shipment contained a large quantity of arms and
ammunitions which was unprecedented in its volume. mm
machine guns, general machine guns, 50 caliber machine guns ammunitions). But see TFl-37l,
Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2758-2761 (the shipment comprised only 44 boxes of ammunition); TFl-
567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12912-12913, 12915 (Bockarie returned to Buedu in December 1998
with RPG bombs, AK rounds, GPMG rounds, guns, camouflage, and other things); Karmoh Kanneh,
Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9416-9418, 9438 (Bockarie brought back materials including AK-47s, AK-47
rounds, G3s, hand grenades, mines, RPG rockets and tubes, G3 rounds, bombs, hand grenades, mines,
combat fatigues, boots and other items, all of which were stored in an "ammo dump" close to his house
on Buedu Road); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1993-1996 (Bockarie brought with him 300
boxes of ammunition from Monrovia); J abaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13424-13426 (Jaward
testified that in December 1998 a large consignment of AK ammunition, G3 rounds, RPG round rockets, `
GPMG rounds, bazooka rockets, mortar bombs, drums of petrol, diesel, engine, oil, bags of rice, salt,
Maggi, and batteries were brought to Buedu); Issa Sesay, Transcript 10 July 2010, pp. 44127-44129
(Bockarie purchased up to 40 boxes of AK rounds, up to 15 boxes of G3 rounds, and about 10 boxes of
HMG rounds); See also Exhibit P-093. "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam
Bockarie from Brigadier Issa Sesay on the Take Over of Koidu, January 26 l999" (list of materials taken
on 6 December 1998 by Issa Sesay to Kono and Sengwema: 30 boxes of AK rounds, 16 boxes of G3
rounds, 2.5 boxes of RPG rounds, 50 calibre rounds (25 belt feds), 20 boxes of GPMG rounds, and one
BMG round); Exhibit P-371, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 2nd Brigade, Headquarters,
Kono District, Report of Materials Issued Out, From the 2nd Brigade G-4 Commander to the Second
Brigade Commander, 12 December l998" (This report states that Colonel Morison [sic] Kallon was
issued four boxes of AK rounds, two boxes of G-3 rounds, four boxes of GMG rounds, two RPG rockets
and two TNTs; Major Ibrahim Dugbah was issued three boxes of AK rounds, one box of G-3 rounds, two
GMG rounds, two RPG rockets and two TNTs; and Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel KS Banya
was issued 10 packets of AK rounds and 5 packets of G3 rounds); Exhibit P-372, "Restricted
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Materials Issued to the 2nd Brigade Commander on the 13
December, 1998 As Seen Below, 14 December l998" (This report states that materials issued to the 2nd
brigade commander on December 13 1998 included: 13 boxes and 1 tin of AK rounds; 8.5 boxes of G-3
rounds; 8 RPG rockets and 8 TNTs, 7 boxes and tin [sic] GMG rounds. These materials were distributed
to Lieutenant Colonel Akim, Colonel Boston Flomo, S/Capt Junior, an unnamed artillery commander and
Major Victor. This list was signed by 2nd Brigade G-4 Commander Major Christopha M. and approved
by 2nd Brigade Commander Lieutenant Colonel Boston Flomo); Exhibit P-373, "Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone - RUF/SL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters Makeni Bombali District The Office of
the G-4 Unit, Report, From the 2nd Brigade G-4 Commander, to the 2nd Brigade Adjutant". (report dated
22 January 1999 from 2nd Brigade G-4 commander noting that materials transported to Koidu on 15
January 1999 arrived safely on 16 January 1999: 94 boxes of American AA rounds, one box of 60 mm
mortar bombs, two boxes of 120 mm mortar bombs, one box of 81 mm mortar bombs, one 81 mm mortar
stand; four boxes of armoured tank bombs; one 1 barrel gun, and three boxes of 82 mm mortar bombs.
The one barrel gun was asked for by BFC Brigadier Issa). 1
mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March pp. 5789-5795 (Mongor described the ammunition as being packed
from the floor up to the ceiling in stacks that were about 2.5 to 3 meters high. Mongor estimated that there
were more than 100 boxes of different kinds of ammunition and included AK, RPG, and GMG rounds.
Prior to this, Mongor had not seen "any ammunition that could be up to that quantity"); Albert Saidu,
Transcript 6 June 2008, pp. 11205-11207 (Bockarie returned with "a lot of materiel"); TFl-567,
Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12912-12913, 12915 (Bockarie returned to Buedu in December 1998 with
"lots of ammunition"); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3159-3167 (Bockarie summoned
his commanders to a meeting in Buedu where he showed them a large quantity of arms and ammunition
that the Accused had provided in return for diamonds); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September
2008, pp. 16431-16432. (Kabbah testified that in late 1998, prior to the attack on Kono, he saw the
biggest consignment of ammunition, food and used clothing which the RUF had ever received. Kabbah
added that the RUF never had any hundred boxes of ammunition at a stretch and that they never received
such a large consignment again); TFl-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14162, 14181-14182 (There
was so much ammunition that they carried it to there on their heads); See also Exhibit P-067, "RUF
People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sarrkoh from the Black Guard Commander", ERN 9672, 9678.

---- End of Page 1901 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GM 18 May 2012

5527. The Trial Chamber will assess the use of the Burkina Faso shipment in the section of
the Judgement below dealing with the use of materiel supplied or facilitated by the
Accused.‘""8
Findings
5528. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that around November/December 1998, the Accused was instrumental in procuring a large
quantity of arms and ammunition for the RUF from Burkina Faso. These arms and
ammunitions were distributed to RUF and AFRC commanders in Buedu.
4. Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused
General Submissions by the Parties
5529. The Trial Chamber has found beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was
involved in supplying or facilitating the supply of materiel to the RUF and AFRC during the
period when the AFRC/RUF Junta was in power to the end of Issa Sesay's reign as leader of
the RUF.
5530. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided the materiel critical to a
successful initial invasion and the subsequent expansion into Sierra Leone. Throughout the
remainder of the conflict, the Accused provided the RUF and AFRC/RUF with a wide
variety of arms and ammunition, aka materiel. After access to the border was severely
restricted, this assistance was most directly provided during the period from 1997 through
2001. The Prosecution submits that the materiel provided by the Accused contributed
significantly to the crimes committed in Sierra Leone by the RUF, AFRC/RUF and/or the
Accused's Liberian fighters, enabling these forces to carry out their campaign of terror as
charged in Counts 1-11 of the Indictment. The Prosecution contends that such materiel
"ensured the very survival of the rebels as a viable armed group at several crucial times". It
cites evidence linking this materiel to use in specific RUF/AFRC operations. mw
(On their return the RUF delegation was given "huge quantity of materials for serious offensive" to start a
campaign for the release of their leader).
mm See Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.
12309 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 206.

---- End of Page 1902 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03-01·T /5// G" 18 May 2012

3 7 775
5531. The Defence contests that the materiel allegedly supplied by the Accused was as
significant as the Prosecution claims. The Defence submits that the evidence in this case
demonstrates that the RUF obtained its arms and ammunition from a variety of sources
including: capturing weapons from ECOMOG; obtaining weapons from government stores
when it acted as the Junta government; trading for arrns and ammunition with Guinea and
former ULIMO combatants; from Burkina Faso; and from Liberia. The Defence submits that
the RUF's main source of arrns and ammunition was from capturing weapons from
ECOMOG; that the RUF obtained fewer arms and ammunition from Liberia than from other
sources; that the arms and ammunition the RUF obtained from Liberia was not through
official channels and was never enough to enable it to launch major operations. Ultimately,
the Defence submits that the Accused was not involved or informed and cannot be
criminally responsible for having given practical assistance in the form of arms and
ammunition to rebel groups which carried out crimes in Sierra Leone. 123 10
(i) The AFRC coup in May 1997 to the retreat from Freetown in February 1998
5532. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Accused sent Ibrahim Bah on his
behalf to assist in arranging a shipment of materiel delivered to Magburaka in October 1997
and its finding that during the Junta period Daniel Tamba brought ammunition supplied by
the Accused, comprised of AK, GMG and RPG rounds, to the RUF in Sierra Leone. 123 11
5533. According to the Prosecution, the Junta was "desperate for arrns" due to the embargo
imposed on Sierra Leone by UN Security Council Resolution 1 132, and the arms and
ammunition supplied by the Accused during the Junta period allowed the Junta government
to hold on to keyareas in Sierra Leone for several additional months.12312 According to the
Prosecution, the materiel brought in the Magburaka shipment was used to reinforce
RUF/AFRC forces in the fight against ECOMOG12313 and was "central to prolonging the life
of the Junta".12314 The Prosecution submits that the shipment sent via Daniel Tamba (aka
"Jungle") was sent to Denis Mingo (aka "Superrnan") in Freetown to be used to counter an
12310 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1033-1034, 1131.
12111 See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During the Junta Period.
12312 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 223.
12311 TF1—334, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8686—8693; TF1—597, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. l0479—10480.
123 14 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 234.

---- End of Page 1903 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / 2}-5 18 May 2012

anticipated ECOMOG attack against Freetown.I23I5 The Prosecution adduced evidence from
witnesses Isaac Mongor, TF1-338, TF1-371, Samuel Kargbo, Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Mustapha M. Mansaray, TF1-539 and Exhibit P-066.
5534. The Defence acknowledges that there is evidence that materiel obtained from the
Magburaka Shipment was used in fighting ECOMOG in Freetown in February 1998, but
contends that it is not clear how much was left over or used in subsequent operations or the
commission of crimes, and that evidence showing the RUF and AFRC were struggling to
obtain ammunition supplies throughout 1998 suggests that the ammunition from Magburaka
did not last.I23I6 The Defence also submits that there is no evidence as to what use the
materiel delivered by Tamba in 1997 was put to, or how long it lasted.I23I7 The Defence
adduced evidence from witness Issa Sesay and Exhibits D-004, D-009, D-084.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5535. Isaac Mongor, a senior RUF member, testified that one of the AA guns from the
Magburaka shipment was mounted by the AFRC at JPK's house to use against ECOMOG
Alpha Jets. The other was given to the RUF and taken to Kenema and left in the care of Sam
Bockarie. The GMG rounds were used during the fighting in Freetown during the
Intervention. I2} I 8
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
5536. TF1-338 testified that the materiel from the Magburaka shipment was distributed to
AFRC/RUF forces in Freetown, Makeni and Magburaka and later used to repel ECOMOG
from Freetown. Img
Prosecution witness TF1-371
IBIS Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 224.
I2} I6 Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 1055.
*23*1 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1062.
*23** isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5733-5734.
Img TF1—338, Transcript 5 September 2008,1 pp. 15557—15558.

---- End of Page 1904 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 6` 18 May 2012

5537. TF1 -371 testified that the AK-47s obtained upon the arrival of the Magburaka
shipment were distributed amongst the armed guards stationed at the mining operations at
Tongo Fields, in addition to the weapons which the guards already had when they joined the
Junta.l232O According to TF1-371, these guards included members of the "Small Boys Units"
("SBUs"), some of whom were as young as 13 years old.l232l
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
i 5538. Alimamy Bobson Sesay told the Trial Chamber that the arms from the Magburaka
shipment were distributed among RUF and SLA membersmzz and that some other arms and
ammunition were used to reinforce the fight against ECOMOG forces}2323
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
5539. Samuel Kargbo testified that after the ECOMOG intervention and the loss of
Freetown, the AFRC were unable to bring their heavy artillery with them as they retreated,
because Waterloo was blocked and there was no way for the heavy artillery to cross over.
They left the weapons at Tombo}2324
Prosecution Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray
5540. Mustapha Mansaray, who was IDU Commander at Dam Barracks at the time of the
ECOMOG lnterventionl2325 stated that when the AFRC/RUF retreated from Freetown in
February 1998, they took with them a supply of arms and ammunition from Freetown}2326
Prosecution Witness TF1 -539
5541. TF1-539 testified to hearing from the men who were fleeing from Freetown that they
had left their weapons in Freetown}2327
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
'm" TF1-371, rranaannr 29 January 2008, p. 2463 (cs).
*232* TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2337 (cs).
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8702-8704.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8688.
'm" Samuel Kargbo, rranaurrpr 22 May 2008, p. 10514.
my Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, p. 5231.
mm Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, p. 5443.
my TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11396-11398.

---- End of Page 1905 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (ih 18 May 2012

5542. Issa Sesay testihed that the only arms and ammunition that came to Sierra Leone
during the Junta regime was the flight that landed in Magburaka}2328 This was also the only
stock of ammunition Sesay was aware of that the RUF would have had access to. 12329
Defence Exhibit D-004
5543. Exhibit D—004 is a letter, dated 3 October 1997, from Johnny Paul Koroma to
Charles Taylor, thanking him for his supportive position at the UN General Assembly,
describing ECOMOG bombardment of Freetown and noting an impending ECOMOG
invasion of Freetown. The letter ends with a request that Taylor supply the Junta with arms
and ammunition and sets out an itemised list of the quantity and description of the arms and
ammunition requested. 12330
Defence Exhibit D-009
5544. Exhibit D-009l233l is a Salute Report to Sankoh by Bockarie, dated 26 September
1999, in which Bockarie recounts events after Sankoh left Sierra Leone in November 1996
to the date of the report. Bockarie wrote in the Report:
5545. Before Gibril was arrested he exposed to the AFRC, information on materials that
the RUF held in stock. Unknown to me and the rest of the RUF High Command, Gibril and
the AFRC made arrangements for the stock to be moved in place for their use. They then
took control of the entire load leaving the bulk of it stashed away at the residence of J P
Koroma and fled the city whilst our troops fought the enemy from house to house with
nearly empty magazines and no support hre. In the end Freetown fell and the majority of
soldiers, both RUF and SLA retreated safely from the Capital. 123 3 2
Defence Exhibit D-084
12328 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45961
img Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43984—43985.
12330 Exhibit D—004, "Letter from Johnny Paul Koroma to Charles Taylor asking for help in the Defence of the
Country against ECOMOG, 3 October 1997".
lm! Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie - 00009658 — 00009671".
12332 Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9662.

---- End of Page 1906 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T NK , [ 18 May 2012

3 7 9 99
5546. Exhibit D-084 is a Salute Report from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh, dated 27
September 1999, reporting on various events since the Abidjan Accords. The report states
that during the Junta period, the AF RC had arranged to take military equipment belonging to
the RUF without the consent of the RUF High Command, and withheld RUF access. When
the troops retreated from Freetown after the ECOMOG intervention, "a large quantity of the
said equipment was left in storage at the residence of Chairman J P Koroma".12333
Prosecution Exhibit P-066
5547. Exhibit P-066 is an unsigned letter, dated 24 June 1998, from "Brigadier Sam
Bockarie — CDS RUFSL" to Charles Taylor through his "Chief of Protocall" Alhaji Musa
Sesay. The letter begins by describing the RUF 's supply shortages, stating that in the face of
ECOMOG led attacks on RUF positions in Koidu and Kailahun, "we do not have rockets or
bombs which are badly needed to handle the situation" and that the RUF was "merely
managing the small ammunition we have at hand as at now".12334
Deliberations
a. Use of the Magburaka shipment
5548. The Trial Chamber has had regard to the evidence of Isaac Mongor, TF 1-338, and
TF 1-371 as to how the arms and ammunition delivered in the Magburaka shipment were
used. The Trial Chamber recalls that it had no general reservations regarding the testimonies
of Mongor, TF 1-338 or TF1-371.12333 Mongor testihed that the GMG rounds were used in
righting in Freetown in February 1998.12336 TF 1-338 also testihed that the materiel brought
in the Magburaka shipment was distributed to Freetown to be used to repel ECOMOG.12337
Importantly, TF 1-371 testified that the AK-47s obtained upon the arrival of the Magburaka
shipment were distributed amongst the armed guards stationed at the mining operations at
12333 Exhibit D—084, "RUT, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", ERN. 7760.
12333 Exhibit P-066, "ConIidentia1 ~ RUF Brigade Headquarter ~ Buedu, ‘Information and Request’, Report from
Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, 24 June 1998", ERN. 7833.
12333 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274; Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329;
Credibility Assessment, TF1-371, paras 220-226.
12333 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5733-5734.
13337 TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15557-15558.

---- End of Page 1907 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1907% 18 May 2012
Tongo fields, some of whom were as young as 13 years old.12338 The Trial Chamber recalls
that it has previously accepted TF1-371's evidence to establish that the RUF and AFRC
used children under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities in mining sites in
Tongo Fields.12339
5549. The Defence accepts that the Magburaka shipment was used in the fighting in
Freetown during the ECOMOG Intervention. However, it argues that the shipment did not
last much longer beyond that time. 123411 The Defence contends that the AF RC and RUF were
forced to leave a substantial portion of the Magburaka shipment in Freetown. Samuel
Kargbo, TF 1-539 and Issa Sesay all testified that although the retreating AFRC and RUF
troops took with them a supply of arms and ammunition when they left Freetown, the
majority of the supplies were left behind at Johnny Paul Koroma's residence and captured
by ECOMOG.12341 Exhibits D-009 and D-084 also support this contention.12342 According to
Exhibit D-009, the RUF and AF RC soldiers fled the city "with nearly empty
magazines".12343
5550. The Defence also relies on Exhibit P-066, which indicates that at the time that
Bockarie wrote a letter, dated 24 June 1998, to the Accused, the Magburaka shipment had
been exhausted.12344 In the letter, Bockarie informed the Accused that more rockets or
bombs were "badly needed" by the RUF because the group was "merely managing the small
ammunition".12345
5551. The Trial Chamber is satisfied, in light of the uncontested evidence from TF 1-371,
that weapons from the Magburaka shipment were used in the Junta mining operations at
Tongo Fields prior to the ECOMOG Intervention.
12338 TF1—371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2463 (CS); Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2337 (CS).
12339 See also Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes, Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
12340 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1055.
12341 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10514.
12342 Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9662; Exhibit D—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report,
from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September
1999", ERN. 7760.
` 12343 Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9662.
*23*** TF1—371, Transcript 1 rpbmmy 2008, pp. 2839-2841 (cs).
12345 Exhibit P—066, "Confidential — RUF Brigade Headquarter — Buedu, ‘Infonnation and Request’, Report from
Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, 24 June 1998", ERN. 7833; TF1—371, Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2839-
2841 (CS).

---- End of Page 1908 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /’/ 18 May 2012

,41. O O O 7
5552. In relation to the use of the Magburaka shipment during and after the Intervention,
the weight of the evidence suggests that while the materiel from the Magburaka shipment
was used in fighting in Freetown in February 1998, the RUF/AFRC retreated with little
more than the weapons and ammunition they carried and left the bulk of their supply in
Freetown. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that although the rebel forces may still have had
recourse to the remaining shares of the Magburaka shipment left at Magburaka or distributed
to Makeni and Kenema, it was not sufficient to sustain the RUF's military activities beyond
24 June 1998.
5553. Nonetheless, between the ECOMOG lntervention in February 1998 and June 1998,
the AFRC/RUF were engaged in active hostilities, including an extensive campaign of
looting on the way from Freetown to Masiaka and Makeni known as "Operation Pay
Yourself", and subsequent attempts to capture and retain control of Kono district in the
months after the Intervention.l2346 As there is no evidence that the Junta obtained further
materiel after the Magburaka shipment in late 1997 or that the RUF/AFRC were able to
capture a significant amount of supplies in the retreat from Freetown, it is likely that the
only supplies that the retreating troops had access to were from the Magburaka shipment.
Given the nature of these operations and that such operations necessarily involved the use of
arms and ammunition, the Trial Chamber can safely infer that the Magburaka shipment was
relied on in both "Operation Pay Yourself" and subsequent offensives, and was used to
commit crimes during those operations, until the RUF/AFRC was able to capture or
otherwise obtain alternative supplies of materiel.
5554. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that various crimes were committed by
RUF/AFRC troops in "Operation Pay Yourself’ and in subsequent offensives, including but
not limited to, unlawful killings in Paema,l2347 sexual slavery in the Kono District]2348 the
use of children under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities in Koinadugu
Districtl2349 and in Teko Barracks}2350 and pillage in the Kono District,l235l Bombali
District,l2352 and Port Loko District.l2353
'2""’ See supra, Context: AFRC/RUF Junta Period (19974998).
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes, Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings).
Img See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes, Count 5 (Sexual Slavery).
mw See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes, Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
mso See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).

---- End of Page 1909 ---------------------------


Case No.: SQSL—O3~O1—T V/ 18 May 2012

AL O O OSL
b. Materiel brought by Daniel Tamba
5555. Little evidence was adduced as to how the materiel supplied by the Accused via
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. "Jungle") was used during this period. The Prosecution relies primarily
on the evidence of TF 1-375 that somem54 of the convoy of materiel brought by Tamba to
Kenema in 1997 was taken to Denis Mingo in Freetown in preparation for an ECOMOG
attack. 12355
5556. In relation to where the shipment was distributed, the Defence submits that there is
no evidence as to what use the materiel delivered by Tamba was put to, or how long it
lasted.12356 The Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of TF 1-375 that he escorted the
shipment to Kenema, and then onto Freetown, on Bockarie's instructions, in order to prepare
for an imminent ECOMOG attack}2357 However, TF 1—375's evidence as to the shipment's
ultimate destination is uncorroborated. Jaward's evidence that he believed Bockarie's
convoy was on its way to pick up the ammunition Tamba had informed Bockarie about was
speculative, based only on Jaward seeing Bockarie heading in the direction of Buedu.
Neither Isaac Mongor nor Jaward testified as to the ammunition subsequently being sent to
Freetown. On the contrary, TF 1—375's testimony in this respect is contradicted by Isaac
Mongor's testimony that Bockarie did not send the ammunition to Freetown and that they
did not inform the AF RC about this shipment}2358 Recalling that TF 1-375's evidence must
be considered with caution and requires corroboration,l2359 the Trial Chamber is therefore
not satisfied that the materiel delivered by Jungle was ultimately transported to Freetown or
used in the fighting during the ECOMOG Intervention. On the evidence, the shipment
remained with Bockarie in Kenema.
5557. However, according to the Prosecution, the lack of direct evidence as to how
materiel supplied by the Accused was used is immaterial because during this period, the
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 1 1 (Pillage).
12352 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 1 1 (Pillage).
12353 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 1 1 (Pillage).
12354 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12489.
12355 'TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12487-12492, 12495-12496.
12356 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1060-1061.
12357 TF1-375, Transcript, 23 June 2008, pp. 12487-12492, 12495-12496.
12358 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 7 April 2008, pp. 6729-6730 ("Sam Bockarie [...] did not release [the
ammunition] for it to reach us in Freetown").

---- End of Page 1910 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z! 18 May 2012

Junta had no choice but to rely on the Accused for provision of materiel because of the anns
embargo imposed on Sierra Leone.
5558. lt is not contested that on 26 August 1997, ECOWAS members agreed to a total
anns embargo against Sierra Leonel23°0 and that in October 1997, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 1132, which imposed mandatory sanctions on Sierra
Leone. mm ln considering the importance of the Accused's contribution to the Junta's
supplies of materiel after the imposition of the embargo, the Trial Chamber has considered
the evidence of TF 1-371 that at some point in or after August 1997, the Junta had depleted
most of its existing ammunition and logistical suppliesméz and that in 1997 Bockarie had
contacted the Accused from Kenema asking for material support.l2363 The Trial Chamber
also notes Exhibit D-004, indicating that the Junta faced increasing attacks from ECOMOG
and had appealed to the Accused for arms and ammunition in October 1997. l2364
5559. The evidence indicates that the Junta had depleted its existing stores of supplies in
late 1997 but that the RUF, along with the AFRC, were involved in active hostilities and
engaged in the commission of crimes against the civilian population. The Trial Chamber
recalls its finding that the AFRC and RUF forces under the command and control of Sam
Bockarie attacked Tongo Fields in August 1997 and conducted mining operations there.l23°5
It has also determined that during the Junta period, from their base in Kenema Town, these
RUF and AF RC forces committed crimes in various locations in the Kenema District,
including but not limited to a number of unlawful killings in Kenema Town and Tongo
Fields,l23°6 the enslavement of an unspecified number of civilians in the mining operations
mw Credibility Assessment, TF1-375, paras 308-312.
IMO Exhibit D-135, ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, Abuja,
Nigeria, 26 August 1997, p. 3; Exhibit P-078, Sierra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians,
Amnesty International Report, p. 2; Exhibit D-340, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West
Atiican States (ECOWAS), Vol. 33, August 1997", p. 6; Exhibit P—034, Profile: Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS); Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial
Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Fact AC.
mm Exhibit P-069, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, S/RES/1132 (1997), 8 October 1997";
see also Exhibit P-070 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1171, 5 June 1998"; Exhibit P-31 1, "United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1231, S/RES/1231 (1999), 11 March 1999", paras 1-4, 7-12.
méz TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2310-2311 (CS).
Im} TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2693-2694.
mm Exhibit D—004, "Letter from Johnny Paul Koroma to Charles Taylor asking for help in the Defence of the
Country against ECOMOG, 3 October 1997", ERN. 12940-1294l; Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the
Accused Facilitated Supplies, Magburaka Shipment
M65 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings).
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings).

---- End of Page 1911 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gg 18 May 2012

at T0ng0 Fields,l23°7 and use of children to actively participate in hostilities at T0ng0
Fields}2368
5560. In this context, although there is no direct evidence as to how the shipment brought
by Tamba was applied except that it was kept by Bockarie in Kenema, the Trial Chamber
can nonetheless reasonably infer that it was used by the AFRC and RUF forces under
Bockarie's command in the course of their activities in the Kenema District, which included
the commission of crimes in that area.
Findings
5561. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the arms and ammunition
delivered in the Magburaka shipment were used by the AFRC/RUF forces in fighting
ECOMOG and SLPP forces in Freetown befbre, during and after the lntervention and that
this included offensives against the civilian p0pulation. The Trial Chamber also finds
beyond reasonable doubt that weapons from the Magburaka shipment were used in the Junta
mining Operations at T0ng0 Fields prior to the ECOMOG lntervention, in both "Operation
Pay Y0urself’ and subsequent offensives on Kono, as well as the commission of crimes
during those Operations.
5562. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that ammunition delivered by
A Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and supplied by the Accused during the Junta peri0d was kept
by Sam Bockarie in the Kenema District, and used in the course of their activities in the
Kenema District, which included the commission of crimes in that area.
(ii) Febmary 1998 to the Freetown Invasion in J anuagg 1999
5563. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that after the ECOMOG Intervention in 1998:
a. the Accused sent supplies of arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC,
through, inter alia, Daniel Tamba, Sampson Weah and J 0seph Marzah;
b. Bockarie made trips to Liberia throughout 1998 during which he 0btained
materiel from the Accused;
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: C0unt 10 (Enslavement).
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: C0unt 9 (Child Soldiers).

---- End of Page 1912 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012 k

,4000 5
c. The Accused was instrumental in procuring a large quantity of arms and
ammunition for the RUF from Burkina Faso in November or December 1998.
5564. The Prosecution alleges that after the Intervention in February 1998, the RUF and
AF RC used the materiel provided by the Accused to carry out their continuing campaign of
terror against the civilians of Sierra Leone, to make civilian areas "no go" zones, and to
control the civilian population not killed or driven out of AF RC/RUF controlled areas.12369 .
The Prosecution also alleges that this materiel was used in specific operations throughout
1998, including the attempt by the RUF to capture and hold Kono in March to April 1998,
the Fitti-Fatta mission in mid-1998, operations by AF RC/RUF break-away groups in
northern Sierra Leone in the latter half of 1998,12370 as well as the December 1998 and
I January 1999 offensives in Kono, Kenema and the Freetown axis. 12371
5565. The Defence disputes the Prosecution contention that the RUF and AF RC used the
arms and ammunition allegedly provided by the Accused to carry out their continuing
campaign of terror against the civilians of Sierra Leone, including in specific operations
throughout 1998.12372
a. Operations in Kono in early 1998
5566. The Prosecution contends that the ammunition provided by the Accused in early
1998 enabled the AF RC/RUF forces to retain control in Kono District and was used to fight
to capture and hold Koidu Town and the surrounding areas.12373 The Prosecution adduced
evidence from witnesses Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF 1-375, Isaac Mongor, Dauda Arunie
Fornie, Perry Kamara and Alice Pyne.
5567. The Defence rebuts the Prosecution contention that the ammunition used for the
spectrum of crimes in the Kono District in the first half of 1998 could be traced to the
Accused12374 and notes that witnesses cited for this proposition by the Prosecution do not
12369 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 241.
12370 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 156-157.
12371 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 169.
12372 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 41.
12373 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 251.
12374 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1106.

---- End of Page 1913 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T my Chg 18 May 2012
21 oo 0 6
support the Prosecution's allegations.l2375 The Defence adduced evidence from the Accused
and Issa Sesay.
Evidence A
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
5568. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC fighter, testified that in mid—March 1998, shortly
after the RUF/AFRC re—captured Koidu Town, Johnny Paul Koroma held a meeting in a
village near Gandorhun at which he declared that Kono should serve as a strong base for the
Junta forces. He stated that he was going to see Taylor in Liberia, for the purpose of
securing ‘"logistics", including arms, ammunition and food so that they could continue to
"hold the ground" in Kono because Kono was a diamondiferous area whose control would
bring the RUF/AFRC international recognition. l2376
5569. Bobson Sesay also testihed that in April or May 1998, while the AFRC/RUF forces
remained in control of Koidu Town, he was present when Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman)
received a message from Bockarie over the radio that President Taylor had organised for
Bockarie to receive materiel. mw In this message, Bockarie instructed his commanders to get
the ammunition supplied and use it to defend Kono and recapture Koidu Geiya. 12378 Bobson
Sesay testihed that immediately after this communication, Superman, along with Hassan
Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast), Ibrahim Kamara (a.k.a. Bazzy) and RUF Rambo, led an
attack on Koidu Gieya and recaptured it from the Kamajors. 12 379 Subsequently, a combined
force of AFRC and RUF Hghters arrived from Kailahun with a supply of ammunition.
Bobson Sesay clarihed that Bockarie had instructed Superman to capture Koidu Geiya, and
ammunition would then be brought there to defend Koidu Town. mw Bobson Sesay saw the
ammunition when it arrived at Koidu Geiya, which he described as:
mm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 45.
um Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7950-7952.
12377 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8009-801 1.
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8011-8012, 8016; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp.
8709-8710.
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8012-8014.
V 12380 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8015-8016.

---- End of Page 1914 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 M
i

boxes of AK rounds, 60 millimetre mortars, RPGs...they were in green boxes and it was written on them
AFL, Armed Forces of Liberia, and these were clearly written on them. AFL, Armed Forces of`Liberia.m81
5570. Bobson Sesay testified that Superman loaded the ammunition on board a vehicle and
then distributed the materiel at Koidu Town}2382 The troops travelled back to Koidu Town
because they had heard that ECOMOG had begun bombing the town. 12383
5571. On cross-examination, the witness stated that Bockarie had in his initial
communication stated that the commanders should prepare to go to Koidu Geiya to receive
materiel and affirmed that the supplies arrived after they had captured the area}2384 The
ammunition was loaded into one vehiclem85 and only ammunition, not arms, were
provided}2386
5572. On their arrival in Koidu Town, Superman spoke to Bomb Blast about a call received
from Bockarie. Bockarie stated that ECOMOG was advancing toward Sewafe Bridge and
that he had obtained this information from President Taylor}2387 Superman called for an
operation to re el the ECOMOG forces and distributed art of the ammunition Bobson
P P P
Sesay witnessed being delivered after the capture of Koidu Geiya to Bazzy, Bomb Blast and
the RUF/SLA fighters to initiate such an attack}2388 Superman, Bomb Blast, and other
commanders, including Isaac Mongor, led the RUF/SLA forces towards the Sewafe
Bridge}2389 They were unable to completely destroy the bridge but made it impassable.m9O
Because ECOMOG were using heavy weaponry, the RUF/SLA forces made a tactical
withdrawal. 12391 The attack on Sewafe Bridge occurred around mid-May. l2392
5573. After the withdrawal from Sewafe Bridge, Superman moved with his men towards
Gandorhun. The remaining SLA/RUF forces under the leadership of Bomb Blast moved to
lm! Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l8 April 2008, pp. 8016.
12382 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8016.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8017.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8709-8710.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8711, 8713.
@86 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8712.
my Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8018. Note that it is not clear from Bobson Sesay's
testimony who actually received the call from Bockarie — Bomb Blast or Superman.
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8030—803l.
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, p. 8023.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 802l—8022.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 802l—8022, 8032—8033.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 802l—8022.

---- End of Page 1915 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / l8 May 2012 M

Tombodu, where they joined with another group of SLA/RUF troops under the command of
Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) and Bazzy. When the witness ariived at Tombodu, the
group still had the ammunition that Superman had distributed to Bazzy and Bomb Blast.l2393
Around May-June 1998, on the way to Tombudu, Bobson Sesay and others burnt
houses. mm
Prosecution witness TF 1 -375
5574. TF1-375 testified to the RUF and AFRC's operations in the months subsequent to
the ECOMOG Intervention. Approximately one month after the intervention, Rambo, Isaac
Mongor and Superman led attacks against Koidu Town. ONS There were then other attacks in
Kono District, including Bumpel2396 and Mortema}2397
5575. According to TF1-375, during this time RUF and AFRC troops tried to capture
Koidu Geiya, about 15 miles from Koidu Town, so they could cross with Johnny Paul
Koroma to go to Kailahun. When they captured Koidu Geiya, the Kamajors went on the
offensive against the AFRC and RUF troops}2398 The RUF and AFRC were able to repel the
attack, in the process of which Rambo made the area "fearful" by killing civilians, burning
down houses and carrying out amputations. The witness knew about these activities because
after RUF and AFRC troops successfully captured Koidu Geiya, Superman sent him and
others to take ammunition to Rambo at Koidu Geiya.m99
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5576. Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander, also testified that while in Kono under the
command of Superman,l24O0 he was under orders from Bockarie not to let go of Kono
because that was where they got their diamonds from. There was no ammunition in Kono so
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8038-8039. Bobson Sesay confirmed also that both
SLA and RUF troops constituted this group. Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8003, 8022.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8038-8039.
'"°’5 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12508-12509.
W6 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12516-12517.
mr TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12509-12510.
Img TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12517-12519.
mw TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12519-12520.
IMO Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5742-5744.
Z

---- End of Page 1916 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

Mongor requested ammunition from Buedu. Bockarie told him to be patient because Jungle
had gone to Liberia to Taylor to get some.12401
5577. Mongor testified that he later received ammunition from Bockarie which was part of
a delivery made by Jungle to Buedu. 1211112
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie ·
5578. Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that on his trip to Monrovia with Bockarie shortly after
the Intervention, Bockarie met with Taylor and returned with a small "Benz" truck loaded
with ammunition, including "AK rounds... grenades, GPMG, RPG, G3 rounds, [and] RPG
rockets".124113 Fornie stated that upon their return to Buedu, the bulk of the ammunition was
distributed to the "various front lines" within Kailahun and Kono Districts. According to the
witness, "that was the ammunition we used to stop the ECOMOG advance into our
t€I_I,itOI,y>>‘ 12404
Prosecution Witness Pegry Kamara
5579. Perry Kamara testified that the first time the RUF entered Kono after the ECOMOG
Intervention they had a message from Bockarie in Buedu, to Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman)
concerning mining in Koidu Town. The message stated that Taylor had instructed Bockarie
not to lose Kono as the diamonds mined from there were to be given to Taylor in return for
ammunition. After travelling to Monrovia and returning with ammunition, Bockarie
reinforced this message of the importance of holding onto Kono. 1211115
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
5580. Alice Pyne testified that she heard from the radio operator at Gandorhun that before
June 1998, and before the Fitti—Fatta mission, RUF fighters led by Rambo attacked Koidu
Geiya and killed many civilians.1211O6
12401 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5744-5745.
12*02 Mongor testifies that this was shortly after the Intervention. Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp.
5745-5746.
1**03 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21454.
121011 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21455—21456.
124115 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3142.
12"1111’ Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12199-12201.

JQ

---- End of Page 1917 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / 18 May 2012

The Accused
5581. The Accused denied that he supplied materiel to the Sierra Leonean rebels in the
manner that Bobson Sesay described. He accepted that there may have been arms coming
from Liberia, but surmised that witnesses incorrectly assumed that when materiel came from
Liberia, they must have been supplied by the President of Liberia. The Accused emphasised
that he had no arms to provide to the RUF at this time. 12407
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5582. Issa Sesay testified that he participated in an unsuccessful attack on Koidu Geiya in
1998 but did not provide a specific date for the attack. Bockarie also sent reinforcements to
attack Koidu Geiya from the other direction, but again was not successful. Sesay did not
refer to any successful attacks on Koidu Geiya. 12408
Deliberations
5583. To support its contention that materiel supplied by the Accused was used for the
Fitti-Fatta operation, the Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, who testified to materiel arriving after the attack by Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman)
on Koidu Geiya, which was used in an operation at Sewafe Bridge, among other areas. As a
preliminary issue, the Trial Chamber is satisfied, on the basis of the evidence of Bobson
Sesay, Alice Pyne and TF1-375, that both the Koidu Geiya attack and the Sewafe attack
took place prior to the Fitti-Fatta mission in mid-1998, but after the RUF successfully
captured Koidu Town in March 1998.12409
5584. The Trial Chamber notes that while Bobson Sesay initially testified that Bockarie
called Mingo to collect materiel for the purpose of an attack on Koidu Geiya, he later
clarified that the boxes of ammunition marked "Armed Forces of Liberia" actually arrived
"*°’ Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp 29992-29993.
` 12403 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44001-44004.
12409 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12199-12201 (Before the Fitti-Fatta mission, RUF fighters led by
Rambo attacked Koidu Geiya); TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12517-12520 (TFl-375 stated that the
attack on Koidu Geiya occurred before the loss of Koidu Town, which precipitated Fitti-Fatta); Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8009-8011 (The Koidu Geiya attack took place while the
AFRC/RUF forces remained in control of Koidu Town). The Trial Chamber notes that on Bobson Sesay's
account, the attack on Koidu Geiya took place before the attack on Sewafe bridge, which he places in mid-May
1998: Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8021-8022. See also supra, Context: Civil War in
Sierra Leone (1998-1999).

---- End of Page 1918 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.,-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

‘ A} OO { /
after the capture of Koidu Geiya,l24l0 and Mingo then distributed the ammunition to the
fighters.l24H Hence, according to Bobson Sesay, the materiel allegedly provided by the
Accused was not used to attack Koidu Geiya itself but was used for subsequent operations to
hold onto Kono and then for attacks in Koinadugu and Bombali districts from June to
October 1998 once the AFRC and RUF lost control of Kono. The latter operations in the
north of Sierra Leone are the subject of separate allegations by the Prosecution and are dealt
with in that context. 12412 F
5585. The Trial Chamber recalls that it had no general reservations conceming the
1 evidence of Bobson Sesay.l24l3 The Defence, however, contends that there are "serious
issues" with Bobson Sesay's account conceming the ammunition at Koidu Geirya, noting
that in no prior statement did he say that this consignment had "Armed Forces of Liberia"
marked on it. ln cross-examination, Defence counsel referred to a prior statement in which
Bobson Sesay stated that during a period after the January 1999 Freetown invasion, other
RUF members "would always boast that they get their arms and ammunition from Liberia"
but that the witness had not personally seen them.l24l4 Defence counsel then referred to a
second prior statement referring specifically to the ammunition brought to Koidu Geiya,
which did not mention that it was labelled with the words "AFL, Armed Forces of
Lrb€¤a".‘2"‘5
5586. The Trial Chamber considers that these alleged inconsistencies do not undermine
Bobson Sesay's account. lt was clear from the witness's first prior statement that he was
testifying in relation to the arms and ammunition obtained during the post-Freetown
invasion period, and his response that he never saw that ammunition was not a broader claim
» not to have seen any ammunition coming from Liberia.l24l° ln relation to the second prior
statement, the witness explained that the OTP's question about the Koidu Geiya shipment
was limited to the kind of materiel delivered and he was not asked about whether the boxes
of ammunition were marked with any particular kind of writing.l24l7 The Trial Chamber
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8015—8016, 8709~8710..
mn Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8016, 8031, 8039.
mm See supra, Amis and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.
ml} Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285—289.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8720-8721.
'24'5 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8722.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8721.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8722—8723.

---- End of Page 1919 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03~01—T // 18 May 2012

400 /2
notes that he did not appear to have been asked in that interview, as he was at trial, about
where that ammunition came from. In these circumstances, the Trial Chamber accepts his
explanation for why he had not previously raised this aspect of his evidence.
5587. The Trial Chamber finds that the witness's evidence as to this incident was generally
consistent and credible. Despite persistent attempts by Defence counsel to discredit his
account, the witness maintained his position and provided plausible responses to these
challenges. For example, the Defence put it to the witness in cross-examination that the
Accused would not likely have sent ammunition in boxes clearly marked "Aimed Forces of
Liberia" to the RUF in a period when an aims embargo was in place against Sierra Leone.
Bobson Sesay pointed out that even when the unrecognised AFRC govemment was in
power, it was able to bypass the sanctions, while the Accused had the resources of a
legitimate governtnent at his disposal to violate the embargo.[24lg While Bobson Sesay had
not explicitly testified that the Accused was the source of the ammunition received after the
Koidu Geiya attack, it is clear from his testimony that Johnny Paul Koroma had gone to
Liberia to see the Accused immediately prior to the attack, for the puipose of securing
militaiy and other supplies to hold Kono.m[9
5588. The Prosecution also cited the evidence of TFl-3 75 conceming the months after the
ECOMOG Intervention as corroborative of Bobson Sesay's account.[242O Both witnesses
referred to ammunition being taken to Koidu Geiya after a successful attack. However,
unlike Bobson Sesay, who testified that Mingo led the attack, TFl-375 testified that Rambo
led the attack, and that Mingo sent ammunition to Rambo.m2l In any event, TF1-375 did
not link this supply of ammunition to the Accused, nor did he mention anything conceming
the boxes of ammunition being marked with the words "Armed Forces of Liberia". In these
circumstances, the Trial Chamber does not consider TFl-375's evidence to be of value in
assessing whether the Accused supplied materiel for these attacks.
5589. In addition to the evidence cited by the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber has also
considered the evidence of Isaac Mongor, Dauda Aiuna Fomie and Perry Kamara. Mongor
testified that shortly after the Intervention, he received ammunition from Bockarie and that
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8717-8719.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7950-7952.
IMO Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 251, citing TF1-375 Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12508- 125 19.
my TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12508-12, 12516-19
’

---- End of Page 1920 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
%

he was then assigned under the command of Mingo "to go to Kono and [...] not let go of
Kono".l2422 Dauda Aruna Fornie stated that the ammunition collected on his first trip to
Monrovia from the Accused shortly after the Intervention was distributed to the "various
front lines" within the Kailahun and Kono Districts and was used to repel the ECOMOG
advance.l2423 Perry Kamara testified that the first time the RUF entered Kono after the
ECOMOG intervention, Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and returned with ammunition. I2 42 4
5590. All of these witnesses implicated the Accused. Mongor stated that the materiel
supplied was from Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. "Jungle"), who according to Bockarie had gone to
Liberia to see Taylor about re-supply of ammunition.l2425 Fomie stated that he was told by
Bockarie that Bockarie was going to meet with the Accused in Monrovia and on Bockarie's A
retum from the purported meeting, the group was met with a truckload of ammunition.l2426
Kamara testified that the Accused instructed Bockarie not to lose Kono as the diamonds
mined from there were to be given to Taylor in retum for ammunition. 12 427
5591. While the details of these accounts do not relate specifically to Bobson Sesay's
testimony as to ammunition obtained after the capture of Koidu Geiya, their accounts
consistently support the involvement of the Accused in the supply of materiel for operations
in Kono before Operation F itti-F atta.
5592. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that it had no general reservations
concerning the evidence of Mongor, Fornie and Perry Kamara,l2428 and it has no reason to
disbelieve their evidence in relation to the use of materiel provided by the Accused.
5593. Based on Bobson Sesay, Mongor, Fomie and Kamara's evidence, which the Trial
Chamber finds to be credible, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused supplied
materiel that was used in operations by the RUF and AFRC in Kono in early 1998, before
Operation F itti-F atta.
‘2‘*22 Isaac Mcpgsr, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5745.
lm} Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21455-21456.
12424 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3142.
‘2"25 Isaac Mspgpr, rrapscapr 11 March 2008, pp. 5744-5745.
*2226 Dauda Aruna Fsmrc, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21451. g
*2227 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3142.
‘2*2* Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fomie, paras 346-358; Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras
269-274; Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.

---- End of Page 1921 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

5594. The Trial Chamber recalls that it accepted Bobson Sesay's evidence of a range of
crimes committed by the AFRC and RUF aher the attack on Koidu Geiya and the receipt of
this shipment of ammunition, including but not limited to multiple rapes of young women in
Tombodu between March and June 1998,12429 sexual slavery in the Kono District between
March to June 1998,12430 and acts of terror against the civilian population, including burning,
in Bumpe12431 until the AFRC and RUF forces withdrew from the Kono District in June
199812432
Findings
5595. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that materiel supplied by the Accused was used in operations in the Kono District in early
1998, before Operation Fitti-Fatta and the commission of crimes during those operations.
b. Fitti-Fatta in mid-1998
5596. The Prosecution submits that aher the AFRC/RUF were pushed out of Koidu Town
around May/June 1998, they set up a series of camps in Kono District, including PC
Ground, Superman Ground and others, from which they launched attacks with arms and
ammunition supplied to Bockarie by the Accused.12433
5597. Specifically, the Prosecution led evidence that the Accused provided the RUF with
the amis and/or ammunition to execute the unsuccess1i1l attack 1ed by the RUF on Koidu
Town in mid-1998,12434 known as the "Fitti-Fatta" attack. The Prosecution alleges that
Bockarie secured from the Accused in Monrovia a large amount of arms and ammunition,
including AK-47s, GPMGs, RPGs and LMGs, which were then used in the attack.12435
5598. In support of its allegations, the Prosecution adduced evidence from TF1-375, Perry
Kamara, TF1-367, TF1-567, Foday Lansana, Isaac Mongor, Alice Pyne, Komba Sumana,
Karmoh Kanneh and Exhibit P-067.
l2424 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes; Count 4 (Rape).
imo See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery).
my See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 1 (Acts ofTerrorism).
12432 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8064-8067.
'2433 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras. 252.
'2434 See supra, Military Operations: Operation F itti-F atta.

---- End of Page 1922 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T % 18 May 2012

5599. The Defence submits that the materiel for Fitti-Fatta originated from other sources,
namely supplies captured from ECOMOG or purchased from UL1MO.12446 The Defence also
notes that witnesses cited for this allegation by the Prosecution do not support the Accused's
involvement.12434 The Defence adduced evidence from the Accused, Issa Sesay, Charles
Ngebeh, Martin George and Exhibit D-009.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -375
5600. Witness TF1-375 testified that after the the RUF and AFRC lost control of Koidu
Town in 1998, he moved to Superman Ground.12434 About three weeks after they retreated
from Koidu, Bockarie called Superman on the radio and requested him to send people to
Moa River to receive some guests that had come from Liberia. He then saw up to eight
Liberian men bringing arms, ammunition and medicine men to Superman Ground. They
stated that they had brought that ammunition from Liberia and wanted the RUF to retake
Kono, Koidu Town.12449 TF1-375 testified that one of the Liberians was an SSS officer
named "Osebo Demy", whom he came to know subsequently in Liberia and as one of
Yeaten's subordinates in the SSS.1244O
5601. TF1-375 also testified about an occasion in 1998 at the beginning of the rainy
season,12441 when Bockarie ordered him and a group of other AFRC/RUF personnel to travel
with Eddie Kanneh to Liberia. The group went to Foya by road and were received by Zigzag
Marzah, and a helicopter. The helicopter took the group to the President's farm in Gbamga,
where he met Benjamin Yeaten.12442 At the farm, they were told to load ammunition from
the car park or garage at the President's house into two cars. The two cars were driven by
Jungle and Sampson Weah from the SSS. The cars moved to Voinjama and Foya in Lofa
14435 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras. 156, 253.
12446 Defence Final Trial Brief paras, 1 108-1109,
14444 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 46.
12444 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12520-12521.
'2"‘° rrr-375, rr.-rppcrrpr 23 Jppp 2008, pp. 12522-12524,
144411 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12523-12530.
"*"' Tri-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12540.
12442 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12531-12533.

---- End of Page 1923 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T J 18 May 2012

county and finally to Buedu.mA3 At Buedu, they stored the materiel in Bockarie's -
ammunition dump}2444
5602. Bockarie distributed part of the ammunition brought from Gbarnga to Akim Turay,
an AF RC soldier, to attack Segbwema, the Dam barracks, and stored part of it in Buedu. The
majority of the ammunition was given by Bockarie to Superman's contingent, of which
TF1-375 was a member, to retake Koidu Town}2445 Superman took the ammunition and
used it for Operation Fitti-Fatta,l2446 which was not ultimately successful in taking over
rProsecution Witness Pegg; Kamara
5603. Perry Kamara testified that around April-May 1998, Superman received a message
from Bockarie requesting him to go to Buedu for a meeting concerning a plan to recapture
key areas in Sierra Leone, including Kono}2448 Attending the meeting were the witness,
Mike Lamin, Isaac Mongor, Superman and SYB Rogers. At the meeting, Bockarie took the
attendees to his house and showed them a pile of arms and ammunition, commercial radios
and a satellite hone. Bockarie told the attendees that Taylor had rovided these materials in
P Y P
return for diamonds sent to him by the RUF and stated that he expected more to arrive}2449
According to Kamara, amongst the weapons he was shown were AK-47s, RPGs, and
different types of machine guns.l245O
5604. Less than a week later, Kamara returned to Superman Ground, where the men
received ammunition, arms, food and morale boosters. The witness stated that these supplies
were intended for the F itti-F atta Mission and Superman was to carry part of the arms and
ammunition to SAJ Musa.l245l The ammunition would be part of a larger shipment yet to
arrive for a larger plan. my
'"43 TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jupp 2008, pp. 12535-12538.
12444 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12538.
12445 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12538-12539; Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14824-14825.
Wim TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12540-12541.
mn TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12541; Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14824-14825.
Img Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3156.
Img Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3160-3164.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3162-3163, 3170.
my Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3169.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3169-3172.

---- End of Page 1924 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T K QQ 18 May 2012

5605. In cross-examination, the Defence put to Kamara that in a report to Sankoh, Exhibit
D-009, Bockarie had stated that the materials for the attack were sourced from ULlMO.l2453
Kamara insisted that the weapons came from the Accused and stated that Bockarie's
0 information otherwise in the report was a lie. l2454
Prosecution Witness TF 1-367
5606. RUF mining commanderl;4455 TF 1-367 testified that he bought arms and ammunition
from former ULIMO fighters at the very start of the rainy season in 1998 with the proceeds
of a bank robbery during Operation Pay Yourself Once the witness had collected a
"reasonable amount" of weapons he used NPF L communications to communicate with the
RUF in Sierra Leone. The witness loaded the weapons and took them to Sierra Leone.l2456
The materiel bought from ULIMO was used by Superman for Operation F itti-F atta. lm 7
Prosecution Witness TF 1-567
5607. According to TF 1-567, Superman organised troops who called themselves F itti-F atta
and unsuccessfully tried to re-attack Koidu Town. He obtained the materiel for this attack
from Bockarie. Img
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
5608. Foday Lansana, a radio operator stationed in Kono District from January 1998 to
September 1998, testified that at one point in this period Bockarie told Superman that he had
sent Issa Sesay with some diamonds from "Johnny Paul" to Monrovia to purchase arms and
ammunition from Charles Taylor, but that Issa Sesay had lost them.l2459 Superman then
travelled to Buedu to attend a meeting concerning this incident. He returned from that
meeting with "some quantity" of arms and ammunition.l246O Before Superman travelled to
Buedu, he summoned Lansana to Superman Ground. While Superman was in Buedu he used
to communicate with Lansana on a daily basis through his operators King Perry and Alice
l2453 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3344-3345.
12454 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3344-3345.
12455 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14158-14161.
*2456 rrr-367, Transcript 20 August 2008,pp.14148-14150.
12457 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15066-15067,
Um TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12907-12908.
mic) Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4508, 451 1, 4517.

---- End of Page 1925 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Tv; 18 May 2012

Pyne who travelled with him. Supennan was in Buedu for over a month. VVhen Supennan
retumed, Supennan briefed Lansana on why he had to go to Buedu and told him that despite
the loss of the diamonds, Fonti Kanu was able to obtain anns and ammunition from an
ECOMOG commander in Monrovia12461 and some of the LURD or ULIMO-K in Lofa
County had surrendered to Bockarie, as a result of which General Abu Keita had "come
with" anns and ammunition to Bockarie in Buedu.12442
5609. After Supennan left Buedu he went with some of Sam Bockarie's troops to
Supennan Ground and launched an operation called Fitti—Fatta to attack Koidu. The purpose
of the operation was to attack Koidu and to get anns and ammunition. The operation resulted
in serious casualties for both the RUF and ECOMOG.124°3
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5610. Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander, testified that after the meeting in Buedu at
which the Fitti-Fatta operation was ordered, Supennan came to Gandorhun with a quantity
of ammunition for the attack. Mongor subsequently spoke with Bockarie who confinned that
Taylor had sent Jungle with a "small quantity" of ammunition which Bockarie had given to
Supennan for the Fitti-Fatta operation. 12464
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
561 1. Alice Pyne, a radio operator, testified that she travelled to Buedu with Supennan and
more than 150 others to attend a meeting convened by Bockarie prior to the Fitti—Fatta
mission.12465 While Pyne did not attend the meeting,12466 following the meeting, she
observed Bockarie and his bodyguards departing in vehicles. One of the other radio
operators, Sebatu, told her that Bockarie was departing for Foya.12467 Pyne saw the group
retum several hours later, with Colonel Jungle, and unload goods at Bockarie's house. She
12460 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4515-4516.
12441 Foday Lansana, Transcript 2l February 2008, pp. 4508, 4511.
12442 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4516—4517. g
12443 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4518-4519.
124144 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5748. The Prosecution brief also cites Isaac Mongor's
testimony at Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5781—5783, but the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Mongor is
there testifying about the lead up to the December 1998 offensives.
12445 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12191—12193, 12209-1221 1; Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12233;
Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12356—12357.
12444 Alice Pyne, Transcript 20 June 2008, p. 12357.

---- End of Page 1926 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03~01—T " l8 May 2012
/ Khg

» was not able to see the items themselves, but later they gave Superman arms, ammunition
and alcoholic drinks known as "morale boosters" which they said they had brought from
FOya~12468
Prosecution Witness Komba Sumana
5612. Komba Sumana testified that in 1998 three soldiers with red hats delivered arms at
pass out parade. mw He was told by a fellow member of the rebel forces that these men, who
spoke Liberian English, were "Charles Taylor's soldiers".l247O Sumana further added that
after the weapons were distributed, Bockarie stated that they were going to "clear" Kono.
The troops, including the witness, left the next day. En route, General Issa told the troops
that as part of ‘Operation No Living Thing,’ they would attack Koidu Town. The attack was
not successful. mm The witness did not ultimately participate in the attack.l2472
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
5613. Karmoh Kanneh, a senior RUF Commander,l2473 testified that in 1998 "some
months" before the death of Sani Abacha,l2474 Bockarie contacted him from Buedu and
instructed Kanneh to assist in collecting some ammunition which "Pa Taylor" was sending
to Foya for the RUP.m75 Kanneh met with Bockarie and they travelled to Poya in three V
jeeps along with several of Bockarie's securities and his radio man Elevation.l2476 Kanneh
was selected because he was a commander in the Kailahun area and because he had a
vehicle, a land rover. mw
5614. At Foya, a helicopter arrived and five people alighted, unloaded materiel and brought
them into Bockarie's vehicles. Bockarie introduced the witness to a man who Bockarie said
was Taylor's chief bodyguard, named Benjamin Yeaten. The helicopter had flown in from
12467 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12235-12236.
mm Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp, 12236-12237.
'24°q Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17937-17939; Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18031-
18033.
mm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17938; Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18041-18042.
mn Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17940-17943.
mm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17941-17943.
'"73 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9390-9391.
mu Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9452-9463. Sani Abacha died in June 1998, Admitted fact 1 1.
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9448,
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9448-9449.

---- End of Page 1927 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / gw 18 May 2012

Monrovia.12478 The materiel included 40 boxes of AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets, a
few RPG tubes.12479 ln the evening, they left Foya and went to Buedu. At Buedu, the
materials were put in the ammunition dump, by Foya Road, near Sam Bockarie's house.
Kanneh was given some materials for his own use by Bockarie, which Kanneh took to his
base at Baiima.124811
The Accused
5615. The Accused denies any involvement in the Fitti—Fatta attack.12481 He testified that he
was not even aware that Fitti—Fatta had occurred. 12482
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5616. Issa Sesay testified that the ammunition they used in the Fitti—Fatta mission was
buried ammunition bought by an RUF member from ex—ULIMO fighters in Voinjama.12483
According to Issa Sesay, this ammunition was bought with money looted from a bank in
Kono by the AFRC and RUF in early April 1998. Issa Sesay saw the materials in the room
of the RUF member in Voinjama. The ammunition looked rusty, so Bockarie's S4—Jabaty
Jaward—cleaned them in drums in Buedu using diesel oil.12484
5617. Superman experienced heavy casualties in the Fitti—Fatta mission because the
ammunition was not up to standard and there was not enough of it for such an attack. It was
not until after the mission failed, that it was given the name Fitti—Fatta because of the heavy
casualties the RUF suffered. According to Issa Sesay, "Fitti—Fatta" translates as something
which has gone beyond the expected number, i.e. the casualties the RUF suffered.12485
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
12477 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9447—9449.
12478 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9453—9455.
12479 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9456—9457.
‘2‘*" Karmoh Kappph, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9457-9458.
12481 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25819—25820.
12482 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32485.
12483 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44060—44064.
124841ssa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44058—44063.
12485 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44064—44065, 44067.

---- End of Page 1928 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1-T Z M 18 May 2012

5618. Charles Ngebeh testified that the RUF and AFRC forces stationed in Superman
Ground tried to retake Koidu Town during the dry season of 1998 in the ‘Fitti—Fatta’
Operation. According to N gebeh, ‘Fitti-Fatta’ means ‘everything should be enough’;
including manpower, food, and ammunition. The attack failed and the AFRC and RUF lost
21 fighters.I248°
Defence Witness Martin George
5619. Martin George testified that while the RUF had sufficient arms for Fitti-Fatta, they
did not have enough ammunition.I2487
Exhibit P-067
5620. Exhibit P-067 is a 1999 report to Foday Sankoh by the Black Guards, authored by
Junior Vandi, a Black Guard commander.I2°I88 Recounting military operations during the
course of 1998, the report states:
Moreso, President Taylor continues to give helping hands with logistics which involves foodstuff and
materials. The High Command was called in every month to report to Monrovia for briefing. The High
Command later called Bridgadier [sic] Denis Mingle (Superman) on a forum for a mission to be carry·out to
capture the whole of Kono. They came up with an agreement to apply some guerrilla tactics to overrun the
strategic positions in Kono district. A plan was drawn but Superman never went with the plan, and the mission
fail without capturing Kono and over thirty (30) MIA on our side and also KIA.I248°
Exhibit D-009
5621. Exhibit D-009I249O is a salute report to Sankoh by Bockarie, dated 26 September
1999 in which Bockarie recounts events after Sankoh left Sierra Leone in November 1996 to
the date of the report. The report states that "during this period":
I renewed my contact with ULIMO and tried to secure materials from them. It was out of these materials that I
gave Superman a good quantity to attack and capture Kono.
Superman used the materials to attack Kono and was able to control parts of Koidu Town. Though they were
able to raise the ammo dump, they then concentrated on looting and later withdrew leaving the enemy to re·
occupy the town. Even prior to that, all instructions to maintain the ground were not implemented. I249I
I248° Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 24 March 2010, p. 37907. I
'W DCT·062, Transcript 27 April 2010, pp. 40129·40133.
Img TF 1·371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2406 (CS). Vandi authored it and he was a Black Guard
commander; TF1·567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12903.
Img Exhibit P·67, "RUF People's Army — Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN 9676·9676, 9677.
INIII Exhibit D·009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9658 · 9671.

---- End of Page 1929 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T X 18 May 2012

Deliberations
5622. The evidence of Prosecution and Defence witnesses converge on the following
contextual points. Around mid-1998, Bockarie instructed his commanders to report to Buedu
to discuss a plan to recapture Koidu Town from ECOMOG and the Kamajors.12492 At
Buedu, Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) was ordered to lead the attack and was given a
quantity of arms and/or ammunition by Bockarie.12493 Sometime after this meeting, Mingo
commanded an attack on Koidu Town, using the arms and ammunition that had been
provided by Bockarie.12494 What is contested between the parties is whether these arms and
ammunition were sourced from the Accused.
5623. Prosecution witnesses TFl-375, Perry Kamara, TFl-567, Isaac Mongor and Alice
Pyne, testified directly as to the source of the materiel used for Fitti-Fatta. The most detailed
account of the provenance of that materiel is provided by TF 1-375, who claims to have been
personally involved in the transportation of ammunition, with inter alia Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. "Jungle") and Sampson Weah, from the Accused's farm in Gbarnga, which
ammunition was then given by Bockarie to Mingo to use for Operation Fitti-Fatta.12495 The
Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-375 also testified to one occasion, before Fitti-Fatta and his
trip to Gbarnga, in which he saw up to eight Liberian men bringing arms, ammunition and
medicine men to Superman Ground. They stated that they had brought that ammunition
from Liberia and wanted the RUF to retake Kono, Koidu Town.124% TF 1-375 testified that
he came to know one of the Liberians subsequently in Liberia as one of Yeaten's
subordinates in the SSS.12497
12491 Exhibit D-009, RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie - 00009658 - 00009671, p. 9662.
12492 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3160; Alice Pyne, 18 June 2008, pp. 12209-12213; Transcript
19 June 2008, pp. 12233-12241; Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12356-12357; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March
2008, p. 5748.
12493 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5748; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12235~12237;
but see TP 1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2394 (the Pitti-Patta operation was led by Morris Kallon).
12494 Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peop1e's Army, Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander"; Exhibit D-009, RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution, from
Major General Sam Bockarie; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12233-12241; TP1-375, Transcript 23
June 2008, pp. 12532-12541, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14824-14825; TP1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp.
12907-08; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44058-44064; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 24 March 2010, pp.
37907—37908.
12495 TP1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12540-12541.
*2*% TP1-375, Transcript 23 Jump 2008, pp. 12522-12524.
mw TPI-375, Transcript 23 Jump 2008, pp. 12523-12530.

---- End of Page 1930 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / im 18 May 2012

5624. That the Accused was the source of the supplies for Fitti—Fatta is corroborated by
Mongor, Pyne, and Kamara. Both Mongor and Pyne also supported TF1—375's testimony
that Tamba was involved in the delivery of the materiel. Mongor testified that after the
meeting in Buedu at which the Fitti—Fatta operation was ordered, Mingo came to Gandorhun
with a quantity of ammunition for the attack. Mongor subsequently spoke with Bockarie
who confirmed that the Accused had sent Jungle with a ‘°small qua1rtity" of ammunition
which Bockarie had given to Mingo for the Fitti—Fatta operation.l2448 Pyne testified that after
the meeting convened by Bockarie prior to the Fitti—Fatta mission,l2499 Bockarie travelled to
Foya and retumed with Colonel Jungle and materiel which was provided to Mingo. 12500
5625. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that it had no general reservations
concerning the evidence of Mongor, Pyne and Kamara,l250l but that the evidence of TF1—3 75
should be treated with caution and requires corroboration.1254)2 However, the Trial Chamber
notes that the Defence did not seek to impeach his account of this particular trip to Gbamga
or of how the supplies he obtained from that trip were distributed and applied.
5626. The Prosecution has also relied on the evidence of Komba Sumana that in 1998, men
who Sumana were informed were the Accused's soldiers delivered arms at pass out parade,
after which the troops unsuccessfully attacked Koidu Town.l2503 Sumana does not explicitly
mention the Fitti—Fatta attack. However, as Sumana described the attack as unsuccessful, his
evidence was unlikely to relate to either the March or December offensives, which both
resulted in the capture of Koidu Town. He also described the events as occurring after he
finished his training at the base outside of Buedu, which the Trial Chamber has previously
found occurred in approximately July 1998,12504 placing the events within general temporal
proximity to Fitti—Fatta, which the Trial Chamber found occurred in roughly mid—June
12498 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5748. The Prosecution brief also cites Isaac Mongor's
testimony at Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5781-5783, but the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Mongor is
there testifying about the lead up to the December 1998 offensives.
14494 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12191-12193, 12209-12211; Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12233;
Transcript 20 June 2008, pp. 12356-12357.
12500 Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12235-12237 (although it is not clear by whom the witness was
told).
14504 Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274; Credibility Assessment, Alice Pyne, paras 304-307;
Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.
12502 Credibility Assessment, TF1-375, paras 308-312.
44503 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17938; 7 October 2008, pp. 18041-18042.
14504 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence),.

---- End of Page 1931 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z M 18 May 2012

1998.12505 Sumana stated that the men who Sumana was informed were the Accused's
soldiers delivered the arms with which the troops unsuccessfully attacked Koidu Town.
5627. ln support of its allegation that the materiel used for Fitti-Fatta was supplied by the
Accused, the Prosecution also cited Karmoh Kanneh's evidence that he was involved in
obtaining arms and ammunition from Liberia on one occasion in 1998, "some months"
before the death of President Abacha.125116 However, the Trial Chamber notes that the
witness's only testimony concerning the mamier in which the materiel was used was that
Bockarie gave him a quantity of the supplies with which he returned to his base in
Baiima.125117 The witness's evidence provided no identifiable link to the Fitti-Fatta or any
other attack. The Trial Chamber is therefore unable to rely on Kanneh's evidence in support
of the Prosecution's allegation.
5628. The Trial Chamber has also had regard to evidence which, while not specifically
drawing a link between the Accused and the supplies for Fitti-Fatta, provides general
corroboration that the Accused was su l in materiel to Bockarie around the time of that
PP Y 8
operation. TF1 -567, for example, stated that Mingo obtained the materiel for this attack from
Bockarie.125118 However, immediately prior to this point in his testimony, TF1-567 had
testified that Bockarie obtained arms and ammunition from the Accused, via Sampson
Weah, Tamba and others.125119 Exhibit P-067, a salute report to Foday Sankoh by the Black
Guards describing events in 1998, states generally that "President Taylor continues to give
helping hands with [...] materials", and in the same paragraph, describes an unsuccessful
attack on Kono launched by Mingo, an attack which was prompted by a trip by Bockarie to
Monrovia "for briefing".125111
5629. The Defence points to evidence that the RUF obtained the ammunition for Fitti-Fatta
from other sources that did not include the Accused.12511 Issa Sesay testiHed that the
ammunition they used in the Fitti-Fatta mission was buried ammunition bought by an RUF
125115 See supra, Military Operations; Operation Fitti-Fatta.
*2506 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 253, footnote 759.
‘"°’ Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9457-9458.
*2508 rrr-567, Transcript 2 Jury 2008, pp. 12907-12908.
1250(1 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12903-12906.
12510 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Revolutionary
Guards", ERN 9676-9677. Even the Defence also acknowledges, in relation to this paragraph, that the
"imp1ication is the material came from Taylor": Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1 108.
12511 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1 109.

---- End of Page 1932 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

member from ex-ULIMO fighters in Voinjama}25 I2 TF1-367 corroborated Issa Sesay's
account in all respects, including that the ammunition bought from ULIMO and used for
Fitti-Fatta was bought with money looted from a bank in Kono by the AFRC and RUF in
early April 199832513 Foday Lansana also suggests that the materiel from Fitti-Fatta came
from both an ECOMOG commander in Monrovial25 I4 and ULIMO-K.l25l5 The Defence also
cites Exhibit D-009, which states that Bockarie secured materiel from ULIMO for an attack
on Kono.l25l6 Both Issa Sesay and TF1-371 confirmed that this part of D-009 referred to the
Fitti-Fatta operation. U5 W
5630. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber considers that the evidence that materiel used by the
RUF and AFRC for Fitti-Fatta came from other sources does not preclude part of that
materiel also being sourced from the Accused, and indeed Foday Lansana suggests that the
materiel for Fitti-Fatta came from multiple sources.l25l8 Only Issa Sesay specifically denied
that any of the materiel came from the Accused.l25l9 The Trial Chamber is of the view that
there were several sources for the materiel for Fitti-Fatta, and that one of these sources was
the Accused.
5631. On the strength of evidence from TF1-375, Isaac Mongor, Alice Pyne, Perry
Kamara, and Komba Sumana which the Trial Chamber considers to be credible, and the
general evidence of TF1-567 and in Exhibit P-067, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused
supplied materiel which was used for operation Fitti-Fatta.
5632. In relation to quantity of materiel provided, Mongor stated that the Accused had only
provided a "small quantity" of ammunition for the Fitti-Fatta operation]2520 while according
to TF1-3 75, Bockarie gave him a large quantity of ammunition to take to Superman.l252l
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 Iuly 2010, pp. 44060-44064.
mm TF1- 367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15066- 15067; Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 Iuly 2010, pp. 44058-
44063.
12514 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4508, 4511.
12515 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4516-4517.
12516 Exhibit D-009, RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie - 00009658 - 00009671, p. 9662.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 Iuly 2010, pp. 44076-44077; TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2483-2484.
mm Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4508, 4511.
12519 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 Iuly 2010, p. 44064.
12520 Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, p. 5748.
*222* TF1-375, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14824-14825.

---- End of Page 1933 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T Z ju 18 May 201.2

xtoozlé
5633. The Prosecution submits that Fitti-Fatta means "an abundance of everything" and the
operation was so named in advance on account of the substantial amount of arms,
ammunition and other support which was sent by the Accused to the RUF for the
operation.12522 The Defence suggests that there is no evidence for the assumption that the
materiel for the Fitti-Fatta operation was abundant.12523 ln support of its submission, the
Prosecution adduced evidence from Peny Kamara, Alice Pyne and Charles Ngebeh, who all
testified that Fitti-Fatta was so named because the attacking forces had sufficient manpower,
food and ammunition.12524 However, other witnesses gave different explanations as to the
meaning of the term "Fitti-Fatta". Issa Sesay testified that "Fitti-Fatta" meant something that
was disorganised or that lacked control, and that the operation was so named after it failed
and the RUF suffered high casualties.12525 This explanation is somewhat similar to that
offered by Prosecution witness lsaac Mongor, who testified that "Fitti-Fatta" means to do
something senselessly "as if you were a mad man", and Martin George who testified that it
was because all the fighters ran away in retreat under enemy fire.12526 Due to the
contradictory nature of this evidence, the Trial Chamber does not consider the name of the
operation to be of probative value as to the quantity of materiel used for the Fitti-Fatta
mission.
Findings
5634. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that materiel supplied by the Accused was used in Operation Fitti-Fatta in Kono in mid-
1998.
c. Operations in the North
5635. The Prosecution submits that ammunition provided by the Accused prior to Fitti-
Fatta was also used for subsequent operations in the North of Sierra Leone, firstly by SAJ
Musa and Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) for an attack on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala
12522 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 157, 254.
12523 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 42.
12524 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3172; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12239; Charles
Ngebeh, Transcript 24 March 2010, p. 37907.
12525 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46610-46611. ‘
12526 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5749; Martin George, Transcript 27 April 2010, pp. 40129-
40130; George also testified that while the RUF had sufficient arms for Fitti—Fatta, they did not have enough

---- End of Page 1934 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 'WQ 18 May 2012
2 7%

shortly after Fitti-Fatta,l2527 and secondly for a series of attacks by the breakaway group led
by Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast), Ibrahim
Kamara (a.k.a. Bazzy) in the Koinadugu and Bombali Districts from June to October
5636. The Prosecution adduced evidence from Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Perry Kamara,
TFl-375, Komba Sumana, Alice Pyne, TF l-143, TF l-028 and Exhibit P-080.
5637. The Defence contends that the evidence of Prosecution witnesses in relation to this
allegation is not credible,l2529 and generally maintains that the Accused was not involved in
supply of materiel to the RUF/AFRC during this period. The Defence adduced evidence
from Exhibit D-009. A
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
5638. Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC fighter, testified that the ammunition delivered
after the attack at Koidu Geiya and distributed to Bazzy, Bomb Blast and the RUF/SLA
fighters to use in the attack on Sewafe Bridge,l253O was also used in subsequent attacks by
Superman, and the group led by Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) and Ibrahim Kamara
(a.k.a. Bazzy).
5639. Bobson Sesay told the Trial Chamber that after the withdrawal from Sewafe Bridge,
Superman moved with his men towards Gandorhun. The remaining SLA/RUF forces under
the leadership of Bomb Blast moved to Tombodu, where they joined with another group of
SLA/RUF troops under the command of Gullit and Bazzy. When the witness arrived at
Tombodu, the group still had available the ammunition obtained after Koidu Geiya. *253 I
ammunition: Transcript 27 April 20l0, pp. 40129-40133.
um Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 255.
Img Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 256, see also para. 6.
'"2" Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 107.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l8 April 2008, pp. 8030-803l.
lm] Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l8 April 2008, pp. 8038-8039; Bobson Sesay confirmed also that both
SLA and RUF troops constituted this group: Transcript l8 April 2008, pp. 8003, 8022.

---- End of Page 1935 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—Ol—T % jg l8 May 20l2

5640. With that group, the witness then participated in a number of operations through
June to October 1998, including at Masofinia in Koinadugu district in June 1998,12532
Karina]2533 Mandaha,l2534 and Gbedembulmj in Bombali district in July 1998, and then at
Camp Rososl2536 and Gbombsambalm`7 in Bombali District in September and October 1998.
The troops burnt houses]2538 looted and captured civilians along the way. The troops settled
at Camp Rosos. A
5641. Around September-October 1998, the troops established a new base at Major Eddie
town, towards the Tonko-Limba area, in Kambia District. Gullit re-named the town Colonel
Eddie town, when Major Eddie, who found the location for the base, was promoted.l2539
5642. Bobson Sesay testified that the supply of ammunition he witnessed being brought
after Koidu Geiya and distributed by Superman to Bazzy and Bomb Blast was used
throughout the military attacks undertaken by Gullit's group in Mansofinia, Karina,
Mandaha, Gbedembu, Rosos and Gbombsamba}2540 According to the witness, the group
"never had any other supply".l254l
Prosecution witness TF1 -375
5643. TF1-375, a fighter under the command of Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) for most of
1998, testified that two days after Fitti-Fatta, Supennan instructed him to take the
ammunition he had collected from Taylor's farm in Gbarnga to Komba Gbundema at
Wordu. Gbundema was an RUF commander. The witness went with Gbundema and the
ammunition to Kurubonla to meet SAJ Musa. With SAJ Musa, they then used that
12532 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8039-8040.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8090-8108.
12534 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 81 11-8113.
IMS Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8114-8118.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8124-8131.
12537 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8132-8136.
*2538 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 18 April 2008, pp. 8038-8039.
*2539 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8162-8165.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8142.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8136-8139.

---- End of Page 1936 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / NP}. 18 May 2012

ammunition to launch an attack on Mongor Bendugu.I2542 The attack on Mongor Bendugu
occurred in late 1998, at the end of the rainy season.I2543
5644. Heavy weapons and a lot of ammunition were captured during the attack on Mongor
Bendugu, including one 40 barrelled missile, an armoured car, a 50 calibre, some one barrel
missiles, mortars, GMG, some RPGs, pistols, and AK-47s. I2544
5645. TFl-375 testified that after the attack on Mongor Bendugu, Superman travelled to
Kurubonla, where a commanders’ forum was held to discuss a planned attack on
Kabala.I2545 SA] Musa, Superman and General Bropleh, among others, were present at this
meeting. Superman arrived in Kurubonla with armed bodyguards and the same ammunition
brought rrpm Gbamga. He explained that Bockarie told him to work with SA] Musa to
capture Kabala and, eventually, Freetown. The witness knew the ammunition Superman
brought was the same ammunition rrpm Gbamga because he was able to tell the difference
between ammunition used in Liberia and Sierra Leone.I2546 After the forum, they attacked
Kabala}2547 They used the ammunition rrpm Mongor Bendugu, as well as ammunition
brought by Superman.I2548 The attack on Kabala was still during the rainy season. At Kabala
they were able to take a lot of weapons and ammunition rrpm the Nigerian contingent.I2549
Prosecution witness Pegy Kamara
5646. Perry Kamara testified that when Superman received ammunition at Buedu for the
Fitti-Fatta Mission, Bockarie also instructed Superman to carry part of` the arms and
ammunition to SA] Musa.I2550 The ammunition would be part of a larger shipment yet to
arrive for a larger plan.I255I
Prosecution witness Komba Sumana ‘
I2542 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543, 12548.
*2555 rrr-375, Transcript 23 Jupp 2008, pp. 12553-12554.
*2555 TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12551-12553.
*2555 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557.
*2555 Tri-375, Transcript 24 Jump 2008, pp. 12558—12559.
*2547 TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12559-12560.
Img TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12560-12562.
*2542 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12559-12560.
'255° Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3169.
*255 I Perry Kamara, 'Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3169-3172.

---- End of Page 1937 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T / gm 18 May 2012

5647. K0mba Sumana testified that after the Fitti—Fatta Operation, he went to Korunbala
and attended a meeting there. At this meeting Superman arrived, saying that he had brought
ammunition.12552 The ammunition was then used to launch an attack on Mong0r
Bendugu,12553 which they successfully captured along with a large quantity of materiel.12554
After this SA} Musa decided to attack Kabala.12555
Prosecution witness Alice Pyne
5648. Witness Alice Pyne testified that while at Superman Ground, she saw supplies of
arms and ammunition, including AK rounds and RPG b0mbs, arrive from Buedu on two
0ccasions. The first time 0ccurred when the RUF attacked Koidu Town and captured two
ECOMOG soldiers whom they took to Bockarie at Buedu. The men escorting the ECOMOG
soldiers returned with arms and ammunition and f00d. On one 0ccasion armed men brought
arms and ammunition for the RUF fighters at Superman Ground. They told the witness that
they had g0t them from Sam Bockarie at Buedu. Then Alice Pyne sent a message on behalf
0f Superman to Sam Bockarie confirming receipt of the supplies. This 0ccurred nearly two
months after the witness arrived in Superman Ground in March 199812556 but before Fitti-
Fatm. 12557
Prosecution witness TF 1 — 143
5649. TF1—143, a child soldier, testified that in September 1998, when he was 12 years 0ld,
rebels attacked Kabala Town, Koinadugu District where he was living with his family.12558
His family ran away to his mother's village, Konk0ba, located 12 miles from Kabala
Town.12559 Tw0 nights later, TF1—143's family was captured at gunpoint and locked in a
house with 150 civilians.1256O He testified about being trained to use weaponry in Koinadugu
District,12561 and then moving to launch an attack on Karina, where there were Nigerian
12552 Kcrnba Sumana, Transcript 6 Octcber 2008, p. 17950.
*2555 Kcmba Sumana, Transcript 6 Octcber 2008, p. 17951.
*2555 Kcmba Sumana, Transcript 6 Octcber 2008, p. 17958.
12555 Kcrnba Sumana, Transcript 6 Octcber 2008, pp. 17959-17961.
125% Alice Pyrie, Transcript 18 June 2008,pp. 12191-12194.
‘255’ Alice Pyne refers to this ccnsignment as being chron010gical1y prior to Fitti-Fatta: Transcript 19 June 2008,
pp. 12236-12240.
*2555 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, p. 8970.
*2552 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8970-8971.
*255** TF 1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8974-8976.
12561 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 8980-8981.

---- End of Page 1938 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / .~J 18 May 2012

soldiers and heavy fighting.l2562 After Karina, they travelled to Kukuna where there were
Nigerian soldiers,l2563 and then to Colonel Eddie Town.l2564 At Eddie Town, SAJ Musa gave
them an order to go to Freetown to overthrow the goverrrment.l2565
Prosecution witness TF 1 -028
5650. TF 1-028 testified that she fled Freetown after the ECOMOG lntervention and moved
to Karina.l2566 Sh0rtly afterwards, the "Juntas" entered Karina, where they took her captive.
They remained in Karina for two weeks before returning.l25 62 The tr00ps then left the forest,
taking the witness and other civilians with them, and moved towards Mandaha.l2568 The
commanders in Mandaha included Five-Five, Gullit, W0y0h, Leatherb00t and Alabama.l2569
After Mandaha, the group moved to Makiteh in B0mbali district,l257O then Gbendembu,
Kalangba, and on to Sander Malafter leaving Mandaha. mm The witness was then taken to R0s0s, which was by the Batkanu
area, 12572
5651. After six months at R0s0s, the witness was taken to Tufayim, also lTown. She travelled with other "juntas" and civilians.l2573 TF 1-028 testified that when the
witness was held captive at Eddie Town, she heard that Superman was sending
reinforcements from Kurubonla with "a g00d number of ammunition".l2574 According to
TF 1-028, when the reinforcements arrived there was a celebration, and the tr00ps stated that
they could now take Freetown.l25 22
Defence Exhibit D-009
*2262 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 2927-2929.
*2262 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9000-9004.
*2266 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9005-9006.
M65 TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9013-9014, 9015-9018.
*2266 TF1—028, Transcript 6 May 2008, pp. 9122-9129.
mm TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9142-9146.
*2262 TF1-022, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9176-9178.
*2262 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9183-9185.
*2226 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9185-9187.
*222* TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9189-9190.
*2222 TF1—028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9190-9192.
*2222 Tri-022, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9201-9202.
*2226 Tri-022, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9205-9207.
*2222 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9205-9210.

---- End of Page 1939 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Am 18 May 2012

5652. Exhibit D-00912576 is a salute report to Sankoh by Bockarie, dated 26 September
1999, in which Bockarie recounts events after Sankoh left Sierra Leone in November 1996
to the date of the report. After recounting the failed Fitti-Fatta mission to retake Kono,
during which Superman was able to capture materiel from the ammunition dump in Koidu
Town, the report states:
With the captured materials from Kono, Superman went to the Kabala axis to join SAJ Musa. 1 instmcted him
to send some materials to which he agreed. Later he refused to dispatch the materials and refused to grant
pennission to the receiving officer to retum to me.
Brig. Issa insisted that the materials be handed over as Superman had not only misused large , amounts of
ammo in his failed attempt to capture Kono but had also refused to give account of materials captured when the
Koidu Town ammo dump of ECOMOG was captured. Superman continued to refuse and Brig. Issa
accompanied by Brig. Kallon entered his house and arrested all materials found. 12577
Prosecution Exhibit P-080
5653. Exhibit P-080 is the First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone dated 12 August 1998. lt states:
13. On 27 July 1998, apparently after seizing weapons and ammunition in an attack on ECOMOG units at
Bendugu in north-eastem Sierra Leone, junta supporters attacked ECOMOG troops in the town of Kabala. 12578
Deliberations
5654. The evidence unequivocally demonstrates that following the failed Fitti-Fatta
mission, Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) took a group of fighters from Kono to Kunibonla in
Koinadugu District, where SAJ Musa was based, after which they launched attacks on
Mongor Bendugu and Kabala.12579 Separately, after the RUF/AFRC withdrawal from Koidu
12576 Exhibit D-009, RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie - 00009658 - 00009671.
12577 Exhibit D-009, RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie - 00009658 - 00009671, p. 9662.
12578 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998", para. 13, ERN 12388.
12579 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44054-44055 (describing a meeting occurring in July 1998 in which
Superman defied Bockarie and went to Koinadugu after the Fitti-Fata mission); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5
February 2008, pp. 3155-3156, 3167-31769 (describing a meeting in Buedu in which Bockarie orders Superman
to go to Koinadugu because SAJ Musa, in Koinadugu, was unskilled in jungle operations); TF1-375, Transcript
24 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557 (testifying that when Superman arrived in Kumbonla and told SAJ Musa that
Sam Bockarie had told him to go and work with SAJ Musa). lt was also suggested that Superman was ordered to
go to Koinadugu to kill SAJ Musa: Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, 4524-4525; Exhibit P-080,
"UN Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone, 12 August 1998", p. 3, ERN 12388 (placing the attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala in late July

---- End of Page 1940 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z Ib 18 May 2012

Town in or around April 1998, a break-away group of primarily SLA troops under the
leadership of Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) independently made their way from Kono to
Eddie Town, in the Kambia District, establishing a base there in September or October
i. The materiel used by Alex Tamba Brima's group on their way
to Eddie Town
5655. In support of its allegations that the Accused provided the materiel used by Brima's
group on their way to Eddie Town, the Prosecution relies on the evidence of Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, who testified that the ammunition he witnessed being brought for the attack
on Koidu Gieya in April or May 1998 was also used during military attacks undertaken by
Brima's group when it moved north through Karina, Mandaha, Gbendembu and Rosos in the
Bombali and Koinadugu districts. According to the witness, the group "never had any other
Supply,'12581
5656. The Trial Chamber first recalls its finding that it had no general reservations
concerning the evidence of Bobson Sesay.l2582 The Defence contends that Bobson Sesay's
evidence as to this incident is not credible}2583 citing in support the implausibility of the
same consignment of ammunition being used by the fighters in numerous operations over
the next months, including as late as September/October 1998 in Camp Rosos.l2584 Bobson
Sesay testified that Brima's group did not receive any shipment of ammunition between the
arrival of the shipment after the Koidu Geiya attack and the time it entered Freetown.l2585
5657. The Trial Chamber also recalls its finding that the evidence was insufficient to
establish the quantity of ammunition brought. According to Bobson Sesay, the ammunition
1998),
imo Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8153-8155, 8162-8165; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5
February 2008, p. 3173 (The break-away group of AFRC that was not happy with the fact that Sam Bockarie
was in command went to Rosos (Bombali District) and was comprised of Gullit, Five Five, Bazzy and Junior
Lion and the other fighters of AFRC); Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44087-44090.
{ml Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8136-8139.
USB2 Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285-289.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1106,
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1107; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp, 8723-8726,
USES Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8733-8734. p

---- End of Page 1941 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z Im 18 May 2012

provided at Koidu Geiya fit into one vehicle,l2586 although he did not describe the type of
vehicle. The Trial Chamber takes into account that while the troops did meet resistance from
Kamajors and ECOMOG forces on their route, Bobson Sesay described a number of the
operations by Brima's group as being against primarily undefended civilian targets. my The
Trial Chamber considers that in such circumstances, and accounting for captured materiel
from military engagements, it is not implausible that the materiel lasted for several months,
until September and October 1998.
5658. The Trial Chamber finds Bobson Sesay's account of his participation in operations
conducted by Brima's group from mid-1998 to October 1998 to be consistent and credible.
Notably, the evidence provided by witnesses who had been captured by Brima's group
closely corresponded to his account of the route and operations undertaken by Brima's
troops throughout this period}2588 While no other witness testified that materiel supplied by
the Accused for the RUF and AFRC was applied for any of these operations, the Trial
Chamber is of the opinion that this is due to the dearth of witnesses who participated in the
attacks led by Brima. The witnesses who were captured by Brima's group either retained
their civilian status or were not in a high ranking position within the contingent.l2589 As a
fighter and officer in the AF RC organisation headed by Brima,l2590 Bobson Sesay is the only
witness who testified before this Trial Chamber in a position to know the source of materiel
used by the SLA commanders Brima and Kamara.
5659. On the basis of the evidence of Bobson Sesay, which the Trial Chamber considers to
be credible, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the materiel used by the SLA commanders
IMG Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8711, 8713.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8092 (the troops were surprised that they did not meet
any military presence in Karina); Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8114 (describing looting and capturing of civilians
in Gbendembu); Transcript 21 April 2008, pp. 8120-8121 (the people at Matiti ran away when the troops arrived:
"We did not even shoot. They ran away".); but see Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8112 (the troops repelled
Kamajors at Mandaha); Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8122 (Attacks by Gbethis and Kamajors at Foro Loko);
Transcript 21 April 2008, p. 8135 (encountering some resistance from ECOMOG forces at Gbomsamba). See
also evidence of DCT-068, that in some cases, arms were not necessary to control a territory because the
reputation of the RUF as murderers and rapists meant that sometimes opposing forces would abandon their
posts: DCT-068, Transcript 11 March 2010, pp. 37125 ~ 37126,
um TF1-143, Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9005-9006; TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9142-9146.
Img The only other witnesses who accompanied Brima's group during this period were TF1-143 and TF1-028,
both captured civilians. TF1-143 was a child soldier trained to fight with Brima's group, but TF1-028 remained a
civilian.
‘25°° Arrmamy Bobson spray, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7867-7869.

---- End of Page 1942 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / ’I I 18 May 2012

40 O 35
Brima and Kamara in northern Sierra Leone after the attack on Koidu Geiya was supplied by
the Accused.
5660. Bobson Sesay did not testify, nor does the Prosecution allege, that this ammunition
was used after the capture of Rosos. Further, the Trial Chamber recalls that it has been
judicially noticed that once the AFRC troops arrived at Colonel Eddie Town, in or around
September 1998, they had to make a number of attacks on ECOMOG positions to
supplement their dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition,l259l suggesting that after
arriving at Eddie Town, Brima's group obtained other sources of materiel.
5661. Bobson Sesay described a range of crimes committed by the RUF and SLA troops on
its way through the Koinadugu and Bombali districts but the only crime for which these
locations are within the geographical scope of the Indictment is Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
The Trial Chamber recalls that on the basis of Bobson Sesay's evidence of the capture of
boys during the attack by Brima's group on Karina in July 1998 and their later use in the
Koinadugu District and in the Freetown attack, it has found that the crime of using children
to participate actively in hostilities was committed.l2592 The Trial Chamber has also found
that the abduction and training of TF1-158 in late 1998 by AFRC troops led by Gullit and
SAJ Musa constituted the forcible conscription of a child into an armed force. 12593 Although
there was no direct evidence that the materiel brought for the attack on Koidu Gieya in April
or May 1998 was used for these crimes, the Trial Chamber can nonetheless reasonably infer
that it was used by SLA commanders Brima and Kamara in the course of their activities
from around mid-1998 to October 1998, which included the commission of crimes.
ii. The materiel used by Denis Mingo and SAJ Musa's group in
northern Sierra Leone
5662. Turning to the Prosecution allegation that the Accused provided the materiel used by
Mingo and SAJ Musa's group in northern Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber finds that the
evidence consistently establishes that Mingo did arrive with ammunition in Koinadugu
lm! Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated
Facts from the AF RC Trial Judgement pursuant to Rule 94(B), 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 9.
12592 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).

---- End of Page 1943 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Im 18 May 2012

district.l2594 According to TPl-375,%% this was the ammunition he assisted in transporting
from Gbarnga. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has accepted TPl-375's account that the
ammunition from Gbamga was given by the Accused to Bockarie, and in turn to Mingo to
use for Operation Pitti-Patta.|25% This account is supported by Perry Kamara, who stated,
that before Fitti-Patta, Bockarie brought ammunition from the Accused and that while some
of this materiel was used for Pitti-Patta, Bockarie instructed Mingo to take part of the
materiel to SAJ Musa. min Alice Pyne also testified that some time before Pitti-Patta,
Bockarie provided supplies of arms and ammunition to Superman at his territory near
Guinea Highway. IZSQS
5663. ln light of the general credibility concerns surrounding TPl-375's evidence, the Trial
Chamber treats his testimony with caution.l2599 TPl-375's explanation for linking this
ammunition to that brought by Mingo to Kurubonla is that he was able to tell the difference
between the types of ammunition used in Liberia and Sierra Leone.l2600 The Trial Chamber
is of the opinion that this explanation is plausible, in light of the lengthy period of time the
witness spent in Liberia during the war.l260l Nor was he challenged on it. Further, TF1-375's
account is supported by Peny Kamara, about whose evidence the Trial Chamber had no
general reservations.l2602
I2594 TF1-028, Transcript 7 May 2008, pp. 9205-9207 (stating that when the witness was held captive at Eddie
Town, she heard that Superman was sending reinforcements from Kurubonla with "a good number of
ammunition"); Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17950 (stating that after the Fitti-Fatta operation,
he went to Korunbala, and shortly afterwards Superman arrived, saying that he had brought ammunition); Issa
Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44222 (Superman misused large amounts of ammunition captured during the
Fitti-Fatta mission, disobeying Bockarie's orders to send the ammunition to him and instead used the
ammunition to go to Koinadugu); Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the
Revolution from Major General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9662 ("With the captured materials from Kono,
Superman went to the Kabala axis to join SAJ Musa. I instructed him to send some materials to which he agreed.
Later he refused to dispatch the materials [...]").
mw TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543, 12548.
*25% TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12840-1284i.
I2597 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3169.
mm Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 1219l-12194.
mw Credibility Assessment, TF1-375, paras 308-312.
"°°° TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12558-12559.
‘2°°‘ TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12469-12470, 12473.
mm Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.

---- End of Page 1944 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

5664. A different account of how Mingo obtained this ammunition is provided by Issa
Sesay, who testified that the ammunition brought by Mingo to SAJ Musa was materiel
captured during the Fitti-Fatta mission. This is also supported by Exhibit D-009. l26O3
5665. The Trial Chamber does not consider that the two explanations for the sources of the
materiel brought by Mingo to Northem Sierra Leone to be mutually inconsistent. While
evidence suggests that Mingo did capture materiel from the Fitti-Fatta operation,l2604 this
would not have precluded him from also taking the materiel given to him by Bockarie for
the Fitti-Fatta mission.
5666. On the basis of the evidence of TF] -3 75 and Perry Kamara, which the Trial Chamber
considers to be credible, the Trial Chamber finds that at least part of the materiel used by
SAJ Musa and Mingo's group in the attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala was supplied
by the Accused. The Trial Chamber also accepts TF1-375's evidence that he took the
ammunition he had collected from Taylor's farm in Gbamga, to Komba Gbundema at
Wmdu 12605
5667. The Trial Chamber notes that neither TFl-375 nor Kamara testified that this
ammunition was used beyond Mongor Bendugu and Kabala. However, TFl-375 testified
that the RUF/ SLA troops captured a large amount of heavy weapons and ammunition during
the attack on Mongor Bendugu, which they then applied, together with the remaining
ammunition from Mingo, towards the Kabala attack.l26O6 The Trial Chamber recalls its
findings that the forcible abduction and conscription of TFl-143 after SAJ Musa's attack on
Kabala constituted the crime of using a child to participate actively in hostilities.l26O7 It also
recalls its acceptance of TF1-375's evidence that immediately after the Fitti-Fatta Operation
in mid-1998, when TFl-375 provided the ammunition he had collected from the Accused's
lm} Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie", ERN. 9662.
@04 TFl-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15707 (While Superman was not able to capture Kono, but they
were able to capture some amis and ammunition); Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 1224642248
(capture of materiel from Guineans on the way to Koidu Town).
IMS TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. l2553—12554.
lim) TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. l2560—l2562.
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).

---- End of Page 1945 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsr-03-01-T % @.9 is May 2012

farm in Gbamga to RUF Commander Komba Gbundema, an unknown number of people
were mutilated by the carving of RUF on their chests by Gbundema.l2°O8
Findings
5668. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that materiel supplied by the Accused was used by SAI Musa and Denis Mingo (a.l<.a.
Superman) in attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala shortly after Operation Fitti—Fatta in
mid—1998, which included the commission of crimes.
5669. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that materiel supplied by the Accused was used by the AFRC group led by Alex Tamba
Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast), and Ibrahim Kamara (a.k.a.
Bazzy) in their activities in the Koinadugu and Bombali Districts from June to October
1998, which included the commission of crimes.
d. The December 1998 offensives and the Freetown Invasion
5670. The Prosecution contends that the surge of materiel brought by the Burkina Faso
shipment was "critical to the success of the multi—axis nationwide operation" in December
1998 in the lead up to the Freetown attack. The Prosecution alleges that the materiel from
the Burkina Faso shipment was used to capture Koidu town and environs and other
locations, capturing more supplies which in tum enabled their advance along the Freetown
and Kenema axis.l26O9 The Prosecution adduced evidence from witnesses Isaac Mongor,
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1—375, Komba Sumana, TF1—174, Perry Kamara, Mohamed
Kabbah, and Dauda Aruna Fomie.
5671. The Defence does not contest that the materiel obtained from Bockarie's trip to
Burkina Faso in November/December 1998 was used during the RUF attack on Koidu Town l
and Kenema in December 1998, enabling the further capture of materiel by the RUF.l26lO
The Defence disputes that any of the materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment was used in
the January 1999 Freetown invasion. The Defence contends that the forces led by Alex
Img See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 7 and 8 (Physical Violence).
Img Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras. 263-264.

---- End of Page 1946 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012
1

,400 39
Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) and SAI Musa launched the Freetown attack independently
from the RUF, and that the RUF commanders never got closer to Freetown than
Waterloo.12611 It submits that the Burkina Faso shipment never reached the group led by
Brima and SAI Musa.12612 The Defence adduced evidence from witness Issa Sesay.
5672. The Prosecution further alleges that the shipment brought by Dauda Aruna Fornie
from White Flower during the Freetown invasion was sent on to Issa Sesay in Makeni, who
then sent it on to Boston F lomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo) whose forces were at that time in the
Waterloo area to reinforce the forces in Freetown.12613 It relies on the evidence of F ornie for
this contention.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor j
5673. Isaac Mongor testified that Bockarie called RUF commanders to Buedu for a
meeting after returning from the November/December 1998 trip to Burkina Faso. At the
meeting, Bockarie showed them the ammunition for the mission and they discussed a
planned operation to capture Kono, Makeni and advance to Freetown.12614 SAI Musa was
not present at the meeting; he was in Koinadugu. At the meeting, SAI Musa's and
Superman's forces in the north were discussed. It was agreed that Johnny Paul Koroma
would send a radio message to SAI Musa and instruct them to join together for the
operation. Mongor had a radio in his area. His radio man monitored the radio and told
Mongor that the message had been relayed to SAI Musa and that SAI Musa agreed to run
the operation. There were some RUF men with SAI Musa at that time, including Alfred
Brown, Perry Kamara (a.k.a. King Perry) and others. 12615
5674. After the meeting with all the commanders, everyone agreed to run the operation and
received a supply of ammunition. The only commanders who did not receive the supplies
were those in the Northern jungle in the Koinadugu District. There was no way for the
*26*0 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1078, 1070.
12611 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 617-618.
12612 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1078.
12613 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 266.
11614 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5797-5798; see also p. 5795.
12615 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5799-5801.

---- End of Page 1947 ---------------------------


Case No.: ` L- — - / Gb 18 May2012
SCS 03 01 T 1947 in

RUF/AF RC to transport any ammunition to the Koinadugu District because the ECOMOG
troops, the Kabbah loyalists and the Kamajors were based in Koidu Town.l26l6
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
5675. Alimamy Bobson Sesay was an AF RC fighter and officerl26l7 who testified to
participating in the Freetown attack in January 1999 as part of the group led by Gullit. He
testified that during the second week of January, when he and Gullit were in Freetown and
had captured the State House, Gullit called RUF Rambo from the State House and requested
reinforcements. RUF Rambo stated that he and "Issa" had moved with SLA Rambo, also
known as Rambo Red Goat to Hastings and were preparing reinforcements to come to
Freetown.l26l8
5676. Some time before the third week of January, Gullit appointed the witness and
Colonel Eddie to receive Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat), who came with 30 RUF
fighters and 20 SLA as reinforcements from Allen town.l26l9 The group was "heavily
armed". Gullit's group was happy because by then they were running out of ammunition,
and the reinforcements were equipped with a supply of ammunition "they received from
Mosquito when they were advancing to capture Kono and Makeni until they advanced to our
area".l262O According to Bobson Sesay, Rambo Red Goat explained the source of the
ammunition when he arrived and it ‘"was not hidden to the troop".l262l The whole troop then
moved to Ferry Junction, and later recaptured the State House}2622
5677. On cross—examination, Bobson Sesay stated that Rambo Red Goat did not disclose
whether the ammunition he brought came from Liberia. @23 q
5678. Bobson Sesay also testified that later, when the AFRC troops retreated from Allen
Town through Grafton and Hastings and Benguema, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, RUF Rambo
'2(M Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5801-5803
'26'7 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865-7866.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8300-8301.
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 22 April 2008, pp. 8301-8302; Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8326-
7 8327. He testified that "this was almost during the third week of 6 January when we entered": Transcript 23
April 2008, p. 8328.
M20 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8434.
IMI Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8434.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328-8330.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8733-8734.

---- End of Page 1948 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T du 18 May 2012 A
Q

and RUF/ SLA fighters joined them at Benguema, where they held a meeting. At the
meeting, Issa Sesay informed them of a plan to recapture Freetown by using the peninsular
route. Issa Sesay told them that he would bring ammunition from Makeni so they could
advance to Freetown. 12624
5679. Bobson Sesay testified that during the third week of January 1999, he led the troops
to Macdonald. When he was based in Macdonald, Issa Sesay, along with Five-Five, Morris
Kallon, Superman, Bomb Blast and RUF Rambo, Med Bajehjeh arrived to provide
reinforcements for the planned advance towards Freetown. Sesay carrie in a vehicle that had
ammunition, including rocket propelled grenades. He distributed ammunition to the fighters
who reinforced the troops at Macdonald, and they advanced towards Tombo axis}2625 While
Bobson Sesay stated when asked in examination-in-chief that he did not know where this
ammunition came from,l2626 in cross-examination, he testified:
[there were] rumours around that this ammunition came from Liberia. People were saying that, because we had
no other place to get ammunition. They said the ammunition came from Liberia that even enabled them to
capture Kono and right up to the advancement that they made through our own area and the other one that Issa
Sesay was going to take to give us was to recapture Freetown and that was what we used. We used the Tombo
route. But that was a rumour around, that it was from Liberia. [2627
Prosecution Witness TF1-3 75
5680. TF1-375, who fought with Superman and SAJ Musa from December 1998 to January
1999, testified that Rambo Red Goat was one of the commanders with Superman, Issa Sesay
and RUF Rambo who were on the outskirts of Freetown in January 1999.12628 At Waterloo,
Superman, Issa Sesay, Komba Gbundema and other senior officers decided that RUF
Rambo should take a group to attack Hastings and get across the bridge to go to Freetown to
join their "brothers".m’29 Issa Sesay appointed Rambo Red Goat to lead the group that went
to Freetown because, as Sesay stated, Rambo Red Goat was once an SLA soldier and "knew
his brothers in the city well".l2630 The group led by Rambo Red Goat numbered roughly 60
to 65 and comprised some RUF men, some SLA and some STF. The RUF were armed by
[2624 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8379-8381.
12625 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8382-8384.
[2626 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8384.
[2627 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8734.
*262* TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12608.
‘262" TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12608.
*290 rrr-375, Transcript 24 June 2008,p. 12609.

---- End of Page 1949 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J Op 18 May 2012

,44004 LL
Issa Sesay and Superman, the STF were armed by General Bropleh and the SLA were amred
by Brigadier Mani and Colonel T.I2(’3I
Prosecution Witness Komba Sumana G
5681. Komba Sumana testified that in 1998, alter a conHict between SAJ Musa and
Superman, SAJ Musa left Koinadugu. Superman remained the commander and General
Bropleh the deputy. Later, SAJ Musa communicated to them that he was to move with Five-
Five to Freetown and requested Superman's group to move to Makeni.I2°32 The witness and
others successfully attacked and captured Makeni.I2(’33 Brigadier Mani was with Superman
in Koinadugu}2634 At Makeni, Superman received a communication from Five-Five, who
told them that SAJ Musa was shot and requested reinforcement. Alter this, the witness and
other fighters assembled at Issa's house. Issa told the fighters that they were to reinforce the
forces in Freetown. IMS
5682. The witness travelled on a truck with other fighters, commanded by Superman, to
Lunsar, where they remained for a month. From Lunsar, the witness's group attacked Gberi
Junction and dislodged ECOMOG. Two other trucks went on towards Freetown. The
witness's friend, "Rubber-Rubber" was on one of those trucks.I2(’3(’ When both had returned
to Makeni, Rubber-Rubber told Sumana that:
5683. [T]hey went but they stopped at Waterloo. He said not all of them were able to go to
Freetown. He said they took the - they used a bypass and went to Freetown. He said when
they went they met Five-Five and others. At the time that they went SAJ Musa had already
diedizesv
Prosecution Witness TF1-174
5684. Witness TF1-174, who did relief work during the Sierra Leonean Civil War, I2638
testified that on 28 December 1998I2°39 he was introduced to Issa Sesay in Makeni when
IMI TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12610.
Img Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17966—17969.
I2633 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17973—17974.
I 263 4 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17968.
IMS Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. l7976—l7978.
I2636 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17979—17980.
mm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17979.

---- End of Page 1950 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / in 18 May 2012

Sesay's vehicle pulled up close to where the witness was sitting.l264O On the same day, he
then encountered a black Mercedes Benz with about six persons dressed in black and
military attire in the centre of Makeni. They were rebels with guns, in military brown and
green shirts. They stopped the witness and one of the men pointed to a vehicle in front of
them loaded with young men and women.l264l According to the witness, the man then stated
that "very soon we will hear what will come out of Freetown, even the vehicle ahead was
proceeding to Freetown". 12642 Immediately afterwards, two other vehicles arrived from
behind. Inside the vehicles were young men and girls who said that they were heading for
Freetown. The three vehicles loaded with young men and girls were ECOMOG trucks which
had a usual capacity of about 20-30 people but were packed with up to 90 or 100 people.
42643 The witness could see that those sittin at the back door were armed. When the
3 Y
assed, the witness continued on to meet his wife and children.l2644
P
5685. From 28 December, for the next weeks, the witness saw the People's Army
continuously moving to Kabala, Port Loko to Lunsar, Bumbuna and Freetown. The witness
knew this because he saw the rebels loading their vehicles and they would say where they
were going or where they were coming back lrom.l2645
Prosecution Witness Peg Kamara
5686. Perry Kamara was a radio operator who moved to Rosos on Bockarie's instructions
in or around September 1998.12646 Ultimately, he accompanied SAJ Musa and Gullit on the
way to Freetown from Camp Rosos.l2°47 According to Kamara, after the Kukuna mission in
September 1998, and when Sam Bockarie returned from a trip to Liberia, Bockarie sent a
message to his commanders from Buedu saying that materiel had arrived for the mission
mg TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23664.
IZ644 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23690-23692.
42440 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23692- 23693.
N64] TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23693-23696.
PM2 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p. 23694.
‘2°"’ TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23694-23695.
l2°44 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23695-23696.
M45 TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23707-23708. A
IZ644 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3175 (The witness was instructed to move to Rosos by
Bockarie to join SA.} Musa in Koinadugu to reinforce Gullit and his own radio operators); Perry Kamara,
Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3188 (The witness left from Koinadugu to Rosos on 1 September 1998 which
took about 21 days).
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3212.

---- End of Page 1951 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T in 18 May 2012
’\/

"that was planned".I2°48 Ammunition was allotted for various groups. However, the witness
was unsure as to whether the commanders at Rosos got their part of the ammunition due to
the conflict that developed between SAJ Musa and Superman. While materiel destined for
Koinadugu and Rosos did arrive at Koinadugu, the witness is unaware whether SAJ Musa
actually took any of that ammunition with him to Rosos because when SAJ Musa arrived at
Rosos, he prohibited radio contact with the RUF}2649 SAJ Musa went to Rosos in late
November 199882650
5687. Kamara also testified that, around 25 December 1998, the troops captured
Benguema, the location of the SLA barracks and ECOMOG headquarters.I265 I During the
attack, the had ca tured a lar e amount of ammunition but were unable to carr it to
Y P 8 Y
Freetown. SAJ Musa instructed them to set fire to the captured materielI2652 so that
ECOMOG could not have it.I2653
5688. When the group had reached Waterloo and Benguema but before moving into
Freetown, Gullit contacted Bockarie using the witness as radio operator.I2654 Bockarie asked
Gullit to wait for Superman and Issa Sesay to join him with reinforcements before entering
Freetown. Gullit responded that if this was because Bockarie wanted to supply them with
ammunition, it was not necessary as the group had sufhcient ammunition to enter Freetown.
Gullit did not ultimately wait for Superman and Sesay.I2655
5689. Kamara also testified that during the invasion, a former SLA called Rambo Red Goat
`oined the troo s at Kiss Road with reinforcements of 15 men who had b assed
J P Y YP
ECOMOG.I265° While Rambo Red Goat stayed in Freetown,I2°57 Kamara and the remaining
forces retreated to Waterloo, because many of the troops, especially those who were released
y from Pademba, had no weaponry}2658 Bockarie ordered the troops to leave Freetown and
I2648 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3206.
I2649 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3207.
*2620 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3208.
I265I Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3214.
*2622 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 rpbmary 2008, pp. 3214-3215.
Im} Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3215.
'26" Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 rpbmary 2008, p. 3218.
I2655 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3218—3219.
I2656 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3237—3238.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3238.
IMS Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3238.

---- End of Page 1952 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / GN 18 May 2012

retum to Waterloo to reorganise themselves in order to re-attack Freetown.12666 The
remaining forces were told to make the area fearful. 12666
5690. Kamara also testified that after the troops in Freetown captured the State House,
Bockarie told them that reinforcements would arrive, although the reinforcements, led by
Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Superman could not make it to Freetown, only to
Waterloo. 16661
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
5691. Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator, testified that when Superman and others
were operating in Northem Sierra Leone independently from the RUF, they had to capture
ammunition so that the group could defend itself 12662
5692. Kabbah gave a specific example of an offensive in late 1998 in which Superman,
SAJ Musa and Gullit obtained weapons from Guineans stationed in Kambia at around the
same time as the RUF successfully attacked Kono in 1998.12666 Kabbah confirmed a prior
statement that there were such large quantities of arms captured from Kambia that excess I
weapons were stored in Kabbah's house in Kailahun.12664
5693. Kabbah testified that the AFRC group did not ask for weapons before launching the
Freetown operation. 12666
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
5694. Dauda Aruna Fomie testified that the ammunition he brought back to Buedu during
the Freetown invasion was despatched directly to Kono where Peter Vandi received it and
sent it directly on to Issa Sesay in Makeni who despatched it to Rambo and others in the
Waterloo area. The ammunition reached Rambo approximately 3 days after Fomie came
16666 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3239.
16666 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241—3242.
‘2°°‘ Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 Fermi-y 2008, p. 3387.
16662 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16373—16374.
12666 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16417.
16666 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16419.
16666 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16420—1642 1.

---- End of Page 1953 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01·T Z 18 May 2012
/ r

21004 b
with them to Buedu. The witness explained that he knew all this because it was written
down in the message log book.l2°66
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5695. Issa Sesay testified that the ammunition used by the AFRC in the Freetown invasion
was from captured supplies}2667 He testified that from February 1998 to January 1999, the
AFRC, including Brigadier Mani, SAJ Musa and the groups in the Koinadugu District, used
ammunition captured from ECOMOG, which was why their supplies ran out quickly. The
AFRC were a purely independent operation at this point, they were not taking orders from
Taylor or the RUF. 12668
5696. Sesay denied that there was one joint plan for the AFRC and RUF to attack Freetown
which included SAJ Musa and his troops coming from Koinadugu because (i) their similar V
timing was pure coincidence and (ii) Jolmny Paul Koroma and SAJ Musa were not in
contact at this time so cannot have colluded. When Sesay then attacked Kono, SAJ Musa
was already on his way to Freetown}2669
5697. According to Issa Sesay, after SAJ Musa died, Gullit called Bockarie via the radio
operator Alfred Brown. He told Bockarie about SAJ Musa's death and the plan to attack
Freetown. Bockarie told Gullit that they should wait to attack Freetown and that Bockarie
would send reinforcements to meet them at Waterloo. Gullit did not wait and attacked
Freetown one or two days later.l267O Gullit also called Bockarie after they had captured the `
State House and their troops were at the Congo Cross Bridge and asked Bockarie to send
reinforcements and ammunition.l267l
5698. Issa Sesay testified that at the time of the Freetown invasion, Bockarie was in Buedu,
Superman was in Lunsar and Sesay was in Makeni. The RUF did not take part in the attack
on Freetown, and they did not send reinforcements or ammunition to the attacking
forces}2672 Sesay testified that in December 1998, after an unsuccessful attack on Makeni,
l2°°° Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21595-2 1596.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44632.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44632-44633.
*2669 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45424—45425
@70 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44162-44163.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, p. 44162.
12672 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44161-44162.

---- End of Page 1954 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T K] (2 18 May 2012
/ .2/

Bockarie instructed Brigadier Mani, an AFRC member,l2673 Superman and others to join
Sesay's group in Makeni so they could capture Teko Barracks.l2674 Brigadier Mani, General
Bropleh and Superman then coordinated a joint attack on ECOMOG at Teko Barracks. lzf'75
From the time that Brigadier Mani, General Bropleh and Superman attacked Teko Barracks,
Brigadier Mani and General Bropleh stayed with Sesay in Makeni until Superman and
Massaquoi attacked Sesay in March 1999.}%%
5699. After the Teko Barracks attack, Superman stayed in Makeni for a week before he
moved to Lunsar. He stayed in Lunsar until Bockarie gave orders to Superman and Rambo
to attack Port Loko. H677 The attack on Port Loko failed, and Bockarie ordered Superman and
Rambo to advance towards Waterloo, where ECOMOG had redeployed after the attack on
Freetown. On the way to Waterloo, they captured Masiaka. The RUF fought at Waterloo for
two weeks before ECOMOG withdrew. By this time, the AF RC was already leaving
Freetown. The RUF forces did not get further than Waterloo.l2678 Rambo's forces attacked
Waterloo as part of the RUF's plan to take Freetown, as the path through Waterloo was the
only way to get to Freetown,l2679 not to link up with or open a way for the AF RC. MSO
5700. Sesay testified that he went to Waterloo from Makeni after the withdrawal of the
AF RC from Freetown.l2°8l Bockarie sent Sesay to Waterloo to instruct Gibril Massaquoi,
who had just been freed by the AF RC from Pademba Road Prison and had joined Superman
and Rambo in Waterloo,l2682 to take the APC politicians who had also been freed from
Pademba Road Prison to go to Makeni to talk with Sam Bockarie. l2683
5701. Sesay denied going to Waterloo to assist the AF RC in retaking Freetown.l2684 When
Sesay arrived at Waterloo, the AF RC were split into two groups. Gullit commanded one
lzc`73 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 43991-43994.
12674 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44082-44083.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44159-44160.
· IZ676 Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44159-44160. Sesay acknowledged in cross-examination that he did
have some level of co-ordination with Brigadier Mani from late December 1998 until March 1999: Issa Sesay,
Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46679—46680
12677 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44216-44217.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44168-44169.
12679 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45433.
imo Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45432.
lm] Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45974.
12682 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45976; Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44823-44824.
l2°83 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45974—45975.

---- End of Page 1955 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (Pi 18 May 2012

group in Benguema and Bazzy commanded the other in Hastings.12685 There was no unity
between the AFRC and the RUF. Neither side would subordinate themselves to the other, so
misunderstandings arose and they used to shoot at each other. The AFRC blamed the RUF
for their forced retreat from Freetown because the RUF did not reinforce them}2686 Due to
roblems between the AFRC and the RUF at Waterloo, Bockarie ordered Sesa to withdraw
P Y
Rambo. Sesay did so and Rambo came to Makeni. When Rambo withdrew, ECOMOG were
attacking the AFRC positions in Hastings and advancing towards Waterloo. 12687
5702. Sesay testified that Rambo Red Goat was part of the AFRC group led by Brigadier
Manimgg and was a former SLA soldier.12689 He testified that the "Red Goat Battalion"
operated with Brigadier Mani's group in Koinadugu and was comprised of RUF soldiers.
Sesay first heard about them in December 1998 when they met in Makeni. They were not
involved in the attack on Freetown because at that time they were in Makeni.l269O Sesay
testified that he did not know who Rambo Red Goat was at this time and only first met
Rambo Red Goat in the detention facility where he was kept, when Red Goat came to visit
Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara (a.k.a. Bazzy)42691 Sesay testified that he and Brigadier Mani had
separate commands in Makeni. Mani commanded the AFRC, whereas Superman and Sesay
commanded the RUF.12692 Sesay denied ever commanding Red Goat or instructing him or
anybody to reinforce Freetown. Sesay stated that if he was to send reinforcements, he would
have sent RUF Rambo, not Red Goat Rambo. And if the RUF wanted to send
reinforcements to Freetown, they would have sent more than 60 men}2693
5703. Sesay testified that the RUF captured a large quantity of arms and ammunition from
ECOMOG during the attack on Koidu Town. Sesay used some of this ammunition on the
way to Makeni, but he also still had some of it when he arrived. They continued to use this
ammunition until the time of disarmament.12694 The ammunition Bockarie brought from
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45978.
'M5 rm Sesay, Transcript ll August 2010, p. 45974.
MM Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 4420l—44203.
'W rm Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44201.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44916.
I2689 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p.45979.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 441 67-44168.
M9! Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46800
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47335
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47335
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44187.

---- End of Page 1956 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T / Om 18 May 2012 H
• ,/

Liberia was not used to fight all the way from Kono to Makeni and Waterl00. lt was used to
attack Kono but it was ammunition captured there that was used to fight ECOMOG in
Makeni. Without taking Kono, the RUF would not have had the ammunition necessary to
attack Makeni. l2695
5704. Sesay disagreed with the proposition put to him by Prosecution counsel that all the
attacks and atrocities carried out by the RUF and AFRC in December and January were as a
result of the ammunition brought by Bockarie from Liberia in December 199842696 The
atrocities in Freetown had nothing to do with the tr00ps who came from Kono to
Makeni}2697 Sesay stated that without the ammunition from Liberia, the RUF would not
have attacked Kono but the AFRC would still have attacked Freetown. The AFRC had its
own plans.l2698 Sesay disagreed that the AFRC would not have g0t into Freetown without
the RUF attacks on Koidu and Makeni and other locations. The RUF was in Buedu when the
AFRC captured Lunsar and Masiaka, between 5 and 10 December 1998,l2699 so the AFRC
had already made plans to take Freetown regardless of whether the RUF attacked Koidu.l27O0
Deliberations
5705. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Accused facilitated a large shipment of
materiel from Burkina Fas0 during November/December 1998, and that the evidence clearly
establishes that prior to the arrival of the shipment, the RUF and AFRC under Bockarie's
command was sh0rt of materielmm The evidence also unequivocally shows, and the
Defence does not dispute,mO2 that the materiel 0btained by Bockarie during his trip to
'2°"5 ipsa scsay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46661-46662.
lmé Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46168.
l2697 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p.46168-46169.
12698 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p.46169.
l2°99 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p.46170.
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p.46169-46170.
mm John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010 pp 38418-38419 (Before the Waterworks meeting, the RUF was
out of ammunition but the RUF had plenty of weapons when the attack on Kono was launched); TF1-371,
Transcript 28 January 2008 p. 2402 (Bockarie was concerned with expanding the fighting to Kono especially
after they suffer the casualty after the aborted attempt of the Fitti-Fatta Operation); Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 11
March 2008, pp. 5776-5781 (The RUF decided to write a letter to the Accused requesting ammunition because
they did not have enough ammunition to continue its offensive, to fight, or to defend its areas); TF1-371,
Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2403 (Bockarie needed ammunition for a maj0r attack); see also Defence Final
Trial Brief, para. 1067 ("[...] both RUF and AFRC groups needed additional supplies of ammunition [in
1998]").
mm Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1078 ("The materiel 0btained from Bockarie's trip to Burkina Fas0 was
used during the RUF attack on Koidu Town in December 1998. It was also used during the attack on Kenema").

---- End of Page 1957 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 6% 18 May 2012 M

Burkina Faso was distributed to RUF commanders to attack Kono, Kenema and Makeni,mO3
and AF RC commanders to attack various targets, including Tongo.m04 The key question in
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2416 (Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon used the materials brought
from Monrovia to capture Koidu); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21549 (Kono and
Tongo were the first targets to be hit with the ammunition they had brought back with them); Isaac Mongor,
Transcript 1 1 March pp. 5801-5805 (The ammunition were distributed to RUF and AF RC commanders and used
to attack Koidu Town, Njaiama Nimikoro, and Makeni); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12914-12916
(Those arms of the shipment were used in attacks on Koidu Town that commenced after the meeting in Buedu);
Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21552- 21555 (Some of the ammunition he sent toward a
target in Njama, which is in Kenema, some of it went "to Eagle and others in their defensive area", but most of it
was sent with Issa Sesay towards Kono and Tongo. The Commanders then left for their respective areas of
responsibility with Issa organising his men to launch an immediate attack on Kono, Akim and others heading
toward Tongo, Issac Monger toward the Njama area. The witness testified that there was a general all-out attack
on the frontlines in the Kono and Kenema districts that commenced on about 15 to 20 December 1998);
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20220-20224 (After the meeting Bockarie gave the
commanders the arms, ammunition in order to attack the Kenema axis and Kono); TFl-5 16, Transcript 8 April
2008 pp. 6960-6961 (In around November or December 1998, just prior to the Kono operation, Sam Bockarie
came to Buedu with a ten-tyre truck loaded with ammunition, specifically AK rounds, RPG bombs, and GMG);
Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16432 (This ammunition was used to "attack Kono, as far
as Makeni and other areas"); TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14162, 14181-14182 (When Bockarie
returned to Buedu he gave the ammunition to Sesay, who then took the ammunition to Kono for their attack on
Koidu Town); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2005-2007 (Bockarie said that they should use the
ammunition to take over Makeni and Kono); J abaty Jaward, Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13424-13426 (A large
part of the supply went to the Kono operation and smaller quantities were allocated to other defensive positions);
Issa Sesay, Transcript 10 July 2010, pp. 44129, 44136-441342 (Bockarie ordered Sesay to attack Koidu Town in
Kono. Bockarie gave Sesay 20 boxes of AK rounds, eight boxes of G3 rounds, and five or six boxes of GPMG
rounds, as well as medicines, five jerry cans of diesel, five jerry cans of petrol, cigarettes, cartons of Maggi, acid
for the operator's battery, stationary, and engine oil to clean the arms. Sesay successfully carried out the attack,
after which he captured a lot of arms and ammunition including tanks, armoured tanks, and many armoured tank
rockets, because they captured the entire ECOMOG ammunition dump); See also Exhibit P-018, "Report of the
Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-S/2000/1 195, Adopted on 20 December 2000", paras 208, 21 1
(A few days after receiving a shipment in December 1998, the RUF rebels started a major offensive that
eventually resulted in the destructive January 1999 raid on Freetown"); See also Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peop1e's
Army — Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander", ERN 9677-9678 (The
delegation returned to Monrovia in November and then back to the base where a forum was immediately held to
"for a serious offensive to commence". The fighters were happy and agreed to start an operation to capture
Kono. A huge quantity of materials was given to B.F.C. Issa Sesay who immediately left for Kono); Exhibit P-
093. "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report to Major Sam Bockarie from Brigadier Issa Sesay on the Take
Over of Koidu, January 26 1999" (list of materials taken on 6 December 1998 by Issa Sesay to Kono and
Sengwema); Exhibit P-371, "Revo1utionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 2nd Brigade, Headquarters, Kono
District, Report of Materials Issued Out, From the 2nd Brigade G-4 Commander to the Second Brigade
Commander, 12 December l998" (This report states that Colonel Morison [sic] Kallon was issued four boxes of
AK rounds, two boxes of G-3 rounds, four boxes of GMG rounds, two RPG rockets and two TNTs; Major
Ibrahim Dugbah was issued three boxes of AK rounds, one box of G-3 rounds, two GMG rounds, two RPG
rockets and two TNTs; and Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel KS Banya was issued 10 packets of AK
rounds and 5 packets of G3 rounds); Exhibit P-373, "Revo1utionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUF/SL 2nd
INF Brigade Headquarters Makeni Bombali District The Office of the G-4 Unit, Report, From the 2nd Brigade
G-4 Commander, to the 2nd Brigade Adjutant". (report dated 22 January 1999 from 2nd Brigade G-4
commander noting that materials transported to Koidu on 15 January 1999 arrived safely on 16 January 1999: 94
boxes of American AA rounds, one box of 60 mm mortar bombs, two boxes of 120 mortar bombs, one box of
8 lmm mortar bombs, one 8 lmm mortar stand; four boxes of armoured tank bombs; one 1 barrel gun, and three
boxes of 82 mm mortar bombs. The one barrel gun was asked for by BFC Brigadier Issa).
mm Specifically, Akim Turay was one of the AFRC commanders to whom the Burkina Faso shipment was
distributed. Isaac Mongor, Transcript ll March 2008, pp. 5803-5804 (Issa Sesay and Akim Turay received
materiel from Bockarie after the Burkina Faso shipment to carry out attacks on Kono and Tongo); See also
Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21552- 21555 (Bockarie met with various commanders

---- End of Page 1958 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Q

dispute is whether the Burkina Faso shipment was used in operations in Freetown and the
Western AYGEL 12705
5706. It is not contested that it was the predominantly AFRC forces led by Alex Tamba
Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) and SAJ Musa, moving from the Bombali District, who launched the
Freetown attack}2706 The Defence submits that the Burkina Faso shipment was not
distributed to these forces,mO7 and in any case Brima's group captured so much ammunition
en route to Freetown that they had no need for additional supplies to enter the city.mO8 As
he had sent for, including Isaac Mongor, Saddam, Eagle, Akim Turay and Sesay to discuss how they could
successfully attack Kono and Tongo. Akim and others eventually headed toward Tongo); Augustine Mallah,
Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20220-20224 (CO Denis (a.k.a. Monkey Brown), the First Brigade
commander, was to attack the Kenema axis; Issa Sesay, Akim Turay, Soriba and others were to attack Kono);
TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14186 (Akim Turay moved on to attack Tongo and Boston Flomo (a.k.a.
Rambo) moved on to attack Makeni); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2005-2007 (When Sam
Bockarie arrived with the 300 boxes of ammunition in Buedu, Bockarie immediately called a meeting of the
commanders in his home including Issa Sesay, Lawrence Wohmandia, SB Rogers, Akim, and Leatherboot,
where Bockarie said that they should use the ammunition to take over Makeni and Kono); Exhibit P-372,
"Restricted Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Materials Issued to the 2nd Brigade Commander on the
13 December, 1998 As Seen Below, 14 December 1998" (This report states that materials issued to the 2nd
brigade commander on December 13 1998 included: 13 boxes and 1 tin of AK rounds; 8.5 boxes of G-3 rounds;
8 RPG rockets and 8 TNTs, 7 boxes and tin [sic] GMG rounds. These materials were distributed to Lieutenant
Colonel Akim, Colonel Boston Flomo, S/Capt Junior, an unnamed artillery commander and Major Victor. This
list was signed by 2nd Brigade G-4 Commander Major Christopha M. and 2nd Brigade Commander Lieutenant
Colonel Boston Flomo).
12705 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 626-627, 1071 (The Defence allege that the materiel captured from the
December 1998 offensives in Kono, Kenema and Makeni were put to use to secure further targets during that
period, not to aid and abet the commission of crimes, citing in support evidence which suggests that there were
no reports of amputations, mutilations, and burning in Maken, Kono, Tonkili, Bombali, or Kambia districts).
12706 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 617 (contending that the RUF was not involved in the Freetown attack);
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras. 516 (While the Prosecution contends that the RUF forces commanded by
Bockarie "were significantly involved in the battle for Freeetown", it acknowledges that "‘the majority of its
forces were attacking from outside of the city boundary and never successfully entered in force".)
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 617-618, citing the evidence of Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008,
p. 5801 (There were logistical problems in getting any of the supplies to the Koinadugu District); Perry Kamara
expressed similar doubts concerning whether Gu11it's group ever received the materiel distributed from the
Burkina Faso shipment: Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3207; see also Exhibit D-175, "UN
Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary—Genera1 on the United Nations Observer Mission in
Sierra Leone, S/1998/1176, 16 December 1998 — DCT 102 (D-175)", para. 20 (On the movement of the rebel
group led by SAJ Musa in December 1998, the Progress Report states that "ECOMOG and the Civil Defence
Forces (CDF) have done much to disrupt the supply of arms and ammunition from Kailahun to the rebels in the
north").
Img Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1113; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8733-8734
(Gu11it's group did not receive any shipment of ammunition from the Koidu Geiya shipment and the time it
entered Freetown); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3214-3215 (The AFRC destroyed excess
amounts of arms and ammunition captured on the way to Freetown because they could not carry them);
Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16373-16374 (Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,
testified that when Superman and others were operating in Northern Sierra Leone independently from the RUF,
they had to capture ammunition so that the group could defend itself); Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16417-
16419 (In late 1998, SAJ Musa and Gullit obtained weapons from Guineans stationed in Kambia and then
attacked Freetown. They obtained so many weapons that some were considered surplus and were stored in
Kabbah's house); Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18059-18060 (SAJ Musa used arms captured
at Mongor Bendugu and Kabala during the Freetown attack); Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44632 (SAJ

---- End of Page 1959 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ 6* 18 May 2012

Mohamed Kabbah testified, Gullit and SAJ Musa's group did not ask for weapons before
launching the Freetown operation. 12709
5707. The Prosecution does not contend that materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment was
ever directly supplied to Brima's forces before their entry into Freetown.1271O However, the
Prosecution submits that, firstly, even if it did not reach the AFRC commanders in the north
prior to their entry into Freetown, some of the materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment was
later distributed in Freetown via reinforcements sent by Bockarie.12711 Secondly, the
Prosecution contends that the materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment was used by the
RUF to capture Koidu Town and environs and other locations from which the attacking
forces were able to supplement their supplies by capturing more materiel, which in tum
enabled them to move on to targets along the Freetown axis.12712
5708. The Trial Chamber also recalls its finding that a separate shipment of` 25 boxes of`
ammunition was provided by the Accused during the Freetown invasion in January 1999,
when Fomie and others on Bockarie's orders, transported materiel provided by the Accused
from Liberia to Sierra Leone.12713 The Trial Chamber recalls that it accepted Fomie's
testimony that ammunition he brought back to Buedu was ultimately despatched to Rambo
and others in the Waterloo area.12714
i. Materiel brought by Idrissa Kamara ga.k.a. Rambo Red Goat) to
the troops in Freetown
Musa and the groups in the Koinadugu District used ammunition captured from ECOMOG which they used to
attack Freetown); TFl-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12581-12582 (On the way to Freetown, TFl-375's
group captured "lots of arms and ammunition" from Yira Filaia, known as "Pumpkin Ground" and at Makeni,
arms and ammunition, including an armour car, trucks, small tactical jeeps, camouflage combat and other
things.)
127119 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16420-16421.
127111 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 263 ("Bockarie distributed the ammunition to his AFRC/RUF
commanders for the all out attacks on the Kenema and Kono axes, including against Tongo, Sengema and
Kuiva". The Brief does not refer to distribution to the Koinadugu or Bombali districts, where SAJ Musa and
Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), were based.) .
12711 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 264.
12712 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 264.
12713 See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (February 1998-December 1999).
12714 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21595-21596.

---- End of Page 1960 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (L 18 May 2012

5709. In relation to whether the Burkina Faso shipment reached Gullit's contingent in
Freetown via reinforcements arriving when they were already in or retreating from
Freetown,ml5 the Prosecution relies primarily on two aspects of the evidence of Bobson
Sesay. First, Bobson Sesay testified that, when Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat)
came to reinforce the troops in their attack on Freetown, he brought extra materiel with him
to re-supply the troops already in Freetown. mm
5710. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding, on the basis of the evidence of
Bobson Sesay, Perry Kamara, TF 1-375, as corroborated by Komba Sumana and TF 1-174,
that Idrissa Kamara did arrive in Freetown some time before the third week of January with
a contingent of fighters and that he was part of the group of reinforcements led by Boston
Flomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo) and others under the command of Bockarie.ml7 While these
witnesses do not specifically corroborate Bobson Sesay's account that Idrissa Kamara
brought materiel, the Trial Chamber considers it a reasonable inference that Idrissa Kamara
brought materiel with him, noting in particular that TF 1 -375 testified that the reinforcements
led by Idrissa Kamara were well armed,ml8 and TF 1-174's evidence that the fighters
heading to Freetown were armed. mw
5711. Concerning the source of the materiel brought by Rambo Red Goat and who sent
him to Freetown, the Trial Chamber considers credible Bobson Sesay's evidence that
Rambo Red Goat told him it came from Bockarie's distribution prior to advancing towards
Kono and Makeni,m2O although Red Goat did not disclose whether the ammunition he
brought came from Liberia.m2l Recalling its finding that the materiel obtained by Bockarie
during his trip to Burkina Faso was distributed to RUF and AF RC commanders in Buedu to
attack Kono, Kenema and Makeni, and that prior to the arrival of the shipment, the RUF and
AF RC under Bockarie's command did not receive any other suppliesmm the Trial Chamber
[2715 Defence Final Trial Brief, para 1115.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8322-8323, 8326-8328; Transcript 28 April 2008,
pp. 8431-8434.
mn See supra, Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
*21** rrr-375, Transcript 24 mm 2008,p. 12610.
mw TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, pp. 23695-23696.
mm A1i1na1ny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8322-8323, 8326-8328; Transcript 28 April 2008,
pp. 8431-8434. `
my Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8733-8734.
mm See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso
Shipment.

---- End of Page 1961 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 ~

is satisfied that the "distribution" to which Bobson Sesay referred was the materiel from the
Burkina Faso shipment.
ii. Materiel brouglgt by Issa Sesay when Gullit's forces retreated
from Freetown
5712. In relation to whether the Burkina Faso shipment reached Gullit's forces, the
Prosecution also relies on Bobson Sesay's evidence that in the third week of January 1999
when Gullit's forces retreated from Freetown, Issa Sesay arrived on the outskirts of
Freetown to provide reinforcements for a planned second attack on Freetown. He distributed
ammunition to the fighters who reinforced the troops at Macdonald and they used this
ammunition to attack Tombo village.12723 According to Bobson Sesay, there were rumours
that this ammunition came from Liberia.12724
5713. Issa Sesay denied that the RUF sent reinforcements or ammunition to the AFRC
forces while they were retreating from Freetown.12725 The Trial Chamber recalls its previous
finding that Issa Sesay's evidence as to whether there was coordination between Bockarie's
forces and Gullit's forces as the latter retreated from Freetown is not credible12726 and is
outweighed by the consistent evidence of Prosecution witnesses that there was such
cooperation in which Sesay himself was involved. Having found that troops under
Bockarie's command and Gullit's forces made collaborative efforts to re—attack Freetown,
including joint attacks on the outskirts of Freetown,12727 the Trial Chamber considers it
likely that the former also supplied latter with additional ammunition.12728 The Trial
Chamber does not therefore accept Issa Sesay's denial that he brought reinforcements or
ammunition to the AFRC forces that retreated from Freetown.12729
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8382-8384.
my Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, p. 8734.
mx Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44187—44188.
mm Additionally, Sesay was inconsistent on his own movements during January 1999. While frrst stating that he
stayed in Makeni throughout the invasion of Freetown up until Superman attacked him in March 1999, Issa
Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, p. 44200, he later testified that when the AFRC withdrew from Freetown but still
at some point in January 1999, he travelled to Waterloo from Makeni: Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p.
45974.
my See supra, Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
mm See supra, Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44l87—44188.

---- End of Page 1962 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ 18 May 2012 %

5714. In light of its previous findings, the Trial Chamber accepts Bobson Sesay's evidence
that Issa Sesay coordinated with the retreating troops on the outskirts of Freetown and that
he brought supplies of ammunition in order to do so.
5715. The Defence submits that even if it could be established that materiel was sent by
RUF and AFRC troops under Bockarie's command to the forces around Freetown, it is not
possible to establish that it was specifically materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment which
was sent. The Defence contends that large amounts of materiel were captured by the RUF
and AFRC in Kono, which dwarfed the amount alleged to have been brought by the Burkina
Faso shipment, and it was these supplies from Kono that fuelled the rest of the December
1998 offensives and the involvement of those troops on the outskirts of Freetown.m30 The
Defence argues that because of this any effect of the materiel from the Burkina Faso
shipment on the associated atrocities in or around Freetown was too remote in time and
place, the RUF having used captured materiel for their activities after moving from Kono
and Kenema.m3l The Defence also contends that if Bockarie indeed did reinforce Gullit
with materiel, he gave Gullit materiel from supplies captured from those operations. mm
5716. Consistent evidence has been adduced as to the large quantities of materiel captured
in Kono in December 1998. mm While there is evidence that the materiel brought by Rambo
mw Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1068, 1070.
Im} Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 11 11.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1115.
my TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14184—14185, 14188 (The attack on Koidu Town was a success
and the RUF were able to capture ground missiles, lighter arms, ammunition and vehicles from ECOMOG,
although ECOMOG destroyed much of their heavy weaponry before leaving); Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23
March 2010, pp. 37916 — 37917 (the successful capture of Koidu Town on 16 and 17 of December 1998 resulted
in the seizure of food, arms and ammunition from ECOMOG, including two ‘shakers’, one missile and
ammunition, artillery ammunition, G3 rounds and RPG bombs); TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12913—
12917 (TF1—567 testified that in December 1998, the RUF were successful in capturing Koidu Town, where they
were also able to capture ECOMOG arms and ammunition); Exhibit P—093, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive
Report from Major Sam Bockarie to Brigadier Issa Sesay on the take over of Koidu, 26 January 1999", p. 25505
(Exhibit lists items captured from successful attacks in December 1998, including the capture of 5 fifiy caliber
guns, 3 full sets of81 mm guns, 39 120 mm mortar bombs in boxes, 73 boxes of American AA rounds, 16 boxes
of 81 mm mortar bombs and 3 armoured tanks from the successful attack on Koidu Town on 16-17 December
1998; further materiel was captured on the successful takeover of Sewafe, Gold Town and Masingbe); Exhibit
D—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, Bom Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield
Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. 7763 (Describing troop
advancements against ECOMOG in the December 1998 offensives, the report states: "The enemy were forced to
retreat through the road leading to Massingbi where they fell [...]. The enemy lost four war—tanks, armored cars,
and a multitude of heavy artillery pieces, personal rifles, and large amounts of ammunition"); Exhibit P—067,
"RUF People's Arm— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander", ERN 9679 (the
Sesay—led operation to capture Kono in late 1998, before the Freetown invasion, succeeded in "overrunning the
entire Kono district", and capturing artillery weapons and "huge quantities of arms and ammunition?).

---- End of Page 1963 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % dla 18 May 2012

Ao 0.6 6
Red Goat into Freetown came from the Burkina Faso shipment,12734 the Trial Chamber
recognises that it is not possible to differentiate whether the materiel brought by Issa Sesay
to MacDonald or generally that the materiel used by the troops on the outskirts of Freetown
came from the Burkina Faso shipment or further materiel captured from the offensives in
Kono and Makeni. As the Defence points out, Bobson Sesay's evidence concerning the
ammunition brought by Issa Sesay to MacDonald did not make clear the origin of that
ammunition; Bobson Sesay himself admitted that it was only a rumour that the ammunition
brought by Sesay came from Liberia. 12135
5717. The Trial Chamber also considers that it is not possible to distinguish between this
materiel and the materiel brought by Dauda Aruna Fornie in January 1999. According to
Fomie, Boston Flomo and others in the Waterloo area received the ammunition he brought
to Buedu several days after he returned, which was only 36 hours after he departed, two days
after 6 January 1999.12136 However, Fomie gave no evidence as to whether it reached its
intended destination, that is, to reinforce Gullit's forces in Freetown. lt is likely that the
shipment of inter alia, 25 boxes of ammunition brought by Fomie became added to the
overall resources of the groups commanded by Boston Flomo, Issa Sesay and others as they
operated in the outskirts of Freetown.
5718. However, the Trial Chamber does not consider that it is necessary to pin down from
which of these three possible sources—the Burkina Faso shipment, materiel captured in
Kono, the shipment brought by Dauda Aruna Fornie—the materiel used by Bockarie's
troops in the outskirts of Freetown originated. First, the Trial Chamber found that both the
Burkina Faso shipment and the shipment brought by Dauda Aruna Fornie were either
supplied or facilitated by the Accused. Second, in relation to the materiel captured in Kono,
the Trial Chamber notes that the Burkina Faso shipment was causally critical to the success
of the Kono operation, and hence the materiel captured there. As Issa Sesay himself
acknowledged, without the shipment that Bockarie brought back in November/December
1998, the RUF would not have launched these initial operations on Kono,12737 and without
12134 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8434.
12135 See Arms and Ammunition, Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's
Leadership (February 1998—December 1999).
*2136 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21595—21596.
12131 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46169.

---- End of Page 1964 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % db, 18 May 2012

400 5 7
taking Kono, the RUF would not have had the materiel necessary to attack other areas.m38
Hence, the materiel captured in the operations in Kono is directly referable to the materiel
from the Burkina Faso shipment.
5719. The Trial Chamber is therefore satisfied that the Burkina Faso shipment, the materiel
captured from Kono and the shipment brought by Dauda Aruna Fornie together formed an
amalgamate of fungible resources from which 1ssa Sesay supplied Gullit's troops as they
were withdrawing from Freetown.
iii. Whether crimes were committed by the RUF and AFRC
during December 1998 offensives in Kono, Kenema and Makeni A
5720. Finally, the Defence alleges that the materiel captured from the December 1998
offensives in Kono, Kenema and Makeni was put to use to secure further targets during that
period, not to aid and abet the commission of crimes, citing in support evidence which
suggests that there were no reports of amputations, mutilations, amputations and burning in
Makeni, Kono, Tonkili, Bombali, or Kambia districts. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding
that there were crimes committed in these districts by rebel forces during December 1998.
Specifically, the Trial Chamber has found, on the evidence of TF1-362 that at the end of
1998, when Kono was "cleared", children were forcibly conscripted and trained by the RUF
and AFRC,m39 and adult civilians were forced to undergo military trainingmm at the
Yengema training base. The Trial Chamber has also found, on the evidence of Komba
Sumana, that the RUF and AFRC used a child to participate actively in hostilities in attacks
carried out by RUF/AFRC rebels in Makeni in Bombali District in December 1998. 12741
5721. The Trial Chamber considers that even if it were the case that no crimes were
committed in these districts, it has found crimes, including rape, were committed in p
Freetown and the Western Area by the forces led by Rambo Red Goat that entered Freetown
to join Gullit's forces.12742 Notably, on the evidence of Perry Kamara, the group led by
Rambo Red Goat as well as members of the Red Lion Battalion remained in Freetown after
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46661—46662.
mw See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement).
me See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
mm See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 4 (Rape), Count 5 (Sexual Slavery).

---- End of Page 1965 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03—01~T 1965 J GL 18 May 2012

400 SK
the departure of Gullit and the civilian brigade, and constituted the forces predominantly
charged with carrying out Bockarie's instruction to make the area "fearfi1l".m43 Further, the
contribution of the attacks on Kono and Makeni to later attacks on the Freetown axis by the
RUF and jointly by the RUF and AFRC was critical. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has
found crimes were committed by these groups in the Western Area during the AFRC's
retreat from Freetown, including the forcible conscription and use of an unknown number of
children to participate actively in hostilities in Benguema from the end of January until
March 1999.m44 The Trial Chamber notes that it has also accepted as evidence of the crime
of sexual slavery Bobson Sesay's account that after the joint Tombo attack in mid—February
1999 with 1ssa Sesay and Morris Kallon, captured women at Benguema were "subdued"
with weapons and would do whatever the troops wanted them to do, including having sexual
intercourse with them. [2745 .
Findings
5722. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the arms and ammunition from the Burkina Faso shipment were distributed to RUF and
AFRC commanders in Buedu and used in attacks in Kono and Kenema in December 1998,
where further arms and ammunition were captured, and in the commission of crimes in the
Kono and Makeni Districts.
5723. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that part of the materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment was taken by a contingent of
fighters led by ldrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat) to reinforce the troops in Freetown
some time before the third week of January, and was used in the commission of crimes in
Freetown and the Western Area.
5724. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Burkina Faso shipment, the materiel captured from the December 1998 offensives in
Kono and the shipment brought by Dauda Aruna Fomie together formed an amalgamate of
fungible resources which was used in attacks by the RUF and AFRC on the outskirts of
12743 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 32413242 (Gullit ordered Red Goat to make the area fearful
after leaving him in charge of Freetown)
12744 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
12745 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 5 (Sexual Slavery).

---- End of Page 1966 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03—01-T f db) 18 May 2012

Freetown after the withdrawal of` Gullit's forces from the city, and in the commission of`
crimes in the Westem Area.
(iii) Post—Freetown invasion to J anuay 2002
5725. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Accused:
a. sent supplies of` arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC between February
1998 and December 1999 in Buedu, through, inter alia, Daniel Tamba, Sampson Weah and
Joseph Marzah, and continued to send such supplies to the RUF in 2000 and 2001;
b. sent a major shipment of` materiel to the RUF in or around March 1999,
whether originating from Burkina Faso or otherwise;
c. provided Bockarie with materiel during his trips to Liberia at an undefined
time after the Freetown invasion, and in August to October 1999;
d. provided Dauda Amna Fomie with materiel on his trip to Liberia during the
January 1999 Freetown invasion;
e. provided Issa Sesay with materiel during his trips to Liberia in May 2000, in
the second half`of 2000 and in early 2001;
fi provided Issa Sesay with materiel via Sesay's subordinates, TF1—567 and
Albert Saidu during Issa Sesay's reign as Interim Leader of` the RUF.
5726. The Prosecution makes no specific contention as to where the materiel provided
during 1999 was applied, but contends that materiel Taylor provided to Issa Sesay from
2000 to 2001 was used, in part, against the Sierra Leone govermnent and Kamajor forces
attacking Superman and other RUF contingents in Freetown and in Makeni, against
UNAMS1L forces and against the LURD in Liberia and Guinea when, on Taylor's orders,
Sesay sent AF RC/RUF fighters to attack Lansana Conte's troops on the Guinean border and
in Guinea}2746 The Prosecution adduced evidence from witnesses TF1—338, Karmoh
Kanneh, Albert Saidu, TF1—567, and Exhibit P—264.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 280.

---- End of Page 1967 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

5727. The Defence contends that due to a lack of military operations in 2000 and 2001, and
evidence of few atrocities against civilians, the RUF had no need to obtain large quantities
of arms and a.mmunition.m47 The Defence adduced evidence from Exhibit D—441C.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1—338
5728. TF1—338 testified that the materiel brought back by Issa Sesay from the trip to
Monrovia to discuss Foday Sankoh's arrest in May 2000 was used in Sierra Leone to fight
against the Kamajors and other pro—government forces who were attacking Superman's
group, firstly from Freetown to Makeni. m/18
5729. TF1—338 testified that the materiel brought back by Issa Sesay from Camp Schefflein
at the end of 2000 was partly used in Sierra Leone to fight against the Kamajors and
UNAMSIL, in the mission in Guinea, and some remained in Liberia for RUF forces
assisting in the fight against LURD rebels. mfw
5730. TF1—338 testified that the materiel in the trip in early 2001 was used. to attack
Kamajors and UNAMSIL peacekeepers and the remainder was stored in Koidu Town. mw
5731. Finally, TF1—338 testified that Benjamin Yeaten told Sesay that Charles Taylor
wanted Sesay to use the materiel Taylor had given him to attack Guinea. Issa Sesay then
plamied attacks at Pamelap and Kissidougou. The attacks were cariied out successfully at
the end of 2001.mSl
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
5732. Karmoh Kanneh testified that the materiel brought back to Sierra Leone by Issa
Sesay and the witness in the second half of 2000 from Monrovia was stored in the
. ammunition dump in Buedu and later distributed to various commanders, including the c
mw Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1 128-1 130.
*27*8 TF1—371, Transcript 1 September 2008,p. 15137 (cs).
Img TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15163—15164; Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15218 (CS).
mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15166-15167.
mm TF1—338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15179; Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15218 (CS).

---- End of Page 1968 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

witness,12752 along with the materiel they had just captured in their offensive against
LURD 12753
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
5733. Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant,m54 testified that of the materiel he brought back
from Benjamin Yeaten in 2000, fifty AK-47 rifles were distributed to Saidu, which they
brought back to Segbwema and kept until the final disarmament in 2001.12755 According to
Saidu, they experienced no further attacks by the CDF and did not use the rif1es.m56
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
5734. Witness TF1-567, who went with Sam Bockarie to Monrovia during the Lomé peace
talks,12757 testified that Yeaten explained to Bockarie that the materiel brought back by
Bockarie by helicopter from Spriggs Field was given to him "by my dad, Charles Taylor" to
take to Buedu for the purpose of "keeping security" while Sankoh was in Freetown. *2755
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5735. Issa Sesay testified that in mid-1999, after the Peace Accord was signed, there were
still persistent Kamajor attacks on RUF positions.m59 The RUF recaptured Tongo in
January 1999 but could not mine there in 1999 because there were constant Kamajor attacks
and air raids.m6O According to Sesay, the RUF also fought with the Government of Sierra
Leone twice during this period. In March/April 1999, ECOMOG attacked the RUF in
Masiaka and Gberi Junction.m6l In July 2000, the government attacked the RUF at Lunsar
and Gberi Junction.12762 The government was bombing Makeni and Magburaka in July
*2752 Karmoh Kanneh, rranaanpr 9 May 2008, pp. 9467-9469.
*2755 xannan Kanneh, rranaarrpr 12 May 2008, pp. 9605-9607.
my Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10887-10888; Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
*2755 Aman Saidu, rranaanpr 5 June 2008, pp. 11110-11111.
*2755 Aman Saidu, Transcript 5 Jnna 2008, pp. 11111-11112.
*2757 rm-567, rranaar1pr4 July 2008, pp. 12974- 12976.
*2755 r1=1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12983.
*27521aaa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44387.
*27*55 Issa Sesay, rranaanpr 26 July 2010, pp. 44639-44640.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44199·44200.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45637-45638.

---- End of Page 1969 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dg 18 May 2012

2000. mw A further threat during 1999 came from the AFRC West Side Boys, who had
joined the government troops and were attacking the RUF in Lunsar. I2764
5736. Sesay admitted that, accordingly, at this time the RUF was in need of supplies due to
the attacks from overnment troo s, the Kama`ors and the AFRC.m65 However, he denied
g P J
obtaining any arms and ammunition from Taylor in May to July 2000, or discussing the
issues of materiel with Taylor. IZ766
5737. Sesay stated that, after his appointment as interim leader in July 2000, the peace
process progressed well. According to Sesay, there were no hostilities from August 2000
until the end of disamiament,m67 aside from one or two skirmishes with Kamajors}2768 The
Kamajors, after the 8 May incident,m69 continued to attack around the Fotaneh Junction
(between Magburaka and Masingbi), Sewafe, and on the border between Kono and
Guinea. mm Further, by August 2000 disarmament had taken place in Lunsar and Gberi
Junction, Fadugu, Segbwema, totalling around 2,500 combatants.m7l ln the locations where
disarmament was already underway, such as Lunsar, the men there had no guns. mm
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
5738. Witness Charles Ngebeh affirmed that in 200l, the Kamajors came from Guinea and
attacked the RUF at Gandorhun base in Kono.m73 However, the RUF maintained the peace
and did not disrupt the peace process. mm He also testified that at this time, the RUF did not
have any weapons in Kono due to disarmament. mw
Prosecution Exhibit P—264
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45638-45639.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45222.
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45222.
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45222.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44574.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44570-4457l.
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45286.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45283—45284.
ma Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45285.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45612.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38697.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. $8697-38698
'2"5 charms Ngcbch, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38699.

---- End of Page 1970 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T // Qlx 18 May 2012

5739. Exhibit P-264 is a photocopy of a radio log book kept by TF1-274 of
communications between Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh during the Lomé peace talks
kept by Dauda Aruna Fomie. lt includes a message from Issa Sesay (a.k.a. "SSS") to
Bockarie (a.k.a. "Concord") dated 25 July 1999 reporting on attacks by Kamajors on Sesay's
position at Bandajuma Yawei}2776
Defence Exhibit D-441C
5740. Exhibit D-441C is the witness statement of Daniel Opande, the Force Commander of
UNAMSIL from November 2000 to September 2003. The statement was made in the RUF
Trial and admitted before this Trial Chamber through witness Issa Sesay. lt states that when
in April 2001, there was a major invasion of Kono by CDF combatants from Guinea, Sesay
requested that Opande immediately deploy to Kono to stop the fighting. 12777
Deliberations
5741. As a preliminary issue, the Trial Chamber notes that it has found in another context
of the Judgement that in 1999, the Accused ordered Bockarie to send AFRC/RUF forces to
assist him in his tight against Mosquito Spray and the LURD forces that had attacked his
forces and that that in 2000 and 2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces,
who fought alongside AFL forces in Liberia and Guinea under the command of the
Accused's subordinateslzm Some of the witnesses testifying to military shipments sent by
the Accused during 1999, and a large proportion of the witnesses testifying to military
shipments sent by the Accused in 2000 and 2001, testitied that those shipments, including
the sizeable March 1999 shipment, were received partially or for the predominant purpose of
these joint operations outside Sierra Leone, including Operation Mosquito Spray in April
1999,12779 RUF/AFRC operations against LURD in Liberia and Guinea, and RUF operations
in Guinea in 2000 and 2001.12780 The Trial Chamber is satistied on the basis of the evidence
12776 Exhibit P—264, "Radio Log Book — 00008636 — 00008726", ERN. 8693; Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010,
pp. 44382—44383.
12777 Exhibit D—44lC, "SCSL, Witness Statement of Daniel Opande (Issa Sesay), SCSL, March 7 2008 (14
End of Pages)", p. 6; Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44742.
mm See supra, Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Operations
Outside of Sierra Leone.
mm TEl-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2751 (CS) (the March 1999 shipment of materiel from Monrovia
came around the time the righting with LURD intensified and after "Mr Taylor asked Sam Bockarie to beef up
their troops in Foya and he went to Monrovia").

---- End of Page 1971 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T % 18 May 2012

considered in those shipments that the materiel provided by the Accused was used in these
operations outside Sierra Leone.
5742. The Trial Chamber explores below only the extent to which those arms and
ammunition were also used within Sierra Leone.
a. Materiel supplied in 1999
5743. Meagre evidence was adduced concerning use of materiel provided by the Accused
during 1999. The Trial Chamber notes that Karmoh Kanneh testified that the materiel
Bockarie obtained when they went to Monrovia in March 1999 was a reward for the work
they did in clearing LURD forces from Lofa County and was taken back to Sierra Leone.
Kanneh explained that the RUF was still "at war" at that time, and the ammunition was
stored in the ammunition dump in Buedu and later distributed to various commanders,
including the witness,m8l along with the materiel they had just captured in their offensive
against LURD. 12782
5744. The Trial Chamber also notes that TFl-567, who went with Sam Bockarie on his trip
to Monrovia in August to October 1999, stated that Yeaten explained to Bockarie that the
mm Exhibit P-099A, (confidential). See Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Communication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Pub1ic", ERN 19181 (recording a message from Yeaten to Issa Sesay on 30 September 2001. In the message,
Gen 50 informs Sesay that pursuant to a telephone conversation the day before, he has despatched 10 boxes of
AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets (A11 with TNTs) for smooth operation". In a second message to Sesay
dated 22 October 2001, Yeaten refers to an operation in Guinea); TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp.
2456-2457 (CS) (Issa Sesay told the witness in September 2001 that he received materiel from Benjamin Yeaten
to attack the government of President Lansana Conte in Guinea); TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp.
15163—15164; Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15218 (CS) (TF1-338 testified that the materiel brought back by
Issa Sesay from Camp Schefflein at the end of 2000 was partly used in Sierra Leone to fight against the
Kamajors and UNAMSIL, in the mission in Guinea, and some remained in Liberia for RUF forces assisting in
the fight against LURD rebels); TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p.15179; Transcript 2 September 2008,
p. 15218 (CS) (Benjamin Yeaten told Issa Sesay that Charles Taylor wanted Sesay to use the materiel Taylor had
given him to attack Guinea. Sesay then planned attacks at Pamelap and Kissidougou. The attacks were carried
out successfully at the end of 2001); TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6959 (ln early 2001, Momoh Gibba
brought a supply of rifles to Benjamin Yeaten's house. After some time, the rifles were flown to Foya some of
which were distributed to RUF combatants who were to participate in an operation in Guinea); Karmoh Kamreh,
Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9506-9507 (Issa Sesay told the witness that Taylor had given him materiel for the
RUF to attack Guinea from Sierra Leone); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2055 (The ammunition for
the RUF operations in Liberia against the LURD and in Guinea was provided by Benjamin Yeaten); Varmuyan
Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 899 (Together with the RUF, the witness fought against LURD. Taylor
provided arms to Benjamin Yeaten and in return Yeaten distributed them among the groups that fought in Lofa
County).
**7** Kpmiph Kamen, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9467-9469.
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9605-9607.

---- End of Page 1972 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f G\ 18 May 2012

materiel iven to him was for the u 0se of "kee in securit " when Sankoh had retumed
8 P YP P 8 Y
to Freetown after signing the Lomé Peace agreement.127113
5745. It is undisputed that on 18 May 1999, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Lomé, to
take effect from 24 May 1999,12784 although it failed to bring about the end of hostilities.
The Trial Chamber has had regard to evidence that Kamaj0r forces and ECOMOG forces
continued their offensives a ainst the RUF ,12 785 while in addition, a s linter 0u of AFRC
8 P EY P
fighters l0yal to Koroma and known as the ‘West Side Boys’ attacked ECOMOG forces and
the civilian p0pulation in P011; L0k0 District.12786 In the second half of July 1999, the
Kama`0rs attacked the RUF at Futane Junction, G0ld Town, Massin bi and C0d0r.12787 Issa
J 8
Sesay also testified that during 1999, even after the Lomé Peace Accord, the RUF faced
persistent Kama`0r attacks on RUF 0sitions,127g8 ECOMOG attacks in March/A ril
J P P
1999,12789 and attacks from the "West Side Boys", the AF RC breakaway group, in Lunsar,
also during March and April 1999.12790
5746. Having regard to the existence of these Operations and the evidence of other
witnesses that some of the materiel supplied by the Accused was taken to Buedu for the
RUF to defend their own positions, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that at least part of that
materiel was used in Sierra Leone. 1
5747. The Trial Chamber recalls its previ0us findings that during 1999, the RUF and
AFRC under the command of Sam Bockarie committed a number of crimes within Sierra
Leone. ln particular, the Trial Chamber found that an unknown number of children who
were used to guard mining in T0mbudu in December 1999 were used to participate actively
in hostilities,12791 that AFRC/RUF members detained women and used them for sexual
u 0ses in Buedu from March 1998 to December 1999,12792 that AFRC/RUF members in
P YP
'"P TF1-567, Transcript 4 Juiy 2008, pp. 12983. P
12784 Exhibit D-199, Special ECOWAS Report on Successful Peace Talks in Lomé, 1999, pp. 3, 9, 11.
12785 Exhibit P-264, Radi0 L0g-B001< 0008636-0008726, pp. 8653, 8656, 8658, 8660, 8662, 8665, 8668A, 8672.
12786 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44201—44203; Ccrirme Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1930;
Isaac Mong0r, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6178-6180; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp.
8416-8419; Transcript 24 April, pp. 8447-8760.
127117 Exhibit P-264, Radio L0g-B001< 0008636-0008726, pp. 8680-8681, 8687, 8701.
1271111 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44387.
mw ipsa Sesay, Transcript 12 Juiy 2010, pp. 44199-44200.
127911 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45222
12791 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings 011 Alleged Crimes: C0unt 9 (Child S0ldiers).
12792 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: C0unt 4 (Rape).

---- End of Page 1973 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / dg 18 May 2012

Sierra Leone to fight against the Kamajors and other pro—government forces who were
attacking Superman's group, firstly from Freetown to Makeni.128111 He also testified that both
the materiel brought back by Issa Sesay from Camp Schefflein at the end of 200012802 and
the materiel obtained from the trip in early 2001128113 were partly used in Sierra Leone to
fight against the Kamajors and UNAMSIL peacekeepers.
5750. Issa Sesay affirmed that there was fighting in Sierra Leone from May to July 2000 1
against UNAMSlL.128O4 However, according to Sesay, there were no hostilities from August
2000 until the end of disarmament, aside from one or two skirmishes with Kamajors.128O5 He
testified that by August 2000 disarmament was well underway and had taken place in Lunsar
and Gberi Junction, Fadugu, Segbwema, totalling around 2,500 combatants,128116 and by
2001, progress was significant.128O7 He acknowledged that even after August 2000, the
Kamajors continued to attack RUF positions around the Fotaneh Junction (between
Magburaka and Masingbi), Sewafe, and on the border between Kono and Guinea. He also
testified that the Guineans used to cross the border to attack the Rokupr area and the Kambia
and Kono axes.12808 However, he stated that these cross—border skirmishes were not full-
scale operations and only happened occasionally.128O9
5751. lt is unclear whether the RUF engaged militarily with the Kamajor attacks. Although
Charles Ngebeh affirmed that in 2001, the Kamajors came from Guinea and attacked the
RUF at Gandorhun base in Kono,1281O the RUF maintained the peace and did not disrupt the
peace process.12811 He also testified that at this time, the RUF did not have any weapons in
Kono due to disarmament.12812 Similarly, Exhibit D—441C states and Issa Sesay affirmed that
when in April 2001, there was a major invasion of Kono by CDF combatants from Guinea,
128111 TF1—371, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15137 (CS). ·
128112 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15163—15164; Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15218(CS).
W3 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15166—15167.
128114 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45637—45638.
128115 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44570—44571.
128116 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45285.
128117 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45286.
128118 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45283—45284. See also DCT—292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp.
41805—41806 (the RUF was fighting against Kamajors and ECOMOG until late 2001).
MW Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45283-4
‘2*’° Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38697.
12811 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, pp. 38697—38698.
12812Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38699.

---- End of Page 1975 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % dk 18 May 2012 .

A 0068
Sesay requested that Opande immediately deploy to Kono to stop the fighting. 12813 The Trial
Chamber also notes the evidence of Albert Saidu, who testified that when at one point in
2000, he received fifty AK-47 rifles from a consignment of materiel provided to Sesay by
Yeaten,12818 they were never used because the RUF experienced no further attacks by the
CDF·12x1s
5752. The Trial Chamber notes that parts of Issa Sesay's testimony as to the RUF's need
for arms supplies during this period are implausible. Sesay testified that in 2001, it was not
necessary for the RUF to acquire arms, firstly as there was little fighting occuning in Sierra
Leone after August 2000 and secondly because the RUF had access to an existing supply of
arms and ammunition captured from ECOMOG and government sources in December
1998.12818 Firstly, that the RUF had a supply of arms and ammunition from December 1998
that lasted until 2001 is inconsistent with his testimony that by 2001, the process of
disarmament had progressed significantly.12817 Secondly, Sesay had previously testified that
the RUF was in need of supplies in 1999. Given that he acknowledged there were attacks by
Kamajors in 2001 and that the process of disarmament was taking place, it is difficult to
understand why in 2001 Sesay would not have required arms when there was such a need in
1999.
5753. Regardless of whether military operations persisted during this time, the Trial
Chamber recalls its findings that the commission of crimes by RUF forces continued under
Issa Sesay's administration. Specifically, it found that from December 1999 until the
disarmament, RUF forces intentionally killed an unknown number of civilians who refused
to mine for the AFRC/RUF at Tombudu Bridge or who were denied medical treatment,12818
that a further unknown number of children under 15 years were conscripted into the RUF, an
armed force in May 2000 at Makeni,1281° that an unknown number of children were used to
participate actively in hostilities as bodyguards to the RUF and AFRC between 1996 to 2000
12818 Exhibit D—44lC, "SCSL, Witness Statement of Daniel Opande (Issa Sesay), SCSL, March 7 2008 (14
End of Pages)", p. 6, Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44742.
12818 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11107-11110.
12815 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11111-11112.
12818 Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44809-44810, 47195.
12817 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47193-47195.
12818 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings).
12819 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).

---- End of Page 1976 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T //4 OA 18 May 2012

in Kailahun,128211 that civilians were captured either in the bush or by Morris Kallon and Issa
Sesay in towns such as Makeni and Magburaka and forced to work in the Kono mines from
1998 to 2000,12821 that civilians were forced to farm and fish near Talia and Giema from
November 1996 to 200012822 and that between May 1999 and July 2000 in Pendembu,
civilians who had been abducted by the RUF were assigned to fighters, and made to perform
domestic duties.12823 The Trial Chamber also notes that the RUF were involved in the
capture of between 400 to 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in May 2000.12824
5754. As with the evidence pertaining to 1999, the Trial Chamber considers that the
evidence of the relevant witnesses is not sufficiently precise to find conclusively that the
materiel supplied by the Accused was specifically used to commit these crimes or conduct
these activities, particularly in light of evidence that the RUF had recourse to alternate
sources of materiel during this period.12825 Nonetheless, given the nature of the crimes
committed and activities conducted during this period and that they necessarily involved the
use of arms and ammunition, the Trial Chamber can reasonably infer that the supplies
provided by the Accused, and established to have been used in Sierra Leone, were part of the
overall supply of materiel used by the RUF in its activities, including the commission of
crimes.
Findings
5755. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the arms and ammunition sent by the Accused to the RUF during 1999 were used in
fighting in Sierra Leone, against Kamajors throughout 1999, and against ECOMOG and the
"West Side Boys" in March to April 1999, and were part of the overall supply of materiel
used by the RUF in its activities, including the commission of crimes.
5756. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the arms and ammunition sent by the Accused to the RUF during 2000 to 2001 were
128211 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
12821 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement).
12822 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Errslavement).
12823 See supra, Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 9 (Child Soldiers).
121124 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44505—44513; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-
2032; Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 36.
12825 See supra, Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel, Captured Materiel.

---- End of Page 1977 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T [4 GL 18 May 2012

4 no W
part of the overall supply of materiel used by the RUF in its activities, including the
commission of crimes.
5. Other Sources of Materiel
Submissions of the Parties
5757. The Defence submits that the RUF and AFRC's primary source of military
equipment was not the Accused. The Defence submits that: from May 1997 to the
ECOMOG lntervention, the Junta government obtained its arms and ammunition by
inheriting supplies from the former government, by trading for them with former ULIMO
combatants, and by trading for them with people in Guinea;l2826 from February 1998 to
December 1998, the RUF and the AFRC obtained arms and ammunition from the stockpiles
of arms and ammunition held by the Junta government, supplies captured from ECOMOG
soldiers and trade with former ULIMO combatants;l2827 from February 1999 to December
1999, the RUF and AFRC obtained arms and ammunition by capturing them from
ECOMOG;l2828 and in 2000 and 2001, when the RUF was not in need of large quantities of
supply, the RUF obtained what it needed by capturing materiel aerii ECOMOG soldiers and
UN peacekeepers. mm
5758. According to the Defence, these supplies far outweighed those allegedly supplied by
the Accused}2830 The Defence contends that where the RUF or the AFRC did source
materiel from Liberia, the amount of materiel it obtained was small and not sufficient to
enable the RUF or AFRC to launch major operations.l283l The Defence adduced evidence
from witnesses Issa Sesay, Isatu Kallon, Fayia Musa, John Vincent, Charles Ngebeh, DCT-
292, and exhibits D-003, D-009, D-084 and D-085.
5759. The Prosecution does not dispute that the RUF and AFRC were able to obtain arms
and ammunition supplies from sources other than the Accused, including capturing arms and
ammunition from ECOMOG forces}2832 However, it contends that the regular materiel
'Z826 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1042-1043.
*2827 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1064.
Img Defence Final Trial Brief`, para. l 121.
mm Defence 1=iria1 Trial Brief`, paras 1128-1130.
12830 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. l 121.
mm Def`ence Final Trial Brief, para. 1131.
1283 2 Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, para. 238.

---- End of Page 1978 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T I? `GTQ. 18 May 2012 M

support provided by the Accused enabled the Junta government to hold onto power during a
time when an embargo imposed on Sierra Leone by UN Security Council Resolution 1132
prevented the Junta forces from obtaining materiel iiom external sourcesmm and enabled
the RUF and AFRC, once ousted from power, to carry out offensives and maintain
territories throughout the lndictment Period}2834 According to the Prosecution, the AFRC
and RUF depended overwhelmingly on the Accused's direct provisioning.l2835 The
Prosecution adduced evidence from witnesses Alice Pyne, TFl—585, TF1-371, TF1—367,
lsaac Mongo, Mohamed Kabbah, Mustapha M. Mansaray, Varmuyan Sherif, TF1—375,
Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Albert Saidu, TF1—338, Jabaty Jaward, Foday Lansana, Perry
Kamara, TF1-516, and exhibits P-361, P—080, P-093, P—067, P-149 and P—018.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyge
5760. Alice Pyne testified that some time after the lntervention, RUF fighters at Tefeya
sent a message that they had set ambushes along Sewafe Bumpe highway and as a result,
they captured arms.l2836 Pyne also testified that around the end of May 1998, during an
unsuccessful operation to take Koidu, they captured heavy weapons from the Guineans. 12837
Prosecution Witness TF1-585
5761. TF1-585 testified that in 1998, Bockarie called a meeting and instructed his
commanders to go to Kono to join Superman in an attack on Koidu}2838 'While the RUF
were not able to capture Kono, but they were able to capture some arms and
ammunition. mw
Prosecution Witness Komba Sumana
12833 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 223.
12834 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 2, 6.
1283 5 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 238.
[2836 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12194-12198.
W7 Arree Pyrre, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12246—12248.
*2*3* TF1-585, Trrmeerrpt 8 September 2008, pp. 1570815707
‘2*‘" TF1-585, rrmrserrpt 8 September 2008, p. 15707.

---- End of Page 1979 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T K GX 18 May 2012

5762. Komba Sumana testified that after the Fitti-Fatta operation, an operation launched by
Superman and SAJ Musa was successful in taking Mongo Bendugu,1284O along with a large
quantity of materiel. 12841 After this SAJ Musa decided to attack Kabala.12842
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
5763. TF1-371 testified that the RUF began purchasing arms and ammunition from
ULIMO at around the same time as the elections in Liberia.12843 He disagreed with Defence
counsel's suggestion that these arms purchases lasted over the next several years and were a
major undertaking, stating that he could only recall several discrete occasions in which the
RUF purchased arms from ULlMO.12844 Further, TF1-371 considered these transactions to
be minor.12845 The witness referred to one occasion in 1998, when Bockarie told the witness
that he had been given 40,000 Liberian dollars to buy arms and ammunition from the former
ULIMO-K fighters in Lofa County. Bockarie gave the money to Mulbah, the overall G4
commander, and Mulbah returned from Lofa County with a large amount of arms and
ammunition.12846 A further transaction took place some time in 1998 when the RUF
retreated from Freetown. On Bockarie's instructions, TF1-371 met one of the ULIMO
commanders and traded a water pump machine for three boxes of AK-47 ammunition.12847
TF1-37l also stated that in June 1998, the RUF had received small amounts of arms, bought
from ULIMO, but that was not sufficient to fight off the Guinean and ECOMOG
attacks. 12848
5764. TF1-371 further stated before the 1997 coup, Jungle made trips to Guinea to
purchase arms for the RUF. The RUF bribed the Guinean troops at the Moa River border
crossing, who facilitated the movement of goods. 12844
128411 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17951.
12841 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17958.
12442 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17959-17961.
*2843 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2695-2697 (cs).
12444 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2696-2700 (CS).
121445 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2698-2700 (CS).
12346 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2688-2689 (CS).
*2**7 TF1-371, rranupnpr sr January 2008, pp. 2688-2689 (cs).
*284* TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2825 (cs).
12844 TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 2965-2966 (CS).

---- End of Page 1980 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

5765. TF1-371 testified that at some point in or after August 1997, he attended an
emergency meeting of the AFRC Supreme Council because the military received an
intelligence report of an impending ECOMOG attack on Freetown. Security was the
paramount concern because the Junta had depleted most of its ammunition and logistical
supplies, and it was of concern to the Chairman to develop a contingency plan.l285O TF 1-371
also testified that in 1997 Bockarie told him that he contacted Taylor from Kenema asking
for material support. 1285 1
Prosecution Witness TF1-3 67
5766. TF1-367, an RUF member, testified that after the ECOMOG Intervention at the very
start of the rainy season, he travelled with Bockarie to Foya where Bockarie instructed the
witness to purchase ammunition from ULlMO.l2852 Once the witness had collected a
"reasonable amount" of weapons he used NPFL communications to communicate with the
RUF in Sierra Leone, and the witness loaded the weapons and took them to Sierra
Leone.l2853 The witness took four such shopping trips to former ULIMO iighters.l2854
5767. TF1-367 also stated that the attack on Koidu Town in December 1998 was a success
and the RUF were able to capture ground missiles, lighter arms, ammunition and vehicles
from ECOMOG, although ECOMOG destroyed much of their heavy weaponry before
leaving. 12855
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5768. lsaac Mongor testified that when ULIMO blockaded the border in 1993, the RUF
used to barter cocoa and coffee for ammunition from Guinean soldiers at the border.
However, the quantities purchased were not large. Sometimes they got three boxes of
ammunition with some grenades.l2856
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2310-2311 (CS).
my TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2693-2694 (CS).
mm TF1-367, Transcript 20'August 2008,pp.14148-14150.
Img TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14150-14154.
mm TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14155- 14156. 8
mj TF1-267, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14184-14185, 14188.
mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5749.

---- End of Page 1981 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T V/ GA 18 May 2012

5769. Mohamed Kabbah testified that ULIMO cut off the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border
from 1992-1997l2857 and during this period, the RUF was able to purchase arms from
ULIMO and ammunition from Guinea. 12858
5770. Kabbah also testified that when Superman and SAJ Musa were operating in Northern
Sie1Ta Leone independently from the RUF, they captured large amounts of ammunition from
Guineans stationed at Kambia at around the same time as the RUF successfully attacked
Kono in 1998. mw Kabbah confirmed a prior statement that there were such large quantities
of arms captured from Kambia that excess weapons were stored in Kabbah's house in
Kailahun. 12860
Prosecution Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray
5771. Mustapha M. Mansaray, 1DU Commander at Segbwema, Kailahun District during
1998,l286l testified that in 1996, when the witness and his former commander went to
Guinea, he saw ammunition which was purchased by the commanders in return for coffee
and cocoa and transported by canoe. mm
5772. Mansaray also testified that in 1998 and 1999, the RUF captured arms and
ammunition from ECOMOG}2863
e Prosecution Witness Vamiuyan Sherif
5773. Vamiuyan Sherif testified that the RUF bought arms from former ULIMO fighters in
Lofa County from the end of 1997 to 2003. mm
Prosecution Witness TF1 -375
5774. TF1-375, who fought under the leadership of SAJ Musa and Superman during late
1998, testified that during this time, at the end of the rainy season,l2865 Superman and SAJ
my Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16423.
*8888 Mohamed Kabbah, rrrmsempt 15 September 2008, pp. 12677-12678.
*8**88 Mbbemeri Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16417.
@60 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16419.
mm Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 4 March 2008, pp. 5232-5233.
mm Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, p. 5414.
mm Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5410-541 1.
IZSC`4 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 1018.
*8888 rrr-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12553-12554.

---- End of Page 1982 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI,-03-01-T 4/ GK 18 May 2012

Musa launched an attack on Mongor Bendugu.18888 Heavy weapons and a lot of ammunition
were captured during the attack on Mongor Bendugu, including one 40 barrelled missile, an
armoured car, a 50 calibre, some one barrel missiles, mortars, GMG, some RPGs, pistols,
and AK-47s.18888 The group then used the ammunition captured from Mongor Bendugu to
attack Kabala.18888 At Kabala they were able to capture a lot of weapons and
ammunition,18888 including AK-47s, FM or LAR rifles (a heavy gun larger than an AK-47,
similar to a G3), some pistols and mortar guns including 60 millimetre mortar bombs and 81
millimetre mortar guns. *2878
5775. TF1-375 also testified that on the way to Freetown in December 1998, his group
captured "lots of arms and ammunition" from Yira Filaia, known as "Pumpkin Ground" and
at Makeni, arms and ammunition,18881 including an armoured car, trucks, small tactical
jeeps, camouflage combat and other things. 18888
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
5776. Bobson Sesay testified that the AFRC, led by lbrahim Kamara (a.k.a. Bazzy),
captured ammunition when they attacked Makolo town around June 1999.18878
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
5777. Albert Saidu testified that the RUF exchanged money, coffee, cocoa and palm oil
from Sierra Leone for salt, Maggi, rice, cigarettes and clothing from Guinea. Saidu testified
that on one occasion in the second half of 1998, he was present when Bockarie gave his
bodyguard Shabado some US currency in hundred dollar bills and instructed him to go to the
riverside and trade with the Guineans.18888
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
18888 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12543, 12548.
*2887 TF1-375, Transcript 23 Jupp 2008, pp. 12551-12553.
*2888 TF1—375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12560-12562.
*2888 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12559-12560.
*2878 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12560-12562.
*287* TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12581-12582.
*2872 TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jupp 2008, p. 12600
*2872 Aumamy Bpbppp spsay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8461-8463.
*2878 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11069-11070, 11072—11074, 11119.

---- End of Page 1983 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

5778. TF1-338, an RUF member, testified that the RUF received arms from ULIMO
around 1997, when ULIMO was disarming.l2875 Bockarie and others would negotiate to
purchase arms and ammunition from ULIMO in Foya. mm
4 Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
5779. Jabaty Jaward testified that some time after November 1996, but before the May
1997 coup, Bockarie began to negotiate with ULIMO in order to gets arms and ammunition
to reinforce their various front lines}2877 At Koindu, once, Sam Bockarie wrote a letter that
he gave to Jaward and others to deliver together with cigarettes, a big tape recorder and
boots to the immediate ULIMO commander at the border}2878 The witness and the others
went to Mendekoma where they encountered UL1MOs at the check points and delivered the
letter}2879 The next day Bockarie and the commander went to Foya in Liberia. Later, RUF
received arms and ammunition from ULIMO in exchange for the items they had sent. mm
5780. The witness refuted a suggestion by Defence counsel that the RUF received arms
from all disarming factions, including ULIMO, the NPFL and the Liberian Peace Council,
stating that he was not aware of the RUF purchasing materiel from any other faction. mm
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
5781. Foday Lansana testified that when he was in the Kono District during January to
September 1998,l2882 Superman returned from a meeting in Buedu where he got arms and
ammunition. Su erman informed Lansana that he learnt from Bockarie that Issa Sesa had
P Y
travelled with some diamonds from "Johnny Paul" to Monrovia to purchase arms and
ammunition from Charles Taylor, but that Issa Sesay had lost them. Superman said that
despite the loss of the diamonds, Fonti Kanu had made arrangements with an ECOMOG
mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15271; Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. 15275-15276.
'2"6 TF1-338, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15276.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13332-13334.
'M Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13334- 13336.
'""’ Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13336.
Imc Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13337.
Im] Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13821.
mm Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 45013.

---- End of Page 1984 ---------------------------


Case No; SCSL-03-01-T Gb; 18 May 2012

general in Monrovia to get the arms and ammunition.l2888 After Superman came back from
Buedu with the arms and ammunition, fighting took place at Tombodu. IZ884
Prosecution Witness Peg Kamara
5782. Perry Kamara testified that in May 2000, the RUF arrested a contingent of UN
eacekee ers in Freetown, and took their arms and ammunition, includin a number of
P P 8
armoured tanks. U885 While Issa Sesay agreed to return the armoured tanks, the RUF kept the
light weaponry. IZ886
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
5783. TF1-516 testified that the weapons the RUF had confiscated from UN peace-keepers
in 2000 were new and of better quality than those that the RUF had had before that time. IZ887
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5784. In relation to supplies during the Junta period, Issa Sesay testified that as Freetown
was the army headquarters the ammunition dump at Murray Town had armnunition even
before the coup. So after the coup, the AFRC and RUF used this ammunition to fight against
the Kamajors. I2888 Further, according to Sesay, when Bockarie wanted to attack Kamajors at
that time, he would send the army chief of staff to Freetown. Sometimes a helicopter would
take ammunition from Freetown and deliver it to Bockarie in Kenema. Bockarie also got
supplies from the brigade commander in Kenema. @89
5785. According to Issa Sesay, from February 1998 to January 1999 the RUF bought
buried ammunition from ULIMO. This was the ammunition they used in the Fitti-Fatta
mission. The ammunition Sesay used for the attack on Kono in December 1998 was bought
by Bockarie in Lofa.l2890 In September 1998 Mike Lamin collected a well-digging machine
from Baiwala and sold it to Bob Gibson, the AFL battalion commander in Bomi Hills. In
*2**3 Foday Larraarra, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4508, 4511, 4517.
12884 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4511-4513.
*2885 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269.
*2888 Peny Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270.
*2**7 r1¤1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7103-7104.
12888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45958 _
12889 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45958
12890 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44626-44628.

---- End of Page 1985 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

exchange, Lamin received ammunition.I289I Some time after May 1998, Mike Lamin and
Sesay also began buying small amounts of ammunition, "sardine tins", from an AFL
company commander in Vahun who was secretly selling to the RUF the ammunition that
was sent to him for the border. I2892
5786. Issa Sesay testified that the trade with the Guineans lasted from 1992 until Junem;93
or July 1998 when the Guineans attacked Koidu.I2g94 These attacks continued through
2000.I2895 The Guinean overnment was unaware that Guinean commanders were sellin
8 8
ammunition to the RUF. The commanders would stop trading during government patrols of
the border and then start up again when the patrols finished.I28% Sesay stated that after those
attacks, around October or November 1998, the RUF continued to do business with the
Guineans at the border crossing points.I2897 Isatu Kallon, a woman who procured materiel
and other supplies for the RUF,I2g98 would often go to Guinea to make arrangements to buy
ammunition for the organisation.I2899 Sesay also heard that SAJ Musa sent his wife to
Guinea to buy ammunition during the time that he was not cooperating with the RUF, from
February to December 1998.I29°O However, in June 1998 the only ammunition they had was
that which they bought from ex—UL1MO fighters in Voinjama or that which they obtained in
ambushes. IZQOI
5787. Sesay testified that in 2001, it was not necessary for the RUF to acquire arms, firstly
as there was little fighting occurring in Sierra Leone after August 2000 and secondly
because the RUF had access to an existing supply of arms and ammunition captured from
ECOMOG and govemment sources in December 1998.I29°2 The RUF also had available
IMI Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44071·44072.
I2892 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44107—44114, 441 16-44117.
I2893 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44105·44106.
I2894 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44628—44629.
IMS Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44105—44106, 47254.
I2896 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44628—44629.
IHI97 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47254.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43760.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47254.
I2900 Issa Sesay, Transcript 19 August 2010, p. 46681.
IMI Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44106·44107.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, pp. 44809-44810, 47195.

---- End of Page 1986 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % $5 18 May 2012

from May 2000 ammunition, armoured cars, vehicles and communication sets captured from
the UN peacekeepers taken hostage in that period. 12903 .
Defence Witness Isatu Kallon
5788. Isatu Kallon, a businesswoman who assisted the RUF with procuring food, clothing
and other supplies,l29O4 testified that prior to the lndictment period, the RUF sold produce
and palm oil cultivated by civilians to the Guineans.l29O5 According to Kallon, the RUF
operated through "contractors", intermediaries who traded these products to the
Guineans.l29O6 She testiHed to herself trading food, medicines, clothing to the RUF at
Gbemalu town.l29O7 In around 1995, while the witness was in Gueckedou, she began trading
in ammunition. She bought a box with two "sardine cups" of AK rounds from a Guinean
soldier, went to the border and traded the box with the RUF contractors for five Jerry cans of
palm 011.12908
Defence Witness F ayja Musa
5789. F ayia Musa testiHed that after Top F inal,l29O9 he set up a barter system whereby he
traded coffee and cocoa for other foodstuffs and ammunition Guinean security authorities
along the Guinea—Sierra Leone border. mm This barter system continued to operate under the
witness's supervision until the witness was appointed by Foday Sankoh to begin diplomatic
relations with the international community in June 1995.l29ll At that point the witness
transferred operation of the barter program to someone else. mm
Defence Witness John Vincent
5790. John Vincent testihed that in 1998, the RUF obtained arms and ammunition by
selling cocoa and coffee, through trading at the Guinean border and trading in NPF L
12903 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 45998
mm Isatu Kallon, Transcript 21 June 2010, pp. 43005—43006.
12905 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42765—42773; Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42840-4284l.
‘2"°6 rsrrrrr 1mm Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42836—42838.
‘2"°" rsrrur 1moi} Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, p. 38876.
mm Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38870 — 38873, 38877.
mu Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38875 — 38876.
mm Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, p. 38877.

---- End of Page 1987 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 4% GQ 18 May 2012
I

controlled areas with the help of General Timothy Fayah, who was the NPFL commander in
Foya.l29l3 Vincent stated that during December 1998, the border with Liberia was closed and
the RUF could only obtain ammunition through its ambushes against ECOMOG and the
SLA and trade with Guinea.l29l4 Sam Kolleh, a Liberian vanguard, organised the sale of
cocoa and coffee with a woman in Guinea in exchange for arms and ammunition for the
RUR 12915
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
5791. Charles Ngebeh, an armourer commander for the RUF throughout much of the
" Indictment period,129l6 testified that before Zogoda fell into the hands of the Kamajors in
November 1996, Bockarie had established an arms trading relationship with ULlMO,l29l7
whereby the RUF would barter items in exchange for ammunition and arnis.l29l8 ULIMO
would provide the RUF with AK—47s, GMGs, LARs, BARs, and RPGs, as well as
ammunition for these weapons.l29l9 The materiel obtained fiom ULIMO was mostly msted.
Ngebeh was responsible for cleaning the weapons and ammunition so they could be used by
thc RUF.12°2(’
5792. Ngebeh also testified that about three weeks after Bockarie and the RUF forces
entered Freetown after the AFRC coup, they received news that Kamajors had blocked the
road from Bo to Kenema. Bockarie and his troops were successful in clearing the
highwayl292l and around June or Julyl2922 the RUF pursued the Kamajors to Tongo, where
they had heard that they were harassing the families of soldiers}2923 At this time the RUF
"S"3 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38100-38104.
""" John Vincent, rrnnncript 26 March 2010 pp. 38121—38123.
mm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38103-38105.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37847.
‘"" Charles Ngcbcn, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37849, 37852. .
mfg Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37850-3785l.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37852.
‘"2° Charles Ngcbcn, rrnnncript 23 March 2010, pp. 37852-37853.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37863.
‘2°" Charles Ngcbcn, rrnnncript 23 March 2010, p. 37864.
my Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37863.

---- End of Page 1988 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % E'. 18 May 2012

was well equipped with weapons and ammunition,l2924 the sole source of which was Johnny
Paul Koroma in Freetown. @25
5793. Ngebeh stated that the successful capture of Koidu Town on 16 and 17 of December
1998 resulted in the seizure of food, arms and ammunition from ECOMOGIZQZ6 ln Koidu
Town itself the RUF and AFRC captured two ‘shakers’, one missile and ammunition,
including artillery ammunition, G3 rounds and RPG bombs. By virtue of having attacked
the ECOMOG forces the day after their payday the RUF and AFRC also captured US
dollars from them. The cash was declared ‘govemment property’ and fighters were ordered
to hand over any cash they took from a captured ECOMOG soldier. The witness himself
took $1000, which he gave to Issa Sesay, from another soldier who had captured the money
from a Nigerian. mm
5794. Ngebeh also testified that the RUF was able to capture a lot of ammunition and arms
in the successful capture of Makeni on 25 December 1998, as that was where the ECOMOG
barracks, known as the "Teko barracks", were stationed.l2928 He also testified to the capture
of RPG bombs, AK—47s and GT rounds at Gberi Junctionlmg some time before the first
week of February 1999,l293O the capture of ammunition from the Guineans at Masiaka, and
when a Guinean convoy fell into an AFRC and RUF ambush in Lumpa, Waterloo, the
capture of a 40 barrel gun as well as a DAF 25 foot trailer,l293l although the 40 barrel gun
could not be moved across the river to Kailahun and was eventually destroyed by an
Ecomoo jpt.‘2"32
5795. ln relation to the May 2000 capture of UN peacekeepers, Ngebeh testified that he
took charge of the heavy weapons and armoured cars captured during that attack. The
witness removed the weapons that were mounted on the armoured cars. mm
my Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37865.
'MS champs Ngebeh, Transcript 23 Mami] 2010, p. 37873.
IMG Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37914-37915.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37916-37917.
'zm chanps Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37918 -37919.
my Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37924.
'"3° Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37920-37922
'm|Char1es Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37927- 37928.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37929.
'2"" champs Ngebeh, Transcript 13 April 2010, p. 38784.

---- End of Page 1989 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ® 18 May 2012

Defence Witness Sam Kolleh
5796. Sam Kolleh, a Liberian member of the RUF ,12934 testified that he delivered food and
other domestic items from Guinea to Sankoh in Zogoda during 1994 to 1995. U935
Defence Witness DCT-292
5797. DCT-292, an RUF member, testified that to get ammunition for battles against
Kamajors and ECOMOG, the RUF used to carry cocoa and coffee to the Guinean borders
and barter for supplies, although there was no such need to do so from late 1999 to 2001 as
the RUF had sufHcient ammunition. @36
Prosecution Exhibit P-361
5798. Exhibit P-361 is a radio log book covering communications within the RUF for the
period 28 April 1999 to 11 September 1999. Exhibit P-361 was part of a series of documents
seized from Foday Sankoh's house on Spur Road in Freetown in May 2000 admitted
through rule 92bis.l2937 It includes radio messages from Bockarie and 1ssa Sesay to Sankoh
reporting on attacks by Kamajors on RUF positions in June and July 1999 and materiel
captured by the RUF in these attacks. 12938
Prosecution Exhibit P-080
5799. Exhibit P-080 is the First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 12 August 1998. Describing the military situation
in Sierra Leone, it states that on 27 July 1998, "apparently after seizing weapons and
'2""‘ sam 1*2935 sem 1*2936 DCT—292, Transcript 1 Jurre 2010, pp. 41806—41807. ,
{2937 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T—747, Decision on Prosecution Motion For Admission of Documents
Seized from Foday Sankoh's House, 26 February 2009, para. 51; Tariq Malik, 19 January 2009, pp. 22940-
22941.
mm Exhibit P—361, "Radio Log Book covering communication for the period — 28/04/1999 — 11/09/1999 —
00008636 — 00008726 (CMS PGS 21955—22046)", ERN. 8662 (Radio message from Bockarie to Sankoh
reporting that Kamajors attacked Kantia village in the Kambia District on 16 June 1999 and they captured two
Single—barrel rifles and two G—3 rifles); 8693 (Radio message from Bockarie to Sankoh that report received from
Bandajuma Yawei of Kamajor attack and capture by RUF of 6 rockets of RPG and 5 TNTS, 1 RPG tube, 5
packets of AK rounds, dated 19 June 1999); 8701 (message from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh detailing Kamajor
attack on RUF near Guinea—Sierra Leone Border (village called Godor). Arms captured include: RPG tube, 6
RPG bombs and 5 TNTS, 5 packets ofAK rounds, 1 stick grenade, dated 29 July 1999).

---- End of Page 1990 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T d\5 18 May 2012

· /1-0 08 3
ammunition in an attack on ECOMOG units at Bendugu in north-eastern Sierra Leone, junta
supporters attacked ECOMOG troops in the town of Kabala".12229
Prosecution Exhibit P-093
5800. Exhibit P-093 is a report from Issa Sesay to Bockarie on military operations led by
Sesay, dated 26 January 1999, listing items captured from a number of successful attacks in
December 1998. lt notes the capture of 5 fifty calibre guns, 3 full sets of 81mm guns, 39
120mm mortar bombs in boxes, 73 boxes of American AA rounds, 16 boxes of 81mm
mortar bombs and 3 armoured tanks from the successful attack on Koidu Town on 16-17
December 1998. Further materiel was captured on the successful takeover of Sewafe, Gold
Town and Masingbe.12940 The report notes that on 23 December 1998, the RUF captured
Magburaka but little materiel supply was taken as its military strength was not high.12941
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
5801. Exhibit P-067 is a 1999 report to Foday Sankoh by the Black Guards, authored by
Junior Vandi, a Black Guard commander. It states that the Sesay-led operation to capture
Kono in late 1998, before the Freetown invasion, succeeded in "ovenunning the entire Kono
district", and capturing artillery weapons and "huge quantities of arms and ammunitionj’12942
Prosecution Exhibit P- 1 49
5802. Exhibit P-149 is a memorandum to the Battlefield Commander from the RUF Black
Guard Adjutant, dated 21 January 1999, detailing an attack on Masiaka on 5 Jan 1999
launched by Colonel Boston Flomo (a.k.a Vemdame), resulting in the capture of an
American GMG, some light automatic rifles and assorted GMG rounds. The report then
states that the RUF advanced to RDF and Waterloo, capturing six rockets RPG bombs with
6 TNTs, and one box of mortar bombs. On 8 January 1999, the RUF attacked again and the
enemies at Waterloo evacuated towards the Port Loko axis. They left behind a 120mm
12222 Exhibit P—080, "UN Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary—Genera1 on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August l998", para.l3, ERN. 12388.
12940 Exhibit P—O93, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report from Brigadier Issa Sesay to Major Sam
Bockarie on the take over of Koidu, 26 January 1999", p. 25505.
12241 Exhibit P-093, "Restricted RUF/SL Comprehensive Report from Brigadier Issa Sesay to Major Sam
Bockarie on the rake over of Koidu, 26 January 19992 p. 25505.
‘2""2 Exhibit P-067, "RUF Peoples Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9679.

---- End of Page 1991 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T Z Oy} 18 May 2012

Mortar gun, a 40 barrel Missile with assorted rounds of AK rounds, G3, GMG, and
bombs.l2943
Prosecution Exhibit P-018
5803. Exhibit P-018 is a report of the UN Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1306 (2000) in relation to the situation in Sierra Leone, dated December
2000. It reports on a study made available to the Panel by the Small Amis Survey, a Geneva-
based NGO, which provided a well-documented summary overview of the capture of
weapons by the RUF during confrontations with the Sierra Leone Army, ECOMOG and
UNAMSIL forces. The Panel noted that it was able to verify most of the incidents reported
in the survey. The Panel summarises the supplies obtained by the RUF from intervening
forces deployed in Sierra Leone as including: 12944
• considerable amounts of weaponry seized during confrontations with the government of Sierra Leone armed
forces. A lack of training and discipline led to soldiers abandoning their weapons for ready seizure by the
rebels. SLA soldiers are also reported to have sold weapons and ammunition to the rebels;
• a significant number of weapons, including hundreds of rifles, 24 machine guns, 10 mortars, 20 rocket
propelled grenades, several tons of ammunition and three armoured personnel carriers were seized when the
rebels detained and disarmed a Guinean UNAMSIL unit in January 2000. Guinean units sewing under
ECOMOG had also been disarmed during previous ambushes and seizures;
• Kenyan and Zambian UNAMSIL contingents were disarmed when they were taken hostage by rebels in May
2000. In these cases, great amounts of rifles were lost to the rebels, as well as eight armoured personnel carriers
and several other military vehicles". I2945
Defence Exhibit D-003
5804. Exhibit D-003 is a Radio Log Book recording radio messages between RUF
commanders from 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000. Exhibit D-003 was adduced
through Prosecution witness Perry Kamara, who testihed that it was one of the logbooks
relating to Buedu, Sam Bockarie's radio station.l2946 A message from Issa Sesay (a.k.a. SSS)
to Bockarie (a.k.a. Concord) dated 14 October 1999 records that materiel captured by
'2943 Exhibit P-149, "Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard
Adjutant, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali
District Revolution lntelligence Office, 21 January 1999", ERN. 25494.
'2944 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 ~ S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para. 178.
@45 Exhibit P-018, ‘"Report of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 ~ S/2000/1195, adopted on
20 December 2000", para. 179.
'""" Perry Kamara, rrapsmpr 7 February 2008, pp. 3334-3335.

---- End of Page 1992 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6*6 18 May 2012

Superman from the Guineans included more than 50 boxes of SK rounds, more than 35
boxes of RPG bombs and more than 35 boxes of grenades with many weapons.I2947 Further
messages record the capture of a Nigerian truck full of ammunition from Daru heading to
Kenema on 26 December 1999.12948
5805. Notably, a radio message from Komba Gbundema to the Leader, dated 10 January
2000, describes the arrest of Guinean ECOMOG troops heading in the direction of Mile 91,
and their three armoured cars, five trucks and large quantity of arms and ammunition,|2949
although Sankoh instructed Issa Sesay to release the captured materiel the next day. @50
Defence Exhibit D—009
5806. Exhibit D—009I295l is a salute report to Sankoh by Bockarie dated 26 September 1999
in which Bockarie recounts events after Sankoh left Sierra Leone in November 1996 to the
date of the report. The report states that "during this period":
I renewed my contact with ULIMO and tried to secure materials from them. It was out of these materials that I
gave Superman a good quantity to attack and capture Kono.
Superman used the materials to attack Kono and was able to control parts of Koidu Town. Though they were
able to raise the ammo dump, they then concentrated on looting and later withdrew leaving the enemy to re-
occupy the town. Even prior to that, all instructions to maintain the ground were not implemented. mm
5807. The report also describes the RUF advance to Port Loko, noting that "Rambo was
successful in ca turin art of the town and in ca turin a lar e uantit of materials". mm
P SP P S S (I Y
Defence Exhibit D—084
mm Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000",
ERN. 8732.
12948 Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 — 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000",
ERN. 8769.
mw Exhibit D-003, Radio Log Book Three — 00008727 — 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000, p.
00008779.
12950 Exhibit D-003, Radio Log Book Three — 00008727 — 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000, p.
00008779.
my Exhibit D-009, RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie - 00009658 - 00009671.
mm Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie — 00009658 — 00009671", ERN, 9662.
mm Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie - 00009658 — 00009671", ERN. 9664.

---- End of Page 1993 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dg 18 May 2012

5808. Exhibit D—084 is a Salute Report from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh, dated 27
September 1999, reporting on various events since the Abidjan Accords.
5809. Describing troop advancements against ECOMOG in the December 1998 offensives,
the report states: "The enemy were forced to retreat through the road leading to Massingbi
where they fell [...]. The enemy lost four war-tanks, armored cars, and a multitude of heavy .
artillery pieces, personal rifles, and large amounts of ammunition". The report states that
"taking with me all needed Military Materials for the attack", Sesay joined Rambo and
Kallon's group in the attack against Makeni.l2954
5810. It also refers to Sesay's successful capture of a "Forty Barrel Missile and a large
quantity of its bombs" in an ambush near Waterloo and RDF.l2955
Defence Exhibit D—085
5811. Exhibit D-085 is a report to Foday Sankoh from Major Francis M. Musa, District
IDU Commander, dated 31 August 1999, covering RUF activities that took place in
Sankoh's absence from 24 March 1996 to 31 August 1999. Recounting events towards the
beginning of this period, the report states
Major General Sam Bockarie ..... went to Liberia, contacted the Liberian soldiers and established strong
relationship between the RUF and the Liberian soldiers. Devoted soldiers and civilians freely offered cocoa
beans, coffee beans, pistols, single-barrels, X-Base tape, presentable dressings, etc to the movement to be
exchanged for ammunition. This ammunition was what we used to fight the enemies and withheld the Burkina
axis until the AFRC took over [. , .]l295°
Deliberations
5812. At the outset, the Trial Chamber notes that the Defence conceded that the three main
sources of arms and ammunition for the RUF and AF RC during the Indictment period were
the Magburaka shipment, the Burkina Faso shipment, and the materiel captured from
ECOMOG in December 1998.12957 Having found that the Accused was responsible for
12954 Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. 8, ERN. 7763.
@55 Exhibit D-084, RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, dated 27 September 1999, pp. 000077634-
000077635.
12956 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 July 2009, pp. 25117-25119.
my Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1131; see also para. 1073 (There has been an abundance of evidence that
Bockarie and other key figures in the RUF travelled to Burkina Faso in about November 1998, and that
following the trip, the RUF obtained significant quantity of arms and ammunition).

---- End of Page 1994 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dkh 18 May 2012

,4} O O 8 T
facilitating both the Magburaka and the Burkina Faso shipments, the basis for the Defence
submission that that alternative sources of supply, in quantitative terms, "far outweighed"
those allegedly supplied by the Accused is considerably weakened.
5813. The Trial Chamber will now examine the extent to which the RUF and AFRC relied
on the remaining alternative sources of materiel asserted by the Defence.
a. Existing militagy stores in Freetown
5814. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence that the Junta had recourse to the existing
‘ military stores in Freetown in fighting against the Kamajors, particularly in the subsequent
months after the May 1997 coup. Issa Sesay stated that the Junta forces drew from the
existing ammunition dump at Murray Town to fight against the Kamajors.l2958 Evidence
suggests that such supplies were not insignificant. Charles Ngebeh testified that in the month
after the May 1997 coup, the RUF was well equipped with weapons and ammunition for its
military engagements with pro—Kabbah forces, the sole source of which was Johnny Paul
Koroma in Freetown.l2959
5815. However, as the Trial Chamber has previously noted, at some point in or after
August 1997, the Junta had depleted the available sources of supplies in Freetown or were
not obtaining from them satisfactory amounts of materiell296O and Bockarie had contacted
the Accused from Kenema asking for material support.l2%l ln these circumstances, the Trial
Chamber is not satisfied that the existing military stores in Freetown were sufficient to
sustain the Junta forces beyond August 1997.
b. Materiel purchased from ULIMO, Guinea and other private sources
12958 Issa Sesay, Transcript 11 August 2010, p. 45958.
12959 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37873.
’2°"O TF1-37 1, Transcript 28 January 2008. pp. 2310-2311 (CS) (in or after August 1997, the witness attended an
emergency meeting of the AFRC Supreme Council because the military received an intelligence report of an
impending ECOMOG attack on Freetown and the Junta had depleted most of its ammunition and logistical
supplies).
mw TF1—371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2693-2694.

---- End of Page 1995 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 6\` 18 May 2012

5816. The Trial Chamber has also heard evidence of the RUF obtaining supplies from
former ULIMO fighters, from sources within Guinea, and from ECOMOG and AFL
commanders in Liberia.
5817. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the RUF commenced trading
independently with ULIMO from late 1996 and throughout the Junta period. Jabaty Jaward
testified that some time after November 1996, but before the coup, Bockarie began to
negotiate with ULIMO in order to get arms and ammunition to reinforce their various front
lines}2962 TF1-338, an RUF member, also testified that the RUF received arms from
ULIMO around 1997, when ULIMO was disarming.l2963 Some of these transactions were
exchanges of goods for materiel,l2%4 while in others the RUF purchased arms and
ammunition for cash}2965 Although the extent of the trade between the RUF and ULIMO
before the Junta period was minor, the trade between the RUF/AFRC and ULIMO expanded
after the ECOMOG Intervention in mid-February 1998.l2%6
5818. The evidence also consistently establishes that the RUF exchanged or sold
agricultural commodities such as palm oil, cocoa and coffee along the Guinean border
throughout the Sierra Leonean conflict, albeit with some interruptions depending on which
armed groups controlled the borders}2967 The Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of TF1-
367 and Defence witness John Vincent that the RUF used money earned in such transactions
to purchase ammunition. Mohamed Kabbah testified from 1992-199712968 when ULIMO cut
off the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border, the RUF was able to purchase ammunition from
Guinea}2969 Mustapha M. Mansaray attested to such trade occurring in 1996.l2970 According
to Issa Sesay, the RUF and parts of the AFRC were still obtaining ammunition from Guinea
*2*2 Jabary Jaward, Transcript 9 Jury 2008, pp. 18882-18884.
mf'} TFl—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15271; Transcript 3 September 2008, pp. l5275—l5276.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13334-13336 (Sam Bockarie wrote a letter that he gave to Jaward
and others to deliver together with cigarettes, a big tape recorder and boots to the immediate ULIMO
commander at the border. Later, RUF received arms and ammunitions from ULIMO in exchange for the items
they had sent).
@65 The Trial Chamber recalls its previous fmding that Sankoh gave Bockarie SUSD 7,000 which was used to
purchase arms and ammunition from ULIMO from around late 1996. Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of
Materiel.
@66 See, Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel.
12967 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13821; TFl—367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. l4307—l4308.
@68 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p, 16423. y
‘2"°" Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript is September 2008, pp. 12677-12678.
mm Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, p. 5414.

---- End of Page 1996 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

around October or November 1998, even after incursions by Guinean forces into Kono.l297l
John Vincent confirms that in December 1998, the RUF were still trading with Guinea and
that it was one of their few sources of ammunition}2972
5819. The Trial Chamber also accepts that on occasions the RUF traded such goods
directly for arms and ammunition or purchased materiel with cash. Defence witness John
Vincent testified that such transactions on the Guinean border took place and Sam Kolleh, a
Liberian member of the RUF, organised the sale of cocoa and coffee with a woman in
Guinea in exchange for arms and ammunition for the RUF .l2973 Albert Saidu testified that on
one occasion in the second half of 1998, he was present when Bockarie gave his bodyguard
Shabado some US currency in hundred dollar bills and instructed him to go to the riverside 0
and trade with the Guineans}2974 The RUF bribed Guinean troops at border crossings, who
would facilitate the movement of oods. @75
8
5820. Sesay also testified that he was involved in clandestine transactions with AFL
commanders along the Liberian border, in which he would exchange goods such as bikes or
enerators for ammunition}2976 Vincent also testified that he artici ated in a deal between
S P P
the RUF and an AFL commander in Foya}2977 Recalling Sherif’ s testimony that the Lofa
County area was "totally lawless",l2978 the Trial Chamber accepts that private trade with
AFL officers on the Sierra Leonean-Liberian border was an additional source of supply for
the RUF.
5821. Foday Lansana testified that when he was in the Kono District during January to
September 1998,l2979 Superman returned from a meeting in Buedu where he got arms and
ammunition. Su erman informed Lansana that he learnt from Bockarie that this materiel had
P
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47254.
mm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38121—38123.
mm John Vincent, rrnnscnpt 26 March 2010 pp. 38103—38105.
mm Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11069-11070, 11072-11074, 11119.
mm TF1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 2965-2966.
@76 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44107-44114.
mm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38100-38104.
mm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 1 1 January 2008, pp. 1081-1083.
@79 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 45013.

---- End of Page 1997 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / G\ 18 May 2012

come about because Fonti Kanu had made arrangements with an ECOMOG general in
Monrovia to get the arms and ammunition.I29IIII
5822. However, the materiel purchased or traded from ULIMO and Guinea appears to have
been relatively small in quantity and insufficient to sustain the operations of the rebel
groups. The Trial Chamber has had regard to the evidence of TF1-371 that the arms
purchases from ULIMO were a "minor enterprise"I298I and that by June 1998, during a
period of heightened military action for the RUF, the small amounts of arms bought from
ULIMO were not sufficient to fight off the Guinean and ECOMOG attacks.I2982 The Trial
Chamber also heard differing evidence conceming how long this trade lasted. Although
Varmuyan Sherif testified that this trade continued to 2003,I2983 the Trial Chamber considers
it unlikely, as the RUF were fighting against the revival of the ULIMO insurgency in Lofa
County by early 1999.I2984 This assertion is unsupported by any other witness. In particular,
Issa Sesay indicated that the RUF bought buried ammunition from ULIMO only until
January 1999.I2985 Finally, although purchases from ULIMO are framed as an altemative
source for the RUF by the Defence, the Trial Chamber considers significant its previous
finding that the Accused played a key role in facilitating the border trade after the
ECOMOG Intervention which resulted in the expansion of such trade. I2986
5823. Issa Sesay's evidence also indicates that trade on the border with Guinea was
irregular and not dependable, interrupted at sporadic intervals by government border patrols,
and by Guinean cross-border incursions into Sierra Leone in 1998.I2987 Conceming the
quantity of supplies obtained from Guinea, although Issa Sesay testified that Isatu Kallon
would often go to Guinea to make arrangements to buy ammunition for the organisation,I2988
Kallon herself testified to successfully facilitating trade between the RUF and Guineans only
once, in the pre-Indictment period, to obtain two "sardine cups" of AK rounds.I2989 On other
IMO Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4508, 4511, 4517.
'""' TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2700 (CS).
""*2 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2825 (cs).
'2"" Varmuyan snanr, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 1018.
IZ984 See, supra, Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Operations
Outside of Sierra Leone.
IMS Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44626—44628.
IMG See Arms and Ammunition, Other Sources of Materiel.
’"’" iaaa Sesay, rranaanpr 26 July 2010, pp. 44628—44629.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47254.
""*"’ inaru Kallon, rranaanpr 18 June 2010, pp. 4287842882

---- End of Page 1998 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01~T % Em 18 May 2012

`ourne s into Guinea she rimaril rocured food, clothin and other non—milita
J Y P Y P E YY
supplies.l299O Similarly, although Fayia Musa testified that Sam Kolleh organised the
urchase of arms and ammunition for the RUF from Guinea,l299l Kolleh himself onl
P Y
testified that he delivered food and other domestic items from Guinea to Sankoh in Zogoda
during 1994 to 199532992 Isaac Mongor testified that when the RUF used to barter cocoa and
coffee for ammunition from Guinean soldiers at the border, the quantities purchased were
not large}2993 Further, it is unclear whether the trade with Guinea continued past late
199832994 According to DCT—292, there was no such need to obtain supplies from Guinea
from late 1999 to 2001 as the RUF had sufficient annnunition}2995
5824. Further, the quality of the ammunition obtained from ULIMO is questionable.l29%
Charles Ngebeh, armourer commander for the RUF throughout much of the Indictment
eriod,l2997 testified that the materiel obtained from ULIMO was mostl rusted. N ebeh had
P Y E
to clean the weapons and ammunition so they could be used by the RUF}2998 Similarly, Issa
Sesay affirmed that the materiel the RUF purchased from ULIMO was rusty, and had to be
cleaned in drums in Buedu using diesel oil. @99
5825. Evidence also indicates that the materiel purchased or traded from AFL and
ECOMOG commanders was not large. Issa Sesay testified that trade with AFL commanders
resulted only in small amounts of a1mnunition.l3OO0 Also, apart from an isolated incident of
purchasing from ECOMOG commanders in the evidence of Foday Lansana, there is little
mw Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42836-42838; Albert Saidu and Sam Kolleh also testified
concerning primarily obtaining food and domestic items from Guinea, rather than military supplies: Albert
Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11069-11070 (The RUF would barter palm oil, cocoa, and coffee with the
Guineans in return for salt, clothing, Maggi or rice); Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48390-
48394, 48398-48401 (The witness also delivered food and other domestic items from Guinea to Zogoda during
1994-1995).
'""’ Jprrrr Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38103-38105.
mm Sam Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48390-48394, 48398-48401.
@93 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5749.
'2994 Jprrrr Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp 38121—38123.
'2""5 DCT-292, Transcript 1 Jurrr 2010, pp. 41806—41807.
IMG TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2751-2758.
mm Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37847.
'2°°8 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37852-37853.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44058-44063; see also TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2758
(CS).
*3000 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44107-44114, 44116-44117 (Lamin and Sesay bought small amounts
of ammunition, "sardine tins", from an AFL company commander in Vahun).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % dk 18 May 2012

indication in the record that the RUF had continuing arrangements with ECOMOG for arms
and ammunition.131)111
5826. Overall, there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the needs of the RUF and
AFRC during the Indictment period were fulfilled in any significant proportion by materiel
purchased from ULIMO, Guinea or other private sources.
c. Captured materiel
5827. The Trial Chamber heard reliable evidence that the RUF captured a significant
quantity of arms, ammunition and other supplies from ECOMOG in the Kono attacks in
December 1998. The most detailed account of what was captured is contained in
Exhibit P-093, the written report from Sesay to Bockarie after the attack on Koidu Town.
The Trial Chamber also notes that in Exhibit P-67, the Black Guards reported to Sankoh that
the fighters succeeded in "overrunning the entire Kono district", and captured "huge
quantities of arms and ammunitionj’13O02 Witnesses TFl-367, Kabbah, TFl-375 and Charles
Ngebeh also note the capture of a substantial quantity of arms in the December Koidu Town
attack. 131103 Kabbah testified that the arms and ammunition were of such a high quantity that
the surplus AK-47s were stored in the witness's home in Kailahun.131)114 It is also evident that
the RUF were able to use this captured materiel to secure further targets and supplies in
subsequent offensives in Kenema, Makeni and in the Western Area.1311115
5828. The Trial Chamber also recalls the evidence that the break-away groups led by Alex
Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) and SAJ Musa also relied on
131101 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4508, 4511, 4517.
*3002 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army~ Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9679.
131103 TFl-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, pp. 14184-14185; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008,
pp. 16418-16420, TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, pp. 12552-12554; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March
2010, pp. 37916-37917.
13004 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, p. 16419.
130115 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, pp. 37918-37919, 37924, 37927-37928 (the RUF were also
able to capture a lot of ammunition and arms in the successful capture of the ECOMOG barracks in Makeni on
` 25 December 1998, in the attack at Gberi Junction in January or February 1999, in an attack on the Guineans at
Masiaka, and in an RUF ambush in Lumpa, Waterloo, during or shortly after January 1999); Exhibit P-149,
"Memo of the BFC, from the Overall Intelligent Officer Commander and Black Guard Adjutant, Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone - RUFSL 2nd INF Brigade Headquarters - Bombali District Revolution Intelligence
Office, 21 January l999", ERN. 25494 (recording weapons and ammunition captured during an attack on
Masiaka on 5 Jan 1999 and an attack on RDF and Waterloo on 8 January 1999).

---- End of Page 2000 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % GL 18 May 2012

@0 093
captured ammunition after they rejected Bockarie's command in the latter half of 1998.13006
Notably, the attack on Mongor Bendugu launched by Superman and SAJ Musa during the
rainy season of 1998 resulted also in a substantial quantity of materiel,l3O07 which was used,
in part, to attack Kabala,l30O8 which in turn garnered more captured arms and
ammunition.l30O9 Evidence also indicates that the AF RC forces who led the Freetown
invasion captured sufficient ammunition en route to Freetown to enable them to enter
Freetown.l30lO Evidence suggests that the RUF were also able to capture materiel in 1999,
primarily in the course of military engagements with Kamajorsiwll
BOQ6 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1113; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8733-8734
(Gu11it's group did not receive any shipment of ammunition from the Koidu Geiya shipment and the time it
entered Freetown); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3214-3215 (The AFRC destroyed excess
amounts of arms and ammunition captured on the way to Freetown because they could not carry them);
Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16417-16419 (SAJ Musa and Gullit obtained weapons
from Guineans stationed in Kambia and then attacked Freetown, and some of these weapons were considered
surplus and were stored in Kabbah's house); Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16420-16421 (The AF RC group
did not ask for weapons before launching the Freetown operation); Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008,
pp. 18059-18060 (SAJ Musa used arms captured at Mongo Bendugu and Kabala during the Freetown attack);
Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44632 (SAJ Musa and the groups in the Koinadugu District used
ammunition captured from ECOMOG which they used to attack Freetown); TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008,
pp. 12581—12582 (On the way to Freetown, TF1-375's group captured "1ots of arms and ammunitions" from Yira
Filaia, known as "Pumpkin Ground" and at Makeni, arms and ammunition, including an armour car, trucks,
small tactical jeeps, camouflage combat and other things); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008,
pp. 8461-8463 (The AFRC captured ammunition when they attacked Makolo town after June 1999)
mm Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17958.
BUGS Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, pp. 17959-17961.
WG9 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008. pp. 12563-12566.
mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8733-8734 (Gu11it's group did not receive any
shipment of ammunition from the Koidu Geiya shipment by the time it entered Freetown); Perry Kamara,
Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3214-3215 (The AFRC destroyed excess amounts of arms and ammunition
captured on the way to Freetown because they could not carry them); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 17
September 2008, pp. 16417-16419 (SAJ Musa and Gullit obtained weapons from Guineans stationed in Kambia
and then attacked Freetown, and some of these weapons were considered surplus and were stored in Kabbah's
house); Transcript 17 September 2008, pp. 16420-16421 (The AFRC group did not ask for weapons before
launching the Freetown operation); Komba Sumana, Transcript 7 October 2008, pp. 18059-18060 (SAJ Musa
used arms captured at Mongo Bendugu and Kabala during the Freetown attack); Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July
2010, p. 44632 (SAJ Musa and the groups in the Koinadugu District used ammunition captured from ECOMOG
which they used to attack Freetown); TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12581-12582 (On the way to
Freetown, TF1-375's group captured "1ots of arms and ammunitions" from Yira Filaia, known as "Pumpkin
Ground" and at Makeni, arms and ammunition, including an armour car, trucks, small tactical jeeps, camouflage
combat and other things.)
B0" Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 6 March 2008, pp. 5410-541 1; Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three -
00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000", ERN. 8732 (from Issa Sesay (SSS) to Concord
(Bockarie) with information to Smile (Sankoh) dated 15 October 1999 referring to large amounts of ammunition
captured by Superman from the Guineans); Exhibit P-361, "Radio Log Book covering communication for the
period - 28/04/1999 - 11/09/1999 - 00008636 - 00008726 (CMS PGS 21955-22046)", ERN. 8662 (Radio
message from Bockarie to Sankoh reporting that Kamajors attacked Kantia village in the Kambia District on 16
June 1999 and they captured two Single-barrel rifles and two G-3 rifles); 8693 (Radio message from Bockarie to
Sankoh that report received from Bandajuma Yawei of Kamaj or attack and capture by RUF of 6 rockets of RPG
and 5 TNTs, 1 RPG tube, 5 packets of AK rounds, dated 19 June 1999); 8701 (message from Issa Sesay to
Foday Sankoh dated 29 July 1999 detailing Kamajor attack on RUF near the Guinea-Sierra Leone border at a

---- End of Page 2001 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 6% 18 May 2012

LM? M
5829. However, the Trial Chamber notes that the capture of supplies by the RUF and
AFRC at most other times tended to be sporadic and irregular. The Trial Chamber heard
consistent evidence that the RUF was short of ammunition after the ECOMOG Intervention
through 1998 until the Burkina Faso shipment,l3O 12 and there is little evidence that the RUF
were able to capture much by the way of arms and ammunition during this period. Alice
Pyne stated that some time after the Intervention, RUF fighters at Tefeya sent a message that
they had set ambushes along Sewafe Bumpe highway and as a result, they captured
anns.l30l3 Further, there is some evidence to suggest that although the Fitti—Fatta mission to
capture Kono in mid—l998 failed, the RUF succeeded in capturing some arms and
annnunition.l30l4 However, during a period when a number of crucial attacks were carried
out by the RUF and AFRC, there is a notable dearth of other evidence concerning captured
materiel.
5830. Similarly there is little evidence of captured materiel in 2000 and 200l,l30l5 and
what was seized, primarily from ECOMOG and UN peacekeepers, ultimately had to be
returned. While the Trial Chamber also heard consistent evidence that the RUF captured
supplies from UN peacekeepers in May 2000,l3Ol6 Perry Kamara testified that Issa Sesay
village called Godor in which the RUF captured RPG tubes, RPG bombs and TNTs, 5 packets of AK rounds, 1
stick grenade); Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April
2000", ERN. 8769 (recording the capture of a Nigerian truck full of ammunition from Daru heading to Kenema
on 26 December 1999).
Bm TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2670-2671 (CS); TF1-579, Transcript 25 November 2008, pp.
21 138-21141 (the RUF had its own weapons but was short of ammunition); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March
2008, pp. 5744-5745 (Isaac Mongor stated that while in Kono in 1998, the RUF had no ammunition); Karmoh
Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9416; John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38418-38419 (John
Vincent testified that before the Waterworks meeting, the RUF was out of ammunition); Samuel Kargbo,
Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10515 (Kargbo testified that after the ECOMOG Intervention, the AFRC and RUF
had to abandon the heavy artillery and weapons in Freetown and there was no way for the AF RC to replace the
arms that were lost); Exhibit P-066, "Confidential ~ RUF Brigade Headquaiter ~ Buedu, information and
Request’, Report from Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor, 24 June 1998", ERN. 7833 (Exhibit P-066 indicates that
the RUF were short of ammunition by June 1998 to repel ECOMOG attacks); Exhibit P-080, "UN Security
Council ~ First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone", 12
August 1998, ERN. 12388: "Reported shortages of food and ammunition among the rebels have increased the
risk that they could attack ECOMOG convoys and isolated settlements in order to resupply themselves. ...".
13013 Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12194-12198.
BOM Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12246-12248 (Around the end of May 1998, during an
unsuccessful operation to take Koidu, the RUF captured heavy weapons from the Guineans); TF 1-585,
Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15707 (While witness places this meeting and failed attempt to capture Kono in
late 1998, the Trial Chamber considers that this cannot be correct as the RUF successfully captured Kono in
December 1998. It is more likely she is referring to Fitti-Fatta),
'""5 Defence frrrei Trial Brief, paras 1128-1130.
13016 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44107-44114, 44116-44117; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp.
7103-7104 (TF1-516 testified that the weapons the RUF had confiscated from UN peace-keepers in 2000 were
new and of better quality than those that the RUF had had before that time); Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel

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Case No.: SCSI,-03-01-T % gx 18 May 2012

uf
00098
agreed to return much of the heavy weaponry captured from the UN peacekeepers in May
2000, keeping only the light weaponry.131117 Sankoh also instructed Issa Sesay to release the
materiel captured from the arrest of Guinean ECOMOG troops in January 2000.13018
Conclusion
5831. In light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber cannot accept the Defence contention
that the RUF and AFRC either obtained significant quantities of materiel from any of the
alternative sources it asserts or that the RUF and AFRC relied on those sources.
5832. In assessing the relative importance of the Accused's contribution, the Trial Chamber
has also had regard to the evidence indicating that the Accused's support often satisfied a
need or request for materiel at a particular time. The evidence clearly establishes that
Bockarie and Sesay would regularly turn to the Accused when the RUF was out of arms and
ammunition.13019 For example, the Magburaka shipment came at a time when the Junta
government had depleted its existing sources of supply13O2O and after Bockarie had requested
of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/1195, adopted on 20 December 2000", para. 178 ("Kenyan
and Zambian UNAMSIL contingents were disarmed when they were taken hostage by rebels in May 2000. In
these cases, great amounts of rifles were lost to the rebels, as well as eight armoured personnel carriers and
several other military vehicles"); see also Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 178; Exhibit P-018, "Report of the
Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1306 — S/2000/ 1195, adopted on 20 December 2000", para. 178
("Kenyan and Zambian UNAMSIL contingents were disarmed when they were taken hostage by rebels in May
2000. In these cases, great amounts of rifles were lost to the rebels, as well as eight armoured persomiel carriers
and several other military vehicles"); Exhibit P-604A, "UN Security Council, Ninth Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/228, March 14, 2001", para. 6 ("So far, RUF
have returned to UNAMSIL 56 personal weapons, 10 vehicles, and 20 armoured personnel carriers, which were
part of the weapons and equipment seized by RUF hom UNAMSIL contingents last year").
13017 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 13 April 2010, p. 38784
(Ngebeh testified that he took charge of the heavy weapons and armoured cars captured from the UN
peacekeepers in May 2000 and removed the weapons that were mounted on the armoured cars); See also Peace
Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000).
13018 Exhibit D-003, "Radio Log Book Three - 00008727 - 00008903, 23 September 1999 to 18 April 2000," p.
00008779.
13019 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15682 (Jungle came every two or three weeks throughout 1998
into mid-1999, whenever Bockarie requested military equipment); Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 2 December
2008, p. 21479 (from early 1998 until late April 1999, Bockarie, through his radio operators, would contact
Benjamin Yeaten or Taylor to request military supplies); TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6965 (Zigzag
Marzah, Jungle and Dopoe Menkarzon brought arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone shortly after the
Intervention in 1998 regularly and when materiel was needed for operations. Requests for ammunition from
Liberia were never denied, but on some occasions Bockarie was told to wait); Jabaty J award, Transcript l0 July
2008, pp. 13390-13391 (at times the witness was informed by Bockarie that Bockarie had made a request "to
Monrovia" for supplies on account of pressing needs on the ground); TFl-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp.
7010-7011 (the practice of making requests via radio to Yeaten for materiel remained the same when Issa Sesay
took over command of the RUF).
13020 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2310-2311 (CS).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

gp0Qé
material support from the Accused.131121 It is also clear that several shipments enabled the
rebel groups to launch major offensives in which they were able to take and control key
parts of Sierra Leonean territory. As the Trial Chamber has previously found, the retreating
RUF and AFRC forces after the ECOMOG Intervention were reliant on weapons from the
Magburaka shipment in Operation Pay Yourself, consigmnents sent by the Accused were
used in efforts to hold Kono in early 1998, in operation Fitti—Fatta, and by the AFRC-led
breakaway groups in the north, while the Burkina Faso shipment precipitated the December
1998 attacks on Kono, Kenema, and the Western Area.131)22
5833. Further, the Trial Chamber observes that shipments of materiel supplied by or
facilitated by the Accused often contributed to and were causally linked to the capture of
supplies by the RUF and AFRC. In particular, the Burkina Faso shipment was causally
critical to the December 1998 offensives, which the Defence concede constituted the third
main source of materiel for the RUF.13023 Similarly, as the Trial Chamber has found, the
Fitti-Fatta mission, from which arms and ammunition were captured, was conducted through
materiel supplied by the Accused,131124 and the attacks by SAJ Musa and Mingo's group on
Mongo Bendugu from which it captured a large supply of materiel13O25 were also enabled by
materiel supplied by the Accused.13026
5834. In these circumstances, the finding that the RUF and the RUF/AFRC also had other
sources of materiel from May 1997 to February does not diminish the significance of the
materiel provided or facilitated by the Accused. Indeed, the evidence clearly establishes that
throughout much of the Indictment period the RUF and RUF/AFRC heavily and frequently
relied on the materiel supplied or facilitated by the Accused to carry out offensives and
maintain territories throughout much of the Indictment Period.
Findings
13021 TF1—37l, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2693-2694 (CS).
131122 See Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.
131123 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p. 46169.
131124 TFl—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15707 (While witness places this meeting and failed attempt to
capture Kono in late 1998, the Trial Chamber considers that this cannot be correct as the RUF successfully
captured Keno in December 1998. It is more likely she is referring to Frm-Parra).
13025 Komba Sumana, Transcript 6 October 2008, p. 17958.
13026 See Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % GL 18 May 2012

UO 0 9 7
5835. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that, in addition to receiving
materiel supplies from the Accused, the RUF and the AFRC also obtained arms and
ammunition (a) from the stockpiles of arms and ammunition held by the Junta government;
(b) by capturing them from ECOMOG and other pro-government forces; (c) through trade
with ULIMO and sources in Guinea; (c) through trade with AFL and ECOMOG
commanders; and (d) by capturing materiel from UN peacekeepers in May 2000.
5836. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these alternative sources of
materiel were of minor importance in comparison to that supplied or facilitated by the
Accused.
5837. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the materiel provided or facilitated by the Accused, beginning with the airival of the
Magburaka shipment in October 1997, was critical in enabling the RUF and the AFRC to
carry out offensives and maintain territories until the end of the lndictment period.
Summagy of Findings
5838. The Trial Chamber has found that -
(i) At no relevant time in the lndictment period was the ECOMOG presence
on the Liberia/ Sierra Leone border, or the official closure of the border by
the Liberian Government, sufficient to prevent the cross-border movement
of arms and ammunition.
(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was
able to obtain arms and had the capacity to supply arms and ammunition to
the rebel groups in Sierra Leone, and had the capacity to facilitate larger
arms shipments through third countries.
(iii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that during the Junta
period the Accused sent ammunition to Bockarie in Sierra Leone via
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle).
(iv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the shipment
of ammunition brought by Memunatu Deen and Fonti Kanu to Sierra
Leone in 1997 was sent by the Accused.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 6-ba 18 May 2012

000 Q6
(v) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that supplies of aims
and ammunition were sent to the RUF/AFRC in Buedu between February
1998 and December 1999 by the Accused, through, inter alia, Daniel
Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Sampson Weah and Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah.
However, there is insufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that, except for the Burkina Faso shipment of November/December
1998, the amounts of materiel provided by the Accused in 1998 and 1999
through, inter alia, Daniel Tamba, Sampson Weah and Joseph Marzah
were large.
(vi) Bockarie made trips to Liberia in 1998 during which he obtained from the
Accused.
(vii) The RUF/AFRC received sizeable amounts of materiel from the Accused
in 1998 although not comparable in quantity to the Magburaka shipment,
the Burkina Faso shipment and the March 1999 shipment.
(viii) Bockarie made a trip to Liberia at an undefined time after the Freetown
invasion during which he obtained aims and ammunitions supplied by the
Accused.
(ix) On Bockarie's trip to Monrovia around March 1999, he brought back a
large shipment of materiel supplied by the Accused
(x) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie made a
trip to Monrovia as part of the Lomé delegation and returned to Sierra
Leone in or around late September to October 1999 with a helicopter of
materiel supplied by the Accused.
(xi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that during the
Freetown invasion in January 1999, Dauda Aruna Fornie and others
transported materiel provided by the Accused from Liberia to Sierra
Leone.
(xii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
continued to deliver arms and ammunition to the RUF in 2000 and 2001
via, inter alia, Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.

---- End of Page 2006 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012 m

(#0 O 7 7
Jungle), Sampson Weah, Dopoe Menkarzon, Roland Duoh (a.k.a.
Amphibian Father) and Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian
Mosquito).However, There is insufficient evidence to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the amounts of materiel delivered were large.
(xiii) Issa Sesay made a trip to Liberia in May 2000 in which he obtained arms
and ammunitions from the Accused.
(xiv) Issa Sesay made at least two trips to Liberia in the second half of 2000 and
in early 2001 during which he obtained arms and ammunition supplied by
the Accused. However, There is insufficient evidence to establish the
quantity of materiel received by Sesay from the Accused on his trips to
Liberia during 2000 and 2001.
(xv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that during Issa
Sesay's reign as Interim Leader of the RUF, TF 1-567 was involved in the
transportation of materiel frequently over the course of one year and that
materiel was provided by the Accused from Liberia to the RUF in Sierra
Leone.
(xvi) The Peosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in 2000, Albert
Saidu brought back two vehicles of ammunition and medicine from Yeaten
in response to a request from Issa Sesay.
(xvii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that during Issa
Sesay's reign as Interim Leader of the RUF, TF 1-37 5 was involved in the
transportation of materiel to Sierra Leone from Liberia on four occasions.
(xviii) Sankoh gave Bockarie SUSD 7,000 which was used to purchase arms and
ammunition from ULIMO from around late 1996. The Prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was involved in the
arms and ammunition transactions between the RUF and ULIMO between
November 1996 and May 1997.
(xix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
sent Varmuyan Sherif to open a corridor to facilitate the existing trade of
the purchase and sale of arms and ammunition between the RUF and

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / 18 May 2012

i,L0/ 00
ULIMO between Lofa County and RUF—held—territories after 14 February
1998, that Sherif fulfilled his assignment, as result of which members of
ULIMO who were supposed to disarms and surrender their arms to the
UN, instead sold or bartered them to the RUF.
(xx) The prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided financial support to the RUF/AFRC in order to facilitate their
purchases of arms and ammunition from ex—ULlMO combatants.
(xxi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
used one ofhis superior commanders, Saye Boayou, in an attempt to help
the RUF purchase arms and ammunition from ECOMOG in November
1996.
(xxii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
sent lbrahim Bah on his behalf to Freetown to meet with Sam Bockarie
and Johnny Paul Koroma to make arrangements for the procurement of
arms and ammunition. Bah was given 90 carats of diamonds and $USD
90,000 to pay for the shipment.
(xxiii) The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused travelled to a number of Afiican
countries, including South Afiica, from September to 3 October l997. On
September 25 September l997 he attended a dinner at the Presidential
House of Nelson Mandela, which was also attended by Naomi Campbell.
Following the dinner two men sent by the Accused delivered diamonds to
Naomi Campbell. However, there is insufficient evidence to establish that
the Accused made arrangements during the course of these travels for the
purchase of arms and ammunition to be shipped to Sierra Leone.
(xxiv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the shipment of
materiel negotiated with Bockarie and Koroma by Ibrahim Bah in
Freetown on behalf of the Accused was delivered by plane to Magburaka
in Sierra Leone sometime between September and December l997, and
that members of the AFRC/RUF Junta were present for the delivery. There
is insufficient evidence to determine where the flight to Magburaka
originated.

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Case No.: scsL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
K at tif

00/0/
(xxv) The shipment of materiel delivered to Magburaka included arms and
ammunition, which were distributed among the AFRC/RUF Junta, and
was very large.
(xxvi) The Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that around
November/December 1998, the Accused was instrumental in procuring a
large quantity of arms and ammunition for the RUF from Burkina Faso.
These arms and ammunitions were distributed to RUF and AFRC
commanders in Buedu. »
(xxvii) The arms and ammunition delivered in the Magburaka shipment were
used by the AFRC/RUF forces in fighting ECOMOG and SLPP forces in
Freetown before, during and after the Intervention and that this included
offensives against the civilian population. Weapons from the Magburaka
shipment were used in the Junta mining operations at Tongo Fields prior to
the ECOMOG Intervention, in both "Operation Pay Yourself" and
subsequent offensives on Kono, as well as the commission of crimes
during those operations.
(xxviii) Ammunition delivered by Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and supplied by
the Accused during the Junta period was kept by Sam Bockarie in the
Kenema District, and used in the course of their activities in the Kenema
District, which included the commission of crimes in that area.
(xxix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that materiel
supplied by the Accused was used in operations in the Kono District in
early 1998, before Operation Fitti—Fatta and the commission of crimes
during those operations.
(xxx) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that materiel
supplied by the Accused was used in Operation Fitti—Fatta in Kono in mid-
1998.
(xxxi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that materiel
supplied by the Accused was used by SAJ Musa and Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman) in attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala shortly after

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
GH

at 0 x 0 2
Operation Fitti—Fatta in mid—1998, which included the commission of
crimes.
(xxxii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that materiel
supplied by the Accused was used by the AFRC group led by Alex Tamba
Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast), and
Ibrahim Kamara (a.k.a. Bazzy) in their activities in the Koinadugu and
Bombali Districts from June to October 1998, which included the
commission of crimes.
(xxxiii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the arms and
ammunition from the Burkina Faso shipment were distributed to RUF and
AFRC commanders in Buedu and used in attacks in Kono and Kenema in
December 1998, where further arms and ammunition were captured, and in
the commission of crimes in the Kono and Makeni Districts.
(xxxiv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that part of the
materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment was taken by a contingent of
fighters led by Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat) to reinforce the
troops in Freetown some time before the third week of January, and was
used in the commission of crimes in Freetown and the Western Area.
(xxxv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Burkina
Faso shipment, the materiel captured from the December 1998 offensives
in Kono and the shipment brought by Dauda Aruna Fornie together formed
an amalgamate of fungible resources which was used in attacks by the
RUF and AFRC on the outskirts of Freetown after the withdrawal of
Gullit's forces from the city, and in the commission of crimes in the
Western Area.
(xxxvi) The Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the arms and
ammunition sent by the Accused to the RUF during 1999 were used in
fighting in Sierra Leone, against Kamajors throughout 1999, and against
ECOMOG and the "West Side Boys" in March to April 1999, and were
part of the overall supply of materiel used by the RUF in its activities,
including the commission of crimes.

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/ TN

L; 0 /0 3
(xxxvii) The Prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the arms and
ammunition sent by the Accused to the RUF during 2000 to 200l were
part of the overall supply of materiel used by the RUF in its activities,
including the commission of crimes.
(xxxviii) In addition to receiving materiel supplies from the Accused, the RUF and
the AFRC also obtained arms and ammunition (a) from the stockpiles of
arms and ammunition held by the Junta government, (b) by capturing them
from ECOMOG and other pro-government forces; (c) through trade with
ULIMO and sources in Guinea; (c) through trade with AFL and ECOMOG
commanders; and (d) by capturing materiel from UN peacekeepers in May
2000.
(xxxix) These alternative sources of materiel were of minor importance in
comparison to that supplied or facilitated by the Accused.
(xl) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the materiel
provided or facilitated by the Accused, beginning with the arrival of the
Magburaka shipment in October l997, was critical in enabling the RUF
and the AF RC to carry out offensives and maintain territories until the end
of the Indictment period.
Conclusion
5839. In reviewing the allegations of the Prosecution relating to the role of the Accused in
providing military support to the RUF/AFRC, the Trial Chamber first considered two
preliminary issues raised by the Defence, one relating to the status of the border between
Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the other relating to disarmament in Liberia. The Trial
Chamber has found that at no relevant time in the Indictment period was the ECOMOG
presence on the Liberia/Sierra Leone border, or the official closure of the border by the
Liberian government, sufficient to prevent the cross-border movement of arms and
ammunition. With regard to the claim that as a result of disarmament and the destruction of
arms, as well as the arms embargo, Liberia had insufficient arms and ammunition to supply
Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber has found that despite these measures, the Accused was
able to obtain arms and had the capacity to supply arms and ammunitions from Liberia to the
rebel groups in Sierra Leone. Moreover, he had the capacity to facilitate larger arms

---- End of Page 2011 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T ·_ 18 May 2012
(IP

Kr 01 0 shipments through third countries. Of the arms shipments to the RUF and AFRC linked to
the Accused during the Indictment period, the largest arrived not from Liberia, but through
Liberia from third party states, primarily Burkina Faso.
5840. The Accused directly supplied arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC, as well as
facilitated the supply of arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC from outside Liberia.
During the Junta period, the Accused sent ammunition to Bockarie via Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle) in 1997. The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused was the source of the materiel
delivered by Tamba, Joseph (a.k.a Zizgag) Marzah and Sampson Weah, among others, to
Sierra Leone throughout 1998 and 1999, such supplies consisting of both arms and
ammunition. Bockarie himself made trips to Liberia in 1998 and 1999 during which he
obtained arms and ammunition from the Accused. During Issa Sesay's leadership of the
RUF, the Accused continued to deliver arms and ammunition to the RUF in 2000 and 2001
via Tamba, Marzah, Weah and others. As well as sending subordinates, Sesay himself made
trips to Liberia, including a trip in May 2000 and at least two trips in the second half of 2000
and early 2001, during which he obtained arms and ammunition from the Accused.
5841. Although the materiel delivered through, inter alia, Tamba, Weah and Marzah was
limited in quantity, certain shipments provided by the Accused on Bockarie's trips to Liberia
in 1998 and 1999 did contain substantial amounts of materiel.
5842. After 14 February 1998, the Accused sent Varmuyan Sherif to open a corridor
between Lofa County and RUF—held territories to facilitate the trade of arms and
ammunition between the RUF/AFRC and ULIMO. As a result, members of ULIMO who
were supposed to disarm and surrender their arms to the UN, instead sold or bartered them
to the RUF. The Accused also provided financial support to the RUF/AFRC in order to
facilitate their purchases of arms and ammunition from ex—ULIMO combatants. However,
the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Accused attempted to help the RUF
purchase arms and ammunition from ULIMO and ECOMOG prior to the Junta period.
5843. The Accused facilitated two large shipments of ammunition. The first occurred in
late 1997. In around September 1997, the Accused sent lbrahim Bah to Freetown to meet
with Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma to make arrangements for the procurement of
arms and ammunition. Bah was given 90 carats of diamonds and $USD 90,000 to pay for
the shipment. This shipment of arms and ammunition was delivered by plane to Magburaka

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T GDS % 18 May 2012

4 0/ 0 5
in Sierra Leone sometime between September and December 1997 and was distributed
amongst members of the AFRC/RUF Junta. The Trial Chamber finds that materiel from this
shipment was used by the AFRC/RUF forces in fighting ECOMOG and SLPP forces in
Freetown before, during and after the Intervention, in the Junta mining operations at Tongo
Fields prior to the ECOMOG Intervention, in "Operation Pay Yourself°’ and subsequent
offensives on Kono, as well as in the commission of crimes during those operations.
5844. The Accused to have facilitated a shipment of materiel in around November 1998
from Burkina Faso. Ibrahim Bah and Musa Cissé, Charles Taylor's Chief of Protocol,
accompanied a delegation led by Bockarie to Burkina Faso where a shipment of arms and
ammunition was arranged and brought back by plane to Liberia, and then transported by
trucks provided by the Accused to Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber has found that the
Accused was instrumental in procuring this large quantity of arms and ammunition for the
RUF, that he was paid for it with diamonds, and that he kept some of the shipment for his
own purposes. The Trial Chamber finds that the shipment from Burkina Faso was
unprecedented in volume and was critical in the December 1998 and January 1999
offensives.
5845. The Trial Chamber considered the Defence submission that other sources of military
equipment for the RUF and AFRC far outweighed supplies allegedly provided by the
Accused. In addition to receiving arms and ammunition from the Accused, the Trial
Chamber finds that the RUF and the AFRC also obtained supplies from the existing
stockpiles of the former government when they took over power in May 1997, by capturing
them from ECOMOG and UN peacekeepers, and through trade with ULIMO, AFL and
ECOMOG commanders. However, these sources of materiel were of minor importance in
comparison to that supplied or facilitated by the Accused. Significantly, the RUF/AFRC in
fact heavily and frequently relied on the materiel supplied and facilitated by the Accused,
the Accused's support often satisfied a need or request for materiel at a particular time; and
shipments of materiel supplied by or facilitated by the Accused often contributed to and
were causally linked to the capture of further supplies by the RUF and AFRC. Although
there were instances in which the materiel that the Accused gave to the RUF/AFRC was
more limited in quantity, on a number of occasions the arms and ammunitions which he
supplied or facilitated were indispensable for the RUF/AFRC military offensives. The

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T GH. av 18 May 2012

QLD! O 6
materiel provided or facilitated by the Accused was critical in enabling the operational
strategy of the RUF and the AFRC during the Indictment period.

---- End of Page 2014 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

G. Diamonds
1. Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused
General Submissions by the Parties
5846. The Parties agree that the AFRC/RUF was engaged in active mining in both Tongo
Fields and Kono beginning in 1997.13027 The Prosecution acknowledges that the RUF's hold
over Kono during l998 was not continuous, and the Defence asserts that, in addition to the
AFRC/RUF's mining activity, ECOMOG, the CDF and "international actors" (referring to a
private company called Sandline) also engaged in mining in Kono during times in 1998
when the AFRC/RUF was not in control of the area}3028 Defence witnesses testified that
although mining operations continued in Kono in 1999, the RUF was not engaged in mining
in Tongo during that time.l3O29 Evidence adduced by the Prosecution was consistent with
that testimony. Mining later resumed in Tongo Fields around 2000, and the RUF continued
mining in Tongo Fields and Kono until disarmament.l3O30
5847. The parties’ disputes regarding diamonds and diamond mining relate to: whether the
Accused assisted the Junta and/or RUF with its mining activities by supplying equipment
and other materials; whether the Accused received diamonds from the Junta and/or RUF in
return for arms and ammunitions and other supplies, or for "safekeeping;" and, whether the
Accused introduced the RUF to diamond buyers to enable the RUF to sell diamonds and use
the proceeds to purchase arms and ammunitions and other supplies needed to sustain its
operations. The Prosecution submits that the Accused was involved in many facets of the
AFRC/RUF's activities and that one of the many benefits the Accused received from his
"multi-faceted participation, involvement" and "concerted action" with the rebel groups was
B027Prosecution Final Trial Brief] paras 349-350; Defence Final Trial BriefQ paras 1209-1211. See also TF1-371,
Transcript 8 January 2008, p.2723; TF1-367, Transcript l September 2008, pp. 15040-15043; Issa Sesay,
Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44635.
B028Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, paras 358-359 (discussing the Junta's need to regain control over Koidu Town
and Kono District); Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1210-1211. See also Stephen Smith, Transcript 22
September 2008, pp. 16824-16827; TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15044; Issa Sesay, Transcript 28
July 2010, p. 44853.
*3029 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 360-362 (discussing mining in Kono throughout 1998 and 1999; no
mention of mining in Tongo Fields in 1999); Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, pp. 46825-46826, 46913-
46917. This is also consistent with the Trial Chamber's findings in the crime base portion of this judgement. See
Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement).
[3030 See Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes: Count 10 (Enslavement).

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

the ability to pillage Sierra Leone's diamond resources.]3O3] According to the Prosecution,
the RUF began taking diamonds to the Accused as early as 1992 when the RUF attacked
Koidu Town.]3(m However, during the Junta government period, the Accused began to
"taste the real benefits of Sierra Leone's abundant diamond resources", receiving diamonds
mined by forced labourers in Kenema District under the control of Sam Bockarie, and
delivered by Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle),]3O33 and from Kono under the watch of Johnny
Paul Koroma.]3034 The Prosecution alleges that the Accused sent arms and ammunition as
well as other "varied assistance", including machinery, fuel and mining experts to assist the
RUF,]3O35 in return for some of the diamonds delivered to him.]3O36 As a consequence of his
assistance with mining operations, which the Accused was regularly updated about via
radio,]3O37 diamond production increased.]3O38 Later, from 2000 to 2002, these diamonds,
estimated to be worth millions of dollars, were delivered by Issa Sesay and other "liaison
of`ficers" and "trusted subordinates".]3O39 The Prosecution submits that these deliveries were
monitored via radios controlled by the Accused.]3O4O
5848. The Defence denies all allegations that the Accused ever received diamonds from the
RUF and that he gave anns, ammunitions and other supplies to the RUF and/or Junta in
exchange for diamonds.]3O4l The Defence calls the Trial Chamber's attention to the fact that
only two of the Prosecution's witnesses provided first hand accounts of the Accused
receiving diamonds, and the Defence heavily challenges the credibility of both of those
witnesses.]3O42 The Defence further challenges the general credibility of the Prosecution's
relevant evidence, contending that witnesses were told by the Prosecution that they wanted
to "hear about diamonds to Taylor and anns to the RUF", and that the Prosecution gave
financial incentives for such testimony.]3O43 The Defence further contends that all of the
lm I Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 341.
Um Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 18.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 18.
my Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 349, 353-354.
kms Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 20, 343, 360, 372.
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 349-359, 364.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 372.
Img Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 20, 343, 372.
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 21, 341-382.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 373, 382.
""" Defence rmi rmi Brief] paras 1198-1229.
"°"’ Defence rmi rmi Brief, para. 1198.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1199. The Trial Chamber has considered the Defence's submissions

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T j .___1 i 18 May 2012

{ro 1 09
Prosecution's evidence that Taylor obtained diamonds from Sierra Leone is based on
circumstantial evidence,l3O44 and that all of the transactions referred to by the Prosecution
link the RUF to middle men, not to the Accused. UO45 The Defence recalls that a link must be
roved directl between the Accused, not `ust Monrovia, and ractical assistance rovided
P Y J P P
by him along with his awareness of a substantial likelihood that his actionswould result in
the commission of a crime.l3O46 The defence contends that the diamond trade with Liberia
was a private enterprise conducted between the RUF and the Accused's alleged
subordinates, without Taylor's knowledge and approval". mm
(a) Junta Period
Submissions of the Parties
5849. The Prosecution submits that the formation of the Junta granted the Accused access
to Sierra Leone's mining areas in Kono and Kenema Districts, including Tongo Fields.l3O48
During this time, the AFRC/RUF focused its efforts on raising revenue through the trade of
diamonds mined by civilians under conditions amounting to forced labour. According to the
Prosecution, this trade was executed through an exchange of diamonds for arms and
ammunitions with the Accused, the "most significant" of which was the Magburaka
shipment. mm
5850. The Prosecution submits that during this time, some of the diamonds that the
Accused received were forcibly mined by civilians in Kenema District, including Tongo
Fields, under the supervisory command of Sam Bockarie, who was based in Kenema Town
at that time.l3O5O Bockarie received diamonds mined from Tongo Fields from his subordinate
RUF officers, including Karmoh Kanneh (a.k.a. Captain Eagle) and Amuyepeh. Those
regarding the testimony of witnesses Sam Kolleh, Transcript 3 November 2010, pp. 48584—48587, 48606, and
Martin George, Transcript 12 March 2010, p. 37204. The Trial Chamber has addressed such issues of alleged
Prosecutorial impropriety in another section of the judgement. See Preliminary Issues: Discretionary Payments
and Other lnducements to Witnesses by the Prosecution.
I3044 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1199.
Bw Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1201.
"°"6 Defence rrmi rmi amt, para. 1202.
PW Defence rrmi rmi Brief, para. 1203.
Img Prosecution Final Trial Brief. para. 349.
mw The allegations and evidence regarding the Magburaka Shipment is considered in the section of this
judgement on the Magburaka Shipment. See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated
Supplies, Magburaka Shipment.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 349, 351.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 6% 18 May 2012

ap 1 ID
diamonds, as well as diamonds mined in Kono, were delivered to the Accused in Liberia by
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), and in exchange, the Accused sent anns and ammunition that
was later used by the Junta to hold power against threats from ECOMOG and the
Kamajors.l3O5l Furthennore, the AFRC component of the Junta had commanders in Tongo
Fields, including Captain Yamao Kati and Sergeant Junior, who delivered diamonds to
Eddie Kanneh. Kanneh then passed the diamonds on to Johnny Paul Koroma in Freetown,
and the Accused ultimately received them from Koroma.l3O52
5851. The AFRC Secretariat in Koidu Town was responsible for mining in Kono District,
with Alex Tamba Brima and Cobra overseeing operations in Kono. Additionally, Captain
Moriba oversaw mining in Kono on behalf of the RUF, along with representatives of Morris
Kallon and Issa Sesay. Mining in Tombodu in 1998, near Koidu, was supervised by
Superman.l3053 Diamonds mined from Kono during this period were delivered to designated
AFRC and RUF commanders and taken to Koroma or Bockarie. Ultimately, those diamonds
reached the Accused. The Prosecution relies upon witnesses lsaac Mongor, Augustine
Mallah, Karmoh Kanneh, TF1-375, TF1-567 and Abdul Conteh in support of its
submissions. 13054 i
5852. The Defence generally denies that the Accused ever received diamonds from any
member of the RUFHO55 Additionally, the Defence contends that the only allegation of
shipments of amis and ammunition in exchange for diamonds during this time occurred in
the context of the Magburaka shipment. The Defence refutes the Accused's involvement in
the Magburaka shipment, highlighting the inconsistencies among Prosecution witnesses’
accounts of whether the shipment was actually paid for with diamonds and by whom.u056
The Trial Chamber has considered this evidence, including the relevant testimony of TF1-
371 and Samuel Kargbo, in the context of its deliberations on the Magburaka shipment.l3O57
Below, in response to the Prosecution's more general allegations that the Accused received
13051 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 349, 351.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 351, 353. This allegation is considered in the section of this judgement
on the Magburaka Shipment. See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies,
Magburaka Shipment
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para.350.
UO54 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 350.
"°" Defence rmi rmi Brief, pm. 1198.
**056 Defence rmi mei Brief, paras 592, 1212.
mm See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Magburaka Shipment.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l~T gk 18 May 2012
/ %

AFRC/RUF diamonds during this time period, the Trial Chamber has considered the
testimony of the Accused Issa Sesay, DCT-190 and Exhibit P-033B.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5853. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander,15058 testified that during
199715055 Johnny Paul Koroma organized mining in Kono and "sent people" to mine there
under Gullit's supervision. 15060 Mongor testified that the AFRC and RUF were both mining
at that time, and that the RUF was mining at different sites in Kono and in Tongo.151161
According to Mongor, the Supreme Council did not have an operating budget and so it
sought to use diamonds as currency to pay for weapons purchases.1511152 The witness saw
these diamonds during Supreme Council meetings. The diamonds were kept in jam jars of
about 250 millilitres and then taken to the "big Pa, that is Mr Taylor" to get the things they
wanted and "those were the ammunition and the arms".15065
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
5854. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,151164 testified that he visited Kenema around July 199715065 and saw Sam
Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) with Karmoh Kanneh (a.k.a. Captain Eagle)15O66 and Daniel
Tamba (a.k.a. Colonel Jungle). Mosquito said to Mallah, in reference to Jungle, "Charles
151158 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
15055 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5717-5718. Although the witness did not testify explicitly
regarding the date, the Trial Chamber notes that this testimony was included in other testimony regarding events
in 1997.
13060 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5719.
1511151 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5720.
151152 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5718-5719.
15065 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5719-5721.
15054 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209-20210.
150155 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20139.
151166 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20141.

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T L! 18 May 2012

Taylor ...sent him for us to give him some parcels of diamonds".1311°7 Mallah then observed
Mosquito, Captain Jungle and Captain Eagle board a vehicle and head towards Tongo.13O68
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
5855. Witness Karmoh Kanneh (a.k.a. Captain Eagle), an RUF mining commander at
Tongo Fields,13069 testified that, after the RUF had captured the diamond mining areas at
Tongo Field, he was present in the room when the Accused thanked and congratulated
Bockarie over a satellite phone for capturing Tongo Field. Bockarie first informed Johnny
Paul Koroma that Ton o Fields had been ca tured, then Bockarie informed "Pa
S P
Taylo1".13070 Jungle, who was the "Pa's representative" was also present during this
conversation.13071 Kanneh testified that he mined Tongo Fields for the RUF for about one
month in 1997.13072 At Tongo Fields, civilians were forced to mine and were flogged if they
refused.13O73 During this time when "they" found a diamond they took it to a two-storey
house in Tongo where Jungle, JR and Lion all assembled.13O74 There, the witness and others
counted the diamonds and parcelled them in paper and Sellotape before they were taken to
Liberia.131175 The witness testified about two specific instances where he witnessed the
preparation of diamonds for delivery to Liberia. The first package of diamonds contained 43
ieces. After the were arcelled, Mr Bockarie called Mr Taylor on a satellite hone and
P Y P Y P
told him the total.13076 The witness heard Mr Taylor thank Bockarie and tell Bockarie to
hand the diamonds over to Jungle who would travel with them.13O77 Jungle then confirmed
the total of diamonds to Mr Taylor over the satellite phone.13078 Mr Taylor told Jungle he
should "move with it", and then Jun le left.131179 CO Lion escorted Jun le as far as Fo a,
S S Y
*3333 Augustine Ma11a11, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20148-20149.
*3333 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20148-20149.
*3333 Kamen Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9385-9586.
*3333 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript. 8 May 2008, pp. 9369-9371. See also Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged
Crimes: Counts 2 and 3 (Unlawful Killings).
*333*Ka1·mp11 Kappeh, Transcript. 8 May 2008, p. 9371.
*3333 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9386-9387. Regarding timing, the witness testified that he was
in Kenema Town at the time of the Intervention and had been there for about three or four months before the
Intervention.
*3333 Kamen Kappeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9371-9372.
*3333 Kamen Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9380-9381.
*3333 Kamen Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9380-9381.
*3333 Kamen Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9381.
*3333 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9381-9382.
*3333 Karmoh Karmeh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9382.
*3333 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9382.

---- End of Page 2020 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 6/J 18 May 2012

which was "always the station" where the helicopter would pick him up to go to
Monrovia.l3O8O The second batch of diamonds included 18 pieces of diamonds, and one big
diamond.l3O8l The witness testified that they followed the same procedure with the second
batch of diamonds: the diamonds were shown to Jungle at Bockarie's place, and were
counted and parcelled.l3O82 Then, just as before, the witness heard Bockarie call Mr Taylor
and inform him of the total, and then Jungle confirmed the total.l3O83 Again, Mr Taylor
thanked Mr Bockarie and Jungle was given the parcel and he was escorted to the border. 13084
The witness further testified that Jungle was always with the "top commanders". 13085
Prosecution Witness TFl—3 75
5856. Witness TFl—375, an RUF fighter,l3O86 testified that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle),
told him that Jungle served as a liaison between Sam Bockarie and President Taylor.l3O87
Jun le also told the witness that he took diamonds to President Taylor who ave him
8 Y 8
ammunition to take back to Sierra Leone. 13088
Prosecution Witness TF l—567
5857. Witness TFl—567, an RUF member,l3089 testified that he saw Mohammed
Kannehmgo give Sam Bockarie diamonds mined in Tongo Field on numerous occasions in
l997,l309l and that Eddie Kanneh also received diamonds, but the witness did not actually
observe Eddie Kanneh receiving diamonds.l3O92 TFl—567 further testified that towards the
end of l997,l3O93 he was in Kenema, where he went to visit Sam Bockarie, and he met
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) who told the witness that "the Pa had sent him; that is Charles
**0*0 Kanncn Kanncn, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9382.
13081 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9383.
*30*2 Karmoh Kanncn, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9383-9384.
**)*3 Karmoh Kanncn, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9384.
*3%* Karmoh Kanncn, 8 May 2008, p. 93 84.
*30*5 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9371.
"°*° T1¤1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.
"°"7 T1¤1-373, Transcript 23 June 2008,p. 12492.
‘3°"" T1¤1-375, Transcript 23 Jnnc 2008, pp. 12492, 12494.
13089 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
*3090 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that although the witness testified about "Mohammed Kanneh", the context
of his testimony makes it clear that he is referring to Karmoh Kanneh.
mol TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12884-12886. Mohammed Kanneh was one of` Sam Bockarie's
"securities" appointed to receive diamonds from the miners.
"""2 T1¤1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12884-12886.
"""’ T1¤1-567, Transcript, 2 July 2008, p. 12883.

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Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T 5% N 18 May 2012

Taylor".13O94 The witness did not testify as to what Charles Taylor had sent him to d0, but
Jungle did tell the witness that Charles Taylor had told him not to "be involved that much"
in the AF RC government.13O95
Prosecution Witness Abdul Conteh
5858. Witness Abdul Conteh, a sch00l teacher and diamond miner,1311`16 testified that while
he was in T0ng0 Fields in August of 1997131197 Captain Eagle, a "rebel command0", told him
that they were supported by Charles Taylor and that "all the diamonds they were getting in
that place" were sent to Charles Taylor.1311911 The witness further testified that Charles Taylor
was getting amrnunition for the RUF at this time.131199
5859. Conteh also testified that twice, when he delivered reports to OC Secretariat Sek0u
Kunnateh in T0ng0, he saw Kunnateh counting diamonds in the presence of Kamara, a
"second in charge".131O11 Kunnateh told the witness that he was taking the diamonds to Sam
Bockarie (a.k.a. 1\/10squit0).131O1 Conteh testified that he saw Sam Bockarie once on 16
August 1997 at the office of Kunnateh, and that Bockarie used to come to T0ng0 with "his
tr00 s", who were "rebels", around that time to c0llect diamonds and take them back to
P
Kenema Town.131112
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
5860. Witness Jabaty Jaward, a clerk for Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie and Bockarie's
storekeeper, 131113 testified that in 1998, after Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) arrived in Kenema
from Liberia, he reported to Sam Bockarie that he brought along a truck full of ammunition
that had become stuck on the road before Buedu.131114 Jaward testified that he did not know
who had directly given Jungle the ammunitions but he knew that "he wouldn’t have had
A "°9" TP1-567, Transcript, 2 Jury 2008, p. 12889.
"°"5 TP1-567, Transcript, 2 Jury 2008, p. 12889.
11096 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17495- 17500.
13097 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17540.
"""" Abdur ceprerr, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17545-17546.
131199 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17546.
111110 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17543.
131111 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, p. 17544.
11102 Abdul Conteh, Transcript 29 September 2008, pp. 17540-1754 1.
13103 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13306, 13332; Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13383.
"""‘ Jebery Jewerd, Transcript 9 Jury 2008, pp. 13354-13355.

---- End of Page 2022 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

ammunition all by himself in Liberia rather than getting it through the orders of Charles
Taylor".l3m5 The witness heard that Bockarie sent an envoy in the direction of the stuck
truck with the ammunition, and J award "believed" that they were going for that ammunition
but did not know if it was actually ever retrieved.mO6 Jaward was present the day after
Jungle arrived when Bockarie gave Jungle a parcel of diamonds.mO7 J award testified that he
knew that the parcel contained diamonds because they always referred to packages of
diamonds as "parcels".l3 lO8The witness also testified that he saw the parcel, but was not
specific as to whether he actually saw its contents.mO9 When Bockarie handed Jungle the
parcel, he said "this is what I have now for the old ma.n" and the witness understood that the
"old man" was Charles Taylor because they always referred to Foday Sankoh and Charles
Taylor as ‘papay’ or ‘the old man.’ m IO
The Accused
5861. The Accused denied that he was in possession of diamonds at any point during this
period.l3m In response to the testimony of Augustine Mallah, the Accused denied that
Jungle was his runner.ml2 The Accused further denied knowing Jungle and denied that
Jungle, Mosquito or Issa Sesay ever brought diamonds to him.m I3 I
5862. The Accused asserted that Kannoh Kanneh's evidence that he instructed Bockarie
over a satellite phone to hand 43 diamonds over to Jungle is a lie because it is impossible to
make a satellite phone call indoors and this must have occurred when Johnny Paul Koroma
was still in control.ml4 Regarding the second occasion, about which Kanneh testified, that
the Accused instructed Bockarie to send diamonds via Jungle the Accused testified that it
*0*00 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 Jrriy 2008, pp. 13354-13355.
*0*00 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 Jrriy 2008, p. 13355.
*0*0* Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 Jrriy 2008, pp. 13356-13357.
***00 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 Jrriy 2008, pp. 13356-13357.
*0*00 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 Jrriy 2008, p. 13357.
mw Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13357.
Bm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33336-33338. The Trial Chamber has considered
the Accused's denials in the context of the Magburaka shipment in that section of the judgement. Arms and
Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Magburaka Shipment.
****2c1rar1pa Girarriray Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp 30089-30091.
*0**’Char1as Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30100-30103. For a discussion on the role of
Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and other intermediaries, see The Role of Intermediaries: Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle).
****"c1rar1pa Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30567-30571.

---- End of Page 2023 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T <% N 18 May 2012

did not happen and remarked that none of the people who testified about diamond transfers
claimed that they were present. m I5
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5863. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,l3ll6 testified that from late May to
July 1997, he was not aware of any "extemal assistance" coming to the RUF from
Liberia. ml 17
DCT-190
5864. Witness DCT—190, a former member of one of the Liberian forces,l3ll8 testiHed that
in 1998, just before ECOMOG pushed the AFRC out of power, the witnesses and his forces
were told to leave Tongo to go to Kenema so that ECOMOG could secure the mines. Once
the witness and his group moved to Kenema, ECOMOG began "doing business" with the
mines.l3l 19
Prosecution Exhibit P-033B
5865. Exhibit P-033B is an article appearing in Le Monde on 15 November 2000, entitled
"Charles Taylor, former warlord and President of Liberia, ‘British Officials are after Sierra
Leone's diamonds."’ In relevant part, the article contains a statement by the Accused that the
British were involved in peace keeping in Sierra Leonebecause the British wanted Sierra
Leone's diamonds. Furthermore, the Accused was quoted that the war in Sierra Leone was a
"war for diamonds", but that not because Liberia wants diamonds, as Liberia has its own
diamonds. I3 UO
Deliberations
5866. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence in support of the Prosecution's
allegation that additional exchanges of diamonds for arms and ammunitions, apart from
m l5Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30571-30574.
mmIssa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
*3**71ssa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43840.
mm DCT—190, Transcript 7 June 2010, pp. 42185, 42186.
*3* *° oct-190, Transcript 7 Jrrrrp 2010, pp. 42259, 42260.
I3 120 Exhibit P-033B, "Charles Taylor, former warlord and President of Liberia, ‘British Officials are after Sierra
Leone's diamonds"’, p. 1, ERN 43984.

---- End of Page 2024 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T jg 18 May 2012

(A0 II 7
those in the context of the Magburaka shipment, occurred between May 1997 and February
1998.
5867. The Trial Chamber notes that Augustine Mallah, TFl-567, TF1-375, Karmoh
Kamreh and J abaty J award all testified that Jungle delivered diamonds to the Accused during
this period. The Trial Chamber also notes its previous findings that Mallah, TF1-567,
Kanneh and J award are generally credible witnesses13121 and that the evidence of TFl -375 is
to be considered with caution and requires corroboration.13122 Bockarie told Mallah that
Jungle had been sent by the Accused so that they could "give him some parcels of
diamonds".13123 Mallah then observed Jungle, Sam Bockarie and Karmoh Kamreh drive off
towards Tongo.13124 Jungle told TFl-567 directly that he had been sent to Tongo by the
Accused. TFl-375 testified that Jungle also told him that he was a liaison between the RUF
and the Accused and that he brought arms and ammunitions to Sierra Leone in exchange for
the diamonds that he delivered to the Accused. Karmoh Kanneh gave direct evidence of Sam
Bockarie giving diamonds from Tongo to Jungle on two occasions in 1997. Kamreh also
testified that he heard the Accused speak to Bockarie and Jungle over a satellite phone and
heard the Accused instruct Jungle to "move" with the diamonds. Abdul Conteh also
mentioned delivery of diamonds to the Accused and supply of arms and ammunitions from
the Accused in his testimony, although he did not testify that Jungle was a runner of
diamonds to the Accused. The Trial Chamber notes the Defence's assertion that Kanneh's
evidence has not been properly corroborated by Abdul Conteh.13123 Given that Kanneh is
also corroborated by other witnesses, including Augustine Mallah, the challenge to Conteh's
evidence as not corroborative is irrelevant.
5868. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination Kanneh was confronted with an
inconsistency between his testimony, in which he denied that diamonds taken to Liberia
were seized at checkpoints, and a prior statement in which he had said they were. Kanneh
testified that this erroneous statement had not come to his attention before, although he
admitted that the interview had previously been read back to him. The Trial Chamber found
13131 Credibility Assessment, TFI-567, paras 313-317; Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre-
Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2522; Credibility Assessment, Karrrroh Kanrreh, The Role of
Intermediaries, para. 2704; Credibility Assessment, J abaty J award, The Role of Intermediaries, para. 2708.
13123 Credibility Assessment, TFl-375, paras 308-312.
13123 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20148-20149.
13134 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20148-20149.
13133 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 76.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 _}

L10 11 2
Kanneh's testimony to be clear and consistent and accepts his testimony that the prior
statement was erroneous, without detriment to his credibility.
5869. Although Karmoh Kanneh provided direct evidence that Sam Bockarie gave
diamonds to Jungle and testified that he was present when Bockarie and Jungle spoke with
the Accused, the Trial Chamber notes that the witness first testified that he heard the
Accused's voice, but when asked how he was able to hear the voice, he said they told him,
or Bockarie told him, that they had been talking to the Accused. In light of Kanneh's
detailed report of the conversations with both Bockarie and Jungle, on several occasions,
and the fact that the witness was present and directly heard the conversation on his side, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that his testimony that Bockarie and Jungle were talking to the
Accused is credible. Moreover, his testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Mallah,
TFl—567, and TFl—375 that Jungle was sent by the Accused.
5870. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross—examination, Augustine Mallah testified that
he did not see the diamonds himself, nor did he accompany the men when he saw them drive
off towards Tongo. However, Bockarie told Mallah that Jungle had been sent to pick up
diamonds for Charles Taylor. \Vhile Mallah did not see the diamonds, the testimony of
several witnesses that diamonds were taken from Tongo to Bockarie, corroborates Mallah's
account. For example, Abdul Conteh saw Bockarie in Tongo and testified that he came there
or that others came on his behalf to collect diamonds. TFl—567 also witnessed diamonds
from mines in Tongo being given to Bockarie.
587l. The Trial Chamber notes that TFl—375, Abdul Conteh and Isaac Mongor testified
that the diamonds were taken to the Accused in exchange for arms and ammunition. TFl—
375 testified that Jungle told him that he took diamonds to Taylor who gave him
ammunition to take back to Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the
testimony of TFl—3 75 requires corroboration but considers that the testimony of Conteh and
Mongor corroborates TFl—375's account. In that regard, the Trial Chamber recalls that
Mongor is a generally credible witness.l3 H6 Abdul Conteh also testified that diamonds were A
sent to Taylor and Taylor was getting ammunition for the RUF at that time. He heard this
from Captain Eagle, a rebel commando. lsaac Mongor testified generally that diamonds
were kept in jam jars and then taken to Taylor to get arms and ammunition.
"‘2" Credibility Assessment, Isaac Mongor, paras 269-274.

---- End of Page 2026 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T 18 May 2012

crow J9
5872. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross—examination Conteh was confronted with a
prior statement in which he told the Prosecution that he did not know what happened to the
diamonds that were being mined at that time. The witness explained this as an error and
reiterated his earlier testimony that he twice witnessed the diamonds being counted by
Kunnateh, who told Conteh that he was taking the diamonds to Bockarie. Conteh was also
confronted with a prior statement in which he had said that the arms that the rebels brought
had came from the bush and that the rebels were already armed when they entered
Tongo,l3 m while he testified that Captain Eagle told him that the amrs came from Taylor.
Conteh clarified that the rebels had arrived with amrs but that when they ran out they were
replenished by Taylor. The Trial Chamber accepts Conteh's explanations of his prior
statements but notes that his evidence does not indicate that the diamonds were specifically
A exchanged for arms. The evidence of Mongor, however, does make this specific link
indicating that the diamonds were given to Taylor in exchange for arms and ammunition,
corroborating the evidence of TF1—3 75 in this regard.
5873. With regard to the testimony of Jabaty Jaward that when Jungle attempted to bring a
truckload of ammunition to Buedu, Bockarie gave him a "parcel", and stated "this is what I
have for the old man", referring to the Accused, the Trial Chamber notes that although
Jaward saw the parcel, he did not see the actual diamonds it allegedly contained. He said he
knew it contained diamonds because "parcel" was the word that Bockarie always used to
refer to diamondslmg The Trial Chamber notes that Jaward's prior statement did not
contain the word "parcel". I3 H9 The Trial Chamber further recalls J award's testimony that he
did not know who had given the ammunition to Jungle, but concluded that it must have been
the Accused, as well as his prior statement in which he said that he did not know if
diamonds were handed to Jungle or whether Jungle brought any arms and ammunitions at
this time.m30 Jaward clarified that he did not know where Sam Bockarie put the diamonds
that were handed to him by Pa Abdul and also by Mohammed Kanneh, or whether those
diamonds were the same diamonds given to Jungle,m3l but he did know that the diamonds
that Sam Bockarie handed to Jungle were to be taken to the Accused in Liberia in order to
Um Abdul Conteh, Transcript 30 September 2008, pp. 17591~17592.
my Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13832~13834, 13838.
mw Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13834.
mm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13830.
my Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, p. 13826.

---- End of Page 2027 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~01~T sfgi 18 May 2012
% XF

Li 0 1 2 0
receive arms and ammunitions.m32 Given Jaward's detailed and consistent testimony, and
given that his evidence was not effectively challenged on cross-examination, the Trial
Chamber accepts his evidence on this point.
5874. The Trial Chamber has considered the Accused's denial that he received diamonds in
exchange for arms and ammunitions during this time period as well as his testimony that he
did not know Jungle. However, the Trial Chamber is of the view that his testimony does not
raise doubts regarding these allegations, in light of the overwhelming evidence to the
contrary. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber considers that whether or not the Accused
personally knew Jungle, is not a relevant consideration as to whether Jungle delivered
diamonds to the Accused.
5875. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of DCT-190 who
testiiied that ECOMOG as well as other fighting forces were engaged in mining in Tongo
Fields prior to the Intervention. The Trial Chamber considers that, in light of the .
overwhelming evidence that the AFRC/RUF mined in Kono and Tongo Fields during the
junta period, and that those diamonds were delivered to the Accused, mining by ECOMOG
or other forces at times during this period does not raise doubt that the Accused received
AFRC/RUF diamonds mined in Kono and Tongo Fields during the junta period. Likewise,
any interest that the British may have had in Sierra Leone's diamonds, as asserted by the
Accused in P-033B, does not raise doubt as to his receipt of those diamonds during that
time.
5876. In light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber does not find the blanket denials of the
Accused to be credible, and finds beyond reasonable doubt that during this period Daniel
Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) delivered diamonds to the Accused in exchange for arms and
ammunition. Having addressed the credibility concerns of Kanneh brought out in cross-
examination, recalling its finding that TFl-567 is generally credible and noting that neither
Mallah's nor Mongor's testimony about these events was successfully challenged on cross-
examination, the Trial Chamber considers the testimony of these witnesses to be reliable.
While the evidence of Augustine Mallah, Karmoh Kanneh, TFl-567 and Abdul Conteh is
specific to Tongo Fields, lsaac Mongor and TFl-375 both testified more generally, and
Mongor testified as to the diamonds mined at different sites in Kono and in Tongo. The
Bm Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. l3826—l3827.

---- End of Page 2028 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T jg May 2012

L; 0 x 21
Trial Chamber is satisfied on the basis of his evidence that diamonds mined in both Kono
and Kenema Districts were sent to the Accused in exchange for arms and ammunition.
Findings
5877. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that diamonds mined in Kono and Tongo Fields were delivered from the AFRC/RUF to the
Accused by Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) in exchange for arms and ammunitions during the
period May l997 to February 1998.
(b) February l998—July l999
Submissions of the Parties
5878. The Prosecution submits that, during this period, after near total defeat, the
AFRC/RUF was able to revitalize itself in large measure through their capture of Kono
A District. According to the Prosecution, during the first half of l999, the Accused remained
focused on the AFRC/RUF's mining capabilities in Kono and directly assisted these efforts
through the provision of mining equipment, mining experts and other material.l3 13 3 As a
result of his efforts, the Accused was supplied with diamonds mined in Kono District
throughout l998 and l999m34 delivered by Sam Bockarie,m35 as well as "liaison officers",
trusted subordinates, and other members of the RUF".m36 In return for these diamonds, the
AFRC/RUF received arms and ammunitions and other materials, which allowed the
AFRC/RUF to undertake offensives like the one in Koidu Town.l3m The Prosecution
submits that the shipment of materiel from Burkina Faso was the most significant shipment
of arms and ammunitions during this time period, and following the shipment and the
capture of the entirety of Kono District, diamond traffic increased and the Accused was
"handsomely rewarded for his direction and support during this period".l3 138 The 8
Prosecution further submits that Sam Bockarie's movements with diamonds were monitored
Um Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 360. See Diamonds: Provision of Mining Equipment and Mining
Experts.
Bm Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 358-359.
I3 Us Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, paras 363-367.
3 BM Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 368-369.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 358.
Img Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 358.

---- End of Page 2029 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ` l8 May 2012
X

90/ 2 7.
and coordinated via RUF stations and stations under the command of the Accused.m39 The
Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of witnesses TFl-371, Varmuyan Sherif TFl-
585, Perry Kamara, TFl-5l6, TFl-367, TFl-579, TFl-375, TFl-539, Suwandi Camara, Abu
Keita, J abaty Jaward, Augustine Mallah, Isaac Mongor, Mohamed Kabbah and TFl-590,
Dauda Aruna Fomie, as well as Exhibits P-063, P-0l8, D-008 and D-009 in support of the
Prosecution's submissions.
5879. The Accused generally denied that he received diamonds in exchange for arms and
ammunition from the RUF, or that he received diamonds from the RUF at all. The Defence
asserts that Eddie Kanneh became a key player during this time, as he served as a liaison and
business man for the RUF and oversaw mining in Tongo Field during the Junta period. As
Eddie Kanneh also became close to Bockarie during this time, he eventually conducted
diamond transactions in Liberia on the RUF's behalf.m4O In support of its submissions, the
g Defence relied upon the evidence of the Accused, Issa Sesay, lan Smillie and Exhibit D-393.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF l -371
5880. Witness TFl-371, a member of the RUF,m4l testified that Bockarie took a series of
trips to Monrovia throughout l998, three of which the witness characterized as "very
essential", and one "major trip" in November/December.m42 Regarding the "series of trips",
the witness testified that Bockarie always made sure that when he went to Monrovia he
carried "at least some diamonds with him".m43 The witness could not specify how many
diamonds Bockarie took to Monrovia, but stated that Bockarie had intensified the mining
operation and that there was "a lot of mining going on" and that "they" would bring
diamonds to Bockarie from Kono and Tongo and go back with food and cigarettes for the
fighters.m44 Bockarie would also bring back ammunition, including AK rounds, RPG
bombs and hand grenades, from his trips to Monrovia and would be escorted by three
Bm Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 363.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 1213.
Bm TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
Bm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2382-2383 (CS).
Um TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2382-2383 (CS).
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2383 (CS).

---- End of Page 2030 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

members of the SSS. Once, in late 1998, Dopoe Menkarzon came back with Bockarie.l3 145
On one occasion when he returned from Monrovia, Bockarie briefed "them" about his trip
and was excited because he had made contact with Taylor and confirmed that the diamonds
that had been taken from Johnny Paul Koroma were in Taylor's possession.m46
5881. TFl—37l testified that sometime in March 1998, he arrived in Buedu.m47 At Buedu,
Bockarie instructed Issa Sesay and others to travel to Kailahun to take diamonds from Gullit A
to sell and use the proceeds for food and supplies for the SLA and RUF. At this time,
Koroma also appointed Bockarie as Chief of Defence Staff and "brigadier".l3 148 Once in
Kailahun, Sesay searched Gullit and retrieved about 15 pieces of diamonds of various carats
contained in a white "plastic" that was about five inches long and three inches wide.l3 149
Sesay took the diamonds and Gullit with him back to Buedu.m5O Once in Buedu, Sesay
handed the diamonds over to Bockarie.m5l
5882. Sometime later, Sesay and Kallon confiscated 9 "plastics" of diamonds from J olmny
Paul Koroma.m52 Bockarie later took possession of those diamonds, and Koroma was
relocated to Kangama.l3 153 The diamonds were examined in Bockarie's bedroom, and were
about 1000 pieces in total.m54 Bockarie then said that Bah was going to take the diamonds
to Monrovia to Mr Taylor to try to get more arms and ammunition.m55 Bah and Bockarie
then left with the diamonds they had taken from Koroma as well as the diamonds that they
had taken from cru11rr.‘3‘"
5883. Bockarie returned four or five days later and told the witness that he had trouble
meeting the Accused because of a "problem with ECOMOG". Consequently, Bockarie had
made arrangements with Musa Cissé and Benjamin Yeaten whereby they gave the diamonds
*3**5 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2384 (CS),
*3**6 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2384 (cs). .
13147 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2362 (CS).
*3**8 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2364 (cs).
‘""°rr1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2365 (cs).
BISOTF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2365 (CS).
‘3‘5‘rr1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2366 (cs).
m52TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2369-2370 (CS).
m53TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2370 (CS).
*3*5*rri-371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2370 (CS).
"‘55rr1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2370-2371 (cs). u
***56rri-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2370-2371 (cs).

---- End of Page 2031 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ 18 May 2012

to Yeaten to transfer to Mr Taylor.m57 When Bockarie returned to Buedu, he came along
with Rashid Mansaray and Dennis Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle). When Bockarie, Jungle, and
Mansaray returned from this trip to Monrovia, the witness did not see them bring anything
with them.m58About one week later Bockarie, Jungle and Rashid Sandy returned to
Monrovia with diamonds.l3 M9 The witness testified that he saw the diamonds Bockarie took
on the second trip, which amounted to about 20 to 30 pieces of six to ten carat
diamonds.m6O Some of the diamonds came from Tongo, while others were diamonds that
CO Med, a mining commander, brought from Konomél TF1—371 testified that Bockarie
went to Monrovia on this occasion because "the mission was to meet Mr Taylor by all
means...Sam Bockarie had the diamonds and he wanted the materials. He needed the arms
and ammunitions".m62
5884. Between Bockarie's first and second trips to Monrovia he communicated via VHF
with Benjamin Yeaten, and the witness overheard Yeaten tell Bockarie that he had delivered
the diamonds that Bockarie had been unable to deliver himself on the first trip to the
Accused. Those diamonds were the same diamonds that had been taken from Johnny Paul
Koroma.m63 VVhen Bockarie returned from his second trip he came back with some of Mr
Taylor's security and 15 to 20 boxes of AK—47 ammunition, a few RPG bombs, salt, Maggi,
rice and cigarettes.m64 Bockarie also reported that he had met with Mr Taylor on that trip
and that he had seen "the parcels" and that Mr Taylor had said he would keep them for Mr
Sankoh when Mr Sankoh came from prison, and that Mr Taylor instructed Benjamin Yeaten
to give Bockarie the ammunition.m65
5885. TF1-371 testified that after the retreat from Freetown, in January 1999, Sam
_ Bockarie, along with his security and Jungle, went to Monrovia.m66 Bockarie took along
diamonds brought to him by CO Med, who was the mining commander in Kono at that
m57TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp, 2371, 2375 (CS).
m58TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2375 (CS).
UISQTF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2375 (CS).
'3'°°rr1-871, rrannunpr 28 January 2008, p. 2376 (cs). ’
"'°'r1¤1-871, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2375-2376 (cs).
'3'°2T1¤1-871, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2374 (cs).
m63TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2377-2378 (cs).
'3'6‘*r1=1-871, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2378 (cs).
UIGSTF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2378-2379 (CS),
'3'°6 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2429 (cs).

---- End of Page 2032 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % GW 18 May 2012

L;0/ 2 5
time.m67 Bockarie said that he was going to meet Mr Taylor, and when Bockarie arrived he
sent a message to Issa Sesay, who was in charge during Bockarie's absence, that he was with
Benjamin Yeaten and was waiting to meet with Mr Taylor.l3 IGS When Bockarie returned
from that trip he was received by a group of RUF members, including the witness, and told
them that Mr Taylor had appointed him as a two-star general "for mission accomplished",
which the witness explained was the capture of Koidu and Freetown. I3 169
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
5886. Witness Varmuyan Sherif a former ULIMO-K fighter who became an officer in the
sss,‘3"° testified that around the end of 1998, or the beginning of 1999, Mr Taylor asked
him to go to James Sprigg airfield to meet an AFRC delegation and bring them to Mr
Taylor's office. Sherif was unable to meet them as requested because ECOMOG intercepted
their arrival.l3m Later, Mr Taylor called Sherif to his office and in front of Musa Cissé, Joe
Tuah, Benjamin Yeaten, Mommoh Jibba, and Joseph Montgomery, Mr Taylor asked the
witness to go to "the territory of the RUF" to retrieve Sam Bockarie and bring him to
Liberia.m72 While Sherif was escorting Bockarie from Buedu to Liberia, they stopped off at
the witness’ house in Voinjama. When Bockarie removed his coat and left it to go have a
bath, the witness observed a mayonnaise jar containing diamonds inside the coat pocket. I3 m
5887. Sherif further testified that he definitely knew that Sam Bockarie was involved in
diamond mining and in bringing diamonds to Monrovia, to Mr Taylor, and that was why
"Bockarie was being supplied with arms and ammunitions quickly".l3 H4 Sherif was told by
Eddie Kanneh that he was the "diamond manager" and Sherif then "put together" all of his
information and "ended up concluding that Mr Taylor was involved in diamond
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2429 (CS).
{M8 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2430 (CS).
{M9 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2430-2431 (CS).
mm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript, 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 940,
986-987.
mm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 825-826.
I3 m Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 825.
*3 m Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 845.
li W4 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1201.

---- End of Page 2033 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % \i§-M 18 May 2012

business".m75 Sherif further explained however that he did not see "with his naked eyes"
the Accused discussing diamond business with Sam Bockarie. mm
Prosecution Witness TF1—585
5888. Witness TF1—585, an RUF member,m77 testified that from early 1998 to mid—l999,
Jungle used to come from Monrovia with food, clothing and arms and ammunition, every
time that Sam Bockarie requested ammunition, which occurred frequently, perhaps every
two or three weeksmlg TF1—585 testified that Sam Bockarie used to also go to Monrovia
himself after mid—1999, sometimes every two weeks and sometimes every month.m79 The
witness clarified that in 1998, Bockarie would go to Monrovia, but the trips were not as
frequent as they were in 1999, but that Jungle made frequent trips in 1999.mgO TF1—585
testified that Bockarie would go to Monrovia within two days after every time diamonds
were brought to him from Konomgl The witness knew that the RUF brought diamonds to
Bockarie because the witness heard about it from Bockarie and.his wifemgz On many
occasions Sam Bockarie's wife told the witness that Bockarie would be going to Monrovia
because he had received some diamonds and Charles Taylor or Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. 50)
had requested him to go. M3
Prosecution Witness Pegry Kamara
5889. .Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,l3 {S4 testified that in 1998,mgS
diamonds taken from mining sites were recorded in a record book and then handed to a
mining commander who then gave them to Sam Bockarie.m86 When Bockarie received a
good amount of diamonds from Superman Ground, via "Kamara" or "Gugumeh" or
whoever was sent to retrieve them, Bockarie would send a message that he was "going to
Um Varmuyan Sherif Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1201.
Um Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1201.
W7 TF1-585, rrrmeerrpt 5 September 2008, pp. 15589-15592 (Ps).
'3"S TF1-585, rremerrpt 8 September 2008, p. 15682.
'3"9 TF1-585, rrrmeerrpt 8 September 2008, p. 15682.
"'SO TF1-585, Tremeerrpt 8 September 2008, p. 15683.
""" TF1-585, Tremeerrpt 8 September 2008, pp. 15688-15684.
Um TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15684-15685.
'3'83 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15685.
Um Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
IMS Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3143.
mm) Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3148.

---- End of Page 2034 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ JQ 18 May 2012

Liberia to Mr Taylor for ammunition".13187 When he returned, Bockarie would inform them
that he had come back with ammunition from Mr Taylor. 13188
5890. In 1998,13189 Bockarie sent coded messages from Buedu to Kono regarding
minin .13 1911 The first messa e said that the men should not lose Kono because the could
S S Y
et diamonds from there to ive to Mr Taylor in return for ammunition.13131 The men then
S S Y
moved to Superman Ground, where Superman organised mining according to Bockarie's
instructions.13192 Bockarie came to Superman Ground from Monrovia with ammunition and
"insisted on the same message".13193 During this time, Bockarie sent several radio messages
about mining from Buedu, and he also sent people, including Mr Kamara, to see that the
mining was going on in the way that Bockarie expected. 13194
5891. Kamara also testified that he attended a meeting at Sam Bockarie's house sometime
after April or May of 1998 where Bockarie showed the witness and others an "arms and
ammunitions pile" as well as a satellite phone and FM commercial radio. Bockarie then said
that all of the diamonds and monies they had been sending from Kono "these are the things
in return for them, that Mr Taylor has given" and that they were expecting more. 13193 During
the meeting the issue of Issa Sesay losing diamonds in Monrovia was also discussed. The
diamonds Sesay lost were diamonds that had been taken from Johnny Paul Koroma and
iven to Sesa b Bockarie to take to Charles Taylor in Liberia. 13 1%
S Y Y Y
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
5892. Witness TFl-516, an RUF radio operator,13197 saw the RUF mining commander in
Buedu with diamonds, and since the mining commander had sent a previous communication
about bringing diamonds from Kono to Sam Bockarie, the witness deduced that the mining
13187 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3148-3149.
13188 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3148.
"‘8° Peny Karnara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3143.
13190 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3141-3142.
13191 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3142.
13193 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3144.
13193 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3142.
13 194 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3146.
13193 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3159-3162. See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds
to the Accused, June 2000-2002.
""’° Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3146-3147.
""" TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.

---- End of Page 2035 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / 18 May 2012 %
?~./

commander was in Buedu with those diamonds. 13}% Bockarie would then give the diamonds
to Eddie Kanneh who would take them to Monrovia, and his movement would be monitored
by radio in code.!} 199 Kanneh himself would armounce his arrival in Monrovia from either
Base 1 or from 020, although sometimes when he announced his arrival, he had not yet met
with "the chief".l32OO TF1-516 himself sent some of the messages to Base 1 or 020 about
Karmeh's movement, but he was not sure how many times.l3 201 Bockarie told TF1-516 and
others many times in 1999 that Kanneh went to Monrovia to see "his chief, Charles
Tayloraa. 13202
5893. TF1-516 was also at Bockarie's house when the mining commander and Bockarie
went together to Monrovia and called from 020 to the radio base in Buedu when they
arrived.l32O3 Bockarie had told TF 1-516 that they were going to see "his chief] Charles
Taylor". TF1-516 knew that they took diamonds with them because the mining commander
had messaged to Bockarie that he had diamonds, and when the mining commander arrived,
they left for Monrovia.l32O4 Bockarie also went with Eddie Kanneh to deliver diamonds to
Monrovia. The witness testified that Bockarie went more often to Monrovia with Karmeh
than with the mining commander, but most often Kanneh went to Monrovia on his own.l32O5
TF1-516 testified that Bockarie would order the mining commander to bring diamonds from
Kono to Buedu about every two weeks to one month, and that those trips would then
"trigger" Kanneh to take a trip to Monrovia.l32O6
5894. The witness testified that messages about diamonds continued coming at least until
3 the time the witness left in late 2001.13207 The witness knew Eddie Kanneh moved with
diamonds to Liberia because "it was not a secret", and Sam Bockarie used to talk about
Kanneh moving with diamonds to see the Chief.l32O8 Sometimes after Karmeh would move
*3*00 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7164.
*3*00 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7164.
N200 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7164-7165.
*320* TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7165.
*3202 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7165-7166.
*3203 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7166-7167.
*320* TFI-516, 'Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7167.
mw TF1—516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7167-7168.
*3200 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7168.
*3202 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7172.
*3200 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7173.

---- End of Page 2036 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

to Liberia with diamonds, Bockarie would get a call "to report to call sign 020 and thereafter
he would come with materials into Buedu".132119
5895. The witness testified that after the AF RC coup,132111 Captain Moriba was the overall
mining commander in Kono and that it was "the routine" for diamonds to be reported to the
overall mining commander who then reported to Sam Bockarie.13211 ln 1999, there were
increasing radio communications between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten concerning
Bockarie's delivery of diamond parcels to the Accused either by himself directly or through
Eddie Kanneh.13212
Prosecution Witness TF1-367
5896. Witness TF1-367, a member of the RUF,11213 testified that during the time he was in
the mines in Kono in 1998, when he took diamonds to Sam Bockarie, Bockarie took them to
Monrovia to Charles Taylor.13214 The witness knew that Bockarie took the diamonds to
Taylor because the witness was close to Bockarie and used to get a lot of information from
him.13215 The witness further testified that those who had travelled with Foday Sankoh to
Nigeria, came back and gave a message that Sankoh advised that Sesay and Bockarie
shouldn’t abuse any government property, especially diamonds and that they should give
them to Charles Taylor for safe keeping.13216 TF1-367 stated that "the diamonds that we got
were the diamonds that [Sam Bockarie] took to Monrovia to Charles Taylor for us to get our
supply of arms and ammunitions".13211
Prosecution Witness TF1-5 79
5897. Witness TF1-579, a member of the 888,13218 testified that in late 1999,13219 Sam
Bockarie told him that they used to take a certain portion of diamonds to Mr Taylor to
'"°" TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7173.
'"'° TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7119.
W" TF1-516, rrsussrrpt 10 April 2008, p. 7156.
13112 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7164-7172,
'32'3 TF1-367, rrsrrssrrpt 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
'32'4 TF1-367, rrrurssrrpt 21 August 2008, p. 14228.
'32'5 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14228-14229.
'32'6 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14229.
'32'7 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14230.
131111 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19822-19823.
13119 TF1—579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19856.

---- End of Page 2037 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /6// 18 May 2012 \/@

ti o 1 3 9
purchase arms and ammunitions, and that another portion was shared among commanders,
like 1ssa Sesay, and a third portion was saved for Foday Sankoh. mm Bockarie never told the
witness about anywhere that they used to get arms and ammunition. He only told the witness
that "it (referring to arms and ammunition) was directly from Mr Taylor to the RUF", and
the witness was not told if "any other thing" was received from elsewhere.l322l Sam
Bockarie explained to the witness that these diamonds had been mined from the Kono area
in Sierra Leone. I3 222
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -375
5898. Witness TF1-375,an RUF fig12ter,l3223 testified that he spoke to Bockarie while
Bockarie was in Cote d’ Ivoire in 2002, and Bockarie told the witness:
The amount of diamonds that he had cross with -- he said he was told to tum the diamonds over to
President Taylor, by President Taylor himself, and that President Taylor will support him and later
. 13224
he did not see the support.
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -539
5899. Witness TF1-539 testified that he was present in 1999 when Bockarie delivered
diamonds to Benjamin Yeaten. As Yeaten, Marzah, Bockarie, Kamara, and two Arab
nationals sat on Yeaten's veranda, Bockarie called to his bodyguard, Major Foday, who
brought out a suitcase. *2222 Bockarie then removed from the suitcase three small mayonnaise
jars, which contained diamonds}3226 Bockarie put the diamonds from the "bottles" onto a
tray and the two Arabs, along with a Lebanese named Mohamed Saleh, split them into
smaller plastic bags and handed them to Yeaten}3227 Then, Bockarie, Yeaten and the two
Lebanese, including Mohamed Saleh, left in a car, but the witness did know where they
*2222 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19860-19861. 1
*222* TFl-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19861-19863.
*2222 TF1-579, rromerrpr 5 November 2008, p. 19863.
*2222 TFl-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.
*2224 TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jrme 2008, p. 12649.
*2222 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, p. 11450. .
*222*2 TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jrme 2008, pp. 11450-11451.
*2222 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11449-1 1454.

---- End of Page 2038 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

went}3228 The witness testified that on this same evenin , Bockarie left to return to Buedu
S
with three trucks of ammunition loaded from a store in the back ofYeaten's house. Img
Prosecution Witness Suwandi Camara
5900. Witness Suwandi Camara, a member of and instructor under the SSS,l323O testified
that when he returned to Liberia in October of 2002, his nephew Mustapha Jallow told him
that while the witness was gone, Ibrahim Bah had been a liaison officer between the RUF
and NPFL.l323l Jallow explained to the witness that Bah "used to go to Sierra Leone and
come back" and that Bah was "engaged in diamond business between Charles Taylor and
the RUF". Hm The witness clarified that Bah had "brought some diamonds for Char1es" and
that "Charles" was supposed to give Ibrahim Bah something that he would take back to the
RUF soldiers}3233 Camara testified that Jallow knew that this happened to Bah because
J allow was close to Bah and they used to "discuss secrets". my
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
5901. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULIMO—K,
who later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,l3235 testified that at a meeting in
Benjamin Yeaten's house in September 1998,l3236 Eddie Kanneh told him that he would be
"the liaison between Sierra Leone and Liberia for the diamond business of the RUF".l3237
During the meeting the witness saw Bockarie with a satellite phone, which Bockarie said he
had received from Yeaten.l3238After this meeting they went to the Boulevard Hotel where
they met with General Ibrahim Bah and discussed "how best General Bah should ensure to
find a buyer for the RUF diamonds and also that General Bah should help them get radio
*3228 TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008,p. 11454.
‘m° TF1-539, Transcript 10 Jana 2008, pp. 11475-11477.
mw Suwandi Camara, Transcript 8 February 2008, pp. 3458-3459, 3472, 3477-3479; Transcript 11 February
2008, pp. 3523, 3525.
my Suwandi Camara, Transcript 1 1 February 2008, p. 3572.
um Suwandi Camara, Transcript 1 1 February 2008, p. 3572.
Hm Suwandi Camara, Transcript 1 1 February 2008, p. 3573. '
my Suwandi Camara, Transcript 1 1 February 2008, p. 3574.
kms Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000;
Trascnript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.
Hm Abu Keita, Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2109. *
my Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1972.
*323* Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1974.

---- End of Page 2039 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J jpg 18 May 2012 M

communication for the RUF".l3239 Ibrahim Bah, Eddie Kanneh, Sam Bockarie, Benjamin
Yeaten, SB Rogers (the War Council leader of the RUFHMO), Rashid and General Ibrahim's
bodyguard called CR were present at the meeting. During the meeting Bockarie showed
diamonds to Bah, but he did not give Bah any diamonds.l324l
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
5902. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,l3242 testified that Jungle delivered ammunition to Buedu three times. Mallah
did not see the ammunition but he saw Jungle and Jungle said that he brought it}3243 On
cross-examination, Mallah stated that he "was actually more sure" of seeing Jungle on the
second and third occasion}3244 Mosquito said he was giving diamonds and money for the
ammunition, and Jungle said that he always took the diamonds for those things directly to
Charles Taylor}3245 The witness testified that he did not see Mosquito handing the things
over to Jungle, and that he also never went to Monrovia but he "used to see what was
happening and what they used to tell [him]".l324(’
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
5903. Witness Isaac Mongor, a senior commander in the RUFJ3247 testified that all
diamonds mined in Tongo Fields were handed over to Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) and
that Bockarie told the witness that the diamonds he received were "always taken to
Monrovia to Mr Taylor in exchange of ammunitions".l3248 Mongor further testified that
giving diamonds to the Accused became a source of tension, and that when Foday Sankoh
returned from Lomé, he visited the Accused who showed him the diamonds, but Sankoh did
*3333 Abu Kaua, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1975.
‘33‘"’ Abu Kuna, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1969.
mill Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1975-1976.
9242 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209-20210.
mu Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20216-20217.
Bm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20433, see also pp. 20423, 20428, 20430.
U245 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20216-20217.
mw Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20217.
mn See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
‘33"3 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6193-6194.

---- End of Page 2040 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T Z dig 18 May 2012

not take them. Sankoh then confronted Mongor and others about how he was angry that
diamonds had been taken to the Accused, and he had not been told about it.13249
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
5904. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,132313 testified that when he was
assigned as a radio operator in Buedu from early 1998 until late 1999,13 25 1 Samuel Bockarie
made frequent trips to Monrovia.13232 When the RUF needed ammunition, Bockarie would
give the radio operators a message, and they would communicate with Sunlight in Liberia in
order to inform Taylor. Bockarie would go to Monrovia and return to Sierra Leone with
ammunition, food, used clothing and other items. ln one instance, Bockarie brought
diamonds from Kono to Monrovia, and returned with a large truck filled with ammunition,
"rubbers", wine, rice, Maggi, salt and other condiments.13 25 3
Prosecution Witness TPI-590
5905. Witness TPI-590, a businessman who fled to Liberia to escape the RUF,13233
testified that in September 1998 he saw Mosquito in Voinjama on his way from Sierra
Leone to Monrovia.13233 Within one or two weeks later, Mosquito returned to Voinjama on
his way back Sierra Leone with a convoy including Chucky Taylor, Campare, who was a
"specia1 protocol officer to Charles Taylor", some ATU members and "two Arab looking
guys".1323° TPI-590 understood that the two "Arab looking guys" were Charles Taylor's
diamond or gem dealers, one of whom was a member of the Saad group in Preetown, Sierra
Leone.13237 The witness did not see any diamonds in Voinjama. Before leaving for Sierra
Leone the convoy remained in Voinjama for about two weeks recruiting people to train at
Gbamga and then go to Sierra Leone.13233 The witness "got to know" this information
13239 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6193-6194.
13 2313 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
13331 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008 p. 16126; Transcript 17 September 2008 p. 16413
(Witness moved to Buedu approximately three weeks after killings in Kailahun that he states occurred in
February or March 1998, and left in late 1999).
13232 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16136-16137.
13233 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16138-16140.
*5555 Tri-590, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11732, 11734.
*5555 rm-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11764.
133313 TF1—590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11764-11768.
13237 TF1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11830, 11959-11960.
*555* rm-390, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11766-11767.

---- End of Page 2041 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
A is

because the men visited his kiosk during the time that they were in Voinjama.16259 The
witness knew that the men left Voinjama to go to Siena Leone because the road they took
was one that "cou1d lead you to Siena Leor1e". 162611
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
5906. Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie, an RUF radio operator, testified that the diamonds
taken from "Johnny", referring to Johnny Paul Koroma, were given to Issa Sesay and Sesay
later lost them in Monrovia.16261
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
5907. Witness Foday Lansana, an RUF radio operator,16262 testified that Denis Mingo
attended a meeting in Buedu in 1998. When Mingo retumed with arms and ammunition, he
told the witness that Issa Sesay had been sent to Monrovia with diamonds confiscated from
Johnny Paul Koroma, to try to secure arms and ammunition from Charles Taylor, but Sesay
had lost the diamonds while in Monrovia.16266
Prosecution Witness Ian Smillie
5908. Expert Witness Ian Smillie,16264 author of Exhibit P-019 and co-author of Exhibit P-
018, testified that diamond smuggling between Liberia and Siena Leone began long before
Mr Taylor's presidency. 16265
The Accused
5909. The Accused testified that he never received diamonds from Sam Bockarie or any
member of the RUF, and further denied allegations that he supplied arms and ammunitions
in retum for diamonds. 16266
‘"" rrr-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11766-11767.
mw rrr-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, p. 11768.
‘"°‘ Dauda Aruna rpmrp, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21690.
16262 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
13266 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4510-4511.
13264 Ian Smillie, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 674.
13266 lan Smillie, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 600.
16266 Charles Gharikay Taylor, Transcript 5 August 2009, pp. 2601 1-26015.

---- End of Page 2042 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

5910. ln response to the testimony of witness TF1—371, the Accused denied that Bockarie
came to Monrovia before Sept 1998, 13267 and stated that he did not recall Sam Bockarie
attempting to get in touch with him while in Monrovia. The Accused testified that TF1-
371's allegation that Bockarie tumed diamonds over to Yeaten, Bah and Cissé and instructed
them to give the diamonds to the Accused was a "lie".13268 The Accused further denied that
Bockarie brought him diamonds from Kono on a second trip about one week later, stating
that he knew "nothing about this".13269 The Accused also asserted that the alleged radio
communication between Yeaten and Bockarie, in which Yeaten confirmed to Bockarie that
he had delivered the diamonds to the Accused on Bockarie's behalf never occuired.132711 The
Accused did acknowledge the possibility that Bockarie could have been bringing diamonds
to Liberia in this time, but stated that he knew nothing about it. 13271
5911. ln response to the testimony of` TF1—367, the Accused testified that he was unaware
that Foday Sankoh had instructed the RUF to deliver diamonds to him during 1998 and
1999. The Accused denied that Sam Bockarie brought diamonds to him in Monrovia
although he acknowledged that from September 1998 to December 1999, Sam Bockarie
made a dozen trips to Liberia.13272 The Accused further denied "safekeeping" diamonds for
the RUF. *3333
5912. The Accused vehemently denied that Varmuyan Sherif was present during the
Accused's first meeting with Bockarie and further testified that Bockarie did not bring a
mayonnaise jar of diamonds to the meeting. 13274
5913. The Accused denied J abaty J award's testimony that Jungle took diamonds from Sam
Bockarie to him in 1998 and that Jungle was a coordinator between Sam Bockarie and the
Accused. 13 275
13267 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29552—29554.
13268 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29563—29564.
13269 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29564—29565.
13270 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29565—29566.
13271 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, p. 29571.
13272 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l0 September 2009, pp. 28628—28629.
*3373 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28625—28626.
13274 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 2581 1-25813.
*3373 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30267—30268.

---- End of Page 2043 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

occasion, that he subsequently lost, were diamonds mined in Kono, and maintained that they
were the same diamonds that were taken from Koroma.l3283
Prosecution Exhibit P-063
5918. Exhibit P-063 is entitled "RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led
by the RUF Defence Staff" and is dated 2 December l998.l3284 It is a report on the meeting
convened by Sam Bockarie to report on the external mission to Burkina Faso, and as such,
the Trial Chamber has assessed this exhibit in the section of this judgement on the Burkina
Faso mission.l3285
Prosecution Exhibit P-018
5919. Exhibit P-018 is a UN report entitled "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by A
Resolution 1306 -S/2000/1195, Adopted on 20 December 2000713286 In its Executive
Summary, the report declares that diamonds are an "important resource" for the RUF, and
goes on to state that the "bulk of RUF diamonds leave Sierra Leone through
Liberia...carried by RUF commanders and trusted Liberian couriers to Foya-Kama or
Voinjama and then to Monrovia".l3287 The report concludes that "such trade cannot be
conducted without the permission and the involvement of Liberian government officials at
the highest level".l3288 In its section on diamonds, the report states that, beginning in the
1980s, the diamond industry in Sierra Leone fell prey to corruption, mismanagement and
illegal export, and thus the export of diamonds between 1992 and 1996 was less than
200,000 carats, compared to 2 million carats annually in the 1960s. The report attributes the
decline to smuggling and further states that between 1997 and 1999, only 36,384 carats of
diamonds were officially exported from Sierra Leone because of the war.l3289 The report
lm} Issa Sesay, Trascnript 12 July 2010, p. 44307.
Bm Exhibit P—063, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Forum with the External Delegates led by the RUF Defence
Staff, 2 December 1998". The authenticity of this document has been challenged by the Defence. For a finding
on its authenticity. See Evaluation of Evidence: Authenticity of Documents.
13285 See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Burkina Faso Shipment.
Bm Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306—»S/2000/1195, Adopted on
20 December 2000".
13287 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306+5/2000/1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 8, ERN4378.
13 288 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-S/2000/1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 8, ERN4378.
lim Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-S/2000/1195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 16, ERN4386.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012 vg

further notes that "estimates of the volume of diamonds mined by the RUF vary widely"——
some estimates leave a gap as large as USDS 100 million, and further acknowledges that
ears of illicit minin and ex ort have reduced all official historical roduction fi ures to the
Y S P P g
extent that they provide "no reliable statistics for at least two decades on what has actually
been mined in Sierra Leone".1329O Based upon production data from the 1960s, the report
then concludes that the production data from 1999 could be anywhere between USD$ 20
million and USD$ 125 million, but that no matter which amount, it is the "primary source of
income to the RUF".13291
5920. In its assessment of how the RUF's diamonds moved out of Sierra Leone, the report
acknowledges what was the continuing diamond trade in Kenema and the presence of
Lebanese diamond dealers there. The report considers that these diamonds either enter the
"official export system" or are smuggled out to neighbouring countries.13292 The report
however notes that the "bulk of the RUF trade in diamonds leaves Sierra Leone through
Liberia".13293 In paragraph 86, the report asserts that "a Liberian is said to be President
Taylor's representative in Kono, with a mandate to supervise mining operations", and
remarks upon the delivery of diamonds to Monrovia by Eddie Kanneh, Sam Bockarie and
Issa Sesay, acknowledging tensions that occasionally arose regarding whether Taylor was in
fact keeping the diamonds safe or selling them.13294 The panel writes that due to "time
constraints" it was unable "to go into details" of the movement of RUF diamonds out of
Liberia, but stated that there was "sufficient evidence to prove that this trade cannot be
conducted in Liberia without the permission and involvement of government officials at the
highest level", referencing "uncorroborated stories" of high-level go-betweens and senior
government officials transacting with other countries.13295 The report further states:
13290 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306—S/2000/ 1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 17, ERN4387.
13291 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306—S/2000/ 1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 18, ERN4388.
13292 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-5/2000/1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 18, ERN4388.
13293 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-5/2000/1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 18, ERN4388.
13294 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306—S/2000/ 1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 18, ERN4388.
13 295 Exhibit P-018, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306—S/2000/1195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p.19, ERN4389.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

[l]n a country where most of the diamond traders are foreigners and where the movement of foreigners, money
and supplies is as carefully watched, as is the case in Liberia, it is not conceivable that...the significantly
greater volumes of high—value Sierra Leone diamonds moving through Liberia could avoid detection by
government. I 32%
Defence Exhibit D—008
5921. Exhibit D—008 is a document entitled "Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion
Between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return From Detention".l3297 The
document is an unofficial translation of a verbatim report of a recorded discussion between
Corporal Foday Sankoh and his cohorts regarding their activities during Sankoh's detention
from 1996 to 1999, particularly the activities of 6 Januaiymgg According to this document,
Mike Lamin told Sankoh during this briefing that he went with Brigadier Issa to meet Gullit
in Kailahun, where they collected 115 pieces of diamonds from Gullit. The diamonds were
valued at USD$ 15,000.132% They returned to Mosquito the next day and gave him the
diamonds. Mosquito then gave those diamonds to Koroma. The men were later told by
Rambo, Koroma's CSO, that Koroma was in possession of diamonds and that he intended to
escape with them. Lamin and Sesay then confronted Koroma who handed over "nine plastics
containing dia1nonds", later confirmed to be 1,832 pieces,m00 which the men then handed
over to Mosquito for "safe keeping and utility".mOl Lamin stated that Mosquito informed
him that he needed "some of them gem stones to give to the leader in Monrovia" to facilitate
contacts with the "other brothers in Monrovia". 13302 .
Defence Exhibit D—009 1
5922. Defence Exhibit D—009 is a document entitled "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute
Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major General Sam Bockarie" and is dated 26
m%Exl1ibit P—0l8, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-3/2000/1 195, Adopted on
20 December 2000", p. 19, ERN4389.
13297 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention".
mqg Exhibit D—008, "Unofficial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detentio11".
m°°Exl1ibit D—008, "Unofficial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", pp. 3—4,ERNl2956—12957.
mm Exhibit D~008, "UnofHcial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", p.5, ERN12959.
m0lExhibit D—008, "Unofficial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN12957.
moz Exhibit D—008, "Unofficial Translation—-Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and lns Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12957.

---- End of Page 2047 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T % 18 May 2012

L; 0 / September 199943303 The report refers to a transaction undertaken within the "marriage" of
the AFRC and RUF, in which a diamond was sold by a Lebanese businessman and the
commission was given to the government. From this sum, nine million Leones was given to
Colonel Superman for the RUF movement, but he embezzled it.mU4
Deliberations
5923. The Trial Chamber notes that a number of witnesses testified generally about the
delivery of diamonds to the Accused during this period, and a number of witnesses
described specific occasions on which diamonds were delivered to the Accused.
5924. Witness TF1-371 testified about three specific occasions on which Sam Bockarie
delivered diamonds to the Accused. On the first trip, the witness testified that the diamonds
taken to the Accused were those taken from Koroma and Gullit, and thus would have
amounted to about l,l l5 diamonds. TFl-37l knew that these diamonds were delivered to
the Accused because he overheard a radio communication between Yeaten and Bockarie
several days after Bockarie retumed, in which Yeaten told Bockarie that the diamonds had
been delivered to the Accused. On Bockarie's second trip, one week later, TF1-371 testified
that 20 to 30 l0-carat diamonds were delivered to the Accused, and on this occasion
Bockarie returned with ammunition and some supplies. On the third occasion, Bockarie
delivered diamonds in an unspecified amount to the Accused. TFl-37l testified on cross-
examination that he never accompanied Sam Bockarie on any of his trips to carry diamonds
to Monrovia, nor was he present when any RUF senior commander gave diamonds to the
Accused.mO5 However, the Trial Chamber notes his testimony that he heard radio
confirmation of the first delivery and recalls its finding that TFl-37l is a generally credible
witness.mO6 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that several details of TF1-371 's
testimony are corroborated by Defence Exhibit D-008.
5925. The Trial Chamber also notes TF1-371 's more general testimony on the delivery of
diamonds to the Accused, testifying that the Accused "will not deny" that he received
mo} Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie?
l3304Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 2, ERN9659.
*3305 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2772 (CS).
um Credibility Assessment, TF l-371, paras 220-226.

---- End of Page 2048 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Q3 18 May 2012

#0/ QL /
diamonds and that he gave money and arms and ammunition.mO7 In cross-examination,
TF1-371 testified that all the transactions that took place, especially from the latter part of
1998 up to 2001 in terms of securing materials predominantly from Liberia, were financed
by diamonds. The witness could not give an exact number of transactions, but described
them as "plenty" and agreed with the Defence's proposition that they were "numerous to the
extent that they were beyond counting". mos
5926. TF1-371's testimony that Bockarie took a "series of trips" throughout 1998 to
deliver diamonds to the Accused is corroborated by the testimony of a number of other
witnesses who gave general testimony about Bockarie's trips to the Accused with diamonds
during this time. TF1-585, TF1-516, TF1-539, TF1-579, TF1-367, Varinuyan Sherif and
Isaac Mongor all testified about Bockarie's trips to Monrovia and to the Accused with
diamonds during this time period. TF1-516 testified that following the AFRC coup, it was
the "routine" for diamonds to be reported to the overall mining commander and then to
Bockarie, and that in 1999 there was regular radio communication between Bockarie and
Yeaten regarding Bockarie's and/or Kanneh's delivery of diamonds to the Accused.
Likewise, Varmuyan Sherif testified to his general knowledge that Sam Bockarie was
involved in diamond mining and supplying diamonds to the Accused. Sherif was clear that
he had not seen the Accused and Bockarie discussing diamonds, but concluded, based on
what he observed, that the Accused was "involved in diamond business".mO9 TF1-585
testified, based on hearsay, that in the second half of 1999, Bockarie went to Monrovia every
two to four weeks, and usually within two days of receiving diamonds from Kono. The
witness was told by Bockarie's wife that Bockarie went to Monrovia because he had
diamonds and had been asked by Benjamin Yeaten or the Accused to go there. TF1-367,
TF1-579 and Isaac Mongor were all told by Bockarie that he took diamonds to the Accused
during this time period. Mohamed Kabbah also testified about radio reports regarding
Bockarie's frequent trips to Monrovia from early 1998 to late 1999.
5927. The Trial Chamber notes that in the cross-examination these witnesses each
confirmed that he/she had not actually witnessed the transactions occurring in Monrovia
with the Accused. Sherif conceded on cross-examination that he never saw Bockarie and
mm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2763 (CS).
MOB TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2764-2765 (CS).
[3309 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1201.

---- End of Page 2049 ---------------------------


Case No., SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

0 0/ M2
the Accused together and never saw Bockaiie give diamonds to the Accused.l33lO
Furthermore, on cross-examination, TFl-367 testified that he never gave diamonds to
Charles Taylor but gave them to Sam Bockaiie and Issa Sesay.l33llVVhen confronted with
piior statements to the Prosecution that he did not know what Sesay did with the diamonds,
TF 1-367 explained that he knew what happened with the diamonds, but that he had limited
the information that he gave to the Prosecution because he could not explain everything, and
he was not asked about everything.ml2 The Tiial Chamber accepts this explanation, and
considers TFl-367's testimony on this point to be reliable.
5928. The Tiial Chamber observes that TFl-516 gave more specific evidence that he was
present at Bockarie's house when the mining commander and Bockaiie went to Monrovia.
TFl-516 had been told by Bockaiie that they were going to see the Accused, and although
TFl -516 did not see the men take diamonds with them, he knew that they took them because
the mining commander had messaged Bockarie that he was bringing diamonds and when the
mining commander arrived they left for Monrovia. As highlighted by the Defence, the Tiial
Chamber notes that, in his piior statement, the witness had said that he "was not allowed to
be around Sam Bockaiie and the senior officers when the mining commanders reported to
Bockaiie. The mining commanders were expected to bring diamonds, but [the] witness
never actually saw diamonds exchange hands". The witness testified that he would be
around when mining commanders came and that he would see Bockaiie putting diamonds
on the table and playing with them. The Tiial Chamber accepts the witness's explanation
that the radio operators were not allowed around the veny table at Bockarie's meetings with
the commanders but that they could still see him sitting on the veranda playing with the
diamonds from their station. The Tiial Chamber recognises that seeing Bockaiie in this
manner is not the same as seeing an exchange of diamonds and does not therefore consider
this aspect of his testimony inconsistent with his piior statement. 133 13 The Tiial Chamber has
found TF 1-516 to be a generally credible witnessmm and accepts his testimony on this
point.
mw Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 1 1 January 2008, pp. 1031-1032.
mu TFl-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14266-14267.
*33*2 TF1-367, Transcript 28 August 2008, pp. 14908-14910.
Bm TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7548-7552.
mm Credibility Assessment, TF1—516, paras 275-284.

---- End of Page 2050 ---------------------------


Case No.: SC L-0 -0 -T 18 May 2012
/ Gt tg

ipa! 4 3
5929. TFl-539 and Varmuyan Sherif both saw Bockarie in possession of diamonds
contained in mayonnaise jars, and TF1-539 testified that he was present when Bockarie
delivered diamonds in mayonnaise jars to Benjamin Yeaten. On cross-examination, Sherif
testified that he never saw Bockarie give diamonds to the Accused.l33l5 Furthermore, on
cross-examination, Sherif was confronted with prior inconsistent statements about the
diamonds in a mayonnaise jar. The witness had not mentioned the mayonnaise jar in an
earlier interview although he mentioned it in three later interviews.l33l6 Sherif maintained
that he saw the diamonds in Bockarie's pocket,l33 17 and explained that he did not mention
seeing Bockarie with the diamonds earlier because he had received misleading information
regarding the Prosecution and he was afraid that he would get himself in trouble.l33l8While
noting that Sherif’ s testimony on direct examination does not accurately reflect the entirety
of his evidence regarding this incident, and recalling that Sherif is a generally credible
witness,l33 19 the Trial Chamber accepts Sherif's explanation that he was not forthiight in all
of his prior statements out of fear of facing prosecution. Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds
Sherif’ s testimony about this incident to be credible.
5930. Similarly, on cross-examination TFl-539 was confronted with a number of
inconsistencies regarding his testimony about Bockarie and the mayonnaise jars containing
diamonds. The Defence submits that during interviews with the Prosecution, TF1-539 stated
that he witnessed Sam Bockarie in possession of diamonds at White Flower and that the
diamonds were in large cardboard taped boxes in contrast to his testimony that they were in
mayonnaise jars in brown suitcaseslmo but corrections "cla1ified" his statement to reflect
that the diamonds were contained in mayonnaise jars, which were inside the cardboard
boxes, which were inside a brown suitcasem 3 21 The Trial Chamber notes that the witness
explained that the record was not read back to him.l3322 The Trial Chamber recalls that the
Defence made specific objections to TFl-539's credibility, particularly on this issue, and
that the Defence asserts that TFl-539 tailored his evidence of the mayonnaise jars after
13315 Vamruyan Sherif, Transcript 11 January 2008, pp. 1031-1033.
13316 Vamruyan Sherif, Transcript 11 January 2008, pp. 1098-1099; Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1111-1112,
1179-1180,1158-1160,1171.
13317 Vamruyan Sherif, Transcript 11 January 2008, pp. 1101; Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1180-1181.
***8 Varmuyan snanr, Transcript 14 January 2008, pp. 1160-1162, 1172, 1180-1181.
133 19 Credibility Assessment, Vamruyan Sherif, Arms and Ammunition, para. 5324.
imo Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1454.
my Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 1454, citing TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, pp. 11684-11685, 11688.
*"" TF1-539,Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11674-11689.

---- End of Page 2051 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

#0/ (PGA
hearing Moses Blah testify about the mayonnaise jars}3323 The Trial Chamber has
considered generally the credibility concerns that have been raised in relation to TF1-539 in
the witness credibility section of this judgement. *3334 In light of its finding that the testimony
of TF1-539 should be treated with caution, the Trial Chamber is of the view that TF1-539's
testimony on this issue is not credible.
5931. Although the Trial Chamber considers the issue of the diamonds lost by Issa Sesay in
the section in another section of the Judgement,l3325 the Trial Chamber notes that the
evidence of Kamara, Fornie, Lansana and Sesay who testified that the diamonds taken from
Koroma were given to Sesay and later lost by him in Monrovia, contradicts TF1-371's
evidence that those diamonds, along with the diamonds taken from Gullit, were given to
Bockarie and ultimately delivered to the Accused by Yeaten. In considering this
A contradiction, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Sesay's evidence requires
corroboration}3326 While the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay's testimony on this issue is
corroborated by the testimony of Lansana, Fornie and Kamara, the Trial Chamber also notes
that Lansana's testimony was based on hearsay and that Fornie and Kamara did not testify as
to the basis of their knowledge of those events. Furthermore, in light of the fact that TF1-
371 's testimony on this issue was consistent and not effectively challenged on cross-
examination, and corroborated by a number of witnesses and exhibits,l3327 the Trial
Chamber accepts TF1-371's testimony that the diamonds taken from Koroma were given to
Bockarie and ultimately delivered to the Accused by Yeaten.
5932. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence of TF1-375 regarding his
conversation with Bockarie in 2002, in which Bockarie intimated to him that he had _
delivered diamonds to the Accused but later did not see the support that he was promised.
Recalling its finding that TF1-375's evidence should be approached with caution,l3328 the
Trial Chamber has considered this testimony as generally corroborative of Bockarie's
delivery of diamonds to the Accused during this time, but has not relied solely on this
evidence in its findings. Additionally, the Trial Chamber considers the evidence of TF1-590
Bm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 79.
Bm Credibility Assessment, TF 1-539 paras 296-303.
*3333 see Diamonds: Loss ofDiamonds by Sesay.
Bm Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
Um See Diamonds: Loss of Diamonds by Sesay.
13328 Credibility Assessment, TF 1-375, paras 308-312.

---- End of Page 2052 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T X 18 May 2012

to corroborate Bockarie's travels from Sierra Leone through Liberia and back during this
time, but considers it too general to be reliable on the issue of delivery of diamonds in
exchange of arms and ammunition.
5933. The Trial Chamber finds, without taking into account the testimony of TF1—539, that
there is substantial and credible evidence indicating that diamonds were delivered regularly
from Bockarie to the Accused.
5934. The Trial Chamber notes that of the witnesses who testified that diamonds were
delivered to the Accused during this time period, TF1—371, Varmuyan Sherif TF1—585,
Perry Kamara, TF1—579, TF1—539, Augustine Mallah, lsaac Mongor and Mohamed Kabbah
all mentioned arms and ammunitions in connection with these diamond deliveries. For
example, Sherif testified that he knew that Bockarie was bringing diamonds to the Accused
because that was the reason that Bockarie was being "supplied with arms and ammunitions
so quickly". TF1—585 testified that Jungle came from Monrovia "every time" that Bockarie
requested ammunition, which occurred frequently, possibly even every two to three weeks.
Augustine Mallah testified that Jungle delivered ammunition to Buedu two or three times,
and that Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) said that he was giving diamonds and money in
exchange for the arms and ammunitions. Likewise, the Trial Chamber recalls lsaac
Mongor's testimony that Bockarie told him that the diamonds he received were "always"
taken to the Accused in exchange for arms and ammunitions, which later became a source of
tension when Sankoh returned to find that diamonds had been taken to the Accused in
quantities that Sankoh was not aware of Mohamed Kabbah also testified about Bockarie's
"frequent" trips to Monrovia from early 1998 to late 1999, and the one occasion that
Bockarie took diamonds mined in Kono to Monrovia and returned with a large truck filled
with ammunition and other supplies.
5935. ln addition to this general testimony of arms and ammunitions in exchange for
diamonds, witness Perry Kamara testified about a specific occasion on which he was shown
an "arms and ammunitions pile", as well as some satellite phones and commercial radio, at
Bockarie's house in April or May of 1998. Kamara was then told by Bockarie that the arms
and ammunitions and other things were things that had been given by the Accused "in
return" for the diamonds and the money. Kamara further testified that when Bockarie took
diamonds to the Accused throughout 1998 he would return with arms and ammunition from
the Accused. The Trial Chamber notes that Kamara's knowledge of these trips and

---- End of Page 2053 ---------------------------


Case No.:

40/ 4 é
Bockarie's return with arms and ammunition is through radio communication. Additionally,
he saw the "pile" of amrs and ammunition already at Bockarie's house, although he did not
witness Bockarie's trips to Monrovia with diamonds or his returns with arms and
ammunition.
5936. On cross-examination Kamara agreed that Bockarie transmitted messages received
on the satellite phone "about movements between him and Charles Taylor" to all RUF
stations}3329 The Defence referred to several messages transmitted during this time about
ammunitions and food,l333O and put to the witness that none of the messages referred to the
Accused providing ammunition.m3l Kamara stated that Sam Bockarie's messages
concerning diamonds mined in order to secure supplies from the Accused were
"continuous"m’32 and identified a log book appr Bockarie's radio station in Buedu covering
the period September to December 1999,Bm but clarified that while most of the messages
were written down in these logbooks, messages for Sam Bockarie, Foday Sankoh and
Charles Taylor were recorded in separate books.l3334When further challenged, the witness
reaffirmed his testimony that messages concerning Mr Taylor's provision of ammunition to
Bockarie were not in this particular log book but were in a separate log book.m’35 Recalling
that Kamara is a generally reliable witness}3336 the Trial Chamber found this response
credible and accepts Kamara's explanation.
5937. TF1—579 testified that he was told by Bockarie that "they used to" give a certain
portion of diamonds mined in Kono to the Accused to purchase arms and ammunitions
while the other diamonds were shared among the commanders and some were kept for
Foday Sankoh. TFl—579 further stated that Bockarie never told him that they received amrs
and ammunitions rrpm any source other than the Accused. The Trial Chamber notes that
TFl—579 also testified that after Bockarie gave the diamonds to Yeaten he left to return to
Buedu with three trucks of ammunition loaded rrpm a store in the back of Yeaten's house.
The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of TFl—579 should be treated with
Bm Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3332-3333.
Um Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3333-3339.
my Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3340.
Um Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3333.
‘"" Perry kamm, Transcript 7 Fpbmary 2008, pp. 3334-3336, 3341.
Bm Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3335, 3341.
Bm Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 3341.
I3336 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.

---- End of Page 2054 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T dif) 18 May 2012

4 0 r wz
caution}3337 However, the Trial Chamber notes that there is substantial corroboration of his
evidence with regard to the exchange of diamonds for aims and ammunitions from the
Accused. I 3338
5938. ln addition to the specific incident testified to by Kamara, the Trial Chamber also
recalls TF1—371's testimony that following a delivery of 20 to 30 10-carat diamonds to the
Accused, Bockarie retumed with Jungle and aims and ammunition.
5939. While the evidence does not establish that every delivery of diamonds to the
Accused was matched by a delivery of aims and/or ammunition for the RUF, the Trial
Chamber notes that the reliable evidence of the witnesses Kamara and TF1-371 clearly
indicates that diamonds were given to the Accused in order to get aims and ammunition
from him.
5940. ln addition to the testimony regarding Sam Bockarie's involvement in the transfer of
diamonds to the Accused in retum for aims and ammunitions, the Trial Chamber also notes
that so—called liaisons were allegedly involved in these transfers. For example, Vaimuyan
Sherif testified that Eddie Kanneh told him that he was a "diamond business manager
between the RUF and Taylor and the Liberian government".m39 Similarly, Abu Keita was
told by Eddie Kanneh himself that Kanneh was a liaison between Sierra Leone and Liberia
for the RUF's "diamond business". TF1—516 also testified that Bockarie gave diamonds to
Eddie Kanneh, who went to Monrovia and announced his arrival via either Base 1 or 020.
Bockarie told TF1—516 and others that Kanneh went to Monrovia to see the Accused many
times in 1999. TF1—516 also testified that Bockarie went with Kanneh to Monrovia on some
occasions, but that Kanneh mostly went on his own, usually about every two to four weeks,
which was how often the mining commander brought diamonds to Buedu. The Trial
Chamber notes that TF1—516's knowledge of Kanneh's trips to take diamonds to the
Accused was based on his monitoring of radio messages that Bockarie received.
5941. The Defence relies upon Sherif and Keita's evidence regarding Karmeh's statements
about his role as a liaison between the RUF and Taylor and his govemment for diamond
business to demonstrate that Kanneh played a "key role" in the diamond business during this
[3337 Credibility Assessment, TFl-579, paras 339-345.
mm See infra the testimony of Peny Kamara and Jabaty Jaward.
[3339 Varmuyan Sheiif, Transcript 1 1 January 2008, p. 1 103.

---- End of Page 2055 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T g GE 18 May 2012 %

00/ 1+ Z
period.*334O While the Trial Chamber accepts Kanneh's role in diamond transactions during
this time, in the Trial Chamber's view, Kanneh's involvement in diamond business does not
3 create doubt about the Accused's own involvement.
5942. Other witnesses testified that Jungle was involved in the delivery of diamonds to the
Accused in exchange for arms and ammunition. The Trial Chamber recalls the testimony of
Augustine Mallah, who testified that Jungle brought arms and ammunitions to Buedu and
that Jungle took diamonds to the Accused. TFl-371 testified on cross-examination that he
had been told by Issa Sesay and Mr Sankoh that Jungle was a liaison between the RUF and
NPFL, but he also "got to know it" because he had a lot of interaction with Sampson and
Jungle and with other securities throughout 1998.*334* The witness also testified that Jungle
was with Musa Cisse, and was used in the early 1990s as a runner between the RUF and
NPFL. The witness later got to know that Jungle was part of Mr Taylor's security outfit, an
SSS•l3342
5943. Witnesses Abu Keita and Suwandi Camara also testified that Ibrahim Bah was
involved in diamond transactions during this period. The Trial Chamber notes that Bah was
present at a meeting in 1998 to determine how best to sell the diamonds in order to secure
radio communications, but that Keita's testimony did not connect Bah to the exchange of
diamonds for arms and ammunitions with the Accused. Furthermore, Keita testified that
Bockarie showed Bah diamonds during the meeting but did not give him diamonds.*3343
Suwandi Camara's evidence of Bah's involvement was based on what he was told by his
nephew, who was very close to Bah that Bah was "engaged in diamond business between
Charles Taylor and the RUFVI3344 However, the Trial Chamber notes that Camara's
testimony was confused when he recounted a story told to him by his cousin about Bah
taking diamonds to the mansion to Charles Taylor, and that it was not sufficiently
e1anner1.*3343
5944. The Trial Chamber does not accept Camara's evidence that Bah served as an
intermediary for the delivery of diamonds to the Accused, as it was based on information
*334*3 Defence Final Tnar Brief, para. 1213.
*334* TF1-371, Transenpr 28 January 2008, pp. 2372-2373 (Cs).
*3343 TF1-371, Transenpr 28 January 2008, pp. 2373-2374 (CS).
*3343 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1975-1976.
*3344 Suwandi Carnara, Tranaenpr 11 February 2008,p. 3572.

---- End of Page 2056 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T @1;, 18 May 2012
X dg

tt 011+9
allegedly told by Bah to Camara's cousin and then to Camara, it was not corroborated by
other witnesses, and because his testimony was unclear. The Trial Chamber also notes that
Keita's testimony does not indicate that Bah served as an intermediary for the delivery of
diamonds to the Accused. Although the Trial Chamber notes evidence indicating that Bah
was involved in diamond dealings on behalf of the RUF with private individuals separate of
the Accused, the Trial Chamber does not find that Bah was an intermediary between the
Accused and the RUF for the purpose of exchanging diamonds for arms and ammunitions.
However, the Trial Chamber does find that Eddie Kanneh and Jungle made diamond
deliveries from Sierra Leone to the Accused.
5945. Having considered Defence Exhibit D—009, the Trial Chamber accepts that the RUF
transacted diamonds with entities and individuals other than the Accused or his government,
but does not find that this document negates any dealings that the RUF could have had with
the Accused or his government.
5946. The Trial Chamber notes Exhibit P—0l8's conclusion that diamond smuggling from
Sierra Leone to Liberia was "the bulk of the RUF trade in diamonds" and that it was done
with the "permission and involvement" of the Liberian government. The report reviews the
available export and production statistics and acknowledges that estimates of the volume of
diamonds mined by the RUF vary widely by as much as SUSD 100 million and that the
production data from l999 could be anywhere from SUSD 20 million to SUSD 25 million,
but notes that whatever the amount, this was the "primary source of income to the RUF".
The report states that "a Liberian is said to be President Taylor's representative in Kono",
and concludes that the trade of diamonds between Liberia and Sierra Leone "cannot be
conducted in Liberia without the permission and the involvement of government ofHcials at
the highest level". The Trial Chamber notes that the panel did not cite in its reports the
evidence on which this particular conclusion was based. However, it finds that the evidence
adduced by the Prosecution of specific involvement of the Accused in the trade of diamonds
lends credence to the more general findings of the panel's report.
5947. The Defence relies on Expert Witness lan Smillie's testimony that diamond
smuggling between Sierra Leone and Liberia began long before the Accused's presidency in
an effort to raise doubt about the Accused's connection to the diamond traffic between the
Um Suwandi Camara, Transcript ll February 2008, pp. 3572-3573.

---- End of Page 2057 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T dy, 18 May 2012

Cm IS 0
two countries.l334° The Trial Chamber notes Smillie's statement, but further considers the
remainder of his testimony as well as the substance of Exhibits P-019 and P-018, which he
authored and co-authored respectively. For example, Smillie testified that he did not know
how accurate the figures provided by Liberia in Exhibit P-019 were, and that there was not
way of knowing where the diamonds that came into Belgium actually originated, but that the
invoices that were checked always went back to Liberia.m47 According to Smillie, the
Belgian statistics of diamonds imported from Liberia between 1985 and 1999 were
"essentially useless" as an indication of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone and Liberia}3348
Smillie admitted that he knew less about the diamond industry in Liberia than in Sierra
Leone and acknowledged that Exhibit P-018 cited only one source for its conclusion that
Liberia's diamonds are small and of poor quality. However, he testified that many other
sources are available to support that fact}3349 Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that in
spite of the relative uncertainty regarding Belgium import figures of Liberian diamonds and
the fact that diamond smuggling between Sierra Leone and Liberia has long occurred,
Smillie, and the UN Panel of Experts who authored Exhibit P-018 still came to the
conclusion that the Accused bore some responsibility for the movement of` diamonds
through Liberia.m5O In the Trial Chamber's view, that diamond smuggling occurred before
the Accused became the President of Liberia does not raise doubt as to whether he was
involved in the smuggling once he took office, particularly in light of the overwhelming
evidence to the contrary.
5948. The Trial Chamber has considered the Accused's denials that he ever received
diamonds from Sam Bockarie or any other RUF member, that he ever transacted arms and
ammunitions in exchange for diamonds, and that he was aware that Benjamin Yeaten ever
received diamonds from the RUF. The Trial Chamber notes the Accused's testimony that it
would have been possible for these diamond transactions to have occurred within Liberia
without his knowledge, and that he, in fact, did not have knowledge of them. In response to
D-008, the Accused testified that Pa Musa probably refers to Musa Cissé and "Big Brother"
and "Papay" refer to the Accused himself The Accused denied having a meeting with Cissé
IMG Defence Final Trial Briei para. 1202.
mm Ian Smillie, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 603-607, 610.
Img lan Smillie, Transcript 8 January 2008, pp. 610-611.
mw Ian Smillie, Transcript 8 January 2008, p. 617.
mw Ian Smillie, Transcript 8 January 2008. p. 617.

---- End of Page 2058 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 619 18 May 2012

it 0 1 S /
where Cissé informed him some RUF members had come with diamonds to see him. The
Accused stated that he would have been "delighted" at that particular time to have been able
to make contact with the RUF, but at that point had not been able to. The Accused denied
receiving 1,832 pieces of diamonds from Sankoh, in spite of what was stated in D-008.mSl
Nevertheless, in light of the substantial and credible evidence adduced to the contrary, the
Trial Chamber does not accept these blanket denials of the Accused.
5949. Regarding the Prosecution's allegation that Bockarie's movements were monitored
and coordinated by radio stations under the Accused's command, the Prosecution relies
upon the evidence of Perry Kamara, who testified that Bockarie sent radio messages from
Buedu to Kono about mining, and sent men to check that the mining was being conducted in
the way that Bockarie expected. The Trial Chamber accepts Kamara's evidence that
diamonds were taken to the Accused by Bockarie in exchange for arms and ammunition.
However, in the Trial Chamber's view, this evidence does not demonstrate that the radios
played any part in the coordination of Bockarie's movement or monitoring of his movement,
nor does it show that either of those was done under the control of the Accused. Likewise,
the allegation is not supported by the remainder of the evidence relied upon by the
Prosecution regarding diamond deliveries during this time period. The Trial Chamber has
considered additional evidence regarding the use of Liberian radios by the RUF, including
the monitoring of Eddie Kanneh's movements, in the section on Operational Suppo1"t.m52
5950. In addition to its specific credibility findings herein, the Trial Chamber accepts the
consistent and unchallenged testimony of Keita, Sherif, Mallah, Kabbah and TF1—371. On
the basis of the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has established that 5
during this period diamonds were delivered to the Accused by Sam Bockarie directly, as 5
well as indirectly through intermediaries such as Eddie Kanneh and Jungle. The Trial
Chamber further finds that these diamonds were delivered to the Accused in order to get
arms and ammunition from him.
Findings
5951. The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that diamonds were delivered
to the Accused by Sam Bockarie directly, as well as indirectly through intermediaries such
my Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29717-29720.

---- End of Page 2059 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gio 18 May 2012

A;0 rs'?.
as Eddie Kanneh and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) from February 1998 to July 1999, and
that these diamonds were delivered to the Accused for the purpose of obtaining arms and
ammunition from him.
(i)_ Loss of Diamonds by Issa Sesay
Submissions of the Parties
5952. The Prosecution submits that the Accused was aware that Johnny Paul Koroma had
diamonds and wanted those diamonds brought to Monrovia. Under the Accused's
instruction, Benjamin Yeaten was to "sneak" Koroma to Monrovia with the diamonds. The
Prosecution submits that Bockarie confiscated diamonds from Koroma, Alex Tamba Brima
and Sam Koroma and travelled from Buedu to Monrovia to deliver these diamonds to Taylor
himself. Owing to Taylor's concerns to keep his links to the RUF secret the diamonds were
delivered to Taylor by his "trusted subordinates".m53 According to the Prosecution, the
events surrounding the taking of these diamonds from Koroma and their delivery to the
Accused were "treated with great delicacy", and in written briefings of the incident to Foday
Sankoh, Bockarie used vague terms. The Prosecution also highlights that Bockarie referred
to Monrovia as the "transit point" when Issa Sesay "lost" diamonds and wrote that he could
not put in writing his (Bockarie's) dealings with "‘sympathizers’ who provided them with
basic needs and facilitated the move to Kono and beyond".m54 By referring to diamonds
carried by Sesay as "lost", the Prosecution questions whether Sesay actually "lost" those
diamonds and the identity of the intended recipient. The Trial Chamber has considered the
evidence of witnesses TF1-371, Perry Kamara, TF1-516, Alice Pyne, Dauda Aruna Fomie
and Foday Lansana, as well as exhibit P-067.
5953. The Defence submits that in April 1998, Ibrahim Bah coordinated with General
Diendere of Burkina Faso to orchestrate an arms and ammunitions shipment from
Ouagadougou. However, this shipment never materialised because Issa Sesay, while in
Monrovia on his way to meet Diendere, lost the diamonds that were to be used as payment
13352 Operational Support: Communications, Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF.
13353 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 145, 367.
13354 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 145, 146.

---- End of Page 2060 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T 18 May 2012

for the shipment.m55 The Accused, Issa Sesay and Exhibits D—OO8 and D—O09 provided
relevant evidence.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1—371
5954. Witness TF1—371, a senior member of the RUFJ3356 testified that Issa Sesay
occasionally took diamonds to Monrovia. Once, Sesay returned with Jungle and explained to
Sam Bockarie that he had lost some diamonds while having tea in a guest house in
Monrovia. Although Bockarie was furious with Sesay, he and Sesay were good friends so
Bockarie did not take drastic measures against Sesay. Bockarie instead sent Sesay to
Pendembu, where Sesay remained until he was given a mission to attack Koidu in December
]998·13357
5955. Witness TF1—371 testified in detail about diamonds being taken from Johnny Paul
Koroma in Buedu around March 1998. TF1-371 testified that those diamonds were given to
Sam Bockarie and Ibrahim Bah and taken to the Accused in Monrovia, and that they were
not the same diamonds that were given to Issa Sesay and subsequently lost by him. That
testimony has been considered in the section on deliveries of diamonds to the Accused
during the Intervention period.l3358
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
5956. Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,m59 testified that during the time that he was
engaged in mining, Johnny Paul Koroma went to Buedu and, when he arrived in Buedu,
there was information that he had diamonds on him.l336° Kamara testified that "Sam
Bockarie went and Issa Sesay attacked Johnny Paul Koroma and took these diamonds from
him".l3 361 The witness testified that the diamonds were then counted and Mosquito sent a
message to all stations that Koroma had tried to escape with diamonds and they had been
13355 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1073.
M6 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (cs).
'"" TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2395.
133 5 8 See Diamonds: Loss of Diamonds by Sesay.
13359 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
"’°° Perry Karnara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3146.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3146.

---- End of Page 2061 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

0 61 54
confiscated from him.133°2 Kamara understood that the diamonds amounted to "two
plastic[s] full", including one 40 carat diamond.13363 Kamara testified that Bockarie "said he
was giving that diamond to Issa Sesay to take it to Liberia to Charles Taylor", and that Sesay
went with the diamonds, but later returned saying that the diamonds had been stolen from
him.13364 Kamara further testified that around April or May 1998, he accompanied Superman
to Buedu where they attended a meeting convened by Sam Bockarie. At the meeting, among
other topics, the issue of Sesay losing the diamonds was discussed. 13365
Prosecution Witness TF1—5 16
5957. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,13366 testified that Issa Sesay travelled to
Liberia during the time that Bockarie was the leader. Once, Sesay was given diamonds to
take to Liberia. He stayed in Liberia for some time and, upon his return to Buedu, Sesay said
that the diamonds were taken from him by gangsters. A forum was then held to discuss the
matter and the people and officers were grumbling.13367
Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne
5958. Witness Alice Pyne, an RUF radio operator,13368 testified that on one occasion she
and Superman were called by Sam Bockarie to a meeting in Buedu to discuss the issue of
Issa Sesay losing diamonds that he had been given by Sam Bockarie.13369 In Buedu, Pyne
was informed by Major Sellay and Sebatu that Issa Sesay had been given the diamonds in
order to take them to Charles Taylor in exchange for arms and ammunition.13370 Pyne
learned that diamonds taken from Johnny Paul Koroma's wife were included in the
diamonds that "went missing"13371 and that Sesay lost the diamonds while staying in a hotel
13362 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3146.
*3363 Perry Kamara, rrrrrrsprrpr 5 February 2008, pp. 3146-3147.
13364 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3146-3147.
13365 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3159-3162.
‘"°6 TF1-516, Transcript 8 Apr·r1 2008, p. 6845.
*367 TF1-516, Transcript 15 Aprrr 2008, p. 7594.
13368 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12074.
133°9Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12209. 12212; Transcript 19 June 2008. pp. 12231, 12233.
133711Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, p. 12231.
13371Alice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12212.

---- End of Page 2062 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2()12

é'
Lf 0 :50
in Liberia.l3372 Based on Pyne's testimony, the meeting in which they discussed Sesay losing
the diamonds occurred sometime around June 1998. mn
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna F ornie
5959. Witness Dauda Aruna F ornie, an RUF radio operator,l3374 testified that around mid-
1998 a dispute arose between Superman and Mosquito.m75 The main cause of the dispute
was that Mr Mosquito had given Mr Issa diamonds for Mr Issa to take to Mr Taylor in
Monrovia, but Mr 1ssa came back stating that he had lost the diamonds.m76 When asked
why Superman went to join SAJ Musa in Koinadugu after the intervention, the witness
attempted to respond that it was because "Mosquito had given diamonds to Issa and those
were the diamonds that they took from Jol1nny".m77
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
5960. Witness Foday Lansana, an RUF radio operator,m78 testified that he was in Kono
District from January 1998 to September 1998, and that for about four months of that time
he was in Tefiyamw Sometime during Lansana's presence in Tefiya, Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superman) was in regular contact with Sam Bockarie over the radio about how to get arms
and ammunitions in order to gain back Koidu. Mingo requested arms and ammunitions to
enable them to advance on ECOMOG and Bockarie informed him that they were always
trying to make ways of getting arms and ammunitions to for the defensive positions around
Koidu.l338O Lansana testified that this was one of the reasons that Bockarie decided to send
Issa Sesay to Monrovia with "some quantities" of diamonds to try to secure arms and
ammunitionsmgl The witness came to know that Issa Sesay was sent to Monrovia with
I3mAlice Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, pp. 12233-12234; Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12192-12193, 12209-
12210. Pyne testified that she first came to PC Ground in March 1998 and that two shipments of arms and
ammunitions came after that. The Hrst came almost two months after she arrived at PC Ground and the second
was brought after the meeting in Buedu where the issue of Sesay losing the diamonds was discussed, which
happened about two months after the first shipment.
W3 Airpp Pyrrp, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12192-12193, 12209-12210.
Bm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.
mm Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21689.
I3376 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21691.
uw Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 4 December 2008, p. 21690.
Img Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
Bm Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4513-4514.
Bm Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4510.
lm! Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4510.

---- End of Page 2063 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI.-03-01-T (J3; 18 May 2012

P"
00/ 6 6
diamonds that had been confiscated from Johnny Paul Koroma to get arms and ammunitions
from Charles Taylor.13382 The witness was told this by Mingo when he returned from a
meeting in Buedu with arms and ammunitions.13383 Lansana also testified that Sesay had lost
the diamonds in Monrovia, but that Fonti Kanu made an arrangement with an ECOMOG
general for them to get arms and ammunitions.13384
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
5961. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,13383 testified that around
April 199813386 he was present at a meeting, along with Colonel Jungle and General
lbrahim,133117 in a secret location between Buedu and Dawa.1331313 Bockarie had given Sesay
diamonds to take to Charles Taylor in Liberia, but Sesay returned after about one week
claiming to have lost the diamonds. Sam Bockarie called the meeting in order for Sesay to
explain how he had lost the diamonds. Those assembled considered what they should do
next as the diamonds Sesay lost were the RUF's source of gaining arms and
ammunitions.13339
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanrreh
5962. Witness Karmoh Kanneh, an RUF commander,13390 testified that he attended a
meeting convened by Bockarie between April and June of 1998, near Buedu. The meeting
was attended by many commanders and discussed at the meeting, among other things, was
the topic of Issa Sesay losing diamonds. 13 3 91
Prosecution Witness TF1 -585
5963. Witness TF1—585, an RUF radio operator,13392 testified that around September
1998,13393 Sam Bockarie convened a meeting in his compound with Issa Sesay, Junior
*3333 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4510-4511.
13333 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, p. 4511.
*3333 Poday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4511, 4517.
*33*33 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
13336 Albert Saidu, Transcript 9 June 2008, p. 11353.
*3333 Albert Saidu, Transcnpt 5 June 2008, p. 11055.
*3333 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11054.
*3333 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11055.
*333** Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.
*333* Karmoh Kanncn, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9683-9684, 9689.

---- End of Page 2064 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / (1/1* 18 Mgy 2012

Rambo (CO Isaac), Five—Five and Jungle. Among other things, the purpose of the meeting
was to discuss Sesay's punishment for losing diamonds in Monrovia. TF1—585 did not attend
the meeting although she testified that those in attendance told her things about the meeting,
and that she overheard Bockarie discussing the issue of Sesay losing the diamonds with
Eddie Kanneh. {3394
The Accused
5964. In response to the testimony of Alice Pyne, the Accused testified that he knew
nothing about this episode. The Accused noted the inconsistency in witness testimony on
this issue, including some witnesses who stated that the diamonds were intended to go to
Burkina Faso and others who stated that the diamonds were intended to go to him. The
Accused reiterated that Sesay never had and could never have brought any diamonds to him.
The Accused testified that he was not the person who would have received any diamonds
from "any one of them". {3395
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
5965. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,{3396 testified that Bockarie held onto
the diamonds taken from Johnny Paul Koroma until about 20 April 199843397 At that time,
Bockarie sent Sesay with the diamonds to meet Memunatu Deen in Monrovia. Upon Sesay's
arrival in Monrovia, Deen was to contact Ibrahim Bah who would come to pick up Sesay
and take him to meet General Diendere in Ouagadougou. {3398 The purpose of his travel was
to take the diamonds to Bah and Diendere to get "fighting materials" to go back and fight
ECOMOG}3399 Sesay explained that while he was in Monrovia, the diamonds went
'""2 rrr-590, Transcript 5 sepremreer 2008, pp. 15582-15584, 15589-15592 (Ps).
{3393 During the witr1ess’ examination-in-chief, TF1-585 testified that three meetings took place in June,
September and December 1999. On cross-examination, the witness corrected her testimony to say that they
occurred in 1998 (TF1-585, Transcript 11 September 2008, pp. 15972-15973). In view of TF1-585's testimony
in chief that the three meetings took place in the June, September and December before "Januar"y 6" (TF1-585,
Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15682), and that they took place withinrthe same year that Johnny Paul Koroma
was removed from power in Freetown, TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 1998, p. 15672, together with the
witness's correction during her cross-examination, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the witness is referring to
events that she recalled occurring in 1998.
{3394 TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15668-15669.
{3395 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 29978-29979.
{33% Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
'""’ reee Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44046, 44050.
{3398 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44046.
'""° reee Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44055.

---- End of Page 2065 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / mi? 18 May 2012

wx Sa
missin .43400 Sesa was in Monrovia for about five da s and then Bockarie sent Ma'or
S Y Y J
Mulbah to "check what happened" and then Sesay and Mulbah returned to Sierra Leone. 43404
Prosecution Exhibit P-067
5966. Exhibit P·067 is a handwritten ‘Situation Re o1t’ from the Black Revolutiona
P YY
Guards to ‘The Leader.’l34O2 The document's author writes that upon Johnny Paul Koroma's
arrival in Buedu, he denied possessing diamonds. "High Command" however had
information to the contrary and gave Brigadier Issah [sic] Sesay and Brigadier Mike Lamin
instructions to search Koroma. The search revealed a "large quantity of diamonds", which
was then taken from Koroma. That parcel of diamonds was later given to "Mr Ibrahim
(General)"and "sister Memuna" to travel with them directly to president Taylor.l34O3
"Through this development, the High Command was able to receive the first satellite phone
from General Ibrahim which he was use to [sic] to do some important contacts with".l34O4
The document states that once General Ibrahim returned to Burkina Faso, the High
Command also received a "good caraiage" [sic] of diamonds from Kono,l34O5 and the High
Command planned to send "another good parcel" to General Ibrahim in Burkina Faso in
exchan e for arms and an1rnunitions.l34% The "Hi Command" then handed over a arcel
S P
of diamonds to the B.G.C. Brigadier Issah [sic] Sesay for him to pass through Monrovia and
make his way to Burkina Faso to meet General Ibrahim to work out modalities and get some
materials. Sesay travelled with Jungle and some Liberian securities to Monrovia.l3407 While
in Monrovia, information was received by the High Command that the parcel of diamonds
had "dropped from Sesay". Sesay then returned to the base and gave the same report to the
High Command. The joint security investigated Sesay and took a statement from
43400 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44047.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, p. 44047.
'3402 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army—Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Corr1mander".
13403 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army—Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Cornmander",ERN9675.
43404 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army—Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander",ERN9675.
I3405 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army—Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commar1der",ERN9675.
134% Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army—Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander",ERN9676.
43407 Exhibit P—067, "RUF People's Army—Situatior1 Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander",ERN9676.

---- End of Page 2066 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / \j$_{ 18 May 2012

him.144O11The document states, " [m]oreso, President Taylor continues to give helping hands
with logistics which involves food stuffs and materials". 144114
Defence Exhibit D-008
5967. Exhibit D-008 is a document entitled "Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion
Between Cpl. Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return From Detention".144111 The
document is an unofficial translation of a verbatim report of a recorded discussion between
Corporal Foday Sankoh and his cohorts regarding their activities during Sankoh's detention
from 1996 to 1999, particularly the activities of 6 J anuary.13411 The conversation occurred in
1999, following Sankoh's release from detention. In addition to the contents in the exhibit
related to the diamonds taken from Koroma and Gullit, the document reflects that in the
meeting, Lamin was "aware that some transactions" had already been "going on" as
Mosquito had made several visits to Monrovia through the help of "Benjamin Legon" and
the Adjutant General. Lamin stated that the Adjutant General "knows about some demands
given to Benjamin Legon for onward handing over to the leader of Liberia".14412 It was later
decided that they should send someone to "the Brother in Burkina" for "logistical materials"
and Mosquito decided to send Brigadier Issa.13413 Lamin continued:
In this way, some parcels of diamonds among which was [a] fifteen carats diamond that I have seen myself
handed over personally by General Mosquito and myself to him. We left for Monrovia but we understood later
from Issa himself that he had lost the diamonds in Monrovia. 14414
5968. Lamin then explained that upon Sesay's return after losing the diamonds Sesay was
sen o en em u an i was eci e o inves iga e e issue a er as e pressure om e
ttPdb dt dddt ttth lt th nth
enemy was increasing. Pa Rogers stated that "In addition, we captured Kono the other day
and started some mining operations there...all the diamonds were handed over to Mosquito
144014 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Co1nmander", ERN. 9676.
144114 Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army-Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Cornmander",ERN9676.
14410 Exhibit D-008, "Unof`ficial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention".
14411 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation-Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his C ohorts on his Return from Detention".
14412 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN12957.
14414 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation-Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN12957.
13 414 Exhibit D-008, "Unof`ficial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN12958.

---- End of Page 2067 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-O3-O1-T / 18 May 2012

and sold at seventeen thousand united states [sic] dollars at Buedu in the presence of Pa
Rogers, Johnny Paul Koroma and other senior members". HMS
5969. Pa Rogers then stated that he was not present during the issue with Koroma but
understood that Ibrahim Bah was present. According to the document, the "Adjutant
General"l34l6 spoke next and stated that the diamonds were with Mosquito until it was
decided that they should use them to make "outside contacts" because of the pressure they
were facing.l34l7 General Ibrahim arrived that same day and it was agreed to "move to
Monrovia to meet the big brother" and that move "coincided with Benjamin leaving for
Monrovia also".l34l8 He goes on to say that "[i]n this way, we met at Koindu were [sic], we
checked the 1832 pieces of diamonds in 9 plastics which was intact. In lieu of this, Bramlg
told Benjamin that they had something that they wanted to presence [sic] to the Big Brother
in Monrovia so that he will help us".l3420
5970. The report records Benjamin's advice about leaving Liberia because of ECOMOG
and, acting on that advice, the men left that night. Upon arriving in Koindu, they met
Benjamin and Memuna, and then wrote a letter and handed over the 1832 pieces in 9 plastics
for the Papay. "Bra approved the letter" and General Ibrahim, Memuna and Jungle went to
Liberia while the others ("we") returned to Buedu. Wm Later, when Pa Rogers "and others"
went to Gban a sic , the diamonds were shown to them and the Bi Brother told them that
S S
he would keep them until Sankoh returned. mm
WHS Exhibit D-008, "Unofticial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12958.
mm The Trial Chamber recalls that the Adjutant General is Rashid Sandy. TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008,
pp. 2841-2846 (CS).
mn Exhibit D-008. "UnofHcial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN12959.
mm Exhibit D-008, "Unofiicial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959.
mw The Trial Chamber is satisfied that "Bra" is Sam Bockarie. See Alex Tamba Teh, Transcript 8 January 2008
p. 272; TF1-371. Transcript 1 February 2008 pp. 2940, 2943 (CS); TF1-362, Transcript 3 March 2008 p. 5094;
TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008 p. 15739; Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010 p. 45173.
M20 Exhibit D-008, "UnoFficial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN 12959.
lm} Exhibit D-008, "Unofiicial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention". ERN 12960.
lm] Exhibit D-008. "UnofHcial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN12960.

---- End of Page 2068 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X 18 May 2012

597l. JRR, or Junior Rambo, then told Sankoh that diamonds, including one ll carat
diamond, were brought from Kono and given to Brigadier Issa.14424 General (referring to
Adjutant General) then had a meeting with senior officers in which he explained that the war
had reached a stage where they required "external assistants [sic] to make contacts for
ammunition in Burkina F aso".14424 Thus, Sesay was given a document and the diamonds to
hand over to General Ibrahim in Burkina F aso.13425 Jungle accompanied Sesay to Liberia and
Sesay was told to try his best to reach General Ibrahim in Burkina Faso for the diamond
sales. They then heard from Jungle that Sesay had dropped the diamonds in Monrovia and
the commander immediately summoned Brigadier Issa to report back to base.14426
Defence Exhibit D—OO9
5972. Defence Exhibit D—OO9 is a document entitled "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute
Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major General Sam Bockarie" and is dated 26
September l999.13424 Bockarie writes, in relevant part, that prior to his quarrel with
Superman, "diamonds mined from Kono were given to Brigadier Issa in order for him to
make contact and delivery to a business associate of yours".14428 The report explains that, at
his "transit point", when Sesay returned from a tea shop to his hotel he discovered that the
"diamonds were missing from his pocket".14429 Sesay's claim of losing the diamonds was
substantiated by local news reports of diamonds found on the street of the city.134311 The
report states that Colonel Jungle was with "Brig. Issa" and thus that the two of them could
better explain the "events surrounding the loss of the diamonds".14441 Bockarie then
14424 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return Hom Detention", ERNl296l.
14424 Exhibit D-OO8, "Unofficial Translation—~Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return Hom Detention", ERNl296l.
13425 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation——Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERNl296l.
14426 Exhibit D-008, "Unofficial Translation—Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal
Foday Sankoh and his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERNl296l. .
14424 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie".
14428 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 6, ERNOOOO9663.
14424 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 6, ERNOOOO9663.
13440 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 6, ERNOOOO9663.
14441 Exhibit D-OO9, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 6, ERNOOOO9663.

---- End of Page 2069 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3—Ol—T / 18 May 20l2 `E

expressed his disappointment at the loss of the diamonds because he had "planned against
revenues generated from the proceeds", then expressed his confidence in Sesay's story and
his ability as a commander}3432 Bockarie then stated that he had decided to "refer the matter
to [Foday Sankoh] on [his] arrival whilst assigning [Bockarie] to the front-line..."l3433
Deliberations
5973. The Trial Chamber notes that in its Final Trial Brief the Prosecution submits that the
diamonds taken from Koroma were ultimately delivered to the Accused. ln support of this
submission, the Prosecution relies upon the evidence of TF1-371 who testified that it was
Bockarie who delivered the diamonds taken from Koroma to the Accused}3434 However, the
Prosecution also submits that Sesay took diamonds to Monrovia and seems to question
whether they were lost}3435 The Trial Chamber considers the use of the terms "transit point"
and "sympathizer" are vague, and that such terminology is intended to conceal the
relationship between the RUF and the Accused. Based upon the overwhelming evidence
adduced by both the Prosecution and Defence that Sesay lost the diamonds in Monrovia,
including direct evidence from Sesay, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the diamonds Sesay
took to Monrovia were lost in Monrovia. 13436 Here, the Trial Chamber considers whether the
Accused was the intended recipient of the diamonds that Sesay lost.
5974. Regarding the source of the diamonds, the Trial Chamber notes at the outset that the
Prosecution's evidence is inconsistent regarding the source of the diamonds given to Issa
Sesay and subsequently lost by him. Witnesses Perry Kamara, Dauda Aruna Fornie, and
Foday Lansana all testified that Sesay received at least some of the diamonds taken from
13432 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 6, ERN00009663.
13433 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution From Major
General Sam Bockarie", p. 6, ERN00009663.
13434 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 145-146, citing TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2369-2371
(CS). TFl-371's evidence regarding the taking of diamonds from Koroma and their ultimate delivery to the
Accused is addressed in the section on alleged deliveries of diamonds to the Accused from February 1998 to July
1999. See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, February 1998-July 1999.
13435 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 146.
13436 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44046-44047; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2395; Alice
Pyne, Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12212; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4511, 4517; Albert
Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11055; Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390; Transcript 13 May
2008, pp. 9683-9684, 9689; TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15668-15669; Exhibit P-067, "RUF
Peop1e's Arm——Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander",ERN9676; Exhibit D-
008, "Unofficial Trans1ation—·Verbatim Report on a Recorded Discussion Between Corporal Foday Sankoh and
his Cohorts on his Return from Detention", ERN12958; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute

---- End of Page 2070 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T WYQ 18 May 2012

Koroma and that those were the same diamonds that he lost. Witness TFI-371 as well as
Exhibits P-067 and D-008 indicate that the diamonds taken from Koroma were ultimately
delivered to the Accused, while TFI-371, P-067, D-008 and and D-009 all indicate that the
diamonds Sesay lost were diamonds mined in Kono, not the same diamonds taken from
Koroma. Issa Sesay, gave first hand evidence that the diamonds he lost in Monrovia were
the same diamonds taken from Koroma, stating that the only diamond of any value among
them was a 14 carat diamond.l3437 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the diamonds
taken from Koroma were delivered to the Accused in exchange for arms and ammunitions
by Bockane and Bahfmg However, in the Trial Chamber's view, the source of the
diamonds lost by Sesay is irrelevant to the consideration of who was the intended recipient
of the diamonds that Sesay lost.
5975. Regarding the intended recipient of the diamonds that Sesay lost, the Trial Chamber
notes that witnesses Alice Pyne, Dauda Aruna Fomie, Foday Lansana and Albert Saidu all
testified that the diamonds Sesay was given were intended to be taken by him to the
Accused. Pyne and Lansana both further testified that those diamonds were to be given to
the Accused in exchange for arms and ammunitions. Saidu testified that he was present in a
meeting where the issue of Sesay losing the diamonds was discussed and it "was said" that
the diamonds had been intended for Charles Taylor in return for arms and ammunitions. The
Trial Chamber further notes that witnesses TFI-371 and TFl-516 testified that the diamonds
were intended to be taken to Monrovia or Liberia generally, without specifying who was to
receive them. However, the Trial Chamber notes Exhibit D-008 which indicates that the
parcels of diamonds, including a 15-carat diamond, that were handed to Issa Sesay and were
later lost by him in Monrovia had been intended for delivery to Ibrahim Bah in Burkina
Faso 13439
5976. Exhibits P-067, D-008 and D-009 all state that the diamonds Sesay lost were
intended to be taken to Burkina Faso. P-067 and D-008 both state that Sesay was to take the
Report to the Leader of the Revolution Prom Major General Sam Bockarie", p. 6, ERN00009663.
13437 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46589. The Trial Chamber notes a number of inconsistencies in
Sesay's testimony regarding the details of his trip to Monrovia and the subsequent loss of the diamonds. As those
inconsistencies are mostly relevant to the Sesay's credibility, they have been considered fully in the section on
Sesay's credibility. Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
13438 See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, February 1998-July 1999.
**4** rrr-371, rrrrrrsprrpr 1 February 2008, pp. 2846-2849.

---- End of Page 2071 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / \i 18 May 2012

4 0 xc or
diamonds to Burkina Faso to meet Ibrahim Bah, while D—009 states that the plan was for
Sesay to "make contact" with a "business associate" of Sankoh's.
5977. Sesay testified that the instructions he received when he was given the diamonds
taken from Koroma was that he would meet Ibrahim Bah in Monrovia to take him to
Burkina Faso to meet General Diendere}3440 Sesay had no other option than this
arrangement because this was what he was told to do.l344l Sesay did not know the amount of
ammunition to be received and he never found out because he lost the diamonds}3442 The
Trial Chamber has noted a number of inconsistencies in the details of Sesay's testimony
regarding this trip. Given the nature of the inconsistencies and the passage of time, the Trial
Chamber considers them to be relatively minor, but the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that
Sesay's evidence must be considered with caution and cannot be relied upon without
corroboration}3444 Here, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay's testimony that the diamonds
were intended for a transaction with Bah and Diendere in Burkina Faso is corroborated by
the evidence of witness TF1—371, as well as exhibits P—O67, D—008 and D—009. A
5978. The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence of Perry Kamara, Alice Pyne, Lansana,
Dauda Aruna Fornie, Albert Saidu and Karmoh Kanneh is based on hearsay whilst Issa
Sesay and TF1—371, more senior members of the RUF with first hand information of events,
stated that the diamonds were to be delivered to Ibrahim Bah. The Trial Chamber accepts the
evidence of TF1—371 and Sesay that the diamonds were intended for delivery to Ibrahim
Bah.
5979. The Trial Chamber has further considered the Accused's testimony that he was
unaware of these events and his denial that he ever received diamonds, taken from Koroma
or otherwise. Regarding Exhibit P—O67, the Accused was asked why he would allow the
RUF to bring diamonds through his country without taking them. The Accused responded
that he was not in control of the diamonds, and expressed doubt that the incident of Sesay
losing the diamonds ever occurred in the first place. The Accused seemed to imply that the
conflicting evidence on this issue, both that Sesay brought diamonds intended for the
Accused that were later lost, and that Sesay was travelling through Monrovia to Burkina
M40 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46590-4569l.
lm] Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 August 2010, pp. 47260—47263.
13442 Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, p. 46591.
l3443 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.

---- End of Page 2072 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Faso with diamonds that were lost in Monrovia, is a lie.13144 However, given that they were
ultimately lost before reaching their destination, the Accused's denial that he received them
is not probative of where they were intended to be delivered.
5980. Regarding the timing of these events, the Trial Chamber notes the Defence's
submission, as well as Issa Sesay's testimony, that the diamonds were lost in April 1998. The
Trial Chamber further recalls its finding that the meeting convened by Bockarie in Buedu at
which Perry Kamara, Alice Pyne, Dauda Aruna Fornie, Albert Saidu, TF1-585 and Karmoh
Kanneh all testified that the issue of Sesay losing the diamonds was discussed occurred in
April 1998.13145 As such, the Trial Chamber finds that Sesay lost the diamonds in Monrovia in
around April 1998.
Findings
5981. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that around April 1998, diamonds
iven to Issa Sesa were lost b him in Monrovia, but the Trial Chamber finds that the
8 Y Y
Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that those diamonds were intended for
delivery to the Accused.
(c) July 1999-May 2000
Submissions of the Parties
5982. The Prosecution submits that the Accused encouraged the AFRC/RUF to sign the
Lomé Peace Accord, which granted the RUF control over Sierra Leone's diamonds
resources.13146 Conse uentl , the RUF was able to continue to deliver diamonds to the
(1 Y
Accused during the conf1ict's final years.13447 The Prosecution adduced evidence of delivery
of diamonds to the Accused during this period through witnesses TF1-567, TF1-371 and
TF1-367.
13144 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29671—29673.
11415 Military Operations: Operation Fitti—Fatta.
13446 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 370. The allegation regarding the Accused's involvement with the RUF
at Lomé is considered elsewhere in the judgement. See Peace Process: Lomé
13147 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 370.

---- End of Page 2073 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03~01~T / 18 May 2012

5983. The Trial Chamber recalls the Defence's general denial that the Accused ever
received any diamonds from the RUF in exchange for arms and ammunitions or other
supplies.m48 This denial is reflected in the testimony of the Accused.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TFl -567
5984. Witness TFl-567, an RUF member}3449 testitied that Foday Sankoh arrived at
Roberts International Airport in 2000 when Sankoh returned from a trip to South
Africa.l345OFollowing his arrival at the airport, Sankoh and "his brother" Charles Taylor to
the ATU graduation in Gbatala. The president of Niger was also in attendance. Following
the graduation, Sankoh returned to where he was staying. Sankoh then dined with the
American Ambassador at the American Embassy.l345l Sankoh told the witness that he had
"brought something with him that he wanted to give to his brother, that is Charles Taylor,
and they were diamonds".m52 Sankoh then showed the witness a "45 carat and some other
three pieces that were each 25 carat" and said "he wanted to give something to his
brother". B453 After that, Benjamin Yeaten brought Sankoh and the witness to White Flower.
Upon their arrival, the witness waited in the waiting room while Sankoh and Yeaten "went
inside".l3454 After some time, Yeaten came out followed b Sankoh sometime later. Yeaten
Y
then escorted Sankoh and the witness to the to where Sankoh was staying. Sankoh said to
the witness in Krio "when we get there I will tell you something that is very interesting, but I
wouldn’t want these people to hear what I have to say, these securities".l3455 When they
arrived, Sankoh told the witness that during the meeting he had given one 45 carat diamond
and two 25 carat diamonds to Charles Taylor who, upon receiving the diamonds, was "over-
happy" and that Sankoh and Taylor then drank champagne together. 13456
Img Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 198.
'"*"’ TF1—367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
'3"° TFl-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13012 (PS).
'3"5' rP1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13012-13013 (PS).
'3452 rrr-567, Transcript, 7 July 2008, p. 13013 (PS).
'3453 rPr-s67, rruusurrpr, 7 July 2008,p. 13013 (PS).
M4 TF1-567, rrpusuupr, 7 July 2008, p. 13013 (PS).
I3455 TF1-567, Transcript, 7 July 2008, pp. 13013-13014 (PS).
'"5° TF1-567, Transcript, 7 July 2008, p. 13014 (PS).

---- End of Page 2074 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0] -T 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness TFl-371
5985. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,l3457 was told by Foday Sankoh in 1999 that
Sankoh had visited Mr Taylor who showed Sankoh the parcels of diamonds that had been
delivered to him during Sankoh's incarceration. Upon seeing the diamonds, Sankoh became
"bitter" because it was not the same amount of diamonds that he had been told were
delivered to Mr Taylor}3458 Sankoh told the witness that it would have been shameful for
him to ask for the diamonds back from the Accused, so he did not}3459
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -367
5986. Prosecution witness TF1-367, a mining commander in the RUF}3460 was confronted
during cross-examination with a prior statement he made to the Prosecution. ln that prior
statement, the witness expressed that the "escorting of diamonds" started at the time of "
Foday Sar1koh, and that the witness was sent to the Accused at Gbamga and he and Sankoh
would return with condiments and arms and ammunitions. Furthermore, the witness stated
that although the RUF wasn’t mining at that time, diamonds and other minerals like gold
were seized from civilians and taken to Charles Taylor by Sankoh himself The witness
accom anied Sankoh on some of these tri s. The witness was also resent when Sankoh told
P P P
Bockarie and Sesay that any diamonds collected in his presence should be taken to Charles
Taylor. 13 46l
The Accused
5987. During examination-in-chief, the Accused testified that he "never, ever" saw Sankoh
after their December 1999 meeting.l3462The Accused also denied receiving a 45 carat
diamond from Foday Sankoh on this occasion, calling the accusation a ‘"blatant lie".l3463
Later, during examination-in-chief, the Accused first testified that he attended the ATU
aduation at Gbatala in earl 2000, but denied that Foda Sankoh was resent,l3464 althou
gf Y Y P
**57 TF1-571, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (cs).
M8 TFl-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2773 (cs).
""" TF1-571, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2773 (cs).
'3‘"’° TF1-567, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
'""' TF1-567, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15058.
MM2 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 271 13-271 14 (PS).
Um Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 271 14-271 15 (PS).
WM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28815, 28818 (PS).

---- End of Page 2075 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T awg 18 May 2012

he recalled that the president of Niger was in attendance.l34°5 The Accused testified that
Sankoh could have been in Monrovia at that time, but that he was not at the graduation. The
Accused also knew that when Sankoh was in Monrovia in September 1999 and that he met
with many diplomats including the US Ambassador, but the Accused was unaware of any
subsequent meetings.l34°° Moments later, the Accused recalled that Foday Sankoh was in
Liberia in 2000 en route from South Africa,l34°7 but he did not recall that Foday Sankoh was
at the aduation.l34°8 The Accused thou t Sankoh had been in South Africa for medical
SY
reasons.l34°9 Again, the Accused flatly denied receiving a 45 carat diamond from Foday
Sankoh on this occasion, and further stated that Foday Sankoh "never gave [him] any
diamonds, none whatsoever". mm
Deliberations
5988. It is undisputed that Foday Sankoh visited South Africa around February or March of
2000, and that he travelled through Monrovia on his way back to Sierra Leone.l347lAt issue,
is whether the Accused met with Foday Sankoh while Sankoh was in Liberia following this
trip to South Africa and whether Sankoh gave diamonds to the Accused during that visit.
5989. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination the Accused initially testified
that he did not know the reason for Foday Sankoh's trip to South Africa and that he did not
know the details of his visit or his departr1re.l3472 W`hen the record of his prior testimony
was put to him, the Accused initially denied his prior statement. However, when
subsequently asked whether Foday Sankoh had come from South Africa to Monrovia to see
him, the Accused answered "1 can say yes and 1 can say no .... it has slipped me. 1 think it is
en route back from South Africa...".l3473 When asked what reason Sankoh gave him for the
9465 crrarras Grraurray rayrur, Transcript 14 saptarrtraar 2009,p. 28815 (PS).
'mcrrarras orraurray rayrur, rrartssrrpt 14 saptarrrraar 2009, pp. 28815-28816 (PS).
'3467 crrarras Grraurray rayrur, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27593-27596.
Img Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28818-28819 (PS).
'3"°" crrarras Grraurray rayrsr, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27593-27596.
'3‘"" crrarras Grraurray rayrur, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28816-28817.
Wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 August 2009, pp. 27596-27597, Transcript 28 January 2010, pp.
34344-34346. During examination-in-chief, the Accused testified that he recalled that Foday Sankoh travelled to
South Africa at the end of February 2000. Upon inquiry at that time, the Accused was told that Sankoh had gone
to South Africa for health reasons. Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44544—44546. Issa Sesay testified
that Foday Sankoh went to South Africa around March 2000. Sankoh told Sesay that he was going to South
Africa to meet an old friend to discuss the "party issue", referring to the RUF becoming a political party.
Bm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32553-32554.
Bm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32557-32558.

---- End of Page 2076 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

4,1 0/A 4
trip to South Africa, the Accused responded that Sankoh had told him that he had gone there
for medical reasons.l3474 Given the Accused's initial prevarication and subsequent
concession, referring to a conversation with Sankoh the Trial Chamber finds that the
Accused and Foday Sankoh met in Monrovia in 2000 following Sankoh's trip to South
Africa.
5990. The Trial Chamber notes that although TF1-567 was not an eyewitness to the
delivery of diamonds to the Accused that he testified about, he did provide testimony about
the circumstances and events directly before and after Sankoh's meeting with the Accused.
TF1-567 saw the diamonds before they were given to the Accused, accompanied Sankoh to
White Flower where the exchange was made, and heard the details of the events of the
meeting directly from Sankoh shortly after it happened. The Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that TF1—567 is a generally credible witness.l3475 The Trial Chamber also notes that
the dates and general details of Sankoh's trip to Monrovia, including the fact that the
meeting occurred, were corroborated by the Accused himself on cross-examination. In light
of his general credibility and the corroboration of his testimony, the Trial Chamber accepts
TF1—567's evidence regarding Sankoh's delivery of diamonds to the Accused during during
his visit to Monrovia in early 2000 and rejects the Accused's denials.
5991. The Trial Chamber considers TF1-367's more general evidence of deliveries of
diamonds to the Accused under Foday Sankoh corroborative of TF1-567's evidence. The
Trial Chamber notes that on cross—examination, the witness confirmed that Sankoh's
delivery of diamonds to the Accused was something he knew and did not make assumptions
about.l3476 He was then confronted with a prior statement that he did not witness Sankoh
giving the Accused diamonds, and that he had assumed that the diamonds were given. The
witness stated that he did not know the meaning of the word "assumption" and maintained
that he had personally given many diamonds to Sankoh and they took them to Gbarnga. 43477
Considering the witness’ confusion surrounding the presence of the word "assumption" in
his prior statement, and his adamant testimony that he knew of the deliveries first hand, the
Trial Chamber is convinced by the witness's explanation.
43474 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, p. 32558.
'3475 Credibility Assessment. TF1—567, paras 313-317.
'3476 TF1-367. Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15059.
H477 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15059-15060.

---- End of Page 2077 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~· 18 May 2012

5992. With regard to the evidence of TF1-371, the Trial Chamber notes that he is not
refening to the same meeting between Sankoh and the Accused as is TF1-567, who testified
about a meeting that took place in 2000. TF l-371's testimony refers to a conversation that
occurred between the witness and Foday Sankoh in l999, about a meeting that Sankoh had
had with the Accused at an earlier time, in which he saw diamonds that had been delivered
to the Accused while he was in detention. Although there is no indication as to the quantity
of diamonds, when they were delivered, or by whom, it is clear that they were delivered to
the Accused on behalf of Sankoh. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1-371 is a
credible witness.13478 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber considers this evidence probative of
delivery of diamonds to the Accused in or before l999 while Sankoh was in detention.
Findings
_ 5993. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Foday Sankoh delivered diamonds to the Accused in February or March of 2000 and
that diamonds were delivered to the Accused on Sankoh's behalf in or before l999 while he
was in detention. A
(d) June 2000-2002
Submissions of the Parties
5994. The Prosecution submits that, during this time period, the assistance that the Accused
provided via equipment and experts in l999 had begun to make mining more productive.
Thus, during Issa Sesay's tenure until disarmament, the Accused received a greater number
of diamonds than before—alleged by the Prosecution to be "thousands of carats". As the
interim leader of the RUF, Issa Sesay "obediently" delivered these diamonds to the Accused.
Liaisons, like Eddie Kanneh, also delivered diamonds to the Accused during this time.13479
The Prosecution further submits that the Accused organised and monitored Sesay's trips to
Monrovia using RUF radios and radio stations operated under the Accused's control. 13480
13478 Credibility Assessment, TF 1-371, paras 220-226.
13479 Prosecution Final Trial Brieii paras 371, 381.
"‘*" Prosecution rmi rmi Brief pm. 373.

---- End of Page 2078 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Jp 18 May 2012

#0/7/
5995. The Prosecution relied upon witnesses TF 1-516, TF 1-371, TF 1-338, Perry Kamara,
TF 1-567, TF 1-375, Joseph (a.k.a. Zigzag) Marzah, Mohamed Kabbah, Augustine Mallah
and TF 1-590 as well as exhibits P-277 and P-019 in support of its allegations. A
5996. The Defence generally denied all allegations that RUF diamonds were delivered to
the Accused. The Defence also specifically challenged the credibility of witness TF 1-338,
who testiried to Sesay's delivery of diamonds to the Accused. In the Defence's view, the
Prosecution's evidence of the Accused's connection to diamonds is based on hearsay that
fails to demonstrate a link between Taylor and the RUF's diamonds, and the evidence of
TF 1-338 is so lacking in credibility that it is wholly unreliable.*348* The Accused and Issa
Sesay provided relevant evidence.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1 -338
5997. Witness TF 1-338, an RUF member,*3482 testiried about three trips Issa Sesay took to
deliver diamonds to the Accused in Monrovia during this time period. First, at the end of
2000, Sesay travelled to the Executive Mansion, via the guesthouse, to deliver an
unspecified amount of diamonds to Charles Taylor.*3483 Sesay told the witness that he
expected food and ammunition in exchange for the diamonds he took on that trip, but when
Taylor received the diamonds he said, "No, this one is for safe keeping until your leader
returns".*3484 Taylor then showed Sesay plastic bags containing diamonds and told Sesay
that those were the diamonds that Bockarie had brought and that he was holding them in
safekeeping until Foday Sankoh's release.*3485 Taylor also told Sesay that, in the meantime,
he would help with "whatever" was needed for "the revolution in Sierra Leone". *3486 Sesay
told the Accused that they lacked materials and that the enemies, including the Kamajors
and UN forces, were "threatening their position".*3487 Sesay did not specify what kind of
materials they lacked, but the Accused told Sesay that he would speak to Benjamin
‘3"8‘ Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1198-1203, 1215-1227; Defence Response rc Prosecution Final Trial Brief
para. 80.
*3482 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086.
*3**3 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15157, 15158—15160.
*3484 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15157.
*4485 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15157.
*3486 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15157.
*3484 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15161.

---- End of Page 2079 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Yeaten}3488 From there, Sesay returned to the guesthouse. He later went with Yeaten to
Camp Schefflin where they saw "AK-47 rounds in large quantities, G3 rounds and RPG
rockets".l3489 Because there was so much materiel, part of it stayed at Camp Scheftlin and
the other part was flown to F oya. From there, Sesay transported the materiel to Koidu Town
on a truck that Sesay had "arrested" from UNAMS1L.l3490
5998. TF 1 -338 testined that Sesay made another trip to Monrovia in early 2001 to deliver a
similar quantity of diamonds to Taylor.l349l On this trip Sesay went to the Boulevard Hotel
where Benjamin Yeaten later retrieved him and took him to the Executive Mansion to give
the diamonds to Charles Taylor}3492 During this meeting Sesay and Taylor discussed
UNAMSIL and the Kamajors and Sesay returned to F oya the next day with diesel and other
supplies. Wm
5999. Sesay also travelled to Monrovia in March, April or May 2001, to deliver diamonds
to the Accused}3494 On this occasion, Yeaten met Sesay in Foya and took him to the
Boulevard Hotel in Monrovia. Later that night, Yeaten came back for Sesay and took him to
Mansion Ground to deliver the diamonds}3495 In this meeting, Taylor told Sesay that he .
should not come so often with diamonds because the UN and the international community
were "having eyes on him to see whether he had connections with the RUF ". I3 496 Taylor also
told Sesay that he was going to try to find someone that Sesay could bring the "small
diamonds" to in exchange for money to buy basic needs to use "on the front line" so that
Sesay would no longer bring diamonds so often to him}3497 The next day, the witness was
resent when Yeaten brou t two white men to the Boulevard Hotel to meet Sesa . One of
P Y
these men was Alpha Bravo, to whom Sesay later brought diamonds}3498 According to TF1-
mg TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15161.
*****9 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15162.
mm) TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15163. For discussion of this witness’ evidence on where this
materiel was used, See Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused;
Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Operations Outside of Sierra
Leone.
mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15164-15166.
M2 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15165.
m93TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15165-15166. See also Diamonds: Provision of Mining
Equipment and Mining Experts.
*3*94 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15167.
*3*95 TF1-338, rremerrpt 2 September 2008, p. 15168.
*34% TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15168.
mw TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15168-15170, 15225 (PS).
Bm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15225-15226 (CS). TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p.

---- End of Page 2080 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

338's knowledge, Sesay never received those diamonds back from the Accused, nor did
anyone in the RUF ever receive the diamonds that Sankoh or Bockarie had deposited with
the Accused. 13499
6000. Sesay said that, by that time in 2002, he "had diamonds with Charles Taylor up to
5,000 carats" as well as the $USD 150,000 that he had given to Taylor. 13500
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
6001. Witness TF1-567, an RUF member,135O1 testified that during the time Issa Sesay
"took over" leadershi of the RUF until 2001, he was resent on occasions when Issa Sesa ,
P P Y
Eddie Karmeh, and Gibril Massaquoi brought diamonds to Monrovia.135O2 TF1-567 testiHed
that Eddie Karmeh brought diamonds twice during that time,135O3 while Sesay and
Massaquoi came with diamonds each on one occasion.135O4 Massaquoi's visit was at the end
of 2000.13505 On these occasions when people brought diamonds, the witness and the others
would o from the RUF esthouse to meet Ibrahim Bah at the Boulevard Hotel to
8 gu
"determine what to do with the diamonds".135O6 The witness recalled going to the Boulevard
Hotel to met Bah in this context three times.135O7
6002. TF1-567 testified in detail about the occasion when he was present when Issa Sesay
came to Monrovia with diamonds.135O8 From the RUF guesthouse, they went to meet Bah at
the Boulevard Hotel and the sat down with the diamonds and Sesa said:
Y Y
These are the diamonds I have brought. I would want these diamonds — I would want us to take these
diamonds to the Pa, Charles Taylor, and we will sell some to enable us to purchase some other items that we
needed. 1 3509
15227 (PS); Transcript 3 September 2008, p. 15321. The witness` testimony regarding the delivery of diamonds
to Alpha Bravo is considered elsewhere. See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, June
2000-2002.
*0000 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15192-15193.
*0500 TF1-338, rruuserrpt 2 September 2008, p. 15192.
13501 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
135112 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13002 (PS).
13503 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13002 (PS).
13504 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13002—l3003 (PS).
*0500 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008,p. 13001-12002 (Ps).
*0500 rrr-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13006-18007 (Ps).
*0500 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13007 (Ps).
135118 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13004—13005 (PS).
*0500 rrr-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 18005-12006 (Ps).

---- End of Page 2081 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

6003. Bah agreed with Sesay's plan and they met with Benjamin Yeaten, and Yeaten then
took Sesay and Bah to meet Charles Taylor.l35m When they g0t to Taylor, Sesay told him
that he wanted him to keep the diamonds safemu Taylor then pulled out and showed them
diamonds and said that he had been keeping them safe since Sam Bockarie brought them to
him and that if Sesay was to bring anything to him for safe-keeping, he would keep it}35 [2
Sesay then gave the diamonds to Taylor and they left. In response to the question of whether
the Accused provided anything to Sesay in retum for the diamonds on this trip, the witness
testified that after this visit when Sesay retumed "he went with arms and armT1unition".[3 513
Sesay gave the other diamonds to Bah because Bah told Sesay that he had his own business
artners who were "whites", and he could tr to et some satellite hones and com uters for
P Y 3 P P
the RUF.l35l4 Later lbrahim Bah retumed with computers and SUSD 50,000.*55*5 TFl-567
saw the diamonds that Sesay brought with him on this trip, but was not sure as to their
quantity. mm
6004. In early 2001, the witness testified, the caretaker at the RUF guesthouse at Taylor's
request because the intemational community was blaming Taylor for supporting the
RUF. B5 [7 The witness testified that Sesay later sent the caretaker back to Monrovia to work
as Eddie Kanneh's representative in the diamond business. During the peri0d that the
witness worked with Eddie Kanneh, diamonds came through the guest house "many
times".l35 [8 When the diamonds came they would meet Bah at the H0tel B0ulevard and they
would divide the diamonds that Bah was to take to "d0 business" for the RUF fi0m the
diamonds that were to be taken to Taylor.l35 lg Bah and Kanneh would then take the
designated portion to Taylor.l352O Later, Kanneh escaped with diamonds. mm
*55*** T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13005 (Ps).
mu TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 13005—l3006 (PS).
*55** T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13005 (Ps).
*55*5 T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008,p. 13006 (Ps).
*55*5 T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 15005-15006 (Ps).
*55*5 T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008,p. 13006 (Ps).
*55*5 T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13006 (Ps).
Um TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13003 (PS). See also Operational Support: Provision of RUF
Guesthcuse in Monrovia.
*55*5 T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 15006-15007 (Ps).
*55*** T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13007 (Ps).
M20 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13012-13013 (PS).
*555* T1¤1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 13003 (PS).

---- End of Page 2082 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T /‘/ jg 18 May 2012

6005. TF1—567 also testified that some of the diamonds the RUF got were given to Taylor
for safekeeping for the benefit of Foday Sankoh. However, after Sankoh visited Taylor in
Monrovia, he never told the witness that he had received the diamonds back from the
Accused. mu
6006. ln 2002, Eddie Kanneh regularly brought diamonds to Monrovia from Issa Sesay.
The witness was Issa Sesay's representative meaning that he was present each time Eddie
Kanneh met with Ibrahim Bah in Monrovia to discuss diamond business and would send a
report to Issa Sesay on the meeting. B523
Prosecution Witness TF 1-5 16
6007. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,l3524 testified that RUF mining continued in
Kono after Sam Bockarie left Sierra Leone at the end of 1999. Issa Sesay then became the
overall mining commander and was based in a section of Koidu called Lebanon. The local
mining commander was Amara Peleto. The witness was not present in Sierra Leone during
this time and only heard about diamond mining activities via radio transmissions from
Elevation, Sesay's radio operator. During Sesay's time as overall mining commander,
diamond mining intensified, and the witness was told by Elevationl3525 that they were
finding "big, big" diamonds}3526 Under Issa Sesay, diamonds continued to be taken to
Monrovia by Eddie Kanneh who, upon his arrival in Monrovia, would tell the witness over
the radio to inform Sesay that he had arrived there}3527 The witness knew that Kanneh
travelled to Monrovia to take diamonds to "the Chief, Charles Taylor" because he heard this
information via radio from Sesay's station}3528 Kanneh's trips continued at least until the
*3522 TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, p. 13201.
‘"" TF1—567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13019-13020.
'mt TF1—516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
M25 According to the witness, Elevation was a radio operator working with Issa Sesay at that time, based in
Lebanon, Koidu Town. TF1—516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7170.
mm TF1—516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7170. The witness heard that someone named Colonel Oslo got a
diamond almost 50 carats big and "Pe1eto took diamonds that was [sic] up to 400 carat, 30 carat, 50 carats, just
like that".
*3527 TF1—516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7171.
‘"" TF1—516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7172.

---- End of Page 2083 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01—T " 18 May 2012

witness left Vahun in late 2001.*3529 On one occasion, the witness saw Eddie Kanneh in
Foya accompanied by white diamond traders who were on their way to see Sesay. *3530
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
6008. Witness TF1-371, a member of the RUF]353 l testified that in 2001, Issa Sesay
informed Mike Lamin that they had been depositing an unspecified amount of diamonds
with Mr Taylor.l3532 Sesay told Lamin that they had received ammunition and food items
from Yeaten in return for the diamonds but that they also expected money from the Accused
in return for the diamonds that they had deposited with himum Upon arriving around
midnight, Sesay and Mr Taylor discussed disarmament, among other things. Sesay asked Mr
Taylor for $USD 100,000 to buy "food and whatever for the men" and Taylor instructed
Yeaten to give Sesay SUSD $0,00043534 The witness explained that by delivering diamonds
to Mr Taylor, Sesay was following up on the relationship that Bockarie had previously had
with him, stating that they tmsted Mr Taylor and "took him as a father" so they ‘"took all the
diamonds they had" to him.l3535 According to TF1-371, alter this trip, Sesay was
disillusioned and vowed not to return to Mr Taylor, and never did. B536
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
6009. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,l3537 testified that alter Sam
Bockarie left Sierra Leone, Issa Sesay was based at Small Lebanon in Kono.l3538Aiier some
time, Sesay appointed Peleto as the overall mining commader because the former
commander had not recovered as many diamonds as Sesay expected.l3539 The sub-
commanders in Kono would take the washed diamonds and ive them to Peleto who would
8
*3535 TF1-516, rraaampr 10 April 2008, pp. 7169-7171.
*353° TF1-516,Transcript, 10 April 2008, pp. 7171-7172. 3
*353* TF1-371, rraaampr 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (cs).
um TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008 pp. 2454, 2457 (CS).
13533 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008 pp. 2454, 2457 (CS).
13534 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008 p. 2454 (CS). The facts surrounding this transaction are considered in
iiirther detail in the section on Financial Support. See Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged
Financial Support.
13535TFl-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2456-2457 (CS).
l353°TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008 pp. 2454, 2457 (CS).
*3537 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
13538 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16180.
13 53 9 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16181.

---- End of Page 2084 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % _Vll`¤J> 18 May 2012

then take them to lsaa Sesay's office at Small Leban0n.1354O After bringing the diamonds to
Sesay, the witness 0bserved them separate the bigger diamonds from the smaller diamonds
0n a table, then Sesay would "parcel it" and take it to his r00m.13541 Kabbah testified that
Sesay sometimes travelled to Liberia and that on these trips "they" would go "as far as
mansion ground" taking the diamonds that they had to Charles Taylor.13542
6010. Kabbah also testified about an incident when a commander at T0ng0 found a 36 carat
diamond.13543 He called Small Leban0n in Kono to reach Sesay but he was not around, s0
the following morning they called Sunlight in Monrovia because they heard Sesay was
there.13544 Sunlight reported that he had not arrived yet, so they called a radi0 Operator in
Foya to tell Sesay that a 36 carat diamond had been c0llected in T0ng0.13545 Unbeknownst to
the witness, Benjamin Yeaten was present in the r00m when they made the call to the radi0
Operator. Yeaten overheard the message and then transmitted the inf0nnation to Charles
Taylor.13546 By the time Sesay arrived at Foya he was given a message by Yeaten to take that
diamond to Charles Taylor.13547 The witness testified that when Sesay came to Small
Leban0n to c0llect the diamond he was very angry and asked why the men had sent the
message.13548 According to the witness Issa Sesay said that he had not received all the
money, and that he had even taken a 52 carat diamond to Taylor that he "had not paid for at
all".13549 That night Sesay c0llected the diamond "and moved with it".13550
6011. On one 0ccasion, just before the attack on Guinea,13551 Sesay returned from Liberia
with Eddie Kanneh, Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), Sheku, Sidibay, "some other Liberian
guys" and "two white men"13552 who "had the semblance of Lebanese", one of whom the
*354** M0hamed Kebbeb, rrerreerrpt 15 September 2008, p. 16186.
*354* Meiremerr Kebbeir, rremerrpt 15 September 2008, p. 16187.
*354* Meiremerr Kabbah, rremerrpt 15 September 2008, pp. 16186-16187.
*3543 Meiremerr Kebbeb, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188.
13 544 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188.
*3545 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188.
13 545 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 6188.
*3543 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188.
*3543 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188.
13 549 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188.
14550 M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16188.
*355* M0hamed Kebbeb, rremerrpt 15 September 2008, p. 16189.
*3553 In a prior statement, Kabbah also told the Prosecution that the two white men who were brokering diamonds
for Eddie Kanneh, were the same ones who were in Buedu with Sam Beckarie at one point. The witness agreed
that he saw these same two white men in Buedu with Sam Bockarie once, after they retreated from Freetown,
after the Junta. M0hamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16394.

---- End of Page 2085 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / i` 18 May 2012

witness was told was called Michel.l3553 When they arrived, Sesay brought the diamonds
from his room and he and Eddie Karmeh sorted them out.l3554 In the witness’ presence Sesay
then gave the diamonds to Eddie Kanneh and asked him to take them to Charles Taylor.l3555
Sesay said that after Charles Taylor had sold them, Sesay would send FOC to collect the
mOn€y_13556
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
6012. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,]3557 testified that after Foday Sankoh was arrested in 2000 and Issa Sesay took
over, diamonds that were mined at Ton o were all taken to 1ssa.l3558 Issa told the witness
S
and others that he took the diamonds to Charles Taylor in Liberia.l3559 Mallah also testified
about one of his "brothers" in Tongo who found a 52 carat diamond, and the diamond was
hidden by Colonel Ranger who didn’t want others to know about it. Colonel Ranger was
then beaten to "near death" and the diamond was then presented to 1ssa Sesay. The witness
also heard over the radio about 51 carats of diamonds that went from Kono to Issa Sesay,
who then took them to the Accused. Mallah did not see these diamonds that were taken to
the Accused by Issa Sesay}3560 Mallah testified that, in exchange for the diamonds, Sesay
brought back ammunition that the witness saw himself, and "a lot of US dollars" for the
RUF to disarm and "go into politics". mm
Prosecution Witness Pegg Kamara
6013. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,l3562 testified that from May 2000 to
disarmament in 2001, Issa Sesay would bring diamonds to Taylor in Liberia for safe
keeping. Sesay would call from Liberia and report on what Taylor had donated to the RUF,
and would bring back to Sierra Leone documents which catalogued the number of diamonds
[3553 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp.16186, 16190-1619l.
[3554 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16189-16190.
[3555 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16190,
[35% Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16190.
[3557 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209-20210.
[3558 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20247.
[mq Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, p. 20248.
[3560 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20248—20249.
mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20248—20249.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.

---- End of Page 2086 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

that Taylor kept, as well as the diesel, petrol, engine oil and food that Taylor would give the
Prosecution Witness Joseph Marzah
6014. Witness Joseph Marzah, a member of the 555,13664 testified that from Sam
Bockarie's (a.k.a. Mosquito) administration until Issa Sesay's administration, he transported
diamonds rrem Sierra Leone to Monrovia on many occasions, possibly 10 to 20 but that he
could not recall the exact number of times.l3666 According to Marzah, each time he "carried
ammos" he was required to "bring diamonds along with Mosquito's representatives".l3666
Marzah further testified that every time he went from Sierra Leone to President Taylor, he
carried diamonds, sometimes in a `ar, like a bottle, and sometimes not.l3667 The witness
J
stated that Bockarie or Sesay travelled with him on some of these trips, but he did not know
if they carried diamonds themselves.l3666
Prosecution Witness TF1-3 67
6015. Witness TF1-367, an RUF member, was confronted with a number of his prior
statements to the Prosecution related to Issa Sesay's activities with diamonds.l3669 On cross-
examination, the witness confirmed prior statements to the Prosecution that two Lebanese
men, who had come to see Sesay and brought a generator, came to stay with the witness at
Number 11 mining site for three weeks. Diamonds were collected in the presence of the
men, but the diamonds were then taken to Sesay and the witness was not aware of how
Sesay transacted business with them. These two Lebanese men had come from
Freetown.l3676 Also in prior statements, TF1-367 told the Prosecution that two white men
from Belgium and an African, whom the witness believed to be Gambian or Senegalese,l367l
*3663 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008 pp. 3267-3269.
I3564 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 6053-6055.
l6566 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, p. 6131.
I3566 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, p. 6131.
*3567 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6132-6133.
**5*** Joseph Msrzsrr, Transcript 14 March 2008, pp. 6131-6133.
*3566 Portions of this evidence have also been assessed in the section dealing with allegations that the accused
provided mining equipment and mining experts. See Diamonds: Provision of Mining Equipment and Mining
Experts.
*""* TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15034.
***7* TF1—367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15035.

---- End of Page 2087 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1% Xlig 18 May 2012

visited Sesay}3572 The men were in Kono for two weeks and all of the diamonds that the
witness collected during their stay were shown to Sesay}3573
6016. The witness testified that he did not know if Sesay sold diamonds to the Lebanese
men.l3574 TF1-3 67 further stated that "they came there for mining and they came there to do
diamonds for Issa Sesay".l3575 Regarding the men's origin, the witness stated during
examination-in-chief that the men came from Liberia, while in prior statements he said they
came from Freetown. On cross-examination, TF1-367 clarified that he had heard that they
came from Liberia, but saw them come from Freetown end.l3576 On cross-examination, the
witness identified the African man who came with the Belgians as Ibrahim Bah, who
sounded like he came from Senegal or Gambia.13577 The witness maintained that Ibrahim
Bah and the Belgians passed from Liberia to Freetown and then came to Kono. B578
6017. The witness did not agree that there was continual contact between the RUF and
diamond merchants from Lebanon and Belgium. He testified that the Lebanese only came
once and that the Belgians only came once for two weeks. The witness testified that Issa
"did not accept that people come and collect diamonds and carry them" and the witness was
not present when Issa Sesay met these businessmen but thought that there was a problem in
cooperation between the businessmen and Issa Sesay.l3579
6018. TF1-367 was then confronted with a prior statement to the Prosecution in which he
said that he was "not exactly sure" what Sesay did with the diamonds that the witness
brought to him.l358° The witness acknowledged that there was no mention in his prior
statement of those diamonds going to Taylor in Liberia. The Defence then referred to the
record of an interview two years later in which the witness told the Prosecution that Sesay
and Bockarie took diamonds to Liberia, and that diamonds were given to Eddie Kanneh
when Peleto was the mining commander.13581 The Defence implied that, according to what
‘"" TF1-367, rremserrpt 1 September 2008, p. 15034.
Bm TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15034.
*3574 TF1-367, rremserrpt 1 September 2008, p. 15035.
*575 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15036.
13576 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15037-15038.
"577 TF1-367, rremeerrpt 1 September 2008, p. 15039.
*3578 TF1-367, rremserrpt 1 September 2008, pp. 15038-15040.
13579 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15040-15041.
*35*1 TF1-367, rremeerrpt 1 September 2008, p. 15054.
‘""‘ rrr-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15054.

---- End of Page 2088 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / EL 18 May 2012
S

A/~0 J 2* 1
the witness testified previously, Charles Taylor's name should have been mentioned in that
prior statement. The witness responded that Taylor's name did not belong there. Although
his testimony was confusing, the witness tried to explain that although he only mentioned
the diamonds being given to Eddie Kanneh in his statement, it did not mean that those
diamonds weren’t later given to the Accused. mm
6019. The witness also stated during prior interviews that he did not know what was done
with the diamonds, because he was not told. He heard sometimes "through hearsay" that "so
and so diamond" had been taken and he knew about the "goveri1ment" diamonds, but what
happened to the others was kept secret.l3583 Regarding the "govemment diamonds", the
witness is recorded as telling the Prosecution that one day Issa Sesay told the witness it
would not be good if Sankoh found no diamonds upon his release from prison. Thus, Issa
Sesay said it would be good to keep the diamonds for him. The Defence pointed out that the
witness did not mention the Accused in that statement either. On cross-examination, the
witness stated that since there was no bank in Kailahun, Sesay thought the safest place to
keep the diamonds was with Taylor in Liberia, but acknowledged that he did not mention
this in the three earlier statements. The witness explained repeatedly that he did not mention
Taylor in the three prior statements because he was not asked about Taylor.l3584 He said that
when he was first asked about Taylor, he told the Prosecution what he knew about him,
including diamonds. B585 The witness also admitted that he purposely did not mention Taylor
because he "did not want to give himl3586 any problem" and iiirthermore because he was
only asked about Sesay.l3587 The witness testified that apart from not mentioning Taylor in
an earlier interview, he was telling the truth, and that he did not believe that consciously
deciding not to mention Taylor was an effort to mislead the court. mm
mm TFl-367, Transcript l September 2008, pp. l5055-l5056.
mg} TFl-367, Transcript l September 2008, pp. 15055-15056.
m84TFl- 367, Transcript l September 2008, pp.l5054-l5057.
USBSTFI-367, Transcript l September 2008, pp. 15057-15058.
‘"8" From the context it is clear that the witness was referring to the Accused.
U587 TPI-367, Transcript l September 2008, p. 15064.
Um TPI-367, Transcript l September 2008, pp. 15064-15065.

---- End of Page 2089 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T { l8 May 20l2

4 0/ Q 2
The Accused
6020. The Accused testified that Issa Sesay came to Liberia in August of 2000, but that
Sesay never gave him diamonds.l35g9 The Accused also testified that he did not know that
Eddie Kanneh brought diamonds and doubted that Eddie Kanneh would come after Sam
Bockarie withdrew to Liberia in December 1999. *3590
6021. The Accused also denied allegations that he was involved in diamond dealing with
Issa Sesay and Ibrahim Bah, calling the accusations against him regarding diamond deals
between him and anyone, including Ibrahim Bah, "blatant lies".l359l The Accused further
denied knowledge of Ibrahim Bah purchasing satellite phones and computers for the
RUFBSQ2
6022. The Accused testified that he did not know Sheku and Sidie Bay, nor did he know of
a visit involving the two white men to Sierra Leone. He denied having diamond dealings
with Eddie Kanneh, and vehemently denied the allegations that he received diamonds}3593
· The Accused further denied that Eddie Kanneh was ever involved in diamond dealing with
him. The Accused did not dispute that diamonds went through Monrovia, but testified that
they did not do so through him.l3594 However, in response to the testimony of TFl—37l, the
Accused agreed that the RUF trusted him, and that he was a father figure in that sense. *3595
6023. In response to the testimony of Augustine Mallah regarding the 52 carat diamond
and Sesay's return to Sierra Leone with US dollars, the Accused conceded that it would have
been a good idea to contribute to the RUF political campaign, but testified that he did not
provide money to Issa Sesay because he did not have the means at the time. The Accused
denied ever receiving the large diamond, or any diamonds from Sesay. The Accused further
suggested that none of these large diamonds ever existed and it would have been public if
they had been sold on the intemational market.l35% In response to Mallah's testimony that
13589 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30874-30875.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28806-28807.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, pp. 28810-28811.
13592 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28812.
Um Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29111-29114; Transcript 27 October 2009, p.
iggifgharles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30458-30460.
Bm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29644-29646.
'3596 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30114-30115.

---- End of Page 2090 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J di?} 18 May 2012

from the time of Foday Sankoh's arrest until disarmament in 2001/2002, Sesay took
diamonds to Liberia and came back with ammunition, the Accused agreed that he saw Sesay
from 2001 to 2002, in the course of the peace negotiations. The Accused further testified
that Sesay took more trips in late 2000 than the whole year of 2001 . 13597
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6024. Witness Issa Sesay testified that he was sent to Kono by Sankoh in February of 2000,
and it was at that time that he first started to receive diamonds mined by the RUF from both
Kono and Tongo.13598 Sesay explained that Amara Peleto was in charge of mining at Kono
and Colonel Gbanya was in charge of mining at Tongo at this time.13599 Diamonds were
brought to Sesay from the mines and he sold some of those diamonds for the interests,
welfare and transformation of the RUF. *3600
6025. Sesay denied that he ever delivered diamonds to the Accused, and testified that, to
his knowledge, neither Sam Bockarie nor Foday Sankoh ever gave diamonds to the
Accused.13601 Sesay had no knowledge that the RUF gave diamonds to the Accused either
for safe keeping or for arms and ammunitions.13602
6026. Sesay testified that he was forced to trade diamonds alier his appointment as interim
leader of the RUF in October 2000, because it was his only means of feeding and managing
the welfare of the RUF.1361)3 From May 2000 until the disarmament in Kono in August-
September 2001, Sesay received diamonds from Kono and Tongo but not from Pujehun and
Bo where significant mining was also taking place. He did not receive diamonds for the full
period since there is no diamond mining during the rainy season. According to Sesay, even
in the mining season, mining was patchy; sometimes an area could be mined and nothing but
gravel extracted. 13604 Sesay did not remember how many carats he received during his
leadership. Most of the diamonds were small. Sesay testified that, while Sierra Leone is
known for its high quality diamonds, those diamonds are a result of mechanised mining in
13597 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 October 2009, pp. 30115-301 16.
13598 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44641-44642.
‘""" Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 Jniy 2010, p. 44642.
13600 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44641.
‘""' Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 Jniy 2010, p. 43594.
136112 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45279.
13603 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45297.
"°"" Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46246-46248.

---- End of Page 2091 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

which the RUF could not afford to be properly involved. After Sesay became leader, they
had one old Caterpillar which used to break down every one or two days and by early 2001
was no longer functioning.13663
6027. Sesay did not hide his diamond trading from the other RUF members.l3666 However,
he said that Taylor was not aware of the diamond transactions that Sesay made in Monrovia.
Yeaten was aware of these transactions because he took commission from one of the
diamond traders, named Sammy, in March 2001.13667 Yeaten was not aware of the diamond
trading in October 2000.13668 Sesay testified that he did not tell the Accused about his
diamond dealings because he did not think that it was necessary. Sesay viewed the Accused
as one of the ECOWAS leaders who was concerned only with advising Sesay under the UN
mandate to deliver peace. 13669
6028. Sesay cannot recall how much he received in total from the sale of diamonds in his
15 months as Interim Leader. He sold one diamond to Michel and Louis for $USD 95,000 in
October 2000, of which Bah took $USD 60,000, and one in March for $USD 135,000. The
remaining smaller diamonds were sold to Alhaji Bakoure and Alhaji Modibor for between
$10,000 and $15,000. He does not remember the final total.13616 Sesay sometimes sold
diamonds to buy rice, medicines, condiments and machines for fighters and civilians.13 611
6029. Issa Sesay's testimony challenged that of TFI-33 8. Sesay denied going to Monrovia
at the end of 2000 to transport a parcel of diamonds to the Accused, which the Accused said
he would keep safe until the return of Sankoh.l3 612 Sesay also denied taking AK-47 rounds,
RPG rockets, G3 rounds, boots and uniforms from Camp SchefHin to Koidu Town.l36l3
However, Sesay testified that he went to Monrovia in October 2000, but that he was
accompanied on that trip by Morris Kallon, Jamba Goba, Samuel Jabba and Abdul
Mansaray, and not others.l3614 The diamonds that Sesay took with him on this trip were
33663 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46248—46249.
33666 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45298.
33667 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45298.
13663 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45298.
13669 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45299.
*36*3 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 Arrgrrpr 2010, pp. 46249462450, 46260.
13613 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46247, 46250.
33612 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45275—45277.
*33*3 Issa Sesay, Trarrpprrpr 2 Arrgrrar 2010, p. 45287.
33613 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45277.

---- End of Page 2092 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

L10 /8 5
brought13°15 through Ibrahim Bah by Louis and Michel and were not given to the
Accused.13°16
6030. Sesay testitied that he did return to Monrovia in March 2001, but he did not travel in
the manner specitied by Witness TF1—338. Sesay also did not see the Accused on this trip.
He was met by Eddie Kanneh who was sent by Ibrahim Bah in a Jeep to pick him up from
Pendembu. Sesay travelled with his two bodyguards Tommy and Abdulai and no one
. €lS€·l36l7
6031. Sesay denied making a further trip and taking diamonds to the Accused in March,
April or May 2001 and denied that the Accused told him that he could not deliver diamonds
so frequently in Monrovia anymore because the eyes of the international community were
on him.13618 Sesay testitied that alter his trip in March 2001, he did not go to Monrovia
agai 11.13619
Prosecution Exhibit P-277
6032. Confidential exhibit Exhibit P-277, a draft publication by persons with personal
knowledge of the RUF states that after the capture of Kono, Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay
were involved in "a big diamond business with President Taylor" and that Foday Sankoh,
during his incarceration and later in Lomé, received little or nothing of the diamonds mined
in his absence. The document suggests that this was one of the reasons for Sankoh and
Bockarie's falling out and states that in one document found at Sankoh's residence Bockarie
wrote bitterly about how Sesay had converted diamonds intended for "a fiiend possibly
President "I`aylor".13620
Prosecution Exhibit P—0 1 9
6033. Exhibit P—019 is a report entitled "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection".
The report was commissioned for the Special Court for Sierra Leone by former Prosecutor
13615 Although the transcript says that the diamonds were "brought", given the context, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the diamonds were "bought" through Ibrahim Bah.
136161ssa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45279.
131117 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45289-45290.
131118 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45296—45297
13619 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45293, 45296
MO crmndcmiai Exhibit P-277, ERN18167.

---- End of Page 2093 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T % 18 May 2012

David Crane.13621 It was authored by lan Smillie and is dated 21 April 2007.13622 The report
is based upon Smillie's work over a five month period in 2000 as a member of the UN Panel
of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arnrs13623 as well as his work for Partnership
Africa Canada, his participation in the Kimberly Process working group, his many travels to
Sierra Leone and Liberia and his participation in various other conferences related to
international diamonds and diamond digging. 13624
6034. Exhibit P—019 begins with an assessment of Liberian diamond production, noting
that "Liberian diamonds are generally known to be small, low quality goods" and that,
historically, "Liberia has not been a significant diamond producer, although during the
1950s it became a major exporter of smuggled diamonds from other countries".13625 The
report notes a "huge increase" in diamond exports from Liberia in 1961, attributable mainly
to "smuggling from Sierra Leone" as well as the end of the SLST13626 monopoly, and other
factors.13627 Further, diamond exploration increased in Liberia in the 1960s, but by the 1970s
and 1980s most of the companies failed or left Liberia due to disappointing findings.13628
The report provides two estimates of Liberian diamond production in the late 1980s and
1990s, the first estimate13629 "is based on historical averages and on estimates rather than
actuals", while the second estimate comes from figures supplied by the Liberian Ministry of
Lands, Mines and Energy.136311 The report compares these export estimates with Belgium's
13621 Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, lan Smillie, 21 April 2007".
13622 Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, lan Smillie, 21 April 2007". The Trial Chamber notes that the
document is also dated 2006 on an inside End of Page, but does not consider the discrepancy in the date to be significant
for the Trial Chamber's purposes.
11623 This panel was created pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000).
13624 Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 4, ERN 30846.
13625 Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, lan Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 9, ERN 30851.
11626 Sierra Leone Selection Trust Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report
for the Office of the Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, lan Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 4, ERN
30847.
13627 Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, lan Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 9, ERN 30851.
13628 Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 9, ERN 30851.
13629 The figures for the first estimate are provided by the "US Geological Survey".
116311 Exhibit P—019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 9, ERN 30851.

---- End of Page 2094 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T X 18 May 2012

records of Liberia's diamond exports for the same period. mm Because there were no official
ex ort fi ures available from Liberia for the ears 1990 to 1997 because of the conflict, the
P g Y
re ort notes that Bel ium's Liberian ex ort data from 1990 to 1999 is five times that of the
P g P
"volume exported at the height of Liberia's diamond smuggling in l96l and 24 times more
than the average annual production in five pre-war years". I3632 The report then recounts how
the Liberian President Charles Taylor and members of his government sought to
demonstrate to the panel that Liberia had its own diamonds, or even "more diamonds than
Sierra Leone", but that the sites they visited and the diamond samples they saw did not
indicate ample diamonds resources in the country. 13633
6035. Based upon the comparison of Belgium import data from the l990s with Liberian
export data from the 1960s the report concludes that almost none of the "huge volume of
diamonds" entering Belgium during the years 1990 to l999 as "Liberian diamonds" actually
originated in Liberia}3634 The report then assesses how many of those diamonds,
purportedly Liberian but not actually of Liberian origin, originated in Sierra Leone}3635
Relying on Sierra Leone Diamond Export Figures from 1990 to 2005 to demonstrate that the
sharp decline in diamond production in Sierra Leone seen in the late 1990sl3636 can be
artiall ascribed to diamond smu lin durin that time}3637 The re ort notes that
P Y gg g g P
estimates are difficult given "the absence of any reliable production data after about l975",
but then concludes that 2004 and 2005 export figures demonstrate that an average of
680,000 carats reflects Sierra Leone's "potential" export during the 1990s.l3°38 Thus, even
accounting for the war, 300,000 to 400,000 carats of diamonds per annum may have been
smu ¤led out of Sierra Leone durin the time that the RUF controlled Kono District and
gg g
I3631 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connectior1——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 9, ERN 30851.
I3632 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Cormection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 10, ERN 30852.
13633 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Cormection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 11, ERN 30853.
I3634 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Cormection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 11, ERN 30853.
I3635 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—··a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 11, ERN 30853.
I363° Figures are not available for the year 1999.
mm Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Cormection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 12, ERN 30854.
Img Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Comrection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 11-12, ERN 30854—30855.

---- End of Page 2095 ---------------------------


Case No.;SCSL—03-01-T % 18 May 2012

Tongo Fields.l3°39 This amount of export could have been worth between $USD 60 million
and $USD 80 million.l3°40 The report challenges the notion that the RUF was incapable of
exporting that amount, because, apart from alleged "1avish spending"l3°4l by Foday Sankoh
after the Lomé accord, the RUF did not show any signs of wealth during this time by
pointing out "any Sierra Leonean diamonds smuggled into Liberia by the RUF were
financing not just the RUF, but Charles Taylor's own rebellion before he became president
in l977". Thus, the report goes on to say that the "widespread academic conclusion" that
Taylor's support for the RUF was not only to obtain resources for his own rebellion, but also
to deny resources to the Sierra Leonean government who had previously given a platforin
for ECOMOG to launch its Liberian operations, cannot be doubted. 13642
6036. The report also notes, however, that the RUF needed to maintain a fighting force of
between 5000 and 6000 men, requiring significant amounts of food and shelter in addition to
the weapons and logistical support that was needed.l3643 The report further suggests that
proceeds from diamonds may have gone into the private accounts of RUF and Liberian
leaders, but that Taylor, who had inherited a bankrupt Liberian economy in 1997, needed
weapons in the same way that the RUF did.
6037. In its examination of the "RUF, Diamonds, Liberia" connection, the report includes
an excerpted statement from an individual whose name was omitted for "reasons of privacy
and security" who told of his time with the RUF going on looting sprees and that he had
been taken to mine in Kono. Regarding the RUF leadership, this individual told the author of
the report that:
General Issa Sesay is the person responsible for the purchase of arms and ammunition for the RUF. He
normally buys arms and ammunition for the RUF through President Charles Taylor on ‘batta’ (barter) system.
When 1ssa Sesay takes our diamonds to President Charles Taylor, he in turn supply [sic] him with arms and
ammunition for the RUF. I3644
13639 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 12, ERN 30854.
13640 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p, 15, ERN 30857.
13641 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 10, ERN 30859.
13642 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, lan Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 1 1-12, ERN 30854-30855.
13643 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 12, ERN 30854.
13644 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the

---- End of Page 2096 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J GL? 18 May 2012

Lt 0 / z Q
6038. The report then examines the way in which diamonds moved out of Liberia, noting
that of the diamonds recorded by Belgian customs as coming from Liberia, many of them
did not originate in Liberia. The panel of experts discovered that eight companies
purporting to export diamonds from Liberia did not actually maintain premises in
Liberia13645 learnt of an agreement between a Kenyan named Anjivan Ruprah (a.k.a. Samir
N. Nasr), who held a Liberian diplomatic passport and President Charles Taylor for "arms
helicopters and helicopter spare parts in exchange for diamond purchasing".13646 The report
states that this illustrates the ease with which individuals could launder diamonds through
Liberia, whether they originated from Sierra Leone or somewhere else. Quoting from the
UN Panel of Experts report13647 the report states that "Liberian officials thrive on their
country's weak administration, its crippled infrastructure and porous borders", noting a
reference from Charles Taylor that RUF diamonds could have gone through Liberia
"unofficially".13648
Deliberations
6039. The Trial Chamber first considers the trips that Issa Sesay allegedly took to
personally deliver diamonds to the Accused during this period. The Trial Chamber recalls
the evidence of TF 1-338, who testified that Issa Sesay delivered diamonds to the Accused
on three occasions in 2000 and 2001. On the first occasion, upon receiving the diamonds,
the Accused told Sesay that they were for safekeeping, but then promised to provide
"whatever"’ was needed for the "revolution in Sierra Leone". After Sesay told the Accused
that the RUF lacked "materials", the Accused spoke to Benjamin Yeaten who later took
Sesay to Camp Schefflin where there were "large quantities" of arms and ammunition. Sesay
then returned to Sierra Leone with some of that "material" on a UNAMSIL vehicle. After
delivering diamonds to the Accused on a second trip in early 2001, Sesay returned to Sierra
Leone with diesel and "some supplies". Finally, in March, April or May of 2001, Sesay
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 10, ERN 30857.
13645 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Cor1nection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 10, ERN 30861.
13446 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds. the RUF and the Liberian Connection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 10, ERN 30861.
131147 See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, February 1998-July 1999. Exhibit P-018,
"Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-5/2000/1195. Adopted on 20 December
0 ".
34480 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Cor1nection—a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007". p. 10. ERN 30862 citing Annex 2,

---- End of Page 2097 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ 18 May 2012

L; 0 I Cf 0
delivered diamonds to the Accused. TF1-338 did not testify that Sesay received anything in
return on this visit, but the Accused did promise to set him up with someone whom he could
sell the "small diamonds" to for cash to buy "basic needs" to use on the "front lines".
6040. The Trial Chamber notes the Defence's challenges to TF1-338's credibility on the
basis of his inconsistencies regarding the number of trips Sesay took to deliver diamonds to
the Accused during this period. ln a prior statement to the Prosecution the witness declared
that he travelled with Issa Sesay to deliver diamonds to Charles Taylor on five occasions,
which he contradicted in later testimony, stating that he only delivered diamonds to the
Accused on three occasions.16646 On cross-examination, the witness clarified that he went
with Issa Sesay on three occasions to deliver diamonds directly to Charles Taylor and on
other occasions he travelled to Monrovia to deliver diamonds to business partners.16656 The
witness explained that in previous interviews with the Prosecution the context of his
explanation was how many times he recalled taking diamonds to Monrovia, or Liberia
generally, not specifically to the Accused. The witness then clarified that they had taken
diamonds to Liberia five times, but that they only took diamonds to the Accused on two
occasions.16651 The Trial Chamber accepts the witnesses explanation with regard to these
inconsistencies and furthermore recalls its finding that TF1-338 is a generally credible
witness.13652 1
6041. The Trial Chamber has also considered the testimony of the Accused and Issa Sesay
with relation to TF1-338's evidence. The Accused testified that TF1-338 never travelled to
Monrovia with Sam Bockarie to transport diamonds.16656 Specifically, in response to TF1-
338's testimony that Issa Sesay delivered diamonds to the Accused at the end of 2000, and
then took arms and ammunitions from Camp Schefflin, the Accused testified that this was a
"lie".13654 The Accused further testified that although Issa Sesay did come to Liberia, he
never gave the Accused diamonds to keep for anyone.16655 Further, regarding Sesay's
alleged trip in early 2001 to deliver diamonds to the Accused, the Accused testified that they
"Notes on Meeting with President Charles Taylor, lan Smi11ie", October 6, 2000.
*36*6 TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15430 (PS).
13656 TF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15429-15430 (PS).
13651 TFl-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15430 (PS).
16652 Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329.
13653 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30853-30854.
13 654 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30873—30875.
13655 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30875.

---- End of Page 2098 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T `jg 18 May 2012 M

L; 0 1 Q I
did not discuss UNAMSIL on that occasion}3656 As for TFl—338's testimony that Sesay
delivered diamonds in either March, April or May of 2001, when the Accused told Sesay
that he would introduce him to someone to deal diamonds with, the Accused testified that he
never had that conversation with Sesay. The Accused further testified that he was unaware
that the RUF would have a need to deal diamonds for weapons at that time because they
were in the middle of disarmament. B657
6042. Recalling the evidence of TF1—567, the Trial Chamber notes that his testimony about
Sesay delivering diamonds to the Accused on one occasion corroborates the events of the
first meeting testified to by TFl—338. Both witnesses testified that the trip occurred around
the same time and that Sesay first visited the guesthouse before going to the Executive
Mansion where he delivered diamonds to the Accused. Both witnesses also testified that on
that occasion the Accused showed Sesay the diamonds that Bockarie had brought for safe
keeping. The Trial Chamber notes that while TFl—338 stated that Sesay went to the
guesthouse, he did not mention the stop at the Boulevard Hotel. ln TFl—567's version of
events, Sesay went first to the guesthouse, then to the Boulevard Hotel to meet Bah, where
they discussed what to do with the diamonds, then to deliver the diamonds to the Accused.
ln the Trial Chamber's view, this discrepancy in the testimony of the two witnesses is minor.
TFl—567's knowledge of this trip was based on what Sesay related to him, and given Sesay's
multiple trips to the guesthouse, the Boulevard Hotel and the Executive Mansion, it is
understandable that the details of some of these trips would conflate with others.
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes Sesay's own testimony that he met Bah on a trip to
Monrovia in October of 2000 and that they transacted diamonds during that meeting. Given
TFl—338's testimony that this trip occurred at the end of 2000, and TFl—567's testimony that
he was present in the guest house from the time of Sesay's take over of the RUF until the
beginning of 2001, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that this trip occurred around October
2000, and that the witnesses testified about the same trip.
6043. The Defence submits that TFl—567's testimony about diamond—related activity, as
well as his testimony about the coordination of arms and ammunitions to Sierra Leone, is
hearsay.l3658 The Trial Chamber is cognizant that the witness never gave the diamonds to the
{W6 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30876.
U657 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30877-30878.
*3658 Defence Final Trial Briei para. 1027.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

@#0 / 92
Accused himself, nor did he ever see anyone give the diamonds to the Accused. However,
the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1-567 is a generally credible witnessl3659 and
notes that TFl-567's evidence on these points has been corroborated by the testimony of
TF1 -338, a credible witness who also testified about Sesay's visits with diamonds.
6044. The Trial Chamber has considered Issa Sesay's response to TFl-567's evidence.
Although Sesay repeatedly denied giving diamonds to the Accused, Sesay confirmed that .
TFl-567 was in Monrovia from around December 2000 until January 2001, when the
international community was blaming Taylor for supporting the RUF.13 660 The Trial
Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of Issa Sesay must be treated with
caution.l3 661 In the Trial Chamber's view, the Accused's denials of TFl-338's evidence are
self-serving and lacking in credibility. For this reason the Trial Chamber rejects the evidence
of the Accused and Issa Sesay and accepts the evidence of TFl-338 and TFl-567, which is
additionally corroborated by the more general testimony of several other witnesses that
Sesay brought diamonds to the Accused during this period. Witnesses TFl-567, TFl-516,
TFl-371, Mohamed Kabbah, Augustine Mallah and Perry Kamara all testified to their h
second-hand knowledge of Issa Sesay delivering diamonds to the Accused on different
occasions during this time. Witnesses Augustine Mallah, TFl-567 and TFl-371 also
testified that Sesay received supplies and/or arms and ammunition in exchange for the
diamonds.
6045. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber considers TFl-567's evidence that Kanneh regularly
brought diamonds to Monrovia from Sesay and met with Bah to discuss diamond business to
be corroborative of the other evidence before the Trial Chamber that Kanneh and Bah were
involved in diamond transactions with the Accused and independent diamond dealers.
6046. The Trial Chamber notes that the more general testimony of these witnesses is
largely related to Sesay's receipt of diamonds at Small Lebanon and his subsequent travel
with them to Liberia during this period. Nevertheless, some of this evidence attests to the
delivery of the diamonds to the Accused. Mallah testified that Sesay told him and others that
he took diamonds to the Accused. Although he never saw any of the diamonds, Mallah
testified that he saw Sesay return from Liberia with arms and ammunition. Perry Kamara
Img Credibility Assessment, TF1—567, paras 313-317.
IMO Issa Sesay, Transcript 28 July 2010, p. 44919.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01.—T / ih 18 May 2012
/

A o M3
testified that Sesay would call from Liberia and report on the things that the Accused had
given him in exchange for diamonds. Kamara also testified that Sesay brought back a
document cataloguing the number of` diamonds that the Accused kept and what he had given
in return. The Trial Chamber recalls that Mallah and Kamara are generally credible
witnesses. 13662
6047. The Trial Chamber notes the cross-examination testimony of` TF 1-367, in which the
witness confirmed that Belgians and Lebanese visited Sesay in Kono on a number of`
occasions. A number of` other witnesses also testified regarding the presence of Belgian and
Lebanese businessmen in Sierra Leone.13663 Although the witness stated that he did not
know if` Sesay sold the diamonds to these men, the Trial Chamber does not consider this
testimony to be inconsistent with or raise doubt as to the testimony of` other witnesses that
diamonds were delivered to the Accused.
6048. Additionally, recalling Mohamed Kabbah's evidence regarding Sesay's deliveries of`
diamonds to the Accused, the Trial Chamber notes that Kabbah's testimony that Sesay
separated the smaller diamonds from the rest bef`ore parcelling corroborates TF 1-338's
testimony that the Accused told Sesay that he would introduce him to someone to whom he
could sell the smaller diamonds. Furthermore, Kabbah gave direct evidence, as one of` the
radio operators who reported about the 36 carat diamond, of` the incident in which Sesay was
called back to Sierra Leone to take the 36 carat diamond to the Accused. Based on Kabbah's
detailed testimony of` the event, including Sesay's statements upon his return to pick up the
diamond, and recalling its previous finding that Kabbah is a generally reliable witness,13664
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Sesay ultimately delivered the diamond to the Accused.
6049. The Trial Chamber notes 1ssa Sesay's testimony of specific diamond transactions he
engaged in on behalf` of` the RUF with persons other than the Accused. In particular, the Trial
Chamber considers that his evidence of` a March 2001 transaction with someone named
"Sammy" for SUSD 135,000 accords with the record in Exhibit D-393 of` a diamond dealer
A 13661 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
13662 Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2522; Credibility
Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.
13663 See Diamonds: Provision of Mining Equipment and Mining Expertsincluding Perry Kamara, Transcript 6
February 2008, pp. 3263-3264; 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44475-44477. See Diamonds: Alleged
Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, February 1998-July 1999, including TF1-539, Transcript 10 June 2008,
pp. 11449-11454.
13664 Credibility Assessment, Mohamed Kabbah, paras 334-338.

---- End of Page 2101 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T 2101 Z (KA 18 May 2012

40 W4
by the name of Ossailly Samih who transacted diamonds with the RUF on a many
occasions. Based upon the timing of Samih's transactions and the phonetic similarity of the
names "Samih" and "Sammy" the Trial Chamber is of the view that the person Sesay named
as Sammy in the transcript is actually Samih. The Trial Chamber is of the view considers
that diamond transactions Sesay might have had with dealers would not preclude and does I
not negate the evidence of his having delivered diamonds to the Accused as well.
6050. Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that Issa Sesay delivered diamonds y
to the Accused during this period.
6051. The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence regarding Eddie Kanneh's alleged
deliveries of diamonds to the Accused. In this context, the Trial Chamber recalls the
testimony of Mohamed Kabbah that on one occasion Sesay gave diamonds to Eddie Kanneh
to "take to Charles Taylor". In cross—examination, Kabbah was confronted with his prior
statement about this event, in which he said that Sesay gave Eddie Kanneh the diamonds to
take to Monrovia to sell them and did not mention the Accused. *3665 Kabbah testified that he
did not "recall to make mention [sic]" the Accused when giving that statement, and that the
Prosecution did not call his attention to it at that time.*3666 The witness then explained that
Eddie Karmeh was not given the diamonds to sell to Charles Taylor, but to show them to
him "to have evidence in the end because in the absence of Foday Sankoh it was Charles
Taylor who we regarded as our father".*3667 The witness agreed that the diamonds were not
taken to Charles Taylor for him to keep them, but so that he could see what was being
sold.*3668 The Defence confronted Kabbah with an additional prior statement about this
event, in which there is no mention of the Accused.*3669 The witness said he did not mention
Taylor then because he did not regard it as important since the diamonds were not to be
taken directly to him.*3670 Kabbah was also confronted with prior statements in which he
said that Francis Oscar Charles ("FOC") was sent to collect money from Eddie Kanneh who
would have in tum received the money from the two white men, not from Charles
*3665 Mohamed Kabbah. Transcript 16 September 2008. p. 16389.
*3666 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16389-16390.
*3°°7 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16391.
*3668 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16391.
*3669 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16401.
*367*) Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16402.

---- End of Page 2102 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dm 18 May 2012

40 /7 5
Taylor.l3(’7l The witness explained again that he did not mention FOC getting the money
from Charles Taylor, because Charles Taylor was only meant to look at the diamonds, but
the two white men were the ones who "came to buy".l3672 The Trial Chamber accepts
Kabbah's explanation that he failed to mention the Accused in prior statements because the
Prosecution did not "call his attention to it" at that time. The Trial Chamber finds Kabbah's
testimony to be credible and notes that his evidence of these events is generally corroborated
by the evidence of other witnesses. In light of the witness's clarification, and the evidence of
TF1-516 and TF1-567 discussed below who also testified about Kanneh taking diamonds to
the Accused, the Trial Chamber considers that Kanneh delivered diamonds to the Accused
as well as to third-parties during this time period.
6052. ln addition to Kabbah, Witnesses TF1-567 and TF1-516 both testified about Eddie
Kanneh's involvement in taking diamonds to the Accused during this period. TF1-567
observed Kanneh's involvement in diamond dealings in 2000 and 2001 and later in 2002,
while TF1-516 heard radio messages about Kanneh's travels to take diamonds to the
Accused from Sesay's station. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination TF1-567
affirmed that he never personally gave dia1nonds to the Accused or saw others giving
diamonds to the Accused.l3673 However, TF1-567 would not have been present at these
meetings, but he was in direct contact with Sesay and would have known his movements.
TF1-516 knew that Kanneh took diamonds to the Accused based on radio messages that he
overheard.
6053. Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that Eddie Kanneh delivered
dia1nonds to the Accused during this time period.
6054. The Trial Chamber has considered Joseph Marzah's testimony that he personally
delivered diamonds on 10 or 20 occasions to the Accused in return for arms and
ammunitions. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Marzah's evidence must be treated
with caution and requires corroboration.l3674 The Trial Chamber notes that while Marzah's
testimony about his transport of arms and ammunitions to Sierra Leone was corroborated by
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16392-16393.
U672 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16392-16393.
Um TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13094-13097.
mm Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

a number of witnesses, his testimony regarding his delivery of diamonds to the Accused
during this period has not been corroborated, and is therefore not reliable.
6055. Regarding Prosecution Exhibit P-019, the Defence submits that its contents are
nearly identical to P-018, a report authored by the UN Panel of Experts, and that P-019's
author, lan Smillie, who was also a member of the UN Panel of Experts has demonstrated
clear bias against Liberia.13°75 Issa Sesay challenged the production estimates in Exhibit P-
019, saying it is an ‘"exaggeration" that, during the 15 months of his leadership, the RUF
could have raised between $USD 60 and 80 million in revenue appr diamond mining, "the
mining issue" and revenue estimates in P-019 were greatly exaggerated.13°76 Sesay
maintained that he sold all the diamonds he received and did not give them to
Taylor.13677The Trial Chamber has considered this challenge to the report, and does not
accept the contention that the report is biased.
6056. The Trial Chamber notes that the report's conclusion on the amount of diamonds that
should have been exported from Sierra Leone during the periods when the RUF controlled
Kono District and Tongo Fields is based upon a rough estimation of the annual exports from
1990 to 1998 and 2005 to 2006, 13678 and that the report contains a note that estimation was
difficult given the "absence of any reliable production data after about 1975".13679 In light of
these circumstances, the Trial Chamber will not rely on the report data to quantify the value
of diamonds smuggled from Sierra Leone to Liberia, particularly as it relates to diamonds
delivered to the Accused, as the Trial Chamber is unable to quantify any value on the basis
of the evidence in the record. Moreover, the Trial Chamber recalls evidence demonstrating
that a number of individuals inside Liberia received RUF diamonds during this time.
However, the Trial Chamber notes that the excerpted statement in the report, unattributed for
reasons of privacy and security, is consistent with the witness testimony that Issa Sesay
"°" Defence rmi rmi Bupr, para. 704.
W6 ipsa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46250. 46253, 46259-46260.
13677 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, p. 46250. During that time he received only black or coffee coloured
industrial diamonds, of which 300 pieces were worth around $USD 10,000 - $15,000. Sesay further remarked
that his father lives in poverty and his children's school fees are paid by friends, which would not be the case if
the RUF had been mining the volume of diamonds alleged. Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46259-
46260.
13678 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection—~a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007", p. 10, ERN 30852.
*3679 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection——a Report for the Office of the
Prosecutor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, lan Smillie, 21 April 2007", p.10, ERN 30852.

---- End of Page 2104 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / X A 18 May 2012

40 /4%
delivered diamonds .to the Accused who in turn supplied the RUF with arms and
ammunition.
6057. The Trial Chamber further notes that the report admitted as Exhibit P-019 includes
an assessment of Liberian diamond production, which indicates that Liberian diamonds are
"generally known to be small, low quality goods" and that diamond exploration in Liberia
dissipated in the 1970s and 1980s due to "disappointing findings". This evidence refutes the
claim made by the Accused that he would have had no reason to trade in diamonds from
Sierra Leone because Liberia had its own diamonds. The report findings indicate that export
of diamonds from Liberia was far greater than Liberian diamond production, attributing the
difference to diamonds from Sierra Leone smuggled through Liberia. The Trial Chamber
accepts this finding in the report as reliable and does not accept the Accused's contention.
6058. The Trial Chamber has considered Confidential Exhibit P-277 in light of the
Prosecution's accusation that the Accused continued to receive diamonds during this period.
Ln the Trial Chamber's view, this document is generally corroborative of diamond dealings
between the RUF and individuals outside of Sierra Leone during this time. However, the
Trial Chamber does not find it probative of the Accused's receipt of RUF diamonds during
this period,13°8O and therefore need not consider the Defence's challenges to the use of this
exhibit in determining whether the Accused received RUF diamonds during this time
pcriodlissxi
6059. Regarding the Prosecution's allegation that the Accused organised and monitored
Sesay's trips to Monrovia using RUF radios and radio stations operated under the Accused's
control, the Trial Chamber is of the view that Mohamed Kabbah's evidence, relied upon by
the Prosecution, does not support this allegation. The incident testified to by Kabbah was not
an indication of ongoing monitoring, and reflected an isolated occurrence in which Yeaten
happened to overhear a communication regarding the 36 carat diamond unbeknownst to
Kabbah when the witness called Sunlight, Yeaten's radio operator, in an effort to reach
Sesay. This evidence is insufficient to establish that there was regular monitoring of Sesay's
movements by the Accused.
Findings
imo Confidential Exhibit P-277; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 371.

---- End of Page 2105 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 21% GA 18 May 2012

,4o 198
6060. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that from June 2000 until the end of hostilities in 2002, Issa Sesay delivered diamonds to the
Accused, sometimes for safekeeping until Sankoh's release from detention and sometimes in
return for supplies and/ or arms and ammunition.
6061. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Eddie Kanneh also delivered diamonds to the Accused on Sesay's behalf on occasion
from J une 2000 until the end of hostilities in 2002.
2. Alleged Facilitation of Diamond Trading bythe Accused
Submissions of the Parties
6062. The Prosecution submits that towards the end of the conflict, and particularly after
"Heart of the Matter" was published in 1999, the Accused became increasingly concerned
about the international community's view of his connection with the RUF. Consequently,
the Accused instructed 1ssa Sesay not to bring diamonds to him so often, and facilitated
"midd1e men" or "diamond dea1ers" to whom Sesay was to deliver the diamonds instead of
to the Accused. Sesay was instructed to use the proceeds from the sale of diamonds to those
middlemen to purchase arms and ammunitions and supp1ies.l3682 The Prosecution argues
that, despite his efforts, the Accused failed to distance himself from the diamond dealings as
the evidence clearly shows that that he authorized the diamond deals and that the "dea1ers"
were present in Sierra Leone under the auspices of the Accused.l3683 The Prosecution
highlights the Accused's admission that it was possible that members of the Liberian SSS
and ATU were involved in those transactions, including Benjamin Yeaten}3684 The
Prosecution relies on the evidence of witnesses TF1-590, TF1-338, Abu Keita and TF1-371,
as well as Exhibit D—393.
6063. The Defence acknowledges that the RUF conducted diamond deals with a number of
businessmen, often through Ibrahim Bah, and acknowledges that this activity occurred in
Monrovia.l3685 The Defence submits that from the capture of Kono in 1998 to disarmament
13681 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 81.
13682 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 379.
lm} Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 380.
13684 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 380.
IMS Defence Final Trial Brief] paras 938-939.

---- End of Page 2106 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012 M

in 2001, Ibrahim Bah connected Bockarie and Sankoh to a number of diamond purchasers,
including Lebanese-Liberians, Belgians and Canadians.l3°86 According to the Defence, these
diamonds purchasers provided the RUF with vehicles, food, mining equipment,m°87
computers telephones and other items.l3°88 ln support of the Defence's arguments, the Trial
Chamber has considered the evidence of the Accused, Issa Sesay, Abu Keita , TF1-567 and
Exhibit D-393.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-590
6064. Witness TF1-590, a businessman who fled to Liberia to escape the RUF}3689
testified that he saw Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito) around September 199813690 in
Voinjama with Chucky Taylor and two Arab men, one of whom was Lebanese. The witness
testified that he learned that they were Mr Taylor'sl3 691 gem dealers and that one of them
was a member of the Saad group}3692 The men were part of a convoy coming from
Monrovia on its way to Sierra Leone. 13 693
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -338
6065. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member}3694 testified that on the third trip that 1ssa Sesay
took to deliver diamonds to the Accused, in March, April or May of 2001, Charles Taylor
told Sesay that he should not come so often with diamonds because the UN and the
international community were "having eyes on him to see whether he had connections with
the RUF".l3°95 Taylor also told Sesay that he was going to try to find someone that Sesay
could bring the "small diamonds" to in exchange for money to buy basic needs to use "on
*3333 Defence rrrrei Trial Brief paras 1079, 1201-1202,
U687 See Diamonds: Provision of Mining Equipment and Mining Experts.
IMS Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1079.
UGSQTFI-590, Transcript 12 June 2008, pp. 11732, 11734.
MQOTF1-590, Transcript 13 June 2008, pp. 11763-11768.
Bw) The witness clarified that this reference to Mr Taylor, was to the President of Liberia, not to Chucky Taylor,
about whom the witness also testified. TFl-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, p. 11830.
*3333 TF1-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11829-11830.
*3333 rrr-590, rrerreerrpt 16 June 2008, p. 11830.
’33°"rr1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (Ps).
‘3°"3 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15168.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

the front line" so that Sesay would no longer bring diamonds so often to him.l36% The next
day, the witness was present when Yeaten brought two white men to the Boulevard Hotel to
meet Sesay. One of the men called himself Alpha Bravo and said that he was from Belgium,
but the witness did not find out the name of the other man. mm Upon meeting the men Sesay
stated that he recalled meeting them in 1999 when Sam Bockarie had taken them to
Kono.l3698 Yeaten explained to Sesay that these white men were the diamond dealers from
Belgium and they had been brought to Sesay so that Sesay could sell him the "small, small"
diamonds that he brought from Sierra Leone and use the money from the sale to support his
fighters in Sierra Leone}3699 Diamonds were not exchanged at this meeting and Sesay then
returned to Sierra Leone with some bags of rice and diesel.mO0
6066. Witness TF 1-338 testified about two to three occasions when diamonds were later
delivered to Alpha Bravo in exchange for cash. TF 1-338 testified that in 2001 Sesay and
Francis Oscar Charles travelled to Foya, where Sesay met Benjamin Yeaten and the two
travelled on to Monrovia. Sesay then met Alpha Bravo at the guesthouse where Alpha Bravo
gave Sesay SUSD 300,000 for diamondsmm Sesay gave half to the Accused for "safe
keeping".mO2 After delivering SUSD 150,000 to the Accused, Sesay took the other SUSD
150,000 to Sierra Leone.mO3 Sesay returned to Foya with Yeaten and loaded his vehicle
with beer, liquor, shoes, clothing and drugs, which he took to Koidu Town--mm TF1-338's
stated that Sesay never received those diamonds back from the Accused, nor did anyone in
the RUF ever receive the diamonds that Sankoh or Bockarie had deposited with the
Accused. mw
*6666 TF1-338, rremterrpt 2 September 2008, pp. 15168-15170, 15225 (PS).
*666* TF1-338, rremterrpt 2 September 2008, p. 15169.
img TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15169-15170.
*6666 TF1-338, rrrmrerrpt 2 September 2008, p. 15170.
*6*66 TF1-338, rrrmeertpt 2 September 2008, p. 15170.
*6*6* TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15171-15172, 15226-15227 (PS).
*6*66 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15171-15172, 15192.
*6*66 TF1-338, rrerreerrpt 2 September 2008, pp. 15226-15227 (Ps).
mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15171-15172.
*6*66 TF1-338, rrrmperrpt 2 September 2008, pp. 15192-15193.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % J1;) 18 May 2012

6067. Eddie Karmeh and Benjamin Yeaten took diamonds to Alpha Bravo on two other
occasions that the witness was aware ofmoé To the witness’ knowledge, the RUF did not
receive anything in return for these diamonds. mm A
6068. According to TF1—338, Eddie Karmeh introduced another diamond dealer from
Belgium named Minie to the RUF.mO8 TF1-338 testified about three occasions in 2001
when diamonds were delivered to Minie.mO9On one occasion, Issa Sesay sent one of his
bodyguards along with Rashid Foday with 350 pieces of industriall37l0 diamonds to meet
with Eddie Karmeh in Monrovia at the Palm Hotel where Minie was lodgedmll At the
hotel, the diamonds were handed over to Minie.ml2 On a second similar occasion, they
delivered 260 pieces of diamonds with Eddie Kanneh to Minie.l3 7*3
6069. On a third occasion in 2001, Sesay sent his bodyguard to Vahun to collect a 40-carat
diamond.ml4 After receiving the diamond, the bodyguard proceeded to Monrovia to meet
with Eddie Karmeh. The two men then met with Minie at the Palm Hotel in Monrovia and
handed the diamonds over to Minie. Issa and Minie then spoke over satellite phone. They
agreed that the price of the diamond would be SUSD 150,000 and that Kanneh was to pick
the money up in Cote d’1voire and transport it on to Sesay. The witness did not know
whether Kanneh ever received the money and handed the money over to Sesay.l37l5 After
this transaction, the RUF did not bring diamonds to Minie again.ml6
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
*37*33 r1¤1-888, rrermertpt 2 September 2008, p. 15193.
*37**7 TP1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15193.
Img The Trial Chamber recalls the coniiision in the witness’ testimony over the spelling and pronunciation of
Minie, Mounie, or Mini11's name. TP1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15194; Transcript 3 September
2008, p. 15326 (PS); Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15410-1541l (PS). However, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the Minie whom the witness has testified about is, in fact, Leonid Minin.
Img TP1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15197.
*37*** TP1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15198.
*37** TF1—338, rremeertpt 2 September 2008, p. 15194.
*37*3 TP1-338, rremeerrpt 2 September 2008, pp. 15193—15194, 15197.
*37*3 r1¤1-888, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15198.
*37*3 r1¤1-888, rremeerrpt 2 September 2008, p. 15216.
*37*3 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15194—15195.
mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15198; TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15214 (PS).

---- End of Page 2109 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T // AL:) 18 May 2012

6070. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULIMO-K who
later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,ml7 testified that he saw Bah in Kono with
Eddie Kanneh and "CR", General Ibrahim Bah's bodyguard, during Issa Sesay's
administration in 2000.mlg Bah had come to Kono with Kanneh and Sesay and four
Lebanese people to get RUF diamonds. mw
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
6071. Witness TF1-567, a member of the RUF, testified that Ibrahim Bah used to sell
diamonds to his "white friends" in exchange for "satellite phones, computer equipment and
some other things like food", not for arms and ammunitions.m20 According to TF1-567, it
was not true that Ibrahim Bah sold diamonds for arms and ammunitions.m2l TF1-567
further testified that in early 2000, Foday Sankoh arranged for a Canadian friend named
"Mishell" to send vehicles for him, but that to the witness’ knowledge, Ibrahim Bah was not
involved in this. H722
The Accused
6072. The Accused testified that he knew nothing of the $USD 300,000 that Issa Sesay
allegedly received in Monrovia in exchange for diamonds. Furthermore, the Accused
doubted that Issa Sesay ever had $USD 300,000.m23
6073. In response to Abu Keita's testimony, the Accused testified that he knew nothing
about Kanneh and "CR" in Kono with Lebanese men. The Accused further stated that other
evidence that he had sent white men came to Kono to assess the mining situation was not
true and he did not send Bah and Kanneh or others to Sierra Leone. my
mw Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000;
Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2025-2026.
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2026.
*373** rri-567, Transcript 8 Juiy 2008,p. 13137.
*373* TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008,p. 13137.
*3733 TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008,p. 13175.
13 733 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30888.
13 724 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29406-29407.

---- End of Page 2110 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6074. Witness Issa Sesay, interim leader of the RUF from 2000 until disarmament in
2002,m25 testified that Ibrahim Bah "was the agent who used to bring diamond dealers to
the RUF to Sam Bockarie".m26 In this capacity, Bah brought a man named Carlos to
Bockarie. Carlos came for the first time in Februa 1999, but Sesa also saw him in Buedu
YY Y
in April 199953727 Carlos provided Bockarie with an FM radio station in Buedu, and
Bockaiie sold diamonds to him}3728 Later, Bah brought another set of people called Michel
and Louis ncin Belgium who brought Sankoh and third satellite phone}3729
6075. Sesay iiirther testified that from January 1999 to December 1999, Sam Bockaiie sold
the diamonds brou t to him b minin commanders to business eo le like Michael, Louis
Y 8 P P
and Carlos, and Fayard and Ahmed, two Lebanese men who were in Monrovia.m3O Bah
brou t those eo le to Bockarie for him to transact diamonds with them.l373l After
P P
Bockarie left, Bah, Michael and Louis continued to buy the diamonds that were mined, and
brought vehicles "to be able to do further business with Mr Sankoh".l3732
6076. Witness Issa Sesay denied selling HSUSD 300,000 worth of diamonds to Alpha Bravo
A and giving half of it to the Accused and taking the remaining half back to Sierra Leone}3733
Furthermore, Sesay testified that he did not know anyone called Alpha Bravo. Bm However,
Sesay testified that Ibrahim Bah had put him in touch with Michel and Louis, two white men
who were diamond dealers from Belgium}3735 Sesa testified that he had never heard
Y
Michel and Louis referred to as Alpha Bravo. I3736 Ibrahim Bah brought them to Monrovia in
October 2000 for Sesay to conduct business with them}3737 Ibrahim Bah had also brought
Michel and Louis to meet Sam Bockarie in August or Se tember of 1999, and that was the
P
my Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588~43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
**7* Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 Jniy 2010, p. 44322.
*77271ssa Sesay, Transcript 13 Jniy 2010, p. 44322.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44322—44323.W
*777°1ssa Sesay, Transcript 8 Jniy 2010, p. 44040.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44640. Sesay also testified that Michel was also called Michael, and
that he first met them with Bah in October of 1999. Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44654.
my Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44640.
**7*7 Issa scsay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44640-4464l.
Um Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 4531 1~45313.
**77* Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 Angnst 2010, pp. 4531 1-45313.
**775 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45309-453 10.
Imé Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 4531 1.

---- End of Page 2111 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03~01~T % 0}% 18 May 2012

time that the RUF first started doing business with them.m38 Bah also brought them to
Sankoh in December of 1999, and then again in March 2000.m39 Sesay testified that he did
not do business with them after October 2000 because Bah had kept $USD 60,000 of final
payment for that transaction. [3 740
6077. Sesay testified that during the time he was the leader of the RUF diamonds were
brought to him and he sold them to various individuals. In October 2000, he sold diamonds
to Michel throu Ibrahim Bah and he also sold diamonds to Alha'i Bakora , on several
J Y
occasions, and to Alhaji Modebor in early 2001.mM Sesay also testified that Ibrahim Bah
brought (or sent) a Lebanese man named Sammy, who was said to be born in Sierra Leone,
to Kono, along with Eddie Kanneh.m42 They were there for five days, and Sesay sold
diamonds to him.m43Sesay further testified that in Febmary or March of 2001,m44 he
travelled with Eddie Kanneh, "CR", the driver, and Kanneh's bodyguard to meet Sammy in
Monrovia. Kanneh had brought Sammy to Kono in Febmary or March 2000 and Kanneh
told Sesay that the man was still in Monrovia, and that if he had diamonds to sell he should
bring them to him.m45 Eddie Kanneh, Ibrahim Bah, and Gibril Massaquoi were with Sesay
when he sold diamonds to Sammy on that occasion. Sesay stayed at the Boulevard Hotel on
that trip, as did Bah and Sammy.m46 Sesay testified that he brought a 52 carat diamonds
with him on that trip. However, because the diamond was faulty, Sammy only offered $USD
1000 per carat. The final sale amount was $USD 137,000, but the man only had $USD
100,000 on him so it was agreed that Kanneh would come to pick up the rest. Sesay was
given the $USD 100,000 during that meeting. min
6078. Sesay denied sending one of his security to meet Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. Five Zero)
to deliver diamonds to Alpha Bravo}3748 Sesay also testified that he did not know who
my Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45310.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45309·45310. Sesay also testified that Michel was also called
Michael, and that he first met them with Bah in October of 1999. Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44654.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45310; Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44654.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45310.
lm} Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44653.
Um Issa spsay, Transcript 26 Juiy 2010, pp. 44653-44654.
""’ ipsa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44654.
um Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45081.
um Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 45080.
{W6 Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, pp. 45080-4508l.
‘"" ipsa sppay, Transcript 29 Juiy 2010, pp. 45081—45082.
Um Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, p. 45349.

---- End of Page 2112 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % GM 18 May 2012

Minie was and did not "do a deal" for EBUSD 200,000 worth of diamonds with Minie. The
only other Belgian diamond dealer whom Sesay knew was Sammy. 13749
Defence Exhibit D—393
6079. Exhibit D—393 is a "summary report" of an investigation conducted by the Belgian
Federal Criminal Investigation Department in Antwerp into the criminal organisation of
Nassour Aziz, Ossailly Samih,m5O ASA DIAM Diamond Company and others. The report
was concluded in November 2008, and was translated into English in December 2008.13751
6080. An introductory letter on the front of the report states:
[I]t has been demonstrated clearly that this organization had direct contacts with the RUF I
rebels in Sierra Leone for the transport of rough diamonds through Monrovia (Liberia) to
Antwerp (Belgium). This was done under the supervision and with the support of the
regime of the former president Charles Taylor. BH2
6081. The introduction then states that the following "summary report...clearly
demonstrates this link", and refers the reader to conclusions numbered one and three (and
their accompanying End of Pages) within the summary report. 13753
6082. Conclusion 1 states that Nassour Aziz, Manager of the ASA DIAM Diamond
Com an "develo ed a mechanism for smu lin rou diamonds, known as conflict or
P Y P gg g
blood diamonds from the Kono region (Sierra Leone) via Monrovia (Liberia) to the Antwerp
diamond market}3754 The report then divides Aziz/ASA DIAM's illegal diamond dealings
into three periods. Periods two and three are relevant to this analysis.m55 The Investigation
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45350-45351.
mw The Trial Chamber notes variant spelling of Ossailly, sometimes spelled as Ossaily, throughout Exhibit D-
393. The Trial Chamber consistently uses "Ossailly".
my Exhibit D-393, "Be1gian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002".
my Exhibit D-393, "Be1gian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 7, ERN102149.
my Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 14, ERNl02156. The introduction states that links to the
Accused can be found at "conclusion 1, see End of Pages 6-14 and conclusion 3, see End of Pages 18-27".
*3154 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 14, ERN102156. Specifically, the Belgian Police investigated
the crimes of "crimina1 organization", money laundering and violations of customs and duty regulations,
including diamond trading committed in Antwerp, Belgium between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2001.
Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 14, ERN102156.
M55 Period one addresses diamond traffic from Congo. Exhibit D-393, "Belgiar1 Investigation Made at the
Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 14,

---- End of Page 2113 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /6/z GT 18 May 2012

found that during Period Two, "October 2000-May 2001 ~ diamond route Monrovia
(Liberia) ~ Antwerp", Aziz introduced Ossailly to Darwish Ali, an American born Lebanese
who purportedly had good contacts in Liberia for setting up a "diamond line".m56 Ossailly
was given $USD 2000 to cover expenses while he inspected a batch of rough diamonds from
Liberia. In December 2000, Ossailly travelled to Liberia with Darwish to "start up the
diamond activities".m57 Once in Liberia, Darwish introduced Ossailly to Ibrahim Bah,
referred to in the report as an "RUF leader".m58 Ossailly moved into the Hotel Boulevard
and paid for several other rooms for Darwish, Bah and others. Beginning in January 2001,
several couriers with "cash" from ASA Diam travelled to Liberia to hand the bank notes to
Ossailly in person. According to the report:
[V]arious loose notes made by Ossailly in Monrovia show that through payments, in Liberia, Ossailly Samih
made it possible under the protection of the Liberian security services, the SSS... or the ATU..., to have
diamonds from the rebel area in Sierra Leone transferred to his hotel in Monrovia (Liberia). ly/59Samih in turn
gave the rough diamonds to the couriers who transported them via various "carrying methods" to Antwerp for
delivery to Asp. DIAM. 'mo
6083. The report indicates that ASA DIAM made every effort to hide its illegal diamond
line from Liberia, including removing any reference to Liberia from ASA DIAM's
telephone record. [3 761 In spite of these efforts to erase links to Liberia, the investigation
revealed regular contacts between ASA DIAM/Aziz and "satellite phones used by RUF
leaders and responsible personnel of the presidential security regime of Liberia". 13762
6084. "Period 3"of this report covers "June 200l—December 2001-—diamond route
Monrovia (Liberia) — Beirut (Lebanon). During May 2001, the relationship between Ossailly
and Aziz ended as a result of Ossailly's apparent withholding of money and Aziz's
ERN102156.
msé Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 15, ERN102157.
my Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 15, ERN102157.
msg Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 15, ERN102157.
Img Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 15, ERN102157.
mw Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 15, ERN102157.
mm Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERN102158.
Bm Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERN102158.

---- End of Page 2114 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (kb 18 May 2012 M

subsequent refusal to pay him for work done in Liberia. 13763 Ossialy then attempted to set up
his own diamond line with Monrovia from his home, and beginning in June 2001, made
numerous phone calls to the people he had previously worked with in Monrovia, including
"Bah and Issa".13764
6085. The report indicates that Ossailly wanted to arrange diamond transactions with the
RUF and to sell the diamonds in Freetown. He thought "there was nothing wrong in buying
diamonds from the RUF" Ossailly's flight records indicate that in the second half of 2001,
he flew three times to Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire from where he once went to Monrovia to do
diamond business there. 13765 The investigators observed that by January 2002 Ossailly's
links with West Africa were greatly reduced. 13766 The investigators were unable to determine
that Ossailly actually bought diamonds from Monrovia or from the RUF in Sierra Leone
durin this eriod.13767 Aziz's im ort throu ASA DIAM ceased com letel in June
8 P P P Y
2001-13768
6086. Under the heading "Indications of diamond trading with the RUF", the report states
that it is clear that Ossailly was the "key figure" for the purchase of rough diamonds for
Aziz and ASA DIAM. "Various evidence" also indicated to the investigators that while in
Monrovia, Ossailly "communicated directly with senior members of the RUF rebel army,
with the general approval of the regime associated with President Taylor". Evidence referred
to in the report includes Ossailly's notes, which mention names like Ibrahim Bah, Issa
Sesay, Sam Bockarie, Denis Mingo and Eddie Caneh [sic]".13769According to the report,
Ossailly's documents and photographs seized by the police also indicated to investigators
that Ossailly had "very close connections with senior figures in the Presidential regime",
13763 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERN102158.
13764 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERN102l58.
13765 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERN102158.
13766 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERNl02l58.
13767 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERNl02l58.
137611 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 16, ERNl02l58,
13769 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 18, ERN102160.

---- End of Page 2115 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03-01-T % ` 18 May 2012 F)
\ [

including the ATU and SSS}3770 As support for this assertion, the report then bullet points a
list of evidence found, including that Ossailly paid for various rooms at the Hotel Boulevard
where he met with RUF members, that he made numerous telephone contacts with RUF
members, that he provided satellite phones to senior RUF members such as, "Bah, Issa,
Mingo and Eddy", that he provided transmitters to the RUF "and/or members of the regime
associated with President Taylor". I3 771The investigators also retrieved photographs of
diamond mines saved under file names like "Kono", "Min", or "mining area". mn The
report also cites evidence of several Western Union transfers, one of which was to Bah, and
notes of payments made to "Bah, Issa, and Eddy" as well as to "members of the SSS and
ATU, such as Colonel Adams". Bm The report also references Ossailly's notes regarding the
use of helicopters and jeeps for transport.
6087. In the investigator's interviews with Ossailly, he admitted to buying "several lots" of
diamonds in Monrovia, which he stated that he then handed over at the same location to
Aziz's cousin or nephew, and sold part of them overseas to benefit his own
account.m74Ossailly denied exporting the diamonds outside Liberia. The report notes that
these statements contradict those of other persons under investigation. 13 775
6088. "Conclusion 3"of the report states that the investigators obtained information from
Italian authorities that one Leonid Minin, "an arms trader of Ukranian/Israeli nationality",
was arrested by the Italian authorities in August of 2000 in possession of a "large quantity of
diamonds".l377° Further documents of the Italian investigation of Minin obtained by the
Belgian authorities indicated that "Minin supplied arms made in Russia to both the regime
of president Charles Taylor of Liberia and to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels
mm Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
b Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. l8, ERNl02l60.
*377* Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Fonner Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", pp. 18-l9, ERNl02l60-l02l6l.
Um Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. l9, ERNl02l6l.
mu Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. l8, ERNl02l60.
mu Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 24, ERNl02l66. The translator of the report notes that there is
no distinction between "cousin" and "nephew" in Flemish or Dutch.
mw Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 24, ERNl02l66. Namely, suspects Macky Abbas and Ly
Samba.
mm Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for

---- End of Page 2116 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-0l-T Z l8 May 2012

in Sierra Leone".13777 The report then concludes that Minin was an important contact for
Nassour Aziz and Ossailly in connection with the supply of arms to "the regime of President
Taylor", and that Minin was paid with rough diamonds. According to the report, "after
Minin's arrest in Italy in August 2000, Nassour Aziz and Ossailly took over Minin's
role".13778This conclusion was supported by Ossailly's handwritten note of taken from his
home in Arrtwerp.13779 The note refers to a Dragonov, a specific type of pistol and "30 _
charges", the ammunition required for the pistol. In interviews with the Belgium police,
Ossailly confirmed that he wrote the note and that it was written in reference to a request
from General Yeaten for Ossailly to supply him with the gun and ammunition. Ossailly
stated that he took the request out of politeness but "did not undertake any steps to further it"
and that he ultimately did not supply the weapon. 13780 However, the investigators noted other
documents indicating that Ossailly did take steps to fulfil Yeaten's request for the weapon.
6089. Furthermore, the report states that "Alpha Zulu" was Aziz's call sign and refers to
other of Ossailly's handwritten notes referencing a meeting in Ouagadougou with Ibrahim
Bah in January 2001. The report also relies upon phone records, which indicated that a
number of calls were made by Ossailly to the Sofitel hotel where he met Bah and where
Aziz was lodged at that time.13781 The phone records also indicated that Ossailly made calls
to "Baba Jobe".
6090. The re ort also lists as one of its evidentiar sources a statement from Johan
P Y
Peleman, who had been appointed on several occasions by the Security Council of the UN as
an "arms ex ert for the Liberia investi ation anel".13782 The investi ators interviewed
P g P g
Peleman on two occasions and he told them that during the panel's investigation:
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 27, ERN102 169.
13777 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 27, ERN 102169.
137711 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 27, ERN102 169.
13779 The reproduction of the note as it appears in the exhibit is illegible. The Trial Chamber has relied upon the
investigators typed "analysis" of the note to determine its contents.
*1780 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 28, ERNl02l670.
13781 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 29, ERNl02l7 1.
13782 Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 33, ERN102 1 75.

---- End of Page 2117 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

it became clear that for its supplies the RUF...was dependant on the regime in Liberia—·Monrovia...because
years ago the RUF was set up in Monrovia to provide a buffer zone between Liberia and Sierra Leone to keep
control over the diamond-rich areas in Sierra Leone.l3783
6091. The excerpt of Peleman's interview goes on to say that the carrying of diamonds
from Sierra Leone to the Liberian capital was done "under the supervision of the presidential
troops of Liberia, the most important are the ATU and SSS.m84" From this, the panel
concluded that Ossaily, at the Boulevard Hotel, was an important buyer of diamonds for sale
by the RUF or its "couriers", and the hotel personnel and Ossaily himself confirmed that the
RUF brought batches of rough diamonds to him at the hote1.m85 Peleman told the
investigators that "Bah could be described as a key figure between President Taylor and the
RUF>> 13786
6092. Peleman also interviewed Cindoor Reeves ("CR"), who told him that he was
involved in a number of arms deliveries in Liberia, organized under Bah. During these deals
the arms were brought to the border of Sierra Leone in trucks and exchanged for diamonds.
Reeves stated that one particular arms delivery in January 2001 came from Gambia, flown
by the aviation company set up by Baba Jobe, who allegedly worked for President
Taylor.m87 The investigators noted several of Ossai11y's handwritten references to "CR",
Bah and Seku, as well as handwritten numbers, which appear to be dollar amounts, and
references like "transfer arms". 13788
Deliberations
6093. The Prosecution, relying mainly upon the evidence of TF1-338, contends that the
Accused instructed Sesay to transact diamonds with so-called "middle men" and/or diamond
dealers and that he facilitated the relationship between Sesay and the RUF and those
middlemen. Sesay was introduced to two Belgian men by Benjamin Yeaten and told that he
Bm Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Foriner Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 33, ERN102175.
mm Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Foriner Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 34, ERN102176.
'3785 Exhibit D—393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 34, ERN102176.
m8° Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Fonner Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 34, ERN102176.
mm Exhibit D-393, ‘"Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Former Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 34, ERN102176.
Img Exhibit D-393, "Belgian Investigation Made at the Request of Foriner Prosecutor for The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, David Crane, November 2002", p. 35, ERN102177.

---- End of Page 2118 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T // 6% 18 May 2012

41 OQ I /
should sell diamonds to those men and purchase arms and ammunitions and other supplies
from those salesmgq ln considering this submission, the Trial Chamber recalls that it has
seen evidence of at least eight different "diamond dealers" or "middlemen" with whom the
RUF allegedly entered into business. TF1-338 testified that the Accused introduced Sesay to
a Belgian man called "Alpha Bravo" and his unnamed fiiend, and that Eddie Kanneh
introduced Sesay to a third man named Minie.
6094. TF1-338 testified about occasions when the RUF dealt diamonds with both Alpha
Bravo and Minie separately. Sesay testified that Ibrahim Bah introduced him to two men,
Michel and Louis, in October 2000, and that Bah had previously brought the same two men
to Sam Bockarie in 1999 and to Foday Sankoh in 1999 and in 2000. Sesay testified that he
did not know Alpha Bravo. The only Belgian diamond dealers Sesay knew of were Michel
and Louis, and a man named "Sammy". Sesay did not testify about Minin, and TF1-338 did
not testify about Michel or Louis. Exhibit D-393 stated that two men, with connections to
Belgium, Nassour Aziz and Ossailly Samih, were dealing in diamonds and arms with the
RUF in Monrovia from October 2000 to December 2001. D-393 also stated that Leonid
Minin had been providing arms and ammunition to the "regime of President Charles Taylor
of Liberia" and the RUF in exchange for rough diamonds.
6095. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Defence challenged TF1-338's credibility based
on inconsistencies between his testimony and prior statements to the Prosecution. ln the
prior statements the witness apparently referred to the RUF's diamond business with Minie
and Alpha Bravo together.m9O The witness testified that it was not correct that they ever met
Minie and Alpha Bravo together, and that he did not tell the Prosecution that he ever met
Minie and Alpha Bravo together.m9l The witness testified that he made this correction in a
separate notebook, as instructed by the Prosecution, but that the correction was never
recordedmqz TF1-338 further testified that he did not tell the Prosecution that Charles
Taylor called a meeting with Minie and Alpha Bravo in Monrovia, as was reflected in the
Prosecution's notes, because Minie and Alpha Bravo never met together.m93Further, TF1-
338 testified that, contrary to his prior statements in interviews, the Accused did not arrange
13789 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 379.
m90TF1—338, Transcript 3 September 2008, p. 15377 (PS).
m9lTF1—338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15350 (CS).
MQZTF1-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. 15350-15351(CS).
mq3TF1—338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15356 (CS).

---- End of Page 2119 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 21V 18 May 2012

402/1
meetings between the AFRC/RUF and Minie. mlm TFl-338 testified that he actually told the
Prosecution that Charles Taylor set up the meeting with Alpha Bravo, not Minie}3795 The
witness explained the discrepancy as being a result of the Prosecution's recording error, and
further that he later corrected the error upon reviewing his statements, but the correction was
not made.m96 The Trial Chamber also notes TFl-338's cross-examination testimony in
which he testified that, during interviews, the Prosecution suggested to him that if Minie was
doing business in Liberia that "Charles Taylor must know about it".m97 The witness
testified that he disagreed with that suggestion when it was made to him, because the
Accused had not set up meetings with Minie, only with Alpha Bravomgg The Trial
Chamber is convinced by TFl-338's explanations regarding his prior statements and
testimony about meetings and introductions with Alpha Bravo and Minie and, as the Trial
Chamber finds TFl-338 to be generally credible,m99 the Trial Chamber accepts his
testimony that suggestions to the contrary were made to him and appeared in the record of
his interview in spite of his disagreement. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that the
Accused facilitated relationships between the RUF and a man known as Alpha Bravo for the
purpose of diamond transactions.
6096. Furthermore, in relation to the disputed facts surrounding Alpha Bravo and Minie,
the Trial Chamber notes a discrepancy in the line of questioning during Sesay's
examination-in-chief regarding TFl-338's testimony that Yeaten brought two white men,
one of whom was Alpha Bravo, to meet Sesay at the Boulevard Hotel. After recounting
TFl-338's testimony of the Accused's statement to Sesay that he would introduce Sesay to
someone that he could sell diamonds to, and then AL0ha Brav0's first meeting with Sesay the
next morning, Defence counsel stated: "Mr Sesay, the clear suggestion is that it was Charles
Taylor who put you in touch with some white diamond dealer from Belgium. Who put you
in touch with Michel and Louis, Mr Sesay‘?", to which Sesay responded that Ibrahim Bah
had introduced them. Sesay was not asked about the evidence that he met Alpha Bravo, and
neither confirmed nor denied whether the meeting at the Boulevard Hotel ever took place.
m94TFl-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15352 (CS).
13795TFl -338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15352 (CS).
m%TFl-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. l5354-15356 (CS).
mQ7TFl—338, Transcript 4 September 2008, p. 15352 (PS).
IWSTFI-338, Transcript 4 September 2008, pp. l5352-15353 (PS).
Img Credibility Assessment, TF]-338, paras 318-329.

---- End of Page 2120 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 %

A 0 A /5
Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay later testified that he did not know who
Alpha Bravo was.
6097. In addition, the Defence challenged TF1-338's credibility on the basis of an
inconsistency that, in the Trial Chamber's view, was a result of confusion over whether one
40-carat bulk diamond, or 40 carats of individual diamonds, were delivered to Monrovia.
Based on the language reflected in the witness’ prior statements he Trial Chamber finds that
this contradiction was merely the result of confusion.l38OO
6098. Regarding Exhibit D-393, at the outset the Trial Chamber notes the Prosecution's
challenge to the Defence's characterisation of the summary report as having been prepared
at the request of David Crane, former Prosecutor for The Special Court for Sierra
Leone.l38OlAfter examining the introductory letter to the report, the Trial Chamber is unable
to discern whether the report was in fact prepared at Crane's request. Nonetheless, the Trial
Chamber is cognisant that the investigation itself was conducted into persons other than the
Accused and does not consider the identity of the person or entity who requested the
preparation of the summary report to be significant.
6099. The Trial Chamber notes that in response to Exhibit D-393, the Accused denied any
knowledge of Ossailly's dealings, including his dealings with Colonel Adams, and denied
receiving a satellite phone from him.l38O2The Accused further denied that Ibrahim Bah was a
key figure between him and the RUF.l38O3 The Accused denied any knowledge that Ossailly
was buying diamonds from senior RUF at the Boulevard Hotel, but did not dispute that it
may have happened. The Accused further remarked that these transactions took place in
hotel rooms and had nothing to do with him or any member of his Government.l38O4The
Accused also testified that he had no knowledge of Benjamin Yeaten requesting a Draganov
and accompanying ammunition from Ossailly, and opined that he was glad that Ossailly had
not provided the weapon.l38O5 The Accused further denied that Baba J obe worked for him
and denied arms shipments came into Liberia from Nassour or Ossailly in January or July
mw TF1—338, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15551-15552 (PS).
1380} Prosecution Final Trial Brief, footnote 1 161.
13802 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31301-31307.
Um Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 313 14-31315.
MS04 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 3 1315-31316.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31310-3131 1.

---- End of Page 2121 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %// l8 May 2012

40 at /4
2001.13806 The Accused criticised the use of the phrase "people associated with the regime of
President Taylor"m8O7 and also remarked that he saw nothing in the report connecting him to
the diamond trade in Sierra Leoneugog
6100. The Trial Chamber notes D-393's conclusion that the arms and diamonds dealing
conducted in Monrovia by Nassour Aziz, Ossailly Samih and ASA DIAM was done "under
the supervision and with the support of the regime of former president Charles Taylor". The
report cites evidence of Ossailly's regular contact with, and provision of communication
supplies to Ibrahim Bah, Issa Sesay and Eddie Kanneh. However, his connections to the
Accused are not direct. The report mentions individuals by name, including Cindoor Reeves
("CR"), Baba .Iobe and Colonel Adams, who are allegedly connected to the Accused, but
their involvement in Ossailly and Aziz's transactions is unclear. Significantly, the Accused
denied that they worked closely with him and accused Reeves of being a liar and a
crook.l38O9 Otherwise, apart from general references to members of the ATU or SSS or "the
regime associated with President Charles Taylor" the report does not identify who those
members are, how the investigators knew the individuals were part of the Accused's
"regime",, or specifically what activity they engaged in with Ossailly and/or Aziz.
Furthermore, the report does not indicate that the Accused facilitated a relationship between
Ossailly and Aziz and the RUF, Eddie Kanneh or Ibrahim Bah. On the contrary, based upon
Ossailly's notes, it is evident that he dealt directly with those individuals. The Trial
Chamber notes that no witnesses testified to any knowledge of Ossailly or Aziz. The Trial
Chamber notes that D-393 makes reference to Aziz's call name as "Alpha Zulu" but finds
this insufficient to conclude that Aziz/ Alpha Zulu may have been Alpha Bravo. Thus, in the
Trial Chamber's view, D-393 fails to connect the Accused to any of Ossailly or Aziz's
diamond or arms-related activity in Monrovia.
6101. The Trial Chamber notes that D-393 mentions a connection between Leonid Minin
and the Accused. However, based upon TFl-338's testimony that it was Eddie Kanneh, not
the Accused, who introduced Minin to the RUF, the Trial Chamber does not find that the
Accused facilitated a relationship between the RUF and Minin.
13306 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31316-31319.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31299-31301.
13808 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31325-31326.
13309 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31316-31317.

---- End of Page 2122 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

ao; Z 5
6102. Having considered Sesay's testimony regarding his dealings with "Sammy", as
compared to the details of Ossailly Samih's dealings detailed in D-393, the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that Sammy and Samih are the same person. D-393 corroborates the timing of
Sesay's meeting with Sammy around March of 2001 and that Sammy was staying at the
Boulevard Hotel at that time. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay was not
asked to spell "Sammy" on the record and that the spelling on the record was therefore done
phonetically. The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution has not adduced any evidence
regarding the Accused's connection to Michel and Louis or Sammy. The Trial Chamber
therefore does not find that the Accused was implicated in the evidence of the RUF's
diamond transactions with Michel, Louis or Sammy. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes
Sesay's testimony regarding a man named Carlos who was brought to Bockarie by Bah and
who provided Bockarie with an FM radio at Buedu. Although it does not necessarily follow
that because Bah brought Carlos to Bockarie, the Accused did not facilitate the relationship,
the Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution has not led evidence to show that Carlos was
introduced to Bockarie by the Accused.
6103. The Trial Chamber notes that Sesay's meeting with Sammy at the Boulevard Hotel
in March 2001 coincides with TF1-338's evidence of Sesay's meeting with Alpha Bravo and
his companion at the Boulevard Hotel. Although the Trial Chamber has not been presented
with evidence indicating that Alpha Bravo and Sammy or Samih are the same person, in the
Trial Chamber's view Sesay's meeting with Sammy or Samih does not negate the possibility
that he also met with Alpha Bravo at or around the same time.
6104. The Trial Chamber considers that the evidence of Abu Keita and TF1-590 are
corroborative of the presence of diamond dealers in Sierra Leone and Liberia. However,
given the general nature of their testimony and considering TF1-590's cross-examination
testimony that he was told by "the SOD guys, the soldiers, or the AFL, ATU" that the two
Arab men were diamond dealers,l38m the Trial Chamber is of the view that this testimony is
not probative of the Accused's facilitation of relationships between the RUF and diamond
dealers.
mm TFl-590, Transcript 16 June 2008, pp. 11829-11830. The SOD police told the witness that the men were
from the Saad group, which the witness knew dealt in the business of diamonds and oaoao.

---- End of Page 2123 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T % 18 May 2012

402 lo
6105. The Defence relies upon the testimony of TF 1-567 to show that it was Bah, not the
Accused, who facilitated relationships between diamond buyers and the RUF. However, the
Trial Chamber does not consider TF 1-567's statement that Bah used to sell diamonds to his
"white friends" in exchange for computers and other supplies to be probative of the fact that
he facilitated relationships between the RUF and those white friends. The Trial Chamber
does, however, consider TF1-567's testimony regarding these deals, and his mention of
Mishell,l38H to be generally corroborative of the fact that diamond dealers were present in
Liberia and Sierra Leone during this time.
Findings
6106. The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused facilitated a
relationship between Issa Sesay/the RUF and a diamond dealer known as Alpha Bravo in
2001 for the purpose of diamond transactions. However, the Prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused facilitated relationships between the RUF and
other diamond dealers.
3. Provision of Mining Equipment and Mining Experts
Submissions of the Parties
6107. The Prosecution submits that during the first half of 1999, the Accused directly
assisted the AFRC/RUF's mining operations in Kono, which included the forced labour of
civilians, by sending in mining experts to determine what equipment was needed to make
the operations more efficient, and thereafter sending the required equipment to the mining
areas in Sierra Leone.l3 812 The Prosecution argues that, as a result of this assistance, the
AFRC/RUF's diamond mining operations became more efficient throughout 1999, and thus,
the Accused received more diamonds from Sierra Leone.l38l3 The Prosecution submits that
from 2000 to 2002, the Accused continued assisting with diamond mining operations,
providing and replacing mining machinery as well as providing necessary fuel for the
operation of that machinery.l38l4 Further, the Prosecution submits that the Accused received
'""Based upon the pronunciation of the name, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that "Mishe11" is the same as the
Michel about whom Sesay testified. Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44654.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 350, 360-361.
Um Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 361.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 372.

---- End of Page 2124 ---------------------------


Case No.: scsr-03-01-T ZI24 % UH is May 2012 xr

frequent reports about RUF mining operations in Sierra Leone, via radio communications
from RUF radio stations in Kenema and Tongo to Yeaten's radio station in Liberia.13813 The
Prosecution relies upon witnesses TF1—338, Perry Kamara, Mohamed Kabbah, TF1—367,
Jabaty Jaward, as well as Defence witness Issa Sesay and Exhibit D—003.
6108. The Defence denies the Accused's involvement in the provision of arms and
ammunitions or other supplies in exchange for diamonds. The Defence further contends that
the Prosecution's allegations with respect to the Accused's involvement in supplying mining
experts and mining equipment during the Junta period is based on indirect evidence and
hearsay.13816 Furthermore, the Defence asserts that [brahim Bah, completely independent of
the Accused, was responsible for introducing Bockarie and Sankoh to a number of diamond
urchasers who rovided them with vehicles, food, minin e ui ment and other
P P 2 Cl P
supplies.131317 The Defence also argues that the evidence clearly establishes that Belgians in
Monrovia were the source of mining equipment, not the Accused.13813 In addition, the
Defence submits that provisions of fuel sent by the Accused to Sierra Leone in 1999 were
intended for use in hospitals, and that the quantities of the diesel were limited as the
Accused was aware of the possibility that it could be used for military purposes.13819
Witnesses Issa Sesay, TF1—567, TF1—516 and the Accused provided relevant evidence.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TFl—338
6109. Witness TF1—338, an RUF member,138213 testified that in early 2001, Issa Sesay
travelled to Monrovia, where he met with the Accused and gave the Accused diamonds.13821
The following day Issa Sesay flew to Foya on a helicopter with arms and ammunitions, food
and other materials, including diesel that he eventually transported to Sierra Leone.13822 TF1—
338 also testified that the fuel was later used in the Caterpillars at the mining sites in Sierra
131113 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 372.
138111 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1161-1162, 1187.
13317 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1079.
13818 Defence Final Trial Brief`, para. 1161.
1381`3 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1179.
13320 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15084-15086 (PS).
13831 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15164-15165.
mi rrr-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15165-15166.

---- End of Page 2125 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
$9 %

Leone.l3823 Again, sometime around March, April or May 2001, Issa Sesay travelled to
Monrovia to deliver diamonds to the Accused.l3824 The following day, Benjamin Yeaten
brought two white men to Issa Sesay at the Boulevard Hotel, introducing them as the
diamond dealers from Belgium}3825 After this meeting with the two white men, one of
whom was named Alpha Bravo, Issa Sesay returned to Sierra Leone, taking supplies with
him, including diesel that was used in the Caterpillars mining diamonds in Kono.l3826TF1-
338 testified that "at all times when Issa came from Koidu Town to Foya he would bring his
jeep and he would fly to Monrovia to get the materials. And when he returned to Foya he
would load them on board the vehicle again and return to Sierra Leone". mm
Prosecution Witness Perry Kamara
6110. Witness Perry Kamara was a radio operator attached to Superman and based mostly
in Makeni in 1999 following the Freetown invasion.l3828 Kamara testified that after the
Freetown invasion, the RUF controlled Kono and was mining diamonds there with the
objective of obtaining more arms and ammunition from Mr Taylor so that they would be
prepared for war. 13 33 9 Before Bockarie left, he gave an instruction to Sesay to return to Kono
and "rearranged for the mining to be more effective".l383O Before this instruction to Sesay,
the RUF heard a message from Sam Bockarie that Charles Taylor was going to send mining
machines and white people to inspect the mining site and airfield at Kono so that the RUF
could do more effective mining.l383l Two white men eventually came to the site, escorted by
RUF soldiers, and they took photographs of the site and of the equipment and took notes on
what was needed for mining.l3832 Kamara testified that "according to" the two men and the
messages received the men were sent by Charles Taylor from Liberia.l3833 Kamara further
*3333 TF1—338, rmrreerrpt 2 September 2008, pp. 15165-15166.
*3334 TF1-338, rrrmeerrpt 2 September 2008, p. 15167.
*3333 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15169-15170.
*3333 TF1-338,Trar1script2 September 2008, p. 15170.
*3333 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15166.
*3333 Perry Kemrrrrt, Transcript 6 rebmery 2008, pp. 3261-3262.
Img Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3262-3263.
mw Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3263.
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3263.
13832 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3263-3264. The record is not clear as to the date of this visit
but it appears to be around 1999.
*3333 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3263-3264.

---- End of Page 2126 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-O3-O1-T % Kflfg 18 May 2012 KE

testified that as a result of receiving the machinery, mining during that period was more
effective. 18881
6111. According to Kamara, from 6 May 2000 until disarmament, Issa Sesay went to
Liberia about every two weeks, taking "all of the diamonds" that they got. Sesay would
return with vehicles, telling the witness and others that he had brought them from Charles
Taylor.18888 After these trips, Sesay would sometimes also return with fuel for the machines
and food.18888 Issa Sesay also brought vehicles from Mr Taylor when he returned to Sierra
Leone. On the occasions that Sesay brought vehicles, he would call them and say "1’ve
brought one or two vehicles from Mr Taylor, Mr Taylor donated this".18887 Sesay also told
them that the Accused was keeping the diamonds while Sankoh was in detention.18888
Prosecution Witness TF 1-367
6112. Witness TF1-367, an RUF member,18889 was mining commander over a number of
diamond mining sites in Kono district for the RUF from 1998 until 2000.18810 The witness
testified that the miners at those sites did not have machines initially and used shovels,
pickaxes, sieves and mining equipment captured from ECOMOG, which deteriorated
quickly, "Issa Sesay sent to Sam Bockarie" and then brand new equipment, including bailing
machines and the fuel to operate them, began arriving from Monrovia, or from Liberia
generally. 18 811
6113. On cross-exarnination, the witness confirmed prior statements to the Prosecution that
two Lebanese men, who had come to see Sesay and brought a generator, came to stay with
the witness at Number 11 mining site for three weeks. Diamonds were collected in the
presence of the men, but the diamonds were then taken to Sesay and the witness was not
aware of how Sesay transacted business with them. These two Lebanese men had come from
Freetown.18812 Also in prior statements, TF1-367 told the Prosecution that two white men
18881 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3264.
18888 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3267-3268.
18888 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3267-3268.
18887 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3268.
18888 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3268.
W9 TF1-367, rmuscupt 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
188111 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14192, 14194-14195.
18811 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14196-14198.
18818 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15034.

---- End of Page 2127 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T `/ 18 May 2012

fiom Belgium and an Aliican, whom the witness believed to be Gambian or Senegalese,l3843
visited Sesay}3844 The men were in Kono for two weeks and all of the diamonds that the
witness collected during their stay were shown to Sesay. M45
6114. The witness testified that he did not know if Sesay sold diamonds to the Lebanese
men}3846 TF 1-367 further stated that "they came there for mining and they came there to do
diamonds for Issa Sesay".l3847 Regarding the men's origin, the witness stated during
examination-in-chief that the men came from Liberia, while in prior statements he said they
came from Freetown. On cross-examination, TF1-367 clarified that he had heard that they
came from Liberia, but saw them come from Freetown end.l3848 On cross-examination, the
witness identified the Aliican man who came with the Belgians as Ibrahim Bah, who
sounded like he came from Senegal or Gambia.l3849 The witness maintained that Ibrahim
Bah and the Belgians passed from Liberia to Freetown and then came to Kono}3850
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
6115. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator,l385l and overall signal
commander for Sierra Leone, was based in Kono from around December 1999 until
200213852 Kabbah testified that he used to visit the mining sites, and that at Number 11 Plant
he observed mining operations being undertaken using Caterpillars and other tools, like
sieves, shovels and buckets}3853 The first time he visited the site was just after Issa Sesay
had brought new mining tools and other supplies from Monrovia.l3854 The witness testified
that he knew Sesay brought the materials from Monrovia, because it was "common
knowledge" that Sesay had just returned from a trip to Monrovia. Kamara testified that he
*3333 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15035.
*3333 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15034.
*3333 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15034.
*3333 TF 1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15035.
*3*3*3 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15036.
Bm TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15037-15038.
mw TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15039.
mm TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15038- 15040.
my Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
mm Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16126-16127, 16191.
my Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16191.
my Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16191-16192.

---- End of Page 2128 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 '

did not know from where in Monrovia Sesay got the materials, or if Sesay bought them or
received them as a donation. 13 855
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
6116. Witness J abaty J award, a clerk for Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie, Bockarie's
storekeeper,13856 and a member of Sankoh's Black Guards,13851 testiHed that in December
1999, while he was on his way from Sierra Leone to Voinjama via Foya, he encountered
Akim Turay and Ibrahim Bah in Voinjama.13858 Jaward testified that Turay and Bah had
vehicles and a machine in a truck that Turay described as a "mining plant" that they were
transporting to Sierra Leone for use in diamond mining at Kono.13859 J award testified that,
Turay did not say "this person had taken this mining plant and given it to us" but Turay and
Bah told the witness that the equipment was from Charles Taylor in Monrovia and they were
going to Sierra Leone.13860
Prosecution Witness TF1—567
61 17. Witness TFl—567, an RUF member,13861 testified that Ibrahim Bah used to sell
diamonds to his "white friends" in exchange for "satellite phones, computer equipment and
some other things like food", not for arms and ammunitions.13862 It was not true that Ibrahim
Bah sold diamonds for arms and ammunitions.13 1163 TF1-567 further testihed that in early 3
2000, Foday Sankoh arranged for a Canadian friend named "Mishell" to send vehicles for
him, but that to the witness’ knowledge, Ibrahim Bah was not involved in this.13 8611
13855 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16191-16192.
13856 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13306, 13332; Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13383.
*3*3* Jabaty Juwuur, rruuupupt 9 July 2008, pp. 13266—13267.
13858 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, pp. 13566-13567.
131159 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, pp.13567-13568.
*3*360 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, p. 13568.
131161 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
*3333 rrr-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, p. 13137,
*3333 rrr-567, ruuupupr 8 July 2008, p. ram.
*336** rrr-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, p. rsrvs.

---- End of Page 2129 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03—01-T 2% 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness TF1 -516 ‘
6118, Witness TF1-516 testified that information about mining was transmitted in code
over the radio, as it was an "open secret".18885 According to the witness Benjamin Yeaten
(a,k,a, 50) would sometimes inquire about the mining operation in Kono,18888 "VVhatever
was happening in Sierra Leone, reports would be prepared to the effect and transmitted and
that report would then be handed over to General 50 and he responded",18887
The Accused
61 19, ln his testimony, the Accused specifically denied taking part in diamond mining,18888
The Accused further stated that he was unaware that mining in Sierra Leone became more
focused after 1997, and that he had no art in hel in it to become more focused, 18869
P P 8
6120, The Accused denied that he sent diesel, petrol or engine oil for the mining machines,
but stated that between February or March 1999 one or two 55 gallon drums "went to Sierra
Leone" for hospital operations,188711 The Accused testified that he put strict quantity
limitations on the amount of diesel being sent to Sierra Leone, a maximum of two drums,
because he was aware that the diesel could be used for military purposes instead of hospital
operations,18871 The Accused further testified that the fuel was purchased, not donated, and
that it was bought in Liberia and then carried across the border into Sierra Leone,18872
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6121, Issa Sesay, a senior RUF comnrander,18878 and interim leader of the RUF from 2000
until disarmament in 2002,18874 testified about one shipment of diamond mining equipment
from Liberia, but said that it was arranged by Foday Sankoh through Ibrahim Bah without
*6866 TF1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7178.
*66*66 T1¤1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7178.
*6*667 T1¤1-516, Transcript 10 April 2008, p. 7179.
18888 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31228—31229.
18888 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 November 2009, pp. 31228.
18878 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p. 29042.
18871 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, p, 29042.
18872 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29042-29043.
*6676 rsss scssy, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44690-44591, 44596.
18874 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.

---- End of Page 2130 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T 2 18 May 2012
-,5/

the Accused's invo1vement.13815 Sesay testified that after Sam Bockarie crossed the border
into Liberia in December of 1999, the border was closed and remained closed until May
2000, except for Ibrahim Bah's crossing in December of 1999.13816 Sesay testified that
around 19 December 1999, General Ibrahim Bah aiiived in Pendembu in a truck with Akim
Turay and two white men from Belgium named Michel and Louis.13811 The next day Sesay,
Akim Turay, Ibrahim Bah, Michel, and Louis transported the equipment, including milling
machines, shakers, shovels and pick axes, to Kono in Sesay's Land Cruiser.13818 According
to Sesay's testimony, during the drive, Michel and Louis told Sesay that they were going to
Kono to mine and to buy diamonds and that they would stay there until Sankoh came. 13819
6122. Issa Sesay went on to testify that no efforts were made to disguise or hide the mining
equipment in the back of the truck because "the leader", refeiiing to Sankoh, had said the
men should bring the equipment, so there was no reason to hide.138811 Sesay further testified
that at the time that this shipment of mining equipment aiiived, Foday Sankoh was the
Chairman of the Ministry of Strategic Minerals and that civilians could easily see the
e ui ment arrivin but Sankoh did not tell them from whom it had come.13881 Sesa also
(1 P 8 Y
testified that Sankoh had arranged for him to meet Ibrahim Bah with the truck and that
Sankoh did not mention the Accused. 131182 When asked directly whether the Accused sent the
truckload of mining equipment, Sesay responded "No, no".13883
6123. Sesay testified that Sankoh had met these two white men while in Monrovia after
having met with the Accused and President Obasanjo the day before. 13884 Sesay testified that
he personally met the two men, Michel and Louis, for the first time in June or July of 1999,
when Sam Bockarie brought them to Buedu.13885 Sesay testified that they transacted business
on that trip but did not bring any mining equipment along with them.13886 According to
***75 raaa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44476-44477.
13876 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44463-44464.
13877 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44475—44477.
13878Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44476-44478, 44481-44482.
131179 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44482.
138811 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44479.
1311111 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44483-44484.
"*"‘2 rpaa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44484.
13883 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44484.
13884 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44476-44477.
****5 raaa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44478-44479.
L 13886 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44478-44479.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T nj _ 18 May 2012

Sesay, the December 1999 trip was the first time that the two Belgian men brought mining
6quipm6at."887
6124. Sesay testified that after arriving in Kono with the mining equipment, the two white
men remained in Kono from December 1999 until late January 200013888 and returned to
Liberia the very same day that Sankoh did, travelling through Kailahun to Liberia.13889 Sesay
further testified that vehicles from Belgium came to Sierra Leone in March of 2000, but did
not specify what those vehicles were used for.13890 Sesay also testified that in 1999, when
Bockarie was the one receiving the diamonds, he would send back clothing and supplies to
the diamond miners. 13891
Exhibit D-003
6125. Exhibit D-003 is a radio communication from Ibrahim Bah to Foday Sankoh (a.k.a.
Smile) on 12 January 2000.13892 The document, records Bah's message to Sankoh that they
had identified all the problems and needed to speed up the process and to inform him that
they were leaving for Monrovia that day, and "imploring" Sankoh to inform Monrovia to
"pick us up at the border today or latest tomorrow to speed up our movements".13893
Deliberations
6126. It is undisputed that fuel, mining equipment and white men crossed the border into
Sierra Leone from Liberia on at least one occasion from the end of 1998 to 2001. The
Prosecution alleges that the Accused was responsible for sending mining experts and mining
e ui ment to minin sites_ in Sierra Leone, which resulted in more roductive minin , and
(1 P 8 P 8
thus, more diamonds bein delivered to the Accused.13894 The Defence contends that the
8
Accused was not at all involved in the provision of mining experts or mining equipment and
*887 rwa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44479.
'mg rwa sway, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44655~44656.
'"8° rwa sway, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44655~44656.
13800 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44659.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45199~45200.
*38* Exhibit D-3, Radio Lag Book Three, p. 08779,
"8°3 12X111p1t D-3, Radio Lag Book naw, p. 0s779.
13894 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 350, 360-361, 372.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T xi PQ 18 May 2012
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4 0 .2.25
that Ibrahim Bah may have been involved with the provision of mining equipment and
mining experts independent of the Accused. l3895
6127. ln support of the Prosecution's allegations, TF1—338 provided first hand evidence of
two trips Issa Sesay took to Monrovia, where he met with the Accused and gave the
Accused diamonds. The Trial Chamber recalls that evidence of the Accused receiving
diamonds has been dealt with elsewhere, but notes that TFl—338 also gave first hand
evidence that alter meeting with the Accused, and on his second trip after meeting with two
white men, Issa Sesay returned to Sierra Leone with arms and ammunition, food and diesel
that was used in the Caterpillars at mining sites in Sierra Leone. The Defence submits that
TF1-338's testimony makes clear that the equipment came from the Belgians. The Trial
Chamber notes that TF1—338 did not testify as to who provided Sesay with the diesel that he
transported to Sierra Leone that was later used in the Caterpillars at the mining sites, and did
not mention a meeting with Belgians on the first occasion, but stated that Sesay met the
Accused. On the second occasion, Sesay first met the Accused and then met the Belgians but
testified that the meeting was an introduction and business was not transacted during that
meeting.
6128. The Prosecution also relies upon the evidence of Jabaty Jaward who encountered
lbrahim Bah and Akim Turay in Voinjama with mining equipment that they told Jaward
they were taking to Tongo for use in mining diamonds. Although Jaward was unable to
testify as to who physically gave the machinery to the men, J award testified that Turay told
him the equipment was "from Charles Taylor". lmé
6129. Perry Kamara also provided evidence that the RUF heard a radio message from Sam
Bockarie telling them that Charles Taylor would be sending mining experts and mining
equipment}3897 Kamara saw two men arrive at the site and take photos of the equipment,
and he testified that "according to them, according to the message we received, Charles
Taylor had sent them from Libe1ia".l3898 Kamara further testified that when Issa Sesay
returned from trips to Liberia with supplies, including fuel for the mining machines, he told
‘38°’5 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 937, 1161-1162, 1079, 1179, 1187, 1198.
B8%Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 14 July 2008, p. 13568. Jaw:-1rd's exact testimony was, "Specifically, you know, he
did not say this person had taken this mining plant and given it to ns, but at that particular moment when they
came he only said that they were from Charles Taylor in Monrovia and that they were going to Sierra Leone."
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p, 3263.
Um Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3263-3264.

---- End of Page 2133 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012


/¤,o;>c;2o
the witness that he had brought them from Charles Taylor.|3899 Although Kamara did not
know the names of the white men, he was told by them that the Accused had sent them.
Kamara was also told by Sesay that the supplies and fuel for the mining equipment had
come from the Accused.
6130. The Trial Chamber recalls TF1-367's direct examination testimony that once the
ECOMOG mining equipment deteriorated, more equipment began arriving from Liberia. ln
cross—examination, the witness was confronted with his prior statement to the Prosecution in
which he had stated that towards the end of his time in Kono, two Lebanese men came in a
jeep to meet Sesay; that they came for a second visit about one week later and brought a
generator with them which the witness believed was taken to Number 11 mining site,l39OO
and that this was the only time he saw Sesay engaged in diamond business with "two white
men".l39Ol ln cross—examination, TF1—367 explained that he meant that that was the only
time he saw Sesay engaged with two Lebanese men. The witness did not dispute any other
aspects of this particular prior statement. moz
6131. The Trial Chamber notes that Mohamed Kabbah also testified that Issa Sesay
brought mining materials from Monrovia, although he said that he did not know from whom
Sesay received the fuel and whether he paid for it or received it as a donation. mm The Trial
Chamber recalls Kabbah's testimony that it was "common knowledge" that Sesay took trips
to and from Monrovia.|39O4 ln the Trial Chamber's view, Mohamed Kabbah's testimony
regarding Sesay's trips to Monrovia and his return with equipment is too general to create a
link to the Accused; however his testimony corroborates the more direct testimony of
witnesses Pen·y Kamara and Jabaty Jaward regarding the arrival of mining equipment and
other supplies into Sierra Leone.
6132. Regarding the Deence's proposition that Ibrahim Bah put the RUF in contact with
diamond dealers who sent supplies to Sierra Leone completely independent of the Accused,
the Trial Chamber notes the testimony of TF1-567 that Bah sold diamonds to his "white
13899 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3267-3268.
mm TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15032.
13901 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15032.
’"°2 The Trial Chamber recalls that it has assessed additional portions of TF1-367's cross-examination testimony
in the above section on allegations of diamonds delivered to the Accused from June 2000 to disarmament in
2002. See Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, June 2000-2002.
13003 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16191-16192.

---- End of Page 2134 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ZI34 18 May 2012

,402:2 7-
friends" for computer equipment and other supplies, Sesay's testimony that Bah was present
on his trip to Sierra Leone with Michel and Louis and the mining equipment, and J award's
testimony that he met Bah and Turay with equipment "from Charles Taylor" on their way to
Sierra Leone. The Defence contends that the testimonies of Sesay and TF 1-567 demonstrate
that Bah acted independently of the Accused. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-567's
testimony does not demonstrate a link to the Accused, however the Trial Chamber recalls
J award's testimony that Bah and Turay were travelling to Sierra Leone with equipment from
the Accused. The Trial Chamber has considered Sesay's denial that the Accused was
involved in the trip that Sesay took with Bah, Michel, Louis and others to bring mining
equipment from Liberia to Sierra Leone. However, given the Trial Chamber's assessment
that Sesay's evidence must be assessed with caution,139115 and considering that the Trial
Chamber does not have any credibility concerns with regard to J abaty Jaward,13906 the Trial
Chamber rejects Sesay's denial of the Accused's involvement and accepts the testimony of
Jabaty J award.
6133. The Trial Chamber also notes the cross-examination testimony of TF 1-367 who
confirmed his prior statement to the Prosecution that, towards the end of his tenure as
mining commander in Kono, Issa Sesay brought two Lebanese men with him to Kono, and
that they came along with a generator that was used at mining site Number 11.13907
However, the Trial Chamber is also cognisant of TF1-367's prior statement that the two
Lebanese who had come to Number 11 site to observe the mining process came from
Freetown, which appeared inconsistent with his testimony on direct examination that they
came from Liberia.13908However the witness clarified that he had heard that the men came
from Liberia, but that he saw them arrive from the direction of Freetown, and that he did not
include that detail in his prior statements to investigators because he had not been asked so
clearly.13909 The Trial Chamber also considers 1ssa Sesay's testimony that Sam Bockarie
brought two Lebanese to Kono to meet TF1-367 in July of 1999 and that at that time they
discussed supplying the miners with clothing, food, medicine, sandals and other supplies.
The Trial Chamber notes that Sesay does not mention the supply of a generator, nor did he
13004 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16191-16192.
139115 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
13 (106 Credibility Assessment, Jabaty Jaward, The Role of Intennediaries, para. 2708.
139117 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 1 5032-15033.
139118 TF1-367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp.15032-15033.
13909 TF1—367, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp.15036-15038.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
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2;. 09..28
testify as to the origin of the two Lebanese.l39l0 Recalling that TF1-367 is a generally
credible witness,l39H the Trial Chamber accepts TF1-367's explanation regarding his prior
inconsistency and does not consider it to be detrimental to his credibility regarding this
incident. Furthermore the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay's evidence corroborates TF1-367
on these points, and generally corroborates the evidence of witnesses TF1-338, Perry
Kamara, Jabaty Jaward, and TF1-567 as to the presence of Lebanese, or "white men" at
mining sites in Kono.
6134. The Trial Chamber notes that Exhibit D-003 is corroborated by the testimony of Issa
Sesay and others who testihed that Ibrahim Bah was in contact with Foday Sankoh during
this time and that he crossed the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone from mid-
December 1999 to May 2000. However, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the document
is not probative of the Accused's alleged provision of mining experts and mining equipment
to Sierra Leone during this time. if
6135. The Trial Chamber notes the Accused's testimony that he only provided a limited
amount of diesel fuel to Sierra Leone for use in hospitals in 1999. However, because
witnesses TF1-338 and Perry Kamara testihed about provisions of fuel from the Accused in
2000 and 2001, the Trial Chamber does not consider that the Accused's testimony about a
1999 shipment raises doubt that he sent later shipments. Moreover, having considered all of
the relevant evidence, the Trial Chamber is of the view that there may have been multiple
sources of mining equipment and fuel entering Sierra Leone during the Indictment Period.
However, recalling that Kamara and J award are generally credible witnesses,ml2 Kamara
A and the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence of Kamara and J award, who were told that the
equipment was sent by the Accused, particularly as corroborated by the evidence of TF1-
338, establishes that the Accused was among those sources of mining equipment, including
fuel used in the mining equipment.
6136. Regarding the Prosecution's allegation that the Accused received "frequent reports"
about RUF mining operations, the Trial Chamber notes the evidence of TF1-516 who
testihed that Benjamin Yeaten occasionally inquired about the activity at the mining sites
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 10 August 2010, pp. 45914-45916.
mn Credibility Assessment, TF1-367, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2446.
Hm Credibility Assessment, Peny Kamara, paras 227-236; Credibility Assessment, Iabaty Jaward. The Role of
Intermediaries, para. 2708.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
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4O 929
and that reports were prepared and transmitted to Yeaten. When asked "what would he
send", TF1-516 testified that Issa sent advice on mining to Yeaten but gave an example of a
communication about a military operation.l3 913 In the Trial Chamber's view this evidence
does not demonstrate that "regular" updates regarding mining operations were sent to the
Accused.
6137. Having considered the evidence, the Trial Chamber is of the view that there may
have been multiples sources of mining equipment and fuel entering Sierra Leone during the
indictment period. However, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence of Kamara and
J award, who told that the equipment was sent by the Accused, particularly as corroborated
by the evidence of TF1-338, establishes that the Accused was among those sources of
mining equipment, including fuel used in the mining equipment.
6138. However, the Trial Chamber notes that, apart from Perry Kamara, who testified that
the two men who arrived at the mining site took photos of the site and of the equipment, the
evidence before the Trial Chamber does not indicate the professional qualifications of the
"white men" who were present at mining sites in Sierra Leone. Hence, the Trial Chamber is
unable to conclude that they were "mining experts". Likewise, TF1-367 who spent weeks
with white men at the sites only testified that diamonds were mined in the men's presence
but did not state that they were mining experts. However the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
two men came and inspected and assessed the mining operations with the intention of
making a report to the Accused on improving efficiency. The Trial Chamber therefore finds
that the Accused sent two men to visit and assess the mining site in Kono.
Findings
6139. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused provided fuel and mining equipment to the RUF
on at least one occasion between 1998 and 2002.
6140. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that two men were sent by the Accused to visit and assess the mining site in Kono.
'"'3 TFl—5l6, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7179-7190. When asked to elaborate on the kinds of updates sent re
Yeaten, the witness gave one example of a message regarding fighting in Kono coming from a station in
T ombodu in 2000.

---- End of Page 2137 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T 18 May 2012

6141. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that regular updates were sent to the Accused about mining activity.
Summary of Findings
6142. The Trial Chamber has found that -
(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that diamonds mined
in Kono and Tongo Fields were delivered from the AFRC/RUF to the
Accused by Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) in exchange for arms and
ammunitions during the period May 1997 to February 1998.
(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that diamonds were
delivered to the Accused by Sam Bockarie directly, as well as indirectly
through intennediaries such as Eddie Kanneh and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle) from February 1998 to July 1999, and that these diamonds were
delivered to the Accused for the purpose of obtaining arms and
ammunition from him, or at times for safekeeping on behalf of the RUF,
until Foday Sankoh's release from detention.
(iii) Around April 1998, diamonds given to Issa Sesay were lost by him in
Monrovia, but the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that those diamonds were intended for delivery to the Accused.
(iv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Foday Sankoh
delivered diamonds to the Accused in February or March of 2000 and that
diamonds were delivered to the Accused on Sankoh's behalf in or before
1999 while he was in detention.
(v) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that from June 2000
until the end of hostilities in 2002, Issa Sesay delivered diamonds to the
Accused, sometimes for safekeeping until Sanland sometimes in return for supplies and/or arms and ammunition.
(vi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Eddie Kanneh
also delivered diamonds to the Accused on Sesay's behalf on occasion
from June 2000 until the end of hostilities in 2002.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012
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(vii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
facilitated a relationship between Issa Sesay/the RUF and a diamond
dealer known as Alpha Bravo in 2001 for the purpose of diamond
transactions. However, the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused facilitated relationships between the RUF and other
diamond dealers.
(viii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
provided fuel and mining equipment to the RUF on at least one occasion
between 1998 and 2002.
(ix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that two men were
sent by the Accused to visit and assess the mining site in Kono.
(x) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that regular
updates were sent to the Accused about mining activity.
Conclusion
6143. The Trial Chamber has found that there was a continuous supply by the AFRC/RUF
of diamonds mined from areas in Sierra Leone to the Accused, often in exchange for arms
and ammunition.
6144. During the period May 1997 to February 1998 diamonds mined in Kono and Tongo
Fields were delivered from the AFRC/RUF to the Accused by Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle)
in exchange for arms and ammunition.
6145. Following the ECOMOG Intervention, from February 1998 to July 1999, diamonds
were delivered to the Accused by Sam Bockarie directly, as well as indirectly through
intermediaries such as Eddie Kanneh and Daniel Tamba, in order to get arms and
ammunition from him, or sometimes for safekeeping on behalf of the RUF, until Sankoh's
return.
6146. The RUF also traded diamonds with entities and individuals other than the Accused
or his govemment. However, testimonial evidence of specific involvement of the Accused in
the trade of diamonds supported the findings of a United Nations report of a panel of experts
that diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone to Liberia was "the bulk of the RUF trade in

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0 1.—T · GW 18 May 2012
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4oa 3 2
diamonds" and while difficult to quantify was nevertheless the "primary source of income to
the RUF". This report concluded that the trade of diamonds between Liberia and Sierra
Leone could not be conducted in Liberia "without the permission and the involvement of
government officials at the highest level". 1
6147. During the period from July 1999 to May 2000 Foday Sankoh delivered diamonds to
the Accused, and diamonds were delivered to the Accused on his behalf in or before 1999
while he was in detention. ln March 2000, Foday Sankoh visited South Africa and travelled
through Monrovia on his way back to Sierra Leone, meeting with the Accused in Monrovia.
According to one witness, among the diamonds delivered to the Accused during this
meeting were a 45 carat diamond and two 25 carat diamonds.
6148. From June 2000 until the end of hostilities in 2002, Issa Sesay delivered diamonds to
the Accused, including on one occasion a 36 carat diamond, and Eddie Kanneh delivered
diamonds to the Accused on Sesay's behalf Sometimes the diamonds were delivered for
"safekeeping" until Sar1koh's release from detention, and at other times in exchange for
supplies and/or arms and ammunition. During this period, diamond trading between the
RUF and persons other than the Accused also took place. V
6149. As detailed in documentary evidence before the Trial Chamber, Liberian diamonds
are generally known to be of a significantly lesser quality than diamonds from Sierra Leone,
refuting the claim made by the Accused that he would have had no reason to trade in
diamonds from Sierra Leone because Liberia had its own diamonds. Moreover, the
documentary evidence indicates that export of diamonds from Liberia was far greater than
Liberian diamond production, attributing the difference to diamonds from Sierra Leone
smuggled through Liberia.
6150. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused facilitated a relationship between the
RUF and a Belgian known as Alpha Bravo for the purpose of diamond transactions.
However, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Accused facilitated a
relationship between the RUF and other diamond dealers.
6151. The Accused also provided diesel fuel for the Caterpillars at the mining sites in
Sierra Leone, and equipment for use in mining diamonds to the RUF on at least one
occasion between 1998 and 2002. While there may have been multiple sources of mining
equipment and fuel entering Sierra Leone during the Indictment period, the Accused was

---- End of Page 2140 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03—0l-T . UVB 18 May 2012
2 %

among them. The Trial Chamber also found that men sent by the Accused visited at least
one mining site and assessed mining operations.
6152. While there was evidence of occasional inquiries as to activity at the mining sites in
Sierra Leone from Benjamin Yeaten, the Director of Special Security Services for the
Accused, and reports to him about the activity at the mining sites in Sierra Leone, the
evidence does not establish that regular updates were sent to the Accused about mining
activity. The messages sent to Yeaten concerned mainly military operations, such as
messages regarding fighting in Kono.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T /6// GLN 18 May 2012
,//iii if

H. Peace Process
1. External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire
Submissions of the Parties
6153. Both Prosecution and Defence concur that in May 1995, an RUF group called the
External Delegation travelled to Danané, Cote d’Ivoire where they met senior lvorian
officials and were given material assistance by the lvorian gOV€I`f11’l’l€H1.l39l4 The delegation
also met Musa Cissé, Taylor's chief of protocol, and used the radio at his house in
Danané.l39l5
6154. In this context, the Prosecution, relying on the testimony of Perry Kamara, submits
that it was the Accused who, during a radio conversation with Foday Sankoh, advised the
RUF leader to send an external delegation to Cote d’1voire.l3 (H6 The Prosecution further
submits that the Accused took members of the delegation with him to Accra, which allowed
the Accused to introduce them to contacts who could facilitate arms deals for the RUF. wm
6155. The Defence acknowledges that the Accused met members of the External
Delegation at a hotel in Abidjan on occasion of the launch of the publication "Footpaths to
Democracy" and gave them money, but denies that the Accused advised this mission since
he had no communications with Foday Sankoh after Operation Top Final.l3 918 The Defence
further acknowledges that RUF members accompanied the Accused on a trip to Accra, but
contend that this trip was facilitated in order to enable them to meet with the international
community and see how peace talks were conducted.l3 919
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Peggy Kamara
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 448, 854, 992, 999, 1014-1015; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 125-
126, 308, 1234-1236.
um Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 991-992; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 125-126, 308, 1234-1236.
""‘° Prosecution rmi rmi Brief, paras 125-126, 308, 1234-1236.
Wm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 127.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 343, 450.
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 451.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
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6156. Witness Peny Kamara, an RUF radio operator,13920 testified that in 1994 Taylor and
Foday Sankoh used to have radio communications every two or three days.l392l As a radio
operator he received and monitored the radio transmissions and read from the radio log
books. Kamara testified that Sankoh "was always advised by Mr Taylor".l3922 He recalled
that after operation Sierra Rutile in late 1994 to 1995,13923 Mohamed Tarawalli came back to
RUF headquarters in Zogoda with money and white hostages. Kamara said that a call from
Sankoh was monitored in which Sankoh informed Taylor of the outcome of the mission in
Sierra Rutile. During this conversation, Taylor advised Sankoh to save the money to, "for
instance, get ammunition, food and drugs for fighters", and to use the money to establish
diplomatic relations with the outside world. Specifically, Taylor advised Sankoh to send
educated civilians to Cote d’Ivoire through Guinea, as the border with Liberia was then
closed. He said they should buy a house and obtain a base there with radio communications
and that they should go at the same time as the white hostages were released, that "the time
they should be released, that was the time the people should go with them".l3924
6157. Following Taylor's advice, Sankoh appointed Fayia Musa, Deen J alloh, Philip
Palmer and their families to go to Cote d’Ivoire. According to Kamara, Taylor instructed the
members of the RUF External Delegation to leave with the hostages from Sierra Rutile when
they were released. The Red Cross came to receive "the white peop1e" together with Deen
Jalloh. Subsequently, and in accordance with Taylor's advice, the RUF External Delegation
bought a house in Cote d’Ivoire and established a base there.13925
6158. Kamara further testified that after the RUF External Delegation established its base
in Cote d’Ivoire, a Liberian named Dr Sebo13 926 came from Cote d’Ivoire to RUF territory in
Sierra Leone and brought Sankoh a satellite phone, which Sankoh used until he left Zogoda.
***20 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 Fpbmary 2008, p. 3039.
13921 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3049.
13922 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3053.
13923 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054. See also Pre Indictment Period (1988-1996):
Sierra Rutile.
13924 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3054-3056.
Bm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3055-3056.
13926 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054, 3057-3058. Kamara referred to Dr Addai Sebo
as "Dr Simbo", but owing to the witnesses’ description of this person the Trial Chamber accepts that he is
referring to Dr Sebo. See Operational Support: Communications, Satellite Phones.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ 18 May 2012

.402 36
Kamara stated that when Dr Sebo came the RUF had already established communications
with the people who had been sent to Cote d’1voire. 13927
Prosecution Witness TF1-168
6159. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member,l3928, testified that by late 1993 the RUF had
been under constant attack by ULIMO and Government troops. As a result, the RUF
established a new headquarters at Zogoda. RUF soldiers were without food and were
surviving with difficulty. mw Foday Sankoh and other RUF officers decided that it was time
to leave the jungle and to meet the international community in order to negotiate peace. ln
this context, on 11 December 1994, Sankoh sent RUF members including Philip Palmer,
Deen Jalloh, lsatu Kallon, Daniel Kallon, Philip Sannoh, Alhaji Kamara and 1ssa Sesay to
Cote d’1voire in order to establish a public relations campaign for the RUF. The members of
the RUF delegation left Sierra Leone, passing through Guinea. 13930
6160. On or about 13 December 1994, while in Gueckedou on their way to Cote d’1voire,
Philip Palmer and Alhaji Kamara were arrested by an anti-gang unit of the police for being
members of a rebel group. They were moved to Conakry and detained there until May 1995.
After being released in May 1995, Palmer remained with the Sierra Leonean Ambassador to
Guinea in Conakry for two weeks until lsatu Kallon came for him.l3 931
6161. TF1-168 testified that Palmer and lsatu Kallon left for Danane, Cote d’1voire, where
they arrived at the end of May 1995. There the External Delegation met and discussed the
fact that they had not made any contacts thus far except with Musa Cisse, Taylor's Chief of
Protocol in Danane, who provided the External Delegation with the communication
equipment at his house, Belle Ville 1, allowing the External Delegation to communicate
with Foday Sankoh. Palmer told the other members of the RUF External Delegation that
they should contact the lvorian authorities and inform them of their presence in Cote
mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3056-3058.
Img TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-23282 (CS).
mm TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23239-23240 (CS).
mm TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23245-23248 (CS).
my TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23248-23252 (CS).

---- End of Page 2144 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2144 18 May 2012

,40 Q3?
d’1voire, starting with the Prefect of Danané, who after inquiries of the police and Musa
Cissé allowed them to remain in Danané. 13932
6162. TF1—168 testified that the Extemal Delegation contacted Essy Amara, the Foreign
Minister, who in tum took them to President Bedie}3933 The delegation also met several
representatives while in Cote d’1voire, including representatives from the Commonwealth,
from the OAU, from the UN, the Red Cross and other organisations. TF1—168 also
mentioned that in Cote d’1voire, one Extemal Delegation member met Dr Akyaaba Addai
Sebo, a Ghanaian working for an NGO named lntemational Alert, whom Sankoh had met in
Gbamga in 1990 and who advised him on the peace process, and who had also visited
Sankoh at Zagoda in 1995.13934 Notably, Dr Sebo played a key role in the release of the
European and American hostages, who were abducted from Sierromco and Sierra Rutile.
According to TF1—168, Sankoh handed over the hostages to Dr Sebo, who escorted them to
the border where they were handed over to the 1CRC.l3935
The Accused
6163. The Accused testified that he had no contact with Foday Sankoh from 1992 onwards
and denied advising Sankoh that the RUF should set up diplomatic relations with the outside
world}3936 He said he was not aware of the establishment of an RUF extemal delegation in
Cote d’1voire in 1995 but leamed later that the President of Cote d’1voire had set up a
residence for the RUF delegates.l3937
6164. The Accused confirmed that Musa Cissé was based in Cote d’1voire and had a radio
that served a function for the NPFL and its extemal relationships but stated that, at that time,
Cissé did not carry the title of Protocol Officerdmg The Accused further stated that he was
not aware and was not told that Musa Cissé provided a facility for the RUF Extemal
Delegation. The Accused stated that the radio was a general use radio and would not require
wm TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23252-23256 (CS).
Bm TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23256 (CS).
Wm TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23256-23258 (CS); Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23262 (CS).
Wm TFl-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23263-23265 (CS).
IMG Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 28995-29000.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 Septernebr 2009, pp. 29523—29524 (PS),
my Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29530-29531 (PS).

---- End of Page 2145 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (PQ 18 May 2012

46 @58
permission to contact another radio. He said it was therefore possible that the radio was used
for RUF purposes, but it was not done with his permission.13939
Defence Witness Isatu Kallon
6165. Witness Isatu Kallon, a businesswoman who arranged supplies for the RUF,1394O
testified that while she was in a refugee camp at Danané, she met a Red Cross officer named
"Dr Sebo" who told her that the Red Cross sent him to Sierra Leone in order to assist in the
release of five white men who had been abducted, and he requested the witness's help.
Kallon decided to assist Dr Sebo in finding a route into Sierra Leone in order to get money
from him in payment for her assistance and to get money from her husband, Daniel Kallon,
who was there with the RUF.13941
6166. Isatu Kallon escorted Dr Sebo through the town of Gbemalu and entered Pumudu in
Sierra Leone.13942 There, Isatu Kallon met her husband Daniel Kallon,
Edwin Collins, Philip Palmer, and Peter Vandi and informed them that Dr Sebo was a Red
Cross man seeking the release of foreign hostages. Peter Vandi escorted Dr Sebo while Isatu
Kallon remained in Pumudu. 10 or 12 days later Dr Sebo, escorted by Sam Kolleh, brought
five white hostages and two black hostages and over 50 captured civilians to Giema. She
testified that she did not know who Sam Kolleh was, only that he spoke Mende. One of the
white men was sick and was placed in a hospital. 13943
6167. Isatu Kallon testified that the hostages spent one night in Giema. The next day
Kolleh handed the people over to Issa Sesay and Sesay, in tum, handed them to Peter Vandi.
That evening Isatu Kallon, Dr Sebo, Peter Vandi and Sam Kolleh escorted the hostages to
Gbemalu, at the Guinean border, where the white men and a few black men captured with
them, not the RUF, were handed over to the Red Cross. Afterwards, Dr Sebo, Vandi, Kolleh
and Isatu Kallon returned to Koindu in Sierra Leone. Dr Sebo thanked Isatu Kallon for her
help in releasing the hostages by giving her $USD 500. She testified she did not know if the
13939 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, pp. 29531—29532 (PS).
13940 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42687-42688, 42708; 17 June 2010, pp. 42733-42735, 42759-
42760, 42807.
13941 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42809-42815.
13942 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42817-42822.
13943 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42823-42829.

---- End of Page 2146 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T g,,,. » 4v

RUF were given any money for the hostage release.13944 Aher this event, 1satu Kallon
decided to open a trading business at Gbemalu, at the border between Guinea and Sierra
Leone. Her husband Daniel Kallon remained with the RUF in Sierra Leone as civilian
liaison. 13115
6168. lsatu Kallon further testified that she received a radio call from Foday Sankoh who
instmcted her, from his headquarters in Zogoda, to escort her husband Daniel Kallon
together with Deen Jalloh, Agnes Jalloh, Alhaji Kamara, Alhaji Fofana, Kono Manie, and
Philip Palmer to Cote d’1voire passing through Guinea.13946 Kallon stated that before leaving
Pumudu, Peter Vandi, an RUF soldier, brought diamonds to Kamara and Fofana, saying that
on Sankoh's instruction 1ssa Sesay gave him these diamonds to fund the External
Delegation's expenses.13947 After paying Guinean soldiers the External Delegation crossed
the border and stopped in Gueckedou, Guinea to obtain 1D cards.139i1g Isatu Kallon testified
that there were no white men travelling with them.13949 While she was dealing with the
Sierra Leonean refugee committee in order to obtain the ID Cards, Fofana sold the diamonds
in Gueckedou and reimbursed Isatu Kallon for her expenses including the bribes she had to
pay to the Guinean soldiers.139511 lsatu Kallon stated that Guinean soldiers arrested Palmer
aHer ransacking the house where the Delegation was staying, and also arrested Kamara, who
was at Nongawa Park. They were transferred to Conakry and detained at the anti-gang
headquarters. The other members of the External Delegation 1eH Gueckedou for Danané,
C6te d’1voire. Isatu Kallon also went to Danané but retumed and remained in
Gueckedou. 13951
6169. Less than a year later, Isatu Kallon travelled to Conakry where she met Kamara, who
had been released. He told her that Palmer had been released from prison and was at the
Sierra Leonean Embassy. At Foday SanlPalmer. Kallon gave Palmer money and he went to a Sierra Leonean in order to obtain
131144 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp. 42829—42834.
13945 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42843-42846.
11(146 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42849-4285l, 42854.
""‘7 ism Kallon, Transcript is Jupp 2010, pp. 42854-42856.
11918 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42860—42865.
13949 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, pp. 43090-4309l.
139511 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42865-42869.
111151 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42869-42875.

---- End of Page 2147 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 `%

refugee documents.13932 Palmer and lsatu Kallon left for Danané, where they met the RUF
External Delegation. After this trip, [satu Kallon retumed to Gueckedou. 13 933
6170. Kallon was contacted again to escort three men to Cote d’Ivoire: Fayia Musa,
another RUF member, Philip Sarmoh, a "radio boy" and Alhaji Barrie.13933 Kallon met these
three men in Buedu and took them, together with a dismantled radio, to Koilu, where they
crossed the Guinean-Sierra Leonean border at Nongowa.13933
6171. Kallon did not know why Sankoh decided to send the RUF delegation to Danané, but
she heard that they were supposed to explain to NGOs such as the Red Cross why the RUF
was fi tin . Kallon was onl concerned about com letin the task and ettin aid.13933
S Y P S S S P
Defence Witness Fayia Musa
6172. Witness Fayia Musa, a member of the External Delegation and an agricultural officer
in the RUF,13937 testified that in late 1993 he met Dr Addai Sebo, who entered RUF territory
claiming that he was a joumalist who wanted to meet Foday Sankoh. Issa Sesay arranged for
Sebo to travel to Zogoda to see Sankoh.139313 Dr Sebo returned in 1994, when he disclosed
that in fact he was a representative of lntemational Alert, an NGO based in London working
on conflict-resolution.13333 Dr Sebo said that his boss had sent him to undertake a project
that would search for solutions to the Sierra Leonean conflict through dialogue, and he had
come to assess whether Sankoh would be willing to send out a delegation to meet the
international community. 13 9613
6173. Foday Sankoh agreed and sent an External Delegation comprised of Ibrahim Deen
Jalloh, [satta Kallon, Agnes Deen Jalloh, Philip Sylvester Palmer, Kono Manyi and Alhaji
Brima Kamara.13361 In December 1994, the "first batch" of the delegation was picked up by
Dr Sebo in Kailahun and went to Cote d’Ivoire passing through Guinea. They crossed at
13332 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42885-42889.
13333 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42889-42890.
133134 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42884, 42894.
"‘"5 mm Karrpp, Transcript rs Jupp 2010, pp. 42894-42896.
13333 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42890-42891.
13337 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38949; Transcript 19 April 2010, p. 39283.
""5* rayra Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010 pp. 38940-38941.
13333 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010 pp. 38940-38941.
‘"°° rayra Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010 pp. 38941-38944.
133131 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38942-38947.

---- End of Page 2148 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-O1-T / dh 18 May 2012 ·
%/

Dia at the border with Guinea, from there they went to Gueckedou, to the Guinea·Cote
d’1voire border, and from there to Danane, Cote d’Ivoire. The most direct route from Sierra
Leone to Cote d’Ivoire is through Liberia, but at that time the RUF had decided not to have
"much to do with Liberia", and ULIMO was at the border. 13962 F ayia Musa stated that lsatu
Kallon managed the travel poorly, and when the RUF delegation reached Gueckedou police
officers arrested Kamara and Palmer. Palmer was held in Guinea until July 1995.13963
6174. F ayia Musa also testified that in June 1995, Sankoh instructed him to follow the first
delegation to Danane. Musa travelled with Morris Kallon, Philip Sannoh and lsatu Kallon
following the same route as the first delegation, and the trip passed without incident. Dr
Mohamed Barrie joined them later. Dr Sebo met the group upon their arrival in Danane and
took them to a residence that had been prepared for them in Houphouetville. Upon their
arrival in Danane, Fayia Musa and his companions met up with the first delegation in
Bellevi11e.l3964 lsatu Kallon sold diamonds given to her by Sankoh to pay for
accommodation and an "allowance". The RUF delegation in Danane was comprised, at this
time, of F ayia Musa, lbrahim Hassan, Deen J alloh and his wife Agnes Deen J alloh, Philip
Sannoh, and Stephen Kamanda, a radio operator to Palmer.l3%5 Palmer arrived in early July
1995 after the Delegation had met the Prefect and Chief of Police.l3%6
6175. While in Danane, Dr Sebo introduced the External Delegation to Alhaji Fofana, a
Mauritanian, who brought the External Delegation to Mauritanians with whom they could
trade diamonds.13967 Dr Sebo also introduced the External Delegation to Musa Cisse,
Taylor's Chief of Protocol in Danane, who introduced them to the Prefect and Chief of
Police of Danané}3968 Dr Sebo finally introduced the External Delegation to the Foreign
Minister of Cote d’Ivoire, Amara Essy, who later became the chief negotiator for the
mu Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38942~38944
""°’ Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 Apri12010, pp. 38945~38946.
mél Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38946-38949.
""°5 ray1a Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38951. 4
mw Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38958.
mm Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38948-3 8949.
*3%* Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38950~38951.

---- End of Page 2149 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1~T (lil 18 May 2012 j

Abidjan Peace Accord,l3%9 as well as Omrie Golley and Ambrose Ganda, Sierra Leonean
lawyers based in London. *3970
6176. Musa Cissé and Dr Sebo also arranged for the RUF delegation to meet the Prefect of
Danané. At that meeting the External Delegation informed the Prefect that the purpose of
their stay in Cote d’1voire was to establish RUF political representation in Danané and to put
aside the military aspect of their agenda and focus on the diplomatic and political aspects so
they were there to seek support.l3 971 Fayia Musa testified that when the Prefect of Danane
saw that Musa Cissé supported the RUF delegation, he sent for the police commissaire, Mr
Koffi, to check out the residence where the delegation was staying in Danané. Mr Koffi
made arrangements for the members of the delegation to have resident permit 1D cards
delivered and told them to see him "in case of any problems". 13972
6177. Fayia Musa stated that Musa Cissé allowed the delegation to use his radio set,
located at his house in Belleville, to communicate with Foday Sankoh}3973 The delegation
used Cissé's radio twice a week in order to communicate with Sankoh. The radio was never
used to communicate with Taylor}3974 The radio was not set up in Musa Cissé's house for
the exclusive use of the RUF dele ation}3975 Musa testified that the RUF dele ation relied
8 8
exclusively on Musa Cisse's radio to communicate with the RUF in Sierra Leone through
1995 13976
6178. Fayia Musa further testified that around July 1995, Taylor helped the External 1
Delegation to prepare for the peace talks by inviting himself and Palmer to Gbarnga to meet
him there. Taylor sent a message through Casse1l,l3977 Musa Cisse's radio operator}3978
Sankoh told Fayia and Pa1mer not to go, but then allowed them to do so}3979 Fayia and
Palmer arrived in the first week of July 1995, and stayed unti1 the start of August, but Taylor
‘"6’ Fayaa Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38954.
13970 Eayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38964-38966.
‘"7‘ 1¤ay1a Musa, rrauspupt 14 April 2010, p. 38950.
W2 1¤ay1a Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38951-38952.
mm Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38957.
13974 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38952.
**975 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38953.
W6 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39009.
W7 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38959.
***7* Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38957.
‘"7° rayaa Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38959-38960.

---- End of Page 2150 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (ll"} 18 May 2012

was only able to meet with them twice, and for approximately ten minutes.l398O Taylor told
them that he would talk to them later and asked how "the brother" (meaning Foday Sankoh)
was. He did not "disclose" why he had called them.l398l
6179. When Taylor began the Liberian peace talks in Accra, Ghana in August, 1995, he
called and told Musa and Palmer to follow his convoy to Accra}3982 When they arrived
Taylor told them that he wanted them to meet people in the international community and see
how they negotiated peace so as to prepare them for their own peace negotiations}3983
Taylor gave them the same allowance and accommodation that he gave to his own Liberian
staffly)84 In the end, however, Taylor did not invite them to the peace negotiations. Musa
testified that he and Palmer were "just there around", did not see Taylor at all for the first
week, and only saw him once in the second week. Musa considered it as being a "sight—
Sccingaa 13985
6180. ln December 1995, the RUF book "Footpaths to Democracy" was launched in the
C6te d’1voire Foreign Ministry. @86 On that day, Taylor was in Abidjan and asked to see the
delegation. Fayia Musa went with others to Taylor's hotel room. Musa testified that Taylor's
room was crowded, but that he congratulated them on marketing themselves, and stated that
making their views known was the first step to a peace process. Taylor then asked General
Jackson, his bodyguard, to give the delegation CFA 10 million francs for their maintenance
in C6te d’1voire. He said that the money was to support the RUF when it ran for office after
the peace process. 13987
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6181. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,l3988 testified that around December
1994, Foday Sankoh did not have outside contacts and depended on captured materials. No
one outside knew what the RUF stood for. He thought it was necessary to get the message
‘"8" Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 28959-38961.
*398* Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38961.
*39*2 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38961-38962, 38965.
*3%*3 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 28962-38963.
*3%* rsyis Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38962.
"°" Fayia Msss, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 28062-28064.
*39*6 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38967.
""*7 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39000-39001.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596, and

---- End of Page 2151 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (1% 18 May 2012

out as to what the RUF stood for and to make contacts with the sympathisers and friends of
Foday Sankoh, such as the Libyan and Burkina Faso governments. 13989
6182. After discussions with Deen Jalloh and Fayia Musa, Sankoh decided to establish an
external delegation in Danané, C6te d’Ivoire. Sankoh decided to base the External
Delegation in Danané because it was close to the Guinean border, and thus facilitated
movement to and from Sierra Leone, and because the housing rental prices were
inexpensive.l3990 The External Delegation, comprised of Fayia Musa, Deen Jalloh, Alhaji
Kamara, Konomanyie, Philip Palmer, and Deen Jalloh's wife, was given instructions to go
to oammé.1"9‘
6183. Between 10 and 20 December 1994, Issa Sesay escorted the External Delegation to
the Guinean border. The External Delegation crossed the border to Guinea at the end of
December 1994 and contacted Mamie 1 Brown, the wife of CO Brown. She arranged a
vehicle to collect the delegates at the border.l3992 While in Guinea, Philip Palmer and Alhaji
Kamara were arrested. After his release, Alhaji did not return to the RUF until 2000 when
Sankoh was in Freetown. He did not rejoin the External Delegation. Palmer was released
around March 1995 and `oined the External Dele ation in Cote d’1voire.13993
J E
6184. While in Cote d’Ivoire, the External Delegation rented a house in Danané, where
they stayed until 1995. They were joined by their wives, and lsatu Kallon would go back
and forth between Danané and Sierra Leone, bringing ammunition, medicine and food she
purchased in Guinea. 13994 1
6185. Issa Sesay testified that, while in Cote d’Ivoire, around March and April 1995, the
External Delegation met with Dr Addai Sebo, from International Alert.l3995 Sesay further
testified that Palmer arranged Dr Sebo's visit to Sankoh and brought Dr Sebo from Cote
d’Ivoire into Sierra Leone. During his visit, Dr Sebo brought with him video cameras and a
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43707, 43709·43710, 43712·43714; Transcript 17 August 2010, pp.
46471·46472.
mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46478.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43707·4371 1.
Bm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43714.
‘"‘" rm spspy, Transcript 6 Jury 2010, pp. 43709, 43714.
I3994 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43715.
IMS Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43715·43717; Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46472.

---- End of Page 2152 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03·01·T [ G"!) 18 May 2012

satellite phone. He left the satellite phone with Sankoh after the visit.13996 The purpose of Dr
Sebo's visit was to disseminate information about the RUF so the international community
would know what it stood for. During the meeting, Sankoh and Dr Sebo discussed the
possibility of the RUF writing a book to further spread their message. Sankoh told Palmer,
who accompanied Dr Sebo, that the External Delegation should prepare a book and bring it
to him.13997
Deliberations
6186. The evidence unequivocally establishes that around December 1994, Sankoh sent an
RUF group called the External Delegation to Cote d’Ivoire in order to establish RUF
political representation there.139911 This group was composed of Ibrahim Deen J alloh, Agnes
Deen J alloh, Philip Palmer, Konomanyie and Alhaji Brima Kamara, and it was escorted by
Isatu Kallon.13999 On their way to Cote d’Ivoire, the group stopped in Guinea, where Palmer
and Alhaji Kamara were arrested by the Guinean authorities and transported to Conakry.1401)0
139961ssa Sesay, Transcript 6 Jury 2010, pp. 43715—43717.
13997 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43717.
13998 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3055-3056 (in late 1994, Foday Sarrkoh appointed Fayia
Musa, Deen Jalloh, Palmer and their families to go to Cote d’Ivoire); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp.
23245-23248 (CS) (on 11 December 1994, Foday Sarrkoh sent RUF members including Deen Jalloh, Isatu
Kallon, Daniel Kallon, Philip Sannoh, Alhaji Kamara and Issa Sesay to Cote d’Ivoire in order to establish a
public relations campaign for the RUF); Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42849-42851, 42854 (Isatu
Kallon received a radio call from Foday Sarrkoh who instructed her, from his headquarters in Zogoda, to escort
her husband Daniel Kallon together with Deen Jalloh, Agnes Jalloh, Alhaji Kamara, Alhaji Fofana, Konomanie,
and Philip Palmer to Cote d’Ivoire); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38947 (in December 1994 Foday
Sankoh sent an extemal delegation comprised of Ibrahim Deen Jalloh, Isatta Kallon, Agnes Deen Jalloh, Philip
Sylvester Palmer, Kono Manyi and Alhaji Brima Kamara); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43707, 43709-
43710, 43712-43714; Transcript 17 August 2010, pp. 46471-46472 (around December 1994, Sarrkoh decided to
establish an extemal delegation in Danane, Cote d’Ivoire).
13999 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42849—42851, 42854 (Isatu Kallon escorted her husband, Daniel
Kallon, together with Deen Jalloh, Agnes Jalloh, Alhaji Kamara, Alhaji Fofana, Konomanie, and Philip Palmer
to Cote d’Ivoire); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23245-23248 (CS) (on 11 December 1994, Foday
Sarrkoh sent RUF members including Deen Jalloh, Isatu Kallon, Daniel Kallon, Philip Sannoh, Alhaji Kamara
and Issa to Cote d’Ivoire in order to establish a PR campaign for the RUF); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April
2010, p. 38947 (in December 1994 Foday Sarrkoh sent an extemal delegation comprised of Ibrahim Deen Jalloh,
Isatta Kallon, Agnes Deen Jalloh, Philip Sylvester Palmer, Kono Manyi and Alhaji Brima Kamara; Fayia Musa
further testified that Isatu Kallon managed the travel poorly); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43707-
43711 (the Extemal Delegation was comprised of Fayia Musa, Deen J alloh, Alhaji Kamara, Konomanyie, Philip
Palmer, Deen Jalloh's wife and Konomanyie).
1401111 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23248-23252 (CS) (on or around 13 December 1994, while in
Gueckedou on their way to Cote d’Ivoire, Philip Palmer and Alhaji Kamara were arrested by an anti-gang unit of
the police for being member of a rebel group. They were moved to Conakry and detained there until May 1995);
Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42869-42875 (Guinean soldiers arrested Palmer and Kamara after
ransackirrg the house where the delegation was staying and were transferred to Conakry); Fayia Musa, Transcript
14 April 2010, pp. 38945-38946 (when the RUF delegation reached Gueckedou, police officers arrested Kamara
and Palmer); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43709, 43714 (while in Guinea, Philip Palmer and Alhaji
Kamara were arrested).

---- End of Page 2153 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T GL 18 May 2012
/4

Palmer and Alhaji Kamara were released in May 1995.14001 After his release, Palmer joined
the RUF External Delegation in Danane, Cote d’Ivoire, escorted by lsatu Kallon.14OO2 The
evidence also shows that, around May or June 1995, Sankoh instructed Fayia Musa to join
the External Delegation in Danane.1411113 There, the delegation met several representatives14004
including Musa Cisse, an NPFL representative,14OO5 who allowed them to use his radio to
communicate with Sankoh.14OO6
14001 TFl- 168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23248-23252 (CS) (Palmer and Alhaji Kamara were detained in
Conakry until May 1995. After being released in May 1995, Palmer remained with the Sierra Leonean
Ambassador to Guinea, in Conakry for two weeks); Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42887-42889
(Palmer was released around May 1995); See also Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38945-38946
(Palmer was held in Guinea until July 1995); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43709, 43714 (Philip
Palmer was released around March 1995 and joined the Extemal Delegation in the Cote d’Ivoire).
141402 TFl-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23252 (CS) (Witness TFl-168 testified that Philip Palmer and
Isatu Kallon left for Danané, Cote d’Ivoire, where they arrived at the end of May 1995. The Extemal Delegation
there including Philip Sannoh, Mr Konomanyie, Deen Jalloh and Fayia Musa); Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June
2010, pp. 428 87-42890 (around May 1995, Isatu Kallon travelled to Conakry where she met Philip Palmer who
had been released from prison. Kallon gave Palmer money and he went to the Sierra Leonean Embassy in order
to obtain refugee documents. Palmer and Isatu Kallon left to Danané where they encountered the RUF Extemal
Delegation); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43709 (when Philip Palmer was released, he joined the
Extemal Delegation in the Cote d’Ivoire).
141104 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38949 (in June 1995, Foday Sankoh instructed Fayia Musa to
follow the first delegation to Danané. Musa travelled with Morris Kallon and Philip Sannoh and followed the
same route as the first delegation and the trip passed without incident. Upon their arrival in Danané, F ayia Musa
and his companions met up with the first delegation in Belleville); Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp.
42884, 42894-42896 (around June 1995, Kallon was contacted by Sankoh who asked her to escort Fayia Musa,
Philip Sannoh, and Aihaji Barrie to Guinea. Kallon met these three men in Buedu, and took them to Koilu where
they crossed the Guinean-Sierra Leonean border at the Nongowa); TFl-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp.
23252-23256 (CS) (when Palmer joined the Extemal Delegation at the end of May 1995, Fayia Musa was
already there).
141104 TFl- 168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23263-23265 (CS) (the Extemal Delegation met several
representatives while in Cote d’Ivoire, including representatives from the Commonwealth, from the OAU, from
the UN, the Red Cross and other organisations); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38948-38951, 38954,
38964-38966 (while in Danané, Dr Sebo introduced the Extemal Delegation to Alhaji Fofana, a Mauritanian,
who brought the Extemal Delegation to Mauritanians, to Musa C issé, the Accused's chief of protocol in Danané,
to the Foreign Minister of Cote d’Ivoire, who later became the chief negotiator for the Abidjan Peace Accord, as
well as Omrie Golley and Ambrose Ganda, Sierra Leonean lawyers based in London).
14005 Several witnesses testified that Musa Cissé was the Accused's Chief of Protocol in Danané. See TFl-168,
Transcript 21 January 2009, p. 23254 (CS); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38950-38951. See also
Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 991. But see Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 23 September 2009, p. 29531
(PS) (at that time, Musa Cissé did not carry the title of Chief of Protocol).
14006 TFl-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23252-23256 (CS) (when Palmer arrived in Danané in May 1995,
the Extemal Delegation had made no contacts except with Musa Cissé, the Accused's chief who provided the
Extemal Delegation with the communication equipment of his house, Belle Ville 1, allowing the External
Delegation to communicate with Foday Sankoh); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38952, 38957
(Musa Cissé allowed the delegation to use his radio set, located at his house in Belleville, to communicate with
Foday Sankoh. The delegation used Cissé's radio twice a week in order to communicate with Foday Sankoh. The
radio was never used to communicate with Charles Taylor). See also Witness TFl-371, 25 January 2008, pp.
2248-2250 (CS) (Witness TFl-371 testified that Fayia Musa of the Extemal Delegation used the radio at Musa
Cissé's house in Danané to contact Sankoh in Zogoda to inform him that he had met Witness TFl-371 in
Danané); See also Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 991-992; Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 125, 308.

---- End of Page 2154 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ({11; 18 May 2012
/'/TU

6187. The Prosecution, relying on Perry Kamara's testimony, submits that it was the
Accused who advised Sankoh to send this delegation to Cote d’Ivoire.l40O7 Kamara testified
that during radio conversations in late 1994, the Accused suggested that Sankoh send
educated civilians to Cote d’Ivoire through Guinea, to set up a base there with radio
communications, a plan that Sankoh implemented. Kamara also testified that the Accused
suggested sending this delegation at the same time as the hostages were released, to go
together with them. 14008
6188. The Trial Chamber notes that Perry Kamara is the only witness who testified as to
the radio communication between the Accused and Sankoh in which the Accused advised
Sankoh to send the External Delegation to Cote d’Ivoire. The Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that Kamara is a generally credible witness. 14009 Kamara testified that as a radio man,
he received and monitored the radio transmissions and read from the log books.l4OlO Kamara
testified that he monitored the call.l4OH When describing this conversation, Kamara quoted
the Accused's alleged statement, indicating that he directly heard the conversation.l4Ol2
6189. The Trial Chamber notes that in the conversation Kamara recounted, the Accused
suggested that Sankoh send the External Delegation out of Sierra Leone together with the
white hostages captured during the attack on Sierra Rutile.l4Ol3 Kamara testified that Sankoh
followed Taylor's advice and sent Fayia Musa, Deen Jalloh, Philip Palmer and their families
together with the hostages.l`ml4 However, the account given by both Prosecution and
Defence witnesses who had direct involvement in the movements of the External Delegation
differs from Kamara's account. Both Prosecution and Defence Witnesses testified from first-
hand knowledge that Fayia Musa and Philip Palmer were not part of the same mission.
While Palmer left Zogoda in December 1994, Fayia Musa left Sierra Leone to join the RUF
External Delegation only in June 1995. None of the witnesses other than Kamara testified
Wm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 125-126, 308, 1234-1236.
MODS Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3055-3056.
MOO9 Credibility Assessment, Perry Kamara, paras 227-236.
Mom Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3053.
MOH Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3055.
Mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3054 ("And then Mr Taylor told him that, ‘you have to save
that money to do some other things with it, for instance to get ammunition, food and drugs for your fighters} He
kept the money for some time. Then also ‘You can use this money to establish diplomatic relationship with the
outside world. "’)
MOB Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3055-3056.
MOM Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3055 ("Who was appointed for that mission was Fayiah
f`

---- End of Page 2155 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

that the delegation travelled with hostages. Witness TE1—168 and Isatu Kallon testified that
Sankoh turned the hostages over to Dr Sebo, a member of an NGO, who in tum delivered
them to the ICRC.MOl5
6190. The Trial Chamber recalls that Perry Kamara was not part of the Extemal Delegation
and did not partake in the organisation of the handing over of the hostages or in the travel
arrangements of the Extemal Delegation. He was an RUF radio operator. What happened
after the conversation he described between the Accused and Sankoh is not attributed to any
source of information, and he does not claim to have witnessed these events himself The
Trial Chamber accepts the evidence of TF 1-168, Isatu Kallon and F ayia Musa, who was
himself a member of the Extemal Delegation, as to the travel of the members of the Extemal
Delegation to Cote d’Ivoire, unrelated to the travel of the white hostages released to the Red
Cross. The Trial Chamber notes that Isatu Kallon organised the separate travel of both
groups to Guinea. Kallon testified that there were 50 captured civilians in addition to the
white hostages. In these circumstances, the Trial Chamber is of the view that while the
testimony of Kamara is inaccurate with regard to the circumstances of the departure of the
Extemal Delegation, this inaccuracy does not undermine his credibility.
6191. The Trial Chamber notes that Augustine Mallah and Isaac Mongor testified that
Sankoh and the Accused had cornrnunications during this period and that Sankoh was
seeking advice from Taylor.l4Ol6 Moreover, TF1—168 and Fayia Musa testified that Musa
Cissé, a high ranking NPFL officer in Danane whom they said was Taylor's Chief of
Protocol, was instrumental in helping the RUF External Delegation to establish their
representation in Cote d’Ivoire.l40l7 As discussed, Fayia Musa further testified that the
Accused himself brought members of the Extemal Delegation with him to Accra. In these
circumstances, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused's blanket assertion that he did not
Musa, Deen Jalloh, Mr Palmer and their families").
Mm TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23263-23265 (CS); Isatu Kallon, Transcript 17 June 2010, pp.
42829-42834.
Mom See Pre-Indictment Period: Sierra Rutile; Pre-Indictment Period: Operation Stop Election.
MOU TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23252-23256 (CS) (when Pahner arrived in Danané in May 1995,
the External Delegation had made no contacts except with Musa Cissé, the Accused's chief who provided the
External Delegation with the communication equipment of his house, Belle Ville 1, allowing the External
Delegation to communicate with Foday Sarrkoh); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38952, 38957
(Musa Cissé allowed the delegation to use his radio set, located at his house in Belleville, to communicate with
Foday Sankoh). Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38950-38951 (Musa Cissé introduced the External
Delegation to the prefect and chief of police of Danané; when the prefect of Danané saw that Musa Cissé
supported the RUF delegation, he sent for the police commissaire, Mr Koffi to check out the residence where the

---- End of Page 2156 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

have any contact with Sankoh and his testimony that he was unaware of the establishment of
an RUF External Delegation is not credible.l40l8
6192 I · , · 14019 - 14020
. n the Trial Chamber s view, the fact that TF1—168, Fayia Musa , Issa
Sesayl402l and lsatu Kallonl4022 provided other explanations for Sankoh's decision to send
the External Delegation to Cote d’Ivoire does not exclude the possibility that the Accused
also advised Sankoh to do so, as described by Perry Kamara.
6193. Regarding the Prosecution allegation that the Accused took members of the External
Delegation with him to Accra, the Trial Chamber notes that the allegation is supported by
the testimony of Fayia Musa, and that the Defence concedes that this trip occurred with the
Accused.l4023 The Prosecution alleges that this trip to Accra allowed the Accused to
introduce the External Delegation members to contacts who could facilitate arms deals.
However, the Prosecution does not cite any evidence to support its allegation that the trip to
Accra was for the purpose of dealing in arms. Fayia Musa, the only witness to testify to this
trip to Accra, said that he and Philip Palmer did not interact with any outside contacts, and
that they only saw Taylor once in the two weeks they were in Accra, concluding that this
became, for them, a "sightseeing trip". For this reason, the Trial Chamber finds that the
Prosecution has not established that the Accused arranged this trip to Accra in order to
facilitate arms deals.
Findings
delegation was staying in Danané).
44040 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 28999-29000.
**0*9 TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23239-23240 (CS) (Sankoh and officers decided to send an
External Delegation considering the fact that the RUF was living in extremely difficult conditions in the jungle,
surviving without food and repeatedly attacked by ULIMO and Government troops).
44020 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38941-38944 (Fayia Musa testified that it was Dr Sebo, a
representative of International Alert, an NGO based in London working on conflict-resolution, who said that his
boss had sent him to undenake a project that would search for solutions to the Sierra Leonean conflict, and he
had come to assess whether Foday Sankoh would be willing to send out a delegation to meet the international
community).
44024 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43707, 43709-43710, 43712-43714; Transcript 17 August 2010, pp.
46471-46472, 46478 (Issa Sesay testified that after discussions with Deen Jalloh and Fayia Musa Sankoh
decided to establish an RUF External Delegation in Danané, Cote d’Ivoire to make contacts with sympathisers
and friends of Foday Sankoh, such as the Libyan and Burkina Faso governments. Sesay explained that Sankoh
decided to base the External Delegation in Danané because it was close to the Guinean border, and thus
facilitated movement to and from Sierra Leone, and because the housing rental prices were inexpensive).
44042 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 18 June 2010, pp. 42890-42891 (Kallon did not know why Sankoh decided to send
this RUF delegation to Danané, but heard that they were supposed to explain to international organisations such
as the Red Cross why the RUF was fighting).
r`

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

40 ABO
6194. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that during a radio conversation with Foday Sankoh, the Accused advised the RUF leader to
send an External Delegation to Cote d’Ivoire. In Cote d’Ivoire, the delegates met Musa
Cisse, an NPF L representative, who allowed them to use his radio for communications with
Sankoh.
6195. TheTrial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused, through contact with Musa Cissé, invited members of the External
Delegation to Liberia, where he met them twice in 1995. In December 1995 the Accused
met members of the External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire on the occasion of the publication
"Footpaths to Democracy", at which time he gave them CFA 10 million francs for their
maintenance.
6196. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the trip by members of the External Delegation to Accra at the invitation of the
Accused was made in order to facilitate contacts for amrs deals.
2. Abidjan
Submissions of the Parties
6197. It is undisputed that on 24 March 1996, Foday Sankoh travelled to Yamoussoukro,
Cote d’Ivoire for peace talks with the Sierra Leonean Govermnent, which then continued in
Abidjan. After six months of negotiations, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed on 30
November 1996.14024 The Prosecution alleges that the Accused convinced Sankoh to
participate in the Abidjan peace talks in order to ensure the RUF 's survival to continue its
fight to control the people and territory, and to pillage the resources of Sierra Leone. Before
Sankoh's departure to Sierra Leone, the Accused told Sankoh to take advantage of his
attendance at the peace negotiations to "move outside" and get more ammunition and other
combat-related materials. After receiving this advice from the Accused, Sankoh joined the
14023 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 127.
14024 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL—03—01—T—370, Agreed Fact 28; Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial
Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Facts O and P; Defence Final Trial Briei paras 445-447.
GN

---- End of Page 2158 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—0l—T 18 May 2012

40 Sl 51
External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire, and used the Accused's contacts to secure arms and
ammunition for the RUF. Wm
6198. The Defence concedes that during the Abidjan peace negotiations Foday Sankoh
travelled to several countries outside of Cote d’Ivoire, but contends that he did so in order to
get advice on how to tum the RUF into a political party.l4O26 The Defence claims that the
Accsued had no contact with Sankoh at this time, and Sankoh vowed never to go to Liberia
to meet the Accused again. MO27
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
6199. Witness TF 1-516, an RUF radio operator,l4028 testified that he was an RUF radio
operator in Zogoda, Sierra Leone in 1996.l4O29 Just prior to the date when Foday Sankoh
travelled from Zogoda to Yamoussoukro, the witness received a call from a Liberian radio
station, 35 Bravo. The station sergeant, Zedman, had previously told the witness that 35
Bravo was Taylor's station, located in Gbamga. The witness ran to call the station sergeant,
who spoke to the operator on the other line. The radio operator stated that Ebony, whom the
witness testified was Taylor, was on the radio to talk to Toyota, whom the witness testified
was Sankoh. Zedman rushed to call Sankoh, who came to the radio to talk to Taylor. ln their
conversation, during which TF 1-516 was present, Taylor told Sankoh to take advantage of
the peace negotiations in Yamoussoukro in order to "move outside and get more dancing
materials". The witness testified that dancing materials referred to ammunition and other
_ materiel relating to combat. limo
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
6200. Witness Foday Lansana (a.k.a. Co Nya), an RUF radio operator,l4O3l testified that
before Foday Sankoh left for the peace negotiations in Cote d’Ivoire, he heard Sankoh call
[4025 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 136-138, 219.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 449.
Wm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 451, 456-457.
M028 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
14029 TF1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7462-7465.
mw TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6868-6869.
M3 I Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.

---- End of Page 2159 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T 5,/ +5,, 18 May 2012
%~·

440.2 52-
Mohamed Tarawalli on the radio. Tarawalli was opposed to the peace talks, and so Sankoh
tried to convince him of the necessity of the negotiations. Sankoh told Tarawalli that his big
brother, Taylor, had informed him that it was necessary for him to go to the peace talks
because it would help him to reconnect with people who had assisted him in the past.444442
Apart from the peace accord, Sankoh explained, all lines and connections to the RUF were
cut off so it would be impossible for the RUF to survive without going to the peace
negotiations to "regain their strength".444444 Lansana considered that in stating the RUF
would regain its strength through the peace process, Sankoh clearly demonstrated to
Tarawalli that he would receive arms and ammunition from contacts there.444444
6201. Lansana also testified that while in Cote d’Ivoire Sankoh made trips to several places
with Dauda Aruna Fornie "in respect of arms and ammunition". Fomie would call home to
other operators to report on these trips, and the witness used to monitor the conversations.
Fomie would transmit these messages in Mende, which is a type of code, but the Mende-
speaking operators would decode them into English or Krio for Lansana at his station.444445
Prosecution Witness TF1 -168
6202. Witness TF1-168, an RUF member,444444 testified that from what he understood,
before Foday Sankoh left for Cote d’1voire he told the RUF combatants that he was going
there to make arrangements to acquire materials to go back and fight, and not to pursue
peace. That was his ulterior motive. 44047
6203. After the first negotiations, TF1-168 testified, Sankoh had wanted to go back to the
bush in Sierra Leone until the signing of the agreement, but the Government of Cote d’Ivoire
and the international community wanted him to stay in Cote d’1voire. Sankoh in tum told the
Ivorian officials that he wanted to tour the region and meet with Heads of State in order to
get advice on turning the RUF into a political party. The international community agreed,
and facilitated his trip. 44048
44034 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4487-4488.
444433 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4488-4489.
44443 4 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4488-4489.
444435 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4488-4490.
444434 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
44037 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23279 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23474-23475 (CS).
444434 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23274-23275 (CS).

---- End of Page 2160 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % (ik 18 May 2012

6204. The witness travelled with Sankoh for this tour. They went first to Ougadougou,
Burkina Faso, where Sankoh had a meeting with President Blaise Compaore. 14039 From there
Sankoh travelled to Libya while the witness stayed in Ouagadougou, and he was told later
that Sankoh met with Muammar Gaddafi. He and Sankoh then travelled to Accra, Ghana
where they were received by President John Jerry Rawlings. From Ghana Sankoh told the
witness to return to Cote d’1voire, but Sankoh went with others to Nigeria.l4O40 Sankoh later
told the witness that they were received by President Sani Abacha of Nigeria, who gave
them $USD 50,000 and a gown each as a cultural recognition. Finally, the witness travelled
with Sankoh to Togo to meet President Gnassingbe Euadema, but was not present in the
meeting between them and was not told what transpired at the meeting. MOM
6205. ln May 1996 in the Hotel Ivoire in Danané, Cote d’1voire Sankoh received $USD
500,000 in travellers cheques from the Libyan ambassador to Ghana, Mohamed Talibi, for
the transformation of his movement to a political pa1ty.l4O42 The witness did not know how
all of this money was spent, but stated that Sankoh sent SUSD 7,000 to Daniel Tamba (a.k.a.
Jungle) to purchase food and ammunition for RUF combatants. Sankoh also sent funds to
Samuel Bockarie, who told him he could get ammunition from ULIMO fighters along the
Sierra Leonean—Liberian border. MOM
6206. In June 1996, Sankoh asked Philip Palmer to carry a letter from him to Talibi in
Accra, Ghana, and told him to read the letter before the joumey.l4O44 The letter, dated 26
June 1996, thanked Talibi for the $USD 500,000 Sankoh had received from him and "the
other brothers back home" which referred to the fact that these funds were from executive
members of the Libyan Govermnent, and not from Talibi.l4O45 Sankoh also stated that he
was negotiating with his "business pa1"tners" for the purchase of arms and ammunition;l4O46
Wm TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23275 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, p. 23459 (CS).
MMO TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23276-23277 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, p. 23459 (CS).
"‘°"‘ TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23276-23277 (cs).
Mw TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23283-23284 (CS), 23288-23289 (CS); Transcript 23 January
2009, pp. 23454-23458 (CS).
Wm TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23284 (CS). The Trial Chamber notes that the fact that funds were
given to Bockarie at this time in order to buy ammunition was corroborated by Issa Sesay. Issa Sesay, Transcript
6 July 2010, pp. 43769-43770.
M044 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23285-23287 (CS).
MMS TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23287 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23454-23458 (CS);
' See also Exhibit D-015, "RUF, Follow up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/ SL to Brother Mohamed
Talibi, Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriyya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996".
MO46 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23288 (CS).

---- End of Page 2161 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

the witness did not, however, know to whom Sankoh was referring when he wrote of these
"business partners".l4O47 In the letter Sankoh also requested an additional $USD 1.5 million
with which he would purchase materiel, but the witness testified that these funds were not
disbursed to Sankoh, and he was not aware of any other materials Sankoh received while in
Abidjan. MO48
6207. Sankoh requested Philip Palmer to draft and then carry a second letter from him to
Talibi in December 1996. This letter indicated that Talibi sent $USD 29,000 to Sankoh
through Daniel Kallon, but that Sankoh needed more funds.l4049 The letter also stated that
Sankoh had already finished negotiations with his business partners, and had so far paid
them $USD 300,000, but asked for an additional $USD 700,000 to give to these business
partners. The witness was again not aware of the identity of these business partners. 14050
6208. Sankoh also wrote that the Government of Bukino Faso had not shown a keen
interest in assisting him, and asked for Talibi to prepare a letter of introduction from Sankoh
to President Blaise Compaore so that the two could meet.l4O51 The witness was not aware
that a letter of introduction was ever prepared by the Libyan government for Sankoh. MO52
6209. When Philip Palmer presented Talibi with the letter in person, Talibi read it and
stated that he would speak with "brother", meaning Sankoh, and told him to return to Cote
d’Ivoire.l4O53 The witness testified that Sankoh did not receive these funds from Talibi, and
he was sure of this because each time Sankoh received such a large sum he would become
M047 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23288 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23455-23461 (CS).
MMS TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23285-23290 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23454-23455
(CS). Exhibit D-015, "RUF, Follow up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother Mohamed
Talibi, Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriyya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996".
Img TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23290-23292 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, p. 23460 (CS);
Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23472-23473 (CS). See also Exhibit P-272, "Revo1utionary United Front of
Sierra Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl. Foday S Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi,
Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797 — 00007798".
M050 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23292-23293 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23477-23479
(CS).
MOM TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23290-23295 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, pp. 23479-23480
(CS). See also Exhibit P-272, "Revo1utionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl.
Foday S Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi, Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples
Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797 — 00007798".
‘*"52 TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23293-23294 (cs).
MOS} TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23295 (CS).

---- End of Page 2162 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

excited and let the witness know}4054 Finally, the witness stated that Taylor did not feature
in any ofSankoh's activities in 1996.l4055
The Accused
6210. The Accused denied telling Foday Sankoh to use the peace talks in Yamoussoukro to
facilitate arms deals in 1996. He further contended that TF1-516's testimony - that the
Accused called Sankoh from Gbarnga to talk to him about Yamoussoukro - could not be true
because in 1996 he was in Monrovia, working with the "counci1 of state".l4056 He further
denied that there was any contact between himself and Sankoh in at this particular time in
1996 6r LLHO other time". *4057
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6211. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander}4058 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,l4059 testified that in April 1996, Foday Sankoh and others
travelled from Cote d’1voire to Burkina Faso and Libya}4060 When they returned, Sankoh
told Sesay that he had been given $USD 2 million by President Gaddafi in Libya. MOM Sesay
testified that he believed Sankoh's business partner for the purchase of ammunitions at this
time was a man in Burkina Faso named "Commandant Diendere". *4002
6212. ln approximately September 1996, Mohamed Tarawalli told Sesay that as there was
a shortage of ammunition, he would ask "the leader" Sankoh in Abidjan to send money -
"for somebody to bring money through Guinea" as the woman who supplied them with
ammunition had been arrested. Tarawalli instructed Sesay to buy ammunition from Guinea
and send it to him in Zogoda. Sesay thereafter met Abdul Rahman, a Guinean businessman,
*4054 Tri-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, p. 23295 (cs).
*4055 Tri-168, Transcript 26 January 2009,p. 23481 (cs).
M056 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 27 October 2009, pp. 30445-30447.
*4057 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 27 October 2009, pp. 30445-30446.
*4050 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596, and
MOS`) Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
*4000 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43901-43902, 43909-43910.
Mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43902; Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46564, 46567-46570. See also
Exhibit D-015, "RUF, Follow up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother Mohamed Talibi,
Libyan Arab Peop1e's Jamahiriyya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996".
*4000 Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43903, 4391 1.

---- End of Page 2163 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

at the Guinean border. Rahman told Sesay that the officer who would assist him had gone to
Conakry, so Sesay waited a week and retumed to Sierra Leone. MO63
Defence Witness rayja Musa
6213. Witness Fayia Musa, a member of the Extemal Delegation and an agricultural officer
in the RUF}4064 testified that once the Extemal Delegation had laid the groundwork for the
peace process in the Cote d’1voire, Musa was appointed by the delegation to go see Foday
Sankoh in Zogoda in January 1996 to convince him to come out of the bush for peace talks.
Musa testified that Sankoh's reaction appeared positive, and he accepted coming out, but
said that he was unsure of his own secu1ity.l4O65 Musa told Sankoh that the Government of
Cote d’1voire had agreed to provide for his transport, and gave him several reasons why his
artici ation would be beneficial. Sankoh then a eed to artici ate. MO66
P P SY P P
6214. At this time Sankoh received support from other leaders in Afiica. For example,
Sankoh received SUSD 500,000 from Mohamed Talibi, who worked at the Libyan embassy
in Ghana.l4O67 Inside the carton holding the money was a letter congratulating him on
accepting peace and stating that the money should be used for food, medicine and
humanitarian aid for civilians.l4068 Afier he received the money Musa and Phillip Palmer
met with Sankoh and advised him to spend the money on humanitarian aid, but instead
Sankoh sent SUSD 7,000 to Samuel Bockarie to buy arms and ammunition.l4O69 Musa
thought a radio operator took SUSD 7,000 to Bockarie and that other radio operators were
aware that Sankoh received this large sum, because the witness told them after they met with
Sanl6215. Musa was present on 26 June 1996, when Foday Sankoh dictated a letter that was
‘ sent to Mohamed Talibi, thanking him and "the other brothers back home" for the SUSD
500,000 used to purchase material for the RUF's military mission.l4O7l When asked why
'*"‘" rssa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43759-43760, 43763.
'"’6" Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 38949; Transcript 19 April 2010, p. 39283.
'"’°$ Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38966-38967, 39005.
"°°6 Fayia Musa, rrarrsarrpr 14 April 2010, pp. 39005—39006. 1
14067 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39019-39020, 39022-39023.
"°°8 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39020-39021.
How Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39022-39023.
Wm Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39023.
Wm Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39028-39029.
r

---- End of Page 2164 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012
\/

Sankoh would have told those who provided him with money for humanitarian assistance
that he spent the money on arms and ammunition, Musa replied that Sankoh "was a very
unpredictable person".1L1072 Musa testified that the letter's reference to Sankoh's "business
partners" was a lie, because Sankoh had no business partners at this time. 141173
6216. Musa was asked why he sat with Sankoh while a letter was written that was clearly
contemplated the furtherance of war when he testified that he and the other External
Delegates were in Cote d’1voire ostensibly in order to pursue peace.141174 The witness first
testified that he did not act because he knew that Sankoh's request would not be satisfied,
and that the Libyan government would not give Sankoh money for arms and
ammunition.141175 He then stated that, as far as he knew, the letter was never taken to
Ghana. 14076 He also stated that he was afraid for his safety and that of his family. 14077
6217. ln April 1996, Sankoh and the External Delegation, including Musa, made a tour of
the sub—region of Africa to raise funds for the RUF; Sankoh told regional leaders that he
needed funds to support civilians in Sierra Leone knowing that if he said this money would
be made available to him. They went first to Burkina Faso, where Sankoh met with
President Blaise Compaoré, and then to Libya accompanied by Ibrahim Balde, where the
Libyan authorities gave Sankoh approximately $USD 100,000.14078 From Libya the
delegation went to Ghana, where they met President Jerry Rawlings in Accra, and then to
Nigeria, where they met Sani Abacha.14079 President Abacha gave the Delegation $USD
50,000 in travellers cheques and a gown each, and the delegation returned to Abidjan.1408O
6218. The witness testified that in the year that Sankoh was in Cote d’Ivoire, Sankoh had
no contact with Taylor, and in fact was "filled with hate" for Taylor. 14081
14072 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39028-39029.
"‘°’3 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39029.
‘"‘"* Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39030-2.9032.
'"°" Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39031.
14076 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39031-39032.
1111177 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39032.
140711 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39034-39039; Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39053-39054.
14079 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39039-39041; Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39053-39054.
14080 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39042.
140111 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, p. 39051; Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39054.

---- End of Page 2165 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {fl}; 18 May 2012
·/

Prosecution Exhibit P—272
6219. Exhibit P—272 is a letter dated 4 December 1996 from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed
Talibi, People's Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriyya in Accra, Ghana.l4O82 In this
letter, Sankoh writes that he is grateful to Talibi "and the other brothers back home" for the
$USD 29,000 he received via Daniel Kallon. I—Ie also states that the RUF signed the peace
accord on 29 November 1996 "just so as to relieve our movement of the enormous pressure
from the International Community" but that he "will use this opportunity to transact [his]
business in getting out fighting materials freely and easily". Sankoh tells Talibi that he has
already paid his "business partners" $USD 300,000 but that the total cost of the materials
they are offering him is $USD 2,000,000. I-Ie therefore asked Talibi and "his brothers" for an
addimmi suso 700,000.""’"
6220. As he had always learned from "you people", Sankoh wrote, the Burkina Faso
govemment had funds for the provision of materials, but it had not shown any keen interest
in assisting theRUF as a movement. Sankoh also had a conversation with Commandant
Diendere with no result. Sankoh therefore asked Talibi to prepare a letter for him to meet
President Compaore on this issue, as he had not received any answer from them even after
his delegates went to Ouagadougou. 14084
Defence Exhibit D—015
6221. Exhibit D—015 is a letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi, Libyan Arab
People's Jamahiriya, in Accra, Ghana dated 26 June 1996. In this letter, Sankoh thanks
Talibi for the $USD 500,000 he received for the purchase of "needed material to pursue the
military mission". Sankoh states that he has had extensive discussions on the subject of
mm Exhibit P—272, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl. Foday S
Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi, Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya,
Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797—00007798"; TFl—l68, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23291-
23292 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, p. 23471—23472 (CS).
MOS} Exhibit P-272, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl. Foday S
Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi, Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya,
Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797 — 00007798". V
M084 Exhibit P—272, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl. Foday S
Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi, Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya,
Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797 — 000077987

---- End of Page 2166 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T (ltr 13 May 2012

materials, and attached a list of amrs and ammunition that he needed to purchase. He
therefore asked for Talibi for an additional SUSD 1,500,000 to purchase these materials.M085
Deliberations
6222. It is undisputed that Foday Sankoh participated in what became known as the
Abidjan peace talks from March to November 1996. The Prosecution alleges that the
Accused convinced Sankoh to participate in these talks in order to obtain ammunition and
materiel for the RUF, and that he used the Accused's contacts to secure arms and
ammunition for the RUF. The Defence denies that the Accused had any contact with Sankoh
at this time.
6223. Concerning the allegation that the Accused instructed Sankoh to attend the Abidjan
peace talks in order to obtain arms and ammunition, several witnesses, including TF1-168,
Foday Lansana, Issa Sesay and Fayia Musa, testified that Sankoh did obtain funds to
purchase arms and ammunition for the RUF while in Abidjan for these negotiations.l4O86 The
Trial Chamber recalls its findings on the general credibility of these witnesses,l4O87 and notes
that the testimony of Issa Sesay must be viewed with caution and requires corroboration.
The transactions to which the witnesses testified are further confirmed by documentary
evidence, two contemporaneous letters from Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi discussing arms
negotiations made by Sankoh at this time.l4O88
6224. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-516 is the only witness to give first-hand
testimony of the Accused's instruction to Sankoh to participate in the talks so as to obtain
arms and ammunitions for the RUF. As a radio operator in Zogoda, TF1-516 testified that ·
he overheard a conversation in which Taylor told Sankoh to attend the peace talks in order to
get more "dancing materials", which the witness identified as ammunition and other
M085 Exhibit D-015, "RUF, Follow up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother Mohamed Talibi,
Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996".
*4086 TF1—168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23279 (CS), 23284 (CS); Transcript 26 January 2009, p. 23475
(CS); Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43769—43770; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp.
4488-4490;
Wm Credibility Assessment, Foday Lansana, paras 237-243; Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
Credibility Assessment, TF 1-168, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2328; Credibility Assessment, Fayia
Musa, Pre-Indictment period (1988-1996), para. 2557.
14088 Exhibit P-272, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Urgent Infomation, From Cpl. Foday S
Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi, Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya,
Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797 — 00007798".

---- End of Page 2167 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T X dll? 18 May 2012

mate1iel.{4080 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TF1—5l6 is a generally credible
witness. {4000
6225. TFl—5l6 provided a detailed account of this incident, including specifics that were
corroborated by other witnesses. For example, the witness testified that he received this
radio call from "35 Bravo", identified by other witnesses as a call sign for communications
between the RUF and the NPFL.{400{ The witness also identified the Accused's code name
as Ebony and Sankoh's as Toyota, code names that have been confirmed by the Accused
himself and several other witnesses. {4002
6226. Foday Lansana provided evidence that he overheard Sankoh tell Mohamed Tarawalli
that Taylor told him to use the talks to reconnect with supporters of the RUF.{4003 Lansana
did not explicitly hear Sankoh state that Taylor instmcted him to obtain arms and
ammunition at the peace talks, but he understood Sankoh to mean this.{4004 Though this
evidence is hearsay, it corroborates TF1—l68's testimony that Sankoh was in contact with
the Accused. The Trial Chamber finds Lansana's testimony on the meaning of Sankoh's
words to be credible.
6227. The Accused denied that he instmcted Sankoh to attend the Abidjan peace talks,
stating that he was not in Gbamga, but in Monrovia in 1996, and further stating that he had
{4000 TFl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6868-6869. Though no other Prosecution witnesses refer to aims or
ammunition as "dancing materials", and Defence Witness Yanks Smythe testified that he had never heard of the
term dancing materials, Transcript 1 March 2010, pp. 36294-36295, the Defence did not challenge this
interpretation of the term in their multiple submissions on this incident, and the Trial Chamber finds TFl-5 l6's
interpretation of the term credible.
{4000 Credibility Assessment, TFl-516, paras 275-284.
{400{ Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3050; Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3074-3075; TFl-585,
Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15604-15605. Witness DCT-008 first stated that he, as an NPFL radio
operator, communicated with the RUF through call sign "35B", Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47042;
Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47375-47376, but then stated that this was a mistake, he communicated to the
RUF in 1998 by calling for "Sellay", Transcript 7 September 2010, pp. 48l65·48l68.
{4002 The following witnesses identified Ebony as the call sign for Taylor: Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16
September 2009, pp. 28992-28993, 28995-28996; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 Febmary 2008, p. 3050;
Transcript 6 Febmary 2008, pp. 3299-3300; Amna Gbonda, Transcript 20 Febmary 2008, pp. 4367, 4384; Foday
Lansana, Transcript 25 Febmary 2008, p. 4682; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16250-16251;
Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21325-21327, 21330, 21358. The following witnesses
identified Toyota as the call sign for Sankoh: Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp.
28992—28993, 28995-28996; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16250-16251; Dauda Amna
Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21358, 21394.
{4003 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4487-4488.
{4004 Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 Febmary 2008, pp. 4488-4489.

---- End of Page 2168 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (jk 18 May 2012

21.026/
no contact with Sankoh at this time.l4O95 The Trial Chamber is not convinced, however, that
the Accused could not have travelled from Monrovia to Gbarnga during the course of an
entire year. Moreover, the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Accused and Sankoh
did have radio communications during this period in which the Accused claimed to have had
no contact with Sankoh. M096 For these reasons the Trial Chamber does not find the denial of
the Accused to be credible.
6228. The Defence iiirther challenges TFl—5l6's testimony that Taylor instructed Sankoh
to attend the Abidjan peace negotiation by contending in its Final Trial Brief that Dauda
Aruna Fornie testified that at this time there was no direct link with Taylor's radio
station}4097 The Defence, however, misrepresents Fornie's testimony. While Fornie testified
that there was no direct link to Taylor's station at this time, Fornie also stated that RUF
stations did contact Taylor's station "once in a while".l4098 This implies that there was an
indirect link between the stations. For this reason the Trial Chamber considers that Fomie's
evidence, cited by the Defence, does not challenge the credibility of TFl—5l6's testimony.
6229. Finally, Fayia Musa testified that as a member of the External Delegation he
travelled to Sierra Leone and convinced Sankoh to attend the Abidjan peace talks}4099 The
Trial Chamber is of the view that this testimony does not preclude the possibility that Taylor
also advised Sankoh to attend the negotiations for more nefarious reasons.
6230. Having considered the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused instructed Sankoh to attend the Abidjan
peace talks in order to obtain arms and ammunition for the RUF.
6231. Concerning the Prosecution's allegation that during the Abidjan peace process
Sankoh used the Accused's contacts to obtain materiel for the RUF, the Prosecution offers
vague assertions that Sankoh used contacts such as "the Libyan delegation in Ghana", and
the Accused's "long—time supporter, Libya", and "long—time ally Burkina Faso".l4l00
Several witnesses, including TFl—l68, Fayia Musa and Issa Sesay testify as to Sankoh's
MM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30445—30447.
M096 Operational Support: Communications .
*4097 See Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1496, citing Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008, p.
igiiglgauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 5 December 2008, p. 21786.
MW Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 38966—38967, 39005—39006.

---- End of Page 2169 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T // (ll; 18 May 2012


travels throughout the region, including to Libya and Burkina Faso, to garner support for the
RUF .l4lOl In addition, TF 1-168 and F ayia Musa testified that Sankoh received monies from
Mohamed Talibi, the Libyan ambassador to Ghana, a f`act also confirmed by the two letters
from Sankoh to Talibi entered into evidence. Mm
6232. None of these witnesses, however, attest to the Accused's connection to Mohamed
Talibi or to the leaders of Lib a, Burkina Faso, or an of the other countries visited b
Y Y Y
Sankoh at this time. Further, the Trial Chamber notes the testimony of TF 1-168, who stated
that Taylor did not feature in any of`Sankoh's activities in 1996.mO} Notably, the Accused's
name is not mentioned in either of the two letters Sankoh wrote to Talibi.l4l04
6233. For the above reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Sankoh used the Accused's contacts to obtain arms and
ammunition for the RUF during the Abidjan peace process.
Findings
6234. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused instructed Foday Sankoh to attend the Abidjan peace negotiations in order
to obtain arms and ammunitions for the RUF.
6235. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Foday Sankoh used the contacts of the Accused to obtain arms and ammunition
for the RUF during the Abidjan peace process.
WOO Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 137.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43901-43902, 43909—43910; Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010,
pp. 39035-39039; Transcript 15 April 2010, pp. 39053-39054; TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23275-
23277 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, p. 23459 (CS).
Mm TF1-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23283-23284 (CS), 23288-23289 (CS); Transcript 23 January
2009, pp. 23454-23458 (CS); Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 2010, pp. 39019-39020, 39022-39023; Exhibit D-
015, "RUF, Follow up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother Mohamed Talibi, Libyan Arab
People's Jamahiriyya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996"; Exhibit P-272, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl. Foday S Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed Talibi, Peoples
Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797 — 00007798".
*4***3 TF1-168, Transcript 26 January 2009, p. 23481 (CS).
mm See Exhibit D-015, "RUF, Follow up request from Foday Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL to Brother Mohamed
Talibi, Libyan Arab People's Jamahiriyya, Accra, Ghana, 26 June 1996"; Exhibit P-272, "Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, Urgent Information, From Cpl. Foday S Sankoh, Leader, RUF/SL, To Brother Mohamed
Talibi, Peoples Bureau of Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana, 4 December 1996, 00007797 --
00007798%

---- End of Page 2170 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ‘ 18 May 2012
5/

3. Lomé
Submissions of the Parties
6236. The parties do not dispute that a ceasefire between the AFRC/RUF and the
Government of Sierra Leone was signed in Lomé on 18 May 1999 to take effect from 24
May 1999, and that the Lomé Peace Accord was signed by President Ahmad Kabbah and
Foday Sankoh on 7 July 1999.14105 The parties’ dispute centres on the nature of the
Accused's involvement in the negotiations and signing of the Lomé Peace Accord. 14106
6237. The Prosecution alleges that while publicly portraying himself as a peace—maker, the
Accused instructed the rebels to subvert peace agreements and provided critical support and
direction to the rebel campaign to seize control of territory and resources in Sierra
Leone.14107 More specifically, the Accused played a crucial role in protecting and advancing
his and the AFRC/RUF's common interests during the Lomé peace process. For example,
i the Prosecution contends that after Sankoh arrived in Lomé, the Accused sent his own
negotiating team, headed by a trusted subordinate, to work with Sankoh in formulating
positions favourable to the AFRC/RUF and the Accused. The Accused met with Ibrahim
Bah and Omrie Golley, who were in Monrovia en route to Lomé, to provide further
instructions to Sankoh.141118 Golley insisted that the press not speak with Sankoh until the
other members of the RUF delegation arrived in Lomé, thus ensuring that he would be
isolated until he had a chance to meet with the Accused.14109
6238. The Prosecution contends that the Accused ensured that the larger AFRC/RUF
delegation travelled through Monrovia to Lomé so that he had an opportunity to instruct the
group before the negotiations.14110 Furthermore, while Sankoh was in Lomé and the
Accused in Monrovia, the Accused and Sankoh communicated directly, with Sankoh's radio
operators sending the Accused updates on the negotiations.14111
14105 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-370, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7
December 2007, Annex A, Fact W; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT, Joint Filing by the Prosecution and
Defence: Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact No. 32.
141116 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 197-198; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 95, 571, 575-576.
14107 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1.
14108 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 195.
141119 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 193, 195.
141 111 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 195.
141 11 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 197.

---- End of Page 2171 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ’"' 18 May 2012

46264
6239. The Prosecution also contends that once the Accused arrived in Lomé, he met with
Sankoh outside the presence of other African leaders in order to ensure that the Lomé
Accords were beneficial to himself and the AFRC/RUF.I4ll2 The Prosecution notes that the
result of the Accused's efforts was a peace agreement that bestowed many benefits on the
AFRC/RUF, including providing Sankoh with a position that allowed him control over
natural resources, including diamonds, in Sierra Leonem 13
6240. The Defence claims that the Accused's role in the Lome negotiations was part of the
mandate given to him by ECOWAS, and was carried out transparently and with the full
knowledge of ECOWAS and the UN. The Defence claims that the Accused joined the
ECOWAS committee because "he thought that he could help", and that unless Sierra Leone
had peace "there was no way Liberia could make it". The Defence also refers to the many
instances in which the Accused was commended and praised for his role in fostering peace
in Sierra Leone. The Defence denies that the Accused was double-handed in his dealings
with the peace process, and notes that other African leaders were as involved as he in the
peace process. Ml M
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -3 71
6241. Witness TF1-371, an RUF member,l4ll5 testified that in April 1999, an RUF
delegation 1ef`t Buedu for Lomé, passing through Monrovia on the way. They travelled from
Buedu to Vahun in two vehicles brought to them by Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), and then
from Vahun to Monrovia in a helicopter brought to them by Joe Tuah, a member of Taylor's
security team. MI I6
6242. Once in Monrovia, they were taken to the RUF guesthouse, where they remained for
two days before going to Lomé. Benjamin Yeaten met the delegates at the guesthouse,
where he gave each of them $USD 300, which he said was from the Accused.l4m From the
W12 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 197.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 199, 371.
NH4 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 87-95, 97, 99, 101-102, 574, 1011-1012, 1017-1018.
MHS TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2434 (CS).
Mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2435-2436 (CS); Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2796-2798
(CS).

---- End of Page 2172 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V! {U) 18 May 2012

airport, they travelled on a UN plane to Lome.14118 The delegation travelling to Lome
included "SYB" Rogers, Rashid Sandi, "Junior" Vandi, Lawrence Womandia and
others. 141 14
6243. TF 1-371 testified that in Lome the delegation was met at the airport by the Foreign
Minister of` Togo, who took them to a hotel.141211 There was a briehng with the delegates,
Mike Lamin, Ibrahim Bah, and Foday Sankoh.14121 The witness described Ibrahim Bah as an
advisor to Sankoh who doubled as a member of the External Delegation.14122 The witness
stated that during Lome, Bah also continued to serve as a liaison with the Accused. 14123
6244. When asked about meetings with any Liberians in Lome, TF 1-371 testified that
Monie Captan, the Liberian Foreign Affairs Minister, met with Sankoh briefly. The witness
described this as a courtesy call to thank Sankoh for participating in the peace process.14124
There was also a meeting between Sankoh, Mike Lamin, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle),
Ibrahim Bah and Memunatu Deen, who came from Monrovia with $USD 20,000 from
Taylor for Sankoh.14125 2
Prosecution Witness TF 1-567
6245. Witness TF 1-567, an RUF member,14126 testified that he was in Koidu when Sankoh
called commanders over the radio and asked Bockarie to organise 15 to 17 people, including
the witness, to Hrst travel to Monrovia, and then meet him in Lome.14124 The witness
travelled to Buedu, and waited for the trip to Lome. While he was there, Bockarie appointed
the dele ation, which included "SYB Ro ers", Mike Lamin, ldrissa Kamara, A es Fimioh,
S S SU
Lawrence Womandia, Dauda Aruna Fornie (a.k.a. DAF), Rashid Sandy, Leather Boot,
Amari Vandi, Jr. (a.k.a. Junior Vandi), Major SS Williams, Major Earnest Ngeba, Major M
141 18 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2436 (CS).
141 14 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2436 (CS); Transcript 1 February 2008, pp. 2796-2798 (CS).
141211 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2436-2437 (CS).
""2' TFl-37l, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2437-2439 (cs).
14122 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2437-2438 (CS).
'tm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2438-2439 (cs).
""2‘ TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2442 (cs).
W5 TF1-371, rranapnpr 29 January 2008, p. 2442 (cs).
14126 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).
14124 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12929-12930; Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13124-13128.

---- End of Page 2173 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T / G1.; 18 May 20]; r

Jalloh, Captain Alex Williams, Major Morie Gibao, and others.m28 During a meeting in
Buedu, Sam Bockarie gave Dauda Aruna Fomie a radio, which Fomie brought to Lome. Mm
6246. While in Buedu, the witness saw Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag) and Mike Lama
bring ammunition there, saying it was from Taylor. According to the men, Taylor said that
"when it was time for peace he should prepare for war", and because of the peace process
the ammunition should be kept underground.l4l3O
6247. The delegation travelled by road from Buedu to Vahun, and then took a UN
helicopter to Spriggs Field, Monrovia, accompanied by Bockarie, three UN officers and a
political officer from the US embassy. They were taken by the SSS to a guesthouse.l4m
6248. When they arrived in Lome they saw Sankoh and had a briefing, at which Sankoh
talked about his arrest. Rogers said that since Sankoh had not been available, Taylor had
provided a great deal of assistance to the RUF, saying that Taylor "really showed us that he
was your brother in the revolution". Rogers also said that Bockarie had been good on the
ground.m32
6249. On one occasion in Lomé, the witness saw Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), and
overheard Tamba explaining that he had been sent by Taylor to see how Sankoh was
doing.l4m The witness also saw General lbrahim Bah at Lomé, whom the witness testified
was with the NPFL, and whom Sankoh described as his friend who was "living outside
helping the establishment of the RUF movement". The witness saw Omrie Golley, the
spokesman for the RUF.l4l34 The witness testified that any time that Sankoh would send
Tamba to Monrovia, Bah would accompany him.l4l35
6250. After two weeks at Lomé, Sankoh told the witness and others to go brief Bockarie on
developments at Lome. The witness and "Dr Williams" retumed to Monrovia and stayed at
the guesthouse. Benjamin Yeaten arrived and gave Williams a parcel. Yeaten told Williams
Img TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12930; Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13124-13128, 13143-13144.
'4'29 TF1-567, Transcript 2; July 2008, pp. 13133—13134.
'4'"’ rr1-s67, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12965-12966.
Mm TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12965-12966; Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13128-13129, 13144.
""32 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12967—12968.
Mm rrr-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, p. 12969.
"*"" rrr-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12970-1297;
"'" TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12970-12972.
F"

---- End of Page 2174 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

40.2 6 ?
and the witness that Taylor knew they had arrived and they should buy things to take back to
Sierra Leone. Williams gave the witness EBUSD 200 to buy items. Williams and the witness
flew from Monrovia to Vahun, and Bockarie sent vehicles to pick the men up at Vahun and
bring them to Buedu.*4*3°
6251. Williams and the witness explained to Bockarie in Buedu that Sankoh was happy
with him and that the talks were going well. The witness then travelled to Balahun and then
Kailahun. After about a month Bockarie summoned the witness to Buedu, saying that
Sankoh had sent a message that the witness should visit him in Lome. The witness went to
Buedu and travelled with Bockarie to Foya, where they were picked up by a helicopter and
taken to Monrovia. ln Monrovia, they were taken back to the guesthouse. Bockarie stated
that he would not go to Lome because he believed he would be arrested, so they waited in
Monrovia until Sankoh arrived.*4*37 At this time Yeaten came to the guesthouse to collect
Bockarie and bring him to the Executive Mansion, and Bockarie met with Taylor. The
witness did not attend this meeting and Bockarie did not tell him what the meeting was
abOur.""38
6252. Dauda Aruna Fornie was a member of the RUF delegation to Lome. Fornie set up a
radio set in Lome so that communication could take place with Sierra Leone. Fornie would
communicate with Sam Bockarie in Buedu and also with a radio operator named Sunlight,
who worked for Benjamin Yeaten in Monrovia. Sankoh also had a telephone; he would tell
Fornie that he had communicated with Taylor on this phone, but did not say what they
discussed.*4*39
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
6253. Witness Dauda Amna Fornie ("DAF"), an RUF radio operator,*4*4O travelled from
Buedu with the AFRC/RUF delegation for the Lome peace talks in April 1999. Fornie went
as a radio operator responsible for keeping Sam Bockarie and the RUF informed of the
*4*46 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12972-12974.
*4*37 TF1—567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12974-12976; Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13026 (PS); Transcript 8 July
2008, pp. 13142-13145.
*4*48 TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13142-13145.
*4*39 TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12976-12977.
*4*44* Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21418.

---- End of Page 2175 ---------------------------


Case No.: SL- - 1- / 1 May 2012

negotiations and to transmit messages from Foday Sankoh to the frontlines.14141 The
delegation was comprised of Mike Lamin, Lawrence Womandia, "Leather Boot", "Alex"
and "Jalloh", "Junior Vandi", Morie Gibba, and "Rashid".14142 Fornie stayed in Lome until
early November 1999.14144
6254. Fomie kept logbooks during the peace negotiations, which he described as
containing messages from Sankoh to Bockarie, Denis Mingo, and other commanders, and
vice versa.14144
6255. VVhen asked whether he remembered anyone from the Liberian delegation to the
Lome negotiations, Fornie testified that he remembered that Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle)
visited the RUF delegation during negotiations, and he saw Taylor and Benjamin Yeaten
during the signing of the Asssra.‘4‘45
6256. Fomie testified that Sankoh was serious about the peace process,14144 and demanded
that the UN deploy military observers to ensure compliance of all parties to the
ceasefire. 14144
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
6257. Witness Moses Blah, Inspector General of the NPF L from 1990 to 1997,14148
Liberian Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000,14149 and
Vice—President of Liberia from 2000 to 2003, 14150testified that in December 1998, as part of
the peace process, Taylor closed the border with Sierra Leone and kept it closed until
October 1999, in order to put pressure on the RUF to begin discussions.14151 Blah also
testified that in May 1998, Taylor was involved in setting up the meetings which eventually
14141 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21615-21616.
14142 Dauda Amna Fomie. Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21615.
14144 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21616, 21623.
14144 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21618; 11 December 2008, p. 22141. See also P-264,
"Radio Log Book - 00008636 - 00008726 (P-264) of communications between Sam Bockarie and Foday
Sankoh during the Lomé peace talks (kept by TF1-274)".
14145 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 1 1 December 2008, p. 22198.
14144 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 11 December 2008, p. 22163.
14147 Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 11 December 2008, p. 22154.
mtg Moses Bran, Transcript is May 2008, pp. 9943-9945.
14144 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884.
14150 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884; Blah became President of Liberia for 60 days from 1 1
August to 1 1 October 2003: Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10065.

---- End of Page 2176 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / , 18 May 2012

led to the Lome agreement and that Taylor worked "extremely hard" to bring the parties
together and secure peace in Sierra Leone.14152
6258. Blah then went with Taylor to Togo to attend the Sierra Leonean peace talks, and
was also sent as Taylor's special envoy to Sierra Leone and other countries, in order to hold
discussions with leaders on the advancement of peace in Sierra Leone.14153 Blah also
confirmed that Dorothy Museleng Cooper, the former Liberian foreign minister, served as
Taylor's envoy to Lome from May to July 1999, when the Lome Accord was signed.14154 On
5 or 6 July, Taylor joined Presidents Obasanjo, Compaore, Kabbah and Eyadema to finalise
the agreement, because Foday Sankoh at the last minute was threatening not to agree with
certain points which had been discussed.14155
The Accused
6259. The Accused testified that upon his election as President of Liberia, he was
appointed to the ECOWAS Committee of Four, which had been dealing with the conflict in
Sierra Leone. The Committee appointed him because he was "an old rebel" who knew how
to deal with rebels, and so they thought he could be of help.14156
6260. ln April 1999, preparations were made for the movement of RUF delegates,
including Foday Sankoh, to Lome for the peace talks. Transportation was being organised
by the UN, but Liberia was involved in terms of giving permission for the flights to come
through Liberia, providing Liberian security personnel to escort the UN to the border to pick
up the AFRC/RUF delegation, and providing internal helicopter flights.l4157 Taylor was kept
abreast of these developments through his foreign minister, Monie Captan, and the Special
Representative to the Secretary General.14l58
""5' Mppap Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10314, 10362-10363.
MS2 Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10314, 10317.
""" Mappa Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 103 12-10313.
Mm Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10314.
MISS Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10314.
'"'" Charles ohapkay Taylor, Transcript 14 Jury 2009, pp. 24431—24432.
my Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, pp. 26500-2650l; Transcript 12 August 2009, p.
26576; Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28351-28352, 28354.
MISS Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28351-28352, 28354.

---- End of Page 2177 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01-T (mh 18 May 2012

6261. The RUF delegation stayed at the RUF guesthouse in Monrovia,l4l59 and he gave the
representatives some money, but did not remember how much.l4l60 The Accused also refutes
TF1-37l's testimony implying that one of Taylor's helicopters took the delegates from
Vahun to Monrovia, saying that "we have produced documents here, reports to the United
Nations by Downes-Thomas" confirming that it was a UN helicopter that brought them iiom
Vahun to Monrovia.l4l6l
6262. The Accused conceded that lbrahim Bah and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) were in
Monrovia before the AFRC/RUF delegation bound for Lome arrived, and that he met with
them at this time.l4l62 The Accused denied, however, that either Tamba or Bah travelled to
Lome at his request.m63 He stated that Jungle was a member of the RUF, and therefore went
to Lomé via Foday Sankoh, and not him.l4164
6263. Starting in April 1999, Liberia had a negotiating group present, including former
foreign minister of Liberia, D Musuleng-Cooper, former general Joe Tuah, and an assistant
to Musuleng-Cooper.m65
6264. The Accused testified that by the end of June and beginning of July, President
Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo told him he was concemed about the progress of the peace
talks, and said that he had already spoken to Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and
Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso. The Presidents agreed to travel to Lomé to apply pressure
to the negotiating parties.l4l66 The Presidents met in Lomé on 5 July, and Sankoh angrily
told them that he would not sign an agreement unless certain issues were resolved.l4l67 The
Presidents met first with President Kabbah, and then with Sankoh. It was also decided that
Obasanjo would manage the Kabbah negotiating side, and the Accused, Eyadema and the
Wig Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29605.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29605.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29607-29608.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29605.
W6} Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29609-29610, 29616; Transcript 14 September
2009, pp. 28740-28743.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29616.
MMS Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26551-26552.
*4*66 Charles Ghankay rayrpr, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26569-26571, 26578.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26571-26572.

---- End of Page 2178 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % GN 18 May 2012

OAU chairman would manage Sankoh. The negotiators circulated amongst the different
groupings trying to extract whatever compromises they could obtain.l4l68
6265. The Accused confirmed that after the Lomé Accords were signed, Sankoh came to
Monrovia on 28 September, on the way to Freetown, and contended that he did so in order
to solve the problem of what was to be done with the SLA who were under the command of
Johnny Paul Koroma before he returned to Sierra Leone. Mm
6266. The Accused testified that his main preoccupations alter he was elected President
were to rebuild Liberia after their seven—year civil war, and to get international assistance to
d0 SO 14170
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6267. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,l4m and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,Mm testified that the British High Commissioner in
Freetown provided GBP 50,000 for Foday Sankoh to travel to Lomé and attend the peace
talks in May 1999. Sam Bockarie, Ibrahim Bah, and Dr Paulo Bangura accompanied him,
and Bah was invited because he was one of Sankoh's best friends.l4m Sesay stated that
while Bah was in Buedu, Bockarie gave him money to take to Sankoh in Lomé.l4l74
6268. Sankoh instructed Bockarie to send an RUF delegation from Sierra Leone to Lome
as well. This delegation was headed by Mike Lamin, and included Rashid Sandy, the general
adjutant, Lawrence Womandia, SYB Rogers, Agnes Kamanda, Idriss Kamara (a.k.a. Leather
Boot), Captain Musa Jalloh, and J unor Vandi.l4l75
6269. Sankoh did not have a radio operator or radio with him when he first went to Lomé,
but when the delegation headed by Lamin arrived, they brought with them Dauda Aruna
Fornie, a radio operator, and a radio set.l4l76 Fornie was the only radio operator with Sankoh
***6** crtutrps ohuurtuy 1*uy16t, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26573—26574.
****9 crtutrps Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26795-26796.
****° chutrps Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, pp. 24454-24455.
***** rssu Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596, aud
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
****’ rssu Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 4435 1-44552.
***** rssu spsuy, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44561-44562.
****5 rssu Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44552-44555.
***** rssu Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44352.

---- End of Page 2179 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QN 18 May 2012

4 O QL? 2
in Lome.l4m Sesay testified that radio operator Memunatu Deen was stationed at the RUF
guesthouse in Monrovia, where she served as the radio operator during the Lome Peace
Accord. Mm Sesay also identified Exhibit P—264 as the radio log book kept by Fornie while A
Sankoh was in Lome.m79
6270. Sesay travelled to Lome the day before the signing, along with Eldred Collins,
Francis Musa, Pa Blue, and Sheku Kumba. They travelled from Foya to Roberts
Intemational Airport, where they joined the Liberian delegation, including Taylor, to travel
to Lome. Taylor did not speak to them and they did not speak to him. The Heads of State
retumed home after it was signed, and Sesay and the others stayed for two more days. They
returned to Sierra Leone the same way they came: from Lome to Monrovia to Buedu.l4l8O
6271. In late November 1999, Sankoh sent Sesay a message instructing him to go to Port
Loko so that he could accompany Sankoh to Kambia. When he overheard this message on
the radio, Bockarie told Sesay that if he went to Port Loko, ECOMOG would arrest him.
Sesay consulted with CO Lawrence, Kallon and Gbao, who told him that since Sankoh was
the leader he should obey Sankoh. When he met Sankoh in Port Loko, Sankoh told him he
would not tolerate anyone sabotaging the peace process. The Lome Accords had tumed
ECOMOG into peacekeepers, and the RUF should disarm under ECOMOG. Mm
Defence Witness DCT—008
6272. Witness DCT—008, a Liberian radio operator,m82 testified that Sunlight met radio
operator Dauda Aruna Fomie at the RUF guesthouse in l999.l4l83 Fomie called Sunlight on
the radio that he had brought with him to Lome, saying that he had been in Togo but was
now in Monrovia. Fomie invited Sunlight to meet him at the guesthouse, and he went there
but only spent about fifteen minutes and then had to get back to work.m84
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44353.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44239-44241.
Mug Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44353-44354.
IMO Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44379—44380, 43594.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44449-44451.
Mm DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 46948-4695l (PS).
mg} DCT~008, Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47477—47480.
Mm DCT-008, Transcript 27 August 2010, p. 47478.

---- End of Page 2180 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
Z

6273. Witness DCT-008 denied that Sunlight received messages from Fomie while Fomie
was in Lome, and denied that Fomie passed along reports of progress at the peace talks.m85
Further, DCT-008 testified that Sunlight did not know that Fomie was at Lome until he
came to Monrovia afterwards and told him.m86
Prosecution Exhibit P-264
6274. Exhibit P-264 is Dauda Aruna Fomie's radio logbook from May 1999, which Fomie
verified was the logbook that he used to record messages while he was in Lome with Foday
Sankoh. Mm When Fomie returned to Freetown after Lomé, he returned to Buedu but left the
logbook in "the Freetown office", which was Sankoh's lodge from which Sankoh was
arrested in May 2000.14188 Several messages in the logbook indicated that Sankoh ordered
AFRC/RUF members to join him in Lome for the peace negotiations. There is no mention of
the Accused in these records.
Prosecution Exhibit P-422
6275. Exhibit P-422 is a copy of the Lome Peace Accords. Part Two indicates that the RUF
will be incorporated into the governance of Sierra Leone, and given the status of a political
party. Part Three provides for absolute and free pardon for Foday Sankoh and other
combatants for actions up to the signing of the agreement.
Defence Exhibits D-193A through K
6276. Exhibits D-193A through K consist of UN documents, including code cables, letters
and memoranda. Exhibit 193-E, an unattributed report, indicates that RUF members Omrie
Golley and Ibrahim Bah were accompanied by UN officials and SSS members from
Monrovia to Sierra Leone on 18 and 19 April in order to consult with RUF leaders inside
Sierra Leone to select delegates to meet Foday Sankoh in Lomé. On this trip Golley
""" Dcr-00s, Transcript 1 September 2010, p. 47662.
""*‘° Dcr-00s, Transcript 1 September 2010, pp. 47662-47663.
Mm Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21618-21819; Transcript 11 December 2008, p.
22141. The log book was also identified as such by Defence Witness Issa Sesay (Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July
2010, pp. 44353-44354). Pornie testified that the book was used at call sign "Vision 1", which indicated it this
was in Lomé, Togo, and that the code names "Lion" and "Smi1e" refer to Sankoh, "Black Jah" refers to Gullit,
"Log" and "Planet" refer to Sam Bockarie, "Gaffa" refers to Gibril Massaqoui", "Equaliser" or "Timing Bomb"
refer to Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman), and "Sparrow" refers to Morris Kallon. Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript
3 December 2008, pp. 21619, 21622; Transcript 11 December 2008, pp. 22142-22144.
14188 Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 11 December 2008, p. 22141.

---- End of Page 2181 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T {LA 18 May 2012

telephoned Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Lansana Kouyate, and stressed to him that
"no one should be allowed to talk to Sankoh, especially the press, before the arrival of the
RUF delegation". Golley also told the author of this report that Taylor had been mistreated
and disrespected by the UN and ECOWAS.
6277. Exhibit D-193A states that the UN requested permission from Liberia for the
delegation to stop in Monrovia en route to Sierra Leone, and Exhibits D—193A through K
indicate that the UN was aware that this stop-over in Monrovia occurred. Exhibits 193D and
F state that Ibrahim Bah and Ornrie Golley travelled from Monrovia to Lomé on 20 April
1999, and Exhibits D-193J and K state that the AF RC/RUF delegation travelled from Sierra
Leone to Lomé with a stop-over in Monrovia in two groups, one that left Monrovia for
Lomé on 24 April 1999, and one that left Monrovia for Lomé on 25 April 1999.
Defence Exhibit D—l95 g
6278. Exhibit D-195 is a joint communiqué from President Obasanjo of Nigeria and the
Accused dated 5 June 1999, describing a visit that the Accused made to Nigeria on 5 June
1999. The two leaders commended ECOWAS’ efforts to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone
and welcome the imposed ceasefire.
Defence Exhibit D—362
6279. Exhibit D-362 is a joint communiqué from President Obasanjo and President Taylor
which describes the Presidents’ welcoming of the peace process in Sierra Leone. They
stressed that no member of ECOWAS should encourage, support or commit an act of
subversion against the government and people of Sierra Leone.
Defence Exhibit D-215
6280. Exhibit D-215 is a letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Susan E Rice, to a "General Yer1·:s",m89 commending the Accused because he "has been
positively engaged in the Sierra Leone peace process". The author states that they
14189 Taylor testified that General Yerks was a retired US army general and a "friend of Liberia", who helped in
getting the international community to provide assistance to Liberia. He denied that General Yerks was hired by
the Government of Liberia. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 1 February 2010, pp. $4538-34544; Transcript 2
February 2010, pp. 34547—34550; Transcript 18 February 2010, pp. 35332—35336.

---- End of Page 2182 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / dl:) 18 May 2012

"especially hope" that Tayor will continue to encourage Foday Sankoh to retum to Freetown
to implement the peace process, which was essential for the Lomé Accord to succeed.
Defence Exhibit D-223
6281. Exhibit D-223 is a letter to President Taylor from Madeleine Albright141411 dated 13
October 1999, thanking Taylor for his critical role in supporting the peace process in Sierra
Leone. The letter states that his "work in promoting dialogue among key players and
persuading the rebel leaders to retum to Freetown" was "an important contribution to the
implementation of the Lomé Accord".
Defence Exhibit D-251
6282. Exhibit D-251 is a letter from Bismarck Myrick, the US Ambassador to Liberia, to
the Accused, thanking him for receiving and speaking with the Reverend Jesse Jackson.
Myrick praised Taylor's efforts to secure the release of UN personnel held by the RUF.
Deliberations
6283. The Prosecution puts forth several discrete allegations conceming the role of the
Accused in the negotiations at Lomé, several of which are conceded to by the Defence or
undisputed. The parties do not dispute that the Accused assisted in transporting Foday
Sankoh and others, including Omrie Golley and Ibrahim Bah, to Lomé and provided them
with accommodation in Monrovia en route to the negotiations.14191 The Accused also
conceded to having met with Golley and Bah in Liberia before they travelled to Lomé.14142
He conceded to placing a negotiating team, led by his former Foreign Minister D Musuleng
Cooper, in Lomé in April 1999 and to receiving daily updates on the negotiations from
them.14143 Finally, the parties do not dispute that the Accused attended the negotiations and
141411 Exhibit D-233, "Letter to Jonathan C. Taylor, Minister of State/Chief of Staff Executive Mansion,
Monrovia, Liberia, Transmitting a Press Release from the United States Embassy, Monrovia, Liberia, New Years
Remarks from United States Ambassador, Bismarck Myrick".
14141 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 195, 370; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 94, 571, 1011-1014, 1017.
[See Operational Support: Provision of RUF Guesthouse in Monrovia]. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding
that Ibrahim Bah served as a liaison between the RUF and the Accused, but had no permanent affiliation with
either the RUF or the Accused. See The Role of Interrnediaries: Ibrahim Bah.
14142 Defence Final Trial Brief para. 571.
14143 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26551-26552. The Prosecution further relies on
the testimony of Witness TF1-567 to support the allegation that Dauda Aruna Fornie, Sankoh's radio operator in
Lomé, communicated with Sunlight, in Monrovia, in order to update the Accused on the negotiations. TF 1-567,
Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12976-12977. This was refuted by Dauda Aruna Fornie, who, when asked with

---- End of Page 2183 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (hx 18 May 2012

met with Sankoh, and that as a result of the Lomé Accord, Sankoh was given control over
the natural resources of Sierra Leone.14194 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the
Accused provided $USD 20,000 to Sankoh during the Lomé negotiations for Sankoh's
personal use,14195 and the Accused's concession that he provided a small amount of money
to each of the AF RC/RUF delegates when they stopped in Monrovia.14196
6284. In this context, the Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided all of the above
assistance so that he could instruct Sankoh and the AF RC/RUF delegation to protect their
shared interests in "pillaging the resources of Sierra Leone", and "controlling the territory
and people of Sierra Leone".14197 The Accused's assistance to the RUF in furthering the
peace negotiations, however, does not per se prove that he provided this assistance in order
to continue his and the RUF 's control over Sierra Leone. The Prosecution cites the fact that
the Lomé Accords resulted in Sankoh maintaining control over diamond production in
Sierra Leone, an outcome that was mutually beneficial to both the AFRC/RUF and the
Accused. The evidence shows, however, that the Lomé Accord was agreed to by both parties
after negotiations involving ECOWAS partners other than the Accused. The Prosecution has
proffered evidence establishing that the Accused was actively involved in the negotiations
but not that he dictated the outcome of the negotiations.
6285. The Prosecution contends that the Accused had some control over the AFRC/RUF
delegation, but the Trial Chamber notes that several witnesses testified that it was Sam
Bockarie, upon the instructions of Sankoh, who selected the AFRC/RUF delegation that
would travel to Lomé. None of the witnesses mentioned the Accused as influencing this
decision.14198 The evidence that Golley directed that "no one should be allowed to talk to
whom he communicated from Lomé did not mention the Accused. Dauda Amna Fornie, Transcript 2 December
2008, pp. 21615-21616; Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21618; Transcript 11 December 2008, p. 22141.
Witness DCT-008 testified that Sunlight never received messages from Fornie in Lomé. DCT-008, Transcript 1
September 2010, p. 47662.
11194 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 197-198; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 95, 571, 575-576. See also
Exhibit P-422 "Excerpts from: Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lomé Accord, 7 July 1999".
14195 See Operational Support: Support and Training, Financial Support.
111% Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, p. 29605. See also TF1-371, Transcript 28 January
2008, p. 2436 (CS) (Taylor gave each delegate $USD 300 in Monrovia before they travelled to Lomé).
11197 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 191-192.
11198 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2441 (CS); TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, pp. 12929-12930;
Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13124-13128; Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44352-44353. See also
Exhibit P-264, "Radio Log Book,, 00008636 - 00008726 (P-264) of communications between Sam Bockarie
and Foday Sankoh during the Lomé peace talks (kept by TF1-274)" (describing radio messages in which Sankoh

---- End of Page 2184 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / dhs 18 May 2012

Sankoh, especially the press, before the arrival of the RUF delegation"l4l99 is cited by the
Prosecution, but the Trial Chamber notes that TFl-567 identified Golley as a spokesperson
for the RUF. WOO The evidence does not establish that his instruction was in any way related
to the Accused. Similarly, the fact that the Accused had a team of his own in Lomé does not
support the allegations of the Prosecution absent evidence of any particular improper actions
taken by the team.
6286. The Defence contends that the Accused's involvement in the Lomé negotiations was
in accordance with the mandate given him by ECOWAS, and was at all times transparent
and above-board. The Defence has presented significant evidence to support this
proposition. Prosecution and Defence witness testimony, as well as the contemporaneous
documents provided by the Defence, demonstrate that UN officials were aware of the
Accused's involvement in the transport of RUF officials through Monrovia to Sierra
Leone.l42Ol Further, there is significant evidence that, as the Defence contends, several other
world leaders were equally involved in furthering the Lome Accords}4202 Finally, although
the Accused concedes to having met with Sankoh without other Heads of State present at
Lome,l4203 he also describes a fast-paced negotiation process by which the ECOWAS
members circulated among the negotiating parties, and sometimes spoke to each party
orders members of the RUF to meet him in Lome, with no mention of Taylor); Exhibit D-193E, "UN Report on
the Visit to the Liberia~Sierra Leone Border, 20 April 1999, DCT 90" (UN report stating that Omrie Golley and
Ibrahim Bah were taken by the UN to Sierra Leone to consult with RUF leaders on the selection of delegates to
meet Sankoh in Lomé).
""""’ Defence Exhibit D-19312.
"‘2"° rrr-567, riaiieepipt 4 Jiiiy 2008, pp. 12970-12972.
14201 TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2436 (CS); TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12965-12966;
Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13128-13129, 13144; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, pp.
26500-26501; Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26576; Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28351-28352, 28354;
Defence Exhibits D-193A-K (UN documents concerning RUF/AFRC transport to Lomé in 1999). Prosecution
Witness TF1-371 is the only witness to testify that the helicopter bringing the delegation from Vahun to
Monrovia was provided by Joe Tuah, a member of Taylor's security team, TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008
_ p. 2434 (CS), but this evidence is contradicted by the significant evidence cited above.
14202 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2436-2437 (CS) (testifying that the RUF/AFRC delegation was
met at the airport in Lome by the Foreign Minister of Togo, who took them to their hotel); Moses Blah,
Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10314 (testifying that on 5 or 6 July, Taylor joined several African leaders in Lomé
in order to finalise the peace agreement); Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44351—44352 (testifying that
the British High Commissioner in Freetown provided funds for Foday Sankoh to travel to Lomé). See also D-
195, "Joint Corninuniqueissued by President Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Charles Taylor of Liberia,
Abuja, 5 June 1999, DCT 193" and D-362 "Joint Communique following the visit of President Obasanjo to
Liberia, dated 25 June 1999".
14203 The Prosecution bases their allegation that Taylor met with Sankoh outside the presence of other African
leaders on Taylor's testimony that "Sankoh comes ~ in fact, Blaise Compaore visits me. I visit him. Sankoh
comes to visit me and you see Senator Keikura here. [W]e just put our best minds to work circulating amongst
the different groupings and trying to extract whatever little compromise we could get along the way". Charles
r""`

---- End of Page 2185 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

separately.l42O4 The Trial Chamber accepts this description of the negotiation process as
credible. Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that Moses Blah testified that the Accused
closed the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone from December 1998 to October 1999,
in order to pressure the RUF to start peace negotiations. mm
6287. The praise of world leaders of the Accused's involvement in peace negotiations
nothwithstanding,l`m6 the Trial Chamber notes that his involvement in furthering the peace
process at Lomé, which is established by the evidence, is not dispositive as to whether he
was simultaneously assisting the AFRC/RUF in furtherance of criminal activities.
6288. The Prosecution relies on TFl-567 to support its contention that while publicly
supporting the peace process, the Accused was providing instruction to the AFRC/RUF to
maintain control of Sierra Leone through other means. TF1-567 testified that before the
AFRC/RUF delegation travelled to Lomé, he saw Joseph Marzah and Mike Lama with
ammunition that they said was from Taylor. The men told TF1-567 that Taylor stated "when
it was time for peace he should prepare for war".l4207 The Trial Chamber notes, however,
that TF1-567 did not hear this statement from the Accused first-hand, but rather leamed of it
second-hand from either Marzah or Lama. The Trial Chamber notes that it has found that
Marzah's testimony must be treated with caution and requires corroboration.l42O8 Moreover,
Marzah himself did not testify to relaying this statement to TF1-567. The Trial Chamber
notes that several other witnesses testified that Foday Sankoh made precisely the same
statement either during the Abidjan or the Lomé peace negotiations.l42O9 For these reasons
the Trial Chamber cannot be sure that the Accused made the statement attributed to him
indirectly by TF 1 -567.
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26573-26575.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26573-26574.
Mm Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, pp. 10314, 10362-10363,
M206 See Exhibit D-215, "Letter to General Yerks, from Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, D.C., 8 September 1999, DCT 215"; Exhibit D-251, "Letter to the
President of Liberia, Charles Taylor from Bismarck Myrick, Ambassador, Embassy of the United States of
America, Monrovia , Liberia, 23 May 2000".
"*2"’ rrr-567, Transcript 4 Jury 2008, pp. 12965-12966.
Mm Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-268.
moo For example, Karmoh Kanneh testified to having heard Sarikoh say to his men during a public gathering
after signing the Abidjan Peace Accord that "during times of peace, those are times that we should prepare for
war". Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9354-9355. Perry Kamara testified that the moment Sankoh
"went for peace" he told them that "in times of peace we should prepare for war". Perry Kamara, Transcript 6
February 2008, pp. 3262-3263. Finally, TF 1-168 testified that during the Abidjan peace negotiations, Sankoh

---- End of Page 2186 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % A3 18 May 2012

6289. The Trial Chamber recalls, however, that several other Prosecution witnesses
corroborate TFl—567's account that Taylor provided ammunition to the RUF at this time.
The Trial Chamber notes the substantial evidence in the record that the Accused was
engaged in arms transactions at the same time that he was involved in the peace negotiations
in Lome.l42 10 This evidence indicates that the Accused was helping the RUF further
preparations for war at the same time as he was helping them in the peace process. For this
reason, the Trial Chamber Ends that while the Accused did not provide subversive assistance
to the RUF within the context of the peace negotiations in Lomé, he did at the same time
provide other assistance to the RUF outside the peace process that would promote the
continuation of war.
Findings
6290. The Trial Chamber Hnds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused improperly provided assistance and advice to the AFRC/RUF before
and during the Lome negotiations so as to facilitate an outcome most favourable to the
AFRC/RUF and himself
6291. The Trial Chamber iinds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that while publicly promoting peaceat the Lome negotiations, the Accused was privately
providing arms and ammunition to the RUF.
4. Release of UN Peacekeepers g 1999;
Submissions of the Parties
6292. lt is undisputed that in August 1999, the West Side Boys kidnapped UN military
observers, ECOMOG soldiers, aid workers and journalists and stated that they would not
release them until they could account for their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma.l42ll The parties
agree that the Accused was involved in the negotiations for the release of these hostages, but
disagree as to the motive for his involvement.
was trying to obtain arms and he "used to tell us that in time of peace you prepare for war". TF1—168, Transcript
22 January 2009, p. 23288 (CS).
mm See Arm and Ammunition.
mu Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 200-202; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 640.

---- End of Page 2187 ---------------------------


Case No.%/‘/ gm 18 May201"

6293. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused facilitated the release of the hostages in
order to keep the AFRC/RUF alliance strong. ln addition, this incident indicates that the
leaders of both groups yielded to the Accused.l42l2 More specifically, the Prosecution alleges
that the Accused secured the movement of Johnny Paul Koroma from Sierra Leone to
Monrovia by telling Bockarie to release Koroma. At a meeting with Koroma in Monrovia,
the Accused informed him that he did not want division between the RUF and the
AFRC 14213
6294. The Prosecution submits that Koroma instructed a delegation of West Side Boys to
meet him in Monrovia, and met with them after his initial meeting with the Accused.l42l4
Koroma then brought members of the West Side Boys to meet with the Accused, where the
Accused explained that he did not want trouble between the two groups.l42l5 The Accused
explained that they should be focused on ensuring that the AFRC/RUF obtained power in
Sierra Leone.l42l6 Foday Sankoh travelled to Monrovia after the signing of the Lome Peace
Accord, and the Accused facilitated meetings between himself, Sankoh and Koroma.l42l7 At
these meetings, they discussed how they would work together.l42l8 The Prosecution relies on
the testimony of the Accused, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, TF1-367, and TF1-567.14219
6295. The Defence counters that the Accused conducted these negotiations under the
auspices of his ECOWOG mandate.l422O After the hostages were taken, the Defence
contends, the Accused spoke with Foday Sankoh, who was in Togo, and Presidents
Obasanjo and Kabbah. The Accused requested to speak to the UN Secretary-General to ask
that the travel ban imposed on Johnny Paul Koroma be lifted, and the Secretary-General
agreed.l422l The Defence claims that Koroma arrived for the negotiations in August 1999,
and the Accused informed Downes-Thomas of this fact, and requested that it be conveyed to
the Secretary-General}4222 Koroma had meetings with the Liberian government, and then
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 200—202.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 200.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 200.
MI5 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 201.
MM Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 201.
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 202.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 202.
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 200-202.
{mo Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 640—646.
{ml Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 641.
**222 Defence rmi rmi Brief, pm. 643.

---- End of Page 2188 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T L/{ 18 May 2012

the Liberian government contacted other leaders. The Accused tried to reassure Koroma that
the term "RUF" was intended to include the AF RC. M223
6296. The UN and Sierra Leonean officials transported a West Side Boys delegation to
Liberia to meet Koroma, the Defence contends that the Accused did not meet the delegation.
Arrangements were then made to release the hostages}4224 Sankoh arrived in Monrovia on
28 September 1999 to speak with Koroma, and the Accused mediated talks between
them}4225 The Accused met with each side separately before meeting with them together,
and the results of these discussions were transmitted to ECOWAS}4226 A press conference
occurred following these talks, and Sarrkoh and Koroma left Monrovia for Freetown
together. my
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
6297. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC memberlfmg and officer,l4229 testified
that in approximately May 1999, he and other combatants loyal to Johnny Paul Koroma
became known as the "West Side Boys".l423O In July or August 1999, he and other members
of the West Side Boys planned an operation to capture UNAMSIL and ECOMOG officials
because, Sesay testified, the AFRC was "complete1y out of the Lomé Accord" and by doing
so "they will be made to recognise us". 14231 Once the hostages were captured they, as well as
a journalist Christo Johnson who was also captured, were taken to Gberibana to where
Ibrahim Karama (a.k.a. Bazzy)l4232 their commander, was located}4233
6298. The witness was present when Christo Johnson was taken in front of Bazzy, and
Johnson asked Bazzy why he and the soldiers were captured. Bazzy stated that they were not
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief para. 645.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief; para. 646.
M25 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 646, 652—656.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 654.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief paras 653—656.
Mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7859-7867, 7869; 28 April 2008, pp. 8684, 8689.
Mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865—7866.
mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8447—8460. See also Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8653—8658.
'*"' Arrmamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 Appr 2008, pp. 8477—8488.
Mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, p. 8489 (naming Bazzy as Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara).

---- End of Page 2189 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T Ok 18 May 2012


included in the Lomé Accord, and they believed that their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, was
under arrest in Kailahun. Bazzy stated that they wanted Koroma to be released, and the West
Side Boys to be reinstated in the national army.l4234
6299. Johnson convinced Bazzy to release him so that he could state their demands to the
international media; Johnson was then released, and made statements to the BBC and
VOA.l4235 The witness was present when Bockarie then called the radio set at their camp,
and said he had heard the news and ordered Bazzy to release the hostages. Bazzy responded
that the only way the hostages would be released was if he could speak to Koroma and
confirm that he was not under arrest.l4236 -
6300. Later, while the witness was still present, Koroma called on the radio to Bazzy, and
stated that was "annoyed" with Bazzy and he should immediately release the UNAMSIL
and ECOMOG hostages.l4237 Bazzy said that "it was only today that I have heard your
voice", but that he would not release them until he saw Koroma face to face.l4238
6301. Koroma hun u and then called back the same day, tellin Bazzy that they were
g P g
informed that President Taylor would send a helicopter to pick him up, with a delegation of
West Side Boys chosen by Bazzy, from Kailahun, through Freetown, to meet Koroma in
Liberia to discus the issue.l4239 Before they left, they were assured that they would not be
arrested in their travels. M40
6302. Bazzy appointed a delegation of ll members — Bazzy, Hassan Papa Bangura (a.k.a.
Bomb Blast), George Johnson (a.k.a. Junior Lion), "Major Gbonkelenkeh", Junior Jones,
"Tiger", Bob Lahai (a.k.a. Captain Blood), "Humpar", "Hussein", Issa Mansaray, and the
witness, Bobson Sesay, who were taken by ldrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Leather Boot) to
Freetown.l424l In Kailahun they were escorted to Freetown by ldrissa Kamara, Chief
Security Officer to Foday Sankoh, who said that Sankoh sent him, and
*423* Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, p. 8481.
M234 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 848l-8484.
Mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 8482-8483.
Mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 8482-8484.
my Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 8486-8487.
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 8486-8487.
Img Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript l7 April 2008, pp. 8486-8488; Transcript 25 April 2008, p. 858 l.
M40 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008 pp. 8579-8580.
Mw Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8489-8490, 8494.

---- End of Page 2190 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T LZ l8 May 20l2

UNAMSIL/ECOMOG officers.44242 The delegation stayed for two days at a hotel when
ECOMOG officers, including Maxwell Khobe and Chief Kpamber, came and met them.
They were picked up and taken to Aberdeen airfield, in Freetown, where a helicopter flew
them to Lungi airport, and they boarded a plane to Liberia.44243 The delegation was met by
special bodyguards to Taylor, and taken to the Boulevard Hotel in Monrovia where they met
Momoh Gibba, aide-de-camp to Taylor.44244 Gibba stated that they could have whatever they
wanted at the hotel, excepting alcohol, and that they should rest but he would be in touch
later and they could go see Johnny Paul Koroma.44245
6303. The next day the delegation, including the witness, was picked up by two cars sent
by Gibba, with the license plates "Guest l" and "Guest 2", and taken to see Koroma where
he was staying.44246 The place where Koroma was staying was fortified, and the witness saw
that guards were with Koroma, whom Koroma said were ATU, or members of Taylor's
Anti-Terrorist Unit. 44247
6304. Bazzy explained to Koroma that they had been leit out of the Lome Accord and
Koroma had not been given an appointment, and that was the reason they captured the
hostages. They had come to find a solution to these issues, and to be reinstated into the
army.44248 Koroma said that they should talk quietly because there were "RUF boys"
atrollin , but said lainl that he had no control over "the men", and this is wh he could
P 8 P Y Y
not talk to them, but that he was happy that they did this.44249
6305. Koroma told Bazzy to choose a few men to go with him to meet Taylor because
Taylor was "concerned", about the division between the RUF and the AF RC and "wanted to
actually know about this issue so that we will be able to solve it".4425O Taylor had airliited
Koroma to Monrovia so that issues could be resolved, but Koroma felt pressure alter the
ECOMOG officials were captured. For this reason, Bazzy was brought to Monrovia, so and
44242 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8489-8490.
44243 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8489-8491.
44244 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8490, 8494-8496; Transcript 25 April 2008, p. 8580.
**245 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8496.
‘""° Aumamy Bobson Sesay, Trar1script 24 April 2008, pp. 8497-8498.
44247 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Trar1script 24 April 2008, pp. 8499, 8502.
‘42"" Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8498-8499.
44449 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8500-8501.
44250 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8500-8501, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8581-
8582. _

---- End of Page 2191 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

they could "push the Lome Accord and come together".14251 He said Taylor did not want
division because "it is not at the end, when they declared peace that this person will be
sa in this, and that one will be sa in that". Taylor wanted them to resolve their issues
Y 8 Y 8 Y
once and for all.14252 Koroma agreed that he had not been given an appointment in the
government, but believed he would be given the chairmanship for the Consolidation of
Peace, which he preferred because then he could coordinate the peace in Freetown.14253
6306. The delegation returned to the hotel, where Bazzy appointed himself, the witness,
Junior Lion, Bomb Blast and Major Gbonkelenkeh to meet with Taylor. After one or two
da s, the drove to meet Taylor at Taylor's office.14254 Taylor stated that he had been `vin
Y Y Y Y Y gl 8
assistance to the AFRC/RUF, b mobilisin the SLAs and sendin them to fi t, so that the
Y 8 8 Y
could remove the Kabbah government. He said that he was not happy that there was a
division between the RUF and the AFRC, and if they continued this division then "the
politicians will use you", and "you will find yourselves in prison".14255 Their main focus,
Taylor said, should be to fight for the Presidency, and make sure that they were in the seat of
power, and so they must come together to resolve their issues.14256
6307. Taylor said that Foday Sankoh was en route to Liberia from Togo, and he would like
them to meet so that they could go to Freetown together. Koroma explained to Taylor why
the West Side Boys had captured the hostages, and the meeting was then at an end. Taylor
took SSUSD 15,000 and gave it to Koroma so he could give it to the delegation, so that they
could "refresh [themselves] and buy things in Monrovia".14257
6308. Upon cross—examination, when asked by the Defence whether Taylor brought the
two parties together to facilitate peace, Bobson Sesay responded that Taylor did so because
"he was the immediate person that had direct influence on the AF RC and the RUF714258
Prosecution Witness Sam Kargbo
14251 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8502.
14252 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8503-8504.
14253 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8501.
14254 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8503, 8578.
"255 Aiimsmy Bpbspp sassy, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8504-8506, 8509-8511.
14254 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8504-8506, 8509.
14257 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8505-8506; Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8582,
8585-8587.
14254 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, p. 8596.

---- End of Page 2192 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {115 18 May 2012

6309. Witness Sam Kargb0, an AFRC Supreme C0uncil member,l4259 testiiied that on 7
August 1999 he travelled to Buedu, but when he approached, an RUF girl told him not to g0
down where Sam Bockarie was because there was a problem there "between the SLAs and
RUFs".l42°O He parked and as he walked down he saw a white Land Cruiser with a radi0 set
in it, and saw M01ris Kallon, Issa Sesay and other SLA c0lleagues standing there, and their
faces were m0rose.l426l When Kallon saw Kargb0 coming he said "Ha, brigade, come and
see what y0ur man have done again", and "Those y0ur [sic] men at the West Side do have
problems". He said that they had arrested the UNOMSIL at West Side, saying that the
AF RC was not included in the Accord, and they wanted J01mny Paul Koroma to be free.l4262
Kallon asked Kargb0 to speak with them because he had been with them for a long time. M263
6310. The witness called the West Side Boys on the radi0 at the call sign Brav0 33, and
started talking to Ibrahim Bazzy, who then put him on the phone with his "brother,
Tit0".l4264 Tit0 asked if Koroma was there, to which Kargb0 responded that Koroma was
there, and even he himself was a deputy brigade commander there, and tried to get him to
calm down. Once Kargb0 g0t off the phone, one of Issa Sesay's radi0 men said that someone
was calling him on the satellite phone. Sesay sp0ke to this person on the satellite phone, and
Kargb0 heard Sesay say "yes sir" repeatedly.l4265 Sesay told the witness and the others that
Taylor told them to take the satellite phone and the radi0 set to Koroma in Kangama where
he was under house arrest, and they did so. \Vhen they g0t to Kangama, the phone rang and
Sesay answered "yes sir" and "n0 problem", and then gave the phone to Koroma, who also
said "yes sir" and "n0 problem", and gave the receiver back to Sesay}4266 They called the
West Side Boys at call sign Brav0 33, and Koroma sp0ke to Bazzy, their connnander, telling
them to calm down, and that everything would be iine.l4267 Bazzy said that he would not
{4259 Samuel Kargbc, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10439, 10448, 10450; Exhibit P—058, "Excerpts frcm the
Sierra l.eone Gazette No. 52, 4 September 1997, 00007703 - 00007704", ERN 7703-7704.
[4260 Sam Kargbc, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10565-10566.
Mm Sam Kargbc, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10565-10566.
[4262 Sam Kargbc, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10567. See also Sam Kargbc, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10822-
10823.
[4263 Sam Kargbc, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10567.
[4264 Sam Kargbc, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10567-10568.
***265 sam Kargbo, crmsmpt 22 May 2002;, p. 10568.
Mm Sam Kargbc, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10568-10569. See also Sam Kargbc, Transcript 3 June 2008, p.
10821 (testifying that Kcrcma was "under house arrest" at this time).
[4267 Sam Kargbc, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10568-10569.

---- End of Page 2193 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T J 18 May 2012

release the hostages unless they could meet with him, and Koroma tried to negotiate with
them, but failed and got off the phone. *4242
6311. The satellite phone rang again, and Sesay handed it to Koroma, and he spoke on it
again. When the phone rang again Koroma said "No problem, we will go", and put down the
receiver. 14264 Koroma then told the witness and the others that Taylor told him and the other
"supreme members" to go to Liberia. 14270 The witness and the others drove to Foya, where a
helicopter came with Sam Bockarie, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and SSS security men
inside.14271 Bockarie said that Taylor instructed only four people to travel to Monrovia with
Koroma, and Koroma appointed the witness, Jumu Jalloh, and Brima Kamara (a.k.a. Cobra)
to go 14272
6312. They arrived in Monrovia and were taken to the RUF guesthouse, where they would
stay from August until approximately mid-September.14273 About one week after they
arrived the West Side Boys came to Monrovia, and the witness and others went and received
them at the airport.14274 The West Side Boys brought their position statement to Koroma and
said they would like Taylor to see it.14275 A man named "50" or "Short Man", whom the
SSS said was a close aide to Taylor, said he would tell Taylor that they had come. He came
the next day to say that a meeting with Taylor was scheduled for the day after. *4226 The next
day Koroma, the witness, Brima Kamara and Jumu Jalloh were driven to see Taylor, and the
West Side Boys were taken in another car. *4222 Ibrahim Bazzy Kamarah presented the
position statement to Taylor, and thereafter Taylor started talking, giving ‘"words of
encouragement that we should all see each other as one and that the accord was in our
favour".14278 Kargbo testified that Taylor said many things in the meeting, all of which he
could not remember. *4222 Taylor then took two envelopes out of a briefcase, and gave one to
*4264 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10568-10569.
*4242 sam Kargbo, rrannpnpt 22 May 2008, pp. 10569~10570.
*422*2 sam Kargbo, rrannpnpt 22 May 2008, pp. 10569-10571.
*422* sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10569—10570.
14272 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10570.
*4222 Sam Kargbo, rranspnpt 22 May 2008, p. 10573.
*4224 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10575.
*4222 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10575.
*4226 sam Kargbo, rranspnpt 22 May 2008, pp. 10575—10577.
*4222 sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10577—10578.
*422* sam Kargbo, rranapnpt 22 May 2008, p. 10579; rrannanpt 3 June 2008, p. 10826.
*4222 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, p. 10579.

---- End of Page 2194 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0 1-T J {T1; 18 May 2012

Koroma and one to Bazzy, and said that this was for the witness and the others}4280 Once
they returned to the hotel, they asked Bazzy how much was in the envelope and he said it
was $USD 5,000 that Taylor said should be shared amongst them.l428l The witness received
approximately $USD 700.14282
6313. After this meeting the West Side Boys stayed there a short time, less than a week,
and then Koroma told them to return to Freetown. Koroma continued to speak to the West
Side Boys over the radio, and the hostages were released.l4283 During this time, a UN
representative, Francis Okelo, met with Koroma and said that his combatants would be
reinstated in the Sierra Leonean Arniy.l4284 The witness stayed with Koroma for about two
or three weeks, until he flew to Koroma's men to relay to them the fact that they would be
reinstated in the ar1ny.l4285 Kargbo was not present in Monrovia for the talks between
Koroma and Sankoh}4286
Prosecution Witness TF1-3 67
6314. Witness TF1-367, an RUF member}4287 testified that at the end of 1998, "people told
him" that Issa Sesay had "molested" Johnny Paul Koroma in Buedu by taking away his
diamonds. The witness heard from Sam Bockarie that Charles Taylor heard about this
episode, and called Koroma and his wife to move to Monrovia. Bockarie "released"
Koroma, who with his wife and bodyguards travelled to Monrovia, and did not return to
Sierra Leone until after the Lomé Accords}4288
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
6315. Witness TF1-567, an RUF memberfmgtestified that while Sam Bockarie was in
Monrovia waiting for Foday Sankoh to finish with the Lomé Accord, Sankoh told Bockarie
to send a message to Johnny Paul Koroma asking him to meet Sankoh in Monrovia before
[4280 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10579-10580.
**2*** sarrr Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10579-10580.
[4282 Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10579-10580.
**2**3 sarrr Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 105780-10581.
"‘"" sarrr Kargbo, Transcript 3 June 2008, pp. 10824-10825.
Img Sam Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 105780-10581; Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10825.
**2**6 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10593-10594.
*42**7 TF1-367, Transcript 20 August 2008, p. 14158.
"‘2"*‘ TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14298-14300.
[mg TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986-12988 (PS).

---- End of Page 2195 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T gif 18 May 2012

going on to Frootown.14291) Sankoh said that boforo ho rotumod from tho Lomé Accord, ho
wantod to moot with Koroma in Monrovia, so thoy could moot with Taylor boforo rotuming
to Frootown.14291 Bockario sont tho mossago to Koroma, who in tum camo to Monrovia with
"somo of his boys from Frootown", and thoy woro all lodgod at tho Hotol Boulovard, and
guardod by Liborian socurity.14292 Tho witnoss statod that ho not prosont at tho mooting
botwoon Sankoh, Koroma and Taylor, and so did not know its purposo.14293 Tho witnoss saw
J oo Tuah givo a parcol to Koroma, which Koroma said was sont to him by Taylor. Koroma
said that tho parcol containod $USD 15,000, to "tako caro of him and his family".14294
Tho Accusod
6316. Tho Accusod tostiiiod that following tho Lomé Accords, tho Hoads of Stato had to
docido how to got Foday Sankoh, who was now a froo man, back to Frootown and not back
to "tho bush". Thoro was an agroomont that ho would rotum through Liboria, but not by road,
bocauso ho would ond up in his controllod aroa and "God knows" what would happon aftor
that·1429s
6317. 1-lowovor, thoro was ono moro concorn, tho Accusod tostitiod, and that was that tho
AFRC did not fool that thoy had boon a part of tho Lomé Agroomont. ln lato July or oarly ·
August, a group callod tho Wost Sido Boys, who had takon a position in Okra Hills, Siorra
Loono, wantod to spoak to Johnny Paul Koroma and ask him why ho was not involvod in tho
Lomé nogotiations, but noithor tho Accusod, nor tho othor Hoads of Stato, know whoro
Koroma was.14296 Thoso Wost Sido Boys thon arrostod UN officials and joumalists and said
that thoy would not roloaso thom until thoy could spoak to and account for Koroma.14297
14290 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12979. Soo also TFl-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13166-
13168.
**22* TFl-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13166-13168.
*4222 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12979. Soo also TFl—567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13166-
13170.
**222 TF1-567, Transcript s Jniy 2008, pp. 13166-13169.
14294 TFl-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12979. Soo also TFl-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13166-
13168.
**2*22 Charlos onaniray Taylor, Transcript 12 Angnst 2009, pp. 26666-26668.
142% Charlcs Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26668.
14297 Charlos Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26668, 26676.

---- End of Page 2196 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T r 18 May 2012

6318. The Heads of State begin exchanging messages and the Accused testified that he was
"told again to get in high gear". M298 They began the process of getting the hostages released,
and President Kabbah and Sankoh was involved every step of the way}4299 The Accused
also spoke with President Eyadema. N300
6319. During the process of negotiating these issues, RUF members staying at the RUF
guesthouse in Monrovia informed the Accused that Koroma was being held in a different
location by the RUF.l43Ol The Accused testified that there had been problems between the
RUF and the AFRC for months prior to this, and there was "no love" between these
organisations}4302 He spoke to both Sankoh and Bockarie to convince them to release
Koroma}4303 The Accused said that "we" told the RUF that they had a peace agreement, and
keeping Koroma detained was not helpful to the process, and so they consented to release
him}4304 He also asked Bockarie to take the telephone to Koroma so that he could speak
with him, and spoke to Koroma}4305
6320. After they worked out the details, they decided to remove Johnny Paul Koroma from
Sierra Leone and bring him to Liberia, and the West Side Boys would release the hostages.
The problem remained that Koroma was on a travel ban, and so the Accused called the
Secretary-General, President Kabbah, Sankoh and "everybody else", and received approval
for Koroma to travel to Liberia. l430° The Accused contended that all the movements,
communications and agreements concerning these negotiations were "above board", and
open to the UN and the other Heads of State. mm
6321. Koroma arrived in Monrovia on 7 August 1999, and the Accused provided him
accommodation at a hotel, and with a long-range radio, so he could communicate directly
14298 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26669.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26669, 26671. See also Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25436-25437.
N300 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26669.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l2 August 2009, p. 26672; Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30845.
14302 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26676.
14303 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28652-28654; Transcript 2 November 2009,
pp. 30844-30845.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26675-26676.
11305 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30845-30846; Transcript 26 November 2009,
pp. 32586-32587.
143% Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l2 August 2009, pp. 26669-26670, 26673-26674.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l2 August 2009, pp. 26673, 26677; Transcript 30 September 2009, pp.
30019-30020, 30024-30025; Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31651-31652.

---- End of Page 2197 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

with the West Side Boys and give them instructions.]4m Koroma was not housed in the
guesthouse because the RUF members were there, and Koroma was angry at being held
against his will by the RUF.]43U9 The Accused assured Koroma that the use of the term
"RUF" in the Lome Accords included the AFRC, but said that the Accords were not going
to be re-written to include the AFRC}43 10 The first thing Koroma asked for was to see a
delegation of the West Side Boys, and so the Accused communicated with the UN and
President Kabbah to arrange for them to travel to Monroviam H The West Side Boys were
brought to Monrovia by either the UN or someone from President Kabbah's office, and met
with Koroma in Monrovia.]43l2 The Accused testified that he did not meet with the West
Side Boys at this time, because his "business was with their leader", Koromam 13 The West
Side Boys met with Koroma and approximately two or three weeks later, the hostages were
released. M3 14
6322. Koroma wanted to meet Sankoh in Lome to air his grievances against Sankoh, but
the Accused convinced him to stay in Monrovia, where Sankoh would travel on his return to
Freetown from the Accords.]43 15 Sankoh arrived in Monrovia on 28 September 1999, and the
Govemment of Liberia created a full itinerary of activities while Sankoh was there,
including the Accused having meetings with each leader separately, and then a meeting with
them together.]43 16 There was a press briefing on Friday 1 October. President Obasanjo sent
$USD 25,000 to the Accused for the two men, and they left Monrovia on a Nigerian
plane- 14317
Mm Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26678-26679; Transcript 13 August 2009, pp.
26723-26724; Transcript 16 November 2009, pp. 31651-31652.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26678-26679; Transcript 13 August 2009, p.
26724; Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 30010-30011.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26680-26681; Transcript 26 November 2009, p.
32600.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26725-26726; Transcript 2 November 2009, pp.
30851-30852.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26725-26726.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, p. 26726.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26726-26727.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26682-26685.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26685; Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26771-
26772, 26796-26799; Transcript 26 November 2009, p. 32585.
Mm Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, p. 26685; Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26771-
26772, 26799-268125; Transcript 26 November 2009, p. 32592.

---- End of Page 2198 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T _/ P 18 May 2012

6323. When presented with the testimony of Alimamy Bobson Sesay regarding his meeting
with Koroma and the witness in Liberia, the Accused denied that Koroma would have said
that RUF men were hanging around his hotel, because the two groups would have been kept
separate because of the conflict between them.14318 The Accused conceded that he did not
want a division between the RUF and AFRC, and wanted the matters between then to be
resolved so that the Lomé Accords did not have to be revisited.14319 He denied, however,
instructing the two groups to come together so as to seize power from President Kabbah,
stating that his intentions were only to bring unity and ensure that the Lomé Accords were
implemented. 14320
6324. When presented the testimony of Sam Kargbo regarding a meeting between himself
the West Side Boys and Koroma, the Accused did not deny that it occurred,14321 despite
stating earlier in his testimony that he did not meet with the West Side Boys at this time,
only Koroma.
6325. The Accused was asked upon cross—examination why members of the Government of
Sierra Leone were not involved in the talks between the Accused, Sankoh and Koroma.14322
He answer that the issue of the reinstatement of the SLA in the national army was discussed
at Lomé, and President Kabbah was present during the Lomé negotiations. Koroma, who
was not involved at Lomé, needed reassurance that this was the case, and so the Accused
reassured him of this afrer his discussions with Presidents Kabbah and Eyadema. Koroma
was also made Chairman for the Consolidation of Peace in Monrovia, with the backing of
Presidents Kabbah, Eyadema and Obasanjo.14323
Defence Witness 1ssa Sesay
6326. Witness 1ssa Sesay, senior RUF commander,14324 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,14325 testified that during the Lomé peace negotiations,
14414 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp, 30012—30013.
14319 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 300l5—300l6, 30019.
14320 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 30 September 2009, pp. 30022—30024.
14321 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30848-3085 1; Transcript 26 November 2009, p.
32585.
14322 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32588—32590.
14323 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32588—32591.
14324 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-4459l, 44596, and
14325 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp, 43588—43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.

---- End of Page 2199 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /[ {fl; 18 May 2012 1

while Sesay was stationed in Buedu, "General Joshi" of UNAMSIL would call on Sam
Bockarie's satellite phone, and if Bockarie was not present then Sesay would answer the
phone. On 4 August, Joshi called on the satellite phone and told Sesay that he had been
speaking with "Bazzy" and the West Side Boys about releasing the UN officials that had
been captured.14326 Sesay sent a message to Sankoh explaining the incident the same day,
ex lainin those who had been released, those still held in ca tivit , and the West Side
P g P Y
Boys’ demands, including recognition in the Lomé agreement and the release of Johnny Paul
Koroma.14327 Sankoh sent an instruction to Sesay to bring a radio set to Koroma in Kangama
so that Koroma could speak with the West Side Boys, and when he did Koroma told his men
that he was not under arrest, and tried to tell them to wait.14424 1
6327. Sesay also knew about a message from Foday Sankoh to Isaac Mongor, sent on 5
August 1999, instructing Mongor to travel to the West Side Boys’ location in order to ensure
that the UN officials were released. Sesay testified that Mongor did what Sankoh had asked,
but that the mission was not successful in convincing the West Side Boys.14329 Sesay
understood that the West Side Boys refused to take orders from anyone but Koroma.144411
6328. After approximately one week, Sankoh sent a message that Sesay should bring a
message to Koroma in Kangama that the Liberian government was airlifting him to
Monrovia.14431 Sesay, along with Sam Kargbo and Jumu J alloh, drove Koroma from
Kangama to Foya, and a Liberian government helicopter took Koroma to Monrovia.14442
When the Koroma arrived in Monrovia, Koroma, Sesay, the Liberian government and the
Sierra Leonean government had a conversation. They then flew Bazzy and a delegation of
West Side Boys from Freetown to Lungu and then on to Monrovia, where negotiations were
conducted. 14434
Defence Witness Isatu Kallon
14426 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44387·44390; Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44399·44400.
14424 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, pp. 44389—44390. See also Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p.
44397.
14424 Issa Sesay, Transcript l3 July 2010, p. 44391; Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44402—44404.
14424 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44417·44418.
1*330 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44419.
14441 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44392.
14442 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 2010, p. 44392; Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44425.
14443 Issa Sesay, Transcript [3 July 2010, p. 44392.

---- End of Page 2200 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL·03·01—T GN 18 May 2012

6329. Witness Isatu Kallon, a businesswoman who arranged supplies for the RUF,443 3 4 was
A in Monrovia when Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh arrived to meet with Taylor.44333
The witness saw Koroma and the West Side Boys at the RUF guesthouse, where Koroma
stayed until Sankoh arrived, at which point he was moved to another location.44336 Kallon
went to see Sankoh when he arrived because she thought he would facilitate her return to
Sierra Leone.44337 Sankoh told her to wait for a bit, and so Kallon waited in Monrovia.44333
6330. Isatu Kallon's husband, Daniel Kallon, had been with Sankoh in Lomé and also
arrived with Sankoh in Monrovia.44339 After Sankoh arrived, Sankoh chose the witness, her
husband, "Pa Rogers", "Shek Nabieu", "SS Williams" and to accompany him to the
Executive Mansion to meet with Taylor.443444 After a few minutes Johnny Paul Koroma and
Jumu J alloh came in, and as it was the first day Koroma and Sankoh had met, they embraced
each other.44344 Taylor stated that he had been charged with the responsibility of making
peace between the two men, and that they should go in unity to Sierra Leone in peace
because the war was over.44342 Sankoh said that he had no problems with Koroma, that he
was like his son, and Koroma stated that he heard what Sankoh had said, and regarded
Sankoh as his "pa".44343 The witness saw people taking photographs, in the room as
WCIL14344
6331. After the meeting Sankoh told the witness that if she wanted to return to Sierra
Leone she should pack her bags.44343 Two days later the witness boarded a plane, which Pa
Rogers and others said was a UN plane. 44346
Defence Exhibit D—206
44334 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 16 June 2010, pp. 42687-42688, 42708; 17 June 2010, pp. 42733—42735, 42759-
42760, 42807.
44333 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, pp. 43043-43044.
**333 mm Kpiipp, Transcript 22 Jppp 2010, pp. 43043-43047.
*33371spm Kpiipp, Transcript 22 Jppp 2010, p. 43047.
44333 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, p. 43047.
44334 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, p. 43049.
443444 Isatu Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, pp. 43049-43052; Transcript 23 June 2010, p. 43247.
**33* ism Kpiipp, Transcript 22 Jppp 2010, pp. 4304943032 43054.
*4333 mm Kpiipp, Transcript 22 Jppp 2010, pp. 43030-43033.
*3333 nam Kallon, Transcript 22 Jupp 2010, p. 43055.
*333* Isatu Kpiipp, Transcript 22 Jppp 2010, pp. 43053—43054.
*3333 nam Kpiipp, Transcript 22 Jppp 2010, pp. 43033-43036.
"‘3"61spm Kallon, Transcript 22 June 2010, p. 43057; Transcript 24 June 2010, pp. 43393-43394.

---- End of Page 2201 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T GL 18 May 2012

40294
6332. Exhibit D-206 is a code cable dated 6 August 1999 from Felix Downes-Thomas,
representative of the Secretary-General, UNOL, in Monrovia to a representative of the UN
Secretary-General in New York. In this cable, Downes-Thomas relays Taylor's request for a
telephone conversation with the UN Secretary-General conceming the capture of the
hostages by the West Side Boys, whom Downes-Thomas calls ex-members of the Sierra
Leonean army. Downes-Thomas states that Taylor informed him that as of the date of the
cable he had already spoken twice to President Kabbah, once to Foday Sankoh, and once to
President Obasanjo on this issue. Taylor told Downes-Thomas that "on learning that the
‘RUF Com1nander’ in charge of the area in which the abduction and detention has taken
place was in Liberia", he, with the knowledge and consent of President Kabbah, chartered a
plane to transport the RUF Commander from Monrovia to Freetown so as to diffuse the
crisis. Taylor also told Downes-Thomas that according to his sources an element in the
incident was that Johnny Paul Koroma was being held against his will, and Taylor believed
that bringing Koroma to Liberia for negotiations could contribute to ending the crisis. He
informed Downes-Thomas that he discussed this with Presidents Kabbah and Obasanjo, who
"did not seem to have a problem with it". Taylor told Downes-Thomas that he was
apprehensive about making travel arrangements for Koroma to Liberia owing to the Security
3 Council travel ban on certain Sierra Leoneans.M347
Defence Exhibit D-024
6333. Exhibit D-024 is a BBC Online News report dated 6 August l999 in which Christo
Johnson, the Reuters journalist held hostage by the West Side Boys, speaks of the incident
following his release. Johnson stated that they arrived in a village where the rebels were
supposed to release a group of children, and a rebel spokesman came out with a statement
saying that they had a lot of problems, including needing food and medicine, but that
"people seemed to be neglecting them". As this was happening a group of rebels came and
took them hostage. The rebels told the hostages that they would not harm them, but that they
just wanted to air their grievances to the Sierra Leonean government and the international
community. One of the commanders told Johnson that he believed Sam Bockarie had
arrested their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, and they wanted President Kabbah to use his
M347 Exhibit D—206, "Outgoing Code Cable, To Riza for SECGEN, United Nations, New York. From Down-
Thomas. RSG.UNOL, Monrovia, Sierra Leone: Urgent Issues — President Taylor's Request for Telcon with
SECGEN, 6 August l999".

---- End of Page 2202 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T 2% (TE 18 May 2012

AOQQ5
influence to get "Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor to get Sam Bockarie to release Johnny
Paul immediately" so that Koroma could travel to Freetown, announce his position on the
radi0, and instruct them to lay down their arms to keep the peace process going. Johnson
described the m00d of the rebels as desperate, because they "desperately needed peace",
otherwise they would fight the RUF. While Johnson was there the rebels sp0ke on the radi0
to Johnny Paul Koroma, but they said they believed that he sp0ke under duress. M348
Defence Exhibit D-207
6334. Exhibit D-207 is a c0de cable dated 7 August l999 from Felix Downes-Th0mas,
representative of the Secretary-General, UNOL, in Monrovia to officials at the UN in New
Y0rk regarding the arrival of Johnny Paul Koroma in Liberia. Downes-Th0mas relayed that
Taylor called him at ll.00pm and requested that he convey to the Secretary-General that
Koroma arrived in Monrovia at around 5.30pm and arrangements were made for him to
speak to the BBC, on which he called for the unconditional release of the hostages. Downes-
Th0mas also stated that the Government of Liberia made radi0 facilities available to
Koroma, and he was expected to repeat his call for the unconditional release of the hostages
the next m0rning.
6335. Taylor told Downes-Th0mas that Koroma contended that the Lomé Peace Accord
made a distinction between the RUF and Koroma's group, which was indicated by the
0mission of any mention of his group in the text of the Accords. Taylor stated that he
assured Koroma that the Lomé facilitators did not intend to exclude his group, and that the
term "RUF" in the text meant to include Koroma's faction. Taylor also told Koroma that the
text of the Accords would not be redrafted. Downes-Th0mas wr0te that Taylor was not able
to contact President Eyadema today, but that he would do so tom0rrow when he sp0ke with
President Obasanj0 to confirm that his interpretation of the term "RUF" in the Lomé
Accords was correct. Koroma expressed a desire to travel to Lomé to meet with Sankoh to
establish unity, and Taylor conveyed this to President Kabbah, who had no 0bjection.
Downes-Taylor said that Taylor was making arrangements for him to do s0.l4349
A Defence Exhibit D-217
Mm Exhibit D-024, "BBC News Article, W0rld: Africa, Sierra Leone Hcstage Tells of Ordeal, 6 August l999".
Mm Exhibit D-207, "Outgoing Cable to Miyet/Pendergast, United Nations New Y0rk, From Dcwns-Thcmas,
RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, Arrival of Jchnny Paul Koroma in Liberia, 7 August l999".

---- End of Page 2203 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T @ l8 May 2012

402 76
6336. Exhibit D-217 is an unattributed itinerary for Foday Sankoh and his delegation's
visit to Liberia from 28 to 30 September 1999. The itinerary indicates that Sankoh would
anive in Liberia on 28 September 1999, and stay at the RUF guesthouse in Monrovia. On 29
September, Sankoh would meet with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Liberia,
Christ0pher Minik0n; the Vice President of Liberia, En0ch D0g0lea; Special Representative
to the UN Secretary-General, Felix Downes-Th0mas; and the United States Ambassad0r,
Bismack Murick. At 5.00pm Sankoh would meet with Taylor; at 6.00pm Taylor would meet
with Johnny Paul Koroma; and at 7.00pm, Taylor would meet with both Sankoh and
Koroma. On 30 September 1999, Taylor would meet with both Sankoh and Koroma again at
11.00am, and on 1 Oct0ber 1999, there would be a press briefing before the parties departure
to the airp01t.l4350
Defence Exhibit D-023
6337. Exhibit D-023 is a BBC Online News report, dated 1 Oct0ber 1999, reporting that
Foday Sankoh has delayed his return trip to Sierra Leone following his meetings in
Monrovia with Taylor and Johnny Paul Koroma. The report indicates that Sankoh was
scheduled to return to Sierra Leone on 1 Oct0ber, but Sankoh told the BBC he would not
return until the following week. The report states that Sankoh and Koroma held m0re than
T three hours of reconciliation talks in Monrovia mediated by Taylor. Koroma stated after the
meetings that he was satisfied, and that "everything is fine now", but would not elaborate 0n
how his earlier complaints were addressed. Sankoh said that the fate of Koroma's soldiers
could be discussed with President Kabbah, but that he had no problem with them. my
Defence Exhibit D-218
6338. Exhibit D—218 is a statement by Taylor, dated 2 Oct0ber 1999, at the conclusion of
the talks in Monrovia between Foday Sankoh and J 0hnny Paul Koroma. In it, Taylor states
that the peace deal was brokered by the Government of Liberia and ECOWAS, and that his
government was facilitating the return of Sankoh and Koroma to Sierra Leone. Taylor
commends several African leaders and UN officials for their facilitation of the Lome Peace
Accords. Taylor states that he hosted the recent meetings between Sankoh and Koroma in
MO Exhibit D-217, "Itinerary fer the Visit ef Hen. Foday Sankoh and Delegation Visit te Liberia, 8-30
September l999".
my Exhibit D-023, "BBC News Article: Africa, Sierra Leone Rebel Leader Delayas Return, 1 Oct0ber 1999".

---- End of Page 2204 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

,40 29%
Liberia in order to "provide an atmosphere for stabilizing and maintaining the momentum of
the peace process in Sierra Leone by sharing our experience in Conflict Resolution". Taylor
then stated that he was considering re—opening the Liberian—Sierra Leonean border in order
to revitalise the Mano River Union. Finally Taylor stated that he had appointed a delegation
to accompany Sankoh and Koroma to Freetown, including President Pro—Tempore of the
Liberian Senate, Kekura B Kpoto; Minister of Overseas Cooperation of Nigeria, Jerry Gana;
the Minister of Defence of Togo; the United States Ambassador to Liberia; representatives
of the UN and ECOWAS; and members of the press.M352
Defence Exhibit D—078
6339. Exhibit D—078 is a statement by Johnny Paul Koroma, dated 2 October 1999, made at
the conclusion of the talks in Monrovia between himself and Foday Sankoh. Koroma
announced that under the auspices of Taylor, he and Sankoh had successful meetings in
Monrovia and were able to clear any misunderstandings that would have impeded the peace
process. These meetings "strengthened the alliance between the [AFRC] and the [RUF]",
and, he stated, it was time for the two men to return to Sierra Leone. He ended by expressing
"profound gratitude" to Taylor and the people of Liberia for their role in facilitating
peaceuasss
Defence Exhibit D—220
6340. Exhibit D—220 is a "Statement of the Alliance of the [RUF] and [AFRC]" on the
occasion of their return to Sierra Leone, dated 2 October 1999. In this statement the two
groups express their "profound gratitude" to Taylor and the people of Liberia for the
sacrifices they made in order to foster peace in Sierra Leone. They also thanked the
ECOWAS Heads of State, the UN, the OAU, the European Union and the Commonwealth
for their roles in the peace process.
6341. The statement continues by saying there had been concern that the RUF and AFRC
alliance had been split; the groups acknowledged that they did experience "some internal
*4352 Exhibit D—218, "Statement by his Excellency Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of the
Republic of Liberia, at the Conclusion of Reconciliatory Talks with Cpl. Foday Sankoh, Chairman, RUF and
Lt/Col. Johnny Paul Koromah, Leader, AFRC, on the Implementation of the Sierra Leonean Peace Agreement, 2
October 1999, Executive Mansion, Monrovia, Liberia".
14353* Exhibit D—078, "Statement by Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koromah, Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council, Made at the Executive Mansion, Monrovia, 2 october 1999".

---- End of Page 2205 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T / We 18 May 2012
1

4.02 @8
problems", but that they were "put behind [them]" by the intervention of Taylor, and
supported by the ECOWAS Heads of State. The statement reiterated that the alliance was
‘"for peace" and that it is "strong".m54
Defence Exhibit D-222
6342. Exhibit D—222 is a code cable, dated 3 October 1999, from Felix Downes-Thomas,
representative of the Secretarv—General, UNOL, in Monrovia to officials at the UN in New
York regarding Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma's departure from Monrovia for
Freetown. Downes-Thomas relays that Sankoh and Koroma flew from Monrovia to
Freetown with international observers on 3 October 1999. They were scheduled to depart on
2 October immediately following the press statements made at a ceremony at the Executive
Mansion, but, Downes-Thomas wrote, it was delayed due to "protracted negotiations" which
took place before the ceremony. Downes-Thomas confirmed that there was a ceremony in
which both Sankoh and Koroma made statements before Taylor, senior members of the
Liberian Government, and members of the diplomatic corp. Sankoh and Koroma flew on
board an executive jet provided by the Nigerian government, while approximately seventy
of their supporters and family members were flown on commercial planes provided by the
Government of Liberia. M355
Deliberations
6343. The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence of both Prosecution and Defence
witnesses is strikingly consistent with respect to the events surrounding the kidnapping by
the West Side Boys of the UN peacekeepers and others, and the negotiations for their
release. The West Side Boys demanded to talk to, and then see, Johnny Paul Koroma, and
the Accused made arrangements to bring Koroma to Monrovia, negotiating a waiver of the
UN travel ban}4356 The underlying issue - the perception by the AFRC that they had been
sidelined and excluded from the Lomé process and that their combatants would not be
my Exhibit D—220, ‘"Statement of the Alliace of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/ SL) and
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on the Occasion of the Return of the Leadership of the
Alliance for Peace to Freetown, Sierra Leone, Facilitated by his Excellency President Charles Ghankay Taylor
on Behalf of the ECOWAS Authority, 2 October l999".
M55 Exhibit D-222, "Code Cade from Pendergast, United Nations, New York, to Downs—Thomas, RSG, UNOL,
Sankoh and Koromah's Departure from Monrovia and Return to Freetown, 3 October 1999".
H356 The Trial Chamber notes that the testimony of TF1—367 cited by the Prosecution, that Koroma travelled to
Monrovia long before the capture of the UN officials by the West Side Boys, is not corroborated by any other

---- End of Page 2206 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % G0: 18 May 2012

,4 0 ZZ 77
reintegrated into the Sierra Leonean army - was addressed by the Accused and others in the
meetings. By all accounts, the Accused played a central role in bringing Koroma and Foday
Sankoh together and achieving a reduction in the tension between them. In addition, several
pieces of documentary evidence demonstrate that, as the Accused contends, the UN and
ECOWAS Heads of State knew about the Accused's public role in the negotiations.
6344. The Defence refers to a prior statement of Alimamy Bobson Sesay, in which he did
not mention a few details concerning his meeting with Koroma and Taylor, and the
provision of the $USD 15,000.14357 Recalling that Bobson Sesay is a generally credible
witness,l4358 the Trial Chamber accepts his explanation, noting that his testimony of the
meeting is corroborated in its key elements by Samuel Kargbo, as well as the Accused. The
Accused challenged the testimony of Kargbo that Sam Bockarie came in a helicopter to
Foya with Jungle and others to pick him and the rest of the delegation up to bring them to
Monrovia, saying that Bockarie was not in Monrovia at that time, so he could not have come
in the helicopter. 14359 However, the Trial Chamber notes that TF1-567 testified that Bockarie
was in Monrovia waiting for Sankoh to finish with the Lomé Accordmég and accepts this
evidence, which corroborates the evidence of Kargbo.
6345. The evidence makes it clear that while the Accused was involved in the negotiations
for the release of the hostages and made a number of phone calls to this end, the West Side
Boys responded to Koroma, not the Accused. The Accused's primary contribution to the
process was in getting Koroma and the West Side Boys to Monrovia to meet, and then
facilitating the meeting between Sankoh and Koroma.
6346. The Trial Chamber notes the Prosecution allegation that the Accused said he did not
want division between the RUF and the AFRC and that they should be focused on gaining
power in Sierra Leone. Bobson Sesay testified that Taylor stated the two parties must come
together to resolve their issues, and that they should fight for the Presidency to make sure
they were in the seat of power. VVhen presented with Bobson Sesay's evidence, the Accused
denied that his words had any nefarious intention, and stated that he was only instructing the
witnesses or the documentary evidence cited. See TF1—367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14298-14300.
Mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8587-8603.
Mm Credibility Assessment, Alimamy Bobson Sesay, paras 285-289.
M'359 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30848.
mw TF1-567, Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12978-12979. See also TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13166-
13168.

---- End of Page 2207 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

two parties to come together in order to implement the Lomé Accords. In addition, lsatu
Kallon testified that Taylor said they should go in peace to Sierra Leone because the war
was over. The Trial Chamber finds that Bobson Sesay's testimony does not indicate that
Taylor was advocating the overthrow of the Kabbah govermnent, as the Prosecution alleges,
and the Accused's statement as to his intentions were corroborated by lsatu Kallon.
6347. While the evidence does not indicate that the Accused exercised control over the
West Side Boys or Koroma, his influence with both Koroma and Sankoh made him a
significant actor in the process, and he effectively brought the two leaders together over the
course of his meetings with them and their meeting in Monrovia. Bobson Sesay
characterized the Accused in his testimony as "the immediate person that had direct
influence on the AFRC and the RUF". 14361 In addition, in Exhibit D—024, the journalist
Christ0 Johnson is recalled as saying that one of the West Side Boys’ commanders told him
that they believed Sam Bockarie had arrested their leader, Koroma, and wanted President
Kabbah to use his influence to "get Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor to get Sam Bockarie
to release Johnny Paul Koroma". Though this news account is hearsay and not direct in-
court testimony, the Trial Chamber notes that it is also a reporting of contemporane0us facts,
and believes that it speaks to the relationship between the Accused and the other parties.
Findings
6348. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt the Accused used his influence
with both Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh to facilitate the release of the UN
peacekeepers and others who had been taken captive by the West Side Boys, and to bring
the AFRC and RUF leaders together to reduce tension between the RUF and the AFRC
following the Lomé Peace Accord, with the knowledge of the UN and ECOWAS.
5. Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers g2000)
Submissions of the Parties
6349. The Prosecution submits that after the arrest by the RUF of the UN peacekeepers in
May 2000, Issa Sesay sent his representatives to the Accused to inform him of the capture of
the UN peacekeepers and to seek the Accused's advice. Surnmoning Sesay to Monrovia, the
14361 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, p. 8596.

---- End of Page 2208 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2/ 18 May 2012
/5

,4030 T
Accused then told Sesay to release the hostages, which Sesay then did, telling his
subordinates that he had no choice but to do so once it had been directed by the Accused.
The Prosecution alleges that in return for Sesay's cooperation the Accused provided Sesay
with arms and a1nmunition.14362 According to the Prosecution, had it not been for the
Accused's order, Sesay would not have released the hostages.14363
6350. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused's motivation for securing the release of the
peacekeepers was (i) to raise his stature both regionally and internationally; and (ii) to
protect AFRC/RUF forces from being assaulted by UNAMSIL and, thereby, to ensure the
control by the AFRC/RUF of their territories in Sierra Leone, particularly the diamond
mining areas. The Prosecution submits that he was able to achieve both. The Prosecution
maintains that the Accused's manipulation of the situation can be "clearly demonstrated" by
the manner in which the peacekeepers were released. While UNAMSIL was headquartered
in Sierra Leone with access to Lungi Airpor"t, the peacekeepers were taken to Liberia and
then flown to Monrovia.14364 The Prosecution adduced evidence from TF1-338, TF1-567,
Abu Keita, Perry Kamara, and Moses Blah.
6351. The Defence contests the evidence that the Accused ordered, rather than neg0tiated,
the release of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers. The Defence avers that incontrovertible
evidence independent of the Accused's testimony coniirms that the Accused's role in
facilitating the release of UNAMSIL peacekeepers was both requested and sanctioned by
ECOWAS, and that mandate was carried out transparently and with the full knowledge of
ECOWAS and UN officials at all stages of the peace process.14365 According to the Defence,
the Accused was able to secure the release of the hostages as a result of Liberia's long term
association with the peace process and having built up that coniidence over the months and
y€&rS·i4366
6352. The Defence contends that much of the evidence on the meeting between the
Accused and Issa Sesay in fact indicates that Sesay went to the Accused to seek advice 0n
14362 Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, para. l78.
14363 Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, para. 647.
14364 Prosecution Final Trial Brief`, para. 179.
143°5 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 92-94.
14366 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 672-678.

---- End of Page 2209 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // @0* 18 May 2012

how to proceed after the peacekeepers were taken hostage,l/mn and the mere fact that Issa
Sesay found himself in a predicament and chose to comply with the Accused's alleged
instruction cannot be sufficient to sustain a superior/subordinate relationship}4368 lt submits
that the evidence of Prosecution witnesses who testified to the Accused ordering the release
of the peacekeepers is largely based on hearsay, directly refuted by the evidence of the
parties involved in the alleged transactions, namely Sesay and the Accused, and
consequently must be disregarded}4369 The Defence points to evidence from Issa Sesay
denying the Accused's control of the RUF, and contradicting the accounts of Prosecution
witnesses. limo
6353. The Defence also suggests that the evidence of Prosecution witnesses deliberately
attempted to implicate the Accused and exaggerate his influence over the RUF.l437l The
Defence submit that the Prosecution has neglected to address the mandate the Accused
received from ECOWAS and the international community to secure the release of the
peacekeepers}4372 The Defence contrasted an "extraordinary body of independent
documentary evidence" which recorded international comrnendation and praise for the
Accused's efforts in releasing the UN personnel to the oral testimony of witnesses "whose
credibility were found wanting under cross-examination" that the Accused acted in a
duplicitous and criminal manner. 14373 The Defence adduced evidence from the Accused, Issa
Sesay, and Exhibits D-223, D-237, D-241, D-243, D-248, D-245, D-247, D-249, D-250, D-
251, and D-252.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TFl-338
6354. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member,l4374 testified that around 8 May 2000, he
received a radio message in Freetown from Makeni relating to the arrest of UN peacekeepers
mm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1321-1322.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1321-1322.
'"6" Defence rmi Trial Baer, paras 956, 964.
Mm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 35.
Mw Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 950-956.
Mm Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 36.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 99-101.
Mm TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (PS).

---- End of Page 2210 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

A0 3 0 3
by commanders Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao and Kailundo.14375 Foday Sankoh's
immediate reaction was to dispatch two commanders, Lawrence Womandia and Isaac
Mongor, to meet Kallon, 1ssa Sesay and others to negotiate the release of the UN
peacekeepers. The group released some of the peacekeepers but not all of the hostages were
released until Sankoh's residence was attacked on 8 May 2000.14376
6355. TFl-338 testified that at the end of May 2000, Issa Sesay took a trip to Monrovia
because Taylor had invited him to discuss the release of the UN peacekeepers captured by
the RUF.14377 Sesay travelled by road from Koidu to Foya and from Foya, he travelled by
helicopter to Monrovia, using a "Weasua" branded helicopter.111378 From Monrovia,
Benjamin Yeaten met Sesay and took him to the Congo Town guesthouse, rented by Taylor
for foreign leaders during the "peace accord". Around 10.00pm or 11.00pm at night, Sesay
was taken to see Taylor at the Executive Mansion. At the meeting, Taylor stated that the UN
"was after him" to talk to the RUF about releasing the UN peacekeepers. Taylor said that he
had been promised that if he spearheaded the release of the UN peacekeepers he would be
made the ECOWAS chairman. Taylor promised Sesay that if the RUF released the
peacekeepers, Taylor would "help Issa in the struggle".1‘1379
6356. TFl-338 testified that after the discussion, Sesay accepted Taylor's proposal and
went back to his lodge, where he had radios available. He contacted the RUF base by radio
and instructed them to bring the Zambian peacekeepers to the "riverside". The following day
he flew to Foya by helicopter, where Benjamin Yeaten met him, and sent someone to take
the convoy of peacekeepers to the Manowa crossing point in Pendembu. After the
peacekeepers were brought to Foya, they were airlifted to Monrovia to meet with Charles
Taylor. Sesay retumed to Sierra Leone.111380
6357. TF1-338 testified that at the end of 2000,14381 Sesay went again to see Taylor at the
Executive Mansion, delivering a parcel of diarnonds.143112 The witness stated that Sesay told
11375 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008. p. 15119.
11376 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15120-15121.
11377 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15141-15142, 15208-15209 (PS).
1113711 TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15142.
14379 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15143-15144.
11380 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15144-15145, 15207-15209 (PS).
113111 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15156.
, 11382 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15156-15158, 15213-15214 (PS).

---- End of Page 2211 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \/ 18 May 2012
kv

40 3 O4
Taylor that the RUF lacked "materials" and "enemies were threatening their positions".l4383
After the meeting, Sesay travelled with Yeaten to Camp Schefflein, a barracks in Monrovia,
where they collected uniforms, boots, AK—47 rounds in large quantities, G3 rounds and RPG
rockets, some of which were loaded on the ATU helicopter and transported to Foya and to
Sierra Leone.l4384
Prosecution Witness TFl—567 A
6358. Witness TFl-567, an RUF member]4385 testified that while in Liberia, he heard that
the RUF had captured a large number of UN peacekeepers. On learning of the capture of the
peacekeepers, the witness went to Foya and met Benjamin Yeaten. He told Yeaten that he ·
was going to see General Issa Sesay, and Yeaten provided a vehicle for him and one of
Yeaten's bodyguards, Junior Bayalo, as an escort. On his way, TFl-567 met Junior Vandi
and Dauda Aruna Fornie, who were in some UN vehicles, and returned with Fornie and
Vandi to Foya. At Foya, Vandi and others told Benjamin Yeaten that Sesay wanted word
sent to Taylor that the RUF had captured the UN peacekeepers and that Sesay needed advice
from him. Yeaten responded that "Taylor will immediately know about that".l438° The
witness travelled to Sierra Leone, where Sesay gave him a UN vehicle. He took that vehicle
to Monrovia. Shortly afterwards, the witness was instructed by Benjamin Yeaten to call Issa
Sesay and tell him that Taylor wanted to see him urgently. 14387
6359. TFl-567 testified that in Monrovia, Taylor met with Sesay and Bockarie in an
unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the two men so that Bockarie could return to Sierra Leone,
but Bockarie and Sesay had a serious argument, leading to Taylor telling Sesay to return to
the guesthouse in Monrovia.l4388 Sesay sought advice from Taylor, whom Sesay described
to the witness as "our big revolutionary father". Sesay told the witness that Taylor had
requested him to release the captured peacekeepers, because it would "serve as a help to him
to show to the world that when he says anything that thing will happen".l4389 When Sesay
returned to Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers were brought to Foya and from Foya, airlifted to
Mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15161.
'4384 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15162-15163, 15217—15218 (PS).
Mm TF1—567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS); Transcript 4 July 2008, pp. 12986—12988 (PS).
'43S° TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13037-13038.
Mm TF1—567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13038.
14388 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13039.
14389 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13037-13040.

---- End of Page 2212 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

Spriggs Payne Field.143911 Sesay left Monrovia on Charles Taylor's helicopter, which also
contained a supply of ammunition provided by the Accused. The witness stated that he
accompanied Sesay during Sesay's time in Monrovia, travelled with him to Spriggs Payne
Field and saw the materiel himself in the helicopter. It is not clear whether the witness
accompanied Sesay back to Sierra Leone. 14391
6360. On cross-examination, the witness affirmed the proposition of Defence counsel that
Taylor was responsible for "negotiating" the release of the UN peacekeepers held hostage
during the period when Sankoh had been arrested and was in custody. He denied that Foday
Sankoh was upset that they had been released because he had wanted Issa Sesay to use the
hostages to bargain for his own release from custody. 14392
6361. TF1-567 testified that on the evening after Foday Sankoh was arrested in
Freetown,14393 1ssa Sesay came to Liberia and Taylor summoned the witness to the
Executive Mansion. As he approached, Taylor appeared to be angry. Taylor told the witness
that he had advised Sankoh not to base himself in Freetown, but rather to remain in a more
secure area, such as Kailahun. Taylor asked the witness to explain to him what had
happened to Sankoh. After the witness explained what he knew, Taylor told Yeaten to take
the witness to the guesthouse.14394 The meeting occurred past 10.00pm at night,14395 and
Taylor was wearing pyjamas during this meeting. 14396
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
6362. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULIMO-K who
later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,14397 testified that in May 200014398 he was
informed by Augustine Gbao that the RUF had arrested a group of roughly 500 Kenyan and
Zambian UNAMSIL peacekeepers who were involved in the disarmament programme in
Sierra Leone. The witness heard that the RUF arrested the peacekeepers because the latter
"‘"" TF1-567, rrurruprrpr 7 July 2008, p. 13040.
'"°' TF1-567, rrurruprrpr 7 July 2008, p. 13040.
"""2 TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13172-13173.
14393 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13020-13021 (PS).
"""" TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 18021-18022 (Ps).
"""5 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13022 (Ps).
"‘"6 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13024 (Ps).
14397 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000; Transcript 24
January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.

---- End of Page 2213 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-08-01-T / 6% 18 May 2012

40 Bo 6
had attempted to forcefully take some members of the Small Boys Units (SBUs) to the
disarmament camps and the RUF believed that the Lomé Peace Accord did not give
UNAMSIL the right to forcibly disarm any RUF members. The peacekeepers were kept in
Kono until the attack took place on Foday Sar1koh's house in Freetown}4399
6363. Following that attack, Marzah and Jungle arrived in Makeni and took Issa Sesay to
Liberia. When Sesay returned to Sierra Leone, he brought a satellite phone and 50 boxes of
ammunition, which he said had been issued to him by Charles Taylor. Sesay called a
meeting at the Makeni police headquarters. Keita stated:
6364. So he spoke to all the commanders. He said, "Charles Taylor said we should release
the peacekeepers over to him in Liberia", and then now he never had any alternative but for
us to release the peacekeepers. N400
6365. The peacekeepers were driven to the border and handed over to Benjamin Yeaten
and then Joe Tuah in Foya.l44Ol
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
6366. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,l44O2 testified that Foday Sankoh was
arrested in May 2000. Just before this arrest, Issa Sesay ordered the arrest in Makeni Town
of UN persormel. After the RUF had confiscated all the arms, ammunition, communication
devices and vehicles from the captured persormel, Sesay informed Taylor through a satellite
phone that the UN persormel were under detention. lmmediately after Taylor received this
news, he ordered Sesay to bring the captured UN persormel to him in Liberia}4403 Sesay
called everyone in Makeni and told all the authorities and fighters on the ground and they
transported the UN persormel, stripped naked, from Makeni to Yengema. From Yengema,
the persormel were transferred to Foya. At Foya, a helicopter loaded with ammunition
ariived fiom Monrovia. The ammunition was unloaded and in return it took the
peacekeeping forces to Monrovia.l4404 Taylor said the RUF should expect further military
14398 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-2031.
14399 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2030.
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2031.
mm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2031-2032.
Mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
14403 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269.
Y 14404 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270.

---- End of Page 2214 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T % (im l8 May 20l2

2;.0 307-
action as a result of having "molested" UN personnel and should keep the ammunition from
the helicopter to defend themselves. M405
6367. ln cross-examination, Kamara testified that he was not aware that Taylor worked
with other authorities for the release of the UN personnel, or that Taylor sent a former
Foreign Minister of Liberia to Freetown to negotiate the release of these peacekeepers. He
testified that the helicopter sent to pick up these individuals in Foya was Taylor's helicopter
rather than a UN helicopter. He was also in Makeni, not in Foya, when these peacekeepers
were picked up and did not personally witness the helicopter coming to Foya, but "there was
a message to the effect that the helicopter had come to Foya to receive [the UN
personnel]". IMO6
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
6368. Witness Moses Blah, Inspector General of the NPFL from 1990 to l997,l44O7
Liberian Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000,l44O8 and
Vice-President of Liberia from 2000 to 200334409 testified that he heard about an incident in
which the RUF disarmed some peacekeepers and took them hostage. At that point,
ECOWAS asked Taylor to intervene to secure the release of the peacekeepers. Taylor did
intervene and instructed the RUF to release the men and tum them over to him in Monrovia.
Consequently, some of the peacekeepers were brought to Monrovia, where they were turned
over to their rightful commanders. MMO
The Accused
6369. The Accused testified that around 8 May 2000 he left Monrovia for an ECOWAS
meeting in Abuja, which he attended on 9 to 10 May 2000. Towards the end of May, Issa
Sesay came to Liberia in relation to negotiations for the release of the UNAMSIL hostages.
The Accused stated that this was the first time that he ever met Sesay. The UN was involved
14405 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3271.
*4406 Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, pp. 3395-3396.
mm Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9943-9945.
14408 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884.
14409 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884; Blah became President of Liberia for 60 days from 1 1
August to 11 October 2003: Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10065.
MMO Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9968-9969.

---- End of Page 2215 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2215 % dig 18 May 2012

in transporting Issa Sesay from Sierra Leone to Monrovia in order to resolve the hostage
situation. lilill l
6370. With regard to Exhibit D—243,lil`ll2 the Accused explained that at the time he received
the letter from Sesay on 11 May 2000, he had a mandate from ECOWAS from the meeting
on 9 to 10 May 2000 to become personally involved, and certain westem countries had also
requested his interyentionlllll At this stage, it was not clear who the leader of the RUF was
because Sankoh had been arrested. There was a "vacuum" at the top of the RUF. However,
in consultation with his colleagues at ECOWAS, a decision was made to invite Issa Sesay to
Monrovia to discuss the hostage release. ECOWAS leaders, the UN personnel and the US
embassy were all aware of Taylor's invitation to Sesay to visit Monrovia.l44l4 Prior to this
stage, the Accused had spoken to Sesay by telephone at least once and made it clear to him
that the UN personnel had to be released unconditionally. l44l5 To the Accused's knowledge,
Sesay had not been to Monrovia before. l44l6 When Sesay came to Monrovia, he stayed at the
RUF guesthouse and brought several individuals that the Accused believed to be
bodyguards. lim l 7
6371. The Accused denied, as TF 1-338 testified, that he would have sought the release of
the peacekeepers in order to obtain appointment as chairman of ECOWAS, explaining that
the chairmanship was determined by rotation, rather than election. lilillg
6372. The Accused also denied TF1—338's account of who was present at his meeting with
Sesay, stating that no person of a junior rank was present at the meeting. The meeting
occurred in the moming after Issa Sesay arrived in Monrovia. Sesay brought his
spokesperson, Gibril Massaquoi. The Accused's chief of staff was also present at the
meeting. lilil lg
l44ll Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30865-30866.
mlz Exhibit D-243, "Letter from General Issa Sesay, RUF Field Commander to the President of Liberia,
Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 11 May 2000, DCT 195 (3 End of Pages)". See infra.
lllm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27041.
lll`ll4 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, pp. 27041—27043, 27048.
l44l5 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27047.
mlb Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, pp. 27043—27044. 1
l44l7 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27044.
l44l8 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27176—27177.
llim Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27177—27178.

---- End of Page 2216 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {lb 18 May 2012

2, 0 E3 0 9
6373. The Accused testified that when he met with Issa Sesay to discuss the release of the
peacekeepers, he was very firm. Sesay brought up similar concerns to those he had raised in
his letter of 11 May 2000. The Accused noted that he promised Sesay that he would ask for
a Heads of State meeting to discuss some of the RUF's complaints and testified that he did
request such a meeting, which occurred in the last week of May. Ultimately Sesay stated that
he would discuss it with his "council" but agreed in principle to release the UN
personnel. 144211 The Accused saw the meeting as both a negotiation and a statement of a fixed
position on his part; he made clear to Sesay that while he was willing to bring the RUF
concerns to the attention of ECOWAS, the hostages had to be released unconditionally. 14421
63 74. The Accused affirmed TF1-338's evidence that after the meeting, Sesay
communicated via radio at the RUF guesthouse, instructing the hostages to be brought to the
Liberian border.14422 The Accused also acknowledged it was possible that Sesay travelled
with Benjamin Yeaten back to Foya, as Yeaten was responsible for his security.14423
6375. The Accused explained that at a summit meeting of ECOWAS Heads of State in
Abuja on 9 May 2000, he had informed the other leaders that he no longer wanted to be part
of any committee. However, the leaders prevailed upon him to remain involved and
endorsed a mandate to the Accused to "involve himself personally to ensure the liberation of
the hostages and the resumption of the application of the Lome Peace Agreement".14424 The
Accused testified that this mandate was not new and indicated approval of his continued
involvement from 1997 in relation to the Sierra Leonean situation. He also noted that he was
not the only person involved in the matter of the capture of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers.
Many diplomats from all over the world, in particular from troop-contributing countries,
were involved in discussions over the peacekeepers. 14425
6376. The Accused denied that he had any influence over the RUF. He explained that he
was able to secure the release of the hostages due to his long-term association with the peace
process. Having built up confidence with the RUF in that context over the years, he was able
to mediate the situation. Vxfhile other leaders in the sub-region had very good contacts with
144211 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, pp. 27051-27052. 1
14421 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27178-27180.
14422 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009. pp. 27180-27181.
14423 Charles Ghankay Taylor. Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27181-27182.
14424 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009. pp. 27031-27032.

---- End of Page 2217 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 22 O/lb 18 May 2012

the RUF, the Accused believed that he was appointed the point man for dealing with the
Sierra Leonean situation because Liberia shared a border with Sierra Leone.14424 The
Accused testihed that his meetings with Issa Sesay related to exactly what the UN said and
wanted. 14447
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6377. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,14424 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,14424 testiHed that the RUF captured over 400 UNAMSIL
personnel in Makeni during ambushes around 2 May or 3 May 2000. The Hghting started
because three RUF commanders-—-Kailondo, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao——-were
travelling from Magburaka to Makeni when they were forcefully disarmed by UNAMSIL at
the DDR camp at Makump. The RUF commanders went back to the camp to retrieve their
arms and UNAMSIL resisted.144411 After the capture of the UNAMSIL personnel, people
started demonstrating against Foday Sankoh outside of his house and Bring weapons.
Sankoh escaped his house, but on 8 May 2000 the government arrested and imprisoned him.
Sesay was in Makeni at this point. There were helicopter gunships bombarding Lunsar and
Makeni, and after Sankoh's arrest, it was as if the war had returned.14441
6378. Sesay testihed that he was Held commander at the time of the detention of the
UNAMSIL peacekeepers. Sesay conhrmed that Sankoh did not order the release of the
peacekeepers and while Sankoh told him to take the peacekeepers to the forest in the
Kangari Hills, Sesay decided instead to send them to Kono.14444 A few of them were sent to
the Number 11 plant in Kono, the mining quarters, and the rest stayed in Yengema.14444
Sesay stated that the peacekeepers were detained by the RUF until late May.14444 Sesay
denied, as Abu Keita had testiHed, receiving a message from Sankoh to take charge of the
14424 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, pp. 27032-27033.
14424 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 August 2009, pp. 27325-27326.
14424 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30869.
14444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596, and
14424 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
"""° rssu Sesay, Transcript 14 Jury 2010, pp. 44505-44507.
14441 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44504-44505.
14442 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45595-45596.
14444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45597.
***34 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45597.

---- End of Page 2218 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / {lk lg May 2012
2. ‘1..

403//
RUF delivered by Gibril Massaquoi and Superman.l4435 He also denied, as Abu Keita
testified, that Marzah and Jungle came for him in Makeni to go to Liberia. Sesay testified
that instead Benjamin Yeaten anived by helicopter in Pendembu asking the RUF
commander there, Dennis Lansana, for Sesay. Yeaten said to pass a message to Sesay that
President Taylor wanted to see him urgently. I4436
6379. Sesay was in Makeni when he received the message. Wm Sesay informed Kallon and
Gba0 about it and drove through Konoto Kailahun and crossed the border to Foya, where
Joe Tuah escorted Sesay to Monrovia in a helicopter. Sesay denied, as Abu Keita testified,
that Keita came with Sesay to the border. Rather, Keita stayed in Makeni. MMS Sesay testified
that in late May 2000, he did not talk to Taylor before going to Monrovia, and prior to this,
Taylor did not try to call Sesay on Sesay's satellite phone. mw ·
6380. Around 4.00pm or 5.00pm on the day of his anival, Sesay met with Charles Taylor
at the Executive Mansion. Sesay was accompanied on the trip to Monrovia by his adjutant,
Samuel Jabba. Only Joe Tuah, a few of Tuah's guards, and Taylor were present at this
meeting. The meeting lasted approximately 45 minutes. Charles Taylor was angry and told
Sesay that this was the worst mistake Sankoh has made and that the Lomé Peace Accord was
"the thing that gave Mr Sankoh the last chance and he is about to destroy it". Sesay stated
that Taylor expressed concern that the United States and Great Britain would believe that he,
Taylor, was involved in the detention of the peacekeepers. M440 Taylor then told Sesay that he
had a mandate from the guarantors of the Lomé Accord to speak with the RUF and facilitate
the release of the peacekeepers. He asked where the UNAMSIL personnel were being held
and then told Sesay that he should pass the night in Monrovia. IMM Sesay testified that prior
to this meeting in late May 2000, he had not sp0ken to Charles Taylor before. MM2
6381. The next morning, the plan was for Sesay to go to Kono and transport the
UNAMSIL captives to Foya, where Taylor's helicopter would be waiting to transport them
14435 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45599.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45599.
Wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44486.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44515-44516; Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45600.
limi) Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44485, 44488.
M40 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44517-44518.
Wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44518.
M42 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44517.

---- End of Page 2219 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T y 18 May 2012
.2%

ao 3 /1
to Monrovia. Sesay told Taylor that he could not do this because he did not have fuel, so
Charles Taylor gave him $USD 5,000. Sesay then spent the night at the guesthouse the RUF
used in Monrovia and returned to Sierra Leone the next day. When he reached Kono, he
used part of the money to buy diesel to transport the UNAMSIL persormel.l4443 He moved
with the hostages from Kono to Foya, approximately 315 persormel. A separate group of
about 23 captured Indian peacekeepers from Kailahun were taken to Foya on a different day.
One helicopter owned by the Liberian government arrived to transport the peacekeepers in
two trips to Monrovia. The process took two or three days from his return to Kono from
Monrovia until the last batch of peacekeepers were flown out from Foya. 44444
6382. Sesay testified that Taylor spoke to him because Taylor had a mandate from the
ECOWAS leaders not because Taylor was in control of the RUF. The RUF was under
Sankoh's control. 44445 However, Taylor "made [Sesay] understand that he had got a mandate
from his colleague ECOWAS leaders". Since Sesay "knew that the ECOWAS leaders were _
the guarantors to the Lomé Accord", he "had to accept, because of what [he] had heard from
Mr Taylor, because of the guarantors".44446 Sesay also agreed to release the peacekeepers
because it was a sensible decision: the RUF could not fight the UN, and the situation was
also causing problems for the implementation of the Lomé Accord.44447 Sesay did not
consult with Sankoh about the release of the UNAMSIL persormel. At the time of Sesay's
meeting with Charles Taylor — late May 2000 — Sankoh was under arrest and had no means
of communicating with Sesay or anyone else. 44448
6383. The decision to release the persormel was not accepted by everyone in the RUF.
Gibril Massaquoi, Superman and others stated that Sesay had no right to release the
persormel and Sesay should have negotiated the release of Sankoh in exchange for
UNAMSIL personnel.44449 Sesay testified that he made the decision to release the
UNAMSIL persormel because he had never been in favour of capturing them in the first
place. He had disagreed with a plan proposed by Sankoh in February 2000 to set an ambush
for UNAMSIL contingents. Sesay supported Sankoh over Bockarie in December 1999
44443 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44519—44522.
14444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44537-44539.
14445 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44520-44521.
14446 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45600.
14447 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44521; Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44539—44540.
14444 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44521.

---- End of Page 2220 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

because Sankoh wanted to disarm and Bockarie did not. Sesay testified that if the UN or
anybody else had contacted him about the release of the UNAMSIL personnel, he would
have released them. However, the only person who contacted him was Taylor.l445O He also
explained that he released the peacekeepers in Liberia, rather than to the UNAMSIL
headquarters in Sierra Leone, because it had been Taylor who had contacted him concerning
their release. Wm
6384. Sesay denied receiving 50 boxes of ammunition from Taylor or a satellite phone,
stating that he was using a satellite phone provided to him by Sankoh and was only given
$USD 5,000 by Taylor to cover the costs of transportation of the captured UNAMSIL
personnel.l4452 \Vhen he returned from Monrovia, he collected the UNAMSIL peacekeepers
from Kono and went back to Liberia for them to be released. He did not go to Makeni or call
a meeting there. M453
6385. ln response to TF1-338's evidence, Issa Sesay denied ever receiving instructions
from Taylor to brief him regarding Sankoh's arrest.l4454 Further, Sesay denied travelling
from Foya to Monrovia in a Weasua helicopter and stated that for all the meetings with
Taylor, he was collected in an ATU helicopter from Foya. M55 Sesay also maintained that he
only made one trip to Monrovia to visit Taylor in May 2000, instead of two, as TF1-338
testified, and that was to arrange the release of the UNAMSIL personnel in Kono.lM56 Sesay
testiHed that he did go to Monrovia in late May 2000 to discuss the UN hostage incidentl4457
but denied returning with supplies of materiel. According to Sesay, this was the first time he
spoke to Taylor. M458
6386. In relation to TF1-567's evidence, Sesay denied that Taylor asked for the release of
the UN peacekeepers to increase Taylor's international standing. Sesay understood the
"""" im spsay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. $154044541.
M50 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44541-44543.
MSI Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46893.
MS2 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45600-45601.
M45} Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45601.
'M54 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45212.
'4455 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45213—45214.
M456 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45232-45234.
I4457 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, p. 46026.
MASS Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43594.

---- End of Page 2221 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01.-T J 18 May 2012

40B /4
release of the UN personnel to be in the interest of ECOWAS as guarantors of the Lome
Accord and neither Taylor nor Benjamin Yeaten gave him ammunition on the trip.{4459
6387. Issa Sesay testified that Francis Oscar Charles (a.k.a. FOC) accompanied him to
Monrovia.{44°O Charles was one of the RUF personnel staying with Sankoh at Spur Road in
Freetown when the 8 May incident occurred and only retumed to RUF held territory in early
June, after Sesay had already released the UNAMSIL peacekeepers in late May. {44°{
Defence Witness Martin George
6388. Witness Martin George (a.k.a. Mao Mao), a lieutenant, captain, major, brigade
commander, colonel, and area commander of the RUF,{4462 was the RUF commander in
Kailahun between early and late 2000 when there was a problem between the RUF and the
Kenyan contingent of UN troops stationed in Magburaka and Makeni. When the witness
was in Kailahun, he received a message from Issa Sesay informing all front lines that those
UN troops were disarming RUF soldiers by force without the knowledge of RUF
commanders.{44°3 Augustine Gbao and Morris Kallon then went to the UN base in Makeni to
request the release of the men who had been disarmed. Morris Kallon told the witness that
fighting erupted between the RUF and the UN.{4464 The witness later leamt that as a result of
this incident Issa Sesay had taken some Kenyan UN troops hostage in Magburaka and
Makeni and then taken them to Lrb€r~ra."""‘5
Defence Witness DCT-292
6389. Witness DCT-292, an RUF member,{446° testified that arrests of UN peacekeepers in
Makeni began after an incident in which UN officers told some RUF members that they
could not enter a particular area while armed. These RUF members then falsely reported to
Augustine Gbao that they had been being forcibly disarmed by the UN. Gbao then gave the
order to take the UN peacekeepers hostage. The RUF then captured about 500 Zambian
{4459 Issa Sesay, Transcript 1 1 August 2010, pp. 46030-46031.
{4460 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45300, 45178.
{44°{ Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45209-45210.
{4462 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39592; 22 April 2010, pp. 39627, 39708, 39710; 23 April 2010,
pp. 39766, 39787-39795.
{4443 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39819-39820.
{4464 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39820-39821.
{4465 Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39835-3983 8.

---- End of Page 2222 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T GL}, 18 May 2012
./

peacekeepers at Makeni. While they were a heavily armed force with armoured vehicles, the
RUF was able to capture this group because the peacekeepers were not allowed to fight so
they merely gave up their arms. Issa Sesay then arrived in Makeni and took the peacekeepers
to Kono where they were imprisoned for some weeks. 14467
6390. The Zambian hostages were released in Liberia. They were taken to Foya and then
Monrovia, even though the UN was present in force in Freetown. 141168 The witness was not
monitoring the radio during this hostage crisis. The witness was not aware of any
communications with Taylor about these hostages and states that Taylor had no role in the
hostage crisis. 14469
Defence Exhibits D-223 and D-237
6391. Exhibit D-223 is a letter to Charles Taylor from US Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright, dated 13 October 1999.14410 In the letter, Albright extends her appreciation and
gratitude for the "critical role" played by Taylor recently in supporting the peace process in
Sierra Leone, in particular in "promoting dialogue among key players and persuading the
rebel leaders to return to Freetown" and urges Taylor to "continue to support efforts in the
region to foster peace and stability".14411
6392. Exhibit D-237 is the Final Communique of the Consultation Meeting of the Heads of
State on the Mano River Union, held at Bamako, Mali, and dated 2 March 2000. It records
that Taylor was asked by the Heads of State of Guinea and Sierra Leone to "get personnaly
[sic] involved in solving the issues which hamper the peace process in Sierra Leone and to
seek adequate solutions in consultation with the other Heads of State". 14472
Defence Exhibit D-241
14466 DCT-292, Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41673-41674 (PS).
""°’ DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 4197041972.
‘""$ DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41975—41977.
"""9 DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, p. 41978.
1/14711 Exhibit D-223, "Letter to the President of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor from Madeleine K. Albright, 13
October 1999"; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 13 August 2009, pp. 26821-26826.
14471 Exhibit D-223, "Letter to the President of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor from Madeleine K. Albright, 13
October 1999".
***72 Exhibit D-23 7, "Final Communiqué of the Consultation Meeting of the Heads of State on the Mano River
Union, Bamako, Mali, 2 March 2000, DCT 50".

---- End of Page 2223 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z rjix 18 May 2012

403 ie
6393. Exhibit D-241 is a Press Release by the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs,
Liberia, dated 4 May 2000. It states that the President of Liberia has called for a total cease-
fire in the Sierra Leonean conflict and that President Taylor has sent his Former Foreign
Minister Mrs D. Musuleng Cooper to Freetown to open up dialogue with the RUF in relation
to the freeing of UN peacekeepers being held hostage.m73
Defence Exhibit D-243
6394. Exhibit D-243 is a letter from General Issa Sesay, RUF Field Commander, to the
President of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor, dated ll May 2000. The letter complains
about attacks on RUF forces by UNAMSIL and other alleged violations of the Lome Peace
Accord by the UN and the government of Sierra Leone. The letter expresses the RUF's firm
belief that the situation in Sierra Leone can only be resolved by ECOWAS, and not by the
UN and sets out a list of demands on behalf of the RUF movement. The letter states that the
RUF is "convinced that [Taylor's] mediation will achieve an end to the war in our country,
given your experience and your abilities, which are reocgnized by all", and concludes with
the assurance of cooperation.MA74
Defence Exhibits D-248
6395. Exhibit D-248 is a communique following the summit of ECOWAS Heads of State
Members of the Committee on Sierra Leone on the Lome Peace Agreement, held in Abuja
on 9 May 2000. Present at the meeting were among others, President Charles Taylor. The
communique condemns the actions of the RUF soldiers in taking hostage soldiers of
UNAMSIL and called for their immediate and unconditional release. It also approved the
mandate given by the current ECOWAS Chairman and by the Heads of State of the Mano
River Union to the President of the Republic of Liberia, "to involve himself personally to
ensure the liberation of the hostages and the resumption of the application of the Lome
Peace Agreement".`4475
Defence Exhibit D-245
'4473 Exhibit D—241, "Press Release by the President df Liberia, Ministry df State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia,
4 May 2000".
***74 Exhibit D—243, "Letter from General Issa Sesay, RUF Field Cdnirnander td the President of Liberia,
Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, l1 May 2000, DCT 195 (3 End of Pages)".
Mm Exhibit D—248, "Final Communiqué, Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State Members of the Committee on

---- End of Page 2224 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012
Y 2

6396. Exhibit D—245 is a press release from the Secretary-General, Department of Public
Information, New York, titled "Secretary-General Acknowledges Liberian President's Role
in Peacekeepers Release", dated l5 May 2000. It states that 139 captured peacekeepers had
been transferred to Liberia and that the Secretary-General "would like to acknowledge the
important role played by President Charles Taylor of Liberia in the release of detained
United Nations peacekeepers in Sierra Leone". It also encouraged Taylor to "press on until
the roughly 350 remaining detainees held by the [RUF] are freed and their weapons and
equipment recovered".14474
Defence Exhibit D-400
6397. Exhibit D-400 is a declassified memorandum dated May 2000 from the US London
Embassy to the US Secretary of State reporting on meetings between President Taylor and
various Liberian officials with the Reverend Jesse Jackson on 19 May 2000.14477 The
meetings concerned, among other things, allegations of Liberian support for the RUF, and
Taylor's ongoing negotiations for the release of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers. It records
Taylor's statements that he could not guarantee the release of the hostages because he did
not control the RUF,14478 the RUF were generally "out of control",14474 but that he believed
the hostages would be released.14440 The memorandum also notes that Taylor had not been
getting along with Sankoh and had "tough differences".14441 The author of the memorandum
commented that Taylor's message was "predictable but unbelievable:"
6398. He doesn’t control the RUF, he is not involved in gun—mnning, diamond—smuggling
or deforestation. He obviously does retain some influence with at least some portions of the
RUF and with newly re—armed Johnny Paul Koroma Taylor is also effectively engaged on
Sierra Leone on the Lome Peace Agreement, Abuja, 9 May 2000", para. 5.
14444 Exhibit D—245, "Press release, Secretary—General, Department of Public Information, New York, Secretary-
General Acknowledges Liberian President's Role in Peacekeepers Release, 15 May 2000, DCT l94".
14444 Exhibit D·400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000, ERN 0005828 to 0005842, DCT
267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", para. 3, ERN 5829.
14444 Exhibit D·400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000, ERN 0005828 to 0005842, DCT
267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", para. 1, ERN 5828.
14444 Exhibit D—400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000, ERN 0005828 to 0005842, DCT
267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", para. 24, ERN 5835.
, 14444 Exhibit D—400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000, ERN 0005828 to 0005842, DCT
267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", para. 28, ERN 5837.
14441 Exhibit D—400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000, ERN 0005828 to 0005842, DCT
267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", para. 24, ERN 5835.

---- End of Page 2225 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012
i

the UN hostage release, and we should encourage him. He seems to think he will
succeed. 44482
Defence Exhibit D-247
6399. Exhibit D-247 is a press release by the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs,
Liberia, dated 22 May 2000. It states that President Taylor expresses dissatisfaction over the
slow pace of the release of the UN hostages owing to continuing attacks against the RUF by
government forces and reiterated his call for a cease-fire in order to allow his mediation
efforts at freeing the remaining hostages to proceed without difficulties. 44483
Defence Exhibit D-249
6400. Exhibit D-249 is another press release by the Ministry of State for Presidential
Affairs, dated 22 May 2000, recording that 54 additional UN hostages had been released by
the RUF in Sierra Leone and given passage through Liberian territory, bringing to 204 the
_ number of UN peacekeepers "set free to date since President Taylor was given the mandate
to mediate their release by the ECOWAS authority? The Press release states that the 54 UN
personnel arrived by helicopter in Monrovia from Foya, Lofa County alier being airliiied
from Sierra Leonean territory.44484
Defence Exhibit D-250
640l. Exhibit D-250 is a facsimile to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General, Oluyemi Adenij i, from the President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, titled
"Government Statement", and dated 23 May 2000. It acknowledges the role of Taylor in
securing the release of UN peacekeepers held hostage, but denies Liberian press releases
indicating that the Government of Sierra Leone is attacking RUF positions within the
country.44485 .
44482 Exhibit D-400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000, ERN 0005828 to 0005842, DCT
267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", para. 42, ERN 5842.
44483 Exhibit D-247, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia,
22 May 2000, DCT 15".
l4484 Exhibit D-249, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs,
Monrovia, Liberia, 22 May 2000, DCT 141".
44485 Exhibit D-250, "Fax—Letter to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Oluyemi Adeniji,
from the President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Government Statement, 23 May 2000", pp. 1-2.

---- End of Page 2226 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (ms 18 May 2012 r
j ,1
l J

Defence Exhibit D—25l
6402. Exhibit D—25l is a letter to the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, from Bismarck
Myrick, the US Ambassador to Liberia, dated 23 May 2000. lt applauds Taylor's efforts to
secure the release of the UN personnel being held by the RUF, and notes "with appreciation
their continuing success". The Ambassador states in the letter that "[w]e hope you will be
able to secure the release of all those being detained". 44486 V
Defence Exhibit D—252
6403. Exhibit D—252 is the Final Communique of the Twenty—Third Summit of the
Authority of Heads of State and Government on the ECOWAS Silver Jubilee Anniversary,
held in Abuja on 28 to 29 May 2000. lt endorsed the conclusions of the Committee of Heads
of State and Government on Sierra Leone, which met in Abuja on 27 May 2000 and had
expressed its gratitude to the Liberian President for sparing no effort in securing the release
of large number of the hostages, and renewed his mandate to use his good offices in
obtaining the release of the remaining hostages and the recovery of the aims seized.44487
Deliberations
6404. The evidence unequivocally establishes that some time in late April or early May
2000,44488 the RUF forcibly disarmed and detained a group of approximately 50044489
UNAMSIL peacekeepers.444944 The capture of these peacekeepers was affected by a group of
4 4486 Exhibit D-251, "Letter to the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor from Bismarck Myrick, Ambassador,
Embassy of the United States of America, Monrovia , Liberia, 23 May 2000".
44487 Exhibit D-252, "ECOWAS Silver Jubilee Anniversary, Final Communiqué of the Twenty—Third Summit of
the Authority of the authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28-29 May 2000", para. 21.
44488 Exhibit D-241, "Press Release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia,
4 May 2000, DCT 55" (by 4 May 2000, the President of Liberia had sent his Former Foreign Minister to
Freetown to open up dialogue with the RUF relation to the freeing of United Nations Peacekeepers being held
hostage).
4 4489 Exhibit D-245, "Press release, Secretary-General, Department of Public Information, New York, Secretary-
General Acknowledges Liberian President's Role in Peacekeepers Release, 15 May 2000, DCT 194" (stating
that 139 captured peacekeepers had been transferred to Liberia with roughly 350 detainees remaining)? Abu
Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-2031.
44490 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15119 (around 8 May 2000, the witness received a radio message
at Freetown from Makeni relating to the arrest of UN peacekeepers by commanders Morris Kallon, Augustine
Gbao and Kailundo); TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13037-13038 (while in Liberia, the witness heard that
the RUF had captured a large number of UN peacekeepers); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-
2031 (in May 2000, the witness was informed by Augustine Gbao that the RUF had arrested a group of roughly
500 Kenyan and Zambian UNAMSIL peacekeepers who were involved in the disarmament programme in Sierra
Leone); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269 (just before Sankoh's arrest, Issa Sesay ordered the
arrest in Makeni Town of UN personnel because Sankoh was arrested in Freetown); Issa Sesay, Transcript 14

---- End of Page 2227 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ 18 May 2012
2

RUF commanders, including Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, in relation to a dispute
over the conduct of the disarmament process in or around Makeni.`449l It is unclear whether
Issa Sesay himself was involved in ordering the detention of the UNAMSIL personnel.`4492
The captured UNAMSIL personnel were stripped of their clothing and equipment and taken
to Kono, where they were detained for a period of approximately three weeks. `4493
6405. It is not contested that at some point after the capture of the peacekeepers, the
Accused invited Issa Sesay to Monrovia to discuss the matter of their release.`4494 After this
meeting, from about the middle to the end of May 2000 the RUF acceded to the release of
the captured UN peacekeepers into Liberian territory in stages.`4495 It is also not disputed
that the Accused was asked by ECOWAS to become involved in negotiations for their
release}4496 and that this mandate was endorsed by the United Nations. `4497
July 2010, pp. 44505-44507 (the RUF captured over 400 UNAMSIL personnel in Makeni during ambushes
around 2 May or 3 May 2000).
M9! TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15119; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-2031;
Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44505-44507; DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41970-41972.
I4492 Three witnesses state that Issa Sesay ordered the arrest of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers: Perry Kamara,
Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269; Martin George, Transcript 23 April 2010, pp. 39819-39821, 39835-39838
(although note that George testified that Sesay's order was in relation to the detention of a separate group of
Indian UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Kailahun); DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41973-41975 (reporting
what he was told by Martin George at the time); contrast Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44541-44543
(Sesay took the decision to release the UNAMSIL because he had never been in favour of capturing them in the
first place).
M493 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44513-44515 (admitting that some of the UNAMSIL personnel
were stripped and their clothes were left behind); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269 (after the
arrest the RUF confiscated all the arms, ammunition, communication devices and vehicles from the captured
personnel), 3270 (UNAMSIL personnel were stripped naked and taken from Makeni to Yengema); DCT-292,
Transcript 2 June 2010, pp. 41970-41972 (Issa Sesay then arrived in Makeni and took the peacekeepers to Kono
where they were imprisoned for some weeks).
M494 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30865-30866 (towards the end of May, Issa
Sesay came to Liberia in relation to negotiations for the release of the UNAMSIL hostages in late May).
M495 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44537-44539 (the process took two or three days from his return to
Kono from Monrovia until the last batch of peacekeepers were flown out from Foya); Exhibit D-245, "Press
release, Secretary-General, Department of Public Information, New York, Secretary-General Acknowledges
Liberian President's Role in Peacekeepers Release, 15 May 2000, DCT 194" (139 captured peacekeepers had
been transferred to Liberia by 15 May 2000); Exhibit D-249, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry
of State for Presidential Affairs, Monrovia, Liberia, 22 May 2000, DCT 141" (204 peacekeepers set free by 22
May 2000); Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9968-9969.
I4496 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, pp. 27031-27032, 27041; Moses Blah, Transcript 15
May 2008, pp. 9968-9969; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44520-44521; Exhibit D-248, "Final
Communiqué, Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State Members of the Committee on Sierra Leone on the Lomé
Peace Agreement, Abuja, 9 May 2000", para. 5 (approving the mandate given by the current ECOWAS
Chairman and by the Heads of State of the Mano River Union to the President of the Republic of Liberia, ‘"to
involve himself personally to ensure the liberation of the hostages and the resumption of the application of the
Lomé Peace Agreement"); Exhibit D-252, "ECOWAS Silver Jubilee Anniversary, Final Communiqué of the
Twenty—Third Summit of the Authority of the authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28-29 May
2000", para. 21 (endorsing the conclusions of the Committee of Heads of State and Government on Sierra

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012 Dy
Q

6406. The Prosecution, however, maintains that the incident evidenced the Accused's high
degree of control over the RUF and the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
between the Accused and the RUF.l449g According to the Prosecution, the Accused ordered p
Issa Sesay to release the peacekeepers.l4499 The Prosecution also contends that his
involvement in the peace process masked more nefarious purposes, including protecting "his
proxy force from a full assault by UNAMSIL" and ensuring that the RUF would continue to
hold onto Sierra Leonean territory.l45()0
6407. The Prosecution relies predominantly on the evidence of TFl-338, TFl-567 and Abu
Keita. TF]-338 stated that when the Accused met Sesay, the former told the latter that he
had been promised that if he spearheaded the release of the UN peacekeepers he would be
made the ECOWAS chairman and he promised Sesay that if the RUF released the
eacekee ers, Taylor would "hel Issa in the stru le".l45Ol TFl-567 testified that after the
P P Y P gg
capture of the peacekeepers, Sesay sought advice from Taylor, whom Sesay described to the
witness as "our big revolutionary father", and Sesay told the witness that Taylor had
requested him to release the captured peacekeepers, because it would "serve as a help to him
to show to the world that when he says anything that thing will happen".l4502 Abu Keita
testified that when Sesay retumed from the meeting with the Accused, he told the RUF
commanders that the Accused said the RUF should release the peacekeepers over to him in
Liberia.l45O3 TFl-567 and Keita testified that when Sesay returned from the meeting in
Liberia conceming the hostages, he came with materiel for the RUF provided by the
Accused. 14504
Leone, which met in Abuja on 27 May 2000 and had expressed their gratitude to the Liberian President for
sparing no effort in securing the release of large number of the hostages, and renewed his mandate to use his
good offices in obtaining the release of the remaining hostages and the recovery of the arms).
U'497 Exhibit D-245, "Press release, Secretary—General, Department of Public Information, New York, Secretary-
General Acknowledges Liberian President's Role in Peacekeepers Release, 15 May 2000, DCT l94"
(acknowledging the role played by Taylor in the release of detained United Nations peacekeepers in Sierra
Leone and encouraging Taylor to "press on until the roughly 350 remaining detainees held by the [RUF] are
freed and their weapons and equipment recovered").
M498 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 645, 647.
Mw) Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 647.
M500 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 179.
*000* TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15143-15144.
*0000 r1¤1~s67,Trrtrrperrpt7 Jury 2008, pp. 13037-13040.
M50} Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2031.
MS04 TF1~567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13040; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2031. TF1—338 also
testified that the Accused supplied ammunition to the RUF but the timing is different. He stated that Sesay went
on two other trips to Monrovia in which he returned with materiel: in early May 2000 and at the end of 2000:

---- End of Page 2229 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

40 32.2
6408. The Trial Chamber has also considered the evidence of Perry Kamara, who testified
that when the Accused heard the news conceming the detention of the UN personnel, he
"ordered" Sesay to bring the captured UN personnel to him in Liberia.01505 The Trial
Chamber recalls its finding that Kamara is a generally credible witness. However, Kamara
did not explain, nor was he asked, how he knew the Accused told Sesay to release the
peacekeepers, and was not questioned on why he believed that this was an "order". Further,
his account of the release of the peacekeepers departs from the evidence of other witnesses:
unlike other witnesses, he omitted any account of a trip by Sesay to see the Accused to
discuss the release of the peacekeepers; he was the only witness to describe the peacekeepers
being transferred directly from Makeni to Kono and then to Foya,l4500 rather than being held
at Kono for a period of time while Sesay went to see the Accused;l4507 and the only witness
to have described materiel from the Accused arriving in the same helicopter that had come
to Foya to pick up the released UN personnel.l4508
6409. Despite the discrepancies between Kamara's testimony and the evidence of witnesses
with first hand knowledge of the incident, the Trial Chamber finds a fair degree of
consistency among the witnesses in relaying the message from the Accused that the captured
UN peacekeepers should be released. Kamara said the Accused "ordered" Sesay to bring the
captured UN personnel to him in Liberia. Abu Keita testified that Sesay told the RUF that
the Accused had said the peacekeepers should be released and there was no "altemative but
for us to release the peacekeepers".l4500 TF1—338 testified that the Accused told Sesay that
he had personal reasons for wanting the RUF to release the UN peacekeepers, and promised
to assist the RUF.l45l0 According to TFl—567, Sesay went to the Accused to seek advice on
the correct course of action after the capture of the peacekeepers, described the Accused to
the witness as "our big revolutionary father",l40ll although he agreed on cross—examination
TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15136; Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15207-15209 (PS), 15162-
15163, 15217-15218 (PS).
[4505 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269.
M500 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3270.
14507 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45597; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2030.
M500 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's Leadership
(December 1999-January 2002).
M500 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2031.
T;§4gF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15143-15144; TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13037-
MSH TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13037-13040.

---- End of Page 2230 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

40 323
that the Accused was "negotiating" the release of the UN peacekeepers held hostage.*i*5*5
Even Issa Sesay stated that he felt he "had to accept" the Accused's proposal, "because of
what [he] had heard from Mr Taylor", although he explained that it was also a good decision
on independent grounds.
6410. The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused had, and was seen to have, a great deal of
influence over the RUF.*55*5 The evidence indicates that he exerted this influence over the
RUF to effect the release of the UN peacekeepers, and the Trial Chamber considers that
while the witnesses vary as to precisely how coercive the Accused was in securing the
release of the peacekeepers, that he told them to release the peacekeepers would be a fair
characterisation of his message, which was not reported verbatim by any of the witnesses.
The Trial Chamber notes that the question of whether in this instance the contact between
the Accused and the RUF satisfies the threshold of effective control is to be dealt with, in
light of the totality of evidence, when analysing the criminal responsibility of the Accused.
6411. The Trial Chamber recalls that it had no general reservations concerning the
evidence of TF1-338, TF1-567 and Abu Keita.*45*4 The Defence contends that the evidence
of Prosecution witnesses who testified to the conversation between the Accused and Issa
Sesay relating to the release of the peacekeepers is largely based on hearsay, directly refuted
by the evidence of the parties involved in the alleged transactions, namely Sesay and the
Accused, and cannot be relied on.*45*5 In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes that both Issa
Sesay and the Accused denied that Sesay only released the peacekeepers because the
Accused had control over the RUF,*45*5 or that the May 2000 meeting related to anything
other than a good faith negotiation on the part of the Accused based on the furtherance of the
peace process.*45*7 The Defence further notes that the details of the meeting provided by
TF1-338 is also refuted by Sesay and the Accused. In particular, the Defence points out that
*55*5 TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13172-13173.
*45*5 See for example Peace Process: Release of UN Peacekeepers and others (1999).
*45*4 Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329; Credibility Assessment, TF1-567, paras 313-317;
Credibility Assessment, Abu Keita, paras 213-219.
*45*5 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 956, 964.
*55*5 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 20 August 2009, pp. 27325-27326; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010,
pp. 44520-44521; Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45600.
*55*7 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, p. 30869.

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Case No.; SC L-03-0 -T K. 18 May 2012
/ .1,9 %

40 324-
Sesay testified that his meeting with the Accused took place in the afternoon, not at 10.00pm
or 11.00pm, and that he did not take anyone with him to Monrovia except his adjutant.*45*4
6412. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of Issa Sesay must be
considered with caution and requires corroboration.*45*9 The testimony of the Accused, in
the view of the Trial Chamber, is self-serving. ln relation to inconsistencies concerning the
details of the meeting, the Trial Chamber also notes that even the accounts of the Accused
and Sesay contradict each other on these details. For example, while Sesay testified that the
meeting took place on the afternoon of his arrival,*452O the Accused testified that it occurred V
the next morning.*452* While Sesay testified that he did not take anyone with him to
Monrovia except his adjutant,*4522 the Accused first testified that Sesay arrived with several
individuals that the Accused believed to be bodyguards*4523 and then stated that Sesay
brought his spokesperson, Gibril Massaquoi, to the meeting. *4524
6413. Furthermore, the testimony of both Sesay and the Accused is contradicted by the
evidence of TF1-338, TF1-567 and Abu Keita. The Trial Chamber notes that this evidence is
not entirely hearsay and includes direct evidence of the meeting. On the basis of this
evidence, the Trial Chamber does not accept the evidence of Sesay and the Accused
regarding this event.
6414. Further, none of the reports given by these witnesses of the meeting between the
Accused and Sesay support the Prosecution's allegation that the Accused became involved
in the negotiations in order to ensure that the RUF would continue to hold onto Sierra
Leonean territory.*4525 This evidence indicates at the most, as TF1-338 and TF1-567
testified, that the Accused requested Sesay's compliance with the intention of heightening
the Accused's international standing.
6415. The Trial Chamber also rejects the Prosecution contention that the Accused's
"manipulation of the situation" can be demonstrated by the fact that the peacekeepers were
*45 *8 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para 35; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44517.
*45 *4 Credibility Assessment, Issa Sesay, paras 359-372.
*4520 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44517—44518.
*452* Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27177—27178.
*4522 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, p. 44517.
*4523 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27044.
*4524 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27177—27178.
*4525 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 179.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
1 ~ i

released in Liberia, rather than taken to UNAMSIL controlled territories in Sierra
Leone.14526 The Trial Chamber accepts Sesay's explanation that he had released the
peacekeepers in Liberia because his contact for the negotiation for their release was from
Monrovia,14527 considering also that Sesay knew ECOWAS had requested the Accused's
assistance in facilitating their release, and that the Accused had provided funds for the RUF
to transport the UNAMSIL personnel to the Liberian border.14528 The Trial Chamber also
considers the evidence indicating that the RUF mistrusted UNAMSIL at the time,14529 and
that fighting persisted in areas of Sierra Leone between UNAMSIL, government forces and
the RUF,145311 to be further reasons for why the hostages were released in Liberia rather than
Sierra Leone.
6416. In light of these considerations, the Trial Chamber agrees with the Defence
contention that Sesay's decision to comply with the Accused's advice is not sufficient to
sustain a superior/subordinate relationship, or that the Prosecution evidence shows that the
Accused had the specific ulterior motive of protecting his "proxy force".14531 Nevertheless,
the Trial Chamber concludes that the evidence adduced establishing that the Accused was
selected to be the point person for these negotiations, as well as the evidence of the
witnesses regarding the interaction between the Accused and Sesay to indicate that the
Accused did have influence over the actions of the RUF and Sesay. As Sesay himself
described it, the Accused "made him understand", in light of the ongoing peace process, that
he had to accept the proposal.14532 The evidence in Exhibit D-400 that the Accused
"obviously does retain some influence with at least some portions of the RUF" also supports
this view.14533
14526 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 179.
14527 Issa Sesay, Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46893.
14528 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44519—44522.
14529 Exhibit D—243, "Letter from General Issa Sesay, RUF Field Commander to the President of Liberia,
Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 11 May 2000, DCT 195 (3 End of Pages)" (complains about attacks on RUF
forces by UNAMSIL and other alleged violations of the Lomé Peace Accord by the United Nations and the
government of Sierra Leone)
14530 Exhibit D—247, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia,
22 May 2000, DCT 15" (expressing dissatisfaction over the slow pace of the release of the United Nations
hostages owing to continuing attacks against the RUF by government forces).
M"' Defence freer Trial Brief, paras 1321-1322.
14532 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45600.
14533 Exhibit D—400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000, ERN 0005828 to 0005842, DCT
267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", para. 42.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T // 6A 18 May 2012

,40 326
6417. Tuming to whether the Accused provided the RUF with ammunition in retum for the
release of the peacekeepers, the Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding on the basis of the
evidence of TF1-338, TF1-567 and Abu Keita, that the Accused provided Issa Sesay with a
helicopter loaded with materiel when Sesay travelled to Liberia in May 2000.1453 4 However,
although both TF1-567 and TFl-338 testified that when Sesay retumed fiom the meeting in
Liberia conceming the hostages, the Accused provided the RUF with amis and
ammunition,14535 neither witness explicitly indicated that the materiel was provided in retum
for the release of the peacekeepers. TF1 -338 stated that the Accused offered to "help Issa in
the struggle" in retum for the release of the peacekeepers.14536 However, TF1-338 did not
make clear what the Accused meant by these words, or whether the materiel later provided
at the end of 2000, was the promised assistance. On the contrary, TF1 -338 indicated that the
materiel provided at the end of 2000 was procured after Issa Sesay went again to see Taylor
at the Executive Mansion, delivering a parcel of diamonds14537 and complaining that the
RUF lacked "materials".14538
6418. Due to the lack of clear evidence, the Trial Chamber is unable to find beyond
reasonable doubt that the Accused provided materiel to the RUF in May 2000 or thereafter
in exchange for Issa Sesay agreeing to release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers.
Findings
6419. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused had significant
influence over Issa Sesay's decision to release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers, and that he was
asked by ECOWAS to become involved in negotiations for their release.
6420. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the amis and ammunition Issa Sesay obtained fiom the Accused during Sesay's
trip to Liberia in May 2000 were provided in exchange for Issa Sesay agreeing to release the
UNAMSIL peacekeepers.
14534 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's Leadership
(December 1999-January 2002).
14535 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p, 13040.
14536 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15143-15144.
14537 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp, 15156-15158, 15213-15214 (PS).
14544 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15161.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % &j‘[3, 18 May 2012

21, 0 B2 $2
6. Communications with Issa Sesay on Disarmament
Submissions of the Parties
6421. The Prosecution submits that the Accused "gave ongoing instruction, direction and
guidance to Issa Sesay to resist the disarmament in Sierra Leone", and that Sesay followed
this instruction, thereby prolonging the conflict. The Prosecution submits that the Accused
first gave this instruction to Sesay at a private meeting following the July 2000 meeting that
the Accused convened with the ECOWAS presidents and an RUF delegation headed by
Sesay to discuss a change in the RUF leadership.14539 At the private meeting "Taylor's real
agenda was laid out". The Accused directed Sesay not to listen to the Sierra Leonean
government since it was a British elected government and "remote controlled" by the
British. The Accused told Sesay that anytime the UN asked him to disarm "he should say
yes but not do it". The Accused also assured Sesay that he would provide continued support
to the RUF as he had already been doing, and gave Sesay $USD 15,000.1454O
6422. The Prosecution further submits that during Sesay's time in power, the Accused and
his commanders met regularly with Sesay, who was often in Monrovia, and directed him to
resist disarmament, which he did. In as late as 2001, the Accused met with Sesay and other
top commanders in Monrovia, where he said that he mistmsted the UN disarmament process
for Sierra Leone and provided Sesay with money "to make sure the RUF stayed strong and
did not disarm Kono and Kailahun districts".14541 Even when disarmament in Sierra Leone
became "an inevitable reality", the Accused still was successful in postponing it.14542
6423. The Defence submits that after the Accused, Presidents Konaré and Obasanjo, Issa
Sesay and his delegation met at Roberts Intemational Airport in 21 August 2001 in order to
formally confirm Sesay's interim leadership of the RUF, Sesay then attended a "closed-door
meeting" with Presidents Taylor, Obasanjo, and Konare, where among other matters
discussed, Sesay agreed to immediately begin the disarmament and demobilisation process.
The Defence also submits that the Accused never gave Sesay a consignment of arms and/or
14544 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 182.
14540 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 182.
14541 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 183.
14542 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 183-184.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /// K1; 18 May 2012 *@

.4 0 E28
ammunition to bring back to Sierra Leone when he was making his return trip from
Monrovia. I4543
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-338
6424. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member,|4544 testified that after the July 2000 meeting in
Monrovia where Taylor suggested that Issa Sesay take over as interim leader of the RUF,
Sesay and the rest of the RUF delegation returned to the guesthouse at which they were
staying in Congo Town. That night, at around 11.00pm or midnight, Benjamin Yeaten came
to collect Sesay, Augustine Gbao and one other person to go to meet with Taylor. TF1-338
testified that Taylor told Sesay that he should bear in mind that the people who were talking
to him before were British elected presidents and that he should not listen to the Sierra
Leone govemment because it was a British elected govemment that was remote-controlled
by the British. According to the witness, Taylor told Sesay that any time he would be asked
by the UN to disarm he should just say yes, but he should not do it in reality. And in that
p case he, Taylor, will continue to assist the RUF as he was doing before. Taylor also told
Sesay that he should not listen to the other Heads of State because "today...they will
embrace him and the other day they will just deny him". Taylor then gave Sesay $USD
15,000 and he returned to the guesthouse. Sesay then flew back to Sierra Leone the next
day·14s4s
6425. TF1-338 was asked about his earlier testimony to the Trial Chamber that although
Sesay began the disarmament of the RUF at the end of 2001 into 2002, in certain areas he
also delayed the disarmament "because of certain things that were happening", including his
assistance to the Government of Liberia in repelling rebel attacks in that country. TF1-338
testified that, for example, Sesay said "he got an instruction from Charles Taylor that he
should organise the troops to enter Guinea through Pamelap" and that they should enter
Guinea by Kissidougou through Kono, not Koinadugu, and send manpower to Foya to
14543 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 691-694.
14544 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086 (PS).
M45 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15149-15150.

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Case No.: SCSL—03-01—T Gm 18 May 2012 M

40 $27
Benjamin Yeaten to join the other forces who were there to enter through Guéckedou. TFl—
338 said that was why there was delay in the disannament in that area. *4546
6426. TFl-338 testified that in mid—200l UN Force Commander Opande, Adenigi, the UN
Secretary-General's representative in Sierra Leone, and Sesay met in Magburaka to discuss
the disannament of child soldiers. The UN representative proposed first finding a way to
disann child soldiers before moving on to find a way to disann the adult ones. Sesay told the
UN representatives that he wanted to first consult the "RUF family" or RUF commanders.
When he retumed to Kono, Sesay said that he wanted to go to meet Taylor to brief him and
to get his advice. Sesay briefed Taylor about the meeting at the Executive Mansion in
Monrovia, and Taylor asked if it would be safe for him and the RUF movement to disann.
Taylor then advised him not to disann at all because "the United Nations were people who
were would talk nicely to you today and tomorrow they would tum around and arrest
you...7*4547 Sesay left for Sierra Leone the next day. On his way back he complained to the
commanders with whom he was travelling that he would no longer take instructions not to
disarm from Taylor, pointing out that Taylor was now living in peace and that Liberia had
held elections and had made Taylor President. Sesay said that he wanted to allow
disannament to take place in Sierra Leone so that he would also ‘"be able to give peace to his
own people in Sierra Leone". *4548
6427. TFl-338 testified that Issa Sesay made four trips to Monrovia in late 2000 into the
spring of 2001, wherein Sesay brought diamonds to Taylor or Taylor's middleman and then
retumed to Sierra Leone with supplies or money.*4549 After the first meeting, which took
place in the end of 2000, Sesay went to the Camp Schefflein barracks in Monrovia and took
AK—47 rounds, RPG rockets, G3 rounds, and large quantities of boots and unifonns. Some
of these materials were used by the RUF against the Kamajors and UNAMSTL forces that
were "fighting and pushing toward Makeni".*455O After the second meeting, which was in
early 200l, Sesay told Taylor that he had gotten UNAMSIL under control, but that the
Kamajors were still a threat. Sesay retumed to Sierra Leone with a few AK rifles, a few G3
rifles, G3 rounds, RPG rockets, bags of rice and about four drums of diesel. Sesay later used
"*5"" TFl—338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15556-15557.
*4547 TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15171-15175.
*45** TFl—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15175-15176.
*4549 TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. l5l6l-l5l72.
*4550 TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. l5l6l-15164.

---- End of Page 2237 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-0l-T Gu 18 May 2012
/4 2

4035 0
some of the arms and ammunition that he brought back from this trip against the Kamajors
and UNAMSIL.14551
6428. After the third meeting, which was in the spring of 2001, Taylor told Sesay that
because UN observers and the international community were watching him, he would set up
"Alpha Bravo" as a middle man to whom could Sesay to bring small amounts of diamonds
in exchange for money, so that Sesay could buy the basic things that he needed for the front
lines. VVhen Sesay returned to Sierra Leone after this trip, he brought with him bags of rice,
diesel, medicine and drugs.14552 On the fourth trip to Monrovia, which also took place in
2001, Sesay gave diamonds to Alpha Bravo in exchange for EEUSD 300,000. Sesay left half
of this amount with Taylor in Monrovia for safe-keeping and took the other half back with
him to Sierra Leone.14553 TF1-338 further testified that on each of these trips, Sesay left
Monrovia via helicopter. 14554
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
6429. Witness TF1 -371 , an RUF member,14555 testified that in 2001 Mike Lamin attended a
meeting that took place at midnight with Issa Sesay, who was then the Field Commander,
Morris Kallon, and Taylor at White Flower in which Taylor asked Sesay about the
disannament process, specifically wanting to know how many men they had disarmed thus
far. Sesay told Taylor that they had disarmed about forty percent of his men. TF1-371
further testified that Lamin told him that Taylor asked Sesay whether "he trusted the
disarmament process, whether the United Nations system in Sierra Leone in terms of being
really very honest about the genuineness of disarming them and that kind of stuff". 14556
Prosecution Witness TF1-3 75
6430. Witness TF1-375, an RUF fighter,14557 testified that in early 2002, when Issa Sesay
entered Liberia through Vahun, he heard Benjamin Yeaten call Sesay and say to him, "[s]o
you are turning your guns over to the UN peacekeeping force?" TF1-375 testified that he
14551 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15164-15167.
14552 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15167-15170.
14554 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15170-15172.
14554 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15161-15172.
14555 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
14556 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2454-2455 (CS).
14557 TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.

---- End of Page 2238 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T dg 18 May 2012
/\/

40 35/
then heard Sesay reply, "[b]ut [we] have no objective except to disarm". TF1 -375 then heard
Yeaten tell Sesay that "you think the people are not fooling you to disarm because they, the
Liberian government .... " Yeaten then said "[w]e think we have a war and the people are ·
fighting against us. lf you disarm over there we will have more pressure, so we do not want
— the old man told me to advise you strongly that you should not turn over your weapons yet
to the UN peacekeeping force". TF1-375 testified that when Yeaten referred to "the old
man" that he meant Taylor. TF1-375 further explained that Yeaten said to Sesay that the
RUF should not disarm, because if they did it would not be good for them in Liberia. M558
6431. TF1-375 also testified that he heard Benjamin Yeaten say "[w]hat do you think we
can do with this kind of problem when these people have crossed in here? When the United
Nations know they are here we will have more pressure on our government and we already
have our own problem and are not able to solve it and the people are just causing problems
over there and crossing over here. The people are causing problems over there to come here
thinking that we will grant them asylum. We told them before that they should not disarm
and that they would encounter problems, but they did not listen to us. That is the same thing
that is going on now. What do they think we will do for them‘?" TF1-375 testified that
Yeaten then said to him that "he had told Issa Sesay not to disarm, and others, so when they
were encountering any problems they were not responsib1e". M559
The Accused
6432. The Accused testified that he invited the ECOWAS Heads of State to the Executive
Mansion in Monrovia on 26 July 2000, where the leadership of the RUF was discussed.
President Jammah of the Gambia, President Konare of Mali, President Obasanjo of Nigeria,
President Compaore of Burkina Faso, and President Eyadema of Togo attended the meeting,
while President Robert of the Cote d’1voire did not. At the meeting there were at least three
or four delegates from the RUF.l4560
6433. The Accused also testified that there was a second part to this meeting, which was
held at Roberts International Airport on 21 August 2000, and which was attended by only
Mm TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12691.
M559 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12765 (PS).
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27053; Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27159-
Taylor also noted that 26 July was also Liberian Independence Day, Transcript 19 August 2009, p.

---- End of Page 2239 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gm 18 May 2012

,4;.0 332
himself] Obasanjo, Konaré, Issa Sesay and Gibril Massaquoi, who was Sesay's spokesman.
The purpose of the meeting was to formalise Sesay's appointment as interim leader. Taylor
testified that at this meeting Sesay appeared to be "very understanding and wanting to move
forward". Sesay also agreed to immediately begin the disarmament and demobilisation
process. mm
6434. The Accused was questioned concerning TFl-338's testimony that Taylor called the
RUF delegation back for a late night meeting where he is alleged to have instructed Issa
Sesay to say he would disarm but "not do it in reality". Taylor testified that: l) the meeting
did not take place; 2) the record was clear that he was pushing Foday Sankoh to disarm; and
3) Liberia would have nothing to gain by the RUF not disarming. Taylor also disputed that
he would have said that Sesay should not listen to the "British elected" presidents, as
President Konaré is French and had a good relationship with Francophone countries,
President Jammeh was French speaking and had almost more problems with the British than
Nigeria, and President Eyadema is a "personal friend of Chirac and the French and all
preceding French governments from Mitterand to Valery Giscard d’Estaing...". Therefore,
"these little boys don’t know what they are talking about". [4562
6435. The Accused further testified that he found Sesay "to be extremely reasonable in
doing what was required under Lomé. We found him enthusiastic about it. Issa was very,
very understanding and agreeable [...] we found him to be a very reasonable fellow and,
quite frankly, if Issa had not taken over the leadership of the RUF — the interim leadership at
that time, quite frankly I do not think that peace would have come and the disarmament
would have continued". M6}
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6436. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commander,l4564 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,M565 testified that on the behalf of ECOWAS, Taylor invited
mm Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009. pp. 27167-2717l; Transcript 20 August 2009, pp.
27272-27273 (testifying that "When it got down to the major decision, Issa kept Gibnl Massaquoi with him".);
Exhibit D-259, "Press Communique lssued by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following a meeting with
H.E. Alpha Oumar Konaré, President of Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, President
of Nigeria, and H.E. Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia, August 21 2000".
M562 Charles Gharrkay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27193-27199.
M563 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, p. 27212.
MSM Issa Sesay. Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591. 44596. and

---- End of Page 2240 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z {ji 18 May 2012

him to a meeting in the end of July via radio. After spending the first night in Monrovia in 1
the guesthouse, Sesay and the RUF delegation went to the Executive Mansion where they
met with Taylor and Presidents Obasanjo, Jammeh, Konaré, and Eyadema}4566 Sesay
testified that at this meeting, the Heads of State proposed that he take over the leadership of
the RUFJ4567 Sesay stated he would need to first consult with the "RUF family", including
Foday Sankoh}4568 Sesay and his delegation then left to return to Sierra Leone the next
day 14569
6437. On 5 August 2000, about a week after his July 2000 meeting in Monrovia with
Taylor and the ECOWAS Heads of State, he returned to Liberia for a second meeting at
Roberts International Airport with a delegation that included Augustine Gbao, Jonathan
Kposowa, Samuel Jabba, Patrick PS Binda, and Colonel Lion.l457O Taylor was there along
with Presidents Konaré and Obasanjo, representatives of the other Heads of State, for
example Togo and the Gambia, and the press. At the meeting, which took place in a large
conference room, Presidents Taylor, Obasanjo, and Konare expressed that they wanted
Sesay to become the interim leader of the RUF. 14571
6438. After this meeting ended, Presidents Taylor, Obasanjo and Konaré and Sesay met in
a smaller conference room. They told Sesay that the ECOWAS leaders, including President
Kabbah, were supportive of his appointment. Further, they instructed him to arrange the
return of the seized UNAMSIL equipment, to work with UNAMSIL, to be available
whenever UNAMSIL contacted him, and to prepare "to work with the Government of Sierra
Leone in respect of the implementation of the Lomé Accord". The meeting ended and the
following day he returned to Sierra Leone. 145 72
6439. Sesay was questioned concerning the evidence of TF1—338 that after the July 2000
meeting, at about 11.00pm or midnight, Benjamin Yeaten collected him, Gbao and one other
member of the RUF delegation to meet again privately with Taylor, who instructed Sesay to
**5651ssa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.
MM Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44548—44550.
MW Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44548-44550.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44552.
M569 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44553; Transcript 2 August 2010, p. 45260.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44555-44556.
MSH Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44558-44559, 44568.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44560—44561.

---- End of Page 2241 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

,4.0 334
not listen to the British elected presidents and to tell the UN that he would disarm, but that
he should not do it, and that he would continue to support that as before. Sesay testified that
after the July 2000 meeting he was not picked up by Yeaten and taken back to Taylor's
place that night, but that they had the meeting in the daytime, and then the RUF delegation
left the next day.l4573 Sesay further testified that Taylor did not give him one set of
instructions in front of the other ECOWAS leaders during the day, and then another set of
instructions behind their backs at night. Sesay testified that what the ECOWAS leaders,
including Taylor, instructed him to do was to work with the Government of Sierra Leone
and the UN mission in Sierra Leone, and "that is what I did at the end of the day". Sesay
also testified that contrary to the testimony of TF1-338 that Taylor gave Sesay EBUSD 15,000
after the private night meeting, Taylor did not give him any money on that trip. M574
6440. Sesay was also questioned conceming Exhibit D-259, an RUF "Press Communique"
dated 21 August 2000, and signed by Issa Sesay. The communiqué recounted this meeting at
Roberts Intemational Airport with Presidents Konaré, Obasanjo, and Taylor wherein
Presidents Konaré and Obasanjo delivered a letter from Foday Sankoh approving the
appointment of Issa Sesay as interim leader of the RUF. Among other things, the RUF
"assures of our readiness to cooperate with [UNAMSIL] in order to ensure the success of the
DDR Programme [Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration] in particular, and the
peace process in general as mandated in the Lome Peace Accord". 14575
6441. Sesay was questioned conceming Exhibit P-538, a letter approved by Issa Sesay as
Acting Chairman of the RUF, informing Charles Taylor that Gibril Massaquoi was
impeached by the Extemal Delegation.l4576 Sesay testified that this happened because
Massaquoi was working with Foday Sankoh's wife to push "documents through the intemet
saying that they were my instruction [sic], which was not the case so — and the way he was
communicating over the media, we realised that he was opposed to the peace process that
was afoot". General Opande would forward to Sesay the "intemet documents" because he
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45260-45261.
I4574 Issa Sesay, Transc1ipt2 August 2010, pp. 45261—45262.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44567-44568 (testifying that communiqué was drafted by Gibril
Massaquoi); Exhibit D-259, "‘Press Communique Issued by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following a
meeting with H.E. Alpha Oumar Konaré, President of Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E. Olusegun
Obgsbaggo, President of Nigeria, and H.E. Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia, August
@76 Exhibit P-538 (confidential), ERN 25491.

---- End of Page 2242 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T /, 18 May 2012

,40535
was surprised by their contents. Sesay testified that he told Opande that "I did not send
something like this. And this was talking about threats to the peace process that I, General
Issa, would never disann the RUF whilst Foday Sankoh was behind bars, which means it
was going contrary to what the ECOWAS had told me and what [ had accepted. So it was a
direct opposite of what the ECOWAS had told me and what was on the intemet". 14577
6442. When questioned as to how the disannament process progressed following his
appointment as interim leader through the end of 2000, Sesay testified that the fighting
between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone ceased, and that only a few raids took
place between the RUF and Kamajors in Kono and Kailahun until October 2000 when the
ECOWAS sponsored Abuja I meeting was held,l4578 and that from August 2000 through
disarmament, there were no hostilities.l4579 Sesay further testified that although disarmament
of the RUF had begun in as early as December 1999, that after he was appointed as interim
leader in August 2000 further disannament halted while he sent a delegation to Abuja I in
October 2000 and then was waiting for an invitation from ECOWAS for a follow~up
meeting. Once Abuja II took place in May 2000 disannament restarted.l458O
6443. Sesay was questioned conceming the evidence of TF1~338 that Sesay made trips to
Monrovia in late 2000 into the spring of 2001. Sesay testified that conceming the trip that
was alleged to have taken place at the end of 2000, where he was supposed to have gone to
the Camp Schefflin barracks in Monrovia and taken anns and ammunition and large
quantities of boots and uniforms, while he had driven by Camp Schefflin he had never
entered it. Further, since he "was appointed interim leader, I never brought unifonns and
boots to the RUF, nor did I bring AKs". MSM Sesay testified that the second trip in early 2001
recounted by TFl~338 occurred, wherein he was alleged to have taken back a few AK rifles,
a few G3 rifles, G3 rounds, RPG rockets, bags of rice, and about four drums of diesel. Sesay
testified that in December 2000 he had a meeting with UN General Opande and then in early
2001 UNAMSIL had redeployed in Makeni and Magburaka, and from that time the RUF
and UNAMSIL never had any problems until disannament came to an end. Therefore he did
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp, 44568—44569.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44570-4457l.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44573.
MSO Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45285—45286.
{ml Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45282—45283.

---- End of Page 2243 ---------------------------


Case No

40 53 6
not have any need for ammunition in either 2000 or early 200144542 Sesay also disputed
TF1-338's evidence that he gave diamonds to Alpha Bravo in exchange for $USD 300,000,
half of which he left for safe-keeping with Taylor. Sesay testified that he never sold
diamonds to a person named Alpha and that the witness was telling lies because none of this
had occurred.l4443 Sesay further testified that on no occasion in which he travelled from
Monrovia to Foya by helicopter did Taylor give him arms and ammunition to take back with
him~14ss4
6444. Sesay also disputed the evidence of TF1-338 that he met with UN officials Opande
and Adenigi in mid-2001 to discuss child disarmament, and that he then went to brief Taylor
in order to get his advice. Sesay testified that he did not specifically remember meeting with
General Opande in Magburaka in mid-2001, although General Opande and he did hold a
number of meetings. Similarly, he did not remember a meeting to discuss specifically the
disarming of child combatants. Sesay also testified that he never had a meeting with Taylor
to discuss the disarmament of child soldiers, and that on no occasion did Taylor ever tell him
not to disarm with the UN44585 Finally, in regard to TF1-338's testimony that Sesay
complained that he would no longer take instructions from Taylor not to disarm, as Taylor
was living in peace and he wanted to give peace to the people of Sierra Leone, Sesay
testified that he never had such a conversation. 44546
6445. In relation to TF1-338's evidence that the RUF attacked Gueckedou and Koinadugu
in Guinea pursuant to an instruction from Charles Taylor, Sesay testified that the RUF never
left Sierra Leone to attack Gueckedou and Koinadugu, and that he never sent any organised
force to go and join Benjamin Yeaten to attack Guinea.l4587
Deliberations
6446. TF1-33 8, the Accused, and Issa Sesay all testified concerning meetings that were
held in Liberia in July and/or August 2000, and that were convened in relation to selecting
new leadership for the RUF after Sankoh's imprisonment. All three witneses testified that
14582 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45289-45292.
14544 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 Augum 2010, pp. 4531 1-45313.
14584 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44563. p
14545 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45329-45331.
14546 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45331-45332.
14587 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45617-45618.

---- End of Page 2244 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-F 18 May 2012
-4

there was a meeting in July 2000 in Monrovia that included all of the ECOWAS presidents
and an RUF delegation led by Issa Sesay where it was proposed that Sesay take over as
interim leader, and that there was a second meeting at Roberts International Airport in
August 2000 which Presidents Taylor, Obasanjo, and Konaré attended to fonnalise Sesay's
appointment as interim leader after receiving Foday Sankoh's consent. 44588
6447. The Prosecution allegation that the Accused told Sesay that he should say he would
disarm, but then "not do it in reality" is supported by TF1-338, who testified that Taylor told
this to Sesay at a smaller meeting that took place in Monrovia immediately after the July
meeting at around midnight and included the Accused, Sesay, and Augustine Gbao. 44544
6448. When examined regarding TF1-338's evidence concerning the midnight meeting in
Monrovia, the Accused denied that such a meeting took place. He also disputed that he
would have told Sesay not to listen to the English elected presidents as several of the
ECOWAS presidents were Francophone without strong ties to England, and because Liberia
had nothing to gain if Sierra Leone did not disann.44544) Sesay disputed that the midnight
meeting took place as well, and that Taylor was telling him one thing in front of the
ECOWAS Heads of State, but another thing in private. 44544 The evidence of the Accused and
Sesay supports the proposition that during the time of the July and August 2000 meetings,
Sesay was enthusiastic about carrying out disarmament. 44592
6449. In addition to the evidence concerning the meeting that allegedly took place in July
2000 in Monrovia, the Prosecution brought evidence through TF1-338 that Sesay delayed
the disarmament process in certain areas because of "things that were happening", including
repelling rebel attacks in Liberia. TF1-338 provided as an example that Taylor gave orders
to Sesay to send fighters to Guinea, and that this was why "there was delay, the disarmament
44544 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15149-15150; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August
2009, p. 27053; Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27159-27164, 27167-27171; Transcript 20 August 2009, p.
27272-27273; Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44548-44561.
‘"*"’ Tri-338. Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15149-15150.
44590 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27193-27199.
44544 Issa Sesay. Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45260-45262.
44542 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, p. 27212; Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp.
44567-44569; Exhibit D-259, "Press Communique Issued by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following a
meeting with H.E. Alpha Oumar Konaré, President of Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E. Olusegun
Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, and H.E. Dahlcpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia. August
21 2000"; Exhibit P-538 (confidential), ERN 25491.

---- End of Page 2245 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

40 338
in that area".l4592` The operations in Guinea and Liberia with RUF support refute the
argument of the Accused that Liberia had nothing to gain if Sesay did not disarm. He would
call upon their fighters to help him in Guinea. Although Sesay disputed this evidence,l4594
the Trial Chamber recalls its finding, based in part on TF1-338's evidence, that in 2000 and
2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces, who fought alongside AFL
forces in Liberia and Guinea under the command of the Accused's subordinates}4595
6450. ln a related vein, the Prosecution also presented the evidence of TF1-375, who
testified that when Sesay entered Liberia in 2002, he heard Benjamin Yeaten call Sesay and
ask whether it was true that he was "turning [his] guns over to the UN peacekeeping force"
and Sesay replied that "[we] don’t have any objective but to disarm". TF1-3 75 then heard
Yeaten tell Sesay that Taylor told him to strongly advise Sesay not to disarm because if he
did, it would not be good for them in Liberia.l459° TF1-3 75 went on to testify that he heard
Benjamin Yeaten say that when "these people" were crossing into Liberia hoping for
asylum, that "[w]e had told them before that they should not disarm and that they would
encounter problems, but they did not listen to us". TF1-3 75 then testified that Yeaten said to
him directly that he had told Sesay and others not to disarm, so if they were having problems
that "they were not responsible".l4597 The Trial Chamber recalls that TF1-375's evidence
must be considered with caution and cannot be relied upon without corroboration}4598
6451. TF1-375 suggests that although Taylor may have advised Sesay not to disarm, Sesay
may have been reluctant to follow his advice. TF1-371 testified that Mike Lamin attended a
meeting in 2001 with the Accused, Sesay, and Morris Kallon where the Accused had a
discussion with Sesay concerning his progress in disarming the RUF, and asked him
whether he trusted the process. M599
6452. TF1-338 also testified that in mid-2001, after Sesay's meeting to discuss the
disarmament of child soldiers, that Sesay said Taylor asked him whether it would be safe for
14593 TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15556-15557.
14504 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45617-45618.
**595 Leadership and Command Stmetnre: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Operations Outside Sierra
ESQHTF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12691.
14597 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12765 (PS).
14598 Credibility Assessment, TF1-375, paras 308-312.
14599 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2454-2455 (CS).

---- End of Page 2246 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T [ 18 May 2012

the RUF to disarm, and "advised him not to disarm at all" because the UN would be nice "t0
y0u today and tom0rrow they would turn around and arrest y0u...". The evidence suggests
that the Accused was calling on Sesay to question the disarmament process. TF 1-338
recounted that on the way back Sesay complained to the commanders he was travelling with
that he would no longer take instructions from Taylor telling him to disarm, as Taylor and
Liberia were living in peace, and Sesay believed that disarmament would also bring peace to
Sierra Leone. 44000 Sesay disputed that this conversation 0ccurred. 44004
6453. The Prosecution also brought evidence through TF 1-338 that in late 2000 into 2001,
Sesay made four trips to Monrovia in which he gave Taylor diamonds and then left
Monrovia via helicopter with supplies.l4002 Although Sesay disputed this evidence,l4003 the
Trial Chamber recalls its tinding, based in part on TF1-338's evidence, that the Accused
supplied Issa Sesay with military equipment when he travelled to Liberia in the second half
er 2000 and earry 2001. *0000
6454. Taking into consideration the 0ngoing provision of arms and ammunition by the
Accused to Issa Sesay during this peri0d, as well as the Accused's own interest in keeping
the RUF armed so that it could help him iight enemies in Liberia and Guinea, and recalling
its tinding that TF 1-338 is a generally credible witness,l4005 the Trial Chamber accepts the
evidence of TF 1-338 that the Accused privately advised Sesay not to disarm.
Findings
6455. The Trial Chamber linds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused privately advised Issa Sesay to resist disarmament in Sierra Leone.
Summagg of Findings
6456. The Trial Chamber has found that -
14000 TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15175-15176.
14004 Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45329-45332.
**000 TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15161-15172.
14003 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44563; Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45282-45283, 45289-45292,
45311-45313.
14004 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's Leadership
(December l999—January 2002).
**000 credrbrrrty Assessment, TFl-338, paras 318-329.

---- End of Page 2247 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that during a radio
conversation with Foday Sankoh, the Accused advised the RUF leader to
send an External Delegation to Cote d’Ivoire. In Cote d’Ivoire, the
delegates met Musa Cisse, an NPFL representative, who allowed them to
use his radio for communications with Sankoh.
(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused,
through contact with Musa Cissé, invited members of the External
Delegation to Liberia, where he met them twice in 1995. In December
1995 the Accused met members of the External Delegation in Cote
d’Ivoire on the occasion of the publication "Footpaths to Democracy", at
which time he gave them CFA 10 million francs for their maintenance.
(iii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the trip by
members of the External Delegation to Accra at the invitation of the
Accused was made in order to facilitate contacts for arms deals.
(iv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
instructed Foday Sankoh to attend the Abidjan peace negotiations in order
to obtain arms and ammunitions for the RUF.
(v) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Foday
Sankoh used the contacts of the Accused to obtain arms and ammunition
for the RUF during the Abidjan peace process.
(vi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
improperly provided assistance and advice to the AFRC/RUF before and
during the Lomé negotiations so as to facilitate an outcome most
( favourable to the AFRC/RUF and himself
(vii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that while publicly
promoting peace at the Lomé negotiations, the Accused was privately
providing arms and ammunition to the RUF.
(viii) The Accused used his influence with both Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday
Sankoh to facilitate the release of the UN peacekeepers and others who
had been taken captive by the West Side Boys, and to bring the AFRC and

---- End of Page 2248 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T [ {ig 18 May 2012

RUF leaders together to reduce tension between the RUF and the AFRC
following the Lomé Peace Accord, with the knowledge of the UN and
ECOWAS.
(ix) The Accused had significant influence over Issa Sesay's decision to
release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers, and that he was asked by ECOWAS
to become involved in negotiations for their release.
(x) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the arms and
ammunition Issa Sesay obtained from the Accused during Sesay's trip to
Liberia in May 2000 were provided in exchange for Issa Sesay agreeing to
release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers.
(xi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
privately advised Issa Sesay to resist disarmament in Sierra Leone.
Conclusion
6457. The Trial Chamber has considered the role of the Accused in the peace process and
the Defence contention that his involvement with the RUF/AFRC was solely for the purpose
of promoting peace.
6458. The Trial Chamber has found that during a radio conversation with Foday Sankoh,
following the attack on Sierra Rutile in 1994, the Accused advised the RUF leader to send
an External Delegation to Cote d’1voire. In Cote d’1voire, the delegates met Musa Cissé, an
NPFL representative, who allowed them to use his radio for communications with Sankoh.
The Accused, through contact with Musa Cissé, invited members of the External Delegation
to Liberia, where he met them twice in 1995. In December 1995 he met members of the
External Delegation in Cote d’1voire on the occasion of the publication "Footpaths to
Democracy", at which time he gave them CFA 10 million francs for their maintenance. The
evidence was insufficient to establish that the trip by members of the External Delegation to
Accra in 1995 at the invitation of the Accused was made in order to facilitate contacts for
arms deals.
6459. The Accused instructed Foday Sankoh to participate in the Abidjan peace talks from
March to November 1996 in order to obtain ammunition and materiel for the RUF. The
evidence established that while in Abidjan, Sankoh obtained arms and ammunition for the

---- End of Page 2249 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL·03·01·T % 583 18 May 2012

40 342
RUF. However, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Sankoh used contacts of the
Accused to obtain aims and ammunition in Abidjan.
6460. The Accused played an active role in the Lomé peace negotiations, which role the
Prosecution alleged to be subversive, suggesting that the Accused improperly assisted and
instructed the RUF before and during the negotiations so as to procure the most favourable
outcome for AFRC/RUF and himself The Trial Chamber did not find this to be the case in
the absence of evidence of improper actions during the negotiations or evidence that the
Accused controlled the RUF delegation or dictated the outcome of the negotiations.
However, the evidence established that the Accused was engaged in arms transactions at the
same time that he was involved in the peace negotiations in Lomé, publicly promoting peace
at the Lomé negotiations, while privately providing aims and ammunition to the RUF.
6461. Following the Lomé Peace Accord, discontent with the apparent exclusion of the
AFRC from the process, the so—called West Side Boys kidnapped UN peacekeepers and
others and demanded to talk to, and then see, Johnny Paul Koroma. The Accused made
arrangements to bring Koroma to Monrovia, including negotiating a waiver of the UN travel
ban, and facilitating several meetings, thereby playing a central role in bringing Koroma and
Sankoh together and achieving a reduction in the tension between the RUF and the AFRC.
The evidence establishes, as the Accused contends, that the UN and ECOWAS Heads of
State knew about his public role in the negotiations. The influence of the Accused with both
Koroma and Sankoh made him a significant actor in the process and helped to facilitate the
release of the UN peacekeepers and others who had been taken captive by the West Side
Boys.
6462. ln late April or early May 2000, the RUF forcibly disarmed and detained a group of
approximately 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. The Accused was asked by
ECOWAS to become involved in the negotiations for the release of these hostages, and his
mandate was endorsed by the UN. Thereafter, the Accused invited Issa Sesay to Monrovia to
discuss the matter of their release. After this meeting, from about the middle to the end of
May 2000 the RUF released the captured UNAMSIL peacekeepers into Liberian territory in
stages. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused had significant influence over the
RUF decision to release the UNAMSlL peacekeepers, and that in his meeting concerning the
release of the peacekeepers with Issa Sesay he promised assistance "in the struggle". While
the Trial Chamber has found that Issa Sesay made a trip to Liberia in May 2000 in which he

---- End of Page 2250 ---------------------------


Case No; SCSL-03-01-T jh [ 18 May 2012

40 34 3
obtained arms and amrnunitions from the Accused, the evidence was insufficient to establish
that this materiel was provided in exchange for Issa Sesay agreeing to release the UNAMSIL
peacekeepers.
6463. In July 2000, a meeting was convened in Monrovia to discuss the selection of new
leadership for the RUF following Sankoh's imprisonment. The meeting was attended by all
of the ECOWAS heads of state and an RUF delegation led by Issa Sesay where it was
proposed that Sesay take over as interim leader of the RUF. In another meeting late that
night, the Accused privately advised Issa Sesay to say that he would disarm but "not do it in
reality". At that time, the Accused was supplying Sesay with arms and ammunition, and
also calling on the RUF to send forces to help him iight his own enemies together with the _
AFL in Liberia and in Guinea.

---- End of Page 2251 ---------------------------


Case No.; scsL-03-01-T {ju fl 18 May 2012

I. Leadership and Command Structure
l. Accused Relationship with the RUF /AF RC
6464. The Prosecution alleges that Taylor played a critical, authoritative role vis cz vis the
RUF. lt submits that from the beginning and throughout his association with the RUF and
later the AFRC/RUF, Taylor was the ultimate authority, the overall leader, the one who truly
created and sustained his proxy forces, the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF. These proxy
forces rightly referred to Taylor as "Chief" or "Commander in "Chief", "Father" or
"Papay/Pa" or "Godfather" accurately reflecting his central role in the life of the RUF and
later the AFRC/RUF and his overall control of these his surrogate forces in Sierra
Leone.l46O6
6465. The Defence contends that the Prosecution's allegation is unclear and inconsistent
with its previous allegation of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (J CE) between the Accused and
the RUF based on an equal and mutually beneficial relationship. The Defence further
submits that the evidence fails to establish a superior/ subordinate relationship in that there is
no indication of Taylor's effective control over the RUF, the Junta or the AFRC/RUF. MGM
Prelimingg Remarks
6466. The Trial Chamber recalls that a significant part of the entire evidence adduced by
both the Prosecution and the Defence is relevant to Taylor's relationship with the RUF and
later the AFRC/RUF. Thus, Taylor's role vis a vis the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF can
only be assessed by examining the entirety of the evidence. The following parts of this
section are only those which have not been considered previously in the Judgement.
However, in making its conclusion regarding Taylor's relationship vis a vis the RUF and
AFRC/RUF, the Trial Chamber has considered the evidence in its entirety and all the
findings made in the other parts of the Judgement.
**06 Prosecution rmi rmi Brief, paras. 1, 48, 51-58, 60, 115, 129
‘*°‘" Defence rim Trial Brief paras. 1230-1258

---- End of Page 2252 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol-T 18 May 2012

(a) Foday Sankoh
Submissions of the Parties
6467. The Prosecution alleges that toward the end of 1996, Sankoh made it clear that in his
absence, Bockarie should take orders from Taylor. According to the Prosecution,
AFRC/RUF leaders from Foday Sankoh to Issa Sesay and Johnny Paul Koroma all regarded
Charles Taylor as their "boss", "senior brother" or "chief’. The Prosecution submits that
immediately after his arrest in March 1997,l46Og Sankoh reiterated to Bockarie that in his
absence, Bockarie should take instructions from Charles Taylor, and that Bockarie indicated
he would obey that order and did follow that instruction before, during, and after the Junta
took power in Sierra Leone in May 1997.14609 The Prosecution relies on the evidence of
Karmoh Kanneh, TF1—338, and Augustine Mallah in support of these allegations.
. 6468. The Defence challenges Mallah's allegation that after San1Sankoh used Musa Cisse's radio to send a message to Bockarie instructing him to take
advice and orders from the Accused during the period of Sankoh's incarceration in Nigeria.
The Defence submits that, as the RUF had its own radio base and operators in Cote d’Ivoire
in 1997, there would have been no need for Foday Sankoh to use Musa Cisse's radio to relay
a message.l46lO The Defence submits that Mallah's evidence that Sam Bockarie should take
instructions from the Accused should "be dismissed in much the same way that Mallah's
other alleged overheard conversations between the two estranged leaders during the long
period when everyone else says they had fallen out".l46ll The Defence relies on the evidence
of the Accused and Issa Sesay, and Fayia Musa provided relevant evidence.
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
6469. Witness Karmoh Kanneh, an RUF commander, testified that shortly after the
Abidjan Peace Accord was signed, Foday Sankoh called a meeting for RUF officers and
soldiers in Giema. The witness attended this meeting and heard Foday Sankoh tell those
MOB The Prosecution in fact states "March 1998" but this is assumed to be an error. `
14609 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 55.
MMO Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 993.
Mw Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 454.

---- End of Page 2253 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol-T 18 May 2012

assembled that he had signed the peace process in the interest of the movement. Sankoh also
promoted Kanneh to Captain, and promoted Bockarie to Colonel. Sankoh then told Issa
Sesay to assemble all the senior officers at his home for an officers’ meeting. Those present
included Bockarie, Sesay, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), "Abubakar", Francis Oscar Charles
(a.k.a. FOC), Jackson Swaray, and other commanders.
6470. Sankoh gave Bockarie a satellite phone, and said that all commanders should take
orders from Bockarie while Sankoh was away on a political tour, and that Bockarie should
take instructions from the Accused. Sankoh then introduced Tamba to the commanders as a
representative of the Accused.l46l2
Prosecution Witness TF1—338
6471. Witness TF1—338, an RUF member, testified that after Foday Sankoh was arrested in
Nigeria in 1997, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) called Bockarie on the radio and said that
Taylor had instructed him to give a message to Bockarie, which had been passed on to
Taylor by Sankoh. Tamba said that Sankoh instructed that Bockarie be promoted, and that
he should take all direct orders from Taylor until Sankoh retumed from Nigeria. 14613
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
6472. Witness Augustine Mallah, an RUF security officer, testified that while he was in
Danane, Cote d’Ivoire, a man known as Action Man, an NPFL radio operator who worked
for Musa Cisse, invited the witness to Cisse's house approximately two days after Sankoh
had been arrested in Nigeria. At Cissé's house, Action Man told the witness that he had been
in radio communication with Sankoh, who had asked Action Man to contact Bockarie and to
establish a direct radio link between Sankoh and Bockarie so that Sankoh could
communicate instructions to Bockarie.l46l4
6473. The following night, Mallah again went to Musa Cisse's house, this time with CO
Brown, and saw Action Man contact Bockarie by radio. The witness testified that he heard
Sankoh's voice over the radio, and that Sankoh instructed Bockarie to stop dealing with
Fayia Musa and others and instead to take advice and orders from the Accused in Liberia
Mm Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9353-9359.
WM TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15114-15116.
Mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20125-20127.

---- End of Page 2254 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ 18 May 2012

.40 347
during the period of Sankoh's incarceration in Nigeria.{4°{5 He then heard Bockarie say that
he would accept these instructions. {M6
The Accused
6474. The Accused denied that he was receiving messages from Foday Sankoh while the
latter was incarcerated in Nigeria. The Accused testified that Sankoh would not have needed
his services to relay messages to Sierra Leone, as Sankoh's guesthouse in Cote d’Ivoire was
equipped with facilities for the RUF to communicate with Sierra Leone.{46{7 The Accused
also denied the allegation that he sent a message to Sam Bockarie through Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. Jungle). The Accused testified that he had never known Tamba, and that he heard this
name for the first time in court. {M8 The Accused asserted that he was not in communication
with Sankoh or Bockarie after Sankoh's arrest in Nigeria, and that he was not involved in
any RUF promotions. {M9
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6475. Witness Issa Sesay testified that two RUF radio operators remained in Cote d’Ivoire
after Foday Sankoh's arrest. When Sankoh wanted to communicate with Sam Bockarie in
Sierra Leone, he would telephone either Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) or "Pa Kallon" at
Sankoh's house in Abidjan and leave a message for Bockarie. Memunatu Deen, Sankoh's
radio operator in Abidjan, would then communicate the message to Bockarie in Sierra
Leone.{462O
6476. Sesay testified that Sankoh promoted several RUF members through a message sent
in this way: Bockarie was promoted to Field Commander, Mike Lamin became a Colonel,
Denis Mingo became a Colonel, Isaac Mongor a Colonel, and Issa Sesay a Lieutenant
Colonel. Sankoh made no mention of Taylor in this message, nor did he direct that Bockarie
should take instructions from Taylor, but told Bockarie to take instructions from Johnny
{M5 Augustine Mallah, Transcript l2 November 2008, pp. 20125-20127.
{4°{6 Augustine Mallah, Transcript l2 November 2008, pp. 20127-20128.
{4°{7 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30530-30532.
{M8 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript l4 September 2009, p. 28717; Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30530.
{W9 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2009, pp. 30859-30860; Transcript 28 October 2009, pp.
30530-30532.
{4620 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43736-43737, 43768-43769.

---- End of Page 2255 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T A%/ l8 May 20l2

Paul Koroma.14621 Sesay was inconsistent on the time period in which Sankoh made these
romotions, statin Hrst that he sent the messa ¤e after he was arrested in Ni eria, and then
P 8 8 8
that he sent the message while he was still in Abidjan, before he was arrested. 14622
6477. Sesay also stated that Tamba was a close friend of his, and was not a member of
Taylor's special security forces in Liberia, nor did he work for Taylor. Tamba was a member
of the RUF, and worked at Foday Sankoh's house in Abidjan in 1996.14423 Sesay also
testified that following his arrest, Sankoh used to communicate with Bockarie in Abidjan
through telephone lines. 141424
6478. Sesay denied Augustine Mallah's claim that Sankoh ordered Bockarie to take advice
from Taylor over the radio at Musa Cisse's home in Danané. Sesay contends that in October
1996, Mallah was in Liberia with Mike Lamin, and therefore could not have been in Danané
to hear that conversation. 14625
Defence Witness Fayia Musa
6479. Witness Fayia Musa denied the veracity of Augustine Mallah's claim that he was
present when Action Man connected Sankoh and Bockarie on the radio at Cissé's house in
Cote d’1voire. First, Musa denied that Musa Cissé had a radio operator named "Action
Man", stating that instead his operator was named "Cassell".14626 Second, Musa stated that at
the time of Sankoh's arrest, he had several other ways of communicating and did not need to
use Cissé's radio. When Foday Sankoh arrived in Cote d’1voire in March 1996, he brought
with him two radios and several radio operators, including Juliet Gbessy James, Martin
Moinama, Menamutu Deen, Eddie Murphy, and Dauda Aruna Fornie (a.k.a ‘°DAF"). One
radio was set up at Phillip Palmer's house in Danané, and the other was in Abidjan at
Sankoh's "Cocody house".14627 The witness and other members of the Eexternal Delegation
14621 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43776—43779, 43800; 2 August 2010, pp. 45184·45185.
14(mIssa Sesay, Transcript 17 Aagaar 2010, pp. 46522;-46552
14423 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45183·45184; Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43801—43806, 43809.
146241ssa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43797.
14625 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 August 2010, p.46132—46133; Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46524.
‘*°2° Fayia Musa, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 59565.
14627 Fayia Musa, Transcript 14 April 20l0, pp. 39010~3901 1; Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39566—39567.

---- End of Page 2256 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T % 18 May 2012

A GSA?
had good relationships with the RUF operators in Abidjan, and none of them told him of a
message from Sankoh to Bockarie that he should take orders from Taylor. M628
Deliberations A
6480. Prosecution Witnesses Karmoh Kanneh, TF1-338, and Augustine Mallah each
testified that Foday Sankoh conveyed a message to Sam Bockarie that he should take orders
from the Accused. Kanneh testified that this message was conveyed shortly after the Abidjan
Peace Accord was signed, at a meeting that he attended of RUF officers in Giema. Mallah
testified that a few days after Sankoh's detention in Nigeria, in 1997, he heard this message
conveyed through a radio conversation between Sankoh and Bockarie, via Musa Cisse's
radio. TF1-338 testified that this communication occurred while Sankoh was in detention in
iNigeria in the beginning of 1997. According to TF1-338, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle)
relayed the message to Bockarie over the radio, stating that the instruction had come from
Sankoh to Taylor, and then to Tamba.
6481. Kanneh testified to having heard Sankoh tell Bockarie directly that he should take
instructions from the Accused while he was away. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that
Kanneh is a generally credible witness}4629 TF1-338, also found by the Trial Chamber to be
a credible witness,l463O testified that Sankoh gave this instruction after he had been arrested.
The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-338 did not mention the earlier instruction in his
testimony, but the Trial Chamber does not find that this undermines the credibility of
Kanneh's account. It is unclear from TF1-338's testimony whether he was in the room when
the radio message between Tamba and Bockarie transpired, and the Trial Chamber notes that
his evidence that Sankoh gave these instructions to Bockarie came from Tamba, who
received it from Taylor. Nevertheless, the content of the message delivered is consistent
with the content of the message about which Mallah testified. Mallah testified that he was
present and heard Sankoh tell Bockarie over the radio to take orders from Taylor. The Trial
Chamber recalls its finding that Mallah is a generally credible witness.1463l These three
directives, delivered at different times and in different manners, all convey the same
message, that Bockarie was to take orders from the Accused.
14628 Fayia Musa, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39568.
14629 Credibility Assessment, Karmoh Kanneh, The Role of Intermediaries, para. 2704.
""° Credibility Assessment, TFl-338, putus 318-329.
"‘°" Credibility Assessment, Augustine Mallah, Pte-lndietment Period (1988-1996), para. 2522.

---- End of Page 2257 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T §·_}_ 18 May 20 l2 IM

,4}.0 3 5 O
6482. The Trial Chamber considers that the three messages testified to by Kanneh, TFl—
338 and Mallah, respectively, are mutually corroborative. Prior to his departure Sankoh
instructed his men on an interim delegation of authority during his absence on a political
tour. Once he was arrested, Sankoh reiterated the delegation of authority to cover his time in
detention. He informed both Bockarie and Taylor, Mallah's testimony describing his
communication with Bockarie, and TFl—338 describing his communication with Taylor,
who then passed the message to Bockarie.
6483. The Defence challenges the credibility of Mallah's account by offering evidence that
Sankoh had other means of communicating this message to Bockarie, such as through
Sankoh's own operators in Cote d’1voire. The Trial Chamber finds, however, that Sankoh's
access to other operators does not negate the evidence that Sankoh communicated
instructions via Musa Cissé's operator as well. Issa Sesay testified that in October 1996,
Mallah was in Liberia with Mike Lamin and therefore could not have been in Cote d’1voire
to hear this conversation. The Trial Chamber recalls, however, that Mallah testified that this
incident occurred two days after Sankoh's arrest, which took place in March 1997.l4°32
Finally, Sesay testified that Musa Cissé's radio operator was named "Cassell", and not
"Action Man". The Trial Chamber notes, however, that Prosecution Witness TFl—168
testified to Cissé having two operators, Cassell and Action Man}4633
6484. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the testimony of Issa Sesay must be treated
with caution}4634 1n light of the aforementioned evidence, the Trial Chamber does not find
his testimony that Sankoh told Bockarie to take instructions from Johnny Paul Koroma to be
credible, nor does it find the denials of the Accused to be credible.
Findings
6485. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that before he left Sierra Leone on a political tour, and following his arrest in Nigeria in
March 1997, Sankoh instructed Bockarie to take orders from the Accused.
""’;"2 See Exhibit P—078, "Sierra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 2; Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010. p. 39098; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43737. This
incident therefore allegedly also occurred in March 1997
Mw TFl—168, Transcript 22 January 2009 p. 23262.
MGM Credibility Assessment. Issa Sesay. paras 359-372.

---- End of Page 2258 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

(b) Junta Period
Submissions of the Parties
6486. It is undisputed that the AFRC seized power from the elected government of Sierra
Leone in a coup d’etat on 25 May 1997, and Johnny Paul Koroma became the leader and
chairman of the AFRC. 14635 Shortly after the AFRC seized power, Foday Sankoh ordered the
RUF to join the AFRC in governing Sierra Leone}4636 As the founders of the AFRC
belonged to the Sierra Leonean Army and had therefore been fighting the RUF since 1991,
the coalition between the two factions was not based on longstanding common interests, but
both factions officially declared that they were joining forces to bring peace and political
stability to Sierra Leone. On approximately 14 February 1998, ECOMOG ousted the
AFRC/RUF Junta government from power. I4637
6487. The Prosecution submits that the Accused realized the importance of a strong
AFRC/RUF alliance in achieving the ultimate objectives of` pillaging the resources, in
particular the diamonds, and controlling the people and territory of Sierra Leone. The
Accused believed that the RUF would have a better position if` it forged and maintained an
alliance with the AFRC than if the AFRC became yet another force against which the RUF
must fight}4638
6488. According to the Prosecution, Taylor was instrumental in creating and maintaining a
viable and strong AFRC/RUF alliance during and after the Junta period. During the Junta,
Taylor remained informed of the situation on the ground in Sierra Leone, including with
regard to the movement of troops and progress at the front lines, via communications
between his radio operators in Liberia and AFRC/RUF operators. This, the Prosecution
alleges, enabled Taylor to continue to take informed action to keep the alliance
functional. 14639
Mw Joint Filing by the Prosecution and Defence: Admitted Facts and Law, Nos. 17 and 18.
M36 Joint Filing by the Prosecution and Defence: Admitted Facts and Law, No. 30. See also Defence Final Trial
Brief para. 581; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008 pp. 10441-10442; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript
17 April 2008 pp. 7872-7873; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008 pp. 13338-13339; Perry Kamara, Transcript
5 February 2008 pp. 3086-3087; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008 pp. 4491-4492; Issa Sesay,
Transcript 18 August 2010 pp. 46540-46541.
Wm Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, Fact AD.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras. 115, 139, 185.
WG9 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 185.

---- End of Page 2259 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012
V

6489. The Prosecution submits that the main reason AFRC leaders requested the RUF to
'oin them was to brin Taylor on their side, and for that the needed the RUF. Accordin to
J S Y Y S
the Prosecution, it was the RUF that provided Johnny Paul Koroma with the contact number
for Taylor, and Taylor was one of the first contacts Koroma made after taking over as
Chairman of the Junta government. After the call to Taylor, Koroma relayed the
conversation with Taylor to his men, saying that Taylor said he accepted the AFRC/RUF
alliance, and advised Koroma to work as a team with the RUF. Taylor indicated his control
over the RUF, telling Koroma that if the AFRC had any problems with the RUF, Koroma
should call him.14444 The Prosecution further alleges that Taylor "reorganized" the Junta
Government and agreed to act as an "ambassador" or "advocate" for them in relation to
EcowAs."""'
6490. The Defence denies that the AFRC invited the RUF to join the government in order
to get to Taylor, stating that the AFRC did so in order to "foster peace".14442 The Defence
further denies that Foday Sankoh provided Taylor's phone number to Koroma, or that
Taylor spoke to Koroma, saying that he first spoke to him in 1999.14443 The Defence denied
that Taylor told Koroma that if there were any problems between the two groups they should
call Taylor,14444 that he encouraged the two groups to work together,14444 or that Taylor
controlled the J unta.14444 The Defence further denied that Taylor reco ised the Junta, and
Y gn
noted that Taylor was not President of Liberia when the RUF joined the AFRC.14447 After
Taylor was inaugurated President and joined ECOWAS, the Defence contends, Taylor
followed ECOWAS's prohibition on recognising the Junta, and agreed with the decision to
return President Kabbah to ower.14444 The Defence denies that, as the Prosecution alle es,
P S
the RUF and AFRC functioned cordially, and contends that the AFRC/RUF alliance was not
unified,14444 and denies that Taylor was in communication with the Junta either through
14444 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 186.
14441 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 187-188.
14444 Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 106.
14443 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 366, 860; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 105.
14444 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 366, 860; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 105.
14445 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 843, 851, 854, 1243.
14444 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 1241-1243.
14447 Defence Final Trial Brief paras 366, 851-852, 854, 856; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief
para. 105. 1
**64** Defence rmi rmi Brief paras 855-859.
14444 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 842; Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras. 107-1 1 1.

---- End of Page 2260 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

communications equipment or alleged intermediaries such as Ibrahim Bah.14°5O Finally, the
Defence contends that had Bockarie been in contact with Taylor prior to the Junta period, as
the Prosecution alleges, the AF RC/RUF 's struggles to gain acceptance from Taylor after the
cou d’etat would be unbelievable. 1465 1
P
Evidence 1
Prosecution Witness Samuel Kargbo
6491. Witness Samuel Kargbo, a former SLA and member of the AF RC Supreme
Council,14652 testified that after the AFRC coup, the AF RC government was not recognized
by the international community, although they were recognised by Niger, Burkina Faso and
Libya. They therefore discussed asking the RUF for their support, manpower and contacts.
They knew that the RUF had contact with Taylor, who was the RUF 's "godfather", and they
needed the RUF to have Taylor on their side. 111653
6492. One to two weeks after the AFRC had taken power, Johnny Paul Koroma called
Foday Sankoh, in the presence of the witness, from a landline phone in the office of the
Chief of Defence Staff in the Defence Headquarters in Cockerill. Koroma told Sankoh that
he would like the RUF to join forces with the AF RC, because the Kamajors were fighting
alongside the Nigerians and the soldiers and officers wanted peace. Koroma then told those
resent that Sankoh romised him that the RUF would `oin the AF RC, and that he would
P P J
send them someone who would come to meet with them. Within 48 or 72 hours the RUF
joined the AF RC, when Gibril Massaquoi met with the "supreme members" and the
chairman in Cockerill. Massaquoi told them that he was an RUF member and that he was
sent by his leader, Foday Sankoh.146511
6493. Massaquoi told the witness that he brought with him phone numbers to give to
Koroma for Taylor, President Mainassara of Niger, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina
M50 Defence rmi rmi Baer, paras ass, 860-xm.
11651 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1244.
111652 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10421-10423, 10433-10440; Transcript 2 June 2008, p.
10717; Transcript 3 June 2008 pp. 10852-10854.
11653 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10440-10442; Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10512-10513;
Transcript 2 June 2008 p. 10669.
11651 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10440-10442; Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. l0512—l0513;
Transcript 2 June 2008 pp. 10664-10667, 10734.

---- End of Page 2261 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % __ 18 May 2012

Faso, and President Mohamed GaddaH of Libya.14666 About 48 hours after Massaquoi
y arrived in Cockerill, Koroma ordered his control ofncer Banja Marrah to dial a number.
Banjah made the call and handed the phone over to Koroma. Koroma then spoke on the
phone and asked for recognition from Taylor in Liberia. Those present in the room during
the conversation, including the witness, could not hear the other side of the conversation, but
heard Koroma saying "Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We need a [sic] recognition" and other things the
witness could not recall. After the call, Koroma said that he had s oken with Taylor and
P Y
asked for Taylor's recognition and that Taylor had advised them to "work with other
brothers who had come to join us", meaning the RUF, and Koroma said that this would not
be a problem. Taylor also told Koroma that in case of any "hiccups", problems between the
AF RC and the RUF, Koroma should call him. 14666
6494. After this phone call, the witness and the Supreme Council were present when
Koroma called Presidents Mainassara, Compaore, and Gaddafi. Koroma then told those
resent that all of them said that the were read to assist them.14667 The calls lasted for
P Y Y
about an hour, and the longest call was with Taylor.11656
6495. Kargbo also testified that at some point before 19 July 1997, Koroma called Taylor
on the telephone in a meeting of the Supreme Council, at which Kargbo was not present, to
discuss Koroma sending a delegation to Taylor in Liberia. ln a second meeting at which
Kargbo was present, Koroma told the delegation that they should take a letter he had written
to Taylor asking him to recognise the AFRC government. 14666 The delegation was headed by
SYB Rogers and included Mike Lamin, AK Sesay and Colonel Charles Conteh, among
others.14666 The delegation travelled to Monrovia, and then went from Liberia on to Niger,
11655 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10442; Transcript 2 June 2008 p. 10672.
11656 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10443-10446; Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10512-10513;
Transcript 2 June 2008 pp. 10666-10668, 10671-10672, 10738.
14657 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10446-10447; Transcript 2 June 2008 p. 10737.
14666 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10447.
14666 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10453-10454; Transcript 2 June 2008 pp. 10704-10707. See
Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008 p. 10684 (testifying that this delegation led by SYB Rogers travelled to
Liberia before 19 July, 1999).
11666 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10453-10455; Transcript 2 June 2008 pp. 10704-10708.

---- End of Page 2262 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T Z Xug 18 May 2012

Libya and Burkina Faso.14661 lt was through this meeting that the Junta received formal
recognition by the Government of Liberia. 14662
6496. The witness stated that there were several phone calls between Koroma and Taylor
during this time period. After the first delegation went to Liberia, Koroma told another
Supreme Council meeting that Kargbo attended that he was sending a second delegation to
Liberia led by Mike Lamin of the RUF, Lieutenant—Colonel Fonti Kanu of the AFRC and
General Ibrahim Bah to purchase arms and ammunition for the Junta.14666 Between 48 and
78 hours later,14664 a delegation headed by Mike Lamin and including Fonti Kanu, and
General 1brahim14666 travelled to Liberia14666 and between one and two weeks later an arms
shipment arrived by plane at Magburaka.14667
6497. Kargbo confirmed that he was present at the first meeting of the AFRC held on 19
July 1997.14666 He testified that before this meeting, Tamba Gborie travelled to Abidjan to
meet with ECOWAS leaders so as to "know how to solve the problems between [the AFRC]
and the SLPP government".14664 The witness stated ECOWAS leaders were refusing to
recognise the Junta government, excepting Liberia, Burkina Faso and Niger, which did
recognise the Junta.14676 At this first meeting of the AFRC, the members discussed the
reco ition b these forei overnments of their re ime, but this discussion was not written
an Y an g g
in the minutes of the meeting because it was secret.14671 He then stated that with his
testimony in this trial, he was the first person to reveal this secret recognition by these
foreign governments. 14672 The witness testified that the countries wanted to keep this a secret
14661 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10455-10456.
14662 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10668, 10685.
14666 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10455-10459, 10477; Transcript 2 June 2008 pp. 10704-
10708.
14664 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10458. A
14666 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10457.
14666 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10478.
14664 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10458-10459; Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10710.
14666 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10674-19675.
14664 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10681-10682.
14646 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10681-10682, 10684.
14641 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10686-10689.
14642 Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10689-10690.

---- End of Page 2263 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / im 18 May 2012 `Q

so that in public they could abide by ECOWAS rules, such as not allowing the Junta
members to cross through Liberia, while in private they could support the J unta}4673
Prosecution Witness TF 1-371
6498. Prosecution Witness TF 1-371 testified that at the end of May l997,l4674 he travelled
to Monrovia and spent approximately one and a half weeks there}4675 From there he crossed
into Sierra Leone and travelled to Buedu}4676 The next day, Bockarie sent a vehicle to
collect the witness, and he travelled to Kenema where he met with Bockarie, Issa Sesay and
Eddie Kanneh.l4677 Bockarie told the witness that he had been given instructions by Sankoh
to join the AFRC, and that he was on his way to Freetown}4678
6499. When the witness arrived in Freetown in July, they had an emergency meeting of the
AFRC at Cockerill military barracks because of a major invasion of Nigerian troops that had
occurred.M679 The meeting was about sending a delegation to Abidjan to participate in peace
negotiations on the Sierra Leonean conflict organised by the ECOWAS Committee of
Four}4680 The meeting was not successful, however, because ECOWAS wanted the Junta to
turn the govermnent over to the democratically elected govermnent of President Kabbah,
which the Junta refused to do.l4°8l The Foreign Minister of the government of Sani Abacha
stated that it was useless to continue negotiating and they would be forced to take military
action to eject the Junta from Sierra Leone}4682
6500. After the witness returned to Freetown, in Au st 1997, he received a call from
gu
Johnny Paul Koroma to report to his office. Koroma gave him a letter to be delivered by a
dele ation to Taylor, askin him to assist the AFRC in ettin reco ition within ECOWAS,
S Y 8 S 8 811
and stating that they were fighting for this recognition because they were "besieged". I4683
*4673 Samuel Kargbo, rranppnpr 2 June 2008, p. 10691.
**674 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2286-2287.
*4675 TF1-371, rrannpnpr 25 January 2008, p. 228 (cs).
*4676 TF1—371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2287(CS).
mm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 22892291 (CS).
**67* TF1-371, rranppnpr 25 January 2008, p. 2290 (cs).
**679 TF1-371, rrannpnpr 25 January 2008, p. 2292 (cs).
14680 TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2293-2294 (CS).
MW TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2293-2294; TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008 p. 2781 (CS).
*%*2 TF1-371, rrannpnpr 25 January 2008, pp. 2293-2294 (cs). 8
Nm TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, p. 2300; TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008 pp. 2778-2780 (CS).

---- End of Page 2264 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 6; 18 May 2012
V

ao 5 5 SZ
6501. When the delegation, headed by Karifa Smart, arrived in Monoriva they met with
John T. Richardson, who was a member of Taylor's government, and Smart briefed
Richardson on their mission in Monrovia. Richardson in turn got in touch with Moni
Captan, the Liberian Foreign Minister who also met with the delegation.[46g4 Captan said
that he was also "disappointed" with the Kabbah government, and he would see what he
could do to transmit the letter to Taylor. The delegation stayed in Monrovia for two days.
Captan told the delegation that he had given the letter to Taylor, and that Taylor was very
busy and could not meet with them, but he was willing with work with the ECOWAS
committee to recognise the AFRC Junta. Captan said that Taylor had been in touch with
Johnny Paul Koroma and they should return to Freetown, and that Taylor would send his
deputy minister to pay their bills and escort them to the airport, which the deputy minister
did the following morning.[46g5
6502. On their return to Freetown the delegation briefed Koroma on their trip, who stated
he had already been in touch with Taylor and he assured Koroma he would work with them
to get recognition.[4°86 Following the meeting with Koroma, the witness went to see Sam
Bockarie at his residence in Monrovia and briefed him on the trip. Bockarie told him that
Ibrahim Bah was in town, and he wanted the witness to accompany him to meet Bah at his
hotel. Bah told the witness that he was coming from Monrovia, where he had been told by
Taylor to meet Koroma in order to help the Junta to get arms and ammunition.[4684 TF l-371
testified that the Accused was in control of the RUF in 1997, but that he did not control the
Junta government.[468g
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
6503. Witness Isaac Mongor testified that the day after the AF RC coup d’etat he was in the
bush, and he received an instruction from Sam Bockarie, which Bockarie said was from
Sankoh, to leave there with his soldiers and join the AF RC in Freetown.[4689 Approximately
[4084 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2303-2304 (CS).
[4685 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2305-2306 (CS); TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2775-
2778 (CS).
[4686 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2307 (CS).
[4684 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2308 (CS).
[4688 TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2894 (CS).
[4644 Isaac Mongor, 10 March 20008, pp. 5698-5703.

---- End of Page 2265 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-']— / Jlgg 18 May 2012

one week later he and his men arrived in Freetown, and Mongor became a member of the
Supreme Council. 146411
6504. Mongor testified that he was present at a meeting at Bockarie's residence at Hill
Station in Freetown at which Ibrahim Bah, whom Mongor knew to be an NPFL Special
Forces fighter, said that Taylor sent him to ask the RUF to work together with the
AFRC.14691 Also present in the meeting were Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Foday Lansana
(a.k.a. CO Nya,) Gibril Massaquoi and others.14692
6505. The RUF members were happy to hear this message, and took Bah to the residence
of Johnny Paul Koroma to give him the same message. Koroma sent for other AFRC
members including SO Williams, Gullit and Bazzy, after which Bah repeated the message
from Taylor that the RUF and AFRC should "work hand in hand", a message that was "well
received" by everyone present.14643 Mongor testified that they were happy because they
needed hel , and believed Bah would be able to hel them et ammunition. The RUF
P P 8
members told Bah that they agreed to work with the AFRC, and then Koroma and Bah held
"a closed-door meeting", but the contents of these discussions were not disclosed to
Mongor.14694 Bah stayed the night, and then left Freetown.14695 After this, Koroma would tell
the Supreme Council that he was communicating with Taylor, and he told Mongor that he
planned to travel to Liberia. 14696
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
6506. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,14697 testified that during
the Junta period problems sometimes erupted between the AFRC and RUF; the AFRC were
former SLAs and the RUF former guerrillas and so the AFRC believed the RUF were not
"fully-trained military personnel".14644 In approximately April 1998, when Saidu was based
in Koindu, he read a message in the radio logbook of the radio operator Selasie which came
1464°Isaac Mongor, 10 March 20008, p. 5705.
14641 Isaac Mongor, 10 March 20008, pp. 5702-5704; Transcript. 11 March 2008, pp. 5711-5712
14642 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5712-5713.
14643Isaac Mongor, Transcript. 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5712-5714.
14694 Isaac Mongor, Transcript. 11 March 2008, pp. 5713-5715; Transcript 4 April 2008, pp. 6658-6659.
14645 Isaac Mongor, Transcript. 11 March 2008, p. 5714.
14646 Isaac Mongor, Transcript. 1 1 March 2008, p. 5717.
"‘°‘" Arbm sardrr, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895.
14644 Albert Saidu, Transcript, 4 June 2008, pp. 11005-11008.

---- End of Page 2266 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

from Buedu. According to this message, Taylor and Bockarie had a discussion and Taylor
sent a message that the AFRC and RUF should "come together as one", and should "work
hand in glove" in order to fight together to achieve their goals.l469q
Prosecution Witness TF1-567 1
6507. Witness TF1—567 testified that while he was based in Tongo he would mine on his
own, and travel to Kenema to sell his diamonds or to visit Sam Bockarie. On one occasion at
the end of 1997, the witness met Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), with Bockarie. Jungle gave
Bockarie a message from Taylor telling him that he should not be "so involved" in the
AFRC govemment.l47OO
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie
6508. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie, a radio operator, testified that around late 1997, he was
assigned to work as a radio operator with Sam Bockarie in Kenema Town. Fornie was in
communication with almost every AFRC/RUF station concerning the movement of troops,
the coordination of mining, and requests for arms and ammunition. The witness was also in
contact with the radio station in Liberia where Taylor was based.l4701
The Accused
6509. The Accused denied that, as Samuel Kargbo testified, the AFRC asked the RUF to
join the Junta government in order to gain himself as a contact, and that following this he
was in frequent contact with Johnny Paul Koroma, providing support. The Accused further
denied that he spoke to Koroma during the Junta period, saying the first time he spoke to
Koroma was in August 1999.14702 He stated that even if he had spoken to Koroma, he would
have been authorised to do so as a member of the Committee of Pour. He also denied that
Liberia recognised the Junta goverrmient, and stated that not one West African country did
$0.14702
‘"*°° A1bp¤ samp. Transcript, 4 Jupp 2008, pp. 11005-11006.
14700 TF1-567, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 12889—12890; Transcript 8 July 2008, pp. 13150-1315l.
mm Dauda Muna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21418—21421, 21428-21433.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2008, pp. 30813—30817.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2008, pp. 3081/-1-30815.

---- End of Page 2267 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

6510. Further, the Accused noted that Samuel Kargbo testified that the phone call between
the Accused and Koroma occurred two weeks after the coup d’etat on 25 May, while other
testimony indicates that within days of the coup a recording was played on the BCC that
Sankoh had instructed the RUF to join the AFRC. 14704
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6511. Issa Sesay testified that when he arrived in Freetown, approximately three or four
days after the AFRC coup d’etat, Johnny Paul Koroma called Foday Sarrkoh at his hotel in
Abuja. Koroma recorded the conversation, and played the tape of this communication on
SLBS radio. Sesay denied that Gibril Massaqoui brought telephone numbers from Sankoh to
Koroma, saying that in June or July of 1997 he brought letters. 14705
Prosecution Exhibit P-131
6512. Exhibit P-131 is a copy of the minutes of the first AFRC meeting held at their
Defence Headquarters on 19 July 1997. A note at the top indicates that the document was
"secret". The document states that Johnny Paul Koroma and other members of the AFRC
and RUF, including Witness Samuel Kargbo, were present. It also states that at this meeting,
Corporal Gborie briefed members on his trip to Abidjan, explaining that he encountered
"difHculties" with the Nigerian Foreign Minister, until there was a change of mind by the
Foreign Minister and the other delegates "in favour of the Sierra Leone Delegation". He
emphasised that any act of aggression against civilians would not help them at the next
ECOWAS meeting. According to a note at the bottom of the End of Page, the document was
distributed to all members.M7O6
Deliberations
6513. The Prosecution puts forth several allegations concerning the Accused's relationship
with the AFRC/RUF government during the Junta period, and the Trial Chamber
summarises these as follows: The Prosecution alleges that the AFRC invited the RUF to join
the Junta government so that they could gain access to the Accused, and that, in joining the
14704 Charles Ghanlcay Taylor, Transcript 2 November 2008, pp. 30816-30817.
14705 Issa Sesay, Transcript 30 July 2010, pp. 45116-45118.
14706 Prosecution Exhibit P-131 "Minutes of the First Meeting of the AFRC held at the Conference Hall, Defence
Headquarters on Saturday 19 July 1997".

---- End of Page 2268 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 \%

Junta government the RUF gave the Accused's contact infonnation to the AFRC}4707 The
Accused accepted and recognised the Junta government, and told the AF RC that he would
encourage ECOWAS members to do so as well.mO8 The Accused urged the two parties to
work together, and said that if Johnny Paul Koroma had any problems with the RUF, they
should call him}4709 Finally, the Prosecution alleges that the Accused remained informed of
the activities of AFRC/RUF govemment via radio communications and intermediaries, and
maintained the strong alliance between the two groups.l47lO The Defence denies that the
Accused played any of these roles.
6514. Several of the Prosecution allegations rely on the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Samuel Kargbo: that the AFRC invited the RUF to join the Junta in order to gain contact
with Taylor, that the RUF supplied Koroma with Taylor's phone number, and that Taylor
recognised the AFRC/RUF alliance and told Koroma that if he had any trouble with the
RUF they should call Taylor. Kargbo also testified to the delegation sent by Koroma, which
travelled to Liberia in order to gain Taylor's recognition and assistance, and Kargbo stated
that it was through this meeting that the Junta received recognition by the Government of
Liberia.
6515. The Trial Chamber notes some confusion in Kargbo's testimony with regard to dates.
He testified about two different delegations sent by Johnny Paul Koroma, one of which was
later in time and sent to Monrovia for the purpose of purchasing arms and ammunition. In
this context, the Trial Chamber will not consider Kargbo's testimony conceming this second
delegation, as it is not relevant to the Prosecution's allegations. With regard to the first
delegation, Kargbo testified that it was led by SYB Rogers and sent to ask "the Liberian
government headed by Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor" to recognise the Junta.l47H Kargbo
contended, however, that the delegation's trip occurred before the first AF RC/RUF meeting,
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 186.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras. 185-188.
'""° Prosecution rrooi roar Brief, para. 186.
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 185.
mn Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10669. The Trial Chamber notes that on direct examination,
Kargbo testified that Koroma asked for recognition from Taylor himself, Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May
2008, p. 10445 (Johnny Paul was asking for recognition from Mr Ghankay Taylor in Liberia), but on cross
examination, the Defence asked Kargbo if Koroma had requested recognition from "the Liberian govemment",
and Kargbo answered that this was "exactly it", but that "Taylor was ready to recognise us". Samuel Kargbo,
Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10668.

---- End of Page 2269 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

40362
which he confirmed took place on 19 July 1997.14712 Kargbo mistakenly said that Taylor was
President of Liberia in July 1997,14713 when in fact Taylor was inaugurated President in
August 1997.‘""‘
6516. The Trial Chamber notes that TF1-371 also testified about a delegation sent by
Koroma to deliver a letter to the Accused asking for his assistance in getting recognition for
the AFRC within ECOWAS. The Trial Chamber considers that this is the same delegation
to which Kargbo testified, although TF1-371 said it was led by Karifa Smart, not SYB
Rogers. Both witnesses testified that the delegation was sent to deliver a letter to the
Accused seeking recognition for the AFRC government. TF1-371 testified that the
delegation went to Monrovia in August 1997. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that
TF1-371 and Samuel Kargbo are both generally credible witnesses.l47l5 A However, in these
circumstances, the Trial Chamber considers that TF1-371 would have been better placed to
know how these events transpired and accepts his evidence that the delegation travelled in
August 1997, which would have been after the inauguration of the Accused as President of
Liberia. Though the Defence notes that in a previous statement, TF1-371 stated he went to
Monrovia to discuss "peace proposals", the Trial Chamber accepts his testimony that he did
clarify this to investigators at the time of his statement.l47l6
6517. When confronted with the inconsistency of his evidence on the date that this
delegation travelled to Monrovia, Kargbo insisted that the Governments of Liberia, Niger,
and Burkina Faso had recognised the Junta government before the July 1997 meeting, but he
said that it was a "secret" so that they could support the Junta while still abiding by
ECOWAS rulesmw He stated that he was the first person to reveal this secret recognition of
the Junta by these foreign governments during his testimony in these proceedings.l47l8 The
Trial Chamber notes Kargbo's evidence that one or two weeks after the AFRC took power,
Sankoh and Koroma spoke and Gibril Massaquoi was sent by the RUF to Monrovia,
bringing telephone numbers for Taylor and the heads of state of Niger, Burkina Faso and
Nm Exhibit P-131 "Minutes of the First Meeting of the AFRC held at the Conference Hall, Defence
Headquarters on Saturday 19 July 1997" p. 1; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, p. 10684.
Mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10670-10671.
mm "Joint Filing by the Prosecution and Defence: Admitted Facts and Law" No. ( l)(d).
Mm Credibility Assessment, Samuel Kargbo, paras 290-295; Credibility Assessment, TF 1-371, paras 220-226.
mm TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2775-2778.
Mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10688-10689.
Mm Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 June 2008, pp. 10689-10690.

---- End of Page 2270 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

405 63
Libya. Koroma called these leaders, and according to Kargbo, they were ready to assist.
The longest call was with the Accused, who would not have been a head of state at that time
but who advised Koroma to work with the RUF and told Koroma to call if there were any
problems.
6518. The Trial Chamber considers that these phone calls indicated the support of the
Accused and the Heads of State for the AFRC and notes Kargbo's explanation that the
recognition by these states was to be kept a secret so that in public they could comply with
ECOWAS rules while in private they could support the Junta. The Trial Chamber considers
that by secret recognition, Kargbo was referring to private support, and accepts that these
commitments came before the July meeting of the AF RC. Although Taylor was not a head
of state at that time, he became President soon alter and from Kargbo's perspective, his
commitment would have continued into his presidency.
6519. The Trial Chamber notes that the minutes of the 19 July 1997 AFRC meeting, in the
record as Exhibit P-131, indicate that Corporal Gborie reported to AFRC/RUF members on
his trip to Abidjan, at which he spoke with ECOWAS officials about the legitimacy of the
Junta govemment.*47*9 The report does not mention recognition of the Junta government by
Niger, Burkina Faso or Libya, and it indicates that difficulties were encountered in the
discussions. TF 1-371 testified that the Abidjan meeting was not successful, and that the
members of the ECOWAS committee were committed to retuming President Kabbah to
power.*472** The Trial Chamber finds this evidence consistent with Kargbo's testimony that
there was concem about ECOWAS rules, and that commitments made to the AFRC were
made secretly. The fact that these commitments are not recorded in the minutes of the
meeting is not surprising as they were made privately and were in contradiction with the
public positions of the concemed heads of state.
6520. Witness TF1-371's testimony that the head of the delegation to Monrovia, Karifa
Smart, reported that the Liberian Foreign Minister told him the Accused was willing to work
to get the Junta recognised by ECOWAS*472* is further supported by TF 1-371 's testimony
that Johnny Paul Koroma told him that he had spoken with the Accused who had said the
*47*** Exhibit P-131 "Minutes of the First Meeting of the APRC held at the Conference Hall, Defence
Headquarters on Saturday 19 July 1997", pp. 3-4.
*472** TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2293-2294; Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2781 (CS).
*472* TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2305-2306; Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2775-2778 (CS).

---- End of Page 2271 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T liar 4/J 18 May 2012

same}4722 TF 1-371 also met Ibrahim Bah in Monrovia, who told him Taylor would work
with the J unta}4723 That the Accused told the AF RC right after the coup d’etat that he would
work with the Junta is also corroborated by the testimony of Isaac Mongor and Albert
Saidu.l4724
6521. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence contention that the Accused followed
ECOWAS prohibitions against recognising the Junta is not dispositive as to whether Taylor
privately accepted and supported the Junta, implicitly recognising them while publicly he
agreed to ECOWAS demands. Further, the Defence claim that the AFRC/RUF were not, in
fact, as united as the Prosecution contends does not preclude Taylor's recognition and aid to
the Junta government as a whole}4725 Finally, the Defence contention that Bockarie and the
RUF 's communications with Taylor prior to the Junta period make the AF RC/RUF 's .
struggle to gain recognition from Taylor unbelievable are unavailing; the Trial Chamber
notes that the new Junta government would have needed a reafhrmation of Taylor's support
following the joining of the two groups, and their overthrow of the Kabbah government.
6522. For the above reasons, the Trial Chamber Hnds that the Prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused accepted and recognised the Junta government,
and told the AF RC/RUF that he would encourage ECOWAS members to do so as well.
6523. The Trial Chamber notes that Kargbo's evidence regarding Koroma's telephone
conversation with the Accused, in which the Accused told Koroma to work with the RUF is
conhrmed in substance by the evidence of Isaac Mongor, who testiHed that Ibrahim Bah
brought the same message from the Accused to both Bockarie and Koroma, that they should
"work hand in hand".m26
*2222 TF1—371, Transcript 28 January 2008,p. 2307 (cs).
‘"2’ Tri-371, rranaarrpr 28 January 2008, p. 2308 (cs).
my Isaac Mongor 10 March 20008 pp. 5702-5704; Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5711-5717; Albert Saidu,
Transcript Albert Saidu, Transcript, 4 June 2008, pp. 1 1005-1 1008.
14725 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 842, citing Adjudicated Fact 4; Exhibit D-084; Exhibit D-085; Exhibit P-
067; Dauda Aruna Fornie, 4 December 2008 pp. 21737-21742, 21748-21749; TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008
pp. 13170—13172. The Trial Chamber also notes that the Defence contention that Kargbo testified that the phone
call between Koroma and Sankoh occurred "two weeks" after the coup d’etat, Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Transcript 2 November 2008 p. 30816-30817, misrepresents Kargbo's testimony. Kargbo testified that the phone
call occurred between one and two weeks after the coup, Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10440-
10442, testimony which the Trial Chamber does not tind in and of itself uncredible. .
Nm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5712-5714.

---- End of Page 2272 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03-01-T / 18 May 2012

A,o36 5
6524. The Trial Chamber further notes the substantial evidence in the record that the
Accused was engaged in arms and diamonds transactions and communications with the
AFRC/RUF govemment during the Junta.14727 For example, the Trial Chamber has found
that a shipment of materiel negotiated with Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma by
lbrahim Bah on behalf of the Accused was delivered by plane to Magburaka some time
between October and December 1997.14728 The Trial Chamber also found that during the
Junta period, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) brought ammunition provided by the Accused to
the RUF in Sierra Leone.14729 The Trial Chamber found that diamonds mined in Kono and
Tongo fields were delivered from the RUF to the Accused by Jungle in exchange for arms
and ammunition during the period of May 1997 to February 1998.14730 The Trial Chamber
also notes the testimony of Dauda Amna Fomie, whom the Trial Chamber found to be a
generally credible witness,14731 that the RUF remained in contact with Taylor during the
Junta period.14732 The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence of Prosecution Witness TF 1-
567, that while in Kenema, at the end of 1997, he heard Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) deliver
a message from Taylor telling him not to be "so involved" with the AF RC, 14733 indicates that
the Accused remained informed of the activities of the AF RC/ RUF govemment.
Findings
6525. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused accepted and supported the Junta government, and told the AF RC/RUF
that he would encourage ECOWAS members to do so as well. He also encouraged the
AF RC and RUF to work together
(c) Sam Bockarie
(i) Bockarie's promotions in the Post-Intervention Period
Submissions of the Parties
14mSee also Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10448-10452 (Taylor instructed Johnny Paul Koroma
to arrest persons who had looted the Iranian Embassy in Freetown).
'"28 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies, Magburaka Shipment.
14729 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During the Junta Period.
14730 Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the Accused, Junta Period.
14731 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Aruna Fomie, paras 346-358.
14732 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21418-21421, 21428-21433.
14733 TF1-567, Transcript 2 June 2008 pp. 12889-12890; Transcript 8 July 2008 pp. 13150-13151.

---- End of Page 2273 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

ADB 66
6526. The Prosecution submits that around March 1998, as part of the restructuring of the
AFRC/RUF alliance alter the ECOMOG Intervention, Bockarie was promoted to Chief of
Defence Staff for the whole movement, which made him the "highest man" and "the leader"
in charge of all the RUF, AFRC and STF forces. Bockarie was also, at the same time,
promoted to "General". The Prosecution submits that this promotion was either a direct
promotion from Taylor or a joint decision made between Taylor and Koroma}4734 Bockarie
himself explained in a meeting that everyone should take instruction from him because "the
chief", Taylor, had promoted him to the rank of General, and Johnny Paul Koroma was
present during a meeting when Bockarie explained this". M735 The Prosecution further alleges
that following the Freetown Invasion, Taylor rewarded Bockarie by promoting him to two-
star general. I4736
6527. The Defence contends that it was Johnny Paul Koroma, and not Taylor, who
promoted Bockarie alter the Intervention, and Koroma promoted Bockarie to be Chief of
Defence Staff and "Brigadier".l4737 The Defence also claims that it was Johnny Paul
Koroma who promoted Bockarie to two-star general alter the Freetown Invasion. M738
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
6528. Witness TF1-371, an RUF IH€1T1b€I',I4739 testified that he arrived from Freetown to
Buedu in the middle of March 1998.14740 Shortly alter his arrival, he attended a meeting at
Sam Bockarie's home, Bockarie had given Johnny Paul Koroma his house to stay in. At the
meeting Koroma promoted Bockarie to be the Chief of the Defence Staff and at the same
time appointed Bockarie to a brigadier because, TF1-371 testified, that rank was
"commensurate with that office".l474l TF1-371 testified that Koroma decided to promote
Bockarie to Chief of Defence Staff because Koroma's brother, SFY Koroma, had abandoned
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 56, 147-148, 450, 454-455.
{4735 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 147.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 56.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras. 597-602, 1259-1265.
{mg Defence Final Trial Brief, paras. 875, 1266-1268.
Mm TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
{4740 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2363 (CS).
Mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2364 (CS).

---- End of Page 2274 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-O3-01-T 2274 X 18 May 2012 M

493 6 SZ
the fighters and went to his village to hide.14442 TF 1-371 further testified that although he
was not supposed to be, Bockarie was then "in charge of all of the AFRC, as well as the
sms and the RUF".14444
6529. Witness TF 1-371 also testified that after the retreat of forces from Freetown in 1999,
Bockarie left for Monrovia with his security detail and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), saying
to the witness that he was going to meet Taylor. Bockarie was in Monrovia for
approximately one week, and while there, sent a message to 1ssa Sesay stating that he had
arrived in Monrovia, had met with Benjamin Yeaten, and was waiting to see Taylor.14444
6530. When Bockarie returned to Buedu, he was received by the witness and others.14445
Bockarie arrived with Joseph Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), who was a member of the SSS, and
Bockarie was dressed in "an American camouflage uniform", and a "green military beret
with two stars on it".14446 Bockarie summoned "all of us" to his office, where, when they
addressed Bockarie as "Brigadier", Tamba said "[T]he man is no longer brigadier, he is a
lieutenant-general, he's a two star genera1". Everyone applauded for Bockarie and Bockarie
said that he had a "two star crown on his beret", and that Taylor promoted him because the
capture of Koidu and Freetown had been a "mission accomplished".14444 The witness also
saw that Bockarie had brought back from Monrovia two sets of the SSS uniform which were
used by Taylor's security members. 14444
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
6531. Witness Karmoh Kanneh, an RUF commander,14449 testified that at a meeting of
approximately 600 soldiers and commanders at Waterworks that took place sometime in the
spring after the February 1998 ECOMOG 1ntervention, in the presence of Johnny Paul
Koroma, Bockarie announced the changes to the AFRC and RUF command structure and
his "new promotion". Kanneh testified that prior to the meeting, Bockarie had travelled to
Monrovia as a Colonel, but had returned with "two high promotions" and was now a
14444 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2364 (CS).
14444 TF]-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2385-2386 (CS).
14444 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS).
14445 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS).
144414 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2430-2431 (CS).
14444 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2430-2431 (CS).
14448 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2431 (CS).
14444 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.

---- End of Page 2275 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-O1-T / 18 May 2012

General. Kanneh further testified that Bockarie said that it was "President Taylor, Pa
Taylor" (a.k.a. Charles Taylor) who had given him these promotions. 44750
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
6532. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,l475l testified that after the 1998 ECOMOG
Intervention, Bockarie immediately retreated to Buedu. Right after TF1-516 arrived in
Buedu, Bockarie called a muster parade "right to the MP" and announced that "I am just
here from the other side" and that he had been promoted "by the Chief Charles Taylor" to
the rank of General, and that everyone should now take their instructions from him.
Bockarie had a new combat fatigue with the insignia of a general, and with the military jeep
that "the Chief" had given to him. The military fatigue was the same type of fatigue that was
worn by the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (a.k.a. ATU), who the witness understood to be the
body guards to Charles Taylor. 44752
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
6533. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,14753 testified that when he
was assigned to Koindu in March 1998 an RUF junior commando named Selasie showed
him a radio message they had received from Buedu from Charles Taylor with the subject
line "promotion", which stated that Taylor had promoted Sam Bockarie to the rank of
General. 44754
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -585
6534. Witness TF1-585, an RUF radio operator,l4755 testified that prior to Johnny Paul
Koroma's arrival in Buedu in the period after the February 1998 ECOMOG Intervention,
Sam Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and returned with a green tactical jeep, new arms, and a
combat suit with a crown or badge that signified the rank of General. TF1-585 testified that
Bockarie "to1d us" that it was the "Pa", or Charles Taylor, who promoted him, and that there
14750 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9392- 9396.
**75* TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
**757 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6854-6856.
**755 Albert samp, Transcript 4 Jump 2008, p. 10895.
44754 Alben Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 1 1004-1 1005.
44755 TP1—585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15582-15584, 15589—15592 (PS).

---- End of Page 2276 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

were documents to that effect. Bockarie took this trip to Monrovia before Johnny Paul
Koroma anived in Buedu.14456
Prosecution Witness Pegs; Kamara
6535. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,14454 testified that when Johnny Paul
Koroma anived in Buedu sometime after the ECOMOG Intervention, that Koroma
immediately met with Sam Bockarie. During that same week, Koroma transmitted a
message over the radio for all of the AF RC, RUF, and STF, announcing that because he did
not understand jungle exercise, that all of the AF RC and RUF were to take commands from
Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito), and that from that date onwards Bockarie should be the "leader
for the movement".14458
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
6536. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander,14459 testified that after the
AFRC/RUF fighters were pushed out of Freetown in February 1998, and after he had taken
Johnny Paul Koroma to Koidu Town, that the command of the "People's A1my" was
restructured. Among other changes, Koroma promoted Sam Bockarie to
"defence chief of staff for the whole movement". Mongor testified that Koroma said that he
made this promotion after speaking to "his brother" Charles Taylor, because Koroma was
planning to travel and prior to leaving he wanted to leave the AFRC and RUF "in one
aCCOrd,,·14760
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
6537. Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to
disarmament,14461 was posed the following question: "You mentioned to the Judges earlier
that when Johnny Paul Koroma and Sam Bockarie or Mosquito met, that Mosquito told
14756 TF]-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15617-15622. The new arms were described as "a series of AK-
47, brand new ones that were not even being used with new AK rounds. They were in something like sardine tins
with rockets".
14757 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
14754 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3094, 3110-3111.
14754 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
147611 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5740-5741.
1471’1 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209-20210.

---- End of Page 2277 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Obi 18 May 2012 xg

40 3 70
Johnny Paul Koroma that now Mosquito was in charge. Can you tell us what was the
command structure now after the intervention and after you had come back to Buedu‘?"
Mallah responded, in pertinent part, that in the post—lntervention period, after Mallah had
retumed to Buedu, Bockarie "had structured the RUF command structure. He was there
taking care of the RUF on behalf of our leader Foday Sankoh .... ". He further testified that
everyone, including the AFRC, reported to Sam Bockarie at that time}4762 Later in his
testimony, Mallah testified that Sam Bockarie had promoted himself to the rank of General,
after which he also assigned himself the position of battlefield commander. I4763
Prosecution Witness TF 1-539
6538. Witness TF 1-539 testified that following the February 1998 ECOMOG Intervention,
the entire army fell into disarray, disturbing the command structure. However, Sam Bockarie
"was able to put the entire RUF structure under a strong command and control .... the men we
expected to receive commands from, like Johnny Paul and some of his Supreme Council
members, they had all gone into disarray somewhere in the north, whilst some of us found
ourselves in the east, so there was actually no command structure amongst the SLA. It was
only Sam Bockarie who had the absolute command".l4764
The Accused
6539. The Accused, denied that he promoted Sam Bockarie when Bockarie met with him
for the first time in Monrovia in February 1998 after the ECOMOG Intervention}4765 Taylor
further denied that he provided Bockarie with a jeep, medicines, uniforms, or that he
promised him a safe house in Monrovia. When asked whether he promoted Bockarie to be
commander of the RUF, Taylor testified that he had not done so, but that rather Foday
Sankoh had made that promotion}4766 p
6540. When questioned on the testimony of Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh, Taylor
responded that he did not promote Bockarie, and that this evidence conflicted with evidence
M762 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20203-20204.
Mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20412. ‘
14764 TFl·539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11397-11398.
M65 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25811-25814. When asked "Did you promote Sam
Bockarie ro General‘?" Taylor testified "No, no, no, no, no, no. Why would I do that? Sam Bockarie is not my -
he is not my military personnel. How could I promote him‘?"
WM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25815.

---- End of Page 2278 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03-0l·T 18 May 2012

403%/
already before the Trial Chamber that those promotions were made by Johnny Paul Koroma
after he retreated from Freetown in February l998, and that Johnny Paul Koroma held a
meeting and he made those promotions in which Sam Bockarie became the chief of defence
staff in Sierra Leone. Taylor said, "Now he is attributing that to me. Never, ever gave any
suggestion or recommendation for any promotion or anything closely related to that in Sierra
Leone. Never did".14767 When questioned again concerning this promotion, Taylor stated,
"l’m not and I really mean not involved in any promotion or recommendation of any officers
of the RUF at all. None".14768
6541. The Accused also denied that he promoted Bockarie to Lieutenant-General after the
Freetown lnvasion.14769 He stated that if Bockarie was promoted to Lieutenant General, he
would have had three stars, and not two, because two stars denotes a Major General.14770 The
Accused, as President, could not have promoted a general anywhere, because even in the
Government of Liberia the President does not promote generals. The Accused also
wondered why, ifBockarie has been in charge all of the years that Foday Sankoh was gone,
that he would have been promoted by Taylor, and testifies that perhaps Bockarie was "just
messing with these boys".14771 Further, even if Bockarie did return to Sierra Leone from
Liberia with a two-star beret, he could have bought it at any military store in Monrovia, put
it on, and pronounced he was a general.14772
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6542. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,14m testified that he arrived in Buedu
in late February or early March 1998. When he arrived, Sam Bockarie was still a field
commander, but a few days later Johnny Paul Koroma appointed Bockarie as Chief of
Defence Staff and promoted him to the rank of Brigadier. When asked in examination—in-
chief whether it was in fact Charles Taylor who promoted Bockarie, Sesay testified that "No,
it was not Charles Taylor. In fact, this was...in the presence of many of us. I was not the
only person or Bockarie alone; all the other officers in Buedu were at Sam Bockarie's house 4
11767 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30574-30575.
14768 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 2 November 2009, pp. 30859-30860.
14769 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 September 2009, p. 29590.
147711 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 September 2009, p. 29589.
14771 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 September 2009, pp. 29589-29591.
14772 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 September 2009, pp. 29589-29591.
14773 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-4459l. 44596.

---- End of Page 2279 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T 18 May 2012

when Johmiy Paul amiounced that promotion to Bockarie". Koroma also promoted Sesay to
the rank of Colonel. Sesay explained that Koroma had the power to make these promotions
because at that time he, Bockarie and Lamin still regarded Koroma as the leader of the
AFRC, and because Foday Sankoh had told them to take instructions from Koroma. Sesay
also testified that Bockarie's deference to Koroma at that time was exhibited in the fact that
Bockarie had left his bedroom and given it to Koroma. M774
6543. Sesay further testified that he was in Makeni after the Freetown Invasion in January
1999 when he heard that Johnny Paul Koroma had promoted Bockarie to be a two-star
general, and after this Bockarie started to wear two stars on his beret. 14775
Prosecution Exhibit P-O62
6544. Exhibit P-O62 is a chart created by the Prosecution and based on TF 1-371 's
testimony on the AFRC/RUF alliance command structure in the Post-Intervention period.
Sam Bockarie is designated as the Chief of Defence Staff ("CDS"), and the Head of the
AFRC/RUF fighters that were in RUF-controlled territory. M776
Prosecution Exhibit P-572
6545. Exhibit P-572 is a colour photograph of two men, one of whom is dressed in a green
camouflage uniform and a red beret with two stars on it whom Issa Sesay identified as Sam
Bockarie. 14777
Defence Exhibit D-OO9
6546. Exhibit D-OO9 is an RUF Salute Report dated 26 September 1999 from "Major
General Sam Bockarie" to Foday Sankoh as "Leader of the Revolution". ln this report,
Bockarie is reporting to Sankoh on what had taken place during his detention in Nigeria. ln
reference to his promotion, Bockarie wrote that "[W]hen J P Koroma arrived in Kailahun, he
appointed me to take over command for both the RUF and the SLA as Chief of Defence
Staff with the rank of Brigadier General. ln order to motivate the most senior officers, l took
**77* ipsa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44014-44017.
1*775 ipsa spsuy. Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46662-46663, 46667.
M776 Exhibit P-062, "AFRC/RUP Alliance Command Structure After the Fall of the Junta, circa March 1998, as
indicated by TF 1 -37 1
14777 Exhibit P-572, "Photograph of Sam Bockarie with Camouflage and Beret". See Issa Sesay, Transcript 18

---- End of Page 2280 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T V ` 18 May 2012

it upon myself to appoint Brig. Issa as Battleheld Commander and Colonel Mingo as Battle
Group Commander". Bockarie then writes that after the Freetown Invasion, in January 1999,
he was "again promoted by J P Koroma to the rank of Major General". Mm
Defence Exhibit D—084
6547. Exhibit D—084 is an RUF Salute Report dated 27 September 1999 from Brigadier
Issa Sesay in his capacity as RUF Battle Field Commander to Foday Sankoh as "Leader of
the Revolution". In reference to Sam, Bockarie's 1998 post—ECOMOG Intervention
promotion, Sesay wrote that "J P Koroma appointed General Mosquito as Chief of Defence
Staff with overall command over both the RUF and the SLA and promoted him to the rank
of Brigadier General. General Mosquito called on me and informed me that since he had
been made Chief of Defence Staff for both the RUF and the SLA by J P Koroma he wanted
to tum over his assignment of Battle Field Commander to me and asked me to tum my
assignment of Battle Group Commander over to Supem1an". 14779
Deliberations
6548. At the outset, the Trial Chamber is cognisant of the Defence's challenges to the
Prosecution's evidence regarding the date and circumstances of the Hrst meeting between
the Accused and Bockarie, in particular the discrepancies between the testimonies of
Varmuyan Sherif and Dauda Aruna Fomie.l478O However, the Trial Chamber has accepted
Fomie's evidence with regard to the trip made by Bockarie immediately after the
Intervention to Monrovia.m8l In the Trial Chambers view, Fomie's testimony that on their
way back from Monrovia to Sierra Leone Bockarie told Fomie that he met with the Accused
and the Accused said that he would help the RUF "to the best of his ability",m82 is
corroborated by Prosecution Exhibit P—067, according to which following the Intervention
the "High Command" met with the Accused who "promised to give his maximum support to
August 2008 pp. 46663—46668.
Mm Exhibit D—009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie, dated 26 September 1999", p. 5, ERN 9662.
mm Exhibit D—084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/ SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. 6, ERN 7761.
'*"‘° Defence rmi rmi Brief, pms 1513-1518. A
Mm Operational Support: Communications, RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communications; Arms and
Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockaire's Leadership (Febmary 1998-
December 1999).
mm Dauda Amna Fomie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21454—21455.

---- End of Page 2281 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T (pk 18 May 2012

,4.0 3 iz ir
the RUF".44783 Moreover, the Trial Chamber has found that Bockarie met the Accused in
February/March 1998 during which the Accused instructed Bockarie to maintain hold over
Kono.44784 The Trial Chamber also notes that on the first day of his testimony the Accused
said that he first met Bockarie in late 1997/early 1998,44785 only to change his version later
on in his testimony that he first met Bockarie in September 1998.44786 The Trial Chamber
therefore finds the Accused's testimony incredible. In light of the evidence, the Trial
Chamber finds that the Accused first met Bockarie in late February/early March 1998.
6549. With regards to the Prosecution allegation that Taylor promoted Bockarie after the
Intervention, the Trial Chamber finds that evidence adduced by the Prosecution to prove that
sometime around March 1998 the Accused either directly, or through a joint decision made
between himself and Johnny Paul Koroma, promoted Sam Bockarie, is inconsistent. While
Prosecution witnesses Karmoh Kanneh, TF1-516, Albert Saidu, and TF1-585 testified that
Taylor promoted Bockarie,44787 Prosecution Witnesses TF1-371 and Perry Kamara testified
that Johnny Paul Koroma promoted Sam Bockarie.44788 Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
also testified that Koroma promoted Bockarie after first consulting with Taylor,44789 while
Prosecution witness Augustine Mallah testified that Bockarie promoted himself4479O
6550. The Trial Chamber notes that both Issa Sesay and TF1-371 provided first-hand
evidence that Bockarie was promoted by Koroma at a meeting at Sam BoclBuedu in late February or March 1998, at a time when Bockarie had vacated his bedroom in
order to host Koroma as a guest.44794 The closely matching accounts of the two witnesses do
not mention the Accused as having been involved in the promotion. Their account is
44783 Exhibit P-067, RUF Peop1e's Arm — Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander",
ERN 9674.
44784 Military Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998); Diamonds: Alleged Delivery of Diamonds to the
Accused, February 1998-July 1999.
**7*5 Charles Ghapkay Taylor, Transcript 14 Jury 2009, pp. 24337—24338.
44786 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25805-25806, 25819, 25827; 25828-25830;
Transcript 5 August 2009, p. 26004.
44747 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9392- 9396; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6854-
6856; Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11004-11005; TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.
15617-15622.
44788 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2363-2364 (CS); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp.
3110-3111,
44789 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5740-5741.
44790 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20412.
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2364 (CS); Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44014-44017.

---- End of Page 2282 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T QW 18 May 2012

corroborated by the hearsay evidence of Perry Kamara,l4792 and the documentary evidence
of the reports introduced as Exhibit D-009,l4793 and Exhibit D-084}4794
6551. With regard to the rank and title of the promotion, Kanneh, Mallah and TF1-371
testified that Bockarie was promoted to General and Chief of the Defence Staff}4795 Mongor
testified that Bockarie was promoted to Chief of the Defence Staff}4796 TF1-516, Albert
Saidu, and TF1-585 testified that Bockarie was promoted to General}4797 Perry Kamara
testified that Bockarie was promoted to be the "leader of the movement".l4798 TF1-539
testified that because the entire army had fallen into disarray, there was no command
structure amongst the SLA and it was only Sam Bockarie who had the absolute
command.l479q The Trial Chamber also recalls the testimony of Isaac Mongor that Bockarie
was promoted to "defence chief of staff for the whole movement"l480O and Mallah's
testimony that Bockarie promoted himself.l48Ol
6552. Considering the many witnesses who mentioned the Accused in their testimony
relating to Bockarie's promotion,l48O2 the Trial Chamber considers that he may well have
been consulted by Koroma, as one witness testified, or talked directly with Bockarie about
the promotion as Bockarie had just been in Monrovia. The Trial Chamber notes that much of
the evidence is hearsay, which might explain the many different versions of this promotion.
In light of these many different versions, the Trial Chamber is unable to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Accused promoted Bockarie, as alleged by the Prosecution.
Mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 31 10-31 1 1.
M793 Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major
General Sam Bockarie, dated 26 September 1999" p. 5, ERN 9662.
Mm Exhibit D-084, "RUF, Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H Sesay
Battlefield Commander RUF/SL, to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", p. 6, ERN 7761.
14705 Kamroh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9392- 9396; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008,
pp. 20412; TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2364 (CS); Exhibit P—062 "AFRC/RUF Alliance Command
Structure After the Fall of the Junta, circa March 1998, as indicated by TF 1-371".
Mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5740-5741.
Mm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6854-6856; Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11004-1 1005;
TF1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15617-15622.
Mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 31 10-31 1 1.
Mm TF1—539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11397-11398.
Mm Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, pp. 5740-5741.
mgm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20412.
Mm Kamroh Kanrreh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9392- 9396; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp.
5740-5741; TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6854-6856; TF1—585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.
15617-15622; Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11004-11005.

---- End of Page 2283 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / "'P 18 May 2012

,40 3 %
6553. Concerning the Prosecution's allegation that Taylor promoted Bockarie to two—star
general after the Freetown Invasion, the Prosecution relies on the evidence of TF1-371 to
support this proposition. TF1-371, however, heard from Bockarie in a meeting in Sierra
Leone that Taylor made this promotion in Liberia, but TF1-371 had no way of confirming
that Taylor was, indeed, the person who made the promotion. The Prosecution also proffers
Exhibit P-572, a color photograph of Bockarie in a camouflage uniform and red beret with
two stars; though this corroborates TF1-371's testimony that Bockarie wore this uniform
and beret, the photograph does not corroborate TF1-371's testimony that Taylor promoted
Bockarie.
6554. Issa Sesay testified that he heard that it was Johnny Paul Koroma who promoted
Bockarie, but the Trial Chamber notes that this evidence is also hearsay. The Trial Chamber
further recalls its finding that Sesay is not a generally credible witness and his testimony
must be corroborated.
6555. The Defence proffered DCT—009, an RUP Salute Report dated 26 September 1999,
written from Bockarie to Sankoh. In this report, Bockarie informs Sankoh that in January
1999, he was promoted by Johnny Paul Koroma. The Trial Chamber has no reason to
believe that this contemporaneous document is not reliable, and in fact, both parties rely on
the document as evidence of the matters asserted therein}4803 This document, corroborated
by the testimony of Issa Sesay, raises a doubt as to the Prosecution's allegation that Taylor
promoted Bockarie.
Findings
6556. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that in about March 1998 Taylor promoted Sam Bockarie to the post of Chief of
Defence Staff for the AFRC/RUF alliance with the rank of Brigadier General.
6557. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused promoted Sam Bockarie to the post of two-star general after the
Freetown lntervention.
MSO} See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 145, footnote 471; para. 146, footnote 476477; para. 161, footnote
512; para. 220, footnote 683; para. 273, footnote 796; para. 520, footnote 1505; para. 539, footnote 1538; para.
565, footnote 1586. See Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 582, footnote 1464, 1466; para. 583, footnote 1471;

---- End of Page 2284 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

(ii) Allegation that in December 1999 the Accused ordered Sam Bockarie to leave
Sierra Leone and come to Liberia
Submissions of the Parties
6558. The Prosecution alleges that the conflict which arose between Foday Sankoh and
Sam Bockarie after the Lomé negotiations prompted the latter to leave Sierra Leone on 14
December 1999 and seek "safe haven" with the Accused in Liberia}4804 According to the
Prosecution, the Accused in fact ordered Bockarie to do so.l48O5 The Prosecution further
submits that the Accused kept Bockarie's arrival in Liberia secret from President Obasanjo
when on 21 December 1999 the two of them met at Roberts lntemational Airport to discuss
the peace process and the problems arising from the conflict between Sankoh and
Bockarie.l48O6 The Prosecution therefore submits that this meeting was a "diplomatic
deceit", organized by the Accused to cover his clandestine actions}4807
6559. The Defence does not dispute that in December 1999 Bockarie was told by the
Accused to travel to Liberia but submits that the evidence used by the Prosecution is
insufficient to show a superior/subordinate relationship between the two of them and only
shows that the Accused was playing a mediating role between Bockarie and Foday
Sanlfrom Sierra Leone and into Liberia in December 1999 were carried out under the auspices of
ECOWASM809 for the purpose of convening a meeting between the Accused, President
Obasanjo, Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh, as part of the peace process.l48l0
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Pegy Kamara
para. 585, footnote 1471, 1476; para. 586, footnote 1484; para. 587, footnote 1485, 1487·1488; para. 601,
footnote 1544; para. 602, footnote 1546.
MW Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 204, 334, 388.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 5 February 2010, p. 34859.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 204.
MSW Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 204.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1297.
MW) Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 663.
‘"’° Defence rmi rmi Brief, pam. 933.

---- End of Page 2285 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T / dvd 18 May 2012
I

6560. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,l48ll recognised the resignation
message sent by Sam Bockarie and testified that it was written at the time Bockarie had a
conflict with the RUF and decided to leave and go to the Accused in Liberia. MM2
Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana
6561. Witness Foday Lansana, (a.k.a. CO Nya) an RUF radio operator,l4gl3 gave evidence
to the effect that toward the end of 1999, Sam Bockarie had come to challenge the
leadership of Foday Sankoh within the RUF.l48M As a result, the latter contacted the
Accused and asked him to intervene and calm down Bockarie.l48l5 The witness further
testified that under the command of the Accused, Bockarie was then ordered to leave Sierra
Leone and go to Liberia.l48l6 Lansana testified that he knew this because the events took
place at the time he entered Monrovia and was in touch with Benjamin Yeaten.l48l7
Prosecution Witness TF 1-579
6562. Witness TF 1-579, an SSS member,l48l8 testified that in late 1999 Sam Bockarie
entered Liberia with a large number of bodyguards.l48l9 The witness further testified that
Bockarie spoke with him in Monrovia and told him that he had left Sierra Leone only
because the Accused called him and told him he should do so.l482O The witness also gave
evidence that the Accused told Bockarie he should leave Sierra Leone because of Foday
Sankoh's fears that Bockarie might take over the RUF. The witness then quoted Bockarie
saying: "had it not been for the Chief who called me to come we would have all fought for
that place until all of us lost the ground".M82l TF 1-579 testified that Bockarie used the tenn
"Chief" to refer to the Accused.l4822 Furthennore, the witness gave testimony that during
mn Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.
Mm Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3080.
Mm Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4361-4362.
Mm Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4573-4574. 5
Mm Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4574.
Mm Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4574.
Mw Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4574.
Mm TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19822-19823.
Mm TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19856, 19858.
***820 Tri-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19859.
‘*"‘ Tri-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19859.
****22 TF1—579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19860.

---- End of Page 2286 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T /6/ 18 May 2012

this conversation Bockarie also stated that with Sankoh wanting him dead, he would now
only follow orders from the Accused}4823
Prosecution Witnesses TF1—5 16 and TF1—371
6563. Witness TF1—516, an RUF radio operator,l4824 gave testimony to the effect that when
Sam Bockarie left the RUF, he took with him a ood number of RUF soldiers and then
8
crossed the border into Liberia}4825 The witness also stated that Bockarie was chased by a
group of RUF soldiers who were sent by Issa Sesay to attack his base in Buedu and
subsequently followed him to the Liberian border}4826 TF1—371 further testified that while
Sam Bockarie and his group of soldiers were allowed to cross, the pursuers were stopped
and severely beaten by the Liberian soldiers}4827
The Accused
6564. The Accused testified that toward the end of 1999 the conflict between Bockarie and
Sankoh led to a split within the RUF and violent clashes between the two newly formed
cam s.l4828 The Accused further stated that, followin discussions within ECOWAS, a
P 8
decision was taken to "extract" Bockarie from Sierra Leone to Liberia because Bockarie's
ideas to challenge Sankoh's leadership over the RUF were threatening the peace
rocess}4829 The Accused therefore stressed that Bockarie did not arrive in Liberia on his
P
personal invitation,l4830 but that his arrival in Monrovia in December 1999 was the result of
many previous consultations amongst the Committee of $11;.1483 I
6565. The Accused further testified that he saw Bockarie's belligerency as a threat to the
disarmament process, which is why the Accused communicated his concerns to President
Obasanjo and eventually organised a meeting at Roberts International Airport.l4832 The
Accused testified that this meeting was held on 21 December 1999 and was attended by the
*4888 rr1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19860.
*4884 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
*4888 TF1-516, rrsrrserrpt 9 April 2008, pp. 7037-7038
*4888 TF1-516, rrsrrserrpt 9 April 2008, p. 7038.
14827 TF1—371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 7038-7039.
*4888 Charles oirurrkuy ruyier, rrurrserrpt 17 August 2009, pp. 26858, 26878.
*4888 cirurres orrurrksy rsyrur, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26859-26860.
*488** Charles orrsrrkuy ruyrer, rrsrrserrpt 17 August 2009, p. 26859.
14831 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26844, 26859.
14832 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26853-26854, 26859, 26878.

---- End of Page 2287 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GQ 18 May 2012 kg

Accused, President Obasanjo, Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh}4833 The Accused stated
that the purpose of this meeting, and President Obasanjo being there, was to "reinforce some
strong medicine", namely that disarmament would continue and Bockarie would stay out of
Sierra Leone.l4834 According to the Accused, Bockarie was given a choice to either stay in
Liberia or go to a third countryl4835 and the decisions made in this meeting were then
communicated to the UN Special Representative in Liberia.l483°
Prosecution Exhibit P-050
6566. Exhibit P-50 is a message from Sam Bockarie in which he announces that as a result
of the increasing tension within the RUF and for the purpose of preventing more bloodshed,
he has decided to leave the movement. The message is dated 14 December 1999.14837
Defence Exhibit D-226
6567. Exhibit D-226 contains a message from the Accused, conveyed to the UN Secretary-
General through the UN Special Representative Felix Downes-Thomas. The message is
dated 14 December 1999 and states that the Accused is currently holding talks in Monrovia
with Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh in an effort to ensure that the peace process remains
on course. The message goes on to say that President Obasanjo will fly to Monrovia on 20
December 1999 to assist the Accused in this matter.l4838
Defence Exhibit D-227
6568. Exhibit D-227 is a code cable dated 21 December 1999, in which the United Nations
s ecial re resentative in Liberia writes about a meetin at Roberts Intemational Ai ort
P P 8 YP
between the Accused and President Obasanjo, where a decision was made to temporarily
relocate Sam Bockarie and his followers to other countries.M839 Downes-Thomas also refers
to a report by the BBC correspondent in Monrovia, Jonathan Pellele, which states that Sam
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26856-26857.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26857, 26859.
14835 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, p. 26858.
14836 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, p. 26854.
Mw Exhibit P-50, ‘"Radio Message — 00008764 19 December 1999 Radio Log Book Three", ERN 52.
14838 Exhibit D-226, "UN Interofiice Memorandum, to IOAL Rizza, Chef de Cabinet, to Felix Downes-Thomas,
RSG, Liberia, Message from President Taylor to Secretary General, December 14 1999 — DCT 84 (3 End of Pages)", p.
2, ERN 625.
14839 Exhibit D-227, "Code Cable, To Predergast, United Nations, New York, From Downes-Thomas, RSG,

---- End of Page 2288 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

4352/
Bockarie also attended the meeting at RIA and was told that he must stay out of Sierra
Leone. According to the BBC report, Bockarie was given the choice to either stay in Liberia
or go to any other third country.l484O
Deliberations
6569. The Trial Chamber observes that it is undisputed that in December 1999, Sam
Bockarie left Sierra Leone and went to Liberia, and that he was told to do so by the Accused.
lt is the nature of this contact between the Accused and Bockarie that is disputed. According
to the Prosecution, this communication between the Accused and Bockarie amounted to an
order and shows the existence of superior/ subordinate relationship between the two of them.
According to the Defence, the Accused relied on the authority of ECOWAS when
summoning Bockarie to Liberia and also sought the help of President Obasanjo in the effort
to deal with Sam Bockarie and ensure that he did not retum to Sierra Leone.
6570. The Trial Chamber notes that the question of whether in this instance the contact
between the Accused and Sam Bockarie satisfies the threshold of effective control is to be
dealt with, in light of the totality of evidence, when analyzing the criminal responsibility of
the Accused. At present, the Trial Chamber finds that the communication between the
Accused and Bockarie resulted in the latter leaving Sierra Leone and entering Liberia in
December 1999. This is supported by the testimony of Prosecution witnesses Foday
Lansanamgiu and TF1-579,14842 and the Defence has not disputed it or presented evidence to
the contrary.
6571. The Trial Chamber further notes that a second, interrelated issue arises from the
evidence presented by the Parties, namely the reasons for Bockarie's stay in Liberia in
December 1999. The Prosecution's allegation that the Accused provided a safe haven for
Bockarie and kept this secret from President Obasanjo during his meeting with him at
Roberts lntemational Airport on 21 December 1999 is not supported by the evidence. Both
the Prosecution and the Defence have presented evidence to the effect that towards the end
of 1999 there was a split within the RUF, leading to violent clashes between RUF fighters
UNOL, Monrovia, Discussion on the Sierra Leonean Situation, December 21, 1999 — DCT 174", ERN 626
14840 Exhibit D—227, "Code Cable, To Predergast, United Nations, New York, From Dowr1es—Thomas, RSG,
UNOL, Monrovia, Discussion on the Sierra Leonean Situation, December 21, 1999 — DCT 174", ERN 626
14841 Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, pp. 4574.
14842 TF1·579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp, 19859.

---- End of Page 2289 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03—01—T / (fhg 18 May 2012
/

loyal to Foday Sankoh and RUF fighters loyal to Sam Bockarie.l4843 Contrary to the
allegation that Bockarie sought a safe haven in Liberia, Prosecution Witness TFl—579
testified that Bockarie declared that he would have kept fighting in Sierra Leone if the
Accused had not called him to Libe1ia.l4844 The Trial Chamber recalls that TFl-579's
evidence is to be considered with caution and requires co1roboration.l4845 Exhibit D-226 and
Exhibit D-227 show that the Accused in fact organized a meeting at Roberts International
Airport between Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, President Obasanjo and himself, as a result
of which a decision was made that Bockarie would not return to Sierra Leone until the
disarmament process had been completed. M846
Findings
6572. The Trial Chamber iinds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the instruction given by the Accused to Sam Bockarie to leave Sierra Leone for
Liberia in December 1999 was a ‘diplomatic deceit’ to cover clandestine actions.
(d) 1ssaSesay
Submissions of the Parties
6573. The Prosecution submits that after Sankoh's arrest and detention in May 2000,
Charles Taylor selected Issa Sesay to take over the leadership of the RUF. ln July 2000
Taylor called Sesay to Monrovia, where he arrived with a delegation that included
Augustine Gbao. Sesay and his delegation met with Taylor and the other ECOWAS
presidents, including President Obasanjo of Nigeria, President J ammeh of Gambia, President
Eyadema of Togo, and President Konaré of Cote d’1voire. M847
6574. Taylor told them that the RUF needed new leadership because "Sankoh was too old,
stubborn and lazy", a point that Sesay and Gbao objected to. Taylor's first proposal was for
Sam Bockarie to be reinstated, which the Prosecution submits Taylor wanted because it
would be better for him to have "as leader the man closest and most useful to him, as well as
14843 TFl-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7038; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3080; Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 August 2009, pp. 26858, 26878.
MSM TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19859.
Mw Credibility Assessment, TF1-579, paras 339-345.
14846 Exhibit D-227, "Code Cable, To Predergast, United Nations, New York, From Downes—Thomas, RSG,
UNOL, Monrovia, Discussion on the Sierra Leonean Situation, December 21, 1999 — DCT 174", ERN 626

---- End of Page 2290 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
.//3

,4 o 3 8.3
most trusted". However when Taylor suggested this Sesay objected, after which Taylor
suggested that Sesay become the leader. Sesay said that ‘"he would need to inform the RUF
family before accepting the position or appointing someone else". The meeting attended by
the presidents closed and Taylor then held a private meeting with just "the delegation".l4848
6575. The Prosecution further submits that after these meetings Sesay held a meeting in
Sierra Leone to discuss the proposal that he take over the RUF leadership. The meeting
attendees agreed in principal that Sesay could be the interim leader while Sankoh was still in
detention on the condition that Sankoh provided a written confirmation of his agreement
with this. On Taylor's invitation, Sesay travelled back to Monrovia where he met with
Taylor, Obasanjo, and Konaré at Roberts International Airport.l4849 Sesay was given a letter
signed by Sankoh which stated that "he did not approve of Sesay becoming the leader of the
RUF; however, 1ssa Sesay could be the interim leader whilst Foday Sankoh was detained".
The letter also directed that just as Bockarie had taken instructions from Taylor when
Sankoh had been previously detained, Sesay would now take instructions from Taylor.
Sesay then returned to Sierra Leone where he reconvened another meeting to have his
appointment as interim leader of the RUF officially endorsed.l485O
6576. The Defence submits that in the summer of 2000, because Foday Sankoh was in
prison, ECOWAS did not know who was in charge of the RUF. Charles Taylor and his
counterparts on the Committee of Six decided that Taylor should host a mini-summit in
Monrovia "to deal with the issue of 1ssa Sesay and the RUF so that the Lomé agreement
would not be torn up and so that disarmament and demobilisation could continue".
Presidents Yahya J amrneh, Alpha Konaré, Olesegun Obasanjo, Gnassingbe Eyadema, Blaise
Compoaré and Robert Guie attended the meeting arranged by Taylor which took place on 26
July 2000 at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia. Sesay attended as well with a delegation.
While Kabbah did not attend because he was not a member of the Committee of Six and was
a party to the conflict in Sierra Leone, he was still aware of the meeting and its purpose.l485 I
MW Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 180.
Mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 180.
M849 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 181.
M50 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 181.
my Defence Final Trial Brief; paras 686-687.

---- End of Page 2291 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2291% (E]?-l-g— 18 May 2012 M

.4 0 $24
6577. The Defence further submits that the heads of state asked Sesay who "was in charge"
of the RUF while Sankoh was being incarcerated by Sierra Leone, and Sesay infomred them
that he was the RUF 's most senior officer. The heads of state suggested that Sesay become
the new leader of the RUF, based on an agreement between Obasanjo and Taylor who were
impressed that Sesay had swiftly surrendered the peacekeepers to Taylor in May. Sesay
explained that he would need the approval of the War Council and Sankoh, and the heads of
state then "facilitated" the sending of a letter to Sankoh, and gave Sesay time to consult the
War Council. Mm
6578. Then ECOWAS Chairman President Konaré and Obasanjo took the letter to Sierra
Leone where they met with Sankoh and Kabbah. Sankoh "approved" Sesay's interim
leadership. Kabbah was kept updated on all developments concerning Sesay's appointment
to interim leader. Sesay then returned to Liberia in order for his appointment to be fomrally
confirmed at a meeting that had been arranged on 21 August 2000 in Roberts International
Airport in Liberia. President Taylor, Konaré, and Obasanjo attended the meeting, which also
included Sesay and RUF spokesman Gibril Massaquoi}4853
6579. The Defence further submits that Sesay contimred that he and his delegation, which
included Augustine Gbao, Konathan Kposowa, Samuel Jabba, Patrick Binda and Colonel
Lion, were invited to a meeting at RIA with Presidents Taylor, Konaré and Obasanjo. ln
addition to the aforementioned heads of state and the RUF delegation, the meeting was also
attended by other ECOWAS representatives and the press. Taylor and Obasanjo reiterated
their preference that Sesay become the RUF interim leader, and Konaré complained about
Sankoh and stated that they would no longer work with him. M854
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF 1 -338
6580. Witness TF 1-338 testified that Issa Sesay travelled with a delegation to Monrovia on
26 July 2000. Upon arrival, which was at about 4.00pm, they went to the sixth floor of the
Executive Mansion where they met Taylor and four other heads of state. The heads of state
[4852 Defence Final Trial Brief, para, 688.
[4853 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 689-691.
Mm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 692.

---- End of Page 2292 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2292 / GTK 18 May 2012

4`D5 85
were Nigerian President Obasanjo, Togolese President Eyadema, Gambian President Yahha
Jammeh, and the Malian President Oumar Konre. Taylor had invited them there to
celebrate "an occasion in Liberia" and to change the RUF leadership. M855
6581. After the introductions were made, he heard Obasanjo thank the RUF delegation for
coming and directed them "to continue with the good relationship that they had with Charles
Taylor...because Charles Taylor was doing good things to them and Charles Taylor was
a good leader. lf Afiica could only get ten of his type then the unity Africa is fighting for,
they will be able to achieve it". TFl—338 also testified that he heard Jammeh thank the RUF
delegation and say that it was "Charles Lord [sic] who had invited them to come and talk to
the RUF delegation for them to have a new leadership so that they will be able to carry on
‘ with the peace process so peace and stability will return to Sierra Leone", and that "if the
RUF took the initiative to have a young leader who would be able to carry on with the
process then they would achieve their objective". TF1—338 testified that both Konare and
Eyadema addressed them as well, but they spoke in French and he was unable to understand
what they said. 14856
6582. TFl—338 testified that Taylor then addressed them and said that because "Foday
Sankoh was too old...too stubborn...always being arrested, and ...a lazy leader" that it was
necessary for the RUF leadership to change. Augustine Gbao and Issa Sesay "emphasised
that no, that shouldn’t happen, but Charles Taylor spoke with them to listen to what the
leaders were telling them". Taylor first suggested that they "take Mosquito back", meaning
to send Sam Bockarie back to Sierra Leone as RUF leader, but Sesay said no, and then
Taylor said "Ah, but Issa if you would take care as a commander or as a leader". Sesay said
that because the RUF was a family, he would inform the "RUF family" first, and then
respond as to whether he would accept the position or appoint someone else.14857
6583. Later that night, at around ll.00pm or midnight, Benjamin Yeaten came to collect
Sesay and others, including Augustine Gbao, to go to meet with Taylor. TFl—338 testified
that Taylor told Sesay that "he should bear in mind that the people who were talking to him
before then were British elected presidents and he should .... not to listen to the Sierra Leone
Mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15145-15146. The "occasion" was Liberia's 26 July
independence celebration. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, p. 27159.
mm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, 15147.
MW TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15147-15148.

---- End of Page 2293 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

.4 O3 8 6
government because...[it] was a British elected government...remote controlled by the
British .... .And so any time he would be asked [by the United Nations] to disarm he should
just say yes, but he should not do it in reality. And in that case he, Charles Taylor, will
continue to assist the RUF as he was doingbefore". Taylor also told Sesay that he should
not listen to the other heads of state because "today...they will embrace him and the other
day they will just deny him". Taylor then gave Sesay SUSD 15,000 and he returned to the
guesthouse. Sesay then travelled back to Sierra Leone the next day, 27 July 2000.14858
6584. When Sesay arrived he convened an RUF meeting in Lebanon, Koidu Town, where
he informed his "col1eagues" of Taylor's proposal that he take over the RUF leadership and
said that he had ‘just come to ask who should be the leader". They all agreed that Sesay
could take over as leader, but only if they received a message from Sankoh showing his
consent. Sesay informed them that Obasanjo had volunteered to meet with Sankoh to find
out his view once they gave him a name to propose, however they insisted that they needed
to see a letter from Sankoh agreeing to it.142;59
6585. Two or three days later, Sesay said that Taylor had invited him to Liberia where he
landed at the international airport (RIA), and where he met Obasanjo and Konaré. They were
taken to a waiting room for a meeting where Obasanjo handed a letter from Sankoh to
Taylor, who then handed it to Sesay. Sesay agreed that the signature on the letter belonged
to Sankoh, and then Jabba, Sesay's adjutant, read the letter aloud. TF 1-338 recalls that Jabba
read from that letter that "Issa should now take control of the leadership and he should take
instructions, just as Mosquito used to do while [Sankoh] was in jail...in Nigeria, that Issa
should now take control and instructions from Charles Taylor".14g6O Obasanjo then handed
Sesay a parcel and he and Konaré left to fly back to their own countries. Sesay then spent
the night in Monrovia before leaving for Sierra Leone the next day.l4861
6586. When Sesay arrived back in Sierra Leone he convened another meeting in Lebanon,
Koidu Town, where he showed Sankoh's letter "to the people and the people were happy
about it because Issa had been appointed the new leader and should carry on with the work
MSB TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15149-15150. TF1—338 explained that when Taylor spoke about
the "British elected preside¤ts" that he was referring to the four other heads of state.
Img TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15151.
limo TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15152—15154.
Mm TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15154.—15155.

---- End of Page 2294 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

40 5%;
Pa Sankoh was to do". The letter explained that Issa was there to be the "interim chairnian",
and "at the same time he should take instructions from Charles Taylor just as before as
Mosquito had been doing and he should take care of the revolution, and he should not allow
anybody to mislead him into disarmament".l4862
The Accused
6587. The Accused testified that he invited the ECOWAS heads of state to the Executive
Mansion in Monrovia on 26 July 2000, in order to resolve who was in charge of the RUF
while Foday Sankoh was incarcerated so that they could "make absolutely sure the [Lomé ]
agreement is not thrown away". President J ammah of the Gambia, President Konaré of Mali,
President Obasanjo of Nigeria, President Compaore of Burkina Faso, and President
Eyadema of Togo attended the meeting, while President Robert of Cote d’Ivoire did not. At
the meeting there was also an RUF delegation which included General Issa Sesay}4863
6588. The Accused testified that "General Sesay made us to understand that he was the
most senior officer, so after we threw it around and we said, ‘Well, then of course you are in
charge and you will be the new leader. Can we assume that‘?"’ Sesay said no because two
conditions needed to be met in order for him to take over the RUF leadership: 1) he would
need the approval of "what he called a War Council", and "even more importantly, he said
that it would take the approval of Foday Sankoh...". Sesay asked for time to consult with the
War Council and that the presidents find a way to get a message to Foday Sankoh.l4864
6589. About a week later, in the first week of August 2000, Presidents Obasanjo and
Konaré travelled to Sierra Leone with a letter written by Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh,
informing him that the senior commander and officer of the RUF had met and decided that
Sesay would become the Interim Leader until Sankoh's return}4865
6590. Presidents Obasanjo and Konaré then met with Tejan Kabbah "and Foday Sankoh
was brought to the meeting" where Sankoh gave his approval of Sesay being appointed as
the Interim Leader. Obasanjo and Konare then discussed Sankoh's agreement over the
Mm TP1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15155-15156.
Mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, p. 27053; Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27159-
27163. First Taylor testified that President Robert of the Cote d’Ivoire attended, but then later testified that he
did not. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 August 2009, pp. 27161, 27164.
MSM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27161-27165.

---- End of Page 2295 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 M
/

phone with Taylor, and then they arranged for a meeting to be held three weeks later on 21
August 2000 at Roberts Intemational Airport in Liberia, in order to formalise Sesay's
appointment as Interim Leader. Taylor testified that this meeting was attended by himself,
Obasanjo, Konaré, Sesay and Gibril Massaquoi, who was Sesay's spokesperson.14866
6591. The Accused also testified about Exhibit D—259, an RUF press communiqué signed
by Issa Sesay that confirms that this meeting at RIA occurred as a "sequel to the one held in
Monrovia on 26 July 2000", and that Sankoh sent a signed letter through Konaré and
Obasanjo confirming Sesay as the Interim Leader of the RUF.14867 Taylor further testified
that President Kabbah was "fully kept abreast" of each development leading to the
appointment of Sesay as the Interim Leader.14868
6592. The Accused was questioned concerning TF1—338's testimony about the 26 July
2000 meeting. Taylor contested TF1—338's testimony that the meeting occurred on the sixth
floor of the Executive Mansion, saying that they met in his office on the fourth floor. Taylor
also recalled that he remembered the RUF delegation being represented at the meeting by
only Sesay and Massaquoi. I·Ie also did not recall the presence of Augustine Gbao. Taylor
also explained that when TF1—338 testified that he had invited them there to celebrate an
"occasion", that the witness was referring to the Liberian Independence Day celebrations,
but that he had not invited the RUF delegation there to attend the celebrations, only to
discuss the RUF leadership issue in the wake of Sankoh's incarceration.14869 The Accused
also contested TF1—338's testimony that he referred to Sankoh as too old, stupid and
stubbom, testifying that "I wouldn’t say anything so stupid to Issa. I know the relationship
between Issa and Sankoh. That alone would have spoiled the whole program".1487O
6593. The Accused further contested TF1—338's testimony that at that meeting Issa was
appointed as the RUF Interim Leader. Taylor testified instead that Sesay "made it very clear
*4865 churres Ghankay ruy16r, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27165-27167.
14866 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27163-27168.
14867 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27167-27171; Transcript 20 August 2009, pp.
27272-27273 (testifying that "When it got down to the major decision, Issa kept Gibril Massaquoi with him".);
Exhibit D-259, "Press Communique Issued by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following a meeting with
H.E. Alpha Oumar Konaré , President of Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, President
of Nigeria, and H.E. Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia, 21 August 2000".
14868 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, p. 27172.
14864 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27184-27187, 27191.
14870 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27189-27191.

---- End of Page 2296 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T /5 18 May 2012

,4 0389
in that meeting that he could not accept the leadership at that particular place and claim that
he was the leader, that he needed the blessing of the War Council and Sankoh himself.
That's why it took almost a month to settle all of these things". Mm Taylor also testified that,
contrary to the testimony of TFl-338, he did not suggest sending Sam Bockarie back as the
leader of the RUF.l4872
6594. The Accused also disputed TFl-338's testimony that he met with the RUF
delegation later that night at around 11.00pm or midnight, and that he gave Sesay $USD
15,000. Taylor testified instead that he did not meet with them again until the next morning,
27 July 2000, when he gave Sesay about $USD 5,000 to 7,000 to shop for things they
needed like jeans and sneakers before they returned, as was the custom of Afiican heads of
state when receiving ‘"little delegations". M873
6595. The Accused also disputed the testimony of TFl-338 that the letter from Sankoh
authorizing Sesay's leadership also said that Sesay should now take instructions from
Taylor. Taylor testified that ‘"if the letter had said that, the first thing Obasanjo and Konaré
would have done, they would have never brought such nonsense, where Foday Sankoh read
a letter and say from now on take instructions from Charles Taylor. In fact, knowing
Obasanjo and Konare, they would not have countenanced such nonsense". Taylor goes on to
further explain that ‘"this letter is written by Foday Sankoh in the presence of three
Presidents. Tejani Kabbah, Obasanjo and Alpha Konaré .... You know who would have been
the first to object and you would have heard about it immediately .... Kabbah would have
j objected. Obasanjo would have never countenanced such. Neither Konaré". mm
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6596. Witness Issa Sesay, senior RUF commanderl4875 and interim leader of the RUF from
2000 until disarmament in 2002,l4876 testified that his appointment as Interim Leader of the
RUF first came up at a meeting in the end of July 2000, which he was invited to via radio
communication from Charles Taylor, acting on behalf of ECOWAS. Taylor told him that he
14871 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27191-27192.
14872 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27192-27193.
14873 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27196-27197, 27199-27200.
14874 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27205-27210.
14375 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44590-44591, 44596.
14876 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589; Transcript 23 August 2010, p. 46883.

---- End of Page 2297 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / (Im 18 May 2012

should travel to Monrovia with some of his colleagues because ECOWAS wanted to have a
meeting with the RUF. Sesay took with a delegation with him. They spent the first night in
Monrovia in the guesthouse, and then Joe Tuah came and brought Sesay and his entire
delegation to the Executive Mansion where they met with Taylor and Presidents Obasanjo,
Jammeh, Konaré, and Eyadema}4877
6597. Sesay testified that at the meeting the Heads of State each took a tum to speak, and
the gist of their discussions was that they as ECOWAS leaders, who were the guarantors to
the Lomé Peace Accord, had decided that they were no longer going to work with Sankoh,
because he did not respect anyone and did not want to implement the Lomé Peace Accord,
and that they, as leaders in the region, would not allow the Lomé Accord to fail. For that
reason, they said they deemed it necessary to change the leadership of Mr Sankoh. Obasanjo
then proposed giving the leadership to Sesay based on his quick resolution of the UNAMSIL
hostage situation, and Taylor agreed that "Issa is somebody who listens....I believe that he
will do the job that we will want him to do". Obasanjo then said, "Then it is better we give
Issa the leadership", followed by support from Eyadema and Konaré. 14878
6598. Sesay testified that he responded to this proposal by saying:
this leadership that you want to give me now, I will ask of you to give me a week so that I
will go back and consult with my fellow RUF people. I said because Mr Sankoh was
operating over a divided loyalty, and I said it would not be good at this point,...if you make
me interim leader and then I go back to Sierra Leone, then you hear that people have started
attacking again, or we start attacking each other .... what I want you to do, and the job you
would want me to do, it would not be possible for it to happen. So I said they should give
me time to go and inform my colleague RUF that this is the decision of the ECOWAS
leaders. And number two, we as RUF who were here now, please allow us to write a
letter so that you will send this letter to Mr Sankoh who is already under the custody of the
Government of Sierra Leone. mm
Obasanjo objected, saying that "Issa if we make you leader, we are the Heads of States of
the region, who else will challenge your leadership?" But then Sesay testified that Eyadema
said they should listen to Sesay, and that Sesay should write a letter that they would take to
sarr1r61r."‘7""’
***877 Issa Sesay, rrarrsarrpr 26 July 2010, pp. 44548-44550.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44551.
"‘*77" rssa Sesay, rrarrsarrpr 26 July 2010, p. 44552.
"""° Issa Sesay, rrarrsarrpr 26 July 2010, p. 44552.

---- End of Page 2298 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / \JL3 18 May 2012

40 347
6599. Sesay testified that Gbao wrote the letter there in Monrovia, and that they informed
Sankoh about the decision of ECOWAS concerning his appointment. They then they gave
the letter to Obasanjo, who took it to Freetown with Konaré. President Kabbah brought
Sankoh to Lungi airport, and it was there that Obasanjo and Konare handed the letter over to
him. Sankoh rejected the proposal, saying that he wanted the ECOWAS leaders to ask Mike
Lamin to take over but both Obasanjo and Konaré said no, and that the time for Sankoh to
tell them anything whatsoever has already passed. The ECOWAS leaders wanted Issa, so Mr
Sankoh was no longer in a place to tell them who they should appoint. Sesay heard about
Sankoh's reaction from Obasanjo during the next time he met with him at RIA in August
6600. After Sesay had given the letter to Obasanjo and Konaré, he and the RUP delegation
returned to Sierra Leone where he convened a meeting of commanders in Kono and
informed them about what had happened at the Monrovia meeting, and of the decision taken
by ECOWAS. During the meeting some of them suggested that Mike Lamin or Pa Rogers
should take over as Interim Leader instead, but others also supported Sesay, as he was the
one ECOWAS wanted. When the meeting ended Sesay had the most support, and a week
later he left to return to Monrovia with only Gbao, Jonathan Kposowa, Samuel Jabba,
Patrick PS Binda, and Colonel Lion. 14882
6601. Sesay testified that after arriving at the guesthouse in Monrovia they were collected
and taken to RIA, where he and the RUP delegation met with Obasanjo, Konare, Taylor,
representatives of the ECOWAS heads of state who could not attend, and the press. At the
meeting Taylor told Sesay about Sankoh's rejection of their suggestion, and said that they
did not accept it, and wanted to know what the outcome of the meeting with Sesay and the
RUF commanders was. Sesay explained that people had suggested him, Mike Lamin and Pa
Rogers. Obasanjo then said they wanted Sesay as RUP Interim Leader and Taylor
concurred. Konare said that they had given enough time to Sankoh and that they would not
listen to him anymore, and that Sesay should become the leader. [4883
6602. After that meeting ended, Taylor, Konaré, and Obasanjo invited Sesay into a small
conference room. They told Sesay that all of the ECOWAS leaders, including President
MKS} Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44553, 44557-44558.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44554-44556; Transcript 2 August 2010, p, 45268.

---- End of Page 2299 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 %

4/0322.
Kabbah, supported Sesay becoming the Interim Leader. They also said that he was a young
man, and should not make them ashamed of him, and that he should do whatever they told
him to. They gave him instructions, including that he should prepare to work with Sierra
Leone in implementing the Lomé Accord. 14884
6603. Sesay again testified that he was not appointed Interim Leader by Taylor alone, and
that it was Obasanjo who Hrst brought up the idea of his appointment}4885 He also testiHed
that Exhibit D—259, an RUF press Communiqué issued on 21 August 2000 which recounted
the events of the meeting at RIA, was drafted by Gibril Massaquoi, and that although it
appears to be signed by him, he does not remember doing so. Sesay testiHed that even
though the communiqué stated that the meeting was held in late August, it actually took
place on 5 August 2000. M886
6604. Sesay testiHed that contrary to the testimony of TF1—338, at the July 2000 meeting
with Taylor and the ECOWAS heads of state in Monrovia, he did not object to the proposal
that Foday Sankoh be replaced as RUF leader. It was only Gbao who made this objection.
Sesay also disputed the testimony of TF1—338 that Sam Bockarie was discussed at that
meeting. Sesay testiHed that Bockarie's name "was not even mentioned in the entire
discussion". Sesay also recalled in relation to this issue that after Bockarie resigned from the
RUF and left to Monrovia, that Sankoh and Obasanjo went to Monrovia and "facilitated" a
meeting with Bockarie. At the meeting they decided that Bockarie should stay in Monrovia
in order to ensure that he would not obstruct the peace process in Sierra Leone.l4887
6605. Sesay also disputed the testimony of TF1—338 in relation to the letter that Foday
Sankoh sent to the August 2000 meeting at RIA, acceding to Sesay's interim leadership.
Sesay testiHed that he did not hand the letter to Jabba, as TF1—338 testihed, but rather to
Kposowa, who read through it and said that Sankoh had written that he approved of
ECOWAS's proposal that Sesay become the interim leader. Sesay also testiHed that he read
Sankoh's letter himself and that it did not instruct him to take orders from Taylor. Sesay
further explained that when Kabbah testiHed at Sesay's trial, he recounted that at the
14883 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44558-44560.
M884 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44560-4456l.
{4885 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44562.
M886 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44567-4456S. ~
I4887 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45256-4525S.

---- End of Page 2300 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / 18 May 2012

49373
meeting in Freetown with Sankoh, Kabbah first wr0te the letter and asked Sankoh to sign it.
Sankoh refused and said that he needed to write it so that his men would recognize his
handwriting, which he did. The letter was then sent to RIA through Obasanj0. Sesay also
testified that he believed it was impossible that Sankoh would have been allowed to write
that Sesay should take instmction from Taylor. Mm
6606. When questioned as to whom he was supposed to take inst1uction fi0m as RUF
Interim Leader, Sesay testified that in that position he was not required to take inst1uction
from anyone, just as Foday Sankoh as leader did not take instmctions from anyone. Sesay
further testified that at the meeting at RIA the ECOWAS leaders did not tell him to take
instmction fi0m anyone, they Only advised him to work with the G0vemment of Sierra
Leone and the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone. 14889
6607. Sesay was also questioned concerning the testimony of TFl—338 that af°ter the
August 2000 meeting at RIA Sesay returned to Leban0n, Koidu Town and showed the
people the letter from Sankoh which stated that Sesay was to be the interim leader and that
he should take instmctions from Charles Taylor and not allow anyone to lead him into
disarmament. Sesay testified that if these were the contents of the letter, Presidents Obasanj0
and Konaré would not have delivered it him, and President Kabbah would not have allowed
his c0lleagues to bring a letter to Sesay instructing him not to disarm, especially as the
disarmament was what all of the ECOWAS leaders were disturbing "their lives and their
reigns...t0 talk about". 14890
6608. Sesay also disputed the testimony of the Accused that Gibril Massaquoi was present
at the August 2000 meeting at RIA, testifying instead that Massaquoi was not there.1489l
Defence Exhibit D—258
6609. Exhibit D—258 is a letter that Charles Taylor testified was written by Issa Sesay to the
"Papay", F 0day Sankoh, dated l August 2000.14892 It states in pertinent part that all of the
*4888 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45267—45270.
{4889 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45271—45272.
{4890 Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45272 -45274.
MW Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45271.
‘""‘°2 Taylor testified that between the marking of the words "DECISION" on the letter is the signature of Issa
Sesay, and that he knows this because he was told that Issa signed the letter as Interim Leader. The Trial
Chamber notes that it is unable to see whose signature is on the letter that was admitted into evidence. Charles

---- End of Page 2301 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T @i° 18 May 2012

40 Z?74.
senior commanders and officers of the RUF P had met and come to a decision "that Brigadier
General Issa Sesay will head the RUF P as interim leader until your return .... We would like
to infonn you about such development and your advice and instruction, which will be
cariied out fully through the high command of the RUFP". The letter was signed "Your
children of the revolution, signed on behalf of the high command of the RUFP", with the
word "intrem" written below the signau1re.l4g93
Defence Exhibit D—259
6610. Exhibit D—259 is an RUF press communiqué issued following a meeting on 21
August 2000 between the RUF High Command and Presidents Konaré, Obasanjo, and
Taylor. It states in pertinent part that the "meeting was a sequel to the one held in Monrovia
on 26 July 2000 and the High command's letter dated 01 August 2000 to Chairman Foday
Sankoh on developments comiected with the peace process in Sierra Leone. His Excellancy
President Obasanjo brought a hand written and signed reply to our letter addressed to
Chairman Foday Sankoh. We are convinced that the letter, which conHrmed Brig. Gen. Issa
Sessay [sic] as the Interim Leader of the RUF, is authentic".l4894
Defence Exhibit D·263
6611. Exhibit D·263 is a letter from Monie R. Captan, the Liberian Foreign Minister, to
United States Under Secretary of State Thomas P. Pickering, dated 17 August 2000. ln this
letter, Captan informed Pickering that "in keeping with consultations held among the
Chairman of ECOWAS, the Chairman of the OAU, the Presidents of Liberia, Nigeria, and
the Gambia in Monrovia on 26 July 2000; a new interlocutor and leader of the RUF has been
proposed by the RUF Command through letter tothe Chairman of ECOWAS".l4895
Defence Exhibit D—264
Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27165-27167; Exhibit D-258, "Handwritten Letter from Issa
Sesay to Foday Sankoh, August 1 2000".
mq} Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27165-27167; Exhibit D-258, "Handwritten Letter
from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh, 1 August 2000".
mm Exhibit D-259, "Press Communique Issued by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following a meeting
with H.E. Alpha Oumar Konaré, President of Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo,
President of Nigeria, and H.E. Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia, 21 August 2000".
14895 Exhibit D-263 "Letter from President of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor to Thomas Pickering, Under
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, 17 August 2000", p. 2. j

---- End of Page 2302 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %{ 18 May 2012

C/0 37
6612. Exhibit D-264 is a letter from Charles Taylor to President William Clinton, dated 23
August 2000, in which he informs Clinton that "the RUF has announced a new leadership
acceptable to ECOWAS...". M896
Deliberations
6613. The Trial Chamber observes that the evidence presented by both the Prosecution and
Defence concerning the appointment of Issa Sesay as Interim Leader of the RUF in August
2000 is substantially similar, even if there is disagreement over some points. Specifically,
each of the witnesses testified that: 1) a meeting occurred on 26 July 2000 at the Executive
Mansion in Monrovia between the heads of state of ECOWAS and an RUF delegation led
by Issa Sesay, where Taylor was either in agreement with the other heads of state that Sesay
should become the Interim Leader, or was himself responsible for first suggesting it,l4897 2)
Sesay would not accept the appointment without it first being approved by the RUF,
including Foday Sa1rlthe appointment of a new interim leadergmgg 4) a message was brought to Foday Sankoh by
President Obasanjo from Sesay asking for his consent;l49OO and 5) a follow-up meeting took
place at RIA in Liberia in August 2000, where Sesay was confirmed as the RUF Interim
Leader. mgm
NW6 Exhibit D-264, "Letter to the President of the United States, H.E. William Jefferson Clinton, from the
President of Liberia, Dahkpannah, Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 August 2000", p. 2.
MW TF}-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15147-15148; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August
2009, pp. 27161-27165; Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44551; Exhibit D-263 "Letter from President of
Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor to Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, 17 August 2000", p. 2;
Mm TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15147-15148; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August
2009, pp. 27161-27165; Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44552.
Mm Witness TF}-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15151; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August
2009, pp. 27165-27167; Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44554-44556; Exhibit D-258, "Handwritten
Letter from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh, August 1 2000".
Wm TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15151; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp.
27165-27167; Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44553, 44557-44558; Exhibit D-258, "Handwritten Letter
from Issa Sesay to Foday Sankoh, August 1 2000;" Exhibit D-259, "Press Communique Issued by the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following a meeting with H.E. Alpha Oumar Konaré , President of Mali and
Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E..Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, and H.E. Dahkpannah Dr Charles
Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia, August 21 2000;" Exhibit D-263 "Letter from President of Liberia,
Charles Ghankay Taylor to Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,
August 17 2000", p. 2.
MOI TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15152-15154; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August
2009, pp. 27163-27168; Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44558-44560; Exhibit D-259, "Press
Comnrunique Issued by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following a meeting with H.E. Alpha Oumar
Konaré , President of Mali and Chairman of ECOWAS, H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, and H.E.

---- End of Page 2303 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

4/0 Z? é
6614. The Trial Chamber will focus its deliberations on three points in dispute: 1) whether
Sesay disagreed and refused to comply with a recommendation from Taylor that Bockarie be
appointed as Interim Leader of the RUF; 2) the extent of the involvement of the other
ECOWAS heads of state in appointing Sesay to Interim Leader of the RUF; and 3) whether
Sankoh instructed that Sesay take instructions from Taylor.
6615. Concerning the first point in dispute, the evidence that the Prosecution presented to
support the proposition that at the 26 July 2000 meeting; Taylor recommended that Bockarie
be appointed as the RUF Interim Leader, and that Sesay rejected this proposal, is the
testimony of TF1—338.14902 The Accused denied in his testimony that he made this
recommendation,149O3 and Sesay also denied that Bockarie's name came up at the meeting,
explaining that at that time Bockarie was in Liberia because Obasanjo and Sankoh wanted to
prevent him from derailing the peace process in Sierra Leone.14904 The Trial Chamber also
recalls its finding that on 14 December 1999 Sam Bockarie left Sierra Leone to relocate to
Monrovia at the instruction of the Accused, who made great efforts in conjunction with
other ECOWAS members to remove him from Sierra Leone.149O5 While the Trial Chamber
also recalls its finding that TF1-3 38 is a generally credible witness,149O6 the circumstances in
this context make it unlikely, in the Trial Chamber's view, that the Accused would have
suggested Bockarie for leadership of the RUF. i
6616. Concerning the second point in dispute, the testimony of the witnesses indicates that
the other ECOWAS heads of state were as involved as Taylor; if not more so, in selecting
Sesay to take over as Interim Leader of the RUF at the 26 July 2000 meeting. TF1-338
testified that at the 26 July 2000 meeting President Jammeh said that it was Taylor who had
invited the ECOWAS heads of state to come together with the RUF delegation to discuss the
RUF taking on new leadership.14907 This suggests that it was a decision that was deliberated
on by the attendees at the meeting, and not a unilateral decision by Taylor. The Accused
testified that at the 26 July 2000 meeting he and the ECOWAS leaders ‘"threw around" the
Dahkpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia, August 21 2000". See also Exhibit D-264, "Letter
to the President of the United States; H.E. William Jefferson Clinton, from the President of Liberia, Dahkparmah,
Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, August 23 2000", p. 2.
Wm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15147-15148.
Im] Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27163-27168.
'""°"1sSa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45256-45258.
'4905 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/ AF RC, Sam Bockarie.
NW6 Credibility Assessment, TF1-338, paras 318-329.

---- End of Page 2304 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T UU) 18 May 2012

qa Z ? Q-·
idea that Sesay should be the RUF Interim Leader because Sesay was at that time the most
senior officer of the RUF.l4908 The Accused's testimony therefore also does not support the
proposition that the suggestion of Sesay was a unilateral proposal that he made by himself
6617. According to Sesay's testimony, Obasanjo first proposed that Sesay should take over
the leadership based on his quick resolution of the UNAMSIL hostage situation, and Taylor
then agreed, followed by Eyadema and Konaré.l49O9 Sesay further testitied that when
Obasanjo and Konaré took the letter to Sankoh informing him about the decision of
ECOWAS confirming his appointment, Sankoh said he wanted Mike Lamin as leader
instead. However, Obasanjo and Eyadema told Sankoh that he no longer could choose
whom to appoint.l49lO The Trial Chamber notes, that President Obasanjo and Konare both
met with Sankoh in Freetown, without the Accused present, indicating that this process was
undertaken by ECOWAS heads of state collectively, rather than by the Accused unilaterally.
Taylor then told Sesay at the meeting in August 2000 at RIA that Sankoh had rejected
ECOWAS's suggestion, but that they were disregarding it, and asked for the outcome of the
meeting that Sesay held with the RUF commanders. Vlfhen Sesay told Taylor, Obasanjo and
Konaré that the RUF commanders had suggested him, Mike Lamin and Pa Rogers, Obasanjo
responded that he wanted Sesay as Interim Leader followed by concurrences from Taylor
and Konaré.l49ll According to Sesay, the three leaders then invited him into a small
conference room where they told him that his leadership had the support of all of the
ECOWAS leaders, including President Kabbah.l49l2 The Trial Chamber iinds that taken
together, the evidence of TFl—338, the Accused and Issa Sesay shows that Taylor did not
unilaterally select Sesay to be the Interim Leader of the RUF in July and August 2000, and
that the ECOWAS leaders appeared to in fact have all had a say in the matter.
6618. Finally, the third point in dispute is whether in acceding to the appointment of Issa
Sesay as RUF Interim Leader, Foday Sankoh also instructed Sesay to take instructions from I
Taylor just as Sam Bockarie had when he was RUF Interim Leader. The Prosecution relies
on the testimony of TFl—338, whose basis of knowledge was his recollection of the reading
Wm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15147.
Wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27161-27162.
14909 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, p. 44551.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44553, 44557-44558.
WH Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44558-44560.
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44560-44561.

---- End of Page 2305 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2305,% 18 May 2012

qa 3 9
of Sankoh's letter by Sesay's adjutant at the RIA meeting in August 2000.l49l3 The Accused
disputed TF1-338's testimony on this point, and testified that as Sankoh wrote the letter in
question in front of Obasanjo, Konaré, and Kabbah, they would have objected to him
including such an instruction.l49l4 Sesay also disputed TF1·338's evidence on this point,
arguing that Obasanjo, Konaré and Kabbah would not have allowed a letter that included an
instruction to follow Taylor's instructions, as well as the instruction not to disarm, to reach
Sesay.
6619. While Sesay did testify that Taylor, Konaré and Obasanjo told him that as he was a
young man, that he should not make them ashamed and that he should do whatever they told
him to,l49l5 he also testified his understanding of his position was that he was not required to
take instructions from anyone else and that the ECOWAS leaders had not told him to take
instructions from anyone, but advised him to cooperate with the Government of Sierra
Leone and the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone.l49l6 The Trial Chamber recalls that
President Kabbah was present when the letter was turned over by Sankoh, as well as
Presidents Obasanjo and Konaré. The Trial Chamber finds the argument that Kabbah and
the other heads of state would not have allowed such a direction to be included in the letter
from Sankoh to be compelling, particularly given Sankoh's weakened position with the
ECOWAS leaders, who were willing to replace him as RUF leader without his input. For
these reasons the Trial Chamber does not find this allegation to be sufficiently supported by
the evidence for a finding beyond reasonable doubt.
Findings
6620. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that at a meeting that took place in the Executive Mansion in Monrovia on 26 July
2000 with ECOWAS Heads of State present, the Accused proposed that Sam Bockarie take
over as Interim Leader of the RUF and Issa Sesay rejected this proposal.
Wm TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15155-15156.
Wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 19 August 2009, pp. 27205-27210.
Mw Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010, pp. 44560—4456 1.
MMG Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45271—45272.

---- End of Page 2306 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (lm 18 May 2012

4-0 3 96}
6621. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that when Issa Sesay was appointed lnterim Leader of the RUF, it was with the
direction from Sankoh that he should take instruction from the Accused.
(e) Operations outside Siena Leone
(i) RUF/AFRC against Mosguito Spray/LURD in Liberia, 1999
Submissions of the Parties
6622. The Prosecution alleges that throughout the conflicts in Liberia and Siena Leone,
Taylor made free use of his proxy forces, the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF.l49l7 More
specifically, the Prosecution submits that, in 1999 and onwards, Taylor made free use of
AFRC/RUF forces to assist him in his fight against Mosquito Spray and LURD forces that
attacked his forces. Bockarie obeyed Taylor's order to send Taylor's proxy forces,
AFRC/RUF fighters, to Liberia to reinforce Taylor's own Liberian subordinates to repel
these attacks. During the fighting, the AFRC/RUF operated under the overall command of
Taylor's Liberian subordinates.l49l8
6623. The Defence submits that the Prosecution's evidence is highly suspect and
contested.l49l9 Most importantly, however, even assuming arguendo that these allegations
were true, the Defence submits that the fact that orders were allegedly issued and followed
does not, ipso facto, establish effective control in this case where the Accused was a civilian
leader in a different country altogether. ln those instances, as established in intemational
jurisprudence, traditional indicia of effective control are not enough. There is a need for
objective evidence that the Accused had the matenal ability to exercise effective control. Wm
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1—375
Mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 383.
Nm Prosecution Final Trial Biief paras 3 l, 385—387; See also para. 320.
Wm Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1293.
Imc Defence Final Trial Brief para. 1294

---- End of Page 2307 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T % Ok 18 May 2012

49 A-OO
6624. Witness TFl-375, an RUF fighter,M92 [ testified that during the rainy season of 1999,
Superman told him to go to Buedu with other RUF and AFRC fighters to take instructions
from Bockarie about crossing the Liberian border in order to help the Liberian Govemment,
who were having problems there. When the RUF/AFRC troops arrived in Buedu, Sam
Bockarie called a muster parade of around 400-500 people and told them to cross over to
Foya in order to repel Mosquito Spray's troops, which were attacking the AFL (Armed
Forces of Liberia) from Guinea. After the muster parade, Bockarie sent these forces to Foya
under the command of CO Eagle. The group was well-armed with AK-47s, RPGs, GMG
and some 60 millimetre mortar and other weapons. When they arrived in Foya, the AFL
soldiers under the command of Christopher Varmoh, Liberian Mosquito, started jubilating.
14922
6625. TF1—375 testified that the next day, Benjamin Yeaten arrived in a helicopter with
Dopoe Menkarzon and some other Special Forces. Yeaten also called a muster parade during
which he explained that the AFL and the RUF/AFRC should fight together to repel
Mosquito Spray's forces since they were "all fighting for the same goal". [4923
6626. TFl-375 stated that after the parade, Christopher Varmoh, CO Eagle, Benjamin
Yeaten, Dopoe Menkarzon, Colonel Sheriff from Sierra Leone, and, other senior
commanders plamred the attack against Mosquito Spray's forces. The AFL, RUF and AFRC
forces attacked the LURD- in Kolahun and pushed them from Voinjama to Guinea.M924 After
the LURD was pushed out of Liberia, the AFL deployed at the border, while TFl—375 and
the RUF forces retreated to Voinjama. TFl—375 testified that during the operation, the RUF
forces looted NGO cars, food, medicine and other items which the commanders used to
enter into Sierra Leone. The cars were marked with UNDP, UNICEF and different NGOs
Signs. 14925
6627. TF1-375 testified that at the time they moved to Liberia, CO Eagle was the overall
boss of the RUF and AFRC combined forces but that, while in Liberia, Christopher Varmoh,
an AFL Commander, was the overall commander of the operation against Mosquito Spray.
Wm TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.
M922 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12617-12623; Transcript 22 August 2008, p. 14324; Transcript 27
August 2008, p. 14742.
Wm TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12617-12620.
Wm TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12622.
M25 -375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12623.

---- End of Page 2308 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2308 { Ow 18 May 2012

TF1-375 stated that Varmoh reported sometimes to Sam Bockarie or to the army
headquarters about the 0ngoing Operation.l4926 .
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
6628. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULIMO-K who
later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,l4927 testified that he participated in several
RUF Operations outside of Sierra Leone.l4928 The first one, "Operation Mosquit0 Spray"
took place in Liberia in August 1999, when the LURD's leader called "Mosquit0 Spray" and
his tr00ps attacked AFL forces in Foya and Voinjama, Liberia in order to remove Taylor
from p0wer. Keita testified that Benjamin Yeaten instructed Sam Bockarie to j0in the AFL,
the Liberian police and the ATU, Taylor's palace guard, in attacking LURD's forces
invading Liberia. Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon also participated in the RUF effort. Keita
testified that the AFL/RUF forces were successful and were able to repel the LURD from
Kolahun and Voinjama.l4929 During the attack against Mosquit0 Spray, the RUF used Small
Boys Units.l493°
6629. Keita stated that the overall commander of the Operation on the field was Benjamin
Yeaten,l493 I who provided the ammunition for the RUF's Operations against the LURD in
Liberia and Guinea}4932 After the attack, Yeaten, Bockarie and the Liberian Defence
Minister Daniel Chea flew by helicopter from Foya to Monrovia. 14933
Prosecution Witness Kann0h Kanneh
6630. Witness Kann0h Kanneh, a senior commander in the RUF,l4934 testified that in
March/April 1998, Bockarie called Kanneh to Buedu and said that Taylor told him that
ULIMO and LURD forces had invaded L0fa C0unty. Sam Bockarie instructed Kanneh to
"‘°2° Witness Tri-875, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12622.
M927 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000;
Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.
**92* Abu ksns, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045.
M929 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2048; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2139.
Wm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2058.
"‘°3’ Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2048.
Wm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2055.
MB Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2055
Wm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.

---- End of Page 2309 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

/1-O/10A
gather RUF forces and to attack LURD in Lofa County. Bockarie asked Issa Sesay and
Morris Kallon to do the same in Kono.14935
6631. Following Bockarie's instmctions, Kanneh brought a platoon of 62 men to Buedu
where they met other troops. There the troops were divided into two groups and instmcted to
attack from two flanks. Sam Bockarie and Kanneh attacked LURD forces in Foya town
while other troops attacked them in Vahun. The attack was successful, forcing the LURD
forces to retreat to Kolahun and Voinjama. After conquering Voinjama, Kanneh testified
that the RUF troops received an order from Benjamin Yeaten to pursue the LURD to
Guinea. According to Yeaten's order, Kanneh and his men chased the LURD forces to
Bayalo in Guinea. While there, Yeaten ordered Kanneh and his men to burn the entire town.
After burning Bayolo, Kanneh and his men retreated to Foya. Liberians troops remained in
Foya. 14936
6632. Kanneh testified that he, Bockarie and Yeaten took a helicopter in Foya to Monrovia.
While in Monrovia, Kanneh and Bockarie lodged at Yeaten's place, White Flower, where
they spent approximately three days.14937 While there, Bockarie told Kanneh that he was
going to see Taylor with Yeaten. Kanneh did not go but when he came back, Bockarie told
him that during the meeting Taylor promised them a "morale booster" and some
1 ammunition. The day they left Monrovia, Kanneh saw AK rounds and some RPG rockets at
Taylor's house. Kanneh also saw a bag of money that Taylor gave to Bockarie to thank RUF
forces for helping him clear the LURD forces from Lofa County. Subsequently, Kanneh and
Bockarie took the same helicopter back to Foya where they met Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon
and other RUF officers.14938 RUF officers decided to use the money to buy dmgs for the
wounded soldiers. The ammunition was to be brought back to the RUF zone along with a
large cache of ammunition captured during the Voinjama attack to be used in the war and
distributed to various RUF commanders, including Karmoh Kanneh.14939
14935 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459.
14936 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9459-9461.
Wm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9461-9463; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9641-9645
14% 8 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9463-9467.
Wm Karmoh Kamieh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9467-9469; Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9649-9655.

---- End of Page 2310 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 18 May 2012

Prosecution Witness TF1-338
6633. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member,l4940 testified that in 1999, he was sent by
Bockarie to meet Foday Sankoh, who was retuming from the Lomé Peace accords to
Monrovia. While in Monrovia, TF1-338 attended a meeting held at the sixth floor of the
Executive Mansion, together with Taylor, Sankoh and Bockarie. During the meeting Taylor
thanked Bockarie for "maintaining the RUF" while Foday Sankoh was away, and for
securing Foya and Voinjama from the LURD rebels and he gave the RUF members
$USD15,000.l494l
Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah
6634. Witness Augustine Mallah, an RUF security officer,l4942 testified that on an
unspecified date between December 1998 and September 1999, he crossed over into
Kolahun, Liberia with Bockarie where he fought with NPFL soldiers against ULIMO/LURD
forces. Wm
Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah
6635. Witness Mohamed Kabbah, an RUF radio operator}4944 testified that he went to
Foya, Liberia, when the RUF troops went to fight the LURD in Kolahun following a LURD
invasion of Liberia from Guinea. Once Kolahun had been captured by the AFL/RUF,
Kabbah moved to Kolahun. While he was in Kolahun, the RUF recaptured Voinjama.l4945
Prosecution Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay
6636. Witness Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an AFRC officer,l4946 testified that after the
intemational media announced that Mosquito Spray's squad had invaded Liberia from
Guinea to oust Taylor's government, he attended a meeting in Monrovia, together with
WMO TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086.
N94] TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15100-15101, 15117-15118.
Mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript5 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13
November 2008, pp. 20209-20210.
Mm Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20440; Transcript 18 November 2008 pp. 20506-
20507.
MM Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16100.
WMS Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16301-16302.
Mm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7865-7866.

---- End of Page 2311 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // 0*5 18 May 2012

4c><¢O4.,
Johnny Paul Koroma, Taylor and other SLAs, during which Taylor told them that he had
ordered Bockarie to come to Voinjama to repel Mosquito Spray's forces from Liberia. M947
Prosecution Witness TF1-539
6637. Witness TF1-539 testified that after the Lome Accord, Issa Sesay left Kono for
around two weeks when Mosquito Spray, the head of LURD (former ULIMO), attacked
Foya in Lofa County, Liberia. TF1-539 stated that when the attack occurred, Sam Bockarie
sent a message asking all the fighters that the RUF had in Kono to go to Liberia to repel
ULIMO from Foya. TF1-539 testified that this was an order from President Charles Taylor
but that the RUF had an interest in helping him since it received everything from Liberia and
that Mosquito Spray's attack had cut the supply route.l4948
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
6638. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operator,l4949 testified that just before he left for
Liberia in June/July 1999, he read in the RUF message logbook that "Bockarie's chief’
Charles Taylor, instructed Bockarie to send RUF soldiers to Liberia to assist the AFL in
repelling a rebel Liberian named Mosquito Spray, who had captured Voinjama. This
operation named "Operation Vulture" was commanded by an RUF Commander named
Colonel Olso. The operation was a success although LURD forces retreated to Guinea and
continued to attack Voinjama from there. TF1-516 testified that during the operation, the
RUF captured two vehicles belonging to NGOs in which they found radios.l495O
Prosecution Witness Varrnuyan Sherif
6639. Witness Varmuyan Sherif, a former ULIMO-K fighter who became an officer in the
SSS,l495l testified that LURD invaded Liberia in late 1998, early 1999. Sherif received
information that LURD, led by Jamani Kamara and Sekou Damate Conneh, used Guinea to
enter Lofa County through Foya in Liberia. Sherif testified that at this time, the Liberian
"""" Airnrnrny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8509-8510, 8515-8516.
';'°"8 rrr-589, Transcript 11 Jnnn 2008,p. 11541.
""""’ TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
M50 TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6872-6874, 6916; Transcript 9 April 2008, pp, 7047-7049
Wm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript, 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 940,
986-987.

---- End of Page 2312 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T (fbi 18 May 2012

4/0<¢army had been disarmed by ECOMOG and was therefore lacking arms and ammunition to
defend itself against the LURD's invasion. 14952
6640. Varmuyan Sherif further testified that RUF forces assisted the Liberian Government
by fighting the LURD in Foya, Kolahun and Voinjama. RUF troops reported directly to
Benjamin Yeaten,14454 who reported to Taylor.14954 Abu Keita was one of the RUF
commanders sent to assist the Liberian government to fight LURD.14455 Sherif further stated
that at that time, during a meeting at VVhite Flower, Taylor provided arms and ammunition
to Benjamin Yeaten, who distributed them among the groups that fought in Lofa
County. 14456
Prosecution Witness TF1-371
6641. Witness TF1-371, a member of the RUF,14954 testified that in late December 1998,
Christopher Varmoh and Dopoe Menkarzon came to Buedu to talk to Bockarie about
organising a fighting force to give support to the ATU and AFL, who were under attack
from LURD rebels in Lofa.14458
6642. TF1-371 further testified that, while he was in Buedu and while the Freetown
fighting was going on, there was serious fighting between Taylor's security forces and
Mosquito Spray's LURD. Taylor and Yeaten requested Bockarie to instruct the RUF
contingent based in Foya, at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, to support the
Liberian forces against the LURD. Bocka.rie agreed and instructed the RUF Commanders in
Foya, including Morris Kallon, to help the Liberian forces in repelling Mosquito Spray's
troops. TF1-371 testified that more than 200 RUF soldiers based in Foya at this time
participated in the operation. 14959
14452 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 1006-1007. _
14453 Varmuyan Sherii Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 898 ("RUF at that time, when they came into Liberian
territory to help the government they were reporting to Benjamin Yeaten directly").
14454 Varmuyan Sherii Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 897 ("All the militias were being supervised by him,
Yeaten Q. And in this capacity who did Benjamin Yeaten report to? A. Benjamin Yeaten reported to Mr
Taylor").
14455 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, p. 898; Transcript 14 January 2008, p. 1 151.
14456 Varmuyan Sherii Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 899, 906-908
14457 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
14454 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2425-2426 (CS).
14454 TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2433-2434, 2464-2465 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2513
(CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700 2703 (CS). See also TF1-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, p. 2672

---- End of Page 2313 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ {N 18 May 2012

ya ¢/ O 6
6643. TF1-371 further testihed that around March 1999, while the righting against LURD
intensihed, Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and came back to Foya with a shipment of
materiel. 449644
Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor
6644. Witness Isaac Mongor, a senior RUF commander,44464 testihed that in 1999, after the
Freetown invasion and before the Lomé Accord, the RUF participated in an operation in
Liberia to Hght "Mosquito Spray", which was fighting to remove Charles Taylor from
power. Isaac Mongor did not participate himself in this operation but Bockarie told him that
the order to Hght there came from Taylor, who told Bockarie to send RUF troops in the Lofa
area iii ribaiia. *4962
Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu
6645. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant,44463 testihed that while he was based in
Komende in 1999, he heard that the LURD rebels invaded Lofa County in Liberia, trying to
cut the supply line between the RUF and Liberian govemment. Sam Bockarie sent RUF
troops to help the Liberian govemment forces Hght the LURD forces, alongside the Liberian
Govemment soldiers, to free up the supply route that would have been blocked if the rebels
had been allowed to settle there. Saidu testihed that RUF soldiers were killed during the
operation, including Mohamed GMG and Commander Komba Gbundema. 44964
Prosecution Witness Pegry Kamara
6646. Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,44965 testiried that after the retreat from
Freetown in 1999, ULIMO, which has changed its name to LURD, started attacking
(CS) (The rebel group was initially called Mosquito Spray before becoming LURD in 1999).
444444 TF1-371, Transcript 31 January 2008, p. 2751 (CS); See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct
Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership (February 1998-December 1999).
44964 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March
2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-6615.
449444 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6163-6164.
44%} Albert Saidu, Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10887; Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895. .
44944 Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, pp. 11099-11102.
44465 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3039.

---- End of Page 2314 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

Taylor's position from the Guinea border. Sam Bockarie sent troops to Liberia to fight them
at Taylor's request. [4466
Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie
6647. Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie, an RUF radio operator,[44°7 testified that while he was
operating in Buedu from early 1998 until April 1999, there was a radio communication
between Yeaten and Bockarie, in which Yeaten requested Bockarie to send reinforcements
to the Voinjama, Kolahun area of Liberia to fight Mosquito Spray's troops. [4468
Prosecution Witness Dennis Koker
6648. Witness Dennis Koker, an AFRC fighter,[44°4 testified that while he was in Buedu in
1999, Bockarie gave him a car belonging to the NGO, "Action contre la faim", captured in
Kolahun, in Lofa County, in order to paint the vehicle in camouflage colours. Koker testified
that the RUF was in Kolahun to repel Mosquito Spray, who had attacked Lofa County. [4970
Prosecution Witness Witness TF1-567
6649. Witness TF1-567, an RUF member,[447[ testified that, in 2000, he was in Monrovia
when Mosquito Spray's LURD forces entered Liberia from Guinea in an attempt to
overthrow Taylor's government before being expelled. [4472
Prosecution Witness Corinne Dufka
6650. Corinne Dufka, a witness who gave evidence on the human rights situation in Sierra
Leone and Liberia,[4473 testified that the RUF factions based in Kailahun District were
involved in responding to the April 1999 fighting in Lofa County, commonly known as
[4466 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3273-3274.
[4467 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21395; Transcript 2 December 2008, p, 21418.
[4468 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21488-21490 ("Even though there was a sat phone
communication, by the time that we had our communication in Buedu those communications used to go on,
because 1 can even recall some time when during the Mosquito Spray operation when it initially started I
remember there was a communication between Benjamin Yeaten and Mosquito for Mosquito to send
reinforcement across to Liberia in Kolahun, Voinjama area, to go and tight against Mosquito Spray — Mosquito
Spray's fighters",
[4444 Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1236.
[4470 Dennis Koker, Transcript, 15 January 2008, pp. 1278-1279.
**9** TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (Ps).
[4472 TF1—567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13106-13107.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % (kg 18 May 2012

//040 E
"Mos uit0 S ra 0 eration" but was not able to ascertain who was in command of the
(1 P Y P
Operation.14474
The Accused
6651. The Accused testified that there was an attack on Voinjama on 21 April 1999 and
1 another in Au st 1999 b Mos uit0 S ra 's LURD. 14415 Ta l0r denied instructin the
gu Y (1 P Y Y S
RUF to assist his forces in repelling the Mosquit0 Spray's LURD invasion. He said he did
not ask Bockarie for help and stated that if he had needed help, he would have contacted the
President of Sierra Leone, Tej an Kabbah.14476
6652. The Accused testified that the LURD was mainly composed of foriner ULIMO
fighters.14471 However, the situation in 1999 was different to the one in 1991, and he did not
need the help of the RUF to fight a common enemy. 14478
6653. The Accused stated that to his knowledge, the RUF did not help him fight in L0fa
C0unt . lf the RUF were fi htin under Ben`amin Yeaten in L0fa C0unt he would have
Y S S J Y
known.14474 Moreover, it was impossible that 200 soldiers could come into Liberia without
his knowledge.144811
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6654. 1ssa Sesa , an RUF commander who became leader of the RUF between 2000 and
Y
2002,14441 testified that Mosquit0 Spray's LURD attacked L0fa C0unty in Liberia from
14413 C0rinne Dufka, Transcript 21 January 2008, pp. 1749-1757.
'·""* cnnnna Dufka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1847.
14415 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32578-32579.
14416 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28958-28960; Transcript 22 September 2009,
pp. 29422-29426; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32577-32579; Transcript 18 February 2010, pp. 35400-
35402.
14411 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28958-28959; Transcript 26 November 2009,
p. 32581.
14414 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32579-32581.
14414 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, p. 32581.
14440 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29598-29602.
144111 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588—43589.
/`

---- End of Page 2316 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

61*
404/O z
Guinea around September/October 1999. 14982 Sesay understood that the LURD was a rebel
force, composed of ex-combatants from Sierra Leone, attacking from Guinea. M983
6655. Sesay testified that the RUF did not take part in attacking LURD rebels in Kolahun
or Voinjama.‘4984 He denied the allegation from Prosecution witnesses that he fought with
Abu Keita and Morris Kallon against Mosquito Spray and LURD rebels in Liberia in August
1999.l4985 Sesay stated that Abu Keita was in Buedu in August 1999 and Morris Kallon in
Magburaka in August 1999. Kallon left Buedu in December 1998 and never returned to
Buedu until December 1999 at the time Bockarie left Buedu. Kallon was the commander in
Magburaka in August l999.l4986
6656. Sesay testified that Bockarie never reported that the RUF was fighting LURD in
Liberia in 1999, or that he had been thanked by Taylor for helping him in fighting
LURD 14987
Prosecution Exhibit P-152A
6657. Exhibit P-152A is a confidential photo.l4988
Prosecution Exhibit P-3 89
6658. Exhibit P-389 is an excerpt of a weekly round up of the African Studies Centre of
University of Pennsylvania, covering the period from 7 to 13 August 1999. End of Page one reads
as follows:
LIBERIA: Dissidents strike in the northwest
Armed men this week seized five localities in northwest Liberia, kidnapped aid workers,
commandeered UNHCR vehicles and battled with government soldiers reinforced by extra
troops rushed to the area, according to various sources.
Liberia's Deputy Information Minister Milton Teahjay told IRIN that the dissidents, on
whose identity he preferred not to speculate, had taken five localities in Lofa County by
Wednesday. Armed men also commandeered five UNHCR vehicles, a source told IRIN.
The government launched a counter-offensive on Thursday, according to Teahjay, who said
Mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 4543745439; Transcript 19 August 2010, pp. 46695-46697.
MW Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 446768.
M984 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45607.
Wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45538.
Mqaé Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45606; Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47097-47099.
Wm Issa Sesay, Transcript 2 August 2010, pp. 45190-45191.
Mm Exhibit P-152A (confidential), ERN 775; TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13024-13025 (PS).

---- End of Page 2317 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T %/ dk 18 May 2012

#0 [//6
on Friday that "the dissidents are retreating and at least two towns have been retaken". He
denied reportsby news organisations and humanitarian sources that former combatants had
( been signing up for active duty in Monrovia to help fight the rebels who, the government
said, came in from Guinea.
A state ofemergency declared earlier in the week by President Charles Taylor and limited
to the affected area was still in effect on Friday. Teahjay said it was helping the security
forces bring the situation under control. Liberia's Defence Minister said on Friday that there
were an estimated 500 to 800 dissidents, but the rebels claimed that they numbered about
3000. A rebel spokesman who gave his name as 'Mosquito Spray' confirmed to the BBC on
Friday that dissidents were holding some 100 persons - around 50 aid workers and their
families - whom they intercepted as they were trying to cross over into Guinea. 'Mosquito
Spray' said they were being held in "protective custody". Their abduction had been reported
in an update on the situation in north-western Liberia that had been sent to IRIN on Friday
by UNHCR in Abidjan. Responsibility for the act was claimed by a group called the Joint
Forces of Liberation for Liberia (JFFL), which demanded assistance, such as fuel, in
exchange for the freedom of the 100 captives, the update said.l4989
Defence Exhibit D—357
6659. Exhibit D—3 57 is an outgoing code cable, dated 27 April 1999, from Downes
Thomas, a UNOL Employee to UN Headquarters in New York. Attached to this cable is a
preliminary and partial report on the events on 21 and 22 April 1999 in Voinjama, drafted by
Mr Camara, a representative of UNHCR in Liberia, and dated 26 April 1999. In his report,
Mr Camara described the meeting he had with three armed men who told him that they were
fighting to bring down Charles Taylor's government.14990 The report also addressed the
looting of UN and NGOs properties by Liberian security forces on 22 April 1999.14991
Deliberations
6660. At the outset, the Trial Chamber notes that this evidence falls outside the geographic
sco e of the indictment and the `urisdiction of the court. The Trial Chamber will consider
P J
this evidence only for contextual purpose or as evidence of a consistent pattern of
conduct. 14992
6661. An analysis of the evidence on record shows that on 21 April 1999, Liberian
dissidents in Guinea, mainly former members of ULIMO, led by a person known as
14989 Exhibit P-3 89, "IRIN-WA Weekely Round-Up 32-1999 [19990814], University of Pennsylvania — African
Studies Centre (End of Pagel), Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information
Network for West Africa", 1.
Wm Exhibit D-357, "Outgoing Code Cable to PRENDERGAST/MIYETNIERA DE MELLO, UN, New York,
From Downs-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, the Voinajama Incidents, 27 April l999", pp. 5, 7-8.
"‘°°‘ Exhibit D-357pp. 7-9.
Wm Preliminary issues: Evidence Outside of the Scope of the Indictment and/or Jurisdiction of the Court.

---- End of Page 2318 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // dm 18 May 2012

#0 4 /!
‘Mosquito Spray’ launched an attack on Voinjama, Liberia. I9999 A second attack occurred on
10 August 1999 and a third on 8 July 200099999 Responsibility for the attacks was claimed
by a group called Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD),l9999 which
had the objective of removing the Accused from power as President of Liberia.l9996
6662. In this context, the Prosecution alleges that following the first attack, Bockarie
obeyed Taylor's instruction to send AFRC/RUF lighters to Liberia to reinforce Taylor's
forces in repelling these attacks. I9997
6663. Numerous witnesses, both from the RUF and AFRC, testified that they went to
Liberia at Bockarie's request to fight alongside the Liberian army against Mosquito Spray's
LURD. TF1-375 testified that he was among the RUF/AFRC troops sent by Bockarie to
Foya to assist AFL soldiers in fighting LURD99999 Abu Keita testified that he was sent by
Sam Bockarie to join the AFL, the Liberian police and the ATU, Taylor's palace guard, in
14993 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7008; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6163-6164; Abu
Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2048; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2139; Albert Saidu, Transcript
5 June 2008, pp. 11099; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, p. 8516 ("This was over the
international media. They said a squad that had come from Guinea had come to oust President Taylor's
government. The leader was called Mosquito Spray. The squad came from the Guinea end. They used the
Voinjama route"); Exhibit D—356A, Letter from the Mission of the Republic of Liberia, to United Nations
Secretary General HE Koffi Annan, 23 April 1999; Exhibit D—356B, Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Monrovia, Liberia, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Guinea, 22 April 1999; Exhibit D-356C,
Note Verbale, from the United Nations Office of Resident Coordinator in Liberia, to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 22 April 1999; Exhibit D—356A, Letter from the Mission of the Republic of Liberia, to United Nations
Secretary General HE Koffi Annan, 23 April 1999; See also Exhibit D-209, Outgoing Code Cable, from
Prendergast, United Nations, New York, to Downes-Thomas (ONLY), RSG, UNOL, 7 May 1999; See also
Karmoh Karineh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459 (while Karmoh Kanneh places Mosquito Spray's attack
in "Apri1 1998", a careful reading of his testimony shows that he was referring to "Apri1 1999").
19999 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7008, 7067; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6163-
6164; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2048; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2139; Exhibit D-
212, Letter to the United Nations Secretary General, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monrovia, Liberia, 1 1
August 1999; Exhibit D-21 1, Outgoing Code Cable, Situation in Lofa County, from Prendergast, United Nations,
New York, to Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, 16 August 1999; Exhibit D-214, ECOWAS Final Communiqué
Ad Hoc Committee Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the Dissident Armed Attack on Liberia, 26
August 1999.
M999 TF1—516, Transcript 9 April 2008 p. 7008 ("when finally those insurgents declared themselves as LAURD
[sic}, that means Liberians United For Reconciliation and Democracy");
14996 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008 p. 8516 ("This was over the international media. They
said a squad that had come from Guinea had come to oust President Taylor's govermnent. The leader was called
Mosquito Spray. The squad came from the Guinea end. They used the Voinjama route"); TF1-5 67, Transcript 7
July 2008, p. 13107 ("They were trying to fight and remove Charles Taylor from power"); Exhibit P-032, Report
of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Council Resolution 1343 (2001).
99997 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 31, 385-387; See also para. 320
19999 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12617-12623; Transcript 22 August 2008, p. 14324; Transcript 27
August 2008, p. 14742.

---- End of Page 2319 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T A15 18 May 2012

//04/ /,4.
attacking LURD's forces invading Liberia.*4999 Kanneh testified that he was instructed by
Bockarie to gather RUF forces and to attack LURD in Lofa County.*5000 Mallah also
testified that he crossed over into Kolahun, Liberia with Bockarie where he fought with
NPFL soldiers against ULIMO/LURD forces.*500* Mohamed Kabbah testified that he went
to Foya, Liberia, to fight with RUF/AFRC troops against LURD forces.*5002 TFl-539
monitored a message from Bockarie asking all the RUF fighters in Kono to go to Liberia
and repel ULIMO from Foya.*5000 In the Trial Chamber's view, this substantial evidence
unequivocally demonstrates that following LURD's attack, Bockarie gave the order to RUF
and AFRC troops to move to Lofa County in Liberia in order to support the Liberian
government forces against Mosquito Spray's forces.
6664. Issa Sesay denied that the RUF took part in attacking LURD rebels in Kolahun or
Voinjama.*5004 The Accused denied instructing the RUF to assist his forces in repelling
Mosquito Spray's LURD invasion.*5005 However, the Trial Chamber notes that he admitted
that it was impossible that 200 soldiers could enter Liberia without his knowledge,*5000 and
he testified that if RUF forces were fighting under Benjamin Yeaten in Lofa County, he
would have known.*5007 The Trial Chamber notes the evidence from numerous witnesses
indicating not only that the Accused knew of their presence in Lofa County but testifying
that Bockarie informed them that he was sending troops at Taylor's request,*5000 or at
Yeaten's request.*5000 TFl-516 further testified that he read in the RUF message logbook
"*""" Abu Krnra, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2048.
'5°°° Karmoh Kannan, rrannpnpr 9 May 2008, pp. 9458-9459.
*500* Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, p. 20440; Transcript 18 November 2008 pp. 20506-
20507.
*5002 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16301-16302.
'5°°3 TF1-539, rranapnpr 11 June 2008, p. 11541.
*5004 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45607.
*5005 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28958-28960; Transcript 26 November 2009,
pp. 32577-32579; 18 February 2010, pp. 35400-35402.
*5000 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 24 September 2009, pp. 29598-29602.
*5007 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, p. 32581.
*5000 Witness TF1-539, Transcript 11 June 2008, p. 11541 (TF1-539 testified that this was an order from
President Charles Taylor but that the RUF had an interest in helping him since it received everything from
Liberia and that Mosquito Spray's attack had cut the supply route); TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp.
2433-2434, 2464-2465 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2513 (CS); Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2700,
2703 (CS) (Taylor and Yeaten requested Bockarie to instruct the RUF contingent based in Foya, at the border
between Liberia and Sierra Leone, to support the Liberian forces against the LURD); Isaac Mongor, Transcript
31 March 2008, pp. 6163-6164 (Bockarie told Mongor that the order to fight LURD in Liberia came from
Taylor); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3273-3274 (Kamara testified that Sam Bockarie sent
troops in Liberia to fight LURD at Taylor's request).
*5000 TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12617-12620 (Yeaten explained that the AFL and the RUF/AFRC

---- End of Page 2320 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

D J 22
Q if / _,,.
that the instruction to send RUF soldiers to Liberia came from Taylor.l5OlO Alimamy Bobson
Sesay testified that he attended a meeting in Monrovia, together with Johnny Paul Koroma,
Taylor and other SLAs, during which Taylor told them that he had ordered Bockarie to come
to Voinjama to repel Mosquito Spray's forces from Liberia.l50H In light of this evidence, the
Trial Chamber finds the denials of the Accused and Issa Sesay to be lacking in credibility.
6665. TF 1-338 testified that he attended a meeting during which Taylor thanked Bockarie
for securing Foya and Voinjama from the LURD rebels and gave him $USD 15,000.l5Ol2
TF 1-338's evidence is corroborated by Kanneh, who testified that after the fighting against
Mosquito Spray's forces, he travelled with Bockarie and Yeaten to Monrovia and that while
there in Monrovia, Kanneh and Bockarie lodged at "VVhite F lower" where they spent
approximately three days. Bockarie told him that he saw the Accused during that period and
that Taylor gave him money and ammunitions.l5Ol3 The Trial Chamber has considered the
discrepancies between Kanneh's testimony and a prior statement on which he was cross-
examined relating to his trips to Liberia and accepts Kanneh's frank and consistent
testimony that he made some mistakes which he did not correct.l5OM The Trial Chamber
notes that his general evidence regarding this event corroborates TF 1-338's first hand
account. The account of these witnesses is also partially corroborated by Abu Keita, who
testified that after the attack, Yeaten, Bockarie and Defence Minister Daniel Chea were
flown by helicopter from F oya to Monrovia.l5Ol5 The Trial Chamber also recalls its finding
that the Accused supplied arms and ammunition to the RUF in 1999, some of which was
used in righting LURD in Lrbppa.'5‘"6
should fight together to repel Mosquito Spray's forces since they were "all fighting for the same goal"); Abu
Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2048 (Yeaten instructed Sam Bockarie to join the AFL, the Liberian
police and the ATU, Taylor's palace guard, in attacking LURD's forces invading Liberia); TF1-371, Transcript
28 January 2008, pp. 2433-2434, 2464-2465 (CS); Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2513 (CS); Transcript 31
January 2008 (CS), pp. 2700, 2703 (Taylor and Yeaten requested Bockarie to instruct the RUF contingent based
in Foya, at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, to support the Liberian forces against the LURD);
Dauda Aruna F oririe, Transcript 2 December 2008, pp. 21488-21490 (Dauda Aruna Fomie testified that Yeaten
requested Bockarie to send reinforcement to the Voinjama, Kolahun area of Liberia to fight Mosquito Spray's
troops).
mm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6872-6874, 6916; Transcript 9 April 2008 pp. 7047-7049.
MOH Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8509-8510, 8515-8516.
ISOIZTFI-338,Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15100-15101,15117-15118.
ml} Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9461-9467.
UOM Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 13 May 2008, pp. 9641-9655 (Defence's cross examination addressing some
discrepancies between Kanneh's testimony and his prior statement)
mw Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2055.
mm Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused.

---- End of Page 2321 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % dk l8 May 2012

404/ /i{-
6666. In light of this compelling evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused
instructed Bockarie to send RUF/ AFRC forces to assist the AFL in fighting Mosquito
Spray's LURD forces in Liberia and Guinea.
6667. Finally, turning to the question of command during the operation, three RUF soldiers
who participated in the operations in Liberia testified that the AFRC/RUF forces in Liberia
were operating under the command of AFL commanders. TF1-375 testified that while in
Liberia, Christopher Varmoh, an AFL Commander, was the overall commander of the
operation against Mosquito Spray.l5Ol7 Keita stated that the overall commander of the
operation on the field was Benjamin Yeaten,l50l8 who provided the ammunition for the
RUF's operations against the LURD in Liberia and Guinea.l5Ol9 Kanneh testified that, after
conquering the LURD in Liberia, RUF troops received an order from Benjamin Yeaten to
pursue them to Guinea. While there, Yeaten ordered Kanneh and his men to burn the entire
town of Bayolo.l5O20 In light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that during the operation against Mosquito Spray's forces, the RUF/AFRC
forces were operating under the overall command of the Accused's Liberian subordinates.
Findings
6668. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in 1999, the Accused ordered Bockaiie to send AFRC/RUF forces to assist him in his
fight against Mosquito Spray and the LURD forces that had attacked his forces, and that
during the fighting, the AFRC/RUF forces operated under the overall corrnnand of the
Accused's Liberian subordinates.
(ii) Operations in Liberia and Guinea during Issa Sesay's leadership
Submissions of the Parties
6669. The Prosecution alleges that, throughout Sesay's reign as leader of the RUF, in
obedience to Taylor's instruction, Sesay provided significant RUF manpower to fight for the
Accused in Liberia and in Guinea under the connnand of the Accused's subordinates. The
‘5°" Kannan Kanneh, rranapnpr 9 May 2008, pp. 9459-9461.
15018 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2048.
‘5""’ Abu Kana, rranaprrpr 23 January 2008, p. 2055.
15020 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9459-9461.

---- End of Page 2322 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 VM

E
A/04 / ./
Prosecution submits that assistance to the Accused was one of the reasons why the RUF was
slow to disarrn.l502l The Prosecution further alleges that the Accused provided arms and
ammunition for these operations.l5O22
6670. The Defence challenges the Prosecution evidence submitting that it relies largely on
hearsay and that it has been disowned by the persons to whom it is attributed. Thus, the
Prosecution's evidence fails to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Issa Sesay ordered the
RUF to attack Guinea at the behest of the Accused. The Defence submits that if the RUF and
the Armed Forces of Liberia worked together on the Guinean operation it was only in order
to fight a common enemy, the alliance between LURD and Kamajors.l5023
Evidence
Prosecution Witness TF1 -338
6671. Witness TF1-338, an RUF member,l5024 testified that in early 2001 Issa Sesay sent a
group of RUF fighters led by Superman to Liberia to fight alongside Liberian forces against
the LURD forces. Sierra Leonean commanders Karmoh (a.k.a. Colonel Eagle), and CO
Hariie also participated in the attack. Witness TF1-338 testified that Benjamin Yeaten was
the overall commander of both the RUF and Liberian militias and that the arms and
ammunition used by both forces during the attack against the LURD came from Liberia.l5025
6672. Later in 2001, Issa Sesay travelled to Monrovia upon Benjamin Yeaten's invitation.
There, Sesay met Yeaten. During this meeting Yeaten told Sesay that Taylor wanted Sesay
to use the materials that he had supplied to the RUF to attack Guinea because Guinea had
been allowing the LURD rebels to use their ground to penetrate Liberia. Issa Sesay agreed
and, immediately after the meeting, called Superman, who was in Liberia fighting alongside
Yeaten in Voinjama, and told him to come back to Sierra Leone to prepare the attack on
Guinea. Sesay told Superman to attack Guinea through Kissigoudou while Morris Kallon
would attack through Pamelap. TF1-338 testified that Sesay replaced Superman in Voinjama
lm] Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 389-392.
mm Prosecution Final Trial Briei para. 393.
'5°25 Defence rmm rrrer Brief paras. 1325-1330.
‘5°2" TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, pp. 15085-15086.
*5555 TF1-338,Transcript2 September 2008, pp. 15186-15188.

---- End of Page 2323 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T JW 18 May 2012

qw /6
with Matthew Barbue, a Liberian RUF Vanguard, who was promoted to Major General by a
common decision of Sesay and Yeaten.151)26
6673.1 TF1—338 testified that at the end of 2001, in accordance with Yeaten's request and
Issa Sesay's plan, RUF forces together with Liberian militias led by Superman and Kallon
attacked Guinea through Pamelap and Kissigoudou. The RUF captured Pamelap and
Kissigoudou for almost a month before being repelled by Guinean forces and retreating to
Sierra Leone. The materials for these operations also came fiom Taylor. 151127
6674. TF1—338 further testified that another attack against Guinea planned by Benjamin
Yeaten took place around this period. RUF fighters led by Matthew Barbue, and Liberian
militias led by General Fassu (a.k.a. Equalizer), attacked Gueckedou in Guinea fiom Foya in
Liberia. Witness TF1—338 stated that RUF troops and Liberian militias entered Gueckedou,
controlling half of the town for a short time before being repelled by Guinean forces. During
the Guinean attack, numerous RUF fighters and Liberian militia lost their lives. Witness
TF1—338 testified that the arms and ammunition used during the attack of Gueckedou came
fiom Monrovia.151128
Prosecution Witness Abu Keita
6675. Witness Abu Keita, a former deputy chief of staff and commander of ULlMO—K,
who later became commander of the Scorpion Unit,151)29 testified that he participated in
several RUF operations outside of Sierra Leone.15030 ln 2000, at the time that African
peacekeepers were being held hostage by the RUF in Makeni, Abu Keita and other RUF
soldiers led by Short Bai Bureh participated in an operation in Guinea. Keita testified that
the RUF forces managed to capture a car and two millimetre weapons and that they killed
the Guinean commander Kanigba Bangura. However, facing numerous casualties fiom the
bombing of Guinean helicopters and jets, the RUF retreated to Sierra Leone. Keita testified
that Issa Sesay told him that Charles Taylor had ordered this operation to take territory in
15026 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15177-15179, 15217-15220
15027 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15179-15780, 15785, 15218.
15028 TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15180-15181.
15029 Abu Keita, Transcript 22 January 2008, pp. 1953-1954; Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 2000;
Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2110, 2145.
150311 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2048. Leadership and Command Structure: Accused
Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Operations Outside Sierra Leone.

---- End of Page 2324 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z 18 May 2012

4,4044 1%
Guinea so that weapons held in Sierra Leone that were subject to disarmament under the
peace process could be moved to Guinea. 1503 1
6676. Abu Keita testified that the next operation he fought in was the attack led by Denis
Mingo (a.k.a. Superman) against the Guinean govermnent troops in the area between
Kissidou and Gueckedou in Guinea. The RUF fought in the area for a month before
retreating to Sierra Leone}5032
6677. Abu Keita further stated that, on another occasion, Issa Sesay led troops to Foya in
Liberia. There the RUF troops met Benjamin Yeaten, who instructed them to take part in an
operation to take Gueckedou, Guinea. On this occasion, the RUF, the AFL and ATU forces
1 moved into Guinea from Liberia. Yeaten was the overall commander of the operation, and
the field commander was Denis Mingo (a.k.a. Superman). Several RUF commanders were
operating under Superman's command, including Matthew Barbue and Mark Gwon. The
operation was planned by Issa Sesay}5033 Following this operation Issa Sesay and Benjamin
Yeaten boarded a helico ter in Fo a and flew to Monrovia. When the returned the said
P Y Y Y
they had seen Charles Taylor}5034 Keita stated that the ammunition for the RUF operations
in Liberia and Guinea was provided by Benjamin Yeaten}5035 Keita testified that during
every operation outside Sierra Leone the RUF used SBUs, boys under the age of 15, except
during an operation in Guinea}5036
Prosecution Witness TF1-516
6678. Witness TF1-516, an RUF radio operatormm working under Yeaten's command at
this time,l5O38 testified that between 1999 and 2000, Voinjama had changed hands four times
between AFL forces and LURD forces.l5O39 During the rainy season of 2000, Voinjama fell
again into the hands of the LURD. TFl-516 transmitted a message from Benjamin Yeaten
re uestin Issa Sesa 's assistance in fi tin the LURD forces and askin him to send
(1 S Y S S
*5**5* Abu Knna, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2048-2050; Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2139.
15032 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2050-2051.
15033 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2052; See also Prosecution Exhibit P-28.
15034 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2055.
*5**55 Abu Keira, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2055.
15036 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2056-2058.
*505* rrr -516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6845.
*5555 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7008-7009.
*5°5"* TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7008, 7067.

---- End of Page 2325 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.,-03-01-T % Qu 18 May 2012

QD? / Z
Superman for that purpose. Shortly after, Issa Sesay commissioned Superman to depart for
Liberia 15040
6679. TF1-516 travelled with Benjamin Yeaten to Foya to greet Superman, who arrived
with several fighters and some artillery pieces. TF1-516 testified that during their stay in
Foya, Yeaten and Superman stayed in a house belonging to Taylor. During the operation,
TF1-516 was assigned by Benjamin Yeaten to assist Superman in maintaining radio contact
with Issa Sesay. TF1-516, Superman and the RUF fighters fought in Kolahun and
Voinjama.l5O4l After the Voinjama battle, Superman retumed to Sierra Leone with
bodyguards but left some of his fighters to continue working with Benjamin Yeaten.15O42
6680. TF1-516 testified that after Supem1an's retum to Sierra Leone, Voinjama again fell
to the LURD. Despite approximately ten AFL attacks on Voinj ama, the AFL was not able to
recapture the town.15O43 Therefore, Benjamin Yeaten again contacted Issa Sesay for
assistance. Sesay sent an RUF fighter named Harris, who participated in a number of
unsuccessful operations against the LURD's forces in Voinjama and then retumed to Sierra
Leone. Sesay then sent Col. Eagle who, together with RUF fighters, was able to capture
Voinj ama. I 5044
6681. TF1-516 testified that in January 2001, while Voinjama had been re-conquered by
the Liberian forces, he flew to Foya with Benjamin Yeaten.15O45 While in Foya, Yeaten
informed TF1-516 that there was going to be a mission to attack Guinea.15O46 According to
Yeaten, the LURD were attacking Liberia from Guinea, and Yeaten wanted to pursue them
on their own territory.l5O47 Issa Sesay arrived, together with several fighters aimed with
artillery, to participate in the operation in Guinea.l5O48 The RUF, AFL and SOD all
participated in the attack against Gueckedou in Guinea, although Sesay himself remained
with Yeaten at the Liberian/Guinean border.l5O49 The commander of this mission was RUF
'5°4° r1=‘1-5 16, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7056-7057.
'5°‘*' TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7058-7061.
'""2 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7062.
"°‘" TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7063.
"°"*‘ TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7064.
'5°" TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7066.
'5°"6 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7066.
XSO47 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7067.
'5°"8 TF1 -516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7068-7070.
ISM) TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7071, 7075.

---- End of Page 2326 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T dg 18 May 2012

J/M//4
General Matthew Barbue. Other Sierra Leoneans, including Abu Keita, participated in the
attack under Issa Sesay's command}5050
6682. Although TF1-516 did not participate himself in the attack, he testified that the AFL-
RUF forces were able to capture Gueckedou before being eventually pushed back by the
Guinean forces. Witness TF1-516 further stated that, at the same time, there was a separate
attack on Guinea from Kono and Makeni in Sierra Leone by RUF forces led by Superman.
After the Guinean attack, the Liberian forces retreated to Liberia, while many of the Sierra
Leonean forces retreated to Sierra Leone.l505l
6683. Following this retreat, Benjamin Yeaten instructed Superman to return to Liberia
with RUF armed fighters, to join forces with Matthew Barbue. AFL and RUF forces led by
Superman launched another operation against Nongorwa Town in Guinea, but this attack
failed too. Witness TF1-516 testified that although he was not present during these
operations, he was given a comprehensive report of what happened during the attacks.l5052
6684. TF1-516 further testified that, in 2001, LURD forces attacked Foya another time but
that RUF forces stationed there were able to repel the attack. Following this attack,
Superman advised Benjamin Yeaten to canton the RUF forces from Saadu in Foya to secure 0
the location. However, one or two months later LURD forces launched another assault on
Foya, and RUF forces were unable to repel the attack. Consequently, Liberian and RUF
forces retreated to Koindu and then to Buedu in Sierra Leone}5053 Superman was wounded
during the attack and transported to Monrovia for treatment}5054
6685. TF1-516 testified that during the rainy season of 2001, Yeaten called and asked the
witness to join him in Vahun. Superman, who had just been released from the hospital in
Monrovia, and Issa Sesay joined them in Vahun too. While there, Yeaten ordered the RUF
commanders to attack a town called Popalahun but Superman refused. Superman indicated
that he was not in a position to execute the order as there was no vehicle to mount the
artillery arms that Superman would want to use for such an attack. Moreover, Superman was
dissatisfied with Yeaten's failure to organise a meeting for him with the Accused. TF1-156
15050 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7071.
15051 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 7072.
15052 TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7073-7074.
15053 TF1 -516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7081-7084.

---- End of Page 2327 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 4 % 18 May 2012

qzpéiizr
testified that subsequently, he attended a meeting between Yeaten and Dopoe Menkazon
during which Yeaten expressed his displeasure with Superman's refusal to follow his orders,
blaming Superman for the RUF infighting in Sierra Leone and suggesting that Superman
was engaged in traitorous activities}5055
Prosecution Witness TF]-371
6686. Witness TF1-371, a member of the RUF,l5O56 testified that Benjamin Yeaten
provided the RUF with ammunition to attack the govermnent of President Lansana Conte in
Guinea. The RUF also received food from Foya and condiments for the fighters}5057
Prosecution Witness Mustapha M. Mansaray
6687. Mustapha M. Mansaray, an RUF member and secretary of RUF Operational
Commander Komba Gbundema, in charge of recording the arms and ammunitions and the
number of fighters of the RUF]5058 attended a muster parade held by Komba Gbundema
during which Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon addressed RUF forces and told them that
Charles Taylor had given them the mission to launch an attack on Lansana Conte's forces in
Guinea. During this muster parade, two Guineans named Amadu Toure and lbrahim
Sidiebay introduced themselves and also addressed the RUF soldiers. Mustapha Mansaray
testified that Taylor provided the arms and ammunition used during the attack on Guinea.
15059
6688. After the muster parade, Mustapha Mansaray and other RUF soldiers put some of the
materials into a vehicle and brought them to Kambia district headquarters. There they held a
new meeting in the presence of Abubakar Jalloh (a.k.a. Tall Bai Bureh). After the meeting,
the RUF troops, including Andrew Swaray (a.k.a. Short Bai Bureh) and Osho, led by Komba
Gbundema, attacked Guinea. l 5060
Prosecution Witness TF]-367
*5054 Witness rr1 -5 I6, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7084-7085.
'5"" Witness r1¤1 -5 I6, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7089-7094.
'5056 Witness TF}-37 l , Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
'5°" Witness TF}-37l , Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2457-2458 (CS).
Img Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5336
5059 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5336-5339.
I5060 Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, pp. 5339-5340.

---- End of Page 2328 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-0l-T % "jh l8 May 20l2

4m/ 9,/
6689. TF1-367, an RUF scldier,16661 testified that at the end of the dry season in 2000, Issa
Sesay, the RUF commander, and Morris Kallon ordered TF1-367 to participate in an attack
0n Guinea. TF1-367 participated in the attack as an advis0r, while RUF commanders Morris
Kallon, Bai Bureh, and Gbundemba led the Operation.16662
6690. TF1-367 testified that this Operation was done in c00rdination with the NPFL, as
well as with the Guinean rebel leader M0hamed Turay, son of the late Guinean leader,
Sheku Turay, who wanted to bring the war to Guinea but did not have the ma.np0wer to d0
it. TF1—367 further explained that these forces had an interest in attacking Guinea since the
President of Guinea, Lansana Conteh, was supporting the Sierra Leonean Army, the
Kamaj0rs, as well as the Liberian rebels attacking the Liberian gcvemment in L0fa C0unty
from Guinea. As such, the Guinean Government was an enemy of both the RUF and the
NPFL. However, the RUF soldiers felt that this was not their war and that they were fighting
because "Turay brought d0llars to Liberia". 15666
6691. Witness TF1-367 testified that the RUF forces suffered casualties and that Lu and
M0hamed GMG were killed during the attack. TF1-367 himself was injured. These
casualties, as well as the feeling that this was not "the RUF's war", undermined the RUF
soldiers’ m0rale, forcing them to retreat to Sierra Lecne.16664
Prosecution Witness TF1-567
6692. Witness TF1-567, an RUF member,16666 testified that when LURD and Guinean
factions attacked Liberia in order to overthrow Taylor's government, Benjamin Yeaten sent
messages on behalf of Charles Taylor, asking Sesay to provide RUF manp0wer in support of
the Liberian tr00ps.16666 In late 2000, TF1-567 participated in the RUF attack from L0fa
C0unty, Liberia against Guinea under the command of Benjamin Yeaten. TF1-567 testified
that during the Operations, RUF members and Benjamin Yeaten ccmmunicated through
Yeaten's radi0 Operator.16667
15661 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14256.
15662 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14254-14256.
15666 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14254-14256, 14258-14259, 14261-14262.
15666 TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp. 14257-14259, 14260-14261.
15665 TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12833 (PS).
16666 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13025, 13106-13108.
15667 TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13041-13043.

---- End of Page 2329 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % Gjét 18 May 2012

QW 4¢ 2.2
6693. TF 1-567 further testified that during this period, when LURD was in control of Lofa
Country, Yeaten coordinated the supply of arms and ammunition. Taylor sent helicopters to
F oya, and the supplies were trucked to the RUF bases in Sierra Leone.l5O68
Prosecution Witness Varmuyan Sherif
6694. Witness Varinuyan Sherif, a former ULIMO-K fighter who became an officer in the
SSS,l5O69 testified that after LURD attacked Liberia, he took Abu Keita to Benjamin
Yeaten's house. While there, Sherif overheard Yeaten saying to Sam Bockarie that he
should send RUF soldiers to attack Guinea. Sherif testified that later, Abu Keita, who was
one of the RUF commanders during the attack in Guinea, told him that RUF forces attacked
Guinea from both Sierra Leone and Liberia upon Yeaten's instruction.l5O7O
Prosecution Witness TF 1-375
6695. Witness TF 1-375, an RUF fighter,l5O7l testified that in 2001 Superman crossed over
to Liberia to help fight against the LURD under the command of Benjamin Yeaten. The joint
forces under Yeaten's control included the Liberian "militia forces" as well as ATU, SSS
and militia forces — including the Navy division, Marine division, Army division, the Jungle
Fire, and later the Strike Force division. Most of the fighters that fell into the divisions were
from the AFL. Each division had their individual chief of staff. Benjamin Yeaten was the
joint chief of staff. The deputy joint chief of staff was Gbenga Y Kona.l5O72
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh
6696. Karmoh Kanneh, an RUF commander,l5073 testified that in May/June 2000, he
participated in the operation against Sekou Damate Conneh, the leader of the LURD who
was attacking Taylor's forces in Voinjama. Kanneh stated that he received instruction from
Issa Sesay to gather men and join Benjamin Yeaten at Kolahun. Kanneh travelled with his
men to Foya where the boarded a helico ter which flew them to Kolahun. While there,
Y P
I50`38 TFl~567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13108~13109; Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by
the Accused, During Issa Sesay's leadership (December l999~January 2002).
Img Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript, 9 January 2008, pp. 806, 820, 834, 836; Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 940,
986~987.
mm Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 9l6~918.
*50** rrrsvs, Transcript 23 rrrrrp 2008, p. 12485.
*50*2 TF1-375, Transcript 24 Jurrp 2008, pp. 12664~12667.
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.

---- End of Page 2330 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~0l—T d'(A 18 May 2012

Q/0 44
Kanneh and his men were supplied with ammunition before leaving for Voinjama. Kanneh
testified that Liberian troops coming from Monrovia also participated in the attack against
LURD. RUF and Liberian troops captured Voinjama, forcing LURD forces to retreat to
Guinea. After the attack Kanneh reported by radio the success of the operation to Benjamin
Yeaten, who had remained in Voinjama.l5O74 Kanneh's radio operator during the operation
was named Morti ga. mm
6697. Karmoh Kanneh further testified that around August or September 2000, Issa Sesay
told him that President Taylor gave the RUF a mission to invade Guinea on two flanks. Issa
Sesay told Kanneh to inform the other commanders and to prepare the men for the attack.
Accordingly, Kanneh invited the officers, including Sankoh's bodyguard Moriba Koroma, to
a meeting during which he explained to them the purpose of the mission. According to
Kanneh, none of the RUF officers were happy about this mission because it would affect
their reputation in the eyes of the intemational community. The attack on Guinea took place
in 2001, but Kanneh did not participate in it. 15076
The Accused
6698. The Accused denied ordering and arming the RUF to overthrow Lansana Conte for
him. mm He confirmed that he invited Issa Sesay to Liberia in July 2000 but asserted that it
was only to talk about peace.l5078 Taylor conceded that it would have been in his interest to
counter Conte's support for LURD but said he did not do so. Moreover, if he had done so,
he would not have used the RUF when he had a stronger force available, composed of
thousands of Liberians. *5079 The Accused testified that he heard the name Komba Gbundema
for the first time in the SCSL court room, that he had not heard it in 2000. *5080
I5074 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9473-9477.
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9477-9478.
M076 Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript l2 May 2008, pp. 9507-9515.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29303-29310, 29428-29436; Transcript 24
September 2009, pp. 29644-29646; 23 November 2009, pp. 32288-32290.
I5078 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29303-29308Transcript 2 November 2009, pp.
30878-30881.
I5079 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29303-29308; Transcript 28 October 2009, pp.
30619-30621.
IMO Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29308-29309.

---- End of Page 2331 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Gb} 18 May 2012

1 QQ?
6699. The Accused denied Keita's allegation that Yeaten, Bockarie and Chea flew to
Voinjama and then to Monrovia.15001 He testified that prior to Bockarie moving to
Monrovia, he had never heard any complaint from the Sierra Leone government or the
intemational community that Bockarie and other Sierra Leoneans were destabilizing the
situation in Foya. However, he started to hear complaints after Bockarie moved to
Monrovia. 15002
Defence Witness Issa Sesay
6700. Witness Issa Sesay, an RUF commander who became leader of the RUF between
2000 and 2002,15003 testified that all his discussions with Taylor in 2000 were about peace in
Sierra Leone. 15004 Sesay denied that the RUF attacked Gueckedou and Kissidou in Guinea or
that Abu Keita, Superman or any other RUF member attacked Guinea alongside Liberian
forces. Sesay testified that whilst the RUF was disarming, some RUF vanguards refusing the
RUF disarmament, including CO Gorgie, Kailondo, Lion, CO Vincent, Ibrahim Dugba, and
Johannes Roberts crossed over into Liberia with their bodyguards, defying Sesay's orders. It
was only when he heard from Sam Kolleh that Lion had died in Kolahun, Liberia, in an
attack against LURD rebels, that Sesay understood that RUF members were fighting
alongside the Liberian troops.15005
6701. Sesay also denied being involved in the planning of the attack on Gueckedou as
testified by Abu Keita. Superman left the RUF in February 2001 and went to Liberia. Sesay
had no control over Superman at this point and only knew that Superman was with the AFL
troops in Liberia fighting against the LURD.15000 He asserted that Keita's testimony that
Sesay and Yeaten co-signed an operation plan document to attack Gueckedou was a lie.15007
He said at this time, he had no relationship with Yeaten, "they just knew each other".15000
Moreover, as leader of the RUF, Sesay never signed operational orders. Sesay accused Abu
150111 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29426—29428.
15082 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29427—29428.
15083 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, pp. 43588-43589.
15084 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45614-45615
15085 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45616—45620.
15080 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45621
15007 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45623
15008 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45622

---- End of Page 2332 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T 2/ @5 18 May 2012 E

40vQS
Keita of having forged Prosecution Exhibit P—28 himself in exchange for money and
protection for Keita's family by the Office of the Prosecutor}5089
6702. Sesay denied flying from Foya with Yeaten to meet Taylor and testified that he never
received any arms or ammunition from Liberia or anywhere from the commencement until
the conclusion of disarmament.l5O90 Issa Sesay testified that in July 2000, the RUF and
government troops were intensely fighting between Lunsar and Gberi Junction because
Johnny Paul Koroma had declared his support for President Kabbah. The RUF was therefore
trying to repel the AFRC, Kamajors and the SLA, which had combined their forces to fight
the RUF.l5O9l Sesay testified that from 6 August 2001, the attacks into Guinea were only
counter—attacks against the Guineans without any other plan or intentionm)92
Defence Witness John Vincent
6703. Witness John Vincent, a Liberian Vanguard commander,l5O93 testified that around
May 2000, he was sent by Issa Sesay to Koindu under the command of Matthew Barbue to
rotect the border a ainst LURD and the Kama`ors, who had `oined to overthrow the Taylor
P S J J Y
Govermnent}5094 LURD forces were fighting to invade Liberia while the Kamajors wanted
to get rid of the RUF in Sierra Leone. The RUF feared that the Kamajors would launch an
offensive into Sierra Leone since they were at the border of Guinea, in the towns of
Gueckedou and Nongowa.l5O95
6704. Vincent testified that in December 2000, the RUF found itself at the border with
AFL forces serving the NPP government under Commander Joe Kwame. They almost
fought one another by accident but some soldiers of the AFL recognized some RUF
vanguards. CO Matthew Barbue was a Liberian like CO Joe Kwame and they decided the
RUF and the AFL should work together to defend the border between Liberia, Sierra Leone
and Guinea.l5O% The two commanders sat together and made operational plans to defend
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45623-45629 A
'5°"°1ssa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45630—45631, 45637, 45641.
mq! Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45638-45640.
mm Issa Sesay, Transcript 10 August 2010, pp. 45885-45886.
mm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; Transcript 30
March 2010, pp. 38226, 38239; Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38390, 38408, 38460, 38461.
'"’°‘* John vmccm, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38149-38151.
ISM John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38152-38154.
ISM) John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38155-38158.

---- End of Page 2333 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

2/0 ¢ ata
themselves from their common enemy.l5O97 However, according to Vincent, the RUF did not
receive any orders from AF L commander Joe Kwame, but only from RUF commander
Matthew Barbue, who had received the order from 1ssa Sesay to collaborate with the
AFL 15098
6705. Vincent testified that the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia was unclear and
that it was hard to know whether you were in Liberia or Sierra Leone. Issa Sesay had never
told the troops that they would encounter AF L soldiers at the border, but they expected that
the Liberian border would be fortified with AF L forces because Liberia had already
experienced LURD's invasion in December 2000, before they retreated to Guinea.l5O99
Vincent testified that, as Sesay expected, the Kamajors and LURD launched a common
attack on Liberia, but RUF and AF L forces pushed them back to Guinea.l5lOO After this
operation, the AF L forces retreated to Foya, while the RUF forces retreated to Koindu.
Vincent retreated to Koindu, but afraid that Issa Sesay would kill him, he decided to retreat
to Vahun, Liberia.l5lOl Vincent did not know if more operations took place after his
departure. 15102
Defence Witness Charles Ngebeh
6706. Witness Charles Ngebeh, a senior armourer in the RUF ,15 103 testified that when Issa
Sesay took over as the RUF interim commander, the RUF and AF RC conducted an
operation in the area of Pamelap in Guinea. Charles N gebeh remained in Makeni but sent his
armourer Morisson Vandi there, alongside the commander of the operation, Tall Bai
Bureh.l5 104 Ngebeh heard that both Komba Gbundema and Short Bai Bureh were also
involved in the Pamelap operation. Ngebeh also heard that the Guinean forces used heavy
artillery during the attack and that a lot of civilians, as well as RUF and APRC forces, were
killed. However, it was the Guinean forces that were targeted by the RUF, not civilians. 15 105
'5°9’ John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010,p. 38158.
mm John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38161-38163.
Img John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38159-38162.
moo John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38161.
mol John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38148-38149; 38163-38164.
'5'°2 John Vincent, Tienccnpt 26 March 2010, pp. 38171-38172.
NO3 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 23 March 2010, p. 37847.
'5"’*‘ Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38758.
'5'°5 Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 Ap1112010,pp. 38759-38760.

---- End of Page 2334 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f Gly 18 May 2012

404A $2 T
Prosecution Exhibit P-028
6707. Prosecution Exhibit P-028 is a one—End of Page document entitled "Operation Order", dated
20 January 2001.15106 The document assigns various RUF or Armed Forces of Liberia
("AFL") commanders to combat units in preparation for an operation coded "No Taking
Side", and it purports to bear the signatures of "Gen. Essa [sic] Sesay" and "General
Benjamin Yeaten". The document is a heavily wom original, tattered along its edges, tibre—
bare where folded, and held together by scotch tape in several places. The purported
signatures of Sesay and Yeaten have been made with the same blue ink, along with their
respective titles, although the full name "Benjeman [sic] D. Yeaten" appears below in a
distinctly different ink and handwriting.
Authenticity of Exhibit P—28
6708. The Trial Chamber has considered the authenticity of Prosecution Exhibit P-028.
The Trial Chamber recalls that Exhibit P-028 was tendered by the Prosecution through
witness Varmuyan Sherifibm who, as the Assistant Director for Operations within the
Accused's Special Security Service ("SSS") and later as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the
Army, claimed to have maintained daily contact with Benjamin Yeaten from 1997 to
2003.15lOS When presented with Exhibit P-028, Sherif recognised the "last" of the
document's two signatures as Yeaten's.l5lO9 Sherif went on to describe the roles and ranks of
Mark Gwon and Abu Keita, whose names appear in the exhibit,l5llO and to attest that Abu
Keita "was one of our commanders that crossed from F oya to attack Guinea upon Benjamin
Yeaten's instruction". f5 1 H
6709. Abu Keita subsequently confirmed his participation in a "joint operation" composed
of RUF, AFL and ATU elements, led by Benjamin Yeaten and directed against LURD
forces in Gueckedou, Guinea.l5H2 Keita further testified, "l think the operation was planned
"'°*‘ Exirrbrr P-028, "opererrerr Order, 20 January 200 1
mm Prosecutor v. Charles Ghan/my Tay/0r, SCSL-03-0l-T, Transcript 14 January 2008, p. l207.
ISIOS Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 8l2-8l3, 815.
I5 109 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 862. See also Exhibit D—l04B, "DP-212 B: Photocopy of
the official ID card of Yanks Smythe, back side"; Yanks Smythe, Transcript l March 20l0, pp. 3632l-36323
(testifying that Exhibit D-104B was signed by Benjamin Yeaten, though declining to say whether Exhibit P-028
bore the same signature).
'5'"’ verrrrrryerr Sherif, Transcript 9 Jerrrrrrry 2008, p. 862.
'5'H Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript l0 January 2008, p. 917.
"' '2 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 205 1-2052, 2055.

---- End of Page 2335 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T / Qfb l8 May 20l2

yar/Q?
and signed by Issa Sesay and Benjamin Yeaten and then I think I gave a copy of that to the
Prosecution".l5l 13 Keita averred that, although he cannot read, Exhibit P-028 was indeed that
document. ‘ S' "‘ .
6710. In addition to this direct evidence as to the document's provenance, three witnesses
testified that Exhibit P-028 bears the signature of Issa Sesay: Prosecution witness
TF1-371,15115 and Defence witnesses DCT-29215116 and John Vincentm 17 Vincent
iiirthermore agreed that when he "went on the operation to attack Gueckedou, the RUF was
fighting together with the AF L", and that Issa Sesay had instructed Matthew Barbue to work
under AFL commander Joe Kwamegm 18 both assertions corroborate the content of Exhibit
P-028.
6711. The foregoing evidence leaves little room for Issa Sesay's challenges to Exhibit P-
028.l5H9 Sesay's broadest challenge to the exhibit is that, because the RUF never worked
with AFL fighters against targets in Guinea, the document is necessarily spurious.l5l2O
Several witnesses claimed to have directly participated in such operations, however, and the
Trial Chamber finds that this disproves the premise on which Sesay's contention rests.l5l2l
Likewise, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidentiary record outweighs Sesay's other
factual attacks on P-028, such as his claims that there was no "Scorpion Unit",l5l22 or that
Matthew Barbue was never promoted to Major General.l5l23
I5! I3 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2052.
"' " Abu Karra, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2053.
'5' ‘5 TF1 -371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2475-2476.
'5' "’ DCT-292, rranaprrpr 3 Juna 2010, p. 42036.
mn John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38437.
""8 John Vincent, rranspnpr 31 Marpir 2010, p. 38437.
I5! L9 Sesay testified that "I've never come across a document like this [...] documents like this are just to lie, to
link the RUF operating with the Liberians", and further claimed that Exhibit P-028 was "prepared by Abu Keita
himself". Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44677; Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45623-45624. Sesay did
not assert any personal knowledge of this matter, and the Trial Chamber has given no weight to this kind of
speculation.
IMO Issa Sesay, Transcript 27 July 2010, p. 44678; Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47085.
lm! See Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2051-2055; Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March
2008, p. 5337; Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5951; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008. pp. 7066-
7076; TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, p. 12623; TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15177-15181;
John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, p. 38176.
Img Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 August 2010, p. 45532 (testifying that "There was no Scorpion unit within the
RUF".); compare- with Varrnuyan Sherif`, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 862; Dennis Koker, Transcript
15 January 2008, p. 1294; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 1970, 1999, 2000, 2054; TF1-371,
Transcript 28 January 2008 p. 2414 (CS).
my Issa Sesay, Transcript 4 August 2010, pp. 45344-45345; Transcript 25 August 2010, p. 47103; compare

---- End of Page 2336 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T {/{ 18 May 2012

404%
6712. Nor is the Trial Chamber swayed by Sesay's testimony that his purported signature is
a forgery,15124 as he adopted this very signature as his own when presented with it outside
the context of Exhibit P-028.15125 Although this does not by itself establish the authenticity
of the signature, it does demonstrate Sesay's inability to consistently discern the signatures
he considers genuine from those he considers forged, and consequently, the Trial Chamber
has accorded little weight to his perfunctory accusations of forgery. The testimonies of
Witnesses TF 1-371, DCT-292, and John Vincent establish that the signature is consistent
with Sesay's.15121°
6713. The Trial Chamber accepts that Issa Sesay did not spell his name "Essa" as found in
P-028,15127 but finds that the misspelling does not by itself indicate that the document is not
authentic. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that both signatures on the exhibit are genuine, and
the possibility that a third person, unaware of the correct spelling of "Issa Sesay", later wrote
in the names and titles of Sesay and Yeaten does not diminish the value of the document.
6714. Finally, the Trial Chamber disregards Sesay's claim that the RUF leadership never
issued written orders to attack specific targets. 15 128 While uncontradicted, this claim does not
control the authenticity of Exhibit P-028 for the simple reason that it does not apply. Exhibit
P-028 merely assigns commanders to units and limits the size of their security routines
within the framework of a joint RUF -AF L operation, it does not designate targets for
attack. 1 5 129
6715. On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that Issa Sesay signed the
Operation Order admitted as Exhibit P-028 and that document is what it purports to be. The
principal relevance of the document lies in its very existence, which is evidence of
collaboration between the RUF and AFL, and in this sense the evidence falls outside the
realm of hearsay. r
with TF1—338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15176
15124 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45623.
15125 Issa Sesay, Transcript 25 August 2010, pp. 47061—47062, 47086; Exhibit P—582, "End of Page indicating fifteen
different signatures with marks indicating those signatures that do not belong to Issa Sesay — as indicated by
DCT—172".
15126 TF1—371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2475-2476; DCT—292, Transcript 3 June 2010, p. 42036; John
Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38437.
15127 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, p. 45623.
**2* ipsa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45627·45629.
15129 Exhibit P—028, "Operation Order 20 January 2001".

---- End of Page 2337 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / ·-— 18 May 2012

Prosecution Exhibits P-099A and P-099B
6716. Prosecution Exhibit P-099A is a redacted version of "a composition book of
handwritten radio communication between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay. Exhibit P-099B
is a redacted copy of Exhibit P-099A. It records a message from "Gen 50 (SSS Director,
Lib)" to Issa Sesay on 30 September 2001. In the message, Gen 50 informs Sesay that
pursuant to a telephone conversation the day before, he has despatched:
6717. 10 boxes of AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets (All with TNTs) for smooth
operation. Colonel Gbovay is en route together with one of your men (Major Takpor)
assigned at Foya Airfield.l5 130
6718. On the next End of Page, the Exhibit records a message from General "1ssah" Sesay from
"Gen 50" dated 22 October 2001 stating:
Be info that your men headed by Col [illegible] have retreated from Guinea leaving no
security at the border. This man appear not to be under control. I have learnt that there has
been a serious fighting going on in Foya Airfield between Col [illegible] and some AFL
COHlH12lI'1d€I`S. I5 131
Authenticity of Exhibit P-099 A and P-099B
6719. Exhibit P-099A was adduced through radio operator TF1-516, who testified that his
task from mid-1999 was to receive messages from, and transmit messages to, RUF leaders
in Sierra Leone, specifically Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, on behalf of Benjamin Yeaten
(a.k.a. 50).15m He affirmed that the Exhibit belonged to him.l5l33 TF1-516 testified that the
messages dated 30 September 2001 and 22 October 2001 was received from Base 1, and was
to be relayed to Issa Sesay's radio station in Buedu.l5l34 He explained that this was the
period when "we were in Buedu and the forces, Amphibian Father and others, fought hard to
retake Foya, so they were still in Foya together with the RUF fighters who were there". He
mm Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Cornmurrication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Public", ERN 19181.
15131 Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P—099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Cornrnurrication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Public", ERN 19182.
W2 T1¤1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6862.
*5*3* TF1-516, Trnnscnpt 8 April 2008, pp. 6864-6865.
**34 TF1-516, Transcript 9 Apnr 2008, pp. 7109-7111.

---- End of Page 2338 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T K {W 18 May 2012

¢¤¢2/
testified that the message was received in code, transcribed and remained in the book until
handed over to the OTP. ISHS
6720. The Defence challenged the reliability of the Exhibit at Trial, noting that although
labelled as a 96-End of Page exercise book, it contained only 44 End of Pages.l5l36 The witness explained
that the two radio messages recorded had long been written on two End of Pages in an older
composition book. He then tore out of that book a number of End of Pages. The book was then
reproduced into a new composition book, what is now Exhibits P-99A and P-99B, by
Rebecca, a girl staying with the witness who wanted to be trained in signal communication,
in 2001.15137 The witness himself added some notes to the new notebook. I5 138
6721. The Trial Chamber has also had regard to Exhibit P-099A, documenting a radio
message {rpm Benjamin Yeaten to Issa Sesay in September 2001 stating that he had
despatched ammunition, via Colonel Gbovay and one of Sesay's men.l5l39 The radio
messa es indicate that Sesa 's forces were at this time coo eratin with Yeaten in relation
S Y P S
to operations in Liberia and Guinea.l5 M0 This was confirmed by numerous witnesses during
the course of the Trial.l5l4l These witnesses indicated having fought alongside Liberian
troops, under the command of Benjamin Yeaten, aka "Gen 50", the SSS Director.l5 142
6722. Noting that TF1-516 affirmed that the Exhibit belonged to himmm and that it was
received from Base 1, and was to be relayed to 1ssa Sesay's radio station in Buedu,l5l44 the
*5*35 TF1—516, Transcript 9 Aprrr 2008, pp. 7112-7113.
*5*% TF1—516, Transcript 10 Aprrr 2008,p. 7218.
*5*37 TF1—516, Transcript 10 Aprrr 2008, pp. 7218-7221.
*5*3* TF1—516, Transcript 10 April 2008, pp. 7261-7262.
[Sm Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Communication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Public", ERN 19181.
[SHO Exhibit P-099A, (confidential); see Exhibit P-099B, "Composition Book of Handwritten Radio
Communication Between Benjamin Yeaten and Issa Sesay - 00019148 - 00019193 - Redacted Version —
Public", ERN 19182.
[SW Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2051; TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15179-
15781, 15785-15788, 15218; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7058-7061, 7064, 7071-7075, 7084-7085;
Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008 pp. 5339-5340; TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp.
14254-14256; Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9473-9477; Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9507-9515;
John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 pp. 38152-38154.
[Sm TPI-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15186-15188; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2052;
TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13041-13043; Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9473-9477 but
see John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38161-38163.
[Sm TF1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6864-6865.
*5*** TF1—516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7109-7111.

---- End of Page 2339 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

4/0 VS2
Trial Chamber considers this documentary evidence to be particularly valuable
corroboration of the oral evidence concerning continued delivery of materiel during Sesay's
administration as leader. I5 M5
6723. The Defence challenged the reliability of the Exhibit at Trial, noting the discrepancy
concerning the number of End of Pages and the reproduction of an older version of the book by a
third party.l5 M6 The Defence also noted that the witness did not mention this third party's
role in copying the notebook during his first interviews. The witness explained he did not
mention it until he was asked about the handwriting in the notebook. I5 M7 The Trial Chamber
does not consider these matters to undermine the probative value of the Exhibit, noting that
the witness provided plausible explanations for the discrepancies. In light of the foregoing
and considering the compelling evidence corroborating the content of Exhibits P-099 A and
P-099B, the Trial Chamber finds it to be an authentic document.
Prosecution Exhibit P- l 67
6724. Prosecution Exhibit P-l67 is a map of Guinea, Sierra Leone and part of Liberia
marked by Prosecution Witness TFl-338. Mark l indicates the location of Pamalap, Mark 2
indicates the location of Kissidougou, while mark 3 indicates the location of
Gueckedou. I5 M8
Prosecution Exhibit P- l 52A
6725. Exhibit P-l52A is a confidential photo.l5l49
Prosecution Exhibit P-5 85
6726. Exhibit P—585 is an excerpt of an article published on the BBC website on Thursday
7 December 2000. This article reads as follows:
Aid workers in Guinea say hundreds of people have been killed in a rebel raid on a town
near the border with Sierra Leone and Liberia. But government officials put the death toll at
{SMS Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's Leadership
(December 1999-January 2002).
*5**6 TFl-516, Transcript 16 Ap¤12008,p. 7844
*5**7 TFl-516, Transcript ll April, pp. 7313-7316.
Img Exhibit P-167, "Map of Guinea, marked by TFl-338"’. See also TFl-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp.
l5l8l-l5l87.
mw Exhibit P-l52A (confidential), ERN 775; TFl-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13024-13025 (PS).

---- End of Page 2340 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-Ol-T l8 May 2012

yo gz 39
~.....¤
48 people — 36 civilians and 12 rebels — during the raid on Gueckedou town. A Red Cross
ofhcial in the town told the BBC that rebels attacked in force early on Wednesday and were
only driven out by Guinean troops after almost 24 hours. The official, Umar Issa
Damagaram, also said more than 1000 people were wounded and many homes burned.
Reports say rebels had on Tuesday threatened to attack t1ie town, forcing people to flee.
The Guinea government accuses Liberia and Sierra Leonean rebels of being behind a series
of recent cross—border attacks into Guinea. The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) says one of
its key regional centres was destroyed in the fighting in Gueckedou. The attack was the first
time rebels 1iad entered a major town after three months of attacks on villages in the south
and east of the country A military source told BBC correspondent Al Hassan Cillah in
Guinea that it was the biggest battle the army had fought with insurgents since September.
Military and humanitarian sources confirmed govemment troops regained control of the
town after it had been occupied for several hours. But during that time the rebels had burnt
public buildings, business premises, vehicles and cut down telephone lines. Humanitarian
sources, quoting witnesses in the town, said bodies littered the streets. Thousands of
civilians have fled into the bush. Gueckedou town is strategically located between the
capital Conakry and the forest region, source of most of the country's agricultural products.
The UNHCR chief, Sadako Ogata, says the region is on the verge of a humanitarian
catastrophe. l 51 50
Defence Exhibit D—270
6727. Exhibit D—270 is an outgoing code cable, dated 12 September 2000, from Downes
Thomas, an UNOL officer to UNAMSIL and UNHCR offices regarding the Liberia-Guinea
relations. Paragraphs 1 to 7 of the code cable read as follow:
l. Thank you for your Code Cable number 3530 dated 8 September on the subject above. I
attach, for your information, copies of articles carried in today's newspapers on the matter.
It is to be noted that, in the wake of the most recent developments in Guinea, six of
yesterday's newspapers (11 September) carried lead headlines on Liberia—Guinea relations,
while five of them devoted their editorials to the same topic.
2. The most recent manifestation of the unease which now typifies the relations between
both govemments is to be found in the widely reported harassment, threats to and detention
of Liberian (and Sierra Leonean) nationals, especially refugees, in Guinea. The Liberian
perspective on the matter is unanimous in its outrage and in its appeal to the Guinean
authorities to demonstrate restraint. In this respect, the threat by the Guinean Prime
Minister "to go on the offensive" against Liberia is particularly worrisome.
3. The current strained relationship between Guinea and Liberia has serious implications
not only for the two countries but also for all members of the Mano River Union. The
deterioration in relations had its genesis in the first armed attack on Voinjama, the capital of
Lofa County, on 21 April 1999, wliicli the Government of Liberia (GOL) blamed on
Guinea. The second attack, launched less than four months later (10 August 1999), and the
latest on 8 July 2000, 11ave confirmed the worst fears of even those who 1iad given Guinea
the benefit of the doubt. While the GOL was able to repe1 the first two incursions within a
matter of weeks, the latest fighting has been raging for the past two months with no
immediate signs for a quick resolution.
15 15 O Prosecution Exhibit P—585, article published on the BBC website on Thursday 7 December 2000 titled
"Hundreds killed’ in Guinea attack".

---- End of Page 2341 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T ~·-1 18 May 2012 E

V0 ¢ 34
4. All three attacks exhibited a number of common features 1 they all involved an attack on
the city of Voinjarna; they were executed by dissidents allegedly affiliated to former faction
leader Alhaji Krornah; and all were concentrated in Lofa County despite the fact that two
other counties, Bong and Nimba, also share the border with Guinea. Repeated denials by
Guinea of its involvement in these attacks were dismissed by the GOL as disingenuous,
leading to a war of words between the two neighbors. it is not inconceivable that the
dissidents may indeed have training bases in Guinea -- as alleged by Liberia -- but without
the knowledge of the Government of Guinea -- as alluded to by the Guinean ambassador to
Liberia. The Guinean envoy has conceded in the past that among Liberian refugees in
Guinea were some former factional elements who felt insecure staying in Liberia after the
1997 elections. He however emphasized that "if these people are returning home and
rearming themselves for whatever reason against their own Government, we have no input
and no knowledge about such actions".
5. Despite public protestations to the contrary by the Guinean Government, Liberia insists
that it has evidence that dissidents opposed to the Liberian Government were being trained
at an agricultural institute outside Macenta, Guinea, not far from the Liberian border.
President Taylor has complained about the international community's silence whenever
there was an incursion into Lofa from Guinea. His Government had been telling the world
about the untoward activities of Liberians abroad especially Messrs. Vamba Kanneh and
Alhaji Kromah and their supporters in Guinea against Liberia. and not unpredictably felt
that the international community had turned a deaf ear to its concems.
6. It is worth noting that the difference between the previous attacks and the current one is
in the latter's magnitude and its propensity to engulf the whole sub region in the absence of
timely interventions particularly by the ECOWAS leadership and the UN. Unlike in the
past when dissident activities were confined within Liberian borders, Guinea has become
the latest victim of cross border attacks allegedly from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean
sides of the border. As with most conflicts, it is ordinary civilians, particularly those in
border towns, who are caught in the crossfire. An immediate cause for alarm is the growing
xenophobic round up of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans residing in Conakry on the orders of
President Lansana Conteh. The Guinean Government has accused Liberian and Sierra
Leonean refugees and ordinary civilians of being used by dissidents opposed to President
Conteh's Government to undermine it. Since yesterday, the GOL has used local radio
stations to appeal to Liberian citizens not to engage in revenge attacks on Guineans resident
in Liberia. The appeal has so far been successful.
7. At present, relations between Liberia and Guinea have reached a critical juncture. On the
surface, the current tension between the two countries would seem to suggest the two sides'
determination to resolve the conflict militarily, notwithstanding recent reconciliatory
statements by the GOL A military option would have obvious adverse effects on the
general state of affairs in both countries, particularly on their economy and on the wellbeing
of their citizens. If the experience in Lofa over the past 18 months where there had been
three rrrilitary incursions - is anyrhing to go by, then it goes without saying that Liberia has
genuine and legitimate security concems regarding its porous borders. Nevertheless, UNOL
continues with its efforts to ensure that the GOL does not consider the military option as a
solution to the current crisis.1515l
Deliberations
15151 Exhibit D-270, "Outgoing Code Cable dated 12 September 2000 from UNOL regarding the Liberia-Guinea
relations".

---- End of Page 2342 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T '/ 5% 18 May 2012

qa? 2 5
6728. lt is undisputed that from 1999 to 2001, confronted by an army of Liberian
dissidents attacking Lofa County in Liberia, from Guinea, the Accused sent troops to oppose
the incursion, which created a "push-back situation", with the hostile sides engaged in
fluctuating battle. 5152
6729. ln this context, the Prosecution alleges that in obedience to Taylor's instruction,
Sesay provided significant RUF manpower to fight for the Accused in Liberia and in Guinea
under the command of the Accused's subordinates, providing them with arms and
ammunition for these operations. I5 IS3
6730. The Accused denied being aware of the RUF's presence in Foya County,
Liberia.l5l54 He also denied ordering and arming the RUF to fight in Guinea for him.l5l55
Issa Sesay denied that the RUF attacked Gueckedou and Kissidou in Guinea or that Abu
Keita, Superman or any other RUF member attacked Guinea alongside Liberian forces.
Sesay denied flying from Foya with Yeaten to meet Taylor and testified that he never
received any arms or ammunition from Liberia or anywhere from the commencement until
the conclusion ofdisar1na1nent.l5l5`(’
6731. Numerous RUF witnesses, both from the Prosecution and the Defence, testified that
in 2000 and 2001, they participated in military operations in Liberia and Guinea against
LURD forces and their allies.l5l57 These witnesses further testified that while they were
fighting LURD and Guinean forces in Liberia and Guinea, they were fighting alongside
Liberian troops, under the command of Benjamin Yeaten.l5 ISS The testimony of these
witnesses is corroborated by Exhibit P-028, an "Operation Order" dated 20 January 2001,
assigning various RUF and AFL commanders to combat units in preparation for an attack on
{Sm See Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 383, 390; Defence Final Trial Brief; paras 679, 682.
*5*55 Prosecution rum roar Brief, paras 389-393.
5154 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29427-29428.
5155 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29303-29310, 29428-29436; Transcript 24
September 2009, pp. 29644-29646; Transcript 23 November 2009, pp. 32288-32290.
*5*551ssa sosay, Transcript 6 August 2010, pp. 45621, 45650-45651, 45637, 45641.
{Sm Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2045-2051; TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15179-
15781, 15785-15788, 15218; TF1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 7058-7061, 7064, 7071-7075, 7084-7085;
Mustapha M. Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008 pp. 5339-5340; TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, pp.
14254-14256; Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9473-9477; Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9507-9515;
John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38152-38154.
Img TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, pp. 15186-15188; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2052;
TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 13041-13043; Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 9 May 2008, pp. 9473-9477 but
see John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38161-38163.

---- End of Page 2343 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T I/J gm 18 May 2012

40 qi B6
Guinea.l5l59 The Trial Chamber has found this document to be authentic, and it carries
Sesay's signature as well as Yeaten's.l5l(’O Moreover, the Trial Chamber has found that
Taylor provided arms and ammunition for these operations.l5l°l
6732. ln light of the evidence, the Trial Chamber considers it impossible that RUF troops
would have fought in Liberia, under Yeaten's command, without Taylor's knowledge and
approval. For this reason the Trial Chamber rejects the testimony of the Accused, as well as
Issa Sesay, with regard to this allegation.
6733. Turning to the nature of Taylor's request for RUF support, the Trial Chamber has
considered the allegation of the Prosecution, relying on Abu Keita's testimony, that Issa
Sesay was obeying an order of the Accused when he sent troops to Guinea.l5l62 Several
other witnesses testified that Taylor requested Sesay's assistance but none of them
mentioned a specific order.l5l63 The Trial Chamber has rejected the evidence of Issa Sesay
and the Accused, denying any involvement, as lacking in credibility. The Trial Chamber
notes that TFl—5l6 referred in his testimony to several orders issued to the RUF by
Benjamin Yeaten. In light of the role that Yeaten played in these operations and his
relationship to the Accused, as well as its finding that the Accused instructed Bockarie to
j send RUF troops to Liberia to repel the earlier attack by Mosquito Spray, the Trial Chamber
is convinced that the Accused instructed Sesay to send troops to fight for him in Liberia and
Guinea.
Findings
6734. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that in 2000 and 2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces, and that the
RUF forces sent in response to these requests fought alongside AFL forces in Liberia and
Guinea under the command of the Accused's subordinates.
I5 159 Prosecution Exhibit P-028, "Operation Order" dated 20 January 2001.
I5 160 See discussion above regarding the authenticity of Exhibit P-028.
mm Amis and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Issa Sesay's Leadership
(December 1999-January 2002).
I5 162 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 389 ("ln obedience to Taylor's instruction, Sesay provided manpower to
fight for Taylor in Liberia and in Guinea, under the overall command of Taylor's senior Liberian commanders");
Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2050
mb} TF1-338, Transcript 2 September 2008, p. 15177.

---- End of Page 2344 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
[ r

(iii) Taylor instructed Bockarie and his subordinates to fight for Taylor's allies in
Cote d’Ivoire
Submissions of the Parties
6735. The Prosecution alleges that having failed to kill Bockarie outside Liberia, Taylor
used Bockarie and his subordinates to fight for Taylor's allies in Cote d’Ivoire. While in
Cote d’Ivoire, Bockarie communicated with Taylor and Yeaten.l5 164
6736. The Defence contends that a policy of disengagement was adopted by the Liberian
government on 12 January 2001 because there was a great deal of misunderstanding about
the Liberian govemment's contact with both the RUF and other parties to the Sierra Leonean
conflict, which contacts were open and publicly maintained under the mandate of ECOWAS
and for the sole objective of promoting regional peace and stability. In compliance with
Liberia's policy of disengagement, Sam Bockarie, and all RUF individuals, had 'departed
Liberia by February 2001. There was no reason to expel those that had been inducted into
the ATU who remained Liberian citizens. Sam Bockarie left to go to Cote d’Ivoire and
Taylor had no further contact with him.l5l°5
Evidence
Prosecution Witness J abaty J award
6737. Prosecution witness Jabaty Jaward, a member of the ATU,l5l66 testified that around
December 2002, on the instructions of Benjamin Yeaten,l5l°7 he and 21 other men, including
Joe Tuah, flew from Roberts International Airport in Liberia into Ouagadougou, Burkina
Faso.l5l°8 Onboard the aircraft, Joe Tuah informed him that Sam Bockarie and others had
crossed into Cote d’Ivoire. Having arrived in Ouagadougou, the group was taken in a bus to
Korhogo, a place near to the Mali-Burkina-Ivorian border. Shortly after, the group crossed
the Ivorian border and joined Bockarie in Seguela, Cote d’Ivoire. While in Cote d’Ivoire,
Sam Bockarie told Jaward that he had come there on the instructions of Taylor in order to
ISM Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 396; See also paras 36, 63.
‘"°5 Defence rmi naar Brief paras 703-705, 714.
ISM Jabaty Jaward Transcript 10 July 2008, pp. 13455-13457.
15167 The witness explained, however, that instructions like that could not come from Yeaten on his own initiative
and should have been approved by the Accused. Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 1 1 July 2008, p. 13500.
Img Jabaty Jaward Transcript 1 1 July 2008, p. 13500.

---- End of Page 2345 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-0l-T % Q1/]· 18 May 2012

406458
assist the Ivorian rebels in their fight. J abaty J award testified that at the time he was in Cote
d’Ivoire, instmctions were coming from Benjamin Yeaten in Liberia.l5l69
Prosecution Witness TF1—585
6738. Witness TF1—585, an RUF radio operator,l5l7O testified that Sam Bockarie left
Liberia in 2001. In 2002, Witness TF1—585 learned from Bockarie's wife that Bockarie was
fighting in Cote d’Ivoire and that, before Cote d’Ivoire, he had been in Libya. In 2002, TPI-
585 joined Bockarie in Cote d’Ivoire for a military operation against the Ivorian
Government. Bockarie and his men fought in Cote d’Ivoire for about 6 or 7 months, after
which the entire group, composed of 500 RUF members, ATU and civilians, retreated from
Cote d’Ivoire to Liberia under the attack of the Ivorian military.l5 W
6739. TF1—585 further testified that Jungle told her that he had heard from Yeaten that
Taylor deployed the Liberian military on the border with Cote d’Ivoire in order to prevent
Bockarie's group from crossing into Liberia, as it might entail Ivorian military chasing the
group on to Liberian soil. Taylor also wanted Bockarie to stay in Cote d’Ivoire to defend
Ivorian ground.l5 172 However, Jungle and the Liberian soldiers who were part of Bockarie's
group were allowed to cross into Liberia. The others, including Witness TF1—585, were
blocked in a village on the border with Cote d’Ivoire while Bockarie was collected and taken
by Benjamin Yeaten and Joe Tuah to Monrovia.l5 173 Subsequently, Benjamin Yeaten and
Joe Tuah came back to the village and relayed an order from Taylor to the effect that those
who had crossed from Cote d’Ivoire in order to proceed to Monrovia would have to fight the
LURD out of Ganta before coming back to Liberia.l5 174
Prosecution Witness TF1—375
6740. Witness TF1—375, an RUF fighter,l5 175 testified that in early 2002, while he was at
Taylor's farm, he had a conversation by satellite phone with Sam Bockarie, who was in
mw Jabaty Jaward Transcript 11 July 2008, pp. 13498—13523.
mm TF1—590, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15582—15584, 15589—15592 (PS).
ism TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15758.
lim TF1—585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15754. However, when asked on whose behalf Bockarie was
righting in Cote d’Ivoire, answered that she didn’r know
Um TF1—585, T. 8 September 2008, pp. 15749—15756.
Hm TF1—585, T. 8 September 2008, p. 15758.
ism TF1—375, Transcript 23 June 2008, p. 12485.

---- End of Page 2346 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2346 qw 18 May 2012
M

C6te d’Ivoire regarding a machine to create ID cards that Bockarie had looted during an
attack in Cote d’Ivoire. TF1—3 75 testiHed that Bockarie refused to hand over the machine he
had looted to the Liberian Government, saying that he refused to take "any orders liom the
Liberian government any more". ln his conversation with TF1—375, Bockarie also explained
that he had been told by Taylor to turn over "the amount of diamonds he crossed over with"
to Taylor, which he did, but he did not receive any support from Taylor in exchange. mm
Prosecution Witness TF1—579
6741. Witness TF1—579, a member of the SSS,l5m testihed that in 2000 Bockarie went on
various missions outside Liberia.l5l78 Bockarie travelled to Danané, where he met Taylor's
Chief of Protocol, Musa Cissé.l5l79 While in Cote d’Ivoire, Musa Cisse introduced Bockarie
to Jonas Savimbi's ambassador. Savimbi's ambassador and Bockarie travelled together to
Lusaka, Zambia in order to see Savimbi.l5l8O However, the arrangement to meet with
Savimbi fell apart. Bockarie was upset and tried to call Yeaten and Sampson, but neither of
them answered.l5l8l Bockarie then decided to travel to Ghana. wm
6742. TF1—579 learned that there was a plan to have Bockarie killed during his mission
abroad, while he was in Angola.l5l83. While in Liberia, TF1—579 heard that Yeaten said it
was a good thing that he had not travelled with Bockarie because he would have executed
both of them. TF1—579 did not tell Bockarie what he had been told by Sampson.l5l84
6743. TF1—579 further testihed that in mid—2002, Sam Bockarie moved from Ghana to
Burkina Faso. Joe Tuah, a member of the Special Forces, was in charge of organising men
for the Cote d’Ivoire war. Yeaten asked TF1—579 to follow Bockarie in Cote d’Ivoire and to
report to him. While he was at the lvorian border, TF1—579 met Sampson Weah, who
W6 TP1-375, T. 24 June 2008, pp. 12645-12649.
‘5"’ TP1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19822-19823.
ISHS TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19870-19873 (PS).
mw TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, p. 19873 (PS).
IMO TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19874-19882 (PS). 0
tml TF1-579. Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19881-19882 (PS).
*5**2 TF1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008. pp. 19882-19883 (PS).
‘5‘" TP1-579, Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19885-19886 (PS).
Um TF1-579. Transcript 5 November 2008, pp. 19886-19889 (PS).

---- End of Page 2347 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T // QW 18 May 2012

{"€‘4l—O
brought him to see Sam Bockarie in Danané.l5l85 TFl-579 testified that while he was in
Cote d’Ivoire, Bockarie had about 2,000 or 3,000 men under his command.l5l8°
6744. TFl-579 testified that while he was in Cote d’Ivoire, he heard Bockarie having
phone conversations with Yeaten and Taylor. During these conversations Bockarie called
Taylor "Chief". According to TFl-579 Taylor was the only person Bockarie called
¢¢Chi€f$)~ is im
6745. TFl-579 stated that Sam Bockarie was fighting with the lvorian rebel leader Philip
Doh [sic] (a.k.a. Andre) against the Ivorian government troops. However, at a certain point,
Doh accused Bockarie of trying to overthrow him. Andre also complained to Yeaten that
Bockarie's men were misbehaving. TFl-579 testified that Taylor told Yeaten to send Joe
Tuah to the Cote d’Ivoire to settle problems between Andre and Bockarie. However, when
Joe Tuah arrived in Cote d’Ivoire, Bockarie told him that he would not take any instruction
from anyone but Charles Taylor. TPI-579 testified that eventually, everyone calmed down
and an agreement was found.l5l88
Prosecution Witness Karmoh Km-gh
6746. Witness Karrnoh Kanneh, a senior commander in the RUF,l5l89 testified that around
May 2000, during a meeting with Sam Bockarie, Yeaten's security officers including
Varney and Bockarie's signal man in Monrovia, mw Bockarie explained that he was
discouraged by Taylor who had asked him to go to the police station where he was detained
for three to four days. Bockarie explained that he was also worried for his life since Taylor
told him that he was under pressure to hand him over to the international community but that
he was afraid that Bockarie would explain to the Special Court for Sierra Leone all the deals
between the RUF and Taylor. Therefore, Bockarie worried for his life. Bockarie further
explained that Taylor had given him a mission but did not explain what it was.l5 wl Kanneh
IMS TFl-579, Transcript 6 November 2008, pp. 19964-19966.
ISM TFl-579, Transcript 6 November 2008, pp. l9966-l9968.
wm TFl-579, Transcript 6 November 2008, pp. l9968-l9969.
Img TFl-579, Transcript 6 November 2008, pp. l9972-l9975.
Img Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9390.
mw Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9489-9490.
mm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript l2 May 2008, pp. 9492-9493.

---- End of Page 2348 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T Gar l8 May 2012
/ ,2


testified that later when he returned to Sierra Leone, he heard on BBC World Focus that
Sam Bockarie had killed Phillip Doe in Cote d’1voire.l5m
The Accused
6747. The Accused testified that in early February 2001, Sam Bockarie was asked to leave
Liberia because his presence was bringing negative attention to the Liberian Government.
There were many questions about his presence in Liberia, even though he came with the
approval of ECOWAS.l5l93 The Liberian Government also requested the departure of all
RUF members from Monrovia and the closure of the RUF contact office in Monrovia.
Bockarie left Liberia for Cote d’Ivoire and Taylor had no further contact with him.l5l94
6748. The Accused denied ordering Sam Bockarie and ATU to fight in Cote d’Ivoire in
order to destabilize the country.l5l95 To the contrary, when a conflict broke out in Cote
d’Ivoire between Guei Robert and Laurent Gbagbo, he intervened and met with Gbagbo to
remed the situation because Liberia needed a stable Cote d’Ivoire.l5l%
Y
6749. The Accused testified that in May 2003, he received reports that Sam Bockarie and
his men were advancing toward the Liberian border with Cote d’1voire. Taylor decided to
rotect the Liberian border from armed soldiers who returned from fi tin in Cote d’1voire,
P 8
and Moses Blah was sent there to apprehend Bockarie and his armed men. However,
Bockarie and his men resisted and Bockarie was killed.l5l97
Defence Exhibit D—299
6750. Exhibit D—299 is a press statement from the Liberian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
dated 26 October 2000, in which the Liberian authorities denied the presence of any
Liberian military personnel in Cote d’Ivoire.l5w8
Deliberations
Hm Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 12 May 2008, pp. 9493-9495.
Um Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, p. 30203.
ISM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 August 2009, pp. 27915-27917; Transcript 26 October 2009, pp.
30205-30208.
HWS Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30212-30213.
NOG Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30213-30214.
Hm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 October 2009, pp. 30210-30212.
Img Exhibit D-299, "Press statement from the Liberian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 October 2000".

---- End of Page 2349 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

qv 4/42.
6751. lt is undisputed that in 2001, Sam Bockarie left Liberia for Cote d’Ivoire.{5{99 The
Prosecution submits that Bockarie relocated to Cote d’Ivoire so that he could fight in the
rebellion against the Ivorian govemment.{52O{{ The Defence, however, submits that Bockarie
was permitted to leave Liberia because of the Liberian government's policy of
disengagement with the Sierra Leone peace process, and that after his departure the Accused
had no further contact with Bockarie.{520{ ln May 2003 Bockarie was advancing towards the
Liberian border from Cote d’Ivoire, when he was shot and killed by Liberian forces. {5202
6752. The Trial Chamber notes that Jabaty Jaward is the only witness who testified that
Bockarie told him that he was sent to Cote d’Ivoire in order to assist the Ivorian rebels in
their fight.{52O3 Although the Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Jaward is a generally
credible witness,{52O4 his hearsay evidence is uncorroborated. Karmoh Kanneh testified that
Bockarie told him the Accused had given him a mission, but he did not say what it was.
Kanneh also testified that Bockarie had been detained by Taylor for a raw days and was
afraid for his life. The evidence indicates that, at the time of Bockarie's departure, relations
between the Accused and Bockarie were difficult. TF1-375 testified that Bockarie was
unhappy with the Accused and said he would no longer take orders from the Liberian
Govemment. In the Trial Chamber's view, in these circumstances it is doubtful that
Bockarie would have fought in Cote d’Ivoire on Taylor's order.
Findings
6753. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused instmcted Bockarie and his subordinates to fight for his allies in Cote
d’Ivoire.
{Sm TF1-579, Transcript, 26 November 2008, pp. 21161-21164 (PS); TF1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008,
pp. 15749-15751; Jabaty Jeward, Transcript 11 July 2008, pp. 13510-13514.
{5200 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 36, 396; TF1-388, Transcript 11 July 2010, p. 13510; TF1-585,
Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15749; TF1-579, Transcript 6 November 2008, pp. 19972-19975.
{Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, 9 March 201 1, paras 703-705. g
{5202 Exhibit D-046, "Autopsy Report, The Central Laborato1y Services Division of Histopathology and Morbid
Anatomy/Forensic Pathology, Connought Hospital, 4 June 2003"; Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, 9989-
9999; TF1-585, Transcript 9 September 2008, pp. 15768-15872; TF1-338, Transcript 16 July 2008, pp. 13862-
13865; DCT-102, Transcript 5 November 2010, pp. 48892-48894.
{5203 Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 11 July 2008, pp. 13498-13523.
{5204 Credibility Assessment, Jabaty Jaward, The Role of lntermediaries, para. 2708.

---- End of Page 2350 ---------------------------


Case No.: scsr-03-01-T / ({1* is May 2012

2
2. Analysis of the RUF /AF RC Alliance
6754. In this section, the Trial Chamber assesses the evolution of the relationship between
the RUF and the AF RC during the lndictment period. The findings made by the Trial
Chamber in this section are based on an analysis of the record as a whole.
6755. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AF RC) was founded by members of the
Sierra Leone Army (SLA), who seized power from the elected government of Sierra Leone
via a coup d'etat on 25 May 1997.15205 Within days of the coup, Johnny Paul Koroma
became the leader and chairman of the AF RC.152116 Soon aiier the coup, Koroma contacted
Foday Sankoh and invited the RUF to join the AF RC in Government.152117 Sankoh agreed
and ordered the RUF to join the AF RC in governing Sierra Leone.15208 As the founders of
the AFRC belonged to the Sierra Leone Army and therefore had been fighting the RUF
since 1991, the coalition between the two factions following the 1997 coup was not based on
longstanding common interests. Both factions officially declared that they were joining
forces to bring peace and political stability to Sierra Leone.15209
6756. The executive body of the Junta Government was the Supreme Council, in which
Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh were appointed Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively. As Sankoh was in custody in Nigeria, Lieutenant Colonel Solomon Anthony
152115 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact 17; Judicially
Noticed Fact D; Final Trial Brief, para. 433 ("on 25 May 1997, a group of enlisted SLA soldiers overthrew the
elected government of President Tejan Kabbah, installing the military government that they called the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council"; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 580 ("The AFRC coup took place on 25 May
1997 as non-commissioned officers of the SLA seized State House, forcing President Kabbah and his
government to leave the country").
152116 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact 18;
Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 433 ("Major Johnny Paul Koroma was named head of the AFRC
government"); Defence Final Trial Brief ("the AFRC government was headed by JP Koroma").
152117 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 437 ("soon after the coup, JPK contacted Foday Sankoh, who agreed to
join the AFRC"; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 581 ("within a week or so of the coup, JP Koroma called
Sankoh and invited the RUF to join the AFRC in government"); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp.
10440-10441; Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46540-46541. ,
152118 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 437 ("soon after the coup, JPK contacted Foday Sankoh, who agreed to
join the AFRC"; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 581 ("within a week or so of the coup, JP Koroma called
Sankoh and invited the RUF to join the AFRC in government. Sankoh .... Agreed, and sent Massaquoi to
Freetown"); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10440-10441; Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010,
pp. 46540-46541; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008 pp. 7872-7873; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9
July 2008 pp. 13338-13339; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008 pp. 3086-3087; Foday Lansana,
Transcript 21 February 2008 pp. 4491-4492; Exhibit P-277 (confidential), pp. 52-53; Exhibit P-067, "RUF
People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Commander",ERN 9672.; Prosecutor
v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Admitted Facts and Law, 26 April 2007, Agreed Fact 30.
*5201* Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T-370, Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 1.

---- End of Page 2351 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03 -01-T /% rf; 18 May 2012 \%

¢v#44
Joseph Musa (‘"SAJ Musa") served as Acting Vice-Chairman in Sankoh's absencemm
Although the AFRC and the RUF had an integrated organisational structure for the
government, they did not integrate their military command structures at this point,l52H and
the command structure of the RUF remained similar to the way it was prior to them allying
with the A1¤Rc.‘"'2
6757. The parties dispute the strength of the relationship between the RUF and the AFRC
during the Junta reign. While the Prosecution submits that the alliance between the AFRC
and the RUF functioned effectively and was cordial,l52l3 the Defence highlights evidence
indicating that the alliance was sour and disagreements between the AFRC and RUF were
frequent, resulting in Bockarie, the acting leader of the RUF in the absence of Foday
Sankoh, departing from Freetown in July 1997 due to his dissatisfaction with Johnny Paul
Koroma's management of the governmentlj 214 The Trial Chamber recalls its tinding there
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 442 ("the AF RC and RUF interacted within the Supreme Council. .. The
first vice chair was Sankoh (during whose absence Bockarie was treated as interim leader for the RUF though he
was the field cornrnander) and the second vice chair was SAJ Musa"); Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 583 ("the
Junta government ruled through the Supreme Council, which was dominated by the AFRC. JP Koroma
appointed himself as chairman, with SAJ Musa as chief secretary of state and acting vice-chairman"); Alimamy
Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7875-7878.
mu Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 443-444 ("the AFRC and the RUF did not have a combined military
structure at that point. The focal point of interaction was between the high command of the Junta (JPK and SAJ
Musa) and the high cornrnand of the RUF (Bockarie and his immediate deputies, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon";
Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 585-586 ("the AFRC and the RUF may have been united in government". JP
Koroma rejected Bockarie's requested [sic] for integration between the AFRC and the RUF, and the groups
remained separate"); TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2327-2329 (CS); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5
February 2008, p. 3090; Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, pp. 43848—43849; Exhibit P-059, "AFRC/RUF Junta
Command Structure Circa May 25 1997 ~ February 1998, as indicated by TF1—371"; Exhibit P-060,
"AFRC/RUF Junta Military Command Structure Circa May 25 1997 ~ February 1998, as indicated by TF1-371";
Exhibit P-360, "Proposal for the Tentative Integration of the People's Army into the National Army and the
Political Circle".
mm TF1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, p. 2327 (CS); Exhibit P-060, "AFRC/RUF Junta Military Cornrnand
Structure Circa May 25 1997 ~ February 1998, as indicated by TF1-371".
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 440 ("during the Junta period, the alliance between the RUF and the
AFRC functioned effectively"), 445 ("the relationship between the AFRC and the RUF was cordial").
ISM Defence Final Trial Brief paras 585-558 ("there were... serious tensions between individuals within the
groups, and between the groups themselves... there were serious problems between Bockarie and the AFRC...
the RUF was marginalized in military matters... Bockarie considered the AFRC did not respect the RUF... JP
Koroma did not trust Bockarie, and asked Bockarie to leave"); Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial
Brief, paras 107-111; Karmoh Karrneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9360-9363; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript
2 December 2008, p. 21421; Issa Sesay, Transcript 7 July 2010, p. 43846; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May
2008, p. 10614; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from
Major General Sam Bockarie", p. 2 ERN 9659 ("thus began the marriage of uneven and unequal partners
between the AFRC and the RUF"); TF1-567, Transcript 8 July 2008, p. 13170; J abaty Jaward Transcript 9 July
2008, p. 13339; Exhibit P-131, "AFRC ~ Secret Minutes of the First Meeting of the AFRC Held at the
Conference Hall, Defence Headquarters on Saturday 19 July l997"; Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army-
Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard Cornrnander", ERN 9673 ("when we join [sic] the
brothers, some of our senior officers and elders were given ministerial positions in the AFRC Government. All
the [sic] some things were not working well with the RUF members in which the High Command even decided

---- End of Page 2352 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Q? 18 May 2012

4U¢@§
was no superior—subordinate relationship between the RUF and the Accused,l5 215 and its
finding that no common plan existed between the RUF and the Accused. mm The Trial
Chamber need not therefore make a finding as to the strength of the relationship between the
RUF and the AFRC during the Junta period, as it not necessary for the purpose of assessing
the role of the Accused.
6758. Following the ECOMOG Intervention on l4 February l998, the RUF and AFRC
forces retreated from Freetownl52l7 to Fogbo, Masiaka and onto Makeni. In Makeni,
combined AFRC/RUF forces re-organised to attack Koidu Town, the primary town in Kono
District. The first attack was unsuccessful, but in a second attack, the AFRC/RUF forces
managed to recapture Koidu Town.l52l8
6759. Bockarie, who at the time of the Intervention was stationed in Kenema, retreated to
Kailahun Town, and from there proceeded to Buedu where he set up a headquarters.l5 219
While in Buedu, Bockarie was promoted by Johnny Paul Koroma to Defence Chief of Staff;
which gave him the overall authority over the AFRC and RUF forces.l522O At this point, the
alliance was restructured, and the command structure became unified; each group led by an
RUF commander was to have an AFRC deputy, and each group commanded by an AFRC
commander was to have an RUF deputy. This resulted in the RUF assumption of command
over the AFRC/RUF forces.l522 I
6760. VVhen Johnny Paul Koroma departed for Kailahun District in l998, he was given to
believe that he would be welcome there by the RUF. However, when he arrived in Kailahun
he encountered a hostile RUF leadership. He was arrested by Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay and
other RUF fighters. His diamonds were taken from him and his wife was sexually assaulted.
to leave the city Freetown and decided to base in the provinces. Things were not put in a proper shape as the so
called Honourables were just doing things as they lilISHS Leadership and Command Structure: Conclusion.
mm Pre—Indictment Period (1988-1996): Conclusion.
wm Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 5; Decision on the Prosecution Motion for
Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007, Annex A, Fact , AD.
ISM Military Operations: Operation in Kono (Early 1998).
mw Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. the AFRCfRUF control centre was no based in Buedu"); Defence Final
Trial Brief, para. 60l ("Bockarie st up his headquarters in Kailahun, and was based in Buedu"); Exhibit D—009,
"RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution from Major General Sam Bockarie",
p. 5 ERN 9662 ("I immediately set about a Defence Headquarters in Kailahun").
imo Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 450; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 602; Leadership and Command
Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Sam Bockarie.
lm} Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 454-455, 460; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 603.

---- End of Page 2353 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T % l8 May 2012

Bockarie placed Koroma under house arrest in Kangama village near Buedu where he
remained until mid 1999. my
6761. Prior to Koroma's arrival in Buedu, SAJ Musa was furious when he learned about
Koroma's decision - that the AFRC soldiers should be subordinate to RUF command, as he V
would not accept the notion that untrained RUF fighters could be in charge of former
soldiers. Musa insisted that the purpose of his group was to reinstate the army and that the
RUF could not lead such a mission. In addition, before the operation to recapture Kono took
lace, a dis ute em ted over command and control issues resultin in hostilities between the
P P P S
two factions and the deaths of several fighters. As a result, SAJ Musa, and a significant
number of AFRC troops loyal to him, opted not to participate in or support the
operation}5223 Later on, Gullit joined SAJ Musa. Witnesses differed as to whether Gullit
joined Musa on account of his diamonds being confiscated by Bockarie and his refusal to
accept Bockarie's command, or whether Gullit went to join SAJ Musa in order to convince
Musa to come to Buedu to talk}5224 Regardless of whether Gullit's departure was
acrimonious, Gullit maintained contact with Bockarie, and would update Bockarie and
Bockar‘ie's commanders on operational matters. mx
6762. When Gullit joined SAJ Musa, Musa instructed him in June/July 1998 to find a base
in the north in order to prepare a route to advance towards Freetown}5226 After Gullit
advanced to the north, and following the failed Fitti-Fatta attack on Koidu Town in mid—June
1998 led by Superman,l5227 Superman joined SAJ Musa in Koinadugu, In October 1998,
Superman and SAJ Musa fought over the killing of a recruit which resulted in an armed
clash between Superman and SAJ Musa, causing Musa to leave Koinadugu for Rosos}5228
{Sm Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex a, Fact 7 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 249
("shortly after Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in Buedu, some 1800 pieces of diamonds were taken from him");
Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 604 ("While in Buedu, JP Koroma... was arrested by the RUF on Bockarie's
order, as Bockarie suspected him of hiding diamonds .... Bockarie was present at the time the diamonds were
seized. Following the seizure of his diamonds, JP Koroma was taken to Kangama").
15223 Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex a, Fact 6.
my Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
{Sm Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
Hm Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
my Military Operations: Operation F itti—F atta.
img Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 470 ("Superrnan and SAJ Musa fell out in early October 1998 over the
killing of a recruit. Superrnan's group headed to Pumpkin Ground while SAJ Musa and his group went to
Rosos"); Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 612-613 ("Senegalese killed a recruit, which led to Musa and
Superman falling out: leading to a gun—tight between Musa's group and Superman's group. This was in about .
October 1998. Following this Musa left Koinadugu, for Camp Rosos..."); Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL—03—1-T-

---- End of Page 2354 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—01—T 4% [bg 18 May 2012

¢0¢4?
Subsequently, upon Bockarie's instructions, Superman joined the forces acting under the
command of Bockarie in the attack on Makeni in December 1998. @29
6763. The parties dispute whether Superman had joined SAJ Musa upon Bockarie's orders
as part of a larger plan to advance towards Freetown, as claimed by the Prosecution,l523O or
whether Bockarie sent Superman to kill SAJ Musa but Superman disobeyed Bockarie's
orders and joined Musa instead.l5 231 Both parties agree that after Superman had joined SAJ
Musa, he and Bockarie had a falling out, which included exchange of insults over the radio
over Superman's girlfriend, but the parties dispute whether this infighting resulted in
Superman breaking away from the RUF .1523 2 Given that the Trial Chamber has found that
Bockarie did not have a grand plan to advance towards Freetown prior to Superman joining
370, Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 10 ("in October 1998, following an armed
clash with Denis Mingo, SAJ Musa left Koinadugu District to join the advance team and prepare for an attack on
Freetown. SAJ Musa did not follow the same route taken by the advance teams in his journey to the west").
Img Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 472 ("...on Bockarie's instruction, Superman and the subordinates under
his command took part in the AFRC/RUF attack on Makeni in December 1998"); Defence Final Trial Brief,
paras 613 ("fo11owing SAJ Musa's departure, Superman's group fought ECOMOG, captured ammunition and
then burnt Koinadugu Town, including killing people, and moved on to Makeni in about December 1998"), 626
("Bockarie coordinated for forces under Sesay, Rambo, Kallon and Superman to join together to fight in Makeni.
The RUF attacked and captured Makeni on or around 24 December 1998").
mm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 467-468 ("after the attack on Mongo Bendugu, a forum was held with
SAJ Musa, Superman, General Bropleh, Brigadier Mani, Colonel T and others where Superman told SAJ Musa
that Bockarie had told him (Superman) to join forces with SAJ Musa to try and get Kabala and then Freetown");
Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3155-3156, 3167-31769 (describing a meeting in Buedu in which
Bockarie orders Superman to go to Koinadugu because SAJ Musa, in Koinadugu, was unskilled in jungle
operations); TF1-375, Transcript 24 June 2008, pp. 12556-12557 (testifying that when Superman arrived in
Kurubonla and told SAJ Musa that Sam Bockarie had told him to go and work with SAJ Musa).
lm I Defence Final Trial Brief ("fo11owing the [Fitti-Fatta] operation, Superman went with a force to Koinadugu.
This was in about August 1998... He may have gone on Bockarie's instruction, or of his own accord. Bockarie
wanted Superman to attack SAJ Musa's AFRC force. However, Superman disobeyed the order and joined SAJ
Musa, perhaps because he feared being arrested by Bockarie following the failure to capture Koidu Town);
Foday Lansana, Transcript 22 February 2008, 4524-4525; Alice Pyne, Transcript 19 June 2008, pp. 12248-12249
(Before June 1998, Superman left for Yomandu having received a message from Sam Bockarie to launch an
attack on SAJ Musa's men at Kurubonla); Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010, pp. 44054-44055 (describing a
meeting occurring in July 1998 in which Superman defied Bockarie and went to Koinadugu after the Fitti-Fatta
mission). See also Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 119-121.
15232 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 472 ("at around the same time as the Superman SAJ Musa fallout [early
October 1998], Superman and Bockarie quarrelled because Bockarie called Superman's ‘wife’ an idiot over the
radio. However... after the failed Fitti-Fatta mission, Superman met with Bockarie in Buedu and thereafter took
AFRC/RUF fighters to the north to join SAJ Musa. According to Superman, where there were AFRC there
should be RUF... Also, after Bockarie's trip to Burkina Faso to get arms, on Bockarie's instruction, Superman
and the subordinates under his command took part in the AFRC/RUF attack on Makeni in December 1998");
Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 609 (". .. perhaps in September, Bockarie called a meeting in Buedu and ordered
Superman to report. However, Superman refused. This led to Bockarie and Superman exchanging insults over
the radio. This involved Bockarie insulting Superman's gir1friend"); Defence Response to Prosecution Final
Trial Brief, paras 122-123 ("...it is quite clear from the evidence taken as a whole that when Superman went to
join Musa in the North, he broke rank with the RUF, and started to operate on his own").

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J dm 18 May 2012

?'0¢4»z;
SAJ Musa,15233 and that Bockarie only presented a plan he had made with the Accused to
advance towards Freetown in late November/early December 1998,1521 4 which resulted in
Superman acting upon the orders of Bockarie and attacking Makeni, the Trial Chamber need
not make findings with regard to the reasons Superman joined SAJ Musa, and whether after
Superman fought with Bockarie he broke away from the RUF. In the Trial Chamber's view
this issue does not affect its assessment of the role of the Accused.
6764. After SAJ Musa arrived in Colonel Eddie Town in November 1998, he ordered his
troops to stop all communications with Bockarie, and those forces remained under the
command of SAJ Musa, outside of Bockarie's control, until SAJ Musa's death15235 on 23
December 1998.15236 Some witnesses suggested in their testimony that Bockarie and Gullit
conspired to kill SAJ Musa.15237 In the Trial Chamber's view, the significant consequence of
Musa's death, whatever its cause, was the resumption of communications between Gullit
and Bockarie.15238 Following his first conversation with Gullit after the death of SAJ Musa,
Bockarie and Gullit coordinated in their efforts to capture Freetown,15239 resulting in
Bockarie exercising effective command and control over Gullit in early 1999.15240 The attack
on Freetown, and the force's retreat and subsequent re-attacks, were conducted under the
command and control of Bockarie.15241 While some divisions erupted between the RUF and
the AFRC after Gullit's retreat from Freetown, the AFRC and the RUF still coordinated and
made collaborative efforts to re-attack Freetown.15242
6765. After the retreat from Freetown Gullit left Newton for Makeni to meet Superman,
while Bazzy, an AFRC member, remained in Newton. 15243 In approximately May 1999,
15233 Military Operations: Operation F itti—F atta.
15234 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
15235 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 470 ("In Rosos, SAJ Musa and his group remained outside of Bockarie's
control; this continued until SAJ Musa's death at Benguema"); Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL—03—1—T—370, Decision
on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 1 1 ("upon his arrival in ‘Colonel Eddie Town’ in November
1998, SAJ Musa assumed command. He emphasised his disenchantment with the RUF and stressed that it was
vital that his troops arrive in Freetown before the RUF ").
15236 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL—03—1—T—370, Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 13.
15237 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, Plan.
152311 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
15239 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan. ~
152411 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
15241 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
15242 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
15243 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8444-8446 (10 STF members and 10 former NPFL
fighters remained in Newton with Bazzy's force at the West Side).

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Case No.: SCSI-—03—0l—T % Gil} 18 May 2012

40 4449
Bazzy formed the West Side Boys and became their leader. The West Side Boys included a
mixed group of AFRC, RUF and former NPFL fighters.15444 Bockarie and Bazzy continued
to cooperate during military operations. 15245
6766. In the meantime, Superman and Gibril Massquoi engaged in infighting with with
Bockarie and Issa Sesay, which resulted in the death of Boston Flomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo)
Superman's forces taking over Makeni, at around late March/early April 1999. ‘"‘"’
15444 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8410-8411; Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8447-
8460; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8653-8658.
15245 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8414-8415 (at around April/May 1999, Bazzy
communicated with Bockarie and requested ammunition. Subsequently, ammunition sent by Bockarie was sent
to Bazzy in order to prevent ECOMOG from crossing over to Masiaka), 8456-8460, 8470-8471, 8475-8477
(Bazzy would contact Bockarie and inform him of military operations. Bazzy informed Bockarie of the operation
in Port Loko in June 1999 in which Bazzy's forces captured two Malian troops. Bockarie then conveyed on the
international media that if Malian troops do not withdraw from Sierra Leone, his forces would execute the two
captured commanders. Bazzy also informed Bockarie on attacks his forces carried out in June/July 1999 on
Gberi Junction, Makolo and Mile 38. Bazzy would also communicate via the radio with Issa Sesay and Morris
Kallon). On Bazzy refusing to take commands from the RUF see TFl-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2969
(the witness agreed that Bazzy would not take commands from Foday Sankoh) and Issa Sesay, Transcript 14
July 2010, pp. 44418-44419 (Bazzy said in a message to Sankoh that he would not take commands from anyone
other than Johnny Paul Koroma).
15246 Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 14200-14205, 14217-14219; TFl-371, Transcript 1 February 2008,
pp. 2872-2878 (The witness agreed that Superman attacked Issa Sesay and Rambo in Makeni and in the process
Rambo was killed. He also agreed that this was "serious dissension within the RUF", stating that Superman and
Massaquoi were challenging Bockarie. This happened after the second retreat from Freetown in 1999. Superman
and Gibril were not taking commands from Bockarie until at least 26 September 1999. At some point in time,
Bockarie took control over it); Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2974; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence
Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF/ SL, from Major General Sam Bockarie", pp. 8-
10, ERN 9665-9667 ("Superman failed to move to Gberi Bridge and instead attacked Makeni late at night with
the aim of killing Brigadier Issa and Rambo. The home of Rambo was attacked by Superman. The attack caught
Rambo off guard as he was fast asleep. He was captured, shot many times and it was reported that he was even
stabbed to ensure that he did not survive the attack... After killing Rambo, they attacked the home of Brigadier
Issa... Brigadier Issa was able to escape through a door from his bedroom... After Makeni had been captured
and raised by Superman and his troops he called a meeting at the town hall and confidently told the people that
he was acting in compliance with instructions received from the leader and that he had taken effective command
of the RUF and that I, Major General Sam Bockarie, was no longer high command of the RUF, and that he,
Brigadier Superman, was taking over from Brigadier Issa in Makeni.,. Till this day Superman and Gibril are
contrary to my command and continued to flaunt the direct command of the Leader. They still do not submit all
reports to me for my necessary information"); Exhibit D-084, "Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute
Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, 27
September l999", pp. 11-13, ERN 7766-7768 ("...I was attacked again by Gibril... Superman took the
opportunity of calling a meeting at the Town Hall where he... informed the meeting that he had received
instructions from the Leader to take full command of the RUF and to arrest and execute both General Mosquito
and 1, Brig. Issa... He incited SLA soldiers to go against RUF command and, together with Gibril, sought to
sabotage the progress of the movement thus delaying the release of the leader. Superman killed Rambo in cold
blood and made several attempts on my life in a bid to eliminate the RUF high command left on the ground by
the leader"); Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army— Situation Report to Foday Sankoh from the Black Guard
Commander", ERN 9680-9681 ("... Superman and his men put on stiff resistance and even opened fire and
launched some RPG bombs, therefore scatter the whole group and kill some men and went to the extent of
advancing to Makeni and attacked the residence of the battlefield commander and vandalized the whole
compound and took everything in the compound including the materials for operations and enough foreign
currency and diamonds. He even extended in raising the compound of some other senior officers. .. After some

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T % E-(AQ 18 May 2012

I ,41 04E?
6767. Subsequently, matters relating to the Lomé peace accord brought to tension between
the AFRC and the RUF. W"hi1e the RUF signed the Lomé peace Accord,l5247 in August
1999, members of the West Side Boys kidnapped UN peacekeepers due to the perception by
the AFRC that they had been sidelined and excluded from the Lomé process and that their
combatants would not be reintegrated into the Sierra Leonean army}5248 On 28 September
1999, Koroma and Sankoh participated in two days of peace talks in Monrovia that were
mediated by the Accused. As a result of the negotiations, the AFRC was included within the
power-sharing government, with Koroma appointed as the Chairman of the Commission for
the Consolidation of Peace ("CCP"). Img
6768. Either prior to or following the signing of the Lomé peace accord, Bazzy of the West
Side Boys also arrested RUF commanders Superman and Mike Lamin, who formed part of a
squad who came from Makeni to the Freetown area. imo
6769. At around October 1999 fighting again broke out in Makeni, involving Issa Sesay,
Superman and Brigadier Mani from the AFRC. This resulted in Sesay taking over command
of Makeni. During this infighting, RUF fighter Senegalese was killed. {Sm
days, he came for the second time and attack Makeni and killed Colonel Rambo, arrested some security
personnels [sic], fire some people but they missed to kill the battle field commander and chase him all the way to
Makali and missed him for the second time. .. According to Superman, he has vowed to not ever take command
from the high command... In conclusion, Sir, we are hereby suggesting that the issue of Superman should
immediately be put under control before he tried to mislead some our snuggle brothers"); Exhibit D-085, "RUF-
Sierra Leone (People's Army of` Sierra Leone) OPS. Segbwema, Brief Comprehensive Report on All Salient
Activities that Took Place in the Absence of the Leader from the 24th Maech, 1996 to the 31S* August 1999, From
Major Francis M. Nusa Distrcit I.D.U. Cornrnander Kailahun, to Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh RUF/SL, 31
August 1999", ERN 9767 ("...This problem escalated to a point that Brigadier Superman either all by himself or
through ‘someone’ killed Colonel Boston Flomo by shooting him").
15247 Agreed Fact and Law, Fact 32.
[5248 Peace Process: Release of UN Peacekeepers and Others (1999). See also Alimamy Bobson Sesay,
Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8477-8480, 8481-8485; Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8559, 8633-8634; Samuel
Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008 p. 10567; Transcript 3 June 2008 pp. 10822-10823; Issa Sesay, Transcript 13
July 2010, pp. 44391-44392; Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44396-44397; Isaac Mongor, T. 31 March 2008, pp.
6178-6180 (the West Side Boys were loyal to Johnny Paul Koroma and had become antagonistic to the RUF at
the time that the peace accord was signed since they believed that nothing in the Peace Accord concerned them
and because they wanted to be reinstated into the army but this was not included in the peace accord).
‘""" comm, crvri war in slam Leone (1999-2002).
15250 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8615-8620; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8652-
8653, 8659-8660; TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2455-2456; Transcript 31 January 2008, pp. 2792-
2794.
[5251 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44432, 44435-44436 (Sankoh ordered Sesay through Bockarie to
move from Buedu to Makeni in October 1999. The day Sesay arrived in Makeni, Superman, Isaac Mongor, and
Gibril Massaquoi came from Lunsar to attack the AF RC in Makeni, and then returned to Lunsar. Sesay then took
over command of Makeni in October 1999); TF1-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p .23659; Transcript 28
January 2009, p. 23730; DCT-062, Transcript 26 April 2010, pp. 39878-39879.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Fw 18 May 2012

aca 2/
6770. Bockarie left Sierra Leone in December 1999,15252 and a reconciliation meeting was
convened on 7 April 2000, in which RUF commander Mike Lamin "regrettably confessed to
the gathering that General Mosquito [Bockarie] was responsible for most of the frictions that
took place between the RUF and the SLA".15253 SYB Rogers said at the meeting that Johnny
Paul Koroma and SAJ Musa did not work as a team, and that senior military officers had
betrayed the cause. He suggested that senior commanders be informed of this meeting and
be included in a committee that would iron out their differences "for the benefit of the
people of Sierra Leone in general and the accomplishment of the mission we had assigned
ourselves when we took up arnis".15254 In his closing remarks at the meeting, the Chainnan
for the meeting, Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Leatherboot), infonned the attendees that
"resolutions will be prepared from the minutes for onward transmission to the two leaders
who will close this ugly chapter after holding talks with senior commanders and other key
players in the whole reconciliation process".15255 Despite these attempts at reconciliation,
members of the AFRC and the RUF kept struggling, as exemplified by the arrest of Isaac
Mongor by members of the AF RC working for Kabbah's government in May 2000.15256
6771. In conclusion, the picture that emerges shows that during the Junta period, the AF RC
and the RUF, while having separate command structures, were united in government, in the
executive body of the state, with Johnny Paul Koroma as head of state. After the
Interyention, Bockarie took charge of the combined AF RC/RUF forces, except for troops in
the north headed by SAJ Musa. While communications may have continued between the
forces in the north and the forces under Bockarie's command, they did not coordinate
military operations until the death of SAJ Musa during his advance towards Freetown in late
December 1998. Following Musa's death, Bockarie assumed command over Gullit. His
command over Gullit continued throughout the attack on Freetown in early January 1999.
15252 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AF RC, Sam Bockarie.
15253 Exhibit P-134A, "Minutes of the Family Reunion Aimed at Reconciling Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh
and Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma Held at the Office of the Deputy Minister of Labour, Social Security and
Industrial Relations — New England on 7 April 2000", p. 6, ERN 8212.
15254 Exhibit P-134A, "Minutes of the Family Reunion Aimed at Reconciling Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh
and Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma Held at the Office of the Deputy Minister of Labour, Social Security and
Industrial Relations — New England on 7 April 2000", p. 12, ERN 8218.
15255 Exhibit P-134A, "Minutes of the Family Reunion Aimed at Reconciling Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh
and Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma Held at the Office of the Deputy Minister of Labour, Social Security and
Industrial Relations — New England on 7 April 2000", p. 12, ERN 8218.
15256 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6180-6182, 6241-6242.

---- End of Page 2359 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T / ({19 18 May 2012 vg

6772. Fracture erupted with the start of the Lomé peace negotiations, due to the AFRC
feeling marginalized. This led to the kidnapping of UN peacekeepers by the West Side Boys,
and to the involvement of the Accused in mediating between the two factions. lntighting
continued, and after Bockarie's departure from Sierra Leone attempts at reconciliation
resumed, although they were unsuccessful.
Summary of Findings
6773. The Trial Chamber has found that -
(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that before he left
Sierra Leone on a political tour, and following his arrest in Nigeria in
March 1997, Sankoh instructed Bockarie to take orders from the Accused.
(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
accepted and supported the Junta government, and told the AFRC/RUF
that he would encourage ECOWAS members to do so as well. He also
encouraged the AFRC and RUF to work together
(iii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in about
March 1998 the Accused promoted Sam Bockarie to the post of Chief of
Defence Staff for the AFRC/RUF alliance with the rank of Brigadier
General.
(iv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Taylor
promoted Sam Bockarie to the post of two-star general after the Freetown
Intervention.
(v) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
instruction given by the Accused to Sam Bockarie to leave Sierra Leone
for Liberia in December 1999 was a ‘diplomatic deceit’ to cover
clandestine actions.
(vi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that at a meeting
that took place in the Executive Mansion in Monrovia on 26 July 2000
with ECOWAS Heads of State present, the Accused proposed that Sam

---- End of Page 2360 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03·0l—T / J

Bockarie take over as Interim Leader of the RUF and Issa Sesay rejected
this proposal.
(vii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that when Issa
Sesay was appointed Interim Leader of the RUF, it was with the direction
from Sankoh that he should take instruction from the Accused.
(viii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in 1999, the
Accused ordered Bockarie to send AFRC/RUF forces to assist him in his
iight against Mosquito Spray and the LURD forces that had attacked his
forces, and that during the fighting, the AFRC/RUF forces operated under
the overall command of the Accused's Liberian subordinates.
(ix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in 2000 and
2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces, and that the
RUF forces sent in response to these requests fought alongside AFL forces
in Liberia and Guinea under the command of the Accused's subordinates.
(x) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
instructed Bockarie and his subordinates to fight for his allies in Cote
d’Ivoire.
Conclusion
6774. At the outset, the Trial Chamber recalls that evidence in the record shows that Taylor
was referred as "Pa",l5257 the "father"}5258 "Papay",l5259 "godfather"}5260 or "Cl1ief",l526l by
[5257 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5720 ("The big Pa was Mr Taylor and he was the big one");
Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6226 ("the Pa, that is Mr Taylor"); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September
2008, p. 16175 (RUF members used to call Taylor "Father" or "Pa"); Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16328
(referring to Taylor as "Dad" or the "Papay" or "Father" or "the Old Man" or "the President"); Karmoh Kanneh,
Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9395 (Taylor was called "President Taylor" or "Pa Taylor"); Transcript 9 May 2008,
p. 9432 (referring to the Accused as "Pa Taylor"); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20119
(referring to the Accused as "the Pa"); TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13039 ("Pa Charles Taylor"); TF1-
367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14300 ("at the time we used to call Charles Taylor Father or Chief [...] In
Monrovia, Liberia, we hadn’t anybody whom we called "Chief" or "Pa" apart from Charles Taylor. He was the
only person who was our Papa and out everything").
[5258 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 866 ("the journalists were asking him, ‘Who is your father
that you are referring to?’ and he said, ‘Char1es Taylor"’); Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 925~926 ("Mr Taylor
is the father and Benjamin Yeaten is the son"); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16175
(referring to Taylor as "The father"); Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16328 (referring to Taylor as "Dad" or
the "Papay" or "Father" or "the Old Man" or "the President") ; Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p.
3317 ("Mr Taylor we knew him as Father"); Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 1 1072 ("we called Charles

---- End of Page 2361 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03—01-T % 18 May 2012 M

¢0¢54
RUF members. These references are clearly indicative of the respect that RUF members had
for the Accused. However this deference per se is insufficient to establish that Taylor had de
facto authority over the RUF. The Trial Chamber recalls that these nicknames were
commonly used in Africa to qualify leaders. On several occasions, witnesses used similar
appellations to mention other leaders. IS262
Taylor the Father. That was how we used to call him by code, the Father"), p. 11083 (we used to call Charles
Taylor the Father"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6227 ("Mosquito used to say that Charles
Taylor was his father"); TF1-371, Transcript, 29 January 2008, p. 2457 (CS) ("so they took him as a father"), pp.
2510-2513 (CS) ("The relationship with Sam Bockarie and Taylor was that of a father and son relationship and
Sam Bockarie took Mr Taylor as a father"); TF1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, pp. 19039-13040 ("Issa Sesay he
told me Charles Taylor was our big revolutionary father"); TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14300 ("Sam
Bockarie said — at the time we used to call Charles Taylor Father or Chief).
Img Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21433 ("the Papay, that is Mr Taylor"), p. 21435 (
referring to the Accused as "Papay Taylor"), p. 21512 ("he told me it was the Papay who gave it to him and by
that he was referring to Charles Taylor"); Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21543 (witness said that when he said
"the Papay" he referred to "CIC Taylor"); Jabaty J award, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13357 ("we used to refer to
Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor as Papay, or the old man"); Transcript 10 July 2008, p. 13391 ("at that time
when he said ‘Papay in Liberia’ he was referring to Charles Ghankay Taylor"), p. 13418 (referring to Charles
Taylor as "the Papay"); TF1 -567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12898 ("the Papay, that is Charles Taylor") p. 12906
("that is was the Papay, Charles Taylor"); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16328 ("They all
knew that Sam Bockarie meant Charles Taylor when he used the terms like Dad or the Papay").
mw Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 925-926 ("Taylor was referred to as father or "the
godfather"); Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, p. 10452 ("Char1es Taylor was the Godfather for RUF";
( Transcript 22 May 2008, pp. 10512-10513 "Char1es Taylor, who was their godfather"; See also Exhibit P-277
(confidential), ERN 181 13 ("the fact is that President Taylor has been the Godfather").
mm TF1-367, Transcript 21 August 2008, p. 14300 ("we used to call Charles Taylor "Chief" [...] In Monrovia,
Liberia we hadn’t anybody whom we called Chief or Pa apart from Charles Taylor"); Dauda Aruna Fornie,
Transcript 11 December 2008, p. 22258 ("Taylor was "the commander in chief" of the RUF"); TF1-516,
Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6883 ("that was common with the senior officers of the RUF referring to Charles
Taylor as the chief ’); See also Exhibit P-065 ("CIC Charles Ghankay Taylor").
15262 Seefor example Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5720 ("I referred to Johnny Paul as ‘Pa’ [...]
when I said "big Pa", I was referring to Mr Taylor"); Periy Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008 p. 3161 (Periy
Kamara calls SYB Rogers "Pa Rogers"); DCT-008, Transcript 30 August 2010 p. 47482-47483 (DCT-008 calls
SYB Rogers "Pa Rogers");. Dennis Koker, Transcript 15 January 2008, p. 1228 (Koker refers to the top
commanders "Pa Kosia" and EBS Bangura as "Pa Bangura"); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1966
(Keita refers to a police officer called "Pa Morrie"); Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2135 (Keita refers to
Benjamin Yeaten as "the Chief"); Witness TF1-371, Transcript 1 February 2008, p. 2941 (CS) (the witness
refers to Musa Cissé as "Pa Musa"), p. 2944 (CS) (the witness refers to "Pa Rogers"); Periy Kamara, Transcript
5 February 2008, p. 3112 (Kamara refers to "Pa Ka11on"); Suwandi Camara, Transcript ll February 2008, p.
3518 (the witness refers to "Genera1 Pa Jean"); Witness TF1-101, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3909 (the
witness refers to "Pa Kabbah"), pp. 3915-3916 (the witness refers to "Pa Bobodin"); Witness TF1-130,
Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4300 (witness refers to Sellu Ensah as "Chief Se1lu"); Witness TF1-362,
Transcript 27 February 2008, p. 4809 (CS) (the witness refers to an eight year old girl as "Zero Zero Pa Mor1ai"),
p. 4842 (CS) (the witness refers to Foday Saybana Sankoh as "Pa Sankoh"); Mustapha Mansaray, Transcript 5
March 2008, p. 5354 (Mansaray refers to "Pa Kosia"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, p. 5661
(Mongor refers to Foday Sankoh as "Pa Mor1ai"); Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6204 (Mongor refers to a child
who is almost ten years as "O1d Pa Harris"); Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8346 (Bobson
Sesay refers to "Pa Kabbah"); Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 2010, p. 44965 (PS) (Sesay refers to "Chief
Buduka"); Transcript 26 August 2010, p. 47233 (Sesay refers to "the late Paramount Chief Bai Yorsoh and the
honourable Paramount Chief Bai Kurr"); Witness DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, p. 47036 (witness
testified that "in, Liberia, every high-ranking officer was referred to as ‘chief’ by his subordinates"); See also

---- End of Page 2362 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

{
qa 46 5;
6775. The Trial Chamber has considered the leadership and command structure of the
RUF, and the role of the Accused, if any, in relation to that structure. An analysis of the
evidence on record in its entirety demonstrates that the nature of the relationship between the
Accused and the RUF, and later the AFRC/RUF, evolved over time. The Trial Chamber has
found that Foday Sankoh and the Accused met in the late 1980s in Libya, where a number of
West African revolutionaries were trained.l5263 Sankoh and the Accused pursued parallel
goals and aspirations, but not in a chain of command.
6776. Following the training in Libya, the Accused supported the creation of the RUF,
providing a training camp and other forms of support in the early 199Os.l5264 NPFL forces
also played a significant role in the invasion of Sierra Leone in March 1991, with RUF
troops working under the command of NPFL officers.l5265 In June 1991, the Accused met
with Foday Sankoh and officially endorsed NPFL participation in the Sierra Leonean
conflict. At that point, support for the RUF was enhanced. The Accused and the RUF had a
common enemy in ULIMO and the Sierra Leonean Government, and it was in their mutual
interest to fight them together.l5266
6777. While the evidence shows that RUF troops were integrated in the NPFL command
structure for military operations during the invasion of Sierra Leone,l5267 it fails to
demonstrate that NPFL and RUF forces were treated as one single body under the command
of the Accused.l5268 To the contrary, the evidence clearly shows that during their training in
Camp Naama, RUF and NPFL troops were separated in two different areas.l5269 Moreover,
by mid-1992, the relationship between NPFL and RUF forces deteriorated. Following
Operation Top Final in 1992 and the withdrawal of NPFL troops from Sierra Leone,
contacts and cooperation between the Accused and Sankoh continued, but to a lesser
extent. I 5270
Exhibit D-OO8 where there is reference to "Pa Musa" and "Big Brother").
{Sm Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989.
'"°" Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996); Camp Naama.
@65 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.
@66 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.
mm Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.
{Sm Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.
*5*9 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996); Camp Naama.
15270 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.

---- End of Page 2363 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T GTA 18 May 2012

4/04/5c?
6778. With regard to the RUF command structure, the evidence demonstrates that Sankoh
was, as early as August 1990, the leader and commander in chief of the RUF. I527I During his
leadership Sankoh gave orders which were followed,I5272 had the power to punishI5273 and
the power to promoteI5274 RUF members. Sankoh also represented the RUF in extemal
relations and peace talks. I5275
6779. Following Operation Top Final in 1992 and the withdrawal of NPFL troops from
Sierra Leone, contacts and cooperation between the Accused and Sankoh continued, but to a
lesser extent. The Accused continued to provide low-level support to the RUF as it
continued fighting in Sierra Leone, while he was himself fighting in Libe1ia.I5 276 In 1993,
the Accused asked Sankoh to send troops to help him fight ULIMOIS277 He advised Sankoh
rior to and followin the RUF attack on Sierra Rutile, and he advised Sankoh to send an
P S
Extemal Delegation to Cote d’1voire. I5278
6780. On 24 March 1996, Foday Sankoh travelled to Cote d’1voire for peace talks with the
Sierra Leonean Government, which then continued in Abidjan. After six months of
negotiations, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed on 30 November 1996.I5279 In March
I527I Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama.
I5272 Orders from Sankoh which were followed: Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra
Leone; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged RUF Assistance to Fight ULIMO in Liberia; Pre-Indictment
Period (1988-1996): Sierra Rutile; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Operation Stop Election (1996);Peace
Process: External Delegation in Cote d’1voire; Leadership and Commande Structure: Accused Relationship with
the RUF, Foday Sankoh.; See also TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2251-2252 (In 1995 Sankoh
ordered TF 1-371 to go to Camp Lion training base); Exhibit P-277, p. 24 (RUF Structure Command - powers of
the Leader)
I5273 See for example TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23216-23222 (TF1-168 testified that in October
1992, Sankoh ordered his arrest and his detention); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23225-23226
(After three weeks of detention, Sankoh ordered TF 1-168's release and assigned him to Jojoima in Kailahun
District); Exhibit P-277, p. 24 (RUF Structure Command - powers of the Leader).
I5274 See for example TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23228-23230 (In February 1993, Sankoh
promoted TF1-168 and assigned him to be a training commander); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp.
5689-5690; Transcript 2 April 2008, pp. 6429-6436, 6438-6440. (In 1995, during a meeting in Vogoda Mongor
was promoted to Major by Sankoh; Mike Lamin, Mohamed Tarawalli, Superman, Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito,
Peter Vandi, Emmanuel Williams aka Rocky CO were also promoted by Sankoh during this meeting); F ayia
Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38863-38864 (Fayia Musa was made Agri-Officer by Foday Sankoh);
Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9353-9359 (After the Abidjan Peace Accord, Sankoh promoted
Kanneh to Captain and Bockarie to Colonel); Exhibit P-277 (confidential), p. 24 (RUF Structure Command -
powers of the Leader)
I5275 See Peace Process: External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire; Peace Process: Abidjan; Peace Process: Lomé.
I5276 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Attack on Kono (November 1992-January 1993).
I5277 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged RUF Assistance to Fight ULIMO in Liberia.
I5278 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Sierra Rutile; Peace Process: External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire;
Peace Process: Abidjan.
Img Context ; Peace Process: Abidjan.

---- End of Page 2364 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1-T // 18 May 2012
fv Y

1997, returning to Sierra Leone from Cote d’Ivoire, Sankoh was detained by Nigerian
authorities for possession of arms and ammunition and kept under house arrest.l528O
Following his arrest, he instructed Sam Bockarie to take orders from the Accused. The
evidence shows, however, that even after his arrest, Sankoh remained the recognised leader
of the RUF.l528l While in detention, Sankoh used the NPFL communications network, as
well as his own, to continue to communicate with the RUF. 15282
6781. While much evidence was adduced relating to the trade of arms and diamonds
between Bockarie and the Accused, the evidence does not establish that Bockarie took
orders from the Accused. The instructions given to Bockarie by the Accused were given
with the inherent authority the Accused had by virtue of his position. Bockarie was
q deferential to the Accused and generally followed his instruction. However, the Trial
Chamber considers that the role Sankoh envisioned for the Accused while he was in
detention was that the Accused would guide Bockarie, and that Bockarie should look to his
idance, not that the Accused should take over Sankoh's role as the leader of the RUF with
gu
effective control over its actions.
6782. Following the coup in Sierra Leone on 25 May 1997, AFRC forces led by Johnny
Paul Koromal5283 invited the RUF into a governing alliance.l5284 Foday Sankoh responded
ositivel to this invitationl5285 and instructed his RUF forces to `oin and work with the
P Y J
mw Context; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998, A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty International
Report", p. 2; Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 2010, p. 39098; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43737.
Um Exhibit P-057, Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997 - 00009769
— 00009771; Exhibit P-085B, Unofhcial Transcript — Audio CD — Radio Broadcast of Sam Bockarie on the BBC
World Service's Focus on Africa (referring to Sankoh as Leader of the RUF).
Um Operational Support: Communications, Sankoh's Communication While Detained.
15283 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Junta Period; Context;
Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Facts 17-18; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact D; Prosecutor v
Taylor, SCSL—03-1-T-765, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts from the
AFRC Trial Judgement pursuant to Rule 94(B), 23 March 2009 [Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC
Adjudicated Facts], Annex A, Fact 1.
15284 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Junta Period; Context;
Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10440-10441; Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46540-
46541.
15285 Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 30; Exhibit P-131, "AFRC — Secret Minutes of the First Meeting of
the AFRC Held at the Conference Hall, Defence Headquarters, 19 July l997"; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence
Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution, from Major General Sam Bockarie; Isaac Mongor,
Transcript 10 March 20l0", pp. 5699-5703; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43818-43829, Transcript 18
August 2010, PP. 46541—46542.

---- End of Page 2365 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSI-—03—01—T (Ihr 18 May 2012

404,58
Junta.l5286 The Accused accepted and supported the Junta government, and he encouraged
the AFRC and RUF to work together.
6783. Sometime around March 1998, Sam Bockarie was promoted. The Prosecution
alleged that this promotion was made by the Accused directly, or through a joint decision
between himself and Johnny Paul Koroma. Bockarie had just returned from Monrovia. The
Trial Chamber has found that the Accused may well have been consulted by Koroma, or
talked directly with Bockarie about the promotion while he was in Monrovia, but not that
Bockarie was promoted by the Accused. Like Sankoh, Koroma turned to the Accused for
advice and support, and the Trial Chamber accepts that he would have consulted the
Accused. Nevertheless, the Accused was not part of the command structure.
6784. In the Trial Chamber's view, such influence is insufhcient to establish that the
Accused had effective control over the AFRC/RUF. The evidence indicates that the
relationship between the Accused and the AFRC/RUF was mainly based on common
economic, political and military interests. ln drawing this conclusion, the Trial Chamber
notes that the advice and instruction of the Accused to the AFRC/RUF mainly focused on
directing their attention to the diamondiferous area of Kono in order to ensure the
continuation of trade, diamonds in exchange for arms and ammunition.l5287
6785. The evidence shows that the nature of the relationship between the Accused and the
RUF/AFRC continued to evolve after the attack on Freetown in January 1999. Tensions
between AFRC and RUF leaders increased after the Freetown attack.l5288 The evidence also
indicates that, at this time, divisions within the RUF itself appeared over political and
military strategy. The RUF leadership was divided between those who wanted to continue
the armed struggle and those in favour of a political solution to the conflict. On 7 January
1999, with the attack on Freetown ongoing, President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh agreed to a
ceasefire which was announced over the radio, but was disregarded by the AFRC and RUF
fighters. Further peace talks were facilitated by the Accused and the other members of the
‘m6 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Junta Period; Samuel
Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008 pp. 10441-10442; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7872-
7873; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13338-13339; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp.
3086-3087; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4491-4492; Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August
2010, pp. 46540-4654; See also Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 581. J
mw Military Operations.
wm Leadership and Command Structure: Analysis of the AFRC/RUF Alliance.

---- End of Page 2366 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Gu 18 May 2012

U @
@7; I,
Committee of Five and, on 18 May 1999, another ceasefire agreement was signed in
Lomé.15289 This ceasefire agreement, however, failed to bring about the end of
hostilities.l529O
6786. On 7 July 1999, the Lomé Peace Accord was signed by President Kabbah and Foday
Sankoh.15291 The Govemment of` Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed to the immediate release
of Sankoh, the transformation of the RUF into a political party that would become part of
the Government of Sierra Leone and amnesty for all waning factions, including RUF
members.l5292 Sankoh received a formal position within the Sierra Leonean Govemment as
Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National
Reconstruction and Development, a position with the status of Vice—President of` Sierra
» Leone.15293
6787. During this period, the Accused used his influence with both Johnny Paul Koroma
and Foday Sankoh to bring the AFRC and RUF leaders together to reduce tension between
the RUF and the AFRC following the Lomé Peace Accord, and he helped to facilitate the
release of` the UN peacekeepers and others kidnapped by the West Side Boys, who were
discontent with the apparent exclusion of the AFRC from the peace process.15294 However,
the Trial Chamber has found that at the same time he was involved in the peace negotiations
in Lomé, the Accused was also engaged in arms transactions with the RUF .15295
6788. Despite the Lomé accords, due in part to the division between RUF and AFRC
leaders and within the RUF, the disarmament process in Sierra Leone took time to
img Peace Process: Lomé; Context; See also Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successiiil Peace
Talks in Lomé, 1999", pp. 3, 9, 11.
mw Peace Process: Lomé; Context; Exhibit P-264, "Radio Log-Book 0008636-0008726", pp. 8653, 8656, 8658,
8660, 8662, 8665, 8668A, 8672; Exhibit D-022, "Sierra Leone News Archives, September 1999, Sierra Leone
Web, 30 September 1999"; Exhibit D-206, "Outgoing Code Cable, Urgent Issues, President Taylor's Request for
Teleconference with the Secretary General, to Riza for Secretary General, United Nations, New York, from
Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, 6 August 1999;" Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August
2009, pp. 26668-26669; Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 2010, pp. 44201-44203; Corinne Dufka, Transcript 22
January 2008, p. 1930; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6178-6180.
lm! Peace Process: Lomé; Context; Exhibit D-224, "Letter to the President of Sierra Leone, Dr Alhaji Ahmad
Tejan Kabbah, from Foday Saybana Sankoh, 29 October 1999", para. 3; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 17 January
2008, pp. 1482-1483.
[Img Peace Process: Lomé; Context; Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successiiil Peace Talks in
Lomé, 1999", pp. 35-36.
[Sm Peace Process: Lomé; Context; Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successiiil Peace Talks in
Lomé, 1999", pp. 35-36.
5294 Peace Process: Release of UN Peacekeepers and Others (1999).
ISM Arms and Ammunition; Peace Process: Lomé Peace Accords.

---- End of Page 2367 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Z GN 18 May 2012

4,:4%% 60
eventuate.l5296 Bockarie defied orders from Sankoh to disarm and, on 14 December 1999,
resigned from the RUF and went to Liberia, amidst violent clashes between RUF fighters
loyal to Foday Sankoh and RUF fighters loyal to him. He was told to leave Sierra Leone by
the Accused, but the Trial Chamber has found that in summoning Bockarie to Liberia, the
Accused relied on the authority of ECOWAS and sought the help of President Obasanjo,
organizing a meeting at Roberts International Airport between Foday Sankoh, Sam
Bockarie, President Obasanjo and himself, as a result of which a decision was made that
Bockarie would not return to Sierra Leone until the disarmament process had been
completed.
6789. In May 2000, the RUF captured between 400 and 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in
the area between Lunsar and Makeni in Sierra Leone}5297 The UNAMSIL peacekeepers
were taken to Liberia and released after having been held hostage for approximately three
weeks. 15298 While the Accused had significant influence over the RUF decision to release the
peacekeepers, the evidence does not establish that he ordered their release. Rather the
Accused in his meeting with Sesay promised him assistance, and although the evidence was
insufficient to establish that arms and ammunition were provided in exchange for an
agreement to release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers, the Trial Chamber has found that in May
2000 Sesay made a trip to Liberia in which he did obtain arms and ammunition from the
Accused. This evidence further indicates a continuing trade relationship between the RUF
U296 See also TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2448-2450 (CS); Stephen Ellis, Transcript 18 January
2008 p. 1595-1596; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28556-28557; Transcript 26
November 2009, pp. 32562-32566; Exhibit D-077, "Letter to Charles Ghankay Taylor from President Alhaji Dr
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 27 October 1999"; Exhibit D-441B, "Witness Statement ofOluyemi Adenij i (Issa Sesay),
Freetown/Nairobi (Telephone), 2 March 2008"; Exhibit D-441E, "Witness Statement of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
(Issa Ses3Y), Juba Hill,12 May 2008".
mw Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000); Context; Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact
36; see also Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44505-44513; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-2032.
Um Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000); Context; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010,
pp. 44515, 44538-44539; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3269-3270; Exhibit D-245, "Press
Release, Secretary General Acknowledges Liberian President's Role in Peacekeepers Release, SG/SM7396,
Secretary General, Department of Public Information, New York, 15 May 2000"; Exhibit D-246, "Press release
by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia, 16 May 2000"; Exhibit D-244,
"Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia, 13 May 2000";
Exhibit D-247, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia, 22
May 2000"; Exhibit D-250, "Fax-Letter, from the President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, to the
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Oluyemi Adeniji, Government Statement, 23
May 2000"; Exhibit D-253, "Letter from President of Liberia, Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor to
President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr AhrnadTejan Kabbah, 5 June 2000"; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 17 January
2008, p. 1482; Exhibit D-243, "Letter from General Issa Sesay, RUF Field Commander, to the President of
Liberia, Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 11 May 2000".

---- End of Page 2368 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

avréf
and the Accused, diamonds for anns and ammunition, rather than the existence of a
superior/ subordinate relationship. I 5299
6790. Following Sankoh's arrest by the Government of Sierra Leone in May 2000,5300 his
detention created a power vacuum within the RUF and threatened to stall the peace
negotiations. At a meeting on 26 July 2000 at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia between
the ECOWAS heads of state, including the Accused, and an RUF delegation led by Issa
Sesay, the suggestion was made that 1ssa Sesay should become the lnterim Leader of the
RUF. Sesay would not accept the appointment without it first being approved by the RUF
and Foday Sankoh. A meeting of RUF commanders was held, and a letter was also delivered
to Foday Sankoh by President Obasanjo seeking Sankoh's consent to the appointment. At a
follow up meeting in August 2000, Sesay was confirmed as the RUF Interim Leader.
Presidents Obasanjo and Konare both met with Sankoh in Freetown, without the Accused
present, indicating that this process was undertaken by ECOWAS heads of state collectively,
rather than the Accused unilaterally. Moreover, Sesay's refusal to accept the role of lnterim
Leader without consulting Sankoh indicates Sankoh's continuing authority and effective
control over the RUF, even while in detention.
6791. While participating in ECOWAS efforts to promote peace in Sierra Leone, the
Accused privately advised Issa Sesay upon his appointment as RUF Interim Leader to say
that he would disarm but "not do it in rea1ity". The Accused had called on the AFRC/RUF to
assist him in fighting outside Sierra Leone, ordering Bockarie in 1999 to send AFRC/RUF
forces to assist him in his fight against Mosquito Spray and the LURD forces that had
attacked his forces. ln 2000 and 2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces.
6792. The RUF forces sent in response to these requests fought alongside AFL forces in
Liberia and Guinea under the command of the Accused's subordinates. However, in the
Trial Chamber's view, this evidence is not inconsistent with its view that the Accused
wielded significant influence over the RUF forces without having command and control
over them. ln their combined operations outside Sierra Leone in 1999-2001 the RUF had an
interest in fighting and repelling a common enemy that was cutting the supply line between
mw Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000).
WOO Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000); Context; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010,
pp. 44504-44505; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269; Charles Ghankay Taylor; Transcript 16
November 2009, p. 31656; TF1-338, Transcript 1 September 2008, p. 15106.

---- End of Page 2369 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

40 $7 y
Liberia and Sierra Leone. The combined operations in Liberia and Guinea were facilitated
by a coordinated command structure specific to these military operations, which all took
place outside of Sierra Leone. mm This was never the case for military operations conducted
in the Sierra Leonean territory during the lndictment period.
6793. ln conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF's
interests were intrinsically linked to the interests of the Accused, and their relationship was
defined by a synergy and complementarity of these interests. The Accused provided ongoing
advice and guidance to the RUF leadership and had significant influence over the RUF and
AFRC, but he did not have effective control over them, and the relationship cannot be
defined within the framework of a superior—subordinate command structure.
mm Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AF RC, Operations Outside Sierra
Leone,

---- End of Page 2370 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—Ol—T _J§-Q 18 May 2012

N =
40440 .3
J. The War Strategy of the RUF/AF RC
6794. At the outset, the Trial Chamber recalls that war is not per se a crime under the
Special Court Statute. The Trial Chamber finds however, that over time the RUF 's war
strategy evolved from a traditional military strategy, to a strategy of guerrilla tactics based
on a campaign of terror against the civilian population.
6795. The evidence shows that from the very beginning of their struggle, Sankoh's forces
abducted civilians, including children, in order to find new recruits to increase their
forces.153O2 However, the record also indicates that Sankoh's initial goal was not to terrorise
the civilian population but to fight the Sierra Leonean Government he considered
corrupt.153113 Vxfhile in Camp Naama, the evidence indicates that RUF soldiers were taught
basic Geneva Convention regulations on the treatment of civilians.153O4 Moreover, Sankoh
and the RUF troops strongly reacted to the crimes committed during the invasion of Sierra
Leone by Liberian forces. 15305
15302 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of
Sierra Leone.
15303 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-
1996): Camp Naama.
15304 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama; citing TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2203-
2204 (Sankoh asked Mike Lamin to teach ideology and provided him with brochures on basic Geneva
Convention regulations on how to treat civilians and respect them during the conflict); TFl-168, Transcript 21
January 2009 p. 23181-23182 (During the invasion of Sierra Leone civilians were "not treated fine. They were
not treated nicely, as opposed to our basic ideology that we were taught at the base. In fact, it was surprising to
me to see things happening that way"); TF1-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23395-23396 (TFl-168
received instruction to give good treatment to civilians in order to make them support the revolution); Martin
George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39612-39614 (George testified that Mike Lamin, a Sierra Leonean
instructor, taught all the recruits how to take care of civilians during missions). John Vincent, Transcript 25
March 2010, pp. 37998-37999 (the ideology class taught the trainees to take good care of civilians and to attack
only military installations); DCT-292, Transcript 1 June 2010, pp. 41708-41709, 41714 (The ideology training in
Camp Naama included: ensuring that a person who surrenders is unharmed and handed them over to the nearest
senior officer for screening; a prohibition against raping; the correct treatment of captured civilians - soldiers
needed to gather the civilians in one place and guard them. Another element of the ideology was that whenever a
town is captured, any material captured, including arms, ammunition, clothing, and food had to be kept under the
supervision of the commander. These materials then had to be shared among the civilians and the fighters); Sam
Kolleh, Transcript 1 November 2010, pp. 48374 (Ideology training included advice on how to treat civilians and
prisoners but not on how to terrorize them. According to Kolleh, terrorism was not the ideology of the RUF);
DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010 pp. 37248-37250 (ideological training included care of civilians, women
and children); See also TFl-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2633-2634 (TFl-371 never heard any direct
order to indiscriminately kill civilians, or a direct order to amputate or mutilate civilians. It was not the policy at
the formation of the RUF in 1991 to terrorise civilians); But see in contrast Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p.
43601 (Sesay testified that while at Camp Naama, Sankoh criticized Isaac Mongor for teaching the trainees that
once they captured a town they should divide the civilians into two groups and kill one of them in order to obtain
the loyalty of the other group).
153115 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.

---- End of Page 2371 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / \/LQ 18 May 2012

6796. However, following military and political defeats,l53O6 surviving in difhcult
conditions in the Jungles of Sierra Leone,l53O7 the military and political strategy of the RUF
changed. As of 1994, Sankoh and RUF officers decided that it was time to leave the jungle
and make contact with the intemational community.l53O8 In that context, and in order to
obtain the intemational community's attention, in late 1994, early 1995, Sankoh ordered his
Deputy Commander CO Mohamed Tarawalli to attack the intemational mining company
Sierra Rutile in Bonthe District during which westem expatriates workers were
captured.l53O9 In 1996, disgruntled by the decision of the National Forum to hold elections
before peace, Sankoh ordered his RUF troops to conduct "Operation Stop E1ection" by
terrorising civi1ians.l53lO During the operation, RUF troops attacked and bumt polling
stations in all major towns and killed or amputated the hands or fingers of any civilian
perceived to participate in the elections. The Trial Chamber notes that the attack was named
"Operation Stop E1ection".l53 ll In the Trial Chamber's view this operation marked a clear
change in the RUF's strategy. After Operation Stop Election, and during the remainder of
the civil war in Sierra Leone, the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF continued to deliberately
use terror against the Sierra Leonean population as a primary modus operandi of their
political and military strategy.
6797. In the Trial Chamber's view, the names chosen by the AFRC/RUF for their main
operations are clearly indicative of a modus operandi based on a campaign of terror against
civilians. During "Operation Pay Yourse1f", around February 1998, AFRC/RUF troops
systematically looted and killed civi1ians.l53l2 "Operation Spare No Sou1" was described by
one witness as an operation during which "humans, ants, goats, all should be ki11ed".l53 I3
Finally, the name "Operation No Living Thing", was used on several occasions by the
AFRC/RUF soldiers to describe their missions during which they systematically committed
’"°6 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996).
mm Context.
Hm Peace Process : External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996); Sierra Rutile.
moo Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Sierra Rutile; TF1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12876; Perry
Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 2010, p. 38653;
Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39712-39716; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43747.
I5 3 10 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Operation Stop Election (1996); Context.
mu Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, p. 43746; Transcript 17 August 2010, p. 46494; Isaac Mongor,
Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5697-5698; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10422-10423;
Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20107-20108; TF1-375, Transcript 23 June 2010, p.
12483.
I5} I2 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes, Count 1 1 (Pillage).
‘"" TF1—143, Transcript 5 May 2008,pp. 9013-9018.

---- End of Page 2372 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

widespread atrocities against civiliansm 3 14 in Sierra Leone including murders, rape, sexual
slavery, looting, abductions, forced labour, conscription and use of child soldiers,
amputations and other forms of physical violence and acts of terror.
6798. Moreover, evidence on the record indicates that during the attack of Freetown in
early 1999, as Gullit was facing increasing pressure from ECOMOG, Bockarie ordered the
AFRC/RUF to make the area "fearful".15315
6799. In the Trial Chamber's view, the crimes committed by the AFRC/RUF were
inextricably linked to how the RUF and AFRC achieved their political and military
objectives. In particular, under the leadership of Sam Bockarie, the RUF and AFRC pursued
a policy of committing crimes in order to achieve military gains at any civilian cost, and also
politically in order to attract the attention of the international community and to highten their
negotiating stance with the Sierra Leonean Government.153 16 That their operations were
given titles such as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Spare No Soul" made
explicit the intent of the RUF and AFRC to wage a campaign of terror against civilians as
part of their war strategy.
mm Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 1, ERN 91 ("A deliberate and systematic
campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF "Opemtion no living thing" — has
emerged since April l998")
'53 15 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan, citing Alimamy Bobson
Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328-8329 (Bockarie ordered to start burning strategic positions in
Freetown and to capture civilians) ; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234-3235 (Bockarie ordered
to "make Freetown more fearful than before"); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241-3242
(Bockarie ordered again to "make the area fearful"); Dauda Aruna Fornje, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21590
("Mosquito was giving direct instructions to to cause a lot of mayhem in the city. [...] Mosquito said if it is
possible to chop off anybody's arm, [...] He said Gullit and others should raise alarm to the level of the
international community so that they can come in"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 1 1 March 2008, p. 5825 (Bockarie
ordered the AFRC/RUF to start a campaign of destruction)
ISM See Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan; Pre—Indictment Period: Operation Stop Election
(1996).

---- End of Page 2373 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T % Ji 18 May 2012

40 ff
K. Knowledge of the Accused
Submissions of the Parties
6800. The Prosecution submits that Taylor was well aware of the notorious reputation of
the RUF and their violent tactics against civilians which included the commission of all the
crimes charged in the Indictment.15317 Indeed, Taylor was a well-informed leader who kept
abreast of the media, and who, as President of Liberia, involved in the political and
diplomatic negotiations between ECOWAS and the RUF, received information from the UN
and its agencies.15318 The Prosecution further contends that Taylor had direct
communications with RUF and was thus privy to the situation in Sierra Leone, that his
subordinates in Sierra Leone informed him of the RUF's activities and crimes.15319
6801. The Defence does not dispute that some of the Prosecution's evidence shows that
Taylor was on notice generally of some of the crimes that the RUF had already committed,
including the campaign waged against civilians in Sierra Leone after the intervention. 15320
However this evidence does not establish that Taylor was aware of every crime charged in
the Indictment. There was no organised structure with reporting and monitoring mechanisms
which would have kept Taylor informed of all the RUF's activities. Moreover, as Head of
State of Liberia, Taylor was geographically removed from the theatre of crimes.15321
Evidence
Prosecution Witness Stephen Smith
6802. Witness Stephen Smith, a journalist covering the war in Liberia,15322 testified that
Charles Taylor followed media reports on Liberia and neighbouring countries very closely.
Smith knows this from discussions between himself and Taylor about certain reports
153*7 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 22-23, 421-424.
153*8 Prosecution rmi rmi Brief, paras 23, 425, 427, 429-432.
‘"’° Prosecution rmi moi Brief, paras 426-428, 431.
151211 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 503, 1257, 1333.
15321 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 566, 1152, 1257, 1333, 1349-1350.
15122 Stephen Smith, Transcript 22 September 2008, pp. 16772-16773, 16781.

---- End of Page 2374 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / ~q1\% 18 May 2012

@4 @21
between 1990 and 1993 or 1994. Smith testified that this awareness continued in the years
thereafter. 13323 Moreover, the brutality of the AFRC/RUF regime was widely reported.13323
Prosecution Witness TF1 -371
6803. Witness TF1-371, a senior member of the RUF,13323 testified that during the Junta
and also in 1998 and 1999, information about RUF actions was conveyed to Charles Taylor
in three main ways. Firstly, by satellite telephone, secondly, by VHF radio; and finally, by
mm €rS_1582e
Prosecution Witness TF1-150
6804. Witness TF1-150, a Human Rights officer in Sierra Leone in 1998,13337 testified that
when he arrived in Sierra Leone in May 1998, he received multiple reports of attacks by
rebel elements on civilians and was also able to trace patterns of attacks during the
preceding months. According to Witness TF1-150 the pattern of the rebels’ attacks was the
instilling of terror, either for its own sake, or to ensure that the community fled and were
displaced. In describing the pattern, Witness TF1-150 referred to an arc of violence which
appeared to have spread rapidly through the early months of 1998 from the East through the
North and down the West of Sierra Leone. During these attacks rebels committed
terrorisation, mutilations, looting, killing, sexual abuse and abduction.13333
Prosecution Witness Moses Blah
6805. Witness Moses Blah, lnspector General of the NPFL from 1990 to 1997,13329
Liberian Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000,13330 and
Vice-President of Liberia from 2000 to 2003,13331 testified that he read in newspapers and
13333 Stephen Smith, Transcript 23 September 2008, pp. 16967-16968.
*324 Stephen Smith, Transcript 23 September 2008, pp. 16971-16972.
13323 TF1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2555-2556 (CS).
13336'1`F1-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2452 (cs).
*327 Witness rrr-150, Transcript 18 Fehmety 2008, p. 4006.
133313 Witness TF1-150, Transcript 18 February 2008, pp. 4019-4022.
13333 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9943-9945.
13330 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884.
13331 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884; Blah became President of Liberia for 60 days from 1 1
August to 11 October 2003: Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p, 10065.

---- End of Page 2375 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

40 re
heard on the radio that crimes committed by the retreating junta after the ECOMOG
intervention in 1998. However, it did not mean that this infomation was true. *3333
6806. Blah was unaware of a military operation called "Spare No Soul" or "No Living
Thing".l5333 He knew nothing about Liberian involvement in the Freetown invasion in 1999
and never discussed with Taylor about it.l5334 Blah never heard Charles Taylor giving
instructions to Foday Sankoh or to senior RUF commanders as to what to do in Sierra
Leone}5335 Blah never discussed with Taylor the invasion of Freetown,l5336 nor did he
participate in any meeting to discuss secret operations by the Government of Liberia
between 1997 and 2000.l5337
The Accused
6807. The Accused testified that, before 1997 he had limited information and was not in a
position to know precisely the crimes taking place in Sierra Leone as he was not elected
President of Liberia yet. Therefore, he was not aware that, during the "Operation Stop
Election", RUF troops committed atrocities including amputations of civilians}5338
6808. Upon becoming President, the Accused received a daily briefing from his national
security advisor which would include press and intelligence reports.l5 33 9 Furthermore, the
Accused would read principal newspapers,l534O watched regularly CNN and more rarely
would listen to BBC broadcast.l53 41
6809. The Accused testified that in 1997, there were news reports of "problems" in Sierra
Leone}5342 After being elected, the Accused was concerned about peace and stability in
*3333 Moses Blah, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10382-10384.
*3333 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10231-10231.
15334 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, p. 10231.
*3333 Moses Blah, rrapaerapr 19 May 2008, p. 10232.
*3333 Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10368.
{Sm Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9962-9967.
[5338 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32375-32379.
Img Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24333; Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28265-
28268; Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31713; Transcript 14 January 2010, p. 33382; Transcript 18 January
2010, p. 33441; Transcript 26 January 2010, pp. 34130-34133.
ISM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28268-28270; Transcript 26 January 2010, pp.
34130-34131.
[SW Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28265-28267; Transcript 3 November 2009, p.
31053; Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33382—33384; 33429.
[Sm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32378.

---- End of Page 2376 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ` 18 May 2012

¢0¢67
Sierra Leone and therefore kept abreast of the situation there.I5343 However, the Accused did
not try to find precisely who was committing these atrocities, as he was not running Sierra
Leone.I5344
6810. The Accused stated that, following the Intervention, there were reports of atrocities
‘°all over the place" being committed by ‘"all sides".I5345 The Accused read reports of these
atrocities prepared by ECOMOGI5346
6811. The Accused testified that by April 1998 if "someone was providing support to the
AFRC/RUF [...] they would be supporting a group engaged in a campaign of atrocities
against the civilian population of Sierra Leone".I5347 Indeed, in May 1998 there were news
reports of a ‘"hon·ific campaign being waged against the civilian population in Sierra
Leone? 15348
6812. Despite issuing a joint communique dated July 1998 with President Kabbah in which
the Accused "strongly condemned the continuing rebel activities in Sierra Leone, as well as
the horrendous atrocities that had been committed there",I5349 and despite the fact that by
August 1998, "RUF's crimes were notorious",I5350 the Accused denied that he had sutHcient
knowledge of the specifics crimes committed by RUF.I535I Thus, the Accused knew that
crimes were committed in Sierra Leone while Sam Bockarie was in charge of the rebelsI5352
including looting in February 1998I5353 or terrorism of the Sierra Leonean population in May
1998,I5354 but he was unaware that the RUF used child soldiers and abducted women as sex
slaves. The UN only reported on these matters following the January 1999 Freetown
I5343 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33406-33407.
I5344 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32378-32379, pp. 32385-32387; Transcript 26
November 2009, pp. 32576-32577; Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33386-33388
I5345 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32379-32380.
ISM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32388.
ISM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32395.
Img Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28274; Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33403.
I5349 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32439.
I5350 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32439.
Im I Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, pp. 26467-26471; Transcript 25 November 2009, p.
32472; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33405-33406, 32316, 33468, 33480.
I5352 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, p, 32573; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33403-
33404.
Im} Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32388-32389.
*535* champs Ghankay Tayrpr, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33409-33410.

---- End of Page 2377 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T V _\‘II··—1 18 May 2012

~»•v
440 wt?
invasion}5355 The Accused never concluded that the RUF constituted a terrorist
organisation. l5356
6813. Regarding Operation F itti—F atta, the Accused did not know what this term meant as
he tirst heard about the "Fitti—Fatta Operation" when Prosecution witnesses testified about it
before scsr. *5**57
6814. The Accused testified that he was not aware of Sam Bockarie's statements in
September and November 1998, in which Bockarie stated that he would order his troops to
kill "every living thing" if anything happened to Foday Sankoh,l5358 or that he would launch
an attack on Freetown around New Year if Sankoh was not released.l5359 The Accused was
also unaware of Bockarie's statement that the RUF would bombard Freetown unless
President Kabbah resigned. imo
6815. The Accused did not receive reports of a major RUF/AF RC offensive in Sierra
Leone shortly after Sam Bockarie returned to Sierra Leone through Liberia from Burkina
Faso.l536l He was briefed in December 1998 by ECOMOG and UN reports that atrocities,
including burning civilians, were being committed in Sierra Leone, but these reports referred
to the Junta not RUF and did not specify in which areas these crimes were committed}5362
Thus, the Accused was not aware of the capture of 11 Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers
after the Christmas 1998 Kono attack.l5363
6816. The Accused was also not aware of Bockarie's public statement dated December
1998, in which the RUF leader announced that RUF troops captured Waterloo and
my Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32389-32390; Transcript 26 November 2009,
p. 32574; Transcript 26 January 2010, pp. 34122-34125.
H356 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32380.
my Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25819-25820; Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26209;
Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28733; Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28870; Transcript 16 September
2008, p. 29029; Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32485.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32473; Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33430;
Transcript 16 February 2010, p. 35136.
I5359 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26231; Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29277;
Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32472-32473; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33430-33438.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33444, 33452-33454.
mm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32506-32507.
@62 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32413-32416; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp.
33463-33466.
mw Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29410-29411.

---- End of Page 2378 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T / 18 May 2012
x/

Benguema and were no longer seeking dialogue. I5364 Similarly, at that time, the Accused did
not know that RUF troops captured Makeni and killed 60 ECOMOG fighters, dragging their
bodies through the streets as an example.I53°5 The Accused was also not aware of the UN
Secretary-General's extreme concem about the latest news of rebel armed activity in Sierra
Leone.I5366 lf the Accused moved troops to the Sierra Leonean border in December 1998 it
was to prevent spill-over. I5367
6817. The Accused was surprised by the attack on Freetown.I5368 On 6 January 1999 at
10.00 am, his national security advisor informed him about the Freetown invasion.I5369 One
of his security personnel also told him that he heard on BBC radio that it were Sam
Bockarie's boys who attacked Freetown.I5370 The Accused relied on news briefing not
intemational media and does not recall hearing the BBC Focus on Africa report in which
Issa Sesay reported that the RUF/AFRC had taken over Freetown.I537I The Accused was
also not aware that AFRC Commander Gullit led troops in the invasion.I5372
6818. The Accused testified that it was only after the January 1999 Freetown invasion that
it dawned on him that atrocities were occurring in Sierra Leone and that he and his
colleagues intensified their efforts.I5m Moreover, as the point President, who "led the whole
Sierra Leonean situation" it was important for the Accused to know what the RUF were
doing.I5374 He got his information from ECOMOG reports, UN reports and received
briefings on reports in Liberian and intemational media. The Accused did not read other
reports done by the intemational human rights community.I5375
I5364 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33449-33452, 33470-33472.
I5365 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 25 November 2009, pp. 32507-32508; Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33444.
ISM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33458-33461.
I5367 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32613-32614.
ISM Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26203; Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 29931;
Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33455, 33457, 33461-33462
Img Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24333; Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26225-26227;
Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29269; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32614—32615; Transcript 18 January
2010, pp. 33476-33477.
I5370 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26225-26227.
I537I Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32614-32615.
I5372 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29266.
I5373 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32387-32388.
I5374 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32388, 32390.
I5375 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32389, 32393.

---- End of Page 2379 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T JQ 18 May 2012 X

6819. In July 1999, the Accused was aware of atrocities being committed by rebels in
Sierra Leone, based on ECOMOG reports, however he was unaware of the specifics of these
crimes and was not briefed on a BBC broadcast giving news from Sierra Leonean refugees
in Guinea.l5376 The Accused was aware of UN Security Council condemnation of the
upsurge of attacks by rebels in Sierra Leone but was unaware of the BBC Focus on Afiica
ro amme which re orted this condemnation}5377 The Accused did not know if the RUF
P ST P
continued to control diamond fields, deploy child soldiers and capture women as sex slaves
from August 2000 to the end of 2001. All he knew was that the RUF was part of the
Government of Sierra Leone.l5378
Defence Witness John Vincent
6820. Witness John Vincent, a Liberian Vanguard commander,l5379 testified that the RUF
did not participate in the Freetown Invasion and there was no communication between the
RUF in Makeni and SAJ Musa during the invasion.l538O Vincent did hear that the RUF
reached Masiaka in January 1999 but he was not part of that operation. The witness heard of
an attack on Waterloo on the BBC. Vincent first heard that the RUF went to Hastings in
CDU 11.15381
Contemporary documentary evidence
6821. The Trial Chamber notes that a considerable amount of contemporary documentary
evidence regarding to the coverage of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone by Intemational
Organisations, Non Governmental Organisations or media as been tendered into evidence by
both the Prosecution and the Defence. For purpose of clarity this contemporary evidence as
been summarised below by chronological order.
I537° Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33467-33468.
I5377 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33499-33500.
wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32332567-32568.
I5379 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38107, 381 14-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145; Transcript 30
March 2010, pp, 38226, 38239; Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38390, 38408, 38460, 38461.
'"*" Jpirrr vrrrpprrr, Transcript 26 March 2010, pp. 38131—38134.
Im} John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 2010, pp. 38431-38434.

---- End of Page 2380 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
<.

N')
40 (fi; 5
Prosecution Exhibit P—297
6822. Exhibit P—297 is an article of Relief Web quoting a report of the UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs dated 4 to 5 June 1997. The UN report details the humanitarian
situation in Sierra Leone at the time, which included concems about security (killings of
civilians, am utations as well as lootin and shorta e of basic amenities. {mz
P 8 8
Prosecution Exhibit P—057
6823. Exhibit P-057 is a transcript of the RUF speech to the nation, dated l8 June 1997. In
their speech RUF members apologised for the crimes they have committed in Sierra Leone.
It states as follow:
"For the past six years or so we have been living in an environment of hatred and divisiveness. We looked at
our brothers and killed them in cold blood, we removed our sisters from their hiding places to undo their
femininity, we slaughtered our mothers and butchered our fathers [. . ,] But the atrocities [...] were the result of
the rottenness of a system which could not be uprooted except by brutal means". {SH3
Prosecution Exhibit P—298
6824. Exhibit P—298 is a letter dated 27 June 1997 from the Permanent representative of
Nigeria, Chairman of the ECOWAS, to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, forwarding the final communiqué issued at the end of the Foreign
Ministers of ECOWAS on the situation in Sierra Leone. In their communiqué the ECOWAS
foreign Ministers deplored the bloodletting and other human losses that occurred during the
coup d’état of 25 May 1997 and wamed the illegal regime against all acts of atrocities
against Sierra Leonean citizens}5384
Prosecution Exhibit P—299
6825. Exhibit P-299 is a Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 1 l July
1997. The communiqué indicates that the Security Council remained deeply concemed by
I5382 Exhibit P-297, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 04-05 June 1997, UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraphs 1, 2, 5 - 00004088 - 00004089 (CMS PGS 21395 - 21396)".
Img Exhibit P-057, "Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997 -
00009769 — 00009771".
I5384 Exhibit P-298, "Letter dated 27 June 1997 from the permanent representative of Nigeria to the United
Nations addressed to the President of Security Counci1" pp. 1-4 (ERN 21400-21403).

---- End of Page 2381 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

cw (5*,4-
the atrocities committed against Sierra Leone's citizens, foreign nationals and personnel of A
the ECOWAS monitoring group.155115
Prosecution Exhibit P-300
6826. Exhibit P-300 is an article of Relief Web quoting a report of the UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs dated 8 to 14 July 1997. The document reports that on in a radio
broadcast to Sierra Leone dated 8 July 1997, President Kabbah urged the AFRC to step
down to spare the people of Sierra Leone further pain and suffering and ordered soldiers and
the RUF to report the nearest ECOMOG base and declare their loyalty. 15 5 56
Prosecution Exhibit P-301
6827. Exhibit P-301 is a Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 6 August
1997. The cornmunique indicates that the Security Council The Security Council remains
deeply concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, and at the
continued looting and cornmandeering of relief supplies of international agencies. lt c alls
u on the milita `unta to cease all interference with the delive of humanitarian assistance
P YY J YY
to the people of Sierra Leone. The Council condemns the continuing violence and threats of
violence by the junta towards the civilian population, foreign nationals and personnel of the
ECOWAS monitoring group, and c alls for an end to such acts ofviolence.155117
Defence Exhibit D-340
6828. Exhibit D-340 is the official journal of ECOWAS, dated August 1997. The journal
documents the decision to extend the scope of activity and mandate of ECOMOG to cover
Sierra Leone due to concerns about the worsening crisis there and to reinstate the legitimate
government. The `ournal also documents sanctions taken a ainst the ille al re `me in Sierra
8 J S S E1
Leone as well as the arms and military equipments embargo on Sierra Leone.15585
155115 Exhibit P-299, "Statement by the President of the Security Counci1" 11 July 1997, pp. 1-4 (CMS 21405-
21406)
155515 Exhibit P-300, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 08-14 July 1997, UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraph 7 — 00004093 (CMS PGS 21409)".
15587 Exhibit P-301, "Statement by the President of the Security Council" 6 August 1997, pp. 1-4 (CMS 21405-
21406)
1551111 Exhibit D-340, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 33,
August 1997 ~ DCT 279".

---- End of Page 2382 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 M

QU? fig
Defence Exhibit D-135
6829. Exhibit D-135 is an ECOWAS report of the Committee of Four on the situation in
Sierra Leone, dated 26 August 1997. The report describes the actions taken by the
Committee of Four following the coup against the government of President Kabbah on 25
May 1997 by sections of the Sierra Leonean military and the RUF, after which general
mayhem ensued, and "massive looting of property, murder and rape became the order of the
day". The report states that "This situation posed a special threat to peace in Liberia" for
which the ECOWAS sub-region "had laboured for several years". Finally, the reports recalls
that, on 11 May 1997 the Security Council expressed deep concern about the continuing
crisis in Sierra Leone. 15389
Defence Exhibit D-136
6830. Exhibit D-136 is the final report of the sixteenth meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of
State in Abuja, Nigeria, dated 26 to 27 August 1997 in which the Liberian representative
participated. The report describes the events in Sierra Leone involving the overthrow of the
Kabbah Government as a serious security threat to sub-regional peace and warns that this
might reverse the gains that have been made in Liberia. The coup was very bloody and was
followed by massive looting and vandalisation of public and private properties and the
opening of the prisons by the junta. The report further states that "The putschists invited the
elements of the RUF into the city of Freetown, thereby disrupting the peace and tranquillity
of that city", which have "since then, assumed and taken over the role of the national army".
ECOWAS is called on restoring the Kabbah Government and to put an end to the crisis in
Sierra Leone. Sanctions are proposed to be used against the illegitimate government in
Sierra Leone. 15390
Prosecution Exhibit P-069
6831. Exhibit P-069 is UN Security Council resolution 1132, dated 8 October 1997. The
Security Council condemned the situation in Sierra Leone as a threat to the peace and states
15389 Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 26 August
1997 i DCT 32".
15390 Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26—27 August 1997 A DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)".

---- End of Page 2383 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 18 May 2012

sw ir éze
it was "grave1y concerned at the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone" and
"the consequences for neighbouring countries".
6832. Article 5 of the UN Security Council Resolution reads as follow:
"Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from their
territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary
equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their ten·itory"; 15391
Defence Exhibit D-140
6833. Exhibit D-140 is a communiqué of the fifth meeting of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, in Abuja on 10 to 1 1 October 1997. The
communiqué describes how the illegal regime in Sierra Leone continues to attack and harass
ECOMOG troops and notes its concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Sierra Leone and the gross violations of human rights by the regime.15392
Prosecution Exhibit P-078
6834. Exhibit P-078 is an Amnesty International Report on atrocities against civilians in
Sierra Leone in 1998. The report acknowledges the dominant role played by, inter alia,
ECOWAS and ECOMOG, in resolving the political crisis in Sierra Leone. The report also
documents the human rights violations committed by the AFRC and RUF after the military
coup, including killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and extra-judicial
executions, mutilations, rapes.153 93
6835. End of Page 1 of the report reads as follow:
"During 1998 the scale of atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has reached unprecedented levels. Several
thousand unarmed civilians, including many women and children, have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed
and mutilated by forces of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the armed opposition
Revolutionary Front (RUF) since February 1998. These atrocities are continuing [...]
"Although security has since returned to the capital, Freetown, and much of the south of the country, the scale
of human rights abuses committed by AF RC and RUF forces in the north and east of the country has escalated
and taken on grotesque forms. From April 1998 reports emerged of civilians suffering mutilations such as
crude amputations of their feet, hands, arms, lips or ears. Women and girls have been systematically raped.
15391 Exhibit P-069, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, 8 October 1997", p. 2.
15392 Exhibit D-140, "ECOWAS, Communiqué, Fifth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, 10-1 1 October 1997 — DCT 39 (5 End of Pages)".
15393 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998 — A year of atrocities against civilians, Amnesty International Repor·t",
pp. 1-31.

---- End of Page 2384 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 7 · 18 May 2012
/ *3fQ

c;0Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, have been abducted by rebel forces.
The violence has resulted in hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leoneans fleeing to neighboring Guinea and
Liberia or becoming internally displaced within Sierra Leone. AFRC and RUF forces must respect
international humanitarian law and immediately end the gross human rights abuses which they are perpetrating
against unamred civilians".
Prosecution Exhibit P-303
6836. Exhibit P-303 is a humanitarian situation report by the African Studies Centre of the
University of Pennsylvania on Sierra Leone, for the period 21 January 1998 to 12 February
1998. The report expresses concem for the humanitarian situation of civilians in Freetown. It
states that "AF RC casualties are known to be high and many civilians have been killed and
injuI.€d>>~l5394
Prosecution Exhibit P-3 85
6837. Exhibit P-385 is a an excerpt of an article published in the Liberian newspaper "The
Daily Times", published on 20 February 1998 reporting that 52 people were bumed alive as
the Junta went on ramEnd of Page. 15395
Defence Exhibit D-155
6838. Exhibit D-155 is the UN Security Counci1's fourth report of the Secretary-General
on the situation in Sierra Leone, dated 18 March 1998. The report describes the intervention
by ECOMOG in Freetown on 13 February 1998 and the widespread looting and some
reprisal killings which accompanied the junta's expulsion. The security situation in Sierra
Leone is still a source of concern and the humanitarian situation remains serious. 153%
15394 Exhibit P-303, "Sierra Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report, 98.02.17., 21 January - 12 February 1998,
Paragraphs 1 (part), 3, 9, 16 (A) — CSM PGS — 21422 — 2l424".
15305 Exhibit P-385, "52 people burned alive as Junta goes on ramEnd of Page", Daily News, dated 20 February 1998 —
CMS 22658-22659
153% Exhibit D-155, "UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra
Leone, S/1998/2449, 18 March 1998 — DCT 189 (1 1 End of Pages)".

---- End of Page 2385 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-O 1 -T % QQ 18 May 2012

Prosecution Exhibit P-036
6839. Exhibit P-036 is an ECOWAS six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone, dated 23
October 1997 to 22 April 1998. The plan consists of seven points to retum constitutional
govemance to Sierra Leone. 15397
Prosecution Exhibit P-304
6840. Exhibit P-304 is a humanitarian situation report for Sierra Leone prepared by the
United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone, for the period 16 April 1998 to
30 April 1998. The report documents that the fighting between ECOMOG and the
RUF/Junta is creating a severe humanitarian situation. It includes summary reports on
victims of the violence, including widespread mutilations and 1ooting.15398
Prosecution Exhibit P-332
6841. Exhibit P-332 is a report by Medecins sans Frontiers, dated 1 May 1998. The report
states there has been an alarming increase in the number of mutilations. The report also
documents instances of rapes and killings, including by being bumed alive. 15399
Prosecution Exhibit P-079
6842. Exhibit P-079 is a press release from Doctors without Borders / Medecins sans
Frontieres, dated 5 May 1998. The press release states that the number of patients suffering
from mutilations has increased significantly within the past few weeks. Other crimes
committed by various armed groups have included executions, rapes and kidnappings.1541111
15397 Exhibit P-036, "ECOWAS six month-peace plan for Sierra Leone 23 October 1997 — 22 April 1998".
15398 Exhibit P-304, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-30 April 1998, Paragraphs 1, 5 (Part), 6 -
CSM PGS 21428 — 21429".
15399 Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report: Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone, 1 May
1998, End of Pages 1 to 4 - CMS PGS 23204 — 23207".
1541111 Exhibit P-079, "Doctors without Borders/Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) Press Release - Mutilation of
Civilians on the increase in Sierra Leone, 5 May 1998".

---- End of Page 2386 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

Prosecution Exhibit P-070
6843. Exhibit P-070 is UN Security Council resolution 1171 (1998), dated 5 June 1998.
The Security Council reiterates its condemnation of the situation in Sierra Leone and
stresses the "urgency for all rebels to put an end to the atrocities". mol
Prosecution Exhibit P-130
6844. Exhibit P-130 is the Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra
Leone, dated 9 June 1998. The report condemns the actions of the Junta in Sierra Leone and
states that they have been attacking towns and villages, terrorising local populations and
extorting food from them. There have also been incidents of looting, property destruction,
, mutilations, rape, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions (including for purposes of
sexual abuse), torture and forced labour}5402
Prosecution Exhibit P-125
6845. Exhibit P-125 is the first End of Page of the Liberian newspaper "Daily Times" dated 24
July 1998. An article titled "Guns, rice traded for diamonds" discuss the disclosure by
RUF/AFRC members that they received guns and rice from Liberia in exchange of
diamonds. The article mentions that gruesome atrocities have been perpetrated by
RUF/Arno Soidiersia ‘5""
Prosecution Exhibit P-081
6846. Exhibit P-081 is a document published by Amnesty International on 24 July 1998
preparing the United Nations Special Conference on Sierra Leone held in New York on 30
July 1998. End of Page 1 of the report reads as follow:
AFRC and RUF force s in the east and north of Sierra Leone are deliberately and arbitrarily killing and
torturing unarmed civilians. A deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by
the AF RC and RUF "Operation no living thing"- has emerged since April 1998.
Although the exact number of those killed in recent months is unknown, it is likely to be several thousand,
many of them women and children. More than 200 people were killed during an attack on one village alone -
Yifm, in Koinadugu District in Northern Province - in late April 1998. Many hundreds of men, women and
mol Exhibit P-070, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1171, 5 June l998".
mm Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217", P. 15, para. 81, ERN 00004215.
ISM Exhibit P-125 , Daily News, 24 July 1998, "Guns, rice traded for diamonds".

---- End of Page 2387 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-01-T / 18 May 2012

//"4‘€`@
children of all ages have suffered mutilation and crude amputations of their arms, legs, lips or ears, lacerations
and gunshot wounds. Women and girls have been raped or suffered other forms of sexual assault. Survivors of
attacks who manage to reach safety and medical assistance recount that many others from their villages were
killed or fled into the bush, their fate unknown.l54O4
6847. End of Page 3 of the report addresses the specific issues of "children caught in the
violence". It reads as follow:
Children have been particular victims of the violence and brutality in Sierra Leone. As well as being
deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and maimed, thousands of children have been and continue to be
abducted by AFRC and RUF forces and forced to fight. Girls and women have been systematically raped and
forced into sexual slavery.
Among the more than 350,000 Sierra Leoneans who have either become refugees in neighbouring countries or
internally displaced since February 1998 are hundreds of unaccompanied children separated from their families
as a result of the violence. Children are the most vulnerable to the acute hardship, disease and malnutrition
faced by Sierra Leonean refugees and displaced people. During May and June 1998, 750 people, including
children, were reported to have died of disease and malnutrition at Masingbi, in Tonkolili District, Northern
Province, where some 15,000 displaced people have sought safety.
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu,
following a visit to Sierra Leone in May 1998, challenged the international community to respond in a more
vigorous and concerted way to the needs of children affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone. In June 1998 the
UN Security Council, condemning the abduction, sexual abuse and recruitment and use in hostilities of
children, said that it would pay serious attention to the situation of children affected by armed conflict. The
needs of children in Sierra Leone are critical. Amnesty International welcomes the work of the Special
Representative and endorses his call for Sierra Leone to be made one of the pilot projects for a more effective
response in the context of post-conflict peace-building.15405
Prosecution Exhibit P-080
6848. Exhibit P-080 is the First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 12 August 1998. The report condemns the
actions of the rebels in Sierra Leone. Such actions have included the destruction of property,
the use of human-shields, rapes, executions, mutilations and the taking of civilian
captives. *5106
Prosecution Exhibit P-306/Defence Exhibit D-169
6849. Prosecution Exhibit P-306 and Defence Exhibit D-169 are the same document. It is
the UN Security Council's second progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN
15404 Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 1, ERN000091
15405 Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 3, ERN000091
15406 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 — 00012386 — 00012400", ERN 00012386.

---- End of Page 2388 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI--03-01-T % 18 May 2012

T 4*0 42/
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 16 October 1998. The report documents that
following the arrest of Foday Sankoh, the RUF announced, on 17 August 1998, a terror
campaign against the civilian population, CDF and ECOMOG if the Government failed to
release Sankoh within seven days. The report indicates that President Kabbah and President
Taylor are in regular contact by telephone and documents instances of attacks and human
rights abuses by the rebels. The alanning humanitarian situation is noted}5407
Defence Exhibit D-175
6850. Exhibit D-175 is the UN Security Council's third progress report of the Secretary-
General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 16 December 1998. The report
states that President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for cooperation on
joint border patrols and that a Catholic priest, Father Mario Guerra, was kidnapped near
Makeni on 17 November 1998 by elements of the AFRC. The report documents that rebel
attacks in the north have persisted and intensified and that in December 1998 there were
attacks on several locations. It states that there have been widespread rebel attacks on
civilian populations, involving amputations, decapitations, rape, burning, destruction of
homes, abduction and looting.l54O8
Defence Exhibit D-177
6851. Exhibit D-177 is a compilation of news/press releases of ECOMOG, dated
September to December 1998. The compilation includes news on ECOMOG's attempts to
block the flow of anns from Liberia to Sierra Leone.l54O9
Defence Exhibit D-141
6852. Exhibit D-141 is a collection of Charles Taylor's Presidential papers, policies,
speeches, statements and record of activities, dated 2 August 1997 to 31 December 1998.
The collection includes a joint communiqué issued by Taylor, the Chairman of ECOWAS
and the President of Sierra Leone on 2 July 1998 in which the Heads of State of Liberia and
15407 Prosecution Exhibit P—306 and Defence Exhibit D—169, "UN Security Council, Second Progress Report of
the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/960, 16 October 1998 ·
DCT 170".
Img Exhibit D—175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary—General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/1176, 16 December 1998 · DCT 102".
Img Exhibit D—177, "Media Communiqué, A Compilation of News/Press Releases of ECOMOG, Vol. 1, No. 1,

---- End of Page 2389 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T / ~- 18 May 2012

404Xz
Sierra Leone "strongly condemned the continuous rebel activities in Sierra Leone as well as
the horrendous atrocities that had been committed there".l54lO
Prosecution Exhibits P-341A and P-341B
6853. Exhibits 341A and 341B are an audio clip and its accompanying transcript,
respectively, of a BBC "Focus on Africa" interview that took place on 22 December 1998
between the Kwabena Mensah, a BBC reporter and Abubakar Sesay, a forest guard for the
Waterloo district.l54ll In the interview Mensah reported that an ECOMOG commander had
confirmed that the RUF had attacked Waterloo in the early hours of the morning. Abubakar
Sesay stated that during the two-hour attack the rebels killed civilians, burnt houses and
looted goods.l54l2
Prosecution Exhibit P-279B
6854. Exhibit P-279B is a transcript of a BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 5 and 6 January
1999. The transcript states that rebels have entered Freetown. The rebels have broken into
the prison. mm
Prosecution Exhibit P-1 1 1
6855. Exhibit P-11 1 is a BBC news article on the ‘Battle for Sierra Leone,’ dated 6 January
1999. The article documents the invasion of Freetown during which the rebels stormed the
main prison and burned down several buildings.l54l4
Prosecution Exhibit P-308/Defence Exhibit D-178
6856. Prosecution Exhibit P-308 and Defence Exhibit D-178 are a UN Security Council,
Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNOMSIL) S/ 1999/20, dated 7 January 1999. lt reported that on 22 December 1998,
Sept—Dec 1998, Freetown, December 1998 ~ DCT 23".
mm Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
ChiefExecutive of Liberia, 2 August l997— December 31 1998 — DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 298, para. 3.
mu Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December l998"; Exhibit P-34lB, "BBC Focus on Africa
Transcript, 22 December l998".
MM2 Exhibit P-34lA, "BBC Focus on Ahica Clip, 22 December l998;" Exhibit P-342B, "BBC Focus on Ahica
Transcript, 22 December l998", p. 23590.
Hm Exhibit P-279B, "Transcript - Track Two, BBC Focus on Ahica, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D00005l7".
mu Exhibit P-111, "BBC News Article, World: Ahica Battle for Sierra Leone, January 6, l999".

---- End of Page 2390 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ( 18 May 2012

404,ZvE
rebels in the Westem area attacked Waterloo, resulting in heavy casualties among the
civilian population,15415 and the looting and buming of property, and the displacement of
around 12,000 persons that fled from Waterloo to Freetown.15415
Prosecution Exhibit P-352B 5
6857. Exhibit P-352B is a transcript ofa BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 11 January 1999.
The transcript states that rebels in Freetown have set fire to many buildings and are using
civilians as humans-shields.15417
Prosecution Exhibit P-351B
6858. Exhibit P-351B is a transcript ofa BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 11 January 1999.
The transcript states that the RUF in Freetown have set fire to many houses and are using
civilians as humans-shields.15415
Prosecution Exhibit P-354B
6859. Exhibit P-354B is a transcript ofa BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 18 January 1999.
The transcript states that the RUF in Freetown have caused widespread destruction, looting
and have executed civilians.15415
Prosecution Exhibit P-356B
6860. Exhibit P-356B, is a transcript of a BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 22 January
1999. It includes a report by BBC correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay, who travelled
with ECOMOG to Kissy. In his report, Mr Ojukutu-Macaulay stated that the "rebels have
15415 Exhibit P-308, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary—General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999", p. 21473.
15416 Exhibit P—308, ‘"UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary—General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999", p. 21477.
15417 Exhibit P—352B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 — D0000515, 11 January 1999 — CMS
PG 23619".
15415 Exhibit P—351B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Aiiica Clip from track 1 — D0000515, 11 January 1999 — CMS
PGS 23616-236l8".
15415 Exhibit P—354B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Aliica Clip from track 2 — D0000542, 18 January 1999 — CMS
PGS 23623-23624".

---- End of Page 2391 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T ` 18 May 2012

reverted to their terr0r campaign of amputating civilians". Thus, he stated that on their way
back to Freetown from Kissy, ECOMOG transported five civilians who were amputated.15420
Prosecution Exhibit P-3 57B
6861. Exhibit P-357B is a transcript of a BBC F0cus on Africa clip, dated 23 January 1999.
The transcript states that the RUF/AFRC rebels are leaving a trail of destruction as they are
being chased out of Freetown, including by burning houses and taking hostages and one
R0man Catholic nun has been killed.l542l
Prosecution Exhibit P-123
6862. Exhibit P-123 is BBC news article, dated 27 January 1999. The article states that the
rebels in Freetown have been following a ‘scorched-earth policy’ and have burned buildings
and attacked and killed civilians. 15422
Prosecution Exhibit P-309
6863. Exhibit P-309 is a ‘Report on Atrocities C0mmitted Against the Sierra Leone
Population’ prepared by the UNHCR, dated 28 January 1999.l5423 The report d0cuments
atrocities committed by Junta forces retreating from Freetown against the local p0pulation.
Defence Exhibit D-191
6864. Exhibit D-191 is the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 4 March 1999. The report d0cuments the rebel
attacks on Freetown on 6 January 1999 which resulted in between 3,000 to 5,000 deaths.
ECOMOG forces managed to expel the rebels but the security situation in Freetown remains
volatile. ln response to allegations that they were supporting the Sierra Leonean rebels, the
Liberian government issued a statement that they recognised the Kabbah Government as the
legitimate government and that they did not, and would not, support any attempt to
15420 Exhibit P-356B, "Trarrscript 4 BBC F0cus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 4 D000507, 22 January 1999", p.
23628. A
15421 Exhibit P-357B, "Transcript - BBC F0cus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000508, 23 January 1999 - CMS
PGS 23629-23630".
15422 Exhibit P—123, "BBC News Article, Freetcwn Bears the Scars, 27 January 1999".
15423 Exhibit P-309, "Report On Atrocities Ccmmitted Against the Sierra Leone Popu1ation, UNHCR Branch
Office Ccnakry, 28 January 1999, Unrrumbered Paras 1-3, Case # 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16 — 0004550 —
00004557, 00004561 - 00004563, 00004557 4 00004577".

---- End of Page 2392 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

40425
destabilise Sierra Leone or any other country. The Liberian Government also requested the
Security Council to approve the deployment of United Nations monitors along with
ECOMOG troops at the Liberian/Sierra Leonean border in light of repeated allegations of
illegal shipments of arms to the rebels.45424
Prosecution Exhibit P-035
6865. Exhibit P-035 is an IRIN update on events in West Africa, dated 8 April 1999. The
update documents the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone, Major General Felix
Mujakperuo, warning the Presidents of Liberia and Burkina Faso that ECOMOG has
confirmed the activities of the two countries and their leaders involved in the shipment and
delivery of arms to the RUF through the government of a neighbouring country.l5425
Prosecution Exhibit P-037
6866. Exhibit P-037 is an agreement on a ceasefire in Sierra Leone, dated 17 April 1999
and signed 18 May 1999. The agreement is signed by Sierra Leonean President Tejan
Kabbah and RUF leader Foday Sankoh. 45426
Defence Exhibit D-019
6867. Exhibit D-019 is a BBC news article, dated 18 April 1999. The article states that the
RUF rebels have committed widespread atrocities and mutilated civilians in Freetown. [5427
Prosecution Exhibit P-312
6868. Exhibit P-312 is a humanitarian situation report on Sierra Leone prepared by UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, dated 1 May 1999 to 17 May 1999.
The reports documents humanitarian concerns for the Sierra Leonean civilian
population. I 5428
45424 Exhibit D-191, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999 — CMS pgs. 2l594~21607 — DCT 142", pp. 1-2, 5,
ERN 4266-4267, 4270.
15425 Exhibit P—035, "IR1N update 438 of events in West Africa, 8 April 1999", ERN 00021259.
15426 Exhibit P-037, "Agreement on ceasefire in Sierra Leone — 17 April 1999, signed 18 May 1999".
*5427 Exhibit D—019, "BBC News Article, 18 April 1999, World: Africa Rebel Leader Freed for Talks, 18 April
1999".
45428 Exhibit P-312, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1-17 May 1999, UN Office For the

---- End of Page 2393 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Oki 18 May 2012

4z0¢3"6
Prosecution Exhibit P-313
6869. Exhibit P-313 is the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 4 June 1999. The report documents a resurgence of
rebel atrocities against civilians, including summary executions, mutilations, amputations,
abductions, sexual abuse and the large-scale destmction of property. 15 429
Prosecution Exhibit P-438
6870. Exhibit P-438 is an excerpt of a letter from the Charge d’Affaires A.1. of the
Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary
General, dated 25 January 1999. ln the letter, the President of Sierra Leone states that he
knows for certain of five camps in Liberia in which rebels are trained to commit atrocities in
Sierra Leone. 15430
Prosecution Exhibit P-314
6871. Exhibit P-314 is a humanitarian situation report on Sierra Leone prepared by UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, dated 18 May 1999 to 11 June 1999.
The report documents that the security situation in Sierra Leone has substantially improved
following the beginning of the ceasefire on 24 May 1999, however there were still incidents
across the country and the humanitarian situation is still a cause for concern.l5431
Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs, Unnumbered Paragraphs 2 and 3 On End of Page 1, Unnumbered Paragraph 3
and 4 On End of Page 4, Unnumbered Paragraph 3 and 4 On End of Page 5".
img Exhibit P-313, "UN Security Council, Sixth Report Of the Secretary-General On the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/645, 4 June 1999, Paragraphs 5-7, 9, 19-20, 28-33, 40 (Part), 48 B
(Part), 63, 64 (Part), 69 - 00012323, 00012326 — 00012332", pp. 6-9, ERN 12327-12330.
{WO Exhibit P-438, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 19 January 1999 from the
Charge d’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary General, S/1999/73, 25 January 1999", p. 2.
[543* Exhibit P-314, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 18 May — 11 June 1999, UN Office for the
Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs, first bullet point in unnumberes paragraph 4 on End of Page 2, third bullet point
in unnumbered paragraph 1".

---- End of Page 2394 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T f 18 May 2012

44%/§Y?‘
Defence Exhibit D-347
6872. Exhibit D-347 is the Official Joumal of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), dated August 1999. The joumal includes a decision on the new
ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone.15452
Prosecution Exhibit P-315 1
6873. Exhibit P-315 is a humanitarian situation report on Sierra Leone prepared by UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, dated 3 October 1999 to 9 October
1999. The report states that the security situation in Sierra Leone has seen no further
improvement and documents what is being done to improve the humanitarian situation.15455
Defence Exhibit D-400
6874. Exhibit D-400 is a summary of the meeting between Presidential Special Envoy
Jesse Jackson and Charles Taylor, dated 19 May 2000. At the meeting Taylor said the UN
hostages release must not be conditioned on Foday Sankoh's fate or on changes to the Lomé
Agreement and that Taylor does not control the RUF, nor is the Liberian Govemment
involved in diamond smuggling or arms trafficking. 1545 4
Defence Exhibit D-248
6875. Exhibit D-248 is a final communiqué of the Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State
Members of the Committee on Sierra Leone on the Lomé Agreement in Abuja, dated 9 May
2000. In the communiqué the Heads of State express their deep concern about the latest
developments in Sierra Leone, in particular condemning the RUF who have taken hostage
soldiers of the UN mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).1545 5
'5132 Exhibit D-347, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 36,
August 1999 — DCT 281 (4 pp.)".
15455 Exhibit P-315, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 03-09 October 1999 UN Office For the
Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs, parasl, 5 and 6 on p.1, part of unnumbered paragpraph one on p. 2,
paragraph on "child protection" on p. 4 - 00004165 — 00004166".
15454 Exhibit D-400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000 — ERN 0005828 to 0005842 ~
DCT 267 (15 End of Pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", pp. 2, 4, ERN R0005823, R0005830
15455 Exhibit D-248, "Final Communique, Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State Members of the Committee on
Sierra Leone on the Lomé Peace Agreement, Abuja, 9 May 2000 — DCT 96", p. 2.

---- End of Page 2395 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / {AQ 18 May 2012

4%
Defence Exhibit D-252
6876. Exhibit D-252 is a final communiqué of the twenty——third summit of the Authority of
Heads of State and Government in Abuja, dated 28 to 29 May 2000. In the communique the
Heads of State and Govermnent strongly condemned the taking of UNAMSIL soldiers
hostage by the RUF, and expressed their gratitude to Charles Taylor for securing the release
of a large number of the hostages. *5436
Prosecution Exhibit P-331
6877. Exhibit P-331 is an Amnesty International report on rape and sexual violence in
Sierra Leone, dated 29 June 2000. The report documents various cases of rape in Sierra
Leone and its effects on the victims. Many girls were raped by the AFRC and RUF during
the invasion of Freetown and many were abducted. Wm
Prosecution Exhibit P-334
6878. Exhibit P-334 is an Amnesty International report, dated 31 August 2000. The report
states that more than 5,000 children have fought as combatants in Sierra Leone's internal
armed conflict. Most of the children have been abducted by both the armed opposition and
forces fighting in support of the government. The children have been forced to kill and
mutilate others. A further 5,000 children have been associated with rebel forces although not
directly deployed in combat, and many of the girls have been raped and forced into sexual
slavery. The figures are provided by the United Nations Children's Fund. Since 2000 the
RUF have continued to abduct and forcibly recmit child combatants}5438
Prosecution Exhibit P-322
6879. Exhibit P-322 is a report of the Security Council mission to Sierra Leone, dated 16
October 2000. The report documents that most of the mission's interlocutors, and President
Obasanjo, have no doubt that President Taylor exercised strong influence, even direct
control, over the RUF. They further felt that the cause of many of Sierra Leone's problems
15436 Exhibit D-252, "ECOWAS Silver Jubilee Anniversary, Final Communiqué of the Twenty~Third Summit of
the Authority of the authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28429 May 2000 ~ DCT 264", p. 7.
15437 Exhibit P-331, "Amnesty Intemational Report, Sierra Leone - Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence
Against Girls and Women, 29 June 2000 (parts marked) - CMS PGS 23194 ~ 23197".
15438 Exhibit P-334, "Amnesty International Report, Sierra Leone: Childhood - A Casualty of Conflict, 31 August

---- End of Page 2396 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

O at
Qi
lay in the support provided to the RUF by President Taylor. Taylor denied these
activities. I 5439
Prosecution Exhibit P-023
6880. Exhibit P-023 is a copy of a letter from Charles Taylor to the UN Secretary-General,
dated 24 January 2001. In the letter, Taylor responds to allegations of the Liberian
Government's involvement in the sale of illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone, in exchange for
supplying war materiel to the RUF. Taylor denies all such allegations. Taylor requests that
the Security Council establish a panel to investigate any large personal funds of Taylor's
which could be attributable to diamond sales. 1f such funds are found, Taylor will resign as
President of Liberia. 15440
Prosecution Exhibit P-024
6881. Exhibit P-024 is a copy of a letter from the Liberian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Monie Captan, to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee, dated 23 April
2001.15441 The letter includes a list of individuals subject to Security Council resolution 1343
(2001) who were not in Liberia at the time of the adoption of the resolution or subsequent.
Prosecution Exhibit P-077
6882. Exhibit P-077 documents crimes in Sierra Leone which included mutilations,
amputations, destruction of houses and killings.l5442
Deliberations
6883. The Accused testified that prior to becoming President, he was not following
whether crimes were committed by the RUF in Sierra Leone and did not hear about murders
and amputations committed during "Operation Stop Election" in 1996. *5443 The Accused
2000, End of Pages 1 and 15 - CMS PGS 23342 — 23356".
Img Exhibit P-322, "UN Security Council, Report of the Security Council to Sierra Leone, S/2000/992, 16
October 2000 - CMS PGS 21726, 21742 - 21743, 21747", pp. 5-7, ERN 00102114-00102116.
IMO Exhibit P-023, "Letter to the Security Council dated 24 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of
Liberia to The United Nations addressed to The Secretary General", ERN 00100018.
IMI Exhibit P-024, "Letter from the Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission to the UN addressed to the
President of the Security Council, dated 18 May 2001", ERN 00100001.
'jm Exhibit P-077 (wuiiatmuai).
IW} Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32375-32379.

---- End of Page 2397 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T `J 18 May 2012

further testified that, upon becoming President, he was aware of "problems" in Sierra
Leone,15444 but that he did not seek to know precisely who was committing these crimes, as
he was not running Sierra Leone.15445
6884. The Trial Chamber recalls its findings that the relationship of the Accused with the
RUF from 1989 until he became President was much closer than he admitted.15446 The
Accused knew that during the early war of Sierra Leone, RUF soldiers, under the command
of NPFL officers, abducted civilians including children, forcing them to fight within the
NPFL/RUF forces against the Sierra Leonean forces and ULlMO.15444 The Trial Chamber
has found that while the relationship between the Accused and the RUF significantly waned
after June 1992, contacts and cooperation between the Accused and Sankoh nonetheless
continued after 1992.15448 Thus, the Trial Chamber, relying on Kamara's testimony, found
that the Accused was aware that the RUF captured civilians and looted money during the
attack of Sierra Rutile, and he advised Sankoh on the use of the hostages and the money. 15449
6885. The Trial Chamber finds that contrary to the statement of the Accused that he did not
know precisely who was committing the crimes, by late August 1997, when he had been
inaugurated President of Liberia, he was undoubtedly informed of the crimes committed by
the RUF during the past years of the Sierra Leonean civil war15450 and of the ongoing crimes
committed by the Junta Government. lndeed, the Accused testified that, upon becoming
President, he received daily briefings from his national security advisor, which would
include press and intelligence reports regarding the situation in Sierra Leone.15451 lt is
undisputed that following his election, the Accused joined the ECOWAS Committee of
Four, making it the Committee of Five, and he would therefore have received and read
ECOWAS reports. *5552
15444 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32378.
15445 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32378-32379, pp. 32385-32387; Transcript 26
November 2009, pp. 32576-32577; Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33386-33388
*5*55 Pre-rnarcrmenr rama (1988-1996).
15444 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996); The Invasion of Sierra Leone.
15444 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Conclusion.
15444 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Sierra Rutile,
15451) Especially the atrocities committed during Operation Stop Election.
15451 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24333; Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28265-
28268; Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31713; Transcript 14 January 2010, p. 33382; Transcript 18 January
2010, p. 33441; Transcript 26 January 2010, pp. 34130-34133.
15452 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 364, 486, 854; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 July 2009, pp.

---- End of Page 2398 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \J rg / 18 May 2012

4 2 4 il
6886. The Trial Chamber notes that the numerous reports prepared in 1997 by ECOWAS
and the United Nations agencies, establish that, as early as May 1997, the crimes committed
by the Junta were significantly reported by international organisations. A report dated 4 to 5
June 1997, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs cited killings of
civilians, amputations and looting in Sierra Leone. The report also mentioned the hostage
taking and the release of the Sierra Leonean Ambassador by RUF commander, Sam
Bockarie, "who masterminded the operation".15453 An ECOWAS report of the Committee of
Four on the situation in Sierra Leone dated 26 August 1997 described the "massive looting
of property, murder and rapes" following the coup by the RUF and sections of the SLA
against Kabbah's government on 25 May 1997.15454 The final report of the sixteenth meeting
of ECOWAS Chiefs of State in Abuja, Nigeria, dated 26 to 27 August 1997, a meeting in
which the Liberian representative participated, also describes "a very bloody coup, followed
by massive looting and vandalisation of public and private properties and the opening of the
prisons by the junta".15455 ln a speech to the Nation on 18 June 1997, the RUF forces
themselves apologised for the atrocities they have committed in Sierra Leone, including
killings and rapes.15456
6887. Following the coup, on 29 August 1997, ECOWAS decided to place a total embargo
on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipment to Sierra Leone.15454
Similarly, on 8 October 1997, the United Nations Security Council decided to impose an
iembargo on arms and ammunitions to Sierra Leone.15458 These embargos clearly indicate
that already by August 1997, the Junta was perceived by the international community as a
threat to peace, and it was recognized that any military support could facilitate the
commission of the crimes described above.
25308-25309; Transcript 28 July 2009, pp. 25416-25417, 25437.
15454 Exhibit P-297, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 04-05 June 1997, UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraphs 1, 2, 5 - 00004088 - 00004089 (CMS PGS 21395 - 21396)".
15 45 4 Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 26 August
1997 — DCT 32".
15455 Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria,
26-27 August 1997 — DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)".
15456 Exhibit P-057, "Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997 -
00009769 — 0000977l".
15457 Exhibit D-340, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol, 33,
29 August 1997, Article 2 (Article 2: Member States hereby place a general and total embargo on all supplies of
petroleum products, arms and military equipment to Sierra Leone . They shall also abstain from transacting any
business of a commercial nature with that country); See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on the Prosecution
Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007, p. 10 (Fact AC).

---- End of Page 2399 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

¢0{’?2
6888. The Accused was evasive in his testimony as to what and when he knew about the
crimes being committed in Sierra Leone. In light of these contemporary reports, considering
the fact that the situation in Sierra Leone had a direct impact on the Liberian situation,l5454
considering the embargos on arms and military equipments to Sierra Leone, and considering
the fact that the Accused received daily briefings from his national security advisor about the
international situation,l5460 and was a member of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, the Trial
Chamber finds the Accused's assertion that he did not know precisely who was committing
the crimes in Sierra Leonel5464 to be unbelievable. The sole reasonable inference that can be
drawn from this evidence is that as early as August 1997, the Accused, as President of
Liberia and a member of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, was informed in detail of the
crimes committed by the AFRC/RUF members during the Junta period, including murder,
abduction of civilians including children, rape, amputation and looting. He would therefore
have been aware of the likelihood that the AFRC/RUF would commit similar crimes in the
future.
6889. The evidence on record unequivocally demonstrates that after 1997, the media
coverage of the AFRC/RUF's crimes and terror campaign against the Sierra Leonean
civilian population increased. Many reports and articles by international organisations, non-
governmental organisations and newspapers admitted into evidence describe the atrocities
committed by the AFRC/RUF troops after the ECOMOG Intervention and the end of the
Junta Government.l5462 These reports demonstrate that at that time, it was public knowledge
45454 Exhibit P-069, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, 8 October 1997", p. 2.
45454 See for example Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra
Leone, 26 August 1997, p. 1 ("This situation also posed a special threat to peace in Liberia"); Exhibit D-136
"ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria, 26-27 August 1997",
p. 6 ("De1ivering a statement, His Excellency, Mr Joe Bleil, the Sierra Leone High Commlssioner to NIgeria,
representing the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone headed by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah [U.] reiterated his
countrys support for ECOWAS objectives in Sierra Leone and reminded the meeting that without peace in
Sierra Leone, the recently-won peace in Liberia would continue to be threatened").
*5*60 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24333; Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28265-
28270; Transcript 3 November 2009, p. 31053, Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31713; Transcript 14 January
2010, p. 33382-33384, 33429; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33406-33407, 334-41; Transcript 26 January
2010, pp. 34130-34133.
15464 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32378-32379, 32385-32387; Transcript 26
November 2009, pp. 32576-32577; Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33386-33388.
45462 See for example Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998 — A year of atrocities against civilians, Amnesty
International Report", p. 1 ("During 1998 the scale of atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has reached
unprecedented levels. Several thousand unarmed civilians, including many women and children, have been
deliberately and arbitrarily killed and mutilated by forces of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
and the armed opposition Revolutionary Front (RUF) since February 1998"); Exhibit P-385, "Daily News, 20
February 1998" (reporting that "52 people burned alive as Junta goes on ramEnd of Page"); Exhibit D-155, "UN

---- End of Page 2400 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ` X 18 May 2012

aouvj
that AFRC/RUF forces committed the crimes of unlawful killings,[5463 sexual violence,[54°4
physical violence,[5465 conscription and use of child soldiers,[5466 abduction and forced
labour, [5467 looting, [5464 and terrorism. [ 5469
Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 18 March 1998"
(mentioning widespread looting and reprisal killings which accompanied the jUI1t3’S expulsion); Exhibit P-304,
"Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-30 April 1998" (mentioning widespread mutilations and
looting); Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report: Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone, 1
May 1998 (The report also documents instances of rapes and killings, including by being burned alive); Exhibit
P-079, "Doctors without Borders/Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) Press Release - Mutilation of Civilians on the
increase in Sierra Leone, 5 May 1998" (executions, rapes and kidnappings); Exhibit P-l30, "United Nations
Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/486, 9 June
1998" (The report condemns the actions of the Junta in Sierra Leone and states that they have been attacking
towns and villages, terrorising local populations and extorting food from them. There have also been incidents of
looting, property destruction, mutilations, rape, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions (including for purposes
of sexual abuse), torture and forced labour); Exhibit P-081, "Arm1esty International Report, 24 July 1998," p. l,
ERN 91 ("A deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF
"Operation no living thing" — has emerged since April 1998"), p. 3 ("Chi1dren have been particular victims of
the violence and brutality in Sierra Leone. As well as being deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and
maimed, thousands of children have been and continue to be abducted by AFRC and RUF tbrces and forced to
fight. Girls and women have been systematically raped and forced into sexual slavery); Exhibit P-080, "UN
Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone,
l2 August 1998" (The report condemns the actions of the rebels in Sierra Leone. Such actions have included the
destruction of property, the use of human-shields, rapes, executions, mutilations and the taking of civilian
captives); Exhibit D-169, "UN Security Council, Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/960, 16 October l998" (The report documents that following
the arrest of Foday Sankoh, the RUF announced, on 17 August l998, a terror campaign against the civilian
population, CDF and ECOMOG if the Government failed to release Sankoh within seven days).
[5463 Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment: Exhibit P-297, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 04-05 June
1997, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraphs 1, 2, 5 - 00004088 — 00004089" (reporting killings
of civilians); Exhibit P-057, "Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997 -
00009769 — 00009771" ("We looked at our brothers and killed them in cold blood [...] we slaughtered our
mothers and butchered our fathers"); Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the
Situation in Sierra Leone, 26 August 1997 — DCT 32" (describing murders committed by AFRC/RUF's forces);
Exhibit P—069, "United Nations Security Council Resolution ll32, 8 October 1997", p. 2 ("gravely concerned at
the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone"); ("reporting AFRC and RUF's crimes , including
killings [...] and extra-judicial executions"); Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998 — A year of atrocities against
civilians, Armiesty International Report", pp, l-3l (The report documents the human rights violations committed
by the AFRC and RUF after the military coup, including killings, extra-judicial executions); Exhibit P-303,
"Sierra Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report, 98.02.17., 2l January - 12 February l998, Paragraphs 1 (part), 3,
9, 16 (A) - CSM PGS - 21422 — 2l424" ("AFRC casualties are known to be high and many civilians have been
killed and injured"); Exhibit P-385, "52 people burned alive as Junta goes on ramEnd of Page, Daily News, dated 20
February 1998 — ERN 22658—22659"; Exhibit D—l55, "UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary
General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/2449, 18 March 1998 — DCT 189 (ll End of Pages)" (The report
describes the intervention by ECOMOG in Freetown on 13 February 1998 and the reprisal killings which
accompanied the junta's expulsion); Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report: Atrocities Against
Civilians in Sierra Leone, 1 May l998, End of Pages l to 4 - CMS PGS 23204 — 23207" (The report documents
instances of killings, including by being burned alive); Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth
Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 —
000042l7", p. 15, para. 8l, ERN 4215 (Reporting the commission of extra judicial killings); Exhibit P-08l,
"Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 1, ERN 9l (describing "a deliberate and systematic campaign of
killing called by the AFRC and RUF" [...] "A1though the exact number of those killed in recent months is
unknown, it is likely to be several thousand, many of them women and children. More than 200 people were
killed during an attack on one village alone"); Exhibit P—080, "UN Security Council — First Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, l2 August 1998 — 00012386 — 00012400",

---- End of Page 2401 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T of 18 May 2012

Qi O QW?
ERN 12386 (reporting executions of civilians); Exhibit P-341A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December
l998;" Exhibit P-342B, "BBC Focus on Africa Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590 (Explaining on BBC
that during their attack on 22 December 1998 the RUF rebels killed civilians).
15464 Counts 4, 5 and 6 of the Indictment: Exhibit P-057, "Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered
on SLBS on 18 June 1997 - 00009769 · 00009771" ("we removed our sisters from their hiding places to undo
their femininity"); Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra
Leone, 26 August 1997 — DCT 32" ("fo1lowing the coup against the government of President Kabbah on 25 May
1997 by sections of the Sierra Leonean military and the RUF [...] rape became the order of the day"); Exhibit P-
078, "Sierra Leone 1998 · A year of atrocities against civilians, Amnesty International Report", pp. 1-31
("Women and girls have been systematically raped"); Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report:
Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone, 1 May 1998, End of Pages 1 to 4 - CMS PGS 23204 · 23207" (The report
also documents instances of rapes); Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report: Atrocities Against
Civilians in Sierra Leone, 1 May 1998, End of Pages 1 to 4 - CMS PGS 23204 · 23207" (reporting rapes); Exhibit P-
130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone,
S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 · 000042l7", p. 15, para. 81, ERN 4215 (reporting rapes); Exhibit P-081,
"Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 1, ERN 91 (describing a deliberate and systematic campaign of
rape by the AF RC and RUF since April l998"[...]"Women and girls have been raped or suffered other forms of
sexual assau1t") Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 3, ERN 91 ("Gir1s and women
have been systematically raped and forced into sexual s1avery"); Exhibit P-081, "UN Special Conference on
Sierra Leone: Protection of Human Rights Must be a Priority for the International Community, Amnesty
International, 24 July 1998" (reporting that children have been abducted by RUF/AFRC rebels and forced to
fight or forced into sexual s1avery"); Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council — First Progress Report of the
Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 — 00012386 — 00012400", ERN
12386 (The report condemns the rapes committed by the rebels in Sierra Leone).
15465 Counts 7 and 8 of the Indictment: Seefootnote on Unlawjizl killings; See also Exhibit P-297, "Sierra Leone
Humanitarian Situation Report 04-05 June 1997, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraphs 1, 2, 5 -
00004088 · 00004089" (CMS PGS 21395 - 21396) (reporting amputations); Exhibit P-300, "Sierra Leone
Humanitarian Situation Report 08-14 July 1997, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraph 7 -
00004093 (CMS PGS 21409)" ("President Kabbah urged the AFRC to step down to spare the people of Sierra
Leone further pain and suffering"); Exhibit P-301, "Statement by the President of the Security Council" 6
August 1997, pp. 1-4 (CMS 21405-21406) ("The United Nations Security Council condemned the continuing
violence and threats of violence by the junta towards the civilian population, foreign nationals and personnel of
the ECOWAS monitoring group, and c alls for an end to such acts of vio1ence"); Exhibit P-069, "United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1132, 8 October l997", p. 2 ("The Security Council condemned the situation in
Sierra Leone as a threat to the peace and states it is gravely concerned at the continued violence and loss of life
in Sierra Leone"); Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998 — A year of atrocities against civilians, Amnesty
International Report", pp. 1-31 ("The report documents the human rights violations committed by the AF RC and
RUF after the military coup, including killings and torture" [...]From April 1998 reports emerged of civilians
V suffering mutilations such as crude amputations of their feet, hands, arms, lips or ears"); Exhibit P-303, "Sierra
Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report, 98.02.17., 21 January - 12 February 1998, Paragraphs 1 (part), 3, 9, 16
(A) - CSM PGS - 21422 — 21424" ("AFRC casualties are known to be high and many civilians have been killed
and injured"); Exhibit P-304, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-30 April 1998, Paragraphs 1, 5
(Part), 6 - CSM PGS 21428 — 21429" ("The report documents that the fighting between ECOMOG and the
RUF/Junta is creating a severe humanitarian situation. It includes summary reports on victims of the violence,
including widespread muti1ations"); Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report: Atrocities Against
Civilians in Sierra Leone, 1 May 1998, End of Pages 1 to 4 - CMS PGS 23204 · 23207 (The report states there has been
an alarming increase in the number of mutilations); Exhibit D-175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report
of the Secretary—Genera1 on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/1 176, 16 December
1998 — DCT l02" (The report documents the widespread rebel attacks on civilian populations, involving
decapitations and amputations); Exhibit P-356B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 ·
D000507, 22 January 1999", p. 23628 (The journalist reported widespread amputations).
15466 Count 9 of the Indictment: Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998 — A year of atrocities against civilians,
Amnesty International Report", pp. 1-31 ("Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and
women, have been abducted by rebel forces"); Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p.
3, ERN 91 ("thousands of children have been and continue to be abducted by AFRC and RUF forces and forced
to fight" [...] "In June 1998 the UN Security Council, condemning the abduction, sexual abuse and recruitment
and use in hostilities of children, said that it would pay serious attention to the situation of children affected by

---- End of Page 2402 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

C/ O 9‘7S7
armed conflict"); Exhibit P-334, "Amnesty Intemational Report, Sierra Leone: Childhood - A Casualty of
Conflict, 31 August 2000, End of Pages 1 and 15 - CMS PGS 23342 — 23356" (The report states that more than 5,000
children have fought as combatants in Sierra Leone's intemal armed conflict. Most of the children have been
abducted by both the armed opposition and forces fighting in support of the govemment. The children have been
forced to kill and mutilate others. A further 5,000 children have been associated with rebel forces although not
directly deployed in combat, and many of the girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery. The figures
are provided by the United Nations Children's Fund. Since 2000 the RUF have continued to abduct and forcibly
recruit child combatants).
wm Count 10 of the Indictment: Exhibit P—080, "UN Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 — 00012386 — 00012400", ERN 12386
(The report condemns the actions of the rebels in Sierra Leone including the taking of civilian captives); Exhibit
D-175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary—General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/1176, 16 December 1998 — DCT 102" (The report documents the widespread
rebel attacks on civilian populations, involving abduction); Exhibit P-079, "Doctors without Borders/Medecins
sans Frontieres (MSF) Press Release - Mutilation of Civilians on the increase in Sierra Leone, 5 May 1998"
(reporting kidnappings); Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General
on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217", P. 15, para. 81, ERN 4215
(reporting forced labour); Exhibit D-175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary—General
on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/1176, 16 December 1998 — DCT 102"
(reporting widespread abductions); Exhibit P-357B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 -
D0000508, 23 January 1999 - CMS PGS 23629-23630" (reporting abductions); Exhibit P-313, "UN Security
Council, Sixth Report Of the Secretary-General On the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone,
S/1999/645, 4 June 1999, Paragraphs 5-7, 9, 19-20, 28-33, 40 (Part), 48 B (Part), 63, 64 (Part), 69 - 00012323,
00012326 — 000l2332", pp. 6-9, ERN 00012327-00012330 (reporting abductions).
15468 Count 11 of the Indictment: Exhibit P-297, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 04-05 June 1997,
UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraphs 1, 2, 5 - 00004088 - 00004089 (CMS PGS 21395 - 21396)"
(The UN report details the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone at the time, which included concems about
looting and shortage of basic amenities); Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the
Situation in Sierra Leone, 26 August 1997 — DCT 32" (After the coup, "massive looting of property [...] became
the order of the day"); Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of
State, Abuja, Nigeria, 26—27 August 1997 — DCT 76 (27 End of Pages)" ("The coup was very bloody and was followed
by massive looting and vandalisation of public and private properties and the opening of the prisons by the
junta"); Exhibit D-155, "UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra
Leone, S/1998/2449, 18 March 1998 — DCT 189" (The report describes the intervention by ECOMOG in
Freetown on 13 February 1998 and the widespread looting and some reprisal killings which accompanied the
junta's expulsion); Exhibit P-304, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-30 April 1998, Paragraphs 1,
5 (Part), 6 - CSM PGS 21428 — 21429" (the exhibit includes summary reports on victims of the violence,
including widespread mutilations and looting); Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of
the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 — 00004217", P. 15,
para. 81, ERN 4215 (The report condemns the actions of the Junta in Sierra Leone and states that they have been
attacking towns and villages, terrorising local populations and extorting food from them. The report also mention
other incidents of looting); Exhibit D-175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary—
General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/ 1 176, 16 December 1998 4 DCT 102"
(reporting widespread looting); Exhibit P-341A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December 1998;" Exhibit P-
342B, "BBC Focus on Africa Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590 (reporting looting); Exhibit P-308, "UN
Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone, 7 January 1999", p. 21477 (reporting the looting and burning of properties).
mw Count 1 of the Indictment: See above; See also Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth
Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 —
00004217", P. 15, para. 81, ERN 4215 (The report condemns the actions of the Junta in Sierra Leone and states
that they have been attacking towns and villages, terrorising local populations and extorting food from them);
Prosecution Exhibit P-306 and Defence Exhibit D-169, "UN Security Council, Second Progress Report of the
Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/960, 16 October 1998 —
DCT 170" (The report documents that following the arrest of Foday Sankoh, the RUF announced, on 17 August
l998, a terror campaign against the civilian population, CDF and ECOMOG if the Government failed to release
Sankoh within seven days); Exhibit P-356B, "Transcript — BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 — D000507,
22 January 1999", p. 23628 ("rebels have reverted to their terror campaign of amputating civilians").

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ` 18 May 2012

fz 0 M!
6890. The Accused himself admitted that by April 1998 if someone was providing support
to the AFRC/RUF, he "would be supporting a group engaged in a campaign of atrocities
against the civilian population of Sierra Leone".l5470 At that time, the Accused testified,
there were news reports of a "horrific campaign being waged against the civilian population
in Sierra Leone".l5 471 In a joint comrnuniqué with President Kabbah, dated 1 July 1998, the
Accused "strongly condemned the continuing rebel activities in Sierra Leone, as well as the
horrendous atrocities that had been committed there".l5472
6891. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is convinced that the Accused knew of
the AFRC/RUF's operational strategy and intent to commit crimes from the clear and
consistent information he received after his election.
Findings
6892. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was aware of the
crimes committed by the RUF/AFRC forces against civilians, including murder, abduction
of civilians including children, rape, amputation and looting, as early as August 1997 when
he became President of Liberia.
15470 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32394 ( "Q. Sir, let me ask you this: At this
point - let's even get a date so it will be clear to you. Let's say by April 1998, was it clear to you that anyone
who continued to provide support to the RUF and the AFRC would be supporting a group engaged in a
campaign against the civilian population of Sierra Leone? A. Well, I would say no because I was not aware that-
I was not aware of anyone that was giving - as you put the question, giving support to be aware that anyone that
would continue. So I really don't know how to answer this question"). But see p. 32395 ("Let's go back to my
question because I don't believe you've answered it. The question is not whether you were aware of people
providing support. The question is: If someone was providing support to the RUF/AFRC as of April 1998, they
would be supporting a group engaged in a campaign of atrocities against the civilian population of Sierra Leone.
Do you agree? A. Well, to an extent you could say yes, anybody that would supply would be doing it against the
civilians, yes").
Wm Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28274 ("Q. Now, first of all, the date, May, at
that time, Mr Taylor, were you aware that there was this horrific campaign being waged against the civilian
population in Sierra Leone? A. May of 1998, yes, there were news reports of that, yes").; Transcript 18 January
2010, p. 33403 ("Q. You would agree that an horrific campaign was being waged against civilians in Sierra
Leone after the intervention? You would agree with that, would you not? A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes").
15472 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the
Chief Executive of Liberia, 2 August 1997- December 31 1998 - DCT 256 (398 End of Pages)", p. 298, para. 3. See
also Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25799-25804"; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp.
33405-33406.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-O1-T 18 May 2012

gz 0 449 7
IX. LEGAL FINDINGS ON RESPONSIBILITY
A. Article 6.1 of the Statute
l. Joint Criminal Enterprise
6893. The Indictment charges the Accused with individual criminal responsibility pursuant
to Article 6.1 for the crimes referred to in Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Statute as alleged in the
Indictment, which crimes amounted to or were involved within a common plan, design or
purpose in which the Accused participated, or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
such common plan, design or purpose. 15475
6894. The Prosecution submits that the Accused participated in a common plan, common
criminal purpose or design, also known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE), to forcibly control
the population and territory of Sierra Leone and to pillage its resources, in particular
diamonds, by the use of criminal means, speciiically a campaign of terror encompassing the
Indictment crimes, with members of the RUF, AFRC/RUF, Taylor's Special Security
Services (SSS), Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU), Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Liberia
National Police (LNP), Special Operations Division (SOD), and officials in his government
during his Presidency.15474 Members of these groups were either participants in the common
plan or were used by the Accused and other leaders and commanders as tools to implement
and achieve the agreed JCE.15475 The Prosecution further alleges that the Accused and the
other members of the JCE shared the intent to commit the Indictment Crimes, and the
Accused intended to participate in the common plan through criminal means — the
commission of the Indictment Crimes.15476
6895. The Prosecution submits that prior to the NPFL invasion of Liberia, the Accused,
Foday Sankoh and Kukoi Samba Sanyang a.k.a Dr Manneh (a Gambian dissident), at
various meetings in Libya, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and Voinjama in Liberia, "formed
common cause" whereby Sankoh and Dr Manneh agreed to assist Taylor in waging war in
Liberia, and the Accused in return agreed to assist Dr Manneh and Sankoh to wage war in
their respective countries. Thereafter, Sankoh's group and Dr Manneh's group assisted the
15475 Indictment, para. 33.
15474 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 574-587.
15475 Prosecution Final Trial Brief] para. 580.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T J {ig % 18 May 2012

Cf 0 if 75
Accused's NPFL in waging war against Liberia.*5477 The Prosecution further submits that
the 1991 invasion of Sierra Leone was the prelude to the achievement of the ultimate
objectives of the J CE and that thereafter, the Accused and other members of the J CE worked
in unison throughout the Sierra Leone conflict to put the J CE into effect.*5448 The
Prosecution further submits that the Accused's participation in the J CE through the
provision of vital instruction, direction, guidance, materiel, manpower, communications
capability, strategic command and other support, contributed significantly to the commission
of the Indictment crimes, the survival of the other JCE participants and prolonged the
conf1ict.*547° Lastly, the Prosecution submits that the Accused and the other members of the
J CE intended to participate in the common plan through criminal means, namely, the
commission of the Indictment crimes.*548O
6896. The Defence submits that the evidence as whole, including all the surrounding
circumstances, fails to establish a J CE, as charged or at all, and that the Accused had nothing
to do with and was not even aware of the crimes he is charged with. In the alternative, the
Defence submits that if there was any common plan between Taylor and Sankoh, the plan
was certainly not criminal and did not involve a campaign of terror against the people of
Sierra Leone. Alternatively, it is submitted that that J CE would have ended in 1992 after the
so called Top Final operation, and if not at that point, the J CE would in any event have
ended when the AFRC Junta came to power in May 1997.*548*
6897. In order to find the Accused guilty of committing the crimes charged in Counts 1 to
11 of the Indictment through participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise, the Trial Chamber
must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused participated in a common plan,
design or purpose with others, which amounts to or involves the commissions of the crimes
charged. The Accused's participation in the common plan must have made at least a
"significant" contribution to the common purpose.*5482 Furthermore, for liability under the
first form of JCE the Trial Chamber must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused both intended the commission of the crime and intended to participate in a common
*5476 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 588-594.
*5477 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 51-53.
*5478 Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 574-579.
*5479 Prosecution Final Trial Brief; paras 581-587.
*5440 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 588-594.
*548* Defence Final Trial Brief paras 733-735.

---- End of Page 2406 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol-T 2406 / 18 May 2012

rvrri
plan aimed at its commission. For liability under the third form of J CE the Trial Chamber
must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused both intended to take part in and
contribute to the common plan and had sufficient knowledge that the additional crime might
be perpetrated by a member of the group, or a person used by a member of the group, and
willingly took the risk by continuing to participate in the common plan.15483
6898. The Trial Chamber recalls its Decision that "[t]he Prosecution has adequately
fulfilled the pleading requirements of the alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Second
Amended Indictment, and has provided sufficient detail to put the Accused on notice of the
case against him". The Trial Chamber identified the "common purpose" of the alleged Joint
Criminal Enterprise (J CE), as "a campaign to terrorize the civilian population of the
Republic of Sierra Leone, of which the crimes charged in Counts 2-ll of the Indictment
were either an integral part, or a foreseeable consequence thereof".15484 This decision was
upheld by the Appeals Chamber.15485
6899. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that the Prosecution's theory of J CE has evolved
and shifted over the course of the proceedings. In its Final Trial Brief, the Prosecution
alleges that the use of criminal means, a campaign of terror, encompassed the Indictment
Crimes, "in order to achieve the ultimate objective of the JCE, to forcibly control the
population and territory of Sierra Leone and to pillage its resources, in particular
diamonds".15486 The Prosecution further contends that thereafter the joint actions of the
Accused and other participants of the J CE were geared toward those dual objectives.15487
6900. The Trial Chamber has found that the Prosecution failed to prove that prior to 1996
the Accused, Foday Sankoh and Kukoi Samba Sanyang (a.k.a Dr Manneh), participated in
any common plan involving the commission of the crimes alleged in the Indictment, nor that
the alleged meetings in Libya, Burkina Faso and Voinjama, where the common plan is
15442 Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility.
15443 Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility.
44434-Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-2003-0I-T-752, Decision on Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal defect in
the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of JCE, 27 February 2009, paras 70-76.
15445 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-T, Appeals Chamber Decision on Defence Notice of Appeal and
Submissions Regarding The Majority Decision Concerning the Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended
lndictment", I May 2009 ("Taylor Appeal Decision on JCE Pleading")
15446 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 574
15487 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 575

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T \iq~{_ l8 May 2012

¢05??
alleged to have been established, ever took place}5488 Furthermore, while the Trial Chamber
found that the Accused provided significant operational and military support to the RUF
during its 1991 invasion of Sierra Leone, the evidence does not indicate that this support
was provided pursuant to a common plan within the context of a joint criminal enterprise.
6901. Subsequently, the nature of the relationship between the Accused and the RUF, and
later the RUF/AFRC, evolved over time. While the relationship was a mutually beneficial
one, the Trial Chamber is of the view that it was the expression of converging and
synergistic interests, rather than "a common plan to terrorize the civilian population of Sierra
Leone". As these interests evolved, the relationship evolved accordingly.
6902. The Trial Chamber has found that although the Accused supported the creation of the
RUF, providing training camps and other forms of support in the early 1990s, and that
Taylor's NPFL forces participated in the invasion of Sierra Leone in March 1991,, the
Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Taylor's support for the 1991
invasion of Sierra Leone was undertaken pursuant to "a common purpose to terrorize the
civilian population of Sierra Leone". The evidence instead shows that the Accused and the
RUF had common enemies, namely, ULIMO, a Liberian insurgency group in Sierra Leone
and the Sierra Leone Govemment forces which supported ULIMO, and it was in the interest
of the Accused and the RUF both to join forces against their common enemies}5489
6903. The Trial Chamber has also found that the Prosecution failed to prove its allegation
that during this period the NPFL trained the RUF recruits in terror tactics in accordance with
the J CE}5490 In fact, Prosecution witnesses testified to the contrary, that training included
the Geneva Convention protections for civilians in armed conflict.l549l Moreover, it is clear
that the RUF strongly opposed some of the crimes committed by NPFL soldiers against the
Sierra Leonean civilian population leading to Top 20 and Top 40.15492 For this reason, the
Trial Chamber considers that even if there were joint military operations between the NPFL
*5*88 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996).
Img Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.
I5490 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996).
mm See for example TF1-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2185-2206 (CS); TF1-168, Transcript 21 January
2009 p. 23182 (CS); Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23395-23396 (CS). See also Pre-Indictment Period (1998-
1996): Camp Naama..
ISM TF1-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2238-2239 (CS); Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9860-
9861; TF1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23211-23213 (CS); Yanks Smythe, Transcript 22 February
2010, p. 35678; Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 2010, pp. 38905-38912; DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, pp.

---- End of Page 2408 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T 2408 18 May 2012 `@

4/0jU/
and RUF in the early l990s, which the evidence indicates there was, the Prosecution failed
to establish they were undertaken pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise. Cooperation
between the NPFL and RUF was limited in its purpose and it was military, not criminal, in T
its nature. Moreover, it continued only until Top Final in 1992, at which point, because of
the criminal activities of the NPFL troops towards the Sierra Leonean citizens, and due to
intensified attacks from ULIMO and the SLA, the cooperation ended with the withdrawal of
the NPFL troops from Sierra Leone by the Accused. The Trial Chamber has found that the
relationship between Taylor and the RUF significantly waned after Top Final but that the
Accused provided low-level support to the RUF as it continued fighting in Sierra Leone,
while the Accused was himself fighting in Liberia. 45443
6904. The Trial Chamber observes that the relationship between the RUF and the Accused
resumed a higher level of activity following the election of the Accused as President of
Liberia in 1997. At this point, the Accused was in a position to play a significantly expanded
role in Sierra Leone, both in terms of political and military support to the RUF. However, in
the Trial Chamber's view the Prosecution failed to prove that this support was provided
pursuant to "a common plan to terrorize the civilian population of Sierra Leone". Rather,
the evidence relating to the support provided indicates that there was a quid pro quo in the
relations between the RUF and the Accused. The trading of diamonds for arms is the clearest
example of this quid pro quo, and a number of statements attributed to the Accused indicate
the interest he had in providing weapons or facilitating the provision of weapons to the RUF
in exchange for diamonds. 45494
6905. ln the Trial Chamber's view, this evidence clearly shows that the Accused and the
RUF were military allies and trading partners, but it is an insufficient basis to find beyond
reasonable doubt that the Accused was part of any J CE.
6906. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused participated in a common plan, design or purpose which amounted to
or involved the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. For this reason
the Trial Chamber finds the Accused not criminally responsible pursuant to Article 6.l of
41882-41893. See also Pre-Indictment Period (1998-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone,.
45444 Pre-Indictment Period (1998-1996): Conclusion,
44444 Military Operations,


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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2409 / 18 May 2012

2/0;z>2
the Statute for the Indictment crimes by virtue of having participated in a Joint Criminal
Enterprise.
2. Aiding and Abetting
6907. The Indictment charges that the Accused, by his acts or omissions, is individually
criminally responsible pursuant to Article 6.1 of the Statute for aiding and abetting the
planning, preparation or execution of the crimes referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the
Statute as alleged in the Indictment.*5495
6908. In particular, the Prosecution submits that the Accused gave practical assistance,
encouragement and moral support which had a significant and substantial effect on the
commission of the Indictment crimes,*54% in particular by providing "strategic instruction,
direction, guidance, maintaining an effective RUF, AFRC/RUF alliance, providing vital
arms and ammunition, manpower, creating and maintaining a linked communications
network, providing safe haven, other support, and exercise of strategic command over these
forces, either individually or in concert with or through the on-the-ground leaders of his
proxy forces in Sierra Leone".*5497 The Prosecution further submits that the Accused had the
requisite knowledge or awareness that his conduct would substantially assist the RUF and
RUF/AFRC to commit the crimes charged in Counts 1 to ll of the Indictment.*5498
6909. The Defence denies that the Accused is responsible for aiding and abetting the
commission of any of the crimes charged in the Indictment. The Defence denies that the
Accused provided any forin of assistance to the RUF and submits that the Prosecution
presented "fabricated and generalized stories [which] offer nothing truly substantive upon
which the Trial Chamber can rely beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction". *5499
6910. In order to find the Accused criminally responsible pursuant to Article 6.1 of the
Statute for aiding and abetting the planning, preparation or execution of the crimes charged
in Counts 1 to ll of the Indictment, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the Accused provided practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support
*5495 Indictment, para.33.
*54% Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 595—601
*5497 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 49.
*5498 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 600-601.
*549q Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 197.

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Case No.; scsr-03-01-T % 18 May 2012 %

c/esi?
which had a substantial effect upon the commission of the crimes (actus reus).l55OO
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
knew that his acts or omissions would assist the commission of the crime, or that he was
aware of the substantial likelihood that his acts would assist the commission of the crime,
and that the Accused was aware of the "essential e1ements" of the crime committed by the
principal offender, including the state of mind of the principal offender (mens rea). 15501
6911. Before turning to the various fonns of assistance provided by the Accused to the
RUF/AFRC, the Trial Chamber recalls its findings regarding the RUF/AFRC's war strategy.
Throughout the Indictment period, the operational strategy of the RUF and AFRC was
characterized by a campaign of crimes against the Sierra Leonean civilian population,
including murders, rapes, sexual slavery, looting, abductions, forced labour, conscription of
child soldiers, amputations and other fonns of physical violence and acts of terror.l5502
These crimes were inextricably linked to the strategy and objectives of the military
operations themse1ves.l55O3 The RUF/AFRC pursued a policy and strategy of committing
crimes against the civilian population in order to achieve military gains, and also politically A
in order to attract the attention of the international community and to heighten their
negotiating stance with the Sierra Leonean Government. This strategy entailing a campaign
of terror against the civilian population is explicitly demonstrated by the overt names of their
military campaigns, such as "Operation Pay Yourself", "Operation No Living Thing" and
"Operation Spare No Soul". The Trial Chamber therefore considers that any assistance
towards these military operations of the RUF and RUF/AFRC constitutes direct assistance to
the commission of crimes by these groups.
6912. The Trial Chamber will now consider the various fonns of assistance provided by the
Accused to the AFRC/RUF and whether his conduct satisfies the actus reus and mens rea of
aiding and abetting the crimes charged in the Indictment.
(a) Findings on the Physical Elements of Aiding and Abetting
(i) Arms and Ammunition
*5500 Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility.
lm] Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility.
*5502 The War Strategy of the RUF/AFRC.
Hm The War Strategy of the RUF/AFRC.

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Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol-T / 18 May 2012

(/@@96
6913. The Prosecution submits that the Accused, both personally and through his
subordinates, directly supplied and facilitated the supply of essential "materiel" (arms and
ammunition) which substantially contributed to the RUF's attacks and control of territory
throughout the Indictment Period.15504 In particular, the Prosecution alleges that the Accused
provided a "steady stream" of materiel critical to a successful initial invasion and the
subsequent expansion into Sierra Leone. Throughout the remainder of the conflict the
Accused provided the RUF and RUF/AFRC with a wide variety of arms and ammunition.
After access to the border was severely restricted, this assistance was most directly provided
during the period from 1997 through 2001.155 115 The Prosecution contends that "the materiel
provided contributed significantly to the crimes committed in Sierra Leone by the RUF,
AFRC/RUF and/or Taylor's Liberian fighters, enabling these forces to carry out their
campaign of terror as charged in Counts 1-11 of the Indictment, in order to pillage the Sierra
Leone diamonds and to forcibly control the people and territory of Sierra Leone". 15506
6914. The Prosecution submits that the materiel provided included AK-47 rifles, AK
rounds, GPMG and rounds, grenades, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, RPGs and RPG
rockets, mortars, M203 guns, GMG, G3, LAR, LMG, Beretta rifles, SMGs and associated
ammunition, BZTs, anti-aircraft guns, land mines and weapons used to shoot down
ECOMOG Alpha jets a.k.a. "chasers".15507
6915. The Defence denies that the Accused was in any way involved in the supply of
military equipment to the RUF and AFRC during the Indictment Period. The Defence
further submits that any assistance provided by sources in Liberia made no substantial
contribution to the commission of the crimes pleaded in the Indictment because the RUF and
RUF/AFRC's primary sources of military equipment were in fact weapons captured from
ECOMOG, from government stores when the groups acted as the Junta government and
from arms trading with Guinea and former ULIMO combatants. 15508
6916. The Trial Chamber has found that during the Indictment period, the Accused directly
or through intermediaries supplied or facilitated the supply of arms and ammunition to the
15504 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 2.
15505 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 206.
15506 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 206.
15507 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 208.
15508 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1033-1034, 1131. ,

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Case No.; - - 1- % é is May 1 M

IXQQS
RUF/AFRC. The Accused sent small but regular supplies of arins and ammunition and
other supplies to the RUF from late 1997 to 1998 via his subordinates, and substantial
amounts of arins and ammunition to the AFRC/RUF from 1998 to 2001.15509 The Accused
facilitated much larger shipments of arins and ammunition from third party states to the
AFRC/RUF, including the Magburaka shipment of October 1997 and the Burkina Faso
shipment of November/December 1998.15510
6917. The Trial Chamber has found that the arins and ammunition provided by the
Accused were used by the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and Liberian fighters
during various military offensives in which crimes were committed, including the Junta
mining operations at Tongo Fields prior to the ECOMOG Intervention, "Operation Pay
Yourse1f" and subsequent offensives in Kono District in 1998, and in the Freetown invasion
in January 1999, and attacks on the outskirts of Freetown and the Western Area in late
January to early February 1999.15511 The Trial Chamber has found that arins and
ammunition provided by the Accused were used by SAJ Musa and Denis Mingo (a.k.a.
Superinan) in attacks on Mongor Bendugu and Kabala shortly after Operation Fitti—Fatta in
mid—l998, as well as by the AFRC group led by Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Hassan
Papa Bangura (a.k.a. Bomb Blast), and Ibrahim Kamara (a.k.a. Bazzy) in their activities in
the Koinadugu and Bombali Districts from June to October 1998.15512 These operations
involved widespread or systematic attacks on the civilian population and the commission of
crimes, specifically acts of terrorism (Count 1), murder (Counts 2 and 3), rape (Count 4),
sexual slavery (Count 5), outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6), cruel treatment (Count
7), other inhumane acts (Count 8), conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15
years into arined forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities (Count
9), enslavement (Count 10), and pillage (Count 1 1).
6918. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the provision and facilitation
of these arms and ammunition by the Accused constituted practical assistance to the
commission of crimes by the RUF and RUF/AFRC during the Indictment period. The Trial
Chamber will now consider whether this assistance had a substantial effect on the
commission of the Indictment crimes.
15509 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused.
155111 Arms and Ammunition: Conclusion.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T / 18 May 2012

Jvsvé
6919. The Trial Chamber has considered the Defence submission that any assistance
provided by sources in Liberia made no substantial contribution to the commission of the
crimes pleaded in the Indictment because the RUF and RUF/AFRC's primary sources of
military equipment were in fact weapons captured from ECOMOG, from government stores
when the groups acted as the Junta government and from arms trading with Guinea and
former ULIMO combatants. The Trial Chamber is also mindful that the applicable law for
aiding and abetting does not require that the Accused be the only source of assistance in
order for his contribution to be substantial.*55*3 The Chamber has found that in addition to
receiving arms and ammunition from the Accused, the RUF, AFRC/RUF also obtained
supplies from the existing stockpiles of the Kabbah Government when they took over power
in May 1997, by capturing them from ECOMOG and UN peacekeepers, and through trade
with ULIMO, AF L and ECOMOG commanders. However, these sources of materiel were of
minor importance in comparison to that supplied or facilitated by the Accused.*55*4 The Trial
Chamber has found that the additional sources of supply which the RUF/AFRC had could
not provide sufficient quantities of materiel to sustain the existence and military operations
of the rebels.*55*5
6920. The Trial Chamber has also found that the RUF/AFRC in fact heavily and frequently
relied on the materiel supplied and facilitated by the Accused. The depletion of RUF arms
C and ammunition was a problem which often prompted Bockarie and Sesay to turn to the
Accused, and the Magburaka shipment is but one example of this.*55*6 The Trial Chamber
further recalls its finding that the materiel supplied by or facilitated by the Accused often
contributed to and was causally linked to the capture of more supplies by the RUF and
AFRC.*55*7 The Trial Chamber has found that although there were instances in which the
materiel that the Accused gave to the RUF/AFRC was more limited in quantity,*55*8 on a
number of occasions the arms and ammunitions which he supplied or facilitated were in fact
indispensable for the RUF/AF RC military offensives. The materiel provided or facilitated by
*55 ** Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.
*55*2 Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused.
*55*3 Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility. See also Perisié Trial Judgement, para. 1601.
*55*4 Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel supplied or facilitated by the Accused.
*55*5 Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel.
*55*6 Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel.
*55*7 Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel
*55*8 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused.

---- End of Page 2414 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL— — 1-T 18 May 2012
2 M

gzvfv 9
the Accused was critical in enabling the operational strategy of the RUF and the AFRC
during the Indictment period .l55l9
6921. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the provision and facilitation of the supply
of arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC had a substantial effect on the commission of
crimes charged in the Indictment.
(ii) Military Personnel
6922. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided military personnel or ‘manpower’
to the RUF in the early 1990s and to the AFRC/RUF during the Junta period and throughout
the Indictment period, from the NPFL and other organized groups in Liberia; by forcibly
repatriating Sierra Leonean refugees and civilians living in Liberia; and, after he became
President, from the AFL, SSS, ATU and LNP.l552O The Prosecution submits that the
provision of these personnel substantially contributed to the commission of the crimes
charged in the Indictment. I 5521
6923. The Defence denies that the Accused sent manpower to the RUF or to the
AFRC/RUF during the Indictment period which substantially contributed to the commission
of crimes.l5522
6924. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused sent a group of approximately 20 ex-
NPFL fighters who had been integrated into the Armed Forces of Liberia ("AFL") to Sierra
Leone. These 20 fighters fought in Karina and Kamalo in Bombali District in
August/September 1998 as part of a group of 200 AFRC/RUF fighters. The 20 fighters were
later on incorporated into the Red Lion Battalion, which was comprised of 200 fighters. The
Red Lion Battalion formed part of a group of 1,000 AFRC/RUF fighters who participated in
the invasion of Freetown and committed crimes during the course of military operations in
December 1998/January 1999.15523
6925. The Trial Chamber further found that the Accused sent Abu Keita and 150 fighters
known as the Scorpion Unit, to serve as a standby force in Sierra Leone, ready to protect
H5 lg Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel.
Hm Prosecution Final Trial Brief; para. 282.
B52] Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 599.
Um Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 48. i

---- End of Page 2415 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL~03~0l~T / jig 18 May 2012

z,¢0$"05’
Liberia from attacks coming from Guinea. Bockarie integrated the Scorpion Unit into the
RUF, a decision approved by Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) on behalf of the Accused,l5524
and the reinforcements subsequently participated in the attack on Kono and Freetown,
including the attack on Kenema. During this attack, crimes charged in Count 1 to 11 of the
Indictment took place.
6926. The Trial Chamber further found that the Accused reorganized, armed and sent
former SLA fighters who had retreated to Liberia back to Sierra Leone to fight in the Kono
and Freetown operations, and these men participated in the attack on Kono in December
1998.l5525 The Trial Chamber has found that Liberian authorities and RUF/AFRC members
recruited and forced Sierra Leonean refugees residing in Liberia to return to Sie1Ta Leone to
fight. However, the evidence did not establish that these civilians participated in attacks in
Sierra Leone.
6927. The Trial Chamber finds that the provision of military persormel by the Accused
constitutes practical assistance to the commission of crimes by the RUF/AFRC during the
Indictment period. The Trial Chamber will now consider whether this assistance was
substantial.
6928. The Trial Chamber notes that Abu Keita was a former ULIMO general and therefore
a person with high—level military expertise. He was sent by the Accused with approximately
150 fighters, who were tasked with the important mission of defending Liberia in case of an
incursion from Guinea.l5526 The Trial Chamber therefore considers that this was a relatively
experienced military force, and that its subsequent inclusion within the ranks of the RUF and
its deployment in the December 1998 attack on Kenema substantially contributed to the
commission of crimes during the Freetown invasion.
6929. The Trial Chamber notes, with regard to the 20 AFL fighters who fought in the Red
Lion Battalion that evidence was given to the effect that the Red Lion Battalion was an
extremely fierce unit, which boosted the morale of the other RUF soldiers who were glad to
{Sm Provision of Military Personnel: Allegations Related to to the Red Lion Battalion.
*5524 Provision of Military Personnel: Scorpion Unit.
*5525 Provision of Military Personnel: Repatriation of Sierra Leoneans.
{Sm Provision of Military Personnel: Scorpion Unit.

---- End of Page 2416 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-01-T 18 May 2012

xm sb'?
fight alongside these soldiers}5527 A witness explained that their fierceness was because
most of the soldiers who were in the Red Lion Battalion "had no relations in Freetown, not
like us who had family members in Freetown, so they didn't care". 15528
6930. The Trial Chamber finds that taken cumulatively, and in addition to the arms and
ammunition provided by the Accused, the military personnel provided by the Accused
constituted practical assistance which had a substantial effect on the commission of crimes
by the RUF and RUF/AF RC.
(iii) Operational Support
6931. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided different forms of operational
support to the RUF and RUF/AFRC including: providing communications equipment and
training,l5529 logistical support, safe haven,l5530 financial assistance,l553 I an RUF Guesthouse
in Monrovial5532 and medical support.l5533 The Accused also provided herbalists to bolster
fighters’ confidence before the ‘Fitti-Fatta’ Operation, and ‘facilitators’ who served as
security escorts for arms, ammunition and diamonds, drivers, messengers and liaisons
between the Accused and the AF RC/RUF .15534 The Prosecution submits that these forms of
assistance ensured the "continued existence of these groups"l5535 and thus substantially
contributed to the commission of the crimes charged in the 1ndictment.l5536
6932. The Defence acknowledges that there were certain instances in which the Accused
provided operational support to the RUF and RUF/AF RC but submits that he did so in order
to facilitate negotiations during the peace process and as such this assistance lacks any
connection to the RUF/AFRC commission of crimes}5537 The Defence further submits that
my Alimarny Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8319-8321.
{Sm Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8321.
{Sm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 7, 49, 93-94, 307.
*5530 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 329.
my Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 335.
*5532 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 333.
lm} Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 338.
{SSM Prosecution Final Trial Brief paras 283-306.
5535 Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 329.
{Sm Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 599.
{Sm The Defence concedes that the Accused provided both Bockarie and Sesay with satellite phones but only in
order to facilitate communications fer the purposes of the peace negotiations. See Defence Final Trial Brief
paras 73, 97, 531, 538, 574, 699, 702, 934, 961, 998-1006, 1520. The Defence also agrees that an RUF
Guesthouse was set up in Monrovia in October 1998 to ensure that the Government of Liberia could contact the

---- End of Page 2417 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

(/0570
this assistance could not have substantially contributed to the crimes charged in the
Indictment. @38
6933. The Trial Chamber has found that during the pre-Indictment period, NPFL radio
operators and equipment were sent to Sierra Leone, and RUF fighters were trained by the
NPFL radio operators in radio communications, with the knowledge of the Accused. The
RUF continued to benefit into the Indictment period from the enhanced communications
capacity that resulted from this assistance. However, as the acts of the Accused took place
prior to the Indictment period, the Trial Chamber has not taken them into account in
determining criminal responsibility.
6934. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused also provided operational support to
the RUF/AFRC during the Indictment period. The Accused provided satellite phones to Sam
Bockarie and Issa Sesay and thus enhanced their capacity to plan, facilitate or order RUF
military operations during which crimes were committed. The Trial Chamber notes that the
Accused and Sam Bockarie cormnunicated by a satellite phone in furtherance of the
Freetown Invasion and other RUF/AFRC military activities during which crimes were
committed.15539
6935. The Trial Chamber has found that on different occasions RUF members, including
Foday Sankoh, Eddie Kanneh, Memunatu Deen and Dauda Aruna Fomie, used Liberian
radio communication equipment in Monrovia to communicate with the RUF in Sierra Leone
regarding arms shipments, diamond transactions and military operations.15540 In addition to
the equipment at the RUF Guesthouse, there is evidence that Base 1, the radio station at
Benjamin Yeaten's home, was used for communications with Bockarie and later Sesay.15541
The Trial Chamber notes its findings that these communications happened with the
knowledge and approval of the Accused}5542
RUF through their persormel at the house, again for the purposes of facilitating the peace process. See Defence
Final Trial Brief paras 101 1-1012. The Defence further concedes that that during a difficult period, the Accused
would allow injured RUF members to receive treatment in Liberia but states that this is a humanitarian assistance
and not a support of the military effort. See Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1 186.
wm Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 989, 998, 1027.
I5539 Operational Suppoit: Communications, Satellite Phones.
15540 Operational Support: Communications, Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF.
HSM Operational Support: Communications, Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF.
ISS42 Operational Support: Communications, Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF; Operational Support:
Communications, RUF and NPFL Codes and Communications.

---- End of Page 2418 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T & 18 May 2012

4¢0S7/
6936. The Trial Chamber has also found that "448 messages" were sent by subordinates of
the Accused in Liberia, with his knowledge, to wam the RUF of impending ECOMOG jet
attacks on AFRC/ RUF forces in Sierra Leone. [5544
6937. The Trial Chamber finds that the communications support provided by the Accused
to the RUF/AFRC constitutes practical assistance to the RUF/AFRC for the crimes
committed during the course of their military operations throughout the Indictment period.
6938. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused provided financial support to the
RUF/AFRC. In most instances, these funds were given to individual RUF members for
unspecified or personal use. After February l998, the Accused gave funds to Bockarie of
$l0,000 to $20,000 at a time, on multiple occasions for the purchase of arms from
ULIMO.[5544 The Accused also kept diamonds and money in "safekeeping" for the
RUF/AFRC.[4545
6939. The Trial Chamber found that the Accused also provided a guesthouse to the RUF in
Monrovia, which was used by the RUF to facilitate the transfer of arms and funds from the
Accused to the RUF and the delivery of diamonds from the RUF to the Accused.[5546
6940. The Trial Chamber also found that during the Indictment period, the Accused
provided the RUF/AFRC with security escorts, facilitation of access through checkpoints,
and much needed assistance with transport of arms and ammunition by road and by air. This
facilitation of road and air transportation of materiel, as well as security escorts, played a
vital role in the operations of the RUF/AFRC during a period when an international arms
embargo was in force.[5544
6941. The Trial Chamber further found that throughout the Indictment period the Accused
provided the RUF and RUF/AFRC with other forms of assistance which supported the well-
functioning and continued existence of these groups. The Accused provided safe haven for 4
RUF fighters during their retreat from Zogoda[5548 and medical support in Liberia for
[5544 Operational Support: Communications, "448" Warnings.
[5544 Operational Support: Support and Training, Financial Support; Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the
Accused Facilitated Supplies, Supplies from ULIMO.
[5545 Diamonds; Operational Support: Support and Training, Financial Support.
[5546 Operational Support: Provision of RUF Guesthouse in Monrovia.
[5544 Operational Support: Logistical Support.
[5444 Operational Support: Alleged Provision of Safe Havens.

---- End of Page 2419 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T 18 May 2012

C/0572.
treatment of wounded RUF fighters,15549 as well as provision of goods such as food,
clothing, cigarettes, alcohol and other supplies to the RUF. The Accused also sent
‘"herbalists" who marked fighters in Buedu and Kono to "protect" them against bullets and
bolster their confidence.1555O Liberian forces also assisted the RUF/AFRC with the capture
and return of deserters to Sierra Leone. 15551 1
6942. The Trial Chamber notes that a common feature of all of the aforementioned forms
of assistance is that they supported, sustained and enhanced the functioning of the RUF and
its capacity to undertake military operations in the course ofwhich crimes were committed.
The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the RUF and RUF/AFRC military campaign was
inextricably linked to the commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment. Therefore,
the Trial Chamber finds that these forms of operational support, including communications,
logistics, and the RUF Guesthouse, which improved coordination and facilitated the trade
for and vital flow of arms and ammunition to the RUF/AF RC, constitute practical assistance
for the commission of crimes charged in Count 1 to 11 of the Indictment.
6943. Taken cumulatively, and having regard to the military support provided by the
Accused to the AFRC/RUF, the Trial Chamber finds that the operational support provided
by the Accused to the AFRC/RUF had a substantial effect on the cornrnission of crimes
charged in Count 1 to 11 of the Indictment.
(iv) Encouragement and Moral Support
6944. The Prosecution alleges that "throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone, Taylor
continued to provide the leaders of the RUF, AFRC/RUF with strategic instruction, direction
and guidance in relation to a range of political, military and other matters".15552 The
Prosecution submits that through this action, the Accused substantially contributed to the
commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment. 15553
15549 Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged Medical and Other Support.
15550 Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged Provision of Herbalists.
1555 1 Provision of Military Personnel: Alleged Cooperation in Return of Deserters to Sierra Leone.
15552 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 119.
‘"" Prosecution rmi rmi Brief, para. 599.

---- End of Page 2420 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T 18 May 2012

¢05'/3
6945. The Defence argues that the Accused "neither gave the RUF nor the Junta any
instructions to carry out atrocities"15554 and denies any such contact between the Accused
and the RUF and RUF/AFRC.15555 The Defence further generally submits that the
Prosecution's evidence does not support a conviction for aiding and abetting.15556
6946. The Trial Chamber has considered the ongoing communication and consultation
between the Accused and the RUF/AFRC leadership, and the ongoing advice and
encouragement that the Accused provided to the RUF/AFRC.
6947. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused advised Sankoh to participate in the
Abidjan peace talks in 1996 in order to obtain arms and ammunition for the RUF, and that
the RUF did obtain arms and ammunition in Abidjan. While pre-Indictment, the Trial
Chamber considers this incident to show a pattern of conduct by the Accused that continued
into and during the Indictment period.
6948. The Trial Chamber also found that in February 1998 the Accused told Johnny Paul
Koroma to capture Kono and, after RUF/AFRC forces carried out two consecutive attacks
on Koidu Town, subsequently told Bockarie that the RUF should keep control over this area
for the purpose of maintaining the trade of diamonds for arms and ammunition.15557 The
Trial Chamber further found that the Accused advised Bockarie to recapture Kono in mid-
June 1998 in order to mine diamonds which would be used to purchase arms and
ammunition, following which the RUF carried out Operation Fitti-Fatta.15558 .
6949. The Trial Chamber also found that after the Intervention in 1998, the Accused told
Bockarie that the RUF should construct or re-prepare the airfield in Buedu, so that arms and
ammunitions can be shipped to RUF/AFRC controlled territory.15559 The Trial Chamber has
also found that in 1998, the Accused advised Sam Bockarie to open an RUF training base in
Bunumbu, Kailahun District, known as "Camp Lion".15560
15554 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 850.
15555 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 851.
15556 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. l 197.
15557 Military Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998).
15558 Military Operations: Operation F itti-Fatta.
15559 Operational Support: Support and Training, Alleged Order to Build an Airfield in Buedu,
15560 Operational Support: Support and Training, Bunumbu Training Camp.

---- End of Page 2421 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

{MS//P
6950. The Trial Chamber finds that by giving advice and direction to the RUF and
RUF/AFRC on matters concerning or directly affecting their military strategy, the Accused
encouraged and morally supported the commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment.
6951. The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused held a position of authority as an elder
statesman and as President of Liberia. As such, he was accorded deference by the RUF and
RUF/AF RC and, as demonstrated by the evidence, his advice was generally heeded by them.
The Trial Chamber is therefore convinced that the approval, support and encouragement
which the RUF and RUF/AFRC troops received from the Accused greatly boosted their
confidence and morale when conducting military operations.
6952. Taken cumulatively, and considering the other forms of practical assistance which
the Accused provided, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused
substantially contributed to the commission of the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 11 of the
Indictment by rendering encouragement and moral support to the RUF and RUF/AFRC.
(b) Findings on the Mental Elements of Aiding and Abetting
6953. The Trial Chamber recalls that as early as August 1997, the Accused knew of the
atrocities being committed against civilians in Sierra Leone by the RUF and RUF/AFRC
forces and of their propensity to commit crimes. The Accused acknowledged that when he
became the President of Liberia, he started receiving daily briefings from his national
security advisor which would include press and intelligence reports regarding the situation in
Sierra Leone.l5 5 61 ln addition to this, as a member of ECOWAS, the Accused was also privy
to numerous reports which described the "massive looting of property, murder and
rapes"l5562 that were being committed on the territory of Sierra Leone.l5563
6954. The Trial Chamber further recalls that the Accused testified that at that time there
were news reports of a "horrific campaign being waged against the civilian population in
Sierra Leone".l5564 ln a statement dated July 1998, Taylor "strongly condemned the
ISSN Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24333; Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28265-
28268; Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31713; Transcript 14 January 2010, p. 33382; Transcript 18 January
2010, p. 33441; Transcript 26 January 2010, pp. 34130-34133.
*5552 Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 26 August
1997 — DCT 32".
l55°3 Knowledge of the Accused.
ISS64 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28274; Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33403.

---- End of Page 2422 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T "/ qw 18 May 2012

({0,05
continuing rebel activities in Sierra Leone, as well as the horrendous atrocities that had been
committed there". 16666
6955. In light of the above, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused knew that his support to the RUF/AFRC would provide practical assistance,
encouragement or moral support to them in the commission of crimes during the course of
their military operations in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, he provided these groups with
practical assistance, encouragement and moral support.
6956. The Trial Chamber also finds that the Accused was aware of the "essentia1 elements"
of the crimes he was contributing to, including the state of mind of the perpetrators. The
Trial Chamber recalls the numerous contemporary public reports which described in detail
and over a large period of time each of the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 11 of the
lndictment.16666 The Trial Chamber also notes that after 1997 there was increased media
coverage on the RUF/AFRC terror campaign in Sierra Leone.16667 Such reports on the
16666 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32439.
16666 Knowledge of the Accused.
16667 See for example Exhibit P-078, "Sien‘a Leone 1998 — A year of atrocities against civilians, Amnesty
International Report", p. 1 ("During 1998 the scale of atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has reached
unprecedented levels. Several thousand unarmed civilians, including many women and children, have been
deliberately and arbitrarily killed and mutilated by forces of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AF RC)
and the armed opposition Revolutionary Front (RUF) since February 1998"); Exhibit P-385, "Daily News, 20
February l998" (reporting that "52 people burned alive as Junta goes on ramEnd of Page"); Exhibit D-155, "UN
Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 18 March l998"
(mentioning widespread looting and reprisal killings which accompanied the junta's expulsion); Exhibit P-304,
"Sien·a Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-30 April l998" (mentioning widespread mutilations and
looting); Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report: Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone, 1
May l998" (The report also documents instances of rapes and killings, including by being burned alive); Exhibit
P-079, "Doctors without Borders/Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) Press Release - Mutilation of Civilians on the
increase in Sierra Leone, 5 May l998" (executions, rapes and kidnappings); Exhibit P-130, "United Nations
Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary—General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/486, 9 June
l998" (The report condemns the actions of the Junta in Sierra Leone and states that they have been attacking
towns and villages, terrorising local populations and extorting food from them. There have also been incidents of
looting, property destruction, mutilations, rape, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions (including for purposes
of sexual abuse), torture and forced labour); Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July l998", p. l,
ERN 91 ("A deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF
"Operation no living thing" — has emerged since April l998"), p. 3 ("Children have been particular victims of
the violence and brutality in Sierra Leone. As well as being deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and
maimed, thousands of children have been and continue to be abducted by AFRC and RUF forces and forced to
fight. Girls and women have been systematically raped and forced into sexual slavery); Exhibit P-080, "UN
Security Council — First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone,
12 August l998" (The report condemns the actions of the rebels in Sierra Leone. Such actions have included the
destruction of property, the use of human-shields, rapes, executions, mutilations and the taking of civilian
captives); Exhibit D-169, "UN Security Council, Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/ 1998/960, 16 October 1998" (The report documents that following
the arrest of Foday Sankoh, the RUF announced, on 17 August 1998, a terror campaign against the civilian
population, CDF and ECOMOG if the Government failed to release Sankoh within seven days).

---- End of Page 2423 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T [ 18 May 2012

qv?/6
crimes taking place in Sierra Leone were at the core of discussions during meetings of the
ECOWAS Committee of Five (later Committee of Six), of which the Accused was a
member.
6957. In light of the above, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused was also aware of the
"essential elements" of the crimes committed by RUF and RUF/AFRC troops, including the
state of mind of the perpetrators.
6958. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused possessed the necessary mens rea for aiding and abetting in relation to the crimes
charged in Counts l to ll of the Indictment.
(c) Finding on the Accused's Criminal Responsibility for Aiding and Abetting the Crimes
Charged in the Indictment
6959. For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused is criminally responsible pursuant to Article 6(I) of the Statute for aiding and
abetting the commission of crimes set forth in Counts 1 through ll of the Indictment.
3. Planning
6960. The Accused is charged with individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article
6(I) of the Statute for planning the crimes referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statutes, as
alleged in the Indictment.l5568
6961. The Prosecution submits that the Accused, acting jointly with RUF, AFRC and
Liberian subordinates, designed or organized the commission of crimes, at both the
preparatory and execution phases, by designing a strategy for the AFRC Junta, the RUF and
AFRC forces, including selecting strategic areas to attack and control, such as Kono and the
capital Freetown, and organizing the delivery of` arms and ammunition needed to carry out
the attacks. The Prosecution submits that in all of his planning for war in Sierra Leone, the
Accused was aware of the substantial likelihood that his planning would result in the
commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment.l5569
Img Second Amended Indictment, para.33.
Img Prosecution Final Trial Brief para. 613. ‘
J ti

---- End of Page 2424 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL·03·0l-T 18 May 2012

405/ ?'
6962. The Defence submits that the evidence presented by the Prosecution is insufhcient to
establish that the Accused planned the commission of crimes alleged in the Indictment, or
was aware of the substantial likelihood that such crimes would be committed, as part of the
invasion of Freetown in January 1999. The Defence further submits that it was the AF RC,
not the RUF, who planned and executed this attack. {5570
6963. In order to find the Accused guilty of planning the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 11
of the Indictment, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused, alone or with others, intentionally planned the criminal conduct constituting the
crimes charged. While it is not a requirement that the crimes charged would not have been
perpetrated but for the Accused's plan, it is necessary to demonstrate that the plan was a
factor which substantially contributed to the commission of these crimes or underlying
offences.l557l Furthermore, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that the Accused intended that a crime or underlying offence be committed in the execution
of` that plan, or that he was aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime or underlying
offence would be committed in the execution of that plan. [5572
(a) Findings on the Physical Elements of Planning
6964. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that in November 1998, Sam Bockarie met
with the Accused in Monrovia, where the two of them designed a plan for the RUF/AFRC
forces to carry out a two-pronged attack on Kono and Kenema with the ultimate objective of
reaching Freetown, releasing Foday Sankoh from prison and regaining control.l5573 The
Accused emphasised to Bockarie that this military operation should be "fearful" in order to
pressure the Government into negotiations for the release of Foday Sankoh.l5574 Upon
returning to Sierra Leone in December 1998, Bockarie convened a meeting at Waterworks,
in Kailahun District, where he conveyed this plan to RUF and AFRC commanders. At the
end of the meeting Bockarie contacted the Accused via satellite phone. During the
conversation, the Accused told Bockarie to use "all means" to capture Freetown. [5575
{Sm Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1340.
[Sm Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility,.
[5572 Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility.
W3 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
W4 Military Operations; The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
15575 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.

---- End of Page 2425 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

405/X
6965. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Bockarie had the idea to attack Freetown
even before meeting with the Accused in Monrovia in November 1998. This is evident from
Bockarie's prior request to the Accused to assist him in obtaining a large amount of arms
and ammunition from Burkina Faso.l5576 However, the Trial Chamber notes that the actual
plan which established the various military targets and the modus dperandi of the attack was
designed during the November 1998 meeting between Bockarie and the Accused}5577 The
objective to capture Kono prior to moving to Freetown was integrated in the plan upon
advice from the Accused and the aim to make the operation "fearful" was articulated}5578
The Trial Chamber notes that the RUF and AFRC attacks which ensued on 17 December
1998 were directed towards the locations prescribed in the plan made by Bockarie and the P
Accused. 15579
6966. The Trial Chamber further recalls that in December 1998 and January 1999,
Bockarie was in frequent contact via radio or satellite phone with the Accused, either
directly or through Yeaten, to update him on the execution of the plan and the progress of
the Kono and Freetown operations. [5580
6967. In light of the above, the Trial Chamber finds that in November 1998, the Accused,
in concert with Bockarie, intentionally designed a plan for the RUF/AFRC Freetown
Invasion. The Trial Chamber will now consider whether this plan substantially contributed
to the crimes committed by RUF/AFRC fighters.
6968. The plan designed by Bockarie and the Accused led directly to the attacks on Kono
and Makeni. In the course of the implementation of this plan, a small contingent of troops
led by Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Rambo Red Goat) reached Freetown and Bockarie's forces got
to the outskirts of Freetown, where they met up with the forces led by Gullit. During the
course of the implementation of this plan, these forces committed crimes charged in the
Indictment. These crimes resulted directly from the plan made by Bockarie and the Accused
in Monrovia.
{Sm Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
{Sm Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
Img Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
Um Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
mso Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, Allegation that the Accused Directed the Freetown Invasion.

---- End of Page 2426 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-Ol—T 18 May 2012

41057 7
6969. The Defence submits that the actual attack on Freetown in January 1999 was planned
and executed by a group of AFRC soldiers who acted on their own and had no contact with
the RUF.)558) According to the Defence, this shows that the Accused was not involved in
any way with the crimes that took place during this attack.
6970. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that in June/July 1998, before the plan for the
two-pronged attack leading to Freetown was made by Bockaiie and the Accused, a group of
disgruntled AFRC soldiers led by SAI Musa, who refused to take orders fiom Bockarie,
devised their own plan to attack Freetown in order to "restore the Sierra Leone A1mf’.)5582
In mid-December 1998, these AFRC fighters started the execution of that plan and,
independently of the RUF, moved towards Freetown.
6971. The Trial Chamber found that following the Waterworks meeting Bockarie told SAI
Musa to attack Freetown but SAI Musa refused and continued on his own advance, pursuant
to his separate plan. The Trial Chamber found that following the death of SAI Musa on 23
December 1998, during an attack in Benguema, Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) took over
the leadership of the troops at Benguema. wm Gullit then resumed contact with Bockarie and
the two of them coordinated efforts to capture Freetown. The Trial Chamber recalls its
finding that Bockarie then assumed effective control over Gullit's actions and SAI Musa's
plan was abandoned for the plan that had been made by Bockarie and the Accused in
November 1998.l5584 The troops commanded by Gullit in Freetown were subordinated to
and used by Bockarie in furtherance of this plan, and further execution of the plan was
carried out with close coordination between Bockarie and Gullit, with Gullit in frequent
communication with Bockarie and with Gullit taking orders from Bockarie. In these
circumstances the Trial Chamber finds that the plan made by Bockarie and the Accused
substantially contributed to the commission of crimes committed by Gullit's forces while
Gullit was operating under Bockarie's command.
6972. The Accused, having drawn up the plan with Bockarie, and having followed its
implementation closely via daily communication with Bockarie, either directly or through
Yeaten, was aware of its continuing evolution.
[ml Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1340.
*582 Military Operations; The Freetown Invasion, The Plan.
'5583 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.
ISSB4 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.

---- End of Page 2427 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—01—T 18 May 2012

qcfzv
6973. The Trial Chamber notes that the RUF/AFRC military campaign to recapture
Freetown was marked by extreme violence and involved the commission of crimes,
specifically acts of terrorism (Count 1); murder (Counts 2 and 3); rape (Count 4); sexual
slavery (Count 5); outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6); cruel treatment (Count 7);
other inhumane acts (Count 8); conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years
into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities (Count 9);
enslavement (Count 10); and pillage (Count 11).15585
6974. In light of the above, the Trial Chamber is satisiied that the plan, devised by
Bockarie and the Accused in Monrovia in November 1998, substantially contributed to the
RUF/AFRC military attacks leading to and involving the Freetown Invasion, during which
these groups committed the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 11 of the Indictment.
(b) Findings on the Mental Elements of Planning
6975. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that as President of Liberia and a member of
1 the ECOWAS Committee of Five, the Accused was continuously receiving detailed reports
of the atrocities committed by RUF/AFRC troops in Sierra Leone. The Accused was well
aware of the crimes committed by the AFRC/RUF forces in the course of their military
operations, and that their war strategy was explicitly based on a widespread or systematic
campaign of crimes against civi1ians.15586 The Accused admitted that by April 1998 he was
aware that the RUF was "a group engaged in a campaign of atrocities against the civilian
population of Sierra Leone".15587 The Accused also stated that there were news reports in
May 1998 which made him aware that the RUF was engaged in a "horrific campaign [...]
against the civilian population in Sierra Leone".15588 The Accused testified that he accepted
the information in these reports and condemned the "gross atrocities".15589 Moreover, by his
instruction to make the operation "fearful", which was repeated many times by Bockarie
during the course of the Freetown invasion, and by his instruction to use "all means", the
Accused demonstrated his awareness of the substantial likelihood that crimes would be
committed during the execution of the plan.
155115 The War Strategy of the RUF/AFRC.
15586 Knowledge of the Accused.
15587 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32395.
15588 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28274.
15589 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28276.
Jr.?

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Case No.; SCSL»03»01»T /i/J 18 May 2012

40512/
6976. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
the Accused intended that the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 11 of the Indictment be
committed or was aware of the substantial likelihood that RUF/AF RC forces would commit
such crimes as a result of executing the plan which he and Bockarie designed.
(c) Finding on the Accused's Criminal Responsibility for Planning the Crimes Charged in
the Indictment
6977. For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused is criminally responsible pursuant to Article 6(I) of the Statute for planning the
crimes charged in Counts 1 to 11 of the Indictment, committed by members of the
RUF/AFRC and Liberian fighters in the attacks on Kono and Makeni, in the invasion of
Freetown and during the retreat from Freetown, between December 1998 and February
1999.
4. Instigating
6978. The Trial Chamber, having already found that the Accused is criminally responsible
for aiding and abetting the commission of the crimes in Counts 1-11 of the Indictment, does
not find that the Accused also instigated those crimes.
5. Ordering
6979. The Trial Chamber has found that while the Accused held a position of authority
amongst the RUF and RUF/AFRC, the instructions and guidance which he gave to the RUF
and RUF/AFRC were generally of an advisory nature and at times were in fact not followed
by the RUF/AFRC leadership. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds that the Accused
cannot be held responsible for ordering the commission of crimes.
B. Article 6.3 of the Statute
1. Superior Responsibility
6980. The Indictment charges that the Accused is individually criminally responsible for
the crimes referred to in Articles 2,3, and 4 of the Statute as alleged in the Indictment by
virtue of holding positions of superior responsibility and exercising command and control
over subordinate members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or

---- End of Page 2429 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL—03—01—T 18 May 2012

Lf 0 _§’"2.2.
Liberian fighters. It is alleged that the Accused is responsible for the criminal acts of his
subordinates in that he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to
commit such acts or had done so and the Accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof
6981. The Prosecution submits that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
the Accused personalized his power over the RUF, and later the AFRC/RUF, exercising
ultimate decision making authority over these forces, the defézcto superior of the members
of the RUF, AFRC/RUF who committed the charged crimes during the Indictment
pcriodtissso
I 6982. The Defence denies criminal responsibility based on a superior/subordinate
relationship between the Accused and the perpetrators of the crimes. The Defence submits
that the evidence does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused bears
command responsibility for the crimes charged in the Indictment, as there is no evidence of
an organized and disciplined structure with reporting and monitoring mechanisms which
would have kept him informed of all the RUF's activities, having him possess the requisite
knowledge of all the crimes charged in the Indictment in order to prevent their commission
or punish the offenders, particularly given the Accused's position as a civilian leader of
another country, geographically removed from the theatre of the crimes. 15591
6983. Article 6(3) of the Statute provides for criminal responsibility if a superior knew or
had reason to know that his or her subordinate was about to commit crimes prohibited by the
Statute or had done so, and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent or punish the perpetrators of such crimes.15592
6984. The Trial Chamber notes that in order to establish criminal liability under Article
6(3) of the Statute the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the Accused
as superior and the perpetrators of the crimes as his subordinates must be established. It
must be demonstrated that the superior had "effective control" over his subordinates — i.e.
the material ability to prevent or punish the commission of the offence.
15590 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 622.
lim] Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1333-1334.
15592 Applicable Law: Law on Individual Criminal Responsibility.

---- End of Page 2430 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

wil?
6985. The Trial Chamber has considered whether the Accused had "effective control" over
the RUF and the AFRC. The Accused had substantial influence over the leadership of the
RUF, and to a lesser extent that of the AFRC. However, the Trial Chamber notes that
substantial influence over the conduct of others falls short of effective control. In
considering whether the Accused exercised effective control over the RUF and the AFRC, it
has examined his interactions with the leaders of these groups closely.
6986. The Trial Chamber first considered the relationship of the Accused and Sankoh in
the pre-Indictment period. The evidence on record establishes that from l990 to March
l997 Sankoh was the sole leader of the RUF and that he did not take orders from the
Accused. When Foday Sankoh was arrested in March l997 he instructed Bockarie to take
direction from the Accused, but the evidence showed that Sankoh was not handing over his
command to the Accused. Instead, the evidence indicated that Sankoh maintained control of
the RUF leadership. Moreover, had the Accused been effectively in control of the RUF, such
an order would not have come from Sankoh. On the basis of the evidence, the Trial Chamber
found that Sankoh was not a subordinate to the Accused.
6987. With regard to the relationship between the Accused and Sam Bockarie, the Trial
Chamber found that, in accordance with Sankoh's instruction of March l997, the Accused
gave guidance, advice, instruction and direction to Bockarie. While the evidence
demonstrates that Bockarie was deferential to the Accused and generally followed his advice
and instruction, it did not establish that he was a subordinate of the Accused and that the
Accused had effective control over the RUF during Bockarie's tenure of RUF leadership, i.e.
that the Accused was in a position to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
or punish Bockarie for the commission of crimes.
6988. With regard to Issa Sesay, who was appointed as Interim Leader of the RUF in 2000,
the Trial Chamber notes that Sesay refused to accept the appointment from the Accused and
others without the approval of the RUF and Sankoh, indicating that Sesay was not initially a
subordinate of the Accused and that the Accused did not have effective control over the
RUF during Sesay's tenure as Interim Leader of the RUF.
6989. Similarly, the Trial Chamber notes that the Accused gave guidance, advice,
instruction and direction to Johnny Paul Koroma when he was leader of the AFRC/RUF
Junta, but the evidence does not establish that Koroma was a subordinate of the Accused,

---- End of Page 2431 ---------------------------


Case No.

€/05*27
nor that the Accused had effective control over the AFRC/RUF Junta, i.e. that the Accused
was in a position to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish
Koroma for the commission of crimes.
6990. With regard to Liberian fighters who were found to have participated in the
commission of crimes in Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber notes that even if they were sent
to Sierra Leone by the Accused, there is insufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that they remained under the authority or effective control of the Accused once in
Sierra Leone. Similarly, the Trial Chamber notes that the evidence is insufficient to establish
that repatriated Sierra Leoneans who were sent by the Accused to Sierra Leone were under
the authority or effective control of the Accused upon their return to Sierra Leone
6991. As the RUF and AFRC leaders were not subordinates of the Accused, and the RUF
and AFRC/RUF Junta were not under the effective control of the Accused, the Trial
Chamber need not consider the other elements of superior responsibility.
6992. In light of the foregoing, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused is individually criminally responsible for the
crimes referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute, as alleged in the Indictment by virtue
of holding positions of superior responsibility and exercising command and control over
subordinate members of the RUF, AFRC, AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian
fighters.

---- End of Page 2432 ---------------------------


Case No.:SCSL-O3-O1-T ~· 18 May 2012
/4 %

c;o5'2.s"
X. CUMULATIVE AND CONCURRENT CONVICTIONS
A. Cumulative Convictions
Applicable Law
6993. ln certain circumstances, the Trial Chamber may find that essentially the same
criminal conduct constitutes different crimes under the Statute}5593 Convictions which arise
under different statutory provisions, but are based on the same criminal conduct, have been
commonly referred to as "cumu1ative convictions" and are pemiissible "on1y if each
statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other. An
element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the
other". 15594 lf an additional element is only required for one of the provisions and not for the
other, then the Trial Chamber can only enter a conviction for the more specific offence, as it
necessarily entails the commission of the less specific offence.l5595
1. Cumulative Convictions for Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes
6994. The general requirements for crimes against humanity and war crimes, as set out in
the General Requirements section above, are clearly distinct and establish different
contextual e1ements.l55% Crimes against humanity are predicated upon a widespread or
systematic attack upon a civilian popu1ation.l5597 War crimes, on the other hand, require a
nexus between the underlying act and an amied conf1ict.l559g The Trial Chamber therefore
holds that cumulative convictions may be entered for the same criminal conduct when it is
15593 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 220; AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 2099; Prosecutor v. Dordevic, lT-05-
87/1-T, Judgement (TC), 23 February 2011, para. 2196.
15594 CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 220; AFRC Trial Judgement, para. 2099; Celibiéi Appeal Judgement, para.
412; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1019; Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement (AC),
16 November 2001 [Musema Appeal Judgement], paras 361-363; Naletilié and Martinovié Appeal Judgement,
paras 584-585.
ISM Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 542, holding that convictions for the crimes against humanity of
murder and extermination were impermissibly cumulative, as "each involves killing within the context of a
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, and the only element that distinguishes these
offences is the requirement of the offence of extermination that the killings occur on a mass scale". See also
Kurtarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 170; Galié Appeal Judgement, para. 163; Krstié Appeal Judgement,
para. 218; Popovic Trial Judgement, para. 2111; Semarzza Appeal Judgement, para. 315; Kordié and Cerkez
Appeal Judgement, para. 1032.
155% Galié Appeal Judgement, para. 165; Kordié and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1036; Jelisié Appeal
Judgement, para. 82; Kumzrac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 176, citing Kupreikié et al. Appeal Judgement,
para. 388 and Jelisié Appeal Judgement, para. 82.
UW Law and Findings on the General Requirements.

---- End of Page 2433 ---------------------------


Case No.:SCSL-03-01-T / \l {iq 18 May 2012 %
I

(/0 {24
defined as a crime against humanity and as a war crime. In light of the Indictment,
convictions may therefore be entered for the same unlawful killings under Counts 2 and 3;
sexual violence under Counts 4 and 6 and Counts 5 and 6; and physical violence under
Counts 7 and 8.
(a) Cumulative Convictions for Crimes against Humanity
(i) Rape and Sexual Slavery
6995. The Trial Chamber considers that it is permissible to enter multiple convictions for
the crime charged under Count 5 (sexual slavery) and the crime charged under Count 4
(rape). While both are forms of sexual violence, each offence contains a distinct element not
required by the other. The offence of rape requires non-consensual sexual penetration}5599
The definition of rape does not require that the perpetrator exercise ongoing control or
ownership over the victim, as is required by the crime of sexual slavery}5600 The Trial
Chamber further notes that the requisite sexual act in the definition of sexual slavery can be
committed by multiple means,l560l and does not necessarily entail non-consensual sexual
penetration. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that rape (Count 4) and sexual slavery
(Count 5) contain materially distinct elements, and that it is legally permissible to enter
convictions on both counts}5602
(b) Cumulative Convictions for War Crimes
(i) Acts of Terror and other war crimes charged
6996. The Trial Chamber finds that the crime of acts of terrorism contains a materially
distinct element from the war crimes of violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons, in particular murder (Count 3), outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6),
violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular cruel
treatment (Count 7), and pillage (Count 11). An essential element of acts of terror is the
ISM Law and Findings on the General Requirements.
5599 Applicable Law, Specific Elements of the Crimes.
N600 Applicable Law, Specific Elements of the Crimes.
mm i.e. Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, paras 70, 86, 773.
moz The Trial Chamber notes that Trial Chamber I, in the RUF case, held that it was not legally permissible to
enter cumulative convictions for rape and sexual slavery. See RUF Trial Judgement, para. 2305. However, the
Trial Chamber is not bound to follow this finding.

---- End of Page 2434 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T `/ 18 May 2012

q¢05’ 2%
intent to spread fear,16666 which distinguishes the offence from the other charged war crimes,
which do not have this requirement.16664 Moreover, all of the other crimes contain elements
that are not required by the crime of acts of terrorism: murder requires the death of the
victim, outrages upon personal dignity requires humiliating or degrading treatment, cruel
treatment requires the infliction of severe mental or physical pain or suffering, and pillage
requires the unlawful appropriation of property.16666 The Trial Chamber therefore holds that
it is permissible to enter cumulative convictions for acts of terrorism (Count l) as well as
murder (Count 3), outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6), cruel treatment (Count 7) and
pillage (Count ll).
B. Concurrent Convictions
6997. The issue of "concurrent convictions" arises when simultaneous convictions are
entered in relation to the same count, based on the same facts, under different modes of
liability. 16666 lt has been held as a general rule that an accused "can be convicted for a single
crime on the basis of several modes of liability".16667 However, where the Prosecution
alleges that the Accused is responsible under both Article 6(l) and 6(3) of the Statute for the
same crime, and where the legal requirements pertaining to both of these heads of
responsibility are met, a conviction should be entered on the basis of Article 6(l) only. In
such cases, the Accused's status as a superior may be considered an aggravating factor in
sentencing. 16666
16666 Applicable Law, Specific Elements of the Crimes.
16664 RUF Appeal Judgement, paras ll97-ll98, where the Appeals Chamber held that "[i]n the Fofana and
Kondewa Appeal Judgement the Appeals Chamber found that conrmulative convictions are permissible for
collective punishment, in addition to murder, cruel treatment and pillage’. The same reasoning applies to acts of
terrorism". See CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 225.
16666 Applicable Law, Specific Elements of the Crimes.
16666 Kordic and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 35, l033; Blaskié Appeal Judgement, paras. 89-93;
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., IT-05-87-T, Judgement (TC), 26 February 2009, para. 76.
16667 Ndindabahizi v Prosecutor, ICTR-0l-7l-A, Judgement (AC), l6 January 2007, para. l22. See also
Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze v Prosecutor, ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement (AC), 28 November 2007, para.
483; Kamahunda v Prosecutor, ICTR-99-54A-A, Judgement (AC), l9 September 2005, Separate and Partially
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, paras 405 and 4ll, where it was maintained that "[T]here
is no reason why a single crime cannot be perpetrated by multiple methods" and that "there is no illogicality
arising from [...] holding that the accused can both aid and abet another to commit a crime and can order that
other to commit that crime".
16666AFRC Appeal Judgement, paras 2l4-2l5; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 23ll; Bias/tic Appeal Judgement,
para. 9l; Kordié and Cer/cez Appeal Judgement, paras 34-35; Kajelyeli Appeal Judgement, para. 8l; Prosecutor
v. Miodrag Jokié, IT-0l-42/l-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal (AC), 30 August 2005 [Jo/tic Sentencing
Appeal], para. 24.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T l8 May 20l2

6998. However, the Trial Chamber notes that concurrent convictions under Article 6(l) and
Article 6(3) of the Statute in relation to the same count in the Indictment are not prohibited if
they are based on a dferent set of facts.l56O9 This is possible when multiple instances of an
offence are charged within a single Count. The Appeals Chamber has held that "when the
accused is charged for multiple instances of an offence under a single Count pursuant to
both Articles 6(l) and 6(3), and one or more is proved beyond a reasonable doubt for each
mode of res onsibilit , then a com ound conviction should be entered a ainst the
P Y P g
accused".l56lO Therefore, where a single set of facts within a single count substantiate an
Accused's individual responsibility and superior responsibility, a conviction may only be
entered under Article 6(I), where multiple, independent sets of facts within a single count
are used to prove an Accused's individual and superior responsibility, concurrent
convictions may be entered under both Article 6(l) and Article 6(3).
Conclusion
6999. Cumulative and concurrent convictions serve to describe the full culpability of a
articular accused or rovide a more com lete icture of his criminal conduct. HGH However,
P P P P
in determining whether to enter cumulative and concurrent convictions, the Trial Chamber
must be guided by considerations of justice for the accused. mn
15609 AFRC Appeal Judgement, paras 214-215; Jokié Sentencing Appeal, para. 25. See also RUF Trial
Judgement, para. 2312.
mm AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 215. The Appeals Chamber goes even further to hold that in such cases, it
constitutes a legal error for the Trial Chamber not to enter a compound sentence. See also RUF Trial Judgement,
para. 2312.
15 °HKunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 169, citing the Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeeen
in Prosecutor v. Je/isié. IT-95-10-A, Judgement (AC), 5 July 2001 [Jelisié Appeal Judgement], para. 34; Kordié
and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1033. See also AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 215; RUF Trial Judgement,
para. 2301.
ism Celebiéi Appeal Judgement, para. 412; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 173. See also para. 174:
"[T]he Chamber must take into account the entire situation so as to avoid a mechanical or blind application of its
guiding principles". See also RUF Trial Judgement, para. 2301.

---- End of Page 2436 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T { 18 May 2012
r

e;a{2»‘7
XI. DISPOSITION
7000. The Trial Chamber convicted Charles Ghankay Taylor for:
(i) Aiding and abetting the commission of the following crimes pursuant to Article 6.1
of the Statute during the Indictment period:
i. Count 1: Acts of terrorism, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
and of Additional Protocol ll pursuant to Article 3(d) of the Statute in Kenema, Kono, and
Kailahun Districts and in Freetown and the Western Area.
ii. Count 2: Murder, a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Statute in
Kenema, Kono and Kailahun Districts, and in Freetown and the Western Area.
iii. Count 3: Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol ll pursuant to Article 3(a) of the Statute in Kenema, Kono and Kailahun
Districts, and in Freetown and the Western Area.
iv. Count 4: Rape, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 2(g) of the Statute
in Kono District and in Freetown and the Western Area.
v. Count 5: Sexual slavery, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 2(g) of the
Statute in Kono and Kailahun Districts, and in Freetown and the Western Area.
vi. Count 6: Outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol ll pursuant to Article 3(e) of the Statute in
Kono District and in Freetown and the Western Area.
vii. Count 7: Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular cruel treatment, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and
of Additional Protocol ll pursuant to Article 3(a) of the Statute in Kono District and in
Freetown and the Western Area.

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T [ 18 May 2012

40 {Z9
viii. Count 8: Other inhumane acts, a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 2(i) of the
Statute in Kono District and in Freetown and the Western Area.
ix. Count 9: Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces
or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, another serious violation of
international humanitarian law pursuant to Article 4(c) of the Statute in Tonkolili, Kailahun,
Kono, Bombali, Port Loko, Kenema and Koinadugu Districts and in Freetown and the
Western Area.
x. Count 10: Enslavement, a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 2 (c) of the Statute
in Kenema, Kono and Kailahun Districts, and in Freetown and the Western Area.
xi. Count 11: Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3(D of the Statute in Kono, Bombali, and Port
Loko Districts and in Freetown and the Western Area.
(ii) Planning the commission of the following crimes pursuant to Article 6.1 of the
Statute in the attacks on Kono and Makeni in December 1998, and in the invasion of
and retreat from Freetown, between December 1998 and February 1999:
i. Count 1: Acts of terrorism, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
and of Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3(d) of the Statute in Kono District and in
Freetown and the Western Area.
ii. Count 2: Murder, a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Statute in
Kono District and in Freetown and the Western Area.
iii. Count 3: Violence to life, health and physical or mental well—being of persons, in
particular murder, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3(a) of the Statute in Kono District and in
Freetown and the Western Area.

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Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T A 18 May 2012

iv. Count 4: Rape, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 2(g) of the Statute
in Kono District and in Freetown and the Westem Area.
v. Count 5: Sexual slavery, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 2(g) of the
Statute in Kono and Kailahun Districts, and in Freetown and the Westem Area.
vi. Count 6: Outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol ll pursuant to Article 3(e) of the Statute in
Kono District and in Freetown and the Westem Area.
vii. Count 7: Violence to life, health and physical or mental well—being of persons, in
particular cmel treatment, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and
of Additional Protocol ll pursuant to Article 3(a) of the Statute in Kono District and in
Freetown and the Westem Area.
viii. Count 8: Other inhumane acts, a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 2(i) of the
Statute in Kono District and in Freetown and the Westem Area.
ix. Count 9: Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces
or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, another serious violation of
international humanitarian law pursuant to Article 4(c) of the Statute in Kailahun, Kono,
Bombali and Port Loko Districts, and in Freetown and the Westem Area.
x. Count 10: Enslavement, a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 2 (c) of the Statute
in Kono and Kailahun Districts, and in Freetown and the Westem Area.
xi. Count 11: Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3(f) of the Statute in Kono District and in
Freetown and the Westem Area.

---- End of Page 2439 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T 18 May 2012

C20 93 2
Done this 18th Day of May 2012, in The Hague, The Netherlands.
/-/gijff · , (,-.5 ‘
»~;%#=·» ,,,,
Justice Te;es{ herty Justice Richard Lussick Justice Julia Sebutinde
Presiding Judge
[Seal of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]

---- End of Page 2440 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

ams'?}
XII. ANNEX A: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
2 I/C second in command
AC Appeals Chamber
Accused A Charles Ghankay Taylor
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
AF RC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
aka/a.l<.a. also known as
ATU Anti Terrorist Unit
APC All Peoples Congress
Art. Article
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BF C Battle Field Commander
BFI Battle Field Inspector
BGC Battle Group Commander
CCP Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CDF Civil Defence Forces
CDF Case Prosecutor v. Norman, F ofana and Kondewa (SCSL-
O4-14-T)
CDS Chief Defence Staff
CIC Commander in Chief
CID Criminal Investigation Department
CO Commanding Officer
Col Colonel
Common Amclc 3 Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of
1949
Closed Session, reference to transcripts and testimony
CS led in closed session for the purpose of witness
protection.
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DCT Defence Witness
Defence Defence for the Accused
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West Aiiican States
ERN Evidence Record Numbers

---- End of Page 2441 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—O1—T 47% 18 May 2012
A

$0 S'}?
Exhibit D Defence Exhibit
Exhibit P Prosecution Exhibit
EU European Union
F n. footnote
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law
[CTR Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
ICTY Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991
IDU Internal Defence Unit
IECOM Independent Elections Commission
IGNU Interim Government of National Unity
Indictment Second Amended Indictment, dated 29 May 2007
Inter-Am. C.H.R. Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
IO Intelligence Office
J CE Joint Criminal Enterprise
J PK Johnny Paul Koroma (Senior AF RC commander)
J SB Joint Security Board
J SBI Joint Security Board of Investigations
KENBATT Kenyan Battalion of UNAMSIL peacekeepers
LDF Lofa Defence Force
Le Leones (currency of Sierra Leone)
LNTG Liberian National Transitional Government
LUDF Liberian United Defence Force
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MILOB Military Observers attached to UNAMSIL
MOJ A Movement for Justice in Africa

---- End of Page 2442 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T qw 18 May 2012

¢#¤s’?ft
Mosquito Nickname of Sam Bockarie
MP Military Police
MRU Movement for the Redemptions of Muslims
NCDDR lglatiggagtigggtee for Disarmament, Demobilisation
NGO Non—govemmental organisation
NPF National Patriotic Front
NPF L National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRAG National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly
Government
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council
NPWJ No Peace Without Justice, NGO
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OTP Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone
p., pp. End of Page, End of Pages
para., paras paragraph
PANAF U Pan African Union
PPPL Progressive Peoples Party of Liberia
PRC Peop1e's Redemption Council
PTSD Post—Traumatic Stress Disorder
RPG Rocket—Prope11ed Grenade
ROE Rules of Engagement
RUF Revolutionary United Front
RUF P Revolutionary United Front Party
Rules Rules of Procedure and Evidence
SBU Small Boys Unit
SGU Small Girls Unit
SLA/ex—SLA Sierra Leone Army
SLBS Sierra Leone Broadcasting Station
SLPP Sierra Leone Peoples Party
SOD Special Operations Division
Special Court or SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone
ss. Sections
SSS Special Security Service
SSU Special Security Unit

---- End of Page 2443 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 2443 18 May 2012
./ rv ‘~’

g¢0§3£
STL Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Statute Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
SLP Sierra Leone Police
STD Sexually transmitted disease
STF Special Task Force
TC Trial Chamber
TFl Prosecution Witness
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
ULIMO gigI;e)dHl;1ib}eration Movement of Liberia for
ULIMO_K g1giI;;e)d;;ib}eraI2p(;imh;1Ilovement of Liberia for
ULIMOJ g1gI;e)d;Ilgi;epa5i§;1inl;/(golvement of Liberia for
ULAA Union of Liberian Associates in America
ULC United Logging Company
US/USA United States of America
USD United States Dollar
USG United States Government
UN United Nations
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
WAC Women's Auxiliaiy Corps
WMU Witness Management Unit (Prosecution)
WVS Witness and Victims Section (Registry)

---- End of Page 2444 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—Ol—T 2444% 18 May 2012

g¢0S'3’?
I. ANNEX B: PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................... 2446
1. INDTCTMENT, ARREST, AND INITIAL APPEARANCE .......................................................... 2446
2. PRELIMINARY OBIECTION BASED ON LACK OF IURISDICTION ......................................... 2447
3. PRE—TRIAL PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................................... 2448
3.1. ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL ........................................................................................... 2448
3.2. CHANGE OF VENUE OF PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................... 2448
3.3. PRE-TRTAL CONFERENCES, TRIAL DATE, AND ADEQUATE TIME EoR PREPARATION .... 2449
3 .4. PROTECTIVE MEASURES .............................................................................................. 2450
3.5. CHARLES TAYLOR’S REQUEST TO GIVE AN UNSWORN STATEMENT ERoM THE DoCT< . 2451
3.6. REQUEST TO SUSPEND UN SECURITY CoUNC1L RESOLUTIONS 1521 AND 1532 ........... 2452
3.7. AGREED FACTS ............................................................................................................ 2452
4. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS ....................................................................................................... 2452
4.1. OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................... 2452
4.2. WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL AND POSTPONEMENT OF THE TRIAL ................................. 2453
4.3. DEEECTS IN THE FoRM OF THE INDICTMENT ................................................................. 2454
4.4. JUDICIAL NOTICE ......................................................................................................... 2454
4.5. PROSECUTION CASE ..................................................................................................... 2455
4.5.1. OVERVIEW ...........................................,.......................................................................... 2455
4.5.2. WITNESS ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 2456
4.5.2.1. Protective Measures ................................................................................................... 2456
4.5.2.2. Subpoena for Moses Blah (TF1—56l) ......................................................................... 2457
4.5.2.3. Reclassification of Witness Corinne Dufka ............................................................... 2457
4.5.3. D1SCLoSURE ................................................................................................................... 2458
4.5.3.1. Disclosure of Confidential Information Obtained from a Witness ............................. 2458
4.5.3.2. Disclosure of Evidence Supporting Chief Prosecutor's Statements ........................... 2458
4.5.3.3. Confidential Source Issue Relating to Witness TFl—355 ........................................... 2458
4.5.3.4. Contradictory Testimony of TF1—37l and Disclosure Under Rule 68 ....................... 2459
4.5.4. DoCUMENTS ................................................................................................................... 2459
4.5.4.1. Personal Archives of the Accused .............................................................................. 2459
4.5.4.2. Admission of Documents Under Rule 92bis, 92ter and 92quater ............................. 2459
4.5.4.3. Access to Documents from the RUF Trial ................................................................. 2461
4.5.4.4. Reclassification of Documents as Confidential .......................................................... 2461
4.5.5. RE-OPENTNG OF PROSECUTION CASE .............................................................................. 2461
4.6. DEFENCE CASE ............................................................................................................ 2462
4.6.1. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................... 2462 A
4.6.2. WITNESS ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 2462
4.6.2.1. Protective Measures ................................................................................................... 2462
4.6.2.2. Contact Between the Accused and Defence Counsel and Witnesses ......................... 2463
4.6.3. DISCLOSURE ................................................................................................................... 2463
4.6.4. DoCUMENTS ................................................................................................................... 2464
4.6.4.1. Use of Fresh Evidence in Cross—Examination ............................................................ 2464
4.6.4.2. Admission of Documents Under Rule 92bis, 92ter and 92quater ............................. 2465
4.6.5. OTHER ............................................................................................................................ 2467
4.6.6. DEFENCE REQUESTS TO RECALL WTTNESSES AND TO RE—OPEN THE DEFENCE CASE ....... 2467
4.7. CONTEMPT MoT1oNS ................................................................................................... 2468
4.8. FILING OF THE FINAL TRIAL BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS ...................................... 2470
4.9. FINAL J UDGEMENT ....................................................................................................... 2472

---- End of Page 2445 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-O3-O1-T T 18 May 2012

XIII. ANNEX B: PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Indictment, Arrest, and Initial Appearance
7001. On 7 March 2003, the Prosecutor requested the confirmation of a 17-count
indictment alleging crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law contrary to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone against the Accused, Charles Ghankay Taylor.l56l3 Justice Bankole
Thompson approved the Indictment on the same day and ordered its non-disclosure to the
pub1ic.l56l4 Also on the same day, Justice Thompson issued a Warrant of Arrest requesting
. all States to assist in the arrest and transfer of the Accused to the Special Court.l56l5 On 4
June 2003, the then Chief Prosecutor, David Crane, disclosed the Indictment and Warrant of
Arrest to the public at a press conference in Freetown.l56l6 On 12 June 2003, the Indictment
and Warrant of Arrest were formally unsealed at the request of the Prosecution by an order
of Justice Boutet.l56l7
7002. On 6 March 2006, the Prosecution requested an amendment to the lndictment,l56l8
which was granted by Justice Thompson on 16 March 2006.l5(’l9 The Prosecution
subsequently filed the Amended Indictment and Case Summary on 17 March 2006. 15620
7003. The Accused was arrested in Nigeria on 29 March 2006. Shortly thereafter he was
transferred into the custody of the Special Court in Freetown and was served with the
'56'3 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-001, Prosecutor Memorandum to Accompany Indictment, tiled 7
March 2003. In order to facilitate the confrmation process the Prosecution included an investigator statement.
'56'4 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-003, Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-
Disclosure, 7 March 2003.
ISM Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-004, Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention, 7 March
2003.
mlb Press Release, Statement of David M. Crane, Chief Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 5 June 2003.
mm Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-006, Order for the Disclosure of the Indictment, the Warrant of Arrest
and Order for Transfer and Detention and the Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-Disclosure,
12 June 2003.Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-078, Decision and Order for Disclosure, 30 March 2006.
'56'8 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-072, Prosecution Motion for Leave to Amend the Indictment and for
Approval and Non-Disclosure of the Amended Indictment, 6 March 2006.
'5("9 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-074, Decision on Prosecution's Application to Amend Indictment and
on Approval of Amended Indictment, 16 March 2006.
Imc Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-075, Amended Indictment and Case Summary accompanying the
Amended Indictment, 17 March 2006.

---- End of Page 2446 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
t/V \/

4.7537
Amended Indictment in accordance with Rule 52. The Amended Indictment was disclosed
to the public the following day.15621
7004. The President assigned the proceedings to Trial Chamber II, composed of Justice
Richard Lussick, Justice Teresa Doherty and Justice Julia Sebutinde.15622 Justice El Hadji
Malick Sow was later appointed as an alternate Judge on 18 May 2007.15623
7005. The Accused made his initial appearance and was formally arraigned before
Presiding Judge Richard Lussick on 3 April 2006, pursuant to Rule 61. He was represented
by the Principal Defender, Vincent Nmehielle, and pleaded not guilty to all counts of the
Amended Indictment. 15624
7006. On 29 May 2007, the Prosecution filed a Second Amended Indictment with minor
changes to three of the eleven counts.15625 The Accused was re-arraigned on 3 July 2007 and
again pleaded not guilty to the amended charges.15626 On 3 August 2007, the Prosecution
filed an Amended Case Summary. 15627
1. Preliminary Objection Based on Lack of Jurisdiction
7007. Before the Accused's arrest and as an incumbent President of the Republic of
Liberia, on 23 July 2003 the Accused pursuant to Rule 72 moved to quash his indictment
and to set aside the outstanding arrest warrant on the grounds that, as incumbent Head of
State of the sovereign Republic of Liberia, he was immune from any exercise of the Court's
'urisdiction.15628 The A eals Chamber, com osed of three A eals Chamber Jud es,
J PP P PP 8
dismissed the motion on 31 May 2004, holding that the Special Court for Sierra Leone was
an international — not a national — court, and that "the principle seems now established that
the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted
15621 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-078, Decision and Order for Disclosure, 30 March 2006.
15622 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03-01-I-079, Order Assigning a Case to a Trial Chamber, 31 March 2006.
15623 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-240, Order Designating Alternate Judge, 18 May 2007.
*6626 Prosecutor V. Taylor, scsr-03-01 -r, Transcript 3 April 2006, p. 14.
15625 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-263, Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment, 29 May 2007.
*6626 1>»·pS€pV;pV V. Taylor, SCSL-03-01 -r, Transcript 3 July 2007, pp. 401 -402
15627 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-327, Prosecution Notification of Filing of Amended Case Summary, 3
August 2007.
15628 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-015, Applicant's Motion Made Under Protest and Without Waiving of
Immunity Accorded to a Head of State President Charles Ghankay Taylor Requesting that the Trial Chamber Do
Quash the Said Approved Indictment of 7111 March 2003 of Judge Bankole Thompson, 23 July 2003.

---- End of Page 2447 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

qomuo
before an intemational tribunal or court".l5629 The Appeals Chamber held that Article 6(2) of
the Statute, which provides that the official position of any accused person, including as
Head of State shall not relieve such a person of criminal responsibility, was not in conflict
with any peremptory norm of intemational humanitarian law, and must be given effect by
the court.l5°3O It therefore held that the official position of the Accused as incumbent Head of
State at the time that the proceedings were initiated against him is not a bar to his
prosecution by the Special Court.l563l
2. Pre-Trial Proceedings
(a) Assigment of Counsel
7008. On 5 April 2006, Mr Karim Asad Ahmed Khan was assigned as provisional Counsel
for a 90-day period.l5°32 On 13 July 2006, he was reassigned as Assigned Counsel for a
further 90-day period.l5°33 He was permanently assigned as legal counsel for the Accused on
2l September 2006.
(b) Change of Venue of Proceedings
7009. In light of security concems, the President of the Special Court formally made a
request under Rule 4 to the Government of The Netherlands and the President of the ICC to
facilitate the conduct of the trial}5634 The Government of The Netherlands, however,
requested an authorisation from the United Nations Security Council before agreeing to the
request of the President of the Special Court}5635 The Security Council determined that the
continued presence of the Accused in the subregion was a threat to the peace of Sierra Leone
and Liberia, and to intemational peace and security in the region, and, acting under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1688 (2006),
Img Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—0l—I—059, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 3l May 2004, para. 52.
*5**** ram., para. 53.
*56**11mz.
mm Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—0l—PT—088, Principal Defender's Decision to Provisionally Assign Counsel
to Charles Ghankay Taylor, 5 April 2006.
1563 3 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—0l—PT—l l l, Principal Defender's Decision to Reassign Counsel to Charles
Ghankay Taylor, 13 July 2006.
my UN Doc. S/2006/207, Letter dated 3l March 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (Annex I).
1563 5 UN Doc. S/2006/207, Letter dated 3l March 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (Annex II).

---- End of Page 2448 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T l8 May 2012


{¢0.<’¢r/
which established the legal basis for the detention of the Accused on Dutch territory.l5636
Following the adoption of this resolution, the agreement of the ICC, an agreement with the
Government of The Netherlands to host the Special Court proceedings in The Netherlands
and the agreement of the United Kingdom to accept the Accused alter the conclusion of the
trial and appeal, on 19 June 2006, the President of the Special Court authorized that the pre-
trial, trial and appeal proceedings be transferred to The Hague, and ordered that the Accused
be transferred to The Netherlands.l5637 The Accused was transferred to The Hague on 20
June 2006.
7010. Prior to the transfer, the Defence challenged the change of venue before the Trial
Chamber, which found the application to be one that raised objections based on lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 72(B)(i) and an abuse of process pursuant to Rule 72(B)(v) and
accordingly referred the matter to the Appeals Chamber pursuant to Rule 72(E).l563g The
Appeals Chamber, composed of three Judges, found the motion premature, inadmissible and
inappropriately directed to the Trial and Appeals Chambers, rather than the President.l5(’39
On 12 March 2007, the President of the Special Court found that the Rules do not provide an
avenue for reconsideration or review before the President.l564O The Defence finally
challen ed the chan e of venue before the Council of Jud es, com osed of the President and
S g S P
the presiding Judges of the respective Trial Chambers. The Council of Judges held on 7 June
2007 that it did not have the authority or jurisdiction to reconsider or review an
administrative decision made by the President of the Special Court.l564l
(c) Pre-Trial Conferences, Trial Date, and Adeguate Time for Preparation
7011. The Trial Chamber convened three status conferences prior to the commencement of
the trial in order to narrow the issues in dispute, ensure the parties complied with their
‘5‘"° UN sc Res. 1688, 16 June 2006.
15637 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-108, Order Changing Venue of Proceedings, 19 June 2006.
15638 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSI.-03-01-PT-098, Order Pursuant to Rules 72(E) and 72(F), 3 May 2006.
15639 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSI.-03-01-AR72-104, Decision on Urgent Defence Motion Against Change of
Venue, 29 May 2006.
15640 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSI.-03-01-PT-202, Decision of the President on Defence Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Changing Venue of Proceedings, 12 March 2007.
15641 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-283, Declaration by the Council ofJudges, 7 June 2007.

---- End of Page 2449 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

disclosure obligations under Rules 66, 67, and 68, and set a trial date as early as
practicable. 4 56*2
7012. An initial trial date of 2 April 2007 was set by Justice Sebutinde at the second status
conference held on 22 September 2006. The Trial Chamber dismissed a Defence motion
requesting better facilities, more time and an office in Monrovia on 23 January 2007, 454443
but granted its request to delay the start of the trial to 4 June 2007.45644 On 25 April 2007,
the Trial Chamber further adjourned the proceedings after the Prosecutor's opening
statement on 4 June 2007 for 18 days, in order to compensate the Accused for time lost as a
result of a delay in removing a video surveillance camera installed in the Accused's
conference room. 4 5645
. 7013. In preparation for the commencement of the trial, a Pre—Trial Conference was held on
7 May 2007.45646 Prior to the Pre—Trial Conference, both parties filed Pre—Trial Briefs.45647
The Prosecution also filed a list of expert witnesses and witnesses of fact. In the Defence's
Pre-Trial Brief, filed on 26 April 2007, it claimed that three weeks was insufficient time to
analyse and respond to the Prosecution's Pre—Trial Brief.4544444
(d) Protective Measures
7014. On 5 May 2006, the Trial Chamber ordered protective measures for 46 Prosecution
witnesses, allowing the Prosecution, inter alia, to withhold identifying information of
45442 Status conferences prior to the commencement of the trial were held on 21 July 2006; 22 September 2006;
and 26 January 2007. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-113, Scheduling Order for Status Conference in
The Hague, 17 July 2006; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-118, Scheduling Order for a Second Status
Conference in The Hague, 4 August 2006; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-131, Scheduling Order for a
Third Status Conference in The Hague, 20 November 2006.
45443 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-164, Joint Decision on Defence Motions on Adequate Facilities and
Adequate Time for the Preparation of Mr Taylor's Defence, 23 January 2007.
ism .
Ibzd.
45445 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-226, Decision on Defence Motion Requesting Reconsideration of
"Joint Decision on Defence Motions on Adequate Facilities and Adequate Time for the Preparation of Mr
Taylor's Defence", Dated 23 January 2007, 25 April 2007.
45446 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-171, Scheduling Order for a Pre-Trial Conference Pursuant to Rule
73bis, 2 February 2007; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-228, Agenda for Pre-Trial Conference, 26 April
2007.
45444 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-218, Rule 73bis Pre-Trial Conference Materials Pre-Trial Brief, 4
April 2007; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-229, Rule 73bis Taylor Defence Pre-Trial Brief, 26 April
2007.
454444 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-229, Rule 73bis Taylor Defence Pre-Trial Brief, 26 April 2007, para.
3.

---- End of Page 2450 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / GLX 18 May 2012

aa 9*%]
witnesses until 42 days before the witness was scheduled to testify at trial.16646 These
protective measures were later extended to 33 additional witnesses.16 65 6
7015. On 15 November 2006, the Trial Chamber altered the protective measures by
allowing the Prosecution and the Witnesses and Victims Section to provide identifying
information to organisations and individuals facilitating the travel arrangements of protected
witnesses to The Hague.16661 On 21 March 2007, the Trial Chamber rescinded the protective
measures in respect of witnesses TF1—3 87 and TF1—391.16662
(e) Charles Taylor's Reguest to Give an Unswom Statement from the Dock
7016. The Defence requested that the Accused be allowed to give an unswom statement
from the dock immediately following the Prosecution's opening statement. In its denial of
the motion on 29 May 2007, the Trial Chamber held that Rule 84 confined the Defence
opening statement to the opening of the Defence's case.16666 Leave to appeal the decision
was later denied on 16 July 2007.16664
15649 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-099, Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Immediate
Protective Measures for Witnesses and for Non-Public Disclosure and Urgent Request for Interim Measures and
on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Leave to Substitute a Corrected and Supplemented List as Annex A of
the Confidential Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses and for Non-Public
Disclosure and Urgent Request for Interim Measures, 5 May 2006.
15656 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-120, Decision on Urgent Prosecution Motion for Immediate
Protective Measures for Witnesses and for Non-Public Disclosure, 15 September 2006; Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-PT-125, Decision on Defence Motion to Set Aside and/or Reconsider Trial Chamber's "Decision
on Urgent Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses and for Non-Public Disc1osure"
dated 15 September 2006, 5 October 2006; Prosecutor v. T avlor, SCSL-03-01-PT-163, Decision on Confidential
Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses and for Non-Public Disclosure with Four
Annexes, One of which Filed Ex Parte, 22 January 2007; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-215, Decision
on Confidential Urgent Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures of Witnesses and for Non-Public
Disclosure and on Public Urgent Prosecution Motion for Leave to Substitute a Supplemented Witness list as
Annex A(4) of the Confidential Urgent Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses
and for Non· Public Disclosure Filed on 8 March 2007 _a_n_d on Public Urgent Prosecution Request for Interim
Measures, 26 March 2007.
15651 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-130, Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion to Vary
Protective Measures, 15 November 2006.
16662Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-209, Decision on Defence Motion to Lift the Redactions of
Identifying Information ofFifteen Core Witnesses, 21 March 2007.
16656 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-264, Decision on Urgent and.Pub1ic Defence Motion Requesting
Leave for Charles Ghankay Taylor to Give an Unsworn Statement from the Dock, 29 May 2007.
16654 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-317, Decision on Defence Application for Leave to Appeal the 29
May 2007 "Decision on Urgent and Public Defence Motion Requesting Leave for Charles Ghankay Taylor to
Give an Unsworn Statement from the Dock", 16 July 2007.

---- End of Page 2451 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—O3—01-T OLS, 18 May 2012
si

@05Pga
(f) Reguest to Suspend UN Security Council Resolutions 1521 and 1532
7017. Concerned that UN Security Council Resolutions 1521 and 1532, which relate to a
travel ban and an assets freeze, would instil fear in potential witnesses and thus prevent them
from testifying, the Defence moved the Trial Chamber to request the Security Council to
suspend the resolutions for the duration of the trial. The Trial Chamber dismissed the motion
on 31 October 2007 on a procedural technicality}5655
(g) Agreed Facts
7018. On 26 April 2007, the Prosecution and the Defence filed a joint statement of
admitted and undisputed facts and law}5656
3. Trial Proceedings
(a) Overview
7019. From the commencement of the trial on 4 June 2007 until its closure on 11 March
2011, the Trial Chamber heard evidence on 420 trial days. In total, 115 witnesses testified
viva voce, of whom two were subpoenaed}5657 ln addition to the viva voce witnesses, the
Trial Chamber admitted into evidence written statements and/or prior testimony of four
witnesses}5658 1521 exhibits were admitted into evidence}5659 The trial record includes
49622 End of Pages of transcripts and 1279 filings and decisions, totalling 38069 End of Pages.
U655 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-351, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Special Measures with
Regard to Resolutions 1521 and 1532 of the United Nations Security Council, 31 October 2007.
U656 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-227, Joint Filing by the Prosecution & Defence Admitted Facts &
Law, 26 April 2007.
@57 Moses Blah — see Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-432, Decision on Prosecution Motion for a
Subpoena ad Testificandum, 3 March 2008 and Naomi Campbell — see Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-
999, Subpoena ad Testificandum, 1 July 2010.
Img The written statements and/or prior testimony of the following witnesses was admitted: Witnesses TF1-021,
TF1-083 (both deceased), TF1-081 and Chief Jalloh Loon (DCT-118), see Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-
720, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes C to E Prosecution Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial
Transcripts of Witnesses TF1-021 and TF1-083 Pursuant to Rule 92quater, 5 February 2009; Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-642, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes B to G Prosecution Notice Under
Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Freetown and the Western Area - TF1-024, TF1-
081 and TF1-084, 20 October 2008. The Defence withdrew its objection to the admission of the evidence of
witness TF1-081 pursuant to Rule 92bis and therefore agreed that there was no need for the witness to be
brought for cross-examination. See Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18660. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-
978, Decision on Defence Application for Admission of Affidavit by DCT-118 Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 11 June
2010. The Prosecution advised that "in light of the advanced age and alleged fragile health of the witness", it did
not object to the admission of the affidavit in lieu of oral testimony. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-
967, Prosecution Response to the Public, with Confidential Annex A Defence Application for Admission of

---- End of Page 2452 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012
\./P

¢0J`@j"’"`
7020. The proceedings were held in the premises of the lntemational Criminal Court, The
Hague, from July 2006 until the proceedings were moved to the premises of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, Leidschendam, on 17 May 2010.
(b) Withdrawal of Counsel and Postponement of the Trial
7021. At the commencement of the trial on 4 June 2007, Mr Khan informed the Trial
Chamber that the Accused had terminated his services as Defence Counsel and that the
Accused intended to represent himself.16666 The Accused himself refused to appear before
the Court and therefore was not present. Duty Counsel Charles J alloh was directed to replace
Mr Khan as Defence counsel for the day's proceedings and until the assignment of new
Defence Counsel. The Principal Defender formally accepted the withdrawal of Mr Khan as
assigned counsel. 15661
7022. On 12 June 2007, the Registrar requested that the Trial Chamber deny the Accused's
request to represent himself and instead assign him court appointed Counsel.16662 At a
hearing on 25 June 2007, the Trial Chamber directed the Principal Defender to appoint new
Defence counsel.16666 On 17 July 2007, Mr Courtenay Griffiths Q.C. was assigned as Lead
Counsel, and Andrew Cayley and Terry Munyard as Co-Counsel to the Defence legal
team.16664 The Defence was later joined by Morris Anyah, Silas Chekera and James
Supuwood as co-counsel and Logan Hambrick as a legal assistant.
7023. On 28 June 2007, the Trial Chamber granted a joint motion from the Prosecution and
Defence to postpone the resumption of the Prosecution's case until 20 August 2007.16666
Affidavit by DCT-1 18 Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 26 May 2010, para. 3.
15659 The Trial Chamber dismissed a motion on 30 March 2007 by the Prosecution requesting that witnesses
falling within certain categories be allowed to testify via video link on the grounds that it did not feel it was in
the interests of justice. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-217, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Allow
Witnesses to Give Testimony by Video Link, 30 March 2007.
15666 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 4 June 2007, pp. 250-251.
15661 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-293, Principal Defender's Decision Accepting the Withdrawal of Mr
Karim Khan as Assigned Counsel to Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 14 June 2007.
15662 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-290, Registrar's Submission in Response to the Order of Expedited
Filing, 12 June 2007.
16666 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, 25 June 2007, p. 384.
15664 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-320, Principal Defender's Decision Assigning New Counsel to
Charles Ghankay Taylor, 17 July 2007.
16665 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-310, Order on Urgent and Public Joint Submissions by the Office of
the Principal Defender and the Prosecution LII Relation to the Re-Commencement of the Trial on 3 July 2007, 28
June 2007.

---- End of Page 2453 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T G5 18 May 2012

During a status conference on 20 August 2007, the Trial Chamber granted a further
adjournment of the proceedings until 7 January 2008 in order to allow the new Defence
counsel adequate time to prepare. 15666
(c) Defects in the Form of the Indictment
7024. On 27 February 2009, by a majority, the Trial Chamber dismissed a Defence motion
challenging the adequacy of the Prosecution's pleading of joint criminal enterprise (J CE) in
the Second Amended Indictment. The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecution had provided
sufficient details to put the Accused on notice of the case against him.15667 Justice Richard
Lussick dissented.15668 On 1 May 2009, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's
decision, reaflirming, inter alia, that common purpose comprises both the objective of the
J CE and the means contemplated to achieve that obj ective.15669
(d) Judicial Notice
7025. On 7 December 2007, the Trial Chamber took judicial notice of 33 facts agreed upon
by the parties.156711 On 29 March 2009, the Trial Chamber took judicial notice of 13 further
facts, as well as adjudicated facts from the AF RC Trial Judgement. Judge Doherty dissented
as to the admission of Fact 15.15671 On 17 June 2010, however, the Trial Chamber declined
to take judicial notice of facts adjudicated in the Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallorz and Gbao case
"RUF Jud ement" . The Trial Chamber found that both the Defence's motion and the
S
Prosecution's motion, if accepted, would disadvantage the other party and, moreover, that
'udicial econom would not be served b takin `udicial notice at this late sta e in the trial.
J Y Y S J S
Justice Sebutinde dissented in part with the decision.15672
15666 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 20 August 2007, pp. 435·436.
15667 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-752, Decision on Urgent Defence Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in
the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of JCE, 27 February 2009.
156158 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-751, Decision on Urgent Defence Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in
the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of JCE - Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Richard Lussick, 27 February 2009.
15669 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-775, Decision on "Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions
Regarding the Majority Decision Concerning the Pleadings of JCE in the Second Amended Indictment", 1 May
2009.
15670 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-370, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7
December 2007.
15 671 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-765, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of
Adjudicated Facts from the AF RC Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B), 23 March 2009. ,
15672 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-987, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of

---- End of Page 2454 ---------------------------


Case No L 03 0 {L Oh ay 2012

W5 4. Prosecution Case
Overview
7026. After delivering an opening statement on 4 June 2007, the Prosecution called its first
witness on 7 January 2008 and rested its case 13 months later on 27 February 2009. During
the Defence case, the Prosecution was granted leave to re-open its case to call three
additional witnesses,l5°73 who testified on 5, 9 and 10 August 2010. Overall, 94 witnesses
testified viva voce for the Prosecution, including three expert witnesses.l5°74 The prior
testimony of one witness, who had testified in other cases before the Special Court, was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92bis without any cross-examination by the Defencem"5 and the
prior evidence of two deceased witnesses was admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule
92quater.l5676 The Prosecution tendered five expert reports into evidence,15677 two of which
were uncontested.l5°78 A total of 782 documents were admitted as Prosecution exhibits,l5°79
including the five expert reports.
7027. Following the conclusion of the Prosecution's case, the Accused filed a motion for
'ud ement of ac uittal ursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules; the Trial Chamber dismissed the
J S (1 P
Adjudicated Facts from the RUF Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule 94(B) @ Prosecution Motion for Judicial
Notice of Adjudicated Facts from the RUF Judgement, 17 June 2010.
I5673 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-993, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A and B
Prosecution Motion to Call Three Additional Witnesses, 29 June 2010.
IS674 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection", Report by lan Smillie, 21 April 2007;
Exhibit P-031, "Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone", Report by Stephen Ellis and Corrigenda, 5
December 2006; Exhibit P-077 (confidential).
15675 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-642, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes B to G
Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Freetown and the
Western Area- TF 1-024, TF 1-081 and TF 1-084, 20 October 2008. The Defence withdrew its objection to the
admission of the evidence of witness TF 1-081 pursuant to Rule 92bis and therefore agreed that there was no
need for the witness to be brought for cross-examination. See Transcript 17 October 2008, p. 18660.
l5°7° Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-720, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes C to E
Prosecution Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial Transcripts of Witnesses TF 1-021 and TF 1-083 Pursuant to
Rule 92quater, 5 February 2009.
I5677 Exhibit P-019, "Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection", Report by lan Smillie, 21 April 2007;
Exhibit P-031, "Charles Taylor and the War in Sierra Leone", Report by Stephen Ellis and Corrigenda, 5
December 2006; Exhibit P-043, "Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the Conflict in Sierra Leone",
Report by Jessica Alexander, 4 May 2007; Exhibit P-077 (confidential); Exhibit P-073, "Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence in Sierra Leone", Report by Beth Vann, 14 May 2007.
mm Exhibit P-043, "Children Associated with Fighting Forces in the Conflict in Sierra Leone", Report by
Jessica Alexander, 4 May 2007; Exhibit P-073, "Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone", Report by
Beth Vann, p. 31550, 14 May 2007.
Img When admitting documents, the Trial Chamber grouped similar documents together and admitted these
documents with the same exhibit number, but with a distinct exhibit letter or sub-number. Therefore, while the
Trial Chamber admitted a total of 615 Prosecution exhibits, the total number of Prosecution documents admitted
was 782.

---- End of Page 2455 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / Ol? 18 May 2012

Q CLCYKX
motion on 4 May 2009, ruling that the Prosecution had adduced evidence that was capable
of sustaining a conviction on all 11 counts of the Indictment.l5680
(a) Witness Issues
(i) Protective Measures
7028. During the trial, the Trial Chamber ordered additional protective measures for ten
Prosecution witnesses.l568l These additional measures included image and/or voice
distortion, screens, and holding partially private or closed sessions for portions of the
testimony. The Prosecution was also granted leave to withhold the identity of nine further p
witnesses until 42 days before their scheduled testimony.l5682 The Prosecution moved for
permission to have eight witnesses testify in entirely closed sessions, but the Trial Chamber
denied these motions, holding the Prosecution had failed to give full and exhaustive
consideration to the use of less restrictive witness protection measures available under Rule
75(B)(i).l5683 The Trial Chamber rescinded the protective measures, in whole or in part, of
nine witnesses at their own request.l5684
*56*0 Praaaatttar V. raytar, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 4 May 2009, pp. 24193-2421 1.
mal These witnesses include TF1-515, TF1-385, TF1-539, TF1-516, TF1-388, TF1-567, TF1-390, TF1-338,
TF1-579, and TF1-358`. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-437, Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion
for Additional Protective Measures for the Trial Proceedings of Witnesses TF1-515, TF1-516, TF1-385, TF1-
539, TF1-567, TP1-388 and TF1-390, 13 March 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-455, Corrigendum
on Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Additional Protective Measures for the Trial Proceedings of
Witnesses TF1-515, TF1-516, TF1-385, TF1-539, TF1-567, TF1-388 and TF1-390, 4 April 2008; Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-515, Decision on Confidential Urgent Prosecution Motion for Additional Protective
Measures for Witnesses TF1-338 and TF1-579, 22 May 2008; & Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-654,
Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Protective Measures for Witness TF1-358, 3 November 2008.
[5682 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-368, Decision on Confidential Urgent Prosecution Motion for
Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses and for Non-Public Disclosure, 7 December 2007 & Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-383, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses
and for Non-Public Disclosure, 10 January 2008.
[5683 These witnesses include TF1-338, TF1-339, TF1-532, TF1-542, TF1-548, TF1-555, TF1-561, and TF1-395.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-427, Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion SCSL-03-01-T-372 and
SCSL-03-01-T-385 for the Testimonies of Witnesses to Be Held in Closed Session, 26 February 2008; &
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-615, Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Additional
Protective Measures for Witness TF1-395, 3 October 2008.
[5684 These included witnesses TF1-015, TF1-276, TF1-326, TF1-092, TF1-406, TF1-275, TF1-334, TF1-366,
TF 1-577. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-313, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Rescind Protective
Measures for Witnesses, 6 July 2007; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-348, Decision on Prosecution Motion
to Rescind Protective Measures for Witnesses, 3 October 2007; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-405,
Decision on Prosecution Motion to Rescind Protective Measures for Witness TF1-275, 31 January 2008;
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-472, Decision on Confidential and Urgent Defence Motion to Rescind or
Vary Protective Measures for Prosecution Witness TF1-334, 14 April 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-
T-551, Decision on Defence Motion Pursuant to Rule 75(G) to Rescind Closed Session Protective Measures
Granted Orally in Other Proceedings for Witness TF1-366, 2 July 2008; Prosecutor v. T aylor, SCSL-03-01-T,

---- End of Page 2456 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ‘/ GLS 18 May 2012

{MIP?
7029. The Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber in two instances with respect to
protective measures: Witness TF1-168 was permitted to testify in closed session{5°35 and the
Appeals Chamber found the Trial Chamber erred in law in adopting an incorrect
construction of the "RUF Protective Measures Decision" when deciding on a protective
measures motion relating to TF1-062,{5°8{’ who had previously testified with protective
measures in the RUF, CDF and AFRC trials.
7030. The following witnesses testified entirely in closed session: TF1-371,{5687 TF1-
168{5688, TF1-362{5689 and expert witness TF1-150.{5°9{{
(ii) Subpoena for Moses Blah gTF1-561 [
7031. On 3 March 2008, the Trial Chamber issued a subpoena for witness TF1-561 and
ordered the Registrar to transmit copies to the responsible authorities in Liberia so that it
could be properly served. {5°9{ On 14 May 2008, the former interim President of Liberia,
Moses Blah (TF1-561), began his testimony in open session.
(iii) Reclassification of Witness Corinne Dufka
Transcript 3 June 2008, p. 10861 and Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, 18 June 2008, p. 12144-
12145.
{5685 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-636, Decision on Prosecution Appeal Regarding the Decision
Concerning Protective Measures of Witness TF1-168, 17 October 2008.
{5686 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-666, Decision on Prosecution Appeal Regarding the Decision
Concerning Protective Measures of Witness TF1-062, 13 November 2008.
{5687 The provision that TF1-371's testimony be heard entirely in closed session was ordered by Trial Chamber I
in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T-577, Decision on Prosecution Motion for the
Testimony of Witnesses TF1-367, TF1-369 and TF1-371 to be Held in Closed Session and for Other Relief for
Witness TF1-369, 14 June 2006; see Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp.
2170-2171, where the Trial Chamber found that it continued to be bound by this order.
{5688 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-636, Decision on Prosecution Appeal Regarding the Decision
Concerning Protective Measures of Witness TF1-168, 17 October 2008.
{5689 The provision that TF1-362's testimony be heard entirely in closed session was ordered by Trial Chamber 1
in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T-377, Ruling on the Prosecution's Application for the
Entire Testimony of Witness TF1-362 to be Heard in Closed Session, 11 May 2005; see Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 27 February 2008, pp. 4792-4797, where the Trial Chamber found that it continued to
be bound by this order.
{5690The provision that TF1-150's testimony be heard entirely in closed session was ordered by Trial Chamber I
in Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T -432, Decision on Prosecution Application for
Closed Session for Witness TF2-218, 15 June 2005, see Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 18
February 2008, pp. 4000-4002, where the Trial Chamber found that it continued to be bound by this order.
{5°9{ Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-432, Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Subpoena ad
Testificandum, 3 March 2008.

---- End of Page 2457 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

q0J‘T'0
7032. On l9 June 2008, the Trial Chamber partially granted the Defence motion to exclude
the evidence of Corinne Dufka.16662 The Trial Chamber reclassihed Dukfa as a witness of
fact and admitted as exhibits certain materials referred to during her testimony. 16663
(b) Disclosure
(i) Disclosure of Confidential Information Obtained from a Witness
7033. On 2 November 2007, the Trial Chamber granted a Prosecution motion requesting
special measures for the disclosure of exculpatory information falling under Rule 68 which
was obtained during a confidential telephone interview with a witness who invoked Rule
70(B) protections. The Trial Chamber prohibited disclosure of the information to any person
other than the Accused and the Defence without prior written approval. 16664
(ii) Disclosure of Evidence Supporting Chief Prosecutor's Statements
7034. The Trial Chamber denied a Defence request for disclosure of the underlying
evidence for the Chief Prosecutor's public statements about the Accused's hidden assets,
finding the assets were irrelevant to the indictment.16666
(iii) Confidential Source lssue Relating to Witness TF I-35 5
7035. On 6 March 2009, the Trial Chamber denied the Defence Motion for disclosure of
the identity of a confidential source raised during the cross-examination of TF I-35 5 .16 666 On
9 February 2009, the Trial Chamber denied leave to certain organisations to file an amicus
curiae brief on confidential source issues raised during the cross-examination of witness
TF]-355.16697
16662 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-543, Decision on Defence Application to Exclude the Evidence of
Proposed Prosecution Expert Witness Corinne Dufka or, in the Alternative, to Limit its Scope gig on Urgent
Prosecution Request for Decision, l9 June 2008.
*5693 1bza.,p. rr.
16664 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-Ol-T-354, Public Version of the Confidential Decision on Prosecution
Motion Requesting Special Measures for Disclosure of Rule 70 Material, 2 November 2007.
16666 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-Ol-T-722, Decision on Motion for Disclosure of Evidence Underlying
Prejudicial Statements Made by the Chief Prosecutor, Mr Stephen Rapp, to the Media, 6 February 2009.
16666 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-Ol-T-759, Decision on Defence Motion for the Disclosure of the ldentity of
a Confidential ‘Source’ Raised During Cross-Examination of TFl-355, 6 March 2009.
16667 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-Ol-T-725, Decision on Application for Leave to File an Amicus Brief on
Confidential Source lssues Raised During the Cross-Examination of Witness TFl-355, 9 February 2009.

---- End of Page 2458 ---------------------------


Case No.; SCSL-03-Ol-T 18 May 20l2

gaj`77
(iv) Contradictory Testimony of TFl—371 and Disclosure Under Rule 68
7036. On 22 May 2008, the Trial Chamber found that the in—court testimony of TF1—371
contradicted the Declaration of the Chief of Investigations, giving rise under Rule 68 to an
A obligation on the Prosecution to disclose the existence of evidence which may affect the
credibility of the Prosecution's evidence. The Trial Chamber granted the Defence Motion in
part and ordered the disclosure to the Defence of the name and contact details of the
"confidential source" who contacted TF1—371 on or prior to 3 November 2005 on behalf of
the Prosecution.l5698
(c) Documents
(i) Personal Archives of the Accused
7037. The Prosecution's ex parte motion requesting access to documents from personal
archives of the Accused was denied on 5 November 2007. The Prosecution's failure to
adequately identify the information meant the motion had "the hallmarks of a fishing
expedition", and it therefore failed to meet the requirements of Rule 54. 15699
(ii ) Admission of Documents Under Rule 92bis, 92ter and 92guater
7038. On 21 August 2008, the Trial Chamber orally decided that documentary evidence not
tendered through a witness must be tendered pursuant to Rule 92bis and not 89(C).l57OO A
Prosecution request for leave to appeal the oral decision was dismissed.l57m
7039. The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence prior trial transcripts and related exhibits
from the testimony of 22 witnesses, as well as the statements of six witnesses, pursuant to
Rule 92bis. Admission of the evidence was contingent upon the Prosecution making the
witnesses available for cross—examination by the Defence. The Trial Chamber dismissed the
Img Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-516, Decision on Confidential Defence Motion for the Disclosure of
Exculpatory Material Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 22 May 2008.
5699 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-355, Decision on Ex Parte and Confidential Prosecution Motion for an
Order to Provide to the Prosecution Non-Piivileged Documents Recently Obtained from the Accused's Personal
Archive, 5 November 2007, p. 5. The Motion was subsequently reclassified as public on 3 December 2007.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-364, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Leave to Reclassify as "Pub1ic" a
Motion Previously Filed on an Ex Parte and Confidential Basis, 3 December 2007.
*0700 Prosecutor V. Taylor, scsr-03-01-r, rruuuuupt 21 August 2008,p. 14253.
mm Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-721, Decision on "Prosecution Notice of Appeal and Submissions

---- End of Page 2459 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T din 18 May 2012
"`V

VOSZVTZ.,
Defence application for rescission of protective measures with respect to 13 of these
Wltfl€SS€S. I 5702
7040. The Trial Chamber also admitted into evidence the following categoiies of
documents pursuant to Rule 92bis: (i) Liberia Search documents;l5703 (ii) extracts of the
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone;l5704 (iii) documents of
United Nations and United Nations Bodies;l5705 (iv) documents of certain non—governmental
organisations and Associated Press releases;l5706 (v) BBC Radio broadcasts;l5707 (vi)
documents seized from Foday Sankoh's house;l5708 (vii) documents seized from RUF Kono
Office, Kono District;l57O9 (viii) newspaper articles obtained from the Catholic Justice and
Concerning the Decision Regarding the Tender of Documents", 6 February 2009.
moz The prior trial transcripts of witnesses TF1-036, TF1-060, TF1-062, TF1-122, TF1-125, TF1-072, TF1-076,
TF1-077, TF1-218, TF1-304, TF1-195, TF1-197, TF1-198, TF1—206, TF1—023, TF1—029, TF1-024, TF1-084,
TF1-081, TF1-098, TF1-104, and TF1-227 were admitted. The witness statements of TF1-198, TF1-206, TF1-
084, TF1-098, TF1-104 and TFl-227 were admitted. The Defence application for rescission of protective
measures was dismissed with regard to witnesses TF1-036, TF1-060, TF1—125, TF1-072, TF1—076, TF1-077,
TF1-195, TF1-197, TF1-198, TF1-206, TF1-023, TF1-029, and TF1-104. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-
556, Decision on Prosecution Notice under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia
Kenema District and on Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of the Prior Testimony of TF1-
036 into Evidence, 15 July 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-623, Decision on Prosecution Notice
Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Kono District, 8 October 2008;
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-633, Decision on Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission
of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Kono District- TF1-218 and TF1-304, 14 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-T-634, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A to G Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis
for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Kono District- TF1-195, TFl-197, TF1-198 and TF1-206,
15 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03-01-T-635, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A to
C Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Freetown and the
Western Area- TF1-023 & TF1-029, 16 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-642, Decision on
Public with Confidential Annexes B to G Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence
Related to Inter Alia Freetown and the Western Area- TF1-024, TF1-081 and TF1-084, 20 October 2008; &
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-644, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A to D and F to G
Prosecution Notice Under Rule 92bis for the Admission of Evidence Related to Inter Alia Freetown & Western
Area- TF1-098, TF1-104 and TF1-227, 21 October 2008.
Um Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-736, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Liberia Search
Documents, 18 February 2009.
mm Prosecutor v, Taylor, SCSL—03—01»—T—737, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Extracts of the
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, 19 February 2009.
Um Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-739, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents of
the United Nations and United Nations Bodies, 20 February 2009.
mm Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-742, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents of
Certain Non-Govemmental Organisations and Associated Press Releases, 23 February 2009.
mm Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-745, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of BBC Radio
Broadcasts, 25 February 2009.
Img Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-747, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents
Seized from Foday Sankoh's House, 26 February 2009.
Img Prosecutor v, Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-749, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents
Seized from RUF Kono Office, Kono District, 27 February 2009.

---- End of Page 2460 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL—03-0l-T (lg 18 May 2012

a0f$L?
Peace Commission Archive in Monrovia, Liberia.15710 ln addition, the Trial Chamber
admitted into evidence Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) pursuant to Rule 92bis.15711
7041. On 25 January 2008, the Trial Chamber denied the Prosecution's request to admit
prior evidence from Witnesses TF1-362 and TF1-371 pursuant to Rule 92ter.15712
7042. On 5 February 2009, the Trial Chamber admitted the prior trial transcripts and
related exhibits of two deceased witnesses pursuant to Rule 92quater.15713
(iii) Access to Documents from the RUF Trial
7043. On 28 October 2008, the Trial Chamber ordered the modification of the Kallon and
Gbao Defence Protective Measures Decisions of 19 March 2007 and 1 March 2007, granting
the Defence access to unredacted transcripts and witness statements procured in preparation
fortrial.15714
(iv) Reclassification of Documents as Confidential
7044. On 16 December 2010, the Trial Chamber dismissed the Prosecution's request that
three filings and decisions be reclassified as "confidential" in order to protect the identity of
Witness rrr-375. *57*5
(d) Re-Opening of Prosecution Case
7045. On 29 June 2010, the Trial Chamber granted the Prosecution leave to re-open its case
to call three additional witnesses.15716 On 1 July 2010, the Trial Chamber issued a subpoena
15710 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-750, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Newspaper
Articles Obtained from the Catholic Justice & Peace Commission Archive in Monrovia, Liberia, 27 February
2009.
15711 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-744, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Document
Pursuant to Rule 89(C) and 92bis, 25 February 2009.
15712 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-399, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Part of the
Prior Evidence of TF1-362 and TF1-371 Pursuant to Rule 92ter, 25 January 2008.
15713 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-720, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes C to E
Prosecution Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial Transcripts of Witnesses TF1-021 and TFI-083 Pursuant to
Rule 92quater, 5 February 2009.
15714 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-649, Decision on Defence Motion Pursuant to Rule 75(G) to Modify
Kallon and Gbao Defence Protective Measures Decisions of 19 March 2007 and 1 March 2007 for Access to
Closed Session Defence Witness Testimony & Limited Disclosure of Defence Witness Names and Related
Exculpatory Material, 28 October 2008.
15715 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1140, Decision on Confidential with Confidential Annex A Urgent
Prosecution Motion to Classify as "Confidential" Certain Public Filings and Decisions in Violation of Protective

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T \/% GTR 18 May 2012

for one of these witnesses, Naomi Campbelllgm The Trial Chamber granted right of
appearance to the legal representatives of Naomi Campbell and Carole White and in the case
of Ms. Campbell's representative, a limited right of audience. The Trial Chamber granted
limited protective measures to Ms. Campbell. I5 718 A Defence motion to stay the proceedings
until the Prosecution disclosed any witness statements or "will-say" statements of Ms.
Campbell was found to be without merit and denied as no such statement existed.l57l9 The
witnesses testihed on 5, 9 and 10 August 2010.
5. Defence Case
Overview
7046. The Defence opened its case on 13 July 2009 and closed on 12 November 2010. ln
total, the Defence called 21 viva voce witnesses, including the Accused who testiied
pursuant to Rule 85(C), and the statement of one witness was admitted pursuant to Rule
92bis.l572O The Accused testihed for seven months, from 14 July 2009 until 18 February
2010. The Defence did not tender any expert reports. A total of 740 documents were
admitted as Defence exhibits.l572l
(a) Witness lssues
(i) Protective Measures
7047. On 27 May 2009, the Trial Chamber granted protective measures to Defence
witnesses falling into two categories: (i) insider witnesses and (ii) former or current political
or other high-ranking ofhcials, allowing the Defence, inter alia, to withhold identifying
Measures, 16 December 2010.
mm Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL·03·01·T·993, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A and B
Prosecution Motion to Call Three Additional Witnesses, 29 June 2010.
15717 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL·03·01·T·999, Subpoena ad Testificandum, 1 July 2010.
15718 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL·03·01·T·1035, Decision on Confidential Request for Protective Measures for
Naomi Campbell's Testimony, 3 August 2010; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL·03·01·T·1042, Decision on Motion
for Right to Appear as Counsel to a Witness, 5 August 2010.
15719 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL·03·01·T·1040, Decision on Urgent Defence Motion for Stay of Evidence
Pending Disclosure of the Statement of Naomi Campbell, 4 August 2010.
15720 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL·03·01·T·978, Decision on Defence Application for Admission of Affidavit by
DCT·118 Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 11 June 2010.
15721 When admitting documents, the Trial Chamber grouped similar documents together and admitted these
documents with the same exhibit number, but with a distinct exhibit letter or number. Therefore, while the Trial
Chamber admitted a total of 482 Defence exhibits, the total number of documents admitted was 740.

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Case No.: SCSL~03·01·T J! 18 May 2012

aeshr
information of witnesses until 21 days before the witness was scheduled to testify at
trial.15722 During the Defence case, the Trial Chamber also ordered additional protective
measures for one Defence witness.15723
(ii) Contact Between the Accused and Defence Counsel and Witnesses
7048. The Trial Chamber dismissed a Prosecution motion to restrict the Accused's access
to Defence Counsel for the duration of his cross—examination, finding that it violated the fair
trial rights of the Accused under Article 17 and that there was no suggestion that Defence
Counsel had acted unethically or inappropriately in their communications with the Accused
during the course of his examination—in—chief15724 The Trial Chamber also dismissed a
Prosecution motion seeking to prohibit direct contact between the Accused and Defence
witnesses, finding that the Prosecution had not established that there was any threat to the
integrity of the proceedings and had not proved that the Accused attempted to influence
potential witnesses or otherwise contaminate potential witness testimony. 15725
(b) Disclosure
7049. On 23 September 2010, the Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution to disclose to the
Defence all payments made to DCT-097, pursuant to Rule 68.15726 The Trial Chamber also
ordered the Prosecution to disclose to the Defence various exculpatory materials relating to
DCT—032, finding that the Prosecution had breached its obligations pursuant to Rule 68 in
not disclosing this material earlier. 15727 The Trial Chamber dismissed a Defence request that
15722 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-782, Decision on Urgent Defence Application for Protective Measures
for Witnesses and for Non-Public Materials, 27 May 2009.
15723 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-887, Decision on Confidential with Ex Parte Annex A Urgent
Defence Motion for Additional Protective Measures for Witness DCT-125, 22 January 2010. The Trial Chamber
also granted additional protective measures for another witness on the Defence witness list who was not called.
See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1047, Decision on Public with Confidential Annex A Defence Motion
for Additional Protective Measures in Relation to Witness DCT-192, 13 August 2010.
15724 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-0l-T-861, Decision on Prosecution Motion for an Order Restricting Contact
Between the Accused and Defence Counsel during Cross-Examination, 20 November 2009.
15725 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-832, Decision on Prosecution Motion for an Order Prohibiting Contact
between the Accused and Defence Witnesses or Alternative Relief, 14 August 2009.
15726 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1084, Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure of Statement and
Prosecution Payments Made to DCT-097, 23 September 2010.
15727 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1104, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A-D Defence
Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Information Relating to DCT-032, 20 October 2010 ("Disclosure
Decision").

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012

gas'}?
it draw an adverse inference from this violation.13723 lt later granted the Defence request for
leave to appeal this decision.13729
7050. During the Defence case, the Prosecution requested the Trial Chamber to order the
Defence to disclose the statements of certain witnesses. The Trial Chamber granted two such
requests in relation to DCT—l79 and DCT-190,137311 and denied four other such requests,
although it granted other remedies, such as allowing the Prosecution additional time to
prepare for cross-examination in three instances.13731 The Trial Chamber denied the
Prosecution leave to appeal one of its oral decisions denying such a request.13732
(c) Documents
(i) Use of Fresh Evidence in Cross-Examination
7051. In the Trial Chamber's decision of 30 November 2009, it determined the legal
standards applicable to the use and admission of documents in cross-examination of the
Accused. The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecution may use documents containing fresh
evidence in order to impeach the credibility of the Accused. The Trial Chamber held that
there was no statutory or procedural obligation upon the Prosecution to disclose such
documents beforehand. 13 733
A 13733 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1119, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A-D Defence
Motion for Admission of Documents and Drawing of an Adverse Inference Relating to the Alleged Death of
Johnny Paul Koroma, 11 November 2010. The Trial Chamber dismissed a Prosecution Motion requesting that
this decision, the Disclosure Decision and the Defence reply to the disclosure motion be re-classified as
confidential, on the basis that these decisions and filing did not disclose information that could reveal the identity
of a protected witness. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1140, Decision on Confidential with
Confidential Annex A Urgent Prosecution Motion to Classify as "Confidential" Certain Public Filings and
Decisions in Violation of Protective Measures, 16 December 2010.
13729 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1131, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Leave to Appeal the
Decision on the Defence Motion for Admission of Documents and Drawing of an Adverse Inference Relating to
the Alleged Death of Johnny Paul Koroma, 2 December 2010.
13730 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 25 February 2010, p. 36119 (re: DCT-179); Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 8 June 2010, p. 42365 (re: DCT-190).
13731 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 3 March 2010, p. 36925 (re: DCT-125); Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 24 March 2010, p. 37950 (re: DCT-146), Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-
T, Transcript 16 April 2010, pp. 39250-39251 (re: DCT-306); Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 3
November 2010, pp. 48624-48625 (re: DCT-102).
13733 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-953, Decision on Urgent Prosecution Application for Leave to Appeal
Decision of 16 April 2010, 5 May 2010.
13733 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-865, Decision on Prosecution Motion in Relation to the Applicable
Legal Standards Governing the Use and Admission of Documents by the Prosecution During Cross-
Examination, 30 November 2009, para. 27.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ,.. 18 May 2012

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7052. In respect of a document containing fresh evidence that was probative of the guilt of
the Accused, the Trial Chamber held that such document was subject to disclosure and could
not be used during cross-examination unless (a) it was in the interest of justice, and (b) it did
not violate the fair trial rights of the Accused. Furthermore, such a document would not be
admitted into evidence unless the Prosecution could establish "exceptional circumstances".
ln considering whether exceptional circumstances had been established, the Trial Chamber
would take into consideration (i) when and by which means the Prosecution obtained the
document; ii) when the Prosecution disclosed it to the Defence, and (iii) why the document
was only being offered only after the conclusion of the Prosecution case. 15734
7053. The Trial Chamber denied Prosecution requests for leave to appeal a number of oral
decisions made by the Trial Chamber disallowing the use of documents during the cross-
examination of the Accused.l5735
7054. The Trial Chamber also applied the principles set out in the "Decision on
Prosecution Motion in Relation to the Applicable Legal Standards Governing the Use and
Admission of Documents by the Prosecution During Cross-Examination" of 30 November
2009 in prohibiting the Prosecution from using a custodial interview of Defence Witness
. Issa Hassan Sesay (DCT-172) for the purposes of impeaching his evidence-in-chief The
Trial Chamber that held since the information was involuntarily obtained and went to proof
of the guilt of the Accused, the use of this document would not be in the interests of justice
or the fair trial rights of the Accused.l5736 A Prosecution application seeking leave to appeal
this decision was iiiSiiiiSSai.‘""
(ii ) Admission of Documents Under Rule 92bis, 92ter and 92guater
7055. The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence various documents pursuant to Rule
92bis, including (i) the affidavit of Witness DCT-118 (Chief J alloh Loon);l5738 (ii) two code-
*5734 Ibid.
Um Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-898, Decision on Public with Annex A and Confidential Annex B
Urgent Application for Leave to Appeal Oral Decisions of 14 January 2010 on Use of Documents in Cross-
Examination, 29 January 2010; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-905, Decision on Urgent Applications for
Leave to Appeal Oral Decisions of 18, 21, 25 and 26 January 2010 on Use of Documents in Cross-Examination,
9 February 2010,
IS736 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 13 August 2010, pp. 46255-46256.
my Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1062, Decision on Urgent Application for Leave to Appeal Decision
Excluding the Use of`Custodial Statement of Issa Sesay, 25 August 2010.
Img Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-978, Decision on Defence Application for Admission of Affidavit by

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T j is May 2012 M

cables;15139 (iii) 12 documents relating to the Special Task Force,151411 (iv) four
"contemporaneous" documents,15141 and (v) four documents relating to Defence
investigators Prince Taylor and Solomon Jusu Moriba.15144 The Trial Chamber denied the
following Defence motions for the admission of documents pursuant to Rule 92bis. It held
that an application for the admission of the autopsy report of Enoch Dogolea was in effect an
application for the admission of an expert report, and that the Defence had failed to make
out a case for the admission of the document pursuant to Rule 92bis as it was opinion
evidence, and had not followed the procedure laid down in Rule 94bis.15143 The Trial
Chamber also held that a newspaper report sought to be admitted went to the acts and
conduct of the Accused and was therefore inadmissible pursuant to Rule 92bis,15144 and that
excerpts of a report by the Intemational Centre for Transitional Justice on the Liberian TRC
report were "opinion" evidence and thus inadmissible pursuant to Rule 92bis.15145 It also
held that certain forensic and autopsy reports were opinion evidence and thus inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 92bis.15146 The Trial Chamber also dismissed a Defence request to admit
exculpatory material relating to DCT—032, on the basis that it went to the acts and conduct of
the Accused. The Trial Chamber later granted leave to the Defence to appeal this
decision,15141 and the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's decision in part,
DCT-118 Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 11 June 2010. The Prosecution advised that "in light of the advanced age and
alleged fragile health of the witness", it did not object to the admission of the affidavit in lieu of oral testimony.
See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-967, Prosecution Response to the Public, with Confidential Annex A
Defence Application for Admission of Affidavit by DCT-118 Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 26 May 2010, para. 3.
15739 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1064, Decision on Public with Annexes A and B Defence Motion for
Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 27 August 2010.
15 7411Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1079, Decision on Public with Annexes A-J and Confidential Annex
K-L Defence Motion for Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis ~— Special Task Force, 17 September
2010, admitting Defence Exhibits 454 to 456. See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1083, Corrigendum
to Decision on Public with Annexes A-J and Confidential Annex K-L Defence Motion for Admission of
Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis ~— Special Task Force, 22 September 2010.
' 15741 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1082, Decision on Public with Annexes A to D Defence Motion for
Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis ~— Contemporaneous Documentation, 22 September 2010.
15744 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript 12 November 2010, pp. 49112-49114.
15743 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1070, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A, B, C and D
Defence Motion for Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis — Autopsy Report, 9 September 2010.
15744 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1099, Decision on Public with Annex A Defence Motion for
Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis ~— Newspaper Article, 5 October 2010.
15745 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-l077, Decision on Public with Annex A Defence Motion for
Admission of Document Pursuant to Rule 92bis - ICTJ Report on Liberian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 16 September 2010.
15746 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1119, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A-D Defence
Motion for Admission of Documents and Drawing of an Adverse Inference Relating to the Alleged Death of
Johnny Paul Koroma, 12 November 2010, para. 30.
15747 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1131, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Leave to Appeal the
Decision on the Defence Motion for Admission of Documents and Drawing of an Adverse Inference Relating to

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Case No.: SCSI.-03-0l-T f 6v§ 18 May 2012

g¢0_$’3 7
affirming the exclusion of the proffered affidavit, but admitting the two other
documents. mlm
(d) Other
7056. The Trial Chamber dismissed a Prosecution motion for an order to direct the
Registry to disclose non-privileged information relating to certain communications made by
the Accused from the Detention Centre.`5749
7057. The Trial Chamber dismissed as premature a Defence motion requesting it to exclude
or limit the scope to be given to evidence falling outside of the temporal and/or geographical
scope of the Indictment and/or the jurisdiction of the Court. [5750
(e) Defence Reguests to Recall Witnesses and to Re-open the Defence Case
7058. On 24 January 2011, the Trial Chamber dismissed a Defence request to recall four
witnesses for further cross-examination in relation to the circumstances of their relocations,
and for the Trial Chamber to order the Chief of the Witnesses and Victims Section to testify
regarding the same.`575 I
7059. On 27 January 2011, the Trial Chamber granted a Defence request to re-open its case
to admit into evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis two United States Govemment ("USG")
cables which were published by the Guardian newspaper on 17 December 2010, but refused
to admit a newspaper article related to the same.`5752 On 28 January 2011, the Trial Chamber
the Alleged Death of Johnny Paul Koroma, 2 December 2010.
15748 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1168, Decision on Defence Appeal Regarding the Decision on the
Defence Motion for Admission of Documents and Drawing of an Adverse Inference Relating to the Alleged
Death of Johnny Paul Koroma, 25 January 2011.
mw Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-886, Decision on Public with Annex A and B and Confidential Annex
C Urgent Prosecution Request for an Order to Direct the Registry to Disclose Non-Privileged Information, 22
January 2010.
mw Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1101, Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude Evidence Falling
Outside the Scope of the Indictment and/or the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 6 October
2010.
my Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1167, Decision on Public with Annexes A-H and Confidential
Annexes I—J Defence Motion to Recall Four Prosecution Witnesses and to Hear Evidence from the Chief of
WVS Regarding Relocation of Prosecution Witnesses, 24 January 2011. The Trial Chamber later denied a
Defence request for leave to appeal this decision. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1188, Decision on
Defence Motion Seeking Leave to Appeal the Decision on Defence Motion to Recall Four Prosecution
Witnesses and to Hear Evidence from the Chief of WVS Regarding Relocation of Prosecution Witnesses, 4
February 201 1.
15752 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1171, Decision on the Urgent and Public with Annexes A-C Defence

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012

a0@
dismissed the Defence request for disclosure and/or investigation into the organs of the
Court in relation to the two leaked USG cables and the newspaper article. 15753
(f) Contempt Motions
7060. On 19 September 2008, the Trial Chamber dismissed four Prosecution motions
requesting investigations into contempt, which alleged that the Defence had breached the
protective measures of witnesses in violation of Rule 77(A).15754
7061. On 18 December 2008, the Trial Chamber granted a Prosecution motion in part, and
directed the Registrar to appoint experienced independent counsel to investigate allegations
of contempt made by Witness TF1-579 during the proceedings before the Trial
Chamber.15755 The Trial Chamber subsequently determined, on the basis of the conclusions
and recommendations of the independent counsel, that there were insufficient grounds for
insti gating contempt proceedings. 1 5756
7062. On 12 November 2010, the Trial Chamber dismissed a Defence motion requesting
that it order a contempt investigation into Prosecution conduct pursuant to Rule 77, alleging
that the Prosecution and its investigators knowingly and wilfully interfered with the
administration of justice by, inter alia, threatening, intimidating, causing injury or offering
bribes to or otherwise interfering with witnesses or potential witnesses.15757 On 3 December
Motion to Re-Open its Case in Order to Seek Admission of Documents Relating to the Relationship between the
United States Government and the Prosecution of Charles Taylor, 27 January 2011.
15753 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1174, Decision on Urgent and Public with Annexes A-N Defence
Motion for Disclosure and/or Investigation of United States Government Sources Within the Trial Chamber, the
Prosecution and the Registry Based on the Leaked USG Cables, 28 January 2011. The Trial Chamber later
denied the Defence request for leave to appeal this decision. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1193,
Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Leave to Appeal the Decision on Urgent and Public with Annexes A-N
Defence Motion for Disclosure and/or Investigation of United States Government Sources Within the Trial
Chamber, the Prosecution and the Registry Based on Leaked USG Cables, 7 February 2011.
15754 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-600, Decision on Prosecution Motions for Investigations into
Contempt of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ( SCSL-03-01-451; SCSL-03-01-452; SCSL-03-01-457; SCSL-
03-01-513), 19 September 2008.
15755Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-690, Confidential.Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for an
Investigation by Independent Counsel into Contempt of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and for Urgent
Interim Measures, 8 December 2008.
15756 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-774, Decision on Contempt Investigation Report by Independent
Counsel, 8 April 2009.
15757 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1118, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A-J and Public
Annexes K-O Defence Motion Requesting an Investigation into Contempt of Court by the Office of the
Prosecutor and its Investigators, 11 November 2010.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T // dh 18 May 2012

g05Z/
2010, the Trial Chamber granted a Defence motion seeking leave to appeal this decision,I5758
which in addition rendered moot the Defence motion requesting that the Trial Chamber
reconsider the same decision.I5759 The Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeal in its entirety
on the basis that it did not have the jurisdiction to consider appeals from preliminary
decisions made by the Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 77. I5760
7063. On 25 February 2011, the Trial Chamber granted in part two Prosecution motions
requesting that it order a contempt investigation pursuant to Rule 77, and directed the
Registrar to appoint independent experienced counsel to investigate allegations that certain
persons had disclosed information in knowing violation of an order of the Trial Chamber,
offered a bribe to and/or otherwise interfered with Prosecution witnesses.I576I On 17 March
201 1, the Trial Chamber ordered that the Registrar further direct the same counsel to
investigate an additional allegation of contempt pursuant to Rule 77, and to provide him
with certain supplementary materials.I5762 On the basis of the report of the independent
counsel,I5763 on 24 May 2011, the Trial Chamber found that there were sufficient grounds to
proceed against Eric Senessie for contempt of court, ordered that an order in lieu of an
indictment be issued charging Eric Senessie with nine counts of contemptuous conduct,
directed independent counsel to prosecute Senessie in accordance with the order in lieu of
indictment and assigned the contempt proceedings to Justice Doherty. I5764
Img Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1130, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Leave to Appeal the
Decision on the Defence Motion Requesting an Investigation into Contempt of Court by the Office of the
Prosecutor and its Investigators, 3 December 2010.
I5759 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1132, Decision on Public with Annex A Defence Motion for
Reconsideration of Decision on Defence Motion Requesting an Investigation into Contempt of Court by the
Office of the Prosecutor and Its Investigators, 3 December 2010.
I57°0 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1166, Decision on Public Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions
Regarding the Decision on the Defence Motion Requesting an Investigation into Contempt of Court by the
Office of the Prosecutor and its Investigators, 21 January 2011, para. 44.
I576I Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1218, Decision on Public with confidential Annexes A to E and Public
Annex F Urgent Prosecution Motion for an Investigation into Contempt of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
and Public with Confidential Annexes A and B Urgent Prosecution Motion for an Investigation into Contempt of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 February 2011.
I5762 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1231, Decision on Public with Confidential Annexes A and B Urgent
Prosecution Motion for an Investigation into Contempt of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and on Prosecution
Supplementary Requests, 17 March 2011.
ISM Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1240, Confidential and Under Seal Submission of Confidential Report
of Independent Counsel, 12 April 2011.
ISM Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1249, Decision on the Report of the Independent Counsel, 24 May
2011.

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T db) 18 May 2012

@0 {Z2
7064. The Prosecution requested that the Trial Chamber summarily deal with a possible
contempt of court by Lead Defence Counsel for disclosing information about protected
witnesses.l5765 On 24 March 2011, the Trial Chamber granted several interim measures, but,
Justice Sebutinde partially dissenting, held that in the interests of a fair and expeditious trial,
a decision on the merits of the motion should be postponed until the trial was completed. 15766
(g) Filing of the Final Trial Briefs and Oral Arguments
7065. On 22 October 2010, the Trial Chamber issued orders relating to the filing schedule
for the final trial briefs and responses, the length of the briefs and responses and dates for the
closing arguments.l5767
7066. On 12 January 2011, the Trial Chamber refused a Defence request for a status
conference and for a stay of proceedings or an extension of time for the filing of the final
trial briefs.l5768 On 14 January 2011, the Prosecution filed its final brief in accordance with
the deadline set out in the scheduling order,`5769 but the Defence did not. A status conference
was held on 20 January 20ll to allow the Defence to explain why it had not filed its final
15765 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL—03—0l—T—l208, Confidential with Confidential Annexes A—E Prosecution
Motion for the Trial Chamber to Sumrnarily Deal with Contempt of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and for
Urgent Interim Measures, 17 February 201 1.
ISM Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1235, Decision on Confidential with Confidential Annexes A-E
Prosecution Motion for the Trial Chamber to Surnmarily Deal with Contempt of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone and for Urgent Interim Measures, 24 March 201 1.
15767 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1 105, Order Setting a Date for the Closure of the Defence Case and
Dates for Filing of Final Trial Briefs and the Presentation of Closing Arguments, 22 October 2010.
15768 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1 154, Decision on Defence Request for a Status Conference Pursuant
to Rule 65bis and Defence Motion for Stay of Proceedings Pending Resolution of Outstanding Issues, 12 January
2011. The Trial Chamber later denied a Defence request for leave to appeal this decision. Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-T-1 180, Decision on Public with Annex A Defence Motion Seeking Leave to Appeal the Decision
on Defence Request for a Status Conference Pursuant to Rule 65Bis and Defence Motion for Stay of Proceedings
Pending Resolution of Outstanding Issues, 2 February 201 1.
15769 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1 156, Confidential Prosecution Final Trial Brief, 14 January 2011.
The Defence refused to accept service of this brief On 3 February 2011, the Trial Chamber granted the
Prosecution request for leave to file a corrigendurn to its final brief. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-1 183,
Decision on Prosecution Corrigendum and Motion for Leave to Substitute End of Pages of the Prosecution Final Trial
Brief, 3 February 201 1. At a status conference held on 7 March 201 1, the Trial Chamber granted the Prosecution
Motion to substitute its final trial brief with a "revised and refined" version of the brief. See Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 7 March 2011, p. 49334. It was filed as Annex A to Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-T-1 189, Public with Confidential Annex Motion to Substitute Final Trial Brief, 4 February 2011.
See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1233, Order re: Prosecution Public with Confidential Annex
Motion to Substitute Prosecution Final Trial Brief, 18 March 201 1. On 7 March 201 1, the Trial Chamber ordered
the parties to file public versions of their brief within one month. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T,
Transcript 7 March 2011, p. 49341. The Prosecution filed the public version of its brief on 8 April 2011. See
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1239, Public Prosecution Final Trial Brief, 8 April 2011. The Trial
Chamber accepted the brief despite its late filing.

---- End of Page 2470 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSI.-03-01-T / hgh 18 May 2012

gas'!} °
trial brief by this date. 15770 on 3 February 2011, the Defence attempted to file its final
brie£15771 but the Trial Chamber refused to accept the late filing. 15772
7067. The Prosecution made its oral closing arguments on 8 and 9 February 2011. On 8
February 2011, Lead Counsel for the Accused withdrew from the hearing, despite being
directed to stay by the Trial Chamber.15773 A hearing in relation to Lead Counsel's conduct
was scheduled for 25 Februar 2011,15774 but was ad`ourned as the Trial Chamber held that
Y J
the court was not properly constituted in the absence of Judge Sebutinde.15775 The Defence
filed a motion seeking the termination of the disciplinary proceedings or leave to appeal the
decision to adjourn,15776 but this was dismissed as moot15777 after Lead Counsel apologized
in court on 11 March 2011.15778
7068. The Trial Chamber granted the Defence request for leave to appeal its decision not to
accept the Defence final brief15779 and on 3 March 2011, the Appeals Chamber ordered the
Trial Chamber to accept the Defence final trial brief and to set a date for the Defence
closing arguments and for the rebuttal arguments.15780 On 7 March 2011, the Trial Chamber
held a status conference to address these issues. 15781
15770 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1 162, Scheduling Order for Status Conference on 20 January 201 1, 18
January 201 1.
15771 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1186, Confidential with Annexes A-C Defence Final Trial Brief, 3
February 201 1.
15772 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1191, Decision on Late Filing of Defence Final Trial Brief, 7 February
2011.
15773 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 8 February 2011, p. 49145. The Accused waived his right
to be present after the moming break, and for the subsequent hearings on 9 and 11 February 2011. Prosecutor v.
Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 8 February 2011, pp. 49187-49188; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T,
Transcript 9 February 2011, pp. 49285-49286; Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript ll February
2011, p. 49295.
15774 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 11 February 2011, pp. 49303—49304.
15775 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 25 February 2011, pp. 493 16-49318.
15776 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1220, Defence Motion Seeking Termination of the Disciplinary
Hearing for Failure to Properly Constitute the Trial Chamber and/or Leave to Appeal the Remaining Judges’
Decision to Adjoum the Disciplinary Hearing, 28 February 2011.
15777 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1234, Order re: Defence Motion Seeking Termination of the
Disciplinary Hearing for Failure to Properly Constitute the Trial Chamber and/or Leave to Appeal the Remaining
Judges’ Decision to Adjourn the Disciplinary Hearing, 18 March 2011.
15778 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript 11 March 2011, pp. 4962l—49622.
15779 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1202, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Leave to Appeal the
Decision on Late Filing of Defence Final Trial Brief, ll February 2011.
15780 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1223, Decision on Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions
Regarding the Decision on Late Filing of Defence Final Trial Brief, 3 March 2011.
15781 Prosecutor v, Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 7 March 2011, p. 49319.

---- End of Page 2471 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T db" 18 May 2012

eyaffée
7069. The final version of the Defence Final Trial Brief was filed on 9 March 2011.l5782 On
9 March 2011, the Prosecution made its oral response to the Defence's final trial briefmg`3
and on 10 March 2011 the Defence filed a written response to the Prosecution's final trial
brief? 15784
7070. The Defence delivered its oral closing arguments on 9 and 10 March 2011,mgS and
on 11 March 2011, both parties made oral arguments in rebuttalmgé
6. Final Judgement
7071. The Final Judgement was delivered in open court on 26 April 2012.
Hm The Defence filed its initial version of its brief on 3 February 2011. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-
1186, Confidential with Annexes A-C Defence Final Trial Brief, 3 February 201 1. The Defence filed a
corrigendum to its final trial brief on 8 February 2011, noting that it did so despite the refusal of the majority to
accept the final trial brief. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1194, Public with Annex A and Confidential
Annex B Corrigendum to Defence Final Trial Brief as Filed on 3 February 2011, 8 February 2011. The
Prosecution objected that Annex A to this Corrigendum, which was filed publicly, revealed the names of
protected witnesses, and the Trial Chamber reclassified it as confidential pending the outcome of its decision
relating to allegations of contempt against the Defence. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1210, Order
for Expedited Filing, 17 February 2011. During the status conference on 7 March 2011, the Trial Chamber held
that the corrected final trial brief should be accepted. However, it found that the Defence had improperly
included material which amounted to factual argument in its Annex, and that therefore the brief exceeded the
End of Page limit of 600 End of Pages set out in the Scheduling Order. lt therefore ordered the Defence to file a revised version
of the brief limited to 600 End of Pages by 9 March 2011. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 7 March
2011, pp. 49335—49336. This was filed as Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1229, Public with Confidential
Annex Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, 9 March 2011. On 7 March 2011, the Trial Chamber
ordered the parties to file public versions of their briefs within one month. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-
01-T, Transcript 7 March 2011, p. 49341. The Defence filed a public version of its brief on 7 April 2011.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1237, Public Version Defence Final Trial Brief, 7 April 2011. However, in
response to a Prosecution motion objecting that the public version of the brief revealed the identities of certain
protected witnesses, the Trial Chamber rejected the brief and ordered the Defence to submit a revised public
version by 20 May 2011. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1246, Decision on Public with Confidential
Annexes A to E Confidential Prosecution Motion for the Re-Filing of the ‘Public Version Defence Final Trial
Brief" and ‘Public Version Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief", l 1 May 201 1. The Trial
Chamber later permitted the Defence an extension until 23 May 2011 to file its brief. The Defence filed the final
public version of its brief on 23 May 2011. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1248, Public Version Defence
Final Trial Brief, 23 May 2011.
15783 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 9 March 2011, pp. 49343-49387.
15784 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1230, Confidential Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief,
10 March 2011. The Defence filed a public version of its response on 7 April 2011. Prosecutor v. Taylor,
SCSL-03-0l-T-123 8, Public Version Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, 7 April 2011. However,
in response to a Prosecution motion objecting that the public version of the response revealed the identities of
certain protected witnesses, the Trial Chamber rejected this response and ordered the Defence to submit a revised
public version by 20 May 2011. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1246, Decision on Public with
Confidential Annexes A to E Confidential Prosecution Motion for the Re-Filing of the ‘Public Version Defence
Final Trial Brief’ and ‘Public Version Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief", l1 May 2011. The
Defence filed the final public version of its response on 20 May 2011. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-
1247, Public Version Defence Response to Prosecution Final Trial Brief, 20 May 201 1.
15785 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript 9-10 March 2011. pp. 49387-49522.
15786 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript l 1 March 2011, pp. 49523—49622.

---- End of Page 2472 ---------------------------


Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % @3 18 May 2012

XIV. ANNEX C: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
l. Judgements and Decisions
(a) Special Court for Sierra Leone
AF RC Case
Kamara Decision on Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL-04-l6-T-
Motion to Exclude 280, Decision on Joint Defence Motion to Exclude all
Evidence Evidence from Witness TFl-277 pursuant to Rule 89 (C)
and/or Rule 95, 24 May 2005
Kamara Decision on Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL-04-l6-PT-
Form of Indictment 046, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion on
Defects in the Form of the Indictment (TC), l April 2004
AFRC Trial Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL-04-l6-T-
Judgement 628, Judgement (TC), 20 June 2007
AFRC Appeal Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL-04-l6-A-
Judgement 675, Judgement (AC), 22 February 2008
Kanu Decision on Prosecutor v. Kanu, SCSL-2003-l3-PT, Decision and Order
Form of Indictment on Defence Preliminary Motion for Defects in the Form of
the Indictment, l9 November 2003
CDF Case
Fofnnn Appeal Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, SCSL-04-l4-AR73-398,
Deeision on Jndieioi Fofana — Decision on Appeal Against "Decision on
Notice and Admission Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of
of Evidence Evidence", Separate Opinion of Justice Robertson, l6 May
2005
CDF Appeal Decision Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-l4-
on Nature of Armed PT-l0l, Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of
Conflict Jurisdiction Materiae: Nature of the Armed Conflict (AC),
25 May 2004
CDF Appeal Decision Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-04-l4-AR72(E)-l3l-
on Child Recruitment 7384/7398/74l3/7430, Decision on Preliminary Motion
Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (AC), 3l
May 2004
Dissenting Opinion of Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-04-l4-AR72(E)-l3 l-
Justice Robertsonf? 7413/7430, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson to
CDFA""°"lCh""‘b°r D°°""°" Appeals Chamber Decision on Child Recruitment, 3l May
on Child Recruitment
Fofana Appeal Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-l4-
Decision Refusing T-371, Fofana — Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail
Bail (AC), ll March 2005

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Case No; SCSL·03-01·T // {jig 18 May 2012

gw§Z{
CDF Decision on Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04—14-
Closed Session for T-432, Decision on Prosecution Application for Closed
Witness TF2—218 Session for Witness TF2-218, 15 June 2005
CDF Trial Judgement Prosecutor v. F ofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T-785,
Judgement (TC), 2 August 2007
CDF Appeal Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-A-829,
Judgement Judgement (AC), 28 May 2008
RUF Case
RUF Trial Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T-1234,
Judgement Judgement (TC), 2 March 2009
RUF Appeal Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-A-1321,
Judgement Judgement (AC), 26 October 2009
Taylor Case
Indictment Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-263, Prosecution's
Second Amended Indictment, 29 May 2007
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-543, Decision on
Exclusion of Evidence Defence Application to Exclude the Evidence of Proposed
of Corinne Dufka Prosecution Expert Witness Corinne Dufka, for, in the
Alternative, to Limit its Scope and on Urgent Prosecution
Request for Decision, 19 June 2008
Taylor Admission of Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Decision on Public
Documents Decision with Annexes A and B Defence Motion for Admission into
Evidence of 301 Documents and Photographs Marked for
Identification During the Cross-Examination of the
Accused and on Prosecution List of Documents Marked for
Identification During the Testimony of Charles Taylor
Sought to be Admitted into Evidence, 18 March 2010
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-543, Decision on
Exclusion of Evidence Defence Application to Exclude the Evidence of Proposed
of Corinne Dufka Prosecution Expert Witness Corinne Dufka or, in the
Alternative, to Limit its Scope and on Urgent Prosecution
Request for Decision, 19 June 2008
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-765, Decision on
Judicial Notice of Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated
AFRC Adjudicated Facts from the AFRC Trial Judgement pursuant to Rule
Facts 94(B), 23 March 2009
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-04-01-T-987, Decision on
Judicial Notice of RUF Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated
Adjudicated Facts Facts from the RUF Trial Judgement Pursuant to Rule
94(B) and Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of
Adjudicated Facts from the RUF Judgement, 17 June 2010
Taylor Appeal Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-775, Decision on

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Case No.: SCSL—03—01—T if dh 18 May 2012

awt?}
Chamber Decision on Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions regarding the
JCE Majority Decision Concerning the Pleading of JCE in the
Second Amended Indictment, l May 2009
Taylor Trial Chamber Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-752, Decision on
Decision on JCE Urgent Defence Motion regarding a Fatal Defect in the
Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment relating to the
Pleading of J CE, 27 February 2009
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-745, Decision on
Admission of BBC Prosecution Motion for Admission of BBC Radio
Radio Broadcasts Broadcasts, 25 February 2009
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-742, Decision on
Admission of Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents of
Documents from NGOs Certain Non-Governmental Organisations and Associated
and Associated Press Press Releases, 23 February 2009
Releases
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v, Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-744, Decision on
Admission of Prosecution Motion for Admission of Document pursuant
Document pursuant to to Rules 89(C) and 92bis, 25 February 2009
Rules 89(C) and 92bis
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-747, Decision on
Admission of Seized Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents Seized
Documents from Foday from Foday Sankoh's House, 26 February 2009
Sankoh's House
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-749, Decision on
Admission of Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents Seized
Documents Seized from from RUF Kono Office, Kono District, 27 February 2009
RUF Kono Office
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-737, Decision on
Admission of Extracts Prosecution Motion for Admission of Extracts of the
of Report of the Truth Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
and Reconciliation Sierra Leone, 19 February 2009
Commission of Sierra
Leone
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-736, Decision on
Admission of Liberia Prosecution Motion for Admission of Liberia Search
Search Documents Documents, 18 February 2009
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-370, Decision on the
Judicial Notice Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 7 December 2007
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-750, Decision on
Admission of Prosecution Motion for Admission of Newspaper Articles
Newspaper Articles Obtained from the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
J Obtained in Monrovia Archive in Monrovia, Liberia, 27 February 2009
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-739, Decision on
Admission of Prosecution Motion for Admission of Documents of the
Documents from UN United Nations and United Nations Bodies, 20 February

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Case No; SCSL-03-O1-T // [lh 18 May 2012

Trial Transcripts Motion for Admission of the Prior Trial Transcripts of
under Rule 92quater Witnesses TF1-021 and TF1-083 pursuant to Rule
92quater, 5 Febmary 2009
Taylor Agreed Facts Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCS L-03-01-PT-227, Joint Filing by
and Law the Prosecution and Defence: Agreed Facts and Law, 26
April 2007
Taylor Rule 98 Decision Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Rule 98 Decision,
Transcript 4 May 2009
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1064, Decision on
Admission of Public with Annexes A and B Defence Motion for
Documents Admission of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 27
August 2010
Taylor, 92bis Decision Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1079, Decision on
on Special Task Force Public with Annexes A-J and Confidential Annexes K-L
Defence Motion for Admission of Documents Pursuant to
Rule 92bis — Special Task Force, 17 September 2010
Taylor 92bis Decision Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1082, Decision on
on Contemporaneous Public with Annexes A-D Defence Motion for Admission
Documentation of Documents Pursuant to Rule 92bis — Contemporaneous
Document, 22 September 2010
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1084, Decision on
Payments to DCT—097 Defence Motion for Disclosure of Statement and
Prosecution Payments made to DCT-097, 23 September
2010
Taylor Decision on Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-1104, Decision on
Exculpatory Public with Confidential Annexes A-—D Defence Motion
Information for Disclosure of Exculpatoiy Infomiation Relating to
DCT-032, 20 October 2010
Taylor Appeal Decision Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-AR73, Decision on
on the Tender of "Prosecution Notice of Appeal and Submissions
Documents Conceming the Decision Regarding the Tender of
Documents", 6 Febmaiy 2009
Taylor Decision on the Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1101, Decision on
Evidence Falling Defence Motion to Exclude Evidence Falling Outside the
Outside of the Scope of the Indictment and/or the Jurisdiction of the
Indictment Special Court for Sierra Leone, 6 October, 2010
Taylor Decision of Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T-1118, Decision on
Contempt Case Public with Confidential Annexes A-J and Public Annexes
K-O Defence Motion Requesting an Investigation into
Contempt of Court by the Office of the Prosecutor and its
Investigators, 12 November 2010
(b) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Prosecutor v. Akayesu ,__

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Case No.: SCSI.—03—01—T 18 May 2012
I

§/0.57o
Akayesu Trial Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC),
Judgement 2 September 1998
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema
Bagilishema Trial Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, lCTR-95-1A-T, Judgement (TC),
Judgement 7 June 2001
Bagilishema Appeal Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgement
Judgement (Reasons) (AC), 3 July 2002
Prosecutor v. Bagosora
Bagosora Trial Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (TC), 18
Judgement December 2008
Bagosora Decision of Prosecutor v. Bagosora, lCTR-98-41-T, Decision on
Witness DBY Admissibility of Proposed Testimony of Witness DBY, 18
September 2003
Bagosora Appeal Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-AR93 & ICTR-98-41-
Decision on Exclusion AR93.2, Decision on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeals
of Evidence Regarding Exclusion of Evidence, 19 December 2003
Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al
Bizimungu etal. Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et ol., ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on
Decision on Expert Defence Motion for Exclusion of Portions of Testimony of
Witness Expert Witness Alison Des Forges, 2 September 2005
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi
Gacumbitsi Appeal Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-01-64-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 7 July 2006
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli
Kajel§eli Appeal Kajelyeli v. Prosecutor, ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 23 May 2005
Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira
Kalimanzira Appeal Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement(AC),
Judgement 20 October 2010
Prosecutor v. Karera
Karera Appeal Karera v. Prosecutor, ICTR#01-74-A, Judgement(
Judgement AC), 2 February 2009
Prosecutor v. Karemera

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Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T % 18 May 2012 w
r

gags};
Karemera Decision on Prosecutor v Karemera et al., [CTR-98-44-A4(a), Decision A
Count Seven of the on Count Seven of the Amended Indictment — Violence to
Amended Indictment Life, Health and Physical or Mental Well-Being of Persons
(TC), 5 Augist 2005
Karemera Decision on Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44-PT, Decision on
Disclosure of Defence Motion for Full Disclosure of Payments to
Payments Witnesses and to Exclude Testimony from Paid Witnesses,
23 Aug1st 2005
Karemera Decision on Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on
Abuse of Process Joseph Nzirorera's Motion to Dismiss for Abuse of Process:
Payments to Prosecution Witnesses and "Requete de
Mathieu Ngirumpatse en Retrait de L’Acte D’Accusation",
27 October 2008
Karemera Decision on Prosecutor v. Karemera, ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on
Admission of Admission of Documents Used in Cross-Examination of
Documents During Edouard Karemera and Witness 6, 11 November 2009
Cross—Examination
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana
Kayishema and Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T,
Ruzindana Trial Judgement (TC), 21 May 1999
Judgement
Prosecutor v. Muhimana
Muhimana Appeal Muhimana v. Prosecutor, ICTR-95-1B-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 21 May 2007
Prosecutor v. Musema
Musema Trial Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement and
Judgement Sentence (TC), 27 January 2000
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi
Muvunyi Appeal Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-00-55A-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 29 August 2008 ,
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al.
Nahimana etal. Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor, ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement
Appeal Judgement (AC), 28 November 2007
Nahimana etal. Ngeze and Nahimana v. Prosecutor, lCTR—97—27—AR72 and
Interlocutory Appeals lCTR—96-11—AR72, Decision on the lnterlocutory Appeals, 5
Decision September 2000

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T // 4/* 18 May 2012

g;0>’9g
Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo
Nchamihigo Appeal Nchamihigo v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-63 -A, Judgement
Judgement (AC), 18 March 2010
Nchamihigo Decision Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, ICTR—2001-63-R50, Decision on
on the Form of the Defence Motion on Defects in the Form of the Indictment,
Indictment 27 September 2006
Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi
Ndindubahizi Appeal Ndindabahizi v. Prosecutor, ICTR—01-71-A, Judgement
Judgement (AC), 16 January 2007
Prosecutor v. Niseyimana and Hategekimana
Niseyimana Decision Prosecutor v. Niseyimana and Hategekimana, ICTR-00-55-I,
on Leave to Amend Decision on the Prosecution's Application for Severance and
the Indictment Leave to Amend the Indictment Against Idelphonse
V Hategekimana, 25 September 2007
Prosecutor v. Musema
Musema Appeal Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement (AC), 16
Judgement November 2001
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi
Muvunyi Appeal Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-00-55A-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 29 August 2008
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe
Ntagerura et aL Trial Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe,
Judgement ICTR-99-46-T, Judgement (TC), 25 February 2004
Ntagerura et al. Prosecutor v. Ntugerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe,
Appeal Judgement ICTR—99—46-A, Judgement (AC), 7 July 2006
Prosecutor v. Nshogoza
Nshogoza Decision on Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, ICTR—07—91-T, Decision on
Evidence of Prosecutor's Motion to Admit Evidence of a Consistent
Consistent Pattern of Pattern of Conduct, 20 February 2009
Conduct
Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana
Ntakirutimana Appeal Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-
Judgement 10A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement (AC), 13 December
2004

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Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T % OV; 18 May 2012

Prosecutor v. N tawukulilyayo
Ntawukulilyayo Prosecutor v. Ntawukulilyayo, ICTR-05-82-PT, Decision on
Decision on the Form Defence Preliminary Motion Alleging Defects in the Form of
of the Indictment the Indictment, 28 April 2009
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda
Rutaganda Trial Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3 -T, Judgement and
Judgement Sentence (TC), 6 December 1999
Rutaganda Appeal Rutagartda v. Prosecutor, ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 26 May 2003
Prosecutor v. Rukundo
Rukundo Trial Prosecutor v. Rukundo, ICTR-2001-70-T, J udgement(TC),
Judgement 27 February 2009
Rukundo Appeal Prosecutor v. Rukundo, ICTR-2001-70-A, J udgement(AC),
Judgement 20 October 2010
Prosecutor v. Semanza
Semanza Trial Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and
Judgement S Sentence (TC), 15 May 2003
Semanza Appeal Semartza v. Prosecutor, ICTR-97-20-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 20 May 2005
Prosecutor v. Seromba
Seromba Appeal Seromba v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 12 March 2008
Prosecutor v. Simba
Simba Appeal Simba v. Prosecutor, [CTR-01-76-AR72.2, Decision on
Decision on Temporal Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction, 29
Jurisdiction July 2004
Simba Appeal Simba v. Prosecutor, ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement (AC), 27
Judgement November 2007
(c) International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski
Aleksovski Appeal Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on
Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence (AC),
Admissibility of l6 February 1999
Evidence

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T Q1" 18 May 2012

C/0 5'?;¤
Aleksovski Trial Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement (TC), 25
Judgement June 1999
Aleksovski Appeal Prosecutor v. Ale/csovs/ci, IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement (AC), 24
Judgement March 2000
Prosecutor v. Blagojevié and Jokié
Blagojevié and Jokié Prosecutor v. Blogojevié and Jokié, IT-02-60-T, Judgement
Trial Judgement (TC), 17 January 2005
Blagojevié and Jokié A Prosecutor Blogojevié cmd Jokié, IT-02?60-A, Judgement A
A Appeal Judgement p (AC), 9 May 2007
Prosecutor v. Blaskié
Blaskié Trial Prosecutor v. Bloskié, IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March
Judgement 2000
Blaskié Appeal Prosecutor v. Bloskic, IT-95-14-A, Judgement (AC), 29 July
Judgement 2004
Prosecutor v. Boskoski and Tarculovski
Boskoski and Prosecutor v. Boskoski cmd T orculovski, IT-04-82-PT,
T aréulovski Decision Decision on Prosecution's Motion to Amend the Indictment
on Amending and Submission of Proposed Second Amended Indictment
Indictment and Submission of Amended Pre-Trial Briei 26 May 2006
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin
Brdjanin Trial Prosecutor v. Brojcmin, IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1
Judgement September 2004
Brdjanin Appeal Prosecutor v. Brdjcmin, IT-99-36-A, Judgement (AC), 3
Judgement April 2007
Brdjanin Decision on Prosecutor v. Brdjcmin, IT-99-36-A, Decision on
lnterlocutory Appeal lnterlocutory Appeal, 19 March 2004
Brdjanin Decision on Prosecutor v. Brdcmin, IT-99-36-T, Decision for Motion of
Motion of Acquittal Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bts, 28 November 2003
Brdjanin Decision on Prosecutor v. Brojantn, IT-99-36-PT, Decision on
the Form of the Objections By Momir Talic to the Form of Amended
Indictment Indictment (TC), 20 February 2001
Prosecutor v. Delalié, Mucié, Delié and Landio (Celibiéi Case)
Celibiéi Trial Prosecutor v. Delolié, Mucié, Delié and Lcmdio, IT-96-21-T,
Judgement Judgement (TC), 16 November 1998
Celibiéi Appeal Prosecutor v. Delolié, Mucié, Delié and Londio, IT-96-21-A,
Judgement Judgement (AC), 20 February 2001

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4/iafij
Celibiéi Appeal Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt and
Judgement, Separate Judge Mohamed Bennouna, 20 February 2001
and Dissenting
Opinion of Judges
Hunt and Bennouna
Prosecutor v. Delic
Delié Trial Prosecutor v. Delic, IT-04-83-T, Judgement (TC), 15
Judgement September 2008
Delié Appeal Decision Prosecutor v. Delié, IT-04-83-AR73. 1, Decision on Rasim
on Admission of Deli¢'s lnterlocutory Appeal against Trial Chamber's Oral
Evidence Decisions on Admission of Exhibits 1316 and 1317, 15 April
2008
Prosecutor v. Dordevic
Bordevié Trial Prosecutor v. Dorcfevic, IT-05-87/1-T, Judgement (TC), 23
Judgement February 201 1
Prosecutor v. Furundiija
F urundiua Trial Prosecutor v. F urundiya, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement (TC), 10
Judgement December 1998
Prosecutor v. Galic
Galié on Expert Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98-29-T, Decision Concerning the
Witness Expert Witnesses Ewa Tabeau and Richard Philipps (TC), 3
July 2002
Galié Trial Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98-29-T, Judgement (TC), 5
Judgement December 2003
Galié Appeal Prosecutor v. Garlic, IT-98-29-A, Judgement (AC), 30
Judgement November 2006
Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovic and Kubura
Hudéihasanovié et aL Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovic and Kubura, IT-01-47-AR72,
Appeal Decision on Decision on lnterlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in
Command relation to Command Responsibility (AC), 16 July 2003
Responsibility
Hudiihusunovié etal. Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 16 July
Appeal Decision, 2003
Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen
Hadiihasunovié et aL Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge David
Appeal Decision, Hunt Command Responsibility Appeal, 16 July 2003

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T CPL 18 May 2012
~\/

Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Hunt
Hadiihasanovié and Prosecutor v. Hadéihosonovic and Kuburo, IT-01-47-A,
Kubura Appeal Judgement (AC), 22 April 2008
Judgement
Prosecutor v. Halilovic
Halilovié Trial Prosecutor v. Holilovic, IT-01-48-T, Judgement (TC), 16
Judgement November 2005
Halilovié Appeal Prosecutor v. Holilovic, IT-01-48-A, Judgement (AC), 16
Judgement October 2007
Prosecutor v. Jelisic
Jelisié Trial Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Judgement (TC), 14
Judgement December 1999
Jelisié Appeal Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgement (AC),
Judgement 5 July 2001
' Prosecutor v. Jokic
Jokié Sentencing Prosecutor v. Miodrag Jokic, IT-01-42/1-A, Judgement on
Appeal Judgement Sentencing Appeal (AC), 30 August 2005
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez
Kordié and Cerkez Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement
Trial Judgement (TC), 26 Febmary 2001
Kordié and Cerkez Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement
Appeal Judgement (AC), 17 December 2004
Prosecutor v. Krajisnik
Krajisnik Trial Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, IT-00-39-T, Judgement (TC), 27 ·
Judgement September 2006
Krajisnik Appeal Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, IT-00-39-A, Judgement (AC), 17
Judgement March 2009
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac
Krnojelac Decision on Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-PT, Decision on the
the Form of Defence Preliminary Motion on the Fomi of the Indictment
Indictment (TC), 24 Febmary 1999
Krnojelac Trial Prosecutor v. Krrtojelac, IT-97-25-T, Judgement (TC), 15
Judgement March 2002
Krnojelac Appeal Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Judgement (AC), 17 0
Judgement September 2003

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Case No.: SCSL—03—0l—T 18 May 2012

cgof? rc
Prosecutor v. Krstic
Krstié Trial Prosecutor v. Krstié, lT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August
Judgement 2001
Krstié Appeal Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgement (AC), 19 April
Judgement 2004
Partial Dissenting Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 19 April
Opinion of Judge 2004
Shahabuddeen
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic
Kunarac et al. Trial Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23-T and
Judgement IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement (TC), 22 February 2001
Kunaruc et al. Appeal Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23 and
Judgement IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement (AC), 12 June 2002
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Josipovic, Papic and gantic
Kupreskié et al. Trial Prosecutor y. Kupreskic, Kupreskic, Kupreskié, Joswovic,
Judgement Pupic and Santic, IT-95-16-T, Judgement (TC), 14 January
2000
Kupreskié et al. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Kupreskic, Kupreskic, Josipovic
Appeal Judgement and Santic, IT-95-16-A, Judgement (AC), 23 October 2001
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Kos, Radic, Zigic and Prcac
Kvocka et al. Trial Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Kos, Radic, Zigic and Prcac, IT-98-
Judgement 30/ 1-T, Judgement (TC), 2 November 2001
Kvocka et ul. Appeal Prosecutor v. Kvockcz, Kos, Radic, Zigic and Prcac, lT-98-
Judgement 30/ 1-A, Judgement (AC), 28 February 2005
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu
Limaj et aL Trial Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, IT-03 -66-T,
A Judgement Judgement (TC), 30 November 2005
Limaj et al. Appeal Prosecutor v. Lima], Balto and Musliu, lT-03-66-A,
Judgement Judgement (AC), 27 September 2007
Prosecutor v. Lukic and Lukic
Lukié and Lukié Trial Prosecutor v. Lukic and Lukic, IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement
Judgement (TC), 20 July 2009
Prosecutor v. Martic
Martié Trial Prosecutor v. Murtic, IT-95-11-T, Judgement (TC), 12 June

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Case No.; SCSL-03-01-T / (jh 18 May 2012

g40f9&°
Judgement 2007
Martic Appeal Prosecutor v. Martic, IT-95-1 1-A, Judgement (AC), 8
Judgement October 2008
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic
D. Milosevic Trial Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, IT-98-29/1-T, Judgement
Judgement (TC), 12 December 2007
D. Milosevic Appeal Prosecutor v. Dragornir Milosevic, IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement
Judgement (AC), 12 November 2009
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic
Milosevic Decision on Prosecutor v. Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for
Motion for Acquittal Judgement of Acquittal, 16 June 2004
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, éainovic and Ojdanic
Milutinovic et al.Trial Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sairzovic and Ojdarzic, lT-05-87-
Judgement T, Judgement (TC), 26 February 2009
Ojdanic Appeal Prosecutor v. Milutirzovic, gairzovic, and Ojdarzic, IT-99-3 7-
Decision on JCE AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging
J urisdiction—J oint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003
Prosecutor v. Mrksic
Mrksic Appeal Prosecutor v. Mrksic, IT-95-13/1-A, Judgement (AC), Q May
Judgement 2009
Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic
Naletilic and Prosecutor v. Noletilic and Martirzovic, IT-98-34-T,
Martinovic Trial Judgement (TC), 31 March 2003
Judgement
Nuletilic and Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martirzovic, IT-98-34-A,
Martinovic Appeal Judgement (AC), 3 May 2006
Judgement
Prosecutor v. Oric
Oric Trial Judgement Prosecutor v. Oric, IT-03-68-T, Judgement (TC), 30 June
2006
Oric Appeal Prosecutor v. Oric, IT-03-68-A, Judgement (AC), 3 July
Judgement ( 2008
Oric Appeal Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen, 3 July 2008
Judgement,

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Case No.: SCSL»03~0l»T % 18 May 2012

440 S`} 7
Declaration of Judge
Shahabuddeen
Orig Order on Prosecution v. Oric, IT-03-68-T, Order Concerning
Evidence Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of Parties During
Trial Proceedings, 21 October 2004
Prosecutor v. Perisié
Periiié Trial A Prosecutor v. Perisic, IT-04-81-T, Judgement (TC), 6
Judgement September 201 1
Prosecutor v. Popovic et al.
popovic Trial Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-T, Judgement(TC), 10
Judgement June 2010
popovic Decision on Prosecutor v. Popovic et. al., IT-05-88-T, Decision on
Adindicated Facts Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts
with Annex, 26 September 2006
Prosecutor v. Prlié
Prlié Decision on Prosecutor v. Prlic, IT-04-74-T, Decision on Slobodan A
Time Frame of Joint Praljak's Motion for Claiitication of the Time Frame of the
Criminal Enterprise Alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise, 15 January 2009
prlic Anneal Decision Prosecutor v. Prlié, IT-04-74-AR73.14, Decision on the
on Admission of lnterlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision
Documents during on Presentation of Documents by the Prosecution in Cross-
Cross__EXamination Examination of Defence Witnesses, 26 February 2009
Prosecutor v. Simié
Simié Trial Prosecutor v. Simic, IT-95-9-T, Judgement (TC), 17 October
Judgement 2003
Simié Appeal Prosecutor v. Simic, IT-95-9-A, Judgement (AC), 28
Judgement November 2006
Prosecutor v. Stakié
Stukié Trial Prosecutor v. Stakic, IT-97-24-T, Judgement (TC), 31 July
Judgement 2003
Stakic Appeal A Prosecutor v. Sta/ctc, IT-97-24-A, Judgement (AC), 22
Judgement March 2006
Prosecutor v. Strugar
Strugar Trial Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Judgement (TC), 31
Judgement January 2005
Strugar Appeal Prosecutor v. Strugar, lT-01-42-A, Judgement (AC), 17 July

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ¢" 18 May 2012
/ dw %

ypffv
Judgement 2008
Prosecutor v. Tadic
T adié Decision on Prosecutor v. Tadié, 1T-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence
Jurisdiction Motion on Jurisdiction (TC), 10 August 1995
T adié Appeal Prosecutor v. Tadié, 1T-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
Decision on Motion for lnterlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (AC), 2
Jurisdiction October 1995
T adié Decision on Prosecutor v, Tadié, Case No. 1T-94-1-T, Decision on
Hearsay Defence Motion on Hearsay, 5 August 1996
T adié Trial Prosecutor v. Tadié, 1T-94-1-T, Judgement (TC), 7 May
Judgement 1997
T adié Appeal F Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1T-94-1-A, Judgement (AC), rs July
JJ¤<1g¢m¢¤¢JJ JJ ,1999 JJ J JJ J J J J J J J 1
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic
VasiUevié Trial Prosecutor v. Vasiyevié, 1T-98-32-T, Judgement (TC), 29
Judgement November 2002
Vasiyevié Appeal Prosecutor v, Vasiyevic, 1T-98-32-A, Judgement (AC), 25
Judgement February 2004
(d) Special Tribunal for Lebanon
STL Appeal Decision STL-11-01/1/AC/R176bis, lrrterlocutory Decision on the
Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide,
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 16 February 2011
(e) World War 11 Tribunals
United States v. Josef Altstoetter
Justice Case United States of America v. Josef Altstoetter, et al. (Case 3),
U.S. Military Tribunal, October 1946 — April 1949, in Trials
of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
under Control Council Law No. IO (l95]), vol. lll
United States v. Greitfelt et al.
RuSHA Case United States v. Greyfelt et al., U.S. Military Tribunal,
Judgement, 10 March 1948, in Yrials of War Criminals
before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10(I95I), vol. V

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Case No.: SCSL·03·01·T % 6,% 18 May 2012

¢0.s’F7
(i) Other International Jurisdictions
International Criminal Court
Lubrmga 9 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC—0l/04-01/06,
Confirmation of Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007
( Charges I
2. International Legal Documents
(a) Treaties, Conventions and Protocols
Additional Protocol II Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 (entered into force 7 December 1978)
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by the
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
1966 (entered into force 23 March 1976 in accordance with
Article 49)
(b) United Nations Documents
Charters and Statutes
African (Banjul) African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peop1es’ Rights,
Charter on Human Adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,
and Peoples’ Rights 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986
Statute Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the
Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, United Nations and Sierra
Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138
ICC Statute Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002)
ICC Elements of International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N.
Crimes Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000)
General Assembly Resolutions
GA Res 2200A UN GA Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966

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Case No.: SCSL—03~01~T [ gi" 18 May 2012

4/0582.
Practice Directions
PDAWEW Practice Direction on Allowances for Witnesses and Expert I
Witnesses, issued on 16 July 2004 by Special Court for
Sierra Leone by the Registrar
Reports
ICC Preparatory Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
Committee Report an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, 14
April 1998
Update to Final Update to Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall,
Report of Special Special Rapporteur, Contemporary Forms of Slavery:
Rapporteur Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices
during armed conflict, Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21, 6 June 2000
Report of the Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Secretary-General on Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915, 4 October 2000
the Establishment of .
the Special Court
Update to Final Update to Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall,
Report of Special Special Rapporteur, Contemporary Forms of Slavery:
Rapporteur Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices
during armed conflict, Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21, 6 June 2000
[CC Elements ef the Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International
Crimes Criminal Court, Finalised Draft Text for the Elements of the
Crimes, New York, 13-31 March 2000/12-30 June 2000
(ICC Elements of the Crimes).
Rules
ICTR Rules International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of
Procedure and Evidence
ICTY Rules International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
SCSL Rules Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Procedure and
Evidence
Security Council Resolutions
SC Res 1315 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000)

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Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T % 67/A 18 May 2012

gra 58]
3. Secondary Sources
(a) Books
Lee, International Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court:
Criminal Court Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, New York: 200l)
ICRC, Customary J ean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-Beck. ICRC,
International Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I:
Humanitarian Law Rules, Cambridge, University Press (2005)

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Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T W 18 May 2012

42025 X ‘/"
XV. ANNEX D — MAPS OF SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA
[not included in this document]